+
+
+
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/advanced/communication-network-types.md b/i18n/ar/advanced/communication-network-types.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..33accb6ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/advanced/communication-network-types.md
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+---
+title: "Types of Communication Networks"
+icon: 'material/transit-connection-variant'
+---
+
+There are several network architectures commonly used to relay messages between people. These networks can provide different privacy guarantees, which is why it's worth considering your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md) when deciding which app to use.
+
+[Recommended Instant Messengers](../real-time-communication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Centralized Networks
+
+{ align=left }
+
+Centralized messengers are those where all participants are on the same server or network of servers controlled by the same organization.
+
+Some self-hosted messengers allow you to set up your own server. Self-hosting can provide additional privacy guarantees, such as no usage logs or limited access to metadata (data about who is talking to whom). Self-hosted centralized messengers are isolated and everyone must be on the same server to communicate.
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- New features and changes can be implemented more quickly.
+- Easier to get started with and to find contacts.
+- Most mature and stable features ecosystems, as they are easier to program in a centralized software.
+- Privacy issues may be reduced when you trust a server that you're self-hosting.
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Can include [restricted control or access](https://drewdevault.com/2018/08/08/Signal.html). This can include things like:
+- Being [forbidden from connecting third-party clients](https://github.com/LibreSignal/LibreSignal/issues/37#issuecomment-217211165) to the centralized network that might provide for greater customization or a better experience. Often defined in Terms and Conditions of usage.
+- Poor or no documentation for third-party developers.
+- The [ownership](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729191953/https://blog.privacytools.io/delisting-wire/), privacy policy, and operations of the service can change easily when a single entity controls it, potentially compromising the service later on.
+- Self-hosting requires effort and knowledge of how to set up a service.
+
+## Federated Networks
+
+{ align=left }
+
+Federated messengers use multiple, independent, decentralized servers that are able to talk to each other (email is one example of a federated service). Federation allows system administrators to control their own server and still be a part of the larger communications network.
+
+When self-hosted, members of a federated server can discover and communicate with members of other servers, although some servers may choose to remain private by being non-federated (e.g., work team server).
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- Allows for greater control over your own data when running your own server.
+- Allows you to choose whom to trust your data with by choosing between multiple "public" servers.
+- Often allows for third-party clients which can provide a more native, customized, or accessible experience.
+- Server software can be verified that it matches public source code, assuming you have access to the server or you trust the person who does (e.g., a family member).
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Adding new features is more complex because these features need to be standardized and tested to ensure they work with all servers on the network.
+- Due to the previous point, features can be lacking, or incomplete or working in unexpected ways compared to centralized platforms, such as message relay when offline or message deletion.
+- Some metadata may be available (e.g., information like "who is talking to whom," but not actual message content if E2EE is used).
+- Federated servers generally require trusting your server's administrator. They may be a hobbyist or otherwise not a "security professional," and may not serve standard documents like a privacy policy or terms of service detailing how your data is used.
+- Server administrators sometimes choose to block other servers, which are a source of unmoderated abuse or break general rules of accepted behavior. This will hinder your ability to communicate with members of those servers.
+
+## Peer-to-Peer Networks
+
+{ align=left }
+
+P2P messengers connect to a [distributed network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_networking) of nodes to relay a message to the recipient without a third-party server.
+
+Clients (peers) usually find each other through the use of a [distributed computing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_computing) network. Examples of this include [Distributed Hash Tables](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_hash_table) (DHT), used by [torrents](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent_(protocol)) and [IPFS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/InterPlanetary_File_System) for example. Another approach is proximity based networks, where a connection is established over WiFi or Bluetooth (for example, Briar or the [Scuttlebutt](https://www.scuttlebutt.nz) social network protocol).
+
+Once a peer has found a route to its contact via any of these methods, a direct connection between them is made. Although messages are usually encrypted, an observer can still deduce the location and identity of the sender and recipient.
+
+P2P networks do not use servers, as peers communicate directly between each other and hence cannot be self-hosted. However, some additional services may rely on centralized servers, such as user discovery or relaying offline messages, which can benefit from self-hosting.
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- Minimal information is exposed to third-parties.
+- Modern P2P platforms implement E2EE by default. There are no servers that could potentially intercept and decrypt your transmissions, unlike centralized and federated models.
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Reduced feature set:
+- Messages can only be sent when both peers are online, however, your client may store messages locally to wait for the contact to return online.
+- Generally increases battery usage on mobile devices, because the client must stay connected to the distributed network to learn about who is online.
+- Some common messenger features may not be implemented or incompletely, such as message deletion.
+- Your IP address and that of the contacts you're communicating with may be exposed if you do not use the software in conjunction with a [VPN](../vpn.md) or [Tor](../tor.md). Many countries have some form of mass surveillance and/or metadata retention.
+
+## Anonymous Routing
+
+{ align=left }
+
+A messenger using [anonymous routing](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_628) hides either the identity of the sender, the receiver, or evidence that they have been communicating. Ideally, a messenger should hide all three.
+
+There are [many](https://doi.org/10.1145/3182658) different ways to implement anonymous routing. One of the most famous is [onion routing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing) (i.e. [Tor](tor-overview.md)), which communicates encrypted messages through a virtual [overlay network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overlay_network) that hides the location of each node as well as the recipient and sender of each message. The sender and recipient never interact directly and only meet through a secret rendezvous node so that there is no leak of IP addresses nor physical location. Nodes cannot decrypt messages, nor the final destination; only the recipient can. Each intermediary node can only decrypt a part that indicates where to send the still encrypted message next, until it arrives at the recipient who can fully decrypt it, hence the "onion layers."
+
+Self-hosting a node in an anonymous routing network does not provide the hoster with additional privacy benefits, but rather contributes to the whole network's resilience against identification attacks for everyone's benefit.
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- Minimal to no information is exposed to other parties.
+- Messages can be relayed in a decentralized manner even if one of the parties is offline.
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Slow message propagation.
+- Often limited to fewer media types, mostly text, since the network is slow.
+- Less reliable if nodes are selected by randomized routing, some nodes may be very far from the sender and receiver, adding latency or even failing to transmit messages if one of the nodes goes offline.
+- More complex to get started, as the creation and secured backup of a cryptographic private key is required.
+- Just like other decentralized platforms, adding features is more complex for developers than on a centralized platform. Hence, features may be lacking or incompletely implemented, such as offline message relaying or message deletion.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/advanced/dns-overview.md b/i18n/ar/advanced/dns-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..909de2acb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/advanced/dns-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+---
+title: "DNS Overview"
+icon: material/dns
+---
+
+The [Domain Name System](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System) is the 'phonebook of the Internet'. DNS translates domain names to IP addresses so browsers and other services can load Internet resources, through a decentralized network of servers.
+
+## What is DNS?
+
+When you visit a website, a numerical address is returned. For example, when you visit `privacyguides.org`, the address `192.98.54.105` is returned.
+
+DNS has existed since the [early days](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System#History) of the Internet. DNS requests made to and from DNS servers are **not** generally encrypted. In a residential setting, a customer is given servers by the ISP via [DHCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dynamic_Host_Configuration_Protocol).
+
+Unencrypted DNS requests are able to be easily **surveilled** and **modified** in transit. In some parts of the world, ISPs are ordered to do primitive [DNS filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking). When you request the IP address of a domain that is blocked, the server may not respond or may respond with a different IP address. As the DNS protocol is not encrypted, the ISP (or any network operator) can use [DPI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection) to monitor requests. ISPs can also block requests based on common characteristics, regardless of which DNS server is used. Unencrypted DNS always uses [port](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_(computer_networking)) 53 and always uses UDP.
+
+Below, we discuss and provide a tutorial to prove what an outside observer may see using regular unencrypted DNS and [encrypted DNS](#what-is-encrypted-dns).
+
+### Unencrypted DNS
+
+1. Using [`tshark`](https://www.wireshark.org/docs/man-pages/tshark.html) (part of the [Wireshark](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wireshark) project) we can monitor and record internet packet flow. This command records packets that meet the rules specified:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/dns.pcap udp port 53 and host 1.1.1.1 or host 8.8.8.8
+ ```
+
+2. We can then use [`dig`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dig_(command)) (Linux, MacOS etc) or [`nslookup`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nslookup) (Windows) to send the DNS lookup to both servers. Software such as web browsers do these lookups automatically, unless they are configured to use encrypted DNS.
+
+ === "Linux, macOS"
+
+ ```
+ dig +noall +answer privacyguides.org @1.1.1.1
+ dig +noall +answer privacyguides.org @8.8.8.8
+ ```
+ === "Windows"
+
+ ```
+ nslookup privacyguides.org 1.1.1.1
+ nslookup privacyguides.org 8.8.8.8
+ ```
+
+3. Next, we want to [analyse](https://www.wireshark.org/docs/wsug_html_chunked/ChapterIntroduction.html#ChIntroWhatIs) the results:
+
+ === "Wireshark"
+
+ ```
+ wireshark -r /tmp/dns.pcap
+ ```
+
+ === "tshark"
+
+ ```
+ tshark -r /tmp/dns.pcap
+ ```
+
+If you run the Wireshark command above, the top pane shows the "[frames](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethernet_frame)", and the bottom pane shows all the data about the selected frame. Enterprise filtering and monitoring solutions (such as those purchased by governments) can do the process automatically, without human interaction, and can aggregate those frames to produce statistical data useful to the network observer.
+
+| No. | Time | Source | Destination | Protocol | Length | Info |
+| --- | -------- | --------- | ----------- | -------- | ------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| 1 | 0.000000 | 192.0.2.1 | 1.1.1.1 | DNS | 104 | Standard query 0x58ba A privacyguides.org OPT |
+| 2 | 0.293395 | 1.1.1.1 | 192.0.2.1 | DNS | 108 | Standard query response 0x58ba A privacyguides.org A 198.98.54.105 OPT |
+| 3 | 1.682109 | 192.0.2.1 | 8.8.8.8 | DNS | 104 | Standard query 0xf1a9 A privacyguides.org OPT |
+| 4 | 2.154698 | 8.8.8.8 | 192.0.2.1 | DNS | 108 | Standard query response 0xf1a9 A privacyguides.org A 198.98.54.105 OPT |
+
+An observer could modify any of these packets.
+
+## What is "encrypted DNS"?
+
+Encrypted DNS can refer to one of a number of protocols, the most common ones being:
+
+### DNSCrypt
+
+[**DNSCrypt**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNSCrypt) was one of the first methods of encrypting DNS queries. DNSCrypt operates on port 443 and works with both the TCP or UDP transport protocols. DNSCrypt has never been submitted to the [Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Engineering_Task_Force) nor has it gone through the [Request for Comments (RFC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Request_for_Comments) process, so it has not been used widely outside of a few [implementations](https://dnscrypt.info/implementations). As a result, it has been largely replaced by the more popular [DNS over HTTPS](#dns-over-https-doh).
+
+### DNS over TLS (DoT)
+
+[**DNS over TLS**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_TLS) is another method for encrypting DNS communication that is defined in [RFC 7858](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7858). Support was first implemented in Android 9, iOS 14, and on Linux in [systemd-resolved](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/resolved.conf.html#DNSOverTLS=) in version 237. Preference in the industry has been moving away from DoT to DoH in recent years, as DoT is a [complex protocol](https://dnscrypt.info/faq/) and has varying compliance to the RFC across the implementations that exist. DoT also operates on a dedicated port 853 which can be blocked easily by restrictive firewalls.
+
+### DNS over HTTPS (DoH)
+
+[**DNS over HTTPS**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_HTTPS) as defined in [RFC 8484](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8484) packages queries in the [HTTP/2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/2) protocol and provides security with HTTPS. Support was first added in web browsers such as Firefox 60 and Chrome 83.
+
+Native implementation of DoH showed up in iOS 14, macOS 11, Microsoft Windows, and Android 13 (however, it won't be enabled [by default](https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/packages/modules/DnsResolver/+/1833144)). General Linux desktop support is waiting on the systemd [implementation](https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/8639) so [installing third-party software is still required](../dns.md#encrypted-dns-proxies).
+
+## What can an outside party see?
+
+In this example we will record what happens when we make a DoH request:
+
+1. First, start `tshark`:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/dns_doh.pcap -f "tcp port https and host 1.1.1.1"
+ ```
+
+2. Second, make a request with `curl`:
+
+ ```bash
+ curl -vI --doh-url https://1.1.1.1/dns-query https://privacyguides.org
+ ```
+
+3. After making the request, we can stop the packet capture with CTRL + C.
+
+4. Analyse the results in Wireshark:
+
+ ```bash
+ wireshark -r /tmp/dns_doh.pcap
+ ```
+
+We can see the [connection establishment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol#Connection_establishment) and [TLS handshake](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ssl/what-happens-in-a-tls-handshake/) that occurs with any encrypted connection. When looking at the "application data" packets that follow, none of them contain the domain we requested or the IP address returned.
+
+## Why **shouldn't** I use encrypted DNS?
+
+In locations where there is internet filtering (or censorship), visiting forbidden resources may have its own consequences which you should consider in your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md). We do **not** suggest the use of encrypted DNS for this purpose. Use [Tor](https://torproject.org) or a [VPN](../vpn.md) instead. If you're using a VPN, you should use your VPN's DNS servers. When using a VPN, you are already trusting them with all your network activity.
+
+When we do a DNS lookup, it's generally because we want to access a resource. Below, we will discuss some of the methods that may disclose your browsing activities even when using encrypted DNS:
+
+### IP Address
+
+The simplest way to determine browsing activity might be to look at the IP addresses your devices are accessing. For example, if the observer knows that `privacyguides.org` is at `198.98.54.105`, and your device is requesting data from `198.98.54.105`, there is a good chance you're visiting Privacy Guides.
+
+This method is only useful when the IP address belongs to a server that only hosts few websites. It's also not very useful if the site is hosted on a shared platform (e.g. Github Pages, Cloudflare Pages, Netlify, WordPress, Blogger, etc). It also isn't very useful if the server is hosted behind a [reverse proxy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_proxy), which is very common on the modern Internet.
+
+### Server Name Indication (SNI)
+
+Server Name Indication is typically used when a IP address hosts many websites. This could be a service like Cloudflare, or some other [Denial-of-service attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial-of-service_attack) protection.
+
+1. Start capturing again with `tshark`. We've added a filter with our IP address so you don't capture many packets:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/pg.pcap port 443 and host 198.98.54.105
+ ```
+
+2. Then we visit [https://privacyguides.org](https://privacyguides.org).
+
+3. After visiting the website, we want to stop the packet capture with CTRL + C.
+
+4. Next we want to analyze the results:
+
+ ```bash
+ wireshark -r /tmp/pg.pcap
+ ```
+
+ We will see the connection establishment, followed by the TLS handshake for the Privacy Guides website. Around frame 5. you'll see a "Client Hello".
+
+5. Expand the triangle ▸ next to each field:
+
+ ```text
+ ▸ Transport Layer Security
+ ▸ TLSv1.3 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
+ ▸ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
+ ▸ Extension: server_name (len=22)
+ ▸ Server Name Indication extension
+ ```
+
+6. We can see the SNI value which discloses the website we are visiting. The `tshark` command can give you the value directly for all packets containing a SNI value:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -r /tmp/pg.pcap -Tfields -Y tls.handshake.extensions_server_name -e tls.handshake.extensions_server_name
+ ```
+
+This means even if we are using "Encrypted DNS" servers, the domain will likely be disclosed through SNI. The [TLS v1.3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#TLS_1.3) protocol brings with it [Encrypted Client Hello](https://blog.cloudflare.com/encrypted-client-hello/), which prevents this kind of leak.
+
+Governments, in particular [China](https://www.zdnet.com/article/china-is-now-blocking-all-encrypted-https-traffic-using-tls-1-3-and-esni/) and [Russia](https://www.zdnet.com/article/russia-wants-to-ban-the-use-of-secure-protocols-such-as-tls-1-3-doh-dot-esni/), have either already [started blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication#Encrypted_Client_Hello) it or expressed a desire to do so. Recently, Russia has [started blocking foreign websites](https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/108) that use the [HTTP/3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) standard. This is because the [QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QUIC) protocol that is a part of HTTP/3 requires that `ClientHello` also be encrypted.
+
+### Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
+
+Another way your browser can disclose your browsing activities is with the [Online Certificate Status Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_Certificate_Status_Protocol). When visiting an HTTPS website, the browser might check to see if the website's [certificate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_certificate) has been revoked. This is generally done through the HTTP protocol, meaning it is **not** encrypted.
+
+The OCSP request contains the certificate "[serial number](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_certificate#Common_fields)", which is unique. It is sent to the "OCSP responder" in order to check its status.
+
+We can simulate what a browser would do using the [`openssl`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenSSL) command.
+
+1. Get the server certificate and use [`sed`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sed) to keep just the important part and write it out to a file:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl s_client -connect privacyguides.org:443 < /dev/null 2>&1 |
+ sed -n '/^-*BEGIN/,/^-*END/p' > /tmp/pg_server.cert
+ ```
+
+2. Get the intermediate certificate. [Certificate Authorities (CA)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) normally don't sign a certificate directly; they use what is known as an "intermediate" certificate.
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl s_client -showcerts -connect privacyguides.org:443 < /dev/null 2>&1 |
+ sed -n '/^-*BEGIN/,/^-*END/p' > /tmp/pg_and_intermediate.cert
+ ```
+
+3. The first certificate in `pg_and_intermediate.cert` is actually the server certificate from step 1. We can use `sed` again to delete until the first instance of END:
+
+ ```bash
+ sed -n '/^-*END CERTIFICATE-*$/!d;:a n;p;ba' \
+ /tmp/pg_and_intermediate.cert > /tmp/intermediate_chain.cert
+ ```
+
+4. Get the OCSP responder for the server certificate:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl x509 -noout -ocsp_uri -in /tmp/pg_server.cert
+ ```
+
+ Our certificate shows the Lets Encrypt certificate responder. If we want to see all the details of the certificate we can use:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl x509 -text -noout -in /tmp/pg_server.cert
+ ```
+
+5. Start the packet capture:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap -f "tcp port http"
+ ```
+
+6. Make the OCSP request:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl ocsp -issuer /tmp/intermediate_chain.cert \
+ -cert /tmp/pg_server.cert \
+ -text \
+ -url http://r3.o.lencr.org
+ ```
+
+7. Open the capture:
+
+ ```bash
+ wireshark -r /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap
+ ```
+
+ There will be two packets with the "OCSP" protocol: a "Request" and a "Response". For the "Request" we can see the "serial number" by expanding the triangle ▸ next to each field:
+
+ ```bash
+ ▸ Online Certificate Status Protocol
+ ▸ tbsRequest
+ ▸ requestList: 1 item
+ ▸ Request
+ ▸ reqCert
+ serialNumber
+ ```
+
+ For the "Response" we can also see the "serial number":
+
+ ```bash
+ ▸ Online Certificate Status Protocol
+ ▸ responseBytes
+ ▸ BasicOCSPResponse
+ ▸ tbsResponseData
+ ▸ responses: 1 item
+ ▸ SingleResponse
+ ▸ certID
+ serialNumber
+ ```
+
+8. Or use `tshark` to filter the packets for the Serial Number:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -r /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap -Tfields -Y ocsp.serialNumber -e ocsp.serialNumber
+ ```
+
+If the network observer has the public certificate, which is publicly available, they can match the serial number with that certificate and therefore determine the site you're visiting from that. The process can be automated and can associate IP addresses with serial numbers. It is also possible to check [Certificate Transparency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_Transparency) logs for the serial number.
+
+## Should I use encrypted DNS?
+
+We made this flow chart to describe when you *should* use encrypted DNS:
+
+``` mermaid
+graph TB
+ Start[Start] --> anonymous{Trying to be anonymous?}
+ anonymous--> | Yes | tor(Use Tor)
+ anonymous --> | No | censorship{Avoiding censorship?}
+ censorship --> | Yes | vpnOrTor(Use VPN or Tor)
+ censorship --> | No | privacy{Want privacy from ISP?}
+ privacy --> | Yes | vpnOrTor
+ privacy --> | No | obnoxious{ISP makes obnoxious redirects?}
+ obnoxious --> | Yes | encryptedDNS(Use encrypted DNS with 3rd party)
+ obnoxious --> | No | ispDNS{Does ISP support encrypted DNS?}
+ ispDNS --> | Yes | useISP(Use encrypted DNS with ISP)
+ ispDNS --> | No | nothing(Do nothing)
+```
+
+Encrypted DNS with a third-party should only be used to get around redirects and basic [DNS blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) when you can be sure there won't be any consequences or you're interested in a provider that does some rudimentary filtering.
+
+[List of recommended DNS servers](../dns.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## What is DNSSEC?
+
+[Domain Name System Security Extensions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Extensions) (DNSSEC) is a feature of DNS that authenticates responses to domain name lookups. It does not provide privacy protections for those lookups, but rather prevents attackers from manipulating or poisoning the responses to DNS requests.
