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title: "帳號創建"
icon: 'material/account-plus'
---
人們經常不假思索地註冊網路服務。 也許這是一個流媒體服務，所以你可以觀看每個人都在談論的新節目，或者是一個為你最喜歡的快餐店提供折扣的帳戶。 無論在什麼樣的場景，您都應該考慮現在和以後對數據的影響。
當你每刺蝟了一個新的服務創建帳號時，都有相關的風險。 數據洩露；向第三方披露客戶信息；員工有不當的權限可以訪問所有數據；所有這些都是在提供您的信息時必須考慮的可能性。 您需要確信您可以信任該服務，這就是為什麼我們建議只在最成熟且經過測試的產品上儲存有價值的資料。 這通常意味著提供 E2EE 並經過加密審計的服務。 審計增加了產品設計的保證，而不是由缺乏經驗的開發人員引起的明顯的安全問題。
It can also be difficult to delete the accounts on some services. Sometimes [overwriting data](account-deletion.md#overwriting-account-information) associated with an account can be possible, but in other cases the service will keep an entire history of changes to the account.
## Terms of Service & Privacy Policy
服務條款是您在使用服務時同意遵守的規則。 With larger services these rules are often enforced by automated systems. Sometimes these automated systems can make mistakes. 例如，您可能會因為使用 VPN 或 VOIP 號碼而被禁止或鎖定某些服務的帳戶。 對這種禁令提出上訴通常很困難，而且通常都由系統自動處理而不是人工審核，造成了上訴的困難度。 這也是我們不建議使用 Gmail 作為電子郵件的原因之一。 電子郵件對於訪問您可能註冊的其他服務至關重要。
隱私權政策是該服務表示他們將如何使用您的數據，因此值得閱讀，以便您了解如何使用您的數據。 公司或組織可能沒有法律義務遵守政策中包含的所有內容（取決於司法管轄區）。 我們建議您了解當地法律以及這些法律允許供應商收集哪些資訊。
我們建議您尋找特定的術語，例如「資料收集」、「資料分析」、「Cookie」、「廣告」或「第三方」服務。 有時您可以選擇退出資料收集或分享資料，但最好從一開始就選擇尊重您隱私權的服務。
您還要信任該公司或組織會實際遵守自己的隱私政策。
## 身份驗證方式
通常有多種註冊帳戶的方式，每種都有自己的好處和缺點。
### 電子郵件和密碼
建立新帳戶的最常見方式是使用電子郵件地址和密碼。 使用此方法時，您應該使用密碼管理器，並遵循 [關於密碼的最佳做法](passwords-overview.md) 。
!!! tip
您也可以使用密碼管理器組織其他驗證方式！ 只需新增條目並填寫適當的欄位，即可新增安全問題或備份金鑰等事項的備註。
您自己負責管理您的登入憑證。 為了增加安全性，您可以在帳戶上設置 [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md) 。
[推薦密碼管理員](../passwords.md ""){.md-button}
#### Email aliases
如果您不想將您的真實電子郵件地址提供給服務，您可以選擇使用別名。 我們在電子郵件服務推薦頁面上更詳細地描述了它們。 基本上，別名服務允許您生成新的電子郵件地址，將所有電子郵件轉發到您的主地址。 這可以幫助防止跨服務跟蹤，並幫助您管理有時會隨註冊過程而來的營銷電子郵件。 這些可以根據它們被發送到的別名自動過濾。
如果服務遭到黑客攻擊，您可能會開始收到網絡釣魚或垃圾郵件到您用於註冊的地址。 為每個服務使用獨特的別名可以幫助確定哪些服務被駭。
[推薦的電子郵件別名服務](../email.md#email-aliasing-services ""){.md-button}
### 單一登入（Single Sign-On）
!!! note
我們討論的是個人使用的單一登入，而不是企業用戶。
單一登入(SSO) 是一種驗證方法，允許您註冊服務，而無需共享太多信息(如果有的話)。 每當您在註冊表單上看到類似「使用 *提供商名稱*登入」的內容時，它就是 SSO。
When you choose single sign-on in a website, it will prompt your SSO provider login page and after that your account will be connected. Your password won't be shared but some basic information will (you can review it during the login request). This process is needed every time you want to log in to the same account.
主要優勢是：
- **安全性**：沒有涉及 [資料外洩](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_breach) 的風險，因為網站沒有儲存您的憑證。
- **易用性**：多個帳戶由單一登入管理。
但也有一些缺陷：
- **隱私權**： SSO供應商將知道您使用的服務。
- **集中化**：如果您的SSO帳戶遭到入侵或您無法登錄，則與其相關的所有其他帳戶都會受到影響。
SSO在您可以從服務之間更深入的整合中受益的情況下尤其有用。 例如，其中一個服務可能為其他服務提供SSO。 我們建議將SSO限制在您需要的地方，並以 [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md)保護主帳戶。
所有使用 SSO 的服務將與您的 SSO 帳戶一樣安全。 例如，如果您想使用硬件密鑰來保護帳戶，但該服務不支持硬件密鑰，您可以使用硬件密鑰來保護您的SSO帳戶，現在您的所有帳戶上基本上都有硬件MFA。 需要注意的是， 如果你 SSO 帳戶本身的安全性很弱，意味著與該登錄綁定的任何帳戶的安全性也會很弱。
### 電話號碼
我們建議您避免使用需要電話號碼才能註冊的服務。 電話號碼可以在多個服務中識別您的身份，並且根據數據共享協議，這將使您的使用更容易跟蹤，特別是當其中一個服務被洩漏時，因為電話號碼通常是 **不是** 加密的。
如果可以的話，你應該避免透露你的真實電話號碼。 某些服務將允許使用 VOIP 號碼，但這些通常會觸發欺詐偵測系統，導致帳戶被鎖定，因此我們不建議重要帳戶使用此系統。
在許多情況下，您需要提供可以接收短信或電話的號碼，特別是在國際購物時，以防您在邊境審查時的訂單出現問題。 服務通常會使用您的號碼作為驗證方式；不要自作聰明使用假的電話號碼，最後讓自己重要的帳戶被鎖定！
### 使用者名稱與密碼
某些服務允許您在不使用電子郵件地址的情況下註冊，並且只需要您設置用戶名稱和密碼。 當與 VPN 或 Tor 結合時，這些服務可能會提供更高的匿名性。 請記住，對於這類型的帳號，如果你忘記了你的用戶名或密碼，很可能會有**沒有辦法恢復你的帳號**。
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title: "刪除帳號"
icon: 'material/account-remove'
---
隨著時間的推移，它可以很容易地積累一些在線帳戶，其中許多你可能不再使用。 刪除這些未使用的帳戶是收回隱私的重要一步，因為休眠帳戶容易受到數據洩露的影響。 資料外洩是指服務的安全性受到破壞，受保護的資訊被未經授權的行為者檢視、傳輸或竊取。 Data breaches are unfortunately all [too common](https://haveibeenpwned.com/PwnedWebsites) these days, and so practicing good digital hygiene is the best way to minimize the impact they have on your life. 本指南的目標是幫助您通過令人討厭的帳戶刪除過程，通常由 [欺騙性設計](https://www.deceptive.design/)使您變得困難，以改善您的在線存在。
## 查找舊帳戶
### Password Manager
如果你有一個密碼管理器，你已經使用了你的整個數字生活，這部分將是非常容易的。 通常，它們包括內置功能，用於檢測您的憑證是否在數據洩露中暴露-例如Bitwarden的 [數據洩露報告](https://bitwarden.com/blog/have-you-been-pwned/)。
<figure markdown>
![Bitwarden's Data Breach Report feature](../assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png)
</figure>
即使您之前沒有明確使用過密碼管理器，也有可能您在瀏覽器或手機中使用了密碼管理器，甚至沒有意識到這一點。 例如： [Firefox Password Manager](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/password-manager-remember-delete-edit-logins)、 [Google Password Manager](https://passwords.google.com/intro) 和 [Edge Password Manager](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-edge/save-or-forget-passwords-in-microsoft-edge-b4beecb0-f2a8-1ca0-f26f-9ec247a3f336)。
桌面平臺通常還有一個密碼管理器，可以幫助您恢復忘記的密碼：
- Windows [Credential Manager](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/accessing-credential-manager-1b5c916a-6a16-889f-8581-fc16e8165ac0)
- macOS [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211145)
- iOS [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211146)
