Correct configuration

This is done with respect to comment by 128bitpotato - https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/windows-guide/250/81

.github/workflows/crowdin-download.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2022-2023 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
+
+# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
+# deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the
+# rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or
+# sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
+# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+# IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+# FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NON-INFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+# AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+# LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
+# FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS
+# IN THE SOFTWARE.
+
+name: 💬 Crowdin Download
+
+on:
+  workflow_dispatch:
+  release:
+    types: [ published ]
+
+permissions: write-all
+
+jobs:
+  synchronize-with-crowdin:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+
+    steps:
+
+    - name: Checkout
+      uses: actions/checkout@v3
+
+    - name: crowdin action
+      uses: crowdin/github-action@v1.7.1
+      with:
+        upload_sources: false
+        upload_translations: false
+        download_translations: true
+        localization_branch_name: crowdin/l10n_translations
+        create_pull_request: true
+        pull_request_title: 'New Crowdin Translations'
+        pull_request_body: 'New Crowdin translations by [Crowdin GitHub Action](https://github.com/crowdin/github-action)'
+        pull_request_base_branch_name: 'main'
+        config: crowdin.yml
+      env:
+        GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.REPO_TOKEN }}
+        CROWDIN_PROJECT_ID: ${{ secrets.CROWDIN_PROJECT_ID }}
+        CROWDIN_PERSONAL_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CROWDIN_PERSONAL_TOKEN }}

.github/workflows/pages.yml

@@ -71,6 +71,9 @@ jobs:
           CARDS: true
         run: |
           pipenv run mkdocs build --config-file config/mkdocs.en.yml
+          pipenv run mkdocs build --config-file config/mkdocs.fr.yml
+          pipenv run mkdocs build --config-file config/mkdocs.he.yml
+          pipenv run mkdocs build --config-file config/mkdocs.nl.yml
           pipenv run mkdocs --version
 
       - name: Package website

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ jobs:
       - name: Create ZIM File
         uses: addnab/docker-run-action@v3
         with:
-          image: ghcr.io/openzim/zim-tools:3.1.3
+          image: openzim/zim-tools:latest
           options: -v ${{ github.workspace }}:/data
           run: |
             zimwriterfs -w index.html -I assets/brand/PNG/Square/pg-yellow.png -l eng -t "Privacy Guides" -d "Your central privacy and security resource to protect yourself online." -c "Privacy Guides" -p "Jonah Aragon" -n "Privacy Guides" -e "https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org" /data/site /data/privacy_guides.zim

.gitignore

@@ -1,7 +1,2 @@
 site
 .cache
-/i18n/
-/includes/*
-!/includes/*.en.*
-/theme/overrides/*
-!/theme/overrides/*.en.*

Brewfile.netlify

@@ -1,2 +1 @@
 brew "pngquant"
-brew "crowdin"

Pipfile

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ mkdocs-material = {path = "./modules/mkdocs-material"}
 mkdocs-git-revision-date-localized-plugin = "~=1.2"
 mkdocs-git-committers-plugin-2 = "~=1.1"
 mkdocs-macros-plugin = "~=0.7"
-pillow = "~=9.5"
+pillow = "~=9.4"
 cairosvg = "~=2.7"
 
 [dev-packages]

Pipfile.lock

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
     "_meta": {
         "hash": {
-            "sha256": "e051706bdf466912ba699c0751d676c20b89501bf4e645f3b4cf81d0c0457be0"
+            "sha256": "277944f03f8186276babbd120f5236037510ab2a6a7c61b36ab1ac71c8f00156"
         },
         "pipfile-spec": 6,
         "requires": {
@@ -26,11 +26,11 @@
         },
         "beautifulsoup4": {
             "hashes": [
-                "sha256:492bbc69dca35d12daac71c4db1bfff0c876c00ef4a2ffacce226d4638eb72da",
-                "sha256:bd2520ca0d9d7d12694a53d44ac482d181b4ec1888909b035a3dbf40d0f57d4a"
+                "sha256:2130a5ad7f513200fae61a17abb5e338ca980fa28c439c0571014bc0217e9591",
+                "sha256:c5fceeaec29d09c84970e47c65f2f0efe57872f7cff494c9691a26ec0ff13234"
             ],
             "markers": "python_version >= '3.6'",
-            "version": "==4.12.2"
+            "version": "==4.12.0"
         },
         "cairocffi": {
             "hashes": [
@@ -278,11 +278,11 @@
         },
         "importlib-metadata": {
             "hashes": [
-                "sha256:23c2bcae4762dfb0bbe072d358faec24957901d75b6c4ab11172c0c982532402",
-                "sha256:8f8bd2af397cf33bd344d35cfe7f489219b7d14fc79a3f854b75b8417e9226b0"
+                "sha256:43ce9281e097583d758c2c708c4376371261a02c34682491a8e98352365aad20",
+                "sha256:ff80f3b5394912eb1b108fcfd444dc78b7f1f3e16b16188054bd01cb9cb86f09"
             ],
             "markers": "python_version < '3.10'",
-            "version": "==6.3.0"
+            "version": "==6.1.0"
         },
         "jinja2": {
             "hashes": [
@@ -465,11 +465,11 @@
         },
         "mkdocs-git-committers-plugin-2": {
             "hashes": [
-                "sha256:745993c4b486de0023ea4c2758daa7a8790a60ac6e369b55203db165d203be80",
-                "sha256:7ffa7c6eaae3ade9eaac625bd7dc155e8a543261c81a0354d12909b49eb48588"
+                "sha256:14d4a89bf8965ab62ca9b8b0cd90f6c9b421bb89bfedca0d91c5119f18791360",
+                "sha256:4f6eb6137f35967dfa444703b6ea293f05bf2fd183506bc51db8fb21b061d5a3"
             ],
             "index": "pypi",
-            "version": "==1.1.2"
+            "version": "==1.1.1"
         },
         "mkdocs-git-revision-date-localized-plugin": {
             "hashes": [
@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@
         },
         "mkdocs-material": {
             "path": "./modules/mkdocs-material",
-            "version": "==9.1.6+insiders.4.32.5"
+            "version": "==9.1.3+insiders.4.32.3"
         },
         "mkdocs-material-extensions": {
             "hashes": [
@@ -515,83 +515,94 @@
         },
         "pillow": {
             "hashes": [
-                "sha256:07999f5834bdc404c442146942a2ecadd1cb6292f5229f4ed3b31e0a108746b1",
-                "sha256:0852ddb76d85f127c135b6dd1f0bb88dbb9ee990d2cd9aa9e28526c93e794fba",
-                "sha256:1781a624c229cb35a2ac31cc4a77e28cafc8900733a864870c49bfeedacd106a",
-                "sha256:1e7723bd90ef94eda669a3c2c19d549874dd5badaeefabefd26053304abe5799",
-                "sha256:229e2c79c00e85989a34b5981a2b67aa079fd08c903f0aaead522a1d68d79e51",
-                "sha256:22baf0c3cf0c7f26e82d6e1adf118027afb325e703922c8dfc1d5d0156bb2eeb",
-                "sha256:252a03f1bdddce077eff2354c3861bf437c892fb1832f75ce813ee94347aa9b5",
-                "sha256:2dfaaf10b6172697b9bceb9a3bd7b951819d1ca339a5ef294d1f1ac6d7f63270",
-                "sha256:322724c0032af6692456cd6ed554bb85f8149214d97398bb80613b04e33769f6",
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+                "sha256:9c94f7cc91ab16b36ba5ce476f1904c91d6c92441f01cd61a8e2729442d6fcf5",
+                "sha256:a37d51fa9a00d265cf73f3de3930fa9c41548177ba4f0faf76e61d512c774690",
+                "sha256:a3a98921da9a1bf8457aeee6a551948a83601689e5ecdd736894ea9bbec77e83",
+                "sha256:a3c1ebd4ed8e76e886507c9eddb1a891673686c813adf889b864a17fafcf6d66",
+                "sha256:a5f9505efd574d1e5b4a76ac9dd92a12acb2b309551e9aa874c13c11caefbe4f",
+                "sha256:a8ff454ef0bb061e37df03557afda9d785c905dab15584860f982e88be73015f",
+                "sha256:a9d0b68ac1743964755ae2d89772c7e6fb0118acd4d0b7464eaf3921c6b49dd4",
+                "sha256:aa62a07ac93b7cb6b7d0389d8ef57ffc321d78f60c037b19dfa78d6b17c928ee",
+                "sha256:ac741bf78b9bb432e2d314439275235f41656e189856b11fb4e774d9f7246d81",
+                "sha256:ae1e96785696b543394a4e3f15f3f225d44f3c55dafe3f206493031419fedf95",
+                "sha256:b683e5fd7f74fb66e89a1ed16076dbab3f8e9f34c18b1979ded614fe10cdc4d9",
+                "sha256:b7a8b43ee64ca8f4befa2bea4083f7c52c92864d8518244bfa6e88c751fa8fff",
+                "sha256:b8e38472739028e5f2c3a4aded0ab7eadc447f0d84f310c7a8bb697ec417229e",
+                "sha256:bfff48c7bd23c6e2aec6454aaf6edc44444b229e94743b34bdcdda2e35126cf5",
+                "sha256:c14b63c9d7bab795d17392c7c1f9aaabbffd4cf4387725a0ac69109fb3b550c6",
+                "sha256:c27cc1e4b197092e50ddbf0118c788d9977f3f8f35bfbbd3e76c1846a3443df7",
+                "sha256:c28d3309ebd6d6b2cf82969b5179bed5fefe6142c70f354ece94324fa11bf6a1",
+                "sha256:c670f4773f2f6f1957ff8a3962c7dd12e4be54d05839b216cb7fd70b5a1df394",
+                "sha256:ce6910b56b700bea7be82c54ddf2e0ed792a577dfaa4a76b9af07d550af435c6",
+                "sha256:d0213671691e341f6849bf33cd9fad21f7b1cb88b89e024f33370733fec58742",
+                "sha256:d03fe67b2325cb3f09be029fd5da8df9e6974f0cde2c2ac6a79d2634e791dd57",
+                "sha256:d0e5af9a9effb88535a472e19169e09ce750c3d442fb222254a276d77808620b",
+                "sha256:d243b36fbf3d73c25e48014961e83c19c9cc92530516ce3c43050ea6276a2ab7",
+                "sha256:d26166acf62f731f50bdd885b04b38828436d74e8e362bfcb8df221d868b5d9b",
+                "sha256:d403d781b0e06d2922435ce3b8d2376579f0c217ae491e273bab8d092727d244",
+                "sha256:d8716f82502997b3d0895d1c64c3b834181b1eaca28f3f6336a71777e437c2af",
+                "sha256:e4f781ffedd17b0b834c8731b75cce2639d5a8afe961c1e58ee7f1f20b3af185",
+                "sha256:e613a98ead2005c4ce037c7b061f2409a1a4e45099edb0ef3200ee26ed2a69a8",
+                "sha256:ef4163770525257876f10e8ece1cf25b71468316f61451ded1a6f44273eedeb5"
             ],
-            "markers": "python_version >= '3.8'",
-            "version": "==2023.3.23"
+            "markers": "python_version >= '3.6'",
+            "version": "==2022.10.31"
         },
         "requests": {
             "hashes": [

README.md

@@ -48,11 +48,10 @@ The current list of team members can be found [here](https://www.privacyguides.o
 
 - 💬 [Start a discussion or suggest an idea](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/)
 - 💖 [Sponsor the project](https://github.com/sponsors/privacyguides)
-- 🈴 [Help translate the site](https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides) [[Matrix chat](https://matrix.to/#/#pg-i18n:aragon.sh)]
+- 🈴 [Help translate the site](https://crwd.in/privacyguides) [[Matrix chat](https://matrix.to/#/#pg-i18n:aragon.sh)]
 - 📝 Edit the site, everything's accessible in this repo
   - Browse our [open issues](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues) to see what needs to be updated
-  - View the list of [approved topics waiting for a PR](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/tag/approved)
-  - Read some writing tips in our [style guide](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/meta/writing-style/)
+  - View some contribution tips on our [contributor's wiki](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/wiki)
 
 All contributors to the site are listed [here](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors). If you make a substantial (i.e. copyright eligible) contribution to the project and would like to be formally credited, you are welcome to include your information in the appropriate `authors` section in [`CITATION.cff`](/CITATION.cff) as well, just submit a PR or ask @jonaharagon to make the change.
 
@@ -90,7 +89,7 @@ This website uses [`mkdocs-material-insiders`](https://squidfunk.github.io/mkdoc
 
 1. Clone this repository and submodules: `git clone --recurse-submodules https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org.git`
 2. Enable SSH commit verification with our local [`.allowed_signers`](/.allowed_signers) file: `git config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile .allowed_signers`
-3. Install Python **3.8**, this is the only version supported by Netlify
+3. Install Python **3.8**, this is the only version supported by Netlify.
 4. Install **pipenv**: `pip install pipenv`
 5. Install dependencies: `pipenv install --dev` (install [Pillow and CairoSVG](https://squidfunk.github.io/mkdocs-material/setup/setting-up-social-cards/#dependencies) as well to generate social cards)
 6. Serve the site locally: `pipenv run mkdocs serve --config-file config/mkdocs.en.yml` (set `CARDS=true` to generate social cards)
@@ -100,15 +99,6 @@ This website uses [`mkdocs-material-insiders`](https://squidfunk.github.io/mkdoc
 
 If you commit to `main` with commits signed with your SSH key, you should add your SSH key to [`.allowed_signers`](/.allowed_signers) in this repo.
 
-### Local Translated Site Builds
-
-1. Install the [Crowdin CLI Tool](https://developer.crowdin.com/cli-tool/) (`brew install crowdin`)
-2. Set the `CROWDIN_PERSONAL_TOKEN` environment variable to your Crowdin personal access token
-3. Run `crowdin download` in the root of this repo
-4. Serve the site locally: `pipenv run mkdocs serve --config-file config/mkdocs.fr.yml` (replacing the config file with any language in [/config](/config))
-
-Translations downloaded from Crowdin are [.gitignore](/.gitignore)'d, so any local changes to the translated site cannot be committed to this repo. Actual modifications need to be made on Crowdin. As an alternative to steps 1-3, you can copy the folders from [privacyguides/i18n](https://github.com/privacyguides/i18n) to the root of this repo to obtain the translated files.
-
 ## Releasing
 
 1. Create a new tag: `git tag -s v3.X.X -m 'Some message'`

_redirects

@@ -18,8 +18,9 @@
 # FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS
 # IN THE SOFTWARE.
 
+# Auto detect text files and perform LF normalization
+
 /  /en/  302  Language=en
-/  /es/  302  Language=es
 /  /fr/  302  Language=fr
 /  /he/  302  Language=he
 /  /nl/  302  Language=nl

config/mkdocs.common.yml

@@ -38,10 +38,6 @@ extra:
       link: /en/
       lang: en
       icon: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/twitter/twemoji/master/assets/svg/1f1fa-1f1f8.svg
-    - name: Español
-      link: /es/
-      lang: es
-      icon: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/twitter/twemoji/master/assets/svg/1f1ea-1f1f8.svg
     - name: Français
       link: /fr/
       lang: fr

config/mkdocs.en.yml

@@ -109,6 +109,11 @@ nav:
       - 'os/android-overview.md'
       - 'os/linux-overview.md'
       - 'os/qubes-overview.md'
+      - Windows Overview:
+        - 'os/windows/index.md'
+        - 'os/windows/hardening.md'
+        - 'os/windows/privacy.md'
+        - 'os/windows/sandboxing.md'
     - Advanced Topics:
       - 'advanced/dns-overview.md'
       - 'advanced/tor-overview.md'

config/mkdocs.es.yml

@@ -1,170 +0,0 @@
-# Copyright (c) 2022-2023 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
-
-# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
-# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
-# deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the
-# rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or
-# sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
-# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
-
-# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
-# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
-
-# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
-# IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
-# FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NON-INFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
-# AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
-# LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
-# FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS
-# IN THE SOFTWARE.
-
-INHERIT: mkdocs.common.yml
-docs_dir: '../i18n/es'
-site_url: "https://www.privacyguides.org/es/"
-site_dir: '../site/es'
-
-site_name: Privacy Guides
-site_description: |
-  Privacy Guides es tu recurso central de privacidad y seguridad para protegerte en línea.
-copyright: |
-  <b>Privacy Guides</b> es un sitio web sin fines lucrativos y de motivación social que ofrece información para proteger la seguridad y privacidad de sus datos.<br>
-  No ganamos dinero por recomendar determinados productos y no utilizamos enlaces de afiliados.<br>
-  &copy; 2019 - 2023 Privacy Guides y colaboradores.
-  <span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="m245.83 214.87-33.22 17.28c-9.43-19.58-25.24-19.93-27.46-19.93-22.13 0-33.22 14.61-33.22 43.84 0 23.57 9.21 43.84 33.22 43.84 14.47 0 24.65-7.09 30.57-21.26l30.55 15.5c-6.17 11.51-25.69 38.98-65.1 38.98-22.6 0-73.96-10.32-73.96-77.05 0-58.69 43-77.06 72.63-77.06 30.72-.01 52.7 11.95 65.99 35.86zm143.05 0-32.78 17.28c-9.5-19.77-25.72-19.93-27.9-19.93-22.14 0-33.22 14.61-33.22 43.84 0 23.55 9.23 43.84 33.22 43.84 14.45 0 24.65-7.09 30.54-21.26l31 15.5c-2.1 3.75-21.39 38.98-65.09 38.98-22.69 0-73.96-9.87-73.96-77.05 0-58.67 42.97-77.06 72.63-77.06 30.71-.01 52.58 11.95 65.56 35.86zM247.56 8.05C104.74 8.05 0 123.11 0 256.05c0 138.49 113.6 248 247.56 248 129.93 0 248.44-100.87 248.44-248 0-137.87-106.62-248-248.44-248zm.87 450.81c-112.54 0-203.7-93.04-203.7-202.81 0-105.42 85.43-203.27 203.72-203.27 112.53 0 202.82 89.46 202.82 203.26-.01 121.69-99.68 202.82-202.84 202.82z"></path></svg></span><span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="M314.9 194.4v101.4h-28.3v120.5h-77.1V295.9h-28.3V194.4c0-4.4 1.6-8.2 4.6-11.3 3.1-3.1 6.9-4.7 11.3-4.7H299c4.1 0 7.8 1.6 11.1 4.7 3.1 3.2 4.8 6.9 4.8 11.3zm-101.5-63.7c0-23.3 11.5-35 34.5-35s34.5 11.7 34.5 35c0 23-11.5 34.5-34.5 34.5s-34.5-11.5-34.5-34.5zM247.6 8C389.4 8 496 118.1 496 256c0 147.1-118.5 248-248.4 248C113.6 504 0 394.5 0 256 0 123.1 104.7 8 247.6 8zm.8 44.7C130.2 52.7 44.7 150.6 44.7 256c0 109.8 91.2 202.8 203.7 202.8 103.2 0 202.8-81.1 202.8-202.8.1-113.8-90.2-203.3-202.8-203.3z"></path></svg></span><span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="M247.6 8C389.4 8 496 118.1 496 256c0 147.1-118.5 248-248.4 248C113.6 504 0 394.5 0 256 0 123.1 104.7 8 247.6 8zm.8 44.7C130.2 52.7 44.7 150.6 44.7 256c0 109.8 91.2 202.8 203.7 202.8 103.2 0 202.8-81.1 202.8-202.8.1-113.8-90.2-203.3-202.8-203.3zm94 144.3v42.5H162.1V197h180.3zm0 79.8v42.5H162.1v-42.5h180.3z"></path></svg></span>
-  Contenido bajo licencia <a href="/license"><strong>CC BY-ND 4.0</strong></a>.
-edit_uri: edit/main/docs/
-
-extra:
-  generator: false
-  analytics:
-    provider: plausible
-    property: privacyguides.org
-    feedback:
-      title: "¿Le ha resultado útil esta página?"
-      ratings:
-        - icon: material/robot-happy-outline
-          name: "Esta página fue útil"
-          data: Helpful
-          note: "Gracias por sus comentarios!"
-        - icon: material/robot-confused
-          name: "Esta página se podría mejorar"
-          data: Needs Improvement
-          note: "Gracias por sus comentarios. Ayúdenos a mejorar esta página abriendo un <a href='https://discuss.privacyguides.net/'>debate en nuestro foro</a>."
-
-theme:
-  language: es
-  logo: ../../theme/assets/brand/SVG/Logo/privacy-guides-logo-notext-colorbg.svg
-  font:
-    text: Public Sans
-    code: DM Mono
-  palette:
-    - media: "(prefers-color-scheme)"
-      scheme: default
-      accent: deep purple
-      toggle:
-        icon: material/brightness-auto
-        name: "Cambiar a modo oscuro"
-    - media: "(prefers-color-scheme: dark)"
-      scheme: slate
-      accent: amber
-      toggle:
-        icon: material/brightness-2
-        name: "Cambiar a modo claro"
-    - media: "(prefers-color-scheme: light)"
-      scheme: default
-      accent: deep purple
-      toggle:
-        icon: material/brightness-5
-        name: "Cambiar al tema del sistema"
-
-plugins:
-  social:
-    cards: !ENV [NETLIFY, false]
-    cards_color:
-      fill: "#FFD06F"
-      text: "#2d2d2d"
-    cards_dir: assets/img/social
-    cards_font: Public Sans
-    cache_dir: .cache/plugin/social-es
-
-markdown_extensions:
-  pymdownx.snippets:
-    auto_append: 
-      - includes/abbreviations.es.txt
-
-nav:
-  - Inicio: 'index.md'
-  - Base de conocimientos:
-    - 'basics/threat-modeling.md'
-    - 'basics/common-threats.md'
-    - 'basics/common-misconceptions.md'
-    - 'basics/account-creation.md'
-    - 'basics/account-deletion.md'
-    - "Aspectos tecnológicos esenciales":
-      - 'basics/passwords-overview.md'
-      - 'basics/multi-factor-authentication.md'
-      - 'basics/email-security.md'
-      - 'basics/vpn-overview.md'
-    - Sistemas operativos:
-      - 'os/android-overview.md'
-      - 'os/linux-overview.md'
-      - 'os/qubes-overview.md'
-    - Temas avanzados:
-      - 'advanced/dns-overview.md'
-      - 'advanced/tor-overview.md'
-      - 'advanced/payments.md'
-      - 'advanced/communication-network-types.md'
-    - kb-archive.md
-  - Recomendaciones:
-    - 'tools.md'
-    - "Navegación por Internet":
-      - 'tor.md'
-      - 'desktop-browsers.md'
-      - 'mobile-browsers.md'
-    - Sistemas operativos:
-      - 'android.md'
-      - 'desktop.md'
-      - 'router.md'
-    - Proveedores:
-      - 'cloud.md'
-      - 'dns.md'
-      - 'email.md'
-      - 'financial-services.md'
-      - 'search-engines.md'
-      - 'vpn.md'
-    - Software:
-      - 'calendar.md'
-      - 'cryptocurrency.md'
-      - 'data-redaction.md'
-      - 'email-clients.md'
-      - 'encryption.md'
-      - 'file-sharing.md'
-      - 'frontends.md'
-      - 'multi-factor-authentication.md'
-      - 'news-aggregators.md'
-      - 'notebooks.md'
-      - 'passwords.md'
-      - 'productivity.md'
-      - 'real-time-communication.md'
-      - 'video-streaming.md'
-  - Acerca de:
-    - 'about/index.md'
-    - 'about/criteria.md'
-    - 'about/statistics.md'
-    - 'about/notices.md'
-    - 'about/privacy-policy.md'
-    - Comunidad:
-      - 'about/donate.md'
-      - Servicios en línea: 'about/services.md'
-      - "Código de conducta": 'CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md'
-      - 'about/privacytools.md'
-    - Contribuir:
-      - "Guía de redacción":
-        - 'meta/writing-style.md'
-        - 'meta/brand.md'
-      - "Guías técnicas":
-        - 'meta/uploading-images.md'
-        - 'meta/git-recommendations.md'
-  - "Registro de cambios": 'https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/releases'
-  - Foro: 'https://discuss.privacyguides.net/'
-  - Blog: 'https://blog.privacyguides.org/'

config/mkdocs.fr.yml

@@ -27,11 +27,11 @@ site_name: Privacy Guides
 site_description: |
   Privacy Guides est votre ressource centrale en matière de vie privée et de sécurité pour vous protéger en ligne.
 copyright: |
-  <b>Privacy Guides</b> est un site web à but non lucratif et à vocation sociale qui fournit des informations pour protéger la sécurité de vos données et votre vie privée.<br>
-  Nous ne gagnons pas d'argent en recommandant certains produits et nous n'utilisons pas de liens d'affiliation.<br>
-  &copy; 2019 - 2023 Privacy Guides et contributeurs.
+  <b>Privacy Guides</b> is a non-profit, socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy.<br>
+  We do not make money from recommending certain products, and we do not use affiliate links.<br>
+  &copy; 2019 - 2023 Privacy Guides and contributors. 
   <span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="m245.83 214.87-33.22 17.28c-9.43-19.58-25.24-19.93-27.46-19.93-22.13 0-33.22 14.61-33.22 43.84 0 23.57 9.21 43.84 33.22 43.84 14.47 0 24.65-7.09 30.57-21.26l30.55 15.5c-6.17 11.51-25.69 38.98-65.1 38.98-22.6 0-73.96-10.32-73.96-77.05 0-58.69 43-77.06 72.63-77.06 30.72-.01 52.7 11.95 65.99 35.86zm143.05 0-32.78 17.28c-9.5-19.77-25.72-19.93-27.9-19.93-22.14 0-33.22 14.61-33.22 43.84 0 23.55 9.23 43.84 33.22 43.84 14.45 0 24.65-7.09 30.54-21.26l31 15.5c-2.1 3.75-21.39 38.98-65.09 38.98-22.69 0-73.96-9.87-73.96-77.05 0-58.67 42.97-77.06 72.63-77.06 30.71-.01 52.58 11.95 65.56 35.86zM247.56 8.05C104.74 8.05 0 123.11 0 256.05c0 138.49 113.6 248 247.56 248 129.93 0 248.44-100.87 248.44-248 0-137.87-106.62-248-248.44-248zm.87 450.81c-112.54 0-203.7-93.04-203.7-202.81 0-105.42 85.43-203.27 203.72-203.27 112.53 0 202.82 89.46 202.82 203.26-.01 121.69-99.68 202.82-202.84 202.82z"></path></svg></span><span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="M314.9 194.4v101.4h-28.3v120.5h-77.1V295.9h-28.3V194.4c0-4.4 1.6-8.2 4.6-11.3 3.1-3.1 6.9-4.7 11.3-4.7H299c4.1 0 7.8 1.6 11.1 4.7 3.1 3.2 4.8 6.9 4.8 11.3zm-101.5-63.7c0-23.3 11.5-35 34.5-35s34.5 11.7 34.5 35c0 23-11.5 34.5-34.5 34.5s-34.5-11.5-34.5-34.5zM247.6 8C389.4 8 496 118.1 496 256c0 147.1-118.5 248-248.4 248C113.6 504 0 394.5 0 256 0 123.1 104.7 8 247.6 8zm.8 44.7C130.2 52.7 44.7 150.6 44.7 256c0 109.8 91.2 202.8 203.7 202.8 103.2 0 202.8-81.1 202.8-202.8.1-113.8-90.2-203.3-202.8-203.3z"></path></svg></span><span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="M247.6 8C389.4 8 496 118.1 496 256c0 147.1-118.5 248-248.4 248C113.6 504 0 394.5 0 256 0 123.1 104.7 8 247.6 8zm.8 44.7C130.2 52.7 44.7 150.6 44.7 256c0 109.8 91.2 202.8 203.7 202.8 103.2 0 202.8-81.1 202.8-202.8.1-113.8-90.2-203.3-202.8-203.3zm94 144.3v42.5H162.1V197h180.3zm0 79.8v42.5H162.1v-42.5h180.3z"></path></svg></span> 
-  Contenu sous licence <a href="/license"><strong>CC BY-ND 4.0</strong></a>.
+  Content licensed under <a href="/license"><strong>CC BY-ND 4.0</strong></a>.
 edit_uri: edit/main/i18n/fr/
 
 extra:
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ extra:
         - icon: material/robot-confused
           name: "Cette page pourrait être améliorée"
           data: Needs Improvement
-          note: "Merci pour vos commentaires ! Aidez-nous à améliorer cette page en ouvrant une <a href='https://discuss.privacyguides.net/'>discussion sur notre forum</a>."
+          note: "Thanks for your feedback! Help us improve this page by opening a <a href='https://discuss.privacyguides.net/'>discussion on our forum</a>."
 
 theme:
   language: fr
@@ -109,6 +109,11 @@ nav:
       - 'os/android-overview.md'
       - 'os/linux-overview.md'
       - 'os/qubes-overview.md'
+      - Windows Overview:
+        - 'os/windows/index.md'
+        - 'os/windows/hardening.md'
+        - 'os/windows/privacy.md'
+        - 'os/windows/sandboxing.md'
     - "Sujets avancés":
       - 'advanced/dns-overview.md'
       - 'advanced/tor-overview.md'
@@ -153,16 +158,16 @@ nav:
     - 'about/statistics.md'
     - 'about/notices.md'
     - 'about/privacy-policy.md'
-    - "Communauté":
+    - Community:
       - 'about/donate.md'
-      - "Services en ligne": 'about/services.md'
-      - "Code de conduite": 'CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md'
+      - Online Services: 'about/services.md'
+      - Code of Conduct: 'CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md'
       - 'about/privacytools.md'
-    - "Contribuer":
-      - "Guide de rédaction":
+    - Contributing:
+      - Writing Guide:
         - 'meta/writing-style.md'
         - 'meta/brand.md'
-      - "Guides techniques":
+      - Technical Guides:
         - 'meta/uploading-images.md'
         - 'meta/git-recommendations.md'
   - Journal des modifications: 'https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/releases'

config/mkdocs.he.yml

@@ -113,6 +113,11 @@ nav:
       - 'os/android-overview.md'
       - 'os/linux-overview.md'
       - 'os/qubes-overview.md'
+      - Windows Overview:
+        - 'os/windows/index.md'
+        - 'os/windows/hardening.md'
+        - 'os/windows/privacy.md'
+        - 'os/windows/sandboxing.md'
     - "נושאים מתקדמים":
       - 'advanced/dns-overview.md'
       - 'advanced/tor-overview.md'

config/mkdocs.nl.yml

@@ -109,6 +109,11 @@ nav:
       - 'os/android-overview.md'
       - 'os/linux-overview.md'
       - 'os/qubes-overview.md'
+      - Windows Overview:
+        - 'os/windows/index.md'
+        - 'os/windows/hardening.md'
+        - 'os/windows/privacy.md'
+        - 'os/windows/sandboxing.md'
     - Gevorderde onderwerpen:
       - 'advanced/dns-overview.md'
       - 'advanced/tor-overview.md'
@@ -153,18 +158,18 @@ nav:
     - 'about/statistics.md'
     - 'about/notices.md'
     - 'about/privacy-policy.md'
-    - Gemeenschap:
+    - Community:
       - 'about/donate.md'
-      - Online diensten: 'about/services.md'
-      - Gedragscode: 'CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md'
+      - Online Services: 'about/services.md'
+      - Code of Conduct: 'CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md'
       - 'about/privacytools.md'
-    - Bijdragen:
-      - Schrijfgids:
+    - Contributing:
+      - Writing Guide:
         - 'meta/writing-style.md'
         - 'meta/brand.md'
-      - Technische gids:
+      - Technical Guides:
         - 'meta/uploading-images.md'
         - 'meta/git-recommendations.md'
-  - Wijzigingslogboek: 'https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/releases'
+  - Changelog: 'https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/releases'
   - Forum: 'https://discuss.privacyguides.net/'
   - Blog: 'https://blog.privacyguides.org/'

config/mkdocs.offline.yml

@@ -98,6 +98,11 @@ nav:
       - 'os/android-overview.md'
       - 'os/linux-overview.md'
       - 'os/qubes-overview.md'
+      - Windows Overview:
+        - 'os/windows/index.md'
+        - 'os/windows/hardening.md'
+        - 'os/windows/privacy.md'
+        - 'os/windows/sandboxing.md'
     - Advanced Topics:
       - 'advanced/dns-overview.md'
       - 'advanced/tor-overview.md'

docs/about/criteria.md

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ We have these requirements in regard to developers which wish to submit their pr
 
 - Must disclose affiliation, i.e. your position within the project being submitted.
 
-- Must have a security whitepaper if it is a project that involves handling of sensitive information like a messenger, password manager, encrypted cloud storage, etc.
+- Must have a security whitepaper if it is a project that involves handling of sensitive information like a messenger, password manager, encrypted cloud storage etc.
     - Third party audit status. We want to know if you have one, or have one planned. If possible please mention who will be conducting the audit.
 