+
+In other words, DNSSEC digitally signs data to help ensure its validity. In order to ensure a secure lookup, the signing occurs at every level in the DNS lookup process. As a result, all answers from DNS can be trusted.
+
+The DNSSEC signing process is similar to someone signing a legal document with a pen; that person signs with a unique signature that no one else can create, and a court expert can look at that signature and verify that the document was signed by that person. These digital signatures ensure that data has not been tampered with.
+
+DNSSEC implements a hierarchical digital signing policy across all layers of DNS. For example, in the case of a `privacyguides.org` lookup, a root DNS server would sign a key for the `.org` nameserver, and the `.org` nameserver would then sign a key for `privacyguides.org`’s authoritative nameserver.
+
+Adapted from [DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) overview](https://cloud.google.com/dns/docs/dnssec) by Google and [DNSSEC: An Introduction](https://blog.cloudflare.com/dnssec-an-introduction/) by Cloudflare, both licensed under [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
+
+## What is QNAME minimization?
+
+A QNAME is a "qualified name", for example `privacyguides.org`. QNAME minimisation reduces the amount of information sent from the DNS server to the [authoritative name server](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Name_server#Authoritative_name_server).
+
+Instead of sending the whole domain `privacyguides.org`, QNAME minimization means the DNS server will ask for all the records that end in `.org`. Further technical description is defined in [RFC 7816](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7816).
+
+## What is EDNS Client Subnet (ECS)?
+
+The [EDNS Client Subnet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EDNS_Client_Subnet) is a method for a recursive DNS resolver to specify a [subnetwork](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subnetwork) for the [host or client](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Client_(computing)) which is making the DNS query.
+
+It's intended to "speed up" delivery of data by giving the client an answer that belongs to a server that is close to them such as a [content delivery network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_delivery_network), which are often used in video streaming and serving JavaScript web apps.
+
+This feature does come at a privacy cost, as it tells the DNS server some information about the client's location.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/advanced/tor-overview.md b/i18n/ar/advanced/tor-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..508d5e6a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/advanced/tor-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+---
+title: "Tor Overview"
+icon: 'simple/torproject'
+---
+
+Tor is a free to use, decentralized network designed for using the internet with as much privacy as possible. If used properly, the network enables private and anonymous browsing and communications.
+
+## Path Building
+
+Tor works by routing your traffic through a network comprised of thousands of volunteer-run servers called nodes (or relays).
+
+Every time you connect to Tor, it will choose three nodes to build a path to the internet—this path is called a "circuit." Each of these nodes has its own function:
+
+### The Entry Node
+
+The entry node, often called the guard node, is the first node to which your Tor client connects. The entry node is able to see your IP address, however it is unable to see what you are connecting to.
+
+Unlike the other nodes, the Tor client will randomly select an entry node and stick with it for two to three months to protect you from certain attacks.[^1]
+
+### The Middle Node
+
+The middle node is the second node to which your Tor client connects. It can see which node the traffic came from—the entry node—and to which node it goes to next. The middle node cannot, see your IP address or the domain you are connecting to.
+
+For each new circuit, the middle node is randomly selected out of all available Tor nodes.
+
+### The Exit Node
+
+The exit node is the point in which your web traffic leaves the Tor network and is forwarded to your desired destination. The exit node is unable to see your IP address, but it does know what site it's connecting to.
+
+The exit node will be chosen at random from all available Tor nodes ran with an exit relay flag.[^2]
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ Tor circuit pathway
+
+
+## Encryption
+
+Tor encrypts each packet (a block of transmitted data) three times with the keys from the exit, middle, and entry node—in that order.
+
+Once Tor has built a circuit, data transmission is done as follows:
+
+1. Firstly: when the packet arrives at the entry node, the first layer of encryption is removed. In this encrypted packet, the entry node will find another encrypted packet with the middle node’s address. The entry node will then forward the packet to the middle node.
+
+2. Secondly: when the middle node receives the packet from the entry node, it too will remove a layer of encryption with its key, and this time finds an encrypted packet with the exit node's address. The middle node will then forward the packet to the exit node.
+
+3. Lastly: when the exit node receives its packet, it will remove the last layer of encryption with its key. The exit node will see the destination address and forward the packet to that address.
+
+Below is an alternative diagram showing the process. Each node removes its own layer of encryption, and when the destination server returns data, the same process happens entirely in reverse. For example, the exit node does not know who you are, but it does know which node it came from, and so it adds its own layer of encryption and sends it back.
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sending and receiving data through the Tor Network
+
+
+Tor allows us to connect to a server without any single party knowing the entire path. The entry node knows who you are, but not where you are going; the middle node doesn’t know who you are or where you are going; and the exit node knows where you are going, but not who you are. Because the exit node is what makes the final connection, the destination server will never know your IP address.
+
+## Caveats
+
+Though Tor does provide strong privacy guarantees, one must be aware that Tor is not perfect:
+
+- Well-funded adversaries with the capability to passively watch most network traffic over the globe have a chance of deanonymizing Tor users by means of advanced traffic analysis. Nor does Tor protect you from exposing yourself by mistake, such as if you share too much information about your real identity.
+- Tor exit nodes can also monitor traffic that passes through them. This means traffic which is not encrypted, such as plain HTTP traffic, can be recorded and monitored. If such traffic contains personally identifiable information, then it can deanonymize you to that exit node. Thus, we recommend using HTTPS over Tor where possible.
+
+If you wish to use Tor for browsing the web, we only recommend the **official** Tor Browser—it is designed to prevent fingerprinting.
+
+- [Tor Browser :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../tor.md#tor-browser)
+
+## Additional Resources
+
+- [Tor Browser User Manual](https://tb-manual.torproject.org)
+- [How Tor Works - Computerphile](https://invidious.privacyguides.net/embed/QRYzre4bf7I?local=true) (YouTube)
+- [Tor Onion Services - Computerphile](https://invidious.privacyguides.net/embed/lVcbq_a5N9I?local=true) (YouTube)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
+
+[^1]: The first relay in your circuit is called an "entry guard" or "guard". It is a fast and stable relay that remains the first one in your circuit for 2-3 months in order to protect against a known anonymity-breaking attack. The rest of your circuit changes with every new website you visit, and all together these relays provide the full privacy protections of Tor. For more information on how guard relays work, see this [blog post](https://blog.torproject.org/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters) and [paper](https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/single_guard.pdf) on entry guards. ([https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2/](https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2/))
+
+[^2]: Relay flag: a special (dis-)qualification of relays for circuit positions (for example, "Guard", "Exit", "BadExit"), circuit properties (for example, "Fast", "Stable"), or roles (for example, "Authority", "HSDir"), as assigned by the directory authorities and further defined in the directory protocol specification. ([https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html](https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html))
diff --git a/i18n/ar/android.md b/i18n/ar/android.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6ddd08015
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/android.md
@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+---
+title: "Android"
+icon: 'simple/android'
+---
+
+{ align=right }
+
+The **Android Open Source Project** is an open-source mobile operating system led by Google which powers the majority of the world's mobile devices. Most phones sold with Android are modified to include invasive integrations and apps such as Google Play Services, so you can significantly improve your privacy on your mobile device by replacing your phone's default installation with a version of Android without these invasive features.
+
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://source.android.com/){ .card-link title=Homepage }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://source.android.com/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+These are the Android operating systems, devices, and apps we recommend to maximize your mobile device's security and privacy. To learn more about Android:
+
+- [General Android Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/android-overview.md)
+- [Why we recommend GrapheneOS over CalyxOS :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/)
+
+## AOSP Derivatives
+
+We recommend installing one of these custom Android operating systems on your device, listed in order of preference, depending on your device's compatibility with these operating systems.
+
+!!! note
+
+ End-of-life devices (such as GrapheneOS or CalyxOS's "extended support" devices) do not have full security patches (firmware updates) due to the OEM discontinuing support. These devices cannot be considered completely secure regardless of installed software.
+
+### GrapheneOS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GrapheneOS** is the best choice when it comes to privacy and security.
+
+ GrapheneOS provides additional [security hardening](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardening_(computing)) and privacy improvements. It has a [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), network and sensor permissions, and various other [security features](https://grapheneos.org/features). GrapheneOS also comes with full firmware updates and signed builds, so verified boot is fully supported.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://grapheneos.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://grapheneos.org/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+GrapheneOS supports [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), which runs [Google Play Services](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Play_Services) fully sandboxed like any other regular app. This means you can take advantage of most Google Play Services, such as [push notifications](https://firebase.google.com/docs/cloud-messaging/), while giving you full control over their permissions and access, and while containing them to a specific [work profile](os/android-overview.md#work-profile) or [user profile](os/android-overview.md#user-profiles) of your choice.
+
+Google Pixel phones are the only devices that currently meet GrapheneOS's [hardware security requirements](https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-support).
+
+### DivestOS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **DivestOS** is a soft-fork of [LineageOS](https://lineageos.org/).
+ DivestOS inherits many [supported devices](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=devices&base=LineageOS) from LineageOS. It has signed builds, making it possible to have [verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) on some non-Pixel devices.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://divestos.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://divestoseb5nncsydt7zzf5hrfg44md4bxqjs5ifcv4t7gt7u6ohjyyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=privacy_policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/divested-mobile){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+DivestOS has automated kernel vulnerability ([CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures)) [patching](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/cve_checker), fewer proprietary blobs, and a custom [hosts](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=dnsbl) file. Its hardened WebView, [Mulch](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/mulch), enables [CFI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity) for all architectures and [network state partitioning](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning), and receives out-of-band updates. DivestOS also includes kernel patches from GrapheneOS and enables all available kernel security features via [defconfig hardening](https://github.com/Divested-Mobile/DivestOS-Build/blob/master/Scripts/Common/Functions.sh#L758). All kernels newer than version 3.4 include full page [sanitization](https://lwn.net/Articles/334747/) and all ~22 Clang-compiled kernels have [`-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero`](https://reviews.llvm.org/D54604?id=174471) enabled.
+
+DivestOS implements some system hardening patches originally developed for GrapheneOS. DivestOS 16.0 and higher implements GrapheneOS's [`INTERNET`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) and SENSORS permission toggle, [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), [exec-spawning](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/#additional-hardening), [JNI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_Native_Interface) [constification](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Const_(computer_programming)), and partial [bionic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bionic_(software)) hardening patchsets. 17.1 and higher features GrapheneOS's per-network full [MAC randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address#Randomization) option, [`ptrace_scope`](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.html) control, and automatic reboot/Wi-Fi/Bluetooth [timeout options](https://grapheneos.org/features).
+
+DivestOS uses F-Droid as its default app store. Normally, we would recommend avoiding F-Droid due to its numerous [security issues](#f-droid). However, doing so on DivestOS isn't viable; the developers update their apps via their own F-Droid repositories ([DivestOS Official](https://divestos.org/fdroid/official/?fingerprint=E4BE8D6ABFA4D9D4FEEF03CDDA7FF62A73FD64B75566F6DD4E5E577550BE8467) and [DivestOS WebView](https://divestos.org/fdroid/webview/?fingerprint=FB426DA1750A53D7724C8A582B4D34174E64A84B38940E5D5A802E1DFF9A40D2)). We recommend disabling the official F-Droid app and using [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) with the DivestOS repositories enabled to keep those components up to date. For other apps, our recommended methods of obtaining them still apply.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ DivestOS firmware update [status](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/firmware-empty/-/blob/master/STATUS) and quality control varies across the devices it supports. We still recommend GrapheneOS depending on your device's compatibility. For other devices, DivestOS is a good alternative.
+
+ Not all of the supported devices have verified boot, and some perform it better than others.
+
+## Android Devices
+
+When purchasing a device, we recommend getting one as new as possible. The software and firmware of mobile devices are only supported for a limited time, so buying new extends that lifespan as much as possible.
+
+Avoid buying phones from mobile network operators. These often have a **locked bootloader** and do not support [OEM unlocking](https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/locking_unlocking). These phone variants will prevent you from installing any kind of alternative Android distribution.
+
+Be very **careful** about buying second hand phones from online marketplaces. Always check the reputation of the seller. If the device is stolen, there's a possibility of [IMEI blacklisting](https://www.gsma.com/security/resources/imei-blacklisting/). There is also a risk involved with you being associated with the activity of the previous owner.
+
+A few more tips regarding Android devices and operating system compatibility:
+
+- Do not buy devices that have reached or are near their end-of-life, additional firmware updates must be provided by the manufacturer.
+- Do not buy preloaded LineageOS or /e/ OS phones or any Android phones without proper [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) support and firmware updates. These devices also have no way for you to check whether they've been tampered with.
+- In short, if a device or Android distribution is not listed here, there is probably a good reason. Check out our [forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/) to find details!
+
+### Google Pixel
+
+Google Pixel phones are the **only** devices we recommend for purchase. Pixel phones have stronger hardware security than any other Android devices currently on the market, due to proper AVB support for third-party operating systems and Google's custom [Titan](https://security.googleblog.com/2021/10/pixel-6-setting-new-standard-for-mobile.html) security chips acting as the Secure Element.
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Google Pixel** devices are known to have good security and properly support [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), even when installing custom operating systems.
+
+ Beginning with the **Pixel 6** and **6 Pro**, Pixel devices receive a minimum of 5 years of guaranteed security updates, ensuring a much longer lifespan compared to the 2-4 years competing OEMs typically offer.
+
+ [:material-shopping: Store](https://store.google.com/category/phones){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+
+Secure Elements like the Titan M2 are more limited than the processor's Trusted Execution Environment used by most other phones as they are only used for secrets storage, hardware attestation, and rate limiting, not for running "trusted" programs. Phones without a Secure Element have to use the TEE for *all* of those functions, resulting in a larger attack surface.
+
+Google Pixel phones use a TEE OS called Trusty which is [open-source](https://source.android.com/security/trusty#whyTrusty), unlike many other phones.
+
+The installation of GrapheneOS on a Pixel phone is easy with their [web installer](https://grapheneos.org/install/web). If you don't feel comfortable doing it yourself and are willing to spend a bit of extra money, check out the [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) as they come preloaded with GrapheneOS from the reputable [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/about) company.
+
+A few more tips for purchasing a Google Pixel:
+
+- If you're after a bargain on a Pixel device, we suggest buying an "**a**" model, just after the next flagship is released. Discounts are usually available because Google will be trying to clear their stock.
+- Consider price beating options and specials offered at physical stores.
+- Look at online community bargain sites in your country. These can alert you to good sales.
+- Google provides a list showing the [support cycle](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) for each one of their devices. The price per day for a device can be calculated as: $\text{Cost} \over \text {EOL Date}-\text{Current Date}$, meaning that the longer use of the device the lower cost per day.
+
+## General Apps
+
+We recommend a wide variety of Android apps throughout this site. The apps listed here are Android-exclusive and specifically enhance or replace key system functionality.
+
+### Shelter
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Shelter** is an app that helps you leverage Android's Work Profile functionality to isolate or duplicate apps on your device.
+
+ Shelter supports blocking contact search cross profiles and sharing files across profiles via the default file manager ([DocumentsUI](https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/modular-system/documentsui)).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://gitea.angry.im/PeterCxy/Shelter#shelter){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitea.angry.im/PeterCxy/Shelter){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.patreon.com/PeterCxy){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.typeblog.shelter)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Shelter is recommended over [Insular](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/) and [Island](https://github.com/oasisfeng/island) as it supports [contact search blocking](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/faq.html).
+
+ When using Shelter, you are placing complete trust in its developer, as Shelter acts as a [Device Admin](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/admin/device-admin) to create the Work Profile, and it has extensive access to the data stored within the Work Profile.
+
+### Auditor
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Auditor** is an app which leverages hardware security features to provide device integrity monitoring for [supported devices](https://attestation.app/about#device-support). Currently, it only works with GrapheneOS and the device's stock operating system.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://attestation.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://attestation.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://attestation.app/about){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://attestation.app/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://attestation.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.attestation.auditor.play)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases)
+ - [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+Auditor performs attestation and intrusion detection by:
+
+- Using a [Trust On First Use (TOFU)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_on_first_use) model between an *auditor* and *auditee*, the pair establish a private key in the [hardware-backed keystore](https://source.android.com/security/keystore/) of the *Auditor*.
+- The *auditor* can either be another instance of the Auditor app or the [Remote Attestation Service](https://attestation.app).
+- The *auditor* records the current state and configuration of the *auditee*.
+- Should tampering with the operating system of the *auditee* happen after the pairing is complete, the auditor will be aware of the change in the device state and configurations.
+- You will be alerted to the change.
+
+No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
+
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service. To make sure that your hardware and operating system is genuine, [perform local attestation](https://grapheneos.org/install/web#verifying-installation) immediately after the device has been installed and prior to any internet connection.
+
+### Secure Camera
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Secure Camera** is a camera app focused on privacy and security which can capture images, videos and QR codes. CameraX vendor extensions (Portrait, HDR, Night Sight, Face Retouch, and Auto) are also supported on available devices.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://grapheneos.org/usage#camera){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.grapheneos.camera.play)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases)
+ - [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+Main privacy features include:
+
+- Auto removal of [Exif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exif) metadata (enabled by default)
+- Use of the new [Media](https://developer.android.com/training/data-storage/shared/media) API, therefore [storage permissions](https://developer.android.com/training/data-storage) are not required
+- Microphone permission not required unless you want to record sound
+
+!!! note
+
+ Metadata is not currently deleted from video files but that is planned.
+
+ The image orientation metadata is not deleted. If you enable location (in Secure Camera) that **won't** be deleted either. If you want to delete that later you will need to use an external app such as [ExifEraser](data-redaction.md#exiferaser).
+
+### Secure PDF Viewer
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Secure PDF Viewer** is a PDF viewer based on [pdf.js](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PDF.js) that doesn't require any permissions. The PDF is fed into a [sandboxed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandbox_(software_development)) [webview](https://developer.android.com/guide/webapps/webview). This means that it doesn't require permission directly to access content or files.
+
+ [Content-Security-Policy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy) is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.grapheneos.pdfviewer.play)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer/releases)
+ - [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+## Obtaining Applications
+
+### GrapheneOS App Store
+
+GrapheneOS's app store is available on [GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases). It supports Android 12 and above and is capable of updating itself. The app store has standalone applications built by the GrapheneOS project such as the [Auditor](https://attestation.app/), [Camera](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera), and [PDF Viewer](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer). If you are looking for these applications, we highly recommend that you get them from GrapheneOS's app store instead of the Play Store, as the apps on their store are signed by the GrapheneOS's project own signature that Google does not have access to.
+
+### Aurora Store
+
+The Google Play Store requires a Google account to login which is not great for privacy. You can get around this by using an alternative client, such as Aurora Store.
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Aurora Store** is a Google Play Store client which does not require a Google Account, Google Play Services, or microG to download apps.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://auroraoss.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-gitlab: GitLab](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore/-/releases)
+
+Aurora Store does not allow you to download paid apps with their anonymous account feature. You can optionally log in with your Google account with Aurora Store to download apps you have purchased, which does give access to the list of apps you've installed to Google, however you still benefit from not requiring the full Google Play client and Google Play Services or microG on your device.
+
+### Manually with RSS Notifications
+
+For apps that are released on platforms like GitHub and GitLab, you may be able to add an RSS feed to your [news aggregator](/news-aggregators) that will help you keep track of new releases.
+
+   
+
+#### GitHub
+
+On GitHub, using [Secure Camera](#secure-camera) as an example, you would navigate to its [releases page](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases) and append `.atom` to the URL:
+
+`https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases.atom`
+
+#### GitLab
+
+On GitLab, using [Aurora Store](#aurora-store) as an example, you would navigate to its [project repository](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore) and append `/-/tags?format=atom` to the URL:
+
+`https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore/-/tags?format=atom`
+
+#### Verifying APK Fingerprints
+
+If you download APK files to install manually, you can verify their signature with the [`apksigner`](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/apksigner) tool, which is a part of Android [build-tools](https://developer.android.com/studio/releases/build-tools).
+
+1. Install [Java JDK](https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/downloads/).
+
+2. Download the [Android Studio command line tools](https://developer.android.com/studio#command-tools).
+
+3. Extract the downloaded archive:
+
+ ```bash
+ unzip commandlinetools-*.zip
+ cd cmdline-tools
+ ./bin/sdkmanager --sdk_root=./ "build-tools;29.0.3"
+ ```
+
+4. Run the signature verification command:
+
+ ```bash
+ ./build-tools/29.0.3/apksigner verify --print-certs ../Camera-37.apk
+ ```
+
+5. The resulting hashes can then be compared with another source. Some developers such as Signal [show the fingerprints](https://signal.org/android/apk/) on their website.