- Linux, Gnome Keyring, which can be accessed through [Seahorse](https://help.gnome.org/users/seahorse/stable/passwords-view.html.en) or [KDE Wallet Manager](https://userbase.kde.org/KDE_Wallet_Manager)
### Email
如果您過去沒有使用密碼管理員，或者您認為您的帳戶從未被添加到密碼管理員，另一個選項是搜索您認為已註冊的電子郵件帳戶。 在電子郵件用戶端上，搜尋「驗證」或「歡迎」等關鍵字。 幾乎每次你建立線上帳戶時，該服務都會向你的電子郵件發送驗證連結或介紹訊息。 這可能是找到舊的，被遺忘的帳戶的好方法。
## 刪除舊帳戶
### 登入
若要刪除舊帳戶，您必須先確認能夠登入帳戶。 同樣，如果帳戶在您的密碼管理員中，則此步驟很簡單。 如果沒有，你可以試著猜測你的密碼。 否則，通常有選項可以重新訪問您的帳戶，通常可以通過登錄頁面的「忘記密碼」鏈接來獲得。 您放棄的帳戶也可能已被刪除：有時服務會自動刪除所有舊帳戶。
嘗試重新取得存取權時，如果網站傳回錯誤訊息，表示電子郵件未與帳戶關聯，或在多次嘗試後您從未收到重設連結，則您沒有該電子郵件地址下的帳戶，應嘗試其他帳戶。 如果您無法確定使用了哪個電子郵件地址，或者您無法再存取該電子郵件，您可以嘗試聯絡該服務的客戶支援。 不幸的是，我們無法保證您能夠恢復訪問您的帳戶。
### GDPR （僅限歐洲經濟區居民）
Residents of the EEA have additional rights regarding data erasure specified in [Article 17](https://www.gdpr.org/regulation/article-17.html) of the GDPR. 如果適用於您，請閱讀任何特定服務的隱私權政策，以查找有關如何行使刪除權利的資訊。 閱讀隱私政策可能很重要，因為某些服務的「刪除帳戶」選項，實際上只是停用您的帳戶，若要真正刪除，您必須採取額外行動。 Sometimes actual deletion may involve filling out surveys, emailing the data protection officer of the service or even proving your residence in the EEA. If you plan to go this way, do **not** overwrite account information—your identity as an EEA resident may be required. Note that the location of the service does not matter; GDPR applies to anyone serving European users. If the service does not respect your right to erasure, you can contact your national [Data Protection Authority](https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/rights-citizens/redress/what-should-i-do-if-i-think-my-personal-data-protection-rights-havent-been-respected_en) and you may be entitled to monetary compensation.
### 覆寫帳戶資訊
在某些情況下，可以採用虛假資料來覆蓋帳戶的信息。 當您登入後，請將帳戶中的所有資訊變更為偽造資訊。 原因是許多網站甚至在帳戶刪除後仍會保留您之前擁有的資訊。 希望他們會用你輸入的最新數據覆蓋之前的信息。 但是，無法保證不會有先前信息的備份。
對於帳戶電子郵件，請通過您選擇的提供商創建新的替代電子郵件帳戶，或使用 [電子郵件別名服務](../email.md#email-aliasing-services)創建別名。 完成後，您可以刪除替代電子郵件地址。 我們建議您不要使用臨時電子郵件提供商，因為通常可以重新啟用臨時電子郵件。
### 刪除帳戶
您可以檢查 [JustDeleteMe](https://justdeleteme. xyz) 以獲取有關刪除特定服務帳戶的指示。 有些網站會慷慨地提供「刪除帳戶」選項，而其他網站則會強迫您與支援人員交談。 刪除過程可能因網站而異，有些網站無法刪除帳戶。
對於不允許帳戶刪除的服務，最好的做法是偽造前面提到的所有信息，並加強帳戶安全性。 爲此，啓用 [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md) 和提供的任何額外安全功能。 此外，請將密碼更改為隨機生成的最大允許大小的密碼（ [密碼管理器](../passwords.md) 對此很有用）。
如果您確信您關心的所有資訊都已被刪除，您可以放心地忘記此帳戶。 如果沒有，最好將憑證與其他密碼一起儲存，並偶爾重新登錄以重設密碼。
即使您能夠刪除帳戶，也無法保證您的所有信息都將被刪除。 事實上，法律要求一些公司保留某些信息，特別是與金融交易有關的信息。 當涉及到網站和雲端服務時，您的數據會發生什麼事情，這在很大程度上是您無法控制的。
## 避免註冊新帳戶
俗話說：「預防更勝治療。」 每當你覺得想要註冊一個新帳戶時，問問自己：「我真的需要註冊這個嗎？ 有不需要註冊的替代方案嗎？」 刪除一個帳戶通常比創建一個帳戶要困難得多。 即使刪除或更改帳戶上的資訊，也可能有來自第三方的緩存版本，例如 [Internet Archive](https://archive.org/)。 如果可能的話，不要隨便註冊帳號－未來的你會感謝你現在的決定！
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title: "常見的迷思"
icon: 'material/robot-confused'
---
## 「開源軟體永遠是安全的」或「商業軟體更安全」
這些迷思源於許多偏見，原始碼是否開放以及軟體的許可並不會以任何方式影響其安全性。 開源軟件 *可能* 比商業軟件更安全，但絕對不能保證這一點。當你評估軟體時，你應該根據每個工具的聲譽和安全性進行評估。
Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. 它還允許您查看代碼並禁用您發現的任何可疑功能。 然而，*除非你真的這樣做了*，否則不能保證程式碼曾經被評估過，特別是對於較小的軟體項目。 The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities into even large projects.[^1]
另一方面，專有軟件不太透明，但這並不意味著它不安全。 主要的專有軟件項目可以由內部和第三方機構進行審計，獨立的安全研究人員仍然可以通過逆向工程等技術發現漏洞。
To avoid biased decisions, it's *vital* that you evaluate the privacy and security standards of the software you use.
## 「信任的轉移可以增加隱私」
在討論 VPN 等解決方案時，我們經常談到「轉移信任」 （將您對 ISP 的信任轉移到 VPN 提供商）。 雖然這可以保護您的瀏覽數據免受 *特定* ISP 的侵害，但您選擇的 VPN 提供商仍然可以訪問您的瀏覽數據：您的數據並非完全受到各方的保護。 這意味著：
1. You must exercise caution when choosing a provider to shift trust to.
2. You should still use other techniques, like E2EE, to protect your data completely. Merely distrusting one provider to trust another is not securing your data.
## "Privacy-focused solutions are inherently trustworthy"
Focusing solely on the privacy policies and marketing of a tool or provider can blind you to its weaknesses. 當您正在尋找更私密的解決方案時，您應該確定潛在的問題是什麼，並找到該問題的技術解決方案。 For example, you may want to avoid Google Drive, which gives Google access to all of your data. The underlying problem in this case is lack of E2EE, so you should make sure that the provider you switch to actually implements E2EE, or use a tool (like [Cryptomator](../encryption.md#cryptomator-cloud)) which provides E2EE on any cloud provider. Switching to a "privacy-focused" provider (that doesn't implement E2EE) doesn't solve your problem: it just shifts trust from Google to that provider.
The privacy policies and business practices of providers you choose are very important, but should be considered secondary to technical guarantees of your privacy: You shouldn't shift trust to another provider when trusting a provider isn't a requirement at all.
## 「愈複雜愈好」
我們經常看到人們描述過於複雜的隱私威脅模型。 通常，這些解決方案包括許多不同的電子郵件帳戶或具有許多運動部件和條件的複雜設置等問題。 The replies are usually answers to "What is the best way to do *X*?"
