Update the-dangers-of-end-to-end-encryption.md

2026-04-29 00:41:30 +00:00 · 2025-04-02 06:22:24 +02:00
175 changed files with 785 additions and 4323 deletions
@@ -2986,26 +2986,6 @@
        "promotion",
        "question"
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@@ -554,11 +554,3 @@ MWEB
 Cyd
 Semiphemeral
 Dangerzone
-simple-activitypub
-ActivityPub
-pseudorandom
-Chaum
-unlinkability
-Kagi
-Secureblue
-pseudonymity
@@ -611,8 +611,6 @@ Privacy Guides wouldn't be possible without these wonderful people ([emoji key](
      <td align="center" valign="top" width="20%"><a rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" href="https://github.com/bruch-alex"><img src="https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/173354246?v=4" width="100px;" loading=lazy /><br /><sub><b>Alex Bruch</b></sub></a><br /><a href="#translation-bruch-alex" title="Translation">🌍</a></td>
      <td align="center" valign="top" width="20%"><a rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" href="https://github.com/qiyongzheng"><img src="https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/153378707?v=4" width="100px;" loading=lazy /><br /><sub><b>qiyongzheng</b></sub></a><br /><a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/commits?author=qiyongzheng" title="Documentation">📖</a></td>
      <td align="center" valign="top" width="20%"><a rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" href="https://github.com/hashcatHitman"><img src="https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/155700084?v=4" width="100px;" loading=lazy /><br /><sub><b>Sam K</b></sub></a><br /><a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/commits?author=hashcatHitman" title="Documentation">📖</a> <a href="#promotion-hashcatHitman" title="Promotion">📣</a> <a href="#question-hashcatHitman" title="Answering Questions">💬</a></td>
-      <td align="center" valign="top" width="20%"><a rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" href="https://github.com/Spirizer"><img src="https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/51120100?v=4" width="100px;" loading=lazy /><br /><sub><b>Spirizer</b></sub></a><br /><a href="#translation-Spirizer" title="Translation">🌍</a></td>
-      <td align="center" valign="top" width="20%"><a rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" href="https://github.com/jordbm"><img src="https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/160433264?v=4" width="100px;" loading=lazy /><br /><sub><b>jordbm</b></sub></a><br /><a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/commits?author=jordbm" title="Documentation">📖</a> <a href="#maintenance-jordbm" title="Maintenance">🚧</a> <a href="#security-jordbm" title="Security">🛡️</a></td>
    </tr>
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  <tfoot>
@@ -40,13 +40,6 @@ authors:
    name: fria
    description: Team Member
    avatar: https://github.com/friadev.png
-  jordan:
-    name: Jordan Warne
-    description: Video Producer
-    avatar: https://forum-cdn.privacyguides.net/user_avatar/discuss.privacyguides.net/jordan/288/7793_2.png
-    mastodon:
-      username: jw
-      instance: social.lol
  jonah:
    name: Jonah Aragon
    description: Project Director
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---
-date:
-    created: 2025-05-06T21:45:00Z
-categories:
-    - News
-authors:
-    - em
-description: Age verification laws and propositions forcing platforms to restrict content accessed by children and teens have been multiplying in recent years. The problem is, implementing such measure necessarily requires identifying each user accessing this content, one way or another. This is bad news for your privacy.
-schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle
-preview:
-  cover: blog/assets/images/age-verification-wants-your-face/ageverification-cover.webp
---
-
-# Age Verification Wants Your Face, and Your Privacy
-
-![A stylized photo showing a person holding a printed photo of their face in front of their actual face.](../assets/images/age-verification-wants-your-face/ageverification-cover.webp)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Photo: Kyle Glenn / Unsplash</small>
-
-Age verification laws and propositions forcing platforms to restrict content accessed by children and teens have been multiplying in recent years. The problem is, implementing such measures necessarily requires identifying each user accessing this content, one way or another. This is bad news for your privacy.<!-- more -->
-
-For a few years now, several legislators in North America, Europe, and Australia have expressed concern about children and teens accessing certain types of content online. While there is no doubt some online content can be worrisome, implementing a technological solution for this is [extremely problematic](https://www.jonaharagon.com/posts/age-verification-is-incompatible-with-the-internet/).
-
-By mandating platforms to be legally responsible to verify a user's age, regulators effectively force them to identify each user requesting access to content deemed inappropriate under a certain age threshold.
-
-If these regulations continue to proliferate, this could lead to the end of pseudonymity online.
-
-## How can age be verified online
-
-Verifying age online is [difficult](https://www.woodhullfoundation.org/fact-checked/online-age-verification-is-not-the-same-as-flashing-your-id-at-a-liquor-store/). There isn't any magical solution to it, it's either recording how a user looks or scanning official documents.
-
-Conducting verification "on-device" offers only few additional protections considering this information still has to be checked and reported with an external service, somehow.
-
-Moreover, processes used to keep this data "on-device" are often opaque. Taking into account how valuable this information is, it becomes very difficult to trust any for-profit third-party services which such a sensitive task.
-
-Users' faces and official documents are two types of very sensitive information. Who becomes responsible to collect, process, store, and safeguard this data? With whom does this data get shared, and for which other purposes? And how accurate is this data anyway?
-
-### Facial scans
-
-Some platforms and third-party providers of the rapidly growing "[identity verification industry](https://www.businessresearchinsights.com/market-reports/digital-identity-verification-market-118180)" have started to use facial recognition and face scan systems in order to determine a user's age.
-
-The problem is, the systems are [horrible for everyone's privacy](https://www.liberties.eu/en/stories/facial-recognition-privacy-concerns/44518), extremely problematic to use due to [racist and gendered biases](https://www.aclu-mn.org/en/news/biased-technology-automated-discrimination-facial-recognition), [inaccurate](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/01/face-scans-estimate-our-age-creepy-af-and-harmful) to determine the correct age, and on top of all that, [can be cheated](https://www.theregister.com/2022/05/22/ai_in_brief/).
-
-### Official documents
-
-The second solution is to require users to provide an official piece of ID. Considering an official ID often contain a photo, full legal name, date of birth, home address, and government specific codes, this is even worse.
-
-All this sensitive data then gets collected by either the platform itself or a third-party provider with little oversight or incentive to protect this data at all. Leaks and breaches for this enormous data trove are just around the corner. Unfortunately, this isn't speculative, [data leaks have already occurred](https://www.404media.co/id-verification-service-for-tiktok-uber-x-exposed-driver-licenses-au10tix/).
-
-The more copies of your official documents exist online, the greater the risk this data *will get exposed*, and the less value this document has to actually identify you when it's *truly* needed.
-
-And again, this sort of verification is easy to cheat. Any determined teenager will soon learn how to either create a fake ID, use someone else's ID, or go around this verification system in another way.
-
-Age verification laws will *without a doubt* support a flourishing criminal industry to provide fake or stolen IDs even more easily online.
-
-## Where age verification is (or will be) required
-
-In April this year, [Discord started to test age verification systems](https://www.theverge.com/news/650493/discord-age-verification-face-id-scan-experiment) using facial or ID scans, as a way to comply with [Australia](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c89vjj0lxx9o)'s and [UK](https://www.theverge.com/2023/10/26/23922397/uk-online-safety-bill-law-passed-royal-assent-moderation-regulation)'s new laws.
-
-This measure only applies to access certain protected posts for users located in Australia and the United Kingdom and at this time, but don't be surprised if it soon gets implemented at the account level for users everywhere.
-
-In the [United States](https://action.freespeechcoalition.com/age-verification-resources/state-avs-laws/), many states have already passed some types of age verification laws, and several others have proposed such laws. In [Canada](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/09/canadas-leaders-must-reject-overbroad-age-verification-bill) and [Europe](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/funding/call-tenders-development-consultancy-and-support-age-verification-solution), legislators have also been pushing for similar regulations to block content online subject to age verification.
-
-There is no doubt the more countries pass similar prohibitive laws, the more other countries will soon follow.
-
-Some hope however, this month a US federal judge ruled an age verification [law in Arkansas unconstitutional](https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/5228836-judge-blocks-social-media-age-verification-law-in-arkansas/).
-
-## Who decides what is sensitive content
-
-When talking about age verification, most assume this only applies to obvious pornographic content. However, many of these laws have [much wider reach](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/01/impact-age-verification-measures-goes-beyond-porn-sites).
-
-For example, the Australian law prohibits access to social media altogether for anyone under the age of 16. This means that, once the law comes into full effect after its transitional period, anyone who uses social media in Australia will have to prove they are older than this age. It is likely that all Australian users will have to provide some form of identifying data to continue using their social media accounts. **This is a privacy nightmare.**
-
-When laws target specific content, definition of what is appropriate and what isn't is often too broad. Moreover, this definition is subject to change from one administration to another.
-
-There are also wide differences from one country to another. For example, some countries sadly consider simple discussions of gender identity or sexual orientation to be sensitive content. What is deemed inappropriate to children in one culture might not be the same in another.
-
-Automating this sort of censorship leads to a lot of misfiring. There has already been numerous instances of [breastfeeding photos mislabelled](https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/facebook-clarifies-breastfeeding-pics-ok-updates-rules-1.2997124) for nudity. Important educational material for sex education could get censored and inaccessible to children, who critically need access to it *before* adulthood.
-
-Who will decide which content should be censored and which shouldn't? Will countries hosting the big tech platforms end up having a greater decision power in the matter? Will platforms simply decide to apply the strongest level of restriction worldwide?
-
-## Age verification isn't effective
-
-Even if we could somehow find a global consensus that is perfectly ethical and never misfires on which content children shouldn't access, it will likely fail.
-
-Children, and teenagers especially, are and have always been incredibly effective at going around such limitation to feed their curious minds.
-
-First, there are technical tools such as VPNs and proxies of all sort to go around location-based restrictions. Then, there's the classic fake ID, and its modern evolution: deepfake face. There will also be without a doubt a growing market of pre-verified "adult" accounts up for sale online.
-
-Perhaps age verification measures will work for a couple of months, until products to evade it get the word out, then they'll become useless. Only leaving the ashes of your social media legal consenting adult pseudonymity in its path.
-
-## Why it's bad news for everyone's privacy
-
-Age verification will require all platforms and/or third-party identification service providers to collect an enormous trove of sensitive data on everyone.
-
-This goes against all principles of data minimization, generally a vital part of data protection regulations.
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-Daily occurrences of data breach incidents have taught us we cannot trust these services to safeguard our data. Data breaches for this sensitive information are only a matter of time.
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-The concentration of such valuable data will likely be monetized and resold either by the platforms themselves, by the for-profit third-party "age assurance" providers they use, or eventually by the criminals who stole it from them.
-
-This data trove will include face scans of children with their location (trying to pass as adults), and faces and official documents from every adult in the world using social media, if this kind of regulation gets implemented at large.
-
-**The privacy and safety implications of this are absolutely disastrous**.
-
-## Age verification is not the solution
-
-Sadly, age verification legislation will not help safeguard children from harmful content online, but it will effectively remove protection for anyone needing pseudonymity online to [stay safe](privacy-means-safety.md). Moreover, it will put everyone at a much greater risk of victimization by identify theft, impersonation, stalking, and worse.
-
-Despite the perhaps well-intended legislators, technological solutions aren't always adequate to solve every problem we have. Here again, education and content moderation are likely much better ways to deal with this sort of issues.
-
-In the meantime, don't be surprised if you cross a teenager on the street suddenly pointing their phone to scan *your* adult face, or a young relative looking in your wallet. They probably won't be looking for your money, but most likely for your adult ID.
@@ -1,238 +0,0 @@
---
-date:
-    created: 2025-05-19T20:15:00Z
-categories:
-    - Opinion
-authors:
-    - fria
-tags:
-    - AI
-    - Content Credentials
---
-# The Power of Digital Provenance in the Age of AI
-
-![Article cover showing a painterly background with cool colors and the Content Credentials logo](../assets/images/digital-provenance/cover.jpg)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Photo: Kseniya Lapteva / Pexels | Logo: Content Credentials</small>
-
-With the popularity of generative AI, it's becoming more and more difficult to [distinguish](https://uwaterloo.ca/news/media/can-you-tell-ai-generated-people-real-ones) reality from fiction. Can this problem be solved using cryptography? What are the privacy implications of the currently proposed systems?<!-- more -->
-
-## The Problem
-
-Can you tell which of these images are AI generated?
-
-<div class="grid" markdown>
-
-![Group of geese by some water](../assets/images/digital-provenance/geese1.jpeg)
-
-![Group of geese by some water](../assets/images/digital-provenance/geese2.jpeg)
-
-![Group of geese by some water](../assets/images/digital-provenance/geese3.jpeg)
-
-![Group of geese by some water](../assets/images/digital-provenance/geese4.jpeg)
-
-</div>
-
-...Have a guess?
-
---
-
-Actually, they're all real. But the fact that you may have believed some of them were AI generated poses a problem: How can we tell where an image came from, if it was AI generated, and whether it was edited?
-
-## Provenance
-
-[Provenance](https://youtu.be/K56EhgfCDjs) is the history of ownership of an object, typically used when referring to antiques or art. Knowing the history of a piece of art can affect the value a lot, but you need a way to prove it's an original piece by the artist instead of a reproduction, or was owned by a famous person.
-
-Provenance can take many [forms](https://artbusiness.com/provwarn.html), from an original receipt or documentation from the artist themselves to stickers from a gallery attached to it. Typically, you want a signed [certificate](https://www.artcertificate.co.uk/?id_article=2267) from an expert on the artist in order to verify its authenticity.
-
-## Hoaxes
-
-It's important for historical preservation as well to know that an object is really from a certain time period. There's no shortage of [historical hoaxes](https://www.history.com/articles/7-historical-hoaxes). These can distort our view of history and make us all a bit dumber.
-
-### Cardiff Giant
-
-One of the most famous hoaxes was that of the [Cardiff Giant](https://www.history.com/articles/the-cardiff-giant-fools-the-nation-145-years-ago).
-
-An atheist named George Hull got into an argument with a preacher. Hull was frustrated with the preacher's literal interpretation of the bible, particularly his belief that giants were real.
-
-Hull devised a plan to trick the religious and make some money at the same time. He would have a statue of a giant man constructed and pass it off as a petrified human.
-
-After securing the materials needed, specifically a soft material called gypsum, he convinced a marble dealer to help him with his scheme. A pair of sculptors carved out the visage of a giant 10-foot man, with Hull posing as a model. They even poured sulfuric acid over it to give it an aged look.
-
-He settled on burying the giant in Cardiff, New York, where he cut a deal with a distant relative and farmer named William "Stub" Newell.
-
-On October 16, 1869, Newell hired an unsuspecting pair of workers to dig a well on his property. After they inevitably uncovered the giant, it wasn't long before the whole town was in a frenzy.
-
-![men surrounding a stone sculpture of a man in a hole in the ground doffing their hats](../assets/images/digital-provenance/cardiff-giant.jpg)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Photo: Wikimedia Commons (Public Domain)</small>
-
-Speculation that the sculpture was an ancient, petrified man quickly began to spread. Eventually, a syndicate of businessmen offered Newell $30,000 (worth $[705,438.97](https://www.in2013dollars.com/us/inflation/1869?amount=30000) in today's money) for a three-fourths stake, and he took them up on that offer.
-
-P.T. Barnum even tried to buy the sculpture, and after being turned down, he had a replica built and displayed it in a Manhattan museum. Several other copies were made afterward, and soon, there were petrified giants being exhibited all over the country.
-
-In a way that seems familiar to us now, you couldn't even be sure you were looking at the *real* hoax. Misinformation can so easily mutate and spread when left unchecked.
-
-A famed Yale paleontologist named Othniel Charles Marsh declared it "of very recent origin, and a most decided humbug." Unfortunately, as is so often the case, Hull had already cashed in on the fervor by the time experts had properly debunked his hoax.
-
-### AI Hoaxes
-
-Many modern hoaxes tend to make use of social media and focus on getting views and clicks over selling a physical object.
-
-[Miniminuteman](https://youtu.be/Pc2psN0PFTk) is a great YouTube channel covering misinformation on the internet, specifically about archaeology. Misinformation can spread quickly, especially now with the rise of generative AI that can make convincing fake images and videos.
-
-[Here](https://www.mediamatters.org/media/4016186/embed/embed) you can see an example of AI being used to make a fake Joe Rogan podcast clip. Now, whether or not you view Joe Rogan as a reliable source of information is another topic, but as one of the [most popular podcasts](https://podcastcharts.byspotify.com), his reach could be leveraged to spread dangerous misinformation like that a meteor is going to hit earth and kill everyone.
-
-The effort required is low, and the return is high. With TikTok's [Creator Rewards Program](https://www.tiktok.com/creator-academy/en/article/creator-rewards-program), content that's at least 60 seconds long and has high engagement will be rewarded. That means longer videos with alarming content like conspiracy theory videos will do very well since they will have lots of comments from people either fooled by the content posting about how scared they are or people debunking the claims. The insidious thing is the creators get rewarded either way.
-
-[Several](https://youtu.be/E4I6K8OEyho?si=wbWAUcLsjOA7yDnO) [history](https://youtu.be/cqrHmjGD1ds?si=k60RTO9MH177ASTS) [channels](https://youtu.be/HG1324unhcA?si=MuwglKd52FQ7iKU3) on YouTube have expressed their concerns about misinformation being spread about history through AI generated images and videos and how they can distort our view of the past. There's even the possibility that these AI generated images could end up polluting the historical record.
-
-## Content Authenticity Initiative
-
-In 2019, [Adobe announced](https://contentauthenticity.org/blog/test) that it was partnering with the New York Times and Twitter on a project to develop an industry standard for digital content attribution called the Content Authenticity Initiative.
-
-Twitter has since dropped out of the partnership.
-
-## Project Origin
-
-At the same time, [Project Origin](https://www.originproject.info) was designing their system for content transparency. This started as a partnership between Microsoft and the BBC.
-
-## C2PA
-
-The Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity, or [C2PA](https://c2pa.org), combines the efforts of Project Origin and the Content Authenticity Initiative. Together, they created the [C2PA standard](https://c2pa.org/specifications/specifications/2.1/specs/C2PA_Specification.html) used to add verifiable provenance data to files, which they dub "Content Credentials."
-
-## Content Credentials
-
-[Content Credentials](https://contentcredentials.org) are the implementation of digital provenance by the C2PA, the culmination of years of research and development by major tech companies, from camera manufacturers to photo editing software and AI companies to social media sites.
-
-The way Content Credentials work draws on concepts both familiar and alien. The standard is designed to be flexible and cover the myriad ways media is used online.
-
-It's important to note that Content Credentials aren't attempting to determine "truth"; that's a much more complex and philosophical topic. Rather, they're trying to show where an image came from, edits made to it, its constituent parts, etc. so that you can decide for yourself if you trust the source. It's trying to show you that an image came from the BBC, rather than whether you should trust the BBC.
-
-### Manifest
-
-Content Credentials are contained in what's called the **manifest**. The manifest consists of the claim, claim signature, and assertions.
-
-![Example of a Manifest, with the Claim, Claim Signature, and Assertions inside](../assets/images/digital-provenance/manifest.svg)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: [C2PA](https://c2pa.org/specifications/specifications/2.1/specs/C2PA_Specification.html)</small>
-
-The manifest is created by hardware or software called a "claim generator."
-
-Files can have multiple manifests, and the set of manifests comprise its provenance data.
-
-#### Assertions
-
-An assertion is labelled data such as the type of camera used, actions performed on the image such as color corrections, a thumbnail image, or other types of data.
-
-#### Claim
-
-The claim gathers together all the assertions and then hashes and cryptographically signs them. The claim is the part that backs up the assertions with cryptography; without it, there wouldn't be a way to verify the authenticity of the data.
-
-### Signatures
-
-The foundation is based around cryptographic signatures, similar to how you'd cryptographically sign software or text with a PGP signature.
-
-The parts of a file that are cryptographically verified are called "hard bindings." This allows programs to detect tampering.
-
-#### Certificate Authorities
-
-There are certificate authorities similar to how HTTPS works, which allow only signatures from trusted sources. Non-trusted signatures will give a warning in whatever C2PA-enabled software you're using.
-
-Content Credentials allow for each application to provide its own *trust lists*: lists of certificate authorities trusted by the application.
-
-The C2PA gives a few examples to illustrate. A news organization might rely on a non-profit organization that verifies the authenticity of sources through real-world due diligence. An insurance company might operate its own internal CA to verify only its own employees handled the images.
-
-### Ingredients
-
-However, what's interesting is Content Credentials can cover multiple assets being [combined](https://contentcredentials.org/verify?source=https%3A%2F%2Fcontentcredentials.org%2F_app%2Fimmutable%2Fassets%2Fhome2.91ab8f2d.jpg) and still be able to verify each element of the image. Each element is called an "ingredient." When the ingredients come together, the result is called a "composed asset," with "asset" referring to a digital media file or data stream.
-
-### Chain of Provenance
-
-It also supports a chain of provenance, showing all steps in the life cycle of the file that change its contents such as edits. These are referred to as "actions."
-
-The specification supports a list of pre-defined actions such as edits, changing the color, translating to a different language, etc. It's really quite flexible, but the flexibility of information that can be provided allows for more opportunities for errors and means you need to trust the entity providing the information more.
-
-An issue I noticed is when making edits using software that doesn't support Content Credentials, they will be corrupted and can't be read by verification programs. This poses a problem for the "unbroken chain of provenance" that the standard promises.
-
-These verification programs tend to offer a way to check against a database of images with Content Credentials, so you can find an image with unbroken provenance data. They use "soft bindings" or a type of fingerprinting of the image in order to find similar images in the database.
-
-I think this problem will be less and less of an issue when more software supports the standard. It will need to be so ubiquitous that image viewing programs don't trust images without provenance data, similar to how browsers don't trust websites without HTTPS. But for now with its very limited availability, that's not the case.
-
-### Privacy
-
-Since Content Credentials are all about attaching extra data to images, concerns about privacy are reasonable.
-
-However, it's important to remember that metadata has always existed in relation to digital files. Just like the metadata we've always had, Content Credentials are optional.
-
-Of course, it'll be up to programs we use to mediate what data is included. In order for the system to work as intended, certain things like "this photo was edited in Adobe Photoshop" will need to be automatically applied. Clear lines between personal data such as names, location, etc. need to be kept up to the user to add.
-
-Privacy was one of the stated goals when the C2PA was designing Content Credentials, and I think they've done a good job giving users control over their information.
-
-## Support
-
-There are several online verification tools you can use to try out Content Credentials. [ContentCredentials.org](https://contentcredentials.org) offers a [verification tool](https://contentcredentials.org/verify) that lets you upload a media file and check its Content Credentials. They have some example images on their site you can try, or you can upload images from elsewhere and see where Content Credentials are supported, for example you can upload any image generated in ChatGPT.
-
-Content Credentials also offers an official [command line tool](https://github.com/contentauth/c2pa-rs/releases?q=c2patool), so you can view exactly what data is being stored in the image. They provide some samples as well that you can play around with. To view the content credentials, just run
-
-```sh
-c2patool sample/C.jpg
-```
-
-for any image you want to inspect, replacing sample/C.jpg with a path to your image.
-
-### BBC
-
-The BBC is doing a limited trial run of Content Credentials with [BBC Verify](https://www.bbc.com/news/bbcverify). Not all media in these articles have Content Credentials attached. [This article](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-68462851) has Content Credentials for the video at the bottom. They also ask for feedback, so feel free to provide some. I'd like to see more Content Credentials show up in news reporting, so please add your voice.
-
-### OpenAI
-
-OpenAI has embraced Content Credentials, with images generated using ChatGPT identifying themselves using Content Credentials. Try [generating an image](https://chatgpt.com) and upload it to the verification tool. You should see it identify the origin as OpenAI.
-
-### TikTok
-
-[TikTok](https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/partnering-with-our-industry-to-advance-ai-transparency-and-literacy) became the first video sharing platform to support Content Credentials. For now, it's limited to being able to read Content Credentials from certain AI platforms. They say in the future they'll start labeling all content from TikTok with Content Credentials, but it seems they haven't enabled that yet, as if you download a video from TikTok, the C2PA verify tool will say it doesn't have any Content Credentials.
-
-### Leica
-
-Leica's [M11-P camera](https://leica-camera.com/en-US/photography/cameras/m/m11-p-black) is the first camera in the world to support Content Credentials. That's a huge step toward adoption; camera manufacturers need to support Content Credentials if they're going to be included from the creation of the image.
-
-### Nikon
-
-Nikon is planning to release a firmware update for their [Z6III](https://www.nikon.co.uk/en_GB/learn-and-explore/magazine/gear/nikon-z6iii-firmware-update-to-feature-content-verification) camera that will support Content Credentials.
-
-### Adobe
-
-Much of Adobe's [software](https://helpx.adobe.com/creative-cloud/help/content-credentials.html) supports Content Credentials, including Photoshop, Lightroom, and Adobe Camera Raw as well as Adobe's Firefly AI.
-
-### Qualcomm
-
-With the Snapdragon 8 Gen 3 chipset, Qualcomm is embedding Content Credential capabilities into the Trusted Execution Environment, allowing for Content Credentials to be added right as the photo is produced.
-
-## Limitations
-
-### Lack of Support
-
-Content Credentials will need widespread support at every level, from hardware OEMs to photo editing software vendors and AI generators to sites that host and display images. The rollout of Content Credentials will be slow, although more and more companies are starting to support them.
-
-There are still major players missing support like Apple and Android, which is a big problem considering how many images are taken, edited, and shared on smartphones. Once photos taken from your phone can be imbued with Content Credentials in the default camera app, we'll see much wider adoption I think.
-
-### Easy to Remove
-
-In my testing, any edits from a program that doesn't support Content Credentials will render them unreadable after that point. This problem won't be as bad if and when support for Content Credentials becomes widespread, since you can just decide not to trust images without them, sort of like not trusting a website without HTTPS. Platforms could even display a warning.
-
-But for now, removing Content Credentials won't be noticed.
-
-### Reliant on Certificate Authorities
-
-The system shares a flaw with HTTPS in that you need to rely on trusted Certificate Authorities to verify the validity of the information, except that Content Credentials are trying to verify a lot more information than just who originally made the image.
-
-Since anyone can add their own Content Credentials to an image, a warning is displayed similar to a certificate warning in your browser that the Content Credentials come from an untrusted entity.
-
-### Complexity
-
-One of the issues I ran into while researching was just how complex the standard is, since it needs to cover so many use cases and situations. This is pure speculation, but I can imagine the sheer complexity makes it unattractive for platforms to implement and maintain, which could be contributing to the very slow and partial rollout we're seeing on the platforms of even founding members of the project like the BBC.
-
-I think this will be less of an issue as it rolls out however, as platforms will likely be able to use each other's implementations, or at least reference them when implementing it on their platform.
-
-The standard is still in early stages and there's plenty of room to shape it and improve it in the future, so make your voice heard about how you want to see it implemented. I think with more awareness about Content Credentials, platforms will feel more pressure to support them, so if you want to see this feature on your favorite platform, speak up and gather support.
@@ -1,183 +0,0 @@
---
-date:
-    created: 2025-04-11T16:00:00Z
-categories:
-    - Opinion
-authors:
-    - em
-description: Encryption is not a crime, encryption protects all of us. Encryption, and especially end-to-end encryption, is an essential tool to protect everyone online. Attempts to undermine encryption are an attack to our fundamental right to privacy and an attack to our inherent right to security and safety.
-schema_type: OpinionNewsArticle
-preview:
-  cover: blog/assets/images/encryption-is-not-a-crime/encryption-is-not-a-crime-cover.webp
---
-# Encryption Is Not a Crime
-
-![Photo of a red key on an all black background.](../assets/images/encryption-is-not-a-crime/encryption-is-not-a-crime-cover.webp)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Photo: Matt Artz / Unsplash</small>
-
-Contrary to what some policymakers seem to believe, whether naively or maliciously, encryption is not a crime. Anyone asserting encryption is a tool for crime is either painfully misinformed or is attempting to manipulate legislators to gain oppressive power over the people.<!-- more -->
-
-Encryption is not a crime, encryption is a shield.
-
-Encryption is the digital tool that protects us against all sorts of attacks. It is the lock on your digital door preventing harmful intruders from entering your home. Encryption is also the door itself, protecting your privacy and intimacy from creepy eavesdroppers while you go about your life.
-
-It's not a crime to lock your home's door for protection, **why would it be a crime to lock your digital door?**
-
-[Encryption protects you](privacy-means-safety.md) from cyberattack, identity theft, discrimination, doxxing, stalking, sexual violence, physical harm, and much more.
-
-## Who says encryption is a crime
-
-Anyone who is well-informed will find it hard to believe someone could want to sabotage such fantastic protection.
-
-Yet, [year](https://www.wired.com/1993/02/crypto-rebels/) after [year](https://www.wired.com/story/a-new-era-of-attacks-on-encryption-is-starting-to-heat-up/), oppressive regimes and lazy or greedy [law enforcement](https://www.techradar.com/computing/cyber-security/anonymity-is-not-a-fundamental-right-experts-disagree-with-europol-chiefs-request-for-encryption-back-door) entities around the world have attempted to [undermine encryption](https://www.howtogeek.com/544727/what-is-an-encryption-backdoor/) using the pretext this is needed to "solve crime", despite all the experts *repeatedly* warning on how [unnecessary](https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/08/post-snowden-tech-became-more-secure-but-is-govt-really-at-risk-of-going-dark/) and [dangerous](https://www.globalencryption.org/2020/11/breaking-encryption-myths/) this would be. And this is without accounting for all the countries where encryption is *already* [severely restricted](https://www.gp-digital.org/world-map-of-encryption/), such as Russia, China, India, Iran, Egypt, Cuba, and others.
-
-Whether breaking encryption is brought up naively by misinformed authorities, or as a disguised excuse for mass surveillance is up for debate.
-
-Nevertheless, the result is the same: An attempt to destroy **a tool we all need to stay safe**.
-
-## Encryption is a protective shield
-
-Encryption, moreover end-to-end encryption, is a tool we all use in our digital life to stay safe.
-
-In today's world, the boundary between online and offline life is largely dissolved. Almost everything we do "offline" has a record of it "online". Online life is regular life now. It's not just your browsing history.
-
-Your medical record from a visit at the clinic, your purchase transaction from a trip to the store, your travel photos saved in the cloud, your text conversations with your friends, family, and children, are all likely protected with encryption, perhaps even with *end-to-end* encryption.
-
-Such a large trove of personal data needs to be protected against eavesdropping and malicious attacks for everyone to stay safe.
-
-Encryption offers this protection. End-to-end encryption all the more.
-
-## What is end-to-end encryption, and what is the war against it
-
-End-to-end encryption is a type of encryption where only the intended recipient(s) have the ability to decrypt (read) the encrypted data.
-
-This means that if you send a message through [Signal](https://signal.org/) for example, only the participants to this conversation will be able to read the content of this conversation. Even Signal cannot know what is being discussed on Signal.
-
-This greatly annoys some over-controlling authorities who would like to be granted unlimited power to spy on anyone anytime they wish, for vaguely defined purposes that could change at any moment.
-
-End-to-end encryption can also mean a situation where you are "both ends" of the communication.
-
-For example, when enabling Apple's [Advanced Data Protection for iCloud](https://support.apple.com/en-ca/guide/security/sec973254c5f/web) (ADP), it activates end-to-end encryption protection for almost all of iCloud data, including photos. This means that even Apple could not see your photos, or be forced to share your photos with a governmental entity.
-
-Without ADP, Apple can read or share your photos (or other data) if they are legally compelled to, or if they feel like it. The same is true for Google's services, Microsoft's services, and any other online services that aren't end-to-end encrypted.
-
-This is at the root of the latest attack on encryption:
-
-In February this year, it was reported that [Apple was served with a notice](uk-forced-apple-to-remove-adp.md) from the UK's Home Office to force it to break ADP's end-to-end encryption. In response, Apple removed access to ADP from the UK entirely, making this protection unavailable to UK residents.
-
-Do not mistakenly think this attack is limited to the UK and Apple users, however. If this regulation notice or a similar one gets enforced, it would **impact the whole world.** Other countries would likely soon follow, and other services would likely soon get under attack as well.
-
-Moreover, do not feel unaffected just because you use end-to-end encryption with [Signal](https://www-svt-se.translate.goog/nyheter/inrikes/signal-lamnar-sverige-om-regeringens-forslag-pa-datalagring-klubbas?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en-US&_x_tr_pto=wapp) or [Proton](https://www.techradar.com/vpn/vpn-privacy-security/secure-encryption-and-online-anonymity-are-now-at-risk-in-switzerland-heres-what-you-need-to-know) services instead of Apple, they are both **under attack** as well in this war.
-
-Just in recent years, the war against encryption has affected the [US](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/04/earn-it-bill-back-again-seeking-scan-our-messages-and-photos), the [UK](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cgj54eq4vejo), [Sweden](https://www.globalencryption.org/2025/04/joint-letter-on-swedish-data-storage-and-access-to-electronic-information-legislation/), [France](https://www.laquadrature.net/en/warondrugslaw/), [Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India, Japan](https://www.theverge.com/2020/10/12/21513212/backdoor-encryption-access-us-canada-australia-new-zealand-uk-india-japan), and all the European Union countries with proposals such as [Chat Control](the-future-of-privacy.md/#chat-control-wants-to-break-end-to-end-encryption).
-
-## The arguments given to break encryption make no sense
-
-Authoritarian entities generally use the same populist excuses to justify their senseless demands. "Protecting the children" is always a fashionable disingenuous argument.
-
-Because no one would disagree that protecting the children is important, it is often used as an attempt to deceitfully make an irrefutable argument to justify breaking encryption.
-
-The problem is, **breaking encryption doesn't protect the children**, it [endangers](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/jan/21/end-to-end-encryption-protects-children-says-uk-information-watchdog) them.
-
-When law enforcement officials claim they need to be able to read everyone's messages and see everyone's personal photos to be able to fight child predators, they seem to neglect that:
-
- This means they will expose the children's messages, contact information, locations, and photos in the process, potentially *endangering the children further*.
-
- Exposing everyone's data will make this data much more likely to be found and exploited by criminals, making *everyone* more vulnerable to attacks.
-
- Predators will simply move to underground channels, [unbothered](https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/07/back_doors_wont.html).
-
-They use the same kind of deceptive argument trying to justify weakening the protections we have to supposedly catch "criminals" and "terrorists".
-
-Of course the exact definition of what is a "criminal" or a "terrorist" is always vague and subject to change. In the past, human rights activists and authoritarian regime dissidents have been labeled as such, climate change activists as well, LGBTQ+ people even in some countries. Maybe next year this label will include "DEI advocates", who knows where they draw the line and what can be considered a "criminal" worth spying on.
-
-You *cannot* remove everyone's right to privacy and protection from harm while pretending it is to protect them. No one who is well-informed and well-intended could possibly consider this a smart thing to do.
-
-**An attack on end-to-end encryption isn't an attack on criminals, it's an attack on all of us.**
-
-## Magical backdoor only for "the good guys" is a complete fantasy
-
-Let's say the strategy is akin to creating a MagicalKey that unlocks every door (a magical key because thinking encryption backdoors would only be used by "the good guys" is a great example of [magical thinking](https://www.britannica.com/science/magical-thinking)).
-
-Imagine, for the sake of this exercise, the MagicalLock for this MagicalKey is impossible to pick, and imagine only police officers have MagicalKeys. Let's say one thousand police officers each have a MagicalKey.
-
-They argue they need to be able to unlock anyone's door if they suspect a crime is happening inside. "It's for safety!"
-
-Overtime, let's say only 1% of the police officers accidentally lose their MagicalKey. This kind of things happen. Now 10 MagicalKeys are lost in the wild and could be used by anyone else, for any purposes, including crime.
-
-Then, let's say only 0.1% of police officers get corrupted by a crime gang. That's just one right? This corrupted "good guy" lets the gang create a double of the MagicalKey. Which crime gang wouldn't want a key that can magically open any door? They pay the police officer good money for this. It's an investment.
-
-Now, the gang creates doubles of the MagicalKey they have. They obfuscate its serial number, so it cannot be traced back to them. They use it subtly at first to avoid detection. They make sure they never leave traces behind, so victims have no idea their door got unlocked.
-
-During this time, they steal your data, they sell it, they use it to impersonate you, they use it to harm you and your loved ones.
-
-Then, another criminal figures out on their own how to emulate a MagicalKey without even having access to one. The criminal creates a reproducible mold for this Emulated-MagicalKey and sells it to other criminals on the criminal market. Now, the MagicalKey™️ is available to any criminals looking for it. Restrictions on the backdoor are off. **Your personal data is up for grabs.**
-
-This is what is going to happen if backdoors are implemented in end-to-end encryption. But don't worry they say, "it's only for the good guys!".
-
-At least, the criminals' data will also be up for grabs, right?
-
-Nope! The criminals knew about this, so they just started using different channels that weren't impacted. Criminals will have their privacy intact, they don't care about using illegal tools, but **your legal privacy protections will be gone**.
-
-*Backdoored* end-to-end encryption isn't end-to-end anymore, it's just open-ended encryption. This offers pretty much no protection at all.
-
-## Ignoring experts doesn't make facts disappear
-
-Where is the opposition to this? Where are the experts pushing against this nightmare? Everywhere.
-
-Thankfully, opposition has been strong, despite the relentless ignorance or malevolence from authoritarian authorities repeatedly pushing against encryption.
-
-Many people and groups have been fighting valiantly to defend our collective right to privacy and security. Countless experts have patiently taken the time to explain [again](https://signal.org/blog/uk-online-safety-bill/) and [again](https://www.globalencryption.org/2020/10/cdt-gpd-and-internet-society-reject-time-worn-argument-for-encryption-backdoors/) and [again](https://www.schneier.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/paper-keys-under-doormats-CSAIL.pdf) how an encryption backdoor only for "the good guys" is simply impossible.
-
-Weakening encryption to let "the good guys" enter, lets *anyone* enter, including criminals. There is no way around this.
-
-Seemingly ignoring warnings and advice from the most respected specialists in the field, authoritarian officials continue to push against encryption. So much so that it has become difficult to assume good intent misguided by ignorance at this point.
-
-Unfortunately, ignoring the experts or silencing the debate will not make the facts magically disappear.
-
-In an encouraging development this week, Apple [won a case](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cvgn1lz3v4no) fighting an attempt from the UK Home Office to hide from the public details of their latest attack on encryption.
-
-This battle and all battles to protect our privacy rights, *must* be fought is broad daylight, for all to see and to support.
-
-## Fight for encryption rights everywhere you can
-
-The war against encryption isn't anything new, it has been happening for decades. However, the quantity of data, personal and sensitive data, that is collected, stored, and shared about us is much larger today. It is essential we use the proper tools to secure this information.
-
-This is what have changed, and what is making encryption and end-to-end encryption even more indispensable today.
-
-Mass surveillance will not keep us safe, it will endanger us further and damage our democracies and freedoms in irreparable ways.
-
-We must fight to keep our right to privacy, and use of strong end-to-end encryption to protect ourselves, our friends, our family, and yes also to protect the children.
-
-### How can you support the right to encryption?
-
- [x] Use end-to-end encryption everywhere you can.
-
- [x] Talk about the benefits of end-to-end encryption to everyone around you, especially your loved ones less knowledgeable about technology. Talk about how it is essential to protect everyone's data, including the children's.
-
- [x] Use social media to promote the benefits of end-to-end encryption and post about how it protects us all.
-
- [x] Write or call your government representatives to let them know you care about end-to-end encryption and are worried about dangerous backdoors or chat control proposals.
-
- [x] Support organizations fighting for encryption, such as:
-
-    - [Global Encryption Coalition](https://www.globalencryption.org/)
-
-    - [Open Rights Group](https://www.openrightsgroup.org/campaign/save-encryption/)
-
-    - [Fight For The Future](https://www.makedmssafe.com/)
-
-    - [Signal app](https://signal.org/donate/)
-
-    - [Internet Society](https://www.internetsociety.org/open-letters/fix-the-take-it-down-act-to-protect-encryption/)
-
-    - [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.eff.org/issues/end-end-encryption)
-
-    - [Privacy Guides](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/about/donate/) 💛
-
-Finally, have a look at our [recommendations](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tools/) if you want to start using more tools protecting your privacy using end-to-end encryption.
-
-This is a long war, but the importance of it doesn't allow us to give up.
-
-We must continue fighting for the right to protect our data with end-to-end encryption, **we owe it to ourselves, our loved ones, and the future generations.**
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ On the surface, this seems true to many people – but the reality is very diffe

 In the end it only convicted one person.

-Now, many have argued that stopping one terrorist might be worth giving up some security for, but [according](https://web.archive.org/web/20230318132243/https://www.aclu.org/issues/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/surveillance-under-patriot-act) to the ACLU, the conviction would have occurred without the Patriot Act.
+Now, many have argued that stopping one terrorist might be worth giving up some security for, but [according](https://www.aclu.org/issues/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/surveillance-under-patriot-act) to the ACLU, the conviction would have occurred without the Patriot Act.

 Many legal actions you take today could be deemed illegal by future laws or future government. In the US today there is discussion around the possibility of Roe v. Wade being overturned, allowing states to outlaw abortions. You may not currently feel the need to hide internet searches, menstrual cycle apps, or donations to women's health clinics today because it's not illegal, but tomorrow that information could be used against you.

@@ -1,353 +0,0 @@
---
-date:
-    created: 2025-06-03T17:00:00Z
-categories:
-    - News
-tags:
-    - Pride Month
-authors:
-    - em
-description: Data privacy is important for everyone. But for some marginalized populations, data privacy is indispensable for social connection, access to information, and physical safety. For Pride month this year, we will discuss topics at the intersection of data privacy and experiences specific to the LGBTQ+ community.
-schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle
-preview:
-  cover: blog/assets/images/importance-of-privacy-for-the-queer-community/pride-cover.webp
---
-# The Importance of Data Privacy For The Queer Community
-
-![Photo of a Progress Pride Flag with a semi-transparent padlock icon over it.](../assets/images/importance-of-privacy-for-the-queer-community/pride-cover.webp)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Em / Privacy Guides | Photo: Chris Robert / Unsplash</small>
-
-Data privacy is important for everyone. But for some marginalized populations, data privacy is indispensable for social connection, access to information, and physical safety. For [Pride month](../tags.md#tag:pride-month) this year, we will discuss topics at the intersection of data privacy and experiences specific to the LGBTQ+ community.<!-- more -->
-
-While it's difficult to get a complete estimate on this, due to fear of discrimination and other factors, a 2021 [survey](https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2021-06/LGBT%20Pride%202021%20Global%20Survey%20Report_3.pdf) conducted by Ipsos in 27 countries revealed that only 80% of the population surveyed identified as heterosexual. Additionally, about 1% of adults identified as a gender different from the one they were assigned at birth. This percentage is even higher for Gen Z and Millennials.
-
-In the United States alone, it's [estimated](https://www.lgbttech.org/_files/ugd/d77b01_0e1e02c938e94ae3aad4ce21312bdde4.pdf) there are 20 million adults who are part of the LGBTQ+ community. That's a lot of people!
-
-Despite the progress of the past decades, the queer population still faces many challenges to being free and safe from discrimination.
-
-Discrimination online, at work, at school, at the national or even the familial level, can put LGBTQ+ individuals in dangerous situations, where data privacy may be the only shield available for protection.
-
-In this context, it's essential for the queer community to be well-informed on the tools and practices that can help mitigate the risks, so that information, services, and support can still be accessed safely.
-
-## Higher risk when data gets exposed
-
-Unfortunately, LGBTQ+ people are still at a higher risk when their personal data gets exposed.
-
-First, for people living in environments hostile to their sexual orientation or gender identity, keeping personal information private can literally mean life or death. Tragically, even today many countries still criminalize homosexuality and gender identities different from cisgender. When this personal information gets exposed, people might lose support from their family, lose their job, get arrested, or even be [executed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capital_punishment_for_homosexuality) in some countries.
-
-People in these very vulnerable situations have to be *extremely* careful about protecting their data in order to stay safe, online and offline.
-
-Moreover, organizations collecting data that could put anyone at risk of getting accidentally or maliciously outed should feel a *strong responsibility* to protect this data fiercely, and be held legally accountable when they fail.
-
-### Being outed against one's will
-
-For a queer person, deciding when, how, and to whom to reveal their sexuality or gender identity is a very important and intimate moment. It *must* be a personal choice, and only on the person's own terms.
-
-Even in countries where queer identities and sexualities are legal and accepted, [being outed against one's will can have devastating consequences](https://www.pridecorner.org/post/how-to-support-someone-who-has-been-outed-against-their-will).
-
-If someone lives with family members who do not accept who they are, getting outed against their will could mean losing their home and familial support. In other situations, perhaps their family is supportive, but their employer isn't, or maybe some of their friends or co-workers are hostile. They might want to keep this information from them in order to avoid conflicts at work, or avoid losing friendships. Further, there is of course the risk for discrimination, online harassment, and worse.
-
-No matter the situation, coming out as queer should always be an individual and intentional choice.
-
-It is an act of violence to out someone against their consent, even when performed by the intermediary of an algorithm or a neglectful data leak.
-
-Each time there is a data breach that includes information about gender identity, sexuality, browsing history, location history, installed applications, or legal names, this data leak risks outing people against their will.
-
-For all these reasons, it is vital that information be safeguarded so that a queer person is empowered to choose when, how, and to whom to come out on their own terms.
-
-In today's political climate, this is unfortunately even truer for trans people, who are at a greater risk of getting outed against their will when data about their gender, sex, or legal name leaks. Sadly, there are still too many online forms and software that needlessly collect gender data when it's completely unnecessary. Similarly, requiring full *legal* name is completely irrelevant in many situations where it is currently asked.
-
-Developers must take responsibility and design software and forms considering these risks. As data scientist and civic technologist Soren Spicknall explains brilliantly, gender data [should never be collected](https://medium.com/@SorenSpicknall/protecting-queer-communities-through-data-4707ae0cb562) unless *absolutely* necessary and *absolutely* protected, which in most instances it really isn't:
-
-> "Is the danger to your LGBT+ users worth the ability to roughly guess whether somebody is buying a purse for themselves or as a gift, or to assume you know what kind of movie they want to watch?"
-
-Algorithms shouldn't be able to target sexuality and gender identity as markers for advertising purposes. Unfortunately, there have already been reported incidents where [people were outed against their will by Facebook](https://www.dailydot.com/irl/facebook-ads-lgbtq/) spitting around rainbow ads everywhere, because of Facebook secretly tying someone's browsing activity back to their profile.
-
-Facebook (and most other commercial platforms) uses cookies and other tracking technologies to follow users online and [build an advertising profile](https://www.makeuseof.com/tag/facebook-tracking-stop/) based on their online activity, even outside of Facebook. Then, it shows ads on Facebook related to that activity, no matter if this information was shared or not on the platform.
-
-This kind of non-consensual outing can have devastating consequences, and should be forbidden by law. Everyone should be able to come out when and how they see fit, and not be aggressively outed by some Facebook or Google ad algorithm, or by some negligent data leak.
-
-### Online harassment and extortion
-
-The risk of having data about one's sexuality or gender identity revealed against one's will can be very dangerous for some people.
-
-With online harassment on the rise, this intimate information can be weaponized by bigots and extortionists to cause severe harm. Unfortunately, this isn't a rare occurrence, even in countries where the LGBTQ+ community is well accepted. Regrettably, some platforms have even started to [roll back previous protections against hate speech](https://apnews.com/article/social-media-lgbtq-tiktok-x-facebook-instagram-glaad-f790bda1bc3f169ef28ca3f441ea8447) and harassment. This will have a severely detrimental impact on the safety of the queer community online.
-
-This year, the LGBTQ advocacy organization GLAAD produced a [Social Media Safety Index](https://glaad.org/smsi/2025/platform-scorecard/) rating six major platforms: TikTok, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, Threads, and X. X (formerly Twitter) received the worst safety score of them all.
-
-### Seeking health information
-
-People questioning their gender identity or sexuality might seek information online about the health procedures or treatments they need.
-
-This sensitive search history can reveal a lot of personal details that should never be exposed against one's will. Sadly, browsing the internet without any tracking is a task that becomes harder every year, and many people aren't aware of the protections they can use against this tracking.
-
-People can suffer from severe harm when sensitive data related to their gender-affirming care or sexual health is exposed, ranging from non-consensual outing to imprisonment. Discrimination related to this type of health information is still rampant in every country in the world.
-
-### Seeking community online
-
-Seeking the support of online communities is common for queer people who can more easily feel isolated. This is especially true for youth living in hostile or rural environments, where smaller population density often means less supportive local resources and venues.
-
-For people in these situations, finding community online can be essential to survival.
-
-Despite all its flaws, the internet still offers a wonderful way to connect with others regardless of physical distances, and this is doubly true for the queer community.
-
-The need for social connection and support from peers is a fundamental human need. No matter how dangerous this can be, not sharing information online is simply not a viable option for many queer people.
-
-## Privacy-invasive practices that are exponentially worse for queer people
-
-### Real-name policies
-
-Many privacy-invasive practices and policies are significantly more dangerous for LGBTQ+ people. For example, [the "real-name" policies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Real-name_system) on Facebook and other platforms are absolutely horrendous for transgender people.
-
-If a trans person uses an older account, or has not changed their name on official documentation, a real-name policy could either out them against their will, force them to keep their [deadname](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deadnaming) online, or even lock them out of their account if official ID is requested for account recovery and doesn't match the name they used for the account.
-
-For many people around the world, the use of pseudonyms or chosen names online means safety, and this is even truer for trans people and other queer people.
-
-### Single-account policies
-
-Thankfully, most platforms aren't using such policies yet. But unfortunately, it does seem there could be a push to implement single-account policies in the near future.
-
-With the multiplication of age verification laws and the proliferation of unregulated AI systems, there has been some talk of using unique identifiers to prevent the creation of multiple accounts. This is **a horrible idea for everyone**, and should never be allowed, but it's even worse for LGBTQ+ people.
-
-Creating multiple accounts for different purposes, for example to separate work life from personal life, is a great privacy practice for anyone.
-
-Multiple accounts on a same platform, or "alt accounts", are regularly used by queer people in order to be their full selves online, when they aren't fully out in their public or personal life, or just because they prefer to keep their queer identity and activities separated.
-
-Sadly, if single-account policies begin to be implemented on platforms, this great privacy protection could soon disappear.
-
-### Facial recognition
-
-Facial recognition is an especially problematic technology for transgender people. Many times, these algorithms will not only create a faceprint from the data, but will also try to infer gender from it.
-
-These systems are deeply flawed and have discrimination biases built-in. They can't even reliably identify the correct gender of cisgender people. Because of the way these algorithms were developed, the use of this technology is [worse for transgender people](https://www.theswaddle.com/how-facial-recognition-ai-reinforces-discrimination-against-trans-people), and [exponentially worse](https://sciencepolicy.hsites.harvard.edu/blog/racial-discrimination-face-recognition-technology) for transgender people of color.
-
-Tragically, privacy legislation is lagging behind at protecting us by regulating this biased, invasive, and inaccurate technology that is spreading faster and further every year.
-
-### Public photos during events
-
-These days, it's pretty much impossible to attend many events without having our photo intrusively taken by a stranger and posted on Instagram without our consent.
-
-This is a generally bad behavior that we should all work on improving culturally. Posting photos of strangers online without their consent can be much more harmful for queer people.
-
-For example, taking photos at a Pride event and posting it online can out people against their will. While it's perhaps fair to assume most people *performing* in a Pride parade or on a stage might implicitly be comfortable with it, this isn't necessarily the case for people in the *audience*.
-
-This non-consensual practice, coupled with the corporate social media tendency to use facial recognition to tag everyone's faces, can cause harm in all sorts of ways.
-
-We should all [develop more respectful practices](the-privacy-of-others.md) when taking photos at events, and be mindful not to post anything online which could identify anyone in the audience who did not give their explicit consent.
-
-### Background checks and algorithmic biases
-
-Even for people who are publicly out and live in regions that are supportive, discrimination and biases are still there. Despite new legislations and a more progressive culture, data remnants of previous oppressive times can still have a severe negative impact on someone's life. Too few efforts are made by institutions to correct records properly after legislation has passed.
-
-This is especially problematic with opaque systems where embedded discrimination might not be obvious. Algorithmic decision-making is a growing danger for this, considering there is often no way to trace back the reasons a decision was made, and no accountability for whomever fed biased data to the black-box algorithm, whether negligently or maliciously.
-
-There are also older systems of decision-making, such as background checks. Last year, a 78-year-old woman from West Sussex [learned](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c3v5pwnpnvko) that she had a criminal record for 56 years for being a lesbian in the military (at a time when it was illegal). Completely unaware of this outdated data trail, this woman spent her whole life with this discriminatory tag attached to her records. This likely cost her countless opportunities throughout the decades, without her ever knowing the cause.
-
-Unfortunately, this kind of incident is likely to multiply by millions with the increased use of algorithmic decision-making using closed systems, often impossible to audit.
-
-### Dating apps data
-
-Last but not least, data collected by dating apps is an especially sensitive issue for the queer population.
-
-Regrettably, there have already been numerous data breaches showing this risk is very real. Intimate photos have been leaked, location data has been leaked, health data has been leaked, and even private messages have been [leaked](https://www.pride.com/think-your-privacy-is-safe-on-the-gay-dating-apps-this-data-leak-could-change-your-mind).
-
-The harm caused by these leaks and breaches have consequences ranging from accidental outing, to loss of employment, extortion by criminals, imprisonment, and even *death*.
-
-In countries where homosexuality is criminalized, cruel state authorities and homophobic bigots are [weaponizing dating apps to entrap](https://www.article19.org/resources/apps-traps-dating-apps-must-protect-communities-middle-east-north-africa/) LGBTQ+ people to attack or arrest them. Weighing the need for support, love, and affection, with the very real risk of physical aggression is a dreadful challenge many queer people face.
-
-## Things to keep in mind to stay safe
-
-Despite the increased risks the queer community is exposed to, staying offline and disconnected from the world isn't a viable option.
-
-Indeed, disconnection and isolation can be a *worse* risk for many LGBTQ+ people, especially younger people. Tragically, queer youth are more than four times as likely to attempt suicide. Disconnecting from the internet communities that accept them isn't an option, and would pose dangers of its own.
-
-Thankfully, there are many tools and practices that can be adopted to improve privacy online, and reduce the risk of sensitive data getting exposed. Here are a few ideas that might help yourself or your loved ones to stay safer online:
-
-### Using better social media
-
-Social media usage leaves *a lot* of digital footprints online, and some platforms are worse than others for this. Staying mindful about which platform to choose, and how to use it, can greatly improve one's experience and security.
-
-Favoring alternative social media platforms that do not have a commercial incentive to monetize data can really help.
-
-For example, platforms that are developed and managed by a community of volunteers, rather than a for-profit corporation, tend to keep their users' benefits and safety in mind much more.
-
-If you are ready to make a change, [Mastodon](https://joinmastodon.org/) is a non-profit platform that [we recommend](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/social-networks/#mastodon).
-
-Mastodon is a social media platform that somewhat resembles Twitter prior to its rebranding. It is composed of multiple servers you can choose from, which makes it easier to move your account if you aren't satisfied with the moderation on one particular server.
-
-To get started, you can choose the server administrated by the team who develops the Mastodon software ([mastodon.social](https://mastodon.social/about)), or you can choose a smaller server run by volunteers (you can also self-host, but that's a longer story).
-
-Don't let this choice intimidate you too much though, these servers connect with each other, and you can always move later on. Just pick one you like. Some servers will have a focus on a region, a topic, a hobby, and there are even servers focused on LGBTQ+ communities, such as [tech.lgbt](https://tech.lgbt/about), [lgbtqia.space](https://lgbtqia.space/about), and [more](https://joinmastodon.org/servers).
-
-All the servers listed on the Mastodon website have [committed](https://joinmastodon.org/covenant) to hold active moderation against racism, sexism, homophobia, and transphobia.
-
-Additionally, Mastodon connects with other social media platforms that are also part of the larger [Fediverse](https://fediverse.info/) network.
-
-If you prefer something similar to Instagram, you can replace it with [Pixelfed](https://pixelfed.org/). For something similar to Facebook, look for [Friendica](https://friendi.ca/). For something more like TikTok, try [Loops](https://loops.video/). For a replacement to YouTube, check videos on [PeerTube](https://joinpeertube.org/), and [more](https://fediverse.info/explore/projects)!
-
-These alternative platforms often benefit from stronger moderation and better respect for their users' data. Because they aren't for-profit corporations, they have no interest in collecting your data, tracking you, or imposing invasive "real-name" policies. Additionally, they run **no ads**!
-
-#### Secure any social media you use
-
-No matter what social media platform(s) you choose to use, the first step should always be to make sure you go through all the settings to secure your account ([enable multifactor authentication](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/multi-factor-authentication/)!), and adjust the available privacy options to your needs and preferences (consider [locking](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/social-networks/#public-profile) your account if you wish to restrict visibility to your followers).
-
-This is true for Mastodon as well, but you should make adjusting all the privacy and security options an *absolute priority* for *any* corporate social media, especially [if you stay on Facebook](https://www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/how-to-opt-out-of-targeted-ads-on-facebook/).
-
-Additionally, keep in mind that many platforms, including X, Facebook, and Reddit, will now use all your posted content to train their AI systems, making this information and embedded biases likely impossible to delete in the future.
-
-Developing an awareness of what data is shared, who can access it, how it is secured, and how it is used is very important for staying safe online.
-
-### Securing data when communicating
-
-Outside of social media platforms, many tools are available to help you secure your intimate and private communications.
-
-While chatting on dating apps may be the first step to meeting new people, moving early to end-to-end encrypted channels is likely a good idea for data security and privacy.
-
-That being said, also take into account that because your communications there will be fully end-to-end encrypted (only visible by its intended sender and recipient), there will be no moderation with it. Make sure you trust a person enough before moving the discussion to an end-to-end encrypted, more personal channel.
-
-#### Instant messaging communication
-
-[Signal](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/#signal) is a wonderful end-to-end encrypted and free-to-use instant messaging app. Signal will collect your phone number to create the account, but nothing else.
-
-When using Signal, you should [enable the username feature](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/6712070553754-Phone-Number-Privacy-and-Usernames). That way, you can (and should) share your *username* only, instead of sharing your phone number to connect with others.
-
-Additionally, you should [enable the disappearing messages](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360007320771-Set-and-manage-disappearing-messages) feature from Signal, to help clean up the data you no longer need as time goes, and reduce the risk of leaks.
-
-<div class="admonition danger" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Only send sensitive information to people you genuinely trust!</p>
-
-Keep in mind that even when using end-to-end encrypted apps and a disappearing message features, this will not prevent a malicious person from downloading this data on their device or taking a screenshot of it.
-
-Be especially careful when sending very sensitive information, such as intimate photos for example. No matter how secure the application is, you should only send sensitive information and pictures to people you know and sincerely trust.
-
-</div>
-
-#### Email communication
-
-For email communication, migrating to an end-to-end encrypted alternative can make a big difference for your privacy.
-
-For example, services like Gmail (Google) and Hotmail (Microsoft) could access the content of all your communications, and often use this information in various ways to build advertising profiles. Because email content isn't end-to-end encrypted, this data could get requested by authorities as well, and handed to them in plain text (unencrypted).
-
-For secure and more private end-to-end encrypted email services, we recommend [Proton Mail](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/email/#proton-mail) or [Tuta](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/email/#tuta). These services will not make you anonymous when you email someone (email address, IP address, and subject line, could still identify you), but the content of your communication will be encrypted end-to-end (if used with a compatible service), and only visible to its intended recipient(s).
-
-<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Encrypted email service limitations</p>
-
-Stay aware that if you email someone who is not using the same end-to-end encrypted email service as you, and you aren't using any additional measures to encrypt the message, this email will likely be accessible to the service you sent it to.
-
-For example, if you send an email from a Proton Mail address, to someone using a Gmail address, without asking the recipient to use your encryption key or use any additional services, then the email you sent will be stored on Google's servers, and could get accessed by Google.
-
-If you send a Proton Mail email to another Proton Mail user, the *content* of the message will be fully end-to-end encrypted and Proton could not access it.
-
-The same is true for any other email providers. Make sure to verify compatibility fully before sending any sensitive information that way.
-
-</div>
-
-### Securing data when traveling
-
-When traveling, keep in mind that different countries or regions might have different laws related to LGBTQ+ people.
-
-Your marriage might not be recognized in the location you are visiting. Your new legal name might also not get the same recognition, sadly. The first step to take when planning a trip should always be to gather information on the legal and cultural differences between your own region and the one you are visiting.
-
-If you are visiting a country hostile to your sexuality or gender identity, make sure to take the proper precautions to secure your data *before* you cross the border.
-
-This could mean leaving your phone at home and only bringing a burner phone with you. It could also mean bringing additional (or different) types of official ID that are less likely to get you in trouble, and more likely to get accepted by the authorities of your visiting country.
-
-Be extremely careful when connecting to Wi-Fi services from a foreign country. If you were to connect to a service or website that is illegal there, and could accidentally out yourself as queer, you could get in trouble with few recourses. Using a [trustworthy VPN](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/) can help mitigate some of this risk.
-
-### Securing data when protesting
-
-For this month of Pride, you might feel the need to join a protest more than a parade.
-
-If you decide to join the action, make sure to secure your data properly to stay safe. Prepare your devices adequately to be ready and resist surveillance targeted at protesters. Consult our [Protesters' Guide to Smartphone Security](activists-guide-securing-your-smartphone.md), and make sure you understand well the level of risk of this particular protest. **Different protests in different regions require different levels of data protection.**
-
-If you are organizing actions, try to stay away from corporate platforms who will willingly and quickly share your data with authorities (even private messages). If you must use corporate platforms, then make sure to limit the personal data you share there, and ensure attendees have alternative ways to contact you that do not require them to create an account, to register, or to use their legal name.
-
-Having an independent website, or using a Fediverse-connected platform that will be accessible to everyone even without an account, are better ways to organize.
-
-For example, if you create a Mastodon account for your organization, people will not need to create a Mastodon account to read your posts and event announcements. All your posts will be accessible just like any independent website would be (if you leave your posts' visibility public).
-
-Setting up an end-to-end encrypted email address and using an [alias email address](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/email-aliasing/) are also good ways to stay accessible without requiring attendees to use a Facebook account.
-
-Additionally, there are federated platforms, such as [Mobilizon](https://mobilizon.org/), that can be a great non-commercial way to organize in a safer and more accessible space.
-
-Data shared on federated platforms isn't necessarily end-to-end encrypted, and could also get shared with authorities if requested. But by using non-commercial platforms, this data will not be compiled and attached to an account the same way this would happen on a for-profit corporate platform such as Facebook. Using alternative not-for-profit platforms isn't perfect nor anonymous, but it's still a great improvement from the corporate default.
-
-### Protections for extreme situations
-
-Finally, if you are living in an extreme situation where being yourself is dangerous to your physical safety, caution must be a priority.
-
-There isn't a single solution that can protect all your data at once, and anyone telling you there is one is lying to sell you something. Remain skeptical of such claims.
-
-However, there are a *multitude* of practices and tools that can help *reduce* your data trails, and improve your privacy greatly. The tools and practices you need to adopt will depend on the [threat model](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/threat-modeling/) specific to your situation.
-
-Take the time to evaluate well which data could put you in danger, and focus on protecting this first.
-
-If you are in a situation where someone hostile to you has access to your device, for example because you are living with an unsupportive family and need to browse the internet on a family device, Tails may be a tool that can help you. If you can use this computer unobserved, by [using the live system Tails](installing-and-using-tails.md) installed on a USB stick, you can keep your browsing activity hidden from this device. Your Internet Service Provider (ISP) could still know you have been visiting a special network, however. Make sure to read our tutorial thoroughly if you decide to use Tails.
-
-If the information stored on your computer isn't a risk to you, but visiting LGBTQ+ websites from your country could be dangerous, perhaps [using Tor](in-praise-of-tor.md) with a Bridge or through a [trustworthy VPN](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/) could be another solution to allow you to access this information in a safer way.
-
-It's impossible to cover every specific situation, but know that there are [many solutions](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tools/) to reduce the risks greatly, and improve data protection to allow you to **stay connected, stay yourself, and stay safe** 💛
-
-<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Caution: This isn't an exhaustive list!</p>
-
-This is only a short introduction to some practices and tools that *can* improve your privacy online. Not one solution will be enough to be anonymous online.
-
-It's important to stay aware of what data will still be shared and which will be better protected, but nothing will make you 100% anonymous.
-
-For more information on how to improve further your data protection online, you can consult our various guides. If you are just starting in your privacy-improving journey, be patient. Adopt one small improvement at the time, then add another one. Each additional step you take will slowly but surely reduce your data trails, and improve your privacy overtime.
-
-</div>
-
-## Improving data privacy is vital for everyone, but critical for the queer community
-
-Every situation is different and requires different protections. While data privacy is important for everyone, it's also essential to acknowledge that marginalized populations are often at a heightened risk when their data gets exposed.
-
-Protection *cannot* be only an individual responsibility. **Protecting vulnerable and marginalized populations is a societal responsibility that concerns everyone.**
-
-We *all* have a **duty of care** to protect the data of others. Whether it's from the photos we take at public events, or the discussions we have about others on Facebook or X-Twitter's direct messages, *everyone* must improve their practices on this.
-
-Moreover, anyone in a position to improve how data is collected from users *must* be held accountable, and must feel morally liable on the decisions taken that could endanger anyone, but especially marginalized groups like the queer community.
-
-In an ideal world, laws and cultures would protect everyone and particularly the most vulnerable *by default*.
-
-But until we get there, we have to empowered ourselves to bring change and stop predatory data collection, prevent negligent data security, and educate everyone on the tools we can use to help ourselves and the most vulnerable to stay safe.
-
-## Additional resources
-
-### Helplines
-
- [Mindline Trans+ (UK)](https://www.mindinsomerset.org.uk/our-services/adult-one-to-one-support/mindline-trans/): A confidential emotional, mental health support helpline for people who identify as Trans, Agender, Gender Fluid or Non-Binary.
-
- [Trans Lifeline Hotline (US and Canada)](https://translifeline.org/hotline/): Trans peer support over the phone.
-
- [Suicide & Crisis Helpline (US and Canada)](https://988lifeline.org/): General support 24/7 phone number 988.
-
- [Suicide & Crisis Helpline (International)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_suicide_crisis_lines): List of suicide crisis lines around the world.
-
-### Supportive organizations
-
- [Egale (Canada, International)](https://egale.ca/asylum/): Resources for LGBTQ+ asylum and immigration requests from outside and inside Canada.
-
- [SOS Homophobie (France)](https://www.sos-homophobie.org/international-content): Non-profit, volunteer-run organization committed to combatting hate-motivated violence and discrimination against LGBTI people.
-
- [The Trevor Project (US)](https://www.thetrevorproject.org/): Suicide prevention and crisis intervention non-profit organization for LGBTQ+ young people.
-
- [Trans Rescue (International)](https://transrescue.org/): Organization assisting trans and queer individuals in relocating from dangerous areas to safer places.
-
- [Twenty10 (Australia)](https://twenty10.org.au/): Sydney-based organization providing a broad range of free support programs to the LGBTIQA+ community.
-
-### International advocacy
-
- [Amnesty International](https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/discrimination/lgbti-rights/): Human rights organization running campaigns to protect and uphold the rights of LGBTI people globally.
-
- [Human Rights Watch](https://www.hrw.org/topic/lgbt-rights): Human rights non-profit who documents and exposes abuses based on sexual orientation and gender identity worldwide, and advocate for better protective laws and policies.
-
-<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Stay aware of your data trail</p>
-
-If the traces of this article in your browsing history could put you at risk, visit [our guide](clearing-browsing-data.md) to properly delete this data from your device.
-
-</div>
@@ -1,420 +0,0 @@
---
-date:
-    created: 2025-04-30T20:30:00Z
-    updated: 2025-05-06T18:00:00Z
-categories:
-    - Explainers
-tags:
-    - Tor
-authors:
-    - em
-description: You might have heard of Tor in the news a few times, yet never dared to try it yourself. Despite being around for decades, Tor is still a tool too few people know about. Today, Tor is easy to use for anyone. It not only helps journalists and activists, but anybody who seeks greater privacy online or access to information regardless of location. But what is Tor exactly? How can Tor help you? And why is it such an important tool?
-schema_type: OpinionNewsArticle
-preview:
-  cover: blog/assets/images/in-praise-of-tor/tor-cover.webp
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-
-# In Praise of Tor: Why You Should Support and Use Tor
-
-![The Tor Project logo over a series of Tor icons on a purple background.](../assets/images/in-praise-of-tor/tor-cover.webp)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Em / Privacy Guides | Logo and icons: The Tor Project</small>
-
-You might have heard of Tor in the news a few times, yet never dared to try it yourself. Despite being around for decades, Tor is still a tool too few people know about.
-
-Today, Tor is easy to use for anyone. It helps not only journalists and activists, but anybody who seeks greater privacy online or access to information regardless of location. But what is Tor exactly? How can Tor help you? And why is it such an important tool?<!-- more -->
-
-## :simple-torbrowser: What is Tor
-
-Tor is an overlay network that was specifically designed to protect the privacy of its users. The Tor Network uses multiple layers of encryption and relays in order to protect a person's location and other potential identifiers, such as an IP address.
-
-Its name comes from the acronym for **The Onion Router**, a [routing system](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing) using multiple layers that can get peeled off at each step, like an onion 🧅
-
-This special network can be easily accessed by anyone, for free, through the Tor Browser. The Tor Browser is as easy to use as any other browser you are familiar with already.
-
-Both the tools for the Tor Network and the Tor Browser are maintained by a nonprofit organization called the Tor Project.
-
-### The Tor Network
-
-The [Tor Network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tor_(network)) was deployed in 2002, although its core principle was developed in the mid 1990s. It was first created at the United States Naval Research Laboratory in order to protect intelligence communication online.
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-In 2004, the laboratory released the project's code under a free and open source license, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) began funding its development. A few years later, the onion routing project officially became the Tor Project.
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-Today, Tor is one of the [largest](https://metrics.torproject.org/) anonymity networks, with thousands of relays and millions of users worldwide.
-
-#### How does it work
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-The Tor Network is run by a community of volunteers who operate the relays required for the network to function.
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-Each time someone uses the Tor Network, the communication passes through at least 3 relays: A Guard Relay, a Middle Relay, and an Exit Relay. Each relay has a different function to protect the communication.
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-**The Guard Relay** knows where the communication is from (IP address), but doesn't know where it's going (which website is visited, for example). This relay only knows that you want to access the Tor Network. Its task is to send your encrypted communication to a Middle Relay, but it cannot read it.
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-**The Middle Relay** doesn't really know anything. It doesn't know who you are nor where you are going. It only knows a Guard Relay wants to send encrypted data to an Exit Relay. The Middle Relay transfers this communication from one relay to another, and it cannot read it either.
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-**The Exit Relay** has no idea who you are. It only knows someone, somewhere, wants to access this website (or other content). The Exit Relay will get the information from the website, then send it back to the Middle Relay, so that you can receive it from the Guard Relay. If you only visit pages using HTTPS, the Exit Relay can know someone is visiting this website, but cannot know what they are doing on it. Visiting *non-onion* websites using HTTPS instead of just HTTP is **[very important](https://support.torproject.org/https/https-1/)** for security and privacy.
-
-<div class="admonition info" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Onion service websites</p>
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-Onion service websites are special websites that can only be accessed using the Tor Network.
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-They are easy to recognize because they use the .onion domain at the end, and are often composed of a long string of seemingly random characters. Onion websites offer protections equivalent to HTTPS.
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-You can see this represented by the [onion padlock icon](https://support.torproject.org/onionservices/onionservices-5/) in the Tor Browser.
-
-</div>
-
-#### How Tor works using a letter and envelopes analogy
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-Tor works a bit as if you put a letter (request) into an envelope with someone's address. Then, you put this envelope in another envelope addressed to someone else, with instructions. Finally, you put this second envelope in yet another one.
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-Each envelope protects the content of the other, and can only be opened one at the time by each recipient. In this analogy, each recipient (relay) has a key that can only open the envelope addressed to them, and not the others.
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-![Graphic representation of a Tor Circuit composed of a Guard Relay, a Middle Relay, and an Exit Relay using a letter and envelopes analogy.](../assets/images/in-praise-of-tor/tor-diagram.webp)
-<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Em / Privacy Guides</small>
-
-#### What is a Tor Circuit
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-The network of randomly selected relays to complete a request on the Tor Network is called a Tor Circuit. This circuit changes each time a new connection is established.
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-From the Tor Browser, you can see each relay that was selected for a circuit, and even change it manually. To generate a new circuit, click on the "Tor Circuit" button on the upper-left of the browser, then on "New Tor circuit for this site" at the bottom.
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-![Screenshot from the Tor Browser showing a popup window from the Tor Circuit button.](../assets/images/in-praise-of-tor/tor-torcircuit.webp)
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-### The Tor Browser
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-The [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/download/) was created in 2008 to facilitate access to the Tor Network. It is a modified version of Mozilla's Firefox browser, and can be installed on Linux, macOS, Windows, and Android systems.
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-The Tor Browser start configuration is private by default. No additional extensions are required to make it more secure or more private. Actually, it's even discouraged to install any additional extensions, as this would weaken its [fingerprinting resistance](https://blog.torproject.org/browser-fingerprinting-introduction-and-challenges-ahead/).
-
-<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Highest security settings</p>
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-Even if the Tor Browser is configured to be private by default, if you are in an especially sensitive situation, for example if you are using Tor as a whistleblower or a dissident activist, you might want to adjust the Tor Browser security level to "Safest".
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-For this, click on the shield icon on the upper-right, then on the "Settings" button in blue, and select "Safest" instead of the default "Standard".
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-**Important:** Each time you change the security level, you **must** make sure to restart the browser to ensure all changes have taken effect. Otherwise, [some changes](tor-security-slider-flaw.md) might not have been applied yet.
-
-</div>
-
-![Screenshot from the Tor Browser showing a warning from the SecureDrop website to adjust Tor security level to Safest.](../assets/images/in-praise-of-tor/tor-safestsetting.webp)
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-The default search engine is the privacy-focused [DuckDuckGo](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/search-engines/#duckduckgo). You will not even find Google in the options for the default search engine. More browsers should follow this good practice.
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-The first page opening with the Tor Browser will give the option to Connect to Tor. From there, you can click on "Connect" to start browsing through Tor, or on "Configure Connection" if you need additional settings. For example, if you need to set up a [Bridge](https://bridges.torproject.org/) because Tor is blocked from your country.
-
-<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Only connect to Tor if it is safe for you</p>
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-Be careful when using Tor from a country where Tor might be blocked or perceived as suspicious. Similarly, be careful if you connect from a location where revealing you have been using Tor [could](#depending-on-where-you-are-using-tor-is-likely-safe) be dangerous to you.
-
-</div>
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-![Screenshot from the Tor Browser showing the "Connect to Tor" welcome page.](../assets/images/in-praise-of-tor/tor-torbrowser.webp)
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-Once connected to the Tor Network, you will be directed to the DuckDuckGo welcome page, and you can search or type any URLs in the address bar, like you would with any other browser.
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-If you know an organization has an onion site (a website that is only accessible through Tor), you can type this onion address directly in the address bar.
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-If you don't know if an organization has an onion site, you might find it from its regular URL. For example, if you visit privacyguides.org from the Tor Browser, you will notice a purple button on the right informing you that an onion version of this website is available, click on it to get redirected to it.
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-![Screenshot from the Tor Browser showing the Privacy Guides website with an onion available purple button right to the address bar.](../assets/images/in-praise-of-tor/tor-privacyguides.webp)
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-<div class="admonition info" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Mullvad Browser and the Tor Project</p>
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-If you are familiar with the Mullvad Browser, know that the Mullvad Browser was developed by the Tor Project team!
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-The Mullvad Browser was born of a [collaboration](https://blog.torproject.org/releasing-mullvad-browser/) between Mullvad VPN and the Tor Project, to build a browser that offers similar privacy features to the Tor Browser, but while using it through a VPN instead of through the Tor Network (both offering different benefits).
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-The Mullvad Browser can also be used without a VPN, and will still provide better privacy protections than most other browsers. It cannot be used to access the Tor Network, however.
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-</div>
-
-### The Tor Project
-
-The [Tor Project](https://www.torproject.org/) is the US-based nonprofit organization maintaining the software and community for the Tor Network, and developing and maintaining the Tor Browser. It's also a privacy advocacy organization, with a mission to advance human rights and freedoms around the world through the free technology it creates.
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-The nonprofit was founded in 2006 and gets its funding from [various sources](https://www.torproject.org/about/supporters/) including government grants, independent contributors, and individual [donations](https://donate.torproject.org/).
-
-## :octicons-lock-16: What Tor can do
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-### Improve Privacy
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-Tor is not magical, but it's by far one of the best privacy tool we have. Using Tor will not make you perfectly anonymous online, but it will greatly reduce the traces your leave online.
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-Here are a few benefits Tor can provide for your privacy:
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- Tor can prevent the websites you are visiting from collecting your IP address (and your IP address can indeed lead to identifying *you*).
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- Tor can prevent your Internet Service Provider (ISP), Virtual Private Network (VPN) provider, or authorities requesting information from them to collect a list of the websites you have visited. They will know however that you have been using Tor.
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- The Tor Browser isolates each website you visit. This prevents ads and trackers from following you around, potentially popping up later in your [Facebook ads and accidentally outing you](https://www.intomore.com/culture/you/facebook-ads-outed-me/).
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- The Tor Browser is fingerprinting resistant. This reduces the ways you can be tracked and identified online, even without your IP address.
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- When keeping the default settings, the Tor Browser only uses private windows and will not keep any traces of your browsing history. It will also delete all cookies and site data when closing.
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-### Circumvent censorship
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-Because of how the Tor Network redirects traffic, it's a perfect tool to resist censorship. Using Tor can give access to websites or services that aren't accessible from a country blocking them.
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-Even from a region where Tor itself is actively blocked, the network can still be accessed using [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention/).
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-Using this type of measures to circumvent government censorship will make Tor accessible even from countries with heavily censored internet, such as [China](https://support.torproject.org/censorship/connecting-from-china/), [Russia](https://blog.torproject.org/call-for-webtunnel-bridges/), [Iran](https://forum.torproject.org/t/iran-circumventing-censorship-with-tor/4590), and many others.
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-<div class="admonition question" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">If you can't download the Tor Browser from your country</p>
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-If you cannot download the Tor Browser because of your country's censorship, and **if it is safe for you to do**, you can try downloading the browser from a proxy website such as the [EFF website](https://tor.eff.org/), the [Calyx Institute website](https://tor.calyxinstitute.org/).
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-You can even directly email **<gettor@torproject.org>** and send the name of your operating system (Linux, macOS, Windows) to get a direct link to download the Tor Browser.
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-</div>
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-If you want to help people around the world access the internet freely, you can volunteer to run a [Tor Snowflake](https://snowflake.torproject.org/) proxy. For more tech-savvy volunteers, you can also help by running a [Tor Bridge](https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/bridge/), or even a [WebTunnel Bridge](https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/webtunnel/).
-
-## :octicons-heart-16: Why Tor is so important
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-### Tor is vital for human rights and democracy
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-Tor is an essential tool for journalists, activists, whistleblowers, dissidents, and people in vulnerable situations everywhere. It is one of the best tool we have to increase privacy online, and to resist censorship from oppressive regimes.
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-Thanks to Tor, activists have a safe way to continue fighting for human rights.
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-Some of the most respected human rights organizations use Tor to offer safe access to their services and information. This includes organizations such as [Amnesty International](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/12/global-amnesty-international-website-launches-on-tor-network-to-help-universal-access/), [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/04/eff-now-has-tor-onions), Freedom of The Press Foundation, and of course the Tor Project.
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-Without Tor, journalists would lose invaluable sources of information provided by courageous whistleblowers reporting in the public interest.
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-Without Tor, brave citizens fighting against authoritarian governments would be at much greater risk when organizing and bringing vital information to the public's attention.
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-Without Tor, victims of domestic violence and LGBTQ+ people living in hostile environments could be in much greater danger when researching life-saving information online.
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-Without Tor, people living in oppressive regimes would not have access to the crucial information they need to fight for freedom, democracy, and peace.
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-<div class="admonition success" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Add an onion service for your organization's website</p>
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-If you would like to add this service for your website to help more people access it safely, you can [read more](https://blog.torproject.org/more-onions-porfavor/) about onion services on the Tor Project Blog. As of 2021, you can even [get](https://blog.torproject.org/tls-certificate-for-onion-site/) domain-validated certificates for your onion site using HARICA, an operator founded by a nonprofit civil society from Greece.
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-</div>
-
-### Tor is for everyone to use
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-Tor is a tool that can help so many people. But Tor isn't *only* for people in highly sensitive situations like whistleblowers and journalists, Tor is for everyone!
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-Of course, people in more dangerous situations will *need* Tor to stay safe, but everyone can benefit from Tor's privacy protections in their daily lives. I personally use Tor when I am forced to visit Google Map. Not because it's dangerous to me, but just because I greatly dislike the idea of Google tracking my location activities.
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-Tor can also help fighting surveillance capitalism!
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-Moreover, you can considerably help people in dangerous situations by using Tor for trivial reasons like I do.
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-By using Tor for banal activities, when you aren't in any danger worse than a nasty ad-attack, you help to normalize the use of Tor and add more noise to the traffic. The more people do this, the more using Tor becomes just something people do when they care about privacy online, and nothing more.
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-### Who uses Tor?
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- Anyone who cares about privacy!
- Journalists who need to conduct research and protect their sources.
- Whistleblowers using special websites to communication information to newspapers anonymously.
- Democracy activists fighting against authoritarian governments who require anonymity online to stay safe from persecution.
- People living under oppressive regimes who need to circumvent their country's censorship to access information freely.
- Victims of domestic violence who need to research safe shelters and supportive resources without raising suspicion from their aggressor.
- LGBTQ+ people living in hostile environments who need to access information online and stay connected with their community.
- Generous people who want to [help and support](https://blog.torproject.org/support-tor-project-share-your-story/) all the above 💜
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-The Tor community has gathered this [wonderful collection of anonymous user stories](https://community.torproject.org/outreach/stories/) from people describing why they use Tor.
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-### Tor is critical public infrastructure
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-To keep Tor strong for everyone, it's essential to support and grow the network of volunteer-operated relays forming the Tor Network.
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-Thousands of journalists and activists rely on the Tor Network every day to stay safe and to continue their important work.
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-Furthermore, **countless privacy-oriented projects depend on the Tor Network**.
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-To name only a few, the messaging applications [Briar](https://briarproject.org/), [Cwtch](https://docs.cwtch.im/), and [SimpleX](https://simplex.chat/) all use Tor to harden some of their privacy-preserving features.
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-For whistleblowers to stay safe, both [SecureDrop](https://securedrop.org/) and [Hush Line](https://hushline.app/) use the Tor Network. Many [newsrooms around the world](https://securedrop.org/directory/) host onion services to protect sources, such as The Guardian in the UK, CBC in Canada, ProPublica in the US, and many more.
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-There's also all the applications protecting people with the highest needs such as [Tails](https://tails.net/), [OnionShare](https://onionshare.org/), and [more](https://github.com/Polycarbohydrate/awesome-tor).
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-**Losing the Tor Network would mean losing all the applications and features relying on it.**
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-This would be disastrous for the privacy community, journalists, activists, dissidents, victims of domestic violence, LGBTQ+ population, and so many worldwide.
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-From a human rights perspective, **we simply cannot afford to lose Tor**.
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-## :octicons-question-16: Things to consider when using Tor
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-### Tor compared to VPN protections
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-When using a VPN, your ISP will not know which websites you visit online (or other activities). Your ISP will see that you are connecting to a VPN, but will not know what you do from there. Your VPN however *could* know which websites you visit. Using a VPN is a transfer of trust from your ISP. When using a VPN, you should always trust your VPN provider more than your ISP.
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-The websites you visit will see the IP address of your VPN provider instead of yours. This can help protect your identity and location, but they will know this connection uses a VPN.
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-VPNs can offer great benefits for your privacy. However, if your VPN provider was compelled by law to provide the logs of the websites you visited (or will visit), it is *technically* possible to do for them.
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-When using the Tor Network correctly, no one knows which websites *you visited*, or other services you accessed. Your ISP or VPN provider will only know you have accessed Tor, but will not know which websites you have visited from there. Even if compelled by law, they could only share that you have accessed Tor, at this specific time.
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-The websites you have visited also won't know who you are (unless you tell them). They will only know someone accessed their websites through Tor, at this specific time.
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-The relays used for a Tor Circuit cannot alone re-recreate the link between your IP address and the websites you visit either. This offers much stronger protection for your privacy than a VPN does.
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-### Who knows you are using Tor
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-When using the Tor Network, your ISP and the Guard Relay will both know you (the IP address you are using) are using Tor.
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-To prevent this, you [could](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/advanced/tor-overview/#safely-connecting-to-tor) use Tor from a [trustworthy VPN](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/).
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-If you do so, your VPN provider will know you are using Tor, but your ISP will not. Your ISP will only see you are accessing your VPN, and the Tor Guard Relay will see your VPN's IP address instead of yours.
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-### HTTPS for non-onion websites
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-The Exit Relay from the Tor Circuit will see someone is accessing this website (or other service).
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-If you were to use Tor to visit a non-onion website that isn't protected with HTTPS, and log in with your credentials, this Exit Relay *could* technically read this information. Using HTTPS with non-onion websites is *very* important when using Tor. Onion sites offer protections that are equivalent to HTTPS.
-
-### Be careful with files when using Tor
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-While it's safe to visit secured websites through Tor, be careful when downloading files or opening documents.
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-Depending on what kind of files it is, there are a number of problems that could arise. For example, it's a [bad idea](https://blog.torproject.org/blog/bittorrent-over-tor-isnt-good-idea) to download torrent files over Tor. Additionally, Tor will not protect you from downloading malware or exposing metadata with shared files.
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-If you need to share files through Tor with a *trusted* contact, [OnionShare](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/file-sharing/#onionshare) is a good option.
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-## :octicons-stop-16: Addressing misconceptions
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-There has been misconceptions floating around about Tor. Most of them repeat similar misinformation attributed to many other privacy tools: Why using this if you have nothing to hide? But this argument is incredibly flawed and comes from a naive understanding of privacy rights and needs.
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-Most people use privacy tools for protection, and everyone needs protection. Moreover, [privacy is a fundamental right](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/04/17/is-privacy-dead/) intrinsically connected to democracy and civil liberties.
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-### The dark web, the deep web, and the surface web
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-Some misconceptions have spread from confusion on what the *deep* web and the *dark* web are. Because yes, Tor is part of the dark web.
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-While using the term "dark web" might make for great sensationalist news title, the dark web isn't anything to fear.
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-It's not "dark" as in "dark intent" or the "dark side of the Force". It's really just dark as in "it's so dark on this road, I can't read the addresses around".
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-This dark web needs special software, configuration, or authorization to access it. For example, **the Tor Browser is the streetlight you need to navigate on the Onion roads**.
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-If you use Tor to visit the Privacy Guides onion site, you will be using the dark web. It's a website (or website version) that can only be accessed using a specialized tool. That's it!
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-The dark web is part of the deep web, which is simply all the online information that isn't indexed by any standard web search engines. Aren't you happy your bank account is on the deep web?
-
-![Illustration of an iceberg where the tip above water represents the surface web, the part underwater represents the deep web, and the part under the iceberg represents the dark web.](../assets/images/in-praise-of-tor/tor-darkweb.webp)
-<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Em / Privacy Guides | Inspired by: [Ranjithsiji](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Iceberg_of_Webs.svg)</small>
-
-### Criminals use envelopes, doors, and clothing too
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-Some fear that Tor is used by criminals. While that might be true some criminals use Tor, a lot of people who aren't criminals at all also use Tor.
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-This kind of argument really leads nowhere. Criminals also use Google, Facebook, and Twitter (a lot actually). Criminals use envelopes to hide their ransom letters, closed doors to hide their crimes, and clothing to conceal weapons! Are we going to forbid clothing because some (all?) criminals use clothing to hide their weapons?
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-**We shouldn't ban clothing, and we shouldn't ban Tor either.** There are other better ways to catch criminals than removing a tool millions use to stay safe online.
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-### Tor receives government funding
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-Yes, Tor does receive government funding, and that's a good thing. A lot of nonprofit organizations receive government funding as a stable ([usually](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/02/03/the-future-of-privacy/#the-tools-you-use-might-depend-on-government-funding)) source of income. Our governments *should* be contributing financially to the tools we all use to improve our security and privacy for free, moreover if they are using it themselves.
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-While any organization should thrive to diversify its sources of income to reduce its dependency on large contributors, it's not always easy to do.
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-If you feel uneasy about a privacy tool you use receiving government funding, the best thing you can do to fight this is to [donate](https://donate.torproject.org/) directly to reduce its dependence to it.
-
-### Depending on where you are, using Tor is likely safe
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-If you are not living under an oppressive regime with heavy censorship, it's likely that using Tor is safe for you, and will not put you on "a list". Even if it was putting you on "a list", it likely is a list full of great people working to defend human rights and privacy rights online.
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-That being said, **if you are living in a region where using Tor is dangerous**, and could put you on a list of anti-regime dissidents, you *should absolutely* be careful and take special measures to hide your usage of Tor.
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-Additionally, **if you are in a vulnerable situation** where an aggressor has access to your device or ISP information, and could hurt you if they knew you have used Tor, you should use a Tor Bridge and only [access Tor through Tails](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/01/29/installing-and-using-tails/).
-
-### Tor is fantastic for your privacy, but is not magical
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-Tor is a great tool to improve your privacy online and make it much harder to identify you, your location, and the content you access online. However, it will not make you magically anonymous.
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-If you use Tor with files containing metadata about you, this metadata can still identify you.
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-If you use Tor to log in your Facebook account, then of course Facebook still knows it's you, and now also knows you are using Tor.
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-If you use Tor to create a new account, but use an email address, phone number, username, or profile picture you used elsewhere when not connected through Tor, then your Tor activity can get linked to your previous activity.
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-If you use Tor to reveal information so specific that only you, or only someone at your company, or only someone in this small government department could know, then of course authorities can identify you this way.
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-You should also consider correlation in time when using Tor. If your activity is so specific that it can be narrowed down to only a few people, and your ISP or VPN knows you have accessed Tor at this specific time (and shares this information with authorities), a correlation in time could be enough to de-anonymize you.
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-### Misconceptions are very detrimental to Tor, and other privacy tools
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-We need to be extremely careful when spreading information that could be inaccurate or hasn't been verified when talking about Tor (or any other privacy tools).
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-Misinformation can create mistaken fears and stop people from using a tool they would greatly benefit from.
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-If someone is so scared of Tor because of some rumor they heard, that they continue their activism from the surface web instead, they could needlessly put themselves at risk.
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-Furthermore, unjustified bad reputations can severely hurt funding for tools like Tor. This leads to less resources to continue developing the browser, the network, and to advocate for privacy everywhere.
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-We all have a responsibility to verify which information we share with others, make sure we stop misinformation at its root, and correct harmful misconceptions everywhere we hear them.
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-## :material-hand-heart-outline: Tor needs our support
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-**Tor is at risk, and needs our help.** Despite its strength and history, Tor isn't safe from the same attacks oppressive regimes and misinformed legislators direct at encryption and many other privacy-enhancing technologies.
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-Moreover, due to its US government funding, Tor has already been on the destruction path of the recent hectic government cuts. Thankfully, the US Agency for Global Media finally [rescinded the grant termination](https://www.theregister.com/2025/03/25/otf_tor_lets_encrypt_funding_lawsuit/?td=rt-3a) it had announced on March 15th to the Open Technology Fund, which the Tor Project benefits from. Sadly, considering the unpredictability of the current US administration, this doesn't mean the Tor Project is safe from cuts later on.
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-As much as the Tor Network relies on generous volunteers to run it, the nonprofit Tor Project relies on grants and donations to survive.
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-The good news is, we can help with both!
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-The more individuals donate to the Tor Project, the less it depends on government funding, and the more stable its donation income becomes.
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-Similarly, the more people volunteer to run a Tor relay, the more stable and reliable the Tor Network becomes.
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-Tor is a privacy tool so many people, organizations, and applications need to stay safe and secure. It is **our collective responsibility to contribute what we can** to keep Tor strong and thriving for all of us.
-
-### How to support Tor
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-There are many ways to help Tor survive and thrive! You can help by:
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- [Donating to the Tor Project (includes really neat merch!)](https://donate.torproject.org/)
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- [Spreading the word about Tor](https://community.torproject.org/outreach/)
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- [Joining the Tor community](https://community.torproject.org/)
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- [Making your website accessible as an onion service](https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/setup/)
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- [Asking your university to run a Tor relay](https://toruniversity.eff.org/)
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- [Running a Tor relay yourself](https://community.torproject.org/relay/)
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- [Running a Snowflake proxy to help fight censorship](https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/snowflake/)
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- Using Tor for anything from important to trivial
-
- Sharing this article 💜
-
-## :octicons-bookmark-16: Onion sites you can visit using the Tor Browser
-
- [Privacy Guides website](http://www.xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh6wh5jc4up35bqdflu6bkdc5cas5vjqd.onion/en/) 💛
- [Privacy Guides forum](http://discuss.6xotdxvg7pexnean3xu6b7ivs7g52zcwsdbnz4mdm4byivc3yfv65aid.onion/)
- [Amnesty International](https://www.amnestyl337aduwuvpf57irfl54ggtnuera45ygcxzuftwxjvvmpuzqd.onion)
- [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.iykpqm7jiradoeezzkhj7c4b33g4hbgfwelht2evxxeicbpjy44c7ead.onion/)
- [Freedom of the Press Foundation](http://fpfjxcrmw437h6z2xl3w4czl55kvkmxpapg37bbopsafdu7q454byxid.onion/)
- [Secure Drop directory (for whistleblowers)](http://sdolvtfhatvsysc6l34d65ymdwxcujausv7k5jk4cy5ttzhjoi6fzvyd.onion/directory/)
- [ProPublica](http://p53lf57qovyuvwsc6xnrppyply3vtqm7l6pcobkmyqsiofyeznfu5uqd.onion/)
- [Internet Archive](https://archivep75mbjunhxc6x4j5mwjmomyxb573v42baldlqu56ruil2oiad.onion/)
- [OnionShare (file sharing)](http://lldan5gahapx5k7iafb3s4ikijc4ni7gx5iywdflkba5y2ezyg6sjgyd.onion/)
- [Proton Mail](https://protonmailrmez3lotccipshtkleegetolb73fuirgj7r4o4vfu7ozyd.onion/)
- [Tor Project](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion)
-
-***
-
-For more in-depth information about Tor, you can consult our [Tor Overview](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/advanced/tor-overview/).
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Unless credited otherwise, all screenshots from: Privacy Guides</small>
-
---
-
-**Update (5/6):** This article was updated to note [the importance of restarting Tor Browser](tor-security-slider-flaw.md) when changing security level settings.
@@ -1,696 +0,0 @@
---
-title: "KeePassium Review: A Flexible Password Manager for iOS and macOS"
-template: review-article.html
-schema_type: ReviewNewsArticle
-date:
-    created: 2025-05-13T16:30:00Z
-categories:
-    - Reviews
-authors:
-    - em
-description: "If you need a password manager for iOS or macOS that gives you full control over your data, KeePassium is a fantastic option. KeePassium offers some synchronization features, but keeps your password database offline by default. You choose who to trust to store your passwords, and you can change it whenever you want."
-preview:
-  logo: blog/assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium.svg
-review:
-  type: SoftwareApplication
-  category: SecurityApplication
-  subcategory: Password Manager
-  name: KeePassium
-  price: 0
-  website: https://keepassium.com/
-  rating: 4.5
-  pros:
-    - Open source.
-    - Free basic plan.
-    - Data portability.
-    - Offline-only option.
-    - No account or personal data required.
-    - Easy to use, beautiful, and customizable.
-    - Excellent documentation.
-  cons:
-    - AutoFill might not work for some websites and browsers.
-    - Some important features only available on paid plans.
-    - No app for Linux, Android, or Windows.
---
-
-![The KeePassium logo over a yellow background showing Apple devices.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-cover.webp)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Em / Privacy Guides | Photo: PicJumbo / Pexels</small>
-
-If you have been looking for a password manager giving you full control over your data, KeePassium is a fantastic option. The application available for iOS and macOS keeps your password database offline by default. KeePassium still offers synchronization and backup options, but allows you to choose which storage provider to trust with your database, and change it whenever you want.<!-- more -->
-
-![KeePassium logo](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium.svg){align=right itemprop="image"}
-
-[KeePassium](https://keepassium.com/) is a commercial open-source application made by KeePassium Labs, based in Luxembourg.
-
-Because it's open-source, anyone can inspect and download its [code](https://github.com/keepassium/KeePassium) if they wish. Anyone could even [build](https://github.com/keepassium/KeePassium?tab=readme-ov-file#is-it-free) the entire application by themselves, and use the advanced features completely for free.
-
-However, if you do not want to bother with code, you can use either the basic plan for free, or pay for a premium plan to access advanced features and to support the project.
-
-KeePassium is a [KeePass](https://keepass.info/)-compatible project. If you are already familiar with any software from the [KeePass ecosystem](https://github.com/lgg/awesome-keepass), you will feel right at home with KeePassium.
-
-KeePassium's strength resides in how it integrates KeePass' security and features into a well-rounded and well-designed application, that is very instinctive to use, while not compromising on flexibility and customizability.
-
-<div class="admonition abstract" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">The KeePassium application</p>
-
-For this review, the words "KeePassium" and "application" refer to both the KeePassium iOS and macOS applications simultaneously, unless otherwise specified. The mobile application was tested first and will be more prominent in the examples and screenshots.
-
-</div>
-
-## :material-apple: Platforms and Compatibility
-
-KeePassium is written in Apple's Swift programming language and is available for Apple devices.
-
-### Mobile
-
- For iPhone and iPad, KeePassium works on iOS 17.0 or later.
-
-### Desktop
-
- For Mac computers, KeePassium works on macOS 14.0 (Sonoma) or later.
- KeePassium is compatible with both Apple Silicon and Intel hardware.
- The desktop application is new and was [released](https://keepassium.com/blog/2024/12/keepassium-2.0/) on December 17th, 2024.
-
-### Apple Vision
-
- For Apple Vision, KeePassium works on visionOS 1.0 or later.
-
-### Languages
-
-The KeePassium application is available in the following languages: English, Arabic, Czech, Dutch, French, German, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Simplified Chinese, Slovak, Spanish, Swedish, Thai, Traditional Chinese, Turkish, and Ukrainian.
-
-### Cross-compatibility
-
-One great strength of any applications derivative of KeePass is compatibility with other KeePass applications. This is due to implementing of the same `.kdbx` file format for password databases, and often sharing similar features as well.
-
-If you use KeePassium to store your passwords, you will be able to easily transfer your password database to other KeePass-compatible applications, and vice versa. This offers powerful portability for your password database.
-
-<div class="admonition info" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">File formats and encryption</p>
-
-KeePassium supports the KDB, KDBX3, and KDBX4 file formats, and implements AES, ChaCha20, Twofish, and Argon2 for encryption algorithms.
-
-Even if compatibility with older database formats is available, it is recommended to use the more recent and [more secure](https://keepass.info/help/kb/kdbx_4.html) KDBX4 format. This latest format will be the default when you create a new database in KeePassium.
-
-</div>
-
-This cross-compatibility is so versatile that you could, for example, use KeePassium on mobile but sync it with [KeePassXC](installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey.md) on desktop.
-
-Similarly, if you have a Mac computer but an Android phone, you could use KeePassium on desktop but KeePassDX on mobile, and so on and so forth. You can consult KeePassium's documentation for a list of all [compatible apps](https://support.keepassium.com/kb/compatible-apps/).
-
-<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Testing compatibility</p>
-
-If you plan on using KeePassium with cloud storage and synchronization between devices, make sure to test your settings well before adding all your passwords to it.
-
-</div>
-
-Depending on your usage and settings, glitches in synchronization *could* corrupt your database file. This has more chances to happen if you use a cloud storage that isn't fully supported, or a KeePass-compatible application that isn't listed in KeePassium's documentation.
-
-Ideally, if you use synchronization, create a dummy database at first to test that synchronization works properly with your specific cloud configuration and between all the devices you use.
-
-It's also advisable to enable the backup feature and even keep a backup copy of your database file in a different directory. That way, if your main synced file were to get corrupted or lost somehow, you could always rely on this secondary backup.
-
-This is important because there is no remote database management done by KeePassium. **You are fully in control of your own data, but you are also fully responsible to protect it.**
-
-## :material-wallet-bifold-outline: Pricing
-
-KeePassium can be used completely for free!
-
-That being said, if you need advanced features, you might want to [pay](https://keepassium.com/pricing/) for a [Premium](https://keepassium.com/articles/why-upgrade-to-premium/) plan (monthly or yearly), or a Pro or Business plan. Fortunately, the monthly Premium plan is very affordable, allowing users to test the Premium features one month at the time before committing to a longer subscription.
-
-Alternatively, if you do not need any advanced features but would like to support the project, you could use the free plan and [donate](https://keepassium.com/donate/) a fix amount to KeePassium.
-
-#### Rent-to-own
-
-Something interesting about KeePassium Premium's plan is that it offers a "[rent-to-own](https://support.keepassium.com/kb/license-rent-own/)" license. This means that if you pay for a KeePassium subscription for 12 months or more, you will always "own" the features you've paid for, even if you stop paying.
-
-For example, if you pay for Premium for only one year then stop, you will keep access to all the Premium features that were available while you paid for Premium, but will not have access to new features added after your stopped paying. This is an excellent model that more applications should adopt.
-
-![Screenshot from the KeePassium website's Pricing page with a description of which features are included in each plan.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-pricing.webp)
-
-## :octicons-shield-check-16: Security and Trust
-
-Security and trust are without a doubt the most important characteristics of a good password manager.
-
-While functionality and features are also important, there is no point in having a pretty application that doesn't safeguard your passwords properly. It would defeat the whole purpose of the password manager.
-
-KeePassium does not neglect security for convenience, and has done its homework to earn its users' trust. The database format it uses, its transparency with open source, and its independent security audit, are all factors contributing to build trust in KeePassium.
-
-### Trusted database format
-
-The application is using an encrypted database file format developed by [KeePass](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KeePass), an open-source project with a good reputation in the security and privacy community. KeePass' code and formats are trusted by many other KeePass-compatible projects, including KeePassXC, KeeWeb, OneKeePass, ModernKeePass, MacPass, Keepass2Android, and [more](https://github.com/lgg/awesome-keepass).
-
-Even if the KeePassium application is relatively recent with its first [launch](https://keepassium.com/blog/2019/07/introducing-keepassium-for-ios/) in 2019, the formats it uses to secure password databases had many eyes on since the initial KeePass release in 2003. The fact that so many people have inspected, used, tested, and improved the security foundation of this file format through the years contributes to KeePassium's security as well.
-
-### Open-source code
-
-KeePassium was [created](https://keepassium.com/articles/who-created-keepassium/) by [Dr. Andrei Popleteev](https://popleteev.com/), who founded KeePassium Labs, and continues as its director to develop and maintain the app with a small team of [contributors](https://github.com/keepassium/KeePassium/graphs/contributors). Like KeePass, KeePassium's code is open-source under a [GNU General Public License](https://github.com/keepassium/KeePassium/blob/master/LICENSE.txt).
-
-Open-source code isn't magical, but it helps to build trust by providing full transparency. Because all of KeePassium's code is publicly accessible, anyone could inspect it. This can help to detect and reporting potential vulnerabilities early on, and quickly verifying any claims made. Of course, at least *some* independent qualified people have to inspect the code in order to make this meaningful at all. But this is true for any open-source projects.
-
-#### A note on KeePassium's open-source commercial model
-
-More precisely, KeePassium is a *commercial* open-source application. This means its code is fully open and available to inspect, download, and use (within its license's limits). However, users can also purchase paid plans to access advanced features, without having to build and manage the code themselves.
-
-Paid plans provide a source of revenue to KeePassium, which helps to maintain the application adequately to keep it compatible and secure, providing support to customers, and adding new features down the line.
-
-This commercial model can actually add stability to a project, making it more likely to survive long term. This is reassuring considering all the other KeePass-compatible projects that have stopped getting maintained and are unfortunately no longer usable.
-
-Furthermore, there is some [conflict](https://www.engadget.com/2011-01-09-the-gpl-the-app-store-and-you.html) between certain open-source licenses and publication on Apple's App Store. Because it isn't possible to download an iOS app outside of Apple's App Store (unless you adventure in the perilous waters of [jailbreaking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IOS_jailbreaking)), KeePassium and all other iOS apps are confined to operate within the App Store's requirements.
-
-Also for this reason, the KeePassium projects cannot accept external contributions to its code, but can still [accept contributions](https://github.com/keepassium/KeePassium?tab=readme-ov-file#how-to-contribute) for bug reports, feature suggestions, and translations.
-
-### Independent security audit (iOS)
-
-Perhaps one of the most compelling argument for trusting KeePassium is the [independent security audit](https://support.keepassium.com/kb/security-audits/) the iOS application went through last year.
-
-The Berlin-based cybersecurity firm [Cure53](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cure53) conducted a full evaluation and professional pentest of the mobile application in November 2024.
-
-The review included an audit of the source code, application, network communications, and the implemented cryptography. The few vulnerabilities found were all fixed following reception of the report.
-
-It's important to note that only KeePassium for iOS was audited, and not KeePassium for macOS, which was released after the audit. However, many aspects of KeePassium for iOS that were included in the audit are likely to be similar for KeePassium for macOS.
-
-Interestingly, Cure53 has [audited](https://cure53.de/) many other well-known security and privacy-focused or open-source applications such as Proton Pass, 1Password, Bitwarden, Obsidian, Mullvad VPN, Onion Browser, Threema, Briar, SecureDrop, Mastodon, and much [more](https://github.com/cure53/Publications).
-
-### Recommended by other applications
-
-Finally, if you already trust KeePassXC for your desktop password manager, know that KeePassium is one of the apps [suggested](https://keepassxc.org/docs/) by KeePassXC to use on iOS.
-
-## :octicons-lock-16: Privacy and Encryption
-
-Data privacy and encryption are fundamental aspects of any password managers. Because pretty much all data stored in a password manager is highly sensitive data, all data should be protected by strong end-to-end encryption.
-
-### Data collection
-
-On this point, KeePassium delivers. First, a quick look at Apple's privacy label indicates that "the developer does not collect any data from this app". This is a good start, and this description is true for both the iOS and macOS applications.
-
-![Screenshot from Apple's App Store for KeePassium's App Privacy label. The label states that the "developer does not collect any data from this app".](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-applelabel.webp)
-
-Second, in its current version, KeePassium's [Privacy Policy](https://keepassium.com/privacy/app/) is excellent. This is never a guarantee of course, but the app's [security audit](#independent-security-audit-ios) shows the Privacy Policy statements are likely founded.
-
-KeePassium separates its privacy policies for the application and the website. This is an excellent practice way too rarely adopted by companies. This approach provides much more clarity for what data is collected from where, and is a positive sign that an organization understands well data privacy legal requirements.
-
-The Privacy Policy for the app is detailed and thorough, which are essential qualities to any respectable privacy policies.
-
-It starts by stating clearly that KeePassium does not send any personal data to KeePassium Labs, the company developing the app. Then, it lists all instances where data *could* be collected through the purchase or use of KeePassium, and gives clear instructions on how to opt out for each. This is the kind of privacy policy that shows an organization genuinely values and understands data privacy. I highly encourage you to have a look at it from the link above.
-
-Worth noting as well, KeePassium's Privacy Policy for its *website* states it [does not use any cookies](https://keepassium.com/privacy/website/#our-use-of-cookies-and-tracking). This is certainly refreshing to read.
-
-### Encryption
-
-Although the application is compatible with older formats, KeePassium by default will use the newer KDBX4 file format to encrypt password databases.
-
-This is important because the KDBX4 format offers [significant security improvements](https://keepass.info/help/kb/kdbx_4.html) over the previous KDBX3 format. If you import an older database in KeePassium, it is recommended to upgrade it to KDBX4 and use a different main password for the upgraded database if you keep a backup of the previous one.
-
-<div class="admonition success" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Upgrade from KDB to KDBX</p>
-
-If you need to upgrade an older database file to the newest file format to benefit from better security and KeePassium's full functionality, you can follow KeePassium's [instructions](https://support.keepassium.com/kb/convert-kdb-kdbx/).
-
-</div>
-
-To secure the database, and all the content included in it, KeePassium uses AES256, ChaCha20, Twofish, HMAC, and Argon2 (for KDBX4 only). Because the [KeePass database file format](https://keepass.info/help/kb/kdbx.html) (and so KeePassium's as well) encrypts the whole database, this means that not only passwords are encrypted but also usernames, website URLs, notes, attachments, etc.
-
-<div class="admonition info" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Encrypting all data, not just passwords</p>
-
-Encrypting all user data contained in a password manager entry is *extremely* important, because encrypting passwords only just isn't enough.
-
-In August 2022, the password manager [LastPass suffered a security breach](https://blog.lastpass.com/posts/notice-of-recent-security-incident) where users' password vaults (databases) were stolen from LastPass' servers.
-
-This is bad enough even with end-to-end encrypted data (because vaults with a weak main password could get cracked), but even worse than this, some important data like website URLs were *not encrypted at all*, so this information was [stolen in plain text](https://www.pwndefend.com/2022/12/24/lastpass-breach-the-danger-of-metadata/).
-
-This is the perfect example of why **encrypting all data *and* metadata** input by the user is *crucial* for data privacy and security.
-
-Additionally, the LastPass' breach is a great argument in favor of keeping one's password database *offline,* whenever possible. Something that KeePassium makes possible even by default.
-
-</div>
-
-#### Encryption algorithms used by KeePassium
-
-[AES256](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard): The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a trusted and commonly used block cipher symmetric-key algorithm. It was established in 2001 by NIST, the American National Institute of Standards and Technology. The number following the acronym describes the key size in bits (128, 192, or 256 bits).
-
-[Twofish](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twofish): Twofish is another block cipher symmetric-key algorithm, which KeePassium can use to secure databases, in 256-bit key size as well. Famous cryptographer Bruce Schneier was part of the team who designed Twofish.
-
-[ChaCha20](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salsa20#ChaCha_variant) (KDBX4 only): The ChaCha20 algorithm is a variant of Salsa20, both stream ciphers that encrypt and decrypt data in continuous stream instead of blocks. The number refers to the number of rounds in its structure.
-
-[HMAC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMAC) (Key Derivative Function): Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) is a robust hash function. In KeePass-compatible apps, it is used to [verify](https://keepass.info/help/kb/kdbx.html#hbs) the integrity and authenticity of the database before decryption.
-
-[Argon2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argon2) (Key Derivative Function, for KDBX4 only): Argon2 is a memory-hard function that offers better resistance against GPU cracking attacks compared to AES-KDF. Argon2 was the winner of the Password Hashing Competition in 2015.
-
-[AES-KDF](https://keepass.info/help/kb/kdbx_4.html#intro) (Key Derivative Function, for KDBX3 only): AES-KDF is a key derivative function based on AES. This method was previously used for the KDBX3 database format, but has since been replaced by Argon2 for KDBX4. This is partly because AES-KDF is not memory-hard, which makes it easier to crack for an attacker using modern technologies.
-
-![Screenshot from the iOS app showing the Encryption Settings.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-encryptionoptions.webp){width="400"}
-
-## :octicons-apps-16: Usage and Features
-
-Once solid security and privacy protections have been confirmed, the second important part of a good password manager is how easy it is to use and the features it offers.
-
-In this regard, KeePassium excels again. Not only does KeePassium offer the features users familiar with KeePass-compatible applications will recognize, but importantly, it implements these features with a polished user interface and obvious consideration for accessibility and user experience.
-
-### Starting with KeePassium on iOS
-
-Installing the app from the App Store is a smooth process. Once installed, make sure to go in Apple's "Settings" > "KeePassium" > "Siri & Search" and disable the Siri options you are not using. Apple very annoyingly puts them all on by default for each new app installed.
-
-Additionally, you can follow KeePassium's [instructions](https://keepassium.com/privacy/app/) from its Privacy Policy to opt out of other Apple settings related to KeePassium.
-
-After installing the app, KeePassium will guide you step-by-step to set up an application PIN (you can also enable application lock with biometrics), and import or create a new database.
-
-If you are not familiar with it already, it's a good idea to read each popup from the welcome screen.
-
-<div class="grid" markdown>
-
-![Screenshot from the iOS app showing the Welcome page after installation.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-startwelcome.webp)
-
-![Screenshot from the iOS app showing the page giving options to either create a new database, add an existing database, or connect to a server.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-startdatabase.webp)
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Secure the application properly</p>
-
-When prompted to select a Passcode to lock the application (which is different from the main password to secure your database), you will have the option to switch from the numeric keypad to a full alphanumeric keyboard. This is recommended to set up a stronger Passcode to protect the application, where your database(s) might be kept unlocked if you choose this option.
-
-</div>
-
-If you create a new database to store your passwords, make sure to choose a [strong main password](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/passwords-overview/#passwords) (or "Master Key") that is *unique*, *complex*, and *long*.
-
-KeePassium will guide you to determine if your main password is sufficiently strong. However, the app cannot know if you have used this password before, so you should make sure that you haven't and this main password is unique.
-
-<div class="admonition danger" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Be careful to remember your main password!</p>
-
-This is the only password that cannot be stored in your password manager, so it's important to secure it properly and also ensure you can **remember it well**.
-
-Due to the nature of end-to-end encryption, there is no way for KeePassium to recover a lost password. Not remembering your main password could mean **getting locked out of your password database permanently**.
-
-</div>
-
-After creating a new database, you will be prompted to unlock it with your new main password ("Master Key").
-
-![Screenshot from the iOS app showing the New Database section.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-newdatabase.webp){width="400"}
-
-After you have either created or imported a database, you are ready to explore KeePassium's features.
-
-### Starting with KeePassium on macOS
-
-To download KeePassium on macOS, you will need to go through Apple's App Store. Alternatively, you could also [build](https://github.com/keepassium/KeePassium) the application from the source code, but that is an entirely different process.
-
-![Screenshot from Apple's App Store on macOS showing the KeePassium page.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-appstoremac.webp)
-
-Installing the application is a breeze, and the macOS app shares the same welcome sections and features the iOS version has, with a slightly different format.
-
-![Screenshot from the macOS app showing the Welcome page after installation.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-startwelcomemac.webp)
-
-The application will guide you to either create or import a database, then you will recognize the same features described below for the iOS version.
-
-![Screenshot from the macOS app showing the New Database section.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-newdatabasemac.webp)
-
-### Accessibility
-
-There are a few great accessibility features with KeePassium. First, KeePassium fully works with Apple's VoiceOver. To enable it on iPhone, you can go in the iOS "Settings" > "Accessibility" > "VoiceOver" and enable "VoiceOver".
-
-Second, from the KeePassium app you can tap on the "Settings" gear button on the lower-right to access the "Appearance" menu. From there, you will see a sliding option to adjust the entry's text size. This will change the size of the text in all entries' sections. You also have the option to change the font type from there.
-
-Additionally, when tapping on a Password in an entry section, you can quickly tap on the magnified "a" button (while the blue "Copied" overlay appears) to display the password in large font, with each character separated in an indexed table.
-
-<div class="grid" markdown>
-
-![Screenshot from the iOS app showing the Appearance page from the Settings with the Text Size option.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-textsize.webp)
-
-![Screenshot from the iOS app showing an entry's password selected with the large font option, which displays each character from a password in a separate indexed box.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-largeindexedfont.webp)
-
-</div>
-
-### Security features
-
-In the "Access Control" category of "Settings", there are some important options to customize the app's security features:
-
-#### App Protection
-
-This section gives options to secure the application itself. It includes using the device's biometric lock instead of the app's Passcode, changing the app's Passcode, and choosing when the app gets locked.
-
-#### Data Protection
-
-This section gives options to enable or disable if the database(s)' main password(s) is remembered locally in the device's secure keychain, or if it must be re-entered each time to unlock a database. It also allows you to choose when (if remembered) the database will lock itself again, how long to keep data (including copied passwords) in the device's clipboard, and other security preferences.
-
-A fun (and useful) feature you will find there is that you can decide what happens when the device is "shaken". This can be an important security feature for people in sensitive situations.
-
-<div class="grid" markdown>
-
-![Screenshot from the iOS app showing the App Protection page from the Settings.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-appprotection.webp)
-
-![Screenshot from the iOS app showing the Data Protection page from the Settings.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-dataprotection.webp)
-
-</div>
-
-#### Protection against weak passwords
-
-When first creating a database, KeePassium will indicate if the main password chosen is too weak and display a warning.
-
-This is an important security feature because **a database is only as protected as the strength of its main password**. It goes without saying the main password for a database should always be *unique* (has never been used elsewhere), *complex* (uses a variety of character types), and *long* (is long enough to not be vulnerable to brute-force attacks).
-
-Passwords chosen for each entry will also display an indicator of strength under each field.
-
-#### YubiKey support (Premium)
-
-For users with Premium plans, KeePassium offers [support for YubiKey](https://www.yubico.com/works-with-yubikey/catalog/keepassium/) to add extra protection to a database using the challenge-response implementation.
-
-The same feature is available on KeePassXC on desktop. For more details on this, you can check our [tutorial for KeePassXC](installing-keepassxc-and-yubikey.md), or our tutorial on [how to set up and back up a YubiKey](yubikey-reset-and-backup.md)'s challenge-response.
-
-#### Passwords audit (Premium)
-
-KeePassium offers to audit database's passwords for potential leaks. This feature works by comparing an obfuscated version of a password with the [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/) service. The password is never shared externally during this process. This is helpful information to get an early warning and change a compromised password before the exposed account is attacked.
-
-### Groups and Smart Groups
-
-Before starting to add entries to a new database, it's a good idea to explore the Groups and Smart Groups features. Groups are directories that can be created inside a database to separate categories of passwords.
-
-Smart Groups are simply Groups created from a search query. If you imported a database already full of passwords, you might not feel like sorting them manually. Smart Groups will help to create Groups using queries to [categorize](https://support.keepassium.com/docs/smart-groups/) entries automatically. This can be very convenient to organize larger databases.
-
-When creating a new database, KeePassium will suggest some Groups, which you can be used as provided, changed, or deleted. To add a new Group or Smart Group, tap on the 3-dot button on the upper-right from inside a database and select "New Group" or "New Smart Group".
-
-![Screenshot from the iOS app showing different groups created within a database.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-groups.webp){width="400"}
-
-<div class="admonition info" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Separate databases vs Groups</p>
-
-Using separate databases for different categories of passwords, for example one database for personal passwords, work-related passwords, and family-shared passwords is a good idea because it takes advantage of compartmentalization to add extra security and privacy.
-
-Each database will have its own main password, and if one database were to get compromised, the others might still be protected. KeePassium's free plan only allow to use *one* database at the time, however.
-
-Groups mainly serve to organize passwords and do not provide any additional security, privacy, or portability like separate databases do. For free plan users, Groups can still be a great feature to separate passwords when it isn't a security issue to encrypt them all together using a same main password.
-
-</div>
-
-### Entry options
-
-Once inside a database, users can add a new entry there or first create/enter a Group directory. To create a new entry, tap on the 3-dot menu on the upper-right, then select "New Entry".
-
-Each New Entry section will include a field for the entry's name, choice of icon (or option to download the service's favicon), "User Name", "Password", "URL", "Tags", "Notes", and option to "Set up one-time password (OTP)".
-
-Tapping the plus-sign button at the top will create a new custom text field for an entry. Enabling the "Protected Field" option on the lower-right will hide this field as if it was a password field. That being said, all fields from an entry will be fully encrypted with the database.
-
-<div class="grid" markdown>
-
-![Screenshot from the iOS app showing a New Entry page with various empty fields.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-newentry.webp)
-
-![Screenshot from the iOS app showing the page within a Group with four different entries.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-entries.webp)
-
-</div>
-
-An entry section from macOS:
-
-![Screenshot from the macOS app showing an entry section with the "User Name", "Password", "URL", "Tags", and "Notes" fields filled.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-entrymac.webp)
-
-Finally, to edit, move, copy or delete an entry on iOS, a long press over its name from the directory will show these options. Swiping left on a password entry will also show the edit and delete options.
-
-![Screenshot from the iOS app showing the options Edit, Move, Copy, and Delete when long-pressing on a listed entry.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-moveentry.webp){width="400"}
-
-### Password generator
-
-Conveniently, KeePassium includes a password generator. This is a common feature for password managers, and KeePassium implements this feature very well.
-
-The generator can be used from either the die-shaped button on the right of every password field, the tool-shaped button menu on the lower-left from inside a database selecting "Random Generator", or the die-shaped button on the lower-left from the "Databases" section. The latter is a nice touch if you ever need to generate a random string while your database is locked.
-
-Each time you open the Random Generator, it will automatically generate new random strings for all 3 modes: Basic, Expert, and Passphrase.
-
-<div class="grid" markdown>
-
-![Screenshot from the iOS app showing the tool menu from within a database. The menu shows options for "Random Generator", "Password Audit", "Download Favicons", "Print", "Change Master Key", "Encryption Settings", and "Lock Database".](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-databaseoptions.webp)
-
-![Screenshot from the iOS app showing the Random Generator page that displays three random passwords for "Basic", "Expert", and "Passphrase".](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-generator.webp)
-
-</div>
-
-The Random Generator can also be customized. To customize each mode, tap on the gears-shaped button on the upper-right of the generator and change the mode to adjust the parameters for each. The app will remember the parameters every time it is used.
-
-The customization for Passphrase does not include the options for "MIXED" case at this time, however, considering this option was just added to KeePassXC last month, maybe it will be added to KeePassium as well in the near future.
-
-![Screenshot from the macOS app showing the Random Generator page that displays the options to adjust for generated passphrase.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-generatormac.webp)
-
-### One-Time Password (OTP)
-
-KeePassium offers the option to store one-time password codes with each entry. This can be a convenient way to manage second-factor of authentication, and keep these codes stored locally only.
-
-However, this can also introduce additional risks. If a database file was to get compromised at some point, it would also compromise all the OTP codes within it, making this second-factor protection useless against an attack of the whole database.
-
-If this isn't a risk you are concerned with, then KeePassium's OTP can be a useful feature.
-
-OTP codes are easy to set up and can be entered manually or using a QR code. Once set up, the code will be displayed as a field in the entry. Tap on it to copy it.
-
-<div class="grid" markdown>
-
-![Screenshot from the iOS app showing an entry for Mastodon Social with all credential fields filled, and an arrow pointing at a One-Time Password code.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-otp.webp)
-
-![Screenshot from the iOS app showing an Entry page with the option to "Set up one-time password (OTP)" selected at the bottom and displaying a menu with the options "Scan QR code" and "Enter manually".](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-otpentry.webp)
-
-</div>
-
-### AutoFill
-
-Depending on your usage, AutoFill can be an important feature for a password manager. AutoFill will allow KeePassium to recognize a login page and automatically fill all in the login credentials.
-
-To ensure AutoFill works smoothly, it's important to enter the correct website URL for each entry, specifically the page's URL where the credentials will be required.
-
-Ultimately, it's possible some websites will just not work with KeePassium's AutoFill. Some [issues](https://github.com/keepassium/KeePassium/issues/405) have been experienced while testing the app for this review. If you experience the same issue with a website, you can simply copy-paste the credentials manually in each corresponding field.
-
-<div class="admonition failure" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">AutoFill issues for some websites</p>
-
-A possible cause of AutoFill issues can be an incorrect entry URL that isn't the proper "Caller ID". To troubleshoot this, you can consult KeePassium's helpful [instructions](https://support.keepassium.com/kb/autofill-matching/) here.
-
-</div>
-
-#### AutoFill for iOS
-
-When set up correctly on iOS, a "Passwords" button should appear above the keyboard for websites where credentials have been stored in your database. If it doesn't, this could mean AutoFill was not set up properly from the [iOS Settings](https://support.keepassium.com/kb/autofill-setup-ios/).
-
-![Screenshot from a mobile browser with the login page for mastodon.social displaying empty credential fields and iOS showing a "Passwords" button over the keyboard.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-autofill.webp){width="400"}
-
-#### AutoFill for macOS
-
-There isn't a browser extension available for KeePassium on macOS. The desktop AutoFill feature integrates with the system as a [credential provider](https://www.reddit.com/r/KeePassium/comments/1isvjjd/comment/mdsbwwc/). Browser implementation depends on how each browser integrates this function. The desktop AutoFill feature does work flawlessly with Safari.
-
-To set up AutoFill for KeePassium, you will have to enable it from the [macOS Settings](https://support.keepassium.com/kb/autofill-setup-macos/). KeePassium will guide you through the process with clear instructions to follow:
-
-![Screenshot from the macOS app showing a setting popup to "Uncheck Keychain" with the option to enable KeePassium instead.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-autofillmac.webp)
-
-Once enabled, every website with a corresponding URL in your database will display a small key icon on the right of the credential fields.
-
-![Screenshot from Safari showing the cryptpad.fr login page and a key icon on the right of the Username empty field, with the option on the left to select either KeePassium or Keychain to fill the credentials.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-loginsafarimac.webp)
-
-Despite lacking a browser extension, integration with Safari and the macOS ecosystem works smoothly, and it will work with applications that aren't browsers as well.
-
-![Screenshot from the ProtonDrive login popup in macOS showing a menu over the Password field to select either KeePassium or Keychain to fill the credentials.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-loginappmac.webp)
-
-### Backups
-
-Backing up your database is essential with any KeePass-compatible app. Because there is no remote backup automatically stored by the application, you become responsible for protecting this data properly.
-
-KeePassium offers many options to help users back up their databases.
-
-#### Enable backup copies
-
-The option to back up local copies automatically will be enabled by default. You can disable it if you prefer (ideally not), or enable the option to "Show Backup Files" in "Settings" > "Database Backup". You can also adjust for how long you wish to keep the local backups (the default value is 2 months).
-
-#### Exclude from iCloud/iTunes
-
-There is an important feature to exclude your database file and KeePassium's backups of your database from your device's iCloud or iTunes backups. If you do not trust Apple with your encrypted database, you should enable this everywhere (excluding from iCloud/iTunes is disabled by default).
-
-If your database is stored locally (you might not see the option otherwise): From the "Databases" page, tap on the 3-dot button right to your database name (not the *circled* 3-dot button at the top, the one below). Then tap on "File Info" and *enable* the option "Exclude From iCloud/iTunes Backup" to make sure your database file stays outside your device's iCloud or iTunes backups.
-
-Secondly, to also exclude the backups created by KeePassium, inside a database tap on the "Settings" gear button on the lower-right, then "Database Backup", and *enable* "Exclude Backup Files from System Backup".
-
-<div class="grid" markdown>
-
-![Screenshot from the iOS app showing the File Info page for a database, with the "Exclude From iCloud/iTunes Backup" option enabled in green.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-fileinfo.webp)
-
-![Screenshot from the iOS app showing the Database backup page from Settings with the "Exclude Backup Files from System Backup" option enabled in green.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-backup.webp)
-
-</div>
-
-You will find the same option on macOS:
-
-![Screenshot from the macOS app showing the File Info for a database, with the "Exclude From iCloud/iTunes Backup" option enabled in yellow.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-fileinfomac.webp)
-
-#### Auto-delete backup files
-
-You can choose the backup files to get deleted automatically after a certain period of time. For this, go to "Settings" then the "Database Backup" again, and scroll down to "Keep Backup Files". Select a retention period that is secure for your threat model. You can also tap on "Delete ALL Backup Files" below to delete all backups at any time.
-
-#### Manual backups
-
-Finally, you can simply back up your database `.kdbx` file manually. For this you have the options to transfer the file from KeePassium via cable, cloud storage, local network, AirDrop, email, or even Signal's [Note to Self](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360043272451-Note-to-Self)!
-
-To [transfer](https://support.keepassium.com/kb/database-transfer/) your database file entirely offline to another Apple device, connect your device together via USB cable and follow these [instructions](https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/mac-help/mchl4bd77d3a/mac).
-
-If you stored your database locally on iPhone, you will find the file in Apple's "Files" > "On My iPhone" > "KeePassium". From there, you can long press the file to see options to move or share it.
-
-![Screenshot from the iOS Files showing the menu from a long-press over the local database file with the option to "Move" the file circled.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-movedatabase.webp){width="400"}
-
-#### Restore database from backup
-
-If you encounter any errors while managing your database, you can always restore it from a backup. Keeping multiple backup versions is a good idea to ensure you always have a functional file. Glitches and bugs are more likely to happen if you handle your database in unusual ways, with other software that may not have been tested for this usage yet.
-
-Restoring a database in KeePassium is a very straightforward operation. In the "Databases" section, tap on the 3-dot button on the upper-right, then select "Show Backup Files", if it isn't already on. Follow KeePassium's [instructions to restore](https://support.keepassium.com/kb/restore-backup/) a previous version.
-
-### Synchronization and direct connection
-
-While you can use KeePassium entirely offline, the app also offers options to synchronize your database with other KeePassium installations or other KeePass-compatible applications.
-
-There are two ways to do this. You can either simply store your database file in a cloud service of your choice and let KeePassium access this file, or you can use KeePassium's direct connection with certain cloud providers.
-
-You can see these two options from the app in "Settings" > "Network Access". From there, you have the option to select "Stay Offline", for maximum privacy, or "Allow Network Access", for maximum functionality.
-
-Whether you choose simple file synchronization or a direct connection, you can consult [this list](https://support.keepassium.com/kb/sync/) of cloud storage providers that have been tested by the KeePassium team and users to determine if your provider is supported.
-
-#### Stay offline, and synchronize through a cloud provider (recommended)
-
-This is KeePassium's [recommended method](https://keepassium.com/articles/cloud-sync-sandboxing/) to synchronize your database file(s) while maximizing privacy and minimizing external accesses. By default, KeePassium will remain offline, but you can store your database file with a cloud provider of your choice.
-
-This way, your cloud provider will manage the network communication, and KeePassium will only take care of decrypting your database. Because of system-enforced sandboxing, KeePassium will not have access to anything else on your cloud storage, only the database file(s) your have granted it access to.
-
-For example, you can store your database file on a cloud storage of your choice, then open it from KeePassium for iOS and also from KeePassXC on desktop. Both applications will access and manage the same file, therefore synchronizing your database.
-
-Be careful however when modifying your database. If synchronization isn't handled properly, this could cause errors that could corrupt your file. This is why it's important to test your setting first, and a good practice to keep a backup in a secure secondary location.
-
-![Screenshot from the iOS app showing the Network Access page with the option "Stay Offline" selected.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-offline.webp){width="400"}
-
-<details class="example" markdown>
-<summary>Synchronization through Proton Drive</summary>
-
-Proton Drive isn't part of the recommended and tested list of cloud providers for KeePassium. However, it was briefly tested during this review.
-
-Between KeePassium iOS and KeePassXC on desktop, some synchronization was possible through Proton Drive, but with mixed results.
-
-To make it work, first the Proton Drive app needed to stay unprotected by a PIN or biometrics, which isn't ideal if you have other sensitive files on this drive. There was also some delay to sync the database between mobile and desktop, and a few bugs occurred while testing.
-
-That being said, synchronization was *possible* through Proton Drive between KeePassium for iOS and KeePassXC on desktop, but maybe not recommended. If you choose this setup for yourself, it is *strongly* recommended to conduct adequate testing first using a dummy database, and once set up with your actual database, to keep a secondary backup in a separate location.
-
-Testing couldn't make synchronization work between KeePassium iOS and KeePassium macOS through Proton Drive. Issues seem to come from conflict resolutions on the Proton Drive side. Of course, because Proton Drive isn't even listed by KeePassium as a supported storage, this was simply conducted as an experiment and not an expectation.
-
-Because many of our readers might use Proton Drive as a cloud provider, just be aware it probably isn't a usable synchronization solution at this time.
-
-Using Proton Drive to simply back up a password database file manually without synchronization is still a viable option, however.
-
-</details>
-
-#### Allow network access, to connect directly from KeePassium
-
-In 2022, KeePassium added direct connection options for certain cloud storage providers as a workaround solution for providers that were not integrating well with the system. This should however be a secondary choice only, as it will have some downsides for your data privacy.
-
-You can find this option from the "Data Encryption" welcome window at the start where you can either create a database, import a database, or "Connect to Server".
-
-Although KeePassium will only use what is necessary for this functionality, it [will access](https://keepassium.com/privacy/app/#direct-connections) more data than with the "Stay Offline" synchronization option. The data used for this functionality will however remain between your device and the cloud provider.
-
-#### Supported cloud storage providers
-
-KeePassium offers full support for iCloud Drive, Box, Dropbox, Google Drive, OneDrive, Resilio Sync, Nextcloud, SFTP / WebDAV, and limited support for Mega and Cryptomator.
-
-You might be able to make it work with cloud providers that aren't listed here. However, if you decide to use a provider that isn't fully supported, make sure to properly test your setup with a dummy database first.
-
-### Additional features
-
-This review focused testing on the most commonly used features that are accessible from a free plan. Nonetheless, KeePassium offers many more features, and additional ones for paid plans. Here's a summary of some other interesting features that have not been covered yet:
-
-#### Passkeys
-
-Since December 2024, KeePassium added [support](https://keepassium.com/blog/2024/12/keepassium-2.0/#passkey-support) for passkeys with its 2.0 release.
-
-#### Family sharing (Premium)
-
-You can use Apple's Family Sharing feature to [share](https://support.keepassium.com/kb/family-sharing/) your KeePassium paid license with your family members.
-
-#### Multiple databases (Premium)
-
-With a paid plan, it's possible to create or import multiple databases with KeePassium. This can be very convenient if you use a separate database for work and for your personal life, for example.
-
-#### Printing database
-
-KeePassium has a quick option to print an entire database in plain text, in an easy-to-read format. If this is secure for you, it can be a convenient way to keep a backup paper copy of all your passwords in case of emergency (or for inheritance purposes).
-
-To do this, while inside your database tap on the tool-shaped button on the lower-left, then select "Print". Of course make sure to secure this printed data *very well*, as it could be your weakest link.
-
-<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Important security warning!</p>
-
-Depending on your printer's settings, you should be *very careful* when using the print function. This data will be sent in plain text to your printer, and even perhaps through a network (depending on your printer's settings).
-
-This **can represent a very high security risk**, depending on your printer setup and situation. The file with your plain text passwords could also remain stored in the printer's queue!
-
-The print function can be [disabled](https://support.keepassium.com/docs/mdm-appconfig/#allowDatabasePrint) for users with a Business license.
-
-</div>
-
-![Screenshot from the iOS app showing a preview to print a database file in plain text. The file lists the database name at the top, then each group, and within each group all entries' credentials including usernames, passwords in plain text, URL, and notes.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-print.webp)
-
-#### Read-only database
-
-You can protect a database from accidental changes by enabling this option. This will prevent any entries from being added, removed, or modified.
-
-It can be very useful if you have installed the app for someone who isn't comfortable with technology and want to make sure they cannot inadvertently delete an entry, for example.
-
-To enable it from KeePassium on iOS, go to the "Databases" section, long press on your database file, select "Database Settings", then enable "Read Only" at the top.
-
-#### File storage (attachments)
-
-You can use your database to store files!
-
-It's probably best to stay reasonable with this because files will quickly make your database very heavy. This could significantly slow down the encryption and decryption processes.
-
-That being said, it's a great way to store more sensitive files securely. The files will be encrypted with your database.
-
-You can either add files to an entry already created, or create a new entry named "Files" (or anything else you wish) to store all of your files together.
-
-To add a file, select the paperclip-icon tab at the top of an entry, then tap the plus-sign button at the bottom. Your files (attachments) will be accessible from any other KeePass-compatible application, like KeePassXC for example.
-
-![Screenshot from the macOS app showing the section tab within an Entry to add and view attachment files.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-attachmentmac.webp)
-
-Interestingly, KeePassium even uses a quite decent PDF viewer on iOS:
-
-![Screenshot from the iOS app showing a preview for a PDF file, in this case the document for Privacy by Design by Ann Cavoukian.](../assets/images/keepassium-review/keepassium-pdfviewer.webp){width="400"}
-
-## :material-thumb-up-outline: Nice to have
-
- You can see what was added, changed, or fixed for each KeePassium version from "Settings" in the "What's New" section.
-
- You can change the KeePassium and database icons from "Settings" > "Appearance" > in "App Icon" and "Database Icons".
-
- KeePassium has [excellent documentation](https://support.keepassium.com/)! This is handy to learn about features or to troubleshoot if you encounter any errors.
-
- You can see the full credits for the app from "Settings" in the "About KeePassium" section.
-
-<div class="admonition question" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Check the credits!</p>
-
-KeePassium not only credits its direct contributors but also lists credits for each graphics, code, and encryption algorithms used. You will find the same list of credits on KeePassium's GitHub [page](https://github.com/keepassium/KeePassium?tab=readme-ov-file#author-and-credits). This is a wonderful idea that more software should get inspired by.
-
-</div>
-
-## :material-thumb-down-outline: Downsides
-
-Even if KeePassium is a great secure application that is easy and pleasant to use, there are still a few downsides that should be mentioned:
-
- People with older versions of iOS or macOS will unfortunately not be able to use the application at all.
-
- KeePassium only works in the Apple ecosystem, and there are no versions for other systems at this time.
-
- If you are using a cloud provider that doesn't work smoothly with KeePassium and you need synchronization, you will unfortunately need to synchronize your database manually or change your cloud storage provider.
-
- AutoFill on iOS might not work for every account. This can be an inconvenience depending on your usage and which of your accounts (if any) are impacted.
-
- AutoFill on macOS might not work with your favorite browser (if it isn't Safari).
-
-## :octicons-key-16: Conclusion
-
-Overall, KeePassium is a privacy-focused, offline-first application, that has clearly prioritized user experience and user interface, while not neglecting security and privacy.
-
-When used with the basic and supported settings, it works fairly smoothly and allows enough customization to adapt to a variety of user needs and situations.
-
-The fact that KeePassium allows full compatibility with most other KeePass-compatible applications is an immense benefit compared to proprietary password managers.
-
-If you already keep your database in the KeePass file format, there are no downsides in trying KeePassium. If you aren't using this database format yet, this is a great opportunity to start and free yourself from locked-in systems that secure your precious passwords with obscurity rather than with openness.
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Unless credited otherwise, all screenshots from: Privacy Guides</small>
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ At Privacy Guides, we are always looking for ways to be more effective at our mi

 ## Em – Journalist

-![](https://forum-cdn.privacyguides.net/user_avatar/discuss.privacyguides.net/em/288/8211_2.png){ align=right }
+![](https://forum-cdn.privacyguides.net/user_avatar/discuss.privacyguides.net/ematprivacyguides/288/8211_2.png){ align=right }

 We’re excited to welcome Em (she/her), our new journalist, who will play an important role in taking our [articles](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/) to the next level. She will be focusing on creating in-depth, interesting posts that explore the most important topics in the world of online privacy, security, and digital rights. Em will also conduct interviews with experts in the industry, analyze reports and studies, and produce investigative news stories to keep our readers informed.

@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ The 26-year-old American who incorrectly identified the Australian girl and shar

 ### Targeted research, attack, and spyware

-For targeted attacks, aggressors will often use simple techniques to find a victim's data from what is already leaked online or openly shared on social media. For more sophisticated attacks, perpetrators might use criminal methods such as impersonation for [SIM swap attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam). When attackers have more resources, such as state-backed attackers, more sophisticated processes might be used, like device infection with [NSO Group's spyware](https://citizenlab.ca/tag/nso-group).
+For targeted attacks, aggressors will often use simple techniques to find a victim's data from what is already leaked online, or openly shared on social media. For more sophisticated attacks, perpetrators might use criminal methods such as impersonation for [SIM swap attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam). When attackers have more resources, such as a state-backed attackers, more sophisticated processes might be used, like device infection with [NSO Group's spyware](https://citizenlab.ca/tag/nso-group/).

 ### Maliciously stolen or negligently leaked

@@ -1,245 +0,0 @@
---
-date:
-    created: 2025-04-21T17:30:00Z
-categories:
-    - Explainers
-authors:
-    - fria
-tags:
-    - Privacy Pass
-license: BY-SA
-schema_type: BackgroundNewsArticle
-description: |
-  Privacy Pass is a new way to privately authenticate with a service. Let's look at how it could change the way we use services.
---
-# Privacy Pass: The New Protocol for Private Authentication
-
-![Cover photo of the Privacy Pass logo over a yellow background](../assets/images/privacy-pass/cover.webp)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Background Image: Thomas Ensley / Unsplash</small>
-
-Services that require authentication can correlate your activity on that service with your account, and that account is normally linked with payment information that could potentially link back to your real identity. With the Privacy Pass protocol, it doesn't have to be that way.<!-- more -->
-
-## History
-
-The story of Privacy Pass begins with a [paper](https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/4372.4373) by David Chaum from 1985 (he actually has an earlier paper from [1982](https://chaum.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/chaum_dissertation.pdf), but I'll be referencing this one), in which he laments the ever-increasing data collection by companies and government agencies.
-
-It's funny that all the way back in 1985 he talks about the same issues we deal with today: persistent identifiers tied to our real identity for transactions, government IDs, etc.
-
-Chaum proposes three solutions to the state of affairs he describes.
-
-### Pseudorandom Identifiers
-
-Instead of persistent identifiers like we now have with our government IDs, credit cards, etc., Chaum suggests randomly generated identifiers. For example, you could have a one-time unique identifier for each transaction at a shop.
-
-For ongoing relationships such as a bank, you can use a single pseudorandom identifier for that organization that you use continuously.
-
-### Card Computers
-
-One of the more quaint ideas in the paper is the idea of a small "card computer" on which you would perform transactions. Chaum's theoretical device resembles "a credit-card-sized calculator, and [includes] a character display, keyboard, and a limited distance communication capability (like that of a television remote control)".
-
-Nowadays, we carry around credit-card sized computers like it's nothing. The secret "card number" he describes would probably be your device PIN or even biometric authentication, which are already used to authenticate transactions.
-
-We still haven't *quite* reached Chaum's vision yet in some areas. His idea is for these "card computers" to fully replace ATMs and checkout terminals in stores. Essentially, he wants all transactions to be online transactions, with something like Apple Pay or Google Pay on your device mediating the transaction and using your device PIN to prevent fraudulent transactions.
-Making all transactions online transactions is an interesting idea. I think most people can share in the frustration of dealing with checkout terminals, especially the self-checkout ones with cameras pointed at your face.
-
-We're still falling short in a major area though.
-
-> card computers could be purchased or constructed just like any other personal computer, and would have no secrets from or structures unmodifiable by their owners.
-
-Current smartphones are non-upgradeable by their owners and can't be built from scratch like a desktop computer can. They also contain lots of black-box proprietary code. Even a Google Pixel, the gold standard of Android smartphone freedom that allows you to install your own operating system securely, still suffers from the same pitfalls.
-
-### Cryptography
-
-How do we ensure the pseudonyms can't be linked together? We already use cryptography to protect our communications. Chaum presents ways to similarly protect unlinkability using cryptography:
-
-> Simple mathematical proofs show that, with appropriate use of the systems, even conspiracy of all organizations and tapping of all communication lines cannot yield enough information to link the pseudonyms-regardless of how clever the approach is or how much computation is expended.
-
-## Blind Signatures
-
-Digital signatures normally are used to ensure that something like a piece of software or a message comes from the original sender and hasn't been tampered with. You want to know who the signer is for this system to work.
-
-But what if the signer and the one sending a request are different? Say you have a membership to a hypothetical *PrivacyGuides+ subscription service*, and you want to authenticate with it, but don't want to identify yourself. That's where blind signatures come in.
-
-### How it Works
-
-You can imagine blind signatures like an envelope that's been wrapped in [carbon paper](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_paper) with a window showing your pseudonym for that account, whether it be an account number, username, etc. They never see anything but the account identifier, or whatever they need to verify that you're a valid customer.
-The organization then signs it, indicating you're a valid customer, and you're allowed to access the service.
-
-Later, when you're presented with a request to authenticate as an active subscriber of PrivacyGuides+, you unwrap the envelope and discard it along with the carbon paper. You rewrap it in a new envelope with a window showing the signature and a different pseudonym, and the requester can then be sure that you're allowed to access PrivacyGuides+.
-
-![A diagram showing an envelope being wrapped in carbon paper, transferred to an organization, then passing over a boundary representing the unlinkability between the two transactions. Then the envelope is unwrapped, put in a new envelope with a window showing the signature from the previous organization, and presented to a different organization.](../assets/images/privacy-pass/blind-signatures.webp)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: [David Chaum](https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/4372.4373)</small>
-
-This system relies on the same strong cryptography that tried and true systems use, with the difference being the unlinkability between the credential issuer and the credential receiver.
-
-## Problems
-
-Services that don't require an account or payment to use are great; you can use them with Tor, clear your browser history, whatever you need to do to keep your activity private.
-
-But logging into an account completely invalidates all of that. Every time you log in or authenticate with a service, you have to identify yourself as the same person, linking all your previous activity together. Increasingly, we're asked to provide personal information in order to be able to use certain websites or services.
-
-### Linkability
-
-As long as you're logged into an account with a service, all your previous and current activity can be linked together, along with any data you provided such as an email address, payment information, etc.
-
-### Data Collection
-
-A lot of websites and services want to — [or are forced to](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_media_age_verification_laws_in_the_United_States) — filter out users below a certain age.
-
-We're starting to see a rise in extremely privacy-invasive age verification systems such as submitting a government ID when you want to access a website or invasive facial scans.
-
-### Blocking VPN and Tor Users
-
-Bots are a rampant problem for online services, leading them to sometimes block non-residential IP addresses such as those used for commercial VPNs and Tor.
-
-### CAPTCHAs
-
-When VPN and Tor users aren't blocked, they often have to deal with annoying [CAPTCHAs](http://www.captcha.net) that take up your precious time and use invasive [fingerprinting](https://developers.google.com/recaptcha/docs/v3).
-
-CAPTCHAs aren't even particularly good at detecting bots. With advances in AI, [bots can solve CAPTCHAs better than humans can](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2307.12108).
-
-## Privacy Pass
-
-Several blind signature-based solutions are in various states, some being implemented but not widely used, some being proposed browser APIs, and some being IETF standards.
-
-The landscape is very confusing right now, so I'll try to elucidate what I've found.
-
-[Privacy Pass](https://privacypass.github.io) started out as an attempt at a privacy-preserving way to bypass CAPTCHAs.
-
-It started out and is still an extension that can be installed on the [Chrome](https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/silk-privacy-pass-client/ajhmfdgkijocedmfjonnpjfojldioehi) or [Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/privacy-pass/) extension store, but it's since expanded to become an [IETF standard](https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/privacypass/about/).
-
-The Privacy Pass protocol has massively outgrown its original purpose. It's been updated to support multiple different schemes and purposes.
-
-There are three main roles that need to be played for the authentication mechanism to work. These can be filled by all the same party, by three separate parties, or any combination in between. You'll have increased privacy the more separation there is between each role, so ideally they should all be filled by different parties.
-
-### Origin
-
-The origin is the original website or service that's requesting a token for redemption. The client presents a valid token, or it must request more tokens.
-
-### Attester
-
-The attester is responsible for verifying something about the client. There are several ways it can achieve this, and it can use multiple at the same time if desired.
-
-#### CAPTCHA
-
-The attester can make the client solve a CAPTCHA to prove that it's not a bot. Not the most elegant solution but solving one CAPTCHA instead of multiple is preferable.
-
-#### Client State
-
-The attester can verify something about the client's state like the geographic location, whether the client has a valid account, or the number of issuance protocol invocations.
-
-#### Trusted Device
-
-If your client is running on hardware that's capable of producing device-level attestation, like a device with a secure element, then it can use that to verify that the device is trusted.
-
-For example, in Apple's Private Access Token implementation, they use certificates stored in the Secure Enclave and verify that your Apple account is in good standing.
-
-### Issuer
-
-The issuer is responsible for issuing tokens in response to requests from clients.
-
-The client presents tokens to the Origin once they're provided by the issuer.
-
-![diagram showing the structure of Private Access Tokens. The origin asks the client for a token, the client forwards the request to the attester which then forwards it to the issuer which then generates a token, sends it to the client which then sends it to the origin.](../assets/images/privacy-pass/private-access-tokens.webp)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: [Cloudflare](https://blog.cloudflare.com/eliminating-captchas-on-iphones-and-macs-using-new-standard/)</small>
-
-The tokens need to identify which issuers are trusted.
-
-They can also be interactive or non-interactive. Interactive means that you need a fresh token based on the challenge, whereas a non-interactive token can be stored for later use.
-
-Tokens can also be constrained to one specific Origin, or they can be used across Origins.
-
-### Private State Tokens
-
-[Private State Tokens](https://developers.google.com/privacy-sandbox/protections/private-state-tokens) (PSTs) are a [proposed browser API](https://github.com/WICG/trust-token-api) by Google as part of their [Privacy Sandbox](https://developers.google.com/privacy-sandbox). They're based on the Privacy Pass protocol.
-
-The main benefit of PSTs is that they provide a secure place for websites to store their tokens so that you don't need a separate extension for every service.
-
-A browser-level API, I imagine, would significantly reduce the development burden of browser-based services looking to implement Privacy Pass, but it would leave non-browser apps like VPNs high and dry.
-
-### Private Access Tokens
-
-[Private Access Tokens](https://blog.cloudflare.com/eliminating-captchas-on-iphones-and-macs-using-new-standard/) are based on Privacy Pass as well, but they don't seem to be specifically bound to the browser.
-
-It's unclear to me what really makes Private Access Tokens different from Privacy Pass itself, other than that Private Access Tokens seem to call for separation of the Attester and Issuer while Privacy Pass allows the origin, attester, and issuer to be the same. Delegating each role to a different party adds extra privacy.
-
-The origin website only knows your URL and IP from the initial connection.
-
-The attester only knows the data needed to verify you as a valid user.
-
-The issuer knows the site you visited, but doesn't know any of your device information that the attester used to verify you.
-
-### Kagi
-
-There are scant services actively using Privacy Pass to authenticate users, but a recent and very exciting example is [Kagi](https://blog.kagi.com/kagi-privacy-pass).
-
-With their implementation, you can now install their extension for [Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/kagi-privacy-pass/) and [Chrome](https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/kagi-search/cdglnehniifkbagbbombnjghhcihifij). Safari isn't supported at the moment, but their [Orion](https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/kagi-search/cdglnehniifkbagbbombnjghhcihifij) browser supports it and is WebKit-based.
-
-The need for an extension and lack of support for some platforms highlights the need for widespread support for Privacy Pass in browsers and platforms. It's not reasonable to expect every single platform to implement Privacy Pass themselves and users likely don't want to install a separate extension for every platform either.
-
-That said, I applaud Kagi for their efforts. They went above and beyond to protect their users' privacy. A few notes for future improvements, though.
-
-#### No Account Requirement
-
-Currently, Kagi requires an account in order to use it. Although they allow you to put in a fake email address on account creation since they don't [check it](https://kagifeedback.org/d/3813-enable-anonymous-registration-no-email/16), it's still a persistent identifier that could be eliminated.
-
-Their announcement blog post states that the ability to use Kagi fully without an account is a possibility for the future with an invitation to request the feature on their [forum](https://kagifeedback.org/d/6163-kagi-privacy-pass), so feel free to add your voice. A fully accountless search engine that doesn't rely on ads would be great to see.
-
-#### Separation of Origin, Attester, Issuer
-
-Kagi uses the [Shared Origin, Attester, Issuer](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-privacypass-architecture-03.html?_fsi=jKxFixnl#section-4.1) model for their implementation, which leaves the possibility of data being correlated between each step of the process, such as device fingerprinting or IP address being used to correlate a user who is issued tokens with when they redeem them.
-
-Kagi's onion service helps to mitigate this issue, but I think it would be a significant privacy improvement to separate all three entities.
-
-#### Remove Requirement for an Extension
-
-Having to install an extension is annoying as an end user and surely incurs some development cost in both the initial development and upkeep over time. I'm not sure how it would be possible to get rid of the extension as it seems like there's no good way to do so at the moment, but I'm hopeful that the Private State Token API could be used for that in the future if it ever gets fully standardized as a browser API.
-
-## Future Possibilities
-
-Overall, Privacy Pass is an exciting standard that is already improving the privacy of users on a wide scale.
-
-### Easier Adoption
-
-However, for widespread adoption of anonymous authentication for all online services, there needs to be an easier way for developers to implement it. I see Private State Tokens and Private Access Tokens as paths toward that goal, but they have their own limitations.
-
-Private State Tokens seem to be restricted to browsers, which is mostly fine since so many online services are accessed through the browser. It does put services like VPNs that operate outside the browser in a tight spot though.
-
-Private Access Tokens seem like a possible solution for device-wide Privacy Pass authentication, but the only place I've seen them implemented is in Apple's operating systems to identify users as real iOS or macOS users. I'd like to see wider adoption for more use cases than just that. It's unclear what the vision for Private Access Tokens is for the moment.
-
-### Carriers
-
-One of the biggest and most privacy-invasive services is mobile carriers. They take lots of personal information when you sign up, and then you have permanent identifiers, both IMSI identifying you as a subscriber and IMEI identifying your device, tied to that information while you use it. Because of how the cell network works, they also can tie that information to your physical location and all the traffic you send through their network.
-
-[Cape](https://www.cape.co/research) is a privacy-focused carrier that says they're "studying the use of blinded tokens and zero-knowledge proofs to disaggregate subscriber information." This would have a massive impact on user privacy, possibly allowing a KYC'd mobile subscriber to use their carrier at least semi-anonymously (it's unclear how IMSI and IMEI fit into this scheme, as well as location information).
-
-### VPNs
-
-Commercial VPNs typically require some kind of account identifier, even if it's just a randomized number.
-
-Apple's iCloud Private Relay uses RSA blind signatures to anonymously authenticate users to each of the two hops.
-
-Google's former [VPN](https://www.gstatic.com/vpn/google_vpn_white_paper.pdf) service also used blind signatures to protect users.
-
-![Diagram showing Google's blind signature VPN authentication scheme](../assets/images/privacy-pass/google-vpn.webp)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Image: [Google](https://www.gstatic.com/vpn/google_vpn_white_paper.pdf)</small>
-
-Hopefully we can see more VPN companies start to use Privacy Pass to authenticate users, I think it would be a massive improvement to user privacy.
-
-### Digital Cash
-
-Part of Chaum's vision was anonymous digital transactions using blind signatures, which he made a reality with his company [DigiCash](https://chaum.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/05-27-94-World_s-first-electronic-cash-payment-over-computer-networks.pdf).
-
-For whatever reason, *eCash*, as it was called, never caught on and the company filed for bankruptcy in 1998. We're left with the terrible current system where you need to input your credit card and personal information in order to make a transaction, which is easily traceable back to you. Not to mention the security implications, [credit card fraud](https://www.security.org/digital-safety/credit-card-fraud-report/) is rampant today.
-
-The dream isn't dead, however. Chaum's [eCash 2.0](https://chaum.com/ecash-2-0/) is quantum-resistant and has been built and tested in the Bank for International Settlements' [Project Tourbillon](https://www.bis.org/about/bisih/topics/cbdc/tourbillon.htm).
-
-### Digital ID
-
-Laws are being passed forcing 18+ websites and even [app stores](https://thehill.com/policy/technology/5179865-utah-app-store-age-verification-law/) to collect verify the ID of users. This is a massive slap in the face to the privacy and security of everyone. Data breaches and tracking are inevitable under the current system.
-
-Blind signatures could provide a private and secure way to verify age or other information without having to submit your entire ID or submit invasive face scans.
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ Element is based in the United Kingdom, which is of course no longer in the Euro

 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>

-![Element logo](../assets/img/social-networks/element.svg){ align=right }
+![Element logo](../assets/img/messengers/element.svg){ align=right }

 **Element** is the flagship client for the [Matrix](https://matrix.org/docs/chat_basics/matrix-for-im) protocol, an [open standard](https://spec.matrix.org/latest) for secure decentralized real-time communication.

@@ -1,383 +0,0 @@
---
-date:
-    created: 2025-05-10T15:00:00Z
-    updated: 2025-05-10T15:45:00Z
-categories:
-    - News
-authors:
-    - em
-description: Last week, OpenAI's CEO Sam Altman announced in San Francisco that the World project he co-founded, formerly known as Worldcoin, is opening six stores across the United States, allowing users of the project's app to scan their eyeballs.
-schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle
-preview:
-  color: "#c0322f"
-  text_color: "#ffffff"
-  site_logo: privacy-guides-logo-notext-colorbg-white.svg
-  icon: material/eye-circle
---
-
-
-# Sam Altman Wants Your Eyeball
-
-![Image of a red circle of light that resembles a human iris over a black background.](../assets/images/sam-altman-wants-your-eyeball/orb-cover.webp)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Photo: Flyd / Unsplash</small>
-
-Last week, OpenAI's CEO Sam Altman announced in San Francisco that the World project he co-founded, formerly known as Worldcoin, is opening six stores across the United States, allowing users of the project's app to scan their eyeballs.
-
-Simply put, the premise is this: scan your eyeball, get a biometric tag, verify yourself, buy our apps (and cryptocurrency). The scary part is the for-profit company developing the project has now gathered millions in venture capital investment, powerful partners, and is ready to expand and impose its [Minority Report](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minority_Report_(film)) style technology everywhere. **Welcome to Dystopialand.**<!-- more -->
-
-The World(coin) project is an initiative from the startup Tools for Humanity, co-founded by its CEO Alex Blania. Despite its friendly name, the for-profit corporation has been on the radar of many critics through the years already. From experts to journalists to privacy commissioners around the world, not everyone shares Blania's enthusiasm for his biometric-based technology.
-
-## What is the World App?
-
-The World project, recently rebranded from the Worldcoin project (possibly to convey better its expansionist ambitions) presented its plan for the World App to Americans this week. The project is now expanding well beyond the cryptocurrency it started from.
-
-The World App is an everything app, providing users with a *World ID*, that can be verified through the collection of biometric data in the form of an iris scan.
-
-The scan is then filtered and hashed to create a unique identifier that is stored as a so-called "proof of personhood" on the *World Network*, a blockchain-based protocol.
-
-The World App itself contains a collection of "Mini Apps", where users can manage their cryptocurrencies, chat together, play games, receive their paychecks even, and ultimately live their whole life within the closed "verified" ecosystem of the app.
-
-For a company constantly praising decentralization, it sure looks like they want to make sure they are the center of it all.
-
-To obtain this coveted verification code, users *must* be ready to share their precious eyeball data with the Orb.
-
-The Orb is a piece of hardware designed by Tools for Humanity to perform iris scans. It is available to access in the United States at one of the currently six locations in Austin, Atlanta, Los Angeles, Miami, Nashville and San Francisco (more to come soon), like some sort of biometrics collection ATM.
-
-The World project has for ambition to expand its reach across the United States to install 7,500 Orbs by the end of this year, so be prepared to see this dystopian technology everywhere soon.
-
-The San Francisco [presentation last week](https://www.theregister.com/2025/05/04/sam_altman_startup_world/) was clearly prepared to impress investors with its Apple announcement vibe. The promise of a quickly growing startup that everyone will soon want to work with, was repeated over and over in different flavors.
-
-Tools for Humanity bragged about many large partnerships that should make any privacy advocates shiver in dread: the Match Group dating apps conglomerate (Tinder, OkCupid, Hinge, Plenty of Fish), Stripe, and Visa are some of them.
-
-If they succeed in convincing enough people, many of us could soon have little choice but to unwillingly have to enroll.
-
-## World(coin) isn't new, you might have heard of its unethical practices already
-
-The project [claims](https://techcrunch.com/2025/04/30/sam-altmans-world-unveils-a-mobile-verification-device/) to have onboarded 26 million people already, including 12 million "users" who are verified (had their biometric data collected).
-
-These "users" are largely located in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. This is because the company started testing for its project there a few years ago, in regions where people often have fewer legal protections.
-
-In 2022, MIT Technology Review produced [an extensive investigation](https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/04/06/1048981/worldcoin-cryptocurrency-biometrics-web3/) on the startup's debut in an article titled: *Deception, exploited workers, and cash handouts: How Worldcoin recruited its first half a million test users.*
-
-The investigation revealed a collection of unethical practices to pressure the most vulnerable populations in signing up for Worldcoin, and **have their eyeball scanned in exchange for money** they desperately needed.
-
-Some participants had to provide much more personal information than the company says is required, such as emails, phone numbers, and even photos of official ID. Many people who gave their biometric data to Worldcoin were rushed and misinformed. Some who signed up didn't even have an email and had to create one. The "Orb operators" hired to perform the scans locally were often poorly trained, poorly informed, and unable to answer the questions asked by participants.
-
-So much so that [Kenya suspended the company's operations](https://techcrunch.com/2023/08/02/kenya-suspends-worldcoin-scans-over-security-privacy-and-financial-concerns/) in 2023 over concerns for privacy, security, and financial service practices.
-
-Some people who signed up never received the promised money. Some officials were bribed to give the impression to participants these operations were official and supported by the government.
-
-As Ruswandi, one of the persons targeted by this early campaign [remarked](https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/04/06/1048981/worldcoin-cryptocurrency-biometrics-web3/): "why did Worldcoin target lower-income communities in the first place, instead of crypto enthusiasts or communities?"
-
-Exploiting people in situations of poverty in order to test a biometric identification technology isn't a great way to start a project developed by a company called "Tools for Humanity".
-
-## Creating the problem, selling the solution
-
-Why develop such a technology in the first place?
-
-Sam Altman himself has [expressed concern](https://www.wired.com/story/sam-altman-orb-eyeball-scan-launch-us/) about the problem this alleged solution solves: the avalanche of fake accounts and pretend persons online caused by the new AI tools unleashed everywhere.
-
-The proposed use of a "proof of personhood" claims to solve this problem by allocating a unique identifier to each human, a personal code supposedly impossible to duplicate or cheat. Of course, this has [already been proven wrong](https://gizmodo.com/worldcoin-black-market-iris-data-identity-orb-1850454037).
-
-No one will miss the irony of the CEO of OpenAI, responsible for creating the largest share of this problem, expressing such concern **while continuing to feed the fire**.
-
-This is a classic case of creating a problem and selling the solution. Well, in this case it is more like ***selling* the problem and selling the solution**. As researcher and cryptocurrency critic [Molly White pointed out](https://www.citationneeded.news/worldcoin-a-solution-in-search-of/) in 2023:
-
-"That's right, the guy who's going to sell us all the solution to a worsening AI-powered bot infestation of the Internet and to AI-induced mass unemployment is the same guy who's making the AI in question."
-
-Sadly, this proposed solution also isn't really a solution, or at least it isn't a *good* solution. Indeed, this will **create a whole collection of new problems**, many much worse than a bot infestation.
-
-## The risks of sharing biometric data
-
-Biometric data is incredibly sensitive data, because it's irrevocably attached to a person. Whether it's from a face scan, palm scan, fingerprint, keystroke pattern, or iris scan, this data is part of our bodies and **cannot be changed like a password** if it gets compromised.
-
-For this reason, a growing number of legislations around the world now include special categories for such data collection, and require extra protections and supervision for it.
-
-There are many dangers in collecting and potentially endangering biometric data. First, if this data gets stolen, criminals can impersonate a victim much more convincingly, because they will have the "proof" to "verify" this is really you.
-
-While straight-up stealing your eyeball or face might still belong to science-fiction, the risk of getting the data produced *from* the scan stolen is very real.
-
-When the World project claims it is secure because biometric data isn't stored anywhere, even if that was true, the iris *code* derivative of this data is indeed stored and processed somewhere, and this can potentially be stolen.
-
-How hard will it be for a victim to recover an account from a biometric thief when everything is reinforcing the false narrative shared with investors that this technology can't be cheated?
-
-Then, there is the loss of pseudonymity protections online.
-
-If every social media account becomes tied to a unique biometric-based identifier, whether directly or indirectly, there is no pseudonymity anymore.
-
-Further, if only one account is allowed by "verified human", then no one can create separate accounts for their work life and personal life anymore. Creating separate accounts for separate purposes is an excellent privacy-preserving practice.
-
-Even if the identifier isn't tied to a legal name directly, accounts on different platforms using the same identifier could potentially get linked together. To be fair, it does seem Tools for Humanity worked to prevent different platforms from having access to the same code, but how well will this hold the test of time? Will platforms increasingly escalate privacy-invasive requests from this point, like they often do?
-
-**Pseudonymity saves lives.** It is an essential tool for the safety of the most vulnerable online. Killing pseudonymity by requiring unique biometric identification could endanger millions.
-
-This is a serious problem coming up with [age verification](age-verification-wants-your-face.md) processes as well, which World ID will soon also be a part of when [testing](https://www.engadget.com/cybersecurity/sam-altmans-eyeball-scanning-id-technology-debuts-in-the-us-130032856.html) its implementation for Tinder in Japan.
-
-Biometric data should never be used lightly. It should be reserved for the most extreme cases only.
-
-The regions who have adopted stronger regulations for biometric data collection are moving in the right direction. But will protective legislation be enough to resist the pressure from a for-profit VC-backed corporation with a valuation at billions?
-
-## Flipping the coin
-
-Tools for Humanity seems to be well aware of its creepiness factor, and of the criticisms brought by privacy commissioners around the world.
-
-Its recent Orb redesign from the previous cold (Black)mirror finish clearly tries hard to replace creepiness with cuteness.
-
-The company has also evidently invested a lot in presenting a pro-privacy image, likely in an attempt to reassure users (and investors).
-
-Unfortunately, many of these privacy-preserving claims are inaccurate. Some claims promoting "features" that might sound impressive to a neophyte's ear are actually just the baseline, and others sadly are misleading *at best*.
-
-While a few privacy-preserving efforts are indeed positive, most of the focus on privacy relates to marketing much more than any serious protections.
-
-## How privacy-preserving is it?
-
-Most people are still put off by the idea of having their eyeball scanned, and the company has evidently invested a lot in promoting a "privacy-preserving" image, possibly as an attempt to reassure unconvinced humans and [privacy commissioners](#privacy-legislators-arent-on-board) alike.
-
-But how much can we trust those claims?
-
-### Flawed assumption about what constitutes personal data
-
-The largest assumption about why this technology is "privacy-preserving" seems to come from the fact that the World App doesn't collect names, official IDs ([unless it does](https://www.toolsforhumanity.com/legal/privacy-notice#6-2-credentials-)), emails ([unless it does](https://www.toolsforhumanity.com/legal/privacy-notice#annex-i-%E2%80%93-legal-grounds/purposes-for-tools-for-humanity-data-processing-activities-)), phone numbers ([unless it does](https://www.toolsforhumanity.com/legal/privacy-notice#5-1-data-you-provide-to-us)), date of birth ([unless it does](https://world.org/blog/announcements/worldcoin-new-world-id-unverify-option-increases-personal-control-over-data)), or other identifiers.
-
-This assumption however neglects the fact that 1) even data that isn't attached to a legal name can be personal data, and 2) the iris code it produces from the iris scan *is* indeed personal data.
-
-While there are variations, most privacy regulations have similar definitions of what constitute personal data. The European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [defines](https://gdpr-info.eu/art-4-gdpr/) it as "any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person". An iris code derived from an iris scan of course fits this definition.
-
-Moreover, to create a World ID, the company also collects a face image. Together, the original iris scan and face photo are referred to as *Image Data*. For "privacy-preserving" purposes, Image Data of course never leaves the Orb device ([unless it does](https://world.org/legal/biometric-data-consent-form)).
-
-While it seems some effort has been made to protect the Image Data in some ways, the idea that derivative data from the scans isn't still sensitive personal information anymore is wrong.
-
-If there is a way for a person to scan their iris again and generate the same code, then this data relates to their identifiable person. This also means that *someone else* could scan their iris and generate the same code.
-
-As whistleblower [Edward Snowden rightfully pointed out](https://x.com/Snowden/status/1451990496537088000) in a 2021 tweet:
-
-“This looks like it produces a global (hash) database of people's iris scans (for 'fairness'), and waves away the implications by saying 'we deleted the scans!' Yeah, but you save the *hashes* produced by the scans. Hashes that match *future* scans. Don't catalogue eyeballs.”
-
-### Questionable reassurance about local data
-
-One of the biggest reassurances relates to the claim that sensitive biometric data (Image Data) is only stored locally. But this isn't completely accurate either, and there seems to be conflicting information about it from the company's own documentation.
-
-The World [white paper](https://whitepaper.world.org/#enrollment-process) specifies that:
-
-"The Orb verifies that it sees a human, runs local fraud prevention checks, and takes pictures of both irises. The iris images are converted on the Orb hardware into the iris code. Raw biometric data does not leave the device (unless explicitly approved by the user for training purposes)."
-
-However, according to the [Biometric Data Consent Form](https://world.org/legal/biometric-data-consent-form) users have to sign prior to data collection, if a user needs a fully verified World ID. Inevitably this sensitive biometric data will be sent to their phone, therefore leaving the Orb.
-
-After a user agrees to the form, they can keep the option for *Data Custody* disabled to have their biometric data deleted from the Orb "later", and have it uploaded to their phone (with all the risk that this entails).
-
-The other option users have is to enable Data Custody (if allowed in the user's country) and have this sensitive data sent to both their phone *and* to Tools for Humanity.
-
-This means the Orb inevitably sends this sensitive data to a mobile device. Then, this data is only as secure as the mobile device is. Which isn't so reassuring.
-
-The documentation does maintain this biometric data is sent as an "end-to-end encrypted data bundle", but this doesn't mean the data never leaves the Orb. It just means it leaves it while encrypted (which is really just the basics), and copies it to the user's device.
-
-Furthermore, future users are *strongly* incentivized to share their Image Data with Tools for Humanity, for algorithm improvement purposes. Pressure to opt in is even presented as a *convenience* option, because it would be cumbersome to have to come over for another scan after every update.
-
-As [stated](https://world.org/legal/biometric-data-consent-form) in the Biometric Data Consent Form:
-
-"This will likely help you avoid some inconvenience because, if we have your Image Data, then you will not need to return to an Orb to re-verify your digital identity when we update the software."
-
-The company continues to repeat they have a "privacy by default and by design approach". But **you can't keep your privacy-preserving cake and eat it, too**.
-
-### What does the white paper say
-
-In tech, a white paper is usually a research-based document produced by the developers that presents more technical details on an application, product, or process. It is especially valuable for products like the Orb and the World App, where security and privacy *should* be paramount, and therefore examined closer.
-
-Because it isn't an independent review, a white paper can also not be worth much more than a marketing pamphlet.
-
-To its credit, Tools for Humanity does [warn](https://whitepaper.world.org/#nature-of-the-whitepaper) in its white paper that this information is "intended for general informational purposes and community discussion only and do not constitute a prospectus, an offer document, an offer of securities, a solicitation for investment, or any offer to sell any product, item or asset (whether digital or otherwise)."
-
-Furthermore, the company makes sure to specify that "circumstances may change and that the Whitepaper or the Website may become outdated as a result; and the [World] Foundation is not under any obligation to update or correct this document in connection therewith."
-
-The document is also described as a "crypto-asset white paper".
-
-We have been warned.
-
-In its Privacy section, the white paper [states](https://whitepaper.world.org/#image-custody-opt-in) that "no data collected, including images taken by the Orb has or will ever be sold. Nor will it be used for any other intent than to improve World ID."
-
-However, its [Privacy Notice also states](https://world.org/legal/privacy-notice#8--when-we-share-your-data) that they may "share your personal information in connection with, or during negotiations concerning, any merger, sale of company assets, financing, or acquisition of all or a portion of our business by another company."
-
-If this happens, many regretful users might find themselves in [the same shoes as 23andMe users this year](https://www.techradar.com/health-fitness/23andme-is-bankrupt-and-about-to-sell-your-dna-heres-how-to-stop-that-from-happening), where the DNA collecting company started to look for buyers of its biometric data assets after filling for bankruptcy.
-
-Additionally, the Face Authentication section of the white paper [describes](https://whitepaper.world.org/#face-authentication) a process where encrypted facial biometrics collected from the Orb are used for authentication in the World App.
-
-Even if this data is stored on-device, it is still biometric data getting collected by the Orb then processed by the phone app. There is no question this is sensitive and personal biometric data, and it is indeed kept outside the Orb.
-
-Tools for Humanity lacks consistency in the various claims and statements found through its documentation and promotion material. It becomes difficult to know which version to trust, and if it is to be trusted at all.
-
-### No deletion on the blockchain
-
-Tools for Humanity's Privacy Policy declares that the company will delete all account data (when laws allow it) one month after it is closed (this is good). They also state they will delete entirely any inactive account after 2 years, and this is actually a great policy.
-
-But what happens to the World ID, transactions, and other data stored on the blockchain?
-
-While some thoughts have been put into deletion and some good mechanisms seem to have been implemented, unfortunately data stored on the blockchain might be "deletion-resistant".
-
-There's a possibility that **what happens on the blockchain stays on the blockchain, forever**.
-
-The policy [notes](https://www.toolsforhumanity.com/legal/privacy-notice#11--how-long-do-we-keep-your-data-) that:
-
-"Due to the public and immutable nature of blockchain technology, we cannot amend, erase, or control the disclosure of data that is stored on blockchains."
-
-So that is something to keep in mind if you value your right to delete.
-
-## Data security considerations
-
-Even if some thoughtful security features seem to have been implemented for the World App and its Orbs, nothing processing sensitive data at such a large scale should be left in the hands of a single for-profit, largely unregulated, organization.
-
-This would be like putting 8 billion eggs in a very fragile basket, held by someone paid to make the basket pretty and convince as many people as possible to put their precious single egg in it, with no incentive whatsoever to ensure the basket doesn't break. I would not want to put my egg in there, especially with how much it costs now.
-
-The idea of using one single *for-profit* app worldwide for "human verification", identity verification, age verification, money transactions, and storing official IDs (and so on and so forth) makes this application a *huge* target for criminals and hostile governments alike.
-
-It's good that the app had [security audits](https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/2023-08-worldcoin-orb-securityreview.pdf), made some [code available](https://github.com/worldcoin) as open source, and reportedly [plans](https://whitepaper.world.org/#why-custom-hardware-is-needed) to open a bug bounty program.
-
-However, there are still problems that remain. For example, the phone in this case becomes a single point of failure. The easiest way to steal someone's identity and money (all at once) will be to steal their phone data (whether physically or remotely). Even without criminal intent, what happens when someone just loses their phone? Or accidentally drop it in the pool? Or step on it?
-
-With **everything relying on a single app and a single device**, risk is greatly amplified.
-
-Outside the user's responsibility, Orb operators and Orb stores are susceptible to various attacks. This will increase exponentially with the number of users of course, as the target becomes bigger. In fact, Orb operators have [already been hacked](https://techcrunch.com/2023/05/12/hackers-stole-passwords-of-worldcoin-orb-operators/).
-
-Then, there is the appeal of fake identities and money fraud for criminals. Already, there is a [black market](https://gizmodo.com/worldcoin-black-market-iris-data-identity-orb-1850454037) for iris data in China, where people buy iris data (or verified World ID according to World) from people in Cambodia, Kenya, and other countries for a few dollars only. The vulnerability allowing this was reportedly fixed, but it is doubtful this is the last one we hear about.
-
-The Orb itself is also an important potential attack surface. With Tools for Humanity's ambition to fill the world with Orbs everywhere, will Orbs become the next version of the sketchy ATM? Where you might wonder if this funny-looking Orb is trustworthy enough to pay your bar tab without risking emptying your crypto wallet?
-
-## Privacy legislators aren't on board
-
-Despite all its privacy promotion material, the World project has failed to convince privacy commissioners around the world of their supposedly good intentions. Perhaps in this case actions speak louder than words, and privacy commissioners aren't so gullible.
-
-With the expansion the project plans this year, we can expect even more experts will examine the company's claims and challenge its "privacy-preserving" assumptions.
-
-There are many reasons to remain skeptical about these promises of privacy. Indeed, numerous countries have already suspended, fined, or called for investigation on the company's (mal)practices.
-
-### The company was fined for personal data violation
-
-In 2024, the company was [fined](https://cointelegraph.com/news/south-korea-fines-worldcoin-personal-data-violations) 1.1 billion Korean won for violating South Korea's Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA). The Worldcoin Foundation was also imposed corrective orders and recommendations. Organizations that are truly "privacy-first" rarely reach this point.
-
-The Data Custody feature, which allows (and encourages) users to share their biometric data with Tools for Humanity is now unavailable in South Korea.
-
-### Brazil has banned Worldcoin in the country
-
-In January this year, the National Data Protection Authority (ANPD) [banned](https://decrypt.co/305639/brazilian-regulator-denies-worldcoin-appeal-ban) Worldcoin's operations in Brazil, after the company's appeal was rejected.
-
-The ban comes from regulation stating that consent to process biometric data must be "free, informed, and unequivocal", which cannot be the case with the World project paying users in cryptocurrency in exchange for their iris scans. Data deletion concerns were also raised by the regulator.
-
-The World project tried again to appeal the decision, in vain.
-
-### Kenya and Indonesia suspended its operations
-
-In 2023, Kenya, one of the first countries where Worldcoin was available, [suspended](https://techcrunch.com/2023/08/02/kenya-suspends-worldcoin-scans-over-security-privacy-and-financial-concerns/) Worldcoin's operations citing concerns over the "authenticity and legality" of its activities related to privacy, security, and financial services.
-
-The worse part is that months before, the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner (ODPC) of the country had ordered Tools for Humanity to stop collecting personal information from its citizens. The company simply [ignored the ODPC order](https://techcrunch.com/2023/08/15/worldcoin-in-kenya/) and continued to collect biometric data from Kenyans. It only stopped after Kenya's ministry of interior and administration gave the suspension order later on.
-
-This again is quite far from the behavior of a company who genuinely values privacy.
-
-More recently on May 4th, 2025, Indonesia also [suspended](https://en.antaranews.com/news/353861/indonesia-suspends-worldcoin-world-id-operations-over-public-concerns) the World project's operation in the country over concerns related to user privacy and security. The Ministry of Communication and Digital will be summoning the project's local operators to clarify the operations and determine potential violation of the Indonesia's electronic system regulation.
-
-### German regulator ordered GDPR compliance following investigation
-
-In December 2024, the German regulator, the Bavarian State Office for Data Protection Supervision (BayLDA), [issued an order](https://decrypt.co/298090/german-watchdog-cracks-down-on-worldcoin-over-biometric-data) to obligate providing deletion procedures that comply with the GDPR within one month. Additionally, the BayLDA ordered the complete deletion of certain data records that were previously collected without sufficient legal basis.
-
-Again, the World Foundation is fighting the order and will [appeal](https://cointelegraph.com/news/german-watchdog-order-worldcoin-delete-data) the decision. The company tries to argue the data collected was "anonymized", a common strategy to try evading GDPR compliance, which does not regulate anonymized data.
-
-### Data protection authorities around the world are investigating
-
-In 2023, France's data protection authority the CNIL [investigated](https://www.reuters.com/technology/worldcoin-paris-office-checked-by-french-data-watchdog-2023-08-31/) Worldcoin's activities in the country. The same year, UK's privacy watchdog started its own [inquiry](https://www.reuters.com/technology/uk-data-watchdog-make-enquiries-worldcoin-crypto-project-2023-07-25/) into the company's operations.
-
-In 2024, Hong Kong's Office of the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data [raided](https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3250480/hong-kong-eye-scan-cryptocurrency-scheme-probed-citys-privacy-watchdog) six Worldcoin offices citing personal information privacy and security concerns.
-
-There is no doubt more countries and regions will follow with similar investigations and bans as the World project expands to its ambition.
-
-### In the United States, the app is restricted in some states
-
-Even in the US where the company is headquartered, the app is [restricted](https://www.wired.com/story/sam-altman-orb-eyeball-scan-launch-us/) in some states. The announcement for its event this month carried a warning that the World is “not available for distribution via World App to people, companies or organizations who are residents of, or are located or incorporated in the State of New York or other restricted territories.”
-
-We can also expect the project will encounter roadblocks in states that have passed [regulations specific to the collection of biometric data](https://www.huschblackwell.com/2024-state-biometric-privacy-law-tracker). This includes states like Illinois, Texas, Washington, and Colorado.
-
-### Some regions have special regulations for biometric data
-
-Around the world the number of biometric-specific regulations is growing. Even without a regulation specific to this type of data, many privacy laws have started to include special categories and requirements to govern the collection and processing of sensitive biometric data. As companies are increasingly requesting such collection, legislations to protect users are essential.
-
-For example, the province of Quebec in Canada has recently implemented [strong protections for biometric data](https://www.cai.gouv.qc.ca/protection-renseignements-personnels/sujets-et-domaines-dinteret/biometrie?%2F) with its new privacy law, the Law 25. Consent isn't sufficient to collect biometric data, as the law requires organizations to explicitly justify the necessity for such collection in the first place. Importantly, any violation of Law 25 comes with fines as hefty as the GDPR's.
-
-More privacy laws should implement such protections quickly, as corporations collecting biometric information carelessly are multiplying fast.
-
-## Welcome to full dystopia
-
-The most concerning part of the World project's recent expansion isn't its cryptocurrency grift as much as stepping out of it.
-
-If cryptocurrency enthusiasts wish to share their personal data to get into a special cryptocurrency club, they might (although privacy regulations should still protect them). But using financial coercion to get new users by exploiting vulnerable communities living in poverty is **absolutely despicable**.
-
-Further, the fact that the World project has partnered with powerful players in the financial, gaming, and even dating sectors *should terrify everyone*.
-
-Beyond cryptocurrency, if platforms start to demand users everywhere to verify they are a human and verify they are an adult through the World ID system, then **everyone will soon be subjected to this**.
-
-The amount of money invested in the project means there will be an incredible pressure to spread it everywhere soon, and *monetize* it. There will be a *strong* incentive to monetize our data and to monetize our proof of humanity. This isn't trivial.
-
-The well-known dating app Tinder has already partnered with World ID to verify the age of users in Japan. If this experiment works well, and if users comply without objection, this could be soon mandatory for *all* dating apps.
-
-Let's not stop at dating apps. The World project has already announced last week they will also be working with Razer to verify humanity of online gamers. How far can this go in the age of age verification? Will every online games with mature content soon require a World ID to play?
-
-What about social media? Tools for Humanity's team have insisted the age of AI made us incapable of detecting if we are interacting with bots online. Therefore, they must valiantly come to our rescue to verify our humanity scanning our eyeballs (which bots tragically lack). What if this human verification is expanded to all our social media accounts? Certainly, regulators pushing for authoritarian age verification online would be delighted by such a product.
-
-Then, it comes for our money. The everything app of course offers payment and money management features. This is the app where you can keep your whole wallet, containing all your official IDs, your cryptocurrencies of all kind, and even connect with your less hyped regular bank accounts.
-
-Imagine a single app, owned by a single for-profit corporation, that collects and processes all the data from all your transactions online, all your communications online, that you absolutely have to continue using for your other social media accounts, your gaming life, and your dating life.
-
-There could soon be no way to escape the grasp of World's everything app. Actually, [some governments](https://www.theregister.com/2025/05/04/sam_altman_startup_world/) (Taiwan and Malaysia) have already started using it for official services, because why not.
-
-**The ways this could degenerate fast into full dystopia are infinite**, and very real.
-
-The company even plans to ship next year the Orb Mini, a pocket-size personal spy-device with which users will be able to scan their own eyeballs on the go!
-
-But why stop there? Why not scan other people's eyeballs as well? Maybe all government officials could carry one? Maybe every payment terminal could have one too?
-
-We will find out soon, in one or two years.
-
-Tools for Humanity also bragged about the numerous utilities its new technology could make possible. For example, for event tickets! Order a concert ticket with your "proof of personhood" then maybe confirm you are the owner by having your eyeballs scanned to assist to a Rage Against the Machine concert?
-
-The only fun part in this is the irony.
-
-Tools for Humanity with its expansionist dream is without a doubt hungry enough to eat the whole World™️.
-
-### A new world of wealth inequalities
-
-The company brings up a few times the mention of Universal Basic Income (UBI) in its documentation, it even mentions it briefly in its [white paper](https://whitepaper.world.org/#ubi).
-
-While puzzling, it appears Tools for Humanity might consider its cryptocurrency bribe to sign up and subsequent token giveaways as some form of UBI? Or perhaps this is only one of its other ambition to control all the financial systems in the entire world. Why UBI is even mentioned at all in this context is unclear.
-
-Regardless, it's worth mentioning a for-profit company giving cash back in exchange for biometric data isn't UBI at all, it's just a **creepy membership card points**, at best.
-
-While the World project works hard to present the idea this is a tool for the people, where everyone is equal, wealth will definitely [not be distributed evenly](https://whitepaper.world.org/#wld-token-allocation) in this new World order.
-
-Already, 11.1% of World's cryptocurrency tokens (WLD) have been distributed to the World's team, 13.6% to investors, and 0.3% are reserved for Tools for Humanity. This means these entities would share together 25% of the wealth, while 75% of the world's population (according the Tools for Humanity's ambition) would have to share 75% of what's left.
-
-In the new "human" world this corporation envisions, Tools for Humanity and its investors would own 1 quarter of the entire world's wealth. There is nothing equitable or communal in a system like this.
-
-It's important not to forget this everything app will do everything to pressure its users in eventually using Worldcoins, its ultimate goal.
-
-From Tinder's mandatory age verification to cryptocurrency financial ruin in one single move.
-
-## The normalization of surveillance
-
-Even if this process was perfectly secure and perfectly private (which it is definitely not), the problem remains the normalization of surveillance.
-
-This isn't limited to Tools for Humanity, although the way the company tries to advertise itself as a privacy-first organization makes it even more important to scrutinize.
-
-But anyone else with a similar approach to biometric data collection for verifying humanity or age or legal names should be on our radar. Moreover if it's a for-profit corporation with the power to impose this technology on us everywhere in the world.
-
-One company should never have such power.
-
-Further, biometric data should never be used for trivial purposes like "proof of personhood" or age verification. No amount of supposedly "privacy-preserving" features can change this.
-
-The premise itself is flawed from the start to respect privacy rights.
-
-While the problem of proving identity can still be an important one to solve in *some* context, the solution to this can never be monopolized by for-profit corporations.
-
-Regardless of Tools for Humanity's intentions and efforts to convince us to trust them, any similar technology is just another step towards a global system of mass surveillance, where ultimately privacy rights and human rights are lost.
-
-So, should you scan your eyeball to get a verified World ID?
-
-**No.**
-
-**No, you really shouldn't.**
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 date:
    created: 2022-07-07T19:00:00Z
-    updated: 2025-05-24T14:00:00Z
+    updated: 2024-08-23T19:00:00Z
 authors:
    - contributors
    - matchboxbananasynergy
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle
 ---
 # Signal Configuration and Hardening Guide

-[Signal](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication#signal) is a widely regarded instant messaging service that is not only easy to use but is also private and secure. Signal's strong end-to-end encryption implementation and metadata protections provide a level of assurance that only you and your intended recipients are able to read communications.<!-- more -->
+[Signal](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication#signal) is a widely regarded instant messaging service that is not only easy to use but is also private and secure. Signal's strong E2EE implementation and metadata protections provide a level of assurance that only you and your intended recipients are able to read communications.<!-- more -->

 This guide details actions you can take to configure and harden Signal in accordance with your [threat model](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/threat-modeling/).

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This guide details actions you can take to configure and harden Signal in accord

 ### Signal PIN

-When you register for Signal with your phone number, you will be asked to set up a Signal PIN. This PIN can be used to recover your profile, settings, contacts, and blocked users in case you ever lose or switch devices.
+When you register for Signal with your phone number, you will be asked to set up a Signal PIN. This PIN can be used to recover your profile, settings, contacts and who you've blocked in case you ever lose or switch devices.

 Additionally, your Signal PIN can also double as a registration lock that prevents others from registering with your number.

@@ -34,18 +34,18 @@ Additionally, your Signal PIN can also double as a registration lock that preven

    The server will not enforce the registration lock after 7 days of inactivity. After that, someone will be able to reset the PIN at registration and register with your phone number. This will wipe the data stored in your Signal account, as it is encrypted by the PIN, but it won't prevent someone from registering with your number provided that they can receive a text on it.

-**Important update**: Since this blog post was published, there have been changes to the registration flow for Signal. You should read about this [here](signal-number-registration-update.md).
+**Important update**: since this blog post was published, there have been changes to the registration flow for Signal. You should read about this [here](signal-number-registration-update.md).

 If you haven't set up a Signal PIN, or have previously opted out of setting one up, follow these steps on Android/iOS:

- Select :material-dots-vertical: → **Settings** → **Account** → **Signal PIN**
+- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Account** > **Signal PIN**
 - Select **Create new PIN**

-Signal will prompt you to enter a PIN. We suggest using a strong, alphanumeric PIN that can be stored in a [password manager](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/passwords/).
+Signal will prompt you to enter a PIN. We suggest using a strong alphanumeric PIN that can be stored in a [password manager](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/passwords/).

 Once you have done that, or if you already have set up a PIN, make sure that **Registration Lock** is also enabled.

- Select :material-dots-vertical: → **Settings** → **Account** → **Signal PIN**
+- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Account** > **Signal PIN**
 - [x] Turn on **Registration Lock**

 !!! Important
@@ -65,12 +65,12 @@ It is best practice to always compare safety numbers with your contacts. This ca

 !!! Important

-    In order for safety numbers to also verify that the intended recipient has access to the device you're verifying, you need a secondary communication channel where you can authenticate the person that is holding the device. For example, an in-person meeting or a video call.
+    In order for safety numbers to also verify that the intended recipient has access to the device you're verifying, you need a secondary communication channel where you can authenticate the person that is holding the device. For example, an in-person meeting or during a video call.

 To view the safety number for a particular contact, you need to follow these steps within Signal:

 - Go to a chat with a contact.
- Select the chat header or :material-dots-vertical: → **View Safety Number**
+- Select the chat header or :material-dots-vertical: > **View Safety Number**

 Once you've compared the safety numbers on both devices, you can mark that contact as **Verified**.

@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ A checkmark will appear in the chat header by your contact's name when the safet

 After doing that, any time the safety number changes, you'll be notified.

-If the safety number with one of your contacts changes, we recommend asking the contact what happened (if they switched to a new device or re-installed Signal, for example) and verifying the safety numbers again.
+If the safety number with one of your contacts changes, we recommend asking the contact what happened (if they switched to a new device or re-installed Signal, for example) and verify the safety numbers again.

 For more demanding threat models, you should agree on a protocol with your contacts in advance on what to do in case the safety number ever changes.

@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ It is good practice to set up disappearing messages in Signal's settings so that

 On Android/iOS:

- Select :material-dots-vertical: → **Settings** → **Privacy**
+- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Privacy**
 - Under **Disappearing messages**, select **Default timer for new chats**
 - Select the desired amount of time and select **Save**

@@ -119,20 +119,22 @@ Your recipient doesn't make any requests unless they open the link on their end.

 On Android/iOS:

- Select :material-dots-vertical: → **Settings** → **Chats**
+- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Chats**
 - [ ] Turn off **Generate link previews**

 ### Screen Security

-Signal allows you to prevent a preview of the app being shown (i.e., in the app switcher) unless you explicitly open it. This option can be found in :material-dots-vertical: → **Settings** → **Privacy**.
+Signal allows you to prevent a preview of the app being shown (i.e., in the app switcher) unless you explicitly open it.

-=== "Android"
+On Android:

-    - [x] Turn on **Screen Security**
+- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Privacy**
+- [x] Turn on **Screen Security**

-=== "iOS"
+On iOS:

-    - [x] Turn on **Hide Screen in App Switcher**
+- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Privacy**
+- [x] Turn on **Hide Screen in App Switcher**

 ### Screen Lock

@@ -142,22 +144,26 @@ To mitigate this, you can leverage the Screen Lock option to require additional

 On Android/iOS:

- Select :material-dots-vertical: → **Settings** → **Privacy**
+- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Privacy**
 - [x] Turn on **Screen Lock**

 ### Notification Privacy

 Even when your phone is locked, anyone who can lay eyes on the device can read messages and sender names from your lock screen.

-On Signal, you have the ability to hide message content and sender name, or just the message content itself. This option can be found in :material-dots-vertical: → **Settings** → **Notifications** → **Show**.
+On Signal, you have the ability to hide message content and sender name, or just the message content itself.

-=== "Android"
+On Android:

-    - Select **No name or message** or **Name only**, respectively.
+- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Notifications**
+- Select **Show**
+- Select **No name or message** or **Name only** respectively.

-=== "iOS"
+On iOS:

-    - Select **No name or Content** or **Name Only**, respectively.
+- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Notifications**
+- Select **Show**
+- Select **No name or Content** or **Name Only** respectively.

 ### Call Relaying

@@ -165,21 +171,14 @@ Signal allows you to relay all calls (including video calls) through the Signal

 On Android/iOS:

- Select :material-dots-vertical: → **Settings** → **Privacy** → **Advanced**
+- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Privacy** > **Advanced**
 - [x] Turn on **Always Relay Calls**

 For incoming calls from people who are not in your Contacts app, the call will be relayed through the Signal server regardless of how you've set it up.

-### Bypass Internet Censorship
+### Proxy Support

-If Signal is blocked in your country, it has a built-in "Censorship Circumvention" feature that uses domain fronting to bypass restrictions.
-
-On Android/iOS:
-
- Select :material-dots-vertical: → **Settings** → **Privacy** → **Advanced**
- [x] Turn on **Censorship Circumvention**
-
-Additionally, Signal allows you to set up a proxy to bypass censorship.
+If Signal is blocked in your country, Signal allows you to set up a proxy to bypass it.

 !!! Warning

@@ -187,13 +186,13 @@ Additionally, Signal allows you to set up a proxy to bypass censorship.

 You can learn more about Signal's proxy support on their [website](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360056052052-Proxy-Support).

-### Disable Signal Call History (iOS only)
+### Disable Signal Call History (iOS)

 Signal allows you to see your call history from your regular phone app. This allows your iOS device to sync your call history with iCloud, including whom you spoke to, when, and for how long.

 If you use iCloud and you don’t want to share call history on Signal, confirm it’s turned off:

- Select :material-dots-vertical: → **Settings** → **Privacy**
+- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Privacy**
 - [ ] Turn off **Show Calls in Recents**

 ## Signal Hardening
@@ -202,13 +201,13 @@ If you use iCloud and you don’t want to share call history on Signal, confirm

 While it may be tempting to link your Signal account to your desktop device for convenience, keep in mind that this extends your trust to an additional and potentially less secure operating system.

-Avoid linking your Signal account to a desktop device to reduce your attack surface if your threat model calls for protecting against [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/common-threats/#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }.
+Avoid linking your Signal account to a desktop device to reduce your attack surface, if your threat model calls for protecting against [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/common-threats/#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }.

 ### Molly (Android)

-If you use [Molly](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/#molly-android) on Android to access the Signal network, below is an overview of the many privacy- and security-enhancing features that you may want to explore. You can find a full list of Molly's [features](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#features) on the project's repository.
+If you use [Molly](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/#molly-android) on Android to access the Signal network, there are many privacy and security-enhancing features that you may want to explore.

-#### Data Encryption at Rest
+#### Privacy and Security Features

 Molly has implemented database encryption at rest, which means that you can encrypt the app's database with a passphrase to ensure that none of its data is accessible without it.

@@ -225,16 +224,14 @@ For the database encryption feature to be useful, two conditions must be met:

 If both of the above conditions are met, the data within Molly is safe as long as the passphrase is not accessible to the attacker.

-#### RAM Wiper
-
 To supplement the database encryption feature, Molly securely wipes your device's RAM once the database is locked to defend against forensic analysis.

 While Molly is running, your data is kept in RAM. When any app closes, its data remains in RAM until another app takes the same physical memory pages. That can take seconds or days, depending on many factors. To prevent anyone from dumping the RAM to disk and extracting your data after Molly is locked, the app overrides all free RAM memory with random data when you lock the database.

-#### Calls and Contacts
-
-There is also the ability to configure a SOCKS proxy in Molly to route its traffic through the proxy or [Tor via Orbot](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/alternative-networks/#orbot). When enabled, all traffic is routed through the proxy and there are no known IP or DNS leaks. When using this feature, [call relaying](#call-relaying) will always be enabled, regardless of the setting.
+There is also the ability to configure a SOCKS proxy in Molly to route its traffic through the proxy or [Tor via Orbot](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tor#orbot). When enabled, all traffic is routed through the proxy and there are no known IP or DNS leaks. When using this feature, [call relaying](#call-relaying) will always be enabled, regardless of the setting.

 Signal adds everyone who you have communicated with to its database. Molly allows you to delete those contacts and stop sharing your profile with them.

-To supplement the feature above, as well as for additional security and to fight spam, Molly offers the ability to block unknown contacts whom you've never been in contact with or those who are not in your contact list without you having to manually block them.
+To supplement the feature above, as well as for additional security and to fight spam, Molly offers the ability to block unknown contacts that you've never been in contact with or those that are not in your contact list without you having to manually block them.
+
+You can find a full list of Molly's [features](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#features) on the project's repository.
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 date:
    created: 2025-04-01T05:40:00Z
 categories:
-    - Opinion
+    - Announcements
 tags:
    - April Fools
 authors:
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ schema_type: SatiricalArticle
 preview:
  logo: blog/assets/images/the-dangers-of-end-to-end-encryption/fire.svg
 ---
-# The Dangers of End-to-End Encryption
+# The Dangers of End-to-End Encryption - Happy April fools!

 ![An image showing a burning car](../assets/images/the-dangers-of-end-to-end-encryption/cover.webp)

@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
---
-date:
-    created: 2025-05-02T11:20:00Z
-    updated: 2025-05-03T15:00:00Z
-categories:
-    - News
-authors:
-    - jonah
-tags:
-    - PSA
-    - Tor
-description: |
-  PSA: The security level slider in Tor Browser (and Mullvad Browser) does not fully apply until restarting the browser. This presents a high risk to people who switch from Standard to Safer security during a browsing session in order to protect themselves from browser exploits.
-schema_type: ReportageNewsArticle
-preview:
-  cover: blog/assets/images/tor-security-slider-flaw/cover.png
---
-# A Flaw With the Security Level Slider in Tor Browser
-
-![Illustration showing Tor's security level options with question marks next to the selected Safer level](../assets/images/tor-security-slider-flaw/cover.png)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Jonah Aragon / Privacy Guides</small>
-
-[Tor Browser](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tor/#tor-browser) and [Mullvad Browser](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/desktop-browsers/#mullvad-browser) users should be aware of a flaw with the Security Level slider: Not all protections advertised by the browser are properly engaged until the browser is fully restarted.<!-- more -->
-
-This flaw was anonymously reported to *Privacy Guides* by a member of our [community](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/), and I confirmed it via the latest Tor Browser 14.5.1 on macOS. Additionally, I confirmed this behavior in Mullvad Browser 14.5.1 on macOS.
-
-~~I was unable to find any documentation or open GitLab issues with Tor regarding the need to take additional steps before security settings are fully applied, and~~ Tor Browser documentation does not note that a restart is required, nor does it prompt users to restart the browser after security changes are made. (update: see below)
-
-This presents a high risk to people who switch from Standard to Safer security during a browsing session with the goal to protect themselves from browser exploits.
-
-## Demonstration
-
-The effect can be easily demonstrated in your own Tor Browser install by running a JavaScript benchmark such as [JetStream 2.2](https://browserbench.org/JetStream/). These benchmarks rely on a technology called Just-in-Time (JIT) compilation to improve performance, but JIT is linked to numerous security vulnerabilities in modern web browsers. The "Safer" security level normally disables JIT entirely to prevent these issues, however, you can see virtually no performance impact when switching to the Safer security level in Tor Browser and running the benchmark again:
-
-<figure markdown="span">
-  ![JetStream2 benchmark results with a score of 196 and the shield indicator in the browser's toolbar indicating that Standard security level is set](../assets/images/tor-security-slider-flaw/standard-level-jetstream2.png)
-  <figcaption>JetStream 2.2 benchmark results in <strong>Standard</strong> mode</figcaption>
-</figure>
-
-<figure markdown="span">
-  ![JetStream2 benchmark results with a score of 191 and the shield indicator in the browser's toolbar indicating that Safer security level is set](../assets/images/tor-security-slider-flaw/safer-level-before-restart-jetstream2.png)
-  <figcaption>JetStream 2.2 benchmark results in <strong>Safer</strong> mode, <em>without</em> restarting Tor Browser</figcaption>
-</figure>
-
-While the performance is virtually identical between these two runs, *after* restarting Tor Browser and re-running the test, we see drastically lower performance results, in line with what we would expect with JIT properly disabled:
-
-<figure markdown="span">
-  ![JetStream2 benchmark results with a score of 33 and the shield indicator in the browser's toolbar indicating that Safer security level is set](../assets/images/tor-security-slider-flaw/safer-level-after-restart-jetstream2.png)
-  <figcaption>JetStream 2.2 benchmark results in <strong>Safer</strong> mode, <em>after</em> restarting Tor Browser</figcaption>
-</figure>
-
-As you can see, there is no visible indicator that anything is different between the last two runs, and there was no prompt to restart the browser after changing these settings. However, this clearly indicates that JavaScript technologies that are meant to be disabled in Safer mode can still be accessed by websites until the browser is restarted, potentially opening you up to browser exploits if you are unaware of the additional steps required to secure yourself.
-
-## Safest Mode
-
-We have not tested or verified the full extent of security features which require a browser restart. We tested whether JIT remained enabled after switching to Safer mode because it was the easiest feature to test. Safest mode disables JavaScript entirely, so the demonstration above will not demonstrate this problem exists when switching to Safest mode.
-
-However, it is possible that there are *other* features normally disabled by Safest mode which remain enabled until you restart your browser. Out of an abundance of caution, we recommend always restarting your browser after changing this setting, regardless of whether you are switching to Safer or Safest mode.
-
-## Conclusion
-
-The Tor Project advertises the security slider as a way to conveniently adjust the protections that the Tor Browser provides, but does not note additional steps necessary to ensure those settings actually go into effect.
-
-This is our public service announcement to make sure you **always completely restart Tor Browser after adjusting your security settings.** Relying on these indicators can create a false sense of security and potentially expose users relying on this security level slider to greater risk than they expect based on Tor Browser's UI and documentation.
-
-Hopefully, Tor Browser will prompt or force their users to restart the browser after adjusting these settings in a future update.
-
---
-
-**Update (5/3):** A few hours following the publication of this article, the Tor Project emailed us the following statement:
-
-> The Tor Project is aware of this issue, and it is being tracked and actively
-> addressed. Those interested can follow the discussion and progress here:
-> <https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/42572>. In
-> addition to a restart prompt, we’re also exploring broader improvements to the
-> security level system, including aligning it more closely with Tor Browser's
-> updated threat model\[1] and possibly delegating even more of its back-end
-> to NoScript for additional flexibility. These improvements may be part of the
-> upcoming 15.0 release cycle.
->
-> \[1]: <https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/wiki/-/wikis/>
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
---
-date:
-    created: 2025-05-16T16:00:00Z
-categories:
-    - Opinion
-authors:
-    - em
-description: If you, like myself, have been inhabiting the internet for a few decades, you're probably familiar with the old adage IRL (In Real Life). The acronym was used a lot when the distinction between online life and offline life was much greater than it is now. In today's world, can we really keep referring to our digital life as being somehow disconnected from our real life?
-schema_type: OpinionNewsArticle
-preview:
-  cover: blog/assets/images/your-online-life-is-irl/irl-cover.webp
---
-
-# Your Online Life Is IRL
-
-![Photo of an illuminated red street sign with the word Internet on it.](../assets/images/your-online-life-is-irl/irl-cover.webp)
-<small aria-hidden="true">Leon Seibert / Unsplash</small>
-
-If you, like myself, have been inhabiting the internet for a few decades, you're probably familiar with the old adage IRL: In Real Life.
-
-The acronym was used a lot when the distinction between online life and offline life was much greater than it is now. In today's world, can we really keep referring to our digital life as being somehow disconnected from our "real life"?<!-- more -->
-
-While it's true that pseudo-anonymity online is still alive and well, most people don't hide their real identity online because it's much different from their personality offline, but generally simply as a protection.
-
-Even when using pseudonyms, online life is still part of *real life*.
-
-The proportion of time we spend on the connected world today is also far greater than it was before. We often chat with friends online, work online, communicate with our family online, play games online, assist to events online, go to school online, watch recipe videos online, and so on and so forth.
-
-## Our offline life is happening (and tracked) online too
-
-Another thing that has changed is how much data about what we do offline ends up getting collected and stored *online*.
-
-Maybe it's the places we visit during the day getting [tracked by our phones](https://www.pcmag.com/how-to/how-to-get-google-to-quit-tracking-you) and then stored by Google in our profile.
-
-Maybe it's our [smart speaker recording](https://www.lifewire.com/can-alexa-record-conversations-5205324) an intimate conversation and sending it to Amazon.
-
-Completely outside our control, maybe it's the street cameras, cellular towers, car license readers [tracking our movement](https://www.aclum.org/en/publications/what-you-need-know-about-automatic-license-plate-readers) outside as we go about our day.
-
-Or even more dystopian, maybe it's our [doctor using an AI note-taking app](https://theconversation.com/some-clinicians-are-using-ai-to-write-health-records-what-do-you-need-to-know-237762), sending a copy of our very personal in-person medical consultation to who knows which for-profit company.
-
-## Our digital lives and IRL lives are intertwined
-
-All this data collected on what we do *offline*, can sometimes [get aggregated](https://epic.org/issues/consumer-privacy/data-brokers/) together with the data collected on us *online*, even while using pseudo-anonymity.
-
-The social media account where we use a pseudonym and cat profile picture to stay anonymous can get aggregated from the same IP address we used to log in another account using our legal name.
-
-Our offline data and our online data often get connected and bundled up together. This is especially concerning with the growing practice of [social media monitoring](https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/5337/social-media-monitoring-uk-invisible-surveillance-tool-increasingly-deployed) used by governments and companies.
-
-## What we do online have offline consequences
-
-Taking this into account, there isn't a separation between our *online* life and *offline* life anymore.
-
-What we do online affects what we do offline, and vice versa. All of our life, online and offline, is *In Real Life* now.
-
-Our digital life and communications can affect our employment, our dating life, our family life, our housing situation, and even the capacity we have to visit a country [or not](https://globalnews.ca/news/11090232/french-scientist-denied-us-entry-critical-trump-text-messages/).
-
-## The data collected on us online should be cared for even more
-
-Because there isn't much separation anymore, we should treat all data collected about us online as sensitive data intrinsically attached to our person.
-
-An invasion of online privacy, of our online life, becomes the same as an invasion of our home, our body, our IRL life. Not only because this data can be used to find our IRL location, identify our person, and have important repercussions offline, but also because all data about us is an essential part of who we are.
-
-It's not just data points, it's a part of us.
-
-Considering how the world has evolved in the past decades, and shows no sign of slowing down its greedy appropriation of every single piece of information about us, **we should defend our online lives as fiercely as we would our offline lives**.
-
-We need to fight for a future anchored in human rights, and for this, we need to firmly enforce the principle that **digital rights are fundamental human rights**.
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ Examples of gifts which are too restrictive include:
 - Those which are too difficult for us to administer.
 - Those that are for purposes outside our general mission.

-An example of an acceptable restriction could be a gift towards funding our [video](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos) production, or hosting our website and forum.
+An example of an acceptable restriction could be a gift towards funding our [video](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/) production, or hosting our website and forum.

 Final decisions on the restrictive nature of a gift and its acceptance or refusal will be made by our executive committee.

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: An overview of several network architectures commonly used by insta
 There are several network architectures commonly used to relay messages between people. These networks can provide different privacy guarantees, which is why it's worth considering your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md) when deciding which app to use.

 [Recommended Instant Messengers](../real-time-communication.md){ .md-button }
-[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why){ .md-button }
+[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why/){ .md-button }

 ## Centralized Networks

@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ description: Tor is a free to use, decentralized network designed for using the

 [**Tor**](../alternative-networks.md#tor) is a free to use, decentralized network designed for using the internet with as much privacy as possible. If used properly, the network enables private and anonymous browsing and communications. Because Tor traffic is difficult to block and trace, Tor is an effective censorship circumvention tool.

-[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: Why You Need Tor](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/03/02/why-you-need-tor){ .md-button }
+[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: Why You Need Tor](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/03/02/why-you-need-tor/){ .md-button }

-Tor works by routing your internet traffic through volunteer-operated servers instead of making a direct connection to the site you're trying to visit. This obfuscates where the traffic is coming from, and no server in the connection path is able to see the full path of where the traffic is coming from and going to, meaning even the servers you are using to connect cannot break your anonymity.
+Tor works by routing your internet traffic through volunteer-operated servers, instead of making a direct connection to the site you're trying to visit. This obfuscates where the traffic is coming from, and no server in the connection path is able to see the full path of where the traffic is coming from and going to, meaning even the servers you are using to connect cannot break your anonymity.

 [:octicons-home-16:](https://torproject.org){ .card-link title=Homepage }
 [:simple-torbrowser:](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
@@ -35,13 +35,13 @@ Because we already [generally recommend](../basics/vpn-overview.md) that the vas

 Connecting directly to Tor will make your connection stand out to any local network administrators or your ISP. Detecting and correlating this traffic [has been done](https://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/17/justice/massachusetts-harvard-hoax) in the past by network administrators to identify and deanonymize specific Tor users on their network. On the other hand, connecting to a VPN is almost always less suspicious, because commercial VPN providers are used by everyday consumers for a variety of mundane tasks like bypassing geo-restrictions, even in countries with heavy internet restrictions.

-Therefore, you should make an effort to hide your IP address **before** connecting to the Tor network. You can do this by simply connecting to a VPN (through a client installed on your computer) and then accessing [Tor](../tor.md) as normal (e.g., through Tor Browser). This creates a connection chain like so:
+Therefore, you should make an effort to hide your IP address **before** connecting to the Tor network. You can do this by simply connecting to a VPN (through a client installed on your computer) and then accessing [Tor](../tor.md) as normal, through Tor Browser for example. This creates a connection chain like:

 - [x] You → VPN → Tor → Internet

 From your ISP's perspective, it looks like you're accessing a VPN normally (with the associated cover that provides you). From your VPN's perspective, they can see that you are connecting to the Tor network, but nothing about what websites you're accessing. From Tor's perspective, you're connecting normally, but in the unlikely event of some sort of Tor network compromise, only your VPN's IP would be exposed, and your VPN would *additionally* have to be compromised to deanonymize you.

-This is **not** censorship circumvention advice because if Tor is blocked entirely by your ISP, your VPN likely is as well. Rather, this recommendation aims to make your traffic blend in better with commonplace VPN user traffic, and provide you with some level of plausible deniability by obscuring the fact that you're connecting to Tor from your ISP.
+This is **not** censorship circumvention advice, because if Tor is blocked entirely by your ISP, your VPN likely is as well. Rather, this recommendation aims to make your traffic blend in better with commonplace VPN user traffic, and provide you with some level of plausible deniability by obscuring the fact that you're connecting to Tor from your ISP.

 ---

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ We **very strongly discourage** combining Tor with a VPN in any other manner. Do
 - You → VPN → Tor → VPN → Internet
 - Any other configuration

-Some VPN providers and other publications will occasionally recommend these **bad** configurations to evade Tor bans (i.e., exit nodes being blocked by websites) in some places. [Normally](https://support.torproject.org/#about_change-paths), Tor frequently changes your circuit path through the network. When you choose a permanent *destination* VPN (connecting to a VPN server *after* Tor), you're eliminating this advantage and drastically harming your anonymity.
+Some VPN providers and other publications will occasionally recommend these **bad** configurations to evade Tor bans (exit nodes being blocked by websites) in some places. [Normally](https://support.torproject.org/#about_change-paths), Tor frequently changes your circuit path through the network. When you choose a permanent *destination* VPN (connecting to a VPN server *after* Tor), you're eliminating this advantage and drastically harming your anonymity.

 Setting up bad configurations like these is difficult to do accidentally, because it usually involves either setting up custom proxy settings inside Tor Browser, or setting up custom proxy settings inside your VPN client which routes your VPN traffic through the Tor Browser. As long as you avoid these non-default configurations, you're probably fine.

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Setting up bad configurations like these is difficult to do accidentally, becaus
 <div class="admonition info" markdown>
 <p class="admonition-title">VPN/SSH Fingerprinting</p>

-The Tor Project [notes](https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/wikis/doc/TorPlusVPN#vpnssh-fingerprinting) that *theoretically* using a VPN to hide Tor activities from your ISP may not be foolproof. VPNs have been found to be vulnerable to website traffic fingerprinting, where an adversary can still guess what website is being visited because all websites have specific traffic patterns.
+The Tor Project [notes](https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/wikis/doc/TorPlusVPN#vpnssh-fingerprinting) that *theoretically* using a VPN to hide Tor activities from your ISP may not be foolproof. VPNs have been found to be vulnerable to website traffic fingerprinting, where an adversary can still guess what website is being visited, because all websites have specific traffic patterns.

 Therefore, it's not unreasonable to believe that encrypted Tor traffic hidden by a VPN could also be detected via similar methods. There are no research papers on this subject, and we still consider the benefits of using a VPN to far outweigh these risks, but it is something to keep in mind.

@@ -68,11 +68,11 @@ If you still believe that pluggable transports (bridges) provide additional prot

 </div>

-Determining whether you should first use a VPN to connect to the Tor network will require some common sense and knowledge of your own government's and ISP's policies relating to what you're connecting to. To reiterate, though, you will be better off being seen as connecting to a commercial VPN network than directly to the Tor network in most cases. If VPN providers are censored in your area, then you can also consider using Tor pluggable transports (e.g., Snowflake or meek bridges) as an alternative, but using these bridges may arouse more suspicion than standard WireGuard/OpenVPN tunnels.
+Determining whether you should first use a VPN to connect to the Tor network will require some common sense and knowledge of your own government's and ISP's policies relating to what you're connecting to. However, again in most cases you will be better off being seen as connecting to a commercial VPN network than directly to the Tor network. If VPN providers are censored in your area, then you can also consider using Tor pluggable transports (e.g. Snowflake or meek bridges) as an alternative, but using these bridges may arouse more suspicion than standard WireGuard/OpenVPN tunnels.

 ## What Tor is Not

-The Tor network is not the perfect privacy protection tool in all cases and has a number of drawbacks which should be carefully considered. These things should not discourage you from using Tor if it is appropriate for your needs, but they are still things to think about when deciding which solution is most appropriate for you.
+The Tor network is not the perfect privacy protection tool in all cases, and has a number of drawbacks which should be carefully considered. These things should not discourage you from using Tor if it is appropriate for your needs, but they are still things to think about when deciding which solution is most appropriate for you.

 ### Tor is not a free VPN

@@ -80,26 +80,26 @@ The release of the *Orbot* mobile app has lead many people to describe Tor as a

 Unlike Tor exit nodes, VPN providers are usually not *actively* [malicious](#caveats). Because Tor exit nodes can be created by anybody, they are hotspots for network logging and modification. In 2020, many Tor exit nodes were documented to be downgrading HTTPS traffic to HTTP in order to [hijack cryptocurrency transactions](https://therecord.media/thousands-of-tor-exit-nodes-attacked-cryptocurrency-users-over-the-past-year). Other exit node attacks such as replacing downloads via unencrypted channels with malware have also been observed. HTTPS does mitigate these threats to an extent.

-As we've alluded to already, Tor is also easily identifiable on the network. Unlike an actual VPN provider, using Tor will make you stick out as a person likely attempting to evade authorities. In a perfect world, Tor would be seen by network administrators and authorities as a tool with many uses (like how VPNs are viewed), but in reality the perception of Tor is still far less legitimate than the perception of commercial VPNs. As such, using a real VPN provides you with plausible deniability, e.g. "I was just using it to watch Netflix," etc.
+As we've alluded to already, Tor is also easily identifiable on the network. Unlike an actual VPN provider, using Tor will make you stick out as a person likely attempting to evade authorities. In a perfect world, Tor would be seen by network administrators and authorities as a tool with many uses (like how VPNs are viewed), but in reality the perception of Tor is still far less legitimate than the perception of commercial VPNs, so using a real VPN provides you with plausible deniability, e.g. "I was just using it to watch Netflix," etc.

 ### Tor usage is not undetectable

-**Even if you use bridges and pluggable transports,** the Tor Project doesn't provide any tools to hide the fact that you are using Tor from your ISP. Even using obfuscated "pluggable transports" or non-public bridges do not hide the fact that you are using a private communications channel. The most popular pluggable transports like obfs4 (which obfuscates your traffic to "look like nothing") and meek (which uses domain fronting to camouflage your traffic) can be [detected](https://hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/889-Tor-0day-Burning-Bridges.html) with fairly standard traffic analysis techniques. Snowflake has similar issues, and can be [easily detected](https://hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/944-Tor-0day-Snowflake.html) *before* a Tor connection is even established.
+**Even if you use bridges and pluggable transports,** the Tor Project provides no tools to hide the fact that you are using Tor from your ISP. Even using obfuscated "pluggable transports" or non-public bridges do not hide the fact that you are using a private communications channel. The most popular pluggable transports like obfs4 (which obfuscates your traffic to "look like nothing") and meek (which uses domain fronting to camouflage your traffic) can be [detected](https://hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/889-Tor-0day-Burning-Bridges.html) with fairly standard traffic analysis techniques. Snowflake has similar issues, and can be [easily detected](https://hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/944-Tor-0day-Snowflake.html) *before* a Tor connection is even established.

-Pluggable transports other than these three do exist, but typically rely on security through obscurity to evade detection. They aren't impossible to detect—they are just used by so few people that it's not worth the effort building detectors for them. They shouldn't be relied upon if you specifically are being monitored.
+Pluggable transports other than these three do exist, but typically rely on security through obscurity to evade detection. They aren't impossible to detect, they are just used by so few people that it's not worth the effort building detectors for them. They shouldn't be relied upon if you specifically are being monitored.

 It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and evading detection. It is easier to accomplish the former because of the many real-world limitations on what network censors can realistically do en masse, but these techniques do not hide the fact that you—*specifically* you—are using Tor from an interested party monitoring your network.

 ### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security: Tor's anonymity requires every user to be identical, which creates a monoculture (e.g., the same bugs are present across all Tor Browser users). As a cybersecurity rule of thumb, monocultures are generally regarded as bad: Security through diversity (which Tor lacks) provides natural segmentation by limiting vulnerabilities to smaller groups, and is therefore usually desirable, but this diversity is also less good for anonymity.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security: Tor's anonymity requires every user to be identical, which creates a monoculture (the same bugs are present across all Tor Browser users). As a cybersecurity rule of thumb, monocultures are generally regarded as bad: Security through diversity (which Tor lacks) provides natural segmentation by limiting vulnerabilities to smaller groups, and is therefore usually desirable, but this diversity is also less good for anonymity.

 Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):

 1. Look for new Critical/High vulnerabilities in Firefox nightly or beta builds, then check if they are exploitable in Tor Browser (this vulnerability period can last weeks).
 2. Chain *multiple* Medium/Low vulnerabilities together until they get the level of access they're looking for (this vulnerability period can last months or longer).

-Those at risk of browser vulnerabilities should consider additional protections to defend against Tor Browser exploits, such as using Whonix in [Qubes](../os/qubes-overview.md) to contain your Tor browsing in a secure virtual machine and protect against leaks.
+Those at risk of browser vulnerabilities should consider additional protections to defend against Tor Browser exploits, such as using Whonix in [Qubes](../os/qubes-overview.md) to contain your Tor browsing in a secure VM and protect against leaks.

 ## Path Building to Clearnet Services

@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ The entry node, often called the guard node, is the first node to which your Tor

 Unlike the other nodes, the Tor client will randomly select an entry node and stick with it for two to three months to protect you from certain attacks.[^1]

-[^1]: The first relay in your circuit is called an "entry guard" or "guard". It is a fast and stable relay that remains the first one in your circuit for 2-3 months in order to protect against a known anonymity-breaking attack. The rest of your circuit changes with every new website you visit, and all together these relays provide the full privacy protections of Tor. For more information on how guard relays work, see this [blog post](https://blog.torproject.org/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters) and [paper](https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/single_guard.pdf) on entry guards. ([https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2](https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2))
+[^1]: The first relay in your circuit is called an "entry guard" or "guard". It is a fast and stable relay that remains the first one in your circuit for 2-3 months in order to protect against a known anonymity-breaking attack. The rest of your circuit changes with every new website you visit, and all together these relays provide the full privacy protections of Tor. For more information on how guard relays work, see this [blog post](https://blog.torproject.org/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters) and [paper](https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/single_guard.pdf) on entry guards. ([https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2/](https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2))

 ### The Middle Node

@@ -135,13 +135,13 @@ The exit node is the point in which your web traffic leaves the Tor network and

 The exit node will be chosen at random from all available Tor nodes ran with an exit relay flag.[^2]

-[^2]: Relay flag: a special (dis-)qualification of relays for circuit positions (for example, "Guard", "Exit", "BadExit"), circuit properties (for example, "Fast", "Stable"), or roles (for example, "Authority", "HSDir"), as assigned by the directory authorities and further defined in the directory protocol specification. ([https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html](https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html#relay-flag))
+[^2]: Relay flag: a special (dis-)qualification of relays for circuit positions (for example, "Guard", "Exit", "BadExit"), circuit properties (for example, "Fast", "Stable"), or roles (for example, "Authority", "HSDir"), as assigned by the directory authorities and further defined in the directory protocol specification. ([https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html](https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html))

 ## Path Building to Onion Services

 "Onion Services" (also commonly referred to as "hidden services") are websites which can only be accessed by the Tor browser. These websites have a long randomly generated domain name ending with `.onion`.

-Connecting to an Onion Service in Tor works very similarly to connecting to a clearnet service, but your traffic is routed through a total of **six** nodes before reaching the destination server. Just like before, however, only three of these nodes are contributing to *your* anonymity, the other three nodes protect *the Onion Service's* anonymity, hiding the website's true IP and location in the same manner that Tor Browser is hiding yours.
+Connecting to an Onion Service in Tor works very similarly to connecting to a clearnet service, but your traffic is routed through a total of **six** nodes before reaching the destination server. Just like before however, only three of these nodes are contributing to *your* anonymity, the other three nodes protect *the Onion Service's* anonymity, hiding the website's true IP and location in the same manner that Tor Browser is hiding yours.

 <figure style="width:100%" markdown>
  ![Tor path showing your traffic being routed through your three Tor nodes plus three additional Tor nodes which hide the website's identity](../assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-hidden-service.svg#only-light)
@@ -151,15 +151,15 @@ Connecting to an Onion Service in Tor works very similarly to connecting to a cl

 ## Encryption

-Tor encrypts each packet (a block of transmitted data) three times with the keys from the exit, middle, and entry node in that order.
+Tor encrypts each packet (a block of transmitted data) three times with the keys from the exit, middle, and entry node—in that order.

 Once Tor has built a circuit, data transmission is done as follows:

-1. Firstly: When the packet arrives at the entry node, the first layer of encryption is removed. In this encrypted packet, the entry node will find another encrypted packet with the middle node’s address. The entry node will then forward the packet to the middle node.
+1. Firstly: when the packet arrives at the entry node, the first layer of encryption is removed. In this encrypted packet, the entry node will find another encrypted packet with the middle node’s address. The entry node will then forward the packet to the middle node.

-2. Secondly: When the middle node receives the packet from the entry node, it too will remove a layer of encryption with its key, and this time finds an encrypted packet with the exit node's address. The middle node will then forward the packet to the exit node.
+2. Secondly: when the middle node receives the packet from the entry node, it too will remove a layer of encryption with its key, and this time finds an encrypted packet with the exit node's address. The middle node will then forward the packet to the exit node.

-3. Lastly: When the exit node receives its packet, it will remove the last layer of encryption with its key. The exit node will see the destination address and forward the packet to that address.
+3. Lastly: when the exit node receives its packet, it will remove the last layer of encryption with its key. The exit node will see the destination address and forward the packet to that address.

 Below is an alternative diagram showing the process. Each node removes its own layer of encryption, and when the destination server returns data, the same process happens entirely in reverse. For example, the exit node does not know who you are, but it does know which node it came from, and so it adds its own layer of encryption and sends it back.

@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ If you wish to use Tor for browsing the web, we only recommend the **official**

 Tor bridges are commonly touted as an alternative method to hiding Tor usage from an ISP, instead of a VPN (as we suggest using if possible). Something to consider is that while bridges may provide adequate censorship circumvention, this is only a *transient* benefit. They do not adequately protect you from your ISP discovering you connected to Tor in the *past* with historical traffic log analysis.

-To illustrate this point, consider the following scenario: You connect to Tor via a bridge, and your ISP doesn’t detect it because they are not doing sophisticated analysis of your traffic, so things are working as intended. Now, 4 months go by, and the IP of your bridge has been made public. This is a very common occurrence with bridges; they are discovered and blocked relatively frequently, just not immediately.
+To illustrate this point, consider the following scenario: You connect to Tor via a bridge, and your ISP doesn’t detect it because they are not doing sophisticated analysis of your traffic, so things are working as intended. Now, 4 months go by, and the IP of your bridge has been made public. This is a very common occurrence with bridges, they are discovered and blocked relatively frequently, just not immediately.

 Your ISP wants to identify Tor users 4 months ago, and with their limited metadata logging they can see that you connected to an IP address which was later revealed to be a Tor bridge. You have virtually no other excuse to be making such a connection, so the ISP can say with very high confidence that you were a Tor user at that time.

@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ Contrast this with our recommended scenario, where you connect to Tor via a VPN.

 Because your ISP almost certainly is not capturing all packet-level data and storing it forever, they have no way of determining what you connected to with that VPN *after* the fact with an advanced technique like deep packet inspection, and therefore you have plausible deniability.

-Therefore, bridges provide the most benefit when circumventing internet censorship *in the moment*, but they are not an adequate substitute for **all** the benefits that using a VPN alongside Tor can provide. Again, this is not advice *against* using Tor bridges—you should just be aware of these limitations while making your decision. In some cases bridges may be the *only* option (if all VPN providers are blocked, for instance), so you can still use them in those circumstances with this limitation in mind.
+Therefore, bridges provide the most benefit when circumventing internet censorship *in the moment*, but they are not an adequate substitute for **all** the benefits that using a VPN alongside Tor can provide. Again, this is not advice *against* using Tor bridges, you should just be aware of these limitations while making your decision. In some cases bridges may be the *only* option (if all VPN providers are blocked, for instance), so you can still use them in those circumstances with this limitation in mind.

 If you think that a bridge can aid in defending against fingerprinting or other advanced network analysis more than a VPN's encrypted tunnel already can, you always have the option to use a bridge in conjunction with a VPN as well. That way you are still protected by the pluggable transport's obfuscation techniques even if an adversary gains some level of visibility into your VPN tunnel. If you decide to go this route, we recommend connecting to an obfs4 bridge behind your VPN for optimal fingerprinting protection, rather than meek or Snowflake.

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ cover: ai-chatbots.webp
 - [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
 - [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }

-The use of **AI chat**, also known as Large Language Models (LLMs), has become increasingly common since the release of ChatGPT in 2022. LLMs can help us write better, understand unfamiliar subjects, or answer a wide range of questions. They work by statistically predicting the next word in their responses based on a vast amount of data scraped from the web.
+Since the release of ChatGPT in 2022, interactions with Large Language Models (LLMs) have become increasingly common. LLMs can help us write better, understand unfamiliar subjects, or answer a wide range of questions. They can statistically predict the next word based on a vast amount of data scraped from the web.

 ## Privacy Concerns About LLMs

@@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ To run AI locally, you need both an AI model and an AI client.

 ### Choosing a Model

-There are many permissively licensed models available to download. [Hugging Face](https://huggingface.co/models) is a platform that lets you browse, research, and download models in common formats like [GGUF](https://huggingface.co/docs/hub/en/gguf). Companies that provide good open-weights models include big names like Mistral, Meta, Microsoft, and Google. However, there are also many community models and [fine-tuned](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fine-tuning_(deep_learning)) models available. As mentioned above, quantized models offer the best balance between model quality and performance for those using consumer-grade hardware.
+There are many permissively licensed models available to download. [Hugging Face](https://huggingface.co/models) is a platform that lets you browse, research, and download models in common formats like [GGUF](https://huggingface.co/docs/hub/en/gguf). Companies that provide good open-weights models include big names like Mistral, Meta, Microsoft, and Google. However, there are also many community models and 'fine-tunes' available. As mentioned above, quantized models offer the best balance between model quality and performance for those using consumer-grade hardware.

-To help you choose a model that fits your needs, you can look at leaderboards and benchmarks. The most widely-used leaderboard is the community-driven [LM Arena](https://lmarena.ai). Additionally, the [OpenLLM Leaderboard](https://huggingface.co/spaces/open-llm-leaderboard/open_llm_leaderboard) focuses on the performance of open-weights models on common benchmarks like [MMLU-Pro](https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.01574).  There are also specialized benchmarks which measure factors like [emotional intelligence](https://eqbench.com), ["uncensored general intelligence"](https://huggingface.co/spaces/DontPlanToEnd/UGI-Leaderboard), and [many others](https://nebuly.com/blog/llm-leaderboards).
+To help you choose a model that fits your needs, you can look at leaderboards and benchmarks. The most widely-used leaderboard is the community-driven [LM Arena](https://lmarena.ai). Additionally, the [OpenLLM Leaderboard](https://huggingface.co/spaces/open-llm-leaderboard/open_llm_leaderboard) focuses on the performance of open-weights models on common benchmarks like [MMLU-Pro](https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.01574).  There are also specialized benchmarks which measure factors like [emotional intelligence](https://eqbench.com), ["uncensored general intelligence"](https://huggingface.co/spaces/DontPlanToEnd/UGI-Leaderboard), and [many others](https://www.nebuly.com/blog/llm-leaderboards).

 ## AI Chat Clients

@@ -62,11 +62,11 @@ To help you choose a model that fits your needs, you can look at leaderboards an

 ![Kobold.cpp Logo](assets/img/ai-chat/kobold.png){align=right}

-**Kobold.cpp** is an AI client that runs locally on your Windows, Mac, or Linux computer. It's an excellent choice if you are looking for heavy customization and tweaking, such as for role-playing purposes.
+Kobold.cpp is an AI client that runs locally on your Windows, Mac, or Linux computer. It's an excellent choice if you are looking for heavy customization and tweaking, such as for role-playing purposes.

 In addition to supporting a large range of text models, Kobold.cpp also supports image generators such as [Stable Diffusion](https://stability.ai/stable-image) and automatic speech recognition tools such as [Whisper](https://github.com/ggerganov/whisper.cpp).

-[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/LostRuins/koboldcpp#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://github.com/LostRuins/koboldcpp){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/LostRuins/koboldcpp/wiki){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
 [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/LostRuins/koboldcpp){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
 [:octicons-lock-16:](https://github.com/LostRuins/koboldcpp/blob/2f3597c29abea8b6da28f21e714b6b24a5aca79b/SECURITY.md){ .card-link title="Security Policy" }
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ In addition to supporting a large range of text models, Kobold.cpp also supports

 </div>

-<div class="admonition info" markdown>
+<div class="admonition note" markdown>
 <p class="admonition-title">Compatibility Issues</p>

 Kobold.cpp might not run on computers without AVX/AVX2 support.
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ Kobold.cpp allows you to modify parameters such as the AI model temperature and

 ![Ollama Logo](assets/img/ai-chat/ollama.png){align=right}

-**Ollama** is a command-line AI assistant that is available on macOS, Linux, and Windows. Ollama is a great choice if you're looking for an AI client that's easy-to-use, widely compatible, and fast due to its use of inference and other techniques. It also doesn't involve any manual setup.
+Ollama is a command-line AI assistant that is available on macOS, Linux, and Windows. Ollama is a great choice if you're looking for an AI client that's easy-to-use, widely compatible, and fast due to its use of inference and other techniques. It also doesn't involve any manual setup.

 In addition to supporting a wide range of text models, Ollama also supports [LLaVA](https://github.com/haotian-liu/LLaVA) models and has experimental support for Meta's [Llama vision capabilities](https://huggingface.co/blog/llama32#what-is-llama-32-vision).

@@ -123,23 +123,21 @@ Ollama simplifies the process of setting up a local AI chat by downloading the A

 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>

-![Llamafile Logo](assets/img/ai-chat/llamafile.webp){align=right}
+![Llamafile Logo](assets/img/ai-chat/llamafile.svg){align=right}

-**Llamafile** is a lightweight, single-file executable that allows users to run LLMs locally on their own computers without any setup involved. It is [backed by Mozilla](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2023/11/introducing-llamafile) and available on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+Llamafile is a lightweight single-file executable that allows users to run LLMs locally on their own computers without any setup involved. It is [backed by Mozilla](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2023/11/introducing-llamafile) and available on Linux, macOS, and Windows.

 Llamafile also supports LLaVA. However, it doesn't support speech recognition or image generation.

-[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile#quickstart){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile#llamafile){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
 [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
 [:octicons-lock-16:](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile#security){ .card-link title="Security Policy" }

 <details class="downloads" markdown>
 <summary>Downloads</summary>

- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile#quickstart)
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile#quickstart)
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile#quickstart)
+- [:fontawesome-solid-desktop: Desktop](https://github.com/Mozilla-Ocho/llamafile#quickstart)

 </details>

@@ -172,11 +170,11 @@ Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend. In addi

 ### Minimum Requirements

- Must be open source.
+- Must be open-source.
 - Must not transmit personal data, including chat data.
 - Must be multi-platform.
 - Must not require a GPU.
- Must support GPU-powered, fast inference.
+- Must support GPU-powered fast inference.
 - Must not require an internet connection.

 ### Best-Case
@@ -187,11 +185,4 @@ Our best-case criteria represent what we *would* like to see from the perfect pr
 - Should have a built-in model downloader option.
 - The user should be able to modify the LLM parameters, such as its system prompt or temperature.

-*[LLaVA]: Large Language and Vision Assistant (multimodal AI model)
-*[LLM]: Large Language Model (AI model such as ChatGPT)
-*[LLMs]: Large Language Models (AI models such as ChatGPT)
-*[open-weights models]: AI models that anyone can download and use, but the underlying training data and/or algorithms for them are proprietary.
-*[system prompt]: The general instructions given by a human to guide how an AI chat should operate.
-*[temperature]: A parameter used in AI models to control the level of randomness and creativity in the generated text.
-
 [^1]: A file checksum is a type of anti-tampering fingerprint. A developer usually provides a checksum in a text file that can be downloaded separately, or on the download page itself. Verifying that the checksum of the file you downloaded matches the one provided by the developer helps ensure that the file is genuine and wasn't tampered with in transit. You can use commands like `sha256sum` on Linux and macOS, or `certutil -hashfile file SHA256` on Windows to generate the downloaded file's checksum.
@@ -34,8 +34,6 @@ The recommended way to access the Tor network is via the official Tor Browser, w

 [Tor Browser Info :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }

-You can access the Tor network using other tools; making this determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
-
 <div class="admonition example" markdown>
 <p class="admonition-title">Try it out!</p>

@@ -43,50 +41,12 @@ You can try connecting to *Privacy Guides* via Tor at [xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh

 </div>

-#### Orbot
-
-<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
-
-![Orbot logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/orbot.svg){ align=right }
-
-**Orbot** is a mobile application which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
-
-<details class="downloads" markdown>
-<summary>Downloads</summary>
-
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1609461599)
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
- [:simple-fdroid: F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid)
-
-</details>
-
-</div>
-
-We previously recommended enabling the *Isolate Destination Address* preference in Orbot settings. While this setting can theoretically improve privacy by enforcing the use of a different circuit for each IP address you connect to, it doesn't provide a practical advantage for most applications (especially web browsing), can come with a significant performance penalty, and increases the load on the Tor network. We no longer recommend adjusting this setting from its default value unless you know you need to.[^1]
-
-=== "Android"
-
-    Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN kill switch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
-
-    Orbot is often outdated on Google Play and the Guardian Project's F-Droid repository, so consider downloading directly from the GitHub repository instead. All versions are signed using the same signature, so they should be compatible with each other.
-
-=== "iOS"
-
-    On iOS, Orbot has some limitations that could potentially cause crashes or leaks: iOS does not have an effective OS-level feature to block connections without a VPN like Android does, and iOS has an artificial memory limit for network extensions that makes it challenging to run Tor in Orbot without crashes. Currently, it is always safer to use Tor on a desktop computer compared to a mobile device.
-
 #### Snowflake

 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>

-![Snowflake logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/snowflake.svg#only-light){ align=right }
-![Snowflake logo](assets/img/self-contained-networks/snowflake-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
+![Snowflake logo](assets/img/browsers/snowflake.svg#only-light){ align=right }
+![Snowflake logo](assets/img/browsers/snowflake-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }

 **Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.

@@ -150,5 +110,3 @@ Also, unlike Tor, every I2P node will relay traffic for other users by default,
 There are downsides to I2P's approach, however. Tor relying on dedicated exit nodes means more people in less safe environments can use it, and the relays that do exist on Tor are likely to be more performant and stable, as they generally aren't run on residential connections. Tor is also far more focused on **browser privacy** (i.e. anti-fingerprinting), with a dedicated [Tor Browser](tor.md) to make browsing activity as anonymous as possible. I2P is used via your [regular web browser](desktop-browsers.md), and while you can configure your browser to be more privacy-protecting, you probably still won't have the same browser fingerprint as other I2P users (there's no "crowd" to blend in with in that regard).

 Tor is likely to be more resistant to censorship, due to their robust network of bridges and varying [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention). On the other hand, I2P uses directory servers for the initial connection which are varying/untrusted and run by volunteers, compared to the hard-coded/trusted ones Tor uses which are likely easier to block.
-
-[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ Shelter is recommended over [Insular](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular) a

 **Secure Camera** is a camera app focused on privacy and security which can capture images, videos, and QR codes. CameraX vendor extensions (Portrait, HDR, Night Sight, Face Retouch, and Auto) are also supported on available devices.

-[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-info-16:](https://grapheneos.org/usage#camera){ .card-link title=Documentation}
 [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
 [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ The image orientation metadata is not deleted. If you enable location (in Secure

 [Content-Security-Policy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy) is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content.

-[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
 [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }

@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that

 [Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition, meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the attack surface of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.

-Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)) (like AdAway) and firewalls which require root access persistently (like AFWall+) are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy-enhancing services such as [Orbot](../alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).
+Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For content blocking, we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or content blocking functionality provided by a VPN instead. TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN), preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as [Orbot](../tor.md#orbot) or a [real VPN provider](../vpn.md).

 AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ You will be responsible for managing your login credentials. For added security,

 #### Email aliases

-If you don't want to give your real email address to a service, you have the option to use an alias. We describe them in more detail on our email services recommendation page. Essentially, alias services allow you to generate new email addresses that forward all emails to your main address. This can help prevent tracking across services and help you manage the marketing emails that sometimes come with the sign-up process. Those can be filtered automatically based on the alias they are sent to.
+If you don't want to give your real email address to a service, you have the option to use an alias. We described them in more detail on our email services recommendation page. Essentially, alias services allow you to generate new email addresses that forward all emails to your main address. This can help prevent tracking across services and help you manage the marketing emails that sometimes come with the sign-up process. Those can be filtered automatically based on the alias they are sent to.

 Should a service get hacked, you might start receiving phishing or spam emails to the address you used to sign up. Using unique aliases for each service can assist in identifying exactly what service was hacked.

@@ -50,19 +50,19 @@ Should a service get hacked, you might start receiving phishing or spam emails t

 ### "Sign in with..." (OAuth)

-[Open Authorization (OAuth)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth) is an authentication protocol that allows you to register for a service without sharing much information with the service provider, if any, by using an existing account you have with another service instead. Whenever you see something along the lines of "Sign in with *provider name*" on a registration form, it's typically using OAuth.
+OAuth is an authentication protocol that allows you to register for a service without sharing much information with the service provider, if any, by using an existing account you have with another service instead. Whenever you see something along the lines of "Sign in with *provider name*" on a registration form, it's typically using OAuth.

 When you sign in with OAuth, it will open a login page with the provider you choose, and your existing account and new account will be connected. Your password won't be shared, but some basic information typically will (you can review it during the login request). This process is needed every time you want to log in to the same account.

 The main advantages are:

- **Security**: You don't have to trust the security practices of the service you're logging into when it comes to storing your login credentials because they are stored with the external OAuth provider. Common OAuth providers like Apple and Google typically follow the best security practices, continuously audit their authentication systems, and don't store credentials inappropriately (such as in plain text).
- **Ease-of-use**: Multiple accounts are managed by a single login.
+- **Security**: you don't have to trust the security practices of the service you're logging into when it comes to storing your login credentials, because they are stored with the external OAuth provider, which when it comes to services like Apple and Google typically follow the best security practices, continuously audit their authentication systems, and don't store credentials inappropriately (such as in plain text).
+- **Ease of use**: multiple accounts are managed by a single login.

 But there are disadvantages:

- **Privacy**: The OAuth provider you log in with will know the services you use.
- **Centralization**: If the account you use for OAuth is compromised, or you aren't able to log in to it, all other accounts connected to it are affected.
+- **Privacy**: the OAuth provider you log in with will know the services you use.
+- **Centralization**: if the account you use for OAuth is compromised, or you aren't able to log in to it, all other accounts connected to it are affected.

 OAuth can be especially useful in those situations where you could benefit from deeper integration between services. Our recommendation is to limit using OAuth to only where you need it, and always protect the main account with [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md).

@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ Censorship online can be carried out (to varying degrees) by actors including to

 Censorship on corporate platforms is increasingly common, as platforms like Twitter and Facebook give in to public demand, market pressures, and pressures from government agencies. Government pressures can be covert requests to businesses, such as the White House [requesting the takedown](https://nytimes.com/2012/09/17/technology/on-the-web-a-fine-line-on-free-speech-across-globe.html) of a provocative YouTube video, or overt, such as the Chinese government requiring companies to adhere to a strict regime of censorship.

-People concerned with the threat of censorship can use technologies like [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) to circumvent it, and support censorship-resistant communication platforms like [Matrix](../social-networks.md#element), which doesn't have a centralized account authority that can close accounts arbitrarily.
+People concerned with the threat of censorship can use technologies like [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) to circumvent it, and support censorship-resistant communication platforms like [Matrix](../real-time-communication.md#element), which doesn't have a centralized account authority that can close accounts arbitrarily.

 <div class="admonition tip" markdown>
 <p class="admonition-title">Tip</p>
@@ -2,34 +2,34 @@
 meta_title: "Why Email Isn't the Best Choice for Privacy and Security - Privacy Guides"
 title: Email Security
 icon: material/email
-description: Email is insecure in many ways, and these are some of the reasons it isn't our top choice for secure communications.
+description: Email is inherently insecure in many ways, and these are some of the reasons it isn't our top choice for secure communications.
 ---

-Email is an insecure form of communication by default. You can improve your email security with tools such as OpenPGP, which add end-to-end encryption to your messages, but OpenPGP still has a number of drawbacks compared to encryption in other messaging applications.
+Email is an insecure form of communication by default. You can improve your email security with tools such as OpenPGP, which add End-to-End Encryption to your messages, but OpenPGP still has a number of drawbacks compared to encryption in other messaging applications, and some email data can never be encrypted inherently due to how email is designed.

 As a result, email is best used for receiving transactional emails (like notifications, verification emails, password resets, etc.) from the services you sign up for online, not for communicating with others.

 ## Email Encryption Overview

-The standard way to add E2EE to emails between different email providers is by using OpenPGP. There are different implementations of the OpenPGP standard, the most common being [GnuPG](../encryption.md#gnu-privacy-guard) and [OpenPGP.js](https://openpgpjs.org).
+The standard way to add E2EE to emails between different email providers is by using OpenPGP. There are different implementations of the OpenPGP standard, the most common being [GnuPG](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard) and [OpenPGP.js](https://openpgpjs.org).

-Even if you use OpenPGP, it does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if the private key of either you or the message recipient is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. This is why we recommend [instant messengers](../real-time-communication.md) which implement forward secrecy over email for person-to-person communications whenever possible.
+There is another standard which is popular with business called [S/MIME](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME), however, it requires a certificate issued from a [Certificate Authority](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) (not all of them issue S/MIME certificates). It has support in [Google Workplace](https://support.google.com/a/topic/9061730) and [Outlook for Web or Exchange Server 2016, 2019](https://support.office.com/article/encrypt-messages-by-using-s-mime-in-outlook-on-the-web-878c79fc-7088-4b39-966f-14512658f480).

-There is another standard which is popular with business called [S/MIME](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME), however it requires a certificate issued from a [Certificate Authority](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) (not all of them issue S/MIME certificates, and often a yearly payment is required). In some cases it is more usable than PGP because it has support in popular/mainstream email applications like Apple Mail, [Google Workplace](https://support.google.com/a/topic/9061730), and [Outlook](https://support.office.com/article/encrypt-messages-by-using-s-mime-in-outlook-on-the-web-878c79fc-7088-4b39-966f-14512658f480). However, S/MIME does not solve the issue of lack of forward secrecy, and isn't particularly more secure than PGP.
+Even if you use OpenPGP, it does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. This is why we recommend [instant messengers](../real-time-communication.md) which implement forward secrecy over email for person-to-person communications whenever possible.

 ## What is the Web Key Directory standard?

-The [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD) standard allows email clients to discover the OpenPGP key for other mailboxes, even those hosted on a different provider. Email clients which support WKD will ask the recipient's server for a key based on the email address' domain name. For example, if you emailed `jonah@privacyguides.org`, your email client would ask `privacyguides.org` for Jonah's OpenPGP key, and if `privacyguides.org` has a key for that account, your message would be automatically encrypted.
+The Web Key Directory (WKD) standard allows email clients to discover the OpenPGP key for other mailboxes, even those hosted on a different provider. Email clients which support WKD will ask the recipient's server for a key based on the email address' domain name. For example, if you emailed `jonah@privacyguides.org`, your email client would ask `privacyguides.org` for Jonah's OpenPGP key, and if `privacyguides.org` has a key for that account, your message would be automatically encrypted.

 In addition to the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md) which support WKD, some webmail providers also support WKD. Whether *your own* key is published to WKD for others to use depends on your domain configuration. If you use an [email provider](../email.md#openpgp-compatible-services) which supports WKD, such as Proton Mail or Mailbox.org, they can publish your OpenPGP key on their domain for you.

-If you use your own custom domain, you will need to configure WKD separately. If you control your domain name, you can set up WKD regardless of your email provider. One easy way to do this is to use the "[WKD as a Service](https://keys.openpgp.org/about/usage#wkd-as-a-service)" feature from the `keys.openpgp.org` server: Set a CNAME record on the `openpgpkey` subdomain of your domain pointed to `wkd.keys.openpgp.org`, then upload your key to [keys.openpgp.org](https://keys.openpgp.org). Alternatively, you can [self-host WKD on your own web server](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKDHosting).
+If you use your own custom domain, you will need to configure WKD separately. If you control your domain name, you can set up WKD regardless of your email provider. One easy way to do this is to use the "[WKD as a Service](https://keys.openpgp.org/about/usage#wkd-as-a-service)" feature from keys.openpgp.org, by setting a CNAME record on the `openpgpkey` subdomain of your domain pointed to `wkd.keys.openpgp.org`, then uploading your key to [keys.openpgp.org](https://keys.openpgp.org). Alternatively, you can [self-host WKD on your own web server](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKDHosting).

-If you use a shared domain from a provider which doesn't support WKD, like `@gmail.com`, you won't be able to share your OpenPGP key with others via this method.
+If you use a shared domain from a provider which doesn't support WKD, like @gmail.com, you won't be able to share your OpenPGP key with others via this method.

 ### What Email Clients Support E2EE?

-Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md). Depending on the authentication method, this may lead to decreased security if either the provider or the email client does not support [OAuth](account-creation.md#sign-in-with-oauth) or a bridge application as [multifactor authentication](multi-factor-authentication.md) is not possible with plain password authentication.
+Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md). Depending on the authentication method, this may lead to the decrease security if either the provider or the email client does not support OATH or a bridge application as [multifactor authentication](multi-factor-authentication.md) is not possible with plain password authentication.

 ### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?

@@ -39,14 +39,14 @@ It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smart card to avoid possib

 ## Email Metadata Overview

-Email metadata is stored in the [message header](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) of the email message and includes some visible headers that you may have seen such as `To`, `From`, `Cc`, `Date`, and `Subject`. There are also a number of hidden headers included by many email clients and providers that can reveal information about your account.
+Email metadata is stored in the [message header](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) of the email message and includes some visible headers that you may have seen such as: `To`, `From`, `Cc`, `Date`, `Subject`. There are also a number of hidden headers included by many email clients and providers that can reveal information about your account.

 Client software may use email metadata to show who a message is from and what time it was received. Servers may use it to determine where an email message must be sent, among [other purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) which are not always transparent.

 ### Who Can View Email Metadata?

-Email metadata is protected from outside observers with [opportunistic TLS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunistic_TLS), but it is still able to be seen by your email client software (or webmail) and any servers relaying the message from you to any recipients including your email provider. Sometimes email servers will also use third-party services to protect against spam, which generally also have access to your messages.
+Email metadata is protected from outside observers with [Opportunistic TLS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunistic_TLS) protecting it from outside observers, but it is still able to be seen by your email client software (or webmail) and any servers relaying the message from you to any recipients including your email provider. Sometimes email servers will also use third-party services to protect against spam, which generally also have access to your messages.

 ### Why Can't Metadata be E2EE?

-Email metadata is crucial to the most basic functionality of email (where it came from, and where it has to go). E2EE was not built into standard email protocols originally, instead requiring add-on software like OpenPGP. Because OpenPGP messages still have to work with traditional email providers, it cannot encrypt some of this email metadata required for identifying the parties communicating. That means that even when using OpenPGP, outside observers can see lots of information about your messages, such as whom you're emailing, when you're emailing, etc.
+Email metadata is crucial to the most basic functionality of email (where it came from, and where it has to go). E2EE was not built into the email protocols originally, instead requiring add-on software like OpenPGP. Because OpenPGP messages still have to work with traditional email providers, it cannot encrypt email metadata, only the message body itself. That means that even when using OpenPGP, outside observers can see lots of information about your messages, such as whom you're emailing, the subject lines, when you're emailing, etc.
@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
 ---
-title: Introduction to Passwords
-icon: material/form-textbox-password
+title: "Introduction to Passwords"
+icon: 'material/form-textbox-password'
 description: These are some tips and tricks on how to create the strongest passwords and keep your accounts secure.
 ---

-Passwords are an essential part of our everyday digital lives. We use them to protect our accounts, our devices, and our secrets. Despite often being the only thing between us and an adversary who's after our private information, not a lot of thought is put into them, which often leads to people using passwords that can be easily guessed or brute-forced.
+Passwords are an essential part of our everyday digital lives. We use them to protect our accounts, our devices and our secrets. Despite often being the only thing between us and an adversary who's after our private information, not a lot of thought is put into them, which often leads to people using passwords that can be easily guessed or brute-forced.

 ## Best Practices

 ### Use unique passwords for every service

-Imagine this: You sign up for an account with the same e-mail and password on multiple online services. If one of those service providers is malicious, or their service has a data breach that exposes your password in an unencrypted format, all a bad actor would have to do is try that e-mail and password combination across multiple popular services until they get a hit. It doesn't matter how strong that one password is, because they already have it.
+Imagine this; you sign up for an account with the same e-mail and password on multiple online services. If one of those service providers is malicious, or their service has a data breach that exposes your password in an unencrypted format, all a bad actor would have to do is try that e-mail and password combination across multiple popular services until they get a hit. It doesn't matter how strong that one password is, because they already have it.

 This is called [credential stuffing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credential_stuffing), and it is one of the most common ways that your accounts can be compromised by bad actors. To avoid this, make sure that you never re-use your passwords.

@@ -73,9 +73,9 @@ You should **not** re-roll words until you get a combination of words that appea

 </div>

-If you don't have access to or would prefer to not use real dice, you can use your password manager's built-in password generator, as most of them have the option to generate diceware passphrases in addition to regular passwords. We recommend setting the generated passphrase length to at least 6 words.
+If you don't have access to or would prefer to not use real dice, you can use your password manager's built-in password generator, as most of them have the option to generate diceware passphrases in addition to regular passwords.

-We also recommend using [EFF's large word list](https://eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate your diceware passphrases, as it offers the exact same security as the original list, while containing words that are easier to memorize. There are also [word lists in different languages](https://theworld.com/~reinhold/diceware.html#Diceware%20in%20Other%20Languages|outline), if you do not want your passphrase to be in English.
+We recommend using [EFF's large word list](https://eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate your diceware passphrases, as it offers the exact same security as the original list, while containing words that are easier to memorize. There are also [word lists in different languages](https://theworld.com/~reinhold/diceware.html#Diceware%20in%20Other%20Languages|outline), if you do not want your passphrase to be in English.

 <details class="note" markdown>
 <summary>Explanation of entropy and strength of diceware passphrases</summary>
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: Virtual Private Networks shift risk away from your ISP to a third-p

 Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit somewhere else in the world.

-[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: Do you need a VPN?](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2024/12/12/do-you-need-a-vpn){ .md-button }
+[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: Do you need a VPN?](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2024/12/12/do-you-need-a-vpn/){ .md-button }

 Normally, an ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (i.e. modem). Encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, so they may not be able to see exactly what you're posting or reading, but they can get an idea of the [domains you request](../advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ VPNs cannot encrypt data outside the connection between your device and the VPN

 Using a VPN in cases where you're using your [real-life or well-known identity](common-misconceptions.md#complicated-is-better) online is unlikely to be useful. Doing so may trigger spam and fraud detection systems, such as if you were to log into your bank's website.

-It's important to remember that a VPN will not provide you with absolute anonymity because the VPN provider itself will still have access to your real IP address, destination website information, and often a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. "No logging" policies are merely a promise; if you need complete safety from the network itself, consider using [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) in addition to or instead of a VPN.
+It's important to remember that a VPN will not provide you with absolute anonymity, because the VPN provider itself will still see your real IP address, destination website information, and often has a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. You can't rely on "no logging" policies to protect your data from anyone who is able to protect. If you need complete safety from the network itself, consider using [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) in addition to or instead of a VPN.

 You also should not trust a VPN to secure your connection to an unencrypted, HTTP destination. In order to keep what you actually do on the websites you visit private and secure, you must use HTTPS. This will keep your passwords, session tokens, and queries safe from the VPN provider and other potential adversaries in between the VPN server and your destination. You should enable HTTPS-only mode in your browser (if it's supported) to mitigate attacks which try to downgrade your connection from HTTPS to HTTP.

@@ -91,9 +91,7 @@ Recently, some attempts have been made by various organizations to address some

 Multi-Party Relays (MPRs) use multiple nodes owned by different parties, such that no individual party knows both who you are and what you're connecting to. This is the basic idea behind Tor, but now there are some paid services that try to emulate this model.

-MPRs seek to solve a problem inherent to VPNs: the fact that you must trust them completely. They accomplish this goal by segmenting the responsibilities between two or more different companies.
-
-One example of a commercially available MPR is Apple's iCloud+ Private Relay, which routes your traffic through two servers:
+MPRs seek to solve a problem inherent to VPNs: the fact that you must trust them completely. They accomplish this goal by segmenting the responsibilities between two or more different companies. For example, Apple's iCloud+ Private Relay routes your traffic through two servers:

 1. Firstly, a server operated by Apple.

@@ -103,7 +101,7 @@ One example of a commercially available MPR is Apple's iCloud+ Private Relay, wh

    This server actually makes the connection to your destination website, but has no knowledge of your device. The only IP address it knows about is Apple's server's.

-Other MPRs run by different companies operate in a very similar manner. This protection by segmentation only exists if you trust the two companies to not collude with each other to deanonymize you.
+Other MPRs run by different companies like Google or INVISV operate in a very similar manner. This protection by segmentation only exists if you trust the two companies to not collude with each other to deanonymize you.

 ### Decentralized VPNs

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Privacy is ultimately about human information, and this is important because we

 Many people get the concepts of **privacy**, **security**, and **anonymity** confused. You'll see people criticize various products as "not private" when really they mean it doesn't provide anonymity, for example. On this website, we cover all three of these topics, but it is important you understand the difference between them, and when each one comes into play.

-[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: Stop Confusing Privacy, Anonymity, and Security](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/03/14/stop-confusing-privacy-anonymity-and-security){ .md-button }
+[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: Stop Confusing Privacy, Anonymity, and Security](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/03/14/stop-confusing-privacy-anonymity-and-security/){ .md-button }

 <!-- markdownlint-disable-next-line -->
 **Privacy**
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ Take cookie consent forms, for example. You may encounter these dozens of times

 Privacy is something we need to have baked into the [software and services](../tools.md) we use by default, you can't bend most apps into being private on your own.

-[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: 5 Steps to Improve Your Privacy](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/02/14/5-easy-steps-to-protect-yourself-online){ class="md-button" }
+[:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: 5 Steps to Improve Your Privacy](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/02/14/5-easy-steps-to-protect-yourself-online/){ class="md-button" }

 ## Sources

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ cover: cloud.webp
 - [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
 - [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }

-Many **cloud storage providers** require your full trust that they will not look at your files. The alternatives listed below eliminate the need for trust by implementing secure end-to-end encryption.
+Many **cloud storage providers** require your full trust that they will not look at your files. The alternatives listed below eliminate the need for trust by implementing secure E2EE.

 If these alternatives do not fit your needs, we suggest you look into using encryption software like [Cryptomator](encryption.md#cryptomator-cloud) with another cloud provider. Using Cryptomator in conjunction with **any** cloud provider (including these) may be a good idea to reduce the risk of encryption flaws in a provider's native clients.

@@ -27,9 +27,7 @@ Nextcloud is [still a recommended tool](document-collaboration.md#nextcloud) for

 ![Proton Drive logo](assets/img/cloud/protondrive.svg){ align=right }

-**Proton Drive** is an encrypted cloud storage provider from the popular encrypted email provider [Proton Mail](email.md#proton-mail).
-
-The initial free storage is limited to 2 GB, but with the completion of [certain steps](https://proton.me/support/more-free-storage-existing-users), additional storage can be obtained up to 5 GB.
+**Proton Drive** is an encrypted cloud storage provider from the popular encrypted email provider [Proton Mail](email.md#proton-mail). The initial free storage is limited to 2 GB, but with the completion of [certain steps](https://proton.me/support/more-free-storage-existing-users), additional storage can be obtained up to 5 GB.

 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/drive){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/drive/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@@ -48,7 +46,9 @@ The initial free storage is limited to 2 GB, but with the completion of [certai

 </div>

-The Proton Drive web application has been independently audited by Securitum in [2021](https://proton.me/community/open-source), but the brand new mobile clients have not yet been publicly audited by a third party.
+The Proton Drive web application has been independently audited by Securitum in [2021](https://proton.me/community/open-source).
+
+Proton Drive's brand new mobile clients have not yet been publicly audited by a third party.

 ## Tresorit

@@ -83,9 +83,7 @@ Tresorit has received a number of independent security audits:
    - Computest discovered two vulnerabilities which have been resolved.
 - [2019](https://tresorit.com/blog/ernst-young-review-verifies-tresorits-security-architecture): Penetration Testing by Ernst & Young.
    - This review analyzed the full source code of Tresorit and validated that the implementation matches the concepts described in Tresorit's [white paper](https://prodfrontendcdn.azureedge.net/202208011608/tresorit-encryption-whitepaper.pdf).
-    - Ernst & Young additionally tested the web, mobile, and desktop clients. They concluded:
-
-        > Test results found no deviation from Tresorit’s data confidentiality claims.
+    - Ernst & Young additionally tested the web, mobile, and desktop clients: "Test results found no deviation from Tresorit’s data confidentiality claims."

 [^1]: [ISO/IEC 27001](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO/IEC_27001):2013 compliance relates to the company's [information security management system](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_security_management) and covers the sales, development, maintenance and support of their cloud services.

@@ -97,43 +95,40 @@ They have also received the Digital Trust Label, a certification from the [Swiss

 ![Peergos logo](assets/img/cloud/peergos.svg){ align=right }

-**Peergos** is a decentralized protocol and open-source platform for storage, social media, and applications. It provides a secure and private space where users can store, share, and view their photos, videos, documents, etc. Peergos secures your files with quantum-resistant end-to-end encryption and ensures all data about your files remains private.
+**Peergos** is a decentralized protocol and open-source platform for storage, social media, and applications. It provides a secure and private space where users can store, share, and view their photos, videos, documents, etc. Peergos secures your files with quantum-resistant end-to-end encryption and ensures all data about your files remains private. It is built on top of [IPFS (InterPlanetary File System)](https://ipfs.tech), a peer-to-peer architecture that protects against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }.

 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://peergos.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://peergos.net/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
 [:octicons-info-16:](https://book.peergos.org){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
 [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Peergos/Peergos){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/peergos/peergos#support){ .card-link title="Contribute" }

 <details class="downloads" markdown>
 <summary>Downloads</summary>

- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=peergos.android)
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/Peergos/web-ui/releases)
+- [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://peergos.net)
 - [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://github.com/Peergos/web-ui/releases)
 - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://github.com/Peergos/web-ui/releases)
 - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://github.com/Peergos/web-ui/releases)
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://peergos.net)

 </details>

 </div>

-Peergos is built on top of the [InterPlanetary File System (IPFS)](https://ipfs.tech), a peer-to-peer architecture that protects against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }.
-
 Peergos is primarily a web app, but you can self-host the server either as a local cache for your remote Peergos account, or as a standalone storage server which negates the need to register for a remote account and subscription. The Peergos server is a `.jar` file, which means the Java 17+ Runtime Environment ([OpenJDK download](https://azul.com/downloads)) should be installed on your machine to get it working.

 Running a local version of Peergos alongside a registered account on their paid, hosted service allows you to access your Peergos storage without any reliance on DNS or TLS certificate authorities, and keep a copy of your data backed up to their cloud. The user experience should be the same whether you run their desktop server or just use their hosted web interface.

 Peergos was [audited](https://peergos.org/posts/security-audit-2024) in November 2024 by Radically Open Security and all issues were fixed. They were previously [audited](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_peergos.pdf) by Cure53 in June 2019, and all found issues were subsequently fixed.

+An Android app is not available, but it is [in the works](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/peergos-private-storage-sharing-social-media-and-application-platform/11825/25). The current workaround is to use the mobile [PWA](https://peergos.net) instead.
+
 ## Criteria

 **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.

 ### Minimum Requirements

- Must enforce E2EE.
+- Must enforce end-to-end encryption.
 - Must offer a free plan or trial period for testing.
 - Must support TOTP or FIDO2 multifactor authentication, or passkey logins.
 - Must offer a web interface which supports basic file management functionality.
@@ -144,8 +139,8 @@ Peergos was [audited](https://peergos.org/posts/security-audit-2024) in November
 Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.

 - Clients should be open source.
- Clients should be audited in their entirety by an independent third party.
+- Clients should be audited in their entirety by an independent third-party.
 - Should offer native clients for Linux, Android, Windows, macOS, and iOS.
    - These clients should integrate with native OS tools for cloud storage providers, such as Files app integration on iOS, or DocumentsProvider functionality on Android.
- Should support easy file sharing with other users.
+- Should support easy file-sharing with other users.
 - Should offer at least basic file preview and editing functionality on the web interface.
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ You should **never** use blur to redact [text in images](https://bishopfox.com/b
 <details class="downloads" markdown>
 <summary>Downloads</summary>

- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://pypi.org/project/mat2#metadata-and-privacy)
+- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://pypi.org/project/mat2)
 - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2#requirements-setup-on-macos-os-x-using-homebrew)
 - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://pypi.org/project/mat2)
 - [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2#web-interface)
@@ -50,10 +50,10 @@ You should **never** use blur to redact [text in images](https://bishopfox.com/b

 **ExifEraser** is a modern, permissionless image metadata erasing application for Android.

-It currently supports JPEG, PNG, and WebP files.
+It currently supports JPEG, PNG and WebP files.

-[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser#description){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser#readme){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
 [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }

 <details class="downloads" markdown>
@@ -88,11 +88,7 @@ If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) ins

 </div>

-Like [Tor Browser](tor.md), Mullvad Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting by making your browser fingerprint identical to all other Mullvad Browser users, and it includes default settings and extensions that are automatically configured by the default security levels: *Standard*, *Safer* and *Safest*.
-
-Therefore, it is imperative that you do not modify the browser at all outside adjusting the default [security levels](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings). When adjusting the security level, you **must** always restart the browser before continuing to use it. Otherwise, [the security settings may not be fully applied](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/05/02/tor-security-slider-flaw), putting you at a higher risk of fingerprinting and exploits than you may expect based on the setting chosen.
-
-Modifications other than adjusting this setting would make your fingerprint unique, defeating the purpose of using this browser. If you want to configure your browser more heavily and fingerprinting is not a concern for you, we recommend [Firefox](#firefox) instead.
+Like [Tor Browser](tor.md), Mullvad Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting by making your browser fingerprint identical to all other Mullvad Browser users, and it includes default settings and extensions that are automatically configured by the default security levels: *Standard*, *Safer* and *Safest*. Therefore, it is imperative that you do not modify the browser at all outside adjusting the default [security levels](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings). Other modifications would make your fingerprint unique, defeating the purpose of using this browser. If you want to configure your browser more heavily and fingerprinting is not a concern for you, we recommend [Firefox](#firefox) instead.

 ### Anti-Fingerprinting

@@ -321,6 +317,15 @@ Brave allows you to select additional content filters within the internal `brave

 1. Disabling the V8 optimizer reduces your attack surface by disabling [*some*](https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/112708049232710156) parts of JavaScript Just-In-Time (JIT) compilation.

+<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Sanitizing on close</p>
+
+- [x] Select **Delete data sites have saved to your device when you close all windows** under *Sites and Shields Settings* → *Content* → *Additional content settings* → *On-device site data*.
+
+If you wish to stay logged in to a particular site you visit often, you can set exceptions on a per-site basis under the *Customized behaviors* section.
+
+</div>
+
 ##### Tor windows

 [**Private Window with Tor**](https://support.brave.com/hc/articles/360018121491-What-is-a-Private-Window-with-Tor-Connectivity) allows you to route your traffic through the Tor network in Private Windows and access .onion services, which may be useful in some cases. However, Brave is **not** as resistant to fingerprinting as the Tor Browser is, and far fewer people use Brave with Tor, so you will stand out. If your threat model requires strong anonymity, use the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser).
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More