+
+ ```bash
+ Signer #1 certificate DN: CN=GrapheneOS
+ Signer #1 certificate SHA-256 digest: 6436b155b917c2f9a9ed1d15c4993a5968ffabc94947c13f2aeee14b7b27ed59
+ Signer #1 certificate SHA-1 digest: 23e108677a2e1b1d6e6b056f3bb951df7ad5570c
+ Signer #1 certificate MD5 digest: dbbcd0cac71bd6fa2102a0297c6e0dd3
+ ```
+
+### F-Droid
+
+{ align=right width=120px }
+
+==We do **not** currently recommend F-Droid as a way to obtain apps.== F-Droid is often recommended as an alternative to Google Play, particularly in the privacy community. The option to add third-party repositories and not be confined to Google's walled garden has led to its popularity. F-Droid additionally has [reproducible builds](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Reproducible_Builds/) for some applications and is dedicated to free and open-source software. However, there are [notable problems](https://privsec.dev/posts/android/f-droid-security-issues/) with the official F-Droid client, their quality control, and how they build, sign, and deliver packages.
+
+Due to their process of building apps, apps in the official F-Droid repository often fall behind on updates. F-Droid maintainers also reuse package IDs while signing apps with their own keys, which is not ideal as it gives the F-Droid team ultimate trust.
+
+Other popular third-party repositories such as [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) alleviate some of these concerns. The IzzyOnDroid repository pulls builds directly from GitHub and is the next best thing to the developers' own repositories. However, it is not something that we can recommend, as apps are typically [removed](https://github.com/vfsfitvnm/ViMusic/issues/240#issuecomment-1225564446) from that respository when they make it to the main F-Droid repository. While that makes sense (since the goal of that particular repository is to host apps before they're accepted into the main F-Droid repository), it can leave you with installed apps which no longer receive updates.
+
+That said, the [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/) and [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) repositories are home to countless apps, so they can be a useful tool to search for and discover open-source apps that you can then download through Play Store, Aurora Store, or by getting the APK directly from the developer. It is important to keep in mind that some apps in these repositories have not been updated in years and may rely on unsupported libraries, among other things, posing a potential security risk. You should use your best judgement when looking for new apps via this method.
+
+!!! note
+
+ In some rare cases, the developer of an app will only distribute it through F-Droid ([Gadgetbridge](https://gadgetbridge.org/) is one example of this). If you really need an app like that, we recommend using [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) instead of the official F-Droid app to obtain it.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Operating Systems
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must support bootloader locking with custom AVB key support.
+- Must receive major Android updates within 0-1 months of release.
+- Must receive Android feature updates (minor version) within 0-14 days of release.
+- Must receive regular security patches within 0-5 days of release.
+- Must **not** be "rooted" out of the box.
+- Must **not** enable Google Play Services by default.
+- Must **not** require system modification to support Google Play Services.
+
+### Devices
+
+- Must support at least one of our recommended custom operating systems.
+- Must be currently sold new in stores.
+- Must receive a minimum of 5 years of security updates.
+- Must have dedicated secure element hardware.
+
+### Applications
+
+- Applications on this page must not be applicable to any other software category on the site.
+- General applications should extend or replace core system functionality.
+- Applications should receive regular updates and maintenance.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png b/i18n/ar/assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5295c902c
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/ar/assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/ar/assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png b/i18n/ar/assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..974869a4e
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/ar/assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/ar/assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png b/i18n/ar/assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..21d6ef03a
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/ar/assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/ar/assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png b/i18n/ar/assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b46283571
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/ar/assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/ar/assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png b/i18n/ar/assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f88f7b404
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/ar/assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/ar/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption-dark.svg b/i18n/ar/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption-dark.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..95e681571
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption-dark.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/ar/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg b/i18n/ar/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f5b1e2915
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/ar/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg b/i18n/ar/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9002c9b16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/ar/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg b/i18n/ar/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cb53d8b13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/ar/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png b/i18n/ar/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7a4a0d170
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/ar/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/ar/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png b/i18n/ar/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f81058d88
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/ar/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/ar/assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png b/i18n/ar/assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cde3771e0
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/ar/assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/ar/assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png b/i18n/ar/assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d71381491
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/ar/assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/ar/basics/account-creation.md b/i18n/ar/basics/account-creation.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b9428b858
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/basics/account-creation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+---
+title: "Account Creation"
+icon: 'material/account-plus'
+---
+
+Often people sign up for services without thinking. Maybe it's a streaming service so you can watch that new show everyone's talking about, or an account that gives you a discount for your favorite fast food place. Whatever the case may be, you should consider the implications for your data now and later on down the line.
+
+There are risks associated with every new service that you use. Data breaches; disclosure of customer information to third parties; rogue employees accessing data; all are possibilities that must be considered when giving your information out. You need to be confident that you can trust the service, which is why we don't recommend storing valuable data on anything but the most mature and battle-tested products. That usually means services which provide E2EE and have undergone a cryptographic audit. An audit increases assurance that the product was designed without glaring security issues caused by an inexperienced developer.
+
+It can also be difficult to delete the accounts on some services. Sometimes [overwriting data](account-deletion.md#overwriting-account-information) associated with an account can be possible, but in other cases the service will keep an entire history of changes to the account.
+
+## Terms of Service & Privacy Policy
+
+The ToS are the rules that you agree to follow when using the service. With larger services these rules are often enforced by automated systems. Sometimes these automated systems can make mistakes. For example, you may be banned or locked out of your account on some services for using a VPN or VOIP number. Appealing such bans is often difficult, and involves an automated process too, which isn't always successful. This would be one of the reasons why we wouldn't suggest using Gmail for email as an example. Email is crucial for access to other services you might have signed up for.
+
+The Privacy Policy is how the service says they will use your data and it is worth reading so that you understand how your data will be used. A company or organization might not be legally obligated to follow everything contained in the policy (it depends on the jurisdiction). We would recommend having some idea what your local laws are and what they permit a provider to collect.
+
+We recommend looking for particular terms such as "data collection", "data analysis", "cookies", "ads" or "3rd-party" services. Sometimes you will be able to opt-out from data collection or from sharing your data, but it is best to choose a service that respects your privacy from the start.
+
+Keep in mind you're also placing your trust in the company or organization and that they will comply with their own privacy policy.
+
+## Authentication methods
+
+There are usually multiple ways to sign up for an account, each with their own benefits and drawbacks.
+
+### Email and password
+
+The most common way to create a new account is by an email address and password. When using this method, you should use a password manager and follow [best practices](passwords-overview.md) regarding passwords.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ You can use your password manager to organize other authentication methods too! Just add the new entry and fill the appropriate fields, you can add notes for things like security questions or a backup key.
+
+You will be responsible for managing your login credentials. For added security, you can set up [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md) on your accounts.
+
+[Recommended password managers](../passwords.md ""){.md-button}
+
+#### Email aliases
+
+If you don't want to give your real email address to a service, you have the option to use an alias. We described them in more detail on our email services recommendation page. Essentially, alias services allow you to generate new email addresses that forward all emails to your main address. This can help prevent tracking across services and help you manage the marketing emails that sometimes come with the sign up process. Those can be filtered automatically based on the alias they are sent to.
+
+Should a service get hacked, you might start receiving phishing or spam emails to the address you used to sign up. Using unique aliases for each service can assist in identifying exactly what service was hacked.
+
+[Recommended email aliasing services](../email.md#email-aliasing-services ""){.md-button}
+
+### Single sign-on
+
+!!! note
+
+ We are discussing Single sign-on for personal use, not enterprise users.
+
+Single sign-on (SSO) is an authentication method that allows you to register for a service without sharing much information, if any. Whenever you see something along the lines of "Sign-in with *provider name*" on a registration form it's SSO.
+
+When you choose single sign-on in a website, it will prompt your SSO provider login page and after that your account will be connected. Your password won't be shared but some basic information will (you can review it during the login request). This process is needed every time you want to log in to the same account.
+
+The main advantages are:
+
+- **Security**: no risk of being involved in a [data breach](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_breach) because the website does not store your credentials.
+- **Ease of use**: multiple accounts are managed by a single login.
+
+But there are disadvantages:
+
+- **Privacy**: a SSO provider will know the services you use.
+- **Centralization**: if your SSO account gets compromised or you aren't able to login to it, all other accounts connected to it are affected.
+
+SSO can be especially useful in those situations where you could benefit from deeper integration between services. For example, one of those services may offer SSO for the others. Our recommendation is to limit SSO to only where you need it and protect the main account with [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md).
+
+All services that use SSO will be as secure as your SSO account. For example, if you want to secure an account with a hardware key but that service doesn't support hardware keys, you can secure your SSO account with a hardware key and now you essentially have hardware MFA on all your accounts. It is worth noting though that weak authentication on your SSO account means that any account tied to that login will also be weak.
+
+### Phone number
+
+We recommend avoiding services that require a phone number for sign up. A phone number can identity you across multiple services and depending on data sharing agreements this will make your usage easier to track, particularly if one of those services is breached as the phone number is often **not** encrypted.
+
+You should avoid giving out your real phone number if you can. Some services will allow the use of VOIP numbers, however these often trigger fraud detection systems, causing an account to be locked down, so we don't recommend that for important accounts.
+
+In many cases you will need to provide a number that you can receive SMS or calls from, particularly when shopping internationally, in case there is a problem with your order at border screening. It's common for services to use your number as a verification method; don't let yourself get locked out of an important account because you wanted to be clever and give a fake number!
+
+### Username and password
+
+Some services allow you to register without using an email address and only require you to set a username and password. These services may provide increased anonymity when combined with a VPN or Tor. Keep in mind that for these accounts there will most likely be **no way to recover your account** in the event you forget your username or password.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/basics/account-deletion.md b/i18n/ar/basics/account-deletion.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..05f04ceb1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/basics/account-deletion.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: "Account Deletion"
+icon: 'material/account-remove'
+---
+
+Over time, it can be easy to accumulate a number of online accounts, many of which you may no longer use. Deleting these unused accounts is an important step in reclaiming your privacy, as dormant accounts are vulnerable to data breaches. A data breach is when a service's security is compromised and protected information is viewed, transmitted, or stolen by unauthorized actors. Data breaches are unfortunately all [too common](https://haveibeenpwned.com/PwnedWebsites) these days, and so practicing good digital hygiene is the best way to minimize the impact they have on your life. The goal of this guide then is to help navigate you through the irksome process of account deletion, often made difficult by [deceptive design](https://www.deceptive.design/), for the betterment of your online presence.
+
+## Finding Old Accounts
+
+### Password Manager
+
+If you have a password manager that you've used for your entire digital life, this part will be very easy. Oftentimes, they include built-in functionality for detecting if your credentials were exposed in a data breach—such as Bitwarden's [Data Breach Report](https://bitwarden.com/blog/have-you-been-pwned/).
+
+
+ 
+
+
+Even if you haven't explicitly used a password manager before, there's a chance you've used the one in your browser or your phone without even realizing it. For example: [Firefox Password Manager](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/password-manager-remember-delete-edit-logins), [Google Password Manager](https://passwords.google.com/intro) and [Edge Password Manager](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-edge/save-or-forget-passwords-in-microsoft-edge-b4beecb0-f2a8-1ca0-f26f-9ec247a3f336).
+
+Desktop platforms also often have a password manager which may help you recover passwords you've forgotten about:
+
+- Windows [Credential Manager](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/accessing-credential-manager-1b5c916a-6a16-889f-8581-fc16e8165ac0)
+- macOS [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211145)
+- iOS [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211146)
+- Linux, Gnome Keyring, which can be accessed through [Seahorse](https://help.gnome.org/users/seahorse/stable/passwords-view.html.en) or [KDE Wallet Manager](https://userbase.kde.org/KDE_Wallet_Manager)
+
+### Email
+
+If you didn't use a password manager in the past or you think you have accounts that were never added to your password manager, another option is to search the email account(s) that you believe you signed up on. On your email client, search for keywords such as "verify" or "welcome." Almost every time you make an online account, the service will send a verification link or an introductory message to your email. This can be a good way to find old, forgotten accounts.
+
+## Deleting Old Accounts
+
+### Log In
+
+In order to delete your old accounts, you'll need to first make sure you can log in to them. Again, if the account was in your password manager, this step is easy. If not, you can try to guess your password. Failing that, there are typically options to regain access to your account, commonly available through a "forgot password" link on the login page. It may also be possible that accounts you've abandoned have already been deleted—sometimes services prune all old accounts.
+
+When attempting to regain access, if the site returns an error message saying that email is not associated with an account, or you never receive a reset link after multiple attempts, then you do not have an account under that email address and should try a different one. If you can't figure out which email address you used, or you no longer have access to that email, you can try contacting the service's customer support. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that you will be able to reclaim access your account.
+
+### GDPR (EEA residents only)
+
+Residents of the EEA have additional rights regarding data erasure specified in [Article 17](https://www.gdpr.org/regulation/article-17.html) of the GDPR. If it's applicable to you, read the privacy policy for any given service to find information on how to exercise your right to erasure. Reading the privacy policy can prove important, as some services have a "Delete Account" option that only disables your account and for real deletion you have to take additional action. Sometimes actual deletion may involve filling out surveys, emailing the data protection officer of the service or even proving your residence in the EEA. If you plan to go this way, do **not** overwrite account information—your identity as an EEA resident may be required. Note that the location of the service does not matter; GDPR applies to anyone serving European users. If the service does not respect your right to erasure, you can contact your national [Data Protection Authority](https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/rights-citizens/redress/what-should-i-do-if-i-think-my-personal-data-protection-rights-havent-been-respected_en) and you may be entitled to monetary compensation.
+
+### Overwriting Account information
+
+In some situations where you plan to abandon an account, it may make sense to overwrite the account information with fake data. Once you've made sure you can log in, change all the information in your account to falsified information. The reason for this is that many sites will retain information you previously had even after account deletion. The hope is that they will overwrite the previous information with the newest data you entered. However, there is no guarantee that there won't be backups with the prior information.
+
+For the account email, either create a new alternate email account via your provider of choice or create an alias using an [email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services). You can then delete your alternate email address once you are done. We recommend against using temporary email providers, as oftentimes it is possible to reactivate temporary emails.
+
+### Delete
+
+You can check [JustDeleteMe](https://justdeleteme.xyz) for instructions on deleting the account for a specific service. Some sites will graciously have a "Delete Account" option, while others will go as far as to force you to speak with a support agent. The deletion process can vary from site to site, with account deletion being impossible on some.
+
+For services that don't allow account deletion, the best thing to do is falsify all your information as previously mentioned and strengthen account security. To do so, enable [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md) and any extra security features offered. As well, change the password to a randomly-generated one that is the maximum allowed size (a [password manager](../passwords.md) can be useful for this).
+
+If you're satisfied that all information you care about is removed, you can safely forget about this account. If not, it might be a good idea to keep the credentials stored with your other passwords and occasionally re-login to reset the password.
+
+Even when you are able to delete an account, there is no guarantee that all your information will be removed. In fact, some companies are required by law to keep certain information, particularly when related to financial transactions. It's mostly out of your control what happens to your data when it comes to websites and cloud services.
+
+## Avoid New Accounts
+
+As the old saying goes, "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." Whenever you feel tempted to sign up for a new account, ask yourself, "Do I really need this? Can I accomplish what I need to without an account?" It can often be much harder to delete an account than to create one. And even after deleting or changing the info on your account, there might be a cached version from a third-party—like the [Internet Archive](https://archive.org/). Avoid the temptation when you're able to—your future self will thank you!
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/ar/basics/common-misconceptions.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b79b03fae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/basics/common-misconceptions.md
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+---
+title: "Common Misconceptions"
+icon: 'material/robot-confused'
+---
+
+## "Open-source software is always secure" or "Proprietary software is more secure"
+
+These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis.
+
+Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities into even large projects.[^1]
+
+On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering.
+
+To avoid biased decisions, it's *vital* that you evaluate the privacy and security standards of the software you use.
+
+## "Shifting trust can increase privacy"
+
+We talk about "shifting trust" a lot when discussing solutions like VPNs (which shift the trust you place in your ISP to the VPN provider). While this protects your browsing data from your ISP *specifically*, the VPN provider you choose still has access to your browsing data: Your data isn't completely secured from all parties. This means that:
+
+1. You must exercise caution when choosing a provider to shift trust to.
+2. You should still use other techniques, like E2EE, to protect your data completely. Merely distrusting one provider to trust another is not securing your data.
+
+## "Privacy-focused solutions are inherently trustworthy"
+
+Focusing solely on the privacy policies and marketing of a tool or provider can blind you to its weaknesses. When you're looking for a more private solution, you should determine what the underlying problem is and find technical solutions to that problem. For example, you may want to avoid Google Drive, which gives Google access to all of your data. The underlying problem in this case is lack of E2EE, so you should make sure that the provider you switch to actually implements E2EE, or use a tool (like [Cryptomator](../encryption.md#cryptomator-cloud)) which provides E2EE on any cloud provider. Switching to a "privacy-focused" provider (that doesn't implement E2EE) doesn't solve your problem: it just shifts trust from Google to that provider.
+
+The privacy policies and business practices of providers you choose are very important, but should be considered secondary to technical guarantees of your privacy: You shouldn't shift trust to another provider when trusting a provider isn't a requirement at all.
+
+## "Complicated is better"
+
+We often see people describing privacy threat models that are overly complex. Often, these solutions include problems like many different email accounts or complicated setups with lots of moving parts and conditions. The replies are usually answers to "What is the best way to do *X*?"
+
+Finding the "best" solution for yourself doesn't necessarily mean you are after an infallible solution with dozens of conditions—these solutions are often difficult to work with realistically. As we discussed previously, security often comes at the cost of convenience. Below, we provide some tips:
+
+1. ==Actions need to serve a particular purpose:== think about how to do what you want with the fewest actions.
+2. ==Remove human failure points:== We fail, get tired, and forget things. To maintain security, avoid relying on manual conditions and processes that you have to remember.
+3. ==Use the right level of protection for what you intend.== We often see recommendations of so-called law-enforcement or subpoena-proof solutions. These often require specialist knowledge and generally aren't what people want. There's no point in building an intricate threat model for anonymity if you can be easily de-anonymized by a simple oversight.
+
+So, how might this look?
+
+One of the clearest threat models is one where people *know who you are* and one where they do not. There will always be situations where you must declare your legal name and there are others where you don't need to.
+
+1. **Known identity** - A known identity is used for things where you must declare your name. There are many legal documents and contracts where a legal identity is required. This could range from opening a bank account, signing a property lease, obtaining a passport, customs declarations when importing items, or otherwise dealing with your government. These things will usually lead to credentials such as credit cards, credit rating checks, account numbers, and possibly physical addresses.
+
+ We don't suggest using a VPN or Tor for any of these things, as your identity is already known through other means.
+
+ !!! tip
+
+ When shopping online, the use of a [parcel locker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parcel_locker) can help keep your physical address private.
+
+2. **Unknown identity** - An unknown identity could be a stable pseudonym that you regularly use. It is not anonymous because it doesn't change. If you're part of an online community, you may wish to retain a persona that others know. This pseudonym isn't anonymous because—if monitored for long enough—details about the owner can reveal further information, such as the way they write, their general knowledge about topics of interest, etc.
+
+ You may wish to use a VPN for this, to mask your IP address. Financial transactions are more difficult to mask: You could consider using anonymous cryptocurrencies, such as [Monero](https://www.getmonero.org/). Employing altcoin shifting may also help to disguise where your currency originated. Typically, exchanges require KYC (know your customer) to be completed before they'll allow you to exchange fiat currency into any kind of cryptocurrency. Local meet-up options may also be a solution; however, those are often more expensive and sometimes also require KYC.
+
+3. **Anonymous identity** - Even with experience, anonymous identities are difficult to maintain over long periods of time. They should be short-term and short-lived identities which are rotated regularly.
+
+ Using Tor can help with this. It is also worth noting that greater anonymity is possible through asynchronous communication: Real-time communication is vulnerable to analysis of typing patterns (i.e. more than a paragraph of text, distributed on a forum, via email, etc.)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
+
+[^1]: One notable example of this is the [2021 incident in which University of Minnesota researchers introduced three vulnerabilities into the Linux kernel development project](https://cse.umn.edu/cs/linux-incident).
diff --git a/i18n/ar/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/ar/basics/common-threats.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..752bccffb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/basics/common-threats.md
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+---
+title: "Common Threats"
+icon: 'material/eye-outline'
+---
+
+Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside of these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat.
+
+- :material-incognito: Anonymity - Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically.
+- :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks - Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically.
+- :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks - Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once.
+- :material-server-network: Service Providers - Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server).
+- :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance - Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities.
+- :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism - Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors.
+- :material-account-search: Public Exposure - Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public.
+- :material-close-outline: Censorship - Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online.
+
+Some of these threats may be more important to you than others, depending on your specific concerns. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks, but they probably still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Similarly, many people may be primarily concerned with :material-account-search: Public Exposure of their personal data, but they should still be wary of security-focused issues, such as :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks—like malware affecting their devices.