Finding the "best" solution for yourself doesn't necessarily mean you are after an infallible solution with dozens of conditions—these solutions are often difficult to work with realistically. As we discussed previously, security often comes at the cost of convenience. Below, we provide some tips:
1. ==Actions need to serve a particular purpose:== think about how to do what you want with the fewest actions.
2. ==Remove human failure points:== We fail, get tired, and forget things. To maintain security, avoid relying on manual conditions and processes that you have to remember.
3. ==Use the right level of protection for what you intend.== We often see recommendations of so-called law-enforcement or subpoena-proof solutions. These often require specialist knowledge and generally aren't what people want. There's no point in building an intricate threat model for anonymity if you can be easily de-anonymized by a simple oversight.
So, how might this look?
One of the clearest threat models is one where people *know who you are* and one where they do not. 總會有你必須申報你的法定姓名的情況，還有其他你不需要的情況。
1. **Known identity** - A known identity is used for things where you must declare your name. 有許多法律文件和合同需要合法身份。 這可能包括開設銀行帳戶，簽署財產租賃，獲得護照，進口物品時的海關申報，或以其他方式與您的政府打交道。 這些東西通常會導致憑證，如信用卡，信用評級檢查，帳戶號碼，以及可能的物理地址。
我們不建議您使用 VPN 或 Tor 來處理這些事情，因為您的身份已經通過其他方式被對方知道。
!!! tip
在網上購物時，使用[包裹儲物櫃] (https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parcel_locker)有助於保護您的實際地址的私密性。
2. **未知身份** - 未知身份可能是您經常使用的穩定假名。 它不是匿名的，因為它不會改變。 如果您是線上社群的一員，您可能希望保留其他人知道的角色。 這個假名不是匿名的，因為如果監控時間足夠長，關於所有者的詳細信息可以透露更多信息，例如他們的寫作方式，他們對感興趣主題的一般知識等。
您可能希望使用 VPN 來隱藏您的 IP 地址。 金融交易更難掩蓋：您可以考慮使用匿名加密貨幣，例如 [Monero](https://www.getmonero.org/)。 採用山寨幣轉移也可能有助於偽裝您的貨幣起源。 通常情況下，交易所需要完成 KYC （了解您的客戶） ，然後才能將法定貨幣兌換為任何類型的加密貨幣。 線下操作也可能是一個解決方案；然而，這些往往更昂貴，有時也需要 KYC。
3. **匿名身份** - 即使有經驗的專家，也很難長時間保持一個帳號的匿名性。 它們應該是短期和短暫的身份，定期輪流。
使用 Tor 可以幫助我們做到這一點。 同樣值得注意的是，通過異步溝通可以實現更大的匿名性：實時溝通容易受到打字模式分析的影響（即不止一段文字，在論壇上分發，通過電子郵件等）。
--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.zh-Hant.txt"
[^1]: One notable example of this is the [2021 incident in which University of Minnesota researchers introduced three vulnerabilities into the Linux kernel development project](https://cse.umn.edu/cs/linux-incident).

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---
title: "Common Threats"
icon: 'material/eye-outline'
---
從廣義上講，我們將我們的建議分為適用於大多數人的 [個威脅](threat-modeling.md) 或目標。 你可能會關心沒有，一個，幾個或所有這些可能性，你使用的工具和服務取決於你的目標是什麼。 您也可能有這些類別之外的特定威脅，這完全有可能！ 重要的是要了解您選擇使用的工具的好處和缺點，因為幾乎沒有一種工具可以保護您免受任何威脅。
- <span class="pg-purple">:material-incognito: 匿名</span> -保護您的在線活動免受您的真實身份影響，保護您免受試圖特別揭露 *您* 身份的人的侵害。
- <span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: 有針對性的攻擊</span> -保護免受駭客或其他惡意行為者的攻擊，這些行為者正試圖特別訪問 *個您的* 個數據或設備。
- <span class="pg-orange">:material-bug-outline: 被動攻擊</span> -保護免受惡意軟體、數據洩露和其他同時針對多人的攻擊。
- <span class="pg-teal">:material-server-network: Service Providers</span> - Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server).
- <span class="pg-blue">:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance</span> - Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities.
- <span class="pg-brown">:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism</span> - Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors.
- <span class="pg-green">:material-account-search: Public Exposure</span> - Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public.
- <span class="pg-blue-gray">:material-close-outline: Censorship</span> - Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online.
其中一些威脅對您來說可能比其他威脅更重要，這取決於您的具體問題。 For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with <span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks</span>, but they probably still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in <span class="pg-blue">:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance</span> programs. Similarly, many people may be primarily concerned with <span class="pg-green">:material-account-search: Public Exposure</span> of their personal data, but they should still be wary of security-focused issues, such as <span class="pg-orange">:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks</span>—like malware affecting their devices.
## Anonymity vs. Privacy
<span class="pg-purple">:material-incognito: Anonymity</span>
Anonymity is often confused with privacy, but they're distinct concepts. While privacy is a set of choices you make about how your data is used and shared, anonymity is the complete disassociation of your online activities from your real identity.
Whistleblowers and journalists, for example, can have a much more extreme threat model which requires total anonymity. That's not only hiding what they do, what data they have, and not getting hacked by malicious actors or governments, but also hiding who they are entirely. They will often sacrifice any kind of convenience if it means protecting their anonymity, privacy, or security, because their lives could depend on it. Most people don't need to go so far.
## Security and Privacy
<span class="pg-orange">:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks</span>
Security and privacy are also often confused, because you need security to obtain any semblance of privacy: Using tools—even if they're private by design—is futile if they could be easily exploited by attackers who later release your data. However, the inverse isn't necessarily true: The most secure service in the world *isn't necessarily* private. The best example of this is trusting data to Google who, given their scale, have had few security incidents by employing industry-leading security experts to secure their infrastructure. Even though Google provides very secure services, very few people would consider their data private in Google's free consumer products (Gmail, YouTube, etc.)
When it comes to application security, we generally don't (and sometimes can't) know if the software we use is malicious, or might one day become malicious. Even with the most trustworthy developers, there's generally no guarantee that their software doesn't have a serious vulnerability that could later be exploited.
To minimize the damage that a malicious piece of software *could* do, you should employ security by compartmentalization. For example, this could come in the form of using different computers for different jobs, using virtual machines to separate different groups of related applications, or using a secure operating system with a strong focus on application sandboxing and mandatory access control.
!!! tip
Mobile operating systems generally have better application sandboxing than desktop operating systems: Apps can't obtain root access, and require permission for access to system resources.
Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS has similar sandboxing capabilities to Android, and macOS has full system permission control (and developers can opt-in to sandboxing for applications). However, these operating systems do transmit identifying information to their respective OEMs. Linux tends to not submit information to system vendors, but it has poor protection against exploits and malicious apps. This can be mitigated somewhat with specialized distributions which make significant use of virtual machines or containers, such as [Qubes OS](../../desktop/#qubes-os).
<span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks</span>
Targeted attacks against a specific person are more problematic to deal with. Common attacks include sending malicious documents via email, exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g. in browsers and operating systems), and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you should employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies.
!!! tip
By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typically run untrusted code, sent to you from third parties. Running multiple virtual machines—to separate applications like these from your host system, as well as each other—is one technique you can use to mitigate the chance of an exploit in these applications compromising the rest of your system. For example, technologies like Qubes OS or Microsoft Defender Application Guard on Windows provide convenient methods to do this.
If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user.
## Privacy From Service Providers
<span class="pg-teal">:material-server-network: Service Providers</span>
We live in a world where almost everything is connected to the internet. Our "private" messages, emails, and social interactions are typically stored on a server, somewhere. Generally, when you send someone a message it's stored on a server, and when your friend wants to read the message the server will show it to them.
The obvious problem with this is that the service provider (or a hacker who has compromised the server) can access your conversations whenever and however they want, without you ever knowing. This applies to many common services, like SMS messaging, Telegram, and Discord.
Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between you and your desired recipients before they are even sent to the server. The confidentiality of your messages is guaranteed, assuming the service provider doesn't have access to the private keys of either party.
!!! note "Note on Web-based Encryption"
In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering).
On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt.
Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible.
Even with E2EE, service providers can still profile you based on **metadata**, which typically isn't protected. While the service provider can't read your messages, they can still observe important things, such as who you're talking to, how often you message them, and when you're typically active. Protection of metadata is fairly uncommon, and—if it's within your [threat model](threat-modeling.md)—you should pay close attention to the technical documentation of the software you're using to see if there's any metadata minimization or protection at all.
## Mass Surveillance Programs
<span class="pg-blue">:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance</span>
Mass surveillance is the intricate effort to monitor the "behavior, many activities, or information" of an entire (or substantial fraction of a) population.[^1] It often refers to government programs, such as the ones [disclosed by Edward Snowden in 2013](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_surveillance_disclosures_(2013%E2%80%93present)). However, it can also be carried out by corporations, either on behalf of government agencies or by their own initiative.
!!! abstract "Atlas of Surveillance"
If you want to learn more about surveillance methods and how they're implemented in your city you can also take a look at the [Atlas of Surveillance](https://atlasofsurveillance.org/) by the [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.eff.org/).
In France you can take a look at the [Technolopolice website](https://technopolice.fr/villes/) maintained by the non-profit association La Quadrature du Net.
Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, breaching human rights, it's most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.
!!! quote "ACLU: [*The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward*](https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/the-privacy-lesson-of-9-11-mass-surveillance-is-not-the-way-forward)"
In the face of [Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRISM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM) and [Upstream](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upstream_collection)], intelligence officials also admitted that the NSA had for years been secretly collecting records about virtually every American’s phone calls — who’s calling whom, when those calls are made, and how long they last. This kind of information, when amassed by the NSA day after day, can reveal incredibly sensitive details about people’s lives and associations, such as whether they have called a pastor, an abortion provider, an addiction counselor, or a suicide hotline.
Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^2]
Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods:
- Your IP address
- Browser cookies
- The data you submit to websites
- Your browser or device fingerprint
- Payment method correlation
\[This list isn't exhaustive].
If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategues like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information.
<span class="pg-brown">:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism</span>
> Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^3]
For many people, tracking and surveillance by private corporations is a growing concern. Pervasive ad networks, such as those operated by Google and Facebook, span the internet far beyond just the sites they control, tracking your actions along the way. Using tools like content blockers to limit network requests to their servers, and reading the privacy policies of the services you use can help you avoid many basic adversaries (although it can't completely prevent tracking).[^4]
Additionally, even companies outside of the *AdTech* or tracking industry can share your information with [data brokers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_broker) (such as Cambridge Analytica, Experian, or Datalogix) or other parties. You can't automatically assume your data is safe just because the service you're using doesn't fall within the typical AdTech or tracking business model. The strongest protection against corporate data collection is to encrypt or obfuscate your data whenever possible, making it difficult for different providers to correlate data with each other and build a profile on you.
## Limiting Public Information
<span class="pg-green">:material-account-search: Public Exposure</span>
The best way to keep your data private is simply not making it public in the first place. Deleting unwanted information you find about yourself online is one of the best first steps you can take to regain your privacy.
- [View our guide on account deletion :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](account-deletion.md)
On sites where you do share information, checking the privacy settings of your account to limit how widely that data is spread is very important. For example, enable "private mode" on your accounts if given the option: This ensures that your account isn't being indexed by search engines, and that it can't be viewed without your permission.
If you've already submitted your real information to sites which shouldn't have it, consider using disinformation tactics, like submitting fictitious information related to that online identity. This makes your real information indistinguishable from the false information.
## Avoiding Censorship
<span class="pg-blue-gray">:material-close-outline: Censorship</span>
Censorship online can be carried out (to varying degrees) by actors including totalitarian governments, network administrators, and service providers. These efforts to control communication and restrict access to information will always be incompatible with the human right to Freedom of Expression.[^5]
Censorship on corporate platforms is increasingly common, as platforms like Twitter and Facebook give in to public demand, market pressures, and pressures from government agencies. Government pressures can be covert requests to businesses, such as the White House [requesting the takedown](https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/technology/on-the-web-a-fine-line-on-free-speech-across-globe.html) of a provocative YouTube video, or overt, such as the Chinese government requiring companies to adhere to a strict regime of censorship.
People concerned with the threat of censorship can use technologies like [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) to circumvent it, and support censorship-resistant communication platforms like [Matrix](../real-time-communication.md#element), which doesn't have a centralized account authority that can close accounts arbitrarily.
!!! tip
While evading censorship itself can be easy, hiding the fact that you are doing it can be very problematic.
You should consider which aspects of the network your adversary can observe, and whether you have plausible deniability for your actions. For example, using [encrypted DNS](../advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns) can help you bypass rudimentary, DNS-based censorship systems, but it can't truly hide what you are visiting from your ISP. A VPN or Tor can help hide what you are visiting from network administrators, but can't hide that you're using those networks in the first place. Pluggable transports (such as Obfs4proxy, Meek, or Shadowsocks) can help you evade firewalls that block common VPN protocols or Tor, but your circumvention attempts can still be detected by methods like probing or [deep packet inspection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection).
You must always consider the risks of trying to bypass censorship, the potential consequences, and how sophisticated your adversary may be. You should be cautious with your software selection, and have a backup plan in case you are caught.
--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.zh-Hant.txt"
[^1]: Wikipedia: [*Mass Surveillance*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass_surveillance) and [*Surveillance*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance).
[^2]: United States Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: [*Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215*](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/ec542143-1079-424a-84b3-acc354698560/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf)
[^3]: Wikipedia: [*Surveillance capitalism*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance_capitalism)
[^4]: "[Enumerating badness](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/)" (or, "listing all the bad things that we know about"), as many adblockers and antivirus programs do, fails to adequately protect you from new and unknown threats because they have not yet been added to the filter list. You should also employ other mitigation techniques.
[^5]: United Nations: [*Universal Declaration of Human Rights*](https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights).

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title: 電子郵件安全
icon: material/email
---
電子郵件本身即非安全的通訊形式。 您可以使用 OpenPGP 等工具提高電子郵件安全性，這些工具為您的消息添加端到端加密，但與其他消息傳遞應用程序中的加密相比， OpenPGP 仍然存在許多缺點，而且由於電子郵件的設計方式，某些電子郵件數據永遠不會加密。
因此，電子郵件最適合用於從您在線註冊的服務接收交易性電子郵件（如通知、驗證電子郵件、密碼重置等），而不是用於與他人溝通。
## 郵件是如何加密的
將 E2EE 添加到不同電子郵件提供商之間的電子郵件的標準方法是使用 OpenPGP。 OpenPGP 標準有不同的實現，最常見的是 [GnuPG](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard) 和 [OpenPGP.js](https://openpgpjs.org)。
還有另一種標準被稱為 [S/MIME](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME)，但它需要由 [憑證機構](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) 頒發的憑證（並非所有憑證都發行S/MIME憑證）。 它支持 [Google Workplace](https://support.google.com/a/topic/9061730?hl=en&ref_topic=9061731) 和 [Outlook for Web或Exchange Server 2016 ， 2019](https://support.office.com/en-us/article/encrypt-messages-by-using-s-mime-in-outlook-on-the-web-878c79fc-7088-4b39-966f-14512658f480)。
即使您使用OpenPGP ，它也不支持 [向前保密](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy)，這意味著如果您或收件人的私鑰被盜，所有先前加密的消息都將被曝光。 這就是為什麼我們建議 [即時通訊](../real-time-communication.md) ，只要有可能，就實現電子郵件的前向保密性，以進行個人對個人的通信。
### 哪些郵件客戶端支持 E2EE？
Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md). 根據驗證方法的不同，如果提供者或電子郵件用戶端不支持OAT或橋接應用程序，這可能會導致安全性降低，因為 [多因素驗證](multi-factor-authentication.md) 在純密碼驗證中是不可能的。
### 我要怎樣保護自己的私密鑰匙？
A smartcard (such as a [Yubikey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
在智能卡上進行解密是有利的，以避免可能將您的私鑰暴露在受損的設備上。
## Email Metadata Overview
電子郵件中繼資料儲存在電子郵件的 [個訊息標題](https://en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Email#Message_header) 中，並包含您可能已經看到的一些可見標題，例如： `To`、 `From`、 `Cc`、 `Date`、 `Subject`。 許多電子郵件客戶端和提供商還包含一些隱藏的標題，可以揭示有關您的帳戶的信息。
客戶端軟體可能會使用電子郵件中繼資料來顯示來自誰以及收到訊息的時間。 服務器可以使用它來確定電子郵件消息必須發送的位置，其中 [個其他目的](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) 並不總是透明的。
### 誰可以查看電子郵件中繼資料？
電子郵件元數據受到外部觀察者的保護， [Opportunistic TLS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunistic_TLS) 保護它免受外部觀察者的影響，但它仍然能夠被您的電子郵件客戶端軟件（或網絡郵件）和任何伺服器看到，將您的消息轉發給任何收件人，包括您的電子郵件提供商。 有時，電子郵件伺服器也會使用第三方服務來防範垃圾郵件，垃圾郵件通常也可以訪問您的郵件。