 - Must explain what the project brings to the table in regard to privacy.

docs/about/donate.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ It takes a lot of [people](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/gr
 
 If you want to support us financially, the most convenient method for us is contributing via Open Collective, a website operated by our fiscal host. Open Collective accepts payments via credit/debit card, PayPal, and bank transfers.
 
-[Donate on OpenCollective.com](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/donate){ class="md-button md-button--primary" }
+[Donate on OpenCollective.com](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/donate){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 
 Donations made directly to us on Open Collective are generally tax-deductible in the US, because our fiscal host (the Open Collective Foundation) is a registered 501(c)3 organization. You will receive a receipt from the Open Collective Foundation after donating. Privacy Guides does not provide financial advice, and you should contact your tax advisor to find out whether this is applicable to you.
 

docs/about/index.md

@@ -1,20 +1,7 @@
 ---
+template: schema.html
 title: "About Privacy Guides"
 description: Privacy Guides is a socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy.
-schema:
-  "@context": https://schema.org
-  "@type": Organization
-  "@id": https://www.privacyguides.org/
-  name: Privacy Guides
-  url: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/about/
-  logo: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/assets/brand/png/square/pg-yellow.png
-  sameAs:
-    - https://twitter.com/privacy_guides
-    - https://github.com/privacyguides
-    - https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q111710163
-    - https://opencollective.com/privacyguides
-    - https://www.youtube.com/@privacyguides
-    - https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides
 ---
 ![Privacy Guides logo](../assets/brand/png/square/pg-yellow.png){ align=right }
 

docs/about/services.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 We run a number of web services to test out features and promote cool decentralized, federated, and/or open-source projects. Many of these services are available to the public and are detailed below.
 
-[:material-comment-alert: Report an issue](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/services/2){ class="md-button md-button--primary" }
+[:material-comment-alert: Report an issue](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/services/2){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 
 ## Discourse
 

docs/advanced/dns-overview.md

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Below, we discuss and provide a tutorial to prove what an outside observer may s
     tshark -w /tmp/dns.pcap udp port 53 and host 1.1.1.1 or host 8.8.8.8
     ```
 
-2. We can then use [`dig`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dig_(command)) (Linux, MacOS, etc.) or [`nslookup`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nslookup) (Windows) to send the DNS lookup to both servers. Software such as web browsers do these lookups automatically, unless they are configured to use encrypted DNS.
+2. We can then use [`dig`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dig_(command)) (Linux, MacOS etc) or [`nslookup`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nslookup) (Windows) to send the DNS lookup to both servers. Software such as web browsers do these lookups automatically, unless they are configured to use encrypted DNS.
 
     === "Linux, macOS"
 
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ When we do a DNS lookup, it's generally because we want to access a resource. Be
 
 The simplest way to determine browsing activity might be to look at the IP addresses your devices are accessing. For example, if the observer knows that `privacyguides.org` is at `198.98.54.105`, and your device is requesting data from `198.98.54.105`, there is a good chance you're visiting Privacy Guides.
 
-This method is only useful when the IP address belongs to a server that only hosts few websites. It's also not very useful if the site is hosted on a shared platform (e.g. Github Pages, Cloudflare Pages, Netlify, WordPress, Blogger, etc.). It also isn't very useful if the server is hosted behind a [reverse proxy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_proxy), which is very common on the modern Internet.
+This method is only useful when the IP address belongs to a server that only hosts few websites. It's also not very useful if the site is hosted on a shared platform (e.g. Github Pages, Cloudflare Pages, Netlify, WordPress, Blogger, etc). It also isn't very useful if the server is hosted behind a [reverse proxy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_proxy), which is very common on the modern Internet.
 
 ### Server Name Indication (SNI)
 

docs/android.md

@@ -2,79 +2,6 @@
 title: "Android"
 icon: 'simple/android'
 description: You can replace the operating system on your Android phone with these secure and privacy-respecting alternatives.
-schema:
-  - 
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": WebPage
-    name: Private Android Operating Systems
-    url: "./"
-  - 
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": CreativeWork
-    name: Android
-    image: /assets/img/android/android.svg
-    url: https://source.android.com/
-    sameAs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)
-  - 
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": CreativeWork
-    name: GrapheneOS
-    image: /assets/img/android/grapheneos.svg
-    url: https://grapheneos.org/
-    sameAs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GrapheneOS
-    subjectOf:
-      "@context": http://schema.org
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
-  - 
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": CreativeWork
-    name: Divest
-    image: /assets/img/android/divestos.svg
-    url: https://divestos.org/
-    sameAs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DivestOS
-    subjectOf:
-      "@context": http://schema.org
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
-  - 
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": Product
-    name: Pixel
-    brand:
-      "@type": Brand
-      name: Google
-    image: /assets/img/android/google-pixel.png
-    sameAs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Pixel
-    review:
-      "@type": Review
-      author:
-        "@type": Organization
-        name: Privacy Guides
-  - 
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": MobileApplication
-    name: Shelter
-    applicationCategory: Utilities
-    operatingSystem: Android
-  - 
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": MobileApplication
-    name: Auditor
-    applicationCategory: Utilities
-    operatingSystem: Android
-  - 
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": MobileApplication
-    name: Secure Camera
-    applicationCategory: Utilities
-    operatingSystem: Android
-  - 
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": MobileApplication
-    name: Secure PDF Viewer
-    applicationCategory: Utilities
-    operatingSystem: Android
 ---
 
 ![Android logo](assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right }

docs/basics/common-misconceptions.md

@@ -2,40 +2,6 @@
 title: "Common Misconceptions"
 icon: 'material/robot-confused'
 description: Privacy isn't a straightforward topic, and it's easy to get caught up in marketing claims and other disinformation.
-schema:
-  - 
-    "@context": https://schema.org
-    "@type": FAQPage
-    mainEntity:
-    - 
-      "@type": Question
-      name: Is open source software inherently secure?
-      acceptedAnswer:
-          "@type": Answer
-          text: |
-            Whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. Open-source software has the potential to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case. When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis.
-    - 
-      "@type": Question
-      name: Can shifting trust to another provider increase privacy?
-      acceptedAnswer:
-          "@type": Answer
-          text: |
-            We talk about "shifting trust" a lot when discussing solutions like VPNs (which shift the trust you place in your ISP to the VPN provider). While this protects your browsing data from your ISP specifically, the VPN provider you choose still has access to your browsing data: Your data isn't completely secured from all parties.
-    - 
-      "@type": Question
-      name: Are privacy-focused solutions inherently trustworthy?
-      acceptedAnswer:
-          "@type": Answer
-          text: |
-            Focusing solely on the privacy policies and marketing of a tool or provider can blind you to its weaknesses. When you're looking for a more private solution, you should determine what the underlying problem is and find technical solutions to that problem. For example, you may want to avoid Google Drive, which gives Google access to all of your data. The underlying problem in this case is lack of E2EE, so you should make sure that the provider you switch to actually implements E2EE, or use a tool (like Cryptomator) which provides E2EE on any cloud provider. Switching to a "privacy-focused" provider (that doesn't implement E2EE) doesn't solve your problem: it just shifts trust from Google to that provider.
-    - 
-      "@type": Question
-      name: How complicated should my threat model be?
-      acceptedAnswer:
-          "@type": Answer
-          text: |
-            We often see people describing privacy threat models that are overly complex. Often, these solutions include problems like many different email accounts or complicated setups with lots of moving parts and conditions. The replies are usually answers to "What is the best way to do X?"
-            Finding the "best" solution for yourself doesn't necessarily mean you are after an infallible solution with dozens of conditions—these solutions are often difficult to work with realistically. As we discussed previously, security often comes at the cost of convenience.
 ---
 
 ## "Open-source software is always secure" or "Proprietary software is more secure"

docs/basics/email-security.md

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and S
 
 ### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
 
-A smartcard (such as a [Yubikey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
+A smartcard (such as a [Yubikey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
 
 It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard so as to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.
 

docs/basics/vpn-overview.md

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ VPNs cannot provide anonymity. Your VPN provider will still see your real IP add
 
 ## What about VPN providers that provide Tor nodes?
 
-Do not use that feature. The point of using Tor is that you do not trust your VPN provider. Currently Tor only supports the [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol) protocol. [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol) (used in [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC) for voice and video sharing, the new [HTTP3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) protocol, etc.), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol) and other packets will be dropped. To compensate for this, VPN providers typically will route all non-TCP packets through their VPN server (your first hop). This is the case with [ProtonVPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn/). Additionally, when using this Tor over VPN setup, you do not have control over other important Tor features such as [Isolated Destination Address](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (using a different Tor circuit for every domain you visit).
+Do not use that feature. The point of using Tor is that you do not trust your VPN provider. Currently Tor only supports the [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol) protocol. [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol) (used in [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC) for voice and video sharing, the new [HTTP3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) protocol, etc), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol) and other packets will be dropped. To compensate for this, VPN providers typically will route all non-TCP packets through their VPN server (your first hop). This is the case with [ProtonVPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn/). Additionally, when using this Tor over VPN setup, you do not have control over other important Tor features such as [Isolated Destination Address](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (using a different Tor circuit for every domain you visit).
 
 The feature should be viewed as a convenient way to access the Tor Network, not to stay anonymous. For proper anonymity, use the Tor Browser, TorSocks, or a Tor gateway.
 

docs/cloud.md

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ If these alternatives do not fit your needs, we suggest you look into using encr
 
     **Proton Drive** is a Swiss encrypted cloud storage provider from the popular encrypted email provider [Proton Mail](email.md#proton-mail).
 
-    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/drive){ class="md-button md-button--primary" }
+    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/drive){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
     [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
     [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/drive){ .card-link title=Documentation}
     [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Proton Drive's brand new mobile clients have not yet been publicly audited by a
 
     **Tresorit** is a Hungarian encrypted cloud storage provider founded in 2011. Tresorit is owned by the Swiss Post, the national postal service of Switzerland.
 
-    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tresorit.com/){ class="md-button md-button--primary" }
+    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tresorit.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
     [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tresorit.com/legal/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
     [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.tresorit.com/hc/en-us){ .card-link title=Documentation}
 

docs/desktop-browsers.md

@@ -1,103 +1,9 @@
 ---
 title: "Desktop Browsers"
 icon: material/laptop
-description: These web browsers provide stronger privacy protections than Google Chrome.
-schema:
-  - 
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": WebPage
-    name: Private Desktop Browser Recommendations
-    url: "./"
-    relatedLink: "../mobile-browsers/"
-  - 
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": SoftwareApplication
-    name: Mullvad Browser
-    image: /assets/img/browsers/mullvad_browser.svg
-    url: https://mullvad.net/en/browser
-    applicationCategory: Web Browser
-    operatingSystem:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-    subjectOf:
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
-  - 
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": SoftwareApplication
-    name: Firefox
-    image: /assets/img/browsers/firefox.svg
-    url: https://firefox.com
-    sameAs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firefox
-    applicationCategory: Web Browser
-    operatingSystem:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-    subjectOf:
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
-  - 
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": SoftwareApplication
-    name: Brave
-    image: /assets/img/browsers/brave.svg
-    url: https://brave.com
-    sameAs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brave_(web_browser)
-    applicationCategory: Web Browser
-    operatingSystem:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-    subjectOf:
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
+description: Firefox and Brave are our recommendations for standard/non-anonymous browsing.
 ---
-These are our currently recommended desktop web browsers and configurations for standard/non-anonymous browsing. We recommend [Mullvad Browser](#mullvad-browser) if you are focused on strong privacy protections and anti-fingerprinting out of the box, [Firefox](#firefox) for casual internet browsers looking for a good alternative to Google Chrome, and [Brave](#brave) if you need Chromium browser compatibility.
-
-If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) instead. We make some configuration recommendations on this page, but all browsers other than Tor Browser will be traceable by *somebody* in some manner or another.
-
-## Mullvad Browser
-
-!!! recommendation
-
-    ![Mullvad Browser logo](assets/img/browsers/mullvad_browser.svg){ align=right }
-
-    **Mullvad Browser** is a version of [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) with Tor network integrations removed, aimed at providing Tor Browser's anti-fingerprinting browser technologies to VPN users. It is developed by the Tor Project and distributed by [Mullvad](vpn.md#mullvad), and does **not** require the use of Mullvad's VPN.
-
-    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mullvad.net/en/browser){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-    [:octicons-eye-16:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/privacy-policy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-    [:octicons-info-16:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/tag/mullvad-browser/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
-    [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/mullvad-browser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-
-    ??? downloads
-
-        - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://mullvad.net/en/download/browser/windows)
-        - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://mullvad.net/en/download/browser/macos)
-        - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://mullvad.net/en/download/browser/linux)
-
-Like [Tor Browser](tor.md), Mullvad Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting by making your browser fingerprint identical to all other Mullvad Browser users, and it includes default settings and extensions that are automatically configured by the default security levels: *Standard*, *Safer* and *Safest*. Therefore, it is imperative that you do not modify the browser at all outside adjusting the default [security levels](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/). Other modifications would make your fingerprint unique, defeating the purpose of using this browser. If you want to configure your browser more heavily and fingerprinting is not a concern for you, we recommend [Firefox](#firefox) instead.
-
-### Anti-Fingerprinting
-
-**Without** using a [VPN](vpn.md), Mullvad Browser provides the same protections against [naive fingerprinting scripts](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/3.3-Overrides-%5BTo-RFP-or-Not%5D#-fingerprinting) as other private browsers like Firefox+[Arkenfox](#arkenfox-advanced) or [Brave](#brave). Mullvad Browser provides these protections out of the box, at the expense of some flexibility and convenience that other private browsers can provide.
-
-==For the strongest anti-fingerprinting protection, we recommend using Mullvad Browser in conjunction **with** a VPN==, whether that is Mullvad or another recommended VPN provider. When using a VPN with Mullvad Browser, you will share a fingerprint and a pool of IP addresses with many other users, giving you a "crowd" to blend in with. This strategy is the only way to thwart advanced tracking scripts, and is the same anti-fingerprinting technique used by Tor Browser.
-
-Note that while you can use Mullvad Browser with any VPN provider, other people on that VPN must also be using Mullvad Browser for this "crowd" to exist, something which is more likely on Mullvad VPN compared to other providers, particularly this close to the launch of Mullvad Browser. Mullvad Browser does not have built-in VPN connectivity, nor does it check whether you are using a VPN before browsing; your VPN connection has to be configured and managed separately.
-
-Mullvad Browser comes with the *uBlock Origin* and *NoScript* browser extensions pre-installed. While we typically [don't recommend](#extensions) adding *additional* browser extensions, these extensions that come pre-installed with the browser should **not** be removed or configured outside their default values, because doing so would noticeably make your browser fingerprint distinct from other Mullvad Browser users. It also comes pre-installed with the Mullvad Browser Extension, which *can* be safely removed without impacting your browser fingerprint if you would like, but is also safe to keep even if you don't use Mullvad VPN.
-
-### Private Browsing Mode
-
-Mullvad Browser operates in permanent private browsing mode, meaning your history, cookies, and other site data will always be cleared every time the browser is closed. Your bookmarks, browser settings, and extension settings will still be preserved.
-
-This is required to prevent advanced forms of tracking, but does come at the cost of convenience and some Firefox features, such as Multi-Account Containers. Remember you can always use multiple browsers, for example, you could consider using Firefox+Arkenfox for a few sites that you want to stay logged in on or otherwise don't work properly in Mullvad Browser, and Mullvad Browser for general browsing.
-
-### Mullvad Leta
-
-Mullvad Browser comes with DuckDuckGo set as the default [search engine](search-engines.md), but it also comes preinstalled with **Mullvad Leta**, a search engine which requires an active Mullvad VPN subscription to access. Mullvad Leta queries Google's paid search API directly (which is why it is limited to paying subscribers), however because of this limitation it is possible for Mullvad to correlate search queries and Mullvad VPN accounts. For this reason we discourage the use of Mullvad Leta, even though Mullvad collects very little information about their VPN subscribers.
+These are our currently recommended desktop web browsers and configurations for standard/non-anonymous browsing. If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) instead. In general, we recommend keeping your browser extensions to a minimum; they have privileged access within your browser, require you to trust the developer, can make you [stand out](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint), and [weaken](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/chromium-extensions/c/0ei-UCHNm34/m/lDaXwQhzBAAJ) site isolation.
 
 ## Firefox
 
@@ -125,17 +31,9 @@ Mullvad Browser comes with DuckDuckGo set as the default [search engine](search-
 
 ### Recommended Configuration
 
-These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings**
+Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. When you use Firefox, we recommend changing the following settings to protect your privacy from certain parties, but all browsers other than [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) will be traceable by *somebody* in some regard or another.
 
-#### Search
-
-- [ ] Uncheck **Provide search suggestions**
-
-Search suggestion features may not be available in your region.
-
-Search suggestions send everything you type in the address bar to the default search engine, regardless of whether you submit an actual search. Disabling search suggestions allows you to more precisely control what data you send to your search engine provider.
-
-#### Privacy & Security
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Privacy & Security**.
 
 ##### Enhanced Tracking Protection
 
@@ -143,13 +41,6 @@ Search suggestions send everything you type in the address bar to the default se
 
 This protects you by blocking social media trackers, fingerprinting scripts (note that this does not protect you from *all* fingerprinting), cryptominers, cross-site tracking cookies, and some other tracking content. ETP protects against many common threats, but it does not block all tracking avenues because it is designed to have minimal to no impact on site usability.
 
-##### Firefox Suggest (US only)
-
-[Firefox Suggest](https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/firefox-suggest) is a feature similar to search suggestions which is only available in the US. We recommend disabling it for the same reason we recommend disabling search suggestions. If you don't see these options under the **Address Bar** header, you do not have the new experience and can ignore these changes.
-
-- [ ] Uncheck **Suggestions from the web**
-- [ ] Uncheck **Suggestions from sponsors**
-
 ##### Sanitize on Close
 
 If you want to stay logged in to particular sites, you can allow exceptions in **Cookies and Site Data** → **Manage Exceptions...**
@@ -158,6 +49,14 @@ If you want to stay logged in to particular sites, you can allow exceptions in *
 
 This protects you from persistent cookies, but does not protect you against cookies acquired during any one browsing session. When this is enabled, it becomes possible to easily cleanse your browser cookies by simply restarting Firefox. You can set exceptions on a per-site basis, if you wish to stay logged in to a particular site you visit often.
 
+##### Search Suggestions
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Provide search suggestions**
+
+Search suggestion features may not be available in your region.
+
+Search suggestions send everything you type in the address bar to the default search engine, regardless of whether you submit an actual search. Disabling search suggestions allows you to more precisely control what data you send to your search engine provider.
+
 ##### Telemetry
 
 - [ ] Uncheck **Allow Firefox to send technical and interaction data to Mozilla**
@@ -177,20 +76,14 @@ Additionally, the Firefox Accounts service collects [some technical data](https:
 
 This prevents you from unintentionally connecting to a website in plain-text HTTP. Sites without HTTPS are uncommon nowadays, so this should have little to no impact on your day to day browsing.
 
-#### Sync
+### Firefox Sync
 
 [Firefox Sync](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2018/11/firefox-sync-privacy/) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices and protects it with E2EE.
 
 ### Arkenfox (advanced)
 
-!!! tip "Use Mullvad Browser for advanced anti-fingerprinting"
-
-    [Mullvad Browser](#mullvad-browser) provides the same anti-fingerprinting protections as Arkenfox out of the box, and does not require the use of Mullvad's VPN to benefit from these protections. Coupled with a VPN, Mullvad Browser can thwart more advanced tracking scripts which Arkenfox cannot. Arkenfox still has the advantage of being much more flexible, and allowing per-site exceptions for websites which you need to stay logged in to.
-
 The [Arkenfox project](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js) provides a set of carefully considered options for Firefox. If you [decide](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/1.1-To-Arkenfox-or-Not) to use Arkenfox, a [few options](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/3.2-Overrides-[Common]) are subjectively strict and/or may cause some websites to not work properly - [which you can easily change](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/3.1-Overrides) to suit your needs. We **strongly recommend** reading through their full [wiki](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki). Arkenfox also enables [container](https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/containers#w_for-advanced-users) support.
 
-Arkenfox only aims to thwart basic or naive tracking scripts through canvas randomization and Firefox's built-in fingerprint resistance configuration settings. It does not aim to make your browser blend in with a large crowd of other Arkenfox users in the same way Mullvad Browser or Tor Browser do, which is the only way to thwart advanced fingerprint tracking scripts. Remember you can always use multiple browsers, for example, you could consider using Firefox+Arkenfox for a few sites that you want to stay logged in on or otherwise trust, and Mullvad Browser for general browsing.
-
 ## Brave
 
 !!! recommendation
@@ -218,9 +111,9 @@ Arkenfox only aims to thwart basic or naive tracking scripts through canvas rand
 
 ### Recommended Configuration
 
-These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings**.
+Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. When you use Brave, we recommend changing the following settings to protect your privacy from certain parties, but all browsers other than the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) will be traceable by *somebody* in some regard or another.
 
-#### Settings
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings**.
 
 ##### Shields
 
@@ -260,7 +153,6 @@ Shields' options can be downgraded on a per-site basis as needed, but by default
 - [ ] Uncheck **Private window with Tor** (1)
 
     !!! tip "Sanitizing on Close"
-
         - [x] Select **Clear cookies and site data when you close all windows** in the *Cookies and other site data* menu
 
         If you wish to stay logged in to a particular site you visit often, you can set exceptions on a per-site basis under the *Customized behaviors* section.
@@ -276,15 +168,15 @@ Disable built-in extensions you do not use in **Extensions**
 - [ ] Uncheck **Hangouts**
 - [ ] Uncheck **WebTorrent**
 
-##### Web3
+##### IPFS
 
-Brave's Web3 features can potentially add to your browser fingerprint and attack surface. Unless you use any of features, they should be disabled.
+InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is a decentralized, peer-to-peer network for storing and sharing data in a distributed filesystem. Unless you use the feature, disable it.
 
-- [ ] Set **Default Ethereum Wallet** to **None**
-- [ ] Set **Default Solana Wallet** to **None**
-- [ ] Set **Method to resolve IPFS resources** to **Disabled
+- [x] Select **Disabled** on Method to resolve IPFS resources
 
-##### System
+##### Additional settings
+
+Under the *System* menu
 
 <div class="annotate" markdown>
 
@@ -294,19 +186,13 @@ Brave's Web3 features can potentially add to your browser fingerprint and attack
 
 1. This option is not present on all platforms.
 
-#### Sync
+### Brave Sync
 
 [Brave Sync](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360059793111-Understanding-Brave-Sync) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices without requiring an account and protects it with E2EE.
 
-#### Brave Rewards and Wallet
-
-**Brave Rewards** lets you recieve Basic Attention Token (BAT) cryptocurrency for performing certain actions within Brave. It relies on a custodial account and KYC from a select number of providers. We do not recommend BAT as a [private cryptocurrency](cryptocurrency.md), nor do we recommend using a [custodial wallet](advanced/payments.md#other-coins-bitcoin-ethereum-etc), so we would discourage using this feature.
-
-**Brave Wallet** operates locally on your computer, but does not support any private cryptocurrencies, so we would discourage using this feature as well.
-
 ## Additional Resources
 
-In general, we recommend keeping your browser extensions to a minimum to decrease your attack surface; they have privileged access within your browser, require you to trust the developer, can make you [stand out](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint), and [weaken](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/chromium-extensions/c/0ei-UCHNm34/m/lDaXwQhzBAAJ) site isolation. However, uBlock Origin may prove useful if you value content blocking functionality.
+We generally do not recommend installing any extensions as they increase your attack surface. However, uBlock Origin may prove useful if you value content blocking functionality.
 
 ### uBlock Origin
 

docs/email.md

@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ We regard these features as important in order to provide a safe and optimal ser
 
 **Best Case:**
 
-- Encrypts all account data (Contacts, Calendars, etc.) at rest with zero-access encryption.
+- Encrypts all account data (Contacts, Calendars, etc) at rest with zero-access encryption.
 - Integrated webmail E2EE/PGP encryption provided as a convenience.
 - Support for [WKD](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD) to allow improved discovery of public OpenPGP keys via HTTP.
     GnuPG users can get a key by typing: `gpg --locate-key example_user@example.com`
@@ -486,14 +486,14 @@ With the email providers we recommend we like to see responsible marketing.
 
 **Minimum to Qualify:**
 
-- Must self-host analytics (no Google Analytics, Adobe Analytics, etc.). The provider's site must also comply with [DNT (Do Not Track)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Do_Not_Track) for those who wish to opt-out.
+- Must self-host analytics (no Google Analytics, Adobe Analytics, etc). The provider's site must also comply with [DNT (Do Not Track)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Do_Not_Track) for those who wish to opt-out.
 
 Must not have any marketing which is irresponsible:
 
 - Claims of "unbreakable encryption." Encryption should be used with the intention that it may not be secret in the future when the technology exists to crack it.
 - Making guarantees of protecting anonymity 100%. When someone makes a claim that something is 100% it means there is no certainty for failure. We know people can quite easily deanonymize themselves in a number of ways, e.g.:
 
-- Reusing personal information e.g. (email accounts, unique pseudonyms, etc.) that they accessed without anonymity software (Tor, VPN, etc.)
+- Reusing personal information e.g. (email accounts, unique pseudonyms, etc) that they accessed without anonymity software (Tor, VPN, etc)
 - [Browser fingerprinting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint)
 
 **Best Case:**

docs/index.md

@@ -4,34 +4,6 @@ hide:
   - navigation
   - toc
   - feedback
-schema:
-  - 
-    "@context": https://schema.org
-    "@type": Organization
-    "@id": https://www.privacyguides.org/
-    name: Privacy Guides
-    url: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/about/
-    logo: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/assets/brand/png/square/pg-yellow.png
-    sameAs:
-      - https://twitter.com/privacy_guides
-      - https://github.com/privacyguides
-      - https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q111710163
-      - https://opencollective.com/privacyguides
-      - https://www.youtube.com/@privacyguides
-      - https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides
-  - 
-    "@context": https://schema.org
-    "@type": WebSite
-    name: Privacy Guides
-    url: "https://www.privacyguides.org/"
-    sameAs:
-      - https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q111710163
-    potentialAction:
-      "@type": SearchAction
-      target:
-        "@type": EntryPoint
-        urlTemplate: "https://www.privacyguides.org/?q={search_term_string}"
-      query-input: required name=search_term_string
 ---
 <!-- markdownlint-disable-next-line -->
 ## Why should I care?
@@ -42,7 +14,7 @@ Much like the right to interracial marriage, woman's suffrage, freedom of speech
 
 You shouldn't confuse privacy with secrecy. We know what happens in the bathroom, but you still close the door. That's because you want privacy, not secrecy. **Everyone** has something to protect. Privacy is something that makes us human.
 
-[:material-target-account: Common Internet Threats](basics/common-threats.md){ class="md-button md-button--primary" }
+[:material-target-account: Common Internet Threats](basics/common-threats.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 
 ## What should I do?
 
@@ -52,7 +24,7 @@ Trying to protect all your data from everyone all the time is impractical, expen
 
 ==This process of identifying threats and defining countermeasures is called **threat modeling**==, and it forms the basis of every good security and privacy plan.
 
-[:material-book-outline: Learn More About Threat Modeling](basics/threat-modeling.md){ class="md-button md-button--primary" }
+[:material-book-outline: Learn More About Threat Modeling](basics/threat-modeling.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 
 ---
 

docs/mobile-browsers.md

@@ -2,37 +2,6 @@
 title: "Mobile Browsers"
 icon: material/cellphone-information
 description: These browsers are what we currently recommend for standard/non-anonymous internet browsing on your phone.
-schema:
-  - 
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": WebPage
-    name: Private Mobile Browser Recommendations
-    url: "./"
-    relatedLink: "../desktop-browsers/"
-  - 
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": MobileApplication
-    name: Brave
-    image: /assets/img/browsers/brave.svg
-    url: https://brave.com
-    applicationCategory: Web Browser
-    operatingSystem:
-      - Android
-    subjectOf:
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
-  - 
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": MobileApplication
-    name: Safari
-    image: /assets/img/browsers/safari.svg
-    url: https://www.apple.com/safari/
-    applicationCategory: Web Browser
-    operatingSystem:
-      - iOS
-    subjectOf:
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
 ---
 These are our currently recommended mobile web browsers and configurations for standard/non-anonymous internet browsing. If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) instead. In general, we recommend keeping extensions to a minimum; they have privileged access within your browser, require you to trust the developer, can make you [stand out](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint), and [weaken](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/chromium-extensions/c/0ei-UCHNm34/m/lDaXwQhzBAAJ) site isolation.
 
@@ -83,7 +52,6 @@ Shields' options can be downgraded on a per-site basis as needed, but by default
         Brave allows you to select additional content filters within the internal `brave://adblock` page. We advise against using this feature; instead, keep the default filter lists. Using extra lists will make you stand out from other Brave users and may also increase attack surface if there is an exploit in Brave and a malicious rule is added to one of the lists you use.
 
 - [x] Select **Upgrade connections to HTTPS**
-- [x] Select **Always use secure connections**
 - [x] (Optional) Select **Block Scripts** (1)
 - [x] Select **Strict, may break sites** under **Block fingerprinting**
 
@@ -111,10 +79,10 @@ Shields' options can be downgraded on a per-site basis as needed, but by default
 - [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send diagnostic reports**
 - [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send daily usage ping to Brave**
 
-</div>
-
 1. InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is a decentralized, peer-to-peer network for storing and sharing data in a distributed filesystem. Unless you use the feature, disable it.
 
+</div>
+
 #### Brave Sync
 
 [Brave Sync](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360059793111-Understanding-Brave-Sync) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices without requiring an account and protects it with E2EE.

docs/multi-factor-authentication.md

@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
 
     We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
 
-- Source code must be publicly available.
+- Must be open-source software.
 - Must not require internet connectivity.
 - Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
     - **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.

docs/os/linux-overview.md

@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automaticall
 
 ### MAC Address Randomization
 
-Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings.
+Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings.
 
 It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous.
 

docs/os/windows/hardening.md

@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
+---
+title: System Hardening
+icon: material/monitor-lock
+---
+
+## Setting up Windows after Installation
+
+If you wish to limit the amount of data Microsoft obtains from your device, an [offline/local account](https://answers.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/forum/all/how-to-create-a-local-or-offline-account-in/95097c32-40c4-48c0-8f3b-3bcb67afaf7c) is **recommended**. 
+
+![user-account](../../assets/img/windows/user-account.webp)
+
+!!! note
+    Microsoft is pushing users to use Microsoft accounts for other editions except Education and Enterprise after installation. 
+
+    So, You could also follow the guide by [ghacks.net](https://www.ghacks.net/2022/05/13/how-to-bypass-the-microsoft-account-requirement-during-windows-setup/) to bypass the Microsoft account requirement during setup and use Local account.
+
+While setting up, it is recommended to use a generic name such as `user` and `host` and avoid identifying terms such as your name or operating system. This can make it more difficult for privileged `Win32` apps or attackers to discern your identity.
+
+For security, it's recommended to set up Windows Hello on all of your accounts because it uses the trusted platform module (TPM) if applicable, which protects against brute-force attacks; see the documentation: [How Windows Uses the TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm#windows-hello-for-business)
+
+- [ ] Toggle off all privacy related settings as shown in the image:
+
+![Privacy Settings](../../assets/img/windows/privacy-settings.webp)
+## Encrypting the Drive
+
+After you have installed Windows, turn on full disk encryption (FDE) using BitLocker via the Control Panel. 
+
+!!! info "Choosing the Way to Encrypt"
+    It is recommended to use only the Control Panel because if you go to encrypt via settings app, Microsoft named it as `Device Encryption` and designed it in a way that the encryption keys for BitLocker would be stored on Microsoft's server which is attached to your Microsoft account. This can be dangerous to your privacy and security as anyone who gains access to your account, as could an attacker if they were able to gain access to Microsoft's servers or any Law Enforcement could by a Gag order. 
+
+The best way is to go to the Control Panel by searching for it in the Start Menu or from the context menu (right-click) in File Explorer and set it up for all of the drives that you have.
+
+![Bitlocker in Control Panel](../../assets/img/windows/Bitlocker%20Group%20Policies/bitlocker-control%20panel.webp)
+
+Bitlocker is suggested because of the native implementation by the OS and along with the usage of hardware to be resistant against encryption flaws.
+
+### Security policies for Bitlocker
+
+Enable the Following group policies before you start encrypting your drives.
+
+!!! tip
+    To go to it, search **Group Policy** in the **Windows Search Bar** and press **Enter** or type `gpedit.msc` in ++win+r++. Then, proceed as mentioned below.
+
+General Policies :
+
+Go to `Computer Configuration` > `Administrative Templates` > `Windows Components` > `Bitlocker Drive Encryption`
+
+![Encryption & Cipher](../../assets/img/windows/Bitlocker%20Group%20Policies/encryption-method-and-cipher.webp)
+![Disable DMA](../../assets/img/windows/Bitlocker%20Group%20Policies/Disable%20DMA.webp)
+
+For OS drives : 
+
+Go to `Computer Configuration` > `Administrative Templates` > `Windows Components` > `Bitlocker Drive Encryption` > `Operating System Drives`
+
+Enable Group policies as in the images below <!--(Check images side by side)--> :
+
+![Enforcing full encryption](../../assets/img/windows/Bitlocker%20Group%20Policies/enforce-full-encryption.webp)
+![secure boot integrity validation](../../assets/img/windows/Bitlocker%20Group%20Policies/Secure-boot-integrity-validation.webp)
+![TPM & PIN](../../assets/img/windows/Bitlocker%20Group%20Policies/TPM+PIN.webp)
+![enhanced PINS](../../assets/img/windows/Bitlocker%20Group%20Policies/enhanced-pins.webp)
+![Disallow others changing PIN](../../assets/img/windows/Bitlocker%20Group%20Policies/disallow-user-from-changing-PIN.webp)
+
+For Fixed Drives :
+
+Go to `Computer Configuration` > `Administrative Templates` > `Windows Components` > `Bitlocker Drive Encryption` > `Fixed Data Drives` > `Enforce drive encryption type on fixed data drives`
+
+![Encryption Type](../../assets/img/windows/Bitlocker%20Group%20Policies/fixed-drives.webp)
+
+These policies ensure that your drives are encrypted with `XTS-AES-256` Bit encryption, **fully**.
+
+### Setting up Pre-boot Authentication
+
+!!! warning "Update your TPM"
+    Before enabling Bitlocker in your device,It is strongly recommended to update your TPM chip by downloading package only from **OEM** Websites.
+
+As you are using Windows 11, TPM is used to encrypt and decrypt the drive but it is susceptible to [cold boot attacks](https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2021/01/understanding-bitlocker-tpm-protection/). So, it is recommended to use TPM + PIN to protect the drives
+
+After enabling all the group policies above, Go to Control panel and click on Add PIN. It can be alphanumeric if you had enabled the above policies.
+
+You can check if it's enabled by typing `manage-bde -status`. It will normally show in **Key Protectors**: **Numerical Password** (it's the recovery key) and **TPM And PIN**.
+
+??? abstract "Disabling pre-boot Authentication (Not Recommended)"
+    
+    - open a **terminal** as an **administrator** and type this command `manage-bde -protectors -add c: -TPM`. 
+    - You can again check if it worked by typing `manage-bde -status c:` and it will show you **Numerical Password** and **TPM**
+
+!!! info 
+    The above Group Policy configuration tells the TPM to release the encryption keys after entering PIN instead of releasing it on boot automatically.
+
+    Doing this will set a double password. So, you enter the PIN to release the encryption keys from TPM & boot Windows and another credential to unlock your user account.
+
+    The pre-boot PIN not only protects the OS drive but also other fixed drives used just for storage if bitlocker is enabled for that drive also.
+
+When you do this, the encryption keys of your drive are only unlocked once you enter the PIN, and the decryption happens after. If you forget or lose the PIN, you won't be able to access your drives and OS anymore, and the only way to recover is using the Recovery Key provided during the initial setup of BitLocker. **Make sure you store it in a safe place**, such as a password manager, and keep backups of your Recovery Key or even use an encrypted USB drive.
+
+The preboot authentication is recommend to avoid data being accessed by removal of user Account passwords by methods like this - https://youtu.be/0gOZoroPNuA and access data even though Bitlocker is enabled and managed by TPM
+
+But when you use TPM + Startup PIN, nobody can restart to load the shell and bypass password. Because you need to enter your PIN to go to the Advanced Startup settings as in the video.
+
+Enabling or not-enabling is up to the user's threat model.
+
+If it's a personal device, Startup PIN + TPM is recommended. 
+If a family computer, Normal Bitlocker (Managed by TPM) for OS drive is recommended.
+
+It is recommended to encrypt the OS drive at the least. Encrypting secondary drives either via Bitlocker or other encryption tools such as Veracrypt is upto the user's threat model.
+
+## Creation of User Account and usage
+
+- By Default Windows gives `administrator` access to the user account. Create another `standard` user account to reduce the attack surface enormously as most vulnerabilities today come from the fact that the user is always in `administrator` mode. In addition, you shouldn't use the same password for standard and administrator account.
+
+- Don't use admin account for any of your personal tasks!
+
+- Just restrict it to the standard account created.
+
+- Set [UAC](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-security-policy-settings) settings to the [Highest Privilege](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/about-user-account-control-settings-d5b2046b-dcb8-54eb-f732-059f321afe18).
+    
+- Only use your account for you, if someone needs to use your computer **ALWAYS** create another standard account, even if it's for a one-time use, even if it's your family or someone you trust. This person can plug a malicious USB, can connect to malicious Wi-Fi network, download infectious files, etc... without you knowing about it.
+
+- You might be afraid that the user accessing your device via another User account can access your Internal drive and access critical files violating your privacy. Refer, [Privacy page](windows/privacy/#restrict-access-to-data-drives) on How to restrict access to certain drives only or use EFS on a per-file basis. You can read more about EFS on [Privacy page](privacy.md).
+
+!!! tip
+    You should ALWAYS do the quick shortcut ++win+l++ to lock your device when you are away to prevent unauthorized access.
+
+- If you don't like managing a standard account, then enforce authentication for Administrator accounts too like Standard ones by following the guide by [Wikihow](https://www.wikihow.tech/Require-UAC-Passwords-on-Administrator-Accounts)
+    - This way, Even administrators need to use Password to approve processes instead of just clicking `Yes` or `No`.
+
+## Securing the Boot chain
+
+- In your BIOS/UEFI settings, disable the booting of USB devices
+- Add a password to your BIOS/UEFI settings which restricts anyone from changing them.
+
+### Enabling Secure Boot
+
+- Windows 11 secures its bootloader by default by using Secure boot with the usage of TPM.
+
+- Windows 10, on the other hand, doesn't come with Secure boot enabled by default except for new devices. 
+
+To enable Secure Boot from the PC BIOS menu. Follow this Step-by-Step Instructions by visiting this [documentation](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/manufacture/desktop/disabling-secure-boot?view=windows-11#re-enable-secure-boot).
+
+Visit: [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/user-help/you-need-to-enable-secure-boot-windows#check-secure-boot-status](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/user-help/you-need-to-enable-secure-boot-windows#check-secure-boot-status) on how to verify if enabled after enabling secure boot.
+
+### Firmware Protection
+
+As there are thousands of PC vendors that produce many models with different UEFI BIOS versions, there becomes an incredibly large number of SRTM measurements upon bootup. Two techniques exist to establish trust here—either maintain a list of known 'bad' SRTM measurements (also known as a blocklist), or a list of known 'good' SRTM measurements (also known as an allowlist).
+
+**System Guard** lets the system freely boot into untrusted code initially, but shortly after launches the system into a trusted state by taking control of all CPUs and forcing them down a well-known and measured code path. This has the benefit of allowing untrusted early UEFI code to boot the system, but then being able to securely transition into a trusted and measured state.
+
+- [x] Enable [System Guard](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows) by following the instructions of [Microsoft Docs](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/system-guard-secure-launch-and-smm-protection) to secure the boot chain.
+
+You can also know how to check if it is enabled or not in the guide.
+
+!!! note
+    System Guard is mostly available on Windows Secured-Core PCs not on regular consumer devices. So, Before enabling it check the requirements of your Device.
+## Protection against Malware and Viruses
+
+- Just use the built-in Windows Defender Security to protect against threats and stick to it. Don't use any other Antivirus or Anti-Malware software [as it can weaken your security and your privacy](https://wonderfall.space/windows-hardening/#microsoft-defender-antivirus).
+
+- [x] **Enable** [Windows Defender in a Sandbox](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/10/26/windows-defender-antivirus-can-now-run-in-a-sandbox/) by launching a **terminal** as an **administrator** and copy/paste this command ```setx /M MP_FORCE_USE_SANDBOX 1```. Restart your device and check if there's a process called **MsMpEngCP.exe** by typing `tasklist` in the terminal to verify.
+    
+- [ ] Disable Autoplay for devices so that malware hidden in USB don't execute on plugging in
+    ![Disable autoplay](../../assets/img/windows/autoplay.webp)
+- [x] Enable [Controlled Folder Access](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/enable-controlled-folders) in Windows defender settings. So, The Important folders you listed for protection doesn't get attacked or held hostage in case of a ransomware attack and also stops apps from accessing your important folders. This could also be used as a firewall for the filesystem such as Choosing the drives in the protected ones. And allowing each app when it request access to your device.
+
+- [x] Enable [Microsoft Defender Application Guard](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/md-app-guard-overview). After installing by going to "[Turn Windows Features on or off](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/install-md-app-guard)" you can enable it. This runs Microsoft Edge in an Isolated Hyper-V container preventing unknown Malware from damaging the system.
+
+!!! warning
+    When you use Microsoft Defender Application Guard it bypasses the VPN you are using as when you use WDAG is launching the application in what is essentially a virtual machine, so it bypasses the host, where the VPN is connected. 
+
+- [x] Enable [Memory Integrity](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/core-isolation-e30ed737-17d8-42f3-a2a9-87521df09b78) (also called Hypervisor-Protected Code Integrity) in Windows Defender settings which will run important system process isolated in an environment that cannot be attacked by viruses & malware.
+
+- [x] Enable `Display File Extensions` as most problems start here.
+    
+    ??? example  "Enabling file extension"
+        On standard Windows settings, Malware can hide itself if the filename is like: `Secure-File.txt.exe`
+
+        What you see? A file named `Secure-File.txt`
+
+        Of course the attacker can add a different icon to the file, so it looks like you open the file type extension you think.
+
+        And if you open it, the Malware start's.
+
+        Just Open the File Explorer's settings and change it to show File Extensions by clicking on `View` > `Show` or by configuring via [Registry Editor](https://github.com/beerisgood/Windows11_Hardening/blob/master/always%20display%20file%20typ%20extension)
+
+## Apps
+
+- Avoid any types of Cleaning software at all cost. As Microsoft is working on its own implementation specfically designed for windows.
+- To Install apps, using the `winget` (Windows Package manager). More details in [Sandboxing page](/windows/sandboxing/#using-winget-to-install-sofwaret)
+## Security Improvements
+
+- Use [PeaZip](https://peazip.github.io/) archiver instead of 7-zip as it disables [Mark of the Web(MoW)](https://nolongerset.com/mark-of-the-web-details/) [support by default](https://github.com/nmantani/archiver-MOTW-support-comparison#*2) leading to execution of malicious instantly after extracting.
+
+- Using MS edge or brave over Firefox. Edge is recommended with MDAG mode for secure browsing if security is your priority. Brave is recommeded if content blocking is important for you (Brave shields)
+
+- [Check](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt#how-to-check-if-kernel-dma-protection-is-enabled) if Kernel DMA protections is turned on.
+
+- Use [Winget](/windows/sandboxing/#using-winget-to-install-sofware) tool to remove Bloatware instead of third party apps.
+
+- [x] Block all incoming connections in Windows firewall.
+    - Go to `Firewall & Network Protection` in Windows defender security.
+    - Go to `Domain`, `Private` and `Public` network settings
+    - Scroll and check the box under **Incoming Connections**
+
+    !!! warning "A note regarding screen casting"
+        If you try to cast your screen to another device or cast another device screen to your device via Wireless display (Optional feature). You won't be able to connect the devices. As we have blocked Incoming connections. Miracast (Wireless casting) requires incoming connection to send data back and forth to show the screen on other or vice versa.
+
+        If you want to cast, then disable incoming connections in public network and cast your device and block connection again.
+
+        There is no problem if you use normal Projection via cable.
+## Keeping your device up-to-date
+
+You should keep your Windows Device up-to-date by enabling automatic updates. It is recommended to do so to keep your device with latest security fixes and new features.
+    
+To get information about the latest updates, you can look at the [Windows Release Information](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/release-health/windows11-release-information).
+
+It is recommended to stick to driver updates provided via Optional Updates, as they are thoroughly vetted by Microsoft for the stability of your device, and **do not rely on third-party apps for driver updates**. This way, you get the latest updates and security patches for your drivers along with firmware updates as long as your device is supported by the OEM.
+
+Some Hardware vendors like Nvidia, Intel has their own updater tool which will provide latest drivers.
+
+It is recommended to rather rely on Windows updates or first-party apps.
+
+**Credits** : The page is mostly made based on the recommendations of Windows Hardening Guide by [beerisgood](https://github.com/beerisgood/Windows11_Hardening)
+
+*[TPM]: Trusted Platform Module
+*[FDE]: Full Disk Encryption
+*[UAC]: User Account Control
+*[WDAG]: Windows Defender Application Guard
+*[SRTM]: Static Root-of-Trust Measurement

docs/os/windows/index.md

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+---
+title: Windows Overview
+icon: material/microsoft-windows
+---
+
+## Windows
+
+Windows is a proprietary operating system created by Microsoft Inc. in 1985. It is primarily focused on personal computing and is now the most popular desktop OS, used by about [75%](https://gs.statcounter.com/os-market-share/desktop/worldwide) of all desktop users. However, it has its own privacy and security issues.
+
+## Issues present in Windows
+
+Over the years, Microsoft has demonstrated a lot of privacy-invasive behaviour with their software and services. They have continually taken advantage of the fact that Windows is the most wide-used desktop OS, and that most people don't change the default settings, in order to collect users' personal information.
+
+Windows 10 was [criticized](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings) for having default settings that sent a lot of data and telemetry back to Microsoft, including:
+
+!!! quote "[Criticism of Microsoft - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection)"
+    User's contacts and calendar events, location data and history, "telemetry" (diagnostics data) ... and "advertising ID", as well as further data when the Cortana assistant is enabled.
+
+At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. Only after [criticism](https://www.theverge.com/2016/7/21/12246266/france-microsoft-privacy-windows-10-cnil) from the France data protection commission, the [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/08/windows-10-microsoft-blatantly-disregards-user-choice-and-privacy-deep-dive) and the [European Union](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-microsoft-dataprotection-eu-idUSKBN15Z1UI), Microsoft changed the way they collect telemetry, allowing users to choose between "Basic" (now renamed as `Required`) and "Full", with "Basic" mode collecting [much less telemetry](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects). Along with that, Microsoft collects a [lot more data from Windows 10](https://web.archive.org/web/20210711143017/https://privacytools.io/operating-systems/#win10).
+
+With the launch of Windows 11, a lot of [other](https://www.windowscentral.com/one-thing-microsoft-didnt-discuss-windows-11-privacy) [concerns](https://www.pcworld.com/article/539183/windows-11-review-an-unnecessary-replacement-for-windows-10.html) were raised, such as:
+
+- Integration of Microsoft Teams into the OS, which would encourage users to switch to the service, allowing Microsoft to collect even more data.
+- Removing the ability to have local accounts in Windows 11 Home, therefore forcing you to log into a Microsoft account so as to collect more data.
+- Having all data collection options on by default
+- Working with Amazon to bring Android apps to Windows through the Windows Subsystem for Android, likely allowing both Microsoft and Amazon to collect data about Android app usage on Windows.
+- Using users in a P2P way to distribute Windows updates to reduce load in Microsoft's servers without users' consent.
+
+## Choosing your Windows edition
+
+While using Windows, it is better to select either Windows **Enterprise** Edition or **Education** Edition because it gives more control over the system for hardening it for privacy and security by giving access to stops the OS from sending any Telemetry data using GP Editor.
+
+If you cannot get the above editions, you should opt for **Professional** Edition.
+
+#### Editions to avoid 
+
+- It is not recommended to use forks or modified versions of Windows such as Windows AME. It should be avoided at all cost. Since modified versions of Windows, such as AME, don't get updates, antivirus programs like Defender can fall out of date or be disabled entirely, opening you up to attacks.
+
+- Windows **Home** edition is **not** recommended as it does not have many advantages that Professional edition provides such as BitLocker Drive Encryption, Hyper-V, Windows Sandbox, etc. It also uploads Bitlocker Encryption keys to Microsoft servers which actually defies the aspect of the encryption implemented as the key was supposed to be hold by the user.
+
+##### Recommendations
+
+We recommend you choose Windows 11 over Windows 10 as it is the latest version and brings many security-related improvements with it by default such as [Secure Boot](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-secure-boot), [VBS](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-vbs), [HVCI](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/bringup/device-guard-and-credential-guard), etc. Windows 10 will stop getting updates after [October 14, 2025](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/lifecycle/products/windows-10-home-and-pro).
+
+### Installing Windows
+
+We recommend that you use the official [Media Creation tool](https://www.microsoft.com/software-download/windows11) to flash the ISO to the USB, over third-party options such as Rufus, Balena Etcher, etc., so that you don't tamper the ISO.
+
+#### Downloading ISO
+
+To download the ISO. Follow these steps :
+
+- Download Media Creation tool under `Windows 11 Installation Media`
+- Open a Command prompt terminal in the directory where `mediacreationtool.exe` is downloaded.
+- And Input the following Command :
+    ```
+    mediacreationtool.exe /Eula Accept /Retail /MediaArch x64 /MediaLangCode en-US /MediaEdition Enterprise
+    ```
+- If it asks for Activation key, Use this Generic Key `XGVPP-NMH47-7TTHJ-W3FW7-8HV2C`. This will just allow you to download the ISO but activation is totally upon the user.
+- Accept the UAC prompt
+- Download the ISO file or flash to a USB as you wish
+
+!!! info "Note"
+    - The ISO will consists **only** of Professional, Education & Enterprise edition with a size of ~4.2 GB (Instead of >5.5GB when you download the Multi-Edition ISO) when you download using the above way no other editions such as Home included in it.
+    - If you want to change the Language of the ISO file, Just change the `en-US` part with the appropriate language and country code as per your needs.
+
+### Activating Windows
+
+Activating Education/Enterprise edition is different because for Enterprise Edition it needs to be a part of an enterprise network or buying an enterprise License for several devices and use it for your one device & for Education Edition it needs to be a part of school network or managed by a school administrator.
+
+For activating Professional edition, you can buy the license key from resellers (not recommended) or the [Microsoft Store](https://www.microsoft.com/d/windows-11-pro/dg7gmgf0d8h4?rtc=1).
+
+If you are currently using Pro and want to upgrade to Enterprise. Then, Follow the guide [here](https://www.kapilarya.com/how-to-upgrade-windows-11-pro-to-enterprise-edition)
+
+!!! abstract "Note"
+    This guide will be mostly on Windows 11 but some of the recommendations can be applied to Windows 10 too.
+
+!!! danger "Warning"
+    If you are going to install Windows 11, Then install it only on supported devices and it is not recommended to use tools/scripts that are available online to bypass the requirements which totally breaks the security of Windows 11 which it is aimed for.
+
+    Never download **Pirated ISO Files**
+
+*[GP]: Group Policy
+*[VBS]: Virtualization-Based Security
+*[HVCI]: Hypervisor-Protected Code Integrity
+*[AME]: Ameliorated
+*[P2P]: Peer-to-Peer

docs/os/windows/privacy.md

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+---
+title: Privacy in Windows
+icon: material/incognito
+---
+
+## Using Microsoft account
+
+You should never sign-in to Windows with a Microsoft account. Signing-in to applications like Microsoft Office (which some users are required to do for their school or company) will trigger a dark pattern offering you to sign in to Windows, which will connect your device to your Microsoft account, and make it easier to send data to Microsoft servers and it is critical to reject this offer.
+
+It’s worth noting that according to [this study](https://www.autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/sites/default/files/atoms/files/public_version_dutch_dpa_informal_translation_summary_of_investigation_report.pdf) it seems that Windows collects more telemetry when signed into a Microsoft Account.
+
+![Using account for specific app](../../assets/img/windows/signin-one-app.webp)
+
+You should log in to that specific app only if you need to.
+
+or 
+
+Create another standard user account and connect it to Microsoft account if you are required for School or Work and keep the apps to that account alone. By restricting other data drive access, it is fully isolated from other profiles.
+
+## Telemetry
+
+To disable telemetry at full level, Open Group policy and navigate to `Computer Configuration` > `Administrative Templates` > `Windows Components` > `Data Collection and Preview builds` and choose as required
+
+![Disable telemtry](../../assets/img/windows/disable-telemetry.webp)
+
+The above works only if you use Enterprise or Education edition. If Professional, It will send required (Basic) data.
+
+If you read this article - [https://www.softscheck.com/en/blog/windows-10-enterprise-telemetry-analysis/](https://www.softscheck.com/en/blog/windows-10-enterprise-telemetry-analysis/), Enterprise even sends data even though telemetry is disabled. But there is no updated info about this available.
+
+Disabling full telemtry or sending basic data to Microsoft is totally upto the user's threat model.
+
+- [ ] Disable `Automatic Sample Submission` in Windows Defender will send your files as a sample for Signature Database and might leak your data. You can do it via the below Group Policy so to not prompt you again and again constantly.
+    ```
+    Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Microsoft Defender Antivirus > MAPS > Send file samples when further analysis is required to Never Send.
+    ```
+
+- [ ] Disable Windows spotlight by navigating to `User Configuration` > `Administrative Templates` > `Windows Components` > `Cloud Content` and setting **Turn off all Windows Spotlight features** policy to disabled.
+        !!! note
+        This explicitly disables Windows spotlight features in Lockscreen and Desktop to severe unnecessary between Microsoft servers and the device.
+
+- [ ] Disable in Bing integration in Windows search, by navigating to `Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Search\Don't search the web or display web results`. This way your search queries for local indexed data is not sent to Microsoft.
+
+- [ ] Disable notification in the Lock screen in Windows settings
+    ![Lock screen notification](../../assets/img/windows/lock-screen-notifications.webp)
+
+- [ ] Disable Online Speech recognition and Voice activation
+        ![Alt text](/docs/assets/img/windows/online-speech.webp)
+        ![Alt text](../../assets/img/windows/voice-activation.webp)
+
+- [ ] Disable delivery optimization in Windows Update settings.
+
+- Check all the App permissions and allow only necessary ones.
+
+## Hide MAC Address
+
+Go to `Settings` > `Network & Internet` > `Wifi`
+
+Enable **Random hardware addresses**
+
+## Restrict access to data drives
+
+To prevent other users from accessing your secondary data drives. Type `gpedit.msc` in Windows Run dialog box.
+
+Go to `User Configuration` > `Administrative Templates` > `Windows Components` > `File Explorer` and set the Group Policy as below.
+
+![Restrict-drive](../../assets/img/windows/drive-restriction.webp)
+
+The above configuration will restrict other users to the OS drive where Windows is installed. Making total isolation between your Account and other user account.
+
+If it's a shared drive with another person but you don't want the user to access sensitive data then use EFS. EFS encrypts the documents so that the user who encrypted it can only access it and not others.
+
+![EFS](../../assets/img/windows/EFS.gif)
+
+It is better to export the Private key certificate and store in a safe place so as to use the file later in other devices. To do so,
+
+Press, ++win+r++, Then type `certmgr.msc`, Under `Personal` > `Certificates`. Click the certificate that contains your username. Right Click and choose export. If you find this too tricky, then after using EFS for first time. You will see an encrypted locker Icon in system tray which help you in exporting on clicking it.
+
+To import in another device, simply open and install this certificate in that device and choose the above location. Then you can access EFS encrypted files in other system too.
+
+*[EFS]: Encrypted File System

docs/os/windows/sandboxing.md

@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+---
+title: Application Sandboxing
+icon: octicons/apps-16
+---
+
+## Native Application Sandboxing
+
+### Application Packaging by Windows
+
+Windows has two types of application packaging such as `.exe`/`.msi` (Win32) and `.appx`/`.msix` (UWA).
+
+#### Universal Windows Application (UWA)
+
+UWAs are processes that operate within the `AppContainer` is an application sandbox environment, which implements mechanisms for the restriction of `AppContainer` processes in terms of what system resources they can access. Basically, Application that is fully isolated and only given access to certain resources.
+
+#### Win32 Apps
+
+Win32 is the application platform of choice for developing and running classic Windows applications, that 
+is, Win32 applications, that require direct access to Windows and hardware. 
+
+The core of Win32 is the Win32 API implemented in the Windows SubDLLs (DLLs) and the ntdll.dll library file. With the combination of `SubDLLs` and `ntdll.dll`, the Win32 application has direct access to full system resources.
+
+#### A comparison between UWA and Win32
+
+| UWAs    | Windows |
+| :--------- | :---------------------------------- |
+|UWAs run as restricted, containerized `AppContainer` processes that run by accessing the WinRT API, a subset of COM functionalities and the Win32 API. They have specific properties that define process restrictions in terms of the system resources that processes can access.| Win32 applications run as Windows native, traditional processes that run by accessing the Win32 API and COM functionalities to their full extent and a subset of the WinRT API to directly access all system resources. They do not run as restricted processes, all system functionalities are by design directly available to them.|
+|Only a single instance of a given UWA may run at a given time. | Any number of instances of a given Win32 application may run simultaneously.
+|UWAs are distributed as application packages, archive files with a pre-defined format and required content that is necessary for the deployment and operation of UWAs |The way in which Win32 applications are distributed is not restricted by the operating system. It is defined by the application vendors.
+
+The above comparison gives a clear cut that UWA/UWP apps are the best ones to use in terms of sandboxing the app.
+
+
+### Choosing the way to install software
+
+UWA apps are primarily distributed through Microsoft store and are counter-signed by Microsoft while as third party UWA's are signed by the vendor without Microsoft's signature.
+
+It is recommended to use the UWA apps as they are sandboxed into their own containers.
+
+And for Win32 apps. If you are required to use Win32 apps. Install the application in the host and run it using [Windows Sandbox](/windows/sandboxing/#run-programs-instantly-in-sandbox).
+
+It is **recommended** to install in host and use in Sandbox to reduce your time installing the software again and again in Windows Sandbox.
+
+### Finding Win32 and UWP apps in Windows Store
+
+Generally, apps available in Microsoft store was UWP only before Windows 11 was launched but after the launch both Win32 and UWP apps co-exist in the store.
+
+At this point, it is difficult to differentiate between Win32 and UWP apps. To find which is UWP or Win32. Read below:
+
+When you see an app in store and scroll down to *Additional Information*  section and see if it asks for certain permissions like in the image below:
+
+![UWP in store](../../assets/img/windows/UWP-in-MS-Store.webp)
+
+If the Win32 App, Microsoft store will explicitly state that it is`Provided and Updated by `****` ` and `Uses all System resources` as in the image below:
+
+![Win32 in store](../../assets/img/windows/Win32-in-MS-Store.webp)
+
+!!! note "Un-sandboxed UWP apps"
+    Some UWP apps in the store due to the lift of restrictions in Microsoft store developers can submit the app with a property named `runFullTrust` which disables sandboxing of that UWP application and shows that `Uses all System Resources` in *Additional Information* section such as Firefox. By this you can know if a UWP app is sandboxed or not.
+
+    If it is sandboxed, it will show only certain permissions in *Additional Information* section.
+
+!!! abstract "Note"
+    Most apps will ask that if the app needs to be used for all users or just for your user account. It is best you keep the app to your user Account. So, We achieve better sandboxing between different user accounts.
+
+##### Another way to find
+
+[rg-adguard.net](https://store.rg-adguard.net/) is a third party Microsoft store app which can be used to download `.appx` files (Installer for UWP) and install UWP apps. You can use this site to download Age Restricted apps in store and Install it. **Note** that paid apps don't work unless you connect a Microsoft Account.
+
+
+## Using Winget to Install Sofware
+
+Windows Package Manager winget command-line tool is bundled with Windows 11 and modern versions of Windows 10 by default as the App Installer.
+
+The winget command line tool enables users to discover, install, upgrade, remove and configure applications on Windows 10 and Windows 11 computers. This tool is the client interface to the Windows Package Manager service.
+
+More information here : [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/package-manager/winget/](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/package-manager/winget/)
+
+The Winget tool is a powerful tool to install apps that are safe, trusted and official ones. This should be used to avoid sketchy installers.
+
+Even you have apps installed via the traditional installer setup. You can continue using winget
+
+A Quick demo by ThioJoe - [https://youtu.be/uxr7m8wDeGA](https://youtu.be/uxr7m8wDeGA)
+
+Detailed info about the tool by Microsoft - [https://youtu.be/Lk1gbe_JTpY](https://youtu.be/Lk1gbe_JTpY)
+
+If you understood about Winget, then this tool - [https://winstall.app/](https://winstall.app/) is suggested to bulk install apps.
+
+Note : Be sure to install via Winget or using MSI installer to upgrade the app easily.
+
+#### Benefits of winget
+
+There are general advantages in having a package manager regardless of the operating system.
+
+- Security : The packages that the package manager includes are usually safe because they’re verified by maintainers.
+- Automation : It’s easier to install or uninstall N applications using a package manager. No need to do it manually.
+- Maintenance : With a package manager usually you can update all your applications, including configurations.
+Exploration. Instead of searching manually in a browser for an application you can use the package manager. Since it’s centralized it should be easier to find what you want.
+
+## Windows Sandbox
+
+Windows Sandbox provides a lightweight desktop environment to safely run applications in isolation. Software installed inside the Windows Sandbox environment remains "sandboxed" and runs separately from the host machine.
+
+The sandbox is temporary like TailsOS running on a USB drive. When it's closed, all the software and files and the state are deleted. You get a brand-new instance of the sandbox every time you open it.
+
+You can know more from the Official [Documentation](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-sandbox/windows-sandbox-overview).
+
+
+**Use case of Sandbox:** The Windows Sandbox can be used to run unknown software or if you want to isolate your Workspace from the host with only Specific set of apps, etc.
+
+### Using Sandbox
+
+To use Sandbox, you can create a configuration file as per the official Microsoft [Documentation](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-sandbox/windows-sandbox-configure-using-wsb-file) for your needs.
+
+So, when opening the file, sandbox opens with the Configurations you had set up in your file.
+
+If you do not understand the documentation, you can use [Windows Sandbox Editor](https://github.com/damienvanrobaeys/Windows_Sandbox_Editor) instead. It is a GUI application that can be used to create configuration files easily.
+
+??? note "Regarding Windows Sandbox Editor"
+    The repository doesn't provide a package. So, you need to download the whole codebase. After, extracting the zip Windows Defender or other Antivirus software may flag the [exe](https://github.com/damienvanrobaeys/Windows_Sandbox_Editor/tree/master/EXE) file as a malware. So, it is recommended to install it via the [Powershell Script](https://github.com/damienvanrobaeys/Windows_Sandbox_Editor/tree/master/Install%20on%20desktop%20(in%20case%20of%20issue%20with%20EXE)) they provide.
+
+    By default, You cannot execute Scripts in Powershell and it is restricted to commands only. It is recommend you allow the Terminal to `Unrestricted` mode and use it to install the editor via Script after that change it back to `Restricted` [execution policy](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_execution_policies?view=powershell-7.2) to prevent accidental execution of malicious scripts in the future.
+
+### Run programs instantly in Sandbox
+
+[Run in Sandbox](https://github.com/damienvanrobaeys/Run-in-Sandbox) is a tool to quickly run files in Windows Sandbox with a right click.
+
+We recommend you to use this software as it is convenient and easy to use and even credited by Microsoft. 
+
+A full guide on How to use it can be found here: [https://www.systanddeploy.com/2021/11/run-in-sandbox-quick-way-to-runextract.html](https://www.systanddeploy.com/2021/11/run-in-sandbox-quick-way-to-runextract.html)
+
+Note: The same note of installing sandbox editor via PowerShell also applies here except this doesn't provide an `exe` at all.
+
+This page is based on the German BSI project - [SiSyPHuS Win10](https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN/Topics/Cyber-Security/Recommendations/SiSyPHuS_Win10/SiSyPHuS_node.html)'s Work Package 9 Dcoument.
+
+**For Advanced Users :**
+
+Sandboxie Plus, is a Sandboxing tool which uses File system and registry Virtualization techniques to sandbox every apps and at the same data not being lost like Windows Sandbox.
+
+Use this at your own Risk !
+
+*[UWA]:Universal Windows Applications
+*[UWP]:Universal Windows Platform
+*[SubDLLs]: Subsystem Dynamic link libraries
+*[ntdll.dll]: A core Windows library file that implements functions for interaction with the kernel.
+*[WinRT]: Windows Runtime
+*[COM]: Component Object Model

docs/passwords.md

@@ -2,118 +2,6 @@
 title: "Password Managers"
 icon: material/form-textbox-password
 description: Password managers allow you to securely store and manage passwords and other credentials.
-schema:
-  - 
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": WebPage
-    name: Password Manager Recommendations
-    url: "./"
-  - 
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": SoftwareApplication
-    name: Bitwarden
-    image: /assets/img/password-management/bitwarden.svg
-    url: https://bitwarden.com
-    sameAs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitwarden
-    applicationCategory: Password Manager
-    operatingSystem:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-      - Android
-      - iOS
-    subjectOf:
-      "@context": http://schema.org
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
-  - 
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": SoftwareApplication
-    name: 1Password
-    image: /assets/img/password-management/1password.svg
-    url: https://1password.com
-    sameAs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1Password
-    applicationCategory: Password Manager
-    operatingSystem:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-      - Android
-      - iOS
-    subjectOf:
-      "@context": http://schema.org
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
-  - 
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": SoftwareApplication
-    name: Psono
-    image: /assets/img/password-management/psono.svg
-    url: https://psono.com
-    applicationCategory: Password Manager
-    operatingSystem:
-      - Android
-      - iOS
-    subjectOf:
-      "@context": http://schema.org
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
-  - 
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": SoftwareApplication
-    name: KeePassXC
-    image: /assets/img/password-management/keepassxc.svg
-    url: https://keepassxc.org/
-    sameAs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KeePassXC
-    applicationCategory: Password Manager
-    operatingSystem:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-    subjectOf:
-      "@context": http://schema.org
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
-  - 
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": SoftwareApplication
-    name: KeePassDX
-    image: /assets/img/password-management/keepassdx.svg
-    url: https://www.keepassdx.com/
-    applicationCategory: Password Manager
-    operatingSystem: Android
-    subjectOf:
-      "@context": http://schema.org
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
-  - 
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": SoftwareApplication
-    name: Strongbox
-    image: /assets/img/password-management/strongbox.svg
-    url: https://strongboxsafe.com/
-    applicationCategory: Password Manager
-    operatingSystem: iOS
-    subjectOf:
-      "@context": http://schema.org
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
-  - 
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": SoftwareApplication
-    name: gopass
-    image: /assets/img/password-management/gopass.svg
-    url: https://www.gopass.pw/
-    applicationCategory: Password Manager
-    operatingSystem:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-      - FreeBSD
-    subjectOf:
-      "@context": http://schema.org
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
 ---
 Password managers allow you to securely store and manage passwords and other credentials with the use of a master password.
 

docs/tools.md

@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ For more details about each project, why they were chosen, and additional tips o
 
 <div class="grid cards" markdown>
 
-- ![Mullvad Browser logo](assets/img/browsers/mullvad_browser.svg){ .twemoji } [Mullvad Browser](desktop-browsers.md#mullvad-browser)
 - ![Firefox logo](assets/img/browsers/firefox.svg){ .twemoji } [Firefox](desktop-browsers.md#firefox)
 - ![Brave logo](assets/img/browsers/brave.svg){ .twemoji } [Brave](desktop-browsers.md#brave)
 
@@ -277,7 +276,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
 
 <div class="grid cards" markdown>
 
-- ![Monero logo](assets/img/cryptocurrency/monero.svg){ .twemoji } [Monero](cryptocurrency.md#monero)
+- ![Monero logo](assets/img/cryptocurrency/monero.svg){ .twemoji }[Monero](cryptocurrency.md#monero)
 
 </div>
 

docs/tor.md

@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ The Tor Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting, or identifying you based
         - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/orbot/id1609461599)
         - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
 
-We previously recommended enabling the *Isolate Destination Address* preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
+For resistance against traffic analysis attacks, consider enabling *Isolate Destination Address* in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Connectivity**. This will use a completely different Tor Circuit (different middle relay and exit nodes) for every domain you connect to.
 
 !!! tip "Tips for Android"
 
@@ -115,5 +115,3 @@ We previously recommended enabling the *Isolate Destination Address* preference
 Snowflake does not increase your privacy in any way, nor is it used to connect to the Tor network within your personal browser. However, if your internet connection is uncensored, you should consider running it to help people in censored networks achieve better privacy themselves. There is no need to worry about which websites people are accessing through your proxy—their visible browsing IP address will match their Tor exit node, not yours.
 
 Running a Snowflake proxy is low-risk, even moreso than running a Tor relay or bridge which are already not particularly risky endeavours. However, it does still proxy traffic through your network which can be impactful in some ways, especially if your network is bandwidth-limited. Make sure you understand [how Snowflake works](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/wikis/home) before deciding whether to run a proxy.
-
-[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.

docs/vpn.md

@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ With the VPN providers we recommend we like to see responsible marketing.
 Must not have any marketing which is irresponsible:
 
 - Making guarantees of protecting anonymity 100%. When someone makes a claim that something is 100% it means there is no certainty for failure. We know people can quite easily deanonymize themselves in a number of ways, e.g.:
-    - Reusing personal information (e.g., email accounts, unique pseudonyms, etc.) that they accessed without anonymity software (Tor, VPN, etc.)
+    - Reusing personal information (e.g., email accounts, unique pseudonyms, etc) that they accessed without anonymity software (Tor, VPN, etc.)
     - [Browser fingerprinting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint)
 - Claim that a single circuit VPN is "more anonymous" than Tor, which is a circuit of three or more hops that regularly changes.
 - Use responsible language: i.e., it is okay to say that a VPN is "disconnected" or "not connected", however claiming that someone is "exposed", "vulnerable" or "compromised" is needless use of alarming language that may be incorrect. For example, that person might simply be on another VPN provider's service or using Tor.

i18n/ar/404.md

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+---
+hide:
+  - feedback
+meta:
+  - 
+    property: "robots"
+    content: "noindex, nofollow"
+---
+
+# 404 - غير متوفر
+
+لم نتمكن من العثور على الصفحة التي تبحث عنها! ربما كنت تبحث عن واحد من هؤلاء؟
+
+- [مقدمة إلى نمذجة التهديدات](basics/threat-modeling.md)
+- [خوادِم DNS الموصى بها](dns.md)
+- [أفضل متصفحات الويب للكمبيوتر](desktop-browsers.md)
+- [Best VPN Providers](vpn.md)
+- [Privacy Guides Forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net)
+- [Our Blog](https://blog.privacyguides.org)

i18n/ar/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# Community Code of Conduct
+
+**We pledge** to make our community a harassment-free experience for everyone.
+
+**We strive** to create a positive environment, using welcoming and inclusive language, and being respectful of the viewpoints of others.
+
+**We do not allow** inappropriate or otherwise unacceptable behavior, such as sexualized language, trolling and insulting comments, or otherwise promoting intolerance or harassment.
+
+## Community Standards
+
+What we expect from members of our communities:
+
+1. **Don't spread misinformation**
+
+      We are creating an evidence-based educational community around information privacy and security, not a home for conspiracy theories. For example, when making a claim that a certain piece of software is malicious or that certain telemetry data is privacy invasive, explain in detail what is collected and how it collected. Claims of this nature must be backed by technical evidence.
+
+1. **Don't abuse our willingness to help**
+
+      Our community members are not your free tech support. We are happy to help you with specific steps on your privacy journey if you are willing to put in effort on your end. We are not willing to answer endlessly repeated questions about generic computer problems you could have answered yourself with a 30-second internet search. Don't be a [help vampire](https://slash7.com/2006/12/22/vampires/).
+
+1. **Behave in a positive and constructive manner**
+
+      Examples of behavior that contributes to a positive environment for our community include:
+
+      - Demonstrating empathy and kindness toward other people
+      - Being respectful of differing opinions, viewpoints, and experiences
+      - Giving and gracefully accepting constructive feedback
+      - Accepting responsibility and apologizing to those affected by our mistakes, and learning from the experience
+      - Focusing on what is best not just for us as individuals, but for the overall community
+
+### Unacceptable Behavior
+
+The following behaviors are considered harassment and are unacceptable within our community:
+
+- The use of sexualized language or imagery, and sexual attention or advances of any kind
+- Trolling, insulting or derogatory comments, and personal or political attacks
+- Public or private harassment
+- Publishing others' private information, such as a physical or email address, without their explicit permission
+- Other conduct which could reasonably be considered inappropriate in a professional setting
+
+## Scope
+
+Our Code of Conduct applies within all project spaces, as well as when an individual is representing the Privacy Guides project in other communities.
+
+We are responsible for clarifying the standards of our community, and have the right to remove or alter the comments of those participating within our community, as necessary and at our discretion.
+
+### Contact
+
+If you observe a problem on a platform like Matrix or Reddit, please contact our moderators on that platform in chat, via DM, or through any designated "Modmail" system.
+
+If you have a problem elsewhere, or a problem our community moderators are unable to resolve, reach out to `jonah@privacyguides.org` and/or `dngray@privacyguides.org`.
+
+All community leaders are obligated to respect the privacy and security of the reporter of any incident.

i18n/ar/about/criteria.md

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+---
+title: General Criteria
+---
+
+!!! example "Work in Progress"
+
+    The following page is a work in progress, and does not reflect the full criteria for our recommendations at this time. Past discussion on this topic: [#24](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/discussions/24)
+
+Below are some things that must apply to all submissions to Privacy Guides. Each category will have additional requirements for inclusion.
+
+## Financial Disclosure
+
+We do not make money from recommending certain products, we do not use affiliate links, and we do not provide special consideration to project donors.
+
+## General Guidelines
+
+We apply these priorities when considering new recommendations:
+
+- **Secure**: Tools should follow security best-practices wherever applicable.
+- **Source Availability**: Open source projects are generally preferred over equivalent proprietary alternatives.
+- **Cross-Platform**: We typically prefer recommendations to be cross-platform, to avoid vendor lock-in.
+- **Active Development**: The tools that we recommend should be actively developed, unmaintained projects will be removed in most cases.
+- **Usability**: Tools should be accessible to most computer users, an overly technical background should not be required.
+- **Documented**: Tools should have clear and extensive documentation for use.
+
+## Developer Self-Submissions
+
+We have these requirements in regard to developers which wish to submit their project or software for consideration.
+
+- Must disclose affiliation, i.e. your position within the project being submitted.
+
+- Must have a security whitepaper if it is a project that involves handling of sensitive information like a messenger, password manager, encrypted cloud storage etc.
+    - Third party audit status. We want to know if you have one, or have one planned. If possible please mention who will be conducting the audit.
+
+- Must explain what the project brings to the table in regard to privacy.
+    - Does it solve any new problem?
+    - Why should anyone use it over the alternatives?
+
+- Must state what the exact threat model is with their project.
+    - It should be clear to potential users what the project can provide, and what it cannot.

i18n/ar/about/donate.md

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+---
+title: قم بدعمنا
+---
+
+<!-- markdownlint-disable MD036 -->
+It takes a lot of [people](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors) and [work](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/pulse/monthly) to keep Privacy Guides up to date and spreading the word about privacy and mass surveillance. If you like what we do, consider getting involved by [editing the site](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org) or [contributing translations](https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides).
+
+If you want to support us financially, the most convenient method for us is contributing via Open Collective, a website operated by our fiscal host. Open Collective accepts payments via credit/debit card, PayPal, and bank transfers.
+
+[Donate on OpenCollective.com](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/donate ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+Donations made directly to us on Open Collective are generally tax-deductible in the US, because our fiscal host (the Open Collective Foundation) is a registered 501(c)3 organization. You will receive a receipt from the Open Collective Foundation after donating. Privacy Guides does not provide financial advice, and you should contact your tax advisor to find out whether this is applicable to you.
+
+If you already make use of GitHub sponsorships, you can also sponsor our organization there.
+
+[Sponsor us on GitHub](https://github.com/sponsors/privacyguides ""){.md-button}
+
+## Backers
+
+A special thanks to all those who support our mission! :heart:
+
+*Please note: This section loads a widget directly from Open Collective. This section does not reflect donations made outside of Open Collective, and we have no control over the specific donors featured in this section.*
+
+<script src="https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/banner.js"></script>
+
+## How We Use Donations
+
+Privacy Guides is a **non-profit** organization. We use donations for a variety of purposes, including:
+
+**Domain Registrations**
+:
+
+We have a few domain names like `privacyguides.org` which cost us around $10 yearly to maintain their registration.
+
+**Web Hosting**
+:
+
+Traffic to this website uses hundreds of gigabytes of data per month, we use a variety of service providers to keep up with this traffic.
+
+**Online Services**
+:
+
+We host [internet services](https://privacyguides.net) for testing and showcasing different privacy-products we like and [recommend](../tools.md). Some of which are made publicly available for our community's use (SearXNG, Tor, etc.), and some are provided for our team members (email, etc.).
+
+**Product Purchases**
+:
+
+We occasionally purchase products and services for the purposes of testing our [recommended tools](../tools.md).
+
+We are still working with our fiscal host (the Open Collective Foundation) to receive cryptocurrency donations, at the moment the accounting is unfeasible for many smaller transactions, but this should change in the future. In the meantime, if you wish to make a sizable (> $100) cryptocurrency donation, please reach out to [jonah@privacyguides.org](mailto:jonah@privacyguides.org).

i18n/ar/about/index.md

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+---
+template: schema.html
+title: "About Privacy Guides"
+description: Privacy Guides is a socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy.
+---
+
+![Privacy Guides logo](../assets/brand/png/square/pg-yellow.png){ align=right }
+
+**Privacy Guides** is a socially motivated website that provides [information](/kb) for protecting your data security and privacy. We are a non-profit collective operated entirely by volunteer [team members](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/g/team) and contributors. Our website is free of advertisements and not affiliated with any listed providers.
+
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://www.privacyguides.org/){ .card-link title=Homepage }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](donate.md){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+The purpose of Privacy Guides is to educate our community on the importance of privacy online and government programs internationally that are designed to monitor all of your online activities.
+
+> To find [privacy-focused alternative] apps, check out sites like Good Reports and **Privacy Guides**, which list privacy-focused apps in a variety of categories, notably including email providers (usually on paid plans) that aren’t run by the big tech companies.
+
+— [New York Times](https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/guides/online-security-social-media-privacy/)
+
+> If you're looking for a new VPN, you can go to the discount code of just about any podcast. If you are looking for a **good** VPN, you need professional help. The same goes for email clients, browsers, operating systems and password managers. How do you know which of these is the best, most privacy-friendly option? For that there is **Privacy Guides**, a platform on which a number of volunteers search day in, day out for the best privacy-friendly tools to use on the internet.
+
+— [Tweakers.net](https://tweakers.net/reviews/10568/op-zoek-naar-privacyvriendelijke-tools-niek-de-wilde-van-privacy-guides.html) [Translated from Dutch]
+
+Also featured on: [Ars Technica](https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2022/02/is-firefox-ok/), [Wirecutter](https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/guides/practical-guide-to-securing-windows-pc/) [[2](https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/guides/practical-guide-to-securing-your-mac/)], and [Wired](https://www.wired.com/story/firefox-mozilla-2022/).
+
+## History
+
+Privacy Guides was launched in September 2021 as a continuation of the [defunct](privacytools.md) "PrivacyTools" open-source educational project. We recognized the importance of independent, criteria-focused product recommendations and general knowledge in the privacy space, which is why we needed to preserve the work that had been created by so many contributors since 2015 and make sure that information had a stable home on the web indefinitely.
+
+In 2022, we completed the transition of our main website framework from Jekyll to MkDocs, using the `mkdocs-material` documentation software. This change made open-source contributions to our site significantly easier for outsiders, because instead of needing to know complicated syntax to write posts effectively, contributing is now as easy as writing a standard Markdown document.
+
+We additionally launched our new discussion forum at [discuss.privacyguides.net](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/) as a community platform to share ideas and ask questions about our mission. This augments our existing community on Matrix, and replaced our previous GitHub Discussions platform, decreasing our reliance on proprietary discussion platforms.
+
+So far in 2023 we've launched international translations of our website in [French](/fr/), [Hebrew](/he/), and [Dutch](/nl/), with more languages on the way, made possible by our excellent translation team on [Crowdin](https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides). We plan to continue carrying forward our mission of outreach and education, and finding ways to more clearly highlight the dangers of a lack of privacy awareness in the modern digital age, and the prevalence and harms of security breaches across the technology industry.
+
+## Our Team
+
+??? person "@jonah"
+
+    - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/jonah)
+    - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/jonaharagon "@jonaharagon")
+    - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@jonah "@jonah@neat.computer"){rel=me}
+    - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Homepage](https://www.jonaharagon.com)
+
+??? person "@niek-de-wilde"
+
+    - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/Niek-de-Wilde)
+    - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/blacklight447 "@blacklight447")
+    - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.social/@blacklight447 "@blacklight447@mastodon.social"){rel=me}
+
+??? person "@dngray"
+
+    - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/dngray)
+    - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/dngray "@dngray")
+    - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.social/@dngray "@dngray@mastodon.social"){rel=me}
+    - [:fontawesome-solid-envelope: Email](mailto:dngray@privacyguides.org)
+
+??? person "@freddy"
+
+    - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/freddy)
+    - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/freddy-m "@freddy-m")
+    - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://social.lol/@freddy "@freddy@social.lol"){rel=me}
+    - [:fontawesome-solid-envelope: Email](mailto:freddy@privacyguides.org)
+    - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Homepage](https://freddy.omg.lol)
+
+??? person "@mfwmyfacewhen"
+
+    - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/mfwmyfacewhen)
+    - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/mfwmyfacewhen "@mfwmyfacewhen")
+    - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Homepage](https://mfw.omg.lol)
+
+??? person "@olivia"
+
+    - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/olivia)
+    - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/hook9 "@hook9")
+    - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@oliviablob "@oliviablob@neat.computer"){rel=me}
+
+Additionally, [many people](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors) have made contributions to the project. You can too, we're open sourced on GitHub, and accepting translation suggestions on [Crowdin](https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides).
+
+Our team members review all changes made to the website and handle administrative duties such as web hosting and financials, however they do not personally profit from any contributions made to this site. Our financials are transparently hosted by the Open Collective Foundation 501(c)(3) at [opencollective.com/privacyguides](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides). Donations to Privacy Guides are generally tax-deductible in the United States.
+
+## Site License
+
+*The following is a human-readable summary of (and not a substitute for) the [license](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE):*
+
+:fontawesome-brands-creative-commons: :fontawesome-brands-creative-commons-by: :fontawesome-brands-creative-commons-nd: Unless otherwise noted, the original content on this website is made available under the [Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE). This means that you are free to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format for any purpose, even commercially; as long as you give appropriate credit to `Privacy Guides (www.privacyguides.org)` and provide a link to the license. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests Privacy Guides endorses you or your use. If you remix, transform, or build upon the content of this website, you may not distribute the modified material.
+
+This license is in place to prevent people from sharing our work without giving proper credit, and to prevent people from modifying our work in a way that could be used to mislead people. If you find the terms of this license too restrictive for the project you're working on, please reach out to us at `jonah@privacyguides.org`. We are happy to provide alternative licensing options for well-intentioned projects in the privacy space!

i18n/ar/about/notices.md

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+---
+title: "Notices and Disclaimers"
+hide:
+  - toc
+---
+
+## Legal Disclaimer
+
+Privacy Guides is not a law firm. As such, the Privacy Guides website and contributors are not providing legal advice. The material and recommendations in our website and guides do not constitute legal advice nor does contributing to the website or communicating with Privacy Guides or other contributors about our website create an attorney-client relationship.
+
+Running this website, like any human endeavor, involves uncertainty and trade-offs. We hope this website helps, but it may include mistakes and can’t address every situation. If you have any questions about your situation, we encourage you to do your own research, seek out other experts, and engage in discussions with the Privacy Guides community. If you have any legal questions, you should consult with your own legal counsel before moving forward.
+
+Privacy Guides is an open source project contributed to under licenses that include terms that, for the protection of the website and its contributors, make clear that the Privacy Guides project and website is offered "as-is", without warranty, and disclaiming liability for damages resulting from using the website or any recommendations contained within. Privacy Guides does not warrant or make any representations concerning the accuracy, likely results, or reliability of the use of the materials on the website or otherwise relating to such materials on the website or on any third-party sites linked on this site.
+
+Privacy Guides additionally does not warrant that this website will be constantly available, or available at all.
+
+## Licenses
+
+Unless otherwise noted, all content on this website is made available under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE).
+
+This does not include third-party code embedded in this repository, or code where a superseding license is otherwise noted. The following are notable examples, but this list may not be all-inclusive:
+
+* [MathJax](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/docs/assets/javascripts/mathjax.js) is licensed under the [Apache License 2.0](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/docs/assets/javascripts/LICENSE.mathjax.txt).
+
+Portions of this notice itself were adopted from [opensource.guide](https://github.com/github/opensource.guide/blob/master/notices.md) on GitHub. That resource and this page itself are released under [CC-BY-4.0](https://github.com/github/opensource.guide/blob/master/LICENSE).
+
+This means that you can use the human-readable content in this repository for your own project, per the terms outlined in the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License text. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests Privacy Guides endorses you or your use. You **may not** use the Privacy Guides branding in your own project without express approval from this project. Privacy Guides's brand trademarks include the "Privacy Guides" wordmark and shield logo.
+
+We believe that the logos and other images in `assets` obtained from third-party providers are either in the public domain or **fair use**. In a nutshell, legal [fair use doctrine](https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/more-info.html) allows the use of copyrighted images in order to identify the subject matter for purposes of public comment. However, these logos and other images may still be subject to trademark laws in one or more jurisdictions. Before using this content, please ensure that it is used to identify the entity or organization that owns the trademark and that you have the right to use it under the laws which apply in the circumstances of your intended use. *When copying content from this website, you are solely responsible for ensuring that you do not infringe someone else's trademark or copyright.*
+
+When you contribute to this repository you are doing so under the above licenses, and you are granting Privacy Guides a perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive, transferable, royalty-free, irrevocable license with the right to sublicense such rights through multiple tiers of sublicensees, to reproduce, modify, display, perform and distribute your contribution as part of our project.
+
+## Acceptable Use
+
+You may not use this website in any way that causes or may cause damage to the website or impairment of the availability or accessibility of Privacy Guides, or in any way which is unlawful, illegal, fraudulent, harmful, or in connection with any unlawful, illegal, fraudulent, or harmful purpose or activity.
+
+You must not conduct any systematic or automated data collection activities on or in relation to this website without express written consent, including:
+
+* Excessive Automated Scans
+* Denial of Service Attacks
+* Scraping
+* Data Mining
+* 'Framing' (IFrames)

i18n/ar/about/privacy-policy.md

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+---
+title: "Privacy Policy"
+---
+
+Privacy Guides is a community project operated by a number of active volunteer contributors. The public list of team members [can be found on GitHub](https://github.com/orgs/privacyguides/people).
+
+## Data We Collect From Visitors
+
+The privacy of our website visitors is important to us, so we do not track any individual people. As a visitor to our website:
+
+- No personal information is collected
+- No information such as cookies are stored in the browser
+- No information is shared with, sent to or sold to third-parties
+- No information is shared with advertising companies
+- No information is mined and harvested for personal and behavioral trends
+- No information is monetized
+
+You can view the data we collect on our [statistics](statistics.md) page.
+
+We run a self-hosted installation of [Plausible Analytics](https://plausible.io) to collect some anonymous usage data for statistical purposes. The goal is to track overall trends in our website traffic, it is not to track individual visitors. All the data is in aggregate only. No personal data is collected.
+
+Data collected includes referral sources, top pages, visit duration, information from the devices (device type, operating system, country and browser) used during the visit and more. You can learn more about how Plausible works and collects information in a privacy-respecting manner [here](https://plausible.io/data-policy).
+
+## Data We Collect From Account Holders
+
+On some websites and services we provide, many features may require an account. For example, an account may be required to post and reply to topics on a forum platform.
+
+To sign up for most accounts, we will collect a name, username, email, and password. In the event a website requires more information than just that data, that will be clearly marked and noted in a separate privacy statement per-site.
+
+We use your account data to identify you on the website and to create pages specific to you, such as your profile page. We will also use your account data to publish a public profile for you on our services.
+
+We use your email to:
+
+- Notify you about posts and other activity on the websites or services.
+- Reset your password and help keep your account secure.
+- Contact you in special circumstances related to your account.
+- Contact you about legal requests, such as DMCA takedown requests.
+
+On some websites and services you may provide additional information for your account, such as a short biography, avatar, your location, or your birthday. We make that information available to everyone who can access the website or service in question. This information is not required to use any of our services and can be erased at any time.
+
+We will store your account data as long as your account remains open. After closing an account, we may retain some or all of your account data in the form of backups or archives for up to 90 days.
+
+## Contacting Us
+
+The Privacy Guides team generally does not have access to personal data outside of limited access granted via some moderation panels. Inquiries regarding your personal information should be sent directly to:
+
+```text
+Jonah Aragon
+Services Administrator
+jonah@privacyguides.org
+```
+
+For all other inquiries, you can contact any member of our team.
+
+For complaints under GDPR more generally, you may lodge complaints with your local data protection supervisory authorities. In France it's the Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés which take care and handle the complaints. They provide a [template of complaint letter](https://www.cnil.fr/en/plaintes) to use.
+
+## About This Policy
+
+We will post any new versions of this statement [here](privacy-policy.md). We may change how we announce changes in future versions of this document. In the meantime we may update our contact information at any time without announcing a change. Please refer to the [Privacy Policy](privacy-policy.md) for the latest contact information at any time.
+
+A full revision [history](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/commits/main/docs/about/privacy-policy.md) of this page can be found on GitHub.

i18n/ar/about/privacytools.md

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+---
+title: "PrivacyTools FAQ"
+---
+
+# Why we moved on from PrivacyTools
+
+In September 2021, every active contributor unanimously agreed to move from PrivacyTools to work on this site: Privacy Guides. This decision was made because PrivacyTools’ founder and controller of the domain name had disappeared for an extended period of time and could not be contacted.
+
+Having built a reputable site and set of services on PrivacyTools.io, this caused grave concerns for the future of PrivacyTools, as any future disruption could wipe out the entire organization with no recovery method. This transition was communicated to the PrivacyTools community many months in advance via a variety of channels including its blog, Twitter, Reddit, and Mastodon to ensure the entire process went as smoothly as possible. We did this to ensure nobody was kept in the dark, which has been our modus operandi since our team was created, and to make sure Privacy Guides was recognized as the same reliable organization that PrivacyTools was before the transition.
+
+After the organizational move was completed, the founder of PrivacyTools returned and began to spread misinformation about the Privacy Guides project. They continue to spread misinformation in addition to operating a paid link farm on the PrivacyTools domain. We are creating this page to clear up any misconceptions.
+
+## What is PrivacyTools?
+
+PrivacyTools was created in 2015 by "BurungHantu," who wanted to make a privacy information resource - helpful tools following the Snowden revelations. The site grew into a flourishing open-source project with [many contributors](https://github.com/privacytools/privacytools.io/graphs/contributors), some eventually given various organizational responsibilities, such as operating online services like Matrix and Mastodon, managing and reviewing changes to the site on GitHub, finding sponsors for the project, writing blog posts and operating social media outreach platforms like Twitter, etc.
+
+Beginning in 2019, BurungHantu grew more and more distant from the active development of the website and communities, and began delaying payments he was responsible for related to the servers we operated. To avoid having our system administrator pay server costs out of their own pocket, we changed the donation methods listed on the site from BurungHantu's personal PayPal and crypto accounts to a new OpenCollective page on [October 31, 2019](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184557/https://blog.privacytools.io/privacytools-io-joins-the-open-collective-foundation/). This had the added benefits of making our finances completely transparent, a value we strongly believe in, and tax-deductible in the United States, because they were being held by the Open Collective Foundation 501(c)3. This change was unanimously agreed upon by the team and went uncontested.
+
+## Why We Moved On
+
+In 2020, BurungHantu's absence grew much more noticeable. At one point, we required the domain's nameservers to be changed to nameservers controlled by our system administrator to avoid future disruption, and this change was not completed for over a month after the initial request. He would disappear from the public chat and private team chat rooms on Matrix for months at a time, occasionally popping in to give some small feedback or promise to be more active before disappearing once again.
+
+In October 2020, the PrivacyTools system administrator (Jonah) [left](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190742/https://blog.privacytools.io/blacklight447-taking-over/) the project because of these difficulties, handing control to another long-time contributor. Jonah had been operating nearly every PrivacyTools service and acting as the *de facto* project lead for website development in BurungHantu's absence, thus his departure was a significant change to the organization. At the time, because of these significant organizational changes, BurungHantu promised the remaining team he would return to take control of the project going forward. ==The PrivacyTools team reached out via several communication methods over the following months, but did not receive any response.==
+
+## Domain Name Reliance
+
+At the beginning of 2021, the PrivacyTools team grew worried about the future of the project, because the domain name was set to expire on 1st March 2021. The domain was ultimately renewed by BurungHantu with no comment.
+
+The team’s concerns were not addressed, and we realized this would be a problem every year: If the domain expired it would have allowed it to be stolen by squatters or spammers, thus ruining the organization's reputation. We also would have had trouble reaching the community to inform them of what took place.
+
+Without being in any contact with BurungHantu, we decided the best course of action would be to move to a new domain name while we still had guaranteed control over the old domain name, sometime before March 2022. This way, we would be able to cleanly redirect all PrivacyTools resources to the new site without any interruption in service. This decision was made many months in advance and communicated to the entire team in the hopes that BurungHantu would reach out and assure his continued support for the project, because with a recognizable brand name and large communities online, moving away from "PrivacyTools" was the least desirable possible outcome.
+
+In mid-2021 the PrivacyTools team reached out to Jonah, who agreed to rejoin the team to help with the transition.
+
+## Community Call to Action
+
+At the end of July 2021, we [informed](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184422/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-future-of-privacytools/) the PrivacyTools community of our intention to choose a new name and continue the project on a new domain, to be [chosen](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190935/https://aragon.cloud/apps/forms/cMPxG9KyopapBbcw) on 2nd August 2022. In the end, "Privacy Guides" was selected, with the `privacyguides.org` domain already owned by Jonah for a side-project from 2020 that went undeveloped.
+
+## Control of r/privacytoolsIO
+
+Simultaneously with the ongoing website issues at privacytools.io, the r/privacytoolsIO moderation team was facing challenges with managing the subreddit. The subreddit had always been operated mostly independently of the website's development, but BurungHantu was the primary moderator of the subreddit as well, and he was the only moderator granted "Full Control" privileges. u/trai_dep was the only active moderator at the time, and [posted](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/comments/o9tllh/requesting_rprivacytoolsio_im_only_active_mod_top/) a request to Reddit's administrators on June 28, 2021, asking to be granted the primary moderator position and full control privileges, in order to make necessary changes to the Subreddit.
+
+Reddit requires that subreddits have active moderators. If the primary moderator is inactive for a lengthy period of time (such as a year) the primary moderation position can be re-appointed to the next moderator in line. For this request to have been granted, BurungHantu had to have been completely absent from all Reddit activity for a long period of time, which was consistent with his behaviors on other platforms.
+
+> If you were removed as moderator from a subreddit through Reddit request it is because your lack of response and lack of activity qualified the subreddit for an r/redditrequest transfer.
+> 
+> r/redditrequest is Reddit's way of making sure communities have active moderators and is part of the [Moderator Code of Conduct](https://www.redditinc.com/policies/moderator-code-of-conduct).
+
+## Beginning the Transition
+
+On September 14th, 2021, we [announced](https://www.privacyguides.org/blog/2021/09/14/welcome-to-privacy-guides/) the beginning of our migration to this new domain:
+
+> [...] we found it necessary to make this switch sooner rather than later to ensure people would find out about this transition as soon as possible. This gives us adequate time to transition the domain name, which is currently redirecting to www.privacyguides.org, and it hopefully gives everyone enough time to notice the change, update bookmarks and websites, etc.
+
+This change [entailed:](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pnhn4a/rprivacyguides_privacyguidesorg_what_you_need_to/)
+
+- Redirecting www.privacytools.io to [www.privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org).
+- Archiving the source code on GitHub to preserve our past work and issue tracker, which we continued to use for months of future development of this site.
+- Posting announcements to our subreddit and various other communities informing people of the official change.
+- Formally closing privacytools.io services, like Matrix and Mastodon, and encouraging existing users to migrate as soon as possible.
+
+Things appeared to be going smoothly, and most of our active community made the switch to our new project exactly as we hoped.
+
+## Following Events
+
+Roughly a week following the transition, BurungHantu returned online for the first time in nearly a year, however nobody on our team was willing to return to PrivacyTools because of his historic unreliability. Rather than apologize for his prolonged absence, he immediately went on the offensive and positioned the transition to Privacy Guides as an attack against him and his project. He subsequently [deleted](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/pp9yie/comment/hd49wbn) many of these posts when it was pointed out by the community that he had been absent and abandoned the project.
+
+At this point, BurungHantu claimed he wanted to continue working on privacytools.io on his own and requested that we remove the redirect from www.privacytools.io to [www.privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org). We obliged and requested that he keep the subdomains for Matrix, Mastodon, and PeerTube active for us to run as a public service to our community for at least a few months, in order to allow users on those platforms to easily migrate to other accounts. Due to the federated nature of the services we provided, they were tied to specific domain names making it very difficult to migrate (and in some cases impossible).
+
+Unfortunately, because control of the r/privacytoolsIO subreddit was not returned to BurungHantu at his demand (further information below), those subdomains were [cut off](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pymthv/comment/hexwrps/) at the beginning of October, ending any migration possibilities to any users still using those services.
+
+Following this, BurungHantu made false accusations about Jonah stealing donations from the project. BurungHantu had over a year since the alleged incident occurred, and yet he never made anyone aware of it until after the Privacy Guides migration. BurungHantu has been repeatedly asked for proof and to comment on the reason for his silence by the team [and the community](https://twitter.com/TommyTran732/status/1526153536962281474), and has not done so.
+
+BurungHantu also made a [twitter post](https://twitter.com/privacytoolsIO/status/1510560676967710728) alleging that an "attorney" had reached out to him on Twitter and was providing advice, in another attempt to bully us into giving him control of our subreddit, and as part of his smear campaign to muddy the waters surrounding the launch of Privacy Guides while pretending to be a victim.
+
+## PrivacyTools.io Now
+
+As of September 25th 2022 we are seeing BurungHantu's overall plans come to fruition on privacytools.io, and this is the very reason we decided to create this explainer page today. The website he is operating appears to be a heavily SEO-optimized version of the site which recommends tools in exchange for financial compensation. Very recently, IVPN and Mullvad, two VPN providers near-universally [recommended](../vpn.md) by the privacy community and notable for their stance against affiliate programs were removed from PrivacyTools. In their place? NordVPN, Surfshark, ExpressVPN, and hide.me; Giant VPN corporations with untrustworthy platforms and business practices, notorious for their aggressive marketing and affiliate programs.
+
+==**PrivacyTools has become exactly the type of site we [warned against](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729205249/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-reviews/) on the PrivacyTools blog in 2019.**== We've tried to keep our distance from PrivacyTools since the transition, but their continued harassment towards our project and now their absurd abuse of the credibility their brand gained over 6 years of open source contributions is extremely troubling to us. Those of us actually fighting for privacy are not fighting against each other, and are not getting our advice from the highest bidder.
+
+## r/privacytoolsIO Now
+
+After the launch of [r/PrivacyGuides](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacyguides), it was impractical for u/trai_dep to continue moderating both subreddits, and with the community on-board with the transition, r/privacytoolsIO was [made](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/qk7qrj/a_new_era_why_rptio_is_now_a_restricted_sub/) a restricted sub in a post on November 1st, 2021:
+
+> [...] The growth of this Sub was the result of great effort, across several years, by the PrivacyGuides.org team. And by every one of you.
+> 
+> A Subreddit is a great deal of work to administer and moderate. Like a garden, it requires patient tending and daily care. It’s not a task for dilettantes or commitment-challenged people. It can’t thrive under a gardener who abandons it for several years, then shows up demanding this year’s harvest as their tribute. It’s unfair to the team formed years ago. It’s unfair to you. [...]
+
+Subreddits do not belong to anybody, and they especially do not belong to brand-holders. They belong to their communities, and the community and its moderators made the decision to support the move to r/PrivacyGuides.
+
+In the months since, BurungHantu has threatened and begged for returning subreddit control to his account in [violation](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/wiki/top_mod_removal/) of Reddit rules:
+
+> Retaliation from any moderator with regards to removal requests is disallowed.
+
+For a community with many thousands of remaining subscribers, we feel that it would be incredibly disrespectful to return control of that massive platform to the person who abandoned it for over a year, and who now operates a website that we feel provides very low-quality information. Preserving the years of past discussions in that community is more important to us, and thus u/trai_dep and the rest of the subreddit moderation team has made the decision to keep r/privacytoolsIO as-is.
+
+## OpenCollective Now
+
+Our fundraising platform, OpenCollective, is another source of contention. Our position is that OpenCollective was put in place by our team and managed by our team to fund services we currently operate and which PrivacyTools no longer does. We [reached out](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/updates/transitioning-to-privacy-guides) to all of our donors regarding our move to Privacy Guides, and we were unanimously supported by our sponsors and community.
+
+Thus, the funds in OpenCollective belong to Privacy Guides, they were given to our project, and not the owner of a well known domain name. In the announcement made to donors on September 17th, 2021, we offered refunds to any donor who disagrees with the stance we took, but nobody has taken us up on this offer:
+
+> If any sponsors or backers disagree with or feel misled by these recent events and would like to request a refund given these highly unusual circumstances, please get in touch with our project admin by emailing jonah@triplebit.net.
+
+## Further Reading
+
+This topic has been discussed extensively within our communities in various locations, and it seems likely that most people reading this page will already be familiar with the events leading up to the move to Privacy Guides. Some of our previous posts on the matter may have extra detail we omitted here for brevity. They have been linked below for the sake of completion.
+
+- [June 28, 2021 request for control of r/privacytoolsIO](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/comments/o9tllh/requesting_rprivacytoolsio_im_only_active_mod_top/)
+- [July 27, 2021 announcement of our intentions to move on the PrivacyTools blog, written by the team](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184422/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-future-of-privacytools/)
+- [Sept 13, 2021 announcement of the beginning of our transition to Privacy Guides on r/privacytoolsIO](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/pnql46/rprivacyguides_privacyguidesorg_what_you_need_to/)
+- [Sept 17, 2021 announcement on OpenCollective from Jonah](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/updates/transitioning-to-privacy-guides)
+- [Sept 30, 2021 Twitter thread detailing most of the events now described on this page](https://twitter.com/privacy_guides/status/1443633412800225280)
+- [Oct 1, 2021 post by u/dng99 noting subdomain failure](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pymthv/comment/hexwrps/)
+- [Apr 2, 2022 response by u/dng99 to PrivacyTools' accusatory blog post](https://www.reddit.com/comments/tuo7mm/comment/i35kw5a/)
+- [May 16, 2022 response by @TommyTran732 on Twitter](https://twitter.com/TommyTran732/status/1526153497984618496)
+- [Sep 3, 2022 post on Techlore's forum by @dngray](https://discuss.techlore.tech/t/has-anyone-seen-this-video-wondering-your-thoughts/792/20)

i18n/ar/about/services.md

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# Privacy Guides Services
+
+We run a number of web services to test out features and promote cool decentralized, federated, and/or open-source projects. Many of these services are available to the public and are detailed below.
+
+[:material-comment-alert: Report an issue](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/services/2 ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+## Discourse
+
+- Domain: [discuss.privacyguides.net](https://discuss.privacyguides.net)
+- Availability: Public
+- Source: [github.com/discourse/discourse](https://github.com/discourse/discourse)
+
+## Gitea
+
+- Domain: [code.privacyguides.dev](https://code.privacyguides.dev)
+- Availability: Invite-Only  
+  Access may be granted upon request to any team working on *Privacy Guides*-related development or content.
+- Source: [snapcraft.io/gitea](https://snapcraft.io/gitea)
+
+## Matrix
+
+- Domain: [matrix.privacyguides.org](https://matrix.privacyguides.org)
+- Availability: Invite-Only  
+  Access may be granted upon request to Privacy Guides team members, Matrix moderators, third-party Matrix community administrators, Matrix bot operators, and other individuals in need of a reliable Matrix presence.
+- Source: [github.com/spantaleev/matrix-docker-ansible-deploy](https://github.com/spantaleev/matrix-docker-ansible-deploy)
+
+## SearXNG
+
+- Domain: [search.privacyguides.net](https://search.privacyguides.net)
+- Availability: Public
+- Source: [github.com/searxng/searxng-docker](https://github.com/searxng/searxng-docker)
+
+## Invidious
+
+- Domain: [invidious.privacyguides.net](https://invidious.privacyguides.net)
+- Availability: Semi-Public  
+  We host Invidious primarily to serve embedded YouTube videos on our website, this instance is not intended for general-purpose use and may be limited at any time.
+- Source: [github.com/iv-org/invidious](https://github.com/iv-org/invidious)

i18n/ar/about/statistics.md

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+---
+title: Traffic Statistics
+---
+
+## Website Statistics
+
+<iframe plausible-embed src="https://stats.privacyguides.net/share/privacyguides.org?auth=IxTl2wRhi3uxF09rd1NSn&embed=true&theme=system&background=transparent" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" loading="lazy" style="width: 1px; min-width: 100%; height: 1600px;" id="plausibleFrame"></iframe>
+<div style="font-size: 14px; padding-bottom: 14px;">Stats powered by <a target="_blank" style="color: #4F46E5; text-decoration: underline;" href="https://plausible.io">Plausible Analytics</a></div>
+<script async src="https://stats.privacyguides.net/js/embed.host.js"></script>
+
+<script>
+
+    /* Set palette on initial load */
+    var palette = __md_get("__palette")
+    if (palette && typeof palette.color === "object") {
+        var theme = palette.color.scheme === "slate" ? "dark" : "light"
+        document.getElementById('plausibleFrame').src = 'https://stats.privacyguides.net/share/privacyguides.org?auth=IxTl2wRhi3uxF09rd1NSn&embed=true&theme=' + theme + '&background=transparent';
+    }
+
+    /* Register event handlers after documented loaded */
+    document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function() {
+        var ref = document.querySelector("[data-md-component=palette]")
+        ref.addEventListener("change", function() {
+        var palette = __md_get("__palette")
+        if (palette && typeof palette.color === "object") {
+            var theme = palette.color.scheme === "slate" ? "dark" : "light"
+
+            document.getElementById('plausibleFrame').src = 'https://stats.privacyguides.net/share/privacyguides.org?auth=IxTl2wRhi3uxF09rd1NSn&embed=true&theme=' + theme + '&background=transparent';
+        }
+        })
+    })
+</script>
+
+## Blog Statistics
+
+<iframe plausible-embed src="https://stats.privacyguides.net/share/blog.privacyguides.org?auth=onWV76WWcsDifUqlaHEAg&embed=true&theme=system&background=transparent" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" loading="lazy" style="width: 1px; min-width: 100%; height: 1600px;" id="blogFrame"></iframe>
+<div style="font-size: 14px; padding-bottom: 14px;">Stats powered by <a target="_blank" style="color: #4F46E5; text-decoration: underline;" href="https://plausible.io">Plausible Analytics</a></div>
+<script async src="https://stats.privacyguides.net/js/embed.host.js"></script>
+
+<script>
+
+    /* Set palette on initial load */
+    var palette = __md_get("__palette")
+    if (palette && typeof palette.color === "object") {
+        var theme = palette.color.scheme === "slate" ? "dark" : "light"
+        document.getElementById('blogFrame').src = 'https://stats.privacyguides.net/share/blog.privacyguides.org?auth=onWV76WWcsDifUqlaHEAg&embed=true&theme=' + theme + '&background=transparent';
+    }
+
+    /* Register event handlers after documented loaded */
+    document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function() {
+        var ref = document.querySelector("[data-md-component=palette]")
+        ref.addEventListener("change", function() {
+        var palette = __md_get("__palette")
+        if (palette && typeof palette.color === "object") {
+            var theme = palette.color.scheme === "slate" ? "dark" : "light"
+
+            document.getElementById('blogFrame').src = 'https://stats.privacyguides.net/share/blog.privacyguides.org?auth=onWV76WWcsDifUqlaHEAg&embed=true&theme=' + theme + '&background=transparent';
+        }
+        })
+    })
+</script>

i18n/ar/advanced/communication-network-types.md

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+---
+title: "Types of Communication Networks"
+icon: 'material/transit-connection-variant'
+description: An overview of several network architectures commonly used by instant messaging applications.
+---
+
+There are several network architectures commonly used to relay messages between people. These networks can provide different privacy guarantees, which is why it's worth considering your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md) when deciding which app to use.
+
+[Recommended Instant Messengers](../real-time-communication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Centralized Networks
+
+![Centralized networks diagram](../assets/img/layout/network-centralized.svg){ align=left }
+
+Centralized messengers are those where all participants are on the same server or network of servers controlled by the same organization.
+
+Some self-hosted messengers allow you to set up your own server. Self-hosting can provide additional privacy guarantees, such as no usage logs or limited access to metadata (data about who is talking to whom). Self-hosted centralized messengers are isolated and everyone must be on the same server to communicate.
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- New features and changes can be implemented more quickly.
+- Easier to get started with and to find contacts.
+- Most mature and stable features ecosystems, as they are easier to program in a centralized software.
+- Privacy issues may be reduced when you trust a server that you're self-hosting.
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Can include [restricted control or access](https://drewdevault.com/2018/08/08/Signal.html). This can include things like:
+- Being [forbidden from connecting third-party clients](https://github.com/LibreSignal/LibreSignal/issues/37#issuecomment-217211165) to the centralized network that might provide for greater customization or a better experience. Often defined in Terms and Conditions of usage.
+- Poor or no documentation for third-party developers.
+- The [ownership](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729191953/https://blog.privacytools.io/delisting-wire/), privacy policy, and operations of the service can change easily when a single entity controls it, potentially compromising the service later on.
+- Self-hosting requires effort and knowledge of how to set up a service.
+
+## Federated Networks
+
+![Federated networks diagram](../assets/img/layout/network-decentralized.svg){ align=left }
+
+Federated messengers use multiple, independent, decentralized servers that are able to talk to each other (email is one example of a federated service). Federation allows system administrators to control their own server and still be a part of the larger communications network.
+
+When self-hosted, members of a federated server can discover and communicate with members of other servers, although some servers may choose to remain private by being non-federated (e.g., work team server).
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- Allows for greater control over your own data when running your own server.
+- Allows you to choose whom to trust your data with by choosing between multiple "public" servers.
+- Often allows for third-party clients which can provide a more native, customized, or accessible experience.
+- Server software can be verified that it matches public source code, assuming you have access to the server or you trust the person who does (e.g., a family member).
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Adding new features is more complex because these features need to be standardized and tested to ensure they work with all servers on the network.
+- Due to the previous point, features can be lacking, or incomplete or working in unexpected ways compared to centralized platforms, such as message relay when offline or message deletion.
+- Some metadata may be available (e.g., information like "who is talking to whom," but not actual message content if E2EE is used).
+- Federated servers generally require trusting your server's administrator. They may be a hobbyist or otherwise not a "security professional," and may not serve standard documents like a privacy policy or terms of service detailing how your data is used.
+- Server administrators sometimes choose to block other servers, which are a source of unmoderated abuse or break general rules of accepted behavior. This will hinder your ability to communicate with members of those servers.
+
+## Peer-to-Peer Networks
+
+![P2P diagram](../assets/img/layout/network-distributed.svg){ align=left }
+
+P2P messengers connect to a [distributed network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_networking) of nodes to relay a message to the recipient without a third-party server.
+
+Clients (peers) usually find each other through the use of a [distributed computing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_computing) network. Examples of this include [Distributed Hash Tables](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_hash_table) (DHT), used by [torrents](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent_(protocol)) and [IPFS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/InterPlanetary_File_System) for example. Another approach is proximity based networks, where a connection is established over WiFi or Bluetooth (for example, Briar or the [Scuttlebutt](https://www.scuttlebutt.nz) social network protocol).
+
+Once a peer has found a route to its contact via any of these methods, a direct connection between them is made. Although messages are usually encrypted, an observer can still deduce the location and identity of the sender and recipient.
+
+P2P networks do not use servers, as peers communicate directly between each other and hence cannot be self-hosted. However, some additional services may rely on centralized servers, such as user discovery or relaying offline messages, which can benefit from self-hosting.
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- Minimal information is exposed to third-parties.
+- Modern P2P platforms implement E2EE by default. There are no servers that could potentially intercept and decrypt your transmissions, unlike centralized and federated models.
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Reduced feature set:
+- Messages can only be sent when both peers are online, however, your client may store messages locally to wait for the contact to return online.
+- Generally increases battery usage on mobile devices, because the client must stay connected to the distributed network to learn about who is online.
+- Some common messenger features may not be implemented or incompletely, such as message deletion.
+- Your IP address and that of the contacts you're communicating with may be exposed if you do not use the software in conjunction with a [VPN](../vpn.md) or [Tor](../tor.md). Many countries have some form of mass surveillance and/or metadata retention.
+
+## Anonymous Routing
+
+![Anonymous routing diagram](../assets/img/layout/network-anonymous-routing.svg){ align=left }
+
+A messenger using [anonymous routing](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_628) hides either the identity of the sender, the receiver, or evidence that they have been communicating. Ideally, a messenger should hide all three.
+
+There are [many](https://doi.org/10.1145/3182658) different ways to implement anonymous routing. One of the most famous is [onion routing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing) (i.e. [Tor](tor-overview.md)), which communicates encrypted messages through a virtual [overlay network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overlay_network) that hides the location of each node as well as the recipient and sender of each message. The sender and recipient never interact directly and only meet through a secret rendezvous node so that there is no leak of IP addresses nor physical location. Nodes cannot decrypt messages, nor the final destination; only the recipient can. Each intermediary node can only decrypt a part that indicates where to send the still encrypted message next, until it arrives at the recipient who can fully decrypt it, hence the "onion layers."
+
+Self-hosting a node in an anonymous routing network does not provide the hoster with additional privacy benefits, but rather contributes to the whole network's resilience against identification attacks for everyone's benefit.
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- Minimal to no information is exposed to other parties.
+- Messages can be relayed in a decentralized manner even if one of the parties is offline.
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Slow message propagation.
+- Often limited to fewer media types, mostly text, since the network is slow.
+- Less reliable if nodes are selected by randomized routing, some nodes may be very far from the sender and receiver, adding latency or even failing to transmit messages if one of the nodes goes offline.
+- More complex to get started, as the creation and secured backup of a cryptographic private key is required.
+- Just like other decentralized platforms, adding features is more complex for developers than on a centralized platform. Hence, features may be lacking or incompletely implemented, such as offline message relaying or message deletion.

i18n/ar/advanced/dns-overview.md

@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+---
+title: "DNS Overview"
+icon: material/dns
+description: The Domain Name System is the "phonebook of the internet," helping your browser find the website it's looking for.
+---
+
+The [Domain Name System](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System) is the 'phonebook of the Internet'. DNS translates domain names to IP addresses so browsers and other services can load Internet resources, through a decentralized network of servers.
+
+## What is DNS?
+
+When you visit a website, a numerical address is returned. For example, when you visit `privacyguides.org`, the address `192.98.54.105` is returned.
+
+DNS has existed since the [early days](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System#History) of the Internet. DNS requests made to and from DNS servers are **not** generally encrypted. In a residential setting, a customer is given servers by the ISP via [DHCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dynamic_Host_Configuration_Protocol).
+
+Unencrypted DNS requests are able to be easily **surveilled** and **modified** in transit. In some parts of the world, ISPs are ordered to do primitive [DNS filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking). When you request the IP address of a domain that is blocked, the server may not respond or may respond with a different IP address. As the DNS protocol is not encrypted, the ISP (or any network operator) can use [DPI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection) to monitor requests. ISPs can also block requests based on common characteristics, regardless of which DNS server is used. Unencrypted DNS always uses [port](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_(computer_networking)) 53 and always uses UDP.
+
+Below, we discuss and provide a tutorial to prove what an outside observer may see using regular unencrypted DNS and [encrypted DNS](#what-is-encrypted-dns).
+
+### Unencrypted DNS
+
+1. Using [`tshark`](https://www.wireshark.org/docs/man-pages/tshark.html) (part of the [Wireshark](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wireshark) project) we can monitor and record internet packet flow. This command records packets that meet the rules specified:
+
+    ```bash
+    tshark -w /tmp/dns.pcap udp port 53 and host 1.1.1.1 or host 8.8.8.8
+    ```
+
+2. We can then use [`dig`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dig_(command)) (Linux, MacOS etc) or [`nslookup`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nslookup) (Windows) to send the DNS lookup to both servers. Software such as web browsers do these lookups automatically, unless they are configured to use encrypted DNS.
+
+    === "Linux, macOS"
+
+        ```
+        dig +noall +answer privacyguides.org @1.1.1.1
+        dig +noall +answer privacyguides.org @8.8.8.8
+        ```
+    === "Windows"
+
+        ```
+        nslookup privacyguides.org 1.1.1.1
+        nslookup privacyguides.org 8.8.8.8
+        ```
+
+3. Next, we want to [analyse](https://www.wireshark.org/docs/wsug_html_chunked/ChapterIntroduction.html#ChIntroWhatIs) the results:
+
+    === "Wireshark"
+
+        ```
+        wireshark -r /tmp/dns.pcap
+        ```
+
+    === "tshark"
+
+        ```
+        tshark -r /tmp/dns.pcap
+        ```
+
+If you run the Wireshark command above, the top pane shows the "[frames](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethernet_frame)", and the bottom pane shows all the data about the selected frame. Enterprise filtering and monitoring solutions (such as those purchased by governments) can do the process automatically, without human interaction, and can aggregate those frames to produce statistical data useful to the network observer.
+
+| No. | Time     | Source    | Destination | Protocol | Length | Info                                                                   |
+| --- | -------- | --------- | ----------- | -------- | ------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| 1   | 0.000000 | 192.0.2.1 | 1.1.1.1     | DNS      | 104    | Standard query 0x58ba A privacyguides.org OPT                          |
+| 2   | 0.293395 | 1.1.1.1   | 192.0.2.1   | DNS      | 108    | Standard query response 0x58ba A privacyguides.org A 198.98.54.105 OPT |
+| 3   | 1.682109 | 192.0.2.1 | 8.8.8.8     | DNS      | 104    | Standard query 0xf1a9 A privacyguides.org OPT                          |
+| 4   | 2.154698 | 8.8.8.8   | 192.0.2.1   | DNS      | 108    | Standard query response 0xf1a9 A privacyguides.org A 198.98.54.105 OPT |
+
+An observer could modify any of these packets.
+
+## What is "encrypted DNS"?
+
+Encrypted DNS can refer to one of a number of protocols, the most common ones being:
+
+### DNSCrypt
+
+[**DNSCrypt**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNSCrypt) was one of the first methods of encrypting DNS queries. DNSCrypt operates on port 443 and works with both the TCP or UDP transport protocols. DNSCrypt has never been submitted to the [Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Engineering_Task_Force) nor has it gone through the [Request for Comments (RFC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Request_for_Comments) process, so it has not been used widely outside of a few [implementations](https://dnscrypt.info/implementations). As a result, it has been largely replaced by the more popular [DNS over HTTPS](#dns-over-https-doh).
+
+### DNS over TLS (DoT)
+
+[**DNS over TLS**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_TLS) is another method for encrypting DNS communication that is defined in [RFC 7858](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7858). Support was first implemented in Android 9, iOS 14, and on Linux in [systemd-resolved](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/resolved.conf.html#DNSOverTLS=) in version 237. Preference in the industry has been moving away from DoT to DoH in recent years, as DoT is a [complex protocol](https://dnscrypt.info/faq/) and has varying compliance to the RFC across the implementations that exist. DoT also operates on a dedicated port 853 which can be blocked easily by restrictive firewalls.
+
+### DNS over HTTPS (DoH)
+
+[**DNS over HTTPS**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_HTTPS) as defined in [RFC 8484](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8484) packages queries in the [HTTP/2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/2) protocol and provides security with HTTPS. Support was first added in web browsers such as Firefox 60 and Chrome 83.
+
+Native implementation of DoH showed up in iOS 14, macOS 11, Microsoft Windows, and Android 13 (however, it won't be enabled [by default](https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/packages/modules/DnsResolver/+/1833144)). General Linux desktop support is waiting on the systemd [implementation](https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/8639) so [installing third-party software is still required](../dns.md#encrypted-dns-proxies).
+
+## What can an outside party see?
+
+In this example we will record what happens when we make a DoH request:
+
+1. First, start `tshark`:
+
+    ```bash
+    tshark -w /tmp/dns_doh.pcap -f "tcp port https and host 1.1.1.1"
+    ```
+
+2. Second, make a request with `curl`:
+
+    ```bash
+    curl -vI --doh-url https://1.1.1.1/dns-query https://privacyguides.org
+    ```
+
+3. After making the request, we can stop the packet capture with <kbd>CTRL</kbd> + <kbd>C</kbd>.
+
+4. Analyse the results in Wireshark:
+
+    ```bash
+    wireshark -r /tmp/dns_doh.pcap
+    ```
+
+We can see the [connection establishment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol#Connection_establishment) and [TLS handshake](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ssl/what-happens-in-a-tls-handshake/) that occurs with any encrypted connection. When looking at the "application data" packets that follow, none of them contain the domain we requested or the IP address returned.
+
+## Why **shouldn't** I use encrypted DNS?
+
+In locations where there is internet filtering (or censorship), visiting forbidden resources may have its own consequences which you should consider in your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md). We do **not** suggest the use of encrypted DNS for this purpose. Use [Tor](https://torproject.org) or a [VPN](../vpn.md) instead. If you're using a VPN, you should use your VPN's DNS servers. When using a VPN, you are already trusting them with all your network activity.
+
+When we do a DNS lookup, it's generally because we want to access a resource. Below, we will discuss some of the methods that may disclose your browsing activities even when using encrypted DNS:
+
+### IP Address
+
+The simplest way to determine browsing activity might be to look at the IP addresses your devices are accessing. For example, if the observer knows that `privacyguides.org` is at `198.98.54.105`, and your device is requesting data from `198.98.54.105`, there is a good chance you're visiting Privacy Guides.
+
+This method is only useful when the IP address belongs to a server that only hosts few websites. It's also not very useful if the site is hosted on a shared platform (e.g. Github Pages, Cloudflare Pages, Netlify, WordPress, Blogger, etc). It also isn't very useful if the server is hosted behind a [reverse proxy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_proxy), which is very common on the modern Internet.
+
+### Server Name Indication (SNI)
+
+Server Name Indication is typically used when a IP address hosts many websites. This could be a service like Cloudflare, or some other [Denial-of-service attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial-of-service_attack) protection.
+
+1. Start capturing again with `tshark`. We've added a filter with our IP address so you don't capture many packets:
+
+    ```bash
+    tshark -w /tmp/pg.pcap port 443 and host 198.98.54.105
+    ```
+
+2. Then we visit [https://privacyguides.org](https://privacyguides.org).
+
+3. After visiting the website, we want to stop the packet capture with <kbd>CTRL</kbd> + <kbd>C</kbd>.
+
+4. Next we want to analyze the results:
+
+    ```bash
+    wireshark -r /tmp/pg.pcap
+    ```
+
+    We will see the connection establishment, followed by the TLS handshake for the Privacy Guides website. Around frame 5. you'll see a "Client Hello".
+
+5. Expand the triangle &#9656; next to each field:
+
+    ```text
+    ▸ Transport Layer Security
+      ▸ TLSv1.3 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
+        ▸ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
+          ▸ Extension: server_name (len=22)
+            ▸ Server Name Indication extension
+    ```
+
+6. We can see the SNI value which discloses the website we are visiting. The `tshark` command can give you the value directly for all packets containing a SNI value:
+
+    ```bash
+    tshark -r /tmp/pg.pcap -Tfields -Y tls.handshake.extensions_server_name -e tls.handshake.extensions_server_name
+    ```
+
+This means even if we are using "Encrypted DNS" servers, the domain will likely be disclosed through SNI. The [TLS v1.3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#TLS_1.3) protocol brings with it [Encrypted Client Hello](https://blog.cloudflare.com/encrypted-client-hello/), which prevents this kind of leak.
+
+Governments, in particular [China](https://www.zdnet.com/article/china-is-now-blocking-all-encrypted-https-traffic-using-tls-1-3-and-esni/) and [Russia](https://www.zdnet.com/article/russia-wants-to-ban-the-use-of-secure-protocols-such-as-tls-1-3-doh-dot-esni/), have either already [started blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication#Encrypted_Client_Hello) it or expressed a desire to do so. Recently, Russia has [started blocking foreign websites](https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/108) that use the [HTTP/3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) standard. This is because the [QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QUIC) protocol that is a part of HTTP/3 requires that `ClientHello` also be encrypted.
+
+### Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
+
+Another way your browser can disclose your browsing activities is with the [Online Certificate Status Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_Certificate_Status_Protocol). When visiting an HTTPS website, the browser might check to see if the website's [certificate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_certificate) has been revoked. This is generally done through the HTTP protocol, meaning it is **not** encrypted.
+
+The OCSP request contains the certificate "[serial number](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_certificate#Common_fields)", which is unique. It is sent to the "OCSP responder" in order to check its status.
+
+We can simulate what a browser would do using the [`openssl`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenSSL) command.
+
+1. Get the server certificate and use [`sed`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sed) to keep just the important part and write it out to a file:
+
+    ```bash
+    openssl s_client -connect privacyguides.org:443 < /dev/null 2>&1 |
+        sed -n '/^-*BEGIN/,/^-*END/p' > /tmp/pg_server.cert
+    ```
+
+2. Get the intermediate certificate. [Certificate Authorities (CA)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) normally don't sign a certificate directly; they use what is known as an "intermediate" certificate.
+
+    ```bash
+    openssl s_client -showcerts -connect privacyguides.org:443 < /dev/null 2>&1 |
+        sed -n '/^-*BEGIN/,/^-*END/p' > /tmp/pg_and_intermediate.cert
+    ```
+
+3. The first certificate in `pg_and_intermediate.cert` is actually the server certificate from step 1. We can use `sed` again to delete until the first instance of END:
+
+    ```bash
+    sed -n '/^-*END CERTIFICATE-*$/!d;:a n;p;ba' \
+        /tmp/pg_and_intermediate.cert > /tmp/intermediate_chain.cert
+    ```
+
+4. Get the OCSP responder for the server certificate:
+
+    ```bash
+    openssl x509 -noout -ocsp_uri -in /tmp/pg_server.cert
+    ```
+
+    Our certificate shows the Lets Encrypt certificate responder. If we want to see all the details of the certificate we can use:
+
+    ```bash
+    openssl x509 -text -noout -in /tmp/pg_server.cert
+    ```
+
+5. Start the packet capture:
+
+    ```bash
+    tshark -w /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap -f "tcp port http"
+    ```
+
+6. Make the OCSP request:
+
+    ```bash
+    openssl ocsp -issuer /tmp/intermediate_chain.cert \
+                 -cert /tmp/pg_server.cert \
+                 -text \
+                 -url http://r3.o.lencr.org
+    ```
+
+7. Open the capture:
+
+    ```bash
+    wireshark -r /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap
+    ```
+
+    There will be two packets with the "OCSP" protocol: a "Request" and a "Response". For the "Request" we can see the "serial number" by expanding the triangle &#9656; next to each field:
+
+    ```bash
+    ▸ Online Certificate Status Protocol
+      ▸ tbsRequest
+        ▸ requestList: 1 item
+          ▸ Request
+            ▸ reqCert
+              serialNumber
+    ```
+
+    For the "Response" we can also see the "serial number":
+
+    ```bash
+    ▸ Online Certificate Status Protocol
+      ▸ responseBytes
+        ▸ BasicOCSPResponse
+          ▸ tbsResponseData
+            ▸ responses: 1 item
+              ▸ SingleResponse
+                ▸ certID
+                  serialNumber
+    ```
+
+8. Or use `tshark` to filter the packets for the Serial Number:
+
+    ```bash
+    tshark -r /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap -Tfields -Y ocsp.serialNumber -e ocsp.serialNumber
+    ```
+
+If the network observer has the public certificate, which is publicly available, they can match the serial number with that certificate and therefore determine the site you're visiting from that. The process can be automated and can associate IP addresses with serial numbers. It is also possible to check [Certificate Transparency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_Transparency) logs for the serial number.
+
+## Should I use encrypted DNS?
+
+We made this flow chart to describe when you *should* use encrypted DNS:
+
+``` mermaid
+graph TB
+    Start[Start] --> anonymous{Trying to be<br> anonymous?}
+    anonymous--> | Yes | tor(Use Tor)
+    anonymous --> | No | censorship{Avoiding<br> censorship?}
+    censorship --> | Yes | vpnOrTor(Use<br> VPN or Tor)
+    censorship --> | No | privacy{Want privacy<br> from ISP?}
+    privacy --> | Yes | vpnOrTor
+    privacy --> | No | obnoxious{ISP makes<br> obnoxious<br> redirects?}
+    obnoxious --> | Yes | encryptedDNS(Use<br> encrypted DNS<br> with 3rd party)
+    obnoxious --> | No | ispDNS{Does ISP support<br> encrypted DNS?}
+    ispDNS --> | Yes | useISP(Use<br> encrypted DNS<br> with ISP)
+    ispDNS --> | No | nothing(Do nothing)
+```
+
+Encrypted DNS with a third-party should only be used to get around redirects and basic [DNS blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) when you can be sure there won't be any consequences or you're interested in a provider that does some rudimentary filtering.
+
+[List of recommended DNS servers](../dns.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## What is DNSSEC?
+
+[Domain Name System Security Extensions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Extensions) (DNSSEC) is a feature of DNS that authenticates responses to domain name lookups. It does not provide privacy protections for those lookups, but rather prevents attackers from manipulating or poisoning the responses to DNS requests.
+
+In other words, DNSSEC digitally signs data to help ensure its validity. In order to ensure a secure lookup, the signing occurs at every level in the DNS lookup process. As a result, all answers from DNS can be trusted.
+
+The DNSSEC signing process is similar to someone signing a legal document with a pen; that person signs with a unique signature that no one else can create, and a court expert can look at that signature and verify that the document was signed by that person. These digital signatures ensure that data has not been tampered with.
+
+DNSSEC implements a hierarchical digital signing policy across all layers of DNS. For example, in the case of a `privacyguides.org` lookup, a root DNS server would sign a key for the `.org` nameserver, and the `.org` nameserver would then sign a key for `privacyguides.org`’s authoritative nameserver.
+
+<small>Adapted from [DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) overview](https://cloud.google.com/dns/docs/dnssec) by Google and [DNSSEC: An Introduction](https://blog.cloudflare.com/dnssec-an-introduction/) by Cloudflare, both licensed under [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).</small>
+
+## What is QNAME minimization?
+
+A QNAME is a "qualified name", for example `privacyguides.org`. QNAME minimisation reduces the amount of information sent from the DNS server to the [authoritative name server](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Name_server#Authoritative_name_server).
+
+Instead of sending the whole domain `privacyguides.org`, QNAME minimization means the DNS server will ask for all the records that end in `.org`. Further technical description is defined in [RFC 7816](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7816).
+
+## What is EDNS Client Subnet (ECS)?
+
+The [EDNS Client Subnet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EDNS_Client_Subnet) is a method for a recursive DNS resolver to specify a [subnetwork](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subnetwork) for the [host or client](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Client_(computing)) which is making the DNS query.
+
+It's intended to "speed up" delivery of data by giving the client an answer that belongs to a server that is close to them such as a [content delivery network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_delivery_network), which are often used in video streaming and serving JavaScript web apps.
+
+This feature does come at a privacy cost, as it tells the DNS server some information about the client's location.

i18n/ar/advanced/payments.md

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+---
+title: Private Payments
+icon: material/hand-coin
+---
+
+There's a reason data about your buying habits is considered the holy grail of ad targeting: your purchases can leak a veritable treasure trove of data about you. Unfortunately, the current financial system is anti-privacy by design, enabling banks, other companies, and governments to easily trace transactions. Nevertheless, you have plenty of options when it comes to making payments privately.
+
+## Cash
+
+For centuries, **cash** has functioned as the primary form of private payment. Cash has excellent privacy properties in most cases, is widely accepted in most countries, and is **fungible**, meaning it is non-unique and completely interchangable.
+
+Cash payment laws vary by country. In the United States, special disclosure is required for cash payments over $10,000 to the IRS on [Form 8300](https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/form-8300-and-reporting-cash-payments-of-over-10000). The receiving business is required to ID verify the payee’s name, address, occupation, date of birth, and Social Security Number or other TIN (with some exceptions). Lower limits without ID such as $3,000 or less exist for exchanges and money transmission. Cash also contains serial numbers. These are almost never tracked by merchants, but they can be used by law enforcement in targeted investigations.
+
+Despite this, it’s typically the best option.
+
+## Prepaid Cards & Gift Cards
+
+It’s relatively simple to purchase gift cards and prepaid cards at most grocery stores and convenience stores with cash. Gift cards usually don’t have a fee, though prepaid cards often do, so pay close attention to these fees and expiry dates. Some stores may ask to see your ID at checkout to reduce fraud.
+
+Gift cards usually have limits of up to $200 per card, but some offer limits of up to $2,000 per card. Prepaid cards (eg: from Visa or Mastercard) usually have limits of up to $1,000 per card.
+
+Gift cards have the downside of being subject to merchant policies, which can have terrible terms and restrictions. For example, some merchants don’t accept payment in gift cards exclusively, or they may cancel the value of the card if they consider you to be a high-risk user. Once you have merchant credit, the merchant has a strong degree of control over this credit.
+
+Prepaid cards don’t allow cash withdrawals from ATMs or “peer-to-peer” payments in Venmo and similar apps.
+
+Cash remains the best option for in-person purchases for most people. Gift cards can be useful for the savings they bring. Prepaid cards can be useful for places that don’t accept cash. Gift cards and prepaid cards are easier to use online than cash, and they are easier to acquire with cryptocurrencies than cash.
+
+### Online Marketplaces
+
+If you have [cryptocurrency](../cryptocurrency.md), you can purchase gift cards with an online gift card marketplace. Some of these services offer ID verification options for higher limits, but they also allow accounts with just an email address. Basic limits start at $5,000-10,000 a day for basic accounts, and significantly higher limits for ID verified accounts (if offered).
+
+When buying gift cards online, there is usually a slight discount. Prepaid cards are usually sold online at face value or with a fee. If you buy prepaid cards and gift cards with cryptocurrencies, you should strongly prefer to pay with Monero which provides strong privacy, more on this below. Paying for a gift card with a traceable payment method negates the benefits a gift card can provide when purchased with cash or Monero.
+
+- [Online Gift Card Marketplaces :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../financial-services.md#gift-card-marketplaces)
+
+## Virtual Cards
+
+Another way to protect your information from merchants online is to use virtual, single-use cards which mask your actual banking or billing information. This is primarily useful for protecting you from merchant data breaches, less sophisticated tracking or purchase correlation by marketing agencies, and online data theft. They do **not** assist you in making a purchase completely anonymously, nor do they hide any information from the banking institution themselves. Regular financial institutions which offer virtual cards are subject to "Know Your Customer" (KYC) laws, meaning they may require your ID or other identifying information.
+
+- [Recommended Payment Masking Services :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../financial-services.md#payment-masking-services)
+
+These tend to be good options for recurring/subscription payments online, while prepaid gift cards are preferred for one-time transactions.
+
+## Cryptocurrency
+
+Cryptocurrencies are a digital form of currency designed to work without central authorities such as a government or bank. While *some* cryptocurrency projects can allow you to make private transactions online, many use a public blockchain which does not provide any transaction privacy. Cryptocurrencies also tend to be very volatile assets, meaning their value can change rapidly and significantly at any time. As such, we generally don't recommend using cryptocurrency as a long-term store of value. If you decide to use cryptocurrency online, make sure you have a full understanding of its privacy aspects beforehand, and only invest amounts which would not be disastrous to lose.
+
+!!! danger
+
+    The vast majority of cryptocurrencies operate on a **public** blockchain, meaning that every transaction is public knowledge. This includes even most well-known cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum. Transactions with these cryptocurrencies should not be considered private and will not protect your anonymity.
+    
+    Additionally, many if not most cryptocurrencies are scams. Make transactions carefully with only projects you trust.
+
+### Privacy Coins
+
+There are a number of cryptocurrency projects which purport to provide privacy by making transactions anonymous. We recommend using one which provides transaction anonymity **by default** to avoid operational errors.
+
+- [Recommended Cryptocurrency :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../cryptocurrency.md#coins)
+
+Privacy coins have been subject to increasing scrutiny by government agencies. In 2020, [the IRS published a $625,000 bounty](https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2020/09/14/irs-will-pay-up-to-625000-if-you-can-crack-monero-other-privacy-coins/?sh=2e9808a085cc) for tools which can break Bitcoin Lightning Network and/or Monero's transaction privacy. They ultimately [paid two companies](https://sam.gov/opp/5ab94eae1a8d422e88945b64181c6018/view) (Chainalysis and Integra Fec) a combined $1.25 million for tools which purport to do so (it is unknown which cryptocurrency network these tools target). Due to the secrecy surrounding tools like these, ==none of these methods of tracing cryptocurrencies have been independently confirmed.== However, it is quite likely that tools which assist targeted investigations into private coin transactions exist, and that privacy coins only succeed in thwarting mass surveillance.
+
+### Other Coins (Bitcoin, Ethereum, etc.)
+
+The vast majority of cryptocurrency projects use a public blockchain, meaning that all transactions are both easily traceable and permanent. As such, we strongly discourage the use of most cryptocurrency for privacy-related reasons.
+
+Anonymous transactions on a public blockchain are *theoretically* possible, and the Bitcoin wiki [gives one example of a "completely anonymous" transaction](https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Privacy#Example_-_A_perfectly_private_donation). However, doing so requires a complicated setup involving Tor and "solo-mining" a block to generate completely independent cryptocurrency, a practice which has not been practical for nearly any enthusiast for many years.
+
+==Your best option is to avoid these cryptocurrencies entirely and stick with one which provides privacy by default.== Attempting to use other cryptocurrency is outside the scope of this site and strongly discouraged.
+
+### Wallet Custody
+
+With cryptocurrency there are two forms of wallets: custodial wallets and noncustodial wallets. Custodial wallets are operated by centralized companies/exchanges, where the private key for your wallet is held by that company, and you can access them anywhere typically with a regular username and password. Noncustodial wallets are wallets where you control and manage the private keys to access it. Assuming you keep your wallet's private keys secured and backed up, noncustodial wallets provide greater security and censorship-resistance over custodial wallets, because your cryptocurrency can't be stolen or frozen by a company with custody over your private keys. Key custody is especially important when it comes to privacy coins: Custodial wallets grant the operating company the ability to view your transactions, negating the privacy benefits of those cryptocurrencies.
+
+### Acquisition
+
+Acquiring [cryptocurrencies](../cryptocurrency.md) like Monero privately can be difficult. P2P marketplaces like [LocalMonero](https://localmonero.co/), a platform which facilitates trades between people, are one option that can be used. If using an exchange which requires KYC is an acceptable risk for you as long as subsequent transactions can't be traced, a much easier option is to purchase Monero on an exchange like [Kraken](https://kraken.com/), or purchase Bitcoin/Litecoin from a KYC exchange which can then be swapped for Monero. Then, you can withdraw the purchased Monero to your own noncustodial wallet to use privately from that point forward.
+
+If you go this route, make sure to purchase Monero at different times and in different amounts than where you will spend it. If you purchase $5000 of Monero at an exchange and make a $5000 purchase in Monero an hour later, those actions could potentially be correlated by an outside observer regardless of which path the Monero took. Staggering purchases and purchasing larger amounts of Monero in advance to later spend on multiple smaller transactions can avoid this pitfall.
+
+## Additional Considerations
+
+When you're making a payment in-person with cash, make sure to keep your in-person privacy in mind. Security cameras are ubiquitous. Consider wearing non-distinct clothing and a face mask (such as a surgical mask or N95). Don’t sign up for rewards programs or provide any other information about yourself.
+
+When purchasing online, ideally you should do so over [Tor](tor-overview.md). However, many merchants don’t allow purchases with Tor. You can consider using a [recommended VPN](../vpn.md) (paid for with cash, gift card, or Monero), or making the purchase from a coffee shop or library with free Wi-Fi. If you are ordering a physical item that needs to be delivered, you will need to provide a delivery address. You should consider using a PO box, private mailbox, or work address.

i18n/ar/advanced/tor-overview.md

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+---
+title: "Tor Overview"
+icon: 'simple/torproject'
+description: Tor is a free to use, decentralized network designed for using the internet with as much privacy as possible.
+---
+
+Tor is a free to use, decentralized network designed for using the internet with as much privacy as possible. If used properly, the network enables private and anonymous browsing and communications.
+
+## Path Building
+
+Tor works by routing your traffic through a network comprised of thousands of volunteer-run servers called nodes (or relays).
+
+Every time you connect to Tor, it will choose three nodes to build a path to the internet—this path is called a "circuit." Each of these nodes has its own function:
+
+### The Entry Node
+
+The entry node, often called the guard node, is the first node to which your Tor client connects. The entry node is able to see your IP address, however it is unable to see what you are connecting to.
+
+Unlike the other nodes, the Tor client will randomly select an entry node and stick with it for two to three months to protect you from certain attacks.[^1]
+
+### The Middle Node
+
+The middle node is the second node to which your Tor client connects. It can see which node the traffic came from—the entry node—and to which node it goes to next. The middle node cannot, see your IP address or the domain you are connecting to.
+
+For each new circuit, the middle node is randomly selected out of all available Tor nodes.
+
+### The Exit Node
+
+The exit node is the point in which your web traffic leaves the Tor network and is forwarded to your desired destination. The exit node is unable to see your IP address, but it does know what site it's connecting to.
+
+The exit node will be chosen at random from all available Tor nodes ran with an exit relay flag.[^2]
+
+<figure markdown>
+  ![Tor path](../assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg#only-light)
+  ![Tor path](../assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg#only-dark)
+  <figcaption>Tor circuit pathway</figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+## Encryption
+
+Tor encrypts each packet (a block of transmitted data) three times with the keys from the exit, middle, and entry node—in that order.
+
+Once Tor has built a circuit, data transmission is done as follows:
+
+1. Firstly: when the packet arrives at the entry node, the first layer of encryption is removed. In this encrypted packet, the entry node will find another encrypted packet with the middle node’s address. The entry node will then forward the packet to the middle node.
+
+2. Secondly: when the middle node receives the packet from the entry node, it too will remove a layer of encryption with its key, and this time finds an encrypted packet with the exit node's address. The middle node will then forward the packet to the exit node.
+
+3. Lastly: when the exit node receives its packet, it will remove the last layer of encryption with its key. The exit node will see the destination address and forward the packet to that address.
+
+Below is an alternative diagram showing the process. Each node removes its own layer of encryption, and when the destination server returns data, the same process happens entirely in reverse. For example, the exit node does not know who you are, but it does know which node it came from, and so it adds its own layer of encryption and sends it back.
+
+<figure markdown>
+  ![Tor encryption](../assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg#only-light)
+  ![Tor encryption](../assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption-dark.svg#only-dark)
+  <figcaption>Sending and receiving data through the Tor Network</figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+Tor allows us to connect to a server without any single party knowing the entire path. The entry node knows who you are, but not where you are going; the middle node doesn’t know who you are or where you are going; and the exit node knows where you are going, but not who you are. Because the exit node is what makes the final connection, the destination server will never know your IP address.
+
+## Caveats
+
+Though Tor does provide strong privacy guarantees, one must be aware that Tor is not perfect:
+
+- Well-funded adversaries with the capability to passively watch most network traffic over the globe have a chance of deanonymizing Tor users by means of advanced traffic analysis. Nor does Tor protect you from exposing yourself by mistake, such as if you share too much information about your real identity.
+- Tor exit nodes can also monitor traffic that passes through them. This means traffic which is not encrypted, such as plain HTTP traffic, can be recorded and monitored. If such traffic contains personally identifiable information, then it can deanonymize you to that exit node. Thus, we recommend using HTTPS over Tor where possible.
+
+If you wish to use Tor for browsing the web, we only recommend the **official** Tor Browser—it is designed to prevent fingerprinting.
+
+- [Tor Browser :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../tor.md#tor-browser)
+
+## Additional Resources
+
+- [Tor Browser User Manual](https://tb-manual.torproject.org)
+- [How Tor Works - Computerphile](https://invidious.privacyguides.net/embed/QRYzre4bf7I?local=true) <small>(YouTube)</small>
+- [Tor Onion Services - Computerphile](https://invidious.privacyguides.net/embed/lVcbq_a5N9I?local=true) <small>(YouTube)</small>
+
+[^1]: The first relay in your circuit is called an "entry guard" or "guard". It is a fast and stable relay that remains the first one in your circuit for 2-3 months in order to protect against a known anonymity-breaking attack. The rest of your circuit changes with every new website you visit, and all together these relays provide the full privacy protections of Tor. For more information on how guard relays work, see this [blog post](https://blog.torproject.org/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters) and [paper](https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/single_guard.pdf) on entry guards. ([https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2/](https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2/))
+
+[^2]: Relay flag: a special (dis-)qualification of relays for circuit positions (for example, "Guard", "Exit", "BadExit"), circuit properties (for example, "Fast", "Stable"), or roles (for example, "Authority", "HSDir"), as assigned by the directory authorities and further defined in the directory protocol specification. ([https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html](https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html))

i18n/ar/android.md

@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+---
+title: "Android"
+icon: 'simple/android'
+description: You can replace the operating system on your Android phone with these secure and privacy-respecting alternatives.
+---
+
+![Android logo](assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right }
+
+The **Android Open Source Project** is an open-source mobile operating system led by Google which powers the majority of the world's mobile devices. Most phones sold with Android are modified to include invasive integrations and apps such as Google Play Services, so you can significantly improve your privacy on your mobile device by replacing your phone's default installation with a version of Android without these invasive features.
+
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://source.android.com/){ .card-link title=Homepage }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://source.android.com/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+These are the Android operating systems, devices, and apps we recommend to maximize your mobile device's security and privacy. To learn more about Android:
+
+[General Android Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/android-overview.md ""){.md-button}
+
+[Why we recommend GrapheneOS over CalyxOS :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/ ""){.md-button}
+
+## AOSP Derivatives
+
+We recommend installing one of these custom Android operating systems on your device, listed in order of preference, depending on your device's compatibility with these operating systems.
+
+!!! note
+
+    End-of-life devices (such as GrapheneOS or CalyxOS's "extended support" devices) do not have full security patches (firmware updates) due to the OEM discontinuing support. These devices cannot be considered completely secure regardless of installed software.
+
+### GrapheneOS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+    ![GrapheneOS logo](assets/img/android/grapheneos.svg#only-light){ align=right }
+    ![GrapheneOS logo](assets/img/android/grapheneos-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
+    
+    **GrapheneOS** is the best choice when it comes to privacy and security.
+    
+    GrapheneOS provides additional [security hardening](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardening_(computing)) and privacy improvements. It has a [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), network and sensor permissions, and various other [security features](https://grapheneos.org/features). GrapheneOS also comes with full firmware updates and signed builds, so verified boot is fully supported.
+    
+    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://grapheneos.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:octicons-eye-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://grapheneos.org/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+    [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+GrapheneOS supports [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), which runs [Google Play Services](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Play_Services) fully sandboxed like any other regular app. This means you can take advantage of most Google Play Services, such as [push notifications](https://firebase.google.com/docs/cloud-messaging/), while giving you full control over their permissions and access, and while containing them to a specific [work profile](os/android-overview.md#work-profile) or [user profile](os/android-overview.md#user-profiles) of your choice.
+
+Google Pixel phones are the only devices that currently meet GrapheneOS's [hardware security requirements](https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-support).
+
+### DivestOS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+    ![DivestOS logo](assets/img/android/divestos.svg){ align=right }
+    
+    **DivestOS** is a soft-fork of [LineageOS](https://lineageos.org/).
+    DivestOS inherits many [supported devices](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=devices&base=LineageOS) from LineageOS. It has signed builds, making it possible to have [verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) on some non-Pixel devices.
+    
+    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://divestos.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:simple-torbrowser:](http://divestoseb5nncsydt7zzf5hrfg44md4bxqjs5ifcv4t7gt7u6ohjyyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+    [:octicons-eye-16:](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=privacy_policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/divested-mobile){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+    [:octicons-heart-16:](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+DivestOS has automated kernel vulnerability ([CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures)) [patching](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/cve_checker), fewer proprietary blobs, and a custom [hosts](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=dnsbl) file. Its hardened WebView, [Mulch](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/mulch), enables [CFI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity) for all architectures and [network state partitioning](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning), and receives out-of-band updates. DivestOS also includes kernel patches from GrapheneOS and enables all available kernel security features via [defconfig hardening](https://github.com/Divested-Mobile/DivestOS-Build/blob/master/Scripts/Common/Functions.sh#L758). All kernels newer than version 3.4 include full page [sanitization](https://lwn.net/Articles/334747/) and all ~22 Clang-compiled kernels have [`-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero`](https://reviews.llvm.org/D54604?id=174471) enabled.
+
+DivestOS implements some system hardening patches originally developed for GrapheneOS. DivestOS 16.0 and higher implements GrapheneOS's [`INTERNET`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) and SENSORS permission toggle, [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), [exec-spawning](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/#additional-hardening), [JNI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_Native_Interface) [constification](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Const_(computer_programming)), and partial [bionic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bionic_(software)) hardening patchsets. 17.1 and higher features GrapheneOS's per-network full [MAC randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address#Randomization) option, [`ptrace_scope`](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.html) control, and automatic reboot/Wi-Fi/Bluetooth [timeout options](https://grapheneos.org/features).
+
+DivestOS uses F-Droid as its default app store. Normally, we would recommend avoiding F-Droid due to its numerous [security issues](#f-droid). However, doing so on DivestOS isn't viable; the developers update their apps via their own F-Droid repositories ([DivestOS Official](https://divestos.org/fdroid/official/?fingerprint=E4BE8D6ABFA4D9D4FEEF03CDDA7FF62A73FD64B75566F6DD4E5E577550BE8467) and [DivestOS WebView](https://divestos.org/fdroid/webview/?fingerprint=FB426DA1750A53D7724C8A582B4D34174E64A84B38940E5D5A802E1DFF9A40D2)). We recommend disabling the official F-Droid app and using [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) with the DivestOS repositories enabled to keep those components up to date. For other apps, our recommended methods of obtaining them still apply.
+
+!!! warning
+
+    DivestOS firmware update [status](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/firmware-empty/-/blob/master/STATUS) and quality control varies across the devices it supports. We still recommend GrapheneOS depending on your device's compatibility. For other devices, DivestOS is a good alternative.
+    
+    Not all of the supported devices have verified boot, and some perform it better than others.
+
+## Android Devices
+
+When purchasing a device, we recommend getting one as new as possible. The software and firmware of mobile devices are only supported for a limited time, so buying new extends that lifespan as much as possible.
+
+Avoid buying phones from mobile network operators. These often have a **locked bootloader** and do not support [OEM unlocking](https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/locking_unlocking). These phone variants will prevent you from installing any kind of alternative Android distribution.
+
+Be very **careful** about buying second hand phones from online marketplaces. Always check the reputation of the seller. If the device is stolen, there's a possibility of [IMEI blacklisting](https://www.gsma.com/security/resources/imei-blacklisting/). There is also a risk involved with you being associated with the activity of the previous owner.
+
+A few more tips regarding Android devices and operating system compatibility:
+
+- Do not buy devices that have reached or are near their end-of-life, additional firmware updates must be provided by the manufacturer.
+- Do not buy preloaded LineageOS or /e/ OS phones or any Android phones without proper [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) support and firmware updates. These devices also have no way for you to check whether they've been tampered with.
+- In short, if a device or Android distribution is not listed here, there is probably a good reason. Check out our [forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/) to find details!
+
+### Google Pixel
+
+Google Pixel phones are the **only** devices we recommend for purchase. Pixel phones have stronger hardware security than any other Android devices currently on the market, due to proper AVB support for third-party operating systems and Google's custom [Titan](https://security.googleblog.com/2021/10/pixel-6-setting-new-standard-for-mobile.html) security chips acting as the Secure Element.
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+    ![Google Pixel 6](assets/img/android/google-pixel.png){ align=right }
+    
+    **Google Pixel** devices are known to have good security and properly support [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), even when installing custom operating systems.
+    
+    Beginning with the **Pixel 6** and **6 Pro**, Pixel devices receive a minimum of 5 years of guaranteed security updates, ensuring a much longer lifespan compared to the 2-4 years competing OEMs typically offer.
+    
+    [:material-shopping: Store](https://store.google.com/category/phones){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+
+Secure Elements like the Titan M2 are more limited than the processor's Trusted Execution Environment used by most other phones as they are only used for secrets storage, hardware attestation, and rate limiting, not for running "trusted" programs. Phones without a Secure Element have to use the TEE for *all* of those functions, resulting in a larger attack surface.
+
+Google Pixel phones use a TEE OS called Trusty which is [open-source](https://source.android.com/security/trusty#whyTrusty), unlike many other phones.
+
+The installation of GrapheneOS on a Pixel phone is easy with their [web installer](https://grapheneos.org/install/web). If you don't feel comfortable doing it yourself and are willing to spend a bit of extra money, check out the [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) as they come preloaded with GrapheneOS from the reputable [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/about) company.
+
+A few more tips for purchasing a Google Pixel:
+
+- If you're after a bargain on a Pixel device, we suggest buying an "**a**" model, just after the next flagship is released. Discounts are usually available because Google will be trying to clear their stock.
+- Consider price beating options and specials offered at physical stores.
+- Look at online community bargain sites in your country. These can alert you to good sales.
+- Google provides a list showing the [support cycle](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) for each one of their devices. The price per day for a device can be calculated as: $\text{Cost} \over \text {EOL Date}-\text{Current Date}$, meaning that the longer use of the device the lower cost per day.
+
+## General Apps
+
+We recommend a wide variety of Android apps throughout this site. The apps listed here are Android-exclusive and specifically enhance or replace key system functionality.
+
+### Shelter
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+    ![Shelter logo](assets/img/android/shelter.svg){ align=right }
+    
+    **Shelter** is an app that helps you leverage Android's Work Profile functionality to isolate or duplicate apps on your device.
+    
+    Shelter supports blocking contact search cross profiles and sharing files across profiles via the default file manager ([DocumentsUI](https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/modular-system/documentsui)).
+    
+    [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://gitea.angry.im/PeterCxy/Shelter#shelter){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitea.angry.im/PeterCxy/Shelter){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+    [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.patreon.com/PeterCxy){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+    
+    ??? downloads
+    
+        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.typeblog.shelter)
+
+!!! warning
+
+    Shelter is recommended over [Insular](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/) and [Island](https://github.com/oasisfeng/island) as it supports [contact search blocking](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/faq.html).
+    
+    When using Shelter, you are placing complete trust in its developer, as Shelter acts as a [Device Admin](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/admin/device-admin) to create the Work Profile, and it has extensive access to the data stored within the Work Profile.
+
+### Auditor
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+    ![Auditor logo](assets/img/android/auditor.svg#only-light){ align=right }
+    ![Auditor logo](assets/img/android/auditor-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
+    
+    **Auditor** is an app which leverages hardware security features to provide device integrity monitoring for [supported devices](https://attestation.app/about#device-support). Currently, it only works with GrapheneOS and the device's stock operating system.
+    
+    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://attestation.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:octicons-eye-16:](https://attestation.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://attestation.app/about){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://attestation.app/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+    [:octicons-heart-16:](https://attestation.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+    
+    ??? downloads
+    
+        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.attestation.auditor.play)
+        - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases)
+        - [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+Auditor performs attestation and intrusion detection by:
+
+- Using a [Trust On First Use (TOFU)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_on_first_use) model between an *auditor* and *auditee*, the pair establish a private key in the [hardware-backed keystore](https://source.android.com/security/keystore/) of the *Auditor*.
+- The *auditor* can either be another instance of the Auditor app or the [Remote Attestation Service](https://attestation.app).
+- The *auditor* records the current state and configuration of the *auditee*.
+- Should tampering with the operating system of the *auditee* happen after the pairing is complete, the auditor will be aware of the change in the device state and configurations.
+- You will be alerted to the change.
+
+No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
+
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service. To make sure that your hardware and operating system is genuine, [perform local attestation](https://grapheneos.org/install/web#verifying-installation) immediately after the device has been installed and prior to any internet connection.
+
+### Secure Camera
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+    ![Secure camera logo](assets/img/android/secure_camera.svg#only-light){ align=right }
+    ![Secure camera logo](assets/img/android/secure_camera-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
+    
+    **Secure Camera** is a camera app focused on privacy and security which can capture images, videos and QR codes. CameraX vendor extensions (Portrait, HDR, Night Sight, Face Retouch, and Auto) are also supported on available devices.
+    
+    [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://grapheneos.org/usage#camera){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+    [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+    
+    ??? downloads
+    
+        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.grapheneos.camera.play)
+        - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases)
+        - [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+Main privacy features include:
+
+- Auto removal of [Exif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exif) metadata (enabled by default)
+- Use of the new [Media](https://developer.android.com/training/data-storage/shared/media) API, therefore [storage permissions](https://developer.android.com/training/data-storage) are not required
+- Microphone permission not required unless you want to record sound
+
+!!! note
+
+    Metadata is not currently deleted from video files but that is planned.
+    
+    The image orientation metadata is not deleted. If you enable location (in Secure Camera) that **won't** be deleted either. If you want to delete that later you will need to use an external app such as [ExifEraser](data-redaction.md#exiferaser).
+
+### Secure PDF Viewer
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+    ![Secure PDF Viewer logo](assets/img/android/secure_pdf_viewer.svg#only-light){ align=right }
+    ![Secure PDF Viewer logo](assets/img/android/secure_pdf_viewer-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
+    
+    **Secure PDF Viewer** is a PDF viewer based on [pdf.js](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PDF.js) that doesn't require any permissions. The PDF is fed into a [sandboxed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandbox_(software_development)) [webview](https://developer.android.com/guide/webapps/webview). This means that it doesn't require permission directly to access content or files.
+    
+    [Content-Security-Policy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy) is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content.
+    
+    [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+    [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+    
+    ??? downloads
+    
+        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.grapheneos.pdfviewer.play)
+        - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer/releases)
+        - [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+## Obtaining Applications
+
+### GrapheneOS App Store
+
+GrapheneOS's app store is available on [GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases). It supports Android 12 and above and is capable of updating itself. The app store has standalone applications built by the GrapheneOS project such as the [Auditor](https://attestation.app/), [Camera](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera), and [PDF Viewer](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer). If you are looking for these applications, we highly recommend that you get them from GrapheneOS's app store instead of the Play Store, as the apps on their store are signed by the GrapheneOS's project own signature that Google does not have access to.
+
+### Aurora Store
+
+The Google Play Store requires a Google account to login which is not great for privacy. You can get around this by using an alternative client, such as Aurora Store.
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+    ![Aurora Store logo](assets/img/android/aurora-store.webp){ align=right }
+    
+    **Aurora Store** is a Google Play Store client which does not require a Google Account, Google Play Services, or microG to download apps.
+    
+    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://auroraoss.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+    
+    ??? downloads
+    
+        - [:simple-gitlab: GitLab](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore/-/releases)
+
+Aurora Store does not allow you to download paid apps with their anonymous account feature. You can optionally log in with your Google account with Aurora Store to download apps you have purchased, which does give access to the list of apps you've installed to Google, however you still benefit from not requiring the full Google Play client and Google Play Services or microG on your device.
+
+### Manually with RSS Notifications
+
+For apps that are released on platforms like GitHub and GitLab, you may be able to add an RSS feed to your [news aggregator](/news-aggregators) that will help you keep track of new releases.
+
+![RSS APK](./assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png#only-light) ![RSS APK](./assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png#only-dark) ![APK Changes](./assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png#only-light) ![APK Changes](./assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png#only-dark)
+
+#### GitHub
+
+On GitHub, using [Secure Camera](#secure-camera) as an example, you would navigate to its [releases page](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases) and append `.atom` to the URL:
+
+`https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases.atom`
+
+#### GitLab
+
+On GitLab, using [Aurora Store](#aurora-store) as an example, you would navigate to its [project repository](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore) and append `/-/tags?format=atom` to the URL:
+
+`https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore/-/tags?format=atom`
+
+#### Verifying APK Fingerprints
+
+If you download APK files to install manually, you can verify their signature with the [`apksigner`](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/apksigner) tool, which is a part of Android [build-tools](https://developer.android.com/studio/releases/build-tools).
+
+1. Install [Java JDK](https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/downloads/).
+
+2. Download the [Android Studio command line tools](https://developer.android.com/studio#command-tools).
+
+3. Extract the downloaded archive:
+
+    ```bash
+    unzip commandlinetools-*.zip
+    cd cmdline-tools
+    ./bin/sdkmanager --sdk_root=./ "build-tools;29.0.3"
+    ```
+
+4. Run the signature verification command:
+
+    ```bash
+    ./build-tools/29.0.3/apksigner verify --print-certs ../Camera-37.apk
+    ```
+
+5. The resulting hashes can then be compared with another source. Some developers such as Signal [show the fingerprints](https://signal.org/android/apk/) on their website.
+
+    ```bash
+    Signer #1 certificate DN: CN=GrapheneOS
+    Signer #1 certificate SHA-256 digest: 6436b155b917c2f9a9ed1d15c4993a5968ffabc94947c13f2aeee14b7b27ed59
+    Signer #1 certificate SHA-1 digest: 23e108677a2e1b1d6e6b056f3bb951df7ad5570c
+    Signer #1 certificate MD5 digest: dbbcd0cac71bd6fa2102a0297c6e0dd3
+    ```
+
+### F-Droid
+
+![F-Droid logo](assets/img/android/f-droid.svg){ align=right width=120px }
+
+==We do **not** currently recommend F-Droid as a way to obtain apps.== F-Droid is often recommended as an alternative to Google Play, particularly in the privacy community. The option to add third-party repositories and not be confined to Google's walled garden has led to its popularity. F-Droid additionally has [reproducible builds](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Reproducible_Builds/) for some applications and is dedicated to free and open-source software. However, there are [notable problems](https://privsec.dev/posts/android/f-droid-security-issues/) with the official F-Droid client, their quality control, and how they build, sign, and deliver packages.
+
+Due to their process of building apps, apps in the official F-Droid repository often fall behind on updates. F-Droid maintainers also reuse package IDs while signing apps with their own keys, which is not ideal as it gives the F-Droid team ultimate trust.
+
+Other popular third-party repositories such as [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) alleviate some of these concerns. The IzzyOnDroid repository pulls builds directly from GitHub and is the next best thing to the developers' own repositories. However, it is not something that we can recommend, as apps are typically [removed](https://github.com/vfsfitvnm/ViMusic/issues/240#issuecomment-1225564446) from that respository when they make it to the main F-Droid repository. While that makes sense (since the goal of that particular repository is to host apps before they're accepted into the main F-Droid repository), it can leave you with installed apps which no longer receive updates.
+
+That said, the [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/) and [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) repositories are home to countless apps, so they can be a useful tool to search for and discover open-source apps that you can then download through Play Store, Aurora Store, or by getting the APK directly from the developer. It is important to keep in mind that some apps in these repositories have not been updated in years and may rely on unsupported libraries, among other things, posing a potential security risk. You should use your best judgement when looking for new apps via this method.
+
+!!! note
+
+    In some rare cases, the developer of an app will only distribute it through F-Droid ([Gadgetbridge](https://gadgetbridge.org/) is one example of this). If you really need an app like that, we recommend using [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) instead of the official F-Droid app to obtain it.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+    We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Operating Systems
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must support bootloader locking with custom AVB key support.
+- Must receive major Android updates within 0-1 months of release.
+- Must receive Android feature updates (minor version) within 0-14 days of release.
+- Must receive regular security patches within 0-5 days of release.
+- Must **not** be "rooted" out of the box.
+- Must **not** enable Google Play Services by default.
+- Must **not** require system modification to support Google Play Services.
+
+### Devices
+
+- Must support at least one of our recommended custom operating systems.
+- Must be currently sold new in stores.
+- Must receive a minimum of 5 years of security updates.
+- Must have dedicated secure element hardware.
+
+### Applications
+
+- Applications on this page must not be applicable to any other software category on the site.
+- General applications should extend or replace core system functionality.
+- Applications should receive regular updates and maintenance.

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i18n/ar/basics/account-creation.md

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+---
+title: "Account Creation"
+icon: 'material/account-plus'
+description: Creating accounts online is practically an internet necessity, take these steps to make sure you stay private.
+---
+
+Often people sign up for services without thinking. Maybe it's a streaming service so you can watch that new show everyone's talking about, or an account that gives you a discount for your favorite fast food place. Whatever the case may be, you should consider the implications for your data now and later on down the line.
+
+There are risks associated with every new service that you use. Data breaches; disclosure of customer information to third parties; rogue employees accessing data; all are possibilities that must be considered when giving your information out. You need to be confident that you can trust the service, which is why we don't recommend storing valuable data on anything but the most mature and battle-tested products. That usually means services which provide E2EE and have undergone a cryptographic audit. An audit increases assurance that the product was designed without glaring security issues caused by an inexperienced developer.
+
+It can also be difficult to delete the accounts on some services. Sometimes [overwriting data](account-deletion.md#overwriting-account-information) associated with an account can be possible, but in other cases the service will keep an entire history of changes to the account.
+
+## Terms of Service & Privacy Policy
+
+The ToS are the rules that you agree to follow when using the service. With larger services these rules are often enforced by automated systems. Sometimes these automated systems can make mistakes. For example, you may be banned or locked out of your account on some services for using a VPN or VOIP number. Appealing such bans is often difficult, and involves an automated process too, which isn't always successful. This would be one of the reasons why we wouldn't suggest using Gmail for email as an example. Email is crucial for access to other services you might have signed up for.
+
+The Privacy Policy is how the service says they will use your data and it is worth reading so that you understand how your data will be used. A company or organization might not be legally obligated to follow everything contained in the policy (it depends on the jurisdiction). We would recommend having some idea what your local laws are and what they permit a provider to collect.
+
+We recommend looking for particular terms such as "data collection", "data analysis", "cookies", "ads" or "3rd-party" services. Sometimes you will be able to opt-out from data collection or from sharing your data, but it is best to choose a service that respects your privacy from the start.
+
+Keep in mind you're also placing your trust in the company or organization and that they will comply with their own privacy policy.
+
+## Authentication methods
+
+There are usually multiple ways to sign up for an account, each with their own benefits and drawbacks.
+
+### Email and password
+
+The most common way to create a new account is by an email address and password. When using this method, you should use a password manager and follow [best practices](passwords-overview.md) regarding passwords.
+
+!!! tip
+
+    You can use your password manager to organize other authentication methods too! Just add the new entry and fill the appropriate fields, you can add notes for things like security questions or a backup key.
+
+You will be responsible for managing your login credentials. For added security, you can set up [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md) on your accounts.
+
+[Recommended password managers](../passwords.md ""){.md-button}
+
+#### Email aliases
+
+If you don't want to give your real email address to a service, you have the option to use an alias. We described them in more detail on our email services recommendation page. Essentially, alias services allow you to generate new email addresses that forward all emails to your main address. This can help prevent tracking across services and help you manage the marketing emails that sometimes come with the sign up process. Those can be filtered automatically based on the alias they are sent to.
+
+Should a service get hacked, you might start receiving phishing or spam emails to the address you used to sign up. Using unique aliases for each service can assist in identifying exactly what service was hacked.
+
+[Recommended email aliasing services](../email.md#email-aliasing-services ""){.md-button}
+
+### Single sign-on
+
+!!! note
+
+    We are discussing Single sign-on for personal use, not enterprise users.
+
+Single sign-on (SSO) is an authentication method that allows you to register for a service without sharing much information, if any. Whenever you see something along the lines of "Sign-in with *provider name*" on a registration form it's SSO.
+
+When you choose single sign-on in a website, it will prompt your SSO provider login page and after that your account will be connected. Your password won't be shared but some basic information will (you can review it during the login request). This process is needed every time you want to log in to the same account.
+
+The main advantages are:
+
+- **Security**: no risk of being involved in a [data breach](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_breach) because the website does not store your credentials.
+- **Ease of use**: multiple accounts are managed by a single login.
+
+But there are disadvantages:
+
+- **Privacy**: a SSO provider will know the services you use.
+- **Centralization**: if your SSO account gets compromised or you aren't able to login to it, all other accounts connected to it are affected.
+
+SSO can be especially useful in those situations where you could benefit from deeper integration between services. For example, one of those services may offer SSO for the others. Our recommendation is to limit SSO to only where you need it and protect the main account with [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md).
+
+All services that use SSO will be as secure as your SSO account. For example, if you want to secure an account with a hardware key but that service doesn't support hardware keys, you can secure your SSO account with a hardware key and now you essentially have hardware MFA on all your accounts. It is worth noting though that weak authentication on your SSO account means that any account tied to that login will also be weak.
+
+### Phone number
+
+We recommend avoiding services that require a phone number for sign up. A phone number can identity you across multiple services and depending on data sharing agreements this will make your usage easier to track, particularly if one of those services is breached as the phone number is often **not** encrypted.
+
+You should avoid giving out your real phone number if you can. Some services will allow the use of VOIP numbers, however these often trigger fraud detection systems, causing an account to be locked down, so we don't recommend that for important accounts.
+
+In many cases you will need to provide a number that you can receive SMS or calls from, particularly when shopping internationally, in case there is a problem with your order at border screening. It's common for services to use your number as a verification method; don't let yourself get locked out of an important account because you wanted to be clever and give a fake number!
+
+### Username and password
+
+Some services allow you to register without using an email address and only require you to set a username and password. These services may provide increased anonymity when combined with a VPN or Tor. Keep in mind that for these accounts there will most likely be **no way to recover your account** in the event you forget your username or password.

i18n/ar/basics/account-deletion.md

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+---
+title: "Account Deletion"
+icon: 'material/account-remove'
+description: It's easy to accumulate a large number of internet accounts, here are some tips on how to prune your collection.
+---
+
+Over time, it can be easy to accumulate a number of online accounts, many of which you may no longer use. Deleting these unused accounts is an important step in reclaiming your privacy, as dormant accounts are vulnerable to data breaches. A data breach is when a service's security is compromised and protected information is viewed, transmitted, or stolen by unauthorized actors. Data breaches are unfortunately all [too common](https://haveibeenpwned.com/PwnedWebsites) these days, and so practicing good digital hygiene is the best way to minimize the impact they have on your life. The goal of this guide then is to help navigate you through the irksome process of account deletion, often made difficult by [deceptive design](https://www.deceptive.design/), for the betterment of your online presence.
+
+## Finding Old Accounts
+
+### Password Manager
+
+If you have a password manager that you've used for your entire digital life, this part will be very easy. Oftentimes, they include built-in functionality for detecting if your credentials were exposed in a data breach—such as Bitwarden's [Data Breach Report](https://bitwarden.com/blog/have-you-been-pwned/).
+
+<figure markdown>
+  ![Bitwarden's Data Breach Report feature](../assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png)
+</figure>
+
+Even if you haven't explicitly used a password manager before, there's a chance you've used the one in your browser or your phone without even realizing it. For example: [Firefox Password Manager](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/password-manager-remember-delete-edit-logins), [Google Password Manager](https://passwords.google.com/intro) and [Edge Password Manager](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-edge/save-or-forget-passwords-in-microsoft-edge-b4beecb0-f2a8-1ca0-f26f-9ec247a3f336).
+
+Desktop platforms also often have a password manager which may help you recover passwords you've forgotten about:
+
+- Windows [Credential Manager](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/accessing-credential-manager-1b5c916a-6a16-889f-8581-fc16e8165ac0)
+- macOS [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211145)
+- iOS [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211146)
+- Linux, Gnome Keyring, which can be accessed through [Seahorse](https://help.gnome.org/users/seahorse/stable/passwords-view.html.en) or [KDE Wallet Manager](https://userbase.kde.org/KDE_Wallet_Manager)
+
+### Email
+
+If you didn't use a password manager in the past or you think you have accounts that were never added to your password manager, another option is to search the email account(s) that you believe you signed up on. On your email client, search for keywords such as "verify" or "welcome." Almost every time you make an online account, the service will send a verification link or an introductory message to your email. This can be a good way to find old, forgotten accounts.
+
+## Deleting Old Accounts
+
+### Log In
+
+In order to delete your old accounts, you'll need to first make sure you can log in to them. Again, if the account was in your password manager, this step is easy. If not, you can try to guess your password. Failing that, there are typically options to regain access to your account, commonly available through a "forgot password" link on the login page. It may also be possible that accounts you've abandoned have already been deleted—sometimes services prune all old accounts.
+
+When attempting to regain access, if the site returns an error message saying that email is not associated with an account, or you never receive a reset link after multiple attempts, then you do not have an account under that email address and should try a different one. If you can't figure out which email address you used, or you no longer have access to that email, you can try contacting the service's customer support. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that you will be able to reclaim access your account.
+
+### GDPR (EEA residents only)
+
+Residents of the EEA have additional rights regarding data erasure specified in [Article 17](https://www.gdpr.org/regulation/article-17.html) of the GDPR. If it's applicable to you, read the privacy policy for any given service to find information on how to exercise your right to erasure. Reading the privacy policy can prove important, as some services have a "Delete Account" option that only disables your account and for real deletion you have to take additional action. Sometimes actual deletion may involve filling out surveys, emailing the data protection officer of the service or even proving your residence in the EEA. If you plan to go this way, do **not** overwrite account information—your identity as an EEA resident may be required. Note that the location of the service does not matter; GDPR applies to anyone serving European users. If the service does not respect your right to erasure, you can contact your national [Data Protection Authority](https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/rights-citizens/redress/what-should-i-do-if-i-think-my-personal-data-protection-rights-havent-been-respected_en) and you may be entitled to monetary compensation.
+
+### Overwriting Account information
+
+In some situations where you plan to abandon an account, it may make sense to overwrite the account information with fake data. Once you've made sure you can log in, change all the information in your account to falsified information. The reason for this is that many sites will retain information you previously had even after account deletion. The hope is that they will overwrite the previous information with the newest data you entered. However, there is no guarantee that there won't be backups with the prior information.
+
+For the account email, either create a new alternate email account via your provider of choice or create an alias using an [email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services). You can then delete your alternate email address once you are done. We recommend against using temporary email providers, as oftentimes it is possible to reactivate temporary emails.
+
+### Delete
+
+You can check [JustDeleteMe](https://justdeleteme.xyz) for instructions on deleting the account for a specific service. Some sites will graciously have a "Delete Account" option, while others will go as far as to force you to speak with a support agent. The deletion process can vary from site to site, with account deletion being impossible on some.
+
+For services that don't allow account deletion, the best thing to do is falsify all your information as previously mentioned and strengthen account security. To do so, enable [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md) and any extra security features offered. As well, change the password to a randomly-generated one that is the maximum allowed size (a [password manager](../passwords.md) can be useful for this).
+
+If you're satisfied that all information you care about is removed, you can safely forget about this account. If not, it might be a good idea to keep the credentials stored with your other passwords and occasionally re-login to reset the password.
+
+Even when you are able to delete an account, there is no guarantee that all your information will be removed. In fact, some companies are required by law to keep certain information, particularly when related to financial transactions. It's mostly out of your control what happens to your data when it comes to websites and cloud services.
+
+## Avoid New Accounts
+
+As the old saying goes, "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." Whenever you feel tempted to sign up for a new account, ask yourself, "Do I really need this? Can I accomplish what I need to without an account?" It can often be much harder to delete an account than to create one. And even after deleting or changing the info on your account, there might be a cached version from a third-party—like the [Internet Archive](https://archive.org/). Avoid the temptation when you're able to—your future self will thank you!

i18n/ar/basics/common-misconceptions.md

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+---
+title: "Common Misconceptions"
+icon: 'material/robot-confused'
+description: Privacy isn't a straightforward topic, and it's easy to get caught up in marketing claims and other disinformation.
+---
+
+## "Open-source software is always secure" or "Proprietary software is more secure"
+
+These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis.
+
+Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities into even large projects.[^1]
+
+On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering.
+
+To avoid biased decisions, it's *vital* that you evaluate the privacy and security standards of the software you use.
+
+## "Shifting trust can increase privacy"
+
+We talk about "shifting trust" a lot when discussing solutions like VPNs (which shift the trust you place in your ISP to the VPN provider). While this protects your browsing data from your ISP *specifically*, the VPN provider you choose still has access to your browsing data: Your data isn't completely secured from all parties. This means that:
+
+1. You must exercise caution when choosing a provider to shift trust to.
+2. You should still use other techniques, like E2EE, to protect your data completely. Merely distrusting one provider to trust another is not securing your data.
+
+## "Privacy-focused solutions are inherently trustworthy"
+
+Focusing solely on the privacy policies and marketing of a tool or provider can blind you to its weaknesses. When you're looking for a more private solution, you should determine what the underlying problem is and find technical solutions to that problem. For example, you may want to avoid Google Drive, which gives Google access to all of your data. The underlying problem in this case is lack of E2EE, so you should make sure that the provider you switch to actually implements E2EE, or use a tool (like [Cryptomator](../encryption.md#cryptomator-cloud)) which provides E2EE on any cloud provider. Switching to a "privacy-focused" provider (that doesn't implement E2EE) doesn't solve your problem: it just shifts trust from Google to that provider.
+
+The privacy policies and business practices of providers you choose are very important, but should be considered secondary to technical guarantees of your privacy: You shouldn't shift trust to another provider when trusting a provider isn't a requirement at all.
+
+## "Complicated is better"
+
+We often see people describing privacy threat models that are overly complex. Often, these solutions include problems like many different email accounts or complicated setups with lots of moving parts and conditions. The replies are usually answers to "What is the best way to do *X*?"
+
+Finding the "best" solution for yourself doesn't necessarily mean you are after an infallible solution with dozens of conditions—these solutions are often difficult to work with realistically. As we discussed previously, security often comes at the cost of convenience. Below, we provide some tips:
+
+1. ==Actions need to serve a particular purpose:== think about how to do what you want with the fewest actions.
+2. ==Remove human failure points:== We fail, get tired, and forget things. To maintain security, avoid relying on manual conditions and processes that you have to remember.
+3. ==Use the right level of protection for what you intend.== We often see recommendations of so-called law-enforcement or subpoena-proof solutions. These often require specialist knowledge and generally aren't what people want. There's no point in building an intricate threat model for anonymity if you can be easily de-anonymized by a simple oversight.
+
+So, how might this look?
+
+One of the clearest threat models is one where people *know who you are* and one where they do not. There will always be situations where you must declare your legal name and there are others where you don't need to.
+
+1. **Known identity** - A known identity is used for things where you must declare your name. There are many legal documents and contracts where a legal identity is required. This could range from opening a bank account, signing a property lease, obtaining a passport, customs declarations when importing items, or otherwise dealing with your government. These things will usually lead to credentials such as credit cards, credit rating checks, account numbers, and possibly physical addresses.
+
+    We don't suggest using a VPN or Tor for any of these things, as your identity is already known through other means.
+
+    !!! tip
+   
+        When shopping online, the use of a [parcel locker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parcel_locker) can help keep your physical address private.
+
+2. **Unknown identity** - An unknown identity could be a stable pseudonym that you regularly use. It is not anonymous because it doesn't change. If you're part of an online community, you may wish to retain a persona that others know. This pseudonym isn't anonymous because—if monitored for long enough—details about the owner can reveal further information, such as the way they write, their general knowledge about topics of interest, etc.
+
+    You may wish to use a VPN for this, to mask your IP address. Financial transactions are more difficult to mask: You could consider using anonymous cryptocurrencies, such as [Monero](https://www.getmonero.org/). Employing altcoin shifting may also help to disguise where your currency originated. Typically, exchanges require KYC (know your customer) to be completed before they'll allow you to exchange fiat currency into any kind of cryptocurrency. Local meet-up options may also be a solution; however, those are often more expensive and sometimes also require KYC.
+
+3. **Anonymous identity** - Even with experience, anonymous identities are difficult to maintain over long periods of time. They should be short-term and short-lived identities which are rotated regularly.
+
+    Using Tor can help with this. It is also worth noting that greater anonymity is possible through asynchronous communication: Real-time communication is vulnerable to analysis of typing patterns (i.e. more than a paragraph of text, distributed on a forum, via email, etc.)
+
+[^1]: One notable example of this is the [2021 incident in which University of Minnesota researchers introduced three vulnerabilities into the Linux kernel development project](https://cse.umn.edu/cs/linux-incident).

i18n/ar/basics/common-threats.md

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+---
+title: "Common Threats"
+icon: 'material/eye-outline'
+description: Your threat model is personal to you, but these are some of the things many visitors to this site care about.
+---
+
+Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside of these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat.
+
+- <span class="pg-purple">:material-incognito: Anonymity</span> - Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically.
+- <span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks</span> - Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically.
+- <span class="pg-orange">:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks</span> - Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once.
+- <span class="pg-teal">:material-server-network: Service Providers</span> - Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server).
+- <span class="pg-blue">:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance</span> - Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities.
+- <span class="pg-brown">:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism</span> - Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors.
+- <span class="pg-green">:material-account-search: Public Exposure</span> - Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public.
+- <span class="pg-blue-gray">:material-close-outline: Censorship</span> - Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online.
+
+Some of these threats may be more important to you than others, depending on your specific concerns. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with <span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks</span>, but they probably still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in <span class="pg-blue">:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance</span> programs. Similarly, many people may be primarily concerned with <span class="pg-green">:material-account-search: Public Exposure</span> of their personal data, but they should still be wary of security-focused issues, such as <span class="pg-orange">:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks</span>—like malware affecting their devices.
+
+## Anonymity vs. Privacy
+
+<span class="pg-purple">:material-incognito: Anonymity</span>
+
+Anonymity is often confused with privacy, but they're distinct concepts. While privacy is a set of choices you make about how your data is used and shared, anonymity is the complete disassociation of your online activities from your real identity.
+
+Whistleblowers and journalists, for example, can have a much more extreme threat model which requires total anonymity. That's not only hiding what they do, what data they have, and not getting hacked by malicious actors or governments, but also hiding who they are entirely. They will often sacrifice any kind of convenience if it means protecting their anonymity, privacy, or security, because their lives could depend on it. Most people don't need to go so far.
+
+## Security and Privacy
+
+<span class="pg-orange">:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks</span>
+
+Security and privacy are also often confused, because you need security to obtain any semblance of privacy: Using tools—even if they're private by design—is futile if they could be easily exploited by attackers who later release your data. However, the inverse isn't necessarily true: The most secure service in the world *isn't necessarily* private. The best example of this is trusting data to Google who, given their scale, have had few security incidents by employing industry-leading security experts to secure their infrastructure. Even though Google provides very secure services, very few people would consider their data private in Google's free consumer products (Gmail, YouTube, etc.)
+
+When it comes to application security, we generally don't (and sometimes can't) know if the software we use is malicious, or might one day become malicious. Even with the most trustworthy developers, there's generally no guarantee that their software doesn't have a serious vulnerability that could later be exploited.
+
+To minimize the damage that a malicious piece of software *could* do, you should employ security by compartmentalization. For example, this could come in the form of using different computers for different jobs, using virtual machines to separate different groups of related applications, or using a secure operating system with a strong focus on application sandboxing and mandatory access control.
+
+!!! tip
+
+    Mobile operating systems generally have better application sandboxing than desktop operating systems: Apps can't obtain root access, and require permission for access to system resources.
+    
+    Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS has similar sandboxing capabilities to Android, and macOS has full system permission control (and developers can opt-in to sandboxing for applications). However, these operating systems do transmit identifying information to their respective OEMs. Linux tends to not submit information to system vendors, but it has poor protection against exploits and malicious apps. This can be mitigated somewhat with specialized distributions which make significant use of virtual machines or containers, such as [Qubes OS](../../desktop/#qubes-os).
+
+<span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks</span>
+
+Targeted attacks against a specific person are more problematic to deal with. Common attacks include sending malicious documents via email, exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g. in browsers and operating systems), and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you should employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies.
+
+!!! tip
+
+    By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typically run untrusted code, sent to you from third parties. Running multiple virtual machines—to separate applications like these from your host system, as well as each other—is one technique you can use to mitigate the chance of an exploit in these applications compromising the rest of your system. For example, technologies like Qubes OS or Microsoft Defender Application Guard on Windows provide convenient methods to do this.
+
+If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user.
+
+## Privacy From Service Providers
+
+<span class="pg-teal">:material-server-network: Service Providers</span>
+
+We live in a world where almost everything is connected to the internet. Our "private" messages, emails, and social interactions are typically stored on a server, somewhere. Generally, when you send someone a message it's stored on a server, and when your friend wants to read the message the server will show it to them.
+
+The obvious problem with this is that the service provider (or a hacker who has compromised the server) can access your conversations whenever and however they want, without you ever knowing. This applies to many common services, like SMS messaging, Telegram, and Discord.
+
+Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between you and your desired recipients before they are even sent to the server. The confidentiality of your messages is guaranteed, assuming the service provider doesn't have access to the private keys of either party.
+
+!!! note "Note on Web-based Encryption"
+
+    In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering).
+    
+    On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt.
+    
+    Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible.
+
+Even with E2EE, service providers can still profile you based on **metadata**, which typically isn't protected. While the service provider can't read your messages, they can still observe important things, such as who you're talking to, how often you message them, and when you're typically active. Protection of metadata is fairly uncommon, and—if it's within your [threat model](threat-modeling.md)—you should pay close attention to the technical documentation of the software you're using to see if there's any metadata minimization or protection at all.
+
+## Mass Surveillance Programs
+
+<span class="pg-blue">:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance</span>
+
+Mass surveillance is the intricate effort to monitor the "behavior, many activities, or information" of an entire (or substantial fraction of a) population.[^1] It often refers to government programs, such as the ones [disclosed by Edward Snowden in 2013](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_surveillance_disclosures_(2013%E2%80%93present)). However, it can also be carried out by corporations, either on behalf of government agencies or by their own initiative.
+
+!!! abstract "Atlas of Surveillance"
+
+    If you want to learn more about surveillance methods and how they're implemented in your city you can also take a look at the [Atlas of Surveillance](https://atlasofsurveillance.org/) by the [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.eff.org/).
+    
+    In France you can take a look at the [Technolopolice website](https://technopolice.fr/villes/) maintained by the non-profit association La Quadrature du Net.
+
+Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, breaching human rights, it's most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.
+
+!!! quote "ACLU: [*The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward*](https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/the-privacy-lesson-of-9-11-mass-surveillance-is-not-the-way-forward)"
+
+    In the face of [Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRISM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM) and [Upstream](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upstream_collection)], intelligence officials also admitted that the NSA had for years been secretly collecting records about virtually every American’s phone calls — who’s calling whom, when those calls are made, and how long they last. This kind of information, when amassed by the NSA day after day, can reveal incredibly sensitive details about people’s lives and associations, such as whether they have called a pastor, an abortion provider, an addiction counselor, or a suicide hotline.
+
+Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^2]
+
+Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods:
+
+- Your IP address
+- Browser cookies
+- The data you submit to websites
+- Your browser or device fingerprint
+- Payment method correlation
+
+\[This list isn't exhaustive].
+
+If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategues like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information.
+
+<span class="pg-brown">:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism</span>
+
+> Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^3]
+
+For many people, tracking and surveillance by private corporations is a growing concern. Pervasive ad networks, such as those operated by Google and Facebook, span the internet far beyond just the sites they control, tracking your actions along the way. Using tools like content blockers to limit network requests to their servers, and reading the privacy policies of the services you use can help you avoid many basic adversaries (although it can't completely prevent tracking).[^4]
+
+Additionally, even companies outside of the *AdTech* or tracking industry can share your information with [data brokers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_broker) (such as Cambridge Analytica, Experian, or Datalogix) or other parties. You can't automatically assume your data is safe just because the service you're using doesn't fall within the typical AdTech or tracking business model. The strongest protection against corporate data collection is to encrypt or obfuscate your data whenever possible, making it difficult for different providers to correlate data with each other and build a profile on you.
+
+## Limiting Public Information
+
+<span class="pg-green">:material-account-search: Public Exposure</span>
+
+The best way to keep your data private is simply not making it public in the first place. Deleting unwanted information you find about yourself online is one of the best first steps you can take to regain your privacy.
+
+- [View our guide on account deletion :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](account-deletion.md)
+
+On sites where you do share information, checking the privacy settings of your account to limit how widely that data is spread is very important. For example, enable "private mode" on your accounts if given the option: This ensures that your account isn't being indexed by search engines, and that it can't be viewed without your permission.
+
+If you've already submitted your real information to sites which shouldn't have it, consider using disinformation tactics, like submitting fictitious information related to that online identity. This makes your real information indistinguishable from the false information.
+
+## Avoiding Censorship
+
+<span class="pg-blue-gray">:material-close-outline: Censorship</span>
+
+Censorship online can be carried out (to varying degrees) by actors including totalitarian governments, network administrators, and service providers. These efforts to control communication and restrict access to information will always be incompatible with the human right to Freedom of Expression.[^5]
+
+Censorship on corporate platforms is increasingly common, as platforms like Twitter and Facebook give in to public demand, market pressures, and pressures from government agencies. Government pressures can be covert requests to businesses, such as the White House [requesting the takedown](https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/technology/on-the-web-a-fine-line-on-free-speech-across-globe.html) of a provocative YouTube video, or overt, such as the Chinese government requiring companies to adhere to a strict regime of censorship.
+
+People concerned with the threat of censorship can use technologies like [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) to circumvent it, and support censorship-resistant communication platforms like [Matrix](../real-time-communication.md#element), which doesn't have a centralized account authority that can close accounts arbitrarily.
+
+!!! tip
+
+    While evading censorship itself can be easy, hiding the fact that you are doing it can be very problematic.
+    
+    You should consider which aspects of the network your adversary can observe, and whether you have plausible deniability for your actions. For example, using [encrypted DNS](../advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns) can help you bypass rudimentary, DNS-based censorship systems, but it can't truly hide what you are visiting from your ISP. A VPN or Tor can help hide what you are visiting from network administrators, but can't hide that you're using those networks in the first place. Pluggable transports (such as Obfs4proxy, Meek, or Shadowsocks) can help you evade firewalls that block common VPN protocols or Tor, but your circumvention attempts can still be detected by methods like probing or [deep packet inspection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection).
+
+You must always consider the risks of trying to bypass censorship, the potential consequences, and how sophisticated your adversary may be. You should be cautious with your software selection, and have a backup plan in case you are caught.
+
+[^1]: Wikipedia: [*Mass Surveillance*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass_surveillance) and [*Surveillance*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance).
+[^2]: United States Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: [*Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215*](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/ec542143-1079-424a-84b3-acc354698560/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf)
+[^3]: Wikipedia: [*Surveillance capitalism*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance_capitalism)
+[^4]: "[Enumerating badness](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/)" (or, "listing all the bad things that we know about"), as many adblockers and antivirus programs do, fails to adequately protect you from new and unknown threats because they have not yet been added to the filter list. You should also employ other mitigation techniques.
+[^5]: United Nations: [*Universal Declaration of Human Rights*](https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights).

i18n/ar/basics/email-security.md

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+---
+title: Email Security
+icon: material/email
+description: Email is inherently insecure in many ways, and these are some of the reasons it isn't our top choice for secure communications.
+---
+
+Email is an insecure form of communication by default. You can improve your email security with tools such as OpenPGP, which add End-to-End Encryption to your messages, but OpenPGP still has a number of drawbacks compared to encryption in other messaging applications, and some email data can never be encrypted inherently due to how email is designed.
+
+As a result, email is best used for receiving transactional emails (like notifications, verification emails, password resets, etc.) from the services you sign up for online, not for communicating with others.
+
+## Email Encryption Overview
+
+The standard way to add E2EE to emails between different email providers is by using OpenPGP. There are different implementations of the OpenPGP standard, the most common being [GnuPG](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard) and [OpenPGP.js](https://openpgpjs.org).
+
+There is another standard which is popular with business called [S/MIME](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME), however, it requires a certificate issued from a [Certificate Authority](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) (not all of them issue S/MIME certificates). It has support in [Google Workplace](https://support.google.com/a/topic/9061730?hl=en&ref_topic=9061731) and [Outlook for Web or Exchange Server 2016, 2019](https://support.office.com/en-us/article/encrypt-messages-by-using-s-mime-in-outlook-on-the-web-878c79fc-7088-4b39-966f-14512658f480).
+
+Even if you use OpenPGP, it does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. This is why we recommend [instant messengers](../real-time-communication.md) which implement forward secrecy over email for person-to-person communications whenever possible.
+
+### What Email Clients Support E2EE?
+
+Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md). Depending on the authentication method, this may lead to the decrease security if either the provider or the email client does not support OATH or a bridge application as [multi-factor authentication](multi-factor-authentication.md) is not possible with plain password authentication.
+
+### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
+
+A smartcard (such as a [Yubikey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
+
+It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard so as to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.
+
+## Email Metadata Overview
+
+Email metadata is stored in the [message header](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) of the email message and includes some visible headers that you may have seen such as: `To`, `From`, `Cc`, `Date`, `Subject`. There are also a number of hidden headers included by many email clients and providers that can reveal information about your account.
+
+Client software may use email metadata to show who a message is from and what time it was received. Servers may use it to determine where an email message must be sent, among [other purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) which are not always transparent.
+
+### Who Can View Email Metadata?
+
+Email metadata is protected from outside observers with [Opportunistic TLS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunistic_TLS) protecting it from outside observers, but it is still able to be seen by your email client software (or webmail) and any servers relaying the message from you to any recipients including your email provider. Sometimes email servers will also use third-party services to protect against spam, which generally also have access to your messages.
+
+### Why Can't Metadata be E2EE?
+
+Email metadata is crucial to the most basic functionality of email (where it came from, and where it has to go). E2EE was not built into the email protocols originally, instead requiring add-on software like OpenPGP. Because OpenPGP messages still have to work with traditional email providers, it cannot encrypt email metadata, only the message body itself. That means that even when using OpenPGP, outside observers can see lots of information about your messages, such as who you're emailing, the subject lines, when you're emailing, etc.

i18n/ar/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md

@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+---
+title: "Multi-Factor Authentication"
+icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication'
+description: MFA is a critical security mechanism for securing your online accounts, but some methods are stronger than others.
+---
+
+**Multi-Factor Authentication** (**MFA**) is a security mechanism that requires additional steps beyond entering your username (or email) and password. The most common method is time limited codes you might receive from SMS or an app.
+
+Normally, if a hacker (or adversary) is able to figure out your password then they’d gain access to the account that password belongs to. An account with MFA forces the hacker to have both the password (something you *know*) and a device that you own (something you *have*), like your phone.
+
+MFA methods vary in security, but are based on the premise that the more difficult it is for an attacker to gain access to your MFA method, the better. Examples of MFA methods (from weakest to strongest) include SMS, Email codes, app push notifications, TOTP, Yubico OTP and FIDO.
+
+## MFA Method Comparison
+
+### SMS or Email MFA
+
+Receiving OTP codes via SMS or email are one of the weaker ways to secure your accounts with MFA. Obtaining a code by email or SMS takes away from the "something you *have*" idea, because there are a variety of ways a hacker could [take over your phone number](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam) or gain access to your email without having physical access to any of your devices at all. If an unauthorized person gained access to your email, they would be able to use that access to both reset your password and receive the authentication code, giving them full access to your account.
+
+### Push Notifications
+
+Push notification MFA takes the form of a message being sent to an app on your phone asking you to confirm new account logins. This method is a lot better than SMS or email, since an attacker typically wouldn't be able to get these push notifications without having an already logged-in device, which means they would need to compromise one of your other devices first.
+
+We all make mistakes, and there is the risk that you might accept the login attempt by accident. Push notification login authorizations are typically sent to *all* your devices at once, widening the availability of the MFA code if you have many devices.
+
+The security of push notification MFA is dependent on both the quality of the app, the server component and the trust of the developer who produces it. Installing an app may also require you to accept invasive privileges that grant access to other data on your device. An individual app also requires that you have a specific app for each service which may not require a password to open, unlike a good TOTP generator app.
+
+### Time-based One-time Password (TOTP)
+
+TOTP is one of the most common forms of MFA available. When you set up TOTP, you are generally required to scan a [QR Code](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QR_code) which establishes a "[shared secret](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_secret)" with the service that you intend to use. The shared secret is secured inside of the authenticator app's data, and is sometimes protected by a password.
+
+The time-limited code is then derived from the shared secret and the current time. As the code is only valid for a short time, without access to the shared secret, an adversary cannot generate new codes.
+
+If you have a hardware security key with TOTP support (such as a YubiKey with [Yubico Authenticator](https://www.yubico.com/products/yubico-authenticator/)), we recommend that you store your "shared secrets" on the hardware. Hardware such as the YubiKey was developed with the intention of making the "shared secret" difficult to extract and copy. A YubiKey is also not connected to the Internet, unlike a phone with a TOTP app.
+
+Unlike [WebAuthn](#fido-fast-identity-online), TOTP offers no protection against [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing) or reuse attacks. If an adversary obtains a valid code from you, they may use it as many times as they like until it expires (generally 60 seconds).
+
+An adversary could set up a website to imitate an official service in an attempt to trick you into giving out your username, password and current TOTP code. If the adversary then uses those recorded credentials they may be able to log into the real service and hijack the account.
+
+Although not perfect, TOTP is secure enough for most people, and when [hardware security keys](../multi-factor-authentication.md#hardware-security-keys) are not supported [authenticator apps](../multi-factor-authentication.md#authenticator-apps) are still a good option.
+
+### Hardware security keys
+
+The YubiKey stores data on a tamper-resistant solid-state chip which is [impossible to access](https://security.stackexchange.com/a/245772) non-destructively without an expensive process and a forensics laboratory.
+
+These keys are generally multi-function and provide a number of methods to authenticate. Below are the most common ones.
+
+#### Yubico OTP
+
+Yubico OTP is an authentication protocol typically implemented in hardware security keys. When you decide to use Yubico OTP, the key will generate a public ID, private ID, and a Secret Key which is then uploaded to the Yubico OTP server.
+
+When logging into a website, all you need to do is to physically touch the security key. The security key will emulate a keyboard and print out a one-time password into the password field.
+
+The service will then forward the one-time password to the Yubico OTP server for validation. A counter is incremented both on the key and Yubico's validation server. The OTP can only be used once, and when a successful authentication occurs, the counter is increased which prevents reuse of the OTP. Yubico provides a [detailed document](https://developers.yubico.com/OTP/OTPs_Explained.html) about the process.
+
+<figure markdown>
+  ![Yubico OTP](../assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png)
+</figure>
+
+There are some benefits and disadvantages to using Yubico OTP when compared to TOTP.
+
+The Yubico validation server is a cloud based service, and you're placing trust in Yubico that they are storing data securely and not profiling you. The public ID associated with Yubico OTP is reused on every website and could be another avenue for third-parties to profile you. Like TOTP, Yubico OTP does not provide phishing resistance.
+
+If your threat model requires you to have different identities on different websites, **do not** use Yubico OTP with the same hardware security key across those websites as public ID is unique to each security key.
+
+#### FIDO (Fast IDentity Online)
+
+[FIDO](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIDO_Alliance) includes a number of standards, first there was U2F and then later [FIDO2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIDO2_Project) which includes the web standard [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn).
+
+U2F and FIDO2 refer to the [Client to Authenticator Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Client_to_Authenticator_Protocol), which is the protocol between the security key and the computer, such as a laptop or phone. It complements WebAuthn which is the component used to authenticate with the website (the "Relying Party") you're trying to log in on.
+
+WebAuthn is the most secure and private form of second factor authentication. While the authentication experience is similar to Yubico OTP, the key does not print out a one-time password and validate with a third-party server. Instead, it uses [public key cryptography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography) for authentication.
+
+<figure markdown>
+  ![FIDO](../assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png)
+</figure>
+
+When you create an account, the public key is sent to the service, then when you log in, the service will require you to "sign" some data with your private key. The benefit of this is that no password data is ever stored by the service, so there is nothing for an adversary to steal.
+
+This presentation discusses the history of password authentication, the pitfalls (such as password reuse), and discussion of FIDO2 and [WebAuthn](https://webauthn.guide) standards.
+
+<div class="yt-embed">
+  <iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://invidious.privacyguides.net/embed/aMo4ZlWznao?local=true" title="How FIDO2 and WebAuthn Stop Account Takeovers" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen></iframe>
+</div>
+
+FIDO2 and WebAuthn have superior security and privacy properties when compared to any MFA methods.
+
+Typically for web services it is used with WebAuthn which is a part of the [W3C recommendations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Wide_Web_Consortium#W3C_recommendation_(REC)). It uses public key authentication and is more secure than shared secrets used in Yubico OTP and TOTP methods, as it includes the origin name (usually, the domain name) during authentication. Attestation is provided to protect you from phishing attacks, as it helps you to determine that you are using the authentic service and not a fake copy.
+
+Unlike Yubico OTP, WebAuthn does not use any public ID, so the key is **not** identifiable across different websites. It also does not use any third-party cloud server for authentication. All communication is completed between the key and the website you are logging into. FIDO also uses a counter which is incremented upon use in order to prevent session reuse and cloned keys.
+
+If a website or service supports WebAuthn for the authentication, it is highly recommended that you use it over any other form of MFA.
+
+## General Recommendations
+
+We have these general recommendations:
+
+### Which Method Should I Use?
+
+When configuring your MFA method, keep in mind that it is only as secure as your weakest authentication method you use. This means it is important that you only use the best MFA method available. For instance, if you are already using TOTP, you should disable email and SMS MFA. If you are already using FIDO2/WebAuthn, you should not be using Yubico OTP or TOTP on your account.
+
+### Backups
+
+You should always have backups for your MFA method. Hardware security keys can get lost, stolen or simply stop working over time. It is recommended that you have a pair of hardware security keys with the same access to your accounts instead of just one.
+
+When using TOTP with an authenticator app, be sure to back up your recovery keys or the app itself, or copy the "shared secrets" to another instance of the app on a different phone or to an encrypted container (e.g. [VeraCrypt](../encryption.md#veracrypt)).
+
+### Initial Set Up
+
+When buying a security key, it is important that you change the default credentials, set up password protection for the key, and enable touch confirmation if your key supports it. Products such as the YubiKey have multiple interfaces with separate credentials for each one of them, so you should go over each interface and set up protection as well.
+
+### Email and SMS
+
+If you have to use email for MFA, make sure that the email account itself is secured with a proper MFA method.
+
+If you use SMS MFA, use a carrier who will not switch your phone number to a new SIM card without account access, or use a dedicated VoIP number from a provider with similar security to avoid a [SIM swap attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam).
+
+[MFA tools we recommend](../multi-factor-authentication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## More Places to Set Up MFA
+
+Beyond just securing your website logins, multi-factor authentication can be used to secure your local logins, SSH keys or even password databases as well.
+
+### Windows
+
+Yubico has a dedicated [Credential Provider](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/credential-providers-in-windows) that adds Challenge-Response authentication for the username + password login flow for local Windows accounts. If you have a YubiKey with Challenge-Response authentication support, take a look at the [Yubico Login for Windows Configuration Guide](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013708460-Yubico-Login-for-Windows-Configuration-Guide), which will allow you to set up MFA on your Windows computer.
+
+### macOS
+
+macOS has [native support](https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/intro-to-smart-card-integration-depd0b888248/web) for authentication with smart cards (PIV). If you have a smartcard or a hardware security key that supports the PIV interface such as the YubiKey, we recommend that you follow your smartcard/hardware security vendor's documentation and set up second factor authentication for your macOS computer.
+
+Yubico have a guide [Using Your YubiKey as a Smart Card in macOS](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016649059) which can help you set up your YubiKey on macOS.
+
+After your smartcard/security key is set up, we recommend running this command in the Terminal:
+
+```text
+sudo defaults write /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow DisableFDEAutoLogin -bool YES
+```
+
+The command will prevent an adversary from bypassing MFA when the computer boots.
+
+### Linux
+
+!!! warning
+
+    If the hostname of your system changes (such as due to DHCP), you would be unable to login. It is vital that you set up a proper hostname for your computer before following this guide.
+
+The `pam_u2f` module on Linux can provide two-factor authentication for logging in on most popular Linux distributions. If you have a hardware security key that supports U2F, you can set up MFA authentication for your login. Yubico has a guide [Ubuntu Linux Login Guide - U2F](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016649099-Ubuntu-Linux-Login-Guide-U2F) which should work on any distribution. The package manager commands—such as `apt-get`—and package names may however differ. This guide does **not** apply to Qubes OS.
+
+### Qubes OS
+
+Qubes OS has support for Challenge-Response authentication with YubiKeys. If you have a YubiKey with Challenge-Response authentication support, take a look at the Qubes OS [YubiKey documentation](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/yubikey/) if you want to set up MFA on Qubes OS.
+
+### SSH
+
+#### Hardware Security Keys
+
+SSH MFA could be set up using multiple different authentication methods that are popular with hardware security keys. We recommend that you check out Yubico's [documentation](https://developers.yubico.com/SSH/) on how to set this up.
+
+#### Time-based One-time Password (TOTP)
+
+SSH MFA can also be set up using TOTP. DigitalOcean has provided a tutorial [How To Set Up Multi-Factor Authentication for SSH on Ubuntu 20.04](https://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/how-to-set-up-multi-factor-authentication-for-ssh-on-ubuntu-20-04). Most things should be the same regardless of distribution, however the package manager commands—such as `apt-get`—and package names may differ.
+
+### KeePass (and KeePassXC)
+
+KeePass and KeePassXC databases can be secured using Challenge-Response or HOTP as a second-factor authentication. Yubico has provided a document for KeePass [Using Your YubiKey with KeePass](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013779759-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-KeePass) and there is also one on the [KeePassXC](https://keepassxc.org/docs/#faq-yubikey-2fa) website.

i18n/ar/basics/passwords-overview.md

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+---
+title: "Introduction to Passwords"
+icon: 'material/form-textbox-password'
+description: These are some tips and tricks on how to create the strongest passwords and keep your accounts secure.
+---
+
+Passwords are an essential part of our everyday digital lives. We use them to protect our accounts, our devices and our secrets. Despite often being the only thing between us and an adversary who's after our private information, not a lot of thought is put into them, which often leads to people using passwords that can be easily guessed or brute-forced.
+
+## Best Practices
+
+### Use unique passwords for every service
+
+Imagine this; you sign up for an account with the same e-mail and password on multiple online services. If one of those service providers is malicious, or their service has a data breach that exposes your password in an unencrypted format, all a bad actor would have to do is try that e-mail and password combination across multiple popular services until they get a hit. It doesn't matter how strong that one password is, because they already have it.
+
+This is called [credential stuffing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credential_stuffing), and it is one of the most common ways that your accounts can be compromised by bad actors. To avoid this, make sure that you never re-use your passwords.
+
+### Use randomly generated passwords
+
+==You should **never** rely on yourself to come up with a good password.== We recommend using [randomly generated passwords](#passwords) or [diceware passphrases](#diceware-passphrases) with sufficient entropy to protect your accounts and devices.
+
+All of our [recommended password managers](../passwords.md) include a built-in password generator that you can use.
+
+### Rotating Passwords
+
+You should avoid changing passwords that you have to remember (such as your password manager's master password) too often unless you have reason to believe it has been compromised, as changing it too often exposes you to the risk of forgetting it.
+
+When it comes to passwords that you don't have to remember (such as passwords stored inside your password manager), if your [threat model](threat-modeling.md) calls for it, we recommend going through important accounts (especially accounts that don't use multi-factor authentication) and changing their password every couple of months, in case they have been compromised in a data breach that hasn't become public yet. Most password managers allow you to set an expiry date for your password to make this easier to manage.
+
+!!! tip "Checking for data breaches"
+
+    If your password manager lets you check for compromised passwords, make sure to do so and promptly change any password that may have been exposed in a data breach. Alternatively, you could follow [Have I Been Pwned's Latest Breaches feed](https://feeds.feedburner.com/HaveIBeenPwnedLatestBreaches) with the help of a [news aggregator](../news-aggregators.md).
+
+## Creating strong passwords
+
+### Passwords
+
+A lot of services impose certain criteria when it comes to passwords, including a minimum or maximum length, as well as which special characters, if any, can be used. You should use your password manager's built-in password generator to create passwords that are as long and complex as the service will allow by including capitalized and lowercase letters, numbers and special characters.
+
+If you need a password you can memorize, we recommend a [diceware passphrase](#diceware-passphrases).
+
+### Diceware Passphrases
+
+Diceware is a method for creating passphrases which are easy to remember, but hard to guess.
+
+Diceware passphrases are a great option when you need to memorize or manually input your credentials, such as for your password manager's master password or your device's encryption password.
+
+An example of a diceware passphrase is `viewable fastness reluctant squishy seventeen shown pencil`.
+
+To generate a diceware passphrase using real dice, follow these steps:
+
+!!! note
+
+    These instructions assume that you are using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate the passphrase, which requires five dice rolls per word. Other wordlists may require more or less rolls per word, and may require a different amount of words to achieve the same entropy.
+
+1. Roll a six-sided die five times, noting down the number after each roll.
+
+2. As an example, let's say you rolled `2-5-2-6-6`. Look through the [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) for the word that corresponds to `25266`.
+
+3. You will find the word `encrypt`. Write that word down.
+
+4. Repeat this process until your passphrase has as many words as you need, which you should separate with a space.
+
+!!! warning "Important"
+
+    You should **not** re-roll words until you get a combination of words that appeal to you. The process should be completely random.
+
+If you don't have access to or would prefer to not use real dice, you can use your password manager's built-in password generator, as most of them have the option to generate diceware passphrases in addition to regular passwords.
+
+We recommend using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate your diceware passphrases, as it offers the exact same security as the original list, while containing words that are easier to memorize. There are also [other wordlists in different languages](https://theworld.com/~reinhold/diceware.html#Diceware%20in%20Other%20Languages|outline), if you do not want your passphrase to be in English.
+
+??? note "Explanation of entropy and strength of diceware passphrases"
+
+    To demonstrate how strong diceware passphrases are, we'll use the aforementioned seven word passphrase (`viewable fastness reluctant squishy seventeen shown pencil`) and [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) as an example.
+    
+    One metric to determine the strength of a diceware passphrase is how much entropy it has. The entropy per word in a diceware passphrase is calculated as $\text{log}_2(\text{WordsInList})$ and the overall entropy of the passphrase is calculated as $\text{log}_2(\text{WordsInList}^\text{WordsInPhrase})$.
+    
+    Therefore, each word in the aforementioned list results in ~12.9 bits of entropy ($\text{log}_2(7776)$), and a seven word passphrase derived from it has ~90.47 bits of entropy ($\text{log}_2(7776^7)$).
+    
+    The [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) contains 7776 unique words. To calculate the amount of possible passphrases, all we have to do is $\text{WordsInList}^\text{WordsInPhrase}$, or in our case, $7776^7$.
+    
+    Let's put all of this in perspective: A seven word passphrase using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) is one of ~1,719,070,799,748,422,500,000,000,000 possible passphrases.
+    
+    On average, it takes trying 50% of all the possible combinations to guess your phrase. With that in mind, even if your adversary is capable of ~1,000,000,000,000 guesses per second, it would still take them ~27,255,689 years to guess your passphrase. That is the case even if the following things are true:
+
+    - Your adversary knows that you used the diceware method.
+    - Your adversary knows the specific wordlist that you used.
+    - Your adversary knows how many words your passphrase contains.
+
+To sum it up, diceware passphrases are your best option when you need something that is both easy to remember *and* exceptionally strong.
+
+## Storing Passwords
+
+### Password Managers
+
+The best way to store your passwords is by using a password manager. They allow you to store your passwords in a file or in the cloud and protect them with a single master password. That way, you will only have to remember one strong password, which lets you access the rest of them.
+
+There are many good options to choose from, both cloud-based and local. Choose one of our recommended password managers and use it to establish strong passwords across all of your accounts. We recommend securing your password manager with a [diceware passphrase](#diceware-passphrases) comprised of at least seven words.
+
+[List of recommended password managers](../passwords.md ""){.md-button}
+
+!!! warning "Don't place your passwords and TOTP tokens inside the same password manager"
+
+    When using TOTP codes as [multi-factor authentication](../multi-factor-authentication.md), the best security practice is to keep your TOTP codes in a [separate app](../multi-factor-authentication.md#authenticator-apps).
+    
+    Storing your TOTP tokens in the same place as your passwords, while convenient, reduces the accounts to a single factor in the event that an adversary gains access to your password manager.
+    
+    Furthermore, we do not recommend storing single-use recovery codes in your password manager. Those should be stored separately such as in an encrypted container on an offline storage device.
+
+### Backups
+
+You should store an [encrypted](../encryption.md) backup of your passwords on multiple storage devices or a cloud storage provider. This can help you access your passwords if something happens to your primary device or the service you are using.

i18n/ar/basics/threat-modeling.md

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+---
+title: "تصميم التهديات"
+icon: 'المادة/الحساب-المستهدف'
+description: موازنة الأمان، الخصوصية، وقابلية الاستخدام تعد واحدة من أول وأصعب المهام التي ستواجهها في رحلة الخصوصية.
+---
+
+موازنة الأمان، الخصوصية، وقابلية الاستخدام تعد واحدة من أول وأصعب المهام التي ستواجهها في رحلة الخصوصية. Everything is a trade-off: The more secure something is, the more restricting or inconvenient it generally is, etc. Often, people find that the problem with the tools they see recommended is that they're just too hard to start using!
+
+If you wanted to use the **most** secure tools available, you'd have to sacrifice *a lot* of usability. And, even then, ==nothing is ever fully secure.== There's **high** security, but never **full** security. That's why threat models are important.
+
+**So, what are these threat models, anyway?**
+
+==A threat model is a list of the most probable threats to your security and privacy endeavors.== Since it's impossible to protect yourself against **every** attack(er), you should focus on the **most probable** threats. In computer security, a threat is an event that could undermine your efforts to stay private and secure.
+
+Focusing on the threats that matter to you narrows down your thinking about the protection you need, so you can choose the tools that are right for the job.
+
+## Creating Your Threat Model
+
+To identify what could happen to the things you value and determine from whom you need to protect them, you should answer these five questions:
+
+1. What do I want to protect?
+2. Who do I want to protect it from?
+3. How likely is it that I will need to protect it?
+4. How bad are the consequences if I fail?
+5. How much trouble am I willing to go through to try to prevent potential consequences?
+
+### What do I want to protect?
+
+An “asset” is something you value and want to protect. In the context of digital security, ==an asset is usually some kind of information.== For example, your emails, contact lists, instant messages, location, and files are all possible assets. Your devices themselves may also be assets.
+
+*Make a list of your assets: data that you keep, where it's kept, who has access to it, and what stops others from accessing it.*
+
+### Who do I want to protect it from?
+
+To answer this question, it's important to identify who might want to target you or your information. ==A person or entity that poses a threat to your assets is an “adversary”.== Examples of potential adversaries are your boss, your former partner, your business competition, your government, or a hacker on a public network.
+
+*Make a list of your adversaries or those who might want to get ahold of your assets. Your list may include individuals, a government agency, or corporations.*
+
+Depending on who your adversaries are, under some circumstances, this list might be something you want to destroy after you're done security planning.
+
+### How likely is it that I will need to protect it?
+
+==Risk is the likelihood that a particular threat against a particular asset will actually occur.== It goes hand-in-hand with capability. While your mobile phone provider has the capability to access all of your data, the risk of them posting your private data online to harm your reputation is low.
+
+It is important to distinguish between what might happen and the probability it may happen. For instance, there is a threat that your building might collapse, but the risk of this happening is far greater in San Francisco (where earthquakes are common) than in Stockholm (where they are not).
+
+Assessing risks is both a personal and subjective process. Many people find certain threats unacceptable, no matter the likelihood they will occur, because the mere presence of the threat is not worth the cost. In other cases, people disregard high risks because they don't view the threat as a problem.
+
+*Write down which threats you are going to take seriously, and which may be too rare or too harmless (or too difficult to combat) to worry about.*
+
+### How bad are the consequences if I fail?
+
+There are many ways that an adversary could gain access to your data. For example, an adversary can read your private communications as they pass through the network, or they can delete or corrupt your data.
+
+==The motives of adversaries differ widely, as do their tactics.== A government trying to prevent the spread of a video showing police violence may be content to simply delete or reduce the availability of that video. In contrast, a political opponent may wish to gain access to secret content and publish that content without you knowing.
+
+Security planning involves understanding how bad the consequences could be if an adversary successfully gains access to one of your assets. To determine this, you should consider the capability of your adversary. For example, your mobile phone provider has access to all of your phone records. A hacker on an open Wi-Fi network can access your unencrypted communications. Your government might have stronger capabilities.
+
+*Write down what your adversary might want to do with your private data.*
+
+### How much trouble am I willing to go through to try to prevent potential consequences?
+
+==There is no perfect option for security.== Not everyone has the same priorities, concerns, or access to resources. Your risk assessment will allow you to plan the right strategy for you, balancing convenience, cost, and privacy.
+
+For example, an attorney representing a client in a national security case may be willing to go to greater lengths to protect communications about that case, such as using encrypted email, than a mother who regularly emails her daughter funny cat videos.
+
+*Write down what options you have available to you to help mitigate your unique threats. Note if you have any financial constraints, technical constraints, or social constraints.*
+
+### Try it yourself: Protecting Your Belongings
+
+These questions can apply to a wide variety of situations, online and offline. As a generic demonstration of how these questions work, let's build a plan to keep your house and possessions safe.
+
+**What do you want to protect? (Or, *what do you have that is worth protecting?*)**
+:
+
+Your assets might include jewelry, electronics, important documents, or photos.
+
+**Who do you want to protect it from?**
+:
+
+Your adversaries might include burglars, roommates, or guests.
+
+**How likely is it that you will need to protect it?**
+:
+
+Does your neighborhood have a history of burglaries? How trustworthy are your roommates or guests? What are the capabilities of your adversaries? What are the risks you should consider?
+
+**How bad are the consequences if you fail?**
+:
+
+Do you have anything in your house that you cannot replace? Do you have the time or money to replace those things? Do you have insurance that covers goods stolen from your home?
+
+**How much trouble are you willing to go through to prevent these consequences?**
+:
+
+Are you willing to buy a safe for sensitive documents? Can you afford to buy a high-quality lock? Do you have time to open a security box at your local bank and keep your valuables there?
+
+Only once you have asked yourself these questions will you be in a position to assess what measures to take. If your possessions are valuable, but the probability of a break-in is low, then you may not want to invest too much money in a lock. But, if the probability of a break-in is high, you'll want to get the best lock on the market and consider adding a security system.
+
+Making a security plan will help you to understand the threats that are unique to you and to evaluate your assets, your adversaries, and your adversaries' capabilities, along with the likelihood of risks you face.
+
+## Further Reading
+
+For people looking to increase their privacy and security online, we've compiled a list of common threats our visitors face or goals our visitors have, to give you some inspiration and demonstrate the basis of our recommendations.
+
+- [Common Goals and Threats :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](common-threats.md)
+
+## Sources
+
+- [EFF Surveillance Self Defense: Your Security Plan](https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/your-security-plan)

i18n/ar/basics/vpn-overview.md

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+---
+title: VPN Overview
+icon: material/vpn
+description: Virtual Private Networks shift risk away from your ISP to a third-party you trust. You should keep these things in mind.
+---
+
+Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit somewhere else in the world. An ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (i.e. modem).
+
+Encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, so they may not be able to see exactly what you're posting or reading, but they can get an idea of the [domains you request](../advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).
+
+A VPN can help as it can shift trust to a server somewhere else in the world. As a result, the ISP then only sees that you are connected to a VPN and nothing about the activity that you're passing into it.
+
+## Should I use a VPN?
+
+**Yes**, unless you are already using Tor. A VPN does two things: shifting the risks from your Internet Service Provider to itself and hiding your IP from a third-party service.
+
+VPNs cannot encrypt data outside of the connection between your device and the VPN server. VPN providers can see and modify your traffic the same way your ISP could. And there is no way to verify a VPN provider's "no logging" policies in any way.
+
+However, they do hide your actual IP from a third-party service, provided that there are no IP leaks. They help you blend in with others and mitigate IP based tracking.
+
+## When shouldn't I use a VPN?
+
+Using a VPN in cases where you're using your [known identity](common-threats.md#common-misconceptions) is unlikely be useful.
+
+Doing so may trigger spam and fraud detection systems, such as if you were to log into your bank's website.
+
+## What about encryption?
+
+Encryption offered by VPN providers are between your devices and their servers. It guarantees that this specific link is secure. This is a step up from using unencrypted proxies where an adversary on the network can intercept the communications between your devices and said proxies and modify them. However, encryption between your apps or browsers with the service providers are not handled by this encryption.
+
+In order to keep what you actually do on the websites you visit private and secure, you must use HTTPS. This will keep your passwords, session tokens, and queries safe from the VPN provider. Consider enabling "HTTPS everywhere" in your browser to mitigate downgrade attacks like [SSL Strip](https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Marlinspike/BlackHat-DC-09-Marlinspike-Defeating-SSL.pdf).
+
+## Should I use encrypted DNS with a VPN?
+
+Unless your VPN provider hosts the encrypted DNS servers, **no**. Using DOH/DOT (or any other form of encrypted DNS) with third-party servers will simply add more entities to trust and does **absolutely nothing** to improve your privacy/security. Your VPN provider can still see which websites you visit based on the IP addresses and other methods. Instead of just trusting your VPN provider, you are now trusting both the VPN provider and the DNS provider.
+
+A common reason to recommend encrypted DNS is that it helps against DNS spoofing. However, your browser should already be checking for [TLS certificates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Digital_certificates) with **HTTPS** and warn you about it. If you are not using **HTTPS**, then an adversary can still just modify anything other than your DNS queries and the end result will be little different.
+
+Needless to say, **you shouldn't use encrypted DNS with Tor**. This would direct all of your DNS requests through a single circuit and would allow the encrypted DNS provider to deanonymize you.
+
+## Should I use Tor *and* a VPN?
+
+By using a VPN with Tor, you're creating essentially a permanent entry node, often with a money trail attached. This provides zero additional benefits to you, while increasing the attack surface of your connection dramatically. If you wish to hide your Tor usage from your ISP or your government, Tor has a built-in solution for that: Tor bridges. [Read more about Tor bridges and why using a VPN is not necessary](../advanced/tor-overview.md).
+
+## What if I need anonymity?
+
+VPNs cannot provide anonymity. Your VPN provider will still see your real IP address, and often has a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. You cannot rely on "no logging" policies to protect your data. Use [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) instead.
+
+## What about VPN providers that provide Tor nodes?
+
+Do not use that feature. The point of using Tor is that you do not trust your VPN provider. Currently Tor only supports the [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol) protocol. [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol) (used in [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC) for voice and video sharing, the new [HTTP3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) protocol, etc), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol) and other packets will be dropped. To compensate for this, VPN providers typically will route all non-TCP packets through their VPN server (your first hop). This is the case with [ProtonVPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn/). Additionally, when using this Tor over VPN setup, you do not have control over other important Tor features such as [Isolated Destination Address](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (using a different Tor circuit for every domain you visit).
+
+The feature should be viewed as a convenient way to access the Tor Network, not to stay anonymous. For proper anonymity, use the Tor Browser, TorSocks, or a Tor gateway.
+
+## When are VPNs useful?
+
+A VPN may still be useful to you in a variety of scenarios, such as:
+
+1. Hiding your traffic from **only** your Internet Service Provider.
+1. Hiding your downloads (such as torrents) from your ISP and anti-piracy organizations.
+1. Hiding your IP from third-party websites and services, preventing IP based tracking.
+
+For situations like these, or if you have another compelling reason, the VPN providers we listed above are who we think are the most trustworthy. However, using a VPN provider still means you're *trusting* the provider. In pretty much any other scenario you should be using a secure**-by-design** tool such as Tor.
+
+## Sources and Further Reading
+
+1. [VPN - a Very Precarious Narrative](https://schub.io/blog/2019/04/08/very-precarious-narrative.html) by Dennis Schubert
+1. [Tor Network Overview](../advanced/tor-overview.md)
+1. [IVPN Privacy Guides](https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides)
+1. ["Do I need a VPN?"](https://www.doineedavpn.com), a tool developed by IVPN to challenge aggressive VPN marketing by helping individuals decide if a VPN is right for them.
+
+## Related VPN Information
+
+- [The Trouble with VPN and Privacy Review Sites](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2019/11/20/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-review-sites/)
+- [Free VPN App Investigation](https://www.top10vpn.com/free-vpn-app-investigation/)
+- [Hidden VPN owners unveiled: 101 VPN products run by just 23 companies](https://vpnpro.com/blog/hidden-vpn-owners-unveiled-97-vpns-23-companies/)
+- [This Chinese company is secretly behind 24 popular apps seeking dangerous permissions](https://vpnpro.com/blog/chinese-company-secretly-behind-popular-apps-seeking-dangerous-permissions/)

i18n/ar/calendar.md

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+---
+title: "Calendar Sync"
+icon: material/calendar
+description: Calendars contain some of your most sensitive data; use products that implement encryption at rest.
+---
+
+Calendars contain some of your most sensitive data; use products that implement E2EE at rest to prevent a provider from reading them.
+
+## Tutanota
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+    ![Tutanota logo](assets/img/calendar/tutanota.svg#only-light){ align=right }
+    ![Tutanota logo](assets/img/calendar/tutanota-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
+    
+    **Tutanota** offers a free and encrypted calendar across their supported platforms. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, multi-factor authentication, and [more](https://tutanota.com/calendar-app-comparison/).
+    
+    Multiple calendars and extended sharing functionality is limited to paid subscribers.
+    
+    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tutanota.com/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tutanota.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://tutanota.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+    [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tutanota.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+    
+    ??? downloads
+    
+        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
+        - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/tutanota/id922429609)
+        - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+        - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+        - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+        - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.tutanota.Tutanota)
+        - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.tutanota.com/)
+
+## Proton Calendar
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+    ![Proton](assets/img/calendar/proton-calendar.svg){ align=right }
+    
+    **Proton Calendar** is an encrypted calendar service available to Proton members via web or mobile clients. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, and [more](https://proton.me/support/proton-calendar-guide). Those on the free tier get access to a single calendar, whereas paid subscribers can create up to 20 calendars. Extended sharing functionality is also limited to paid subscribers.
+    
+    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/proton-calendar-guide){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+    
+    ??? downloads
+    
+        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=me.proton.android.calendar)
+        - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://calendar.proton.me)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+    We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Qualifications
+
+- Must sync and store information with E2EE to ensure data is not visible to the service provider.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should integrate with native OS calendar and contact management apps if applicable.

i18n/ar/cloud.md

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+---
+title: "Cloud Storage"
+icon: material/file-cloud
+description: Many cloud storage providers require your trust that they will not look at your files. These are private alternatives!
+---
+
+Many cloud storage providers require your full trust that they will not look at your files. The alternatives listed below eliminate the need for trust by either putting you in control of your data or by implementing E2EE.
+
+If these alternatives do not fit your needs, we suggest you look into [Encryption Software](encryption.md).
+
+??? question "Looking for Nextcloud?"
+
+    Nextcloud is [still a recommended tool](productivity.md) for self-hosting a file management suite, however we do not recommend third-party Nextcloud storage providers at the moment, because we do not recommend Nextcloud's built-in E2EE functionality for home users.
+
+## Proton Drive
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+    ![Proton Drive logo](assets/img/cloud/protondrive.svg){ align=right }
+    
+    **Proton Drive** is an E2EE general file storage service by the popular encrypted email provider [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/mail).
+    
+    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/drive){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/drive){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+    
+    ??? downloads
+    
+        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=me.proton.android.drive)
+        - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1509667851)
+
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+    We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must enforce end-to-end encryption.
+- Must offer a free plan or trial period for testing.
+- Must support TOTP or FIDO2 multi-factor authentication, or Passkey logins.
+- Must offer a web interface which supports basic file management functionality.
+- Must allow for easy exports of all files/documents.
+- Must use standard, audited encryption.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Clients should be open-source.
+- Clients should be audited in their entirety by an independent third-party.
+- Should offer native clients for Linux, Android, Windows, macOS, and iOS.
+    - These clients should integrate with native OS tools for cloud storage providers, such as Files app integration on iOS, or DocumentsProvider functionality on Android.
+- Should support easy file-sharing with other users.
+- Should offer at least basic file preview and editing functionality on the web interface.