+
+## Anonymity vs. Privacy
+
+:material-incognito: Anonymity
+
+Anonymity is often confused with privacy, but they're distinct concepts. While privacy is a set of choices you make about how your data is used and shared, anonymity is the complete disassociation of your online activities from your real identity.
+
+Whistleblowers and journalists, for example, can have a much more extreme threat model which requires total anonymity. That's not only hiding what they do, what data they have, and not getting hacked by malicious actors or governments, but also hiding who they are entirely. They will often sacrifice any kind of convenience if it means protecting their anonymity, privacy, or security, because their lives could depend on it. Most people don't need to go so far.
+
+## Security and Privacy
+
+:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks
+
+Security and privacy are also often confused, because you need security to obtain any semblance of privacy: Using tools—even if they're private by design—is futile if they could be easily exploited by attackers who later release your data. However, the inverse isn't necessarily true: The most secure service in the world *isn't necessarily* private. The best example of this is trusting data to Google who, given their scale, have had few security incidents by employing industry-leading security experts to secure their infrastructure. Even though Google provides very secure services, very few people would consider their data private in Google's free consumer products (Gmail, YouTube, etc.)
+
+When it comes to application security, we generally don't (and sometimes can't) know if the software we use is malicious, or might one day become malicious. Even with the most trustworthy developers, there's generally no guarantee that their software doesn't have a serious vulnerability that could later be exploited.
+
+To minimize the damage that a malicious piece of software *could* do, you should employ security by compartmentalization. For example, this could come in the form of using different computers for different jobs, using virtual machines to separate different groups of related applications, or using a secure operating system with a strong focus on application sandboxing and mandatory access control.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Mobile operating systems generally have better application sandboxing than desktop operating systems: Apps can't obtain root access, and require permission for access to system resources.
+
+ Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS has similar sandboxing capabilities to Android, and macOS has full system permission control (and developers can opt-in to sandboxing for applications). However, these operating systems do transmit identifying information to their respective OEMs. Linux tends to not submit information to system vendors, but it has poor protection against exploits and malicious apps. This can be mitigated somewhat with specialized distributions which make significant use of virtual machines or containers, such as [Qubes OS](../../desktop/#qubes-os).
+
+:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks
+
+Targeted attacks against a specific person are more problematic to deal with. Common attacks include sending malicious documents via email, exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g. in browsers and operating systems), and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you should employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typically run untrusted code, sent to you from third parties. Running multiple virtual machines—to separate applications like these from your host system, as well as each other—is one technique you can use to mitigate the chance of an exploit in these applications compromising the rest of your system. For example, technologies like Qubes OS or Microsoft Defender Application Guard on Windows provide convenient methods to do this.
+
+If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user.
+
+## Privacy From Service Providers
+
+:material-server-network: Service Providers
+
+We live in a world where almost everything is connected to the internet. Our "private" messages, emails, and social interactions are typically stored on a server, somewhere. Generally, when you send someone a message it's stored on a server, and when your friend wants to read the message the server will show it to them.
+
+The obvious problem with this is that the service provider (or a hacker who has compromised the server) can access your conversations whenever and however they want, without you ever knowing. This applies to many common services, like SMS messaging, Telegram, and Discord.
+
+Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between you and your desired recipients before they are even sent to the server. The confidentiality of your messages is guaranteed, assuming the service provider doesn't have access to the private keys of either party.
+
+!!! note "Note on Web-based Encryption"
+
+ In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering).
+
+ On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt.
+
+ Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible.
+
+Even with E2EE, service providers can still profile you based on **metadata**, which typically isn't protected. While the service provider can't read your messages, they can still observe important things, such as who you're talking to, how often you message them, and when you're typically active. Protection of metadata is fairly uncommon, and—if it's within your [threat model](threat-modeling.md)—you should pay close attention to the technical documentation of the software you're using to see if there's any metadata minimization or protection at all.
+
+## Mass Surveillance Programs
+
+:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance
+
+Mass surveillance is the intricate effort to monitor the "behavior, many activities, or information" of an entire (or substantial fraction of a) population.[^1] It often refers to government programs, such as the ones [disclosed by Edward Snowden in 2013](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_surveillance_disclosures_(2013%E2%80%93present)). However, it can also be carried out by corporations, either on behalf of government agencies or by their own initiative.
+
+!!! abstract "Atlas of Surveillance"
+
+ If you want to learn more about surveillance methods and how they're implemented in your city you can also take a look at the [Atlas of Surveillance](https://atlasofsurveillance.org/) by the [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.eff.org/).
+
+ In France you can take a look at the [Technolopolice website](https://technopolice.fr/villes/) maintained by the non-profit association La Quadrature du Net.
+
+Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, breaching human rights, it's most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.
+
+!!! quote "ACLU: [*The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward*](https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/the-privacy-lesson-of-9-11-mass-surveillance-is-not-the-way-forward)"
+
+ In the face of [Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRISM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM) and [Upstream](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upstream_collection)], intelligence officials also admitted that the NSA had for years been secretly collecting records about virtually every American’s phone calls — who’s calling whom, when those calls are made, and how long they last. This kind of information, when amassed by the NSA day after day, can reveal incredibly sensitive details about people’s lives and associations, such as whether they have called a pastor, an abortion provider, an addiction counselor, or a suicide hotline.
+
+Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^2]
+
+Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods:
+
+- Your IP address
+- Browser cookies
+- The data you submit to websites
+- Your browser or device fingerprint
+- Payment method correlation
+
+\[This list isn't exhaustive].
+
+If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategues like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information.
+
+:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism
+
+> Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^3]
+
+For many people, tracking and surveillance by private corporations is a growing concern. Pervasive ad networks, such as those operated by Google and Facebook, span the internet far beyond just the sites they control, tracking your actions along the way. Using tools like content blockers to limit network requests to their servers, and reading the privacy policies of the services you use can help you avoid many basic adversaries (although it can't completely prevent tracking).[^4]
+
+Additionally, even companies outside of the *AdTech* or tracking industry can share your information with [data brokers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_broker) (such as Cambridge Analytica, Experian, or Datalogix) or other parties. You can't automatically assume your data is safe just because the service you're using doesn't fall within the typical AdTech or tracking business model. The strongest protection against corporate data collection is to encrypt or obfuscate your data whenever possible, making it difficult for different providers to correlate data with each other and build a profile on you.
+
+## Limiting Public Information
+
+:material-account-search: Public Exposure
+
+The best way to keep your data private is simply not making it public in the first place. Deleting unwanted information you find about yourself online is one of the best first steps you can take to regain your privacy.
+
+- [View our guide on account deletion :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](account-deletion.md)
+
+On sites where you do share information, checking the privacy settings of your account to limit how widely that data is spread is very important. For example, enable "private mode" on your accounts if given the option: This ensures that your account isn't being indexed by search engines, and that it can't be viewed without your permission.
+
+If you've already submitted your real information to sites which shouldn't have it, consider using disinformation tactics, like submitting fictitious information related to that online identity. This makes your real information indistinguishable from the false information.
+
+## Avoiding Censorship
+
+:material-close-outline: Censorship
+
+Censorship online can be carried out (to varying degrees) by actors including totalitarian governments, network administrators, and service providers. These efforts to control communication and restrict access to information will always be incompatible with the human right to Freedom of Expression.[^5]
+
+Censorship on corporate platforms is increasingly common, as platforms like Twitter and Facebook give in to public demand, market pressures, and pressures from government agencies. Government pressures can be covert requests to businesses, such as the White House [requesting the takedown](https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/technology/on-the-web-a-fine-line-on-free-speech-across-globe.html) of a provocative YouTube video, or overt, such as the Chinese government requiring companies to adhere to a strict regime of censorship.
+
+People concerned with the threat of censorship can use technologies like [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) to circumvent it, and support censorship-resistant communication platforms like [Matrix](../real-time-communication.md#element), which doesn't have a centralized account authority that can close accounts arbitrarily.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ While evading censorship itself can be easy, hiding the fact that you are doing it can be very problematic.
+
+ You should consider which aspects of the network your adversary can observe, and whether you have plausible deniability for your actions. For example, using [encrypted DNS](../advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns) can help you bypass rudimentary, DNS-based censorship systems, but it can't truly hide what you are visiting from your ISP. A VPN or Tor can help hide what you are visiting from network administrators, but can't hide that you're using those networks in the first place. Pluggable transports (such as Obfs4proxy, Meek, or Shadowsocks) can help you evade firewalls that block common VPN protocols or Tor, but your circumvention attempts can still be detected by methods like probing or [deep packet inspection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection).
+
+You must always consider the risks of trying to bypass censorship, the potential consequences, and how sophisticated your adversary may be. You should be cautious with your software selection, and have a backup plan in case you are caught.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
+
+[^1]: Wikipedia: [*Mass Surveillance*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass_surveillance) and [*Surveillance*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance).
+[^2]: United States Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: [*Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215*](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/ec542143-1079-424a-84b3-acc354698560/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf)
+[^3]: Wikipedia: [*Surveillance capitalism*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance_capitalism)
+[^4]: "[Enumerating badness](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/)" (or, "listing all the bad things that we know about"), as many adblockers and antivirus programs do, fails to adequately protect you from new and unknown threats because they have not yet been added to the filter list. You should also employ other mitigation techniques.
+[^5]: United Nations: [*Universal Declaration of Human Rights*](https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights).
diff --git a/i18n/ar/basics/email-security.md b/i18n/ar/basics/email-security.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6ec5133a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/basics/email-security.md
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+---
+title: Email Security
+icon: material/email
+---
+
+Email is an insecure form of communication by default. You can improve your email security with tools such as OpenPGP, which add End-to-End Encryption to your messages, but OpenPGP still has a number of drawbacks compared to encryption in other messaging applications, and some email data can never be encrypted inherently due to how email is designed.
+
+As a result, email is best used for receiving transactional emails (like notifications, verification emails, password resets, etc.) from the services you sign up for online, not for communicating with others.
+
+## Email Encryption Overview
+
+The standard way to add E2EE to emails between different email providers is by using OpenPGP. There are different implementations of the OpenPGP standard, the most common being [GnuPG](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard) and [OpenPGP.js](https://openpgpjs.org).
+
+There is another standard which is popular with business called [S/MIME](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME), however, it requires a certificate issued from a [Certificate Authority](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) (not all of them issue S/MIME certificates). It has support in [Google Workplace](https://support.google.com/a/topic/9061730?hl=en&ref_topic=9061731) and [Outlook for Web or Exchange Server 2016, 2019](https://support.office.com/en-us/article/encrypt-messages-by-using-s-mime-in-outlook-on-the-web-878c79fc-7088-4b39-966f-14512658f480).
+
+Even if you use OpenPGP, it does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. This is why we recommend [instant messengers](../real-time-communication.md) which implement forward secrecy over email for person-to-person communications whenever possible.
+
+### What Email Clients Support E2EE?
+
+Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md). Depending on the authentication method, this may lead to the decrease security if either the provider or the email client does not support OATH or a bridge application as [multi-factor authentication](multi-factor-authentication.md) is not possible with plain password authentication.
+
+### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
+
+A smartcard (such as a [Yubikey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
+
+It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard so as to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.
+
+## Email Metadata Overview
+
+Email metadata is stored in the [message header](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) of the email message and includes some visible headers that you may have seen such as: `To`, `From`, `Cc`, `Date`, `Subject`. There are also a number of hidden headers included by many email clients and providers that can reveal information about your account.
+
+Client software may use email metadata to show who a message is from and what time it was received. Servers may use it to determine where an email message must be sent, among [other purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) which are not always transparent.
+
+### Who Can View Email Metadata?
+
+Email metadata is protected from outside observers with [Opportunistic TLS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunistic_TLS) protecting it from outside observers, but it is still able to be seen by your email client software (or webmail) and any servers relaying the message from you to any recipients including your email provider. Sometimes email servers will also use third-party services to protect against spam, which generally also have access to your messages.
+
+### Why Can't Metadata be E2EE?
+
+Email metadata is crucial to the most basic functionality of email (where it came from, and where it has to go). E2EE was not built into the email protocols originally, instead requiring add-on software like OpenPGP. Because OpenPGP messages still have to work with traditional email providers, it cannot encrypt email metadata, only the message body itself. That means that even when using OpenPGP, outside observers can see lots of information about your messages, such as who you're emailing, the subject lines, when you're emailing, etc.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md b/i18n/ar/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8073f0d42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+---
+title: "Multi-Factor Authentication"
+icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication'
+---
+
+**Multi-Factor Authentication** (**MFA**) is a security mechanism that requires additional steps beyond entering your username (or email) and password. The most common method is time limited codes you might receive from SMS or an app.
+
+Normally, if a hacker (or adversary) is able to figure out your password then they’d gain access to the account that password belongs to. An account with MFA forces the hacker to have both the password (something you *know*) and a device that you own (something you *have*), like your phone.
+
+MFA methods vary in security, but are based on the premise that the more difficult it is for an attacker to gain access to your MFA method, the better. Examples of MFA methods (from weakest to strongest) include SMS, Email codes, app push notifications, TOTP, Yubico OTP and FIDO.
+
+## MFA Method Comparison
+
+### SMS or Email MFA
+
+Receiving OTP codes via SMS or email are one of the weaker ways to secure your accounts with MFA. Obtaining a code by email or SMS takes away from the "something you *have*" idea, because there are a variety of ways a hacker could [take over your phone number](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam) or gain access to your email without having physical access to any of your devices at all. If an unauthorized person gained access to your email, they would be able to use that access to both reset your password and receive the authentication code, giving them full access to your account.
+
+### Push Notifications
+
+Push notification MFA takes the form of a message being sent to an app on your phone asking you to confirm new account logins. This method is a lot better than SMS or email, since an attacker typically wouldn't be able to get these push notifications without having an already logged-in device, which means they would need to compromise one of your other devices first.
+
+We all make mistakes, and there is the risk that you might accept the login attempt by accident. Push notification login authorizations are typically sent to *all* your devices at once, widening the availability of the MFA code if you have many devices.
+
+The security of push notification MFA is dependent on both the quality of the app, the server component and the trust of the developer who produces it. Installing an app may also require you to accept invasive privileges that grant access to other data on your device. An individual app also requires that you have a specific app for each service which may not require a password to open, unlike a good TOTP generator app.
+
+### Time-based One-time Password (TOTP)
+
+TOTP is one of the most common forms of MFA available. When you set up TOTP, you are generally required to scan a [QR Code](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QR_code) which establishes a "[shared secret](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_secret)" with the service that you intend to use. The shared secret is secured inside of the authenticator app's data, and is sometimes protected by a password.
+
+The time-limited code is then derived from the shared secret and the current time. As the code is only valid for a short time, without access to the shared secret, an adversary cannot generate new codes.
+
+If you have a hardware security key with TOTP support (such as a YubiKey with [Yubico Authenticator](https://www.yubico.com/products/yubico-authenticator/)), we recommend that you store your "shared secrets" on the hardware. Hardware such as the YubiKey was developed with the intention of making the "shared secret" difficult to extract and copy. A YubiKey is also not connected to the Internet, unlike a phone with a TOTP app.
+
+Unlike [WebAuthn](#fido-fast-identity-online), TOTP offers no protection against [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing) or reuse attacks. If an adversary obtains a valid code from you, they may use it as many times as they like until it expires (generally 60 seconds).
+
+An adversary could set up a website to imitate an official service in an attempt to trick you into giving out your username, password and current TOTP code. If the adversary then uses those recorded credentials they may be able to log into the real service and hijack the account.
+
+Although not perfect, TOTP is secure enough for most people, and when [hardware security keys](../multi-factor-authentication.md#hardware-security-keys) are not supported [authenticator apps](../multi-factor-authentication.md#authenticator-apps) are still a good option.
+
+### Hardware security keys
+
+The YubiKey stores data on a tamper-resistant solid-state chip which is [impossible to access](https://security.stackexchange.com/a/245772) non-destructively without an expensive process and a forensics laboratory.
+
+These keys are generally multi-function and provide a number of methods to authenticate. Below are the most common ones.
+
+#### Yubico OTP
+
+Yubico OTP is an authentication protocol typically implemented in hardware security keys. When you decide to use Yubico OTP, the key will generate a public ID, private ID, and a Secret Key which is then uploaded to the Yubico OTP server.
+
+When logging into a website, all you need to do is to physically touch the security key. The security key will emulate a keyboard and print out a one-time password into the password field.
+
+The service will then forward the one-time password to the Yubico OTP server for validation. A counter is incremented both on the key and Yubico's validation server. The OTP can only be used once, and when a successful authentication occurs, the counter is increased which prevents reuse of the OTP. Yubico provides a [detailed document](https://developers.yubico.com/OTP/OTPs_Explained.html) about the process.
+
+
+ 
+
+
+There are some benefits and disadvantages to using Yubico OTP when compared to TOTP.
+
+The Yubico validation server is a cloud based service, and you're placing trust in Yubico that they are storing data securely and not profiling you. The public ID associated with Yubico OTP is reused on every website and could be another avenue for third-parties to profile you. Like TOTP, Yubico OTP does not provide phishing resistance.
+
+If your threat model requires you to have different identities on different websites, **do not** use Yubico OTP with the same hardware security key across those websites as public ID is unique to each security key.
+
+#### FIDO (Fast IDentity Online)
+
+[FIDO](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIDO_Alliance) includes a number of standards, first there was U2F and then later [FIDO2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIDO2_Project) which includes the web standard [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn).
+
+U2F and FIDO2 refer to the [Client to Authenticator Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Client_to_Authenticator_Protocol), which is the protocol between the security key and the computer, such as a laptop or phone. It complements WebAuthn which is the component used to authenticate with the website (the "Relying Party") you're trying to log in on.
+
+WebAuthn is the most secure and private form of second factor authentication. While the authentication experience is similar to Yubico OTP, the key does not print out a one-time password and validate with a third-party server. Instead, it uses [public key cryptography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography) for authentication.
+
+
+ 
+
+
+When you create an account, the public key is sent to the service, then when you log in, the service will require you to "sign" some data with your private key. The benefit of this is that no password data is ever stored by the service, so there is nothing for an adversary to steal.
+
+This presentation discusses the history of password authentication, the pitfalls (such as password reuse), and discussion of FIDO2 and [WebAuthn](https://webauthn.guide) standards.
+
+
+
+
+
+FIDO2 and WebAuthn have superior security and privacy properties when compared to any MFA methods.
+
+Typically for web services it is used with WebAuthn which is a part of the [W3C recommendations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Wide_Web_Consortium#W3C_recommendation_(REC)). It uses public key authentication and is more secure than shared secrets used in Yubico OTP and TOTP methods, as it includes the origin name (usually, the domain name) during authentication. Attestation is provided to protect you from phishing attacks, as it helps you to determine that you are using the authentic service and not a fake copy.
+
+Unlike Yubico OTP, WebAuthn does not use any public ID, so the key is **not** identifiable across different websites. It also does not use any third-party cloud server for authentication. All communication is completed between the key and the website you are logging into. FIDO also uses a counter which is incremented upon use in order to prevent session reuse and cloned keys.
+
+If a website or service supports WebAuthn for the authentication, it is highly recommended that you use it over any other form of MFA.
+
+## General Recommendations
+
+We have these general recommendations:
+
+### Which Method Should I Use?
+
+When configuring your MFA method, keep in mind that it is only as secure as your weakest authentication method you use. This means it is important that you only use the best MFA method available. For instance, if you are already using TOTP, you should disable email and SMS MFA. If you are already using FIDO2/WebAuthn, you should not be using Yubico OTP or TOTP on your account.
+
+### Backups
+
+You should always have backups for your MFA method. Hardware security keys can get lost, stolen or simply stop working over time. It is recommended that you have a pair of hardware security keys with the same access to your accounts instead of just one.
+
+When using TOTP with an authenticator app, be sure to back up your recovery keys or the app itself, or copy the "shared secrets" to another instance of the app on a different phone or to an encrypted container (e.g. [VeraCrypt](../encryption.md#veracrypt)).
+
+### Initial Set Up
+
+When buying a security key, it is important that you change the default credentials, set up password protection for the key, and enable touch confirmation if your key supports it. Products such as the YubiKey have multiple interfaces with separate credentials for each one of them, so you should go over each interface and set up protection as well.
+
+### Email and SMS
+
+If you have to use email for MFA, make sure that the email account itself is secured with a proper MFA method.
+
+If you use SMS MFA, use a carrier who will not switch your phone number to a new SIM card without account access, or use a dedicated VoIP number from a provider with similar security to avoid a [SIM swap attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam).
+
+[MFA tools we recommend](../multi-factor-authentication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## More Places to Set Up MFA
+
+Beyond just securing your website logins, multi-factor authentication can be used to secure your local logins, SSH keys or even password databases as well.
+
+### Windows
+
+Yubico has a dedicated [Credential Provider](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/credential-providers-in-windows) that adds Challenge-Response authentication for the username + password login flow for local Windows accounts. If you have a YubiKey with Challenge-Response authentication support, take a look at the [Yubico Login for Windows Configuration Guide](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013708460-Yubico-Login-for-Windows-Configuration-Guide), which will allow you to set up MFA on your Windows computer.