### Why Can't Metadata be E2EE?
電子郵件元數據對於電子郵件最基本的功能（它來自何處，以及它必須去向何處）至關重要。 E2EE 最初並未內建於電子郵件協議中，而是需要像 OpenPGP 這樣的附加軟件。 由於 OpenPGP 訊息仍必須與傳統的電子郵件供應商合作，因此它無法加密電子郵件元數據，只能加密訊息正文本身。 這意味著即使在使用 OpenPGP 時，外部觀察者也可以看到關於您的消息的大量信息，例如您正在發送電子郵件的人，主題行，當您發送電子郵件時等。
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title: "多重身分驗證"
icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication'
---
**多因素認證**（**MFA**）是一種安全機制，除了輸入用戶名（或電子郵件）和密碼之外，還需要其他步驟。 最常見的方法是您會從簡訊或應用程式收到的有時間限制的代碼。
通常情況下，如果駭客（或任何想要盜取您帳號的人）能夠找出您的密碼，那麼他們將獲得密碼屬於的帳戶的存取權。 MFA 的帳戶迫使駭客同時擁有密碼（您 *知道*的東西）和您擁有的設備（您 *擁有*的東西），例如您的手機。
不同 MFA 方式的安全性各不相同，但整體來說，讓攻擊者越難訪問您的 MFA 方法越好。 MFA 方式（從最弱到最強）的例子包括簡訊，電子郵件代碼，應用推送通知， TOTP ， Yubico OTP 和 FIDO。
## MFA 方式的比較
### 簡訊或 Email 多重身分驗證
透過簡訊或電子郵件接收 OTP 代碼是透過 MFA 保護帳戶安全的最弱方法之一。 Obtaining a code by email or SMS takes away from the "something you *have*" idea, because there are a variety of ways a hacker could [take over your phone number](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam) or gain access to your email without having physical access to any of your devices at all. 如果未經授權的人獲得了您的電子郵件訪問權限，他們將能夠使用該訪問權限重設您的密碼並收到驗證碼，使他們能夠完全訪問您的帳戶。
### 推送通知
推送通知多重身份認證的形式是將訊息發送到手機上的應用程式，要求您確認新的帳戶登入。 這種方法比短信或電子郵件要好得多，因為攻擊者通常無法在沒有已經登錄的設備的情況下獲得這些推送通知，這意味著他們需要首先破壞您的其他設備之一。
We all make mistakes, and there is the risk that you might accept the login attempt by accident. 推送通知登入授權通常一次發送到 *所有* 您的設備，如果您有多個設備，則可擴大 MFA 代碼的可用性。
推送通知 MFA 的安全性取決於應用程序的品質，伺服器組件以及生成它的開發人員的信任。 Installing an app may also require you to accept invasive privileges that grant access to other data on your device. An individual app also requires that you have a specific app for each service which may not require a password to open, unlike a good TOTP generator app.
### 暫時性的一次性密碼 (TOTP)
TOTP 是最常見的 MFA 形式之一。 當您設置TOTP時，您通常需要掃描 [QR Code](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QR_code) ，該掃描與您打算使用的服務建立“[共享祕密](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_secret)”。 共用祕密在驗證器應用程式的數據中受到保護，有時會受到密碼的保護。
然後，時間限制代碼從共享機密和當前時間衍生出來。 由於代碼僅在短時間內有效，無法訪問共享機密，因此對手無法生成新代碼。
If you have a hardware security key with TOTP support (such as a YubiKey with [Yubico Authenticator](https://www.yubico.com/products/yubico-authenticator/)), we recommend that you store your "shared secrets" on the hardware. Hardware such as the YubiKey was developed with the intention of making the "shared secret" difficult to extract and copy. A YubiKey is also not connected to the Internet, unlike a phone with a TOTP app.
Unlike [WebAuthn](#fido-fast-identity-online), TOTP offers no protection against [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing) or reuse attacks. If an adversary obtains a valid code from you, they may use it as many times as they like until it expires (generally 60 seconds).
對手可以建立一個網站來模仿官方服務，試圖欺騙你提供你的用戶名，密碼和當前的 TOTP 代碼。 如果對手使用這些記錄的憑證，他們可能能夠登錄到真正的服務並劫持帳戶。
雖然不完美，但 TOTP 對大多數人來說足夠安全，當 [硬件安全金鑰](../multi-factor-authentication.md#hardware-security-keys) 不受支持時， [驗證器應用程序](../multi-factor-authentication.md#authenticator-apps) 仍然是一個不錯的選擇。
### 硬體安全金鑰
The YubiKey stores data on a tamper-resistant solid-state chip which is [impossible to access](https://security.stackexchange.com/a/245772) non-destructively without an expensive process and a forensics laboratory.
These keys are generally multi-function and provide a number of methods to authenticate. Below are the most common ones.
#### Yubico OTP
Yubico OTP is an authentication protocol typically implemented in hardware security keys. When you decide to use Yubico OTP, the key will generate a public ID, private ID, and a Secret Key which is then uploaded to the Yubico OTP server.
When logging into a website, all you need to do is to physically touch the security key. The security key will emulate a keyboard and print out a one-time password into the password field.
The service will then forward the one-time password to the Yubico OTP server for validation. A counter is incremented both on the key and Yubico's validation server. The OTP can only be used once, and when a successful authentication occurs, the counter is increased which prevents reuse of the OTP. Yubico provides a [detailed document](https://developers.yubico.com/OTP/OTPs_Explained.html) about the process.
<figure markdown>
![Yubico OTP](../assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png)
</figure>
There are some benefits and disadvantages to using Yubico OTP when compared to TOTP.
The Yubico validation server is a cloud based service, and you're placing trust in Yubico that they are storing data securely and not profiling you. The public ID associated with Yubico OTP is reused on every website and could be another avenue for third-parties to profile you. Like TOTP, Yubico OTP does not provide phishing resistance.
If your threat model requires you to have different identities on different websites, **do not** use Yubico OTP with the same hardware security key across those websites as public ID is unique to each security key.
#### FIDO (Fast IDentity Online)
[FIDO](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIDO_Alliance) includes a number of standards, first there was U2F and then later [FIDO2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIDO2_Project) which includes the web standard [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn).
U2F and FIDO2 refer to the [Client to Authenticator Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Client_to_Authenticator_Protocol), which is the protocol between the security key and the computer, such as a laptop or phone. It complements WebAuthn which is the component used to authenticate with the website (the "Relying Party") you're trying to log in on.
WebAuthn is the most secure and private form of second factor authentication. While the authentication experience is similar to Yubico OTP, the key does not print out a one-time password and validate with a third-party server. Instead, it uses [public key cryptography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography) for authentication.
<figure markdown>
![FIDO](../assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png)
</figure>
When you create an account, the public key is sent to the service, then when you log in, the service will require you to "sign" some data with your private key. The benefit of this is that no password data is ever stored by the service, so there is nothing for an adversary to steal.
This presentation discusses the history of password authentication, the pitfalls (such as password reuse), and discussion of FIDO2 and [WebAuthn](https://webauthn.guide) standards.
<div class="yt-embed">
<iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://invidious.privacyguides.net/embed/aMo4ZlWznao?local=true" title="How FIDO2 and WebAuthn Stop Account Takeovers" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen></iframe>
</div>
FIDO2 and WebAuthn have superior security and privacy properties when compared to any MFA methods.
Typically for web services it is used with WebAuthn which is a part of the [W3C recommendations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Wide_Web_Consortium#W3C_recommendation_(REC)). It uses public key authentication and is more secure than shared secrets used in Yubico OTP and TOTP methods, as it includes the origin name (usually, the domain name) during authentication. Attestation is provided to protect you from phishing attacks, as it helps you to determine that you are using the authentic service and not a fake copy.
Unlike Yubico OTP, WebAuthn does not use any public ID, so the key is **not** identifiable across different websites. It also does not use any third-party cloud server for authentication. All communication is completed between the key and the website you are logging into. FIDO also uses a counter which is incremented upon use in order to prevent session reuse and cloned keys.
If a website or service supports WebAuthn for the authentication, it is highly recommended that you use it over any other form of MFA.
## 一般性建議
我們有這些一般性建議：
### 我應該選擇哪種方法？
When configuring your MFA method, keep in mind that it is only as secure as your weakest authentication method you use. This means it is important that you only use the best MFA method available. For instance, if you are already using TOTP, you should disable email and SMS MFA. If you are already using FIDO2/WebAuthn, you should not be using Yubico OTP or TOTP on your account.
### 備份
您應該始終備份您的 MFA 方法。 硬體安全金鑰可能會丟失、被盜或隨著時間的推移而停止運作。 建議您擁有一對具有相同帳戶存取權限的硬體安全金鑰，而不僅僅是一個。
當與驗證器應用程式一起使用TOTP時，請務必備份您的恢復密鑰或應用程式本身，或將「共享機密」複製到不同手機上的應用程式的另一個實例或加密容器（例如 [VeraCrypt](../encryption.md#veracrypt)）。
### Initial Set Up
When buying a security key, it is important that you change the default credentials, set up password protection for the key, and enable touch confirmation if your key supports it. Products such as the YubiKey have multiple interfaces with separate credentials for each one of them, so you should go over each interface and set up protection as well.
### Email and SMS
If you have to use email for MFA, make sure that the email account itself is secured with a proper MFA method.
If you use SMS MFA, use a carrier who will not switch your phone number to a new SIM card without account access, or use a dedicated VoIP number from a provider with similar security to avoid a [SIM swap attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam).
[MFA tools we recommend](../multi-factor-authentication.md ""){.md-button}
## More Places to Set Up MFA
Beyond just securing your website logins, multi-factor authentication can be used to secure your local logins, SSH keys or even password databases as well.
### Windows
Yubico has a dedicated [Credential Provider](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/credential-providers-in-windows) that adds Challenge-Response authentication for the username + password login flow for local Windows accounts. If you have a YubiKey with Challenge-Response authentication support, take a look at the [Yubico Login for Windows Configuration Guide](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013708460-Yubico-Login-for-Windows-Configuration-Guide), which will allow you to set up MFA on your Windows computer.
### macOS
macOS 具有 [原生支援](https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/intro-to-smart-card-integration-depd0b888248/web) 用於使用智慧卡(PIV)進行驗證。 If you have a smartcard or a hardware security key that supports the PIV interface such as the YubiKey, we recommend that you follow your smartcard/hardware security vendor's documentation and set up second factor authentication for your macOS computer.
Yubico have a guide [Using Your YubiKey as a Smart Card in macOS](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016649059) which can help you set up your YubiKey on macOS.
設定智慧卡/安全金鑰後，我們建議您在終端機中執行此命令：
```text
sudo defaults write /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow DisableFDEAutoLogin -bool YES
```
The command will prevent an adversary from bypassing MFA when the computer boots.
### Linux
!!! warning
If the hostname of your system changes (such as due to DHCP), you would be unable to login. It is vital that you set up a proper hostname for your computer before following this guide.
The `pam_u2f` module on Linux can provide two-factor authentication for logging in on most popular Linux distributions. If you have a hardware security key that supports U2F, you can set up MFA authentication for your login. Yubico has a guide [Ubuntu Linux Login Guide - U2F](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016649099-Ubuntu-Linux-Login-Guide-U2F) which should work on any distribution. The package manager commands—such as `apt-get`—and package names may however differ. This guide does **not** apply to Qubes OS.
### Qubes OS
Qubes OS has support for Challenge-Response authentication with YubiKeys. If you have a YubiKey with Challenge-Response authentication support, take a look at the Qubes OS [YubiKey documentation](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/yubikey/) if you want to set up MFA on Qubes OS.
### SSH
#### Hardware Security Keys
SSH MFA could be set up using multiple different authentication methods that are popular with hardware security keys. We recommend that you check out Yubico's [documentation](https://developers.yubico.com/SSH/) on how to set this up.
#### 暫時性的一次性密碼 (TOTP)
SSH MFA can also be set up using TOTP. DigitalOcean has provided a tutorial [How To Set Up Multi-Factor Authentication for SSH on Ubuntu 20.04](https://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/how-to-set-up-multi-factor-authentication-for-ssh-on-ubuntu-20-04). Most things should be the same regardless of distribution, however the package manager commands—such as `apt-get`—and package names may differ.
### KeePass (and KeePassXC)
KeePass and KeePassXC databases can be secured using Challenge-Response or HOTP as a second-factor authentication. Yubico has provided a document for KeePass [Using Your YubiKey with KeePass](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013779759-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-KeePass) and there is also one on the [KeePassXC](https://keepassxc.org/docs/#faq-yubikey-2fa) website.
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---
title: "Introduction to Passwords"
icon: 'material/form-textbox-password'
---
Passwords are an essential part of our everyday digital lives. We use them to protect our accounts, our devices and our secrets. Despite often being the only thing between us and an adversary who's after our private information, not a lot of thought is put into them, which often leads to people using passwords that can be easily guessed or brute-forced.
## Best Practices
### Use unique passwords for every service
Imagine this; you sign up for an account with the same e-mail and password on multiple online services. If one of those service providers is malicious, or their service has a data breach that exposes your password in an unencrypted format, all a bad actor would have to do is try that e-mail and password combination across multiple popular services until they get a hit. It doesn't matter how strong that one password is, because they already have it.
This is called [credential stuffing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credential_stuffing), and it is one of the most common ways that your accounts can be compromised by bad actors. To avoid this, make sure that you never re-use your passwords.
### Use randomly generated passwords
==You should **never** rely on yourself to come up with a good password.== We recommend using [randomly generated passwords](#passwords) or [diceware passphrases](#diceware-passphrases) with sufficient entropy to protect your accounts and devices.
All of our [recommended password managers](../passwords.md) include a built-in password generator that you can use.
### Rotating Passwords
You should avoid changing passwords that you have to remember (such as your password manager's master password) too often unless you have reason to believe it has been compromised, as changing it too often exposes you to the risk of forgetting it.
When it comes to passwords that you don't have to remember (such as passwords stored inside your password manager), if your [threat model](threat-modeling.md) calls for it, we recommend going through important accounts (especially accounts that don't use multi-factor authentication) and changing their password every couple of months, in case they have been compromised in a data breach that hasn't become public yet. Most password managers allow you to set an expiry date for your password to make this easier to manage.
!!! tip "Checking for data breaches"
If your password manager lets you check for compromised passwords, make sure to do so and promptly change any password that may have been exposed in a data breach. Alternatively, you could follow [Have I Been Pwned's Latest Breaches feed](https://feeds.feedburner.com/HaveIBeenPwnedLatestBreaches) with the help of a [news aggregator](../news-aggregators.md).
## Creating strong passwords
### Passwords
A lot of services impose certain criteria when it comes to passwords, including a minimum or maximum length, as well as which special characters, if any, can be used. You should use your password manager's built-in password generator to create passwords that are as long and complex as the service will allow by including capitalized and lowercase letters, numbers and special characters.
If you need a password you can memorize, we recommend a [diceware passphrase](#diceware-passphrases).
### Diceware Passphrases
Diceware is a method for creating passphrases which are easy to remember, but hard to guess.
Diceware passphrases are a great option when you need to memorize or manually input your credentials, such as for your password manager's master password or your device's encryption password.
An example of a diceware passphrase is `viewable fastness reluctant squishy seventeen shown pencil`.
To generate a diceware passphrase using real dice, follow these steps:
!!! note
These instructions assume that you are using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate the passphrase, which requires five dice rolls per word. Other wordlists may require more or less rolls per word, and may require a different amount of words to achieve the same entropy.
1. Roll a six-sided die five times, noting down the number after each roll.
2. As an example, let's say you rolled `2-5-2-6-6`. Look through the [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) for the word that corresponds to `25266`.
3. You will find the word `encrypt`. Write that word down.
4. Repeat this process until your passphrase has as many words as you need, which you should separate with a space.
!!! warning "Important"
You should **not** re-roll words until you get a combination of words that appeal to you. The process should be completely random.
If you don't have access to or would prefer to not use real dice, you can use your password manager's built-in password generator, as most of them have the option to generate diceware passphrases in addition to regular passwords.
We recommend using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate your diceware passphrases, as it offers the exact same security as the original list, while containing words that are easier to memorize. There are also [other wordlists in different languages](https://theworld.com/~reinhold/diceware.html#Diceware%20in%20Other%20Languages|outline), if you do not want your passphrase to be in English.
??? note "Explanation of entropy and strength of diceware passphrases"
To demonstrate how strong diceware passphrases are, we'll use the aforementioned seven word passphrase (`viewable fastness reluctant squishy seventeen shown pencil`) and [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) as an example.
One metric to determine the strength of a diceware passphrase is how much entropy it has. The entropy per word in a diceware passphrase is calculated as $\text{log}_2(\text{WordsInList})$ and the overall entropy of the passphrase is calculated as $\text{log}_2(\text{WordsInList}^\text{WordsInPhrase})$.
Therefore, each word in the aforementioned list results in ~12.9 bits of entropy ($\text{log}_2(7776)$), and a seven word passphrase derived from it has ~90.47 bits of entropy ($\text{log}_2(7776^7)$).
The [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) contains 7776 unique words. To calculate the amount of possible passphrases, all we have to do is $\text{WordsInList}^\text{WordsInPhrase}$, or in our case, $7776^7$.
Let's put all of this in perspective: A seven word passphrase using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) is one of ~1,719,070,799,748,422,500,000,000,000 possible passphrases.
On average, it takes trying 50% of all the possible combinations to guess your phrase. With that in mind, even if your adversary is capable of ~1,000,000,000,000 guesses per second, it would still take them ~27,255,689 years to guess your passphrase. That is the case even if the following things are true:
- Your adversary knows that you used the diceware method.
- Your adversary knows the specific wordlist that you used.
- Your adversary knows how many words your passphrase contains.
To sum it up, diceware passphrases are your best option when you need something that is both easy to remember *and* exceptionally strong.
## Storing Passwords
### Password Managers
The best way to store your passwords is by using a password manager. They allow you to store your passwords in a file or in the cloud and protect them with a single master password. That way, you will only have to remember one strong password, which lets you access the rest of them.
There are many good options to choose from, both cloud-based and local. Choose one of our recommended password managers and use it to establish strong passwords across all of your accounts. We recommend securing your password manager with a [diceware passphrase](#diceware-passphrases) comprised of at least seven words.
[List of recommended password managers](../passwords.md ""){.md-button}
!!! warning "Don't place your passwords and TOTP tokens inside the same password manager"
When using TOTP codes as [multi-factor authentication](../multi-factor-authentication.md), the best security practice is to keep your TOTP codes in a [separate app](../multi-factor-authentication.md#authenticator-apps).
Storing your TOTP tokens in the same place as your passwords, while convenient, reduces the accounts to a single factor in the event that an adversary gains access to your password manager.
Furthermore, we do not recommend storing single-use recovery codes in your password manager. Those should be stored separately such as in an encrypted container on an offline storage device.
### 備份
You should store an [encrypted](../encryption.md) backup of your passwords on multiple storage devices or a cloud storage provider. This can help you access your passwords if something happens to your primary device or the service you are using.
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---
title: "Threat Modeling"
icon: 'material/target-account'
---
Balancing security, privacy, and usability is one of the first and most difficult tasks you'll face on your privacy journey. Everything is a trade-off: The more secure something is, the more restricting or inconvenient it generally is, etc. Often, people find that the problem with the tools they see recommended is that they're just too hard to start using!
If you wanted to use the **most** secure tools available, you'd have to sacrifice *a lot* of usability. And, even then, ==nothing is ever fully secure.== There's **high** security, but never **full** security. That's why threat models are important.
**So, what are these threat models, anyway?**
==A threat model is a list of the most probable threats to your security and privacy endeavors.== Since it's impossible to protect yourself against **every** attack(er), you should focus on the **most probable** threats. In computer security, a threat is an event that could undermine your efforts to stay private and secure.
Focusing on the threats that matter to you narrows down your thinking about the protection you need, so you can choose the tools that are right for the job.
## Creating Your Threat Model
To identify what could happen to the things you value and determine from whom you need to protect them, you should answer these five questions:
1. What do I want to protect?
2. Who do I want to protect it from?
3. How likely is it that I will need to protect it?
4. How bad are the consequences if I fail?
5. How much trouble am I willing to go through to try to prevent potential consequences?
### What do I want to protect?
An “asset” is something you value and want to protect. In the context of digital security, ==an asset is usually some kind of information.== For example, your emails, contact lists, instant messages, location, and files are all possible assets. Your devices themselves may also be assets.
*Make a list of your assets: data that you keep, where it's kept, who has access to it, and what stops others from accessing it.*
### Who do I want to protect it from?
To answer this question, it's important to identify who might want to target you or your information. ==A person or entity that poses a threat to your assets is an “adversary”.== Examples of potential adversaries are your boss, your former partner, your business competition, your government, or a hacker on a public network.
*Make a list of your adversaries or those who might want to get ahold of your assets. Your list may include individuals, a government agency, or corporations.*
Depending on who your adversaries are, under some circumstances, this list might be something you want to destroy after you're done security planning.
### How likely is it that I will need to protect it?
==Risk is the likelihood that a particular threat against a particular asset will actually occur.== It goes hand-in-hand with capability. While your mobile phone provider has the capability to access all of your data, the risk of them posting your private data online to harm your reputation is low.
It is important to distinguish between what might happen and the probability it may happen. For instance, there is a threat that your building might collapse, but the risk of this happening is far greater in San Francisco (where earthquakes are common) than in Stockholm (where they are not).
Assessing risks is both a personal and subjective process. Many people find certain threats unacceptable, no matter the likelihood they will occur, because the mere presence of the threat is not worth the cost. In other cases, people disregard high risks because they don't view the threat as a problem.
*Write down which threats you are going to take seriously, and which may be too rare or too harmless (or too difficult to combat) to worry about.*
### How bad are the consequences if I fail?
There are many ways that an adversary could gain access to your data. For example, an adversary can read your private communications as they pass through the network, or they can delete or corrupt your data.
==The motives of adversaries differ widely, as do their tactics.== A government trying to prevent the spread of a video showing police violence may be content to simply delete or reduce the availability of that video. In contrast, a political opponent may wish to gain access to secret content and publish that content without you knowing.
Security planning involves understanding how bad the consequences could be if an adversary successfully gains access to one of your assets. To determine this, you should consider the capability of your adversary. For example, your mobile phone provider has access to all of your phone records. A hacker on an open Wi-Fi network can access your unencrypted communications. Your government might have stronger capabilities.
*Write down what your adversary might want to do with your private data.*
### How much trouble am I willing to go through to try to prevent potential consequences?
==There is no perfect option for security.== Not everyone has the same priorities, concerns, or access to resources. Your risk assessment will allow you to plan the right strategy for you, balancing convenience, cost, and privacy.
For example, an attorney representing a client in a national security case may be willing to go to greater lengths to protect communications about that case, such as using encrypted email, than a mother who regularly emails her daughter funny cat videos.
*Write down what options you have available to you to help mitigate your unique threats. Note if you have any financial constraints, technical constraints, or social constraints.*
### Try it yourself: Protecting Your Belongings
These questions can apply to a wide variety of situations, online and offline. As a generic demonstration of how these questions work, let's build a plan to keep your house and possessions safe.
**What do you want to protect? (Or, *what do you have that is worth protecting?*)**
:
Your assets might include jewelry, electronics, important documents, or photos.
**Who do you want to protect it from?**
:
Your adversaries might include burglars, roommates, or guests.
**How likely is it that you will need to protect it?**
:
Does your neighborhood have a history of burglaries? How trustworthy are your roommates or guests? What are the capabilities of your adversaries? What are the risks you should consider?
**How bad are the consequences if you fail?**
:
Do you have anything in your house that you cannot replace? Do you have the time or money to replace those things? Do you have insurance that covers goods stolen from your home?
**How much trouble are you willing to go through to prevent these consequences?**
:
Are you willing to buy a safe for sensitive documents? Can you afford to buy a high-quality lock? Do you have time to open a security box at your local bank and keep your valuables there?
Only once you have asked yourself these questions will you be in a position to assess what measures to take. If your possessions are valuable, but the probability of a break-in is low, then you may not want to invest too much money in a lock. But, if the probability of a break-in is high, you'll want to get the best lock on the market and consider adding a security system.
Making a security plan will help you to understand the threats that are unique to you and to evaluate your assets, your adversaries, and your adversaries' capabilities, along with the likelihood of risks you face.
## Further Reading
For people looking to increase their privacy and security online, we've compiled a list of common threats our visitors face or goals our visitors have, to give you some inspiration and demonstrate the basis of our recommendations.
- [Common Goals and Threats :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](common-threats.md)
## Sources
- [EFF Surveillance Self Defense: Your Security Plan](https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/your-security-plan)
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---
title: VPN Overview
icon: material/vpn
---
Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit somewhere else in the world. An ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (i.e. modem).
Encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, so they may not be able to see exactly what you're posting or reading but they can get an idea of the [domains you request](../advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).
A VPN can help as it can shift trust to a server somewhere else in the world. As a result, the ISP then only sees that you are connected to a VPN and nothing about the activity that you're passing into it.
## Should I use a VPN?
**Yes**, unless you are already using Tor. A VPN does two things: shifting the risks from your Internet Service Provider to itself and hiding your IP from a third-party service.
VPNs cannot encrypt data outside of the connection between your device and the VPN server. VPN providers can see and modify your traffic the same way your ISP could. And there is no way to verify a VPN provider's "no logging" policies in any way.
However, they do hide your actual IP from a third-party service, provided that there are no IP leaks. They help you blend in with others and mitigate IP based tracking.
## When shouldn't I use a VPN?
Using a VPN in cases where you're using your [known identity](common-threats.md#common-misconceptions) is unlikely be useful.
Doing so may trigger spam and fraud detection systems, such as if you were to log into your bank's website.
## What about encryption?
Encryption offered by VPN providers are between your devices and their servers. It guarantees that this specific link is secure. This is a step up from using unencrypted proxies where an adversary on the network can intercept the communications between your devices and said proxies and modify them. However, encryption between your apps or browsers with the service providers are not handled by this encryption.
In order to keep what you actually do on the websites you visit private and secure, you must use HTTPS. This will keep your passwords, session tokens, and queries safe from the VPN provider. Consider enabling "HTTPS everywhere" in your browser to mitigate downgrade attacks like [SSL Strip](https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Marlinspike/BlackHat-DC-09-Marlinspike-Defeating-SSL.pdf).
## Should I use encrypted DNS with a VPN?
Unless your VPN provider hosts the encrypted DNS servers, **no**. Using DOH/DOT (or any other form of encrypted DNS) with third-party servers will simply add more entities to trust and does **absolutely nothing** to improve your privacy/security. Your VPN provider can still see which websites you visit based on the IP addresses and other methods. Instead of just trusting your VPN provider, you are now trusting both the VPN provider and the DNS provider.
A common reason to recommend encrypted DNS is that it helps against DNS spoofing. However, your browser should already be checking for [TLS certificates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Digital_certificates) with **HTTPS** and warn you about it. If you are not using **HTTPS**, then an adversary can still just modify anything other than your DNS queries and the end result will be little different.
Needless to say, **you shouldn't use encrypted DNS with Tor**. This would direct all of your DNS requests through a single circuit and would allow the encrypted DNS provider to deanonymize you.
## Should I use Tor *and* a VPN?
By using a VPN with Tor, you're creating essentially a permanent entry node, often with a money trail attached. This provides zero additional benefits to you, while increasing the attack surface of your connection dramatically. If you wish to hide your Tor usage from your ISP or your government, Tor has a built-in solution for that: Tor bridges. [Read more about Tor bridges and why using a VPN is not necessary](../advanced/tor-overview.md).
## What if I need anonymity?
VPNs cannot provide anonymity. Your VPN provider will still see your real IP address, and often has a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. You cannot rely on "no logging" policies to protect your data. Use [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) instead.
## What about VPN providers that provide Tor nodes?
Do not use that feature. The point of using Tor is that you do not trust your VPN provider. Currently Tor only supports the [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol) protocol. [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol) (used in [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC) for voice and video sharing, the new [HTTP3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) protocol, etc), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol) and other packets will be dropped. To compensate for this, VPN providers typically will route all non-TCP packets through their VPN server (your first hop). This is the case with [ProtonVPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn/). Additionally, when using this Tor over VPN setup, you do not have control over other important Tor features such as [Isolated Destination Address](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (using a different Tor circuit for every domain you visit).
The feature should be viewed as a convenient way to access the Tor Network, not to stay anonymous. For proper anonymity, use the Tor Browser, TorSocks, or a Tor gateway.
## When are VPNs useful?
A VPN may still be useful to you in a variety of scenarios, such as:
1. Hiding your traffic from **only** your Internet Service Provider.
1. Hiding your downloads (such as torrents) from your ISP and anti-piracy organizations.
1. Hiding your IP from third-party websites and services, preventing IP based tracking.
For situations like these, or if you have another compelling reason, the VPN providers we listed above are who we think are the most trustworthy. However, using a VPN provider still means you're *trusting* the provider. In pretty much any other scenario you should be using a secure**-by-design** tool such as Tor.
## Sources and Further Reading
1. [VPN - a Very Precarious Narrative](https://schub.io/blog/2019/04/08/very-precarious-narrative.html) by Dennis Schubert
1. [Tor Network Overview](../advanced/tor-overview.md)
1. [IVPN Privacy Guides](https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides)
1. ["Do I need a VPN?"](https://www.doineedavpn.com), a tool developed by IVPN to challenge aggressive VPN marketing by helping individuals decide if a VPN is right for them.
## Related VPN Information
- [The Trouble with VPN and Privacy Review Sites](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2019/11/20/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-review-sites/)
- [Free VPN App Investigation](https://www.top10vpn.com/free-vpn-app-investigation/)
- [Hidden VPN owners unveiled: 101 VPN products run by just 23 companies](https://vpnpro.com/blog/hidden-vpn-owners-unveiled-97-vpns-23-companies/)
- [This Chinese company is secretly behind 24 popular apps seeking dangerous permissions](https://vpnpro.com/blog/chinese-company-secretly-behind-popular-apps-seeking-dangerous-permissions/)
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