Update the-dangers-of-end-to-end-encryption.md

.all-contributorsrc

@@ -2986,26 +2986,6 @@
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-      "profile": "https://github.com/jordbm",
-      "contributions": [
-        "doc",
-        "maintenance",
-        "security"
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.vscode/ltex.dictionary.en-US.txt

@@ -554,11 +554,3 @@ MWEB
 Cyd
 Semiphemeral
 Dangerzone
-simple-activitypub
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-pseudorandom
-Chaum
-unlinkability
-Kagi
-Secureblue
-pseudonymity

README.md

@@ -611,8 +611,6 @@ Privacy Guides wouldn't be possible without these wonderful people ([emoji key](
       <td align="center" valign="top" width="20%"><a rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" href="https://github.com/bruch-alex"><img src="https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/173354246?v=4" width="100px;" loading=lazy /><br /><sub><b>Alex Bruch</b></sub></a><br /><a href="#translation-bruch-alex" title="Translation">🌍</a></td>
       <td align="center" valign="top" width="20%"><a rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" href="https://github.com/qiyongzheng"><img src="https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/153378707?v=4" width="100px;" loading=lazy /><br /><sub><b>qiyongzheng</b></sub></a><br /><a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/commits?author=qiyongzheng" title="Documentation">📖</a></td>
       <td align="center" valign="top" width="20%"><a rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" href="https://github.com/hashcatHitman"><img src="https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/155700084?v=4" width="100px;" loading=lazy /><br /><sub><b>Sam K</b></sub></a><br /><a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/commits?author=hashcatHitman" title="Documentation">📖</a> <a href="#promotion-hashcatHitman" title="Promotion">📣</a> <a href="#question-hashcatHitman" title="Answering Questions">💬</a></td>
-      <td align="center" valign="top" width="20%"><a rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" href="https://github.com/Spirizer"><img src="https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/51120100?v=4" width="100px;" loading=lazy /><br /><sub><b>Spirizer</b></sub></a><br /><a href="#translation-Spirizer" title="Translation">🌍</a></td>
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     </tr>
   </tbody>
   <tfoot>

blog/.authors.yml

@@ -40,13 +40,6 @@ authors:
     name: fria
     description: Team Member
     avatar: https://github.com/friadev.png
-  jordan:
-    name: Jordan Warne
-    description: Video Producer
-    avatar: https://forum-cdn.privacyguides.net/user_avatar/discuss.privacyguides.net/jordan/288/7793_2.png
-    mastodon:
-      username: jw
-      instance: social.lol
   jonah:
     name: Jonah Aragon
     description: Project Director

blog/posts/age-verification-wants-your-face.md

@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
----
-date:
-    created: 2025-05-06T21:45:00Z
-categories:
-    - News
-authors:
-    - em
-description: Age verification laws and propositions forcing platforms to restrict content accessed by children and teens have been multiplying in recent years. The problem is, implementing such measure necessarily requires identifying each user accessing this content, one way or another. This is bad news for your privacy.
-schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle
-preview:
-  cover: blog/assets/images/age-verification-wants-your-face/ageverification-cover.webp
----
-
-# Age Verification Wants Your Face, and Your Privacy
-
-![A stylized photo showing a person holding a printed photo of their face in front of their actual face.](../assets/images/age-verification-wants-your-face/ageverification-cover.webp)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Photo: Kyle Glenn / Unsplash</small>
-
-Age verification laws and propositions forcing platforms to restrict content accessed by children and teens have been multiplying in recent years. The problem is, implementing such measures necessarily requires identifying each user accessing this content, one way or another. This is bad news for your privacy.<!-- more -->
-
-For a few years now, several legislators in North America, Europe, and Australia have expressed concern about children and teens accessing certain types of content online. While there is no doubt some online content can be worrisome, implementing a technological solution for this is [extremely problematic](https://www.jonaharagon.com/posts/age-verification-is-incompatible-with-the-internet/).
-
-By mandating platforms to be legally responsible to verify a user's age, regulators effectively force them to identify each user requesting access to content deemed inappropriate under a certain age threshold.
-
-If these regulations continue to proliferate, this could lead to the end of pseudonymity online.
-
-## How can age be verified online
-
-Verifying age online is [difficult](https://www.woodhullfoundation.org/fact-checked/online-age-verification-is-not-the-same-as-flashing-your-id-at-a-liquor-store/). There isn't any magical solution to it, it's either recording how a user looks or scanning official documents.
-
-Conducting verification "on-device" offers only few additional protections considering this information still has to be checked and reported with an external service, somehow.
-
-Moreover, processes used to keep this data "on-device" are often opaque. Taking into account how valuable this information is, it becomes very difficult to trust any for-profit third-party services which such a sensitive task.
-
-Users' faces and official documents are two types of very sensitive information. Who becomes responsible to collect, process, store, and safeguard this data? With whom does this data get shared, and for which other purposes? And how accurate is this data anyway?
-
-### Facial scans
-
-Some platforms and third-party providers of the rapidly growing "[identity verification industry](https://www.businessresearchinsights.com/market-reports/digital-identity-verification-market-118180)" have started to use facial recognition and face scan systems in order to determine a user's age.
-
-The problem is, the systems are [horrible for everyone's privacy](https://www.liberties.eu/en/stories/facial-recognition-privacy-concerns/44518), extremely problematic to use due to [racist and gendered biases](https://www.aclu-mn.org/en/news/biased-technology-automated-discrimination-facial-recognition), [inaccurate](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/01/face-scans-estimate-our-age-creepy-af-and-harmful) to determine the correct age, and on top of all that, [can be cheated](https://www.theregister.com/2022/05/22/ai_in_brief/).
-
-### Official documents
-
-The second solution is to require users to provide an official piece of ID. Considering an official ID often contain a photo, full legal name, date of birth, home address, and government specific codes, this is even worse.
-
-All this sensitive data then gets collected by either the platform itself or a third-party provider with little oversight or incentive to protect this data at all. Leaks and breaches for this enormous data trove are just around the corner. Unfortunately, this isn't speculative, [data leaks have already occurred](https://www.404media.co/id-verification-service-for-tiktok-uber-x-exposed-driver-licenses-au10tix/).
-
-The more copies of your official documents exist online, the greater the risk this data *will get exposed*, and the less value this document has to actually identify you when it's *truly* needed.
-
-And again, this sort of verification is easy to cheat. Any determined teenager will soon learn how to either create a fake ID, use someone else's ID, or go around this verification system in another way.
-
-Age verification laws will *without a doubt* support a flourishing criminal industry to provide fake or stolen IDs even more easily online.
-
-## Where age verification is (or will be) required
-
-In April this year, [Discord started to test age verification systems](https://www.theverge.com/news/650493/discord-age-verification-face-id-scan-experiment) using facial or ID scans, as a way to comply with [Australia](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c89vjj0lxx9o)'s and [UK](https://www.theverge.com/2023/10/26/23922397/uk-online-safety-bill-law-passed-royal-assent-moderation-regulation)'s new laws.
-
-This measure only applies to access certain protected posts for users located in Australia and the United Kingdom and at this time, but don't be surprised if it soon gets implemented at the account level for users everywhere.
-
-In the [United States](https://action.freespeechcoalition.com/age-verification-resources/state-avs-laws/), many states have already passed some types of age verification laws, and several others have proposed such laws. In [Canada](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/09/canadas-leaders-must-reject-overbroad-age-verification-bill) and [Europe](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/funding/call-tenders-development-consultancy-and-support-age-verification-solution), legislators have also been pushing for similar regulations to block content online subject to age verification.
-
-There is no doubt the more countries pass similar prohibitive laws, the more other countries will soon follow.
-
-Some hope however, this month a US federal judge ruled an age verification [law in Arkansas unconstitutional](https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/5228836-judge-blocks-social-media-age-verification-law-in-arkansas/).
-
-## Who decides what is sensitive content
-
-When talking about age verification, most assume this only applies to obvious pornographic content. However, many of these laws have [much wider reach](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/01/impact-age-verification-measures-goes-beyond-porn-sites).
-
-For example, the Australian law prohibits access to social media altogether for anyone under the age of 16. This means that, once the law comes into full effect after its transitional period, anyone who uses social media in Australia will have to prove they are older than this age. It is likely that all Australian users will have to provide some form of identifying data to continue using their social media accounts. **This is a privacy nightmare.**
-
-When laws target specific content, definition of what is appropriate and what isn't is often too broad. Moreover, this definition is subject to change from one administration to another.
-
-There are also wide differences from one country to another. For example, some countries sadly consider simple discussions of gender identity or sexual orientation to be sensitive content. What is deemed inappropriate to children in one culture might not be the same in another.
-
-Automating this sort of censorship leads to a lot of misfiring. There has already been numerous instances of [breastfeeding photos mislabelled](https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/facebook-clarifies-breastfeeding-pics-ok-updates-rules-1.2997124) for nudity. Important educational material for sex education could get censored and inaccessible to children, who critically need access to it *before* adulthood.
-
-Who will decide which content should be censored and which shouldn't? Will countries hosting the big tech platforms end up having a greater decision power in the matter? Will platforms simply decide to apply the strongest level of restriction worldwide?
-
-## Age verification isn't effective
-
-Even if we could somehow find a global consensus that is perfectly ethical and never misfires on which content children shouldn't access, it will likely fail.
-
-Children, and teenagers especially, are and have always been incredibly effective at going around such limitation to feed their curious minds.
-
-First, there are technical tools such as VPNs and proxies of all sort to go around location-based restrictions. Then, there's the classic fake ID, and its modern evolution: deepfake face. There will also be without a doubt a growing market of pre-verified "adult" accounts up for sale online.
-
-Perhaps age verification measures will work for a couple of months, until products to evade it get the word out, then they'll become useless. Only leaving the ashes of your social media legal consenting adult pseudonymity in its path.
-
-## Why it's bad news for everyone's privacy
-
-Age verification will require all platforms and/or third-party identification service providers to collect an enormous trove of sensitive data on everyone.
-
-This goes against all principles of data minimization, generally a vital part of data protection regulations.
-
-Daily occurrences of data breach incidents have taught us we cannot trust these services to safeguard our data. Data breaches for this sensitive information are only a matter of time.
-
-The concentration of such valuable data will likely be monetized and resold either by the platforms themselves, by the for-profit third-party "age assurance" providers they use, or eventually by the criminals who stole it from them.
-
-This data trove will include face scans of children with their location (trying to pass as adults), and faces and official documents from every adult in the world using social media, if this kind of regulation gets implemented at large.
-
-**The privacy and safety implications of this are absolutely disastrous**.
-
-## Age verification is not the solution
-
-Sadly, age verification legislation will not help safeguard children from harmful content online, but it will effectively remove protection for anyone needing pseudonymity online to [stay safe](privacy-means-safety.md). Moreover, it will put everyone at a much greater risk of victimization by identify theft, impersonation, stalking, and worse.
-
-Despite the perhaps well-intended legislators, technological solutions aren't always adequate to solve every problem we have. Here again, education and content moderation are likely much better ways to deal with this sort of issues.
-
-In the meantime, don't be surprised if you cross a teenager on the street suddenly pointing their phone to scan *your* adult face, or a young relative looking in your wallet. They probably won't be looking for your money, but most likely for your adult ID.

blog/posts/encryption-is-not-a-crime.md

@@ -1,183 +0,0 @@
----
-date:
-    created: 2025-04-11T16:00:00Z
-categories:
-    - Opinion
-authors:
-    - em
-description: Encryption is not a crime, encryption protects all of us. Encryption, and especially end-to-end encryption, is an essential tool to protect everyone online. Attempts to undermine encryption are an attack to our fundamental right to privacy and an attack to our inherent right to security and safety.
-schema_type: OpinionNewsArticle
-preview:
-  cover: blog/assets/images/encryption-is-not-a-crime/encryption-is-not-a-crime-cover.webp
----
-# Encryption Is Not a Crime
-
-![Photo of a red key on an all black background.](../assets/images/encryption-is-not-a-crime/encryption-is-not-a-crime-cover.webp)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Photo: Matt Artz / Unsplash</small>
-
-Contrary to what some policymakers seem to believe, whether naively or maliciously, encryption is not a crime. Anyone asserting encryption is a tool for crime is either painfully misinformed or is attempting to manipulate legislators to gain oppressive power over the people.<!-- more -->
-
-Encryption is not a crime, encryption is a shield.
-
-Encryption is the digital tool that protects us against all sorts of attacks. It is the lock on your digital door preventing harmful intruders from entering your home. Encryption is also the door itself, protecting your privacy and intimacy from creepy eavesdroppers while you go about your life.
-
-It's not a crime to lock your home's door for protection, **why would it be a crime to lock your digital door?**
-
-[Encryption protects you](privacy-means-safety.md) from cyberattack, identity theft, discrimination, doxxing, stalking, sexual violence, physical harm, and much more.
-
-## Who says encryption is a crime
-
-Anyone who is well-informed will find it hard to believe someone could want to sabotage such fantastic protection.
-
-Yet, [year](https://www.wired.com/1993/02/crypto-rebels/) after [year](https://www.wired.com/story/a-new-era-of-attacks-on-encryption-is-starting-to-heat-up/), oppressive regimes and lazy or greedy [law enforcement](https://www.techradar.com/computing/cyber-security/anonymity-is-not-a-fundamental-right-experts-disagree-with-europol-chiefs-request-for-encryption-back-door) entities around the world have attempted to [undermine encryption](https://www.howtogeek.com/544727/what-is-an-encryption-backdoor/) using the pretext this is needed to "solve crime", despite all the experts *repeatedly* warning on how [unnecessary](https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/08/post-snowden-tech-became-more-secure-but-is-govt-really-at-risk-of-going-dark/) and [dangerous](https://www.globalencryption.org/2020/11/breaking-encryption-myths/) this would be. And this is without accounting for all the countries where encryption is *already* [severely restricted](https://www.gp-digital.org/world-map-of-encryption/), such as Russia, China, India, Iran, Egypt, Cuba, and others.
-
-Whether breaking encryption is brought up naively by misinformed authorities, or as a disguised excuse for mass surveillance is up for debate.
-
-Nevertheless, the result is the same: An attempt to destroy **a tool we all need to stay safe**.
-
-## Encryption is a protective shield
-
-Encryption, moreover end-to-end encryption, is a tool we all use in our digital life to stay safe.
-
-In today's world, the boundary between online and offline life is largely dissolved. Almost everything we do "offline" has a record of it "online". Online life is regular life now. It's not just your browsing history.
-
-Your medical record from a visit at the clinic, your purchase transaction from a trip to the store, your travel photos saved in the cloud, your text conversations with your friends, family, and children, are all likely protected with encryption, perhaps even with *end-to-end* encryption.
-
-Such a large trove of personal data needs to be protected against eavesdropping and malicious attacks for everyone to stay safe.
-
-Encryption offers this protection. End-to-end encryption all the more.
-
-## What is end-to-end encryption, and what is the war against it
-
-End-to-end encryption is a type of encryption where only the intended recipient(s) have the ability to decrypt (read) the encrypted data.
-
-This means that if you send a message through [Signal](https://signal.org/) for example, only the participants to this conversation will be able to read the content of this conversation. Even Signal cannot know what is being discussed on Signal.
-
-This greatly annoys some over-controlling authorities who would like to be granted unlimited power to spy on anyone anytime they wish, for vaguely defined purposes that could change at any moment.
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-End-to-end encryption can also mean a situation where you are "both ends" of the communication.
-
-For example, when enabling Apple's [Advanced Data Protection for iCloud](https://support.apple.com/en-ca/guide/security/sec973254c5f/web) (ADP), it activates end-to-end encryption protection for almost all of iCloud data, including photos. This means that even Apple could not see your photos, or be forced to share your photos with a governmental entity.
-
-Without ADP, Apple can read or share your photos (or other data) if they are legally compelled to, or if they feel like it. The same is true for Google's services, Microsoft's services, and any other online services that aren't end-to-end encrypted.
-
-This is at the root of the latest attack on encryption:
-
-In February this year, it was reported that [Apple was served with a notice](uk-forced-apple-to-remove-adp.md) from the UK's Home Office to force it to break ADP's end-to-end encryption. In response, Apple removed access to ADP from the UK entirely, making this protection unavailable to UK residents.
-
-Do not mistakenly think this attack is limited to the UK and Apple users, however. If this regulation notice or a similar one gets enforced, it would **impact the whole world.** Other countries would likely soon follow, and other services would likely soon get under attack as well.
-
-Moreover, do not feel unaffected just because you use end-to-end encryption with [Signal](https://www-svt-se.translate.goog/nyheter/inrikes/signal-lamnar-sverige-om-regeringens-forslag-pa-datalagring-klubbas?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en-US&_x_tr_pto=wapp) or [Proton](https://www.techradar.com/vpn/vpn-privacy-security/secure-encryption-and-online-anonymity-are-now-at-risk-in-switzerland-heres-what-you-need-to-know) services instead of Apple, they are both **under attack** as well in this war.
-
-Just in recent years, the war against encryption has affected the [US](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/04/earn-it-bill-back-again-seeking-scan-our-messages-and-photos), the [UK](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cgj54eq4vejo), [Sweden](https://www.globalencryption.org/2025/04/joint-letter-on-swedish-data-storage-and-access-to-electronic-information-legislation/), [France](https://www.laquadrature.net/en/warondrugslaw/), [Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India, Japan](https://www.theverge.com/2020/10/12/21513212/backdoor-encryption-access-us-canada-australia-new-zealand-uk-india-japan), and all the European Union countries with proposals such as [Chat Control](the-future-of-privacy.md/#chat-control-wants-to-break-end-to-end-encryption).
-
-## The arguments given to break encryption make no sense
-
-Authoritarian entities generally use the same populist excuses to justify their senseless demands. "Protecting the children" is always a fashionable disingenuous argument.
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-Because no one would disagree that protecting the children is important, it is often used as an attempt to deceitfully make an irrefutable argument to justify breaking encryption.
-
-The problem is, **breaking encryption doesn't protect the children**, it [endangers](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/jan/21/end-to-end-encryption-protects-children-says-uk-information-watchdog) them.
-
-When law enforcement officials claim they need to be able to read everyone's messages and see everyone's personal photos to be able to fight child predators, they seem to neglect that:
-
-- This means they will expose the children's messages, contact information, locations, and photos in the process, potentially *endangering the children further*.
-
-- Exposing everyone's data will make this data much more likely to be found and exploited by criminals, making *everyone* more vulnerable to attacks.
-
-- Predators will simply move to underground channels, [unbothered](https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/07/back_doors_wont.html).
-
-They use the same kind of deceptive argument trying to justify weakening the protections we have to supposedly catch "criminals" and "terrorists".
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-Of course the exact definition of what is a "criminal" or a "terrorist" is always vague and subject to change. In the past, human rights activists and authoritarian regime dissidents have been labeled as such, climate change activists as well, LGBTQ+ people even in some countries. Maybe next year this label will include "DEI advocates", who knows where they draw the line and what can be considered a "criminal" worth spying on.
-
-You *cannot* remove everyone's right to privacy and protection from harm while pretending it is to protect them. No one who is well-informed and well-intended could possibly consider this a smart thing to do.
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-**An attack on end-to-end encryption isn't an attack on criminals, it's an attack on all of us.**
-
-## Magical backdoor only for "the good guys" is a complete fantasy
-
-Let's say the strategy is akin to creating a MagicalKey that unlocks every door (a magical key because thinking encryption backdoors would only be used by "the good guys" is a great example of [magical thinking](https://www.britannica.com/science/magical-thinking)).
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-Imagine, for the sake of this exercise, the MagicalLock for this MagicalKey is impossible to pick, and imagine only police officers have MagicalKeys. Let's say one thousand police officers each have a MagicalKey.
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-They argue they need to be able to unlock anyone's door if they suspect a crime is happening inside. "It's for safety!"
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-Overtime, let's say only 1% of the police officers accidentally lose their MagicalKey. This kind of things happen. Now 10 MagicalKeys are lost in the wild and could be used by anyone else, for any purposes, including crime.
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-Then, let's say only 0.1% of police officers get corrupted by a crime gang. That's just one right? This corrupted "good guy" lets the gang create a double of the MagicalKey. Which crime gang wouldn't want a key that can magically open any door? They pay the police officer good money for this. It's an investment.
-
-Now, the gang creates doubles of the MagicalKey they have. They obfuscate its serial number, so it cannot be traced back to them. They use it subtly at first to avoid detection. They make sure they never leave traces behind, so victims have no idea their door got unlocked.
-
-During this time, they steal your data, they sell it, they use it to impersonate you, they use it to harm you and your loved ones.
-
-Then, another criminal figures out on their own how to emulate a MagicalKey without even having access to one. The criminal creates a reproducible mold for this Emulated-MagicalKey and sells it to other criminals on the criminal market. Now, the MagicalKey™️ is available to any criminals looking for it. Restrictions on the backdoor are off. **Your personal data is up for grabs.**
-
-This is what is going to happen if backdoors are implemented in end-to-end encryption. But don't worry they say, "it's only for the good guys!".
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-At least, the criminals' data will also be up for grabs, right?
-
-Nope! The criminals knew about this, so they just started using different channels that weren't impacted. Criminals will have their privacy intact, they don't care about using illegal tools, but **your legal privacy protections will be gone**.
-
-*Backdoored* end-to-end encryption isn't end-to-end anymore, it's just open-ended encryption. This offers pretty much no protection at all.
-
-## Ignoring experts doesn't make facts disappear
-
-Where is the opposition to this? Where are the experts pushing against this nightmare? Everywhere.
-
-Thankfully, opposition has been strong, despite the relentless ignorance or malevolence from authoritarian authorities repeatedly pushing against encryption.
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-Many people and groups have been fighting valiantly to defend our collective right to privacy and security. Countless experts have patiently taken the time to explain [again](https://signal.org/blog/uk-online-safety-bill/) and [again](https://www.globalencryption.org/2020/10/cdt-gpd-and-internet-society-reject-time-worn-argument-for-encryption-backdoors/) and [again](https://www.schneier.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/paper-keys-under-doormats-CSAIL.pdf) how an encryption backdoor only for "the good guys" is simply impossible.
-
-Weakening encryption to let "the good guys" enter, lets *anyone* enter, including criminals. There is no way around this.
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-Seemingly ignoring warnings and advice from the most respected specialists in the field, authoritarian officials continue to push against encryption. So much so that it has become difficult to assume good intent misguided by ignorance at this point.
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-Unfortunately, ignoring the experts or silencing the debate will not make the facts magically disappear.
-
-In an encouraging development this week, Apple [won a case](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cvgn1lz3v4no) fighting an attempt from the UK Home Office to hide from the public details of their latest attack on encryption.
-
-This battle and all battles to protect our privacy rights, *must* be fought is broad daylight, for all to see and to support.
-
-## Fight for encryption rights everywhere you can
-
-The war against encryption isn't anything new, it has been happening for decades. However, the quantity of data, personal and sensitive data, that is collected, stored, and shared about us is much larger today. It is essential we use the proper tools to secure this information.
-
-This is what have changed, and what is making encryption and end-to-end encryption even more indispensable today.
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-Mass surveillance will not keep us safe, it will endanger us further and damage our democracies and freedoms in irreparable ways.
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-We must fight to keep our right to privacy, and use of strong end-to-end encryption to protect ourselves, our friends, our family, and yes also to protect the children.
-
-### How can you support the right to encryption?
-
-- [x] Use end-to-end encryption everywhere you can.
-
-- [x] Talk about the benefits of end-to-end encryption to everyone around you, especially your loved ones less knowledgeable about technology. Talk about how it is essential to protect everyone's data, including the children's.
-
-- [x] Use social media to promote the benefits of end-to-end encryption and post about how it protects us all.
-
-- [x] Write or call your government representatives to let them know you care about end-to-end encryption and are worried about dangerous backdoors or chat control proposals.
-
-- [x] Support organizations fighting for encryption, such as:
-
-    - [Global Encryption Coalition](https://www.globalencryption.org/)
-
-    - [Open Rights Group](https://www.openrightsgroup.org/campaign/save-encryption/)
-
-    - [Fight For The Future](https://www.makedmssafe.com/)
-
-    - [Signal app](https://signal.org/donate/)
-
-    - [Internet Society](https://www.internetsociety.org/open-letters/fix-the-take-it-down-act-to-protect-encryption/)
-
-    - [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.eff.org/issues/end-end-encryption)
-
-    - [Privacy Guides](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/about/donate/) 💛
-
-Finally, have a look at our [recommendations](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tools/) if you want to start using more tools protecting your privacy using end-to-end encryption.
-
-This is a long war, but the importance of it doesn't allow us to give up.
-
-We must continue fighting for the right to protect our data with end-to-end encryption, **we owe it to ourselves, our loved ones, and the future generations.**

blog/posts/hide-nothing.md

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ On the surface, this seems true to many people – but the reality is very diffe
 
 In the end it only convicted one person.
 
-Now, many have argued that stopping one terrorist might be worth giving up some security for, but [according](https://web.archive.org/web/20230318132243/https://www.aclu.org/issues/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/surveillance-under-patriot-act) to the ACLU, the conviction would have occurred without the Patriot Act.
+Now, many have argued that stopping one terrorist might be worth giving up some security for, but [according](https://www.aclu.org/issues/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/surveillance-under-patriot-act) to the ACLU, the conviction would have occurred without the Patriot Act.
 
 Many legal actions you take today could be deemed illegal by future laws or future government. In the US today there is discussion around the possibility of Roe v. Wade being overturned, allowing states to outlaw abortions. You may not currently feel the need to hide internet searches, menstrual cycle apps, or donations to women's health clinics today because it's not illegal, but tomorrow that information could be used against you.
 

blog/posts/in-praise-of-tor.md

@@ -1,420 +0,0 @@
----
-date:
-    created: 2025-04-30T20:30:00Z
-    updated: 2025-05-06T18:00:00Z
-categories:
-    - Explainers
-tags:
-    - Tor
-authors:
-    - em
-description: You might have heard of Tor in the news a few times, yet never dared to try it yourself. Despite being around for decades, Tor is still a tool too few people know about. Today, Tor is easy to use for anyone. It not only helps journalists and activists, but anybody who seeks greater privacy online or access to information regardless of location. But what is Tor exactly? How can Tor help you? And why is it such an important tool?
-schema_type: OpinionNewsArticle
-preview:
-  cover: blog/assets/images/in-praise-of-tor/tor-cover.webp
----
-
-# In Praise of Tor: Why You Should Support and Use Tor
-
-![The Tor Project logo over a series of Tor icons on a purple background.](../assets/images/in-praise-of-tor/tor-cover.webp)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Em / Privacy Guides | Logo and icons: The Tor Project</small>
-
-You might have heard of Tor in the news a few times, yet never dared to try it yourself. Despite being around for decades, Tor is still a tool too few people know about.
-
-Today, Tor is easy to use for anyone. It helps not only journalists and activists, but anybody who seeks greater privacy online or access to information regardless of location. But what is Tor exactly? How can Tor help you? And why is it such an important tool?<!-- more -->
-
-## :simple-torbrowser: What is Tor
-
-Tor is an overlay network that was specifically designed to protect the privacy of its users. The Tor Network uses multiple layers of encryption and relays in order to protect a person's location and other potential identifiers, such as an IP address.
-
-Its name comes from the acronym for **The Onion Router**, a [routing system](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing) using multiple layers that can get peeled off at each step, like an onion 🧅
-
-This special network can be easily accessed by anyone, for free, through the Tor Browser. The Tor Browser is as easy to use as any other browser you are familiar with already.
-
-Both the tools for the Tor Network and the Tor Browser are maintained by a nonprofit organization called the Tor Project.
-
-### The Tor Network
-
-The [Tor Network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tor_(network)) was deployed in 2002, although its core principle was developed in the mid 1990s. It was first created at the United States Naval Research Laboratory in order to protect intelligence communication online.
-
-In 2004, the laboratory released the project's code under a free and open source license, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) began funding its development. A few years later, the onion routing project officially became the Tor Project.
-
-Today, Tor is one of the [largest](https://metrics.torproject.org/) anonymity networks, with thousands of relays and millions of users worldwide.
-
-#### How does it work
-
-The Tor Network is run by a community of volunteers who operate the relays required for the network to function.
-
-Each time someone uses the Tor Network, the communication passes through at least 3 relays: A Guard Relay, a Middle Relay, and an Exit Relay. Each relay has a different function to protect the communication.
-
-**The Guard Relay** knows where the communication is from (IP address), but doesn't know where it's going (which website is visited, for example). This relay only knows that you want to access the Tor Network. Its task is to send your encrypted communication to a Middle Relay, but it cannot read it.
-
-**The Middle Relay** doesn't really know anything. It doesn't know who you are nor where you are going. It only knows a Guard Relay wants to send encrypted data to an Exit Relay. The Middle Relay transfers this communication from one relay to another, and it cannot read it either.
-
-**The Exit Relay** has no idea who you are. It only knows someone, somewhere, wants to access this website (or other content). The Exit Relay will get the information from the website, then send it back to the Middle Relay, so that you can receive it from the Guard Relay. If you only visit pages using HTTPS, the Exit Relay can know someone is visiting this website, but cannot know what they are doing on it. Visiting *non-onion* websites using HTTPS instead of just HTTP is **[very important](https://support.torproject.org/https/https-1/)** for security and privacy.
-
-<div class="admonition info" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Onion service websites</p>
-
-Onion service websites are special websites that can only be accessed using the Tor Network.
-
-They are easy to recognize because they use the .onion domain at the end, and are often composed of a long string of seemingly random characters. Onion websites offer protections equivalent to HTTPS.
-
-You can see this represented by the [onion padlock icon](https://support.torproject.org/onionservices/onionservices-5/) in the Tor Browser.
-
-</div>
-
-#### How Tor works using a letter and envelopes analogy
-
-Tor works a bit as if you put a letter (request) into an envelope with someone's address. Then, you put this envelope in another envelope addressed to someone else, with instructions. Finally, you put this second envelope in yet another one.
-
-Each envelope protects the content of the other, and can only be opened one at the time by each recipient. In this analogy, each recipient (relay) has a key that can only open the envelope addressed to them, and not the others.
-
-![Graphic representation of a Tor Circuit composed of a Guard Relay, a Middle Relay, and an Exit Relay using a letter and envelopes analogy.](../assets/images/in-praise-of-tor/tor-diagram.webp)
-<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Em / Privacy Guides</small>
-
-#### What is a Tor Circuit
-
-The network of randomly selected relays to complete a request on the Tor Network is called a Tor Circuit. This circuit changes each time a new connection is established.
-
-From the Tor Browser, you can see each relay that was selected for a circuit, and even change it manually. To generate a new circuit, click on the "Tor Circuit" button on the upper-left of the browser, then on "New Tor circuit for this site" at the bottom.
-
-![Screenshot from the Tor Browser showing a popup window from the Tor Circuit button.](../assets/images/in-praise-of-tor/tor-torcircuit.webp)
-
-### The Tor Browser
-
-The [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/download/) was created in 2008 to facilitate access to the Tor Network. It is a modified version of Mozilla's Firefox browser, and can be installed on Linux, macOS, Windows, and Android systems.
-
-The Tor Browser start configuration is private by default. No additional extensions are required to make it more secure or more private. Actually, it's even discouraged to install any additional extensions, as this would weaken its [fingerprinting resistance](https://blog.torproject.org/browser-fingerprinting-introduction-and-challenges-ahead/).
-
-<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Highest security settings</p>
-
-Even if the Tor Browser is configured to be private by default, if you are in an especially sensitive situation, for example if you are using Tor as a whistleblower or a dissident activist, you might want to adjust the Tor Browser security level to "Safest".
-
-For this, click on the shield icon on the upper-right, then on the "Settings" button in blue, and select "Safest" instead of the default "Standard".
-
-**Important:** Each time you change the security level, you **must** make sure to restart the browser to ensure all changes have taken effect. Otherwise, [some changes](tor-security-slider-flaw.md) might not have been applied yet.
-
-</div>
-
-![Screenshot from the Tor Browser showing a warning from the SecureDrop website to adjust Tor security level to Safest.](../assets/images/in-praise-of-tor/tor-safestsetting.webp)
-
-The default search engine is the privacy-focused [DuckDuckGo](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/search-engines/#duckduckgo). You will not even find Google in the options for the default search engine. More browsers should follow this good practice.
-
-The first page opening with the Tor Browser will give the option to Connect to Tor. From there, you can click on "Connect" to start browsing through Tor, or on "Configure Connection" if you need additional settings. For example, if you need to set up a [Bridge](https://bridges.torproject.org/) because Tor is blocked from your country.
-
-<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Only connect to Tor if it is safe for you</p>
-
-Be careful when using Tor from a country where Tor might be blocked or perceived as suspicious. Similarly, be careful if you connect from a location where revealing you have been using Tor [could](#depending-on-where-you-are-using-tor-is-likely-safe) be dangerous to you.
-
-</div>
-
-![Screenshot from the Tor Browser showing the "Connect to Tor" welcome page.](../assets/images/in-praise-of-tor/tor-torbrowser.webp)
-
-Once connected to the Tor Network, you will be directed to the DuckDuckGo welcome page, and you can search or type any URLs in the address bar, like you would with any other browser.
-
-If you know an organization has an onion site (a website that is only accessible through Tor), you can type this onion address directly in the address bar.
-
-If you don't know if an organization has an onion site, you might find it from its regular URL. For example, if you visit privacyguides.org from the Tor Browser, you will notice a purple button on the right informing you that an onion version of this website is available, click on it to get redirected to it.
-
-![Screenshot from the Tor Browser showing the Privacy Guides website with an onion available purple button right to the address bar.](../assets/images/in-praise-of-tor/tor-privacyguides.webp)
-
-<div class="admonition info" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Mullvad Browser and the Tor Project</p>
-
-If you are familiar with the Mullvad Browser, know that the Mullvad Browser was developed by the Tor Project team!
-
-The Mullvad Browser was born of a [collaboration](https://blog.torproject.org/releasing-mullvad-browser/) between Mullvad VPN and the Tor Project, to build a browser that offers similar privacy features to the Tor Browser, but while using it through a VPN instead of through the Tor Network (both offering different benefits).
-
-The Mullvad Browser can also be used without a VPN, and will still provide better privacy protections than most other browsers. It cannot be used to access the Tor Network, however.
-
-</div>
-
-### The Tor Project
-
-The [Tor Project](https://www.torproject.org/) is the US-based nonprofit organization maintaining the software and community for the Tor Network, and developing and maintaining the Tor Browser. It's also a privacy advocacy organization, with a mission to advance human rights and freedoms around the world through the free technology it creates.
-
-The nonprofit was founded in 2006 and gets its funding from [various sources](https://www.torproject.org/about/supporters/) including government grants, independent contributors, and individual [donations](https://donate.torproject.org/).
-
-## :octicons-lock-16: What Tor can do
-
-### Improve Privacy
-
-Tor is not magical, but it's by far one of the best privacy tool we have. Using Tor will not make you perfectly anonymous online, but it will greatly reduce the traces your leave online.
-
-Here are a few benefits Tor can provide for your privacy:
-
-- Tor can prevent the websites you are visiting from collecting your IP address (and your IP address can indeed lead to identifying *you*).
-
-- Tor can prevent your Internet Service Provider (ISP), Virtual Private Network (VPN) provider, or authorities requesting information from them to collect a list of the websites you have visited. They will know however that you have been using Tor.
-
-- The Tor Browser isolates each website you visit. This prevents ads and trackers from following you around, potentially popping up later in your [Facebook ads and accidentally outing you](https://www.intomore.com/culture/you/facebook-ads-outed-me/).
-
-- The Tor Browser is fingerprinting resistant. This reduces the ways you can be tracked and identified online, even without your IP address.
-
-- When keeping the default settings, the Tor Browser only uses private windows and will not keep any traces of your browsing history. It will also delete all cookies and site data when closing.
-
-### Circumvent censorship
-
-Because of how the Tor Network redirects traffic, it's a perfect tool to resist censorship. Using Tor can give access to websites or services that aren't accessible from a country blocking them.
-
-Even from a region where Tor itself is actively blocked, the network can still be accessed using [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention/).
-
-Using this type of measures to circumvent government censorship will make Tor accessible even from countries with heavily censored internet, such as [China](https://support.torproject.org/censorship/connecting-from-china/), [Russia](https://blog.torproject.org/call-for-webtunnel-bridges/), [Iran](https://forum.torproject.org/t/iran-circumventing-censorship-with-tor/4590), and many others.
-
-<div class="admonition question" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">If you can't download the Tor Browser from your country</p>
-
-If you cannot download the Tor Browser because of your country's censorship, and **if it is safe for you to do**, you can try downloading the browser from a proxy website such as the [EFF website](https://tor.eff.org/), the [Calyx Institute website](https://tor.calyxinstitute.org/).
-
-You can even directly email **<gettor@torproject.org>** and send the name of your operating system (Linux, macOS, Windows) to get a direct link to download the Tor Browser.
-
-</div>
-
-If you want to help people around the world access the internet freely, you can volunteer to run a [Tor Snowflake](https://snowflake.torproject.org/) proxy. For more tech-savvy volunteers, you can also help by running a [Tor Bridge](https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/bridge/), or even a [WebTunnel Bridge](https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/webtunnel/).
-
-## :octicons-heart-16: Why Tor is so important
-
-### Tor is vital for human rights and democracy
-
-Tor is an essential tool for journalists, activists, whistleblowers, dissidents, and people in vulnerable situations everywhere. It is one of the best tool we have to increase privacy online, and to resist censorship from oppressive regimes.
-
-Thanks to Tor, activists have a safe way to continue fighting for human rights.
-
-Some of the most respected human rights organizations use Tor to offer safe access to their services and information. This includes organizations such as [Amnesty International](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/12/global-amnesty-international-website-launches-on-tor-network-to-help-universal-access/), [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/04/eff-now-has-tor-onions), Freedom of The Press Foundation, and of course the Tor Project.
-
-Without Tor, journalists would lose invaluable sources of information provided by courageous whistleblowers reporting in the public interest.
-
-Without Tor, brave citizens fighting against authoritarian governments would be at much greater risk when organizing and bringing vital information to the public's attention.
-
-Without Tor, victims of domestic violence and LGBTQ+ people living in hostile environments could be in much greater danger when researching life-saving information online.
-
-Without Tor, people living in oppressive regimes would not have access to the crucial information they need to fight for freedom, democracy, and peace.
-
-<div class="admonition success" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Add an onion service for your organization's website</p>
-
-If you would like to add this service for your website to help more people access it safely, you can [read more](https://blog.torproject.org/more-onions-porfavor/) about onion services on the Tor Project Blog. As of 2021, you can even [get](https://blog.torproject.org/tls-certificate-for-onion-site/) domain-validated certificates for your onion site using HARICA, an operator founded by a nonprofit civil society from Greece.
-
-</div>
-
-### Tor is for everyone to use
-
-Tor is a tool that can help so many people. But Tor isn't *only* for people in highly sensitive situations like whistleblowers and journalists, Tor is for everyone!
-
-Of course, people in more dangerous situations will *need* Tor to stay safe, but everyone can benefit from Tor's privacy protections in their daily lives. I personally use Tor when I am forced to visit Google Map. Not because it's dangerous to me, but just because I greatly dislike the idea of Google tracking my location activities.
-
-Tor can also help fighting surveillance capitalism!
-
-Moreover, you can considerably help people in dangerous situations by using Tor for trivial reasons like I do.
-
-By using Tor for banal activities, when you aren't in any danger worse than a nasty ad-attack, you help to normalize the use of Tor and add more noise to the traffic. The more people do this, the more using Tor becomes just something people do when they care about privacy online, and nothing more.
-
-### Who uses Tor?
-
-- Anyone who cares about privacy!
-- Journalists who need to conduct research and protect their sources.
-- Whistleblowers using special websites to communication information to newspapers anonymously.
-- Democracy activists fighting against authoritarian governments who require anonymity online to stay safe from persecution.
-- People living under oppressive regimes who need to circumvent their country's censorship to access information freely.
-- Victims of domestic violence who need to research safe shelters and supportive resources without raising suspicion from their aggressor.
-- LGBTQ+ people living in hostile environments who need to access information online and stay connected with their community.
-- Generous people who want to [help and support](https://blog.torproject.org/support-tor-project-share-your-story/) all the above 💜
-
-The Tor community has gathered this [wonderful collection of anonymous user stories](https://community.torproject.org/outreach/stories/) from people describing why they use Tor.
-
-### Tor is critical public infrastructure
-
-To keep Tor strong for everyone, it's essential to support and grow the network of volunteer-operated relays forming the Tor Network.
-
-Thousands of journalists and activists rely on the Tor Network every day to stay safe and to continue their important work.
-
-Furthermore, **countless privacy-oriented projects depend on the Tor Network**.
-
-To name only a few, the messaging applications [Briar](https://briarproject.org/), [Cwtch](https://docs.cwtch.im/), and [SimpleX](https://simplex.chat/) all use Tor to harden some of their privacy-preserving features.
-
-For whistleblowers to stay safe, both [SecureDrop](https://securedrop.org/) and [Hush Line](https://hushline.app/) use the Tor Network. Many [newsrooms around the world](https://securedrop.org/directory/) host onion services to protect sources, such as The Guardian in the UK, CBC in Canada, ProPublica in the US, and many more.
-
-There's also all the applications protecting people with the highest needs such as [Tails](https://tails.net/), [OnionShare](https://onionshare.org/), and [more](https://github.com/Polycarbohydrate/awesome-tor).
-
-**Losing the Tor Network would mean losing all the applications and features relying on it.**
-
-This would be disastrous for the privacy community, journalists, activists, dissidents, victims of domestic violence, LGBTQ+ population, and so many worldwide.
-
-From a human rights perspective, **we simply cannot afford to lose Tor**.
-
-## :octicons-question-16: Things to consider when using Tor
-
-### Tor compared to VPN protections
-
-When using a VPN, your ISP will not know which websites you visit online (or other activities). Your ISP will see that you are connecting to a VPN, but will not know what you do from there. Your VPN however *could* know which websites you visit. Using a VPN is a transfer of trust from your ISP. When using a VPN, you should always trust your VPN provider more than your ISP.
-
-The websites you visit will see the IP address of your VPN provider instead of yours. This can help protect your identity and location, but they will know this connection uses a VPN.
-
-VPNs can offer great benefits for your privacy. However, if your VPN provider was compelled by law to provide the logs of the websites you visited (or will visit), it is *technically* possible to do for them.
-
-When using the Tor Network correctly, no one knows which websites *you visited*, or other services you accessed. Your ISP or VPN provider will only know you have accessed Tor, but will not know which websites you have visited from there. Even if compelled by law, they could only share that you have accessed Tor, at this specific time.
-
-The websites you have visited also won't know who you are (unless you tell them). They will only know someone accessed their websites through Tor, at this specific time.
-
-The relays used for a Tor Circuit cannot alone re-recreate the link between your IP address and the websites you visit either. This offers much stronger protection for your privacy than a VPN does.
-
-### Who knows you are using Tor
-
-When using the Tor Network, your ISP and the Guard Relay will both know you (the IP address you are using) are using Tor.
-
-To prevent this, you [could](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/advanced/tor-overview/#safely-connecting-to-tor) use Tor from a [trustworthy VPN](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/).
-
-If you do so, your VPN provider will know you are using Tor, but your ISP will not. Your ISP will only see you are accessing your VPN, and the Tor Guard Relay will see your VPN's IP address instead of yours.
-
-### HTTPS for non-onion websites
-
-The Exit Relay from the Tor Circuit will see someone is accessing this website (or other service).
-
-If you were to use Tor to visit a non-onion website that isn't protected with HTTPS, and log in with your credentials, this Exit Relay *could* technically read this information. Using HTTPS with non-onion websites is *very* important when using Tor. Onion sites offer protections that are equivalent to HTTPS.
-
-### Be careful with files when using Tor
-
-While it's safe to visit secured websites through Tor, be careful when downloading files or opening documents.
-
-Depending on what kind of files it is, there are a number of problems that could arise. For example, it's a [bad idea](https://blog.torproject.org/blog/bittorrent-over-tor-isnt-good-idea) to download torrent files over Tor. Additionally, Tor will not protect you from downloading malware or exposing metadata with shared files.
-
-If you need to share files through Tor with a *trusted* contact, [OnionShare](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/file-sharing/#onionshare) is a good option.
-
-## :octicons-stop-16: Addressing misconceptions
-
-There has been misconceptions floating around about Tor. Most of them repeat similar misinformation attributed to many other privacy tools: Why using this if you have nothing to hide? But this argument is incredibly flawed and comes from a naive understanding of privacy rights and needs.
-
-Most people use privacy tools for protection, and everyone needs protection. Moreover, [privacy is a fundamental right](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/04/17/is-privacy-dead/) intrinsically connected to democracy and civil liberties.
-
-### The dark web, the deep web, and the surface web
-
-Some misconceptions have spread from confusion on what the *deep* web and the *dark* web are. Because yes, Tor is part of the dark web.
-
-While using the term "dark web" might make for great sensationalist news title, the dark web isn't anything to fear.
-
-It's not "dark" as in "dark intent" or the "dark side of the Force". It's really just dark as in "it's so dark on this road, I can't read the addresses around".
-
-This dark web needs special software, configuration, or authorization to access it. For example, **the Tor Browser is the streetlight you need to navigate on the Onion roads**.
-
-If you use Tor to visit the Privacy Guides onion site, you will be using the dark web. It's a website (or website version) that can only be accessed using a specialized tool. That's it!
-
-The dark web is part of the deep web, which is simply all the online information that isn't indexed by any standard web search engines. Aren't you happy your bank account is on the deep web?
-
-![Illustration of an iceberg where the tip above water represents the surface web, the part underwater represents the deep web, and the part under the iceberg represents the dark web.](../assets/images/in-praise-of-tor/tor-darkweb.webp)
-<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Em / Privacy Guides | Inspired by: [Ranjithsiji](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Iceberg_of_Webs.svg)</small>
-
-### Criminals use envelopes, doors, and clothing too
-
-Some fear that Tor is used by criminals. While that might be true some criminals use Tor, a lot of people who aren't criminals at all also use Tor.
-
-This kind of argument really leads nowhere. Criminals also use Google, Facebook, and Twitter (a lot actually). Criminals use envelopes to hide their ransom letters, closed doors to hide their crimes, and clothing to conceal weapons! Are we going to forbid clothing because some (all?) criminals use clothing to hide their weapons?
-
-**We shouldn't ban clothing, and we shouldn't ban Tor either.** There are other better ways to catch criminals than removing a tool millions use to stay safe online.
-
-### Tor receives government funding
-
-Yes, Tor does receive government funding, and that's a good thing. A lot of nonprofit organizations receive government funding as a stable ([usually](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/02/03/the-future-of-privacy/#the-tools-you-use-might-depend-on-government-funding)) source of income. Our governments *should* be contributing financially to the tools we all use to improve our security and privacy for free, moreover if they are using it themselves.
-
-While any organization should thrive to diversify its sources of income to reduce its dependency on large contributors, it's not always easy to do.
-
-If you feel uneasy about a privacy tool you use receiving government funding, the best thing you can do to fight this is to [donate](https://donate.torproject.org/) directly to reduce its dependence to it.
-
-### Depending on where you are, using Tor is likely safe
-
-If you are not living under an oppressive regime with heavy censorship, it's likely that using Tor is safe for you, and will not put you on "a list". Even if it was putting you on "a list", it likely is a list full of great people working to defend human rights and privacy rights online.
-
-That being said, **if you are living in a region where using Tor is dangerous**, and could put you on a list of anti-regime dissidents, you *should absolutely* be careful and take special measures to hide your usage of Tor.
-
-Additionally, **if you are in a vulnerable situation** where an aggressor has access to your device or ISP information, and could hurt you if they knew you have used Tor, you should use a Tor Bridge and only [access Tor through Tails](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/01/29/installing-and-using-tails/).
-
-### Tor is fantastic for your privacy, but is not magical
-
-Tor is a great tool to improve your privacy online and make it much harder to identify you, your location, and the content you access online. However, it will not make you magically anonymous.
-
-If you use Tor with files containing metadata about you, this metadata can still identify you.
-
-If you use Tor to log in your Facebook account, then of course Facebook still knows it's you, and now also knows you are using Tor.
-
-If you use Tor to create a new account, but use an email address, phone number, username, or profile picture you used elsewhere when not connected through Tor, then your Tor activity can get linked to your previous activity.
-
-If you use Tor to reveal information so specific that only you, or only someone at your company, or only someone in this small government department could know, then of course authorities can identify you this way.
-
-You should also consider correlation in time when using Tor. If your activity is so specific that it can be narrowed down to only a few people, and your ISP or VPN knows you have accessed Tor at this specific time (and shares this information with authorities), a correlation in time could be enough to de-anonymize you.
-
-### Misconceptions are very detrimental to Tor, and other privacy tools
-
-We need to be extremely careful when spreading information that could be inaccurate or hasn't been verified when talking about Tor (or any other privacy tools).
-
-Misinformation can create mistaken fears and stop people from using a tool they would greatly benefit from.
-
-If someone is so scared of Tor because of some rumor they heard, that they continue their activism from the surface web instead, they could needlessly put themselves at risk.
-
-Furthermore, unjustified bad reputations can severely hurt funding for tools like Tor. This leads to less resources to continue developing the browser, the network, and to advocate for privacy everywhere.
-
-We all have a responsibility to verify which information we share with others, make sure we stop misinformation at its root, and correct harmful misconceptions everywhere we hear them.
-
-## :material-hand-heart-outline: Tor needs our support
-
-**Tor is at risk, and needs our help.** Despite its strength and history, Tor isn't safe from the same attacks oppressive regimes and misinformed legislators direct at encryption and many other privacy-enhancing technologies.
-
-Moreover, due to its US government funding, Tor has already been on the destruction path of the recent hectic government cuts. Thankfully, the US Agency for Global Media finally [rescinded the grant termination](https://www.theregister.com/2025/03/25/otf_tor_lets_encrypt_funding_lawsuit/?td=rt-3a) it had announced on March 15th to the Open Technology Fund, which the Tor Project benefits from. Sadly, considering the unpredictability of the current US administration, this doesn't mean the Tor Project is safe from cuts later on.
-
-As much as the Tor Network relies on generous volunteers to run it, the nonprofit Tor Project relies on grants and donations to survive.
-
-The good news is, we can help with both!
-
-The more individuals donate to the Tor Project, the less it depends on government funding, and the more stable its donation income becomes.
-
-Similarly, the more people volunteer to run a Tor relay, the more stable and reliable the Tor Network becomes.
-
-Tor is a privacy tool so many people, organizations, and applications need to stay safe and secure. It is **our collective responsibility to contribute what we can** to keep Tor strong and thriving for all of us.
-
-### How to support Tor
-
-There are many ways to help Tor survive and thrive! You can help by:
-
-- [Donating to the Tor Project (includes really neat merch!)](https://donate.torproject.org/)
-
-- [Spreading the word about Tor](https://community.torproject.org/outreach/)
-
-- [Joining the Tor community](https://community.torproject.org/)
-
-- [Making your website accessible as an onion service](https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/setup/)
-
-- [Asking your university to run a Tor relay](https://toruniversity.eff.org/)
-
-- [Running a Tor relay yourself](https://community.torproject.org/relay/)
-
-- [Running a Snowflake proxy to help fight censorship](https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/snowflake/)
-
-- Using Tor for anything from important to trivial
-
-- Sharing this article 💜
-
-## :octicons-bookmark-16: Onion sites you can visit using the Tor Browser
-
-- [Privacy Guides website](http://www.xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh6wh5jc4up35bqdflu6bkdc5cas5vjqd.onion/en/) 💛
-- [Privacy Guides forum](http://discuss.6xotdxvg7pexnean3xu6b7ivs7g52zcwsdbnz4mdm4byivc3yfv65aid.onion/)
-- [Amnesty International](https://www.amnestyl337aduwuvpf57irfl54ggtnuera45ygcxzuftwxjvvmpuzqd.onion)
-- [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.iykpqm7jiradoeezzkhj7c4b33g4hbgfwelht2evxxeicbpjy44c7ead.onion/)
-- [Freedom of the Press Foundation](http://fpfjxcrmw437h6z2xl3w4czl55kvkmxpapg37bbopsafdu7q454byxid.onion/)
-- [Secure Drop directory (for whistleblowers)](http://sdolvtfhatvsysc6l34d65ymdwxcujausv7k5jk4cy5ttzhjoi6fzvyd.onion/directory/)
-- [ProPublica](http://p53lf57qovyuvwsc6xnrppyply3vtqm7l6pcobkmyqsiofyeznfu5uqd.onion/)
-- [Internet Archive](https://archivep75mbjunhxc6x4j5mwjmomyxb573v42baldlqu56ruil2oiad.onion/)
-- [OnionShare (file sharing)](http://lldan5gahapx5k7iafb3s4ikijc4ni7gx5iywdflkba5y2ezyg6sjgyd.onion/)
-- [Proton Mail](https://protonmailrmez3lotccipshtkleegetolb73fuirgj7r4o4vfu7ozyd.onion/)
-- [Tor Project](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion)
-
-***
-
-For more in-depth information about Tor, you can consult our [Tor Overview](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/advanced/tor-overview/).
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Unless credited otherwise, all screenshots from: Privacy Guides</small>
-
----
-
-**Update (5/6):** This article was updated to note [the importance of restarting Tor Browser](tor-security-slider-flaw.md) when changing security level settings.

blog/posts/privacy-pass.md

@@ -1,245 +0,0 @@
----
-date:
-    created: 2025-04-21T17:30:00Z
-categories:
-    - Explainers
-authors:
-    - fria
-tags:
-    - Privacy Pass
-license: BY-SA
-schema_type: BackgroundNewsArticle
-description: |
-  Privacy Pass is a new way to privately authenticate with a service. Let's look at how it could change the way we use services.
----
-# Privacy Pass: The New Protocol for Private Authentication
-
-![Cover photo of the Privacy Pass logo over a yellow background](../assets/images/privacy-pass/cover.webp)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Background Image: Thomas Ensley / Unsplash</small>
-
-Services that require authentication can correlate your activity on that service with your account, and that account is normally linked with payment information that could potentially link back to your real identity. With the Privacy Pass protocol, it doesn't have to be that way.<!-- more -->
-
-## History
-
-The story of Privacy Pass begins with a [paper](https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/4372.4373) by David Chaum from 1985 (he actually has an earlier paper from [1982](https://chaum.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/chaum_dissertation.pdf), but I'll be referencing this one), in which he laments the ever-increasing data collection by companies and government agencies.
-
-It's funny that all the way back in 1985 he talks about the same issues we deal with today: persistent identifiers tied to our real identity for transactions, government IDs, etc.
-
-Chaum proposes three solutions to the state of affairs he describes.
-
-### Pseudorandom Identifiers
-
-Instead of persistent identifiers like we now have with our government IDs, credit cards, etc., Chaum suggests randomly generated identifiers. For example, you could have a one-time unique identifier for each transaction at a shop.
-
-For ongoing relationships such as a bank, you can use a single pseudorandom identifier for that organization that you use continuously.
-
-### Card Computers
-
-One of the more quaint ideas in the paper is the idea of a small "card computer" on which you would perform transactions. Chaum's theoretical device resembles "a credit-card-sized calculator, and [includes] a character display, keyboard, and a limited distance communication capability (like that of a television remote control)".
-
-Nowadays, we carry around credit-card sized computers like it's nothing. The secret "card number" he describes would probably be your device PIN or even biometric authentication, which are already used to authenticate transactions.
-
-We still haven't *quite* reached Chaum's vision yet in some areas. His idea is for these "card computers" to fully replace ATMs and checkout terminals in stores. Essentially, he wants all transactions to be online transactions, with something like Apple Pay or Google Pay on your device mediating the transaction and using your device PIN to prevent fraudulent transactions.
-Making all transactions online transactions is an interesting idea. I think most people can share in the frustration of dealing with checkout terminals, especially the self-checkout ones with cameras pointed at your face.
-
-We're still falling short in a major area though.
-
-> card computers could be purchased or constructed just like any other personal computer, and would have no secrets from or structures unmodifiable by their owners.
-
-Current smartphones are non-upgradeable by their owners and can't be built from scratch like a desktop computer can. They also contain lots of black-box proprietary code. Even a Google Pixel, the gold standard of Android smartphone freedom that allows you to install your own operating system securely, still suffers from the same pitfalls.
-
-### Cryptography
-
-How do we ensure the pseudonyms can't be linked together? We already use cryptography to protect our communications. Chaum presents ways to similarly protect unlinkability using cryptography:
-
-> Simple mathematical proofs show that, with appropriate use of the systems, even conspiracy of all organizations and tapping of all communication lines cannot yield enough information to link the pseudonyms-regardless of how clever the approach is or how much computation is expended.
-
-## Blind Signatures
-
-Digital signatures normally are used to ensure that something like a piece of software or a message comes from the original sender and hasn't been tampered with. You want to know who the signer is for this system to work.
-
-But what if the signer and the one sending a request are different? Say you have a membership to a hypothetical *PrivacyGuides+ subscription service*, and you want to authenticate with it, but don't want to identify yourself. That's where blind signatures come in.
-
-### How it Works
-
-You can imagine blind signatures like an envelope that's been wrapped in [carbon paper](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_paper) with a window showing your pseudonym for that account, whether it be an account number, username, etc. They never see anything but the account identifier, or whatever they need to verify that you're a valid customer.
-The organization then signs it, indicating you're a valid customer, and you're allowed to access the service.
-
-Later, when you're presented with a request to authenticate as an active subscriber of PrivacyGuides+, you unwrap the envelope and discard it along with the carbon paper. You rewrap it in a new envelope with a window showing the signature and a different pseudonym, and the requester can then be sure that you're allowed to access PrivacyGuides+.
-
-![A diagram showing an envelope being wrapped in carbon paper, transferred to an organization, then passing over a boundary representing the unlinkability between the two transactions. Then the envelope is unwrapped, put in a new envelope with a window showing the signature from the previous organization, and presented to a different organization.](../assets/images/privacy-pass/blind-signatures.webp)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: [David Chaum](https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/4372.4373)</small>
-
-This system relies on the same strong cryptography that tried and true systems use, with the difference being the unlinkability between the credential issuer and the credential receiver.
-
-## Problems
-
-Services that don't require an account or payment to use are great; you can use them with Tor, clear your browser history, whatever you need to do to keep your activity private.
-
-But logging into an account completely invalidates all of that. Every time you log in or authenticate with a service, you have to identify yourself as the same person, linking all your previous activity together. Increasingly, we're asked to provide personal information in order to be able to use certain websites or services.
-
-### Linkability
-
-As long as you're logged into an account with a service, all your previous and current activity can be linked together, along with any data you provided such as an email address, payment information, etc.
-
-### Data Collection
-
-A lot of websites and services want to — [or are forced to](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_media_age_verification_laws_in_the_United_States) — filter out users below a certain age.
-
-We're starting to see a rise in extremely privacy-invasive age verification systems such as submitting a government ID when you want to access a website or invasive facial scans.
-
-### Blocking VPN and Tor Users
-
-Bots are a rampant problem for online services, leading them to sometimes block non-residential IP addresses such as those used for commercial VPNs and Tor.
-
-### CAPTCHAs
-
-When VPN and Tor users aren't blocked, they often have to deal with annoying [CAPTCHAs](http://www.captcha.net) that take up your precious time and use invasive [fingerprinting](https://developers.google.com/recaptcha/docs/v3).
-
-CAPTCHAs aren't even particularly good at detecting bots. With advances in AI, [bots can solve CAPTCHAs better than humans can](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2307.12108).
-
-## Privacy Pass
-
-Several blind signature-based solutions are in various states, some being implemented but not widely used, some being proposed browser APIs, and some being IETF standards.
-
-The landscape is very confusing right now, so I'll try to elucidate what I've found.
-
-[Privacy Pass](https://privacypass.github.io) started out as an attempt at a privacy-preserving way to bypass CAPTCHAs.
-
-It started out and is still an extension that can be installed on the [Chrome](https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/silk-privacy-pass-client/ajhmfdgkijocedmfjonnpjfojldioehi) or [Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/privacy-pass/) extension store, but it's since expanded to become an [IETF standard](https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/privacypass/about/).
-
-The Privacy Pass protocol has massively outgrown its original purpose. It's been updated to support multiple different schemes and purposes.
-
-There are three main roles that need to be played for the authentication mechanism to work. These can be filled by all the same party, by three separate parties, or any combination in between. You'll have increased privacy the more separation there is between each role, so ideally they should all be filled by different parties.
-
-### Origin
-
-The origin is the original website or service that's requesting a token for redemption. The client presents a valid token, or it must request more tokens.
-
-### Attester
-
-The attester is responsible for verifying something about the client. There are several ways it can achieve this, and it can use multiple at the same time if desired.
-
-#### CAPTCHA
-
-The attester can make the client solve a CAPTCHA to prove that it's not a bot. Not the most elegant solution but solving one CAPTCHA instead of multiple is preferable.
-
-#### Client State
-
-The attester can verify something about the client's state like the geographic location, whether the client has a valid account, or the number of issuance protocol invocations.
-
-#### Trusted Device
-
-If your client is running on hardware that's capable of producing device-level attestation, like a device with a secure element, then it can use that to verify that the device is trusted.
-
-For example, in Apple's Private Access Token implementation, they use certificates stored in the Secure Enclave and verify that your Apple account is in good standing.
-
-### Issuer
-
-The issuer is responsible for issuing tokens in response to requests from clients.
-
-The client presents tokens to the Origin once they're provided by the issuer.
-
-![diagram showing the structure of Private Access Tokens. The origin asks the client for a token, the client forwards the request to the attester which then forwards it to the issuer which then generates a token, sends it to the client which then sends it to the origin.](../assets/images/privacy-pass/private-access-tokens.webp)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: [Cloudflare](https://blog.cloudflare.com/eliminating-captchas-on-iphones-and-macs-using-new-standard/)</small>
-
-The tokens need to identify which issuers are trusted.
-
-They can also be interactive or non-interactive. Interactive means that you need a fresh token based on the challenge, whereas a non-interactive token can be stored for later use.
-
-Tokens can also be constrained to one specific Origin, or they can be used across Origins.
-
-### Private State Tokens
-
-[Private State Tokens](https://developers.google.com/privacy-sandbox/protections/private-state-tokens) (PSTs) are a [proposed browser API](https://github.com/WICG/trust-token-api) by Google as part of their [Privacy Sandbox](https://developers.google.com/privacy-sandbox). They're based on the Privacy Pass protocol.
-
-The main benefit of PSTs is that they provide a secure place for websites to store their tokens so that you don't need a separate extension for every service.
-
-A browser-level API, I imagine, would significantly reduce the development burden of browser-based services looking to implement Privacy Pass, but it would leave non-browser apps like VPNs high and dry.
-
-### Private Access Tokens
-
-[Private Access Tokens](https://blog.cloudflare.com/eliminating-captchas-on-iphones-and-macs-using-new-standard/) are based on Privacy Pass as well, but they don't seem to be specifically bound to the browser.
-
-It's unclear to me what really makes Private Access Tokens different from Privacy Pass itself, other than that Private Access Tokens seem to call for separation of the Attester and Issuer while Privacy Pass allows the origin, attester, and issuer to be the same. Delegating each role to a different party adds extra privacy.
-
-The origin website only knows your URL and IP from the initial connection.
-
-The attester only knows the data needed to verify you as a valid user.
-
-The issuer knows the site you visited, but doesn't know any of your device information that the attester used to verify you.
-
-### Kagi
-
-There are scant services actively using Privacy Pass to authenticate users, but a recent and very exciting example is [Kagi](https://blog.kagi.com/kagi-privacy-pass).
-
-With their implementation, you can now install their extension for [Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/kagi-privacy-pass/) and [Chrome](https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/kagi-search/cdglnehniifkbagbbombnjghhcihifij). Safari isn't supported at the moment, but their [Orion](https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/kagi-search/cdglnehniifkbagbbombnjghhcihifij) browser supports it and is WebKit-based.
-
-The need for an extension and lack of support for some platforms highlights the need for widespread support for Privacy Pass in browsers and platforms. It's not reasonable to expect every single platform to implement Privacy Pass themselves and users likely don't want to install a separate extension for every platform either.
-
-That said, I applaud Kagi for their efforts. They went above and beyond to protect their users' privacy. A few notes for future improvements, though.
-
-#### No Account Requirement
-
-Currently, Kagi requires an account in order to use it. Although they allow you to put in a fake email address on account creation since they don't [check it](https://kagifeedback.org/d/3813-enable-anonymous-registration-no-email/16), it's still a persistent identifier that could be eliminated.
-
-Their announcement blog post states that the ability to use Kagi fully without an account is a possibility for the future with an invitation to request the feature on their [forum](https://kagifeedback.org/d/6163-kagi-privacy-pass), so feel free to add your voice. A fully accountless search engine that doesn't rely on ads would be great to see.
-
-#### Separation of Origin, Attester, Issuer
-
-Kagi uses the [Shared Origin, Attester, Issuer](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-privacypass-architecture-03.html?_fsi=jKxFixnl#section-4.1) model for their implementation, which leaves the possibility of data being correlated between each step of the process, such as device fingerprinting or IP address being used to correlate a user who is issued tokens with when they redeem them.
-
-Kagi's onion service helps to mitigate this issue, but I think it would be a significant privacy improvement to separate all three entities.
-
-#### Remove Requirement for an Extension
-
-Having to install an extension is annoying as an end user and surely incurs some development cost in both the initial development and upkeep over time. I'm not sure how it would be possible to get rid of the extension as it seems like there's no good way to do so at the moment, but I'm hopeful that the Private State Token API could be used for that in the future if it ever gets fully standardized as a browser API.
-
-## Future Possibilities
-
-Overall, Privacy Pass is an exciting standard that is already improving the privacy of users on a wide scale.
-
-### Easier Adoption
-
-However, for widespread adoption of anonymous authentication for all online services, there needs to be an easier way for developers to implement it. I see Private State Tokens and Private Access Tokens as paths toward that goal, but they have their own limitations.
-
-Private State Tokens seem to be restricted to browsers, which is mostly fine since so many online services are accessed through the browser. It does put services like VPNs that operate outside the browser in a tight spot though.
-
-Private Access Tokens seem like a possible solution for device-wide Privacy Pass authentication, but the only place I've seen them implemented is in Apple's operating systems to identify users as real iOS or macOS users. I'd like to see wider adoption for more use cases than just that. It's unclear what the vision for Private Access Tokens is for the moment.
-
-### Carriers
-
-One of the biggest and most privacy-invasive services is mobile carriers. They take lots of personal information when you sign up, and then you have permanent identifiers, both IMSI identifying you as a subscriber and IMEI identifying your device, tied to that information while you use it. Because of how the cell network works, they also can tie that information to your physical location and all the traffic you send through their network.
-
-[Cape](https://www.cape.co/research) is a privacy-focused carrier that says they're "studying the use of blinded tokens and zero-knowledge proofs to disaggregate subscriber information." This would have a massive impact on user privacy, possibly allowing a KYC'd mobile subscriber to use their carrier at least semi-anonymously (it's unclear how IMSI and IMEI fit into this scheme, as well as location information).
-
-### VPNs
-
-Commercial VPNs typically require some kind of account identifier, even if it's just a randomized number.
-
-Apple's iCloud Private Relay uses RSA blind signatures to anonymously authenticate users to each of the two hops.
-
-Google's former [VPN](https://www.gstatic.com/vpn/google_vpn_white_paper.pdf) service also used blind signatures to protect users.
-
-![Diagram showing Google's blind signature VPN authentication scheme](../assets/images/privacy-pass/google-vpn.webp)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Image: [Google](https://www.gstatic.com/vpn/google_vpn_white_paper.pdf)</small>
-
-Hopefully we can see more VPN companies start to use Privacy Pass to authenticate users, I think it would be a massive improvement to user privacy.
-
-### Digital Cash
-
-Part of Chaum's vision was anonymous digital transactions using blind signatures, which he made a reality with his company [DigiCash](https://chaum.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/05-27-94-World_s-first-electronic-cash-payment-over-computer-networks.pdf).
-
-For whatever reason, *eCash*, as it was called, never caught on and the company filed for bankruptcy in 1998. We're left with the terrible current system where you need to input your credit card and personal information in order to make a transaction, which is easily traceable back to you. Not to mention the security implications, [credit card fraud](https://www.security.org/digital-safety/credit-card-fraud-report/) is rampant today.
-
-The dream isn't dead, however. Chaum's [eCash 2.0](https://chaum.com/ecash-2-0/) is quantum-resistant and has been built and tested in the Bank for International Settlements' [Project Tourbillon](https://www.bis.org/about/bisih/topics/cbdc/tourbillon.htm).
-
-### Digital ID
-
-Laws are being passed forcing 18+ websites and even [app stores](https://thehill.com/policy/technology/5179865-utah-app-store-age-verification-law/) to collect verify the ID of users. This is a massive slap in the face to the privacy and security of everyone. Data breaches and tracking are inevitable under the current system.
-
-Blind signatures could provide a private and secure way to verify age or other information without having to submit your entire ID or submit invasive face scans.

blog/posts/signal-configuration-and-hardening.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 date:
     created: 2022-07-07T19:00:00Z
-    updated: 2025-04-15T04:00:00Z
+    updated: 2024-08-23T19:00:00Z
 authors:
     - contributors
     - matchboxbananasynergy
@@ -176,16 +176,9 @@ On Android/iOS:
 
 For incoming calls from people who are not in your Contacts app, the call will be relayed through the Signal server regardless of how you've set it up.
 
-### Bypass Internet Censorship
+### Proxy Support
 
-If Signal is blocked in your country, it has a built-in "Censorship Circumvention" feature that uses domain fronting to bypass restrictions.
-
-On Android/iOS:
-
-- Select :material-dots-vertical: → **Settings** → **Privacy** → **Advanced**
-- [x] Turn on **Censorship Circumvention**
-
-Additionally, Signal allows you to set up a proxy to bypass censorship.
+If Signal is blocked in your country, Signal allows you to set up a proxy to bypass it.
 
 !!! Warning
 

blog/posts/the-dangers-of-end-to-end-encryption.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 date:
     created: 2025-04-01T05:40:00Z
 categories:
-    - Opinion
+    - Announcements
 tags:
     - April Fools
 authors:
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ schema_type: SatiricalArticle
 preview:
   logo: blog/assets/images/the-dangers-of-end-to-end-encryption/fire.svg
 ---
-# The Dangers of End-to-End Encryption
+# The Dangers of End-to-End Encryption - Happy April fools!
 
 ![An image showing a burning car](../assets/images/the-dangers-of-end-to-end-encryption/cover.webp)
 

blog/posts/tor-security-slider-flaw.md

@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
----
-date:
-    created: 2025-05-02T11:20:00Z
-    updated: 2025-05-03T15:00:00Z
-categories:
-    - News
-authors:
-    - jonah
-tags:
-    - PSA
-    - Tor
-description: |
-  PSA: The security level slider in Tor Browser (and Mullvad Browser) does not fully apply until restarting the browser. This presents a high risk to people who switch from Standard to Safer security during a browsing session in order to protect themselves from browser exploits.
-schema_type: ReportageNewsArticle
-preview:
-  cover: blog/assets/images/tor-security-slider-flaw/cover.png
----
-# A Flaw With the Security Level Slider in Tor Browser
-
-![Illustration showing Tor's security level options with question marks next to the selected Safer level](../assets/images/tor-security-slider-flaw/cover.png)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Jonah Aragon / Privacy Guides</small>
-
-[Tor Browser](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tor/#tor-browser) and [Mullvad Browser](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/desktop-browsers/#mullvad-browser) users should be aware of a flaw with the Security Level slider: Not all protections advertised by the browser are properly engaged until the browser is fully restarted.<!-- more -->
-
-This flaw was anonymously reported to *Privacy Guides* by a member of our [community](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/), and I confirmed it via the latest Tor Browser 14.5.1 on macOS. Additionally, I confirmed this behavior in Mullvad Browser 14.5.1 on macOS.
-
-~~I was unable to find any documentation or open GitLab issues with Tor regarding the need to take additional steps before security settings are fully applied, and~~ Tor Browser documentation does not note that a restart is required, nor does it prompt users to restart the browser after security changes are made. (update: see below)
-
-This presents a high risk to people who switch from Standard to Safer security during a browsing session with the goal to protect themselves from browser exploits.
-
-## Demonstration
-
-The effect can be easily demonstrated in your own Tor Browser install by running a JavaScript benchmark such as [JetStream 2.2](https://browserbench.org/JetStream/). These benchmarks rely on a technology called Just-in-Time (JIT) compilation to improve performance, but JIT is linked to numerous security vulnerabilities in modern web browsers. The "Safer" security level normally disables JIT entirely to prevent these issues, however, you can see virtually no performance impact when switching to the Safer security level in Tor Browser and running the benchmark again:
-
-<figure markdown="span">
-  ![JetStream2 benchmark results with a score of 196 and the shield indicator in the browser's toolbar indicating that Standard security level is set](../assets/images/tor-security-slider-flaw/standard-level-jetstream2.png)
-  <figcaption>JetStream 2.2 benchmark results in <strong>Standard</strong> mode</figcaption>
-</figure>
-
-<figure markdown="span">
-  ![JetStream2 benchmark results with a score of 191 and the shield indicator in the browser's toolbar indicating that Safer security level is set](../assets/images/tor-security-slider-flaw/safer-level-before-restart-jetstream2.png)
-  <figcaption>JetStream 2.2 benchmark results in <strong>Safer</strong> mode, <em>without</em> restarting Tor Browser</figcaption>
-</figure>
-
-While the performance is virtually identical between these two runs, *after* restarting Tor Browser and re-running the test, we see drastically lower performance results, in line with what we would expect with JIT properly disabled:
-
-<figure markdown="span">
-  ![JetStream2 benchmark results with a score of 33 and the shield indicator in the browser's toolbar indicating that Safer security level is set](../assets/images/tor-security-slider-flaw/safer-level-after-restart-jetstream2.png)
-  <figcaption>JetStream 2.2 benchmark results in <strong>Safer</strong> mode, <em>after</em> restarting Tor Browser</figcaption>
-</figure>
-
-As you can see, there is no visible indicator that anything is different between the last two runs, and there was no prompt to restart the browser after changing these settings. However, this clearly indicates that JavaScript technologies that are meant to be disabled in Safer mode can still be accessed by websites until the browser is restarted, potentially opening you up to browser exploits if you are unaware of the additional steps required to secure yourself.
-
-## Safest Mode
-
-We have not tested or verified the full extent of security features which require a browser restart. We tested whether JIT remained enabled after switching to Safer mode because it was the easiest feature to test. Safest mode disables JavaScript entirely, so the demonstration above will not demonstrate this problem exists when switching to Safest mode.
-
-However, it is possible that there are *other* features normally disabled by Safest mode which remain enabled until you restart your browser. Out of an abundance of caution, we recommend always restarting your browser after changing this setting, regardless of whether you are switching to Safer or Safest mode.
-
-## Conclusion
-
-The Tor Project advertises the security slider as a way to conveniently adjust the protections that the Tor Browser provides, but does not note additional steps necessary to ensure those settings actually go into effect.
-
-This is our public service announcement to make sure you **always completely restart Tor Browser after adjusting your security settings.** Relying on these indicators can create a false sense of security and potentially expose users relying on this security level slider to greater risk than they expect based on Tor Browser's UI and documentation.
-
-Hopefully, Tor Browser will prompt or force their users to restart the browser after adjusting these settings in a future update.
-
----
-
-**Update (5/3):** A few hours following the publication of this article, the Tor Project emailed us the following statement:
-
-> The Tor Project is aware of this issue, and it is being tracked and actively
-> addressed. Those interested can follow the discussion and progress here:
-> <https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/42572>. In
-> addition to a restart prompt, we’re also exploring broader improvements to the
-> security level system, including aligning it more closely with Tor Browser's
-> updated threat model\[1] and possibly delegating even more of its back-end
-> to NoScript for additional flexibility. These improvements may be part of the
-> upcoming 15.0 release cycle.
->
-> \[1]: <https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/wiki/-/wikis/>

docs/ai-chat.md

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ cover: ai-chatbots.webp
 - [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
 - [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }
 
-The use of **AI chat**, also known as Large Language Models (LLMs), has become increasingly common since the release of ChatGPT in 2022. LLMs can help us write better, understand unfamiliar subjects, or answer a wide range of questions. They work by statistically predicting the next word in their responses based on a vast amount of data scraped from the web.
+Since the release of ChatGPT in 2022, interactions with Large Language Models (LLMs) have become increasingly common. LLMs can help us write better, understand unfamiliar subjects, or answer a wide range of questions. They can statistically predict the next word based on a vast amount of data scraped from the web.
 
 ## Privacy Concerns About LLMs
 
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ To run AI locally, you need both an AI model and an AI client.
 
 ### Choosing a Model
 
-There are many permissively licensed models available to download. [Hugging Face](https://huggingface.co/models) is a platform that lets you browse, research, and download models in common formats like [GGUF](https://huggingface.co/docs/hub/en/gguf). Companies that provide good open-weights models include big names like Mistral, Meta, Microsoft, and Google. However, there are also many community models and [fine-tuned](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fine-tuning_(deep_learning)) models available. As mentioned above, quantized models offer the best balance between model quality and performance for those using consumer-grade hardware.
+There are many permissively licensed models available to download. [Hugging Face](https://huggingface.co/models) is a platform that lets you browse, research, and download models in common formats like [GGUF](https://huggingface.co/docs/hub/en/gguf). Companies that provide good open-weights models include big names like Mistral, Meta, Microsoft, and Google. However, there are also many community models and 'fine-tunes' available. As mentioned above, quantized models offer the best balance between model quality and performance for those using consumer-grade hardware.
 
 To help you choose a model that fits your needs, you can look at leaderboards and benchmarks. The most widely-used leaderboard is the community-driven [LM Arena](https://lmarena.ai). Additionally, the [OpenLLM Leaderboard](https://huggingface.co/spaces/open-llm-leaderboard/open_llm_leaderboard) focuses on the performance of open-weights models on common benchmarks like [MMLU-Pro](https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.01574).  There are also specialized benchmarks which measure factors like [emotional intelligence](https://eqbench.com), ["uncensored general intelligence"](https://huggingface.co/spaces/DontPlanToEnd/UGI-Leaderboard), and [many others](https://www.nebuly.com/blog/llm-leaderboards).
 
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ To help you choose a model that fits your needs, you can look at leaderboards an
 
 ![Kobold.cpp Logo](assets/img/ai-chat/kobold.png){align=right}
 
-**Kobold.cpp** is an AI client that runs locally on your Windows, Mac, or Linux computer. It's an excellent choice if you are looking for heavy customization and tweaking, such as for role-playing purposes.
+Kobold.cpp is an AI client that runs locally on your Windows, Mac, or Linux computer. It's an excellent choice if you are looking for heavy customization and tweaking, such as for role-playing purposes.
 
 In addition to supporting a large range of text models, Kobold.cpp also supports image generators such as [Stable Diffusion](https://stability.ai/stable-image) and automatic speech recognition tools such as [Whisper](https://github.com/ggerganov/whisper.cpp).
 
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ In addition to supporting a large range of text models, Kobold.cpp also supports
 
 </div>
 
-<div class="admonition info" markdown>
+<div class="admonition note" markdown>
 <p class="admonition-title">Compatibility Issues</p>
 
 Kobold.cpp might not run on computers without AVX/AVX2 support.
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ Kobold.cpp allows you to modify parameters such as the AI model temperature and
 
 ![Ollama Logo](assets/img/ai-chat/ollama.png){align=right}
 
-**Ollama** is a command-line AI assistant that is available on macOS, Linux, and Windows. Ollama is a great choice if you're looking for an AI client that's easy-to-use, widely compatible, and fast due to its use of inference and other techniques. It also doesn't involve any manual setup.
+Ollama is a command-line AI assistant that is available on macOS, Linux, and Windows. Ollama is a great choice if you're looking for an AI client that's easy-to-use, widely compatible, and fast due to its use of inference and other techniques. It also doesn't involve any manual setup.
 
 In addition to supporting a wide range of text models, Ollama also supports [LLaVA](https://github.com/haotian-liu/LLaVA) models and has experimental support for Meta's [Llama vision capabilities](https://huggingface.co/blog/llama32#what-is-llama-32-vision).
 
@@ -123,9 +123,9 @@ Ollama simplifies the process of setting up a local AI chat by downloading the A
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
-![Llamafile Logo](assets/img/ai-chat/llamafile.png){align=right}
+![Llamafile Logo](assets/img/ai-chat/llamafile.svg){align=right}
 
-**Llamafile** is a lightweight, single-file executable that allows users to run LLMs locally on their own computers without any setup involved. It is [backed by Mozilla](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2023/11/introducing-llamafile) and available on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+Llamafile is a lightweight single-file executable that allows users to run LLMs locally on their own computers without any setup involved. It is [backed by Mozilla](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2023/11/introducing-llamafile) and available on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
 
 Llamafile also supports LLaVA. However, it doesn't support speech recognition or image generation.
 
@@ -137,9 +137,7 @@ Llamafile also supports LLaVA. However, it doesn't support speech recognition or
 <details class="downloads" markdown>
 <summary>Downloads</summary>
 
-- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile#quickstart)
-- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile#quickstart)
-- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile#quickstart)
+- [:fontawesome-solid-desktop: Desktop](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile#quickstart)
 
 </details>
 
@@ -172,11 +170,11 @@ Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend. In addi
 
 ### Minimum Requirements
 
-- Must be open source.
+- Must be open-source.
 - Must not transmit personal data, including chat data.
 - Must be multi-platform.
 - Must not require a GPU.
-- Must support GPU-powered, fast inference.
+- Must support GPU-powered fast inference.
 - Must not require an internet connection.
 
 ### Best-Case
@@ -187,11 +185,4 @@ Our best-case criteria represent what we *would* like to see from the perfect pr
 - Should have a built-in model downloader option.
 - The user should be able to modify the LLM parameters, such as its system prompt or temperature.
 
-*[LLaVA]: Large Language and Vision Assistant (multimodal AI model)
-*[LLM]: Large Language Model (AI model such as ChatGPT)
-*[LLMs]: Large Language Models (AI models such as ChatGPT)
-*[open-weights models]: AI models that anyone can download and use, but the underlying training data and/or algorithms for them are proprietary.
-*[system prompt]: The general instructions given by a human to guide how an AI chat should operate.
-*[temperature]: A parameter used in AI models to control the level of randomness and creativity in the generated text.
-
 [^1]: A file checksum is a type of anti-tampering fingerprint. A developer usually provides a checksum in a text file that can be downloaded separately, or on the download page itself. Verifying that the checksum of the file you downloaded matches the one provided by the developer helps ensure that the file is genuine and wasn't tampered with in transit. You can use commands like `sha256sum` on Linux and macOS, or `certutil -hashfile file SHA256` on Windows to generate the downloaded file's checksum.

docs/alternative-networks.md

@@ -34,8 +34,6 @@ The recommended way to access the Tor network is via the official Tor Browser, w
 
 [Tor Browser Info :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
 
-You can access the Tor network using other tools; making this determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
-
 <div class="admonition example" markdown>
 <p class="admonition-title">Try it out!</p>
 
@@ -43,50 +41,12 @@ You can try connecting to *Privacy Guides* via Tor at [xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh
 
 </div>
 
-#### Orbot
-
-<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
-
-![Orbot logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/orbot.svg){ align=right }
-
-**Orbot** is a mobile application which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
-
-<details class="downloads" markdown>
-<summary>Downloads</summary>
-
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
-- [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid)
-
-</details>
-
-</div>
-
-We previously recommended enabling the *Isolate Destination Address* preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
-
-=== "Android"
-
-    Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
-
-    Orbot is often outdated on Google Play and the Guardian Project's F-Droid repository, so consider downloading directly from the GitHub repository instead. All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
-
-=== "iOS"
-
-    On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
-
 #### Snowflake
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
-![Snowflake logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/snowflake.svg#only-light){ align=right }
-![Snowflake logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/snowflake-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
+![Snowflake logo](assets/img/browsers/snowflake.svg#only-light){ align=right }
+![Snowflake logo](assets/img/browsers/snowflake-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
 
 **Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.
 
@@ -149,5 +109,4 @@ Also, unlike Tor, every I2P node will relay traffic for other users by default,
 
 There are downsides to I2P's approach, however. Tor relying on dedicated exit nodes means more people in less safe environments can use it, and the relays that do exist on Tor are likely to be more performant and stable, as they generally aren't run on residential connections. Tor is also far more focused on **browser privacy** (i.e. anti-fingerprinting), with a dedicated [Tor Browser](tor.md) to make browsing activity as anonymous as possible. I2P is used via your [regular web browser](desktop-browsers.md), and while you can configure your browser to be more privacy-protecting, you probably still won't have the same browser fingerprint as other I2P users (there's no "crowd" to blend in with in that regard).
 
-[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
 Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.

docs/android/index.md

@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that
 
 [Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition, meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the attack surface of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
 
-Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)) (like AdAway) and firewalls which require root access persistently (like AFWall+) are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy-enhancing services such as [Orbot](../alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
+Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as [Orbot](../tor.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
 
 AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
 

docs/basics/account-creation.md

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ You will be responsible for managing your login credentials. For added security,
 
 #### Email aliases
 
-If you don't want to give your real email address to a service, you have the option to use an alias. We describe them in more detail on our email services recommendation page. Essentially, alias services allow you to generate new email addresses that forward all emails to your main address. This can help prevent tracking across services and help you manage the marketing emails that sometimes come with the sign-up process. Those can be filtered automatically based on the alias they are sent to.
+If you don't want to give your real email address to a service, you have the option to use an alias. We described them in more detail on our email services recommendation page. Essentially, alias services allow you to generate new email addresses that forward all emails to your main address. This can help prevent tracking across services and help you manage the marketing emails that sometimes come with the sign-up process. Those can be filtered automatically based on the alias they are sent to.
 
 Should a service get hacked, you might start receiving phishing or spam emails to the address you used to sign up. Using unique aliases for each service can assist in identifying exactly what service was hacked.
 
@@ -50,19 +50,19 @@ Should a service get hacked, you might start receiving phishing or spam emails t
 
 ### "Sign in with..." (OAuth)
 
-[Open Authorization (OAuth)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth) is an authentication protocol that allows you to register for a service without sharing much information with the service provider, if any, by using an existing account you have with another service instead. Whenever you see something along the lines of "Sign in with *provider name*" on a registration form, it's typically using OAuth.
+OAuth is an authentication protocol that allows you to register for a service without sharing much information with the service provider, if any, by using an existing account you have with another service instead. Whenever you see something along the lines of "Sign in with *provider name*" on a registration form, it's typically using OAuth.
 
 When you sign in with OAuth, it will open a login page with the provider you choose, and your existing account and new account will be connected. Your password won't be shared, but some basic information typically will (you can review it during the login request). This process is needed every time you want to log in to the same account.
 
 The main advantages are:
 
-- **Security**: You don't have to trust the security practices of the service you're logging into when it comes to storing your login credentials because they are stored with the external OAuth provider. Common OAuth providers like Apple and Google typically follow the best security practices, continuously audit their authentication systems, and don't store credentials inappropriately (such as in plain text).
-- **Ease-of-use**: Multiple accounts are managed by a single login.
+- **Security**: you don't have to trust the security practices of the service you're logging into when it comes to storing your login credentials, because they are stored with the external OAuth provider, which when it comes to services like Apple and Google typically follow the best security practices, continuously audit their authentication systems, and don't store credentials inappropriately (such as in plain text).
+- **Ease of use**: multiple accounts are managed by a single login.
 
 But there are disadvantages:
 
-- **Privacy**: The OAuth provider you log in with will know the services you use.
-- **Centralization**: If the account you use for OAuth is compromised, or you aren't able to log in to it, all other accounts connected to it are affected.
+- **Privacy**: the OAuth provider you log in with will know the services you use.
+- **Centralization**: if the account you use for OAuth is compromised, or you aren't able to log in to it, all other accounts connected to it are affected.
 
 OAuth can be especially useful in those situations where you could benefit from deeper integration between services. Our recommendation is to limit using OAuth to only where you need it, and always protect the main account with [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md).
 

docs/basics/email-security.md

@@ -2,34 +2,34 @@
 meta_title: "Why Email Isn't the Best Choice for Privacy and Security - Privacy Guides"
 title: Email Security
 icon: material/email
-description: Email is insecure in many ways, and these are some of the reasons it isn't our top choice for secure communications.
+description: Email is inherently insecure in many ways, and these are some of the reasons it isn't our top choice for secure communications.
 ---
 
-Email is an insecure form of communication by default. You can improve your email security with tools such as OpenPGP, which add end-to-end encryption to your messages, but OpenPGP still has a number of drawbacks compared to encryption in other messaging applications.
+Email is an insecure form of communication by default. You can improve your email security with tools such as OpenPGP, which add End-to-End Encryption to your messages, but OpenPGP still has a number of drawbacks compared to encryption in other messaging applications, and some email data can never be encrypted inherently due to how email is designed.
 
 As a result, email is best used for receiving transactional emails (like notifications, verification emails, password resets, etc.) from the services you sign up for online, not for communicating with others.
 
 ## Email Encryption Overview
 
-The standard way to add E2EE to emails between different email providers is by using OpenPGP. There are different implementations of the OpenPGP standard, the most common being [GnuPG](../encryption.md#gnu-privacy-guard) and [OpenPGP.js](https://openpgpjs.org).
+The standard way to add E2EE to emails between different email providers is by using OpenPGP. There are different implementations of the OpenPGP standard, the most common being [GnuPG](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard) and [OpenPGP.js](https://openpgpjs.org).
 
-Even if you use OpenPGP, it does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if the private key of either you or the message recipient is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. This is why we recommend [instant messengers](../real-time-communication.md) which implement forward secrecy over email for person-to-person communications whenever possible.
+There is another standard which is popular with business called [S/MIME](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME), however, it requires a certificate issued from a [Certificate Authority](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) (not all of them issue S/MIME certificates). It has support in [Google Workplace](https://support.google.com/a/topic/9061730) and [Outlook for Web or Exchange Server 2016, 2019](https://support.office.com/article/encrypt-messages-by-using-s-mime-in-outlook-on-the-web-878c79fc-7088-4b39-966f-14512658f480).
 
-There is another standard which is popular with business called [S/MIME](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME), however it requires a certificate issued from a [Certificate Authority](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) (not all of them issue S/MIME certificates, and often a yearly payment is required). In some cases it is more usable than PGP because it has support in popular/mainstream email applications like Apple Mail, [Google Workplace](https://support.google.com/a/topic/9061730), and [Outlook](https://support.office.com/article/encrypt-messages-by-using-s-mime-in-outlook-on-the-web-878c79fc-7088-4b39-966f-14512658f480). However, S/MIME does not solve the issue of lack of forward secrecy, and isn't particularly more secure than PGP.
+Even if you use OpenPGP, it does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. This is why we recommend [instant messengers](../real-time-communication.md) which implement forward secrecy over email for person-to-person communications whenever possible.
 
 ## What is the Web Key Directory standard?
 
-The [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD) standard allows email clients to discover the OpenPGP key for other mailboxes, even those hosted on a different provider. Email clients which support WKD will ask the recipient's server for a key based on the email address' domain name. For example, if you emailed `jonah@privacyguides.org`, your email client would ask `privacyguides.org` for Jonah's OpenPGP key, and if `privacyguides.org` has a key for that account, your message would be automatically encrypted.
+The Web Key Directory (WKD) standard allows email clients to discover the OpenPGP key for other mailboxes, even those hosted on a different provider. Email clients which support WKD will ask the recipient's server for a key based on the email address' domain name. For example, if you emailed `jonah@privacyguides.org`, your email client would ask `privacyguides.org` for Jonah's OpenPGP key, and if `privacyguides.org` has a key for that account, your message would be automatically encrypted.
 
 In addition to the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md) which support WKD, some webmail providers also support WKD. Whether *your own* key is published to WKD for others to use depends on your domain configuration. If you use an [email provider](../email.md#openpgp-compatible-services) which supports WKD, such as Proton Mail or Mailbox.org, they can publish your OpenPGP key on their domain for you.
 
-If you use your own custom domain, you will need to configure WKD separately. If you control your domain name, you can set up WKD regardless of your email provider. One easy way to do this is to use the "[WKD as a Service](https://keys.openpgp.org/about/usage#wkd-as-a-service)" feature from the `keys.openpgp.org` server: Set a CNAME record on the `openpgpkey` subdomain of your domain pointed to `wkd.keys.openpgp.org`, then upload your key to [keys.openpgp.org](https://keys.openpgp.org). Alternatively, you can [self-host WKD on your own web server](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKDHosting).
+If you use your own custom domain, you will need to configure WKD separately. If you control your domain name, you can set up WKD regardless of your email provider. One easy way to do this is to use the "[WKD as a Service](https://keys.openpgp.org/about/usage#wkd-as-a-service)" feature from keys.openpgp.org, by setting a CNAME record on the `openpgpkey` subdomain of your domain pointed to `wkd.keys.openpgp.org`, then uploading your key to [keys.openpgp.org](https://keys.openpgp.org). Alternatively, you can [self-host WKD on your own web server](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKDHosting).
 
-If you use a shared domain from a provider which doesn't support WKD, like `@gmail.com`, you won't be able to share your OpenPGP key with others via this method.
+If you use a shared domain from a provider which doesn't support WKD, like @gmail.com, you won't be able to share your OpenPGP key with others via this method.
 
 ### What Email Clients Support E2EE?
 
-Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md). Depending on the authentication method, this may lead to decreased security if either the provider or the email client does not support [OAuth](account-creation.md#sign-in-with-oauth) or a bridge application as [multifactor authentication](multi-factor-authentication.md) is not possible with plain password authentication.
+Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md). Depending on the authentication method, this may lead to the decrease security if either the provider or the email client does not support OATH or a bridge application as [multifactor authentication](multi-factor-authentication.md) is not possible with plain password authentication.
 
 ### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
 
@@ -39,14 +39,14 @@ It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smart card to avoid possib
 
 ## Email Metadata Overview
 
-Email metadata is stored in the [message header](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) of the email message and includes some visible headers that you may have seen such as `To`, `From`, `Cc`, `Date`, and `Subject`. There are also a number of hidden headers included by many email clients and providers that can reveal information about your account.
+Email metadata is stored in the [message header](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) of the email message and includes some visible headers that you may have seen such as: `To`, `From`, `Cc`, `Date`, `Subject`. There are also a number of hidden headers included by many email clients and providers that can reveal information about your account.
 
 Client software may use email metadata to show who a message is from and what time it was received. Servers may use it to determine where an email message must be sent, among [other purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) which are not always transparent.
 
 ### Who Can View Email Metadata?
 
-Email metadata is protected from outside observers with [opportunistic TLS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunistic_TLS), but it is still able to be seen by your email client software (or webmail) and any servers relaying the message from you to any recipients including your email provider. Sometimes email servers will also use third-party services to protect against spam, which generally also have access to your messages.
+Email metadata is protected from outside observers with [Opportunistic TLS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunistic_TLS) protecting it from outside observers, but it is still able to be seen by your email client software (or webmail) and any servers relaying the message from you to any recipients including your email provider. Sometimes email servers will also use third-party services to protect against spam, which generally also have access to your messages.
 
 ### Why Can't Metadata be E2EE?
 
-Email metadata is crucial to the most basic functionality of email (where it came from, and where it has to go). E2EE was not built into standard email protocols originally, instead requiring add-on software like OpenPGP. Because OpenPGP messages still have to work with traditional email providers, it cannot encrypt some of this email metadata required for identifying the parties communicating. That means that even when using OpenPGP, outside observers can see lots of information about your messages, such as whom you're emailing, when you're emailing, etc.
+Email metadata is crucial to the most basic functionality of email (where it came from, and where it has to go). E2EE was not built into the email protocols originally, instead requiring add-on software like OpenPGP. Because OpenPGP messages still have to work with traditional email providers, it cannot encrypt email metadata, only the message body itself. That means that even when using OpenPGP, outside observers can see lots of information about your messages, such as whom you're emailing, the subject lines, when you're emailing, etc.

docs/basics/vpn-overview.md

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ VPNs cannot encrypt data outside the connection between your device and the VPN
 
 Using a VPN in cases where you're using your [real-life or well-known identity](common-misconceptions.md#complicated-is-better) online is unlikely to be useful. Doing so may trigger spam and fraud detection systems, such as if you were to log into your bank's website.
 
-It's important to remember that a VPN will not provide you with absolute anonymity because the VPN provider itself will still have access to your real IP address, destination website information, and often a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. "No logging" policies are merely a promise; if you need complete safety from the network itself, consider using [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) in addition to or instead of a VPN.
+It's important to remember that a VPN will not provide you with absolute anonymity, because the VPN provider itself will still see your real IP address, destination website information, and often has a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. You can't rely on "no logging" policies to protect your data from anyone who is able to protect. If you need complete safety from the network itself, consider using [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) in addition to or instead of a VPN.
 
 You also should not trust a VPN to secure your connection to an unencrypted, HTTP destination. In order to keep what you actually do on the websites you visit private and secure, you must use HTTPS. This will keep your passwords, session tokens, and queries safe from the VPN provider and other potential adversaries in between the VPN server and your destination. You should enable HTTPS-only mode in your browser (if it's supported) to mitigate attacks which try to downgrade your connection from HTTPS to HTTP.
 
@@ -91,9 +91,7 @@ Recently, some attempts have been made by various organizations to address some
 
 Multi-Party Relays (MPRs) use multiple nodes owned by different parties, such that no individual party knows both who you are and what you're connecting to. This is the basic idea behind Tor, but now there are some paid services that try to emulate this model.
 
-MPRs seek to solve a problem inherent to VPNs: the fact that you must trust them completely. They accomplish this goal by segmenting the responsibilities between two or more different companies.
-
-One example of a commercially available MPR is Apple's iCloud+ Private Relay, which routes your traffic through two servers:
+MPRs seek to solve a problem inherent to VPNs: the fact that you must trust them completely. They accomplish this goal by segmenting the responsibilities between two or more different companies. For example, Apple's iCloud+ Private Relay routes your traffic through two servers:
 
 1. Firstly, a server operated by Apple.
 
@@ -103,7 +101,7 @@ One example of a commercially available MPR is Apple's iCloud+ Private Relay, wh
 
     This server actually makes the connection to your destination website, but has no knowledge of your device. The only IP address it knows about is Apple's server's.
 
-Other MPRs run by different companies operate in a very similar manner. This protection by segmentation only exists if you trust the two companies to not collude with each other to deanonymize you.
+Other MPRs run by different companies like Google or INVISV operate in a very similar manner. This protection by segmentation only exists if you trust the two companies to not collude with each other to deanonymize you.
 
 ### Decentralized VPNs
 

docs/cloud.md

@@ -95,36 +95,33 @@ They have also received the Digital Trust Label, a certification from the [Swiss
 
 ![Peergos logo](assets/img/cloud/peergos.svg){ align=right }
 
-**Peergos** is a decentralized protocol and open-source platform for storage, social media, and applications. It provides a secure and private space where users can store, share, and view their photos, videos, documents, etc. Peergos secures your files with quantum-resistant end-to-end encryption and ensures all data about your files remains private.
+**Peergos** is a decentralized protocol and open-source platform for storage, social media, and applications. It provides a secure and private space where users can store, share, and view their photos, videos, documents, etc. Peergos secures your files with quantum-resistant end-to-end encryption and ensures all data about your files remains private. It is built on top of [IPFS (InterPlanetary File System)](https://ipfs.tech), a peer-to-peer architecture that protects against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://peergos.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://peergos.net/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
 [:octicons-info-16:](https://book.peergos.org){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
 [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Peergos/Peergos){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/peergos/peergos#support){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
 
 <details class="downloads" markdown>
 <summary>Downloads</summary>
 
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=peergos.android)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/Peergos/web-ui/releases)
+- [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://peergos.net)
 - [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://github.com/Peergos/web-ui/releases)
 - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://github.com/Peergos/web-ui/releases)
 - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://github.com/Peergos/web-ui/releases)
-- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://peergos.net)
 
 </details>
 
 </div>
 
-Peergos is built on top of the [InterPlanetary File System (IPFS)](https://ipfs.tech), a peer-to-peer architecture that protects against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }.
-
 Peergos is primarily a web app, but you can self-host the server either as a local cache for your remote Peergos account, or as a standalone storage server which negates the need to register for a remote account and subscription. The Peergos server is a `.jar` file, which means the Java 17+ Runtime Environment ([OpenJDK download](https://azul.com/downloads)) should be installed on your machine to get it working.
 
 Running a local version of Peergos alongside a registered account on their paid, hosted service allows you to access your Peergos storage without any reliance on DNS or TLS certificate authorities, and keep a copy of your data backed up to their cloud. The user experience should be the same whether you run their desktop server or just use their hosted web interface.
 
 Peergos was [audited](https://peergos.org/posts/security-audit-2024) in November 2024 by Radically Open Security and all issues were fixed. They were previously [audited](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_peergos.pdf) by Cure53 in June 2019, and all found issues were subsequently fixed.
 
+An Android app is not available, but it is [in the works](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/peergos-private-storage-sharing-social-media-and-application-platform/11825/25). The current workaround is to use the mobile [PWA](https://peergos.net) instead.
+
 ## Criteria
 
 **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.

docs/desktop-browsers.md

@@ -88,11 +88,7 @@ If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) ins
 
 </div>
 
-Like [Tor Browser](tor.md), Mullvad Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting by making your browser fingerprint identical to all other Mullvad Browser users, and it includes default settings and extensions that are automatically configured by the default security levels: *Standard*, *Safer* and *Safest*.
-
-Therefore, it is imperative that you do not modify the browser at all outside adjusting the default [security levels](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings). When adjusting the security level, you **must** always restart the browser before continuing to use it. Otherwise, [the security settings may not be fully applied](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/05/02/tor-security-slider-flaw/), putting you at a higher risk of fingerprinting and exploits than you may expect based on the setting chosen.
-
-Modifications other than adjusting this setting would make your fingerprint unique, defeating the purpose of using this browser. If you want to configure your browser more heavily and fingerprinting is not a concern for you, we recommend [Firefox](#firefox) instead.
+Like [Tor Browser](tor.md), Mullvad Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting by making your browser fingerprint identical to all other Mullvad Browser users, and it includes default settings and extensions that are automatically configured by the default security levels: *Standard*, *Safer* and *Safest*. Therefore, it is imperative that you do not modify the browser at all outside adjusting the default [security levels](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings). Other modifications would make your fingerprint unique, defeating the purpose of using this browser. If you want to configure your browser more heavily and fingerprinting is not a concern for you, we recommend [Firefox](#firefox) instead.
 
 ### Anti-Fingerprinting
 
@@ -321,6 +317,15 @@ Brave allows you to select additional content filters within the internal `brave
 
 1. Disabling the V8 optimizer reduces your attack surface by disabling [*some*](https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/112708049232710156) parts of JavaScript Just-In-Time (JIT) compilation.
 
+<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Sanitizing on close</p>
+
+- [x] Select **Delete data sites have saved to your device when you close all windows** under *Sites and Shields Settings* → *Content* → *Additional content settings* → *On-device site data*.
+
+If you wish to stay logged in to a particular site you visit often, you can set exceptions on a per-site basis under the *Customized behaviors* section.
+
+</div>
+
 ##### Tor windows
 
 [**Private Window with Tor**](https://support.brave.com/hc/articles/360018121491-What-is-a-Private-Window-with-Tor-Connectivity) allows you to route your traffic through the Tor network in Private Windows and access .onion services, which may be useful in some cases. However, Brave is **not** as resistant to fingerprinting as the Tor Browser is, and far fewer people use Brave with Tor, so you will stand out. If your threat model requires strong anonymity, use the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser).

docs/desktop.md

@@ -14,15 +14,15 @@ Linux distributions are commonly recommended for privacy protection and software
 
 ## Traditional Distributions
 
-### Fedora Linux
+### Fedora Workstation
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
 ![Fedora logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora.svg){ align=right }
 
-**Fedora Linux** is our recommended desktop distribution for people new to Linux. Fedora generally adopts newer technologies (e.g., [Wayland](https://wayland.freedesktop.org) and [PipeWire](https://pipewire.org)) before other distributions. These new technologies often come with improvements in security, privacy, and usability in general.
+**Fedora Workstation** is our recommended distribution for people new to Linux. Fedora generally adopts newer technologies (e.g., [Wayland](https://wayland.freedesktop.org) and [PipeWire](https://pipewire.org)) before other distributions. These new technologies often come with improvements in security, privacy, and usability in general.
 
-[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://fedoraproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://fedoraproject.org/workstation){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
 [:octicons-heart-16:](https://whatcanidoforfedora.org){ .card-link title=Contribute }
 
@@ -30,9 +30,7 @@ Linux distributions are commonly recommended for privacy protection and software
 
 </div>
 
-Fedora comes in two primary desktop editions, [Fedora Workstation](https://fedoraproject.org/workstation), which uses the GNOME desktop environment, and [Fedora KDE Plasma Desktop](https://fedoraproject.org/kde), which uses KDE. Historically, Fedora Workstation has been more popular and widely recommended, but KDE has been gaining in popularity and provides an experience more similar to Windows, which may make transitioning to Linux easier for some. The security and privacy benefits of both editions are very similar, so it mostly comes down to personal preference.
-
-Fedora has a semi-rolling release cycle. While some packages like the desktop environment are frozen until the next Fedora release, most packages (including the kernel) are updated frequently throughout the lifespan of the release. Each Fedora release is supported for one year, with a new version released every 6 months.
+Fedora has a semi-rolling release cycle. While some packages like [GNOME](https://gnome.org) are frozen until the next Fedora release, most packages (including the kernel) are updated frequently throughout the lifespan of the release. Each Fedora release is supported for one year, with a new version released every 6 months.
 
 ### openSUSE Tumbleweed
 
@@ -215,25 +213,6 @@ Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, et
 
 For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page.
 
-### Secureblue
-
-<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
-
-![Secureblue logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/secureblue.svg){ align=right }
-
-**Secureblue** is a security-focused operating system based on [Fedora Atomic Desktops](#fedora-atomic-desktops). It includes a number of [security features](https://secureblue.dev/features) intended to proactively defend against the exploitation of both known and unknown vulnerabilities, and ships with [Trivalent](https://github.com/secureblue/Trivalent), their hardened, Chromium-based web browser.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://secureblue.dev){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://secureblue.dev/install){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/secureblue/secureblue){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://secureblue.dev/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
-
-</div>
-
-**Trivalent** is Secureblue's hardened Chromium for desktop Linux inspired by [GrapheneOS](android/distributions.md#grapheneos)'s Vanadium browser.
-
-Secureblue also provides GrapheneOS's [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc) and enables it globally (including for Flatpaks).
-
 ### Kicksecure
 
 While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install.

docs/device-integrity.md

@@ -69,8 +69,7 @@ These tools can trigger false-positives. If any of these tools finds indicators
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
-![MVT logo](assets/img/device-integrity/mvt.webp#only-light){ align=right }
-![MVT logo](assets/img/device-integrity/mvt-dark.png#only-dark){ align=right }
+![MVT logo](assets/img/device-integrity/mvt.webp){ align=right }
 
 **Mobile Verification Toolkit** (**MVT**) is a collection of utilities which simplifies and automates the process of scanning mobile devices for potential traces of targeting or infection by known spyware campaigns. MVT was developed by Amnesty International and released in 2021 in the context of the [Pegasus Project](https://forbiddenstories.org/about-the-pegasus-project).
 
@@ -187,4 +186,4 @@ It is important to note that Auditor can only effectively detect changes **after
 
 No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
 
-If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address from the attestation service, you could consider using [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [VPN](vpn.md).
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service.

docs/dns.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 title: "DNS Resolvers"
 icon: material/dns
-description: We recommend choosing these encrypted DNS providers to replace your ISP's default configuration.
+description: These are some encrypted DNS providers we recommend switching to, to replace your ISP's default configuration.
 cover: dns.webp
 global:
  - [randomize-element, "table tbody"]
@@ -16,43 +16,23 @@ Encrypted DNS with third-party servers should only be used to get around basic [
 
 ## Recommended Providers
 
-These are our favorite public DNS resolvers based on their privacy and security characteristics, and their worldwide performance. Some of these services offer basic DNS-level blocking of malware or trackers depending on the server you choose, but if you want to be able to see and customize what is blocked, you should use a dedicated DNS filtering product instead.
+These are our favorite public DNS resolvers based on their privacy and security characteristics, and their worldwide performance. Some of these services offer basic DNS-level blocking of malware or trackers depending on the server you choose, but if you want to be able to see and customize what is blocked you should use a dedicated DNS filtering product instead.
 
 | DNS Provider | Protocols | Logging / Privacy Policy | [ECS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-edns-client-subnet-ecs) | Filtering | Signed Apple Profile |
 |---|---|---|---|---|---|
-| [**AdGuard Public DNS**](https://adguard-dns.io/en/public-dns.html) | Cleartext <br>DoH/3 <br>DoT <br>DoQ <br>DNSCrypt | Anonymized[^1] | Anonymized | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardDNS) | Yes [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://adguard-dns.io/en/blog/encrypted-dns-ios-14.html) |
-| [**Cloudflare**](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/setup) | Cleartext <br>DoH/3 <br>DoT | Anonymized[^2] | No | Based on server choice. | No [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://community.cloudflare.com/t/requesting-1-1-1-1-signed-profiles-for-apple/571846) |
-| [**Control D Free DNS**](https://controld.com/free-dns) | Cleartext <br>DoH/3 <br>DoT <br>DoQ | No[^3] | No | Based on server choice. | Yes <br>[:simple-apple: iOS](https://docs.controld.com/docs/ios-platform) <br>[:material-apple-finder: macOS](https://docs.controld.com/docs/macos-platform#manual-setup-profile) |
-| [**DNS0.eu**](https://dns0.eu) | Cleartext <br>DoH/3 <br>DoH <br>DoT <br>DoQ | Anonymized[^4] | Anonymized | Based on server choice. | Yes [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://dns0.eu/zero.dns0.eu.mobileconfig) |
-| [**Mullvad**](https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls) | DoH <br>DoT | No[^5] | No | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/mullvad/dns-adblock) | Yes [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/mullvad/encrypted-dns-profiles) |
-| [**Quad9**](https://quad9.net) | Cleartext <br>DoH <br>DoT <br>DNSCrypt | Anonymized[^6] | Optional | Based on server choice. Malware blocking is included by default. | Yes <br>[:simple-apple: iOS](https://docs.quad9.net/Setup_Guides/iOS/iOS_14_and_later_(Encrypted)) <br>[:material-apple-finder: macOS](https://docs.quad9.net/Setup_Guides/MacOS/Big_Sur_and_later_(Encrypted)) |
+| [**AdGuard Public DNS**](https://adguard-dns.io/en/public-dns.html) | Cleartext   DoH/3   DoT   DoQ   DNSCrypt | Anonymized[^1] | Anonymized | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardDNS) | Yes [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://adguard-dns.io/en/blog/encrypted-dns-ios-14.html) |
+| [**Cloudflare**](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/setup) | Cleartext   DoH/3   DoT | Anonymized[^2] | No | Based on server choice. | No [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://community.cloudflare.com/t/requesting-1-1-1-1-signed-profiles-for-apple/571846) |
+| [**Control D Free DNS**](https://controld.com/free-dns) | Cleartext   DoH/3   DoT   DoQ | No[^3] | No | Based on server choice. | Yes [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://docs.controld.com/docs/macos-platform) |
+| [**dns0.eu**](https://dns0.eu) | Cleartext   DoH/3   DoH   DoT   DoQ | Anonymized[^4] | Anonymized | Based on server choice. | Yes [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://dns0.eu/zero.dns0.eu.mobileconfig) |
+| [**Mullvad**](https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls) | DoH   DoT | No[^5] | No | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/mullvad/dns-adblock) | Yes [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/profiles-to-configure-our-encrypted-dns-on-apple-devices) |
+| [**Quad9**](https://quad9.net) | Cleartext   DoH   DoT   DNSCrypt | Anonymized[^6] | Optional | Based on server choice, malware blocking by default. | Yes [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://quad9.net/news/blog/ios-mobile-provisioning-profiles) |
 
-[^1]:
-    AdGuard stores aggregated performance metrics of their DNS servers, namely the number of complete requests to a particular server, the number of blocked requests, and the speed of processing requests. They also keep and store the database of domains requested within the last 24 hours.
-    > We need this information to identify and block new trackers and threats.
-    > We also log how many times this or that tracker has been blocked. We need this information to remove outdated rules from our filters.
-
-    AdGuard DNS: [*Privacy Policy*](https://adguard-dns.io/en/privacy.html)
-[^2]:
-    Cloudflare collects and stores only the limited DNS query data that is sent to the 1.1.1.1 resolver. The 1.1.1.1 resolver service does not log personal data, and the bulk of the limited non-personally identifiable query data is stored only for 25 hours.
-
-    1.1.1.1 Public DNS Resolver: [*Cloudflare’s commitment to privacy*](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver)
-[^3]:
-    Control D only logs specific account data for Premium resolvers with custom DNS profiles. Free resolvers do not retain any data.
-
-    Control D: [*Privacy Policy*](https://controld.com/privacy)
-[^4]:
-    DNS0.eu collects some data for their threat intelligence feeds to monitor for newly registered/observed/active domains and other bulk data. That data is shared with some [partners](https://docs.dns0.eu/data-feeds/introduction) for e.g. security research. They do not collect any personally identifiable information.
-
-    DNS0.eu: [*Privacy Policy*](https://dns0.eu/privacy)
-[^5]:
-    Mullvad's DNS service is available to both subscribers and non-subscribers of Mullvad VPN. Their privacy policy explicitly claims they do not log DNS requests in any way.
-
-    Mullvad: [*No-logging of user activity policy*](https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy)
-[^6]:
-    Quad9 collects some data for the purposes of threat monitoring and response. That data may then be remixed and shared for purposes like furthering their security research. Quad9 does not collect or record IP addresses or other data they deem personally identifiable.
-
-    Quad9: [*Data and Privacy Policy*](https://quad9.net/privacy/policy)
+[^1]: AdGuard stores aggregated performance metrics of their DNS servers, namely the number of complete requests to a particular server, the number of blocked requests, and the speed of processing requests. They also keep and store the database of domains requested in within last 24 hours. "We need this information to identify and block new trackers and threats." "We also log how many times this or that tracker has been blocked. We need this information to remove outdated rules from our filters." [https://adguard-dns.io/en/privacy.html](https://adguard-dns.io/en/privacy.html)
+[^2]: Cloudflare collects and stores only the limited DNS query data that is sent to the 1.1.1.1 resolver. The 1.1.1.1 resolver service does not log personal data, and the bulk of the limited non-personally identifiable query data is stored only for 25 hours. [https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver)
+[^3]: Control D only logs for Premium resolvers with custom DNS profiles. Free resolvers do not log data. [https://controld.com/privacy](https://controld.com/privacy)
+[^4]: dns0.eu collects some data for their threat intelligence feeds, to monitor for newly registered/observed/active domains and other bulk data. That data is shared with some [partners](https://docs.dns0.eu/data-feeds/introduction) for e.g. security research. They do not collect any Personally Identifiable Information. [https://dns0.eu/privacy](https://dns0.eu/privacy)
+[^5]: Mullvad's DNS service is available to both subscribers and non-subscribers of Mullvad VPN. Their privacy policy explicitly claims they do not log DNS requests in any way. [https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/](https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy)
+[^6]: Quad9 collects some data for the purposes of threat monitoring and response. That data may then be remixed and shared, such as for the purpose of security research. Quad9 does not collect or record IP addresses or other data they deem personally identifiable. [https://quad9.net/privacy/policy](https://quad9.net/privacy/policy)
 
 ## Self-Hosted DNS Filtering
 
@@ -117,12 +97,12 @@ These DNS filtering solutions offer a web dashboard where you can customize the
 <details class="downloads" markdown>
 <summary>Downloads</summary>
 
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.controld.setuputility)
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/1518799460)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/Control-D-Inc/ctrld/releases)
 - [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://docs.controld.com/docs/gui-setup-utility)
 - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://docs.controld.com/docs/gui-setup-utility)
 - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://docs.controld.com/docs/ctrld)
+- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.controld.setuputility)
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/1518799460)
+- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/Control-D-Inc/ctrld/releases)
 
 </details>
 
@@ -144,11 +124,11 @@ These DNS filtering solutions offer a web dashboard where you can customize the
 <details class="downloads" markdown>
 <summary>Downloads</summary>
 
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/nextdns/id1463342498)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/nextdns/nextdns/releases)
 - [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://github.com/nextdns/nextdns/wiki/Windows)
 - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/nextdns/id1464122853)
 - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://github.com/nextdns/nextdns/wiki)
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/nextdns/id1463342498)
+- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/nextdns/nextdns/releases)
 
 </details>
 
@@ -156,9 +136,9 @@ These DNS filtering solutions offer a web dashboard where you can customize the
 
 When used with an account, NextDNS will enable insights and logging features by default (as some features require it). You can choose retention time and log storage location for any logs you choose to keep, or disable logs altogether.
 
-NextDNS's free plan is fully functional, but should not be relied upon for security or other critical filtering applications, because after 300,000 DNS queries in a month all filtering, logging, and other account-based functionality are disabled. It can still be used as a regular DNS provider after that point, so your devices will continue to function and make secure queries via DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH), just without your filter lists.
+NextDNS's free plan is fully functional, but should not be relied upon for security or other critical filtering applications, because after 300,000 DNS queries in a month all filtering, logging, and other account-based functionality is disabled. It can still be used as a regular DNS provider after that point, so your devices will continue to function and make secure queries via DNS-over-HTTPS, just without your filter lists.
 
-NextDNS also offers a public DoH service at `https://dns.nextdns.io` and DNS-over-TLS/QUIC (DoT/DoQ) at `dns.nextdns.io`, which are available by default in Firefox and Chromium, and subject to their default, no-logging [privacy policy](https://nextdns.io/privacy).
+NextDNS also offers public DNS-over-HTTPS service at `https://dns.nextdns.io` and DNS-over-TLS/QUIC at `dns.nextdns.io`, which are available by default in Firefox and Chromium, and subject to their default no-logging [privacy policy](https://nextdns.io/privacy).
 
 ## Encrypted DNS Proxies
 
@@ -171,7 +151,7 @@ Encrypted DNS proxy software provides a local proxy for the [unencrypted DNS](ad
 ![RethinkDNS logo](assets/img/android/rethinkdns.svg#only-light){ align=right }
 ![RethinkDNS logo](assets/img/android/rethinkdns-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
 
-**RethinkDNS** is an open-source Android client that supports [DoH](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), [DoT](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-tls-dot), [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt) and DNS Proxy. It also provides additional functionality such as caching DNS responses, locally logging DNS queries, and using the app as a firewall.
+**RethinkDNS** is an open-source Android client that supports [DNS-over-HTTPS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), [DNS-over-TLS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-tls-dot), [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt) and DNS Proxy. It also provides additional functionality such as caching DNS responses, locally logging DNS queries, and using the app as a firewall.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://rethinkdns.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://rethinkdns.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@@ -190,13 +170,13 @@ Encrypted DNS proxy software provides a local proxy for the [unencrypted DNS](ad
 
 While RethinkDNS takes up the Android VPN slot, you can still use a VPN or Orbot with the app by [adding a WireGuard configuration](https://docs.rethinkdns.com/proxy/wireguard) or [manually configuring Orbot as a Proxy server](https://docs.rethinkdns.com/firewall/orbot), respectively.
 
-### DNSCrypt-Proxy
+### dnscrypt-proxy
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
-![DNSCrypt-Proxy logo](assets/img/dns/dnscrypt-proxy.svg){ align=right }
+![dnscrypt-proxy logo](assets/img/dns/dnscrypt-proxy.svg){ align=right }
 
-**DNSCrypt-Proxy** is a DNS proxy with support for [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt), [DoH](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), and [Anonymized DNS](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Anonymized-DNS).
+**dnscrypt-proxy** is a DNS proxy with support for [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt), [DNS-over-HTTPS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), and [Anonymized DNS](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Anonymized-DNS).
 
 [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
@@ -225,14 +205,14 @@ The anonymized DNS feature does [not](advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-us
 
 **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
 
-All DNS products...
+All DNS products must support:
 
-- Must support [DNSSEC](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-dnssec).
-- Must support [QNAME Minimization](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-qname-minimization).
-- Must anonymize [ECS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-edns-client-subnet-ecs) or disable it by default.
+- [DNSSEC](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-dnssec).
+- [QNAME Minimization](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-qname-minimization).
+- Anonymize [ECS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-edns-client-subnet-ecs) or disable it by default.
 
-Additionally, all public providers...
+Additionally, all public providers:
 
-- Must not log any personal data to disk.
-    - As noted in the footnotes, some providers collect query information for purposes like security research, but in that case the data must not be associated with any PII such as IP address, etc.
-- Should support [anycast](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anycast) or geo-steering.
+- Prefer [anycast](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anycast#Addressing_methods) support or geo-steering support.
+- Must not log any personal data to disk
+    - As noted in our footnotes, some providers collect query information for example, for purposes like security research, but in that case that data must not be associated with any PII such as IP address, etc.

docs/email-aliasing.md

@@ -9,77 +9,61 @@ cover: email-aliasing.webp
 - [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
 - [:material-account-search: Public Exposure](basics/common-threats.md#limiting-public-information){ .pg-green }
 
-An **email aliasing service** allows you to easily generate a new email address for every website you register for. The email aliases you generate are then forwarded to an email address of your choosing, hiding both your "main" email address and the identity of your [email provider](email.md).
+An **email aliasing service** allows you to easily generate a new email address for every website you register for. The email aliases you generate are then forwarded to an email address of your choosing, hiding both your "main" email address and the identity of your [email provider](email.md). True email aliasing is better than plus addressing commonly used and supported by many providers, which allows you to create aliases like `yourname+[anythinghere]@example.com`, because websites, advertisers, and tracking networks can trivially remove anything after the `+` sign. Organizations like the [IAB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interactive_Advertising_Bureau) require that advertisers [normalize email addresses](https://shkspr.mobi/blog/2023/01/the-iab-loves-tracking-users-but-it-hates-users-tracking-them) so that they can be correlated and tracked, regardless of users' privacy wishes.
+
+<div class="grid cards" markdown>
+
+- ![addy.io logo](assets/img/email-aliasing/addy.svg){ .twemoji } [addy.io](email-aliasing.md#addyio)
+- ![SimpleLogin logo](assets/img/email-aliasing/simplelogin.svg){ .twemoji } [SimpleLogin](email-aliasing.md#simplelogin)
+
+</div>
 
 Email aliasing can also act as a safeguard in case your email provider ever ceases operation. In that scenario, you can easily re-route your aliases to a new email address. In turn, however, you are placing trust in the aliasing service to continue functioning.
 
-## Benefits
-
-Using a service which allows you to individually manage email aliases has a number of benefits over conventional mailbox management/filtering methods:
-
-### Over Plus Addressing
-
-True email aliasing is better than plus addressing commonly used and supported by many providers, which allows you to create aliases like `yourname+[anythinghere]@example.com`, because websites, advertisers, and tracking networks can trivially remove anything after the `+` sign. Organizations like the [IAB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interactive_Advertising_Bureau) require that advertisers [normalize email addresses](https://shkspr.mobi/blog/2023/01/the-iab-loves-tracking-users-but-it-hates-users-tracking-them) so that they can be correlated and tracked, regardless of users' privacy wishes.
-
-### Over Catch-All Aliases
-
-Using a dedicated email aliasing service has a number of benefits over a catch-all alias on a custom domain:
+Using a dedicated email aliasing service also has a number of benefits over a catch-all alias on a custom domain:
 
 - Aliases can be turned on and off individually when you need them, preventing websites from emailing you randomly.
 - Replies are sent from the alias address, shielding your real email address.
 
-### Over Temporary Email Services
-
-Email aliasing services also have a number of benefits over "temporary email" services:
+They also have a number of benefits over "temporary email" services:
 
 - Aliases are permanent and can be turned on again if you need to receive something like a password reset.
 - Emails are sent to your trusted mailbox rather than stored by the alias provider.
 - Temporary email services typically have public mailboxes which can be accessed by anyone who knows the address, while aliases are private to you.
 
-## Recommended Providers
-
-<div class="grid cards" markdown>
-
-- ![Addy.io logo](assets/img/email-aliasing/addy.svg){ .twemoji } [Addy.io](email-aliasing.md#addyio)
-- ![SimpleLogin logo](assets/img/email-aliasing/simplelogin.svg){ .twemoji } [SimpleLogin](email-aliasing.md#simplelogin)
-
-</div>
-
-Our email aliasing recommendations are providers that allow you to create aliases on domains they control, as well as on your own custom domain(s) for a modest yearly fee. They can also be self-hosted if you want maximum control. However, using a custom domain can have privacy-related drawbacks: If you are the only person using your custom domain, your actions can be easily tracked across websites simply by looking at the domain name in the email address and ignoring everything before the `@` symbol.
+Our email aliasing recommendations are providers that allow you to create aliases on domains they control, as well as on your own custom domain(s) for a modest yearly fee. They can also be self-hosted if you want maximum control. However, using a custom domain can have privacy-related drawbacks: If you are the only person using your custom domain, your actions can be easily tracked across websites simply by looking at the domain name in the email address and ignoring everything before the at (@) sign.
 
 Using an aliasing service requires trusting both your email provider and your aliasing provider with your unencrypted messages. Some providers mitigate this slightly with automatic PGP encryption[^1], which reduces the number of parties you need to trust from two to one by encrypting incoming emails before they are delivered to your final mailbox provider.
 
-### Addy.io
+### addy.io
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
-![Addy.io logo](assets/img/email-aliasing/addy.svg){ align=right }
+![addy.io logo](assets/img/email-aliasing/addy.svg){ align=right }
 
-**Addy.io** lets you create 10 domain aliases on a shared domain for free, or unlimited ["standard" aliases](https://addy.io/faq/#what-is-a-standard-alias).
+**addy.io** lets you create 10 domain aliases on a shared domain for free, or unlimited "standard" aliases.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://addy.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://addy.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://addy.io/faq){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://addy.io/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
 [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/anonaddy){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://addy.io/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://addy.io/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
 
 <details class="downloads" markdown>
 <summary>Downloads</summary>
 
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://addy.io/faq/#is-there-an-android-app)
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://addy.io/faq/#is-there-an-ios-app)
+- [:simple-android: Android](https://addy.io/faq/#is-there-an-android-app)
+- [:material-apple-ios: iOS](https://addy.io/faq/#is-there-an-ios-app)
 - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/addy_io)
-- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/iadbdpnoknmbdeolbapdackdcogdmjpe)
+- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/addyio-anonymous-email-fo/iadbdpnoknmbdeolbapdackdcogdmjpe)
 
 </details>
 
 </div>
 
-The number of shared aliases (which end in a shared domain like `@addy.io`) that you can create depends on the [plan](https://addy.io/#pricing) you are subscribed to. You can pay for these plans using [cryptocurrency](https://addy.io/help/subscribing-with-cryptocurrency) or purchase a voucher code from [ProxyStore](https://addy.io/help/voucher-codes), Addy.io's official reseller.
+The number of shared aliases (which end in a shared domain like @addy.io) that you can create is limited to 10 on addy.io's free plan, 50 on their $1/month plan and unlimited on the $4/month plan (billed $3 for a year). You can pay for these plans using [cryptocurrency](https://addy.io/help/subscribing-with-cryptocurrency) or purchase a voucher code from [ProxyStore](https://addy.io/help/voucher-codes), addy.io's official reseller.
 
-You can create unlimited standard aliases which end in a domain like `@[username].addy.io` or a custom domain on paid plans. However, as previously mentioned, this can be detrimental to privacy because people can trivially tie your standard aliases together based on the domain name alone. They are useful where a shared domain might be blocked by a service.
-
-Securitum [audited](https://addy.io/blog/addy-io-passes-independent-security-audit) Addy.io in September 2023 and no significant vulnerabilities [were identified](https://addy.io/addy-io-security-audit.pdf).
+You can create unlimited standard aliases which end in a domain like @[username].addy.io or a custom domain on paid plans. However, as previously mentioned, this can be detrimental to privacy because people can trivially tie your standard aliases together based on the domain name alone. They are useful where a shared domain might be blocked by a service. Securitum [audited](https://addy.io/blog/addy-io-passes-independent-security-audit) addy.io in September 2023 and no significant vulnerabilities [were identified](https://addy.io/addy-io-security-audit.pdf).
 
 Notable free features:
 
@@ -101,7 +85,7 @@ If you cancel your subscription, you will still enjoy the features of your paid
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://simplelogin.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://simplelogin.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://simplelogin.io/docs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://simplelogin.io/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
 [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simple-login){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
 
 <details class="downloads" markdown>
@@ -112,18 +96,18 @@ If you cancel your subscription, you will still enjoy the features of your paid
 - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/simple-login/Simple-Login-Android/releases)
 - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/simplelogin)
 - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/dphilobhebphkdjbpfohgikllaljmgbn)
-- [:fontawesome-brands-edge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/diacfpipniklenphgljfkmhinphjlfff)
+- [:fontawesome-brands-edge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/simpleloginreceive-sen/diacfpipniklenphgljfkmhinphjlfff)
 - [:simple-safari: Safari](https://apps.apple.com/app/id6475835429)
 
 </details>
 
 </div>
 
-SimpleLogin was [acquired by Proton AG](https://proton.me/news/proton-and-simplelogin-join-forces) as of April 8, 2022. If you use Proton Mail for your primary mailbox, SimpleLogin is a great choice. As both products are now owned by the same company you now only have to trust a single entity. We also expect that SimpleLogin will be more tightly integrated with Proton's offerings in the future. SimpleLogin continues to support forwarding to any email provider of your choosing.
+SimpleLogin was [acquired by Proton AG](https://proton.me/news/proton-and-simplelogin-join-forces) as of April 8, 2022. If you use Proton Mail for your primary mailbox, SimpleLogin is a great choice. As both products are now owned by the same company you now only have to trust a single entity. We also expect that SimpleLogin will be more tightly integrated with Proton's offerings in the future. SimpleLogin continues to support forwarding to any email provider of your choosing. Securitum [audited](https://simplelogin.io/blog/security-audit) SimpleLogin in early 2022 and all issues [were addressed](https://simplelogin.io/audit2022/web.pdf).
 
-You can link your SimpleLogin account in the settings with your Proton account. If you have Proton Pass Plus, Proton Unlimited, or any multi-user Proton plan, you will have SimpleLogin Premium for free. You can also purchase a voucher code for SimpleLogin Premium anonymously via their official reseller [ProxyStore](https://simplelogin.io/faq).
+You can link your SimpleLogin account in the settings with your Proton account. If you have Proton Pass Plus, Proton Unlimited, or any multi-user Proton plan, you will have SimpleLogin Premium for free.
 
-Securitum [audited](https://simplelogin.io/blog/security-audit) SimpleLogin in early 2022 and all issues [were addressed](https://simplelogin.io/audit2022/web.pdf).
+You can also purchase a voucher code for SimpleLogin Premium anonymously via their official reseller, [ProxyStore](https://simplelogin.io/faq).
 
 Notable free features:
 
@@ -136,6 +120,6 @@ When your subscription ends, all aliases you created will still be able to recei
 
 ## Criteria
 
-**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the providers we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we evaluate email aliasing providers to the same standard as our regular [email provider criteria](email.md#criteria) where applicable. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing an email aliasing service, and conduct your own research to ensure the provider you choose is the right choice for you.
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the providers we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we evaluate email aliasing providers to the same standard as our regular [email provider criteria](email.md#criteria) where applicable. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing an email service, and conduct your own research to ensure the provider you choose is the right choice for you.
 
 [^1]: Automatic PGP encryption allows you to encrypt non-encrypted incoming emails before they are forwarded to your mailbox, making sure your primary mailbox provider never sees unencrypted email content.

docs/email-clients.md

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ cover: email-clients.webp
 - [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
 - [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
 
-The **email clients** we recommend support both [OpenPGP](encryption.md#openpgp) and strong authentication such as [Open Authorization (OAuth)](basics/account-creation.md#sign-in-with-oauth). OAuth allows you to use [Multi-Factor Authentication](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md) to prevent account theft.
+The **email clients** we recommend support both [OpenPGP](encryption.md#openpgp) and strong authentication such as [Open Authorization (OAuth)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth). OAuth allows you to use [Multi-Factor Authentication](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md) to prevent account theft.
 
 <details class="warning" markdown>
 <summary>Email does not provide forward secrecy</summary>
@@ -110,6 +110,39 @@ Currently, GPG Suite does [not yet](https://gpgtools.com/sonoma) have a stable r
 
 Apple Mail has the ability to load remote content in the background or block it entirely and hide your IP address from senders on [macOS](https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/mlhl03be2866/mac) and [iOS](https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/iphf084865c7/ios).
 
+### Canary Mail (iOS)
+
+<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
+
+![Canary Mail logo](assets/img/email-clients/canarymail.svg){ align=right }
+
+**Canary Mail** is a paid email client designed to make end-to-end encryption seamless with security features such as a biometric app lock.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://canarymail.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-eye-16:](https://canarymail.io/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://canarymail.io/help){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+
+<details class="downloads" markdown>
+<summary>Downloads</summary>
+
+- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.canarymail.android)
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1155470386)
+- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://canarymail.io/downloads.html)
+- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1236045954)
+
+</details>
+
+</div>
+
+<details class="warning" markdown>
+<summary>Warning</summary>
+
+Canary Mail only recently released a Windows and Android client, though we don't believe they are as stable as their iOS and Mac counterparts.
+
+</details>
+
+Canary Mail is closed-source. We recommend it due to the few choices there are for email clients on iOS that support PGP E2EE.
+
 ### FairEmail (Android)
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>

docs/email.md

@@ -19,19 +19,19 @@ Email is practically a necessity for using any online service, however we do not
 
 For everything else, we recommend a variety of email providers based on sustainable business models and built-in security and privacy features. Read our [full list of criteria](#criteria) for more information.
 
-| Provider | OpenPGP / WKD | IMAP / SMTP | Zero-Access Encryption | Anonymous Payment Methods |
+| Provider | OpenPGP / WKD | IMAP / SMTP | Zero Access Encryption | Anonymous Payments |
 |---|---|---|---|---|
 | [Proton Mail](#proton-mail) | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Paid plans only | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | Cash |
 | [Mailbox.org](#mailboxorg) | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Mail only | Cash |
-| [Tuta](#tuta) | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | Monero <br>Cash via third party |
+| [Tuta](#tuta) | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | Monero & Cash via third-party |
 
-In addition to (or instead of) an email provider recommended here, you may wish to consider a dedicated [email aliasing service](email-aliasing.md#recommended-providers) to protect your privacy. Among other things, these services can help protect your real inbox from spam, prevent marketers from correlating your accounts, and encrypt all incoming messages with PGP.
+In addition to (or instead of) an email provider recommended here, you may wish to consider a dedicated [email aliasing service](email-aliasing.md) to protect your privacy. Among other things, these services can help protect your real inbox from spam, prevent marketers from correlating your accounts, and encrypt all incoming messages with PGP.
 
 - [More Information :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](email-aliasing.md)
 
 ## OpenPGP Compatible Services
 
-These providers natively support OpenPGP encryption/decryption and the [Web Key Directory (WKD) standard](basics/email-security.md#what-is-the-web-key-directory-standard), allowing for provider-agnostic end-to-end encrypted emails. For example, a Proton Mail user could send an E2EE message to a Mailbox.org user, or you could receive OpenPGP-encrypted notifications from internet services which support it.
+These providers natively support OpenPGP encryption/decryption and the [Web Key Directory standard](basics/email-security.md#what-is-the-web-key-directory-standard), allowing for provider-agnostic E2EE emails. For example, a Proton Mail user could send an E2EE message to a Mailbox.org user, or you could receive OpenPGP-encrypted notifications from internet services which support it.
 
 <div class="grid cards" markdown>
 
@@ -45,9 +45,7 @@ These providers natively support OpenPGP encryption/decryption and the [Web Key
 
 When using E2EE technology like OpenPGP your email will still have some metadata that is not encrypted in the header of the email, generally including the subject line! Read more about [email metadata](basics/email-security.md#email-metadata-overview).
 
-OpenPGP also does not support forward secrecy, which means if the private key of either you or the message recipient is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed.
-
-- [How do I protect my private keys?](basics/email-security.md#how-do-i-protect-my-private-keys)
+OpenPGP also does not support Forward secrecy, which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. [How do I protect my private keys?](basics/email-security.md#how-do-i-protect-my-private-keys)
 
 </div>
 
@@ -57,9 +55,7 @@ OpenPGP also does not support forward secrecy, which means if the private key of
 
 ![Proton Mail logo](assets/img/email/protonmail.svg){ align=right }
 
-**Proton Mail** is an email service with a focus on privacy, encryption, security, and ease of use. They have been in operation since 2013. Proton AG is based in Geneva, Switzerland.
-
-The Proton Free plan comes with 500 MB of Mail storage, which you can increase up to 1 GB for free.
+**Proton Mail** is an email service with a focus on privacy, encryption, security, and ease of use. They have been in operation since 2013. Proton AG is based in Geneva, Switzerland. The Proton Mail Free plan comes with 500 MB of Mail storage, which you can increase up to 1 GB for free.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/mail){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:simple-torbrowser:](https://protonmailrmez3lotccipshtkleegetolb73fuirgj7r4o4vfu7ozyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
@@ -82,9 +78,9 @@ The Proton Free plan comes with 500 MB of Mail storage, which you can increase u
 
 </div>
 
-Free accounts have some limitations, such as not being able to search body text and not having access to [Proton Mail Bridge](https://proton.me/mail/bridge), which is required to use a [recommended desktop email client](email-clients.md) (e.g., Thunderbird). Paid accounts include features like Proton Mail Bridge, additional storage, and custom domain support. If you have the Proton Unlimited plan or any multi-user Proton plan, you also get [SimpleLogin](email-aliasing.md#simplelogin) Premium for free.
+Free accounts have some limitations, such as not being able to search body text and not having access to [Proton Mail Bridge](https://proton.me/mail/bridge), which is required to use a [recommended desktop email client](email-clients.md) (e.g. Thunderbird). Paid accounts include features like Proton Mail Bridge, additional storage, and custom domain support. A [letter of attestation](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps) was provided for Proton Mail's apps on 9th November 2021 by [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com).
 
-A [letter of attestation](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps) was provided for Proton Mail's apps on 9th November 2021 by [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com).
+If you have the Proton Unlimited plan or any multi-user Proton plan, you also get [SimpleLogin](email-aliasing.md#simplelogin) Premium for free.
 
 Proton Mail has internal crash reports that are **not** shared with third parties. This can be disabled in the web app: :gear: → **All Settings** → **Account** → **Security and privacy** → **Privacy and data collection**.
 
@@ -94,7 +90,7 @@ Paid Proton Mail subscribers can use their own domain with the service or a [cat
 
 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Private Payment Methods
 
-Proton Mail [accepts](https://proton.me/support/payment-options) **cash** by mail in addition to standard credit/debit card, [Bitcoin](advanced/payments.md#other-coins-bitcoin-ethereum-etc), and PayPal payments.
+Proton Mail [accepts](https://proton.me/support/payment-options) cash by mail in addition to standard credit/debit card, [Bitcoin](advanced/payments.md#other-coins-bitcoin-ethereum-etc), and PayPal payments.
 
 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Account Security
 
@@ -108,9 +104,9 @@ Certain information stored in [Proton Contacts](https://proton.me/support/proton
 
 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Email Encryption
 
-Proton Mail has [integrated OpenPGP encryption](https://proton.me/support/how-to-use-pgp) in their webmail. Emails to other Proton Mail accounts are encrypted automatically, and encryption to non-Proton Mail addresses with an OpenPGP key can be enabled easily in your account settings. Proton also supports automatic external key discovery with WKD. This means that emails sent to other providers which use WKD will be automatically encrypted with OpenPGP as well, without the need to manually exchange public PGP keys with your contacts. They also allow you to [encrypt messages to non-Proton Mail addresses without OpenPGP](https://proton.me/support/password-protected-emails), without the need for them to sign up for a Proton Mail account.
+Proton Mail has [integrated OpenPGP encryption](https://proton.me/support/how-to-use-pgp) in their webmail. Emails to other Proton Mail accounts are encrypted automatically, and encryption to non-Proton Mail addresses with an OpenPGP key can be enabled easily in your account settings. Proton also supports automatic external key discovery with [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This means that emails sent to other providers which use WKD will be automatically encrypted with OpenPGP as well, without the need to manually exchange public PGP keys with your contacts. They also allow you to [encrypt messages to non-Proton Mail addresses without OpenPGP](https://proton.me/support/password-protected-emails), without the need for them to sign up for a Proton Mail account.
 
-Proton Mail also publishes the public keys of Proton accounts via HTTP from their WKD. This allows people who don't use Proton Mail to find the OpenPGP keys of Proton Mail accounts easily for cross-provider E2EE. This only applies to email addresses ending in one of Proton's own domains, like `@proton.me`. If you use a custom domain, you must [configure WKD](basics/email-security.md#what-is-the-web-key-directory-standard) separately.
+Proton Mail also publishes the public keys of Proton accounts via HTTP from their WKD. This allows people who don't use Proton Mail to find the OpenPGP keys of Proton Mail accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE. This only applies to email addresses ending in one of Proton's own domains, like @proton.me. If you use a custom domain, you must [configure WKD](./basics/email-security.md#what-is-the-web-key-directory-standard) separately.
 
 #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Account Termination
 
@@ -118,7 +114,9 @@ If you have a paid account and your [bill is unpaid](https://proton.me/support/d
 
 #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Additional Functionality
 
-Proton Mail's [Unlimited](https://proton.me/support/proton-plans#proton-unlimited) plan also enables access to other Proton services in addition to providing multiple custom domains, unlimited hide-my-email aliases, and 500 GB of storage.
+Proton Mail's [Unlimited](https://proton.me/support/proton-plans#proton-unlimited) plan also enables access to other Proton services in addition to providing multiple custom domains, unlimited hide-my-email aliases, and 500 GB of storage.
+
+Proton Mail doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
 
 ### Mailbox.org
 
@@ -126,9 +124,7 @@ Proton Mail's [Unlimited](https://proton.me/support/proton-plans#proton-unlimite
 
 ![Mailbox.org logo](assets/img/email/mailboxorg.svg){ align=right }
 
-**Mailbox.org** is an email service with a focus on being secure, ad-free, and powered by 100% eco-friendly energy. They have been in operation since 2014. Mailbox.org is based in Berlin, Germany.
-
-Accounts start with up to 2 GB storage, which can be upgraded as needed.
+**Mailbox.org** is an email service with a focus on being secure, ad-free, and privately powered by 100% eco-friendly energy. They have been in operation since 2014. Mailbox.org is based in Berlin, Germany. Accounts start with up to 2 GB storage, which can be upgraded as needed.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailbox.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://mailbox.org/en/data-protection-privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@@ -149,23 +145,23 @@ Mailbox.org lets you use your own domain, and they support [catch-all](https://k
 
 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Private Payment Methods
 
-Mailbox.org doesn't accept any cryptocurrencies as a result of their payment processor BitPay suspending operations in Germany. However, they do accept **cash** by mail, **cash** payment to bank account, bank transfer, credit card, PayPal, and a couple of German-specific processors: Paydirekt and Sofortüberweisung.
+Mailbox.org doesn't accept any cryptocurrencies as a result of their payment processor BitPay suspending operations in Germany. However, they do accept cash by mail, cash payment to bank account, bank transfer, credit card, PayPal and a couple of German-specific processors: paydirekt and Sofortüberweisung.
 
 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Account Security
 
-Mailbox.org supports [two-factor authentication](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/account-article/how-to-use-two-factor-authentication-2fa) for their webmail only. You can use either TOTP or a [YubiKey](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YubiKey) via the [YubiCloud](https://yubico.com/products/services-software/yubicloud). Web standards such as [WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) are not yet supported.
+Mailbox.org supports [two-factor authentication](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/account-article/how-to-use-two-factor-authentication-2fa) for their webmail only. You can use either TOTP or a [YubiKey](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YubiKey) via the [YubiCloud](https://yubico.com/products/services-software/yubicloud). Web standards such as [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn) are not yet supported.
 
 #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Data Security
 
 Mailbox.org allows for encryption of incoming mail using their [encrypted mailbox](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/e-mail-article/your-encrypted-mailbox). New messages that you receive will then be immediately encrypted with your public key.
 
-However, [Open-Xchange](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-Xchange), the software platform used by Mailbox.org, [does not support](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/security-privacy-article/encryption-of-calendar-and-address-book) the encryption of your address book and calendar. A [standalone option](calendar.md) may be more appropriate for that data.
+However, [Open-Exchange](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-Xchange), the software platform used by Mailbox.org, [does not support](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/security-privacy-article/encryption-of-calendar-and-address-book) the encryption of your address book and calendar. A [standalone option](calendar.md) may be more appropriate for that information.
 
 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Email Encryption
 
 Mailbox.org has [integrated encryption](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/e-mail-article/send-encrypted-e-mails-with-guard) in their webmail, which simplifies sending messages to people with public OpenPGP keys. They also allow [remote recipients to decrypt an email](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/e-mail-article/my-recipient-does-not-use-pgp) on Mailbox.org's servers. This feature is useful when the remote recipient does not have OpenPGP and cannot decrypt a copy of the email in their own mailbox.
 
-Mailbox.org also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their WKD. This allows people outside of Mailbox.org to find the OpenPGP keys of Mailbox.org accounts easily for cross-provider E2EE. This only applies to email addresses ending in one of Mailbox.org's own domains, like `@mailbox.org`. If you use a custom domain, you must [configure WKD](basics/email-security.md#what-is-the-web-key-directory-standard) separately.
+Mailbox.org also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This allows people outside of Mailbox.org to find the OpenPGP keys of Mailbox.org accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE. This only applies to email addresses ending in one of Mailbox.org's own domains, like @mailbox.org. If you use a custom domain, you must [configure WKD](./basics/email-security.md#what-is-the-web-key-directory-standard) separately.
 
 #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Account Termination
 
@@ -177,7 +173,7 @@ You can access your Mailbox.org account via IMAP/SMTP using their [.onion servic
 
 All accounts come with limited cloud storage that [can be encrypted](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/drive-article/encrypt-files-on-your-drive). Mailbox.org also offers the alias [@secure.mailbox.org](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/e-mail-article/ensuring-e-mails-are-sent-securely), which enforces the TLS encryption on the connection between mail servers, otherwise the message will not be sent at all. Mailbox.org also supports [Exchange ActiveSync](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exchange_ActiveSync) in addition to standard access protocols like IMAP and POP3.
 
-Mailbox.org has a digital legacy feature for all plans. You can choose whether you want any of your data to be passed to heirs, providing that they apply and provide your testament. Alternatively, you can nominate a person by name and address.
+Mailbox.org has a digital legacy feature for all plans. You can choose whether you want any of your data to be passed to heirs providing that they apply and provide your testament. Alternatively, you can nominate a person by name and address.
 
 ## More Providers
 
@@ -196,9 +192,7 @@ These providers store your emails with zero-knowledge encryption, making them gr
 ![Tuta logo](assets/img/email/tuta.svg#only-light){ align=right }
 ![Tuta logo](assets/img/email/tuta-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
 
-**Tuta** (formerly *Tutanota*) is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of encryption. Tuta has been in operation since 2011 and is based in Hanover, Germany.
-
-Free accounts start with 1 GB of storage.
+**Tuta** (formerly *Tutanota*) is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of encryption. Tuta has been in operation since 2011 and is based in Hanover, Germany. Free accounts start with 1 GB of storage.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tuta.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tuta.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@@ -229,7 +223,7 @@ Paid Tuta accounts can use either 15 or 30 aliases depending on their plan and u
 
 #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Private Payment Methods
 
-Tuta only directly accepts credit cards and PayPal, however [**cryptocurrency**](cryptocurrency.md) can be used to purchase gift cards via their [partnership](https://tuta.com/support/#cryptocurrency) with ProxyStore.
+Tuta only directly accepts credit cards and PayPal, however [cryptocurrency](cryptocurrency.md) can be used to purchase gift cards via their [partnership](https://tuta.com/support/#cryptocurrency) with ProxyStore.
 
 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Account Security
 
@@ -237,7 +231,7 @@ Tuta supports [two-factor authentication](https://tuta.com/support#2fa) with eit
 
 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Data Security
 
-Tuta has [zero-access encryption at rest](https://tuta.com/support#what-encrypted) for your emails, [address book contacts](https://tuta.com/support#encrypted-address-book), and [calendars](https://tuta.com/support#calendar). This means the messages and other data stored in your account are only readable by you.
+Tuta has [zero access encryption at rest](https://tuta.com/support#what-encrypted) for your emails, [address book contacts](https://tuta.com/support#encrypted-address-book), and [calendars](https://tuta.com/support#calendar). This means the messages and other data stored in your account are only readable by you.
 
 #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Email Encryption
 
@@ -251,6 +245,8 @@ Tuta will [delete inactive free accounts](https://tuta.com/support#inactive-acco
 
 Tuta offers the business version of [Tuta to non-profit organizations](https://tuta.com/blog/secure-email-for-non-profit) for free or with a heavy discount.
 
+Tuta doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
+
 ## Self-Hosting Email
 
 Advanced system administrators may consider setting up their own email server. Mail servers require attention and continuous maintenance in order to keep things secure and mail delivery reliable. In addition to the "all-in-one" solutions below, we've picked out a few articles that cover a more manual approach:
@@ -316,22 +312,22 @@ We regard these features as important in order to provide a safe and optimal ser
 
 **Minimum to Qualify:**
 
-- Must encrypt email account data at rest with zero-access encryption.
-- Must be capable of exporting emails as [Mbox](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mbox) or individual .EML with [RFC5322](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5322) standard.
+- Encrypts email account data at rest with zero-access encryption.
+- Export capability as [Mbox](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mbox) or individual .EML with [RFC5322](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5322) standard.
 - Allow users to use their own [domain name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name). Custom domain names are important to users because it allows them to maintain their agency from the service, should it turn bad or be acquired by another company which doesn't prioritize privacy.
-- Must operate on owned infrastructure, i.e. not built upon third-party email service providers.
+- Operates on owned infrastructure, i.e. not built upon third-party email service providers.
 
 **Best Case:**
 
-- Should encrypt all account data (contacts, calendars, etc.) at rest with zero-access encryption.
-- Should provide integrated webmail E2EE/PGP encryption as a convenience.
-- Should support WKD to allow improved discovery of public OpenPGP keys via HTTP. GnuPG users can get a key with this command: `gpg --locate-key example_user@example.com`.
-- Support for a temporary mailbox for external users. This is useful when you want to send an encrypted email without sending an actual copy to your recipient. These emails usually have a limited lifespan and then are automatically deleted. They also don't require the recipient to configure any cryptography like OpenPGP.
-- Should support [sub-addressing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email_address#Sub-addressing).
-- Should allow users to use their own [domain name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name). Custom domain names are important to users because it allows them to maintain their agency from the service, should it turn bad or be acquired by another company which doesn't prioritize privacy.
+- Encrypts all account data (Contacts, Calendars, etc.) at rest with zero-access encryption.
+- Integrated webmail E2EE/PGP encryption provided as a convenience.
+- Support for [WKD](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD) to allow improved discovery of public OpenPGP keys via HTTP.
+    GnuPG users can get a key by typing: `gpg --locate-key example_user@example.com`
+- Support for a temporary mailbox for external users. This is useful when you want to send an encrypted email, without sending an actual copy to your recipient. These emails usually have a limited lifespan and then are automatically deleted. They also don't require the recipient to configure any cryptography like OpenPGP.
+- Availability of the email provider's services via an [onion service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.onion).
+- [Sub-addressing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email_address#Sub-addressing) support.
 - Catch-all or alias functionality for those who use their own domains.
-- Should use standard email access protocols such as IMAP, SMTP, or [JMAP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Meta_Application_Protocol). Standard access protocols ensure customers can easily download all of their email, should they want to switch to another provider.
-- Email provider's services should be available via an [onion service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.onion).
+- Use of standard email access protocols such as IMAP, SMTP, or [JMAP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Meta_Application_Protocol). Standard access protocols ensure customers can easily download all of their email, should they want to switch to another provider.
 
 ### Privacy
 
@@ -339,30 +335,30 @@ We prefer our recommended providers to collect as little data as possible.
 
 **Minimum to Qualify:**
 
-- Must protect sender's IP address, which can involve filtering it from showing in the `Received` header field.
-- Must not require personally identifiable information (PII) besides a username and a password.
-- Privacy policy must meet the requirements defined by the GDPR.
+- Protect sender's IP address, which can involve filtering it from showing in the `Received` header field.
+- Don't require personally identifiable information (PII) besides a username and a password.
+- Privacy policy that meets the requirements defined by the GDPR.
 
 **Best Case:**
 
-- Should accept [anonymous payment options](advanced/payments.md) ([cryptocurrency](cryptocurrency.md), cash, gift cards, etc.)
-- Should be hosted in a jurisdiction with strong email privacy protection laws.
+- Accepts [anonymous payment options](advanced/payments.md) ([cryptocurrency](cryptocurrency.md), cash, gift cards, etc.)
+- Hosted in a jurisdiction with strong email privacy protection laws.
 
 ### Security
 
-Email servers deal with a lot of very sensitive data. We expect that providers will adopt industry best practices in order to protect their customers.
+Email servers deal with a lot of very sensitive data. We expect that providers will adopt best industry practices in order to protect their customers.
 
 **Minimum to Qualify:**
 
-- Protection of webmail with 2FA, such as [TOTP](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp).
-- Zero-access encryption, which builds on encryption at rest. The provider does not have the decryption keys to the data they hold. This prevents a rogue employee leaking data they have access to or remote adversary from releasing data they have stolen by gaining unauthorized access to the server.
+- Protection of webmail with 2FA, such as TOTP.
+- Zero access encryption, which builds on encryption at rest. The provider does not have the decryption keys to the data they hold. This prevents a rogue employee leaking data they have access to or remote adversary from releasing data they have stolen by gaining unauthorized access to the server.
 - [DNSSEC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Extensions) support.
 - No TLS errors or vulnerabilities when being profiled by tools such as [Hardenize](https://hardenize.com), [testssl.sh](https://testssl.sh), or [Qualys SSL Labs](https://ssllabs.com/ssltest); this includes certificate related errors and weak DH parameters, such as those that led to [Logjam](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logjam_(computer_security)).
-- A server suite preference (optional on TLS 1.3) for strong cipher suites which support forward secrecy and authenticated encryption.
+- A server suite preference (optional on TLSv1.3) for strong cipher suites which support forward secrecy and authenticated encryption.
 - A valid [MTA-STS](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8461) and [TLS-RPT](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8460) policy.
 - Valid [DANE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS-based_Authentication_of_Named_Entities) records.
 - Valid [SPF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sender_Policy_Framework) and [DKIM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DomainKeys_Identified_Mail) records.
-- Must have a proper [DMARC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DMARC) record and policy or use [ARC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain) for authentication. If DMARC authentication is being used, the policy must be set to `reject` or `quarantine`.
+- Have a proper [DMARC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DMARC) record and policy or use [ARC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain) for authentication. If DMARC authentication is being used, the policy must be set to `reject` or `quarantine`.
 - A server suite preference of TLS 1.2 or later and a plan for [RFC8996](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8996).
 - [SMTPS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SMTPS) submission, assuming SMTP is used.
 - Website security standards such as:
@@ -372,10 +368,10 @@ Email servers deal with a lot of very sensitive data. We expect that providers w
 
 **Best Case:**
 
-- Should support hardware authentication, i.e. U2F and [WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online).
+- Support for hardware authentication, i.e. U2F and [WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online).
 - [DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844) in addition to DANE support.
-- Should implement [Authenticated Received Chain (ARC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain), which is useful for people who post to mailing lists [RFC8617](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8617).
-- Published security audits from a reputable, third-party firm.
+- Implementation of [Authenticated Received Chain (ARC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain), which is useful for people who post to mailing lists [RFC8617](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8617).
+- Published security audits from a reputable third-party firm.
 - Bug-bounty programs and/or a coordinated vulnerability-disclosure process.
 - Website security standards such as:
     - [Content Security Policy (CSP)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy)
@@ -400,15 +396,18 @@ With the email providers we recommend, we like to see responsible marketing.
 **Minimum to Qualify:**
 
 - Must self-host analytics (no Google Analytics, Adobe Analytics, etc.).
-- Must not have any irresponsible marketing, which can include the following:
-    - Claims of "unbreakable encryption." Encryption should be used with the intention that it may not be secret in the future when the technology exists to crack it.
-    - Guarantees of protecting anonymity 100%. When someone makes a claim that something is 100%, it means there is no certainty for failure. We know people can quite easily de-anonymize themselves in a number of ways, e.g.:
-        - Reusing personal information e.g. (email accounts, unique pseudonyms, etc.) that they accessed without anonymity software such as Tor
-        - [Browser fingerprinting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint)
+
+Must not have any irresponsible marketing, which can include the following:
+
+- Claims of "unbreakable encryption." Encryption should be used with the intention that it may not be secret in the future when the technology exists to crack it.
+- Making guarantees of protecting anonymity 100%. When someone makes a claim that something is 100% it means there is no certainty for failure. We know people can quite easily de-anonymize themselves in a number of ways, e.g.:
+
+    - Reusing personal information e.g. (email accounts, unique pseudonyms, etc.) that they accessed without anonymity software (Tor, VPN, etc.)
+    - [Browser fingerprinting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint)
 
 **Best Case:**
 
-- Clear and easy-to-read documentation for tasks like setting up 2FA, email clients, OpenPGP, etc.
+- Clear and easy to read documentation for tasks like setting up 2FA, email clients, OpenPGP, etc.
 
 ### Additional Functionality
 

docs/encryption.md

@@ -367,6 +367,13 @@ gpg --quick-gen-key alice@example.com future-default
 
 ### GPG Suite
 
+<div class="admonition note" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Note</p>
+
+We suggest [Canary Mail](email-clients.md#canary-mail-ios) for using PGP with email on iOS devices.
+
+</div>
+
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
 ![GPG Suite logo](assets/img/encryption-software/gpgsuite.png){ align=right }

docs/health-and-wellness.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ meta_title: "Privacy Respecting Health and Wellness apps for Android and iOS - P
 title: "Health and Wellness Apps"
 icon: material/heart-pulse
 description: These applications are what we currently recommend for all health and fitness-related activites on your phone.
-cover: health.webp
+cover: health-cover.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>
 
@@ -15,13 +15,13 @@ Keep track of your health and fitness-related goals with these apps. Unlike thei
 
 Popular menstrual trackers like [Flo](https://techcrunch.com/2021/01/13/flo-gets-ftc-slap-for-sharing-user-data-when-it-promised-privacy) are notorious for collecting and sharing your user data. Depending on your jurisdiction, this may lead to [legal consequences](https://forbes.com/sites/abigaildubiniecki/2024/11/14/post-roe-your-period-app-data-could-be-used-against-you) affecting your reproductive autonomy.
 
-### Drip
+### drip.
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
-![Drip logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/drip.png){ align=right }
+![drip logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/drip.png){ align=right }
 
-**Drip** is a gender-inclusive and open source menstrual cycle tracker available on all mobile platforms. It relies on the "sympto-thermal method" to predict ovulation. All user data is stored locally on your device and can be protected with a password.
+**drip.** is a gender-inclusive and open source menstrual cycle tracker available on all mobile platforms. It relies on the "sympto-thermal method" to predict ovulation. All user data is stored locally on your device and can be protected with a password.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://bloodyhealth.gitlab.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://bloodyhealth.gitlab.io/privacy-policy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }

docs/language-tools.md

@@ -11,23 +11,40 @@ cover: language-tools.webp
 
 Text inputted to grammar, spelling, and style checkers, as well as translation services, can contain sensitive information which may be stored on their servers for an indefinite amount of time and sold to third parties. The language tools listed on this page do not store your submitted text to a server, and can be self-hosted and used offline for maximum control of your data.
 
-## LTeX for VS Code
+## LanguageTool
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
-![LTeX logo](assets/img/language-tools/ltex-for-vscode.svg){ align=right }
+![LanguageTool logo](assets/img/language-tools/languagetool.svg#only-light){ align=right }
+![LanguageTool logo](assets/img/language-tools/languagetool-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
 
-**LTeX** is a multilingual grammar, style, and spell checker for VS Code (or VSCodium) that supports more than 20 languages. It uses the open-source [LanguageTool](https://languagetool.org) spell checker on the backend to check against not just dictionary spelling, but thousands of grammar rules and stylistic errors.
+**LanguageTool** is a multilingual grammar, style, and spell checker that supports more than 20 languages. According to their privacy policy, they do not store any content sent to their service for review, but for higher assurance the software is [self-hostable](https://dev.languagetool.org/http-server).
 
-[:material-microsoft-visual-studio-code: VS Code Extension](https://marketplace.visualstudio.com/items?itemName=valentjn.vscode-ltex){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://valentjn.github.io/ltex/index.html){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/valentjn/vscode-ltex){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://languagetool.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-eye-16:](https://languagetool.org/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://languagetooler.freshdesk.com/en/support/solutions){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/languagetool-org){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+<details class="downloads" markdown>
+<summary>Downloads</summary>
+
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1534275760)
+- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://languagetool.org/windows-desktop)
+- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://languagetool.org/mac-desktop)
+- [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/languagetool)
+- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/grammar-and-spell-checker/oldceeleldhonbafppcapldpdifcinji)
+- [:fontawesome-brands-edge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/hfjadhjooeceemgojogkhlppanjkbobc)
+- [:simple-safari: Safari](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1534275760)
+
+</details>
 
 </div>
 
+LanguageTool offers integration with a variety of [office suites](https://languagetool.org/services#text_editors) and [email clients](https://languagetool.org/services#mail_clients).
+
 ## Criteria
 
 **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
 
 - Must be open source.
-- Must run completely offline.
+- Must be possible to self-host.

docs/maps.md

@@ -25,14 +25,14 @@ Features include cycling routes, hiking trails and walking paths, turn-by-turn n
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://organicmaps.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://organicmaps.app/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://git.omaps.dev/organicmaps/organicmaps){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/organicmaps/organicmaps){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
 
 <details class="downloads" markdown>
 <summary>Downloads</summary>
 
+- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/organicmaps/organicmaps)
 - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.organicmaps)
 - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/organic-maps/id1567437057)
-- [:simple-forgejo: Forgejo](https://git.omaps.dev/organicmaps/organicmaps/releases)
 - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://flathub.org/apps/app.organicmaps.desktop)
 
 </details>

docs/meta/pr-comments.md

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
----
-title: Commenting on PRs
-description: A guide on participating in Pull Request discussions.
----
-Please refrain from using the general **Add a comment** box in GitHub PRs when leaving a comment or performing a review.
-
-![Do not use the general "Add a comment" box in GitHub](../assets/img/meta/pr-avoid-general-comments.png)
-
-Comments that are left like this are not *threaded*, which makes it difficult to keep track of multiple conversations.
-
-Comments that are instead left in the manner described below will have a built-in reply box to keep conversations in a single thread. These comments can also be marked as resolved afterwards, so that discussion can be tracked more easily.
-
-![A screenshot of a comment in GitHub which has a built-in "reply" box, highlighted in orange.](../assets/img/meta/pr-threaded-comment.png)
-
-## Commenting
-
-To start a threaded comment, you should leave all comments under the :octicons-file-diff-16: **Files changed** tab in a PR.
-
-![Screenshot of the tabs for a pull request. The "Files changed" tab is outlined in dark orange.](https://docs.github.com/assets/cb-23571/mw-1440/images/help/pull_requests/pull-request-tabs-changed-files.webp)
-
-To leave a *general* comment on a PR, click the :octicons-comment-16: comment icon to the right of a file:
-
-![Screenshot of an image file on the "Files changed" page of a pull request. To the right of the file, a comment icon is outlined in orange.](https://docs.github.com/assets/cb-73771/mw-1440/images/help/pull_requests/pull-request-comment-on-file.webp)
-
-If the PR has multiple files changed, comment on the primary or most relevant file changed, or comment on the first file if you can't decide.
-
-To leave a comment *on a specific line* of a PR, hover over the line where you'd like to add a comment, and click the blue comment icon:
-
-![Screenshot of a diff in a pull request. Next to a line number, a blue plus icon is highlighted with an orange outline.](https://docs.github.com/assets/cb-44227/mw-1440/images/help/commits/hover-comment-icon.webp)
-
-(Optionally, you can add a comment on multiple lines. You can click the line number of the first line you want to comment on and drag down to select a range of lines, then click the blue comment icon on the last line you want to comment on. Alternatively, you can click the blue comment icon next to the first line you want to comment on, then drag down to the last line you want to comment on.)
-
-Then, type your comment and click **Add single comment**.
-
-## Reviewing
-
-When performing a review, follow the same steps as above, but click **Start a review** (and subsequently, **Add a review comment**) instead of **Add single comment**.
-
-Then, click the green **Finish your review** button at the top of the page.
-
-Do not leave any discussion comments in the *Leave a comment* box in the review finalization pop-up. You can leave it blank, or leave a short note if it will not require any follow-up. To comment on something that will require further discussion, add a comment on a file as described above instead.
-
-Then, click **Submit review**.

docs/meta/uploading-images.md

@@ -88,8 +88,8 @@ scour --set-precision=5 \
 
 ### WebP
 
-Use the [`cwebp`](https://developers.google.com/speed/webp/docs/using) command to convert PNG or JPEG image files to WebP format:
+Use the [cwebp](https://developers.google.com/speed/webp/docs/using) command to convert PNG or JPEG image files to WebP format:
 
 ```bash
-cwebp -m 6 input_file -o output.webp
+cwebp -q 70 -m 6 input_file -o output.webp
 ```

docs/os/android-overview.md

@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ If you have a Google account we suggest enrolling in the [Advanced Protection Pr
 
 The Advanced Protection Program provides enhanced threat monitoring and enables:
 
-- Stricter two-factor authentication; e.g. that [FIDO](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) **must** be used and disallows the use of [SMS OTPs](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#sms-or-email-mfa), [TOTP](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp) and [OAuth](../basics/account-creation.md#sign-in-with-oauth)
+- Stricter two-factor authentication; e.g. that [FIDO](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) **must** be used and disallows the use of [SMS OTPs](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#sms-or-email-mfa), [TOTP](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp) and [OAuth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth)
 - Only Google and verified third-party apps can access account data
 - Scanning of incoming emails on Gmail accounts for [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing#Email_phishing) attempts
 - Stricter [safe browser scanning](https://google.com/chrome/privacy/whitepaper.html#malware) with Google Chrome
@@ -153,9 +153,7 @@ If you have an EOL device shipped with Android 10 or above and are unable to run
 
 All devices with Google Play Services installed automatically generate an [advertising ID](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/6048248) used for targeted advertising. Disable this feature to limit the data collected about you.
 
-On Android distributions with [sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), go to :gear: **Settings** → **Apps** → **Sandboxed Google Play** → **Google Settings** → **All services** → **Ads**.
-
-- [x] Select **Delete advertising ID**
+On Android distributions with [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), go to :gear: **Settings** → **Apps** → **Sandboxed Google Play** → **Google Settings** → **Ads**, and select *Delete advertising ID*.
 
 On Android distributions with privileged Google Play Services (which includes the stock installation on most devices), the setting may be in one of several locations. Check
 

docs/os/linux-overview.md

@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ Distros which use atomic updates, on the other hand, apply updates in full or no
 
 The atomic update method can achieve reliability with this model and is used for [distributions](../desktop.md#atomic-distributions) like Silverblue and NixOS. [Adam Šamalík](https://twitter.com/adsamalik) provides a presentation on how `rpm-ostree` works with Silverblue:
 
-- [Let's try Fedora Silverblue — an immutable desktop OS! - Adam Šamalík](https://youtu.be/-hpV5l-gJnQ) <small>(YouTube)</small>
+- [Let's try Fedora Silverblue — an immutable desktop OS! - Adam Šamalík](https://youtu.be/aMo4ZlWznao) <small>(YouTube)</small>
 
 ### “Security-focused” distributions
 

docs/os/macos-overview.md

@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ Just because one of an app's processes is sandboxed doesn't mean they all are.
 Alternatively, you can check apps before you run them by running this command in the terminal:
 
 ``` zsh
-codesign -dvvv --entitlements - <path to your app>
+% codesign -dvvv --entitlements - <path to your app>
 ```
 
 If an app is sandboxed, you should see the following output:
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ The [Hardened Runtime](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/harden
 You can check if an app uses the Hardened Runtime using this command:
 
 ``` zsh
-codesign -dv <path to your app>
+codesign --display --verbose /path/to/bundle.app
 ```
 
 If Hardened Runtime is enabled, you will see `flags=0x10000(runtime)`. The `runtime` output means Hardened Runtime is enabled. There might be other flags, but the runtime flag is what we're looking for here.

docs/passwords.md

@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ schema:
   -
     "@context": http://schema.org
     "@type": SoftwareApplication
-    name: Gopass
+    name: gopass
     image: /assets/img/password-management/gopass.svg
     url: https://gopass.pw
     applicationCategory: Password Manager
@@ -363,13 +363,13 @@ KeePassXC stores its export data as [CSV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comma-se
 
 </div>
 
-### Gopass (CLI)
+### gopass (CLI)
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
-![Gopass logo](assets/img/password-management/gopass.svg){ align=right }
+![gopass logo](assets/img/password-management/gopass.svg){ align=right }
 
-**Gopass** is a minimal password manager for the command line written in Go. It can be used within scripting applications and works on all major desktop and server operating systems.
+**gopass** is a minimal password manager for the command line written in Go. It can be used within scripting applications and works on all major desktop and server operating systems.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gopass.pw){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/gopasspw/gopass/tree/master/docs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }

docs/photo-management.md

@@ -15,9 +15,10 @@ Most cloud **photo management solutions** like Google Photos, Flickr, and Amazon
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
-![Ente logo](assets/img/photo-management/ente.svg){ align=right }
+![Ente logo](assets/img/photo-management/ente.svg#only-light){ align=right }
+![Ente logo](assets/img/photo-management/ente-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
 
-**Ente Photos** is an end-to-end encrypted photo backup service which supports automatic backups on iOS and Android. Their code is fully open-source, both on the client side and on the server side. It is also [self-hostable](https://github.com/ente-io/ente/tree/main/server#self-hosting). The free plan offers 10 GB of storage as long as you use the service at least once a year.
+**Ente Photos** is an end-to-end encrypted photo backup service which supports automatic backups on iOS and Android. Their code is fully open-source, both on the client side and on the server side. It is also [self-hostable](https://github.com/ente-io/ente/tree/main/server#self-hosting). The free plan offers 5 GB of storage as long as you use the service at least once a year.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://ente.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://ente.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }

docs/security-keys.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 title: "Security Keys"
-icon: material/key-chain
-description: These security keys provide a form of phishing-immune authentication for accounts that support it.
+icon: 'material/key-chain'
+description: Secure your internet accounts with Multi-Factor Authentication without sending your secrets to a third-party.
 cover: multi-factor-authentication.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>
@@ -19,11 +19,11 @@ A physical **security key** adds a very strong layer of protection to your onlin
   ![Security Key Series by Yubico](assets/img/security-keys/yubico-security-key.webp){ width="315" }
 </figure>
 
-The **Yubico Security Key** series is the most cost-effective hardware security key with FIDO Level 2 certification[^1]. It supports FIDO2/WebAuthn and FIDO U2F, and works out of the box with most services that support a security key as a second factor, as well as many password managers.
+The **Yubico Security Key** series is the most cost-effective hardware security key with FIDO Level 2 certification. It supports FIDO2/WebAuthn and FIDO U2F, and works out of the box with most services that support a security key as a second factor, as well as many password managers.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://yubico.com/products/security-key){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://yubico.com/support/terms-conditions/privacy-notice){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.yubico.com){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.yubico.com){ .card-link title=Documentation}
 
 </details>
 
@@ -54,21 +54,23 @@ The firmware of Yubico's Security Keys is not updatable. If you want features in
   ![YubiKeys](assets/img/security-keys/yubikey.png){ width="400" }
 </figure>
 
-The **YubiKey** series from Yubico are among the most popular security keys with FIDO Level 2 Certification[^1]. The YubiKey 5 Series has a wide range of features such as [Universal 2nd Factor (U2F)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_2nd_Factor), [FIDO2 and WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online), [Yubico OTP](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#yubico-otp), [Personal Identity Verification (PIV)](https://developers.yubico.com/PIV), [OpenPGP](https://developers.yubico.com/PGP), and [TOTP and HOTP](https://developers.yubico.com/OATH) authentication.
+The **YubiKey** series from Yubico are among the most popular security keys. The YubiKey 5 Series has a wide range of features such as: [Universal 2nd Factor (U2F)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_2nd_Factor), [FIDO2 and WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online), [Yubico OTP](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#yubico-otp), [Personal Identity Verification (PIV)](https://developers.yubico.com/PIV), [OpenPGP](https://developers.yubico.com/PGP), [TOTP and HOTP](https://developers.yubico.com/OATH) authentication.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://yubico.com/products/yubikey-5-overview){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://yubico.com/support/terms-conditions/privacy-notice){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.yubico.com){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.yubico.com){ .card-link title=Documentation}
 
 </details>
 
 </div>
 
-The [comparison table](https://yubico.com/store/compare) shows how the YubiKeys compare to each other and to Yubico's [Security Key](#yubico-security-key) series in terms of features and other specifications. One of the benefits of the YubiKey series is that one key can do almost everything you could expect from a hardware security key. We encourage you to take their [quiz](https://yubico.com/quiz) before purchasing in order to make sure you choose the right security key.
+The [comparison table](https://yubico.com/store/compare) shows the features and how the YubiKeys compare to each other and to Yubico's [Security Key](#yubico-security-key) series. One of the benefits of the YubiKey series is that one key can do almost everything you could expect from a hardware security key. We encourage you to take their [quiz](https://yubico.com/quiz) before purchasing in order to make sure you make the right choice.
+
+The YubiKey 5 series has FIDO Level 1 certification, which is the most common. However, some governments or other organizations may require a key with Level 2 certification, in which case you'll have to purchase a [YubiKey 5 **FIPS** series](https://yubico.com/products/yubikey-fips) key, or a [Yubico Security Key](#yubico-security-key). Most people do not have to worry about this distinction.
 
 YubiKeys can be programmed using the [YubiKey Manager](https://yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-manager) or [YubiKey Personalization Tools](https://yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-personalization-tools). For managing TOTP codes, you can use the [Yubico Authenticator](https://yubico.com/products/yubico-authenticator). All of Yubico's clients are open source.
 
-For models which support HOTP and TOTP, there are 2 slots in the OTP interface which could be used for HOTP and 32 slots to store TOTP secrets. These secrets are stored encrypted on the key and never exposed to the devices they are plugged into. Once a seed (shared secret) is given to the Yubico Authenticator, it will only give out the six-digit codes, but never the seed. This security model helps limit what an attacker can do if they compromise one of the devices running the Yubico Authenticator and make the YubiKey resistant to a physical attacker.
+For models which support HOTP and TOTP, there are 2 slots in the OTP interface which could be used for HOTP and 32 slots to store TOTP secrets. These secrets are stored encrypted on the key and never expose them to the devices they are plugged into. Once a seed (shared secret) is given to the Yubico Authenticator, it will only give out the six-digit codes, but never the seed. This security model helps limit what an attacker can do if they compromise one of the devices running the Yubico Authenticator and make the YubiKey resistant to a physical attacker.
 
 <div class="admonition warning" markdown>
 <p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
@@ -85,17 +87,17 @@ The firmware of YubiKey is not updatable. If you want features in newer firmware
   ![Nitrokey](assets/img/security-keys/nitrokey.jpg){ width="300" }
 </figure>
 
-**Nitrokey** has a security key capable of [FIDO2 and WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) called the **Nitrokey FIDO2**. For PGP support, you need to purchase one of their other keys such as the **Nitrokey Start**, **Nitrokey Pro 2**, or the **Nitrokey Storage 2**.
+**Nitrokey** has a security key capable of [FIDO2 and WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) called the **Nitrokey FIDO2**. For PGP support, you need to purchase one of their other keys such as the **Nitrokey Start**, **Nitrokey Pro 2** or the **Nitrokey Storage 2**.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://nitrokey.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://nitrokey.com/data-privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.nitrokey.com){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.nitrokey.com){ .card-link title=Documentation}
 
 </details>
 
 </div>
 
-The [comparison table](https://nitrokey.com/products/nitrokeys) shows how the different Nitrokey models compare to each other in terms of features and other specifications. The **Nitrokey 3** listed will have a combined feature set.
+The [comparison table](https://nitrokey.com/#comparison) shows the features and how the Nitrokey models compare. The **Nitrokey 3** listed will have a combined feature set.
 
 Nitrokey models can be configured using the [Nitrokey app](https://nitrokey.com/download).
 
@@ -111,7 +113,7 @@ While Nitrokeys do not release the HOTP/TOTP secrets to the device they are plug
 <div class="admonition warning" markdown>
 <p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
 
-Resetting the OpenPGP interface on a Nitrokey [Pro 2](https://docs.nitrokey.com/nitrokeys/pro/factory-reset) or Nitrokey [Start 2](https://docs.nitrokey.com/nitrokeys/storage/factory-reset) will also make the password database inaccessible.
+Resetting the OpenPGP interface on a Nitrokey will also make the password database [inaccessible](https://docs.nitrokey.com/pro/linux/factory-reset).
 
 </div>
 
@@ -121,7 +123,7 @@ Resetting the OpenPGP interface on a Nitrokey [Pro 2](https://docs.nitrokey.com/
 
 ### Minimum Requirements
 
-- Must use high-quality, tamper-resistant hardware security modules.
+- Must use high quality, tamper resistant hardware security modules.
 - Must support the latest FIDO2 specification.
 - Must not allow private key extraction.
 - Devices which cost over $35 must support handling OpenPGP and S/MIME.
@@ -130,9 +132,7 @@ Resetting the OpenPGP interface on a Nitrokey [Pro 2](https://docs.nitrokey.com/
 
 Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
 
-- Should be available in USB-C form factor.
+- Should be available in USB-C form-factor.
 - Should be available with NFC.
 - Should support TOTP secret storage.
 - Should support secure firmware updates.
-
-[^1]: Some governments or other organizations may require a key with Level 2 certification, but most people do not have to worry about this distinction.

docs/social-networks.md

@@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
----
-title: Social Networks
-icon: material/account-supervisor-circle-outline
-description: Find a new social network that doesn’t pry into your data or monetize your profile.
-cover: social-networks.webp
----
-<small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>
-
-- [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }
-- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
-
-These privacy-respecting **social networks** allow you to participate in online communities without giving up your personal information, like your full name, phone number, and other data commonly requested by tech companies.
-
-A growing problem among social media platforms is censorship in two different forms. First, they often acquiesce to illegitimate censorship requests, either from malicious governments or their own internal policies.
-
-Second, they often require accounts to access walled-off content that would otherwise be published freely on the open internet. This effectively censors the browsing activities of privacy-conscious users who are unable to pay the privacy cost of opening an account on these networks.
-
-The social networks we recommend solve the issue of censorship by operating atop an open and decentralized social networking protocol. While it is possible for your account to be banned or silenced by an individual server, there is no central authority which can censor your account across the entire network. They also don't require an account merely to view publicly available content.
-
-You should note that **no** social networks are appropriate for private or sensitive communications. For chatting directly with others, you should use a recommended [instant messenger](real-time-communication.md) with strong end-to-end encryption, and only use direct messages on social media in order to establish a more private and secure chat platform with your contacts.
-
-## Mastodon
-
-<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
-
-![Mastodon logo](assets/img/social-networks/mastodon.svg){ align=right }
-
-**Mastodon** is a social network based on open web protocols and free, open-source software. It uses the **:simple-activitypub: ActivityPub** protocol, which is decentralized like email: users can exist on different servers or even different platforms but still communicate with each other.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://joinmastodon.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.joinmastodon.org){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
-
-</div>
-
-There are many software platforms which use ActivityPub as their backend social networking protocol, meaning they can talk to servers even when they are running different software. For example, PeerTube is a video publishing software that uses ActivityPub, meaning you can follow channels on PeerTube either with another PeerTube account, *or* with a Mastodon account because Mastodon also uses ActivityPub.
-
-We chose to recommend Mastodon over other ActivityPub software as your primary social media platform for these reasons:
-
-1. Mastodon has a solid history of security updates. In the handful of circumstances where major security vulnerabilities have been found, they coordinate patch releases quickly and cleanly. Historically they have also backported these security patches to older feature branches. This makes it easier for less experienced server hosts who may not feel comfortable upgrading to the latest releases right away to keep their instances secure. Mastodon also has an update notification system built in to the web interface, making it much more likely for server administrators to be aware of critical security patches available for their instance.
-
-2. Mastodon is largely usable with most content types. While it is primarily a microblogging platform, Mastodon easily handles longer posts, image posts, video posts, and most other posts you might encounter when following ActivityPub users who aren't on Mastodon. This makes your Mastodon account an ideal "central hub" for following anyone regardless of the platform they chose to use. In contrast, if you were only using a PeerTube account, you would *only* be able to follow other video channels, for example.
-
-3. Mastodon has fairly comprehensive privacy controls. It has many built-in features which allow you to limit how and when your data is shared, some of which we'll cover below. They also develop new features with privacy in mind. For example, while other ActivityPub software quickly implemented "quote posts" by merely handling links to other posts with a slightly different embed modal, Mastodon is [developing](https://blog.joinmastodon.org/2025/02/bringing-quote-posts-to-mastodon/) a quote post feature which will give you more fine-grained control when your post is quoted.
-
-### Choosing an Instance
-
-To benefit the most from Mastodon, it is critical to choose a server, or "instance," which is well aligned with the type of content you want to post or read about. While censorship in Mastodon does not exist on a network level, it is very possible to experience censorship on a server level depending on your server's administrator.
-
-It is critical to understand that Mastodon is not a single, unified service in the way that X (Twitter) or Facebook are. Each server is its own legal entity, with its own privacy policy, terms of use, administration team, and moderators. While many of these servers are far *less* restrictive and more privacy-respecting than traditional social media platforms, some can be far *more* restrictive or potentially *worse* for your privacy. The Mastodon software does not discriminate between these administrators or place any limitations on their powers.
-
-We do not currently recommend any specific instances, but you may find advice within our communities. We recommend avoiding *mastodon.social* and *mastodon.online* because they are operated by the same company which develops Mastodon itself. From the perspective of decentralization, it is better in the long term to separate software developers and server hosts so that no one party can exert too much control over the network as a whole.
-
-If you are greatly concerned about an existing server censoring your content or the content you can view, you generally have two options:
-
-1. **Host Mastodon yourself.** This approach gives you the exact same censorship resistance as any other website you can host yourself, which is fairly high. Mastodon even [integrates with the Tor network](https://docs.joinmastodon.org/admin/optional/tor) for more extreme scenarios where even your underlying hosting provider is subject to censorship, but this may limit who can access your content to only other servers which integrate with Tor, like most other hidden services.
-
-    Mastodon benefits greatly from a large and active self-hosting community, and its administration is comprehensively documented. While many other ActivityPub platforms can require extensive technical knowledge to run and troubleshoot, Mastodon has very stable and tested releases, and it can generally be run securely without issue by anyone who can use the Linux command line and follow [step-by-step instructions](https://docs.joinmastodon.org/admin/prerequisites).
-
-2. **Use a managed hosting service.** We don't have any specific recommendations, but there are a variety of Mastodon hosting services which will create a brand-new Mastodon server on your own domain (or occasionally a subdomain of their domain, but we recommend against this unless registering your own domain presents too much of a burden to your privacy).
-
-    Typically, Mastodon hosting providers will handle the *technical* side of your instance, but they completely leave the *moderation* side up to you. This means that you will be able to follow any content you like, although it may expose you to more spam or unwanted content because you will not have the dedicated moderation team many larger instances will have.
-
-    This often represents a better approach than self-hosting for most people, because you can benefit from greater control over your own instance without worrying about technical problems or unpatched security vulnerabilities.
-
-    You should look closely at your hosting provider's terms of service and acceptable use policies before registering. These are often far more broad than typical hosted instance rules, and they are far less likely to be enforced without recourse, but they can still be restrictive in undesirable ways.
-
-### Recommended Privacy Settings
-
-From Mastodon's web interface, click the **Administration** link in the right sidebar. Within the administration control panel, you'll find these sections in the left sidebar:
-
-#### Public Profile
-
-There are a number of privacy controls under the **privacy and reach** tab here. Most notably, pay attention to these:
-
-- [ ] **Automatically accept new followers**: You should consider unchecking this box to have a private profile. This will allow you to review who can follow your account before accepting them.
-
-    In contrast to most social media platforms, if you have a private profile you still have the *option* to publish posts which are publicly visible to non-followers, and which can still be boosted and seen by non-followers. Therefore, unchecking this box is the only way to have the *choice* to publish to either the entire world or a select group of people.
-
-- [ ] **Show follows and followers on profile**: You should uncheck this box to hide your social graph from the public. It is fairly uncommon for the list of people you follow to have some genuine benefit to others, but that information can present a risk to you.
-
-- [ ] **Display from which app you sent a post**: You should uncheck this box to prevent revealing information about your personal computing setup to others unnecessarily.
-
-The other privacy controls on this page should be read through, but we would stress that they are **not** technical controls—they are merely requests that you make to others. For example, if you choose to hide your profile from search engines on this page, **nothing** is actually stopping a search engine from reading your profile. You are merely requesting search engine indexes not publish your content to their users.
-
-You will likely still wish to make these requests because they can practically reduce your digital footprint. However, they should not be *relied* upon. The only effective way to hide your posts from search engines and others is to post with non-public (followers only) visibility settings *and* limit who can follow your account.
-
-#### Preferences
-
-You should change your **posting privacy** setting from public to: **Followers-only - Only show to followers**.
-
-Note that this only changes your default settings to prevent accidental over-sharing. You can always adjust your visibility level when composing a new post.
-
-#### Automated post deletion
-
-- [x] Check the **Automatically delete old posts** box.
-
-The default settings here are fine, and will delete any posts you make after 2 weeks, unless you favorite (star) them. This gives you an easy way to control which posts stick around forever, and which ones are only ephemeral. Many settings about how long and when posts are kept can be adjusted here to suit your own needs, however.
-
-It is very rare for social media posts older than a few weeks to be read or relevant to others. These older posts are often ignored because they are challenging to deal with in bulk, but they can build a fairly comprehensive profile about you over time. You should always strive to publish content ephemerally by default, and only keep posts around for longer than that very intentionally.
-
-### Posting Content
-
-When publishing a new post, you will have the option to choose from one of these visibility settings:
-
-- **Public**, which publishes your content to anyone on the internet.
-- **Quiet public**, which you should consider equivalent to publicly posting! This is not a technical guarantee, merely a request you are making to other servers to hide your post from some feeds.
-- **Followers**, which publishes your content only to your followers. If you did not follow our recommendation of restricting your followers, you should consider this equivalent to publicly posting!
-- **Specific people**, which only shares the post with people who are specifically mentioned within the post. This is Mastodon's version of direct messages, but should never be relied on for private communications as we covered earlier, since Mastodon has no E2EE.
-
-If you used our recommended configuration settings above, you should be posting to **Followers** by default, and only posting to **Public** on an intentional and case-by-case basis.
-
-## Criteria
-
-**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
-
-- Must be free and open source software.
-- Must use a federated protocol to communicate with other instances of the social networking software.
-- Must not have non-technical restrictions on who can be federated with.
-- Must be usable within a standard [web browser](desktop-browsers.md).
-- Must make public content accessible to visitors without an account.
-- Must allow you to limit who can follow your profile.
-- Must allow you to post content visible only to your followers.
-- Must support modern web application security standards/features (including [multifactor authentication](multi-factor-authentication.md)).

docs/tools.md

@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ For more details about each project, why they were chosen, and additional tips o
 
 <div class="grid cards" markdown>
 
+- ![Orbot logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/orbot.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Smartphone Tor Proxy)](tor.md#orbot)
 - ![Onion Browser logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/onion_browser.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Onion Browser (Tor for iOS)](tor.md#onion-browser-ios)
 
 </div>
@@ -214,7 +215,7 @@ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connec
 
 <div class="grid cards" markdown>
 
-- ![Addy.io logo](assets/img/email-aliasing/addy.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Addy.io](email-aliasing.md#addyio)
+- ![addy.io logo](assets/img/email-aliasing/addy.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [addy.io](email-aliasing.md#addyio)
 - ![SimpleLogin logo](assets/img/email-aliasing/simplelogin.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [SimpleLogin](email-aliasing.md#simplelogin)
 
 </div>
@@ -240,6 +241,7 @@ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connec
 
 - ![Thunderbird logo](assets/img/email-clients/thunderbird.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Thunderbird](email-clients.md#thunderbird)
 - ![Apple Mail logo](assets/img/email-clients/applemail.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Apple Mail (macOS)](email-clients.md#apple-mail-macos)
+- ![Canary Mail logo](assets/img/email-clients/canarymail.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Canary Mail (iOS)](email-clients.md#canary-mail-ios)
 - ![FairEmail logo](assets/img/email-clients/fairemail.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [FairEmail (Android)](email-clients.md#fairemail-android)
 - ![GNOME Evolution logo](assets/img/email-clients/evolution.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [GNOME Evolution (Linux)](email-clients.md#gnome-evolution-gnome)
 - ![Kontact logo](assets/img/email-clients/kontact.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Kontact (Linux)](email-clients.md#kontact-kde)
@@ -288,7 +290,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
 <div class="grid cards" markdown>
 
 - ![RethinkDNS logo](assets/img/android/rethinkdns.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy }![RethinkDNS logo](assets/img/android/rethinkdns-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [RethinkDNS](dns.md#rethinkdns)
-- ![DNSCrypt-Proxy logo](assets/img/dns/dnscrypt-proxy.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [DNSCrypt-Proxy](dns.md#dnscrypt-proxy)
+- ![dnscrypt-proxy logo](assets/img/dns/dnscrypt-proxy.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [dnscrypt-proxy](dns.md#dnscrypt-proxy)
 
 </div>
 
@@ -332,7 +334,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
 
 <div class="grid cards" markdown>
 
-- ![Ente logo](assets/img/photo-management/ente.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Ente Photos](photo-management.md#ente-photos)
+- ![Ente logo](assets/img/photo-management/ente.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy }![Ente logo](assets/img/photo-management/ente.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Ente Photos](photo-management.md#ente-photos)
 - ![Stingle logo](assets/img/photo-management/stingle.png#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy }![Stingle logo](assets/img/photo-management/stingle-dark.png#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Stingle](photo-management.md#stingle)
 - ![PhotoPrism logo](assets/img/photo-management/photoprism.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [PhotoPrism](photo-management.md#photoprism)
 
@@ -360,7 +362,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
 <div class="grid cards" markdown>
 
 - ![Kobold logo](assets/img/ai-chat/kobold.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Kobold.cpp](ai-chat.md#koboldcpp)
-- ![Llamafile logo](assets/img/ai-chat/llamafile.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Llamafile](ai-chat.md#llamafile)
+- ![Llamafile logo](assets/img/ai-chat/llamafile.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Llamafile](ai-chat.md#llamafile)
 - ![Ollama logo](assets/img/ai-chat/ollama.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Ollama (CLI)](ai-chat.md#ollama-cli)
 
 </div>
@@ -484,7 +486,7 @@ For encrypting your OS drive, we typically recommend using the encryption tool y
 
 <div class="grid cards" markdown>
 
-- ![Drip logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/drip.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Drip](health-and-wellness.md#drip)
+- ![drip. logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/drip.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [drip.](health-and-wellness.md#drip)
 - ![Euki logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/euki.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Euki](health-and-wellness.md#euki)
 - ![Apple Health logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy } ![Apple Health logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy }[Apple Health](health-and-wellness.md#apple-health)
 - ![Gadgetbridge logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/gadgetbridge.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy }![Gadgetbridge logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/gadgetbridge-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Gadgetbridge](health-and-wellness.md#gadgetbridge)
@@ -499,7 +501,7 @@ For encrypting your OS drive, we typically recommend using the encryption tool y
 
 <div class="grid cards" markdown>
 
-- ![LTeX logo](assets/img/language-tools/ltex-for-vscode.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [LTeX for VS Code](language-tools.md#ltex-for-vs-code)
+- ![LanguageTool logo](assets/img/language-tools/languagetool.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy }![LanguageTool logo](assets/img/language-tools/languagetool-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [LanguageTool](language-tools.md#languagetool)
 
 </div>
 
@@ -579,7 +581,7 @@ For encrypting your OS drive, we typically recommend using the encryption tool y
 - ![Psono logo](assets/img/password-management/psono.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Psono](passwords.md#psono)
 - ![KeePassXC logo](assets/img/password-management/keepassxc.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [KeePassXC](passwords.md#keepassxc)
 - ![KeePassDX logo](assets/img/password-management/keepassdx.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [KeePassDX (Android)](passwords.md#keepassdx-android)
-- ![Gopass logo](assets/img/password-management/gopass.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Gopass (CLI)](passwords.md#gopass-cli)
+- ![gopass logo](assets/img/password-management/gopass.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [gopass (CLI)](passwords.md#gopass-cli)
 
 </div>
 
@@ -610,16 +612,6 @@ For encrypting your OS drive, we typically recommend using the encryption tool y
 
 [Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](real-time-communication.md)
 
-### Social Networks
-
-<div class="grid cards" markdown>
-
-- ![Mastodon logo](assets/img/social-networks/mastodon.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Mastodon](social-networks.md#mastodon)
-
-</div>
-
-[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](social-networks.md)
-
 ## Hardware
 
 ### Security Keys
@@ -686,14 +678,13 @@ For encrypting your OS drive, we typically recommend using the encryption tool y
 <div class="grid cards" markdown>
 
 - ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Qubes OS (Xen VM Distribution)](desktop.md#qubes-os)
-- ![Fedora logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Fedora Linux](desktop.md#fedora-linux)
+- ![Fedora logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Fedora Workstation](desktop.md#fedora-workstation)
 - ![openSUSE Tumbleweed logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/opensuse-tumbleweed.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [openSUSE Tumbleweed](desktop.md#opensuse-tumbleweed)
 - ![Arch logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/archlinux.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Arch Linux](desktop.md#arch-linux)
 - ![Fedora logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Fedora Atomic Desktops](desktop.md#fedora-atomic-desktops)
 - ![NixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos)
 - ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix)
 - ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails)
-- ![Secureblue logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/secureblue.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Secureblue](desktop.md#secureblue)
 - ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure)
 
 </div>
@@ -719,10 +710,9 @@ These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functional
 
 <div class="grid cards" markdown>
 
-- ![I2P logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/i2p.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy } ![I2P logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/i2p-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
-- ![Tor logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/tor.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
-- ![Orbot logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/orbot.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Orbot (Mobile Tor Proxy)](alternative-networks.md#orbot)
-- ![Snowflake logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/snowflake.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy }![Snowflake logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/snowflake-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
+- ![I2P logo](./assets/img/self-contained-networks/i2p.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy } ![I2P logo](./assets/img/self-contained-networks/i2p-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project)
+- ![Tor logo](./assets/img/self-contained-networks/tor.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor)
+- ![Snowflake logo](assets/img/browsers/snowflake.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy }![Snowflake logo](assets/img/browsers/snowflake-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Snowflake](alternative-networks.md#snowflake)
 
 </div>
 
@@ -732,7 +722,7 @@ These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functional
 
 <div class="grid cards" markdown>
 
-- ![MVT logo](assets/img/device-integrity/mvt.webp#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy }![MVT logo](assets/img/device-integrity/mvt-dark.png#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Mobile Verification Toolkit](device-integrity.md#mobile-verification-toolkit)
+- ![MVT logo](assets/img/device-integrity/mvt.webp){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Mobile Verification Toolkit](device-integrity.md#mobile-verification-toolkit)
 - ![iMazing logo](assets/img/device-integrity/imazing.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [iMazing (iOS)](device-integrity.md#imazing-ios)
 - ![Auditor logo](assets/img/device-integrity/auditor.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy }![Auditor logo](assets/img/device-integrity/auditor-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Auditor (Android)](device-integrity.md#auditor-android)
 

docs/tor.md

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Before connecting to Tor, please ensure you've read our [overview](advanced/tor-
 
 There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for [:material-incognito: anonymous](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple } browsing for desktop computers and Android.
 
-Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using mobile browser apps like [Onion Browser](#onion-browser-ios) to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
+Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
 
 If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** be using the desktop Tor Browser client, ideally in a [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) configuration. Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against deanonymization.
 
@@ -80,10 +80,50 @@ You should **never** install any additional extensions on Tor Browser or edit `a
 
 </div>
 
-The Tor Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting, or identifying you based on your browser configuration. Therefore, it is imperative that you do **not** modify the browser beyond the default [security levels](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings). When modifying the security level setting, you **must** always restart the browser before continuing to use it. Otherwise, [the security settings may not be fully applied](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/05/02/tor-security-slider-flaw/), putting you at a higher risk of fingerprinting and exploits than you may expect based on the setting chosen.
+The Tor Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting, or identifying you based on your browser configuration. Therefore, it is imperative that you do **not** modify the browser beyond the default [security levels](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings).
 
 In addition to installing Tor Browser on your computer directly, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser alone.
 
+## Orbot
+
+<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
+
+![Orbot logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/orbot.svg){ align=right }
+
+**Orbot** is a free Tor VPN for smartphones which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+<details class="downloads" markdown>
+<summary>Downloads</summary>
+
+- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
+- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+
+</details>
+
+</div>
+
+We previously recommended enabling the *Isolate Destination Address* preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
+
+<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Tips for Android</p>
+
+Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+Orbot is often outdated on the Guardian Project's [F-Droid repository](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android), so consider downloading directly from the [GitHub repository](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases) instead.
+
+All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
+
+</div>
+
+On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
+
 ## Onion Browser (iOS)
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
@@ -109,4 +149,6 @@ In addition to installing Tor Browser on your computer directly, there are also
 
 Onion Browser does not provide the same levels of privacy protections as Tor Browser does on desktop platforms. For casual use it is a perfectly fine way to access hidden services, but if you're concerned about being traced or monitored by advanced adversaries you should not rely on this as an anonymity tool.
 
-[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot), but this still comes with some limitations on iOS.
+[Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside Orbot, but this still comes with some limitations on iOS (noted in the Orbot section above).
+
+[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.

docs/vpn.md

@@ -108,15 +108,6 @@ Unfortunately, it does not work very well in countries where sophisticated filte
 
 Proton VPN has published [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1437005085) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonvpn.android) clients, both supporting an easy-to-use interface as opposed to requiring you to manually configure your WireGuard connection. The Android client is also available on [GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonVPN/android-app/releases).
 
-<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">How to opt out of sharing telemetry</p>
-
-On Android, Proton hides telemetry settings under the misleadingly labeled "**Help us fight censorship**" menu in the settings panel. On other platforms these settings can be found under the "**Usage statistics**" menu.
-
-We are noting this because while we don't necessarily recommend against sharing anonymous usage statistics with developers, it is important that these settings are easily found and clearly labeled.
-
-</div>
-
 #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Additional Notes
 
 Proton VPN clients support two-factor authentication on all platforms. Proton VPN has their own servers and datacenters in Switzerland, Iceland and Sweden. They offer content blocking and known-malware blocking with their DNS service. Additionally, Proton VPN also offers "Tor" servers allowing you to easily connect to onion sites, but we still strongly recommend using [the official Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) for this purpose.

includes/abbreviations.en.txt

@@ -107,5 +107,3 @@
 *[W3C]: World Wide Web Consortium
 *[XMPP]: Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
 *[PWA]: Progressive Web App
-*[PWAs]: Progressive Web Apps
-*[WKD]: Web Key Directory

includes/contributors.md

@@ -450,8 +450,6 @@
       <td align="center" valign="top" width="20%"><a rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" href="https://github.com/bruch-alex"><img src="https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/173354246?v=4" width="100px;" loading=lazy /><br /><sub><b>Alex Bruch</b></sub></a><br /><a href="#translation-bruch-alex" title="Translation">🌍</a></td>
       <td align="center" valign="top" width="20%"><a rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" href="https://github.com/qiyongzheng"><img src="https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/153378707?v=4" width="100px;" loading=lazy /><br /><sub><b>qiyongzheng</b></sub></a><br /><a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/commits?author=qiyongzheng" title="Documentation">📖</a></td>
       <td align="center" valign="top" width="20%"><a rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" href="https://github.com/hashcatHitman"><img src="https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/155700084?v=4" width="100px;" loading=lazy /><br /><sub><b>Sam K</b></sub></a><br /><a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/commits?author=hashcatHitman" title="Documentation">📖</a> <a href="#promotion-hashcatHitman" title="Promotion">📣</a> <a href="#question-hashcatHitman" title="Answering Questions">💬</a></td>
-      <td align="center" valign="top" width="20%"><a rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" href="https://github.com/Spirizer"><img src="https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/51120100?v=4" width="100px;" loading=lazy /><br /><sub><b>Spirizer</b></sub></a><br /><a href="#translation-Spirizer" title="Translation">🌍</a></td>
-      <td align="center" valign="top" width="20%"><a rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" href="https://github.com/jordbm"><img src="https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/160433264?v=4" width="100px;" loading=lazy /><br /><sub><b>jordbm</b></sub></a><br /><a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/commits?author=jordbm" title="Documentation">📖</a> <a href="#maintenance-jordbm" title="Maintenance">🚧</a> <a href="#security-jordbm" title="Security">🛡️</a></td>
     </tr>
   </tbody>
   <tfoot>

mkdocs.yml

@@ -428,7 +428,6 @@ nav:
           - "passwords.md"
           - "pastebins.md"
           - "real-time-communication.md"
-          - "social-networks.md"
       - !ENV [NAV_HARDWARE, "Hardware"]:
           - "mobile-phones.md"
           - "security-keys.md"
@@ -474,7 +473,6 @@ nav:
               - "meta/uploading-images.md"
               - "meta/git-recommendations.md"
               - "meta/commit-messages.md"
-              - "meta/pr-comments.md"
 
 validation:
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videos/.authors.yml

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-../blog/.authors.yml

videos/.authors.yml

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+authors:
+  jordan:
+    name: Jordan Warne
+    description: Video Producer
+    avatar: https://forum-cdn.privacyguides.net/user_avatar/discuss.privacyguides.net/jordan/288/7793_2.png
+    mastodon:
+      username: jw
+      instance: social.lol
+  jonah:
+    name: Jonah Aragon
+    description: Project Director
+    avatar: https://github.com/jonaharagon.png
+    mastodon:
+      username: jonah
+      instance: neat.computer
+    twitter: jonaharagon
+    bluesky: jonaharagon.com

videos/posts/is-privacy-dead.md

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
----
-title: |
-  Think Privacy Is Dead? You're Wrong.
-date:
-    created: 2025-04-17T20:00:00Z
-authors:
-    - jordan
-description: |
-  Privacy isn’t dead, in fact it’s growing. In this video, we explore common arguments against protecting your privacy and why they're not only wrong but dangerous.
-readtime: 5
-thumbnail: https://neat.tube/lazy-static/previews/ebdd1d98-7136-4f5d-9a9e-449004ce47d1.jpg
-embed: https://neat.tube/videos/embed/sSx1yyXESXhvZh1E3VTwtG
-peertube: https://neat.tube/w/sSx1yyXESXhvZh1E3VTwtG
-youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ni2_BN_9xAY
-links:
-  - Why Privacy Matters: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/why-privacy-matters/
-  - posts/5-easy-steps-to-protect-yourself-online.md
----
-Privacy isn’t dead, in fact it’s growing. In this video, we explore common arguments against protecting your privacy and why they're not only wrong but dangerous.
-
-## Sources
-
-- <https://www.wired.com/story/google-app-gmail-chrome-data/>
-- <https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/privacy/what-is-the-gdpr/>

videos/posts/is-your-data-really-safe-understanding-encryption.md

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
----
-title: |
-  Is Your Data Really Safe? Understanding Encryption
-date:
-    created: 2025-04-03T20:00:00Z
-authors:
-    - jordan
-description: |
-  Encryption is a cornerstone of security on the modern internet, in this video we dive deep into how it works and explain why it's so important.
-readtime: 7
-thumbnail: https://neat.tube/lazy-static/previews/f23bff89-bc84-46b7-ac0b-7e72a9c3ad7d.jpg
-embed: https://neat.tube/videos/embed/6gASFPMvy7EBwTiM3XetEZ
-peertube: https://neat.tube/w/6gASFPMvy7EBwTiM3XetEZ
-youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0uQVzK8QWsw
-links:
-  - Privacy Means Safety<br><small>by Em on March 5, 2025</small>: https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/03/25/privacy-means-safety/
-  - Why Privacy Matters: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/why-privacy-matters/
----
-Encryption is a cornerstone of security on the modern internet, in this video we dive deep into how it works and explain why it's so important. This is especially crucial as many governments around the world are pushing to ban encryption and breach our fundamental right to privacy.
-
-## Sources
-
-- <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cgj54eq4vejo>
-- <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/02/uks-demands-apple-break-encryption-emergency-us-all>
-- <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/12/fancy-new-terms-same-old-backdoors-encryption-debate-2019>
-- <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/02/https-www-amnesty-org-en-latest-news-2025-02-uk-encryption-order-threatens-global-privacy-rights/>