+
+### macOS
+
+macOS has [native support](https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/intro-to-smart-card-integration-depd0b888248/web) for authentication with smart cards (PIV). If you have a smartcard or a hardware security key that supports the PIV interface such as the YubiKey, we recommend that you follow your smartcard/hardware security vendor's documentation and set up second factor authentication for your macOS computer.
+
+Yubico have a guide [Using Your YubiKey as a Smart Card in macOS](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016649059) which can help you set up your YubiKey on macOS.
+
+After your smartcard/security key is set up, we recommend running this command in the Terminal:
+
+```text
+sudo defaults write /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow DisableFDEAutoLogin -bool YES
+```
+
+The command will prevent an adversary from bypassing MFA when the computer boots.
+
+### Linux
+
+!!! warning
+
+ If the hostname of your system changes (such as due to DHCP), you would be unable to login. It is vital that you set up a proper hostname for your computer before following this guide.
+
+The `pam_u2f` module on Linux can provide two-factor authentication for logging in on most popular Linux distributions. If you have a hardware security key that supports U2F, you can set up MFA authentication for your login. Yubico has a guide [Ubuntu Linux Login Guide - U2F](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016649099-Ubuntu-Linux-Login-Guide-U2F) which should work on any distribution. The package manager commands—such as `apt-get`—and package names may however differ. This guide does **not** apply to Qubes OS.
+
+### Qubes OS
+
+Qubes OS has support for Challenge-Response authentication with YubiKeys. If you have a YubiKey with Challenge-Response authentication support, take a look at the Qubes OS [YubiKey documentation](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/yubikey/) if you want to set up MFA on Qubes OS.
+
+### SSH
+
+#### Hardware Security Keys
+
+SSH MFA could be set up using multiple different authentication methods that are popular with hardware security keys. We recommend that you check out Yubico's [documentation](https://developers.yubico.com/SSH/) on how to set this up.
+
+#### Time-based One-time Password (TOTP)
+
+SSH MFA can also be set up using TOTP. DigitalOcean has provided a tutorial [How To Set Up Multi-Factor Authentication for SSH on Ubuntu 20.04](https://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/how-to-set-up-multi-factor-authentication-for-ssh-on-ubuntu-20-04). Most things should be the same regardless of distribution, however the package manager commands—such as `apt-get`—and package names may differ.
+
+### KeePass (and KeePassXC)
+
+KeePass and KeePassXC databases can be secured using Challenge-Response or HOTP as a second-factor authentication. Yubico has provided a document for KeePass [Using Your YubiKey with KeePass](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013779759-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-KeePass) and there is also one on the [KeePassXC](https://keepassxc.org/docs/#faq-yubikey-2fa) website.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/basics/passwords-overview.md b/i18n/ar/basics/passwords-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..528f55c8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/basics/passwords-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+---
+title: "Introduction to Passwords"
+icon: 'material/form-textbox-password'
+---
+
+Passwords are an essential part of our everyday digital lives. We use them to protect our accounts, our devices and our secrets. Despite often being the only thing between us and an adversary who's after our private information, not a lot of thought is put into them, which often leads to people using passwords that can be easily guessed or brute-forced.
+
+## Best Practices
+
+### Use unique passwords for every service
+
+Imagine this; you sign up for an account with the same e-mail and password on multiple online services. If one of those service providers is malicious, or their service has a data breach that exposes your password in an unencrypted format, all a bad actor would have to do is try that e-mail and password combination across multiple popular services until they get a hit. It doesn't matter how strong that one password is, because they already have it.
+
+This is called [credential stuffing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credential_stuffing), and it is one of the most common ways that your accounts can be compromised by bad actors. To avoid this, make sure that you never re-use your passwords.
+
+### Use randomly generated passwords
+
+==You should **never** rely on yourself to come up with a good password.== We recommend using [randomly generated passwords](#passwords) or [diceware passphrases](#diceware-passphrases) with sufficient entropy to protect your accounts and devices.
+
+All of our [recommended password managers](../passwords.md) include a built-in password generator that you can use.
+
+### Rotating Passwords
+
+You should avoid changing passwords that you have to remember (such as your password manager's master password) too often unless you have reason to believe it has been compromised, as changing it too often exposes you to the risk of forgetting it.
+
+When it comes to passwords that you don't have to remember (such as passwords stored inside your password manager), if your [threat model](threat-modeling.md) calls for it, we recommend going through important accounts (especially accounts that don't use multi-factor authentication) and changing their password every couple of months, in case they have been compromised in a data breach that hasn't become public yet. Most password managers allow you to set an expiry date for your password to make this easier to manage.
+
+!!! tip "Checking for data breaches"
+
+ If your password manager lets you check for compromised passwords, make sure to do so and promptly change any password that may have been exposed in a data breach. Alternatively, you could follow [Have I Been Pwned's Latest Breaches feed](https://feeds.feedburner.com/HaveIBeenPwnedLatestBreaches) with the help of a [news aggregator](../news-aggregators.md).
+
+## Creating strong passwords
+
+### Passwords
+
+A lot of services impose certain criteria when it comes to passwords, including a minimum or maximum length, as well as which special characters, if any, can be used. You should use your password manager's built-in password generator to create passwords that are as long and complex as the service will allow by including capitalized and lowercase letters, numbers and special characters.
+
+If you need a password you can memorize, we recommend a [diceware passphrase](#diceware-passphrases).
+
+### Diceware Passphrases
+
+Diceware is a method for creating passphrases which are easy to remember, but hard to guess.
+
+Diceware passphrases are a great option when you need to memorize or manually input your credentials, such as for your password manager's master password or your device's encryption password.
+
+An example of a diceware passphrase is `viewable fastness reluctant squishy seventeen shown pencil`.
+
+To generate a diceware passphrase using real dice, follow these steps:
+
+!!! note
+
+ These instructions assume that you are using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate the passphrase, which requires five dice rolls per word. Other wordlists may require more or less rolls per word, and may require a different amount of words to achieve the same entropy.
+
+1. Roll a six-sided die five times, noting down the number after each roll.
+
+2. As an example, let's say you rolled `2-5-2-6-6`. Look through the [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) for the word that corresponds to `25266`.
+
+3. You will find the word `encrypt`. Write that word down.
+
+4. Repeat this process until your passphrase has as many words as you need, which you should separate with a space.
+
+!!! warning "Important"
+
+ You should **not** re-roll words until you get a combination of words that appeal to you. The process should be completely random.
+
+If you don't have access to or would prefer to not use real dice, you can use your password manager's built-in password generator, as most of them have the option to generate diceware passphrases in addition to regular passwords.
+
+We recommend using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate your diceware passphrases, as it offers the exact same security as the original list, while containing words that are easier to memorize. There are also [other wordlists in different languages](https://theworld.com/~reinhold/diceware.html#Diceware%20in%20Other%20Languages|outline), if you do not want your passphrase to be in English.
+
+??? note "Explanation of entropy and strength of diceware passphrases"
+
+ To demonstrate how strong diceware passphrases are, we'll use the aforementioned seven word passphrase (`viewable fastness reluctant squishy seventeen shown pencil`) and [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) as an example.
+
+ One metric to determine the strength of a diceware passphrase is how much entropy it has. The entropy per word in a diceware passphrase is calculated as $\text{log}_2(\text{WordsInList})$ and the overall entropy of the passphrase is calculated as $\text{log}_2(\text{WordsInList}^\text{WordsInPhrase})$.
+
+ Therefore, each word in the aforementioned list results in ~12.9 bits of entropy ($\text{log}_2(7776)$), and a seven word passphrase derived from it has ~90.47 bits of entropy ($\text{log}_2(7776^7)$).
+
+ The [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) contains 7776 unique words. To calculate the amount of possible passphrases, all we have to do is $\text{WordsInList}^\text{WordsInPhrase}$, or in our case, $7776^7$.
+
+ Let's put all of this in perspective: A seven word passphrase using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) is one of ~1,719,070,799,748,422,500,000,000,000 possible passphrases.
+
+ On average, it takes trying 50% of all the possible combinations to guess your phrase. With that in mind, even if your adversary is capable of ~1,000,000,000,000 guesses per second, it would still take them ~27,255,689 years to guess your passphrase. That is the case even if the following things are true:
+
+ - Your adversary knows that you used the diceware method.
+ - Your adversary knows the specific wordlist that you used.
+ - Your adversary knows how many words your passphrase contains.
+
+To sum it up, diceware passphrases are your best option when you need something that is both easy to remember *and* exceptionally strong.
+
+## Storing Passwords
+
+### Password Managers
+
+The best way to store your passwords is by using a password manager. They allow you to store your passwords in a file or in the cloud and protect them with a single master password. That way, you will only have to remember one strong password, which lets you access the rest of them.
+
+There are many good options to choose from, both cloud-based and local. Choose one of our recommended password managers and use it to establish strong passwords across all of your accounts. We recommend securing your password manager with a [diceware passphrase](#diceware-passphrases) comprised of at least seven words.
+
+[List of recommended password managers](../passwords.md ""){.md-button}
+
+!!! warning "Don't place your passwords and TOTP tokens inside the same password manager"
+
+ When using TOTP codes as [multi-factor authentication](../multi-factor-authentication.md), the best security practice is to keep your TOTP codes in a [separate app](../multi-factor-authentication.md#authenticator-apps).
+
+ Storing your TOTP tokens in the same place as your passwords, while convenient, reduces the accounts to a single factor in the event that an adversary gains access to your password manager.
+
+ Furthermore, we do not recommend storing single-use recovery codes in your password manager. Those should be stored separately such as in an encrypted container on an offline storage device.
+
+### Backups
+
+You should store an [encrypted](../encryption.md) backup of your passwords on multiple storage devices or a cloud storage provider. This can help you access your passwords if something happens to your primary device or the service you are using.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/basics/threat-modeling.md b/i18n/ar/basics/threat-modeling.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ac365515c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/basics/threat-modeling.md
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+---
+title: "تصميم التهديات"
+icon: 'المادة/الحساب-المستهدف'
+---
+
+موازنة الأمان، الخصوصية، وقابلية الاستخدام تعد واحدة من أول وأصعب المهام التي ستواجهها في رحلة الخصوصية. Everything is a trade-off: The more secure something is, the more restricting or inconvenient it generally is, etc. Often, people find that the problem with the tools they see recommended is that they're just too hard to start using!
+
+If you wanted to use the **most** secure tools available, you'd have to sacrifice *a lot* of usability. And, even then, ==nothing is ever fully secure.== There's **high** security, but never **full** security. That's why threat models are important.
+
+**So, what are these threat models, anyway?**
+
+==A threat model is a list of the most probable threats to your security and privacy endeavors.== Since it's impossible to protect yourself against **every** attack(er), you should focus on the **most probable** threats. In computer security, a threat is an event that could undermine your efforts to stay private and secure.
+
+Focusing on the threats that matter to you narrows down your thinking about the protection you need, so you can choose the tools that are right for the job.
+
+## Creating Your Threat Model
+
+To identify what could happen to the things you value and determine from whom you need to protect them, you should answer these five questions:
+
+1. What do I want to protect?
+2. Who do I want to protect it from?
+3. How likely is it that I will need to protect it?
+4. How bad are the consequences if I fail?
+5. How much trouble am I willing to go through to try to prevent potential consequences?
+
+### What do I want to protect?
+
+An “asset” is something you value and want to protect. In the context of digital security, ==an asset is usually some kind of information.== For example, your emails, contact lists, instant messages, location, and files are all possible assets. Your devices themselves may also be assets.
+
+*Make a list of your assets: data that you keep, where it's kept, who has access to it, and what stops others from accessing it.*
+
+### Who do I want to protect it from?
+
+To answer this question, it's important to identify who might want to target you or your information. ==A person or entity that poses a threat to your assets is an “adversary”.== Examples of potential adversaries are your boss, your former partner, your business competition, your government, or a hacker on a public network.
+
+*Make a list of your adversaries or those who might want to get ahold of your assets. Your list may include individuals, a government agency, or corporations.*
+
+Depending on who your adversaries are, under some circumstances, this list might be something you want to destroy after you're done security planning.
+
+### How likely is it that I will need to protect it?
+
+==Risk is the likelihood that a particular threat against a particular asset will actually occur.== It goes hand-in-hand with capability. While your mobile phone provider has the capability to access all of your data, the risk of them posting your private data online to harm your reputation is low.
+
+It is important to distinguish between what might happen and the probability it may happen. For instance, there is a threat that your building might collapse, but the risk of this happening is far greater in San Francisco (where earthquakes are common) than in Stockholm (where they are not).
+
+Assessing risks is both a personal and subjective process. Many people find certain threats unacceptable, no matter the likelihood they will occur, because the mere presence of the threat is not worth the cost. In other cases, people disregard high risks because they don't view the threat as a problem.
+
+*Write down which threats you are going to take seriously, and which may be too rare or too harmless (or too difficult to combat) to worry about.*
+
+### How bad are the consequences if I fail?
+
+There are many ways that an adversary could gain access to your data. For example, an adversary can read your private communications as they pass through the network, or they can delete or corrupt your data.
+
+==The motives of adversaries differ widely, as do their tactics.== A government trying to prevent the spread of a video showing police violence may be content to simply delete or reduce the availability of that video. In contrast, a political opponent may wish to gain access to secret content and publish that content without you knowing.
+
+Security planning involves understanding how bad the consequences could be if an adversary successfully gains access to one of your assets. To determine this, you should consider the capability of your adversary. For example, your mobile phone provider has access to all of your phone records. A hacker on an open Wi-Fi network can access your unencrypted communications. Your government might have stronger capabilities.
+
+*Write down what your adversary might want to do with your private data.*
+
+### How much trouble am I willing to go through to try to prevent potential consequences?
+
+==There is no perfect option for security.== Not everyone has the same priorities, concerns, or access to resources. Your risk assessment will allow you to plan the right strategy for you, balancing convenience, cost, and privacy.
+
+For example, an attorney representing a client in a national security case may be willing to go to greater lengths to protect communications about that case, such as using encrypted email, than a mother who regularly emails her daughter funny cat videos.
+
+*Write down what options you have available to you to help mitigate your unique threats. Note if you have any financial constraints, technical constraints, or social constraints.*
+
+### Try it yourself: Protecting Your Belongings
+
+These questions can apply to a wide variety of situations, online and offline. As a generic demonstration of how these questions work, let's build a plan to keep your house and possessions safe.
+
+**What do you want to protect? (Or, *what do you have that is worth protecting?*)**
+:
+
+Your assets might include jewelry, electronics, important documents, or photos.
+
+**Who do you want to protect it from?**
+:
+
+Your adversaries might include burglars, roommates, or guests.
+
+**How likely is it that you will need to protect it?**
+:
+
+Does your neighborhood have a history of burglaries? How trustworthy are your roommates or guests? What are the capabilities of your adversaries? What are the risks you should consider?
+
+**How bad are the consequences if you fail?**
+:
+
+Do you have anything in your house that you cannot replace? Do you have the time or money to replace those things? Do you have insurance that covers goods stolen from your home?
+
+**How much trouble are you willing to go through to prevent these consequences?**
+:
+
+Are you willing to buy a safe for sensitive documents? Can you afford to buy a high-quality lock? Do you have time to open a security box at your local bank and keep your valuables there?
+
+Only once you have asked yourself these questions will you be in a position to assess what measures to take. If your possessions are valuable, but the probability of a break-in is low, then you may not want to invest too much money in a lock. But, if the probability of a break-in is high, you'll want to get the best lock on the market and consider adding a security system.
+
+Making a security plan will help you to understand the threats that are unique to you and to evaluate your assets, your adversaries, and your adversaries' capabilities, along with the likelihood of risks you face.
+
+## Further Reading
+
+For people looking to increase their privacy and security online, we've compiled a list of common threats our visitors face or goals our visitors have, to give you some inspiration and demonstrate the basis of our recommendations.
+
+- [Common Goals and Threats :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](common-threats.md)
+
+## Sources
+
+- [EFF Surveillance Self Defense: Your Security Plan](https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/your-security-plan)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/basics/vpn-overview.md b/i18n/ar/basics/vpn-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ad6aaf23f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/basics/vpn-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+---
+title: VPN Overview
+icon: material/vpn
+---
+
+Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit somewhere else in the world. An ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (i.e. modem).
+
+Encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, so they may not be able to see exactly what you're posting or reading but they can get an idea of the [domains you request](../advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).
+
+A VPN can help as it can shift trust to a server somewhere else in the world. As a result, the ISP then only sees that you are connected to a VPN and nothing about the activity that you're passing into it.
+
+## Should I use a VPN?
+
+**Yes**, unless you are already using Tor. A VPN does two things: shifting the risks from your Internet Service Provider to itself and hiding your IP from a third-party service.
+
+VPNs cannot encrypt data outside of the connection between your device and the VPN server. VPN providers can see and modify your traffic the same way your ISP could. And there is no way to verify a VPN provider's "no logging" policies in any way.
+
+However, they do hide your actual IP from a third-party service, provided that there are no IP leaks. They help you blend in with others and mitigate IP based tracking.
+
+## When shouldn't I use a VPN?
+
+Using a VPN in cases where you're using your [known identity](common-threats.md#common-misconceptions) is unlikely be useful.
+
+Doing so may trigger spam and fraud detection systems, such as if you were to log into your bank's website.
+
+## What about encryption?
+
+Encryption offered by VPN providers are between your devices and their servers. It guarantees that this specific link is secure. This is a step up from using unencrypted proxies where an adversary on the network can intercept the communications between your devices and said proxies and modify them. However, encryption between your apps or browsers with the service providers are not handled by this encryption.
+
+In order to keep what you actually do on the websites you visit private and secure, you must use HTTPS. This will keep your passwords, session tokens, and queries safe from the VPN provider. Consider enabling "HTTPS everywhere" in your browser to mitigate downgrade attacks like [SSL Strip](https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Marlinspike/BlackHat-DC-09-Marlinspike-Defeating-SSL.pdf).
+
+## Should I use encrypted DNS with a VPN?
+
+Unless your VPN provider hosts the encrypted DNS servers, **no**. Using DOH/DOT (or any other form of encrypted DNS) with third-party servers will simply add more entities to trust and does **absolutely nothing** to improve your privacy/security. Your VPN provider can still see which websites you visit based on the IP addresses and other methods. Instead of just trusting your VPN provider, you are now trusting both the VPN provider and the DNS provider.
+
+A common reason to recommend encrypted DNS is that it helps against DNS spoofing. However, your browser should already be checking for [TLS certificates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Digital_certificates) with **HTTPS** and warn you about it. If you are not using **HTTPS**, then an adversary can still just modify anything other than your DNS queries and the end result will be little different.
+
+Needless to say, **you shouldn't use encrypted DNS with Tor**. This would direct all of your DNS requests through a single circuit and would allow the encrypted DNS provider to deanonymize you.
+
+## Should I use Tor *and* a VPN?
+
+By using a VPN with Tor, you're creating essentially a permanent entry node, often with a money trail attached. This provides zero additional benefits to you, while increasing the attack surface of your connection dramatically. If you wish to hide your Tor usage from your ISP or your government, Tor has a built-in solution for that: Tor bridges. [Read more about Tor bridges and why using a VPN is not necessary](../advanced/tor-overview.md).
+
+## What if I need anonymity?
+
+VPNs cannot provide anonymity. Your VPN provider will still see your real IP address, and often has a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. You cannot rely on "no logging" policies to protect your data. Use [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) instead.
+
+## What about VPN providers that provide Tor nodes?
+
+Do not use that feature. The point of using Tor is that you do not trust your VPN provider. Currently Tor only supports the [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol) protocol. [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol) (used in [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC) for voice and video sharing, the new [HTTP3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) protocol, etc), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol) and other packets will be dropped. To compensate for this, VPN providers typically will route all non-TCP packets through their VPN server (your first hop). This is the case with [ProtonVPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn/). Additionally, when using this Tor over VPN setup, you do not have control over other important Tor features such as [Isolated Destination Address](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (using a different Tor circuit for every domain you visit).
+
+The feature should be viewed as a convenient way to access the Tor Network, not to stay anonymous. For proper anonymity, use the Tor Browser, TorSocks, or a Tor gateway.
+
+## When are VPNs useful?
+
+A VPN may still be useful to you in a variety of scenarios, such as:
+
+1. Hiding your traffic from **only** your Internet Service Provider.
+1. Hiding your downloads (such as torrents) from your ISP and anti-piracy organizations.
+1. Hiding your IP from third-party websites and services, preventing IP based tracking.
+
+For situations like these, or if you have another compelling reason, the VPN providers we listed above are who we think are the most trustworthy. However, using a VPN provider still means you're *trusting* the provider. In pretty much any other scenario you should be using a secure**-by-design** tool such as Tor.
+
+## Sources and Further Reading
+
+1. [VPN - a Very Precarious Narrative](https://schub.io/blog/2019/04/08/very-precarious-narrative.html) by Dennis Schubert
+1. [Tor Network Overview](../advanced/tor-overview.md)
+1. [IVPN Privacy Guides](https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides)
+1. ["Do I need a VPN?"](https://www.doineedavpn.com), a tool developed by IVPN to challenge aggressive VPN marketing by helping individuals decide if a VPN is right for them.
+
+## Related VPN Information
+
+- [The Trouble with VPN and Privacy Review Sites](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2019/11/20/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-review-sites/)
+- [Free VPN App Investigation](https://www.top10vpn.com/free-vpn-app-investigation/)
+- [Hidden VPN owners unveiled: 101 VPN products run by just 23 companies](https://vpnpro.com/blog/hidden-vpn-owners-unveiled-97-vpns-23-companies/)
+- [This Chinese company is secretly behind 24 popular apps seeking dangerous permissions](https://vpnpro.com/blog/chinese-company-secretly-behind-popular-apps-seeking-dangerous-permissions/)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/calendar.md b/i18n/ar/calendar.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f612bd8fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/calendar.md
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+---
+title: "Calendar Sync"
+icon: material/calendar
+---
+
+Calendars contain some of your most sensitive data; use products that implement E2EE at rest to prevent a provider from reading them.
+
+## Tutanota
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tutanota** offers a free and encrypted calendar across their supported platforms. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, multi-factor authentication, and [more](https://tutanota.com/calendar-app-comparison/).
+
+ Multiple calendars and extended sharing functionality is limited to paid subscribers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tutanota.com/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tutanota.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tutanota.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tutanota.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/tutanota/id922429609)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.tutanota.Tutanota)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.tutanota.com/)
+
+## Proton Calendar
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton Calendar** is an encrypted calendar service available to Proton members via web or mobile clients. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, and [more](https://proton.me/support/proton-calendar-guide). Those on the free tier get access to a single calendar, whereas paid subscribers can create up to 20 calendars. Extended sharing functionality is also limited to paid subscribers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/proton-calendar-guide){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=me.proton.android.calendar)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://calendar.proton.me)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Qualifications
+
+- Must sync and store information with E2EE to ensure data is not visible to the service provider.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should integrate with native OS calendar and contact management apps if applicable.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/cloud.md b/i18n/ar/cloud.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..72ae0a3fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/cloud.md
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+---
+title: "Cloud Storage"
+icon: material/file-cloud
+---
+
+Many cloud storage providers require your full trust that they will not look at your files. The alternatives listed below eliminate the need for trust by either putting you in control of your data or by implementing E2EE.
+
+If these alternatives do not fit your needs, we suggest you look into [Encryption Software](encryption.md).
+
+??? question "Looking for Nextcloud?"
+
+ Nextcloud is [still a recommended tool](productivity.md) for self-hosting a file management suite, however we do not recommend third-party Nextcloud storage providers at the moment, because we do not recommend Nextcloud's built-in E2EE functionality for home users.
+
+## Proton Drive
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton Drive** is an E2EE general file storage service by the popular encrypted email provider [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/mail).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/drive){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/drive){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=me.proton.android.drive)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1509667851)
+
+Proton Drive's mobile clients were released in December 2022 and are not yet open-source. Proton has historically delayed their source code releases until after initial product releases, and [plans to](https://www.reddit.com/r/ProtonDrive/comments/zf14i8/comment/izdwmme/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web2x&context=3) release the source code by the end of 2023. Proton Drive desktop clients are still in development.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must enforce end-to-end encryption.
+- Must offer a free plan or trial period for testing.
+- Must support TOTP or FIDO2 multi-factor authentication, or Passkey logins.
+- Must offer a web interface which supports basic file management functionality.
+- Must allow for easy exports of all files/documents.
+- Must use standard, audited encryption.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Clients should be open-source.
+- Clients should be audited in their entirety by an independent third-party.
+- Should offer native clients for Linux, Android, Windows, macOS, and iOS.
+ - These clients should integrate with native OS tools for cloud storage providers, such as Files app integration on iOS, or DocumentsProvider functionality on Android.
+- Should support easy file-sharing with other users.
+- Should offer at least basic file preview and editing functionality on the web interface.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/data-redaction.md b/i18n/ar/data-redaction.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1cd1fc0c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/data-redaction.md
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+---
+title: "Data and Metadata Redaction"
+icon: material/tag-remove
+---
+
+When sharing files, be sure to remove associated metadata. Image files commonly include [Exif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exif) data. Photos sometimes even include GPS coordinates in the file metadata.
+
+## Desktop
+
+### MAT2
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **MAT2** is free software, which allows the metadata to be removed from image, audio, torrent, and document file types. It provides both a command line tool and a graphical user interface via an [extension for Nautilus](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/tree/master/nautilus), the default file manager of [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), and [Dolphin](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/tree/master/dolphin), the default file manager of [KDE](https://kde.org).
+
+ On Linux, a third-party graphical tool [Metadata Cleaner](https://gitlab.com/rmnvgr/metadata-cleaner) powered by MAT2 exists and is [available on Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/fr.romainvigier.MetadataCleaner).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/blob/master/README.md){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://pypi.org/project/mat2)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2#requirements-setup-on-macos-os-x-using-homebrew)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://pypi.org/project/mat2)
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2#web-interface)
+
+## Mobile
+
+### ExifEraser (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **ExifEraser** is a modern, permissionless image metadata erasing application for Android.
+
+ It currently supports JPEG, PNG and WebP files.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.none.tom.exiferaser)
+ - [:octicons-moon-16: Accrescent](https://accrescent.app/app/com.none.tom.exiferaser)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser/releases)
+
+The metadata that is erased depends on the image's file type:
+
+* **JPEG**: ICC Profile, Exif, Photoshop Image Resources and XMP/ExtendedXMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
+* **PNG**: ICC Profile, Exif and XMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
+* **WebP**: ICC Profile, Exif and XMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
+
+After processing the images, ExifEraser provides you with a full report about what exactly was removed from each image.
+
+The app offers multiple ways to erase metadata from images. Namely:
+
+* You can share an image from another application with ExifEraser.
+* Through the app itself, you can select a single image, multiple images at once, or even an entire directory.
+* It features a "Camera" option, which uses your operating system's camera app to take a photo, and then it removes the metadata from it.
+* It allows you to drag photos from another app into ExifEraser when they are both open in split-screen mode.
+* Lastly, it allows you to paste an image from your clipboard.
+
+### Metapho (iOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Metapho** is a simple and clean viewer for photo metadata such as date, file name, size, camera model, shutter speed, and location.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://zininworks.com/metapho){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://zininworks.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/metapho/id914457352)
+
+### PrivacyBlur
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **PrivacyBlur** is a free app which can blur sensitive portions of pictures before sharing them online.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://privacyblur.app/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://privacyblur.app/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/MATHEMA-GmbH/privacyblur#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/MATHEMA-GmbH/privacyblur){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.mathema.privacyblur)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/privacyblur/id1536274106)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ You should **never** use blur to redact [text in images](https://bishopfox.com/blog/unredacter-tool-never-pixelation). If you want to redact text in an image, draw a box over the text. For this, we suggest apps like [Pocket Paint](https://github.com/Catrobat/Paintroid).
+
+## Command-line
+
+### ExifTool
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **ExifTool** is the original perl library and command-line application for reading, writing, and editing meta information (Exif, IPTC, XMP, and more) in a wide variety of file formats (JPEG, TIFF, PNG, PDF, RAW, and more).
+
+ It's often a component of other Exif removal applications and is in most Linux distribution repositories.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://exiftool.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://exiftool.org/faq.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/exiftool/exiftool){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://exiftool.org/#donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://exiftool.org)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://exiftool.org)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://exiftool.org)
+
+!!! example "Deleting data from a directory of files"
+
+ ```bash
+ exiftool -all= *.file_extension
+ ```
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Apps developed for open-source operating systems must be open-source.
+- Apps must be free and should not include ads or other limitations.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/desktop-browsers.md b/i18n/ar/desktop-browsers.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..739a2e9f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/desktop-browsers.md
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+---
+title: "Desktop Browsers"
+icon: material/laptop
+---
+
+These are our currently recommended desktop web browsers and configurations for standard/non-anonymous browsing. If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) instead. In general, we recommend keeping your browser extensions to a minimum; they have privileged access within your browser, require you to trust the developer, can make you [stand out](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint), and [weaken](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/chromium-extensions/c/0ei-UCHNm34/m/lDaXwQhzBAAJ) site isolation.
+
+## Firefox
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Firefox** provides strong privacy settings such as [Enhanced Tracking Protection](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/enhanced-tracking-protection-firefox-desktop), which can help block various [types of tracking](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/enhanced-tracking-protection-firefox-desktop#w_what-enhanced-tracking-protection-blocks).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://firefox.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mozilla.org/privacy/firefox/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.mozilla.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/mac)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/linux)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.mozilla.firefox)
+
+!!! warning
+ Firefox includes a unique [download token](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1677497#c0) in downloads from Mozilla's website and uses telemetry in Firefox to send the token. The token is **not** included in releases from the [Mozilla FTP](https://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/firefox/releases/).
+
+### Recommended Configuration
+
+Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. When you use Firefox, we recommend changing the following settings to protect your privacy from certain parties, but all browsers other than [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) will be traceable by *somebody* in some regard or another.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Privacy & Security**.
+
+##### Enhanced Tracking Protection
+
+- [x] Select **Strict** Enhanced Tracking Protection
+
+This protects you by blocking social media trackers, fingerprinting scripts (note that this does not protect you from *all* fingerprinting), cryptominers, cross-site tracking cookies, and some other tracking content. ETP protects against many common threats, but it does not block all tracking avenues because it is designed to have minimal to no impact on site usability.
+
+##### Sanitize on Close
+
+If you want to stay logged in to particular sites, you can allow exceptions in **Cookies and Site Data** → **Manage Exceptions...**
+
+- [x] Check **Delete cookies and site data when Firefox is closed**
+
+This protects you from persistent cookies, but does not protect you against cookies acquired during any one browsing session. When this is enabled, it becomes possible to easily cleanse your browser cookies by simply restarting Firefox. You can set exceptions on a per-site basis, if you wish to stay logged in to a particular site you visit often.
+
+##### Search Suggestions
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Provide search suggestions**
+
+Search suggestion features may not be available in your region.
+
+Search suggestions send everything you type in the address bar to the default search engine, regardless of whether you submit an actual search. Disabling search suggestions allows you to more precisely control what data you send to your search engine provider.
+
+##### Telemetry
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Firefox to send technical and interaction data to Mozilla**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Firefox to install and run studies**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Firefox to send backlogged crash reports on your behalf**
+
+> Firefox sends data about your Firefox version and language; device operating system and hardware configuration; memory, basic information about crashes and errors; outcome of automated processes like updates, safebrowsing, and activation to us. When Firefox sends data to us, your IP address is temporarily collected as part of our server logs.
+
+Additionally, the Firefox Accounts service collects [some technical data](https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/privacy/firefox/#firefox-accounts). If you use a Firefox Account you can opt-out:
+
+1. Open your [profile settings on accounts.firefox.com](https://accounts.firefox.com/settings#data-collection)
+2. Uncheck **Data Collection and Use** > **Help improve Firefox Accounts**
+
+##### HTTPS-Only Mode
+
+- [x] Select **Enable HTTPS-Only Mode in all windows**
+
+This prevents you from unintentionally connecting to a website in plain-text HTTP. Sites without HTTPS are uncommon nowadays, so this should have little to no impact on your day to day browsing.
+
+### Firefox Sync
+
+[Firefox Sync](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2018/11/firefox-sync-privacy/) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices and protects it with E2EE.
+
+### Arkenfox (advanced)
+
+The [Arkenfox project](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js) provides a set of carefully considered options for Firefox. If you [decide](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/1.1-To-Arkenfox-or-Not) to use Arkenfox, a [few options](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/3.2-Overrides-[Common]) are subjectively strict and/or may cause some websites to not work properly - [which you can easily change](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/3.1-Overrides) to suit your needs. We **strongly recommend** reading through their full [wiki](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki). Arkenfox also enables [container](https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/containers#w_for-advanced-users) support.
+
+## Brave
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Brave Browser** includes a built-in content blocker and [privacy features](https://brave.com/privacy-features/), many of which are enabled by default.
+
+ Brave is built upon the Chromium web browser project, so it should feel familiar and have minimal website compatibility issues.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://brave.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://brave4u7jddbv7cyviptqjc7jusxh72uik7zt6adtckl5f4nwy2v72qd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://brave.com/privacy/browser/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.brave.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads annotate
+
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://brave.com/download/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://brave.com/download/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://brave.com/linux/) (1)
+
+ 1. We advise against using the Flatpak version of Brave, as it replaces Chromium's sandbox with Flatpak's, which is less effective. Additionally, the package is not maintained by Brave Software, Inc.
+
+### Recommended Configuration
+
+Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. When you use Brave, we recommend changing the following settings to protect your privacy from certain parties, but all browsers other than the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) will be traceable by *somebody* in some regard or another.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings**.
+
+##### Shields
+
+Brave includes some anti-fingerprinting measures in its [Shields](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360022973471-What-is-Shields-) feature. We suggest configuring these options [globally](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360023646212-How-do-I-configure-global-and-site-specific-Shields-settings-) across all pages that you visit.
+
+Shields' options can be downgraded on a per-site basis as needed, but by default we recommend setting the following:
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Prevent sites from fingerprinting me based on my language preferences**
+- [x] Select **Aggressive** under Trackers & ads blocking
+
+ ??? warning "Use default filter lists"
+ Brave allows you to select additional content filters within the internal `brave://adblock` page. We advise against using this feature; instead, keep the default filter lists. Using extra lists will make you stand out from other Brave users and may also increase attack surface if there is an exploit in Brave and a malicious rule is added to one of the lists you use.
+
+- [x] (Optional) Select **Block Scripts** (1)
+- [x] Select **Strict, may break sites** under Block fingerprinting
+
+
+
+1. This option provides functionality similar to uBlock Origin's advanced [blocking modes](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) or the [NoScript](https://noscript.net/) extension.
+
+##### Social media blocking
+
+- [ ] Uncheck all social media components
+
+##### Privacy and security
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Disable non-proxied UDP** under [WebRTC IP Handling Policy](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360017989132-How-do-I-change-my-Privacy-Settings-#webrtc)
+- [ ] Uncheck **Use Google services for push messaging**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow privacy-preserving product analytics (P3A)**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send daily usage ping to Brave**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send diagnostic reports**
+- [x] Select **Always use secure connections** in the **Security** menu
+- [ ] Uncheck **Private window with Tor** (1)
+
+ !!! tip "Sanitizing on Close"
+ - [x] Select **Clear cookies and site data when you close all windows** in the *Cookies and other site data* menu
+
+ If you wish to stay logged in to a particular site you visit often, you can set exceptions on a per-site basis under the *Customized behaviors* section.
+
+
+
+1. Brave is **not** as resistant to fingerprinting as the Tor Browser and far fewer people use Brave with Tor, so you will stand out. Where [strong anonymity is required](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360018121491-What-is-a-Private-Window-with-Tor-Connectivity-) use the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser).
+
+##### Extensions
+
+Disable built-in extensions you do not use in **Extensions**
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Hangouts**
+- [ ] Uncheck **WebTorrent**
+
+##### IPFS
+
+InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is a decentralized, peer-to-peer network for storing and sharing data in a distributed filesystem. Unless you use the feature, disable it.
+
+- [x] Select **Disabled** on Method to resolve IPFS resources
+
+##### Additional settings
+
+Under the *System* menu
+
+
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Continue running apps when Brave is closed** to disable background apps (1)
+
+
+
+1. This option is not present on all platforms.
+
+### Brave Sync
+
+[Brave Sync](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360059793111-Understanding-Brave-Sync) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices without requiring an account and protects it with E2EE.
+
+## Additional Resources
+
+We generally do not recommend installing any extensions as they increase your attack surface. However, uBlock Origin may prove useful if you value content blocking functionality.
+
+### uBlock Origin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **uBlock Origin** is a popular content blocker that could help you block ads, trackers, and fingerprinting scripts.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/ublock-origin/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/ublock-origin/cjpalhdlnbpafiamejdnhcphjbkeiagm)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/ublock-origin/odfafepnkmbhccpbejgmiehpchacaeak)
+
+We suggest following the [developer's documentation](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) and picking one of the "modes". Additional filter lists can impact performance and [may increase attack surface](https://portswigger.net/research/ublock-i-exfiltrate-exploiting-ad-blockers-with-css).
+
+##### Other lists
+
+These are some other [filter lists](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Dashboard:-Filter-lists) that you may want to consider adding:
+
+- [x] Check **Privacy** > **AdGuard URL Tracking Protection**
+- Add [Actually Legitimate URL Shortener Tool](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DandelionSprout/adfilt/master/LegitimateURLShortener.txt)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Supports automatic updates.
+- Receives engine updates in 0-1 days from upstream release.
+- Available on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- Any changes required to make the browser more privacy-respecting should not negatively impact user experience.
+- Blocks third-party cookies by default.
+- Supports [state partitioning](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning) to mitigate cross-site tracking.[^1]
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Includes built-in content blocking functionality.
+- Supports cookie compartmentalization (à la [Multi-Account Containers](https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/containers)).
+- Supports Progressive Web Apps.
+ PWAs enable you to install certain websites as if they were native apps on your computer. This can have advantages over installing Electron-based apps, because you benefit from your browser's regular security updates.
+- Does not include add-on functionality (bloatware) that does not impact user privacy.
+- Does not collect telemetry by default.
+- Provides open-source sync server implementation.
+- Defaults to a [private search engine](search-engines.md).
+
+### Extension Criteria
+
+- Must not replicate built-in browser or OS functionality.
+- Must directly impact user privacy, i.e. must not simply provide information.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
+
+[^1]: Brave's implementation is detailed at [Brave Privacy Updates: Partitioning network-state for privacy](https://brave.com/privacy-updates/14-partitioning-network-state/).
diff --git a/i18n/ar/desktop.md b/i18n/ar/desktop.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f97c1166e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/desktop.md
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+---
+title: "Desktop/PC"
+icon: simple/linux
+---
+
+Linux distributions are commonly recommended for privacy protection and software freedom. If you don't already use Linux, below are some distributions we suggest trying out, as well as some general privacy and security improvement tips that are applicable to many Linux distributions.
+
+- [General Linux Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/linux-overview.md)
+
+## Traditional Distributions
+
+### Fedora Workstation
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Fedora Workstation** is our recommended distribution for people new to Linux. Fedora generally adopts newer technologies before other distributions e.g., [Wayland](https://wayland.freedesktop.org/), [PipeWire](https://pipewire.org). These new technologies often come with improvements in security, privacy, and usability in general.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getfedora.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://whatcanidoforfedora.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Fedora has a semi-rolling release cycle. While some packages like [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org) are frozen until the next Fedora release, most packages (including the kernel) are updated frequently throughout the lifespan of the release. Each Fedora release is supported for one year, with a new version released every 6 months.
+
+### openSUSE Tumbleweed
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **openSUSE Tumbleweed** is a stable rolling release distribution.
+
+ openSUSE Tumbleweed has a [transactional update](https://kubic.opensuse.org/blog/2018-04-04-transactionalupdates/) system that uses [Btrfs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Btrfs) and [Snapper](https://en.opensuse.org/openSUSE:Snapper_Tutorial) to ensure that snapshots can be rolled back should there be a problem.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://get.opensuse.org/tumbleweed/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://doc.opensuse.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://shop.opensuse.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Tumbleweed follows a rolling release model where each update is released as a snapshot of the distribution. When you upgrade your system, a new snapshot is downloaded. Each snapshot is run through a series of automated tests by [openQA](https://openqa.opensuse.org) to ensure its quality.
+
+### Arch Linux
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Arch Linux** is a lightweight, do-it-yourself (DIY) distribution meaning that you only get what you install. For more information see their [FAQ](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Frequently_asked_questions).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://archlinux.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://wiki.archlinux.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://archlinux.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Arch Linux has a rolling release cycle. There is no fixed release schedule and packages are updated very frequently.
+
+Being a DIY distribution, you are [expected to set up and maintain](os/linux-overview.md#arch-based-distributions) your system on your own. Arch has an [official installer](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Archinstall) to make the installation process a little easier.
+
+A large portion of [Arch Linux’s packages](https://reproducible.archlinux.org) are [reproducible](https://reproducible-builds.org).
+
+## Immutable Distributions
+
+### Fedora Silverblue
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Fedora Silverblue** and **Fedora Kinoite** are immutable variants of Fedora with a strong focus on container workflows. Silverblue comes with the [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org/) desktop environment while Kinoite comes with [KDE](https://kde.org/). Silverblue and Kinoite follow the same release schedule as Fedora Workstation, benefiting from the same fast updates and staying very close to upstream.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://silverblue.fedoraproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora-silverblue/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://whatcanidoforfedora.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Silverblue (and Kinoite) differ from Fedora Workstation as they replace the [DNF](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/DNF) package manager with a much more advanced alternative called [`rpm-ostree`](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/rawhide/system-administrators-guide/package-management/rpm-ostree/). The `rpm-ostree` package manager works by downloading a base image for the system, then overlaying packages over it in a [git](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Git)-like commit tree. When the system is updated, a new base image is downloaded and the overlays will be applied to that new image.
+
+After the update is complete you will reboot the system into the new deployment. `rpm-ostree` keeps two deployments of the system so that you can easily rollback if something breaks in the new deployment. There is also the option to pin more deployments as needed.
+
+[Flatpak](https://www.flatpak.org) is the primary package installation method on these distributions, as `rpm-ostree` is only meant to overlay packages that cannot stay inside of a container on top of the base image.
+
+As an alternative to Flatpaks, there is the option of [Toolbox](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora-silverblue/toolbox/) to create [Podman](https://podman.io) containers with a shared home directory with the host operating system and mimic a traditional Fedora environment, which is a [useful feature](https://containertoolbx.org) for the discerning developer.
+
+### NixOS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ NixOS is an independent distribution based on the Nix package manager with a focus on reproducibility and reliability.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://nixos.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://nixos.org/learn.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nixos.org/donate.html){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+NixOS’s package manager keeps every version of every package in a different folder in the **Nix store**. Due to this you can have different versions of the same package installed on your system. After the package contents have been written to the folder, the folder is made read-only.
+
+NixOS also provides atomic updates; first it downloads (or builds) the packages and files for the new system generation and then switches to it. There are different ways to switch to a new generation; you can tell NixOS to activate it after reboot or you can switch to it at runtime. You can also *test* the new generation by switching to it at runtime, but not setting it as the current system generation. If something in the update process breaks, you can just reboot and automatically and return to a working version of your system.
+
+Nix the package manager uses a purely functional language - which is also called Nix - to define packages.
+
+[Nixpkgs](https://github.com/nixos/nixpkgs) (the main source of packages) are contained in a single GitHub repository. You can also define your own packages in the same language and then easily include them in your config.
+
+Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in the binary cache, Nix will just build the package from source using its definition. It builds each package in a sandboxed *pure* environment, which is as independent of the host system as possible, thus making binaries reproducible.
+
+## Anonymity-Focused Distributions
+
+### Whonix
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Whonix is meant to run as two virtual machines: a “Workstation” and a Tor “Gateway.” All communications from the Workstation must go through the Tor gateway. This means that even if the Workstation is compromised by malware of some kind, the true IP address remains hidden.
+
+Some of its features include Tor Stream Isolation, [keystroke anonymization](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Keystroke_Deanonymization#Kloak), [encrypted swap](https://github.com/Whonix/swap-file-creator), and a hardened memory allocator.
+
+Future versions of Whonix will likely include [full system AppArmor policies](https://github.com/Whonix/apparmor-profile-everything) and a [sandbox app launcher](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Sandbox-app-launcher) to fully confine all processes on the system.
+
+Whonix is best used [in conjunction with Qubes](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Why_use_Qubes_over_other_Virtualizers), Qubes-Whonix has various [disadvantages](https://forums.whonix.org/t/qubes-whonix-security-disadvantages-help-wanted/8581) when compared to other hypervisors.
+
+### Tails
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tails** is a live operating system based on Debian that routes all communications through Tor, which can boot on on almost any computer from a DVD, USB stick, or SD card installation. It uses [Tor](tor.md) to preserve privacy and anonymity while circumventing censorship, and it leaves no trace of itself on the computer it is used on after it is powered off.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tails.boum.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tails.boum.org/doc/index.en.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tails.boum.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Tails is great for counter forensics due to amnesia (meaning nothing is written to the disk); however, it is not a hardened distribution like Whonix. It lacks many anonymity and security features that Whonix has and gets updated much less often (only once every six weeks). A Tails system that is compromised by malware may potentially bypass the transparent proxy allowing for the user to be deanonymized.
+
+Tails includes [uBlock Origin](desktop-browsers.md#ublock-origin) in Tor Browser by default, which may potentially make it easier for adversaries to fingerprint Tails users. [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) virtual machines may be more leak-proof, however they are not amnesic, meaning data may be recovered from your storage device.
+
+By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypted [persistent storage](https://tails.boum.org/doc/persistent_storage/index.en.html) can be configured to store some data between reboots.
+
+## Security-focused Distributions
+
+### Qubes OS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*.
+
+The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/).
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+Our recommended operating systems:
+
+- Must be open-source.
+- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates.
+- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#Wayland).
+- Must support full-disk encryption during installation.
+- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage.
+- Must support a wide variety of hardware.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/dns.md b/i18n/ar/dns.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..109f8b073
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/dns.md
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+---
+title: "DNS Resolvers"
+icon: material/dns
+---
+
+!!! question "Should I use encrypted DNS?"
+
+ Encrypted DNS with third-party servers should only be used to get around basic [DNS blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) when you can be sure there won't be any consequences. Encrypted DNS will not help you hide any of your browsing activity.
+
+ [Learn more about DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md){ .md-button }
+
+## Recommended Providers
+
+| DNS Provider | Privacy Policy | Protocols | Logging | ECS | Filtering |
+| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------ | -------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| [**AdGuard**](https://adguard.com/en/adguard-dns/overview.html) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT DNSCrypt | Some[^1] | No | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardDNS) |
+| [**Cloudflare**](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/setting-up-1.1.1.1/) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT | Some[^2] | No | Based on server choice. |
+| [**Control D**](https://controld.com/free-dns) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://controld.com/privacy) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT DoQ | Optional[^3] | No | Based on server choice. |
+| [**Mullvad**](https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/) | DoH DoT | No[^4] | No | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/mullvad/dns-adblock) |
+| [**NextDNS**](https://www.nextdns.io) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://www.nextdns.io/privacy) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT | Optional[^5] | Optional | Based on server choice. |
+| [**Quad9**](https://quad9.net) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://quad9.net/privacy/policy/) | Cleartext DoH DoT DNSCrypt | Some[^6] | Optional | Based on server choice, Malware blocking by default. |
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must support [DNSSEC](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-dnssec).
+- [QNAME Minimization](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-qname-minimization).
+- Allow for [ECS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-edns-client-subnet-ecs) to be disabled.
+- Prefer [anycast](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anycast#Addressing_methods) support or geo-steering support.
+
+## Native Operating System Support
+
+### Android
+
+Android 9 and above support DNS over TLS. The settings can be found in: **Settings** → **Network & Internet** → **Private DNS**.
+
+### Apple Devices
+
+The latest versions of iOS, iPadOS, tvOS, and macOS, support both DoT and DoH. Both protocols are supported natively via [configuration profiles](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/configuration-profile-enforcement-secf6fb9f053/web) or through the [DNS Settings API](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/networkextension/dns_settings).
+
+After installation of either a configuration profile or an app that uses the DNS Settings API, the DNS configuration can be selected. If a VPN is active, resolution within the VPN tunnel will use the VPN's DNS settings and not your system-wide settings.
+
+#### Signed Profiles
+
+Apple does not provide a native interface for creating encrypted DNS profiles. [Secure DNS profile creator](https://dns.notjakob.com/tool.html) is an unofficial tool for creating your own encrypted DNS profiles, however they will not be signed. Signed profiles are preferred; signing validates a profile's origin and helps to ensure the integrity of the profiles. A green "Verified" label is given to signed configuration profiles. For more information on code signing, see [About Code Signing](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/CodeSigningGuide/Introduction/Introduction.html). **Signed profiles** are offered by [AdGuard](https://adguard.com/en/blog/encrypted-dns-ios-14.html), [NextDNS](https://apple.nextdns.io), and [Quad9](https://www.quad9.net/news/blog/ios-mobile-provisioning-profiles/).
+
+!!! info
+
+ `systemd-resolved`, which many Linux distributions use to do their DNS lookups, doesn't yet [support DoH](https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/8639). If you want to use DoH, you'll need to install a proxy like [dnscrypt-proxy](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy) and [configure it](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dnscrypt-proxy) to take all the DNS queries from your system resolver and forward them over HTTPS.
+
+## Encrypted DNS Proxies
+
+Encrypted DNS proxy software provides a local proxy for the [unencrypted DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md#unencrypted-dns) resolver to forward to. Typically it is used on platforms that don't natively support [encrypted DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns).
+
+### RethinkDNS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **RethinkDNS** is an open-source Android client supporting [DNS-over-HTTPS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), [DNS-over-TLS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-tls-dot), [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt) and DNS Proxy along with caching DNS responses, locally logging DNS queries and can be used as a firewall too.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://rethinkdns.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://rethinkdns.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.rethinkdns.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/celzero/rethink-app){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.celzero.bravedns)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/celzero/rethink-app/releases)
+
+### dnscrypt-proxy
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **dnscrypt-proxy** is a DNS proxy with support for [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt), [DNS-over-HTTPS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), and [Anonymized DNS](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Anonymized-DNS).
+
+ !!! warning "The anonymized DNS feature does [**not**](advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns) anonymize other network traffic."
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/dnscrypt/contribute){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Installation-Windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Installation-macOS)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Installation-linux)
+
+## Self-hosted Solutions
+
+A self-hosted DNS solution is useful for providing filtering on controlled platforms, such as Smart TVs and other IoT devices, as no client-side software is needed.
+
+### AdGuard Home
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **AdGuard Home** is an open-source [DNS-sinkhole](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_sinkhole) which uses [DNS filtering](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/access-management/what-is-dns-filtering/) to block unwanted web content, such as advertisements.
+
+ AdGuard Home features a polished web interface to view insights and manage blocked content.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://adguard.com/adguard-home/overview.html){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://adguard.com/privacy/home.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+### Pi-hole
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Pi-hole** is an open-source [DNS-sinkhole](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_sinkhole) which uses [DNS filtering](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/access-management/what-is-dns-filtering/) to block unwanted web content, such as advertisements.
+
+ Pi-hole is designed to be hosted on a Raspberry Pi, but it is not limited to such hardware. The software features a friendly web interface to view insights and manage blocked content.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://pi-hole.net/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://pi-hole.net/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.pi-hole.net/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/pi-hole/pi-hole){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://pi-hole.net/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
+
+[^1]: AdGuard stores aggregated performance metrics of their DNS servers, namely the number of complete requests to a particular server, the number of blocked requests, and the speed of processing requests. They also keep and store the database of domains requested in within last 24 hours. "We need this information to identify and block new trackers and threats." "We also log how many times this or that tracker has been blocked. We need this information to remove outdated rules from our filters." [https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html](https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html)
+[^2]: Cloudflare collects and stores only the limited DNS query data that is sent to the 1.1.1.1 resolver. The 1.1.1.1 resolver service does not log personal data, and the bulk of the limited non-personally identifiable query data is stored only for 25 hours. [https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/)
+[^3]: Control D only logs for Premium resolvers with custom DNS profiles. Free resolvers do not log data. [https://controld.com/privacy](https://controld.com/privacy)
+[^4]: Mullvad's DNS service is available to both subscribers and non-subscribers of Mullvad VPN. Their privacy policy explicitly claims they do not log DNS requests in any way. [https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/](https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/)
+[^5]: NextDNS can provide insights and logging features on an opt-in basis. You can choose retention times and log storage locations for any logs you choose to keep. If it's not specifically requested, no data is logged. [https://nextdns.io/privacy](https://nextdns.io/privacy)
+[^6]: Quad9 collects some data for the purposes of threat monitoring and response. That data may then be remixed and shared, such as for the purpose of security research. Quad9 does not collect or record IP addresses or other data they deem personally identifiable. [https://www.quad9.net/privacy/policy/](https://www.quad9.net/privacy/policy/)
diff --git a/i18n/ar/email-clients.md b/i18n/ar/email-clients.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ba6792886
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/email-clients.md
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+---
+title: "Email Clients"
+icon: material/email-open
+---
+
+Our recommendation list contains email clients that support both [OpenPGP](encryption.md#openpgp) and strong authentication such as [Open Authorization (OAuth)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth). OAuth allows you to use [Multi-Factor Authentication](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md) and prevent account theft.
+
+??? warning "Email does not provide forward secrecy"
+
+ When using end-to-end encryption (E2EE) technology like OpenPGP, email will still have [some metadata](email.md#email-metadata-overview) that is not encrypted in the header of the email.
+
+ OpenPGP also does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed: [How do I protect my private keys?](basics/email-security.md) Consider using a medium that provides forward secrecy:
+
+ [Real-time Communication](real-time-communication.md){ .md-button }
+
+## Cross-Platform
+
+### Thunderbird
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Thunderbird** is a free, open-source, cross-platform email, newsgroup, news feed, and chat (XMPP, IRC, Twitter) client developed by the Thunderbird community, and previously by the Mozilla Foundation.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.thunderbird.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mozilla.org/privacy/thunderbird){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.mozilla.org/products/thunderbird){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://hg.mozilla.org/comm-central){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.thunderbird.net)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.thunderbird.net)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.thunderbird.net)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.mozilla.Thunderbird)
+
+#### Recommended Configuration
+
+We recommend changing some of these settings to make Thunderbird a little more private.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Privacy & Security**.
+
+##### Web Content
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Remember websites and links I've visited**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Accept cookies from sites**
+
+##### Telemetry
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Thunderbird to send technical and interaction data to Mozilla**
+
+#### Thunderbird-user.js (advanced)
+
+[`thunderbird-user.js`](https://github.com/HorlogeSkynet/thunderbird-user.js), is a set of configurations options that aims to disable as many of the web-browsing features within Thunderbird as possible in order to reduce surface area and maintain privacy. Some of the changes are backported from the [Arkenfox project](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js).
+
+## Platform Specific
+
+### Apple Mail (macOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Apple Mail** is included in macOS and can be extended to have OpenPGP support with [GPG Suite](encryption.md#gpg-suite), which adds the ability to send PGP-encrypted email.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/welcome/mac){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/toc){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+### Canary Mail (iOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Canary Mail** is a paid email client designed to make end-to-end encryption seamless with security features such as a biometric app lock.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://canarymail.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://canarymail.io/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://canarymail.zendesk.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.canarymail.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1236045954)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://canarymail.io/downloads.html)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Canary Mail only recently released a Windows and Android client, though we don't believe they are as stable as their iOS and Mac counterparts.
+
+Canary Mail is closed-source. We recommend it due to the few choices there are for email clients on iOS that support PGP E2EE.
+
+### FairEmail (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FairEmail** is a minimal, open-source email app, using open standards (IMAP, SMTP, OpenPGP) with a low data and battery usage.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://email.faircode.eu){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/blob/master/PRIVACY.md){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/blob/master/FAQ.md){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://email.faircode.eu/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=eu.faircode.email)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/releases)
+
+### GNOME Evolution (GNOME)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Evolution** is a personal information management application that provides integrated mail, calendaring and address book functionality. Evolution has extensive [documentation](https://help.gnome.org/users/evolution/stable/) to help you get started.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Evolution){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Evolution/PrivacyPolicy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://help.gnome.org/users/evolution/stable/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.gnome.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.gnome.Evolution)
+
+### K-9 Mail (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **K-9 Mail** is an independent mail application that supports both POP3 and IMAP mailboxes, but only supports push mail for IMAP.
+
+ In the future, K-9 Mail will be the [officially branded](https://k9mail.app/2022/06/13/K-9-Mail-and-Thunderbird.html) Thunderbird client for Android.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://k9mail.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://k9mail.app/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.k9mail.app/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/k9mail/k-9){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://k9mail.app/contribute){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.fsck.k9)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/k9mail/k-9/releases)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When replying to someone on a mailing list the "reply" option may also include the mailing list. For more information see [thundernest/k-9 #3738](https://github.com/thundernest/k-9/issues/3738).
+
+### Kontact (KDE)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Kontact** is a personal information manager (PIM) application from the [KDE](https://kde.org) project. It provides a mail client, address book, organizer and RSS client.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://kontact.kde.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://kde.org/privacypolicy-apps){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://kontact.kde.org/users/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://invent.kde.org/pim/kmail){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://kde.org/community/donations/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://kontact.kde.org/download)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.kde.kontact)
+
+### Mailvelope (Browser)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mailvelope** is a browser extension that enables the exchange of encrypted emails following the OpenPGP encryption standard.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.mailvelope.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mailvelope.com/en/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mailvelope.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailvelope/mailvelope){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/mailvelope)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/mailvelope/kajibbejlbohfaggdiogboambcijhkke)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/mailvelope/dgcbddhdhjppfdfjpciagmmibadmoapc)
+
+### NeoMutt (CLI)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **NeoMutt** is an open-source command line mail reader (or MUA) for Linux and BSD. It's a fork of [Mutt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutt_(email_client)) with added features.
+
+ NeoMutt is a text-based client that has a steep learning curve. It is however, very customizable.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://neomutt.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://neomutt.org/guide/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/russon/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://neomutt.org/distro)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://neomutt.org/distro)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Qualifications
+
+- Apps developed for open-source operating systems must be open-source.
+- Must not collect telemetry, or have an easy way to disable all telemetry.
+- Must support OpenPGP message encryption.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should be open-source.
+- Should be cross-platform.
+- Should not collect any telemetry by default.
+- Should support OpenPGP natively, i.e. without extensions.
+- Should support storing OpenPGP encrypted emails locally.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/email.md b/i18n/ar/email.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..08cd55fb6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/email.md
@@ -0,0 +1,485 @@
+---
+title: "Email Services"
+icon: material/email
+---
+
+Email is practically a necessity for using any online service, however we do not recommend it for person-to-person conversations. Rather than using email to contact other people, consider using an instant messaging medium that supports forward secrecy.
+
+[Recommended Instant Messengers](real-time-communication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+For everything else, we recommend a variety of email providers based on sustainable business models and built-in security and privacy features.
+
+## OpenPGP Compatible Services
+
+These providers natively support OpenPGP encryption/decryption, allowing for provider-agnostic E2EE emails. For example, a Proton Mail user could send an E2EE message to a Mailbox.org user, or you could receive OpenPGP-encrypted notifications from internet services which support it.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using E2EE technology like OpenPGP, email will still have some metadata that is not encrypted in the header of the email. Read more about [email metadata](basics/email-security.md#email-metadata-overview).
+
+ OpenPGP also does not support Forward secrecy, which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. [How do I protect my private keys?](basics/email-security.md#how-do-i-protect-my-private-keys)
+
+### Proton Mail
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton Mail** is an email service with a focus on privacy, encryption, security, and ease of use. They have been in operation since **2013**. Proton AG is based in Genève, Switzerland. Accounts start with 500 MB storage with their free plan.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/mail){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://protonmailrmez3lotccipshtkleegetolb73fuirgj7r4o4vfu7ozyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/mail){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonmail.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id979659905)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonMail/proton-mail-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.proton.me)
+
+Free accounts have some limitations, such as not being able to search body text and not having access to [Proton Mail Bridge](https://proton.me/mail/bridge), which is required to use a [recommended desktop email client](email-clients.md) (e.g. Thunderbird). Paid accounts include features like Proton Mail Bridge, additional storage, and custom domain support. A [letter of attestation](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps) was provided for Proton Mail's apps on 9th November 2021 by [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com).
+
+If you have the Proton Unlimited, Business, or Visionary Plan, you also get [SimpleLogin](#simplelogin) Premium for free.
+
+Proton Mail has internal crash reports that they **do not** share with third parties. This can be disabled in: **Settings** > **Go to Settings** > **Account** > **Security and privacy** > **Send crash reports**.
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Paid Proton Mail subscribers can use their own domain with the service or a [catch-all](https://proton.me/support/catch-all) address. Proton Mail also supports [subaddressing](https://proton.me/support/creating-aliases), which is useful for people who don't want to purchase a domain.
+
+??? success "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ Proton Mail [accepts](https://proton.me/support/payment-options) Bitcoin and cash by mail in addition to standard credit/debit card and PayPal payments.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ Proton Mail supports TOTP [two factor authentication](https://proton.me/support/two-factor-authentication-2fa) only. The use of a U2F security key is not yet supported. Proton Mail is planning to implement U2F upon completion of their [Single Sign On (SSO)](https://reddit.com/comments/cheoy6/comment/feh2lw0/) code.
+
+??? success "Data Security"
+
+ Proton Mail has [zero-access encryption](https://proton.me/blog/zero-access-encryption) at rest for your emails and [calendars](https://proton.me/news/protoncalendar-security-model). Data secured with zero-access encryption is only accessible by you.
+
+ Certain information stored in [Proton Contacts](https://proton.me/support/proton-contacts), such as display names and email addresses, are not secured with zero-access encryption. Contact fields that support zero-access encryption, such as phone numbers, are indicated with a padlock icon.
+
+??? success "Email Encryption"
+
+ Proton Mail has [integrated OpenPGP encryption](https://proton.me/support/how-to-use-pgp) in their webmail. Emails to other Proton Mail accounts are encrypted automatically, and encryption to non-Proton Mail addresses with an OpenPGP key can be enabled easily in your account settings. They also allow you to [encrypt messages to non-Proton Mail addresses](https://proton.me/support/password-protected-emails) without the need for them to sign up for a Proton Mail account or use software like OpenPGP.
+
+ Proton Mail also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This allows people who don't use Proton Mail to find the OpenPGP keys of Proton Mail accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE.
+
+??? warning "Digital Legacy"
+
+ Proton Mail doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ If you have a paid account and your [bill is unpaid](https://proton.me/support/delinquency) after 14 days, you won't be able to access your data. After 30 days, your account will become delinquent and won't receive incoming mail. You will continue to be billed during this period.
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ Proton Mail offers an "Unlimited" account for €9.99/Month, which also enables access to Proton VPN in addition to providing multiple accounts, domains, aliases, and 500GB of storage.
+
+### Mailbox.org
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mailbox.org** is an email service with a focus on being secure, ad-free, and privately powered by 100% eco-friendly energy. They have been in operation since 2014. Mailbox.org is based in Berlin, Germany. Accounts start with 2 GB of storage, which can be upgraded as needed.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailbox.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://mailbox.org/en/data-protection-privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://login.mailbox.org)
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Mailbox.org lets you use your own domain, and they support [catch-all](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Using+catch-all+alias+with+own+domain) addresses. Mailbox.org also supports [subaddressing](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/BMBOKBEN/What+is+an+alias+and+how+do+I+use+it), which is useful if you don't want to purchase a domain.
+
+??? info "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ Mailbox.org doesn't accept Bitcoin or any other cryptocurrencies as a result of their payment processor BitPay suspending operations in Germany. However, they do accept Cash by mail, cash payment to bank account, bank transfer, credit card, PayPal and couple of German-specific processors: paydirekt and Sofortüberweisung.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ Mailbox.org supports [two factor authentication](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/How+to+use+two-factor+authentication+-+2FA) for their webmail only. You can use either TOTP or a [Yubikey](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YubiKey) via the [Yubicloud](https://www.yubico.com/products/services-software/yubicloud). Web standards such as [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn) are not yet supported.
+
+??? info "Data Security"
+
+ Mailbox.org allows for encryption of incoming mail using their [encrypted mailbox](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/The+Encrypted+Mailbox). New messages that you receive will then be immediately encrypted with your public key.
+
+ However, [Open-Exchange](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-Xchange), the software platform used by Mailbox.org, [does not support](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/BMBOKBEN/Encryption+of+calendar+and+address+book) the encryption of your address book and calendar. A [standalone option](calendar.md) may be more appropriate for that information.
+
+??? success "Email Encryption"
+
+ Mailbox.org has [integrated encryption](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Send+encrypted+e-mails+with+Guard) in their webmail, which simplifies sending messages to people with public OpenPGP keys. They also allow [remote recipients to decrypt an email](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/My+recipient+does+not+use+PGP) on Mailbox.org's servers. This feature is useful when the remote recipient does not have OpenPGP and cannot decrypt a copy of the email in their own mailbox.
+
+ Mailbox.org also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This allows people outside of Mailbox.org to find the OpenPGP keys of Mailbox.org accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE.
+
+??? success "Digital Legacy"
+
+ Mailbox.org has a digital legacy feature for all plans. You can choose whether you want any of your data to be passed to heirs providing that they apply and provide your testament. Alternatively, you can nominate a person by name and address.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ Your account will be set to a restricted user account when your contract ends, after [30 days it will be irrevocably deleted](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/payment-article/what-happens-at-the-end-of-my-contract).
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ You can access your Mailbox.org account via IMAP/SMTP using their [.onion service](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/The+Tor+exit+node+of+mailbox.org). However, their webmail interface cannot be accessed via their .onion service and you may experience TLS certificate errors.
+
+ All accounts come with limited cloud storage that [can be encrypted](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Encrypt+files+on+your+Drive). Mailbox.org also offers the alias [@secure.mailbox.org](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Ensuring+E-Mails+are+Sent+Securely), which enforces the TLS encryption on the connection between mail servers, otherwise the message will not be sent at all. Mailbox.org also supports [Exchange ActiveSync](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exchange_ActiveSync) in addition to standard access protocols like IMAP and POP3.
+
+### StartMail
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **StartMail** is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of standard OpenPGP encryption. StartMail has been in operation since 2014 and is based in Boulevard 11, Zeist Netherlands. Accounts start with 10GB. They offer a 30-day trial.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.startmail.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.startmail.com/en/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.startmail.com){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.startmail.com/login)
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Personal accounts can use [Custom or Quick](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360007297457-Aliases) aliases. [Custom domains](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/4403911432209-Setup-a-custom-domain) are also available.
+
+??? warning "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ StartMail accepts Visa, MasterCard, American Express and Paypal. StartMail also has other [payment options](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006620637-Payment-methods) such as Bitcoin (currently only for Personal accounts) and SEPA Direct Debit for accounts older than a year.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ StartMail supports TOTP two factor authentication [for webmail only](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006682158-Two-factor-authentication-2FA). They do not allow U2F security key authentication.
+
+??? info "Data Security"
+
+ StartMail has [zero access encryption at rest](https://www.startmail.com/en/whitepaper/#_Toc458527835), using their "user vault" system. When you log in, the vault is opened, and the email is then moved to the vault out of the queue where it is decrypted by the corresponding private key.
+
+ StartMail supports importing [contacts](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006495557-Import-contacts) however, they are only accessible in the webmail and not through protocols such as [CalDAV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CalDAV). Contacts are also not stored using zero knowledge encryption.
+
+??? success "Email Encryption"
+
+ StartMail has [integrated encryption](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/sections/360001889078-Encryption) in their webmail, which simplifies sending encrypted messages with public OpenPGP keys.
+
+??? warning "Digital Legacy"
+
+ StartMail does not offer a digital legacy feature.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ On account expiration, StartMail will permanently delete your account after [6 months in 3 phases](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006794398-Account-expiration).
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ StartMail allows for proxying of images within emails. If you allow the remote image to be loaded, the sender won't know what your IP address is.
+
+## More Providers
+
+These providers store your emails with zero-knowledge encryption, making them great options for keeping your stored emails secure. However, they don't support interoperable encryption standards for E2EE communications between providers.
+
+### Tutanota
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tutanota** is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of encryption. Tutanota has been in operation since **2011** and is based in Hanover, Germany. Accounts start with 1GB storage with their free plan.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tutanota.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tutanota.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tutanota.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tutanota.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/tutanota/id922429609)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.tutanota.com/)
+
+Tutanota doesn't support the [IMAP protocol](https://tutanota.com/faq/#imap) or the use of third-party [email clients](email-clients.md), and you also won't be able to add [external email accounts](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/544#issuecomment-670473647) to the Tutanota app. Neither [Email import](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/630) or [subfolders](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/927) are currently supported, though this is [due to be changed](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/kickoff-import). Emails can be exported [individually or by bulk selection](https://tutanota.com/howto#generalMail) per folder, which may be inconvenient if you have many folders.
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Paid Tutanota accounts can use up to 5 [aliases](https://tutanota.com/faq#alias) and [custom domains](https://tutanota.com/faq#custom-domain). Tutanota doesn't allow for [subaddressing (plus addresses)](https://tutanota.com/faq#plus), but you can use a [catch-all](https://tutanota.com/howto#settings-global) with a custom domain.
+
+??? warning "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ Tutanota only directly accepts credit cards and PayPal, however Bitcoin and Monero can be used to purchase gift cards via their [partnership](https://tutanota.com/faq/#cryptocurrency) with Proxystore.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ Tutanota supports [two factor authentication](https://tutanota.com/faq#2fa) with either TOTP or U2F.
+
+??? success "Data Security"
+
+ Tutanota has [zero access encryption at rest](https://tutanota.com/faq#what-encrypted) for your emails, [address book contacts](https://tutanota.com/faq#encrypted-address-book), and [calendars](https://tutanota.com/faq#calendar). This means the messages and other data stored in your account are only readable by you.
+
+??? warning "Email Encryption"
+
+ Tutanota [does not use OpenPGP](https://www.tutanota.com/faq/#pgp). Tutanota accounts can only receive encrypted emails from non-Tutanota email accounts when sent via a [temporary Tutanota mailbox](https://www.tutanota.com/howto/#encrypted-email-external).
+
+??? warning "Digital Legacy"
+
+ Tutanota doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ Tutanota will [delete inactive free accounts](https://tutanota.com/faq#inactive-accounts) after six months. You can reuse a deactivated free account if you pay.
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ Tutanota offers the business version of [Tutanota to non-profit organizations](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/secure-email-for-non-profit) for free or with a heavy discount.
+
+ Tutanota also has a business feature called [Secure Connect](https://tutanota.com/secure-connect/). This ensures customer contact to the business uses E2EE. The feature costs €240/y.
+
+## Email Aliasing Services
+
+An email aliasing service allows you to easily generate a new email address for every website you register for. The email aliases you generate are then forwarded to an email address of your choosing, hiding both your "main" email address and the identity of your email provider. True email aliasing is better than plus addressing commonly used and supported by many providers, which allows you to create aliases like yourname+[anythinghere]@example.com, because websites, advertisers, and tracking networks can trivially remove anything after the + sign to know your true email address.
+
+Email aliasing can act as a safeguard in case your email provider ever ceases operation. In that scenario, you can easily re-route your aliases to a new email address. In turn, however, you are placing trust in the aliasing service to continue functioning.
+
+Using a dedicated email aliasing service also has a number of benefits over a catch-all alias on a custom domain:
+
+- Aliases can be turned on and off individually when you need them, preventing websites from emailing you randomly.
+- Replies are sent from the alias address, shielding your real email address.
+
+They also have a number of benefits over "temporary email" services:
+
+- Aliases are permanent and can be turned on again if you need to receive something like a password reset.
+- Emails are sent to your trusted mailbox rather than stored by the alias provider.
+- Temporary email services typically have public mailboxes which can be accessed by anyone who knows the address, aliases are private to you.
+
+Our email aliasing recommendations are providers that allow you to create aliases on domains they control, as well as your own custom domain(s) for a modest yearly fee. They can also be self-hosted if you want maximum control. However, using a custom domain can have privacy-related drawbacks: If you are the only person using your custom domain, your actions can be easily tracked across websites simply by looking at the domain name in the email address and ignoring everything before the at (@) sign.
+
+Using an aliasing service requires trusting both your email provider and your aliasing provider with your unencrypted messages. Some providers mitigate this slightly with automatic PGP encryption, which reduces the number of parties you need to trust from two to one by encrypting incoming emails before they are delivered to your final mailbox provider.
+
+### AnonAddy
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **AnonAddy** lets you create 20 domain aliases on a shared domain for free, or unlimited "standard" aliases which are less anonymous.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://anonaddy.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://anonaddy.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://app.anonaddy.com/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/anonaddy){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://anonaddy.com/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://anonaddy.com/faq/#is-there-an-android-app)
+ - [:material-apple-ios: iOS](https://anonaddy.com/faq/#is-there-an-ios-app)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-GB/firefox/addon/anonaddy/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/anonaddy-anonymous-email/iadbdpnoknmbdeolbapdackdcogdmjpe)
+
+The number of shared aliases (which end in a shared domain like @anonaddy.me) that you can create is limited to 20 on AnonAddy's free plan and 50 on their $12/year plan. You can create unlimited standard aliases (which end in a domain like @[username].anonaddy.com or a custom domain on paid plans), however, as previously mentioned, this can be detrimental to privacy because people can trivially tie your standard aliases together based on the domain name alone. Unlimited shared aliases are available for $36/year.
+
+Notable free features:
+
+- [x] 20 Shared Aliases
+- [x] Unlimited Standard Aliases
+- [ ] No Outgoing Replies
+- [x] 2 Recipient Mailboxes
+- [x] Automatic PGP Encryption
+
+### SimpleLogin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **SimpleLogin** is a free service which provides email aliases on a variety of shared domain names, and optionally provides paid features like unlimited aliases and custom domains.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://simplelogin.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://simplelogin.io/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://simplelogin.io/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simple-login){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.simplelogin.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1494359858)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/simple-login/Simple-Login-Android/releases)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/simplelogin/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/dphilobhebphkdjbpfohgikllaljmgbn)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/simpleloginreceive-sen/diacfpipniklenphgljfkmhinphjlfff)
+ - [:simple-safari: Safari](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1494051017)
+
+SimpleLogin was [acquired by Proton AG](https://proton.me/news/proton-and-simplelogin-join-forces) as of April 8, 2022. If you use Proton Mail for your primary mailbox, SimpleLogin is a great choice. As both products are now owned by the same company you now only have to trust a single entity. We also expect that SimpleLogin will be more tightly integrated with Proton's offerings in the future. SimpleLogin continues to support forwarding to any email provider of your choosing. Securitum [audited](https://simplelogin.io/blog/security-audit/) SimpleLogin in early 2022 and all issues [were addressed](https://simplelogin.io/audit2022/web.pdf).
+
+You can link your SimpleLogin account in the settings with your Proton account. If you have the Proton Unlimited, Business, or Visionary Plan, you will have SimpleLogin Premium for free.
+
+Notable free features:
+
+- [x] 10 Shared Aliases
+- [x] Unlimited Replies
+- [x] 1 Recipient Mailbox
+
+## Self-Hosting Email
+
+Advanced system administrators may consider setting up their own email server. Mail servers require attention and continuous maintenance in order to keep things secure and mail delivery reliable.
+
+### Combined software solutions
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mailcow** is a more advanced mail server perfect for those with a bit more Linux experience. It has everything you need in a Docker container: A mail server with DKIM support, antivirus and spam monitoring, webmail and ActiveSync with SOGo, and web-based administration with 2FA support.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailcow.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mailcow.github.io/mailcow-dockerized-docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailcow/mailcow-dockerized){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.servercow.de/mailcow?lang=en#sal){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mail-in-a-Box** is an automated setup script for deploying a mail server on Ubuntu. Its goal is to make it easier for people to set up their own mail server.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailinabox.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mailinabox.email/guide.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mail-in-a-box/mailinabox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+For a more manual approach we've picked out these two articles:
+
+- [Setting up a mail server with OpenSMTPD, Dovecot and Rspamd](https://poolp.org/posts/2019-09-14/setting-up-a-mail-server-with-opensmtpd-dovecot-and-rspamd/) (2019)
+- [How To Run Your Own Mail Server](https://www.c0ffee.net/blog/mail-server-guide/) (August 2017)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the providers we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements for any Email provider wishing to be recommended, including implementing industry best practices, modern technology and more. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing an Email provider, and conduct your own research to ensure the Email provider you choose is the right choice for you.
+
+### Technology
+
+We regard these features as important in order to provide a safe and optimal service. You should consider whether the provider which has the features you require.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Encrypts email account data at rest with zero-access encryption.
+- Export capability as [Mbox](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mbox) or individual .eml with [RFC5322](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5322/) standard.
+- Allow users to use their own [domain name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name). Custom domain names are important to users because it allows them to maintain their agency from the service, should it turn bad or be acquired by another company which doesn't prioritize privacy.
+- Operates on owned infrastructure, i.e. not built upon third-party email service providers.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Encrypts all account data (Contacts, Calendars, etc) at rest with zero-access encryption.
+- Integrated webmail E2EE/PGP encryption provided as a convenience.
+- Support for [WKD](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD) to allow improved discovery of public OpenPGP keys via HTTP. GnuPG users can get a key by typing: `gpg --locate-key example_user@example.com`
+- Support for a temporary mailbox for external users. This is useful when you want to send an encrypted email, without sending an actual copy to your recipient. These emails usually have a limited lifespan and then are automatically deleted. They also don't require the recipient to configure any cryptography like OpenPGP.
+- Availability of the email provider's services via an [onion service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.onion).
+- [Subaddressing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email_address#Subaddressing) support.
+- Catch-all or alias functionality for those who own their own domains.
+- Use of standard email access protocols such as IMAP, SMTP or [JMAP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Meta_Application_Protocol). Standard access protocols ensure customers can easily download all of their email, should they want to switch to another provider.
+
+### Privacy
+
+We prefer our recommended providers to collect as little data as possible.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Protect sender's IP address. Filter it from showing in the `Received` header field.
+- Don't require personally identifiable information (PII) besides a username and a password.
+- Privacy policy that meets the requirements defined by the GDPR
+- Must not be hosted in the US due to [ECPA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_Communications_Privacy_Act#Criticism) which has [yet to be reformed](https://epic.org/ecpa/).
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Accepts Bitcoin, cash, and other forms of cryptocurrency and/or anonymous payment options (gift cards, etc.)
+
+### Security
+
+Email servers deal with a lot of very sensitive data. We expect that providers will adopt best industry practices in order to protect their members.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Protection of webmail with 2FA, such as TOTP.
+- Zero access encryption, builds on encryption at rest. The provider does not have the decryption keys to the data they hold. This prevents a rogue employee leaking data they have access to or remote adversary from releasing data they have stolen by gaining unauthorized access to the server.
+- [DNSSEC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Extensions) support.
+- No TLS errors or vulnerabilities when being profiled by tools such as [Hardenize](https://www.hardenize.com/), [testssl.sh](https://testssl.sh/), or [Qualys SSL Labs](https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest); this includes certificate related errors and weak DH parameters, such as those that led to [Logjam](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logjam_(computer_security)).
+- A server suite preference (optional on TLSv1.3) for strong cipher suites which support forward secrecy and authenticated encryption.
+- A valid [MTA-STS](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8461) and [TLS-RPT](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8460) policy.
+- Valid [DANE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS-based_Authentication_of_Named_Entities) records.
+- Valid [SPF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sender_Policy_Framework) and [DKIM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DomainKeys_Identified_Mail) records.
+- Have a proper [DMARC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DMARC) record and policy or use [ARC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain) for authentication. If DMARC authentication is being used, the policy must be set to `reject` or `quarantine`.
+- A server suite preference of TLS 1.2 or later and a plan for [Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate/).
+- [SMTPS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SMTPS) submission, assuming SMTP is used.
+- Website security standards such as:
+ - [HTTP Strict Transport Security](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security)
+ - [Subresource Integrity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subresource_Integrity) if loading things from external domains.
+- Must support viewing of [Message headers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header), as it is a crucial forensic feature to determine if an email is a phishing attempt.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Support for hardware authentication, i.e. U2F and [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn). U2F and WebAuthn are more secure as they use a private key stored on a client-side hardware device to authenticate people, as opposed to a shared secret that is stored on the web server and on the client side when using TOTP. Furthermore, U2F and WebAuthn are more resistant to phishing as their authentication response is based on the authenticated [domain name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name).
+- [DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844) in addition to DANE support.
+- Implementation of [Authenticated Received Chain (ARC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain), this is useful for people who post to mailing lists [RFC8617](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8617).
+- Bug-bounty programs and/or a coordinated vulnerability-disclosure process.
+- Website security standards such as:
+ - [Content Security Policy (CSP)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy)
+ - [Expect-CT](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-expect-ct)
+
+### Trust
+
+You wouldn't trust your finances to someone with a fake identity, so why trust them with your email? We require our recommended providers to be public about their ownership or leadership. We also would like to see frequent transparency reports, especially in regard to how government requests are handled.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership or ownership.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership.
+- Frequent transparency reports.
+
+### Marketing
+
+With the email providers we recommend we like to see responsible marketing.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Must self-host analytics (no Google Analytics, Adobe Analytics, etc). The provider's site must also comply with [DNT (Do Not Track)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Do_Not_Track) for those who wish to opt-out.
+
+Must not have any marketing which is irresponsible:
+
+- Claims of "unbreakable encryption." Encryption should be used with the intention that it may not be secret in the future when the technology exists to crack it.
+- Making guarantees of protecting anonymity 100%. When someone makes a claim that something is 100% it means there is no certainty for failure. We know people can quite easily deanonymize themselves in a number of ways, e.g.:
+
+- Reusing personal information e.g. (email accounts, unique pseudonyms, etc) that they accessed without anonymity software (Tor, VPN, etc)
+- [Browser fingerprinting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint)
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Clear and easy to read documentation. This includes things like, setting up 2FA, email clients, OpenPGP, etc.
+
+### Additional Functionality
+
+While not strictly requirements, there are some other convenience or privacy factors we looked into when determining which providers to recommend.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/encryption.md b/i18n/ar/encryption.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..92179831d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/encryption.md
@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
+---
+title: "Encryption Software"
+icon: material/file-lock
+---
+
+Encryption of data is the only way to control who can access it. If you are currently not using encryption software for your hard disk, emails or files, you should pick an option here.
+
+## Multi-platform
+
+The options listed here are multi-platform and great for creating encrypted backups of your data.
+
+### Cryptomator (Cloud)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Cryptomator** is an encryption solution designