Downrank messengers without PFS (#1999)

Co-Authored-By: mfwmyfacewhen <94880365+mfwmyfacewhen@users.noreply.github.com>

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml

@@ -1,12 +1,15 @@
 contact_links:
   - name: Suggest a New Provider or Software
-    url: https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/discussions/new
+    url: https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/site-development/suggestions
     about: Suggest something new for us to look at, or something we should remove.
+  - name: Suggest a Guide
+    url: https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/site-development/guide-suggestions
+    about: Suggest an area where you think guidance might be required.
   - name: Ask a Question
-    url: https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/discussions/new
+    url: https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/privacy/questions
     about: Let us know if something doesn't make sense!
   - name: Share an Idea
-    url: https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/discussions/new
+    url: https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/site-development
     about: Suggest a new feature/section/page or anything else for the website.
   - name: Report a Translation Issue
     url: https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides/discussions

.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md

@@ -1,10 +1,7 @@
-<!-- READ ENTIRELY BEFORE SUBMITTING:
-Please use a descriptive title for your PR, it will be included in our changelog!
 
-**********
-By submitting a PR, you are agreeing to release your work to the public domain
-persuant to the terms described in our LICENSE file (CC0 1.0 Universal).
-**********
+
+<!-- SCROLL TO BOTTOM TO AGREE!:
+Please use a descriptive title for your PR, it will be included in our changelog!
 
 Please share with us what you've changed.
 If you are adding a software recommendation, give us a link to its website or
@@ -24,3 +21,12 @@ If you have a conflict of interest, you MUST disclose who is paying you for
 this contribution, who the client is (if for example, you are being paid by
 an advertising agency), and any other relevant affiliations.
 -->
+
+<!-- Place an x in the boxes below, like: [x] -->
+- [ ] Please check this box to confirm you have disclosed any relevant conflicts of interest in your post.
+- [ ] Please check this box to confirm your agreement to grant Privacy Guides a perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive, transferable, royalty-free, irrevocable license with the right to sublicense such rights through multiple tiers of sublicensees, to reproduce, modify, display, perform, relicense, and distribute your contribution as part of our project.
+- [ ] Please check this box to confirm you are the sole author of this work, or that any additional authors will also reply to this PR on GitHub confirming their agreement to these terms.
+
+<!-- What's this? When you submit a PR, you keep the Copyright for the work you
+are contributing. We need you to agree to the above terms in order for us to
+publish this contribution to our website. -->

.github/dependabot.yml

@@ -13,17 +13,3 @@ updates:
       - "jonaharagon"
     labels:
       - "fix:github_actions"
-
-  # Maintain dependencies for pipenv
-  - package-ecosystem: "pip"
-    directory: "/"
-    ignore:
-      - dependency-name: "mkdocs-material"
-    schedule:
-      interval: "daily"
-    assignees:
-      - "jonaharagon"
-    reviewers:
-      - "jonaharagon"
-    labels:
-      - "fix:python"

.github/workflows/crowdin.yml

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 name: 💬 Crowdin Upload
 
 on:
-  push:
-    branches: [ main ]
+  workflow_dispatch:
+  release:
+    types: [published]
 
 jobs:
   synchronize-with-crowdin:
@@ -14,7 +15,7 @@ jobs:
       uses: actions/checkout@v3
 
     - name: crowdin action
-      uses: crowdin/github-action@1.4.12
+      uses: crowdin/github-action@v1.7.0
       with:
         upload_sources: true
         upload_sources_args: '--auto-update --delete-obsolete'

.github/workflows/pages.yml

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ jobs:
           submodules: 'true'
       
       - name: Pages setup
-        uses: actions/configure-pages@v2
+        uses: actions/configure-pages@v3
 
       - name: Python setup
         uses: actions/setup-python@v4
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ jobs:
           python-version: '3.10'
       
       - name: Cache files
-        uses: actions/cache@v3.0.8
+        uses: actions/cache@v3.2.5
         with:
           key: ${{ github.ref }}
           path: .cache

.github/workflows/preview.yml

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-name: 🔂 Surge PR Preview
-
-on:
-  pull_request_target:
-    types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
-
-# Ensures that only one mirror task will run at a time.
-concurrency:
-  group: surge-sh
-
-jobs:
-  preview:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    permissions:
-      issues: write
-      pull-requests: write
-      contents: write
-    environment: preview
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@v3
-        with:
-          fetch-depth: '0'
-          ref: ${{github.event.pull_request.head.ref}}
-          repository: ${{github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name}}
-          ssh-key: ${{ secrets.ACTIONS_SSH_KEY }}
-          submodules: 'true'
-
-      - name: Set up Python runtime
-        uses: actions/setup-python@v4
-        with:
-          python-version: '3.10'
-
-      - name: Deploy to surge.sh
-        uses: afc163/surge-preview@v1
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-          CARDS: true
-        with:
-          surge_token: ${{ secrets.SURGE_TOKEN }}
-          github_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-          dist: site
-          failOnError: 'true'
-          build: |
-            pip install pipenv
-            pipenv install
-            pipenv run mkdocs build --config-file mkdocs.production.yml

CITATION.cff

@@ -44,4 +44,4 @@ preferred-citation:
     - encryption
     - website
     - markdown
-  license: CC0-1.0
+  license: "CC-BY-ND-4.0"

LICENSE

@@ -1,116 +1,392 @@
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+Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
 
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+licenses. Notwithstanding, Creative Commons may elect to apply one of
+its public licenses to material it publishes and in those instances
+will be considered the “Licensor.” The text of the Creative Commons
+public licenses is dedicated to the public domain under the CC0 Public
+Domain Dedication. Except for the limited purpose of indicating that
+material is shared under a Creative Commons public license or as
+otherwise permitted by the Creative Commons policies published at
+creativecommons.org/policies, Creative Commons does not authorize the
+use of the trademark "Creative Commons" or any other trademark or logo
+of Creative Commons without its prior written consent including,
+without limitation, in connection with any unauthorized modifications
+to any of its public licenses or any other arrangements,
+understandings, or agreements concerning use of licensed material. For
+the avoidance of doubt, this paragraph does not form part of the
+public licenses.
+
+Creative Commons may be contacted at creativecommons.org.

Pipfile

@@ -9,12 +9,13 @@ mkdocs-material = {path = "./mkdocs-material"}
 mkdocs-static-i18n = "*"
 mkdocs-git-revision-date-localized-plugin = "*"
 typing-extensions = "*"
-mkdocs-rss-plugin = "*"
 mkdocs-git-committers-plugin-2 = "*"
 mkdocs-macros-plugin = "*"
+pillow = "*"
+cairosvg = "*"
 
 [dev-packages]
 scour = "*"
 
 [requires]
-python_version = "3.10"
+python_version = "3.8"

README.md

@@ -9,26 +9,20 @@
 
   <p><em>Your central privacy and security resource to protect yourself online.</em></p>
 
-  <p><a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/">
-    <img src="https://img.shields.io/reddit/subreddit-subscribers/PrivacyGuides?label=Subscribe%20to%20r%2FPrivacyGuides&style=social">
-  </a>
-  <a href="https://mastodon.social/@privacyguides">
-    <img src="https://img.shields.io/mastodon/follow/107604420394178246?style=social">
+  <p><a href="https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides">
+    <img src="https://img.shields.io/mastodon/follow/109298532634697668?domain=https%3A%2F%2Fmastodon.neat.computer&label=Follow%20%40privacyguides%40neat.computer&style=social">
   </a>
   <a href="https://twitter.com/privacy_guides">
     <img src="https://img.shields.io/twitter/follow/privacy_guides?style=social">
   </a>
+  <a href="https://discuss.privacyguides.net/">
+    <img src="https://img.shields.io/discourse/users?label=Join%20our%20forum&logo=discourse&server=https%3A%2F%2Fdiscuss.privacyguides.net&style=social">
+  </a>
   <a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/stargazers">
     <img src="https://img.shields.io/github/stars/privacyguides?style=social">
   </a></p>
 
-  <a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues">
-    <img src="https://img.shields.io/github/issues-raw/privacyguides/privacyguides.org">
-  </a>
-  <a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed">
-    <img src="https://img.shields.io/github/issues-closed-raw/privacyguides/privacyguides.org">
-  </a>
-  <a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/pulls">
+  <p><a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/pulls">
     <img src="https://img.shields.io/github/issues-pr-raw/privacyguides/privacyguides.org">
   </a>
   <a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/pulls?q=is%3Apr+is%3Aclosed">
@@ -36,9 +30,6 @@
   </a>
   <a href="https://opencollective.com/privacyguides">
     <img src="https://img.shields.io/opencollective/all/privacyguides">
-  </a>
-  <a href="https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides">
-    <img src="https://badges.crowdin.net/privacyguides/localized.svg">
   </a></p>
 </div>
 
@@ -46,11 +37,11 @@
 
 **Privacy Guides** is a socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy. We are a non-profit collective operated entirely by volunteer team members and contributors.
 
-Our current list of team members can be found [here](https://github.com/orgs/privacyguides/people). Additionally, [many people](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors) have made contributions to the project, and you can too!
+Our current list of team members can be found [here](https://www.privacyguides.org/about/#our-team). Additionally, [many people](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors) have made contributions to the project, and you can too!
 
 ## Contributing
 
-- 💬 [Start a discussion or suggest an idea](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/discussions)
+- 💬 [Start a discussion or suggest an idea](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/)
 - 💖 [Sponsor the project](https://github.com/sponsors/privacyguides)
 - 🈴 [Help translate the site](https://crwd.in/privacyguides) [[Matrix chat](https://matrix.to/#/#pg-i18n:aragon.sh)]
 - 📝 Edit the site, everything's accessible in this repo

data/articles.yml

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-extra:
-  articles:
-    - name: '"Hide Nothing"'
-      publisher: Privacy Guides
-      url: 'blog/2022/06/09/hide-nothing.md'
-      date: 2022-06-09
-    - name: '"Move Fast and Break Things"'
-      publisher: Privacy Guides
-      url: 'blog/2022/04/04/move-fast-and-break-things.md'
-      date: 2022-04-04
-    - name: 'Firefox Privacy: 2021 Update'
-      publisher: Privacy Guides
-      url: 'blog/2021/12/01/firefox-privacy-2021-update.md'
-      date: 2021-12-01
-    - name: 'Virtual Insanity'
-      publisher: Privacy Guides
-      url: 'blog/2021/11/01/virtual-insanity.md'
-      date: 2021-11-01
-    - name: 'Welcome to Privacy Guides'
-      publisher: Privacy Guides
-      url: 'blog/2021/09/14/welcome-to-privacy-guides.md'
-      date: 2021-09-14

docs/about.en.md

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
----
-title: "About Privacy Guides"
----
-
-**Privacy Guides** is a socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy. We are a non-profit collective operated entirely by volunteer team members and contributors.
-
-Our current list of team members can be found [here on GitHub](https://github.com/orgs/privacyguides/people). Additionally, [many people](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors) have made contributions to the project. You can too, we're open sourced on GitHub!
-
-Our team members review all changes made to the website and handle administrative duties such as web hosting and financials, however they do not personally profit from any contributions made to this site. Our financials are transparently hosted by the Open Collective Foundation 501(c)(3) at [opencollective.com/privacyguides](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides). Donations to Privacy Guides are generally tax deductible in the United States.
-
-:fontawesome-brands-creative-commons: :fontawesome-brands-creative-commons-zero: Unless otherwise noted, the original content on this website is made available under a [CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE). This means that it is completely free of copyright and can be used or reshared as you wish. Though not strictly required, we do kindly request you attribute us by linking back to our homepage from your project.

docs/about/criteria.md

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+---
+title: General Criteria
+---
+
+!!! example "Work in Progress"
+
+    The following page is a work in progress, and does not reflect the full criteria for our recommendations at this time. Past discussion on this topic: [#24](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/discussions/24)
+
+Below are some things that must apply to all submissions to Privacy Guides. Each category will have additional requirements for inclusion.
+
+## Financial Disclosure
+
+We do not make money from recommending certain products, we do not use affiliate links, and we do not provide special consideration to project donors.
+
+## General Guidelines
+
+We apply these priorities when considering new recommendations:
+
+- **Secure**: Tools should follow security best-practices wherever applicable.
+- **Source Availability**: Open source projects are generally preferred over equivalent proprietary alternatives.
+- **Cross-Platform**: We typically prefer recommendations to be cross-platform, to avoid vendor lock-in.
+- **Active Development**: The tools that we recommend should be actively developed, unmaintained projects will be removed in most cases.
+- **Usability**: Tools should be accessible to most computer users, an overly technical background should not be required.
+- **Documented**: Tools should have clear and extensive documentation for use.
+
+## Developer Self-Submissions
+
+We have these requirements in regard to developers which wish to submit their project or software for consideration.
+
+- Must disclose affiliation, i.e. your position within the project being submitted.
+
+- Must have a security whitepaper if it is a project that involves handling of sensitive information like a messenger, password manager, encrypted cloud storage etc.
+    - Third party audit status. We want to know if you have one, or have one planned. If possible please mention who will be conducting the audit.
+
+- Must explain what the project brings to the table in regard to privacy.
+    - Does it solve any new problem?
+    - Why should anyone use it over the alternatives?
+
+- Must state what the exact threat model is with their project.
+    - It should be clear to potential users what the project can provide, and what it cannot.

docs/about/index.md

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+---
+title: "About Privacy Guides"
+---
+
+**Privacy Guides** is a socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy. We are a non-profit collective operated entirely by volunteer [team members](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/g/team) and contributors.
+
+[:material-hand-coin-outline: Support the project](donate.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+
+## Our Team
+
+??? person "@jonah"
+
+    - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/jonah)
+    - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/jonaharagon "@jonaharagon")
+    - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@jonah "@jonah@neat.computer"){rel=me}
+    - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Homepage](https://www.jonaharagon.com)
+
+??? person "@niek-de-wilde"
+
+    - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/Niek-de-Wilde)
+    - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/blacklight447 "@blacklight447")
+    - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.social/@blacklight447 "@blacklight447@mastodon.social"){rel=me}
+
+??? person "@dngray"
+
+    - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/dngray)
+    - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/dngray "@dngray")
+    - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.social/@dngray "@dngray@mastodon.social"){rel=me}
+    - [:fontawesome-solid-envelope: Email](mailto:dngray@privacyguides.org)
+
+??? person "@freddy"
+
+    - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/freddy)
+    - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/freddy-m "@freddy-m")
+    - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://social.lol/@freddy "@freddy@social.lol"){rel=me}
+    - [:fontawesome-solid-envelope: Email](mailto:freddy@privacyguides.org)
+    - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Homepage](https://freddy.omg.lol)
+
+??? person "@mfwmyfacewhen"
+
+    - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/mfwmyfacewhen)
+    - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/mfwmyfacewhen "@mfwmyfacewhen")
+    - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Homepage](https://mfw.omg.lol)
+    
+??? person "@olivia"
+
+    - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/olivia)
+    - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/hook9 "@hook9")
+    - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@oliviablob "@oliviablob@neat.computer"){rel=me}
+
+Additionally, [many people](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors) have made contributions to the project. You can too, we're open sourced on GitHub!
+
+Our team members review all changes made to the website and handle administrative duties such as web hosting and financials, however they do not personally profit from any contributions made to this site. Our financials are transparently hosted by the Open Collective Foundation 501(c)(3) at [opencollective.com/privacyguides](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides). Donations to Privacy Guides are generally tax deductible in the United States.
+
+## Site License
+
+*The following is a human-readable summary of (and not a substitute for) the [license](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE):*
+
+:fontawesome-brands-creative-commons: :fontawesome-brands-creative-commons-by: :fontawesome-brands-creative-commons-nd: Unless otherwise noted, the original content on this website is made available under the [Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE). This means that you are free to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format for any purpose, even commercially; as long as you give appropriate credit to `Privacy Guides (www.privacyguides.org)` and provide a link to the license. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests Privacy Guides endorses you or your use. If you remix, transform, or build upon the content of this website, you may not distribute the modified material.
+
+This license is in place to prevent people from sharing our work without giving proper credit, and to prevent people from modifying our work in a way that could be used to mislead people. If you find the terms of this license too restrictive for the project you're working on, please reach out to us at `jonah@privacyguides.org`. We are happy to provide alternative licensing options for well-intentioned projects in the privacy space!

docs/about/notices.md

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Privacy Guides additionally does not warrant that this website will be constantl
 
 ## Licenses
 
-Unless otherwise noted, all content on this website is made freely available under the terms of the [Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE).
+Unless otherwise noted, all content on this website is made available under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE).
 
 This does not include third-party code embedded in this repository, or code where a superseding license is otherwise noted. The following are notable examples, but this list may not be all-inclusive:
 
@@ -24,17 +24,17 @@ This does not include third-party code embedded in this repository, or code wher
 
 Portions of this notice itself were adopted from [opensource.guide](https://github.com/github/opensource.guide/blob/master/notices.md) on GitHub. That resource and this page itself are released under [CC-BY-4.0](https://github.com/github/opensource.guide/blob/master/LICENSE).
 
-This means that you can use the human-readable content in this repository for your own project, per the terms outlined in the CC0 1.0 Universal text. You **may not** use the Privacy Guides branding in your own project without express approval from this project. Privacy Guides's brand trademarks include the "Privacy Guides" wordmark and shield logo.
+This means that you can use the human-readable content in this repository for your own project, per the terms outlined in the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License text. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests Privacy Guides endorses you or your use. You **may not** use the Privacy Guides branding in your own project without express approval from this project. Privacy Guides's brand trademarks include the "Privacy Guides" wordmark and shield logo.
 
 We believe that the logos and other images in `assets` obtained from third-party providers are either in the public domain or **fair use**. In a nutshell, legal [fair use doctrine](https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/more-info.html) allows the use of copyrighted images in order to identify the subject matter for purposes of public comment. However, these logos and other images may still be subject to trademark laws in one or more jurisdictions. Before using this content, please ensure that it is used to identify the entity or organization that owns the trademark and that you have the right to use it under the laws which apply in the circumstances of your intended use. *When copying content from this website, you are solely responsible for ensuring that you do not infringe someone else's trademark or copyright.*
 
-When you contribute to this repository you are doing so under the above licenses.
+When you contribute to this repository you are doing so under the above licenses, and you are granting Privacy Guides a perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive, transferable, royalty-free, irrevocable license with the right to sublicense such rights through multiple tiers of sublicensees, to reproduce, modify, display, perform and distribute your contribution as part of our project.
 
 ## Acceptable Use
 
 You may not use this website in any way that causes or may cause damage to the website or impairment of the availability or accessibility of Privacy Guides, or in any way which is unlawful, illegal, fraudulent, harmful, or in connection with any unlawful, illegal, fraudulent, or harmful purpose or activity.
 
-You must not conduct any systematic or automated data collection activities on or in relation to this website without express written consent from Aragon Ventures LLC, including:
+You must not conduct any systematic or automated data collection activities on or in relation to this website without express written consent, including:
 
 * Excessive Automated Scans
 * Denial of Service Attacks

docs/about/privacy-policy.md

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ The privacy of our website visitors is important to us, so we do not track any i
 - No information is mined and harvested for personal and behavioral trends
 - No information is monetized
 
-You can view the data we collect at [stats.privacyguides.net/privacyguides.org](https://stats.privacyguides.net/privacyguides.org).
+You can view the data we collect on our [statistics](statistics.md) page.
 
 We run a self-hosted installation of [Plausible Analytics](https://plausible.io) to collect some anonymous usage data for statistical purposes. The goal is to track overall trends in our website traffic, it is not to track individual visitors. All the data is in aggregate only. No personal data is collected.
 
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ We will store your account data as long as your account remains open. After clos
 
 The Privacy Guides team generally does not have access to personal data outside of limited access granted via some moderation panels. Inquiries regarding your personal information should be sent directly to:
 
-```
+```text
 Jonah Aragon
 Services Administrator
 jonah@privacyguides.org
@@ -55,6 +55,6 @@ For complaints under GDPR more generally, you may lodge complaints with your loc
 
 ## About This Policy
 
-We will post any new versions of this statement [here](privacy-policy.en.md). We may change how we announce changes in future versions of this document. In the meantime we may update our contact information at any time without announcing a change. Please refer to the [Privacy Policy](privacy-policy.en.md) for the latest contact information at any time.
+We will post any new versions of this statement [here](privacy-policy.md). We may change how we announce changes in future versions of this document. In the meantime we may update our contact information at any time without announcing a change. Please refer to the [Privacy Policy](privacy-policy.md) for the latest contact information at any time.
 
-A full revision [history](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/commits/main/docs/about/privacy-policy.en.md) of this page can be found on GitHub.
+A full revision [history](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/commits/main/docs/about/privacy-policy.md) of this page can be found on GitHub.

docs/about/privacytools.md

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+---
+title: "PrivacyTools FAQ"
+---
+# Why we moved on from PrivacyTools
+
+In September 2021, every active contributor unanimously agreed to move from PrivacyTools to work on this site: Privacy Guides. This decision was made because PrivacyTools’ founder and controller of the domain name had disappeared for an extended period of time and could not be contacted.
+
+Having built a reputable site and set of services on PrivacyTools.io, this caused grave concerns for the future of PrivacyTools, as any future disruption could wipe out the entire organization with no recovery method. This transition was communicated to the PrivacyTools community many months in advance via a variety of channels including its blog, Twitter, Reddit, and Mastodon to ensure the entire process went as smoothly as possible. We did this to ensure nobody was kept in the dark, which has been our modus operandi since our team was created, and to make sure Privacy Guides was recognized as the same reliable organization that PrivacyTools was before the transition.
+
+After the organizational move was completed, the founder of PrivacyTools returned and began to spread misinformation about the Privacy Guides project. They continue to spread misinformation in addition to operating a paid link farm on the PrivacyTools domain. We are creating this page to clear up any misconceptions.
+
+## What is PrivacyTools?
+
+PrivacyTools was created in 2015 by "BurungHantu," who wanted to make a privacy information resource - helpful tools following the Snowden revelations. The site grew into a flourishing open-source project with [many contributors](https://github.com/privacytools/privacytools.io/graphs/contributors), some eventually given various organizational responsibilities, such as operating online services like Matrix and Mastodon, managing and reviewing changes to the site on GitHub, finding sponsors for the project, writing blog posts and operating social media outreach platforms like Twitter, etc.
+
+Beginning in 2019, BurungHantu grew more and more distant from the active development of the website and communities, and began delaying payments he was responsible for related to the servers we operated. To avoid having our system administrator pay server costs out of their own pocket, we changed the donation methods listed on the site from BurungHantu's personal PayPal and crypto accounts to a new OpenCollective page on [October 31, 2019](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184557/https://blog.privacytools.io/privacytools-io-joins-the-open-collective-foundation/). This had the added benefits of making our finances completely transparent, a value we strongly believe in, and tax-deductible in the United States, because they were being held by the Open Collective Foundation 501(c)3. This change was unanimously agreed upon by the team and went uncontested.
+
+## Why We Moved On
+
+In 2020, BurungHantu's absence grew much more noticeable. At one point, we required the domain's nameservers to be changed to nameservers controlled by our system administrator to avoid future disruption, and this change was not completed for over a month after the initial request. He would disappear from the public chat and private team chat rooms on Matrix for months at a time, occasionally popping in to give some small feedback or promise to be more active before disappearing once again.
+
+In October 2020, the PrivacyTools system administrator (Jonah) [left](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190742/https://blog.privacytools.io/blacklight447-taking-over/) the project because of these difficulties, handing control to another long-time contributor. Jonah had been operating nearly every PrivacyTools service and acting as the *de facto* project lead for website development in BurungHantu's absence, thus his departure was a significant change to the organization. At the time, because of these significant organizational changes, BurungHantu promised the remaining team he would return to take control of the project going forward. ==The PrivacyTools team reached out via several communication methods over the following months, but did not receive any response.==
+
+## Domain Name Reliance
+
+At the beginning of 2021, the PrivacyTools team grew worried about the future of the project, because the domain name was set to expire on 1st March 2021. The domain was ultimately renewed by BurungHantu with no comment.
+
+The team’s concerns were not addressed, and we realized this would be a problem every year: If the domain expired it would have allowed it to be stolen by squatters or spammers, thus ruining the organization's reputation. We also would have had trouble reaching the community to inform them of what took place.
+
+Without being in any contact with BurungHantu, we decided the best course of action would be to move to a new domain name while we still had guaranteed control over the old domain name, sometime before March 2022. This way, we would be able to cleanly redirect all PrivacyTools resources to the new site without any interruption in service. This decision was made many months in advance and communicated to the entire team in the hopes that BurungHantu would reach out and assure his continued support for the project, because with a recognizable brand name and large communities online, moving away from "PrivacyTools" was the least desirable possible outcome.
+
+In mid-2021 the PrivacyTools team reached out to Jonah, who agreed to rejoin the team to help with the transition.
+
+## Community Call to Action
+
+At the end of July 2021, we [informed](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184422/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-future-of-privacytools/) the PrivacyTools community of our intention to choose a new name and continue the project on a new domain, to be [chosen](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190935/https://aragon.cloud/apps/forms/cMPxG9KyopapBbcw) on 2nd August 2022. In the end, "Privacy Guides" was selected, with the `privacyguides.org` domain already owned by Jonah for a side-project from 2020 that went undeveloped.
+
+## Control of r/privacytoolsIO
+
+Simultaneously with the ongoing website issues at privacytools.io, the r/privacytoolsIO moderation team was facing challenges with managing the subreddit. The subreddit had always been operated mostly independently of the website's development, but BurungHantu was the primary moderator of the subreddit as well, and he was the only moderator granted "Full Control" privileges. u/trai_dep was the only active moderator at the time, and [posted](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/comments/o9tllh/requesting_rprivacytoolsio_im_only_active_mod_top/) a request to Reddit's administrators on June 28, 2021, asking to be granted the primary moderator position and full control privileges, in order to make necessary changes to the Subreddit.
+
+Reddit requires that subreddits have active moderators. If the primary moderator is inactive for a lengthy period of time (such as a year) the primary moderation position can be re-appointed to the next moderator in line. For this request to have been granted, BurungHantu had to have been completely absent from all Reddit activity for a long period of time, which was consistent with his behaviors on other platforms.
+
+> If you were removed as moderator from a subreddit through Reddit request it is because your lack of response and lack of activity qualified the subreddit for an r/redditrequest transfer.
+>
+> r/redditrequest is Reddit's way of making sure communities have active moderators and is part of the [Moderator Code of Conduct](https://www.redditinc.com/policies/moderator-code-of-conduct).
+
+## Beginning the Transition
+
+On September 14th, 2021, we [announced](https://www.privacyguides.org/blog/2021/09/14/welcome-to-privacy-guides/) the beginning of our migration to this new domain:
+
+> [...] we found it necessary to make this switch sooner rather than later to ensure people would find out about this transition as soon as possible. This gives us adequate time to transition the domain name, which is currently redirecting to www.privacyguides.org, and it hopefully gives everyone enough time to notice the change, update bookmarks and websites, etc.
+
+This change [entailed:](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pnhn4a/rprivacyguides_privacyguidesorg_what_you_need_to/)
+
+- Redirecting www.privacytools.io to [www.privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org).
+- Archiving the source code on GitHub to preserve our past work and issue tracker, which we continued to use for months of future development of this site.
+- Posting announcements to our subreddit and various other communities informing people of the official change.
+- Formally closing privacytools.io services, like Matrix and Mastodon, and encouraging existing users to migrate as soon as possible.
+
+Things appeared to be going smoothly, and most of our active community made the switch to our new project exactly as we hoped.
+
+## Following Events
+
+Roughly a week following the transition, BurungHantu returned online for the first time in nearly a year, however nobody on our team was willing to return to PrivacyTools because of his historic unreliability. Rather than apologize for his prolonged absence, he immediately went on the offensive and positioned the transition to Privacy Guides as an attack against him and his project. He subsequently [deleted](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/pp9yie/comment/hd49wbn) many of these posts when it was pointed out by the community that he had been absent and abandoned the project.
+
+At this point, BurungHantu claimed he wanted to continue working on privacytools.io on his own and requested that we remove the redirect from www.privacytools.io to [www.privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org). We obliged and requested that he keep the subdomains for Matrix, Mastodon, and PeerTube active for us to run as a public service to our community for at least a few months, in order to allow users on those platforms to easily migrate to other accounts. Due to the federated nature of the services we provided, they were tied to specific domain names making it very difficult to migrate (and in some cases impossible).
+
+Unfortunately, because control of the r/privacytoolsIO subreddit was not returned to BurungHantu at his demand (further information below), those subdomains were [cut off](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pymthv/comment/hexwrps/) at the beginning of October, ending any migration possibilities to any users still using those services.
+
+Following this, BurungHantu made false accusations about Jonah stealing donations from the project. BurungHantu had over a year since the alleged incident occurred, and yet he never made anyone aware of it until after the Privacy Guides migration. BurungHantu has been repeatedly asked for proof and to comment on the reason for his silence by the team [and the community](https://twitter.com/TommyTran732/status/1526153536962281474), and has not done so.
+
+BurungHantu also made a [twitter post](https://twitter.com/privacytoolsIO/status/1510560676967710728) alleging that an "attorney" had reached out to him on Twitter and was providing advice, in another attempt to bully us into giving him control of our subreddit, and as part of his smear campaign to muddy the waters surrounding the launch of Privacy Guides while pretending to be a victim.
+
+## PrivacyTools.io Now
+
+As of September 25th 2022 we are seeing BurungHantu's overall plans come to fruition on privacytools.io, and this is the very reason we decided to create this explainer page today. The website he is operating appears to be a heavily SEO-optimized version of the site which recommends tools in exchange for financial compensation. Very recently, IVPN and Mullvad, two VPN providers near-universally [recommended](../vpn.md) by the privacy community and notable for their stance against affiliate programs were removed from PrivacyTools. In their place? NordVPN, Surfshark, ExpressVPN, and hide.me; Giant VPN corporations with untrustworthy platforms and business practices, notorious for their aggressive marketing and affiliate programs.
+
+==**PrivacyTools has become exactly the type of site we [warned against](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729205249/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-reviews/) on the PrivacyTools blog in 2019.**== We've tried to keep our distance from PrivacyTools since the transition, but their continued harassment towards our project and now their absurd abuse of the credibility their brand gained over 6 years of open source contributions is extremely troubling to us. Those of us actually fighting for privacy are not fighting against each other, and are not getting our advice from the highest bidder.
+
+## r/privacytoolsIO Now
+
+After the launch of [r/PrivacyGuides](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacyguides), it was impractical for u/trai_dep to continue moderating both subreddits, and with the community on-board with the transition, r/privacytoolsIO was [made](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/qk7qrj/a_new_era_why_rptio_is_now_a_restricted_sub/) a restricted sub in a post on November 1st, 2021:
+
+> [...] The growth of this Sub was the result of great effort, across several years, by the PrivacyGuides.org team. And by every one of you.
+>
+> A Subreddit is a great deal of work to administer and moderate. Like a garden, it requires patient tending and daily care. It’s not a task for dilettantes or commitment-challenged people. It can’t thrive under a gardener who abandons it for several years, then shows up demanding this year’s harvest as their tribute. It’s unfair to the team formed years ago. It’s unfair to you. [...]
+
+Subreddits do not belong to anybody, and they especially do not belong to brand-holders. They belong to their communities, and the community and its moderators made the decision to support the move to r/PrivacyGuides.
+
+In the months since, BurungHantu has threatened and begged for returning subreddit control to his account in [violation](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/wiki/top_mod_removal/) of Reddit rules:
+
+> Retaliation from any moderator with regards to removal requests is disallowed.
+
+For a community with many thousands of remaining subscribers, we feel that it would be incredibly disrespectful to return control of that massive platform to the person who abandoned it for over a year, and who now operates a website that we feel provides very low-quality information. Preserving the years of past discussions in that community is more important to us, and thus u/trai_dep and the rest of the subreddit moderation team has made the decision to keep r/privacytoolsIO as-is.
+
+## OpenCollective Now
+
+Our fundraising platform, OpenCollective, is another source of contention. Our position is that OpenCollective was put in place by our team and managed by our team to fund services we currently operate and which PrivacyTools no longer does. We [reached out](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/updates/transitioning-to-privacy-guides) to all of our donors regarding our move to Privacy Guides, and we were unanimously supported by our sponsors and community.
+
+Thus, the funds in OpenCollective belong to Privacy Guides, they were given to our project, and not the owner of a well known domain name. In the announcement made to donors on September 17th, 2021, we offered refunds to any donor who disagrees with the stance we took, but nobody has taken us up on this offer:
+
+> If any sponsors or backers disagree with or feel misled by these recent events and would like to request a refund given these highly unusual circumstances, please get in touch with our project admin by emailing jonah@triplebit.net.
+
+## Further Reading
+
+This topic has been discussed extensively within our communities in various locations, and it seems likely that most people reading this page will already be familiar with the events leading up to the move to Privacy Guides. Some of our previous posts on the matter may have extra detail we omitted here for brevity. They have been linked below for the sake of completion.
+
+- [June 28, 2021 request for control of r/privacytoolsIO](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/comments/o9tllh/requesting_rprivacytoolsio_im_only_active_mod_top/)
+- [July 27, 2021 announcement of our intentions to move on the PrivacyTools blog, written by the team](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184422/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-future-of-privacytools/)
+- [Sept 13, 2021 announcement of the beginning of our transition to Privacy Guides on r/privacytoolsIO](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/pnql46/rprivacyguides_privacyguidesorg_what_you_need_to/)
+- [Sept 17, 2021 announcement on OpenCollective from Jonah](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/updates/transitioning-to-privacy-guides)
+- [Sept 30, 2021 Twitter thread detailing most of the events now described on this page](https://twitter.com/privacy_guides/status/1443633412800225280)
+- [Oct 1, 2021 post by u/dng99 noting subdomain failure](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pymthv/comment/hexwrps/)
+- [Apr 2, 2022 response by u/dng99 to PrivacyTools' accusatory blog post](https://www.reddit.com/comments/tuo7mm/comment/i35kw5a/)
+- [May 16, 2022 response by @TommyTran732 on Twitter](https://twitter.com/TommyTran732/status/1526153497984618496)
+- [Sep 3, 2022 post on Techlore's forum by @dngray](https://discuss.techlore.tech/t/has-anyone-seen-this-video-wondering-your-thoughts/792/20)

docs/about/services.md

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# Privacy Guides Services
+
+We run a number of web services to test out features and promote cool decentralized, federated, and/or open-source projects. Many of these services are available to the public and are detailed below.
+
+[:material-comment-alert: Report an issue](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/services/2){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+
+## Discourse
+
+- Domain: [discuss.privacyguides.net](https://discuss.privacyguides.net)
+- Availability: Public
+- Source: [github.com/discourse/discourse](https://github.com/discourse/discourse)
+
+## Gitea
+
+- Domain: [code.privacyguides.dev](https://code.privacyguides.dev)
+- Availability: Invite-Only  
+Access may be granted upon request to any team working on *Privacy Guides*-related development or content.
+- Source: [snapcraft.io/gitea](https://snapcraft.io/gitea)
+
+## Matrix
+
+- Domain: [matrix.privacyguides.org](https://matrix.privacyguides.org)
+- Availability: Invite-Only  
+Access may be granted upon request to Privacy Guides team members, Matrix moderators, third-party Matrix community administrators, Matrix bot operators, and other individuals in need of a reliable Matrix presence.
+- Source: [github.com/spantaleev/matrix-docker-ansible-deploy](https://github.com/spantaleev/matrix-docker-ansible-deploy)
+
+## SearXNG
+
+- Domain: [search.privacyguides.net](https://search.privacyguides.net)
+- Availability: Public
+- Source: [github.com/searxng/searxng-docker](https://github.com/searxng/searxng-docker)

docs/about/statistics.md

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+---
+title: Traffic Statistics
+---
+## Website Statistics
+
+<iframe plausible-embed src="https://stats.privacyguides.net/share/privacyguides.org?auth=IxTl2wRhi3uxF09rd1NSn&embed=true&theme=system&background=transparent" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" loading="lazy" style="width: 1px; min-width: 100%; height: 1600px;" id="plausibleFrame"></iframe>
+<div style="font-size: 14px; padding-bottom: 14px;">Stats powered by <a target="_blank" style="color: #4F46E5; text-decoration: underline;" href="https://plausible.io">Plausible Analytics</a></div>
+<script async src="https://stats.privacyguides.net/js/embed.host.js"></script>
+
+<script>
+
+    /* Set palette on initial load */
+    var palette = __md_get("__palette")
+    if (palette && typeof palette.color === "object") {
+        var theme = palette.color.scheme === "slate" ? "dark" : "light"
+        document.getElementById('plausibleFrame').src = 'https://stats.privacyguides.net/share/privacyguides.org?auth=IxTl2wRhi3uxF09rd1NSn&embed=true&theme=' + theme + '&background=transparent';
+    }
+
+    /* Register event handlers after documented loaded */
+    document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function() {
+        var ref = document.querySelector("[data-md-component=palette]")
+        ref.addEventListener("change", function() {
+        var palette = __md_get("__palette")
+        if (palette && typeof palette.color === "object") {
+            var theme = palette.color.scheme === "slate" ? "dark" : "light"
+
+            document.getElementById('plausibleFrame').src = 'https://stats.privacyguides.net/share/privacyguides.org?auth=IxTl2wRhi3uxF09rd1NSn&embed=true&theme=' + theme + '&background=transparent';
+        }
+        })
+    })
+</script>
+
+## Blog Statistics
+
+<iframe plausible-embed src="https://stats.privacyguides.net/share/blog.privacyguides.org?auth=onWV76WWcsDifUqlaHEAg&embed=true&theme=system&background=transparent" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" loading="lazy" style="width: 1px; min-width: 100%; height: 1600px;" id="blogFrame"></iframe>
+<div style="font-size: 14px; padding-bottom: 14px;">Stats powered by <a target="_blank" style="color: #4F46E5; text-decoration: underline;" href="https://plausible.io">Plausible Analytics</a></div>
+<script async src="https://stats.privacyguides.net/js/embed.host.js"></script>
+
+<script>
+
+    /* Set palette on initial load */
+    var palette = __md_get("__palette")
+    if (palette && typeof palette.color === "object") {
+        var theme = palette.color.scheme === "slate" ? "dark" : "light"
+        document.getElementById('blogFrame').src = 'https://stats.privacyguides.net/share/blog.privacyguides.org?auth=onWV76WWcsDifUqlaHEAg&embed=true&theme=' + theme + '&background=transparent';
+    }
+
+    /* Register event handlers after documented loaded */
+    document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function() {
+        var ref = document.querySelector("[data-md-component=palette]")
+        ref.addEventListener("change", function() {
+        var palette = __md_get("__palette")
+        if (palette && typeof palette.color === "object") {
+            var theme = palette.color.scheme === "slate" ? "dark" : "light"
+
+            document.getElementById('blogFrame').src = 'https://stats.privacyguides.net/share/blog.privacyguides.org?auth=onWV76WWcsDifUqlaHEAg&embed=true&theme=' + theme + '&background=transparent';
+        }
+        })
+    })
+</script>

docs/advanced/communication-network-types.en.md

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+---
+title: "Types of Communication Networks"
+icon: 'material/transit-connection-variant'
+---
+
+There are several network architectures commonly used to relay messages between people. These networks can provide different privacy guarantees, which is why it's worth considering your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md) when deciding which app to use.
+
+[Recommended Instant Messengers](../real-time-communication.md){ .md-button }
+
+## Centralized Networks
+
+![Centralized networks diagram](../assets/img/layout/network-centralized.svg){ align=left }
+
+Centralized messengers are those where all participants are on the same server or network of servers controlled by the same organization.
+
+Some self-hosted messengers allow you to set up your own server. Self-hosting can provide additional privacy guarantees, such as no usage logs or limited access to metadata (data about who is talking to whom). Self-hosted centralized messengers are isolated and everyone must be on the same server to communicate.
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- New features and changes can be implemented more quickly.
+- Easier to get started with and to find contacts.
+- Most mature and stable features ecosystems, as they are easier to program in a centralized software.
+- Privacy issues may be reduced when you trust a server that you're self-hosting.
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Can include [restricted control or access](https://drewdevault.com/2018/08/08/Signal.html). This can include things like:
+- Being [forbidden from connecting third-party clients](https://github.com/LibreSignal/LibreSignal/issues/37#issuecomment-217211165) to the centralized network that might provide for greater customization or a better experience. Often defined in Terms and Conditions of usage.
+- Poor or no documentation for third-party developers.
+- The [ownership](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729191953/https://blog.privacytools.io/delisting-wire/), privacy policy, and operations of the service can change easily when a single entity controls it, potentially compromising the service later on.
+- Self-hosting requires effort and knowledge of how to set up a service.
+
+## Federated Networks
+
+![Federated networks diagram](../assets/img/layout/network-decentralized.svg){ align=left }
+
+Federated messengers use multiple, independent, decentralized servers that are able to talk to each other (email is one example of a federated service). Federation allows system administrators to control their own server and still be a part of the larger communications network.
+
+When self-hosted, members of a federated server can discover and communicate with members of other servers, although some servers may choose to remain private by being non-federated (e.g., work team server).
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- Allows for greater control over your own data when running your own server.
+- Allows you to choose whom to trust your data with by choosing between multiple "public" servers.
+- Often allows for third-party clients which can provide a more native, customized, or accessible experience.
+- Server software can be verified that it matches public source code, assuming you have access to the server or you trust the person who does (e.g., a family member).
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Adding new features is more complex because these features need to be standardized and tested to ensure they work with all servers on the network.
+- Due to the previous point, features can be lacking, or incomplete or working in unexpected ways compared to centralized platforms, such as message relay when offline or message deletion.
+- Some metadata may be available (e.g., information like "who is talking to whom," but not actual message content if E2EE is used).
+- Federated servers generally require trusting your server's administrator. They may be a hobbyist or otherwise not a "security professional," and may not serve standard documents like a privacy policy or terms of service detailing how your data is used.
+- Server administrators sometimes choose to block other servers, which are a source of unmoderated abuse or break general rules of accepted behavior. This will hinder your ability to communicate with members of those servers.
+
+## Peer-to-Peer Networks
+
+![P2P diagram](../assets/img/layout/network-distributed.svg){ align=left }
+
+P2P messengers connect to a [distributed network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_networking) of nodes to relay a message to the recipient without a third-party server.
+
+Clients (peers) usually find each other through the use of a [distributed computing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_computing) network. Examples of this include [Distributed Hash Tables](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_hash_table) (DHT), used by [torrents](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent_(protocol)) and [IPFS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/InterPlanetary_File_System) for example. Another approach is proximity based networks, where a connection is established over WiFi or Bluetooth (for example, Briar or the [Scuttlebutt](https://www.scuttlebutt.nz) social network protocol).
+
+Once a peer has found a route to its contact via any of these methods, a direct connection between them is made. Although messages are usually encrypted, an observer can still deduce the location and identity of the sender and recipient.
+
+P2P networks do not use servers, as peers communicate directly between each other and hence cannot be self-hosted. However, some additional services may rely on centralized servers, such as user discovery or relaying offline messages, which can benefit from self-hosting.
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- Minimal information is exposed to third-parties.
+- Modern P2P platforms implement E2EE by default. There are no servers that could potentially intercept and decrypt your transmissions, unlike centralized and federated models.
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Reduced feature set:
+- Messages can only be sent when both peers are online, however, your client may store messages locally to wait for the contact to return online.
+- Generally increases battery usage on mobile devices, because the client must stay connected to the distributed network to learn about who is online.
+- Some common messenger features may not be implemented or incompletely, such as message deletion.
+- Your IP address and that of the contacts you're communicating with may be exposed if you do not use the software in conjunction with a [VPN](../vpn.md) or [Tor](../tor.md). Many countries have some form of mass surveillance and/or metadata retention.
+
+## Anonymous Routing
+
+![Anonymous routing diagram](../assets/img/layout/network-anonymous-routing.svg){ align=left }
+
+A messenger using [anonymous routing](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_628) hides either the identity of the sender, the receiver, or evidence that they have been communicating. Ideally, a messenger should hide all three.
+
+There are [many](https://doi.org/10.1145/3182658) different ways to implement anonymous routing. One of the most famous is [onion routing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing) (i.e. [Tor](tor-overview.md)), which communicates encrypted messages through a virtual [overlay network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overlay_network) that hides the location of each node as well as the recipient and sender of each message. The sender and recipient never interact directly and only meet through a secret rendezvous node so that there is no leak of IP addresses nor physical location. Nodes cannot decrypt messages, nor the final destination; only the recipient can. Each intermediary node can only decrypt a part that indicates where to send the still encrypted message next, until it arrives at the recipient who can fully decrypt it, hence the "onion layers."
+
+Self-hosting a node in an anonymous routing network does not provide the hoster with additional privacy benefits, but rather contributes to the whole network's resilience against identification attacks for everyone's benefit.
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- Minimal to no information is exposed to other parties.
+- Messages can be relayed in a decentralized manner even if one of the parties is offline.
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Slow message propagation.
+- Often limited to fewer media types, mostly text, since the network is slow.
+- Less reliable if nodes are selected by randomized routing, some nodes may be very far from the sender and receiver, adding latency or even failing to transmit messages if one of the nodes goes offline.
+- More complex to get started, as the creation and secured backup of a cryptographic private key is required.
+- Just like other decentralized platforms, adding features is more complex for developers than on a centralized platform. Hence, features may be lacking or incompletely implemented, such as offline message relaying or message deletion.

docs/advanced/dns-overview.en.md

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 ---
-title: "Introduction to DNS"
+title: "DNS Overview"
 icon: material/dns
 ---
 
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ Encrypted DNS can refer to one of a number of protocols, the most common ones be
 
 [**DNS over HTTPS**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_HTTPS) as defined in [RFC 8484](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8484) packages queries in the [HTTP/2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/2) protocol and provides security with HTTPS. Support was first added in web browsers such as Firefox 60 and Chrome 83.
 
-Native implementation of DoH showed up in iOS 14, macOS 11, Microsoft Windows, and Android 13 (however, it won't be enabled [by default](https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/packages/modules/DnsResolver/+/1833144)). General Linux desktop support is waiting on the systemd [implementation](https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/8639) so [installing third-party software is still required](../dns.md#linux).
+Native implementation of DoH showed up in iOS 14, macOS 11, Microsoft Windows, and Android 13 (however, it won't be enabled [by default](https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/packages/modules/DnsResolver/+/1833144)). General Linux desktop support is waiting on the systemd [implementation](https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/8639) so [installing third-party software is still required](../dns.md#encrypted-dns-proxies).
 
 ## What can an outside party see?
 
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ We can see the [connection establishment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmis
 
 ## Why **shouldn't** I use encrypted DNS?
 
-In locations where there is internet filtering (or censorship), visiting forbidden resources may have its own consequences which you should consider in your [threat model](threat-modeling.md). We do **not** suggest the use of encrypted DNS for this purpose. Use [Tor](https://torproject.org) or a [VPN](../vpn.md) instead. If you're using a VPN, you should use your VPN's DNS servers. When using a VPN, you are already trusting them with all your network activity.
+In locations where there is internet filtering (or censorship), visiting forbidden resources may have its own consequences which you should consider in your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md). We do **not** suggest the use of encrypted DNS for this purpose. Use [Tor](https://torproject.org) or a [VPN](../vpn.md) instead. If you're using a VPN, you should use your VPN's DNS servers. When using a VPN, you are already trusting them with all your network activity.
 
 When we do a DNS lookup, it's generally because we want to access a resource. Below, we will discuss some of the methods that may disclose your browsing activities even when using encrypted DNS:
 

docs/advanced/erasing-data.md

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
----
-title: "Secure Data Erasure"
-icon: 'material/harddisk-remove'
----
-**Erasing data** from your computer may seem like a simple task, but if you want to make sure the data is truly unrecoverable, there are some things you should consider.
-
-!!! tip
-    You should use [full disk encryption](../encryption.md#os-full-disk-encryption) on your storage devices. If your device is stolen or needs to be returned under warranty your privacy may be at risk.
-
-To erase a storage device **thoroughly**, you should securely erase the whole device and not individual files.
-
-## Erasing Your Entire Drive
-
-When you delete a file, the operating system marks the space where the deleted file was as "empty." That "empty" space can be fairly easily undeleted, yielding the original file.
-
-### Magnetic storage
-
-If the disk is a magnetic storage device, such as a spinning hard disk, we suggest using [`nwipe`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nwipe). `nwipe` can be installed in most Linux distributions. If you wish to use a complete boot environment on a system, consider using [ShredOS Disk Eraser](https://github.com/PartialVolume/shredos.x86_64). ShredOS boots straight into `nwipe` and allows you to erase available disks. To install it to a flash USB stick see the [installation methods](https://github.com/PartialVolume/shredos.x86_64/blob/master/README.md#obtaining-and-writing-shredos-to-a-usb-flash-drive-the-easy-way-).
-
-Once you have your boot media, enter your system's UEFI settings and boot from the USB stick. Commonly used keys to access UEFI are ++f2++, ++f12++, or ++del++. Follow the on-screen prompts to wipe your data.
-
-![ShredOS](../assets/img/erasing-data/shredos.png)
-
-### Flash Storage
-
-For [flash memory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flash_memory) (SSD, NVMe, etc) devices we suggest the ATA Secure Erase command. Methods such as `nwipe` should not be used on flash storage devices as it may damage their performance. The "Secure Erase" feature is often accessible through the UEFI setup menu.
-
-It is also possible to complete a Secure Erase using the [`hdparm`](https://ata.wiki.kernel.org/index.php/ATA_Secure_Erase) command, or [Microsoft Secure Group Commands](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/storage/security-group-commands).
-
-Physical destruction may be necessary to securely erase devices such as memory cards, USB sticks and unusable hard disks.
-
-## Erasing Specific Files
-
-Securely shredding **individual files** is difficult if not impossible. Copies can exist in a variety of ways such as through manual, or automatic backups, [wear leveling](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wear_leveling) (on modern [flash storage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solid-state_drive)), caching and filesystem [journaling](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Journaling_file_system).
-
-Wear leveled devices do not guarantee a fixed relationship between [logical blocks addressed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_block_addressing) through the interface. This means that the physical locations in which the data is stored may be different to where it is actually located, so shredding may not provide adequate security.

docs/advanced/integrating-metadata-removal.en.md

@@ -1,162 +0,0 @@
----
-title: "Integrating Metadata Removal"
-icon: 'material/data-matrix-remove'
----
-
-When sharing files, it's important to remove associated metadata. Image files commonly include [Exif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exif) data, and sometimes photos even include GPS coordinates within its metadata.
-
-While there are plenty of metadata removal tools, they typically aren't convenient to use. The guides featured here aim to detail how to integrate metadata removal tools in a simple fashion by utilizing easy-to-access system features.
-
-- [Recommended metadata removal tools :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../data-redaction.md)
-
-## macOS
-
-This guide uses the [Shortcuts](https://support.apple.com/guide/shortcuts-mac/intro-to-shortcuts-apdf22b0444c/mac) app to add an [ExifTool](../data-redaction.md#exiftool) script to the *Quick Actions* context menu within Finder. Shortcuts is developed by Apple and bundled in with macOS by default.
-
-Shortcuts is quite intuitive to work with, so if you don't like the behavior demoed here then experiment with your own solution. For example, you could set the shortcut to take a clipboard input instead. The sky's the limit.
-
-![ExifTool Quick Action](../assets/img/integrating-metadata-removal/preview-macos.png)
-
-### Prerequisites
-
-1. [Homebrew](https://brew.sh): a package manager.
-
-    ```bash
-    /bin/bash -c "$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/HEAD/install.sh)"
-    ```
-
-2. ExifTool is a tool for viewing and manipulating image, audio, video, and PDF metadata.
-
-    ```bash
-    brew install exiftool
-    ```
-
-!!! note
-    You can check if ExifTool is installed by running `exiftool -ver`. You should see a version number.
-
-### Creating the Shortcut
-
-1. Open **Shortcuts.app** and create a new shortcut
-
-2. In the shortcut's options, check **Use as Quick Action** and **Finder**
-
-3. Set up the retrieval options:
-
-    - Receive **Images, Media, and PDFs** input from **Quick Actions**
-    - If there is no input select **Continue**
-
-4. Add the **Run Shell Script** action to the shortcut. You may need to enable **Allow Running Scripts** in Shortcut.app's settings
-
-5. Set up the shell script action:
-     - Select **zsh** from the shell list
-     - Set the input to **Shortcut Input**
-     - Select **as arguments** for the pass input
-     - Leave **Run as administrator** unchecked
-
-6. Use the following as the body of the script:
-
-    ```bash
-    for f in "$@"
-    do
-        exiftool -all= "$f";
-    done
-    ```
-
-![macOS metadata removal shortcut](../assets/img/integrating-metadata-removal/shortcut-macos.png)
-
-!!! tip "Worth Mentioning"
-    The open-source [ImageOptim](https://imageoptim.com/mac) app integrates into Finder's *Services* context menu by default. While it is primarily an image optimization app, it also removes metadata.
-
-### Enabling & using the Shortcut
-
-1. The shortcut will be accessible through **Quick Actions** context menu within Finder.
-
-2. If you want to reposition the shortcut within the context menu, go to:<br>
-   **System Preferences** → **Extensions** → **Finder and drag the shortcut's position**.
-
-## iOS and iPadOS
-
-[Shortcuts](https://support.apple.com/guide/shortcuts/welcome/ios) can be made accessible through the system Share Sheet, making accessing those shortcuts very convenient. This guide will show you how to build a metadata removal shortcut and integrate it into the system *Share Sheet*.
-
-!!! warning
-    This method of metadata removal is not as comprehensive at removing metadata as utilities like [ExifTool](../data-redaction.md#exiftool) and [mat2](../data-redaction.md#mat2) are.
-
-The lack of *good* metadata removal apps on the App Store is what makes this solution worthwhile.
-
-![Don't preserve metadata shortcut](../assets/img/integrating-metadata-removal/preview-ios.png)
-
-### Prerequisites
-
-1. [Shortcuts](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/shortcuts/id915249334) via the App Store.
-
-### Creating the Shortcut
-
-1. Create a new Shortcut
-
-2. Enter the Shortcut's settings and check **Show in Share Sheet**
-
-3. Add a **Receive** action and set it to receive **Images** from **Share Sheet**
-
-4. Add an **If** action
-
-5. Set the **If** action to **Shortcut Input** and **has any value**
-
-6. Add an **Otherwise** action
-
-7. Add an **End If** action
-
-8. Add a **Convert** action and set it to **If Result** and **Match Input**
-
-9. Finally, add a **Share** action and set that to **Converted Image**
-
-10. Make sure that you uncheck **preserve metadata**
-
-![iOS/iPadOS metadata removal shortcut](../assets/img/integrating-metadata-removal/shortcut-ios.png)
-
-### Enabling & using the Shortcut
-
-1. The shortcut should be available through the system Share Sheet. If it is not, then a device restart may be required.
-2. Optionally, you can add the shortcut to your home screen.
-
-## Windows
-
-Windows allows you to place files in a **SendTo** folder which then appear in the *Send to* context menu. This guide will show you how to add an [ExifTool](../data-redaction.md#exiftool) batch script to this menu.
-
-![Send to metadata removal shortcut](../assets/img/integrating-metadata-removal/preview-windows.jpg)
-
-### Prerequisites
-
-1. ExifTool is a tool for viewing and manipulating image, audio, video, and PDF metadata. We suggest you read the [Installation instructions](https://exiftool.org/install.html#Windows) on the official website.
-
-!!! note
-    You can check if ExifTool is present in your [PATH](https://www.computerhope.com/issues/ch000549.htm) by running `exiftool -ver` in Command Prompt. You should see a version number.
-
-### Creating the shortcut
-
-1. Navigate to `%appdata%\Microsoft\Windows\SendTo`
-
-2. Right click in the **SendTo** folder and create a new **Text Document**
-
-3. Name the file `ExifTool.bat` (any name works, however it must end in `.bat`)
-
-    !!! note
-        You may need to check if [file name extensions](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/common-file-name-extensions-in-windows-da4a4430-8e76-89c5-59f7-1cdbbc75cb01) are enabled.
-
-4. Open **ExifTool.bat** in Notepad
-
-5. Copy the following into the document:
-
-    ```bat
-    exiftool -fast4 -if "$filepermissions =~ /^.w/" %*
-    if not errorlevel 0 (
-        echo Some files are write protected
-        exit /b %errorlevel%
-    )
-    exiftool -all= %*
-    ```
-
-6. Save
-
-### Using the shortcut
-
-1. Right click a supported file and choose **ExifTool.bat** within the *Send to* context menu.

docs/advanced/signal-configuration-hardening.en.md

@@ -1,260 +0,0 @@
----
-title: "Signal Configuration and Hardening"
-icon: 'simple/signal'
----
-
-[Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal) is a widely regarded instant messaging service that is not only easy to use but is also private and secure. Signal's strong E2EE implementation and metadata protections provide a level of assurance that only you and your intended recipients are able to read communications.
-
-This guide details actions you can take to configure and harden Signal in accordance with your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md).
-
-## Signal Configuration
-
-### Signal PIN
-
-When you register for Signal with your phone number, you will be asked to set up a Signal PIN. This PIN can be used to recover your profile, settings, contacts and who you've blocked in case you ever lose or switch devices.
-
-Additionally, your Signal PIN can also double as a registration lock that prevents others from registering with your number.
-
-!!! attention "Registration Lock"
-
-    The server will not enforce the registration lock after 7 days of inactivity. After that, someone will be able to reset the PIN at registration and register with your phone number. This will wipe the data stored in your Signal account, as it is encrypted by the PIN, but it won't prevent someone from registering with your number provided that they can receive a text on it.
-
-If you haven't set up a Signal PIN, or have previously opted out of setting one up, follow these steps on Android/iOS:
-
-- Select :material-dots-vertical: **Settings** > **Account** > **Signal PIN**
-- Select **Create new PIN**
-
-Signal will prompt you to enter a PIN. We suggest using a strong alphanumeric PIN that can be stored in a [password manager](../passwords.md).
-
-Once you have done that, or if you already have set up a PIN, make sure that **Registration Lock** is also enabled.
-
-- Select :material-dots-vertical: **Settings** > **Account** > **Signal PIN**
-- [x] Turn on **Registration Lock**
-
-!!! Important
-
-    If you forget the PIN and have enabled a registration lock, you may be locked out of your account for up to 7 days.
-
-You can learn more about Signal PIN on [Signal's website](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360007059792-Signal-PIN).
-
-### Safety Numbers
-
-Safety numbers are a feature in Signal that allows you to ensure that messages are delivered securely between verified devices.
-
-It is best practice to always compare safety numbers with your contacts. This can be done in a couple of ways:
-
-- Scanning your contact's QR code while viewing their safety number.
-- Comparing the safety numbers on both ends, be it visually or audibly.
-
-!!! Important
-
-    In order for safety numbers to also verify that the intended recipient has access to the device you're verifying, you need a secondary communication channel where you can authenticate the person that is holding the device. For example, an in-person meeting or during a video call.
-
-To view the safety number for a particular contact, you need to follow these steps within Signal:
-
-- Go to a chat with a contact.
-- Select the chat header or :material-dots-vertical: > **View Safety Number**
-
-Once you've compared the safety numbers on both devices, you can mark that contact as **Verified**.
-
-A checkmark will appear in the chat header by your contact's name when the safety number is marked as verified. It will remain verified unless the safety number changes or you manually change the verification status.
-
-After doing that, any time the safety number changes, you'll be notified.
-
-If the safety number with one of your contacts changes, we recommend asking the contact what happened (if they switched to a new device or re-installed Signal, for example) and verify the safety numbers again.
-
-For more demanding threat models, you should agree on a protocol with your contacts in advance on what to do in case the safety number ever changes.
-
-You can learn more about safety numbers on [Signal's website](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360007060632-What-is-a-safety-number-and-why-do-I-see-that-it-changed-).
-
-### Disappearing Messages
-
-While communication in Signal is E2EE, the messages are still available on the devices, unless they are manually deleted.
-
-It is good practice to set up disappearing messages in Signal's settings so that any chats you start will disappear after a specified amount of time has passed.
-
-On Android/iOS:
-
-- Select :material-dots-vertical: **Settings** > **Privacy**
-- Under **Disappearing messages**, select **Default timer for new chats**
-- Select the desired amount of time and select **Save**
-
-!!! tip "Override the global default for specific contacts"
-
-    - Go to a chat with a contact
-    - Select :material-dots-vertical: on the top right
-    - Select **Disappearing messages**
-    - Select the desired amount of time and select **Save**
-
-We recommend setting up a reasonable timer by default, such as one week, and adjusting it per contact as you see fit.
-
-!!! tip "Snapchat-like Functionality"
-
-    Signal allows you to send "view-once" media that are automatically removed from the conversation after they have been viewed.
-
-### Disable Link Previews
-
-Signal offers the ability to retrieve previews of webpages linked within a conversation.
-
-This means that when you send a link, a request will be sent to that website so that a preview of the website can be displayed alongside the link. Thus, we recommend disabling link previews.
-
-Your recipient doesn't make any requests unless they open the link on their end.
-
-On Android/iOS:
-
-- Select :material-dots-vertical: **Settings** > **Chats**
-- [ ] Turn off **Generate link previews**
-
-### Screen Security
-
-Signal allows you to prevent a preview of the app being shown (i.e., in the app switcher) unless you explicitly open it.
-
-On Android:
-
-- Select :material-dots-vertical: **Settings** > **Privacy**
-- [x] Turn on **Screen Security**
-
-On iOS:
-
-- Select :material-dots-vertical: **Settings** > **Privacy**
-- [x] Turn on **Hide Screen in App Switcher**
-
-### Screen Lock
-
-If someone gets a hold of your device while it is unlocked, you run the risk of them being able to open the Signal app and look at your conversations.
-
-To mitigate this, you can leverage the Screen Lock option to require additional authentication before Signal can be accessed.
-
-On Android/iOS:
-
-- Select :material-dots-vertical: **Settings** > **Privacy**
-- [x] Turn on **Screen Lock**
-
-### Notification Privacy
-
-Even when your phone is locked, anyone who can lay eyes on the device can read messages and sender names from your lock screen.
-
-On Signal, you have the ability to hide message content and sender name, or just the message content itself.
-
-On Android:
-
-- Select :material-dots-vertical: **Settings** > **Notifications**
-- Select **Show**
-- Select **No name or message** or **Name only** respectively.
-
-On iOS:
-
-- Select :material-dots-vertical: **Settings** > **Notifications**
-- Select **Show**
-- Select **No name or Content** or **Name Only** respectively.
-
-### Call Relaying
-
-Signal allows you to relay all calls (including video calls) through the Signal server to avoid revealing your IP address to your contact. This may reduce call quality.
-
-On Android/iOS:
-
-- Select :material-dots-vertical: **Settings** > **Privacy** > **Advanced**
-- [x] Turn on **Always Relay Calls**
-
-For incoming calls from people who are not in your Contacts app, the call will be relayed through the Signal server regardless of how you've set it up.
-
-### Proxy Support
-
-If Signal is blocked in your country, Signal allows you to set up a proxy to bypass it.
-
-!!! Warning
-
-    All traffic remains opaque to the proxy operator. However, the censoring party could learn that you are using Signal through a proxy because the app [fails to route all the IP connections to the proxy](https://community.signalusers.org/t/traffic-not-routed-to-tls-proxies-can-expose-users-to-censors/27479).
-
-You can learn more about Signal's proxy support on their [website](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360056052052-Proxy-Support).
-
-### Disable Signal Call History (iOS)
-
-Signal allows you to see your call history from your regular phone app. This allows your iOS device to sync your call history with iCloud, including who you spoke to, when, and for how long.
-
-If you use iCloud and you don’t want to share call history on Signal, confirm it’s turned off:
-
-- Select :material-dots-vertical: **Settings** > **Privacy**
-- [ ] Turn off **Show Calls in Recents**
-
-## Signal Hardening
-
-### Avoid Device Linking
-
-While it may be tempting to link your Signal account to your desktop device for convenience, keep in mind that this extends your trust to an additional and potentially less secure operating system.
-
-If your threat model calls for it, avoid linking your Signal account to a desktop device to reduce your attack surface.
-
-### Endpoint Security
-
-Signal takes security very seriously, however there is only so much an app can do to protect you.
-
-It is very important to take device security on both ends into account to ensure that your conversations are kept private.
-
-We recommend an up-to-date [GrapheneOS](/android/#grapheneos) or iOS device.
-
-### Molly (Android)
-
-On Android you can consider using **Molly**, a fork of the Signal mobile client which aims to provide extensive hardening and anti-forensic features.
-
-!!! recommendation
-
-    ![Molly logo](../assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right }
-
-    **Molly** is an independent Signal fork which offers additional security features, including locking the app at rest, securely shredding unused RAM data, routing via Tor, and more.
-
-    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-    [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-    [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
-    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-    [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/mollyim){ .card-link title=Contribute }
-
-    ??? downloads
-
-         - [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://molly.im/download/fdroid/)
-         - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/releases)
-
-Molly offers two variants of the app: **Molly** and **Molly-FOSS**.
-
-The former is identical to Signal with the addition of Molly's improvements and security features. The latter, Molly-FOSS, removes Google's proprietary code, which is used for some key features (e.g., [FCM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) and Google Maps integration), in an effort to make it fully open-source.
-
-A comparison of the two versions is available in the [project's repository](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#readme).
-
-Both versions of Molly support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code.
-
-#### Features
-
-Molly has implemented database encryption at rest, which means that you can encrypt the app's database with a passphrase to ensure that none of its data is accessible without it.
-
-!!! note
-
-    As long as Molly is locked, you will not receive notifications for any incoming messages or calls until you unlock it again.
-
-Once enabled, a configurable lock timer can be set, after which point Molly will lock itself if you haven't unlocked your device for that specific time period. Alternatively, you can manually lock the app whenever you want.
-
-For the database encryption feature to be useful, two conditions must be met:
-
-1. Molly has to be locked at the time an attacker gains access to the device. This can include a physical attack in which the attacker seizes your device and manages to unlock the device itself, or a remote attack, in which the device is compromised and manages to elevate privileges to root.
-1. If you become aware that your device has been compromised, you should not unlock Molly's database.
-
-If both of the above conditions are met, the data within Molly is safe as long as the passphrase is not accessible to the attacker.
-
-To supplement the database encryption feature, Molly securely wipes your device's RAM once the database is locked to defend against forensic analysis.
-
-While Molly is running, your data is kept in RAM. When any app closes, its data remains in RAM until another app takes the same physical memory pages. That can take seconds or days, depending on many factors. To prevent anyone from dumping the RAM to disk and extracting your data after Molly is locked, the app overrides all free RAM memory with random data when you lock the database.
-
-There is also the ability to configure a SOCKS proxy in Molly to route its traffic through the proxy or [Tor via Orbot](../tor.md#orbot). When enabled, all traffic is routed through the proxy and there are no known IP or DNS leaks. When using this feature, [call relaying](#call-relaying) will always be enabled, regardless of the setting.
-
-Signal adds everyone who you have communicated with to its database. Molly allows you to delete those contacts and stop sharing your profile with them.
-
-To supplement the feature above, as well as for additional security and to fight spam, Molly offers the ability to block unknown contacts that you've never been in contact with or those that are not in your contact list without you having to manually block them.
-
-You can find a full list of Molly's [features](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#features) on the project's repository.
-
-#### Caveats
-
-- Molly does not support SMS messages within the app, unlike the official Signal app.
-- Molly removes Signal's Mobilecoin integration.
-- Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes from Signal. The exception is security issues, that are patched as soon as possible. That said, you should be aware that there might be a slight delay compared to upstream.
-- By using Molly, you are extending your trust to another party, as you now need to trust the Signal team, as well as the Molly team.

docs/android.en.md

@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ The **Android Open Source Project** is an open-source mobile operating system le
 
 These are the Android operating systems, devices, and apps we recommend to maximize your mobile device's security and privacy. To learn more about Android:
 
-- [General Android Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](android/overview.md)
-- [Why we recommend GrapheneOS over CalyxOS :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](android/grapheneos-vs-calyxos.md)
+- [General Android Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/android-overview.md)
+- [Why we recommend GrapheneOS over CalyxOS :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/)
 
 ## AOSP Derivatives
 
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ We recommend installing one of these custom Android operating systems on your de
     [:octicons-code-16:](https://grapheneos.org/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
     [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
 
-GrapheneOS supports [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), which runs [Google Play Services](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Play_Services) fully sandboxed like any other regular app. This means you can take advantage of most Google Play Services, such as [push notifications](https://firebase.google.com/docs/cloud-messaging/), while giving you full control over their permissions and access, and while containing them to a specific [work profile](android/overview.md#work-profile) or [user profile](android/overview.md#user-profiles) of your choice.
+GrapheneOS supports [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), which runs [Google Play Services](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Play_Services) fully sandboxed like any other regular app. This means you can take advantage of most Google Play Services, such as [push notifications](https://firebase.google.com/docs/cloud-messaging/), while giving you full control over their permissions and access, and while containing them to a specific [work profile](os/android-overview.md#work-profile) or [user profile](os/android-overview.md#user-profiles) of your choice.
 
 Google Pixel phones are the only devices that currently meet GrapheneOS's [hardware security requirements](https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-support).
 
@@ -61,11 +61,12 @@ Google Pixel phones are the only devices that currently meet GrapheneOS's [hardw
     [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/divested-mobile){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
     [:octicons-heart-16:](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
 
-DivestOS has automated kernel vulnerability ([CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures)) [patching](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/cve_checker), fewer proprietary blobs, a custom [hosts](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=dnsbl) file, and [F-Droid](https://www.f-droid.org) as the app store. Its hardened WebView, [Mulch](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/mulch), enables [CFI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity) for all architectures and [network state partitioning](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning), and receives out-of-band updates.
-
+DivestOS has automated kernel vulnerability ([CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures)) [patching](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/cve_checker), fewer proprietary blobs, and a custom [hosts](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=dnsbl) file. Its hardened WebView, [Mulch](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/mulch), enables [CFI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity) for all architectures and [network state partitioning](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning), and receives out-of-band updates.
 DivestOS also includes kernel patches from GrapheneOS and enables all available kernel security features via [defconfig hardening](https://github.com/Divested-Mobile/DivestOS-Build/blob/master/Scripts/Common/Functions.sh#L758). All kernels newer than version 3.4 include full page [sanitization](https://lwn.net/Articles/334747/) and all ~22 Clang-compiled kernels have [`-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero`](https://reviews.llvm.org/D54604?id=174471) enabled.
 
-DivestOS implements some system hardening patches originally developed for GrapheneOS. DivestOS 16.0 and higher implements GrapheneOS's [`INTERNET`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) and SENSORS permission toggle, [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), [exec-spawning](android/grapheneos-vs-calyxos.md#additional-hardening), [JNI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_Native_Interface) [constification](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Const_(computer_programming)), and partial [bionic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bionic_(software)) hardening patchsets. 17.1 and higher features GrapheneOS's per-network full [MAC randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address#Randomization) option, [`ptrace_scope`](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.html) control, and automatic reboot/Wi-Fi/Bluetooth [timeout options](https://grapheneos.org/features).
+DivestOS implements some system hardening patches originally developed for GrapheneOS. DivestOS 16.0 and higher implements GrapheneOS's [`INTERNET`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) and SENSORS permission toggle, [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), [exec-spawning](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/#additional-hardening), [JNI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_Native_Interface) [constification](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Const_(computer_programming)), and partial [bionic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bionic_(software)) hardening patchsets. 17.1 and higher features GrapheneOS's per-network full [MAC randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address#Randomization) option, [`ptrace_scope`](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.html) control, and automatic reboot/Wi-Fi/Bluetooth [timeout options](https://grapheneos.org/features).
+
+DivestOS uses F-Droid as its default app store. Normally, we would recommend avoiding F-Droid due to its numerous [security issues](#f-droid). However, doing so on DivestOS isn't viable; the developers update their apps via their own F-Droid repositories ([DivestOS Official](https://divestos.org/fdroid/official/?fingerprint=E4BE8D6ABFA4D9D4FEEF03CDDA7FF62A73FD64B75566F6DD4E5E577550BE8467) and [DivestOS WebView](https://divestos.org/fdroid/webview/?fingerprint=FB426DA1750A53D7724C8A582B4D34174E64A84B38940E5D5A802E1DFF9A40D2)). We recommend disabling the official F-Droid app and using [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) with the DivestOS repositories enabled to keep those components up to date. For other apps, our recommended methods of obtaining them still apply.
 
 !!! warning
 
@@ -85,7 +86,7 @@ A few more tips regarding Android devices and operating system compatibility:
 
 - Do not buy devices that have reached or are near their end-of-life, additional firmware updates must be provided by the manufacturer.
 - Do not buy preloaded LineageOS or /e/ OS phones or any Android phones without proper [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) support and firmware updates. These devices also have no way for you to check whether they've been tampered with.
-- In short, if a device or Android distribution is not listed here, there is probably a good reason, so check our [discussions](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/discussions) page.
+- In short, if a device or Android distribution is not listed here, there is probably a good reason. Check out our [forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/) to find details!
 
 ### Google Pixel
 
@@ -135,7 +136,6 @@ We recommend a wide variety of Android apps throughout this site. The apps liste
     ??? downloads
 
         - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.typeblog.shelter)
-        - [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/net.typeblog.shelter)
 
 !!! warning
 
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ We recommend a wide variety of Android apps throughout this site. The apps liste
 
     ??? downloads
 
-        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.attestation.auditor)
+        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.attestation.auditor.play)
         - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases)
         - [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
 
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ Auditor performs attestation and intrusion detection by:
 - Using a [Trust On First Use (TOFU)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_on_first_use) model between an *auditor* and *auditee*, the pair establish a private key in the [hardware-backed keystore](https://source.android.com/security/keystore/) of the *Auditor*.
 - The *auditor* can either be another instance of the Auditor app or the [Remote Attestation Service](https://attestation.app).
 - The *auditor* records the current state and configuration of the *auditee*.
-- Should tampering with the operating system of the *auditee* after the pairing is complete, the auditor will be aware of the change in the device state and configurations.
+- Should tampering with the operating system of the *auditee* happen after the pairing is complete, the auditor will be aware of the change in the device state and configurations.
 - You will be alerted to the change.
 
 No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
@@ -251,49 +251,10 @@ The Google Play Store requires a Google account to login which is not great for
 
     ??? downloads
 
-        - [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/com.aurora.store/)
         - [:simple-gitlab: GitLab](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore/-/releases)
 
 Aurora Store does not allow you to download paid apps with their anonymous account feature. You can optionally log in with your Google account with Aurora Store to download apps you have purchased, which does give access to the list of apps you've installed to Google, however you still benefit from not requiring the full Google Play client and Google Play Services or microG on your device.
 
-### F-Droid
-
-![F-Droid logo](assets/img/android/f-droid.svg){ align=right width=120px }
-
-F-Droid is often recommended as an alternative to Google Play, particularly in the privacy community. The option to add third-party repositories and not be confined to Google's walled garden has led to its popularity. F-Droid additionally has [reproducible builds](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Reproducible_Builds/) for some applications and is dedicated to free and open-source software. However, there are problems with the official F-Droid client, their quality control, and how they build, sign and deliver packages, outlined in this [post](https://wonderfall.dev/fdroid-issues/).
-
-Sometimes the official F-Droid repository may fall behind on updates. F-Droid maintainers reuse package IDs while signing apps with their own keys, which is not ideal as it does give the F-Droid team ultimate trust. The Google Play version of some apps may contain unwanted telemetry or lack features that are available in the F-Droid version.
-
-We have these general tips:
-
-- Check if the app developers have their own F-Droid repository first, e.g. [Bitwarden](https://bitwarden.com/), [Samourai Wallet](https://www.samouraiwallet.com/), or [Newpipe](https://newpipe.net/), which have their own repositories with less telemetry, additional features or faster updates. This is the ideal situation and you should be using these repositories if possible.
-- Check if an app is available on the [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) repository. The IzzyOnDroid repository pulls builds directly from GitHub and is the next best thing to the developers' own repositories. We recommend that you download the GitHub builds and install them manually first, then use IzzyOnDroid for any subsequent updates. This will ensure that the signature of the applications you get from IzzyOnDroid matches that of the developer and the packages have not been tampered with.
-- Check if there are any differences between the F-Droid version and the Google Play Store version. Some applications like [IVPN](https://www.ivpn.net/) do not include certain features (eg [AntiTracker](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/general/antitracker-faq/)) in their Google Play Store build out of fear of censorship by Google.
-
-Evaluate whether the additional features in the F-Droid build are worth the slower updates. Also think about whether faster updates from the Google Play Store are worth the potential privacy issues in your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md).
-
-#### Neo Store
-
-The official F-Droid client targets a [low API level](https://wonderfall.dev/fdroid-issues/#3-low-target-api-level-sdk-for-client--apps) and does not use the [seamless updates](https://www.androidcentral.com/google-will-finally-bring-seamless-app-updates-alternative-app-stores-android-12) feature introduced in Android 12. Targeting lower API levels means that the F-Droid client cannot take advantage of the new improvements in the application sandboxes that comes with higher API levels. For automatic updates to work, the F-Droid client requires that the [Privileged Extension](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.fdroid.privileged/) be included in the operating system, granting it more privileges than what a normal app would have, which is not great for security.
-
-To mitigate these problems, we recommend [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store) as it supports seamless updates on Android 12 and above without needing any special privileges and targets a higher API level.
-
-!!! recommendation
-
-    ![Neo Store logo](assets/img/android/neo-store.png){ align=right }
-
-    **Neo Store** is a modern F-Droid client made with MaterialUI, forked from [Foxy Droid](https://github.com/kitsunyan/foxy-droid).
-
-    Unlike the official F-Droid client, Neo Store supports seamless updates on Android 12 and above without the need for a privileged extension. If your Android distribution is on Android 12 or above and does not include the [F-Droid privileged extension](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.fdroid.privileged/), it is highly recommended that you use Neo Store instead of the official client.
-
-    [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-
-    ??? downloads
-
-        - [:simple-android: IzzyOnDroid (APK)](https://android.izzysoft.de/repo/apk/com.machiav3lli.fdroid)
-        - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/releases)
-
 ### Manually with RSS Notifications
 
 For apps that are released on platforms like GitHub and GitLab, you may be able to add an RSS feed to your [news aggregator](/news-aggregators) that will help you keep track of new releases.
@@ -342,3 +303,51 @@ If you download APK files to install manually, you can verify their signature wi
     Signer #1 certificate SHA-1 digest: 23e108677a2e1b1d6e6b056f3bb951df7ad5570c
     Signer #1 certificate MD5 digest: dbbcd0cac71bd6fa2102a0297c6e0dd3
     ```
+
+### F-Droid
+
+![F-Droid logo](assets/img/android/f-droid.svg){ align=right width=120px }
+
+==We do **not** currently recommend F-Droid as a way to obtain apps.== F-Droid is often recommended as an alternative to Google Play, particularly in the privacy community. The option to add third-party repositories and not be confined to Google's walled garden has led to its popularity. F-Droid additionally has [reproducible builds](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Reproducible_Builds/) for some applications and is dedicated to free and open-source software. However, there are [notable problems](https://privsec.dev/posts/android/f-droid-security-issues/) with the official F-Droid client, their quality control, and how they build, sign, and deliver packages.
+
+Due to their process of building apps, apps in the official F-Droid repository often fall behind on updates. F-Droid maintainers also reuse package IDs while signing apps with their own keys, which is not ideal as it gives the F-Droid team ultimate trust.
+
+Other popular third-party repositories such as [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) alleviate some of these concerns. The IzzyOnDroid repository pulls builds directly from GitHub and is the next best thing to the developers' own repositories. However, it is not something that we can recommend, as apps are typically [removed](https://github.com/vfsfitvnm/ViMusic/issues/240#issuecomment-1225564446) from that respository when they make it to the main F-droid repository. While that makes sense (since the goal of that particular repository is to host apps before they're accepted into the main F-Droid repository), it can leave you with installed apps which no longer receive updates.
+
+That said, the [F-droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/) and [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) repositories are home to countless apps, so they can be a useful tool to search for and discover open-source apps that you can then download through Play Store, Aurora Store, or by getting the APK directly from the developer. It is important to keep in mind that some apps in these repositories have not been updated in years and may rely on unsupported libraries, among other things, posing a potential security risk. You should use your best judgement when looking for new apps via this method.
+
+!!! note
+
+    In some rare cases, the developer of an app will only distribute it through F-droid ([Gadgetbridge](https://gadgetbridge.org/) is one example of this). If you really need an app like that, we recommend using [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) instead of the official F-droid app to obtain it.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+    We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Operating Systems
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must support bootloader locking with custom AVB key support.
+- Must receive major Android updates within 0-1 months of release.
+- Must receive Android feature updates (minor version) within 0-14 days of release.
+- Must receive regular security patches within 0-5 days of release.
+- Must **not** be "rooted" out of the box.
+- Must **not** enable Google Play Services by default.
+- Must **not** require system modification to support Google Play Services.
+
+### Devices
+
+- Must support at least one of our recommended custom operating systems.
+- Must be currently sold new in stores.
+- Must receive a minimum of 5 years of security updates.
+- Must have dedicated secure element hardware.
+
+### Applications
+
+- Applications on this page must not be applicable to any other software category on the site.
+- General applications should extend or replace core system functionality.
+- Applications should receive regular updates and maintenance.

docs/android/grapheneos-vs-calyxos.en.md

@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
----
-title: "Why we recommend GrapheneOS over CalyxOS"
-icon: 'material/cellphone-cog'
----
-
-GrapheneOS and CalyxOS are often compared as similar options for people looking for an alternative Android OS for their Pixel devices. Below are some of the reasons why we recommend GrapheneOS over CalyxOS.
-
-## Update Frequency
-
-CalyxOS has a track record of being slower to apply security and feature updates to its OS and core applications than other custom Android operating systems. Timely security updates are one of the most important factors to consider when determining whether an OS is secure enough for regular use, which is a requirement for privacy.
-
-In contrast to that, GrapheneOS manages to stay close to upstream and in some cases even [deliver updates even before the stock OS does](https://grapheneos.org/features#more-complete-patching).
-
-As an example, [GrapheneOS's first Android 12 release](https://grapheneos.org/releases#2021102020) was in October 2021, whereas [CalyxOS moved to Android 12](https://calyxos.org/news/2022/01/19/android-12-changelog/) in January 2022.
-
-## Sandboxed Google Play vs Privileged microG
-
-When Google Play Services are used on GrapheneOS, they are confined using the highly restrictive, default [`untrusted_app`](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts) [SELinux](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux) domain. As a result, you have full control as to what these apps can access via permissions, just like any other app you install. Additionally, you can selectively choose which profile(s) to install the Sandboxed Google Play in.
-
-microG is a partially open-source re-implementation of Google Play Services.[^1] On CalyxOS, it runs in the highly privileged [`system_app`](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts) SELinux domain like regular Google Play Services, and it uses [signature spoofing](https://github.com/microg/GmsCore/wiki/Signature-Spoofing) to masquerade as Google Play Services. This is less secure than Sandboxed Google Play's approach, which does not need access to sensitive system APIs.
-
-When using Sandboxed Google Play, you have the option to reroute location requests to the Play Services API back to the OS location API, which uses satellite based location services. With microG, you have the option to choose between different backend location providers, including *shifting trust* to another location backend, like Mozilla; using [DejaVu](https://github.com/n76/DejaVu), a location backend that locally collects and saves RF-based location data to an offline database which can be used when GPS is not available; or to simply not use a network location backend at all.
-
-Network location providers like Play Services or Mozilla rely the on the MAC addresses of surrounding WiFi access points and Bluetooth devices being submitted for location approximation. Choosing a network location like Mozilla to use with microG provides little to no privacy benefit over Google because you are still submitting the same data and trusting them to not profile you.
-
-Local RF location backends like DejaVu require that the phone has a working GPS first for the local RF data collected to be useful. This makes them less effective as location providers, as the job of a location provider is to assist location approximation when satellite based services are not working.
-
-If your [threat model](threat-modeling.md) requires protecting your location or the MAC addresses of nearby devices, rerouting location requests to the OS location API is probably the best option. The benefit brought by microG's custom location backend is minimal at best when compared to Sandboxed Google Play.
-
-In terms of application compatibility, ==Sandboxed Google Play on GrapheneOS is always going to be more compatible== as it is the same code as what is released by Google. microG is a reimplementation of these services. As a result, it only supports the various parts that have been reimplemented, meaning some things such as [Google Play Games](https://play.google.com/googleplaygames) and [In-app Billing API](https://android-doc.github.io/google/play/billing/api.html) are not yet supported.
-
-Larger apps, especially games, require [Play Asset Delivery](https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2020/06/introducing-google-play-asset-delivery.html) to be installed, which is currently not implemented in microG. Authentication using [FIDO](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) with online services on Android also relies on Play Services, and does not currently work with microG.
-
-[^1]: It should be noted that microG still uses proprietary Google binaries for some of its components such as DroidGuard. Push notifications, if enabled, still go through Google's servers just like with Play Services. Outside of default microG setups like on CalyxOS, it is possible to run microG in the unprivileged [`untrusted app`](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts) SELinux domain and without the signature spoofing patch. However, microG's functionality and compatibility, which is already not nearly as broad as Sandboxed Google Play, will greatly diminish.
-
-## Privileged eSIM Activation Application
-
-Currently, eSIM activation is tied to a privileged proprietary application by Google. The app has the `READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE` permission, giving Google access to your hardware identifiers such as the IMEI.
-
-On GrapheneOS, the app comes disabled and you can *optionally* enable it after installing Sandboxed Google Play.
-
-On CalyxOS, the app comes installed by default (regardless of whether you choose to have microG or not) and you cannot opt-out. This means that Google still has access to your hardware identifiers regardless of whether or not you need eSIM activation and they can be accessed persistently.
-
-## Privileged App Extensions
-
-Android 12 comes with special support for seamless app updates with [third-party app stores](https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2020/09/listening-to-developer-feedback-to.html). The popular Free and Open-Source Software (FOSS) repository [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org) doesn't implement this feature and requires a [privileged extension](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.fdroid.privileged) to be included with the Android distribution in order to have unattended app updates.
-
-CalyxOS includes the [privileged extension](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.fdroid.privileged), which may lower device security.
-
-On the other hand, GrapheneOS officially recommends [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play) instead. Many FOSS Android apps are also in Google's Play Store but sometimes they are not (like [NewPipe](../video-streaming.md#newpipe)). In those cases, you can [keep up with updates using RSS](../android.md#manually-with-rss-notifications).
-
-## Profiles
-
-GrapheneOS significantly improves [user profiles](overview.md#user-profiles) in [multiple ways](https://grapheneos.org/features#improved-user-profiles), such as increasing the limit of how many profiles you can create (16 instead of the standard 4), allowing you to log out of user profiles, disabling app installation, and notification forwarding. All of these improvements make it so user profiles can be daily driven without sacrificng too much usability.
-
-CalyxOS doesn't feature any improvements to user profiles over AOSP, and instead includes a device controller app so that the [work profile](overview.md#work-profile) can be used without needing to download a third party app such as [Shelter](../android.md#shelter). However, work profiles are not nearly as flexible (as you're limited to only one) and don't provide the same amount of isolation and security.
-
-## Additional Hardening
-
-GrapheneOS improves upon [AOSP](https://source.android.com/) security with:
-
-- **Hardened WebView:** Vanadium WebView requires [64-bit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/64-bit_computing) processes on the [WebView](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/WebView) process and disables legacy [32-bit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/32-bit_computing) processes. It uses hardened compiler options such as [`-fwrapv`](https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Code-Gen-Options.html) and [`-fstack-protector-strong`](https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.9.3/gcc/Optimize-Options.html), which can help protect against [stack buffer overflows](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stack_buffer_overflow). [API](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/API)s such as the [battery status API](https://chromestatus.com/feature/4537134732017664) are disabled for privacy reasons. All system apps on GrapheneOS use the Vanadium WebView which means that apps which use WebView will also benefit from Vanadium's hardening. The [Vanadium patch set](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium) is a lot more comprehensive than CalyxOS's [Chromium patch set](https://gitlab.com/CalyxOS/chromium-patches) which is derived from it.
-- **Hardened Kernel:** GrapheneOS kernel includes some hardening from the [linux-hardened](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/linux-hardened) project and the [Kernel Self Protection Project (KSPP)](https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project). CalyxOS uses the [same kernel](https://calyxos.org/docs/development/build/kernel/) as regular Android with some minor modifications.
-- **Hardened Memory Allocator:** GrapheneOS uses the [hardened malloc](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc) subproject as its memory allocator. This focuses on hardening against [memory heap corruption](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_corruption). CalyxOS uses the default AOSP [Scudo Malloc](https://source.android.com/devices/tech/debug/scudo), which is generally [less effective](https://twitter.com/danielmicay/status/1033671709197398016). Hardened Malloc has uncovered vulnerabilities in AOSP which have been [fixed](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_system_core/commit/be11b59725aa6118b0e1f0712572e835c3d50746) by GrapheneOS such as [CVE-2021-0703](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-0703).
-- **Secure Exec Spawning:** GrapheneOS [spawns](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spawn_(computing)) fresh processes as opposed to using the [Zygote model](https://ayusch.com/android-internals-the-android-os-boot-process) used by AOSP and CalyxOS. The Zygote model weakens [Address Space Layout Randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Address_space_layout_randomization) (ASLR) and is considered [less secure](https://wenke.gtisc.gatech.edu/papers/morula.pdf). Creating [fresh processes](https://grapheneos.org/usage#exec-spawning) is safer but will have some performance penalty when launching a new application. These penalties are not really noticeable unless you have an [old device](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) with slow storage such as the Pixel 3a/3a XL as it has [eMMC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MultiMediaCard#eMMC).
-
-**Please note that these are just a few examples and are not an extensive list of GrapheneOS's hardening**. For a more complete list, please read GrapheneOS' [official documentation](https://grapheneos.org/features).

docs/articles.en.md

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
----
-title: Curated Articles from Around the Web
-hide:
-    - navigation
-    - feedback
----
-{% for article in articles %}
-- **{{ article.date }}**: [{{ article.name }}]({{ article.url }}) from *{{ article.publisher }}*
-{% endfor %}

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docs/assets/img/frontends/nitter.svg

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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docs/assets/img/frontends/proxitok.svg

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+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<svg width="128" height="128" version="1.1" viewBox="0 0 33.867 33.867" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><g transform="matrix(1.4916 0 0 1.4916 -108.81 -169.4)"><path d="m75.442 117.85c3.3426-0.62057 5.8921-0.31143 8.1139 2.4694 2.9164-2.5188 5.4372-2.8222 9.1722-2.8222-4.1614-5.3918-13.3-5.0479-17.286 0.35278m-2.4694 8.8194h0.35278c0.57274-2.4745 1.4387-4.7979 3.5278-6.35-0.0024 3.6523-2.0171 8.0642-1.0975 11.636 0.49495 1.9227 3.2713 3.1322 4.9781 3.7012 4.9853 1.6617 10.772-0.5401 13.344-5.1071 2.4443-4.3407 2.4887-10.227-3.1135-10.936-0.54247 2.8791-1.2627 5.8902-1.3972 8.8194-0.0545 1.1867 0.16563 2.8529-1.1229 3.4973-1.6634 0.83189-2.0984-1.2819-2.0042-2.439 0.26141-3.2124 1.2561-6.5356 2.4076-9.525-1.338 0.0285-3.3185 0.0732-4.3735 1.0352-0.7456 0.67987-0.64012 1.9754-1.0793 2.8451-1.3627 2.6986-3.871 3.4357-6.5416 2.4697 1.198-0.74525 2.8991-1.1261 3.5245-2.5076 1.8751-4.1413-4.1426-6.0016-6.4428-3.0566-1.2381 1.5851-0.96224 4.037-0.96224 5.9169z" fill="#4343ff"/></g></svg>

docs/assets/img/frontends/yattee.svg

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<svg version="1.1" viewBox="0 0 128 128" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><g transform="scale(.125)" stroke-miterlimit="0" stroke-width="0"><rect id="bg" x="5e-7" y="5e-7" width="1024" height="1024" fill="#1b345f" style="paint-order:markers stroke fill"/><circle id="circle" cx="512" cy="512" r="406.19" fill="#ee3a3a" style="paint-order:markers stroke fill"/><path id="outer" d="m327.85 320.22a50 50 0 0 0-50 50v198.11a50 50 0 0 0 50 50h15.107v-190.81a50 50 0 0 1 50-50h266.35v-7.2949a50 50 0 0 0-50-50z" fill="#fff" style="paint-order:markers stroke fill"/><path id="square" x="367.19916" y="403.98566" width="378.94815" height="299.79266" d="m417.2 403.99h278.95a50 50 45 0 1 50 50v199.79a50 50 135 0 1-50 50h-278.95a50 50 45 0 1-50-50v-199.79a50 50 135 0 1 50-50z" fill="#fff" style="paint-order:markers stroke fill"/><path id="triangle" transform="matrix(.98233 0 0 .98233 1118.3 105.84)" d="m-643.31 522.07v-131.93a14.434 14.434 150 0 1 21.651-12.5l114.25 65.963a14.434 14.434 90 0 1 0 25l-114.25 65.963a14.434 14.434 30 0 1-21.651-12.5z" fill="#ee3a3a" style="paint-order:markers stroke fill"/></g></svg>

docs/assets/img/messengers/molly.svg

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
-<svg width="127.99" height="128" version="1.1" viewBox="0 0 33.864 33.867" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><g transform="translate(-48.383 -89.279)"><g transform="matrix(.083544 0 0 .083551 36.799 77.694)"><path d="m220.51 504.06 120.82 39.937 1.2e-4 4e-5 -143.92-5e-5zm323.49-162.73c0 111.93-90.737 202.67-202.67 202.67-111.93-1e-5 -202.67-90.737-202.67-202.67s90.737-202.67 202.67-202.67c111.93 0 202.67 90.737 202.67 202.67z" fill="#7663f0"/><g transform="translate(-5.1601e-6,-4.0973)"><circle cx="341" cy="433.47" r="23.536" fill="#f9f8fe" stroke-width=".64448"/><circle cx="439.19" cy="375.64" r="23.536" fill="#aaa4ce" stroke-width=".64448"/><circle cx="242.81" cy="375.64" r="23.536" fill="#cba1fe" stroke-width=".64447"/><g stroke-width=".64448"><circle cx="439.19" cy="433.47" r="23.536" fill="#f9f8fe"/><circle cx="439.19" cy="317.82" r="23.536" fill="#aacdf4"/><circle cx="242.81" cy="260" r="23.536" fill="#4b0f9f"/></g><circle cx="242.81" cy="317.82" r="23.536" fill="#aaa4ce" stroke-width=".64447"/><g stroke-width=".64448"><circle cx="242.81" cy="433.47" r="23.536" fill="#f9f8fe"/><circle cx="341" cy="317.82" r="23.536" fill="#4b0f9f"/><circle cx="341" cy="375.64" r="23.536" fill="#aacdf4"/></g><circle cx="439.19" cy="260" r="23.536" fill="#4b0f9f" stroke-width=".64447"/></g></g></g></svg>

docs/assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<svg width="128" height="128" version="1.1" viewBox="0 0 33.867 33.867" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><defs><linearGradient id="paint0_linear_40_164" x1="135.95" x2="132.1" y1="-.81633" y2="36.986" gradientTransform="matrix(.26458 0 0 .26458 5.515 28.687)" gradientUnits="userSpaceOnUse"><stop stop-color="#01F1FF" offset="0"/><stop stop-color="#0197FF" offset="1"/></linearGradient></defs><g transform="matrix(3.1801 0 0 3.1801 -119.14 -91.124)" clip-rule="evenodd" fill-rule="evenodd" stroke-width=".26458"><path d="m38.412 31.362 1.7518 1.7407 1.8005-1.7891 0.87577 0.87034-1.8005 1.789 1.7518 1.7407-0.90011 0.89453-1.7518-1.7407-1.8005 1.7891-0.87577-0.87035 1.8002-1.7891-1.7515-1.7407z" fill="#030749"/><path d="m41.877 36.625 0.89323-0.88757-5.29e-4 -2.38e-4 1.7867-1.775-1.7526-1.7412 2.65e-4 -1.58e-4 -0.8763-0.87072-1.7523-1.7414 0.89297-0.88756 1.7526 1.7414 1.7865-1.7752 0.8763 0.8707-1.7867 1.7751 1.7526 1.7414 1.7865-1.7751 0.8763 0.87071-1.7867 1.775 1.7529 1.7415-0.89323 0.88757-1.7529-1.7415-1.7862 1.7751 1.7526 1.7415-0.89323 0.88754-1.7526-1.7415-1.7862 1.7752-0.8763-0.87069z" fill="url(#paint0_linear_40_164)"/></g></svg>

docs/assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
-<svg width="128" height="128" version="1.1" viewBox="0 0 33.866 33.866" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><g transform="matrix(.52916 0 0 .52916 .0017986 -523)"><g transform="matrix(.40296 0 0 .40296 360.66 978.2)"><path d="m-816.29 25.214a15.882 15.918 0 0 0-8.3171 2.135l-53.648 31.034a15.882 15.918 0 0 0-7.9452 13.784v62.1a15.882 15.918 0 0 0 7.9452 13.768l53.648 31.058a15.882 15.918 0 0 0 15.882 0l53.656-31.058a15.882 15.918 0 0 0 7.9371-13.768v-62.1a15.882 15.918 0 0 0-7.9371-13.784l-53.656-31.034a15.882 15.918 0 0 0-7.5652-2.135zm-0.17228 35.101a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1 4.1636 1.169l29.512 17.071a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1 4.3663 7.582v34.159a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1-4.3663 7.5656l-29.512 17.088a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1-8.7305 0l-29.513-17.088a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1-4.3653-7.5656v-34.159a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1 4.3653-7.582l29.513-17.071a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1 4.5669-1.169z" fill="#63a0ff"/><path d="m-749.26 64.233-30.34 17.551a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1 1.1738 4.375v34.15a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1-4.3652 7.5742l-29.504 17.08a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1-4.3496 1.1602v35.102a15.882 15.918 0 0 0 7.9219-2.1191l11.936-6.9082 15.23 8.8633c6.8122 3.9643 17.78 3.9643 24.592 0l6.8106-3.9629c6.8122-3.9643 6.8122-10.348 0-14.312l-15.146-8.8144 10.234-5.9238a15.882 15.918 0 0 0 7.9375-13.768v-62.092a15.882 15.918 0 0 0-2.1309-7.9551z" fill="#3874d8"/><path d="m-884.06 64.207 30.334 17.56a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1 3.1929-3.2071l29.508-17.075a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1 8.7265 3e-3l29.51 17.071a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1 3.1777 3.1948l30.328-17.55a15.882 15.918 0 0 0-5.791-5.8162l-53.664-31.045a15.882 15.918 0 0 0-15.864-5e-3l-53.649 31.046a15.882 15.918 0 0 0-5.8092 5.8265z" fill="#99bfff"/></g></g></svg>
+<svg width="128" height="128" version="1.1" viewBox="0 0 33.867 33.867" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><g transform="matrix(.52917 0 0 .52917 .0016651 -523.01)"><g transform="matrix(.40296 0 0 .40296 360.66 978.2)"><path d="m-816.29 25.214a15.882 15.918 0 0 0-8.3171 2.135l-53.648 31.034a15.882 15.918 0 0 0-7.9452 13.784v62.1a15.882 15.918 0 0 0 7.9452 13.768l53.648 31.058a15.882 15.918 0 0 0 15.882 0l53.656-31.058a15.882 15.918 0 0 0 7.9371-13.768v-62.1a15.882 15.918 0 0 0-7.9371-13.784l-53.656-31.034a15.882 15.918 0 0 0-7.5652-2.135zm-0.17228 35.101a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1 4.1636 1.169l29.512 17.071a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1 4.3663 7.582v34.159a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1-4.3663 7.5656l-29.512 17.088a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1-8.7305 0l-29.513-17.088a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1-4.3653-7.5656v-34.159a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1 4.3653-7.582l29.513-17.071a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1 4.5669-1.169z" fill="#63a0ff"/><path d="m-749.26 64.233-30.34 17.551a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1 1.1738 4.375v34.15a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1-4.3652 7.5742l-29.504 17.08a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1-4.3496 1.1602v35.102a15.882 15.918 0 0 0 7.9219-2.1191l11.936-6.9082 15.23 8.8633c6.8122 3.9643 17.78 3.9643 24.592 0l6.8106-3.9629c6.8122-3.9643 6.8122-10.348 0-14.312l-15.146-8.8144 10.234-5.9238a15.882 15.918 0 0 0 7.9375-13.768v-62.092a15.882 15.918 0 0 0-2.1309-7.9551z" fill="#3874d8"/><path d="m-884.06 64.207 30.334 17.56a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1 3.1929-3.2071l29.508-17.075a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1 8.7265 3e-3l29.51 17.071a8.7349 8.755 0 0 1 3.1777 3.1948l30.328-17.55a15.882 15.918 0 0 0-5.791-5.8162l-53.664-31.045a15.882 15.918 0 0 0-15.864-5e-3l-53.649 31.046a15.882 15.918 0 0 0-5.8092 5.8265z" fill="#99bfff"/></g></g></svg>

docs/assets/stylesheets/blog.css

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-/* Homepage hero section */
-
-.mdx-hero {
-    color: var(--pg-hero-color);
-    margin: 0 0.8rem;
-    text-align: center;
-}
-.mdx-hero h1 {
-    color: currentcolor;
-    margin-bottom: 1rem;
-    font-size: 2.6rem;
-}
-@media screen and (max-width: 29.9375em) {
-    .mdx-hero h1 {
-        font-size: 1.4rem;
-    }
-}
-.mdx-hero__content {
-    margin-top: 2rem;
-    padding-bottom: 0rem;
-}
-[data-md-color-scheme="slate"] .mdx-hero .md-button--primary {
-    color: var(--md-primary-fg-color);
-}
-.mdx-hero .md-button--primary {
-    color: var(--md-primary-fg-color);
-    background-color: var(--pg-hero-color);
-    border-color: transparent;
-    margin-right: 0.5rem;
-    margin-top: 0.5rem;
-}
-nav[class="md-tabs"] {
-    border-bottom: none;
-}

docs/assets/stylesheets/extra.css

@@ -193,12 +193,11 @@ img[align="right"], svg[align="right"] {
 .md-typeset .admonition.downloads,
 .md-typeset details.downloads {
     border: none;
+    box-shadow: none;
 }
 .md-typeset .downloads > .admonition-title,
 .md-typeset .downloads > summary {
     background-color: rgba(43, 155, 70, 0.0);
-    border: none;
-    padding-left: 0.6rem;
 }
 .md-typeset .downloads > .admonition-title::before,
 .md-typeset .downloads > .admonition-title,
@@ -230,6 +229,25 @@ details[class="downloads annotate"] > p .md-annotation span span::before {
     list-style-type: none;
 }
 
+
+.md-typeset .admonition.person,
+.md-typeset details.person {
+    border-color: var(--md-default-bg-color);
+    box-shadow: none;
+    background-color: var(--md-default-bg-color);
+    margin: 0;
+}
+.md-typeset .person > .admonition-title,
+.md-typeset .person > summary {
+    background-color: var(--md-default-bg-color);
+}
+.md-typeset .person > .admonition-title::before,
+.md-typeset .person > summary::before {
+    background-color: var(--md-accent-fg-color);
+    -webkit-mask-image: url('data:image/svg+xml;charset=utf-8,<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" height="48" width="48"><path d="M24 23.95q-3.3 0-5.4-2.1-2.1-2.1-2.1-5.4 0-3.3 2.1-5.4 2.1-2.1 5.4-2.1 3.3 0 5.4 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 5.4 0 3.3-2.1 5.4-2.1 2.1-5.4 2.1ZM8 40v-4.7q0-1.9.95-3.25T11.4 30q3.35-1.5 6.425-2.25Q20.9 27 24 27q3.1 0 6.15.775 3.05.775 6.4 2.225 1.55.7 2.5 2.05.95 1.35.95 3.25V40Z"/></svg>');
+            mask-image: url('data:image/svg+xml;charset=utf-8,<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" height="48" width="48"><path d="M24 23.95q-3.3 0-5.4-2.1-2.1-2.1-2.1-5.4 0-3.3 2.1-5.4 2.1-2.1 5.4-2.1 3.3 0 5.4 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 5.4 0 3.3-2.1 5.4-2.1 2.1-5.4 2.1ZM8 40v-4.7q0-1.9.95-3.25T11.4 30q3.35-1.5 6.425-2.25Q20.9 27 24 27q3.1 0 6.15.775 3.05.775 6.4 2.225 1.55.7 2.5 2.05.95 1.35.95 3.25V40Z"/></svg>');
+}
+
 @media screen and (max-width: 600px) {
   .downloads > ul {
     grid-template-columns: repeat(2, 1fr);
@@ -445,28 +463,8 @@ div[class="md-source__icon md-icon"], div[class="md-source__repository md-source
 
 /* Redesigned admonitions */
 
-.md-typeset .admonition.recommendation {
-    border: 1px solid var(--pg-light-border);
-}
-
 .md-typeset :is(.admonition, details) {
     background-color: var(--md-primary-fg-color);
-    box-shadow: none;
-    border-radius: 6px;
-    border: 1px solid;
-    border-left-width: 1px!important;
-}
-
-.md-typeset :is(.admonition-title, summary) {
-    margin-left: -0.6rem!important;
-}
-
-.md-typeset details:not(.downloads, [open]) summary:hover {
-    box-shadow: inset 0 0 100px 100px rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.6);
-}
-
-[data-md-color-scheme="slate"] .md-typeset details:not(.downloads, [open]) summary:hover {
-    box-shadow: inset 0 0 100px 100px rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.1);
 }
 
 .md-typeset .recommendation img[align="right"] {

docs/basics/account-creation.en.md

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+---
+title: "Account Creation"
+icon: 'material/account-plus'
+---
+
+Often people sign up for services without thinking. Maybe it's a streaming service so you can watch that new show everyone's talking about, or an account that gives you a discount for your favorite fast food place. Whatever the case may be, you should consider the implications for your data now and later on down the line.
+
+There are risks associated with every new service that you use. Data breaches; disclosure of customer information to third parties; rogue employees accessing data; all are possibilities that must be considered when giving your information out. You need to be confident that you can trust the service, which is why we don't recommend storing valuable data on anything but the most mature and battle-tested products. That usually means services which provide E2EE and have undergone a cryptographic audit. An audit increases assurance that the product was designed without glaring security issues caused by an inexperienced developer.
+
+It can also be difficult to delete the accounts on some services. Sometimes [overwriting data](account-deletion.en.md#overwriting-account-information) associated with an account can be possible, but in other cases the service will keep an entire history of changes to the account.
+
+## Terms of Service & Privacy Policy
+
+The ToS are the rules that you agree to follow when using the service. With larger services these rules are often enforced by automated systems. Sometimes these automated systems can make mistakes. For example, you may be banned or locked out of your account on some services for using a VPN or VOIP number. Appealing such bans is often difficult, and involves an automated process too, which isn't always successful. This would be one of the reasons why we wouldn't suggest using Gmail for email as an example. Email is crucial for access to other services you might have signed up for.
+
+The Privacy Policy is how the service says they will use your data and it is worth reading so that you understand how your data will be used. A company or organization might not be legally obligated to follow everything contained in the policy (it depends on the jurisdiction). We would recommend having some idea what your local laws are and what they permit a provider to collect.
+
+We recommend looking for particular terms such as "data collection", "data analysis", "cookies", "ads" or "3rd-party" services. Sometimes you will be able to opt-out from data collection or from sharing your data, but it is best to choose a service that respects your privacy from the start.
+
+Keep in mind you're also placing your trust in the company or organization and that they will comply with their own privacy policy.
+
+## Authentication methods
+
+There are usually multiple ways to sign up for an account, each with their own benefits and drawbacks.
+
+### Email and password
+
+The most common way to create a new account is by an email address and password. When using this method, you should use a password manager and follow [best practices](passwords-overview.md) regarding passwords.
+
+!!! tip
+
+    You can use your password manager to organize other authentication methods too! Just add the new entry and fill the appropriate fields, you can add notes for things like security questions or a backup key.
+
+You will be responsible for managing your login credentials. For added security, you can set up [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md) on your accounts.
+
+[Recommended password managers](../passwords.md){ .md-button }
+
+#### Email aliases
+
+If you don't want to give your real email address to a service, you have the option to use an alias. We described them in more detail on our email services recommendation page. Essentially, alias services allow you to generate new email addresses that forward all emails to your main address. This can help prevent tracking across services and help you manage the marketing emails that sometimes come with the sign up process. Those can be filtered automatically based on the alias they are sent to.
+
+Should a service get hacked, you might start receiving phishing or spam emails to the address you used to sign up. Using unique aliases for each service can assist in identifying exactly what service was hacked.
+
+[Recommended email aliasing services](../email.md#email-aliasing-services){ .md-button }
+
+### Single sign-on
+
+!!! note
+  
+    We are discussing Single sign-on for personal use, not enterprise users.
+
+Single sign-on (SSO) is an authentication method that allows you to register for a service without sharing much information, if any. Whenever you see something along the lines of "Sign-in with *provider name*" on a registration form it's SSO.
+
+When you choose single sign-on in a website, it will prompt your SSO provider login page and after that your account will be connected. Your password won't be shared but some basic information will (you can review it during the login request). This process is needed every time you want to log in to the same account.
+
+The main advantages are:
+
+- **Security**: no risk of being involved in a [data breach](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_breach) because the website does not store your credentials.
+- **Ease of use**: multiple accounts are managed by a single login.
+
+But there are disadvantages:
+
+- **Privacy**: a SSO provider will know the services you use.
+- **Centralization**: if your SSO account gets compromised or you aren't able to login to it, all other accounts connected to it are affected.
+
+SSO can be especially useful in those situations where you could benefit from deeper integration between services. For example, one of those services may offer SSO for the others. Our recommendation is to limit SSO to only where you need it and protect the main account with [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md).
+
+All services that use SSO will be as secure as your SSO account. For example, if you want to secure an account with a hardware key but that service doesn't support hardware keys, you can secure your SSO account with a hardware key and now you essentially have hardware MFA on all your accounts. It is worth noting though that weak authentication on your SSO account means that any account tied to that login will also be weak.
+
+### Phone number
+
+We recommend avoiding services that require a phone number for sign up. A phone number can identity you across multiple services and depending on data sharing agreements this will make your usage easier to track, particularly if one of those services is breached as the phone number is often **not** encrypted.
+
+You should avoid giving out your real phone number if you can. Some services will allow the use of VOIP numbers, however these often trigger fraud detection systems, causing an account to be locked down, so we don't recommend that for important accounts.
+
+In many cases you will need to provide a number that you can receive SMS or calls from, particularly when shopping internationally, in case there is a problem with your order at border screening. It's common for services to use your number as a verification method; don't let yourself get locked out of an important account because you wanted to be clever and give a fake number!
+
+### Username and password
+
+Some services allow you to register without using an email address and only require you to set a username and password. These services may provide increased anonymity when combined with a VPN or Tor. Keep in mind that for these accounts there will most likely be **no way to recover your account** in the event you forget your username or password.

docs/basics/account-deletion.en.md

@@ -44,13 +44,13 @@ Residents of the EEA have additional rights regarding data erasure specified in
 
 In some situations where you plan to abandon an account, it may make sense to overwrite the account information with fake data. Once you've made sure you can log in, change all the information in your account to falsified information. The reason for this is that many sites will retain information you previously had even after account deletion. The hope is that they will overwrite the previous information with the newest data you entered. However, there is no guarantee that there won't be backups with the prior information.
 
-For the account email, either create a new alternate email account via your provider of choice or create an alias using an [email aliasing service](/email/#email-aliasing-services). You can then delete your alternate email address once you are done. We recommend against using temporary email providers, as oftentimes it is possible to reactivate temporary emails.
+For the account email, either create a new alternate email account via your provider of choice or create an alias using an [email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services). You can then delete your alternate email address once you are done. We recommend against using temporary email providers, as oftentimes it is possible to reactivate temporary emails.
 
 ### Delete
 
 You can check [JustDeleteMe](https://justdeleteme.xyz) for instructions on deleting the account for a specific service. Some sites will graciously have a "Delete Account" option, while others will go as far as to force you to speak with a support agent. The deletion process can vary from site to site, with account deletion being impossible on some.
 
-For services that don't allow account deletion, the best thing to do is falsify all your information as previously mentioned and strengthen account security. To do so, enable [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md) and any extra security features offered. As well, change the password to a randomly-generated one that is the maximum allowed size (a [password manager](/passwords/#local-password-managers) can be useful for this).
+For services that don't allow account deletion, the best thing to do is falsify all your information as previously mentioned and strengthen account security. To do so, enable [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md) and any extra security features offered. As well, change the password to a randomly-generated one that is the maximum allowed size (a [password manager](../passwords.md) can be useful for this).
 
 If you're satisfied that all information you care about is removed, you can safely forget about this account. If not, it might be a good idea to keep the credentials stored with your other passwords and occasionally re-login to reset the password.
 

docs/basics/common-misconceptions.en.md

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+---
+title: "Common Misconceptions"
+icon: 'material/robot-confused'
+---
+
+## "Open-source software is always secure" or "Proprietary software is more secure"
+
+These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis.
+
+Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities into even large projects.[^1]
+
+On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering.
+
+To avoid biased decisions, it's *vital* that you evaluate the privacy and security standards of the software you use.
+
+## "Shifting trust can increase privacy"
+
+We talk about "shifting trust" a lot when discussing solutions like VPNs (which shift the trust you place in your ISP to the VPN provider). While this protects your browsing data from your ISP *specifically*, the VPN provider you choose still has access to your browsing data: Your data isn't completely secured from all parties. This means that:
+
+1. You must exercise caution when choosing a provider to shift trust to.
+2. You should still use other techniques, like E2EE, to protect your data completely. Merely distrusting one provider to trust another is not securing your data.
+
+## "Privacy-focused solutions are inherently trustworthy"
+
+Focusing solely on the privacy policies and marketing of a tool or provider can blind you to its weaknesses. When you're looking for a more private solution, you should determine what the underlying problem is and find technical solutions to that problem. For example, you may want to avoid Google Drive, which gives Google access to all of your data. The underlying problem in this case is lack of E2EE, so you should make sure that the provider you switch to actually implements E2EE, or use a tool (like [Cryptomator](../encryption.md#cryptomator-cloud)) which provides E2EE on any cloud provider. Switching to a "privacy-focused" provider (that doesn't implement E2EE) doesn't solve your problem: it just shifts trust from Google to that provider.
+
+The privacy policies and business practices of providers you choose are very important, but should be considered secondary to technical guarantees of your privacy: You shouldn't shift trust to another provider when trusting a provider isn't a requirement at all.
+
+## "Complicated is better"
+
+We often see people describing privacy threat models that are overly complex. Often, these solutions include problems like many different email accounts or complicated setups with lots of moving parts and conditions. The replies are usually answers to "What is the best way to do *X*?"
+
+Finding the "best" solution for yourself doesn't necessarily mean you are after an infallible solution with dozens of conditions—these solutions are often difficult to work with realistically. As we discussed previously, security often comes at the cost of convenience. Below, we provide some tips:
+
+1. ==Actions need to serve a particular purpose:== think about how to do what you want with the fewest actions.
+2. ==Remove human failure points:== We fail, get tired, and forget things. To maintain security, avoid relying on manual conditions and processes that you have to remember.
+3. ==Use the right level of protection for what you intend.== We often see recommendations of so-called law-enforcement or subpoena-proof solutions. These often require specialist knowledge and generally aren't what people want. There's no point in building an intricate threat model for anonymity if you can be easily de-anonymized by a simple oversight.
+
+So, how might this look?
+
+One of the clearest threat models is one where people *know who you are* and one where they do not. There will always be situations where you must declare your legal name and there are others where you don't need to.
+
+1. **Known identity** - A known identity is used for things where you must declare your name. There are many legal documents and contracts where a legal identity is required. This could range from opening a bank account, signing a property lease, obtaining a passport, customs declarations when importing items, or otherwise dealing with your government. These things will usually lead to credentials such as credit cards, credit rating checks, account numbers, and possibly physical addresses.
+
+    We don't suggest using a VPN or Tor for any of these things, as your identity is already known through other means.
+
+    !!! tip
+
+        When shopping online, the use of a [parcel locker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parcel_locker) can help keep your physical address private.
+
+2. **Unknown identity** - An unknown identity could be a stable pseudonym that you regularly use. It is not anonymous because it doesn't change. If you're part of an online community, you may wish to retain a persona that others know. This pseudonym isn't anonymous because—if monitored for long enough—details about the owner can reveal further information, such as the way they write, their general knowledge about topics of interest, etc.
+
+    You may wish to use a VPN for this, to mask your IP address. Financial transactions are more difficult to mask: You could consider using anonymous cryptocurrencies, such as [Monero](https://www.getmonero.org/). Employing altcoin shifting may also help to disguise where your currency originated. Typically, exchanges require KYC (know your customer) to be completed before they'll allow you to exchange fiat currency into any kind of cryptocurrency. Local meet-up options may also be a solution; however, those are often more expensive and sometimes also require KYC.
+
+3. **Anonymous identity** - Even with experience, anonymous identities are difficult to maintain over long periods of time. They should be short-term and short-lived identities which are rotated regularly.
+
+    Using Tor can help with this. It is also worth noting that greater anonymity is possible through asynchronous communication: Real-time communication is vulnerable to analysis of typing patterns (i.e. more than a paragraph of text, distributed on a forum, via email, etc.)
+
+[^1]: One notable example of this is the [2021 incident in which University of Minnesota researchers introduced three vulnerabilities into the Linux kernel development project](https://cse.umn.edu/cs/linux-incident).

docs/basics/common-threats.en.md

@@ -3,191 +3,143 @@ title: "Common Threats"
 icon: 'material/eye-outline'
 ---
 
-Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into these general categories of [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside of these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat imaginable.
+Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside of these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat.
 
-- <span class="pg-purple">:material-incognito: Anonymity</span> - Shielding your online activity from your real-life identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically
-- <span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks</span> - Being protected  from dedicated hackers or other malicious agents trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically
-- <span class="pg-orange">:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks</span> - Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once
-- <span class="pg-teal">:material-server-network: Service Providers</span> - Protecting your data from service providers, e.g. with end-to-end encryption rendering your data unreadable to the server
-- <span class="pg-blue">:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance</span> - Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services working together to track your activities
-- <span class="pg-brown">:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism</span> - Protecting yourself from big advertising networks like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors
-- <span class="pg-green">:material-account-search: Public Exposure</span> - Limiting the information about you online that is accessible to search engines or the general public
-- <span class="pg-blue-gray">:material-close-outline: Censorship</span> - Avoiding censored access to information and being censored yourself when speaking online
+- <span class="pg-purple">:material-incognito: Anonymity</span> - Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically.
+- <span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks</span> - Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically.
+- <span class="pg-orange">:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks</span> - Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once.
+- <span class="pg-teal">:material-server-network: Service Providers</span> - Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server).
+- <span class="pg-blue">:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance</span> - Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities.
+- <span class="pg-brown">:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism</span> - Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors.
+- <span class="pg-green">:material-account-search: Public Exposure</span> - Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public.
+- <span class="pg-blue-gray">:material-close-outline: Censorship</span> - Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online.
 
-Some of these threats may weigh more than others depending on your specific concerns. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with <span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks</span>, but beyond that they probably still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in <span class="pg-blue">:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance</span> programs. Similarly, an "Average Joe" may be primarily concerned with <span class="pg-green">:material-account-search: Public Exposure</span> of their personal data, but they should still be wary of security-focused issues such as <span class="pg-orange">:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks</span> like malware affecting their devices.
+Some of these threats may be more important to you than others, depending on your specific concerns. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with <span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks</span>, but they probably still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in <span class="pg-blue">:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance</span> programs. Similarly, many people may be primarily concerned with <span class="pg-green">:material-account-search: Public Exposure</span> of their personal data, but they should still be wary of security-focused issues, such as <span class="pg-orange">:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks</span>—like malware affecting their devices.
 
-## Anonymity vs Privacy
+## Anonymity vs. Privacy
 
 <span class="pg-purple">:material-incognito: Anonymity</span>
 
-Anonymity is often confused for privacy, but it's a distinct concept. While privacy is a set of choices you make about how your data is used and shared, anonymity is the complete disassociation of your online activities from your real-life identity.
+Anonymity is often confused with privacy, but they're distinct concepts. While privacy is a set of choices you make about how your data is used and shared, anonymity is the complete disassociation of your online activities from your real identity.
 
-Whistleblowers and journalists, for example, can have a much more extreme threat model requiring total anonymity. That's not only hiding what they do, what data they have, and not getting hacked by hackers or governments, but also hiding who they are entirely. They will sacrifice any kind of convenience if it means protecting their anonymity, privacy, or security, as their lives could depend on it. Most regular people do not need to go so far.
+Whistleblowers and journalists, for example, can have a much more extreme threat model which requires total anonymity. That's not only hiding what they do, what data they have, and not getting hacked by malicious actors or governments, but also hiding who they are entirely. They will often sacrifice any kind of convenience if it means protecting their anonymity, privacy, or security, because their lives could depend on it. Most people don't need to go so far.
 
 ## Security and Privacy
 
 <span class="pg-orange">:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks</span>
 
-Security and privacy are often conflated, because you need security to obtain any semblance of privacy: Using tools which appear private is futile if they could easily be exploited by attackers to release your data later. However, the inverse is not necessarily true; the most secure service in the world *isn't necessarily* private. The best example of this is trusting data to Google, who, given their scale, have had minimal security incidents by employing industry-leading security experts to secure their infrastructure. Even though Google provides a very secure service, very few would consider their data private in Google's free consumer products (Gmail, YouTube, etc).
+Security and privacy are also often confused, because you need security to obtain any semblance of privacy: Using tools—even if they're private by design—is futile if they could be easily exploited by attackers who later release your data. However, the inverse isn't necessarily true: The most secure service in the world *isn't necessarily* private. The best example of this is trusting data to Google who, given their scale, have had few security incidents by employing industry-leading security experts to secure their infrastructure. Even though Google provides very secure services, very few people would consider their data private in Google's free consumer products (Gmail, YouTube, etc.)
 
-When it comes to application security, we generally do not (and sometimes cannot) know if the software that we use is malicious, or might one day become malicious. Even with the most trustworthy developers, there is generally no guarantee that their software does not have a serious vulnerability that could later be exploited.
+When it comes to application security, we generally don't (and sometimes can't) know if the software we use is malicious, or might one day become malicious. Even with the most trustworthy developers, there's generally no guarantee that their software doesn't have a serious vulnerability that could later be exploited.
 
-To minimize the potential damage that a malicious piece of software can do, you should employ security by compartmentalization. This could come in the form of using different computers for different jobs, using virtual machines to separate different groups of related applications, or using a secure operating system with a strong focus on application sandboxing and mandatory access control.
+To minimize the damage that a malicious piece of software *could* do, you should employ security by compartmentalization. For example, this could come in the form of using different computers for different jobs, using virtual machines to separate different groups of related applications, or using a secure operating system with a strong focus on application sandboxing and mandatory access control.
 
 !!! tip
 
-    Mobile operating systems are generally safer than desktop operating systems when it comes to application sandboxing. Apps cannot obtain root access and only have access to system resources which you grant them.
+    Mobile operating systems generally have better application sandboxing than desktop operating systems: Apps can't obtain root access, and require permission for access to system resources.
 
-    Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS has similar sandboxing properties to Android, and macOS has full system permission control and opt-in (for developers) sandboxing for applications, however these operating systems do transmit identifying information to their respective OEMs. Linux tends to not submit information to system vendors, but it has poor protection against exploits and malicious apps. This can be mitigated somewhat with specialized distributions which make heavy use of virtual machines or containers, such as Qubes OS.
+    Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS has similar sandboxing capabilities to Android, and macOS has full system permission control (and developers can opt-in to sandboxing for applications). However, these operating systems do transmit identifying information to their respective OEMs. Linux tends to not submit information to system vendors, but it has poor protection against exploits and malicious apps. This can be mitigated somewhat with specialized distributions which make significant use of virtual machines or containers, such as [Qubes OS](../../desktop/#qubes-os).
 
 <span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks</span>
 
-Targeted attacks against a specific user are more problematic to deal with. Common avenues of attack include sending malicious documents via emails, exploiting vulnerabilities in the browser and operating systems, and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you may have to employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies.
+Targeted attacks against a specific person are more problematic to deal with. Common attacks include sending malicious documents via email, exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g. in browsers and operating systems), and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you should employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies.
 
 !!! tip
 
-    **Web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** all typically run untrusted code sent to you from third-parties by design. Running multiple virtual machines to separate applications like these from your host system as well as each other is one technique you can use to avoid an exploit in these applications from compromising the rest of your system. Technologies like Qubes OS or Microsoft Defender Application Guard on Windows provide convenient methods to do this seamlessly, for example.
+    By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typically run untrusted code, sent to you from third parties. Running multiple virtual machines—to separate applications like these from your host system, as well as each other—is one technique you can use to mitigate the chance of an exploit in these applications compromising the rest of your system. For example, technologies like Qubes OS or Microsoft Defender Application Guard on Windows provide convenient methods to do this.
 
-If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, [Windows (with TPM)](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) for rate limiting attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems do not encrypt data separately per-user.
+If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user.
 
 ## Privacy From Service Providers
 
 <span class="pg-teal">:material-server-network: Service Providers</span>
 
-We live in a world where almost everything is connected to the internet. Our "private" messages, emails, social interactions are typically stored on a server somewhere. Generally, when you send someone a message, that message is then stored on a server, and when your friend wants to read the message, the server will show it to them.
+We live in a world where almost everything is connected to the internet. Our "private" messages, emails, and social interactions are typically stored on a server, somewhere. Generally, when you send someone a message it's stored on a server, and when your friend wants to read the message the server will show it to them.
 
-The obvious problem with this is that the service provider (or a hacker who has compromised the server) can look into your "private" conversations whenever and however they want, without you ever knowing. This applies to many common services like SMS messaging, Telegram, Discord, and so on.
+The obvious problem with this is that the service provider (or a hacker who has compromised the server) can access your conversations whenever and however they want, without you ever knowing. This applies to many common services, like SMS messaging, Telegram, and Discord.
 
-Thankfully, end-to-end encryption can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between you and your desired recipients before they are even sent to the server. The confidentiality of your messages is guaranteed, so long as the service provider does not have access to the private keys of either party.
+Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between you and your desired recipients before they are even sent to the server. The confidentiality of your messages is guaranteed, assuming the service provider doesn't have access to the private keys of either party.
 
-??? note "Note on web-based encryption"
+!!! note "Note on Web-based Encryption"
 
-    In practice, the effectiveness of different end-to-end encryption implementations varies. Applications such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal) run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to backdoor their application in an attempt to steal your private keys, that could later be detected using reverse engineering.
+    In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering).
 
-    On the other hand, web based end-to-end encryption implementations such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's web vault rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptographic operations. A malicious server could target a specific user and send them malicious JavaScript code to steal their encryption key, and it would be extremely hard for the user to ever notice such a thing. Even if the user does notice the attempt to steal their key, it would be incredibly hard to prove that it is the provider trying to do so, because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different users.
+    On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt.
 
-    Therefore, when relying on end-to-end encryption, you should choose to use native applications over web clients whenever possible.
+    Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible.
 
-Even with end-to-end encryption, service providers can still profile you based on **metadata**, which is typically not protected. While the service provider could not read your messages to see what you're saying, they can still observe things like who you're talking to, how often you message them, and what times you're typically active. Protection of metadata is fairly uncommon, and you should pay close attention to the technical documentation of the software you are using to see if there is any metadata minimization or protection at all, if that is a concern for you.
+Even with E2EE, service providers can still profile you based on **metadata**, which typically isn't protected. While the service provider can't read your messages, they can still observe important things, such as who you're talking to, how often you message them, and when you're typically active. Protection of metadata is fairly uncommon, and—if it's within your [threat model](threat-modeling.md)—you should pay close attention to the technical documentation of the software you're using to see if there's any metadata minimization or protection at all.
 
 ## Mass Surveillance Programs
 
-Mass surveillance is an effort to surveil many or all of a given population. It often refers to government programs such as the ones [disclosed by Edward Snowden in 2013](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_surveillance_disclosures_(2013%E2%80%93present)). However, it can also be carried out by corporations, either on behalf of government agencies or by their own initiative.
-
-Online, you can be tracked via a wide variety of methods, including but not limited to:
-
-- Your IP address
-- Browser cookies
-- Data you submit to websites
-- Your browser or device fingerprint
-- Payment method correlation
-
-Therefore, your goals could be to segregate your online identities from each other, to blend in with other users, and to simply avoid giving out identifying information to anyone as much as possible.
-
 <span class="pg-blue">:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance</span>
 
-Governments often cite mass surveillance programs as necessary to combat terrorism and prevent crime, however it is most often used to disproportionately target minorities, political dissidents and many other groups to create a chilling effect on free speech.
+Mass surveillance is the intricate effort to monitor the "behavior, many activities, or information" of an entire (or substantial fraction of a) population.[^1] It often refers to government programs, such as the ones [disclosed by Edward Snowden in 2013](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_surveillance_disclosures_(2013%E2%80%93present)). However, it can also be carried out by corporations, either on behalf of government agencies or by their own initiative.
 
-!!! quote "ACLU: [The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward](https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/the-privacy-lesson-of-9-11-mass-surveillance-is-not-the-way-forward)"
+!!! abstract "Atlas of Surveillance"
+
+    If you want to learn more about surveillance methods and how they're implemented in your city you can also take a look at the [Atlas of Surveillance](https://atlasofsurveillance.org/) by the [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.eff.org/).
+
+Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, breaching human rights, it's most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.
+
+!!! quote "ACLU: [*The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward*](https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/the-privacy-lesson-of-9-11-mass-surveillance-is-not-the-way-forward)"
 
     In the face of [Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRISM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM) and [Upstream](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upstream_collection)], intelligence officials also admitted that the NSA had for years been secretly collecting records about virtually every American’s phone calls — who’s calling whom, when those calls are made, and how long they last. This kind of information, when amassed by the NSA day after day, can reveal incredibly sensitive details about people’s lives and associations, such as whether they have called a pastor, an abortion provider, an addiction counselor, or a suicide hotline.
 
-Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^1]
+Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^2]
+
+Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods:
+
+- Your IP address
+- Browser cookies
+- The data you submit to websites
+- Your browser or device fingerprint
+- Payment method correlation
+
+\[This list isn't exhaustive].
+
+If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategues like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information.
 
 <span class="pg-brown">:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism</span>
 
-> Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^2]
+> Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^3]
 
-Tracking and surveillance by private corporations is a growing concern for many as well. Pervasive ad networks like those operated by Google and Facebook span the internet far beyond just the sites they control, tracking your actions along the way. Using tools like content blockers to limit network requests to their servers, and reading the privacy policies of the services you use can help you avoid many basic adversaries, but can never completely protect you from all tracking.[^3]
+For many people, tracking and surveillance by private corporations is a growing concern. Pervasive ad networks, such as those operated by Google and Facebook, span the internet far beyond just the sites they control, tracking your actions along the way. Using tools like content blockers to limit network requests to their servers, and reading the privacy policies of the services you use can help you avoid many basic adversaries (although it can't completely prevent tracking).[^4]
 
-Additionally, even companies outside of the ad-tech/tracking space can share your information with [data brokers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_broker) (like Cambridge Analytica, Experian, or Datalogix) or other parties, so you can't automatically assume your data is safe merely because the service you are using doesn't fall within a typical data sharing/tracking category. The strongest protection against corporate data collection is to always encrypt or obfuscate your data whenever possible to make it as difficult as possible for different providers to correlate data with each other and build a profile on you.
+Additionally, even companies outside of the *AdTech* or tracking industry can share your information with [data brokers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_broker) (such as Cambridge Analytica, Experian, or Datalogix) or other parties. You can't automatically assume your data is safe just because the service you're using doesn't fall within the typical AdTech or tracking business model. The strongest protection against corporate data collection is to encrypt or obfuscate your data whenever possible, making it difficult for different providers to correlate data with each other and build a profile on you.
 
 ## Limiting Public Information
 
 <span class="pg-green">:material-account-search: Public Exposure</span>
 
-The best way to ensure your data is private is to simply not put it out there in the first place. Deleting information you find about yourself online is one of the best first steps you can take to regain your privacy.
+The best way to keep your data private is simply not making it public in the first place. Deleting unwanted information you find about yourself online is one of the best first steps you can take to regain your privacy.
 
 - [View our guide on account deletion :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](account-deletion.md)
 
-On sites where you do share information, checking the privacy settings of your account to limit how widely that data is spread is very important. For example, if your accounts have a "private mode," enable it to make sure your account isn't being indexed by search engines and can't be viewed by people you don't vet beforehand.
+On sites where you do share information, checking the privacy settings of your account to limit how widely that data is spread is very important. For example, enable "private mode" on your accounts if given the option: This ensures that your account isn't being indexed by search engines, and that it can't be viewed without your permission.
 
-If you have already submitted your real information to a number of sites which shouldn't have it, consider employing disinformation tactics such as submitting fictitious information related to the same online identity to make your real information indistinguishable from the false information.
+If you've already submitted your real information to sites which shouldn't have it, consider using disinformation tactics, like submitting fictitious information related to that online identity. This makes your real information indistinguishable from the false information.
 
 ## Avoiding Censorship
 
 <span class="pg-blue-gray">:material-close-outline: Censorship</span>
 
-Censorship online can be carried out to varying degrees by actors including totalitarian governments, network administrators, and service providers seeking to control the speech of their users and the information they can access. These efforts to filter the internet will always be incompatible with the ideals of free speech.
+Censorship online can be carried out (to varying degrees) by actors including totalitarian governments, network administrators, and service providers. These efforts to control communication and restrict access to information will always be incompatible with the human right to Freedom of Expression.[^5]
 
-Censorship on corporate platforms is increasingly common as platforms like Twitter and Facebook give in to public demand, market pressures, and pressures from government agencies. Government pressures can be covert requests to businesses, such as the White House [requesting the takedown](https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/technology/on-the-web-a-fine-line-on-free-speech-across-globe.html) of a provocative YouTube video; or overt, such as the Chinese government requiring companies to adhere to a strict regime of censorship.
+Censorship on corporate platforms is increasingly common, as platforms like Twitter and Facebook give in to public demand, market pressures, and pressures from government agencies. Government pressures can be covert requests to businesses, such as the White House [requesting the takedown](https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/technology/on-the-web-a-fine-line-on-free-speech-across-globe.html) of a provocative YouTube video, or overt, such as the Chinese government requiring companies to adhere to a strict regime of censorship.
 
-People concerned with the threat of censorship can use technologies like Tor to circumvent it, and support platforms which provide censorship-resistant communication such as Matrix, which has no centralized account authority which can close down accounts arbitrarily.
+People concerned with the threat of censorship can use technologies like [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) to circumvent it, and support censorship-resistant communication platforms like [Matrix](../real-time-communication.md#element), which doesn't have a centralized account authority that can close accounts arbitrarily.
 
-!!! important
+!!! tip
 
-    While simply evading censorship itself is relatively easy, hiding the fact that you are evading the censorship system from the censors can be very problematic.
+    While evading censorship itself can be easy, hiding the fact that you are doing it can be very problematic.
 
-    You should consider what aspects of the network your adversary can observe, and whether you have plausible deniability for your actions. For example, using encrypted DNS can help you bypass rudimentary censorship systems based solely on DNS, but it cannot truly hide what you are visiting from your ISP. A VPN or Tor can help hide what you are visiting from the network administrators, but cannot hide that you are using those networks. Pluggable transports like Obfs4proxy, Meek or Shadowsocks can help you evade firewalls that block common VPN protocols or Tor, but an adversary can still figure out that you are actively trying to bypass their censorship system as opposed to just protecting your privacy through probing or deep packet inspection.
+    You should consider which aspects of the network your adversary can observe, and whether you have plausible deniability for your actions. For example, using [encrypted DNS](../advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns) can help you bypass rudimentary, DNS-based censorship systems, but it can't truly hide what you are visiting from your ISP. A VPN or Tor can help hide what you are visiting from network administrators, but can't hide that you're using those networks in the first place. Pluggable transports (such as Obfs4proxy, Meek, or Shadowsocks) can help you evade firewalls that block common VPN protocols or Tor, but your circumvention attempts can still be detected by methods like probing or [deep packet inspection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection).
 
-You must always consider the risks involved with trying to bypass censorship, what the potential consequences are, and how sophisticated your adversary may be. Be extra cautious with your software selection and have a backup plan in case you are caught.
+You must always consider the risks of trying to bypass censorship, the potential consequences, and how sophisticated your adversary may be. You should be cautious with your software selection, and have a backup plan in case you are caught.
 
-## Common Misconceptions
-
-:material-numeric-1-circle: **Open-source software is always secure** or **Proprietary software is more secure**
-
-These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but the source-availability and licensure of a software product does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you need to look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis.
-
-Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties and is often more transparent regarding potential vulnerabilities than their proprietary counterparts. They can also be more flexible, allowing you to delve into the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, unless you review the code yourself there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects, and the open development process can sometimes be exploited by malicious parties to introduce new vulnerabilities into even large projects.[^4]
-
-On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that does not imply it is not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering.
-
-At the end of the day, it is **vital** that you research and evaluate the privacy and security properties of each piece of software being used and avoid making decisions based on biases.
-
-:material-numeric-2-circle: **Shifting trust can increase privacy**
-
-We talk about "shifting trust" a lot when discussing solutions like VPNs, which shift the trust you place in your ISP to the VPN provider. While this protects your browsing data from your ISP specifically, the VPN provider you choose still has access to your browsing data: Your data is not yet completely secured from all parties. This means that:
-
-1. You need to exercise caution when choosing a provider to shift trust to, rather than choosing blindly.
-2. You still need to employ other techniques like end-to-end encryption to protect your data completely, merely distrusting one provider to trust another is not hiding your data.
-
-:material-numeric-3-circle: **Privacy-focused solutions are inherently trustworthy**
-
-Focusing solely on the privacy policies and marketing of a tool or provider can blind you to its weaknesses. When you're looking for a privacy solution, you should determine what the underlying problem is and find technical solutions to that problem. For example, you may want to avoid Google Drive, which gives Google access to all of your data. The underlying problem, in this case, is a lack of end-to-end encryption, so you should make sure the provider you switch to actually implements end-to-end encryption or use a tool like Cryptomator which provides end-to-end encryption on any cloud provider. Blindly switching to a "privacy-focused" provider which does not provide end-to-end encryption does not solve your problem, it merely shifts trust from Google to that provider.
-
-The privacy policies and business practices of a provider you choose are very important, but should be considered secondary to technical guarantees of your privacy: Don't elect to merely shift trust to another provider when trusting a provider isn't a requirement at all.
-
-:material-numeric-4-circle: **Complicated is better**
-
-We often see people describing privacy threat models that are overly complex. Often, these solutions include problems like many different email accounts or complicated setups with a lot of moving parts and conditions. The replies are usually answers to, "What is the best way to do X?".
-
-Finding the "best" solution for yourself doesn't necessarily mean you are after an infallible solution with dozens of conditions—these solutions are often difficult to work with realistically. As we discussed previously, security often comes at the cost of convenience. Below, we provide some tips:
-
-1. <mark>Actions need to serve a particular purpose</mark>, think about how to do what you want with the least amount of actions.
-2. <mark>Remove human failure points</mark> (don't have a bunch of conditions you must remember to do what with which accounts). Humans fail, they get tired, they forget things... don't have many conditions or manual processes you must remember in order to maintain operational security.
-3. <mark>Use the right level of protection for what you intend.</mark> We often see recommendations of so-called law-enforcement, subpoena proof solutions. These require a lot of special case knowledge (knowing about how things truly work under the hood) and are generally not what people want. There is no point in building an intricately anonymous threat model if you can be easily de-anonymized by a simple oversight.
-
-So, how might this look?
-
-One of the clearest threat models is one where people *know who you are* and one where they do not. There will always be situations where you must declare your legal name and places where you can get away without doing so.
-
-1. **Known identity** - A known identity is used for things where you must declare your name. There are many such legal documents and contracts where a legal identity is required. This could range from opening a bank account, signing a property lease, obtaining a passport, a customs declaration when importing an item or otherwise dealing with your Government. These things will usually lead back credentials such as credit cards, credit rating checks, account numbers and possibly physical addresses.
-
-    We don't suggest using a VPN or Tor for any of these things as your identity is already known through other means.
-
-    !!! tip
-
-        When shopping online, the use of a [parcel locker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parcel_locker) can help keep your physical address private.
-
-2. **Unknown identity** - An unknown identity could be a stable pseudonym that you regularly use. It is not anonymous because it doesn't change. If you're a part of an online community, you may wish to retain a persona that others know. The reason this is not anonymous is that if monitored over a period of time details about the owner may reveal further information, such as the way they write (linguistics), general knowledge about topics of interest, etc.
-
-    You may wish to use a VPN for this to mask your IP address. Financial transactions are more difficult and for this we'd suggest using anonymous cryptocurrencies such as Monero. Employing alt-coin shifting may also help disguise where your currency originated. Typically exchanges require KYC (know your customer) to be completed before they will allow you to exchange fiat currency into any kind of cryptocurrency. Local meet-up options may also be a solution, however those often are more expensive and sometimes also require KYC.
-
-3. **Anonymous identity** - Anonymous identities are difficult to maintain over long periods of time for even the most experienced. They should be short-term and short lived identities which are rotated regularly.
-
-    Using Tor can help with this, it's also worth noting greater anonymity is possible through asynchronous (not real-time communication). Real-time communication is vulnerable to typing analysis patterns (more than a slab of text distributed on a forum, email, etc) that you've had time to think about, maybe even put through a translator and back again.
-
-[^1]: United States Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: [Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/ec542143-1079-424a-84b3-acc354698560/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf)
-[^2]: Wikipedia: [Surveillance capitalism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance_capitalism)
-[^3]: "[Enumerating badness](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/)" (or, "listing all the bad things that we know about") as many adblockers and antivirus programs do, fails to adequately protect you from new and unknown threats because they have not yet been added to the filter list. You need to additionally employ other mitigation techniques to be fully protected.
-[^4]: One notable example of this is the [2021 incident in which University of Minnesota researchers introduced three vulnerabilities into the Linux kernel development project](https://cse.umn.edu/cs/linux-incident).
+[^1]: Wikipedia: [*Mass Surveillance*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass_surveillance) and [*Surveillance*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance).
+[^2]: United States Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: [*Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215*](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/ec542143-1079-424a-84b3-acc354698560/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf)
+[^3]: Wikipedia: [*Surveillance capitalism*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance_capitalism)
+[^4]: "[Enumerating badness](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/)" (or, "listing all the bad things that we know about"), as many adblockers and antivirus programs do, fails to adequately protect you from new and unknown threats because they have not yet been added to the filter list. You should also employ other mitigation techniques.
+[^5]: United Nations: [*Universal Declaration of Human Rights*](https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights).

docs/basics/email-security.en.md

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Even if you use OpenPGP, it does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipe
 
 ### What Email Clients Support E2EE?
 
-Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md). Depending on the authentication method, this may lead to the decrease security if either the provider or the email client does not support OATH or a bridge application as [multi-factor authentication](/basics/multi-factor-authentication/) is not possible with plain password authentication.
+Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md). Depending on the authentication method, this may lead to the decrease security if either the provider or the email client does not support OATH or a bridge application as [multi-factor authentication](multi-factor-authentication.md) is not possible with plain password authentication.
 
 ### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
 

docs/basics/multi-factor-authentication.en.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 ---
-title: "Multi-factor Authentication"
+title: "Multi-Factor Authentication"
 icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication'
 ---
-**Multi-factor authentication** is a security mechanism that requires additional steps beyond entering your username (or email) and password. The most common method is time limited codes you might receive from SMS or an app.
+**Multi-Factor Authentication** (**MFA**) is a security mechanism that requires additional steps beyond entering your username (or email) and password. The most common method is time limited codes you might receive from SMS or an app.
 
 Normally, if a hacker (or adversary) is able to figure out your password then they’d gain access to the account that password belongs to. An account with MFA forces the hacker to have both the password (something you *know*) and a device that you own (something you *have*), like your phone.
 
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Unlike [WebAuthn](#fido-fast-identity-online), TOTP offers no protection against
 
 An adversary could set up a website to imitate an official service in an attempt to trick you into giving out your username, password and current TOTP code. If the adversary then uses those recorded credentials they may be able to log into the real service and hijack the account.
 
-Although not perfect, TOTP is secure enough for most people, and when [hardware security keys](/multi-factor-authentication/#hardware-security-keys) are not supported [authenticator apps](/multi-factor-authentication/#authenticator-apps) are still a good option.
+Although not perfect, TOTP is secure enough for most people, and when [hardware security keys](../multi-factor-authentication.md#hardware-security-keys) are not supported [authenticator apps](../multi-factor-authentication.md#authenticator-apps) are still a good option.
 
 ### Hardware security keys
 

docs/basics/passwords-overview.en.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 title: "Introduction to Passwords"
-icon: 'material/shield-key-outline'
+icon: 'material/form-textbox-password'
 ---
 
 Passwords are an essential part of our everyday digital lives. We use them to protect our accounts, our devices and our secrets. Despite often being the only thing between us and an adversary who's after our private information, not a lot of thought is put into them, which often leads to people using passwords that can be easily guessed or brute-forced.
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ This is called [credential stuffing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credential_st
 
 ### Use randomly generated passwords
 
-==You should **never** rely on yourself to come up with a good password.== We recommend using [randomly generated passwords](#passwords) or [diceware passphrases](#diceware) with sufficient entropy to protect your accounts and devices.
+==You should **never** rely on yourself to come up with a good password.== We recommend using [randomly generated passwords](#passwords) or [diceware passphrases](#diceware-passphrases) with sufficient entropy to protect your accounts and devices.
 
 All of our [recommended password managers](../passwords.md) include a built-in password generator that you can use.
 
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ When it comes to passwords that you don't have to remember (such as passwords st
 
 !!! Tip "Checking for data breaches"
 
-    If your password manager lets you check for compromised passwords, make sure to do so and promptly change any password that may have been exposed in a data breach.
+    If your password manager lets you check for compromised passwords, make sure to do so and promptly change any password that may have been exposed in a data breach. Alternatively, you could follow [Have I Been Pwned's Latest Breaches feed](https://feeds.feedburner.com/HaveIBeenPwnedLatestBreaches) with the help of a [news aggregator](../news-aggregators.md).
 
 
 ## Creating strong passwords
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ When it comes to passwords that you don't have to remember (such as passwords st
 
 A lot of services impose certain criteria when it comes to passwords, including a minimum or maximum length, as well as which special characters, if any, can be used. You should use your password manager's built-in password generator to create passwords that are as long and complex as the service will allow by including capitalized and lowercase letters, numbers and special characters.
 
-If you need a password you can memorize, we recommend a [diceware passphrase](#diceware).
+If you need a password you can memorize, we recommend a [diceware passphrase](#diceware-passphrases).
 
 ### Diceware Passphrases
 
@@ -94,14 +94,18 @@ To sum it up, diceware passphrases are your best option when you need something
 
 The best way to store your passwords is by using a password manager. They allow you to store your passwords in a file or in the cloud and protect them with a single master password. That way, you will only have to remember one strong password, which lets you access the rest of them.
 
-There are many good options to choose from, both cloud-based and local. Choose one of our recommended password managers and use it to establish strong passwords across all of your accounts. We recommend securing your password manager with a [diceware](#diceware) passphrase comprised of at least seven words.
+There are many good options to choose from, both cloud-based and local. Choose one of our recommended password managers and use it to establish strong passwords across all of your accounts. We recommend securing your password manager with a [diceware passphrase](#diceware-passphrases) comprised of at least seven words.
 
 [List of recommended password managers](../passwords.md){ .md-button }
 
 !!! Warning "Don't place your passwords and TOTP tokens inside the same password manager"
 
-    If you're using TOTP as a [multi-factor authentication](../multi-factor-authentication.md) method for any of your accounts, do not store these tokens, any backup codes for them, or the TOTP secrets themselves in your password manager, as that negates the benefit of multi-factor authentication. You should use a dedicated [TOTP app](../multi-factor-authentication.md/#authenticator-apps) instead.
+    When using TOTP codes as [multi-factor authentication](../multi-factor-authentication.md), the best security practice is to keep your TOTP codes in a [separate app](../multi-factor-authentication.md#authenticator-apps).
+
+    Storing your TOTP tokens in the same place as your passwords, while convenient, reduces the accounts to a single factor in the event that an adversary gains access to your password manager.
+
+    Furthermore, we do not recommend storing single-use recovery codes in your password manager. Those should be stored separately such as in an encrypted container on an offline storage device.
 
 ### Backups
 
-You should store an [encrypted](../encryption.md) backup of your passwords on multiple storage devices or a cloud storage provider. This can help you access your passwords if something happens to your primary device or the service you are using.
+You should store an [encrypted](../encryption.md) backup of your passwords on multiple storage devices or a cloud storage provider. This can help you access your passwords if something happens to your primary device or the service you are using.

docs/basics/threat-modeling.en.md

@@ -3,19 +3,19 @@ title: "Threat Modeling"
 icon: 'material/target-account'
 ---
 
-Balancing security, privacy and usability is one of the first and most difficult tasks you'll face on your privacy journey. Everything is a trade-off: The more secure something is, the more restricting or inconvenient it generally is, et cetera. Often people find that the problem with the tools they see recommended is they're just too hard to start using!
+Balancing security, privacy, and usability is one of the first and most difficult tasks you'll face on your privacy journey. Everything is a trade-off: The more secure something is, the more restricting or inconvenient it generally is, etc. Often, people find that the problem with the tools they see recommended is that they're just too hard to start using!
 
-If you wanted to use the **most** secure tools available, you'd have to sacrifice *a lot* of usability. And even then, ==nothing is ever fully secure.== There's **high** security, but never **full** security. That's why threat models are important.
+If you wanted to use the **most** secure tools available, you'd have to sacrifice *a lot* of usability. And, even then, ==nothing is ever fully secure.== There's **high** security, but never **full** security. That's why threat models are important.
 
-**So, what are these threat models anyways?**
+**So, what are these threat models, anyway?**
 
-==A threat model is a list of the most probable threats to your security/privacy endeavors.== Since it's impossible to protect yourself against **every** attack(er), you should focus on the **most probable** threats. In computer security, a threat is a potential event that could undermine your efforts to stay private and secure.
+==A threat model is a list of the most probable threats to your security and privacy endeavors.== Since it's impossible to protect yourself against **every** attack(er), you should focus on the **most probable** threats. In computer security, a threat is an event that could undermine your efforts to stay private and secure.
 
-By focusing on the threats that matter to you, this narrows down your thinking about the protection you need, so you can choose the tools that are right for the job.
+Focusing on the threats that matter to you narrows down your thinking about the protection you need, so you can choose the tools that are right for the job.
 
-## Creating your threat model
+## Creating Your Threat Model
 
-To identify what could happen to the things you value and determine from whom you need to protect them, you want to answer these five questions:
+To identify what could happen to the things you value and determine from whom you need to protect them, you should answer these five questions:
 
 1. What do I want to protect?
 2. Who do I want to protect it from?
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Depending on who your adversaries are, under some circumstances, this list might
 
 It is important to distinguish between what might happen and the probability it may happen. For instance, there is a threat that your building might collapse, but the risk of this happening is far greater in San Francisco (where earthquakes are common) than in Stockholm (where they are not).
 
-Assessing risks is both a personal and a subjective process. Many people find certain threats unacceptable no matter the likelihood they will occur because the mere presence of the threat at any likelihood is not worth the cost. In other cases, people disregard high risks because they don't view the threat as a problem.
+Assessing risks is both a personal and subjective process. Many people find certain threats unacceptable, no matter the likelihood they will occur, because the mere presence of the threat is not worth the cost. In other cases, people disregard high risks because they don't view the threat as a problem.
 
 *Write down which threats you are going to take seriously, and which may be too rare or too harmless (or too difficult to combat) to worry about.*
 
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ There are many ways that an adversary could gain access to your data. For exampl
 
 ==The motives of adversaries differ widely, as do their tactics.== A government trying to prevent the spread of a video showing police violence may be content to simply delete or reduce the availability of that video. In contrast, a political opponent may wish to gain access to secret content and publish that content without you knowing.
 
-Security planning involves understanding how bad the consequences could be if an adversary successfully gains access to one of your assets. To determine this, you should consider the capability of your adversary. For example, your mobile phone provider has access to all your phone records. A hacker on an open Wi-Fi network can access your unencrypted communications. Your government might have stronger capabilities.
+Security planning involves understanding how bad the consequences could be if an adversary successfully gains access to one of your assets. To determine this, you should consider the capability of your adversary. For example, your mobile phone provider has access to all of your phone records. A hacker on an open Wi-Fi network can access your unencrypted communications. Your government might have stronger capabilities.
 
 *Write down what your adversary might want to do with your private data.*
 
@@ -61,15 +61,15 @@ Security planning involves understanding how bad the consequences could be if an
 
 ==There is no perfect option for security.== Not everyone has the same priorities, concerns, or access to resources. Your risk assessment will allow you to plan the right strategy for you, balancing convenience, cost, and privacy.
 
-For example, an attorney representing a client in a national security case may be willing to go to greater lengths to protect communications about that case, such as using encrypted email than a mother who regularly emails her daughter funny cat videos.
+For example, an attorney representing a client in a national security case may be willing to go to greater lengths to protect communications about that case, such as using encrypted email, than a mother who regularly emails her daughter funny cat videos.
 
 *Write down what options you have available to you to help mitigate your unique threats. Note if you have any financial constraints, technical constraints, or social constraints.*
 
-### Try it yourself: Protecting your belongings
+### Try it yourself: Protecting Your Belongings
 
 These questions can apply to a wide variety of situations, online and offline. As a generic demonstration of how these questions work, let's build a plan to keep your house and possessions safe.
 
-**What do you want to protect? (Or *what do you have that is worth protecting?*)**
+**What do you want to protect? (Or, *what do you have that is worth protecting?*)**
 
 :   Your assets might include jewelry, electronics, important documents, or photos.
 
@@ -79,11 +79,11 @@ These questions can apply to a wide variety of situations, online and offline. A
 
 **How likely is it that you will need to protect it?**
 
-:   Does your neighborhood have a history of burglaries? How trustworthy are your roommates/guests? What are the capabilities of your adversaries? What are the risks you should consider?
+:   Does your neighborhood have a history of burglaries? How trustworthy are your roommates or guests? What are the capabilities of your adversaries? What are the risks you should consider?
 
 **How bad are the consequences if you fail?**
 
-:   Do you have anything in your house that you cannot replace? Do you have the time or money to replace these things? Do you have insurance that covers goods stolen from your home?
+:   Do you have anything in your house that you cannot replace? Do you have the time or money to replace those things? Do you have insurance that covers goods stolen from your home?
 
 **How much trouble are you willing to go through to prevent these consequences?**
 
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ Only once you have asked yourself these questions will you be in a position to a
 
 Making a security plan will help you to understand the threats that are unique to you and to evaluate your assets, your adversaries, and your adversaries' capabilities, along with the likelihood of risks you face.
 
-## Further reading
+## Further Reading
 
 For people looking to increase their privacy and security online, we've compiled a list of common threats our visitors face or goals our visitors have, to give you some inspiration and demonstrate the basis of our recommendations. 
 

docs/basics/vpn-overview.en.md

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ icon: material/vpn
 
 Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit somewhere else in the world. An ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (i.e. modem).
 
-Encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, so they may not be able to see exactly what you're posting or reading but they can get an idea of the [domains you request](dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).
+Encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, so they may not be able to see exactly what you're posting or reading but they can get an idea of the [domains you request](../advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).
 
 A VPN can help as it can shift trust to a server somewhere else in the world. As a result, the ISP then only sees that you are connected to a VPN and nothing about the activity that you're passing into it.
 
@@ -17,6 +17,12 @@ VPNs cannot encrypt data outside of the connection between your device and the V
 
 However, they do hide your actual IP from a third-party service, provided that there are no IP leaks. They help you blend in with others and mitigate IP based tracking.
 
+## When shouldn't I use a VPN?
+
+Using a VPN in cases where you're using your [known identity](../basics/common-threats.en.md#common-misconceptions) is unlikely be useful.
+
+Doing so may trigger spam and fraud detection systems, such as if you were to log into your bank's website.
+
 ## What about encryption?
 
 Encryption offered by VPN providers are between your devices and their servers. It guarantees that this specific link is secure. This is a step up from using unencrypted proxies where an adversary on the network can intercept the communications between your devices and said proxies and modify them. However, encryption between your apps or browsers with the service providers are not handled by this encryption.
@@ -33,7 +39,7 @@ Needless to say, **you shouldn't use encrypted DNS with Tor**. This would direct
 
 ## Should I use Tor *and* a VPN?
 
-By using a VPN with Tor, you're creating essentially a permanent entry node, often with a money trail attached. This provides zero additional benefits to you, while increasing the attack surface of your connection dramatically. If you wish to hide your Tor usage from your ISP or your government, Tor has a built-in solution for that: Tor bridges. [Read more about Tor bridges and why using a VPN is not necessary](tor-overview.md).
+By using a VPN with Tor, you're creating essentially a permanent entry node, often with a money trail attached. This provides zero additional benefits to you, while increasing the attack surface of your connection dramatically. If you wish to hide your Tor usage from your ISP or your government, Tor has a built-in solution for that: Tor bridges. [Read more about Tor bridges and why using a VPN is not necessary](../advanced/tor-overview.md).
 
 ## What if I need anonymity?
 
@@ -43,7 +49,7 @@ VPNs cannot provide anonymity. Your VPN provider will still see your real IP add
 
 Do not use that feature. The point of using Tor is that you do not trust your VPN provider. Currently Tor only supports the [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol) protocol. [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol) (used in [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC) for voice and video sharing, the new [HTTP3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) protocol, etc), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol) and other packets will be dropped. To compensate for this, VPN providers typically will route all non-TCP packets through their VPN server (your first hop). This is the case with [ProtonVPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn/). Additionally, when using this Tor over VPN setup, you do not have control over other important Tor features such as [Isolated Destination Address](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (using a different Tor circuit for every domain you visit).
 
-Thus, this feature should be viewed as a convenient way to access the Tor Network, not to stay anonymous. For true anonymity, use the Tor Browser Bundle, TorSocks, or a Tor gateway.
+The feature should be viewed as a convenient way to access the Tor Network, not to stay anonymous. For proper anonymity, use the Tor Browser, TorSocks, or a Tor gateway.
 
 ## When are VPNs useful?
 
@@ -58,13 +64,13 @@ For use cases like these, or if you have another compelling reason, the VPN prov
 ## Sources and Further Reading
 
 1. [VPN - a Very Precarious Narrative](https://schub.io/blog/2019/04/08/very-precarious-narrative.html) by Dennis Schubert
-1. [Tor Network Overview](tor-overview.md) by blacklight447
+1. [Tor Network Overview](../advanced/tor-overview.md)
 1. [IVPN Privacy Guides](https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides)
 1. ["Do I need a VPN?"](https://www.doineedavpn.com), a tool developed by IVPN to challenge aggressive VPN marketing by helping individuals decide if a VPN is right for them.
 
 ## Related VPN Information
 
-- [The Trouble with VPN and Privacy Review Sites](https://jonaharagon.com/2019/11/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-review-sites/)
+- [The Trouble with VPN and Privacy Review Sites](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2019/11/20/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-review-sites/)
 - [Free VPN App Investigation](https://www.top10vpn.com/free-vpn-app-investigation/)
 - [Hidden VPN owners unveiled: 101 VPN products run by just 23 companies](https://vpnpro.com/blog/hidden-vpn-owners-unveiled-97-vpns-23-companies/)
 - [This Chinese company is secretly behind 24 popular apps seeking dangerous permissions](https://vpnpro.com/blog/chinese-company-secretly-behind-popular-apps-seeking-dangerous-permissions/)

docs/blog/2021/09/14/welcome-to-privacy-guides.md

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
----
-title: Welcome to Privacy Guides
-created: "2021-09-14"
-author: 'Jonah'
-template: overrides/blog.en.html
----
-We are excited to announce the launch of [Privacy Guides](https://www.privacyguides.org/) and [r/PrivacyGuides](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/), and welcome the privacy community to participate in our crowdsourced software recommendations and share tips and tricks for keeping your data safe online. Our goal is to be a central resource for privacy and security-related tips that are usable by anybody, and to carry on the trusted legacy of PrivacyTools.
-
-As we [announced](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184422/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-future-of-privacytools/) on the PrivacyTools blog in July, we made the decision to migrate off our former privacytools.io domain for various reasons, including an inability to contact the current domain holder for over a year and [growing](http://www.thedarksideof.io/) [issues](https://fortune.com/2020/08/31/crypto-fraud-io-domain-chagos-islands-uk-colonialism-cryptocurrency/) [with the .IO top-level domain](https://github.com/privacytools/privacytools.io/issues/1324). As attempts to regain ownership of the domain have proven fruitless, we found it necessary to make this switch sooner rather than later to ensure people would find out about this transition as soon as possible. This gives us adequate time to transition the domain name, which is currently redirecting to [www.privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org/), and it hopefully gives everyone enough time to notice the change, update bookmarks and websites, etc.
-
-We chose the name Privacy Guides because it represents two things for us as an organization: An expansion beyond simple recommendation lists, and a goal of acting as the trusted guides to anyone newly learning about protecting their personal data.
-
-As a name, it moves us past recommendations of various tools and focuses us more on the bigger picture. We want to provide more _education_ — rather than _direction_ — surrounding privacy-related topics. You can see the very beginnings of this work in our new page on [threat modeling](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/threat-modeling/), or our [VPN](https://www.privacyguides.org/vpn) and [Email Provider](https://www.privacyguides.org/email) recommendations, but this is just the start of what we eventually hope to accomplish.
-
-## Website Development
-
-Our project has always been community-oriented and open-sourced. The source code for PrivacyTools is currently archived at [https://github.com/privacytools/privacytools.io](https://github.com/privacytools/privacytools.io). This repository will remain online as an archive of everything on PrivacyTools up to this transition.
-
-The source code for our new website is available at [https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org). All updates from PrivacyTools have been merged into this new repository, and this is where all future work will take place.
-
-## Services
-
-PrivacyTools also runs a number of online services in use by many users. Some of these services are federated, namely Mastodon, Matrix, and PeerTube. Due to the technical nature of federation, it is impossible for us to change the domain name on these services, and because we cannot guarantee the future of the privacytools.io domain name we will be shutting down these services in the coming months.
-
-We strongly urge users of these services to migrate to alternative providers in the near future. We hope that we will be able to provide enough time to make this as seamless of a transition as possible for our users.
-
-At this time we do not plan on launching public Matrix, Mastodon, or PeerTube instances under the Privacy Guides domain. Any users affected by this transition can get in touch with [@jonah:aragon.sh](https://matrix.to/#/@jonah:aragon.sh) on Matrix if any assistance is needed.
-
-Other services being operated by PrivacyTools currently will be discontinued. This includes Searx, WriteFreely, and GhostBin.
-
-Our future direction for online services is uncertain, but will be a longer-term discussion within our community after our work is complete on this initial transition. We are very aware that whatever direction we move from here will have to be done in a way that is sustainable in the very long term.
-
-## r/PrivacyGuides
-
-PrivacyTools has a sizable community on Reddit, but to ensure a unified image we have created a new Subreddit at [r/PrivacyGuides](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/) that we encourage all Reddit users to join.
-
-In the coming weeks our current plan is to wind down discussions on r/privacytoolsIO. We will be opening r/PrivacyGuides to lots of the discussions most people are used to shortly, but encouraging general “privacy news” or headline-type posts to be posted on [r/Privacy](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacy/) instead. In our eyes, r/Privacy is the “who/what/when/where” of the privacy community on Reddit, the best place to find the latest news and information; while r/PrivacyGuides is the “how”: a place to share and discuss tools, tips, tricks, and other advice. We think focusing on these strong points will serve to strengthen both communities, and we hope the good moderators of r/Privacy agree 🙂
-
-## Final Thoughts
-
-The former active team at PrivacyTools universally agrees on this direction towards Privacy Guides, and will be working exclusively on Privacy Guides rather than any “PrivacyTools” related projects. We intend to redirect PriavcyTools to new Privacy Guides properties for as long as possible, and archive existing PrivacyTools work as a pre-transition snapshot.
-
-Privacy Guides additionally welcomes back PrivacyTools’ former sysadmin [Jonah](https://twitter.com/JonahAragon), who will be joining the project’s leadership team.
-
-We are not accepting sponsorships or donations at this time, while we work out our financial plan. We will be in touch with existing sponsors on PrivacyTools’ OpenCollective to determine what the best way forward is soon.
-
-We are all very excited about this new brand and direction, and hope to have your continued support through all of this. If you have any questions, concerns, or suggestions, please reach out to us. We are always happy to receive guidance and input from our community! ❤
-
----
-
-**_Privacy Guides_** _is a socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy._
-
-- [Join r/PrivacyGuides on Reddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacyguides)
-- [Follow @privacy_guides on Twitter](https://twitter.com/privacy_guides)
-- [Collaborate with us on GitHub](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org)
-- [Join our chat on Matrix](https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:aragon.sh)

docs/blog/2021/11/01/virtual-insanity.md

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
----
-title: Virtual Insanity
-image: 'blog/2021/11/01/virtual-insanity.jpg'
-created: "2021-11-01"
-author: 'Freddy'
-template: overrides/blog.en.html
----
-Not so long ago, the world was predicting the end for Facebook. Now it is no more. Gone from the face of the planet – never to be seen again. Except it isn’t.
-
-Facebook has not disappeared. No, not even the damning ‘Facebook Papers’ can shut it down. Mark Zuckerberg stood up on stage, and announced that it had changed its name to: Meta.
-
-A key part of this new vision for the company is the idea of the metaverse. If it sounds like something out of a sci-fi movie or novel, that’s because it is. The term was first coined by author Neal Stephenson in his 1992 book _Snow Crash_. Zuckerberg’s only problem is that novel was dystopian. Here’s a brief snippet of Stephenson’s description of the metaverse:
-
-> “Your avatar can look any way you want it to, up to the limitations of your equipment. If you’re ugly, you can make your avatar beautiful. If you’ve just gotten out of bed, your avatar can still be wearing beautiful clothes and professionally applied makeup. You can look like a gorilla or a dragon or a giant talking penis in the Metaverse. Spend five minutes walking down the Street and you will see all of these.”
-
-In fairness, that doesn’t seem unlike the sort of content you see on Facebook today. Compare this to what Zuckerberg [wrote](https://about.fb.com/news/2021/10/founders-letter/) in his 2021 Founders Letter:
-
-> “In this future, you will be able to teleport instantly as a hologram to be at the office without a commute, at a concert with friends, or in your parents’ living room to catch up. This will open up more opportunity no matter where you live. You’ll be able to spend more time on what matters to you, cut down time in traffic, and reduce your carbon footprint.”
-
-The similarities are uncanny.
-
-This wouldn’t be the first time that Facebook has been described as dystopian. One _Mashable_ article [called](https://mashable.com/article/facebook-dystopia) the social media giant ‘Orwellian and Huxleyan at the same time.’ Quite a feat.
-
-The ‘Facebook Papers’ have some pretty shocking - though not entirely surprising - revelations as well. The leaked documents demonstrate the extent to which Facebook values engagement above all else (including a good experience). For instance, we learnt that the algorithm is [optimised](https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-transparency-biggest-sites-pages-links/) for low quality content, [prioritises](https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/10/26/facebook-angry-emoji-algorithm/) rage over happiness for profit, and [promotes](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/10/facebook-papers-democracy-election-zuckerberg/620478/) extremist content. Most alarming was that the firm [failed](https://apnews.com/article/the-facebook-papers-covid-vaccine-misinformation-c8bbc569be7cc2ca583dadb4236a0613) to reduce disinformation during the pandemic even when given the opportunity. Zuckerberg said no to this, presumably because it would reduce engagement and, in turn, Facebook’s advertising revenue.
-
-Let’s not forget all Facebook’s previous scandals. From the Cambridge Analytica kerfuffle to [conducting](https://www.theregister.com/2014/06/29/researchers_mess_with_facebook_users_emotions/) manipulative social experiments in secret.
-
-In light of this, the name change makes sense. It deceives you into thinking the company has evolved into a benevolent corporation, when it simply hasn’t. Zuckerberg would much prefer you to think about Meta as a playful universe where you can meet with friends across the globe in virtual reality. Where humans train themselves to sound like heavily discounted robots. Where Facebook is not a Horrid Company.
-
-Despite all this: Meta _is_ Facebook, just worse. It doesn’t matter about the new name, the company has not changed. It will still be violating our privacy, daily, on an unprecedented scale. It will still be as reliably scandalous as a Carry On film. It will still be terrible. Plus it will have all the added claptrap of a sub-par holographic universe attached.

docs/blog/2021/12/01/firefox-privacy-2021-update.md

@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
----
-title: 'Firefox Privacy: 2021 Update'
-image: 'blog/2021/12/01/firefox-privacy-2021-update.png'
-created: "2021-12-01"
-author: 'Daniel'
-template: overrides/blog.en.html
----
-A lot changed between 2019 and now, not least in regards to Firefox. Since our last post, Mozilla has [improved](https://blog.mozilla.org/en/products/firefox/latest-firefox-rolls-out-enhanced-tracking-protection-2-0-blocking-redirect-trackers-by-default/) privacy with [Enhanced Tracking Protection (ETP)](https://blog.mozilla.org/en/products/firefox/firefox-now-available-with-enhanced-tracking-protection-by-default/). Earlier this year Mozilla introduced [Total Cookie Protection](https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2021/02/23/total-cookie-protection/) (Dynamic First Party Isolation dFPI). This was then further tightened with [Enhanced Cookie Clearing](https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2021/08/10/firefox-91-introduces-enhanced-cookie-clearing/). We’re also looking very forward to [Site Isolation](https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2021/05/18/introducing-site-isolation-in-firefox/) (code named Fission) being enabled by default in the coming releases.
-
-Now that so many privacy features are built into the browser, there is little need for extensions made by third-party developers. Accordingly, we have updated our very outdated [browser](https://www.privacyguides.org/browsers) section. If you’ve got an old browser profile we suggest **creating a new one**. Some of the old advice may make your browser _more_ unique.
-
-#### Privacy Tweaks “about:config”
-
-We’re no longer recommending that users set `about:config` switches manually. Those switches need to be up to date and continuously maintained. They should be studied before blindly making modifications. Sometimes their behaviour changes in between Firefox releases, is superseded by other keys or they are removed entirely. We do not see any point in duplicating the efforts of the community [Arkenfox](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js) project. Arkenfox has very good documentation in their [wiki](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki) and we use it ourselves.
-
-#### LocalCDN and Decentraleyes
-
-These extensions aren’t required with Total Cookie Protection (TCP), which is enabled if you’ve set Enhanced Tracking Protection (ETP) to **Strict**.
-
-Replacing scripts on CDNs with local versions is not a comprehensive solution and is a form of [enumeration of badness](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). While it may work with some scripts that are included it doesn’t help with most other third-party connections.
-
-CDN extensions never really improved privacy as far as sharing your IP address was concerned and their usage is fingerprintable as this Tor Project developer [points out](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/22089#note_2639603). They are the wrong tool for the job and are not a substitute for a good VPN or Tor. Its worth noting the [resources](https://git.synz.io/Synzvato/decentraleyes/-/tree/master/resources) for Decentraleyes are hugely out of date and would not be likely used anyway.
-
-#### NeatURLs and ClearURLS
-
-Previously we recommended ClearURLs to remove tracking parameters from URLs you might visit. These extensions are no longer needed with uBlock Origin’s [`removeparam`](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Static-filter-syntax#removeparam) feature.
-
-#### HTTPS Everywhere
-
-The EFF announced back in September they were [deprecating HTTPS-Everywhere](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/09/https-actually-everywhere) as most browsers now have an HTTPS-Only feature. We are pleased to see privacy features built into the browser and Firefox 91 introduced [HTTPS by Default in Private Browsing](https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2021/08/10/firefox-91-introduces-https-by-default-in-private-browsing/).
-
-#### Multi Account Containers and Temporary Containers
-
-Container extensions aren’t as important as they used to be for privacy now that we have [Total Cookie Protection](https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2021/02/23/total-cookie-protection/).
-
-Multi Account Container will still have some use if you use [Mozilla VPN](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mozilla_VPN) as it is going to be [integrated](https://github.com/mozilla/multi-account-containers/issues/2210) allowing you to configure specified containers to use a particular VPN server. Another use might be if you want to login to multiple accounts on the same domain.
-
-#### Just-In-Time Compilation (JIT)
-
-What is “Disable JIT” in Bromite? This option disables the JavaScript performance feature [JIT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Just-in-time_compilation). It can increase security but at the cost of performance. Those trade-offs vary wildly and are explored in [this](https://microsoftedge.github.io/edgevr/posts/Super-Duper-Secure-Mode/) publication by Johnathan Norman from the Microsoft Edge team. This option is very much a security vs performance option.
-
-#### Mozilla browsers on Android
-
-We don’t recommend any Mozilla based browsers on Android. This is because we don’t feel that [GeckoView](https://mozilla.github.io/geckoview) is quite as secure as it could be as it doesn’t support [site isolation](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2021/05/introducing-firefox-new-site-isolation-security-architecture), soon to be coming in desktop browsers or [isolated processes](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1565196).
-
-We also noticed that there isn’t an option for [HTTPS-Only mode](https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/fenix/issues/16952#issuecomment-907960218). The only way to get something similar is to install the [deprecated](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/09/https-actually-everywhere) extension [HTTPS Everywhere](https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere).
-
-There are places which Firefox on Android shines for example browsing news websites where you may want to _partially_ load some JavaScript (but not all) using medium or hard [blocking mode](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode). The [reader view](https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/view-articles-reader-view-firefox-android) is also pretty cool. We expect things will change in the future, so we’re keeping a close eye on this.
-
-#### Fingerprinting
-
-Firefox has the ability to block known third party [fingerprinting resources](https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2020/01/07/firefox-72-fingerprinting/). Mozilla has [advanced protection](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/firefox-protection-against-fingerprinting) against fingerprinting (RFP is enabled with Arkenfox).
-
-We do not recommend extensions that promise to change your [browser fingerprint](https://blog.torproject.org/browser-fingerprinting-introduction-and-challenges-ahead/). Some of those extensions [are detectable](https://www.cse.chalmers.se/~andrei/codaspy17.pdf) by websites through JavaScript and [CSS](https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03152176/file/style-fingerprinting-usenix.pdf) methods, particularly those which inject anything into the web content.
-
-This includes **all** extensions that try to change the user agent or other browser behaviour to prevent fingerprinting. We see these often recommended on Reddit and would like to say that they will likely make you more unique and can be circumvented. Arkenfox has [a good list](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/4.1-Extensions#small_orange_diamond-%EF%B8%8F-anti-fingerprinting-extensions-fk-no) of extensions you shouldn’t be using. They also have [another list](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/4.1-Extensions#small_orange_diamond-dont-bother) of extensions you needn’t bother with either. We also like to say testing sites which show you how unique you are in a set of users are often using hugely tainted results that are not indicative of real-world usage.
-
-----------
-
-_Special thanks to [Thorin-Oakenpants](https://github.com/Thorin-Oakenpants) and [Tommy](https://tommytran.io) for their help with providing advice and further documentation during the research phase.

docs/blog/2022/04/04/move-fast-and-break-things.md

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
----
-title: '"Move Fast and Break Things"'
-image: 'blog/2022/04/04/move-fast-and-break-things.jpg'
-created: "2022-04-04"
-author: 'Freddy'
-template: overrides/blog.en.html
----
-Mark Zuckerberg does not look comfortable on stage. Yet, there he was proclaiming that “the future is private”. If someone has to tell you that they care about your privacy, they probably don’t.
-
-For someone trying not to appear like a cartoon villain, Zuckerberg doesn’t do a great job. He gives the impression of some strange cyborg algorithmically attempting to impersonate human life. His movements are not quite robotic, but he lacks the charisma you might expect from one of the most powerful people on the planet. A _New Yorker_ [profile](https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/17/can-mark-zuckerberg-fix-facebook-before-it-breaks-democracy) of him revealed that he had an affinity for Emperor Augustus, an ancient Roman tyrant. ‘Through a really harsh approach, [Augustus] established two hundred years of world peace,’ he said.
-
-It’s the first part of that sentence that is worrying.
-
-Is this what Zuckerberg sees himself as: a modern-day emperor hellbent on using any means he can to gain world peace? Probably not, but it would have been reassuring if he just told us he liked doing Sudoku and dad-dancing with his daughter (interestingly named August).
-
-The Zuck once [joked](https://www.esquire.com/uk/latest-news/a19490586/mark-zuckerberg-called-people-who-handed-over-their-data-dumb-f/) to a friend that he could get them ‘info’ about anyone in Harvard. He had email addresses, pictures, real addresses: the lot. When the friend asked how, this was his riposte: ‘People just submitted it. I don’t know why. They trust me. Dumb f*cks.’ We now live in a reality where Zuckerberg can get ‘info’ about almost anyone in the world.
-
-Like a depraved tabloid journalist fishing through a minor celebrity’s trash, Facebook collects everything it can about its users. Even if it means sifting through garbage, they want that data. But Facebook is not technically in the data business. It is in what author and professor Carissa Véliz [terms](https://aeon.co/essays/privacy-matters-because-it-empowers-us-all) ‘the business of power’ – which sounds rather more sinister than flogging off mildly irritating adverts.
-
-Véliz argues that privacy is a form of power. It is the power to influence you, show you adverts and predict your behaviour. In this sense, personal data is being used to make us do things we otherwise would not do: to buy a certain product or to vote a certain way. Filmmaker Laura Poitras [described](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/10/23/snowden-filmmaker-laura-poitras-facebook-is-a-gift-to-intelligence-agencies/) Facebook as ‘a gift to intelligence agencies’. It allows governments to arrest people planning to participate in protests before they have even begun.
-
-The social media giant is tip-toeing ever closer into our personal lives. When Facebook encountered competition it just bought it, adding Instagram and WhatsApp to its roster. The company even tried to make its own cryptocurrency so that one day the Facebook would control all our purchases too. Earlier this year, the project was [killed](https://www.ft.com/content/a88fb591-72d5-4b6b-bb5d-223adfb893f3) by regulators. It is worth noting that when Zuckerberg purchased WhatsApp and Instagram, they had no revenue. Author Tim Wu notes in his book _The Attention Merchants_ that Facebook is ‘a business with an exceedingly low ratio of invention to success’. Perhaps that is a part of Zuck’s genius.
-
-‘Move fast and break things’ was the old company motto. When there were a few too many scandals, they moved fast and [rebranded](https://www.privacyguides.org/blog/2021/11/01/virtual-insanity) to Meta. No one expected online privacy to be the ‘thing’ they broke.
-
-Before it became a global behemoth, Facebook started out as a dorm-room project. Zuckerberg sat at his keyboard after a few drinks and built it mainly because he could. It now has nearly three billion users. In the same way, Facebook [conducted](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/02/facebook-apologises-psychological-experiments-on-users) social experiments seemingly just for fun. Why he did it doesn’t really matter. As John Lanchester [put it](https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v39/n16/john-lanchester/you-are-the-product): he simply did it _because_.
-
-It is unfair to say that Zuckerberg does not care about privacy – he does. That’s why he [spared](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/oct/11/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-neighbouring-houses) no expense buying the houses that surrounded his home. Zuckerberg knows the power of privacy, which is painfully ironic given he has built his career on exploiting it. For Zuckerberg, at least, the future is private. It’s the rest of us that should be worried.

docs/blog/2022/06/09/hide-nothing.md

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
----
-title: '"Hide Nothing"'
-image: 'blog/2022/06/09/hide-nothing.jpg'
-created: "2022-06-09"
-author: 'Dan Arel'
-template: overrides/blog.en.html
----
-In the wake of the September 11, 2001, attack on the United States, the US government enacted laws that weakened citizen privacy in the name of national emergency. This sent up many red flags for human rights and privacy advocates.
-
-These concerns were met with “if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear.” The argument goes that if you're not doing anything illegal, then these violations of your privacy shouldn't bother you. If you care about privacy, you clearly can't be up to anything good.
-
-On the surface, this seems true to many people – but the reality is very different. We may not have had anything to hide in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, but that was not the only information being sought after by governments. Indeed, following the passage of the Patriot Act in the US, the FBI issued 192,499 [National Security Letters](https://www.aclu.org/other/national-security-letters), meaning they collected the records and online activity of nearly 200,000 people.
-
-In the end it only convicted one person.
-
-Now, many have argued that stopping one terrorist might be worth giving up some security for, but [according](https://www.aclu.org/issues/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/surveillance-under-patriot-act) to the ACLU, the conviction would have occurred without the Patriot Act.
-
-Many legal actions you take today could be deemed illegal by future laws or future government. In the US today there is discussion around the possibility of Roe v. Wade being overturned, allowing states to outlaw abortions. You may not currently feel the need to hide internet searches, menstrual cycle apps, or donations to women's health clinics today because it's not illegal, but tomorrow that information could be used against you.
-
-In countries were organizing around political dissent is legal, that doesn't mean the government is tracking those taking part and using that information to create informants or infiltrate such groups. Or worse, when or if laws change, using that surveillance to punish those involved.
-
-And even if you break away from the legal aspects, we all have something to hide. You may not be ready to reveal your sexual or gender identity, but your internet usage could potentially do that for you. You don't want to make your bank account public; you have that information to hide. And you can continue to list things about your life you'd just rather not make public, regardless of potential legality.
-
-In July of 2021, a Catholic priest by the name of Jeffrey Burrill lost his job and was forced to resign after data collected through his cell phone showed that he was active on the Gay dating app Grindr, and that he had visited multiple gay bars in the area. [According](https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2021/07/20/bishop-misconduct-resign-burrill/) to the *Washington Post*:
-
-> “A mobile device correlated to Burrill emitted app data signals from the location-based hookup app Grindr on a near-daily basis during parts of 2018, 2019, and 2020 —– at both his USCCB office and his USCCB-owned residence, as well as during USCCB meetings and events in other cities,” the Pillar reported.
-
-> “The data obtained and analyzed by The Pillar conveys mobile app date signals during two 26-week periods, the first in 2018 and the second in 2019 and 2020. The data was obtained from a data vendor and authenticated by an independent data consulting firm contracted by The Pillar,” the site reported. It did not identify who the vendor was or if the site bought the information or got it from a third party.
-
-> The Pillar story says app data “correlated” to Burrill's phone shows the priest visited gay bars, including while traveling for the USCCB.
-
-While it was not clear who was tracking Burrill's device, the Post went on to say that:
-
-> Privacy experts have long raised concerns about “anonymized” data collected by apps and sold to or shared with aggregators and marketing companies. While the information is typically stripped of obviously identifying fields, like a user's name or phone number, it can contain everything from age and gender to a device ID. It's possible for experts to de-anonymize some of this data and connect it to real people.
-
-While Burrill was without a doubt in violation of his works own code of conduct, he did decide on his own to be a priest. However, his personal life was not harming others and was just that, his personal life. While the question looms about who was tracking him to begin with and why, the fact it was so easy to do is alarming.
-
-What if Burrill wasn't a priest, but just happened to work for someone who held anti-homosexual views who used this data to out him, humiliate him, and fire him under false pretenses? This data, which should be private could (and likely did in the real-life circumstance) ruin his life.
-
-That is what makes internet privacy so important. It's not hiding nefarious activity, it's that we all have an innate right to our privacy.
-
-You might not feel today that you have anything to hide, but you might not feel that way tomorrow and once something is public, it cannot be made private again.

docs/calendar-contacts.en.md

@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
----
-title: "Calendar and Contact Sync"
-icon: material/calendar-account
----
-Calendars and contacts contain some of your most sensitive data; use products that implement E2EE at rest to prevent a provider from reading them.
-
-## Tutanota
-
-!!! recommendation
-
-    ![Tutanota logo](assets/img/calendar-contacts/tutanota.svg#only-light){ align=right }
-    ![Tutanota logo](assets/img/calendar-contacts/tutanota-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
-
-    **Tutanota** offers a free and encrypted calendar across their supported platforms. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, multi-factor authentication, and [more](https://tutanota.com/calendar-app-comparison/).
-
-    Multiple calendars and extended sharing functionality is limited to paid subscribers.
-
-    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tutanota.com/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-    [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tutanota.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-    [:octicons-info-16:](https://tutanota.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
-    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-    [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tutanota.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
-
-    ??? downloads
-
-        - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.tutanota.com/)
-        - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
-        - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
-        - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
-        - [:simple-flathub: Flatpak](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.tutanota.Tutanota)
-        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
-        - [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/de.tutao.tutanota)
-        - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/tutanota/id922429609)
-
-## EteSync
-
-!!! recommendation
-
-    ![EteSync logo](assets/img/calendar-contacts/etesync.svg){ align=right }
-
-    **EteSync** is a secure, end-to-end encrypted, and privacy-respecting cloud backup and synchronization software for your personal information, including contacts and calendars. There are native clients for Android, iOS, with a web client and an adapter layer for most desktop clients available too. Etesync does [not](https://www.etesync.com/faq/#2fa) currently support multi-factor authentication.
-
-    EteSync offers a SaaS for [$24/year](https://dashboard.etebase.com/user/partner/pricing/), or you can host the server yourself for free.
-
-    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.etesync.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-    [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.etesync.com/tos/#privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-    [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.etesync.com/user-guide/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
-    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/etesync){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-    [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.etesync.com/contribute/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
-
-    ??? downloads
-
-        - [:octicons-device-desktop-16: Client Setup](https://github.com/etesync/etesync-dav/blob/master/README.md#specific-client-notes-and-instructions)
-        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.etesync.syncadapter)
-        - [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/app/com.etesync.syncadapter)
-        - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/apple-store/id1489574285)
-        - [:simple-docker: Docker Hub](https://hub.docker.com/r/victorrds/etesync)
-
-## Proton Calendar
-
-!!! recommendation
-
-    ![Proton](assets/img/calendar-contacts/proton-calendar.svg){ align=right }
-
-    **Proton Calendar** is an encrypted calendar service available to Proton members via web or mobile clients. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, and [more](https://proton.me/support/proton-calendar-guide). Those on the free tier get access to a single calendar, whereas paid subscribers can create up to 20 calendars. Extended sharing functionality is also limited to paid subscribers.
-
-    **Proton Mail** can be used to synchronize contacts. Likewise, the service is currently only available via the web and mobile clients.
-
-    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-    [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-    [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/proton-calendar-guide){ .card-link title=Documentation}
-    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-
-    ??? downloads
-
-        - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://calendar.proton.me)
-        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=me.proton.android.calendar)
-
-!!! warning
-    Proton [does not](https://proton.me/support/proton-contacts#verify) use E2EE for your contact names and email addresses.

docs/calendar.en.md

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+---
+title: "Calendar Sync"
+icon: material/calendar
+---
+Calendars contain some of your most sensitive data; use products that implement E2EE at rest to prevent a provider from reading them.
+
+## Tutanota
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+    ![Tutanota logo](assets/img/calendar/tutanota.svg#only-light){ align=right }
+    ![Tutanota logo](assets/img/calendar/tutanota-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
+
+    **Tutanota** offers a free and encrypted calendar across their supported platforms. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, multi-factor authentication, and [more](https://tutanota.com/calendar-app-comparison/).
+
+    Multiple calendars and extended sharing functionality is limited to paid subscribers.
+
+    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tutanota.com/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tutanota.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://tutanota.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+    [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tutanota.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+    ??? downloads
+
+        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
+        - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/tutanota/id922429609)
+        - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+        - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+        - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+        - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.tutanota.Tutanota)
+        - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.tutanota.com/)
+
+## Proton Calendar
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+    ![Proton](assets/img/calendar/proton-calendar.svg){ align=right }
+
+    **Proton Calendar** is an encrypted calendar service available to Proton members via web or mobile clients. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, and [more](https://proton.me/support/proton-calendar-guide). Those on the free tier get access to a single calendar, whereas paid subscribers can create up to 20 calendars. Extended sharing functionality is also limited to paid subscribers.
+
+    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/proton-calendar-guide){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+    ??? downloads
+
+        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=me.proton.android.calendar)
+        - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://calendar.proton.me)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+    We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Qualifications
+
+- Must sync and store information with E2EE to ensure data is not visible to the service provider.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should integrate with native OS calendar and contact management apps if applicable.

docs/cloud.en.md

@@ -6,49 +6,9 @@ Many cloud storage providers require your full trust that they will not look at
 
 If these alternatives do not fit your needs, we suggest you look into [Encryption Software](encryption.md).
 
-## Cryptee
+??? question "Looking for Nextcloud?"
 
-!!! recommendation
-
-    ![Cryptee logo](./assets/img/cloud/cryptee.svg#only-light){ align=right }
-    ![Cryptee logo](./assets/img/cloud/cryptee-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
-
-    **Cryptee** is a web-based, encrypted, secure photo storage service and documents editor.
-
-    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://crypt.ee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-    [:octicons-eye-16:](https://crypt.ee/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-    [:octicons-info-16:](https://crypt.ee/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
-    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/cryptee){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-
-## Nextcloud
-
-!!! recommendation
-
-    ![Nextcloud logo](assets/img/cloud/nextcloud.svg){ align=right }
-
-    **Nextcloud** is a suite of free and open-source client-server software for creating your own file hosting services on a private server you control. It also comes with experimental E2EE.
-
-    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://nextcloud.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-    [:octicons-eye-16:](https://nextcloud.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-    [:octicons-info-16:](https://nextcloud.com/support/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
-    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/nextcloud){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-    [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nextcloud.com/contribute/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
-
-    ??? downloads
-
-        - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
-        - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
-        - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
-        - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/www/nextcloud)
-        - [:simple-openbsd: OpenBSD](https://openports.se/www/nextcloud)
-        - [:simple-netbsd: NetBSD](https://pkgsrc.se/www/php-nextcloud)
-        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nextcloud.client)
-        - [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/packages/com.nextcloud.client)
-        - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1125420102)
-
-We recommend checking if your Nextcloud provider supports E2EE, otherwise you have to trust the provider to not look at your files.
-
-When self-hosting, you should also enable E2EE to protect against your hosting provider snooping on your data.
+    Nextcloud is [still a recommended tool](productivity.md) for self-hosting a file management suite, however we do not recommend third-party Nextcloud storage providers at the moment, because we do not recommend Nextcloud's built-in E2EE functionality for home users.
 
 ## Proton Drive
 
@@ -66,7 +26,34 @@ When self-hosting, you should also enable E2EE to protect against your hosting p
     ??? downloads
 
         - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=me.proton.android.drive)
+        - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1509667851)
 
-Proton Drive is currently in beta and is only available through a web client and an Android app.
+Proton Drive's mobile clients were released in December 2022 and are not yet open-source. Proton has historically delayed their source code releases until after initial product releases, and [plans to](https://www.reddit.com/r/ProtonDrive/comments/zf14i8/comment/izdwmme/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web2x&context=3) release the source code by the end of 2023. Proton Drive desktop clients are still in development.
 
-When using a web client, you are placing trust in the server to send you proper JavaScript code to derive the decryption key and authentication token locally in your browser. A compromised server can send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your master password and decrypt your data. If this does not fit your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md), consider using an alternative.
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+    We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must enforce end-to-end encryption.
+- Must offer a free plan or trial period for testing.
+- Must support TOTP or FIDO2 multi-factor authentication support, or Passkey logins.
+- Must offer a web interface which supports basic file management functionality.
+- Must allow for easy exports of all files/documents.
+- Must use standard, audited encryption.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Clients should be open-source.
+- Clients should be audited in their entirety by an independent third-party.
+- Should offer native clients for Linux, Android, Windows, macOS, and iOS.
+    - These clients should integrate with native OS tools for cloud storage providers, such as Files app integration on iOS, or DocumentsProvider functionality on Android.
+- Should support easy file-sharing with other users.
+- Should offer at least basic file preview and editing functionality on the web interface.

docs/coc.md

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
----
-title: Code of Conduct
-hide:
-    - toc
-    - feedback
----
-
-{% include 'CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md' %}

docs/data-redaction.en.md

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ When sharing files, be sure to remove associated metadata. Image files commonly
     ??? downloads
 
         - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.none.tom.exiferaser)
-        - [:simple-android: IzzyOnDroid (APK)](https://android.izzysoft.de/repo/apk/com.none.tom.exiferaser)
+        - [:octicons-moon-16: Accrescent](https://accrescent.app/app/com.none.tom.exiferaser)
         - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser/releases)
 
 The metadata that is erased depends on the image's file type:
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ The app offers multiple ways to erase metadata from images. Namely:
 
     ![Metapho logo](assets/img/data-redaction/metapho.jpg){ align=right }
 
-    Metapho is a simple and clean viewer for photo metadata such as date, file name, size, camera model, shutter speed, and location.
+    **Metapho** is a simple and clean viewer for photo metadata such as date, file name, size, camera model, shutter speed, and location.
 
     [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://zininworks.com/metapho){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
     [:octicons-eye-16:](https://zininworks.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@@ -114,7 +114,6 @@ The app offers multiple ways to erase metadata from images. Namely:
     ??? downloads
 
         - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.mathema.privacyblur)
-        - [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/de.mathema.privacyblur/)
         - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/privacyblur/id1536274106)
 
 !!! warning
@@ -149,3 +148,14 @@ The app offers multiple ways to erase metadata from images. Namely:
     ```bash
     exiftool -all= *.file_extension
     ```
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+    We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Apps developed for open-source operating systems must be open-source.
+- Apps must be free and should not include ads or other limitations.

docs/desktop-browsers.en.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: material/laptop
 ---
 These are our currently recommended desktop web browsers and configurations for standard/non-anonymous browsing. If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) instead. In general, we recommend keeping your browser extensions to a minimum; they have privileged access within your browser, require you to trust the developer, can make you [stand out](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint), and [weaken](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/chromium-extensions/c/0ei-UCHNm34/m/lDaXwQhzBAAJ) site isolation.
 
-### Firefox
+## Firefox
 
 !!! recommendation
 
@@ -23,12 +23,12 @@ These are our currently recommended desktop web browsers and configurations for
         - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/windows)
         - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/mac)
         - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/linux)
-        - [:simple-flathub: Flatpak](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.mozilla.firefox)
+        - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.mozilla.firefox)
 
 !!! warning
     Firefox includes a unique [download token](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1677497#c0) in downloads from Mozilla's website and uses telemetry in Firefox to send the token. The token is **not** included in releases from the [Mozilla FTP](https://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/firefox/releases/).
 
-#### Recommended Configuration
+### Recommended Configuration
 
 Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. When you use Firefox, we recommend changing the following settings to protect your privacy from certain parties, but all browsers other than [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) will be traceable by *somebody* in some regard or another.
 
@@ -50,9 +50,7 @@ This protects you from persistent cookies, but does not protect you against cook
 
 ##### Search Suggestions
 
-- [ ] Disable **Suggestions from the web**
-- [ ] Disable **Suggestions from sponsors**
-- [ ] Disable **Improve the Firefox Suggest experience**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Provide search suggestions**
 
 Search suggestion features may not be available in your region.
 
@@ -66,21 +64,26 @@ Search suggestions send everything you type in the address bar to the default se
 
 > Firefox sends data about your Firefox version and language; device operating system and hardware configuration; memory, basic information about crashes and errors; outcome of automated processes like updates, safebrowsing, and activation to us. When Firefox sends data to us, your IP address is temporarily collected as part of our server logs.
 
+Additionally, the Firefox Accounts service collects [some technical data](https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/privacy/firefox/#firefox-accounts). If you use a Firefox Account you can opt-out:
+
+1. Open your [profile settings on accounts.firefox.com](https://accounts.firefox.com/settings#data-collection)
+2. Uncheck **Data Collection and Use** > **Help improve Firefox Accounts**
+
 ##### HTTPS-Only Mode
 
 - [x] Select **Enable HTTPS-Only Mode in all windows**
 
 This prevents you from unintentionally connecting to a website in plain-text HTTP. Sites without HTTPS are uncommon nowadays, so this should have little to no impact on your day to day browsing.
 
-#### Sync
+### Firefox Sync
 
 [Firefox Sync](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2018/11/firefox-sync-privacy/) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices and protects it with E2EE.
 
-#### Arkenfox (advanced)
+### Arkenfox (advanced)
 
 The [Arkenfox project](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js) provides a set of carefully considered options for Firefox. If you [decide](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/1.1-To-Arkenfox-or-Not) to use Arkenfox, a [few options](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/3.2-Overrides-[Common]) are subjectively strict and/or may cause some websites to not work properly - [which you can easily change](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/3.1-Overrides) to suit your needs. We **strongly recommend** reading through their full [wiki](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki). Arkenfox also enables [container](https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/containers#w_for-advanced-users) support.
 
-### Brave
+## Brave
 
 !!! recommendation
 
@@ -98,13 +101,14 @@ The [Arkenfox project](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js) provides a set of ca
 
     ??? downloads annotate
 
+        - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/releases)
         - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://brave.com/download/)
         - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://brave.com/download/)
         - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://brave.com/linux/) (1)
 
     1. We advise against using the Flatpak version of Brave, as it replaces Chromium's sandbox with Flatpak's, which is less effective. Additionally, the package is not maintained by Brave Software, Inc.
 
-#### Recommended Configuration
+### Recommended Configuration
 
 Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. When you use Brave, we recommend changing the following settings to protect your privacy from certain parties, but all browsers other than the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) will be traceable by *somebody* in some regard or another.
 
@@ -135,33 +139,34 @@ Shields' options can be downgraded on a per-site basis as needed, but by default
 
 - [ ] Uncheck all social media components
 
-##### Privacy and Security
+##### Privacy and security
 
-- [x] Select **Disable Non-Proxied UDP** under [WebRTC IP Handling Policy](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360017989132-How-do-I-change-my-Privacy-Settings-#webrtc)
+<div class="annotate" markdown>
+
+- [x] Select **Disable non-proxied UDP** under [WebRTC IP Handling Policy](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360017989132-How-do-I-change-my-Privacy-Settings-#webrtc)
 - [ ] Uncheck **Use Google services for push messaging**
 - [ ] Uncheck **Allow privacy-preserving product analytics (P3A)**
 - [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send daily usage ping to Brave**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send diagnostic reports**
 - [x] Select **Always use secure connections** in the **Security** menu
+- [ ] Uncheck **Private window with Tor** (1)
 
-    !!! important "Sanitizing on Close"
+    !!! tip "Sanitizing on Close"
         - [x] Select **Clear cookies and site data when you close all windows** in the *Cookies and other site data* menu
 
         If you wish to stay logged in to a particular site you visit often, you can set exceptions on a per-site basis under the *Customized behaviors* section.
 
+</div>
+
+1. Brave is **not** as resistant to fingerprinting as the Tor Browser and far fewer people use Brave with Tor, so you will stand out. Where [strong anonymity is required](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360018121491-What-is-a-Private-Window-with-Tor-Connectivity-) use the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser).
+
 ##### Extensions
 
 Disable built-in extensions you do not use in **Extensions**
 
-<div class="annotate" markdown>
-
 - [ ] Uncheck **Hangouts**
-- [ ] Uncheck **Private window with Tor** (1)
 - [ ] Uncheck **WebTorrent**
 
-</div>
-
-1. Brave is **not** as resistant to fingerprinting as the Tor Browser and far fewer people use Brave with Tor, so you will stand out. Where [strong anonymity is required](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360018121491-What-is-a-Private-Window-with-Tor-Connectivity-) use the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser).
-
 ##### IPFS
 
 InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is a decentralized, peer-to-peer network for storing and sharing data in a distributed filesystem. Unless you use the feature, disable it.
@@ -180,6 +185,10 @@ Under the *System* menu
 
 1. This option is not present on all platforms.
 
+### Brave Sync
+
+[Brave Sync](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360059793111-Understanding-Brave-Sync) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices without requiring an account and protects it with E2EE.
+
 ## Additional Resources
 
 We generally do not recommend installing any extensions as they increase your attack surface. However, uBlock Origin may prove useful if you value content blocking functionality.
@@ -203,4 +212,49 @@ We generally do not recommend installing any extensions as they increase your at
         - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/ublock-origin/cjpalhdlnbpafiamejdnhcphjbkeiagm)
         - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/ublock-origin/odfafepnkmbhccpbejgmiehpchacaeak)
 
-We suggest following the [developer's documentation](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) and picking one of the "modes". Additional filter lists can impact performance and may increase attack surface, so only apply what you need. If there is a [vulnerability in uBlock Origin](https://portswigger.net/research/ublock-i-exfiltrate-exploiting-ad-blockers-with-css) a third-party filter could add malicious rules that can potentially steal user data.
+We suggest following the [developer's documentation](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) and picking one of the "modes". Additional filter lists can impact performance and [may increase attack surface](https://portswigger.net/research/ublock-i-exfiltrate-exploiting-ad-blockers-with-css).
+
+##### Other lists
+
+These are some other [filter lists](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Dashboard:-Filter-lists) that you may want to consider adding:
+
+- [x] Check **Privacy** > **AdGuard URL Tracking Protection**
+- Add [Actually Legitimate URL Shortener Tool](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DandelionSprout/adfilt/master/LegitimateURLShortener.txt)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+    We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Open-source.
+- Supports automatic updates.
+- Receives engine updates in 0-1 days from upstream release.
+- Available on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- Any changes required to make the browser more privacy-respecting should not negatively impact user experience.
+- Blocks third-party cookies by default.
+- Supports [state partitioning](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning) to mitigate cross-site tracking.[^1]
+
+[^1]: Brave's implementation is detailed at [Brave Privacy Updates: Partitioning network-state for privacy](https://brave.com/privacy-updates/14-partitioning-network-state/).
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Includes built-in content blocking functionality.
+- Supports cookie compartmentalization (à la [Multi-Account Containers](https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/containers)).
+- Supports Progressive Web Apps.  
+  PWAs enable you to install certain websites as if they were native apps on your computer. This can have advantages over installing Electron-based apps, because you benefit from your browser's regular security updates.
+- Does not include add-on functionality (bloatware) that does not impact user privacy.
+- Does not collect telemetry by default.
+- Provides open-source sync server implementation.
+- Defaults to a [private search engine](search-engines.md).
+
+### Extension Criteria
+
+- Must not replicate built-in browser or OS functionality.
+- Must directly impact user privacy, i.e. must not simply provide information.

docs/desktop.en.md

@@ -1,12 +1,10 @@
 ---
-title: "Linux"
+title: "Desktop/PC"
 icon: simple/linux
 ---
-Linux distributions are commonly recommended for privacy protection and software freedom.
+Linux distributions are commonly recommended for privacy protection and software freedom. If you don't already use Linux, below are some distributions we suggest trying out, as well as some general privacy and security improvement tips that are applicable to many Linux distributions.
 
-- [General Linux Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](linux-desktop/overview.md)
-
-If you don't already use Linux, below are some distributions we suggest trying out, as well as some general privacy and security improvement tips that are applicable to many Linux distributions.
+- [General Linux Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/linux-overview.md)
 
 ## Traditional Distributions
 
@@ -16,7 +14,7 @@ If you don't already use Linux, below are some distributions we suggest trying o
 
     ![Fedora logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-workstation.svg){ align=right }
 
-    **Fedora Workstation** is our recommended distribution for people new to Linux. Fedora generally adopts newer technologies before other distributions e.g., [Wayland](https://wayland.freedesktop.org/), [PipeWire](https://pipewire.org), and soon, [FS-Verity](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/FsVerityRPM). These new technologies often come with improvements in security, privacy, and usability in general.
+    **Fedora Workstation** is our recommended distribution for people new to Linux. Fedora generally adopts newer technologies before other distributions e.g., [Wayland](https://wayland.freedesktop.org/), [PipeWire](https://pipewire.org). These new technologies often come with improvements in security, privacy, and usability in general.
 
     [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getfedora.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
     [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
@@ -54,7 +52,7 @@ Tumbleweed follows a rolling release model where each update is released as a sn
 
 Arch Linux has a rolling release cycle. There is no fixed release schedule and packages are updated very frequently.
 
-Being a DIY distribution, you are [expected to set up and maintain](linux-desktop/overview.md#arch-based-distributions) your system on your own. Arch has an [official installer](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Archinstall) to make the installation process a little easier.
+Being a DIY distribution, you are [expected to set up and maintain](os/linux-overview.md#arch-based-distributions) your system on your own. Arch has an [official installer](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Archinstall) to make the installation process a little easier.
 
 A large portion of [Arch Linux’s packages](https://reproducible.archlinux.org) are [reproducible](https://reproducible-builds.org).
 
@@ -110,9 +108,10 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th
 
     ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right }
 
-    **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet.
+    **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os).
 
     [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
     [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation}
     [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
 
@@ -130,14 +129,53 @@ Whonix is best used [in conjunction with Qubes](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qube
 
     ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ align=right }
 
-    **Tails** is a live operating system based on Debian that routes all communications through Tor.
-
-    It can boot on almost any computer from a DVD, USB stick, or SD card. It aims to preserve privacy and anonymity while circumventing censorship and leaving no trace of itself on the computer it is used on.
+    **Tails** is a live operating system based on Debian that routes all communications through Tor, which can boot on on almost any computer from a DVD, USB stick, or SD card installation. It uses [Tor](tor.md) to preserve privacy and anonymity while circumventing censorship, and it leaves no trace of itself on the computer it is used on after it is powered off.
 
     [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tails.boum.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
     [:octicons-info-16:](https://tails.boum.org/doc/index.en.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
     [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tails.boum.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
 
-By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypted [persistent storage](https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/persistence/index.en.html) can be configured to store some data.
-
 Tails is great for counter forensics due to amnesia (meaning nothing is written to the disk); however, it is not a hardened distribution like Whonix. It lacks many anonymity and security features that Whonix has and gets updated much less often (only once every six weeks). A Tails system that is compromised by malware may potentially bypass the transparent proxy allowing for the user to be deanonymized.
+
+Tails includes [uBlock Origin](desktop-browsers.md#ublock-origin) in Tor Browser by default, which may potentially make it easier for adversaries to fingerprint Tails users. [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) virtual machines may be more leak-proof, however they are not amnesic, meaning data may be recovered from your storage device.
+
+By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypted [persistent storage](https://tails.boum.org/doc/persistent_storage/index.en.html) can be configured to store some data between reboots.
+
+## Security-focused Distributions
+
+### Qubes OS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+    ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right }
+
+    **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers.
+
+    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+    [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation }
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+    [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*.
+
+The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/).
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+    We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+Our recommended operating systems:
+
+- Must be open-source.
+- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates.
+- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#Wayland).
+- Must support full-disk encryption during installation.
+- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage.
+- Must support a wide variety of hardware.

docs/dns.en.md

@@ -3,21 +3,21 @@ title: "DNS Resolvers"
 icon: material/dns
 ---
 
-!!! faq "Should I use encrypted DNS?"
+!!! question "Should I use encrypted DNS?"
 
     Encrypted DNS with third-party servers should only be used to get around basic [DNS blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) when you can be sure there won't be any consequences. Encrypted DNS will not help you hide any of your browsing activity.
 
-    [Learn more about DNS](basics/dns-overview.md){ .md-button }
+    [Learn more about DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md){ .md-button }
 
 ## Recommended Providers
 
 | DNS Provider | Privacy Policy | Protocols | Logging | ECS | Filtering |
 | ------------ | -------------- | --------- | ------- | --- | --------- |
-| [**AdGuard**](https://adguard.com/en/adguard-dns/overview.html) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html) | Cleartext <br> DoH <br> DoT <br> DNSCrypt | Some[^1] | No | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardDNS)
-| [**Cloudflare**](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/setting-up-1.1.1.1/) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/) | Cleartext <br> DoH <br> DoT | Some[^2] | No | Based on server choice.|
-| [**Control D**](https://controld.com/free-dns) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://controld.com/privacy) | Cleartext <br> DoH <br> DoT <br> DNSCrypt | Optional[^3] | No | Based on server choice. |
+| [**AdGuard**](https://adguard.com/en/adguard-dns/overview.html) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html) | Cleartext <br> DoH/3 <br> DoT <br> DNSCrypt | Some[^1] | No | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardDNS)
+| [**Cloudflare**](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/setting-up-1.1.1.1/) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/) | Cleartext <br> DoH/3 <br> DoT | Some[^2] | No | Based on server choice.|
+| [**Control D**](https://controld.com/free-dns) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://controld.com/privacy) | Cleartext <br> DoH/3 <br> DoT <br> DoQ| Optional[^3] | No | Based on server choice. |
 | [**Mullvad**](https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/) | DoH <br> DoT | No[^4] | No | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/mullvad/dns-adblock)
-| [**NextDNS**](https://www.nextdns.io) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://www.nextdns.io/privacy) | Cleartext <br> DoH <br> DoT <br> DNSCrypt | Optional[^5] | Optional | Based on server choice. |
+| [**NextDNS**](https://www.nextdns.io) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://www.nextdns.io/privacy) | Cleartext <br> DoH/3 <br> DoT | Optional[^5] | Optional | Based on server choice. |
 | [**Quad9**](https://quad9.net) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://quad9.net/privacy/policy/) | Cleartext <br> DoH <br> DoT <br> DNSCrypt | Some[^6] | Optional |  Based on server choice, Malware blocking by default. |
 
 [^1]: AdGuard stores aggregated performance metrics of their DNS servers, namely the number of complete requests to a particular server, the number of blocked requests, and the speed of processing requests. They also keep and store the database of domains requested in within last 24 hours. "We need this information to identify and block new trackers and threats." "We also log how many times this or that tracker has been blocked. We need this information to remove outdated rules from our filters." [https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html](https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html)
@@ -27,18 +27,24 @@ icon: material/dns
 [^5]: NextDNS can provide insights and logging features on an opt-in basis. You can choose retention times and log storage locations for any logs you choose to keep. If it's not specifically requested, no data is logged. [https://nextdns.io/privacy](https://nextdns.io/privacy)
 [^6]: Quad9 collects some data for the purposes of threat monitoring and response. That data may then be remixed and shared, such as for the purpose of security research. Quad9 does not collect or record IP addresses or other data they deem personally identifiable. [https://www.quad9.net/privacy/policy/](https://www.quad9.net/privacy/policy/)
 
-The criteria for the servers listed above are:
+## Criteria
 
-- Must support [DNSSEC](basics/dns-overview.md#what-is-dnssec)
-- Must have [anycast](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anycast#Addressing_methods) support
-- [QNAME Minimization](basics/dns-overview.md#what-is-qname-minimization)
-- Allow for [ECS](basics/dns-overview.md#what-is-edns-client-subnet-ecs) to be disabled
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+    We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must support [DNSSEC](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-dnssec).
+- [QNAME Minimization](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-qname-minimization).
+- Allow for [ECS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-edns-client-subnet-ecs) to be disabled.
+- Prefer [anycast](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anycast#Addressing_methods) support or geo-steering support.
 
 ## Native Operating System Support
 
 ### Android
 
-Android 9 and above support DNS over TLS. Android 13 will support DNS over HTTPS. The settings can be found in: **Settings** &rarr; **Network & Internet** &rarr; **Private DNS**.
+Android 9 and above support DNS over TLS. The settings can be found in: **Settings** &rarr; **Network & Internet** &rarr; **Private DNS**.
 
 ### Apple Devices
 
@@ -50,31 +56,13 @@ After installation of either a configuration profile or an app that uses the DNS
 
 Apple does not provide a native interface for creating encrypted DNS profiles. [Secure DNS profile creator](https://dns.notjakob.com/tool.html) is an unofficial tool for creating your own encrypted DNS profiles, however they will not be signed. Signed profiles are preferred; signing validates a profile's origin and helps to ensure the integrity of the profiles. A green "Verified" label is given to signed configuration profiles. For more information on code signing, see [About Code Signing](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/CodeSigningGuide/Introduction/Introduction.html). **Signed profiles** are offered by [AdGuard](https://adguard.com/en/blog/encrypted-dns-ios-14.html), [NextDNS](https://apple.nextdns.io), and [Quad9](https://www.quad9.net/news/blog/ios-mobile-provisioning-profiles/).
 
-#### iOS/iPadOS
+!!! info
 
-Select **Settings** &rarr; **General** &rarr; **VPN, DNS, & Device Management** &rarr; **DNS**
-
-#### macOS
-
-Select **System Preferences &rarr; Profiles** or **System Preferences** &rarr; **Network** &rarr; **Advanced**, (depending on if you have configuration profiles installed).
-
-#### tvOS
-
-Select **Settings** &rarr; **General** &rarr; **Privacy** &rarr; **Share Apple TV Analytics** &rarr; then press the *Play* button on the remote.
-
-### Windows
-
-You can [turn on DoH](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/networking/dns/doh-client-support) by accessing Windows settings in the control panel.
-
-Select **Settings** &rarr; **Network & Internet** &rarr; **Ethernet or WiFi**, &rarr; **Edit DNS Settings** &rarr; **Preferred DNS encryption** &rarr; **Encrypted only (DNS over HTTPS)**.
-
-### Linux
-
-`systemd-resolved`, which many Linux distributions use to do their DNS lookups, doesn't yet [support DoH](https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/8639). If you want to use DoH, you'll need to install a proxy like [dnscrypt-proxy](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy) and [configure it](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dnscrypt-proxy) to take all the DNS queries from your system resolver and forward them over HTTPS.
+    `systemd-resolved`, which many Linux distributions use to do their DNS lookups, doesn't yet [support DoH](https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/8639). If you want to use DoH, you'll need to install a proxy like [dnscrypt-proxy](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy) and [configure it](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dnscrypt-proxy) to take all the DNS queries from your system resolver and forward them over HTTPS.
 
 ## Encrypted DNS Proxies
 
-Encrypted DNS proxy software provides a local proxy for the [unencrypted DNS](basics/dns-overview.md#unencrypted-dns) resolver to forward to. Typically it is used on platforms that don't natively support [encrypted DNS](basics/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns).
+Encrypted DNS proxy software provides a local proxy for the [unencrypted DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md#unencrypted-dns) resolver to forward to. Typically it is used on platforms that don't natively support [encrypted DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns).
 
 ### RethinkDNS
 
@@ -83,7 +71,7 @@ Encrypted DNS proxy software provides a local proxy for the [unencrypted DNS](ba
     ![RethinkDNS logo](assets/img/android/rethinkdns.svg#only-light){ align=right }
     ![RethinkDNS logo](assets/img/android/rethinkdns-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
 
-    **RethinkDNS** is an open-source Android client supporting [DNS-over-HTTPS](basics/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), [DNS-over-TLS](basics/dns-overview.md#dns-over-tls-dot), [DNSCrypt](basics/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt) and DNS Proxy along with caching DNS responses, locally logging DNS queries and can be used as a firewall too.
+    **RethinkDNS** is an open-source Android client supporting [DNS-over-HTTPS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), [DNS-over-TLS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-tls-dot), [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt) and DNS Proxy along with caching DNS responses, locally logging DNS queries and can be used as a firewall too.
 
     [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://rethinkdns.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
     [:octicons-eye-16:](https://rethinkdns.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@@ -93,7 +81,7 @@ Encrypted DNS proxy software provides a local proxy for the [unencrypted DNS](ba
     ??? downloads
 
         - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.celzero.bravedns)
-        - [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/packages/com.celzero.bravedns)
+        - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/celzero/rethink-app/releases)
 
 ### dnscrypt-proxy
 
@@ -101,9 +89,9 @@ Encrypted DNS proxy software provides a local proxy for the [unencrypted DNS](ba
 
     ![dnscrypt-proxy logo](assets/img/dns/dnscrypt-proxy.svg){ align=right }
 
-    **dnscrypt-proxy** is a DNS proxy with support for [DNSCrypt](basics/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt), [DNS-over-HTTPS](basics/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), and [Anonymized DNS](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Anonymized-DNS).
+    **dnscrypt-proxy** is a DNS proxy with support for [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt), [DNS-over-HTTPS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), and [Anonymized DNS](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Anonymized-DNS).
 
-    !!! warning "The anonymized DNS feature does [**not**](basics/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns) anonymize other network traffic."
+    !!! warning "The anonymized DNS feature does [**not**](advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns) anonymize other network traffic."
 
     [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
     [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}

docs/email-clients.en.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: material/email-open
 ---
 Our recommendation list contains email clients that support both [OpenPGP](encryption.md#openpgp) and strong authentication such as [Open Authorization (OAuth)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth). OAuth allows you to use [Multi-Factor Authentication](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md) and prevent account theft.
 
-??? Attention "Email does not provide forward secrecy"
+??? warning "Email does not provide forward secrecy"
     When using end-to-end encryption (E2EE) technology like OpenPGP, email will still have [some metadata](email.md#email-metadata-overview) that is not encrypted in the header of the email.
 
     OpenPGP also does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed: [How do I protect my private keys?](basics/email-security.md) Consider using a medium that provides forward secrecy:
@@ -31,7 +31,26 @@ Our recommendation list contains email clients that support both [OpenPGP](encry
         - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.thunderbird.net)
         - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.thunderbird.net)
         - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.thunderbird.net)
-        - [:simple-flathub: Flatpak](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.mozilla.Thunderbird)
+        - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.mozilla.Thunderbird)
+
+#### Recommended Configuration
+
+We recommend changing some of these settings to make Thunderbird a little more private.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Privacy & Security**.
+
+##### Web Content
+
+- [ ] Uncheck  **Remember websites and links I've visited**
+- [ ] Uncheck  **Accept cookies from sites**
+
+##### Telemetry
+
+- [ ] Uncheck  **Allow Thunderbird to send technical and interaction data to Mozilla**
+
+#### Thunderbird-user.js (advanced)
+
+[`thunderbird-user.js`](https://github.com/HorlogeSkynet/thunderbird-user.js), is a set of configurations options that aims to disable as many of the web-browsing features within Thunderbird as possible in order to reduce surface area and maintain privacy. Some of the changes are backported from the [Arkenfox project](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js).
 
 ## Platform Specific
 
@@ -41,7 +60,7 @@ Our recommendation list contains email clients that support both [OpenPGP](encry
 
     ![Apple Mail logo](assets/img/email-clients/applemail.png){ align=right }
 
-    **Apple Mail** is included in macOS and can be extended to have OpenPGP support with [GPG Suite](/encryption/#gpg-suite), which adds the ability to send encrypted email.
+    **Apple Mail** is included in macOS and can be extended to have OpenPGP support with [GPG Suite](encryption.md#gpg-suite), which adds the ability to send encrypted email.
 
     [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/welcome/mac){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
     [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@@ -61,12 +80,11 @@ Our recommendation list contains email clients that support both [OpenPGP](encry
 
     ??? downloads
 
-        - [:simple-apple: Mac App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1236045954)
+        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.canarymail.android)
         - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1236045954)
         - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://canarymail.io/downloads.html)
-        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.canarymail.android)
 
-!!! attention
+!!! warning
 
     Canary Mail only recently released a Windows and Android client, though we don't believe they are as stable as their iOS and Mac counterparts.
 
@@ -89,7 +107,7 @@ Canary Mail is closed-source. We recommend it due to the few choices there are f
     ??? downloads
 
         - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=eu.faircode.email)
-        - [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/packages/eu.faircode.email/)
+        - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/releases)
 
 ### GNOME Evolution (GNOME)
 
@@ -107,7 +125,7 @@ Canary Mail is closed-source. We recommend it due to the few choices there are f
 
     ??? downloads
 
-        - [:simple-flathub: Flatpak](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.gnome.Evolution)
+        - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.gnome.Evolution)
 
 ### K-9 Mail (Android)
 
@@ -128,7 +146,6 @@ Canary Mail is closed-source. We recommend it due to the few choices there are f
     ??? downloads
 
         - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.fsck.k9)
-        - [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/packages/com.fsck.k9)
         - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/k9mail/k-9/releases)
 
 ### Kontact (KDE)
@@ -148,7 +165,7 @@ Canary Mail is closed-source. We recommend it due to the few choices there are f
     ??? downloads
 
         - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://kontact.kde.org/download)
-        - [:simple-flathub: Flatpak](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.kde.kontact)
+        - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.kde.kontact)
 
 ### Mailvelope (Browser)
 
@@ -175,7 +192,7 @@ Canary Mail is closed-source. We recommend it due to the few choices there are f
 
     ![NeoMutt logo](assets/img/email-clients/mutt.svg){ align=right }
 
-    NeoMutt is an open-source command line mail reader (or MUA) for Linux and BSD. It's a fork of [Mutt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutt_(email_client)) with added features.
+    **NeoMutt** is an open-source command line mail reader (or MUA) for Linux and BSD. It's a fork of [Mutt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutt_(email_client)) with added features.
 
     NeoMutt is a text-based client that has a steep learning curve. It is however, very customizable.
 
@@ -186,5 +203,29 @@ Canary Mail is closed-source. We recommend it due to the few choices there are f
 
     ??? downloads
 
-        - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://neomutt.org/distro)
         - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://neomutt.org/distro)
+        - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://neomutt.org/distro)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+    We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Qualifications
+
+- Apps developed for open-source operating systems must be open-source.
+- Must not collect telemetry, or have an easy way to disable all telemetry.
+- Must support OpenPGP message encryption.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should be open-source.
+- Should be cross-platform.
+- Should not collect any telemetry by default.
+- Should support OpenPGP natively, i.e. without extensions.
+- Should support storing OpenPGP encrypted emails locally.

docs/email.en.md

@@ -8,14 +8,16 @@ Email is practically a necessity for using any online service, however we do not
 
 For everything else, we recommend a variety of email providers based on sustainable business models and built-in security and privacy features.
 
+## OpenPGP Compatible Services
+
+These providers natively support OpenPGP encryption/decryption, allowing for provider-agnostic E2EE emails. For example, a Proton Mail user could send an E2EE message to a Mailbox.org user, or you could receive OpenPGP-encrypted notifications from internet services which support it.
+
 !!! warning
 
     When using E2EE technology like OpenPGP, email will still have some metadata that is not encrypted in the header of the email. Read more about [email metadata](basics/email-security.md#email-metadata-overview).
 
     OpenPGP also does not support Forward secrecy, which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. [How do I protect my private keys?](basics/email-security.md#how-do-i-protect-my-private-keys)
 
-## Recommended Email Providers
-
 ### Proton Mail
 
 !!! recommendation
@@ -24,42 +26,60 @@ For everything else, we recommend a variety of email providers based on sustaina
 
     **Proton Mail** is an email service with a focus on privacy, encryption, security, and ease of use. They have been in operation since **2013**. Proton AG is based in Genève, Switzerland. Accounts start with 500 MB storage with their free plan.
 
-    Free accounts have some limitations, such as not being able to search body text and not having access to [Proton Mail Bridge](https://proton.me/mail/bridge), which is required to use a [recommended desktop email client](email-clients.md) (e.g. Thunderbird). Paid accounts are available starting at **€48/y** which include features like Proton Mail Bridge, additional storage, and custom domain support.
-
-    If you have the Proton Unlimited, Business, or Visionary Plan, you also get [SimpleLogin](#simplelogin) Premium for free.
-
-    **Free**
-
     [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/mail){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
     [:simple-torbrowser:](https://protonmailrmez3lotccipshtkleegetolb73fuirgj7r4o4vfu7ozyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
     [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
     [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/mail){ .card-link title=Documentation}
     [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
 
-??? check "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+    ??? downloads
+
+        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonmail.android)
+        - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id979659905)
+        - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonMail/proton-mail-android/releases)
+        - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+        - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+        - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+        - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.proton.me)
+
+Free accounts have some limitations, such as not being able to search body text and not having access to [Proton Mail Bridge](https://proton.me/mail/bridge), which is required to use a [recommended desktop email client](email-clients.md) (e.g. Thunderbird). Paid accounts include features like Proton Mail Bridge, additional storage, and custom domain support. A [letter of attestation](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps) was provided for Proton Mail's apps on 9th November 2021 by [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com).
+
+If you have the Proton Unlimited, Business, or Visionary Plan, you also get [SimpleLogin](#simplelogin) Premium for free.
+
+Proton Mail has internal crash reports that they **do not** share with third parties. This can be disabled in: **Settings** > **Go to Settings** > **Account** > **Security and privacy** > **Send crash reports**.
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
 
     Paid Proton Mail subscribers can use their own domain with the service or a [catch-all](https://proton.me/support/catch-all) address. Proton Mail also supports [subaddressing](https://proton.me/support/creating-aliases), which is useful for people who don't want to purchase a domain.
 
-??? check "Private Payment Methods"
+??? success "Private Payment Methods"
 
     Proton Mail [accepts](https://proton.me/support/payment-options) Bitcoin and cash by mail in addition to standard credit/debit card and PayPal payments.
 
-??? check "Account Security"
+??? success "Account Security"
 
     Proton Mail supports TOTP [two factor authentication](https://proton.me/support/two-factor-authentication-2fa) only. The use of a U2F security key is not yet supported. Proton Mail is planning to implement U2F upon completion of their [Single Sign On (SSO)](https://reddit.com/comments/cheoy6/comment/feh2lw0/) code.
 
-??? check "Data Security"
+??? success "Data Security"
 
     Proton Mail has [zero-access encryption](https://proton.me/blog/zero-access-encryption) at rest for your emails and [calendars](https://proton.me/news/protoncalendar-security-model). Data secured with zero-access encryption is only accessible by you.
 
     Certain information stored in [Proton Contacts](https://proton.me/support/proton-contacts), such as display names and email addresses, are not secured with zero-access encryption. Contact fields that support zero-access encryption, such as phone numbers, are indicated with a padlock icon.
 
-??? check "Email Encryption"
+??? success "Email Encryption"
 
     Proton Mail has [integrated OpenPGP encryption](https://proton.me/support/how-to-use-pgp) in their webmail. Emails to other Proton Mail accounts are encrypted automatically, and encryption to non-Proton Mail addresses with an OpenPGP key can be enabled easily in your account settings. They also allow you to [encrypt messages to non-Proton Mail addresses](https://proton.me/support/password-protected-emails) without the need for them to sign up for a Proton Mail account or use software like OpenPGP.
 
     Proton Mail also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This allows people who don't use Proton Mail to find the OpenPGP keys of Proton Mail accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE.
 
+??? warning "Digital Legacy"
+
+    Proton Mail doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+    If you have a paid account and your [bill is unpaid](https://proton.me/support/delinquency) after 14 days, you won't be able to access your data. After 30 days, your account will become delinquent and won't receive incoming mail. You will continue to be billed during this period.
+
 ??? info "Additional Functionality"
 
     Proton Mail offers an "Unlimited" account for €9.99/Month, which also enables access to Proton VPN in addition to providing multiple accounts, domains, aliases, and 500GB of storage.
@@ -72,13 +92,15 @@ For everything else, we recommend a variety of email providers based on sustaina
 
     **Mailbox.org** is an email service with a focus on being secure, ad-free, and privately powered by 100% eco-friendly energy. They have been in operation since 2014. Mailbox.org is based in Berlin, Germany. Accounts start with 2 GB of storage, which can be upgraded as needed.
 
-    **EUR €12/year**
-
     [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailbox.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
     [:octicons-eye-16:](https://mailbox.org/en/data-protection-privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
     [:octicons-info-16:](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private){ .card-link title=Documentation}
 
-??? check "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+    ??? downloads
+
+        - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://login.mailbox.org)
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
 
     Mailbox.org lets you use your own domain, and they support [catch-all](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Using+catch-all+alias+with+own+domain) addresses. Mailbox.org also supports [subaddressing](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/BMBOKBEN/What+is+an+alias+and+how+do+I+use+it), which is useful if you don't want to purchase a domain.
 
@@ -86,7 +108,7 @@ For everything else, we recommend a variety of email providers based on sustaina
 
     Mailbox.org doesn't accept Bitcoin or any other cryptocurrencies as a result of their payment processor BitPay suspending operations in Germany. However, they do accept Cash by mail, cash payment to bank account, bank transfer, credit card, PayPal and couple of German-specific processors: paydirekt and Sofortüberweisung.
 
-??? check "Account Security"
+??? success "Account Security"
 
     Mailbox.org supports [two factor authentication](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/How+to+use+two-factor+authentication+-+2FA) for their webmail only. You can use either TOTP or a [Yubikey](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YubiKey) via the [Yubicloud](https://www.yubico.com/products/services-software/yubicloud). Web standards such as [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn) are not yet supported.
 
@@ -94,14 +116,22 @@ For everything else, we recommend a variety of email providers based on sustaina
 
     Mailbox.org allows for encryption of incoming mail using their [encrypted mailbox](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/The+Encrypted+Mailbox). New messages that you receive will then be immediately encrypted with your public key.
 
-    However, [Open-Exchange](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-Xchange), the software platform used by Mailbox.org, [does not support](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/BMBOKBEN/Encryption+of+calendar+and+address+book) the encryption of your address book and calendar. A [standalone option](calendar-contacts.md) may be more appropriate for that information.
+    However, [Open-Exchange](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-Xchange), the software platform used by Mailbox.org, [does not support](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/BMBOKBEN/Encryption+of+calendar+and+address+book) the encryption of your address book and calendar. A [standalone option](calendar.md) may be more appropriate for that information.
 
-??? check "Email Encryption"
+??? success "Email Encryption"
 
     Mailbox.org has [integrated encryption](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Send+encrypted+e-mails+with+Guard) in their webmail, which simplifies sending messages to people with public OpenPGP keys. They also allow [remote recipients to decrypt an email](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/My+recipient+does+not+use+PGP) on Mailbox.org's servers. This feature is useful when the remote recipient does not have OpenPGP and cannot decrypt a copy of the email in their own mailbox.
 
     Mailbox.org also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This allows people outside of Mailbox.org to find the OpenPGP keys of Mailbox.org accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE.
 
+??? success "Digital Legacy"
+
+    Mailbox.org has a digital legacy feature for all plans. You can choose whether you want any of your data to be passed to heirs providing that they apply and provide your testament. Alternatively, you can nominate a person by name and address.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+    Your account will be set to a restricted user account when your contract ends, after [30 days it will be irrevocably deleted](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/payment-article/what-happens-at-the-end-of-my-contract).
+
 ??? info "Additional Functionality"
 
     You can access your Mailbox.org account via IMAP/SMTP using their [.onion service](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/The+Tor+exit+node+of+mailbox.org). However, their webmail interface cannot be accessed via their .onion service and you may experience TLS certificate errors.
@@ -117,13 +147,15 @@ For everything else, we recommend a variety of email providers based on sustaina
 
     **StartMail** is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of standard OpenPGP encryption. StartMail has been in operation since 2014 and is based in Boulevard 11, Zeist Netherlands. Accounts start with 10GB. They offer a 30-day trial.
 
-    **USD $59.95/year**
-
     [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.startmail.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
     [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.startmail.com/en/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
     [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.startmail.com){ .card-link title=Documentation}
 
-??? check "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+    ??? downloads
+
+        - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.startmail.com/login)
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
 
     Personal accounts can use [Custom or Quick](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360007297457-Aliases) aliases. [Custom domains](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/4403911432209-Setup-a-custom-domain) are also available.
 
@@ -131,7 +163,7 @@ For everything else, we recommend a variety of email providers based on sustaina
 
     StartMail accepts Visa, MasterCard, American Express and Paypal. StartMail also has other [payment options](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006620637-Payment-methods) such as Bitcoin (currently only for Personal accounts) and SEPA Direct Debit for accounts older than a year.
 
-??? check "Account Security"
+??? success "Account Security"
 
     StartMail supports TOTP two factor authentication [for webmail only](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006682158-Two-factor-authentication-2FA). They do not allow U2F security key authentication.
 
@@ -139,25 +171,35 @@ For everything else, we recommend a variety of email providers based on sustaina
 
     StartMail has [zero access encryption at rest](https://www.startmail.com/en/whitepaper/#_Toc458527835), using their "user vault" system. When you log in, the vault is opened, and the email is then moved to the vault out of the queue where it is decrypted by the corresponding private key.
 
-    StartMail supports importing [contacts](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006495557-Import-contacts) however, they are only accessible in the webmail and not through protocols such as [CalDAV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CalDAV). Contacts are also not stored using zero knowledge encryption, so a [standalone option](calendar-contacts.md) may be more appropriate.
+    StartMail supports importing [contacts](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006495557-Import-contacts) however, they are only accessible in the webmail and not through protocols such as [CalDAV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CalDAV). Contacts are also not stored using zero knowledge encryption.
 
-??? check "Email Encryption"
+??? success "Email Encryption"
 
     StartMail has [integrated encryption](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/sections/360001889078-Encryption) in their webmail, which simplifies sending encrypted messages with public OpenPGP keys.
 
+??? warning "Digital Legacy"
+
+    StartMail does not offer a digital legacy feature.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+    On account expiration, StartMail will permanently delete your account after [6 months in 3 phases](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006794398-Account-expiration).
+
 ??? info "Additional Functionality"
 
     StartMail allows for proxying of images within emails. If you allow the remote image to be loaded, the sender won't know what your IP address is.
 
+## More Providers
+
+These providers store your emails with zero-knowledge encryption, making them great options for keeping your stored emails secure. However, they don't support interoperable encryption standards for E2EE communications between providers.
+
 ### Tutanota
 
 !!! recommendation
 
     ![Tutanota logo](assets/img/email/tutanota.svg){ align=right }
 
-    **[Tutanota.com](https://tutanota.com)** is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of encryption. Tutanota has been in operation since **2011** and is based in Hanover, Germany. Accounts start with 1GB storage with their free plan.
-
-    **Free**
+    **Tutanota** is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of encryption. Tutanota has been in operation since **2011** and is based in Hanover, Germany. Accounts start with 1GB storage with their free plan.
 
     [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tutanota.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
     [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tutanota.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@@ -165,13 +207,19 @@ For everything else, we recommend a variety of email providers based on sustaina
     [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
     [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tutanota.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
 
-Tutanota [doesn't allow](https://tutanota.com/faq/#imap) the use of third-party [email clients](email-clients.md). Tutanota has no plans pull email from [external email accounts](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/544#issuecomment-670473647) using the IMAP protocol. [Email import](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/630) is currently not possible.
+    ??? downloads
 
-Emails can be exported [individually or by bulk selection](https://tutanota.com/howto#generalMail). Tutanota does not allow for [subfolders](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/927) as you might expect with other email providers.
+        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
+        - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/tutanota/id922429609)
+        - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/releases)
+        - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+        - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+        - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+        - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.tutanota.com/)
 
-Tutanota is working on a [desktop client](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/) and they have an app [available in F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/packages/de.tutao.tutanota). They also have their app in conventional stores such as [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/tutanota/id922429609) on iOS and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota) for Android.
+Tutanota doesn't support the [IMAP protocol](https://tutanota.com/faq/#imap) or the use of third-party [email clients](email-clients.md), and you also won't be able to add [external email accounts](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/544#issuecomment-670473647) to the Tutanota app. Neither [Email import](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/630) or [subfolders](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/927) are currently supported, though this is [due to be changed](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/kickoff-import). Emails can be exported [individually or by bulk selection](https://tutanota.com/howto#generalMail) per folder, which may be inconvenient if you have many folders.
 
-??? check "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
 
     Paid Tutanota accounts can use up to 5 [aliases](https://tutanota.com/faq#alias) and [custom domains](https://tutanota.com/faq#custom-domain). Tutanota doesn't allow for [subaddressing (plus addresses)](https://tutanota.com/faq#plus), but you can use a [catch-all](https://tutanota.com/howto#settings-global) with a custom domain.
 
@@ -179,11 +227,11 @@ Tutanota is working on a [desktop client](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/deskto
 
     Tutanota only directly accepts credit cards and PayPal, however Bitcoin and Monero can be used to purchase gift cards via their [partnership](https://tutanota.com/faq/#cryptocurrency) with Proxystore.
 
-??? check "Account Security"
+??? success "Account Security"
 
-    Tutanota supports [two factor authentication](https://tutanota.com/faq#2fa) with either TOTP or U2F. U2F support is [not yet available on Android](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/443).
+    Tutanota supports [two factor authentication](https://tutanota.com/faq#2fa) with either TOTP or U2F.
 
-??? check "Data Security"
+??? success "Data Security"
 
     Tutanota has [zero access encryption at rest](https://tutanota.com/faq#what-encrypted) for your emails, [address book contacts](https://tutanota.com/faq#encrypted-address-book), and [calendars](https://tutanota.com/faq#calendar). This means the messages and other data stored in your account are only readable by you.
 
@@ -191,7 +239,13 @@ Tutanota is working on a [desktop client](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/deskto
 
     Tutanota [does not use OpenPGP](https://www.tutanota.com/faq/#pgp). Tutanota accounts can only receive encrypted emails from non-Tutanota email accounts when sent via a [temporary Tutanota mailbox](https://www.tutanota.com/howto/#encrypted-email-external).
 
-    Tutanota [does have plans](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/198) to support [AutoCrypt](https://autocrypt.org). This would allow for non-Tutanota emails to send encrypted emails to Tutanota accounts as long as their email client supports the AutoCrypt headers.
+??? warning "Digital Legacy"
+
+    Tutanota doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+    Tutanota will [delete inactive free accounts](https://tutanota.com/faq#inactive-accounts) after six months. You can reuse a deactivated free account if you pay.
 
 ??? info "Additional Functionality"
 
@@ -227,18 +281,20 @@ Using an aliasing service requires trusting both your email provider and your al
     ![AnonAddy logo](assets/img/email/anonaddy.svg#only-light){ align=right }
     ![AnonAddy logo](assets/img/email/anonaddy-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
 
-    **[AnonAddy](https://anonaddy.com)** lets you create 20 domain aliases on a shared domain for free, or unlimited "standard" aliases which are less anonymous. It has two premium plans at $12/year and $36/year which provide additional features. [Source code on GitHub](https://github.com/anonaddy/anonaddy).
+    **AnonAddy** lets you create 20 domain aliases on a shared domain for free, or unlimited "standard" aliases which are less anonymous.
 
     [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://anonaddy.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
     [:octicons-eye-16:](https://anonaddy.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://app.anonaddy.com/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
     [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/anonaddy){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
     [:octicons-heart-16:](https://anonaddy.com/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
 
     ??? downloads
+
+        - [:simple-android: Android](https://anonaddy.com/faq/#is-there-an-android-app)
+        - [:material-apple-ios: iOS](https://anonaddy.com/faq/#is-there-an-ios-app)
         - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-GB/firefox/addon/anonaddy/)
         - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/anonaddy-anonymous-email/iadbdpnoknmbdeolbapdackdcogdmjpe)
-        - [:material-apple-ios: iOS](https://anonaddy.com/faq/#is-there-an-ios-app)
-        - [:simple-android: Android](https://anonaddy.com/faq/#is-there-an-android-app)
 
 The number of shared aliases (which end in a shared domain like @anonaddy.me) that you can create is limited to 20 on AnonAddy's free plan and 50 on their $12/year plan. You can create unlimited standard aliases (which end in a domain like @[username].anonaddy.com or a custom domain on paid plans), however, as previously mentioned, this can be detrimental to privacy because people can trivially tie your standard aliases together based on the domain name alone. Unlimited shared aliases are available for $36/year.
 
@@ -256,7 +312,7 @@ Notable free features:
 
     ![Simplelogin logo](assets/img/email/simplelogin.svg){ align=right }
 
-    **[SimpleLogin](https://simplelogin.io)** is a free service which provides email aliases on a variety of shared domain names, and optionally provides features like unlimited aliases and custom domains for $30/year. [Source code on GitHub](https://github.com/simple-login/app).
+    **SimpleLogin** is a free service which provides email aliases on a variety of shared domain names, and optionally provides paid features like unlimited aliases and custom domains.
 
     [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://simplelogin.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
     [:octicons-eye-16:](https://simplelogin.io/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@@ -264,13 +320,14 @@ Notable free features:
     [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simple-login){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
 
     ??? downloads
+    
+        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.simplelogin.android)
+        - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1494359858)
+        - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/simple-login/Simple-Login-Android/releases)
         - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/simplelogin/)
         - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/dphilobhebphkdjbpfohgikllaljmgbn)
         - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/simpleloginreceive-sen/diacfpipniklenphgljfkmhinphjlfff)
         - [:simple-safari: Safari](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1494051017)
-        - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1494359858)
-        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.simplelogin.android)
-        - [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/io.simplelogin.android.fdroid/)
 
 SimpleLogin was [acquired by Proton AG](https://proton.me/news/proton-and-simplelogin-join-forces) as of April 8, 2022. If you use Proton Mail for your primary mailbox, SimpleLogin is a great choice. As both products are now owned by the same company you now only have to trust a single entity. We also expect that SimpleLogin will be more tightly integrated with Proton's offerings in the future. SimpleLogin continues to support forwarding to any email provider of your choosing. Securitum [audited](https://simplelogin.io/blog/security-audit/) SimpleLogin in early 2022 and all issues [were addressed](https://simplelogin.io/audit2022/web.pdf).
 
@@ -316,9 +373,9 @@ For a more manual approach we've picked out these two articles:
 - [Setting up a mail server with OpenSMTPD, Dovecot and Rspamd](https://poolp.org/posts/2019-09-14/setting-up-a-mail-server-with-opensmtpd-dovecot-and-rspamd/) (2019)
 - [How To Run Your Own Mail Server](https://www.c0ffee.net/blog/mail-server-guide/) (August 2017)
 
-## Our Criteria
+## Criteria
 
-**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the providers we recommend.** This allows us to provide completely objective recommendations. We have developed a clear set of requirements for any Email provider wishing to be recommended, including implementing industry best practices, modern technology and more. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing an Email provider, and conduct your own research to ensure the Email provider you choose is the right choice for you.
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the providers we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements for any Email provider wishing to be recommended, including implementing industry best practices, modern technology and more. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing an Email provider, and conduct your own research to ensure the Email provider you choose is the right choice for you.
 
 ### Technology
 
@@ -327,11 +384,13 @@ We regard these features as important in order to provide a safe and optimal ser
 **Minimum to Qualify:**
 
 - Encrypts email account data at rest with zero-access encryption.
+- Export capability as [Mbox](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mbox) or individual .eml with [RFC5322](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5322/) standard.
+- Allow users to use their own [domain name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name). Custom domain names are important to users because it allows them to maintain their agency from the service, should it turn bad or be acquired by another company which doesn't prioritize privacy.
+- Operates on owned infrastructure, i.e. not built upon third-party email service providers.
 
 **Best Case:**
 
 - Encrypts all account data (Contacts, Calendars, etc) at rest with zero-access encryption.
-- Allow users to use their own [domain name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name). Custom domain names are important to users because it allows them to maintain their agency from the service, should it turn bad or be acquired by another company which doesn't prioritize privacy.
 - Integrated webmail E2EE/PGP encryption provided as a convenience.
 - Support for [WKD](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD) to allow improved discovery of public OpenPGP keys via HTTP.
     GnuPG users can get a key by typing: `gpg --locate-key example_user@example.com`
@@ -365,7 +424,8 @@ Email servers deal with a lot of very sensitive data. We expect that providers w
 - Protection of webmail with 2FA, such as TOTP.
 - Zero access encryption, builds on encryption at rest. The provider does not have the decryption keys to the data they hold. This prevents a rogue employee leaking data they have access to or remote adversary from releasing data they have stolen by gaining unauthorized access to the server.
 - [DNSSEC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Extensions) support.
-- No [TLS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunistic_TLS) errors/vulnerabilities when being profiled by tools such as [Hardenize](https://www.hardenize.com), [testssl.sh](https://testssl.sh) or [Qualys SSL Labs](https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest), this includes certificate related errors, poor or weak ciphers suites, weak DH parameters such as those that led to [Logjam](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logjam_(computer_security)).
+- No TLS errors or vulnerabilities when being profiled by tools such as [Hardenize](https://www.hardenize.com/), [testssl.sh](https://testssl.sh/), or [Qualys SSL Labs](https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest); this includes certificate related errors and weak DH parameters, such as those that led to [Logjam](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logjam_(computer_security)).
+- A server suite preference (optional on TLSv1.3) for strong cipher suites which support forward secrecy and authenticated encryption.
 - A valid [MTA-STS](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8461) and [TLS-RPT](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8460) policy.
 - Valid [DANE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS-based_Authentication_of_Named_Entities) records.
 - Valid [SPF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sender_Policy_Framework) and [DKIM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DomainKeys_Identified_Mail) records.
@@ -375,6 +435,7 @@ Email servers deal with a lot of very sensitive data. We expect that providers w
 - Website security standards such as:
     - [HTTP Strict Transport Security](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security)
     - [Subresource Integrity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subresource_Integrity) if loading things from external domains.
+- Must support viewing of [Message headers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header), as it is a crucial forensic feature to determine if an email is a phishing attempt.
 
 **Best Case:**
 

docs/encryption.en.md

@@ -24,13 +24,13 @@ The options listed here are multi-platform and great for creating encrypted back
 
     ??? downloads
 
+        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.cryptomator)
+        - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/cryptomator-2/id1560822163)
+        - [:simple-android: Android](https://cryptomator.org/android)
         - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
         - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
         - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
-        - [:simple-flathub: Flatpak](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.cryptomator.Cryptomator)
-        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.cryptomator)
-        - [:simple-android: Android](https://cryptomator.org/android)
-        - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/cryptomator-2/id1560822163)
+        - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.cryptomator.Cryptomator)
 
 Cryptomator uses AES-256 encryption to encrypt both files and filenames. Cryptomator cannot encrypt metadata such as access, modification, and creation timestamps, nor the number and size of files and folders.
 
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ BitLocker is [only supported](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/turn-o
         manage-bde -protectors -get c: > %UserProfile%\Desktop\BitLocker-Recovery-Key.txt
         ```
 
-        !!! important
+        !!! tip
 
             Backup `BitLocker-Recovery-Key.txt` on your Desktop to a separate storage device. Loss of this recovery code may result in loss of data.
 
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ BitLocker is [only supported](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/turn-o
 
     [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/encrypt-mac-data-with-filevault-mh11785/mac){ .card-link title=Documentation}
 
-We recommend storing a local recovery key in a secure place as opposed to using iCloud FileVault recovery. As well, FileVault should be enabled **after** a complete macOS installation as more pseudorandom number generator ([PRNG](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/random-number-generation-seca0c73a75b/web)) [entropy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropy_(computing)) will be available.
+We recommend storing a local recovery key in a secure place as opposed to using your iCloud account for recovery.
 
 ### Linux Unified Key Setup
 
@@ -267,10 +267,10 @@ When encrypting with PGP, you have the option to configure different options in
 
     ??? downloads
 
+        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.sufficientlysecure.keychain)
         - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://gpg4win.org/download.html)
         - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://gpgtools.org)
         - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://gnupg.org/download/index.html#binary)
-        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.sufficientlysecure.keychain)
 
 ### GPG4win
 
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ When encrypting with PGP, you have the option to configure different options in
 
     ![GPG Suite logo](assets/img/encryption-software/gpgsuite.png){ align=right }
 
-    **GPG Suite** provides OpenPGP support for [Apple Mail](email-clients.md#apple-mail) and macOS. GPG Mail costs $24€ yearly for their support plan and includes a 30-day trial. For more details see the [FAQ](https://gpgtools.org/faq).
+    **GPG Suite** provides OpenPGP support for [Apple Mail](email-clients.md#apple-mail) and macOS.
 
     We recommend taking a look at their [First steps](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb/how-to/first-steps-where-do-i-start-where-do-i-begin-setup-gpgtools-create-a-new-key-your-first-encrypted-email) and [Knowledge base](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb) for support.
 
@@ -330,4 +330,25 @@ When encrypting with PGP, you have the option to configure different options in
     ??? downloads
 
         - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.sufficientlysecure.keychain)
-        - [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/packages/org.sufficientlysecure.keychain/)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+    We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Qualifications
+
+- Cross-platform encryption apps must be open-source.
+- File encryption apps must support decryption on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- External disk encryption apps must support decryption on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- Internal (OS) disk encryption apps must be cross-platform or built in to the operating system natively.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Operating System (FDE) encryption apps should utilize hardware security such as a TPM or Secure Enclave.
+- File encryption apps should have first- or third-party support for mobile platforms.

docs/file-sharing.en.md

@@ -6,6 +6,26 @@ Discover how to privately share your files between your devices, with your frien
 
 ## File Sharing
 
+### Send
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+    ![Send logo](assets/img/file-sharing-sync/send.svg){ align=right }
+
+    **Send** is a fork of Mozilla’s discontinued Firefox Send service which allows you to send files to others with a link. Files are encrypted on your device so that they cannot be read by the server, and they can be optionally password-protected as well. The maintainer of Send hosts a [public instance](https://send.vis.ee/). You can use other public instances, or you can host Send yourself.
+
+    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://send.vis.ee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send-instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+    [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/timvisee){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Send can be used via its web interface or via the [ffsend](https://github.com/timvisee/ffsend) CLI. If you are familiar with the command-line and send files frequently, we recommend using the CLI client to avoid JavaScript-based encryption. You can specify the `--host` flag to use a specific server:
+
+```bash
+ffsend upload --host https://send.vis.ee/ FILE
+```
+
 ### OnionShare
 
 !!! recommendation
@@ -16,7 +36,7 @@ Discover how to privately share your files between your devices, with your frien
 
     [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://onionshare.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
     [:simple-torbrowser:](http://lldan5gahapx5k7iafb3s4ikijc4ni7gx5iywdflkba5y2ezyg6sjgyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
-    [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.onionshare.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.onionshare.org){ .card-link title=Documentation}
     [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/onionshare/onionshare){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
 
     ??? downloads
@@ -25,6 +45,18 @@ Discover how to privately share your files between your devices, with your frien
         - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://onionshare.org/#download)
         - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://onionshare.org/#download)
 
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+    We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must not store decrypted data on a remote server.
+- Must be open-source.
+- Must either have clients for Linux, macOS, and Windows; or have a web interface.
+
 ## FreedomBox
 
 !!! recommendation
@@ -40,7 +72,35 @@ Discover how to privately share your files between your devices, with your frien
 
 ## File Sync
 
-### Syncthing
+### Nextcloud (Client-Server)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+    ![Nextcloud logo](assets/img/productivity/nextcloud.svg){ align=right }
+
+    **Nextcloud** is a suite of free and open-source client-server software for creating your own file hosting services on a private server you control.
+
+    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://nextcloud.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:octicons-eye-16:](https://nextcloud.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://nextcloud.com/support/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/nextcloud){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+    [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nextcloud.com/contribute/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+    ??? downloads
+
+        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nextcloud.client)
+        - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1125420102)
+        - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/nextcloud/android/releases)
+        - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+        - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+        - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+        - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/www/nextcloud)
+
+!!! danger
+
+    We don't recommend using the [E2EE App](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/end_to_end_encryption) for Nextcloud as it may lead to data loss; it is highly experimental and not production quality.
+
+### Syncthing (P2P)
 
 !!! recommendation
 
@@ -55,11 +115,31 @@ Discover how to privately share your files between your devices, with your frien
 
     ??? downloads
 
+        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nutomic.syncthingandroid)
         - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
         - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
         - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
         - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
         - [:simple-openbsd: OpenBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
         - [:simple-netbsd: NetBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
-        - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nutomic.syncthingandroid)
-        - [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/packages/com.nutomic.syncthingandroid/)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+    We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+#### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must not require a third-party remote/cloud server.
+- Must be open-source.
+- Must either have clients for Linux, macOS, and Windows; or have a web interface.
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Has mobile clients for iOS and Android, which at least support document previews.
+- Supports photo backup from iOS and Android, and optionally supports file/folder sync on Android.

docs/frontends.en.md

@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+---
+title: "Frontends"
+icon: material/flip-to-front
+---
+
+Sometimes services will try to force you to sign up for an account by blocking access to content with annoying popups. They might also break without JavaScript enabled. These frontends can allow you to get around these restrictions.
+
+## LBRY
+
+### Librarian
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+    ![Librarian logo](assets/img/frontends/librarian.svg#only-light){ align=right }
+    ![Librarian logo](assets/img/frontends/librarian-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
+
+    **Librarian** is a free and open-source frontend for [Odysee](https://odysee.com/) (LBRY) that is also self-hostable.
+    
+    There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+    [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:octicons-server-16:](https://librarian.codeberg.page/){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+!!! warning
+
+    Librarian does not proxy video streams by default. Videos watched through Librarian will still make direct connections to Odysee's servers (e.g. `odycdn.com`); however, some instances may enable proxying which would be detailed in the instance's privacy policy.
+
+!!! tip
+
+    Librarian is useful if you want watch LBRY content on mobile without mandatory telemetry and if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, as is the case with [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Librarian, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a Librarian instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Librarian instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect the default policy. Librarian instances feature a "privacy nutrition label" to provide an overview of their policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+## Twitter
+
+### Nitter
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+    ![Nitter logo](assets/img/frontends/nitter.svg){ align=right }
+
+    **Nitter** is a free and open-source frontend for [Twitter](https://twitter.com) that is also self-hostable.
+
+    There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+    [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter/wiki/Instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+    [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter#nitter){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! tip
+
+    Nitter is useful if you want to browser Twitter content without having to log in and if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, as is the case with [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level. It also allows you to [create RSS feeds for Twitter](news-aggregators.md#twitter).
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Nitter, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a Nitter instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Nitter instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect the default policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+## TikTok
+
+### ProxiTok
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+    ![ProxiTok logo](assets/img/frontends/proxitok.svg){ align=right }
+
+    **ProxiTok** is an open source frontend to the [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com) website that is also self-hostable.
+
+    There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+    [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok/wiki/Public-instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+!!! tip
+
+    ProxiTok is useful if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, such as [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting ProxiTok, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a ProxiTok instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. ProxiTok instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect their associated privacy policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+## YouTube
+
+### FreeTube
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+    ![FreeTube logo](assets/img/frontends/freetube.svg){ align=right }
+
+    **FreeTube** is a free and open-source desktop application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com). When using FreeTube, your subscription list and playlists are saved locally on your device.
+
+    By default, FreeTube blocks all YouTube advertisements. In addition, FreeTube optionally integrates with [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments.
+
+    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://freetubeapp.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:octicons-eye-16:](https://freetubeapp.io/privacy.php){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.freetubeapp.io/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/FreeTubeApp/FreeTube){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+    [:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/FreeTube){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+    ??? downloads
+
+        - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+        - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+        - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+        - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/io.freetubeapp.FreeTube)
+
+!!! Warning
+
+    When using FreeTube, your IP address may still be known to YouTube, [Invidious](https://instances.invidious.io) or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+### Yattee
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+    ![Yattee logo](assets/img/frontends/yattee.svg){ align=right }
+
+    **Yattee** is a free and open-source privacy oriented video player for iOS, tvOS and macOS for [YouTube](https://youtube.com). When using Yattee, your subscription list are saved locally on your device.
+
+    By default, Yattee blocks all YouTube advertisements. In addition, Yattee optionally integrates with [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments.
+
+    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://github.com/yattee/yattee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:octicons-eye-16:](https://r.yattee.stream/docs/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+    [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/wiki/Donations){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+    ??? downloads
+
+        - [:simple-apple: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/yattee/id1595136629)
+        - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/releases)
+
+Due to App Store restrictions, you'll need to take a few [extra steps](https://gonzoknows.com/posts/Yattee/) before you can use Yattee.
+
+!!! Warning
+
+    When using Yattee, your IP address may still be known to YouTube, [Invidious](https://instances.invidious.io), [Piped](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances) or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+### NewPipe (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation annotate
+
+    ![Newpipe logo](assets/img/frontends/newpipe.svg){ align=right }
+
+    **NewPipe** is a free and open-source Android application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com), [SoundCloud](https://soundcloud.com), [media.ccc.de](https://media.ccc.de), [Bandcamp](https://bandcamp.com), and [PeerTube](https://joinpeertube.org/) (1).
+
+    Your subscription list and playlists are saved locally on your Android device.
+
+    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://newpipe.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:octicons-eye-16:](https://newpipe.net/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://teamnewpipe.github.io/documentation/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamNewPipe/NewPipe){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+    [:octicons-heart-16:](https://newpipe.net/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+    ??? downloads
+
+        - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/TeamNewPipe/NewPipe/releases)
+
+1. The default instance is [FramaTube](https://framatube.org/), however more can be added via **Settings** → **Content** → **PeerTube instances**
+
+!!! Warning
+
+    When using NewPipe, your IP address will be visible to the video providers used. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+### Invidious
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+    ![Invidious logo](assets/img/frontends/invidious.svg#only-light){ align=right }
+    ![Invidious logo](assets/img/frontends/invidious-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
+
+    **Invidious** is a free and open-source frontend for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) that is also self-hostable.
+
+    There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://invidious.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:octicons-server-16:](https://instances.invidious.io){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.invidious.io/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/iv-org/invidious){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+    [:octicons-heart-16:](https://invidious.io/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! warning
+
+    Invidious does not proxy video streams by default. Videos watched through Invidious will still make direct connections to Google's servers (e.g. `googlevideo.com`); however, some instances support video proxying—simply enable *Proxy videos* within the instances' settings or add `&local=true` to the URL.
+
+!!! tip
+
+    Invidious is useful if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, such as [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level. It does not provide privacy by itself, and we don’t recommend logging into any accounts.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Invidious, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using an Invidious instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Invidious instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect their associated privacy policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+### Piped
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+    ![Piped logo](assets/img/frontends/piped.svg){ align=right }
+
+    **Piped** is a free and open-source frontend for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) that is also self-hostable.
+
+    Piped requires JavaScript in order to function and there are a number of public instances.
+
+    [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:octicons-server-16:](https://piped.kavin.rocks/preferences#ddlInstanceSelection){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://piped-docs.kavin.rocks/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+    [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped#donations){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! tip
+
+    Piped is useful if you want to use [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) without installing an extension or to access age-restricted content without an account. It does not provide privacy by itself, and we don’t recommend logging into any accounts.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Piped, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a Piped instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Piped instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect their associated privacy policy.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+    We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+Recommended frontends...
+
+- Must be open-source.
+- Must be self-hostable.
+- Must provide all basic website functionality available to anonymous users.
+
+We only consider frontends for websites which are...
+
+- Not normally accessible without JavaScript.

docs/index.en.md

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ hide:
 
 ##### “I have nothing to hide. Why should I care about my privacy?”
 
-Much like the right to interracial marriage, woman's suffrage, freedom of speech, and many others, we didn't always have the right to privacy. In several dictatorships, many still don't. Generations before ours fought for our right to privacy. ==Privacy is a human right inherent to all of us== that we are entitled to without discrimination.
+Much like the right to interracial marriage, woman's suffrage, freedom of speech, and many others, our right to privacy hasn't always been upheld. In several dictatorships, it still isn't. Generations before ours fought for our right to privacy. ==Privacy is a human right, inherent to all of us,== that we are entitled to (without discrimination).
 
 You shouldn't confuse privacy with secrecy. We know what happens in the bathroom, but you still close the door. That's because you want privacy, not secrecy. **Everyone** has something to protect. Privacy is something that makes you human.
 
@@ -22,9 +22,9 @@ You shouldn't confuse privacy with secrecy. We know what happens in the bathroom
 <div style="margin-left:auto;margin-right:0;text-align:right;max-width:38rem;" markdown>
 ## What should I do?
 
-##### First, you need to make a plan
+##### First, you need to make a plan.
 
-Trying to protect all your data from everyone all the time is impractical, expensive, and exhausting. But don't worry! Security is a process, and by thinking ahead you can put together a plan that's right for you. Security isn't just about the tools you use or the software you download. Rather, it begins by understanding the unique threats you face, and how you can counter them.
+Trying to protect all your data from everyone all the time is impractical, expensive, and exhausting. But don't worry! Security is a process, and, by thinking ahead, you can put together a plan that's right for you. Security isn't just about the tools you use or the software you download. Rather, it begins by understanding the unique threats you face, and how you can mitigate them.
 
 ==This process of identifying threats and defining countermeasures is called **threat modeling**==, and it forms the basis of every good security and privacy plan.
 
@@ -32,29 +32,19 @@ Trying to protect all your data from everyone all the time is impractical, expen
 </div>
 </div>
 
-<div style="padding-top:5em;max-width:960px;margin:auto;text-align:center;" markdown>
-## We need you! Here's how to get involved
+<div style="padding:3em;max-width:960px;margin:auto;text-align:center;" markdown>
+## We need you! Here's how to get involved:
 
 It's important for a website like Privacy Guides to always stay up-to-date. We need our audience to keep an eye on software updates for the applications listed on our site and follow recent news about providers that we recommend. It's hard to keep up with the fast pace of the internet, but we try our best. If you spot an error, think a provider should not be listed, notice a qualified provider is missing, believe a browser plugin is no longer the best choice, or uncover any other issue, please let us know.
-</div>
+
 <div class="grid cards" style="margin:auto;max-width:800px;text-align:center;" markdown>
 
-- [:simple-reddit: Join the r/PrivacyGuides Subreddit](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacyguides)
-- [:simple-mastodon: Follow us on Mastodon](https://mastodon.social/@privacyguides){ rel=me }
+- [:simple-discourse: Join our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/)
+- [:simple-mastodon: Follow us on Mastodon](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides){ rel=me }
 - [:material-book-edit: Contribute to this website](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org)
 - [:simple-matrix: Chat with us on Matrix](https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org)
-
-</div>
-<div style="padding:3em;text-align:center;" markdown>
-## About Privacy Guides
-
-**Privacy Guides** is a non-profit, socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy.
-
-We do not make money from recommending certain products, and we do not use affiliate links.
-<div class="grid cards" style="margin:auto;max-width:800px;text-align:center;" markdown>
-
-- [:material-information-outline: Learn More About Us](about/)
-- [:material-hand-coin-outline: Donation Info & Project Backers](about/donate/)
+- [:material-information-outline: Learn more about us](about/index.md)
+- [:material-hand-coin-outline: Support the project](about/donate.md)
 
 </div>
 </div>

docs/kb-archive.en.md

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+---
+title: KB Archive
+icon: material/archive
+---
+# Pages Moved to Blog
+
+Some pages that used to be in our knowledge base can now be found on our blog:
+
+- [GrapheneOS vs. CalyxOS](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/)
+- [Signal Configuration Hardening](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening/)
+- [Linux - System Hardening](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/22/linux-system-hardening/)
+- [Linux - Application Sandboxing](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/22/linux-application-sandboxing/)
+- [Secure Data Erasure](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/05/25/secure-data-erasure/)
+- [Integrating Metadata Removal](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/09/integrating-metadata-removal/)
+- [iOS Configuration Guide](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/22/ios-configuration-guide/)

docs/linux-desktop/hardening.en.md

@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
----
-title: System Hardening
-icon: material/monitor-lock
----
-There are a number of procedures you can follow to make your Linux desktop system more secure, some more advanced than others. We cover some general techniques here.
-
-## Firewalls
-
-A [firewall](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)) may be used to secure connections to your system. If you’re on a public network, the necessity of this may be greater than if you’re on a local trusted network that you control. We would generally recommend that you block incoming connections only, unless you’re using an application firewall such as [OpenSnitch](https://github.com/evilsocket/opensnitch) or [Portmaster](https://safing.io/portmaster/).
-
-Red Hat distributions (such as Fedora) are typically configured through [firewalld](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewalld). Red Hat has plenty of [documentation](https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/8/html/configuring_and_managing_networking/using-and-configuring-firewalld_configuring-and-managing-networking) regarding this topic. There is also the [Uncomplicated Firewall](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncomplicated_Firewall) which can be used as an alternative.
-
-You could also set your default firewall zone to drop packets. If you're on a Redhat based distribution, such as Fedora this can be done with the following commands:
-
-!!! Example
-    ```
-    firewall-cmd --set-default-zone=drop;
-    firewall-cmd --add-protocol=ipv6-icmp --permanent;
-    firewall-cmd --add-service=dhcpv6-client --permanent;
-    ```
-
-All these firewalls use the [Netfilter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netfilter) framework and therefore cannot protect against malicious programs running on the system. A malicious program could insert its own rules.
-
-If you are using Flatpak packages, you can revoke their network socket access using Flatseal and prevent those applications from accessing your network. This permission is not bypassable.
-
-If you are using non-classic [Snap](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snap_(package_manager)) packages on a system with proper snap confinement support (with both AppArmor and [cgroups](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cgroups) v1 present), you can use the Snap Store to revoke network permission as well. This is also not bypassable.
-
-## Kernel hardening
-
-Kernel hardening options such as configuring [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl#Linux) keys and [kernel command-line parameters](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.html) can help harden your system. We suggest looking at the following [sysctl settings](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#sysctl) and [boot parameters](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#boot-parameters).
-
-We **strongly** recommend that you learn what these options do before applying them. There are also some methods of [kernel attack surface reduction](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#kernel-attack-surface-reduction) and [access restrictions to sysfs](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#restricting-sysfs) that can further improve security.
-
-!!! Note
-    Unprivileged [user namespaces](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#kernel) can be disabled, due to it being responsible for various privileged escalation vulnerabilities. Some software such as Docker, Podman, and LXC require unprivileged user namespaces to function. If you use these tools you should not disable `kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone`.
-
-    Disabling access to `/sys` without a proper whitelist will lead to various applications breaking. This will unfortunately be an extremely tedious process for most users. Kicksecure, and by extension, Whonix, has an experimental [hide hardware info service](https://github.com/Kicksecure/security-misc/blob/master/lib/systemd/system/hide-hardware-info.service) which does just this. From our testing, these work perfectly fine on minimal Kicksecure installations and both Qubes-Whonix Workstation and Gateway. If you are using Kicksecure or Whonix, we recommend that you follow the [Kicksecure Wiki](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Security-misc) to enable hide hardware info service.
-
-## Linux-Hardened
-
-Some distributions like Arch Linux have the [linux-hardened](https://github.com/anthraxx/linux-hardened), kernel package. It includes [hardening patches](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/security#Kernel_hardening) and more security-conscious defaults. Linux-Hardened has `kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=0` disabled by default. See the [note above](#kernel-hardening) about how this might impact you.
-
-## Linux Kernel Runtime Guard (LKRG)
-
-LKRG is a kernel module that performs runtime integrity check on the kernel to help detect exploits against the kernel. LKRG works in a *post*-detect fashion, attempting to respond to unauthorized modifications to the running Linux kernel. While it is [bypassable by design](https://lkrg.org/), it does stop off-the-shelf malware that does not specifically target LKRG itself. This may make exploits harder to develop and execute on vulnerable systems.
-
-If you can get LKRG and maintain module updates, it provides a worthwhile improvement to security. Debian based distributions can get the LKRG DKMS package from KickSecure's secure repository and the [KickSecure documentation](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Linux_Kernel_Runtime_Guard_LKRG) has instructions.
-
-On Fedora, [fepitre](https://github.com/fepitre), a QubesOS developer has a [COPR repository](https://copr.fedorainfracloud.org/coprs/fepitre/lkrg/) where you can install it. Arch based systems can obtain the LKRG DKMS package via an [AUR package](https://aur.archlinux.org/packages/lkrg-dkms).
-
-## GRSecurity
-
-GRSecurity is a set of kernel patches that attempt to improve security of the Linux kernel. It requires [payment to access](https://grsecurity.net/purchase) the code and is worth using if you have a subscription.
-
-## Simultaneous multithreading (SMT)
-
-[SMT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simultaneous_multithreading) has been the cause of numerous hardware vulnerabilities, and subsequent patches for those vulnerabilities often come with performance penalties that negate most of the performance gain given by SMT. If you followed the “kernel hardening” section above, some kernel parameters already disable SMT. If the option is available to you, we recommend that you disable it in your firmware as well.
-
-## Hardened memory allocator
-
-The [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc) from [GrapheneOS](https://grapheneos.org) can also be used on general Linux distributions. It is available as an [AUR package](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Security#Hardened_malloc) on Arch based distributions, and (though not enabled by default) on Whonix and Kicksecure.
-
-If you are using Whonix, Kicksecure or the AUR package, consider setting up `LD_PRELOAD` as described in the [Kicksecure Documentation](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Hardened_Malloc) or [Arch Wiki](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Security#Hardened_malloc).
-
-## Umask
-
-If you are not using openSUSE, consider changing the default [umask](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Umask) for both regular user accounts and root to 077. Changing umask to 077 can break snapper on openSUSE and is **not** recommended.
-
-## Mountpoint hardening
-
-Consider adding the [following options](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/mount.8.html) `nodev`, `noexec`, and `nosuid` to [mountpoints](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mount_(computing)) which do not need them. Typically, these could be applied to `/boot`, `/boot/efi`, and `/var`.
-
-These flags could also be applied to `/home` and `/root` as well, however, `noexec` will prevent applications from working that require binary execution in those locations. This includes products such as Flatpak and Snap.
-
-If you use [Toolbox](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora-silverblue/toolbox/), `/var/log/journal` must not have any of those options. If you are on Arch Linux, do not apply `noexec` to `/var/tmp`.
-
-## Disabling SUID
-
-SUID allows a user to execute an application as the owner of that application, which in many cases, would be the `root` user. Vulnerable SUID executables could lead to privilege escalation vulnerabilities.
-
-It is desirable to remove SUID from as many binaries as possible; however, this takes substantial effort and trial and error on the user's part, as some applications require SUID to function.
-
-Kicksecure, and by extension, Whonix has an experimental [permission hardening service](https://github.com/Kicksecure/security-misc/blob/master/lib/systemd/system/permission-hardening.service) and [application whitelist](https://github.com/Kicksecure/security-misc/tree/master/etc/permission-hardening.d) to automate SUID removal from most binaries and libraries on the system. From our testing, these work perfectly fine on a minimal Kicksecure installation and both Qubes-Whonix Workstation and Gateway.
-
-If you are using Kicksecure or Whonix, we recommend that you follow the [Kicksecure Wiki](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/SUID_Disabler_and_Permission_Hardener) to enable the permission hardener.
-
-Users of other distributions can adapt the permission hardener to their own system based on the source code linked above.
-
-## Secure Time Synchronization
-
-Most Linux distributions by default (especially Arch based distributions with `systemd-timesyncd`) use un-encrypted NTP for time synchronization. Securing NTP can be achieved by [configuring NTS with chronyd](https://fedoramagazine.org/secure-ntp-with-nts/) or by using [swdate](https://github.com/Kicksecure/sdwdate) on Debian based distributions.
-
-## Linux Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM)
-
-The security of [PAM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux_PAM) can be [hardened](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#pam) to allow secure authentication to your system.
-
-On Red Hat distributions you can use [`authselect`](https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/8/html/configuring_authentication_and_authorization_in_rhel/configuring-user-authentication-using-authselect_configuring-authentication-and-authorization-in-rhel) to configure this e.g.:
-
-```bash
-sudo authselect select <profile_id, default: sssd> with-faillock without-nullok with-pamaccess
-```
-
-On systems where [`pam_faillock`](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/pam_tally.8.html) is not available, consider using [`pam_tally2`](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/pam_tally.8.html) instead.
-
-## USB port protection
-
-To better protect your [USB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USB) ports from attacks such as [BadUSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BadUSB), we recommend [USBGuard](https://github.com/USBGuard/usbguard). USBGuard has [documentation](https://github.com/USBGuard/usbguard#documentation) as does the [Arch Wiki](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/USBGuard).
-
-Another alternative option if you’re using the [linux-hardened](#linux-hardened) is the [`deny_new_usb`](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/linux-hardened/commit/96dc427ab60d28129b36362e1577b6673b0ba5c4) sysctl. See [Preventing USB Attacks with `linux-hardened`](https://blog.lizzie.io/preventing-usb-attacks-with-linux-hardened.html).
-
-## Secure Boot
-
-[Secure Boot](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface#Secure_Boot) can be used to secure the boot process by preventing the loading of [unsigned](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography) [UEFI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface) drivers or [boot loaders](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bootloader).
-
-One of the problems with Secure Boot, particularly on Linux is, that only the [chainloader](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chain_loading#Chain_loading_in_boot_manager_programs) (shim), the [boot loader](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bootloader) (GRUB), and the [kernel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kernel_(operating_system)) are verified and that's where verification stops. The [initramfs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Initial_ramdisk) is often left unverified, unencrypted, and open up the window for an [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attack. The firmware on most devices is also configured to trust Microsoft's keys for Windows and its partners, leading to a large attacks surface.
-
-To eliminate the need to trust Microsoft's keys, follow the "Using your own keys" section on the [Arch Wiki](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface/Secure_Boot). The important thing that needs to be done here is to replace the OEM's key with your own Platform Key.
-
-There are several ways to work around the unverified initramfs:
-
-The first way is to [encrypt the /boot partition](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/GRUB#Encrypted_/boot). If you are on Fedora Workstation (not Silverblue), you can follow [this guide](https://mutschler.eu/linux/install-guides/fedora-btrfs-33/) to convert the existing installation to encrypted `/boot`. openSUSE comes with this that by default.
-
-Encrypting `/boot` however have its own issues, one being that [GRUB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_GRUB) only supports [LUKS1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux_Unified_Key_Setup) and not the newer default LUKS2 scheme. As the bootloader runs in [protected mode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protected_mode) and the encryption module lacks [SSE acceleration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Streaming_SIMD_Extensions) so the boot process will take minutes to complete. Another problem with this is that you have to type the encryption password twice, which could be solved by following the [openSUSE Wiki](https://en.opensuse.org/SDB:Encrypted_root_file_system#Avoiding_to_type_the_passphrase_twice).
-
-There are a few options depending on your configuration:
-
-- If you enroll your own keys as described above, and your distribution supports Secure Boot by default, you can add your distribution's EFI Key into the list of trusted keys (db keys). It can then be enrolled into the firmware. Then, you should move all of your keys off your local storage device.
-- If you enroll your own keys as described above, and your distribution does **not** support Secure Boot out of the box (like Arch Linux), you have to leave the keys on the disk and setup automatic signing of the [kernel](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface/Secure_Boot#Signing_the_kernel_with_a_pacman_hook) and bootloader. If you are using Grub, you can install it with the `--no-shim-lock` option and remove the need for the chainloader.
-
-The second option is to creating an [EFI Boot Stub](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Unified_kernel_image) that contains the [kernel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kernel_(operating_system)), [initramfs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Initial_ramdisk), and [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode). This EFI stub can then be signed. If you use [dracut](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dracut_(software)) this can easily be done with the [`--uefi-stub` switch](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/dracut.8.html) or the [`uefi_stub` config](https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/dracut.conf.5.html) option. This option also requires you to leave the keys on the disk to setup automatic signing, which weakens the security model.
-
-After setting up Secure Boot it is crucial that you set a “firmware password” (also called a “supervisor password”, “BIOS password” or “UEFI password”), otherwise an adversary can simply disable Secure Boot.
-
-These recommendations can make you a little more resistant to [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, but they not good as a proper verified boot process such as that found on [Android](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), [ChromeOS](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), [macOS](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208198), or [Windows](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process).

docs/linux-desktop/sandboxing.en.md

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
----
-title: Application Sandboxing
-icon: octicons/apps-16
----
-Some sandboxing solutions for desktop Linux distributions do exist, however they are not as strict as those found in macOS or ChromeOS. Applications installed from the package manager (`dnf`, `apt`, etc.) typically have **no** sandboxing or confinement whatsoever. Below are a few projects that aim to solve this problem:
-
-### Flatpak
-
-[Flatpak](https://flatpak.org) aims to be a universal package manager for Linux. One of its main functions is to provide a universal package format which can be used in most Linux distributions. It provides some [permission control](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html).However, [it is known](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#flatpak) that Flatpak sandboxing could be improved as particular Flatpaks often have greater permission than required. There does seem to be [some agreement](https://theevilskeleton.gitlab.io/2021/02/11/response-to-flatkill-org.html) that this is the case.
-
-You can restrict applications further by issuing [Flatpak overrides](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/flatpak-command-reference.html#flatpak-override). This can be done with the command-line or by using [Flatseal](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.github.tchx84.Flatseal). Some sample overrides are provided by [tommytran732](https://github.com/tommytran732/Flatpak-Overrides) and [rusty-snake](https://github.com/rusty-snake/kyst/tree/main/flatpak).
-
-We generally recommend revoking access to:
-
-- the Network (`share=network`) socket (internet access)
-- the PulseAudio socket (for both audio in and out), `device=all` (access to all devices including the camera)
-- `org.freedesktop.secrets` dbus (access to secrets stored on your keychain) for applications which do not need it
-
-If an application works natively with Wayland (and not running through the [XWayland](https://wayland.freedesktop.org/xserver.html) compatibility layer), consider revoking its access to the X11 (`socket=x11`) and [Inter-process communications (IPC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unix_domain_socket) socket (`share=ipc`) as well.
-
-We also recommend restricting broad filesystem permissions such as `filesystem=home` and `filesystem=host` which should be revoked and replaced with just the directories that the app needs to access. Some applications like [VLC](https://www.flathub.org/apps/details/org.videolan.VLC) implement the [Portals](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/portal-api-reference.html) [API](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/API), which allows a file manager to pass files to the Flatpak application (e.g. VLC) without specific filesystem access privileges. VLC is only able to access the specific file that you want to open, rather than requiring privileges to particular locations.
-
-Hard-coded access to some kernel interfaces like [`/sys`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysfs) and [`/proc`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Procfs#Linux) and weak [seccomp](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seccomp) filters unfortunately cannot be secured with Flatpak.
-
-### Firejail
-
-[Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) is another method of sandboxing. As it is a large [setuid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Setuid) binary, it has a large attack surface which may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation).
-
-[This post from a Whonix security researcher](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#firejail) provides additional details on how Firejail can worsen the security of your device.
-
-### Mandatory Access Control
-
-[Mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) systems require policy files in order to force constraints on the system.
-
-The two main control systems are [SELinux](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux) (used on Android and Fedora) and [AppArmor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AppArmor).
-
-Fedora includes SELinux preconfigured with some policies that will confine [system daemons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daemon_(computing)) (background processes). We don’t recommend disabling SELinux.
-
-openSUSE gives the choice of AppArmor or SELinux during the installation process. We recommend sticking to the default for each variant (AppArmor for [Tumbleweed](https://get.opensuse.org/tumbleweed/) and SELinux for [MicroOS](https://microos.opensuse.org/)). openSUSE’s SELinux policies are derived from Fedora.
-
-Arch and Arch-based operating systems often do not come with a mandatory access control system and that must be configured manually for either [AppArmor](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AppArmor) or [SELinux](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/SELinux).
-
-Linux desktops don't usually include individual app confinement rules, unlike Android which sandboxes every application installed.
-
-### Making your own policies/profiles
-
-You can make your own AppArmor profiles, SELinux policies, Bubblewrap profiles, and [seccomp](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seccomp) blacklist to have better confinement of applications. This is an advanced and sometimes tedious task, so we won’t go into detail about how to do it here, but we do have a few projects that you could use as reference.
-
-- Whonix’s [AppArmor Everything](https://github.com/Whonix/apparmor-profile-everything)
-- Krathalan’s [AppArmor profiles](https://github.com/krathalan/apparmor-profiles)
-- noatsecure’s [SELinux templates](https://github.com/noatsecure/hardhat-selinux-templates)
-- Seirdy’s [Bubblewrap scripts](https://sr.ht/~seirdy/bwrap-scripts)
-
-### Securing Linux containers
-
-If you’re running a server, you may have heard of Linux Containers, Docker, or Podman which refer to a kind of [OS-level virtualization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OS-level_virtualization). Containers are more common in server and development environments where individual apps are built to operate independently.
-
-[Docker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Docker_(software)) is one of the most common container solutions. It does not run a proper sandbox, and this means that there is a large kernel attack surface. The [daemon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daemon_(computing)) controls everything and [typically](https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/rootless/#known-limitations) runs as root. If it crashes for some reason, all the containers will crash too. The [gVisor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GVisor) runtime which implements an application level kernel can help limit the number of [syscalls](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/System_call) an application can make and can help isolate it from the host’s [kernel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kernel_(operating_system)).
-
-Red Hat develops [Podman](https://docs.podman.io/en/latest/) and secures it with SELinux to [isolate](https://www.redhat.com/sysadmin/apparmor-selinux-isolation) containers from each other. One of the notable differences between Docker and Podman is that Docker requires [root](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superuser) while Podman can run with [rootless containers](https://developers.redhat.com/blog/2020/09/25/rootless-containers-with-podman-the-basics) that are also [daemonless](https://developers.redhat.com/blog/2018/08/29/intro-to-podman), meaning if one crashes they don’t all come down.
-
-Another option is [Kata containers](https://katacontainers.io/), where virtual machines masquerade as containers. Each Kata container has its own Linux kernel and is isolated from the host.
-
-The above container technologies can be useful if you want to run certain web app software on your local network, such as [Vaultwarden](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden) or images provided by [LinuxServer.io](https://www.linuxserver.io), to increase privacy by decreasing dependence on various web services. A guide on [hardening Docker and OCI](https://wonderfall.dev/docker-hardening) has been written by the author "Wonderfall."

docs/meta/brand.md

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+---
+title: Branding Guidelines
+---
+
+The name of the website is **Privacy Guides** and should **not** be changed to:
+
+<div class="pg-red" markdown>
+- PrivacyGuides
+- Privacy guides
+- PG
+- PG.org
+</div>
+
+The name of the subreddit is **r/PrivacyGuides** or **the Privacy Guides Subreddit**.
+
+Additional branding guidelines can be found at [github.com/privacyguides/brand](https://github.com/privacyguides/brand)
+
+## Trademark
+
+"Privacy Guides" and the shield logo are trademarks owned by Jonah Aragon, unlimited usage is granted to the Privacy Guides project.
+
+Without waiving any of its rights, Privacy Guides does not advise others on the scope of its intellectual property rights. Privacy Guides does not permit or consent to any use of its trademarks in any manner that is likely to cause confusion by implying association with or sponsorship by Privacy Guides. If you are aware of any such use, please contact Jonah Aragon at jonah@privacyguides.org. Consult your legal counsel if you have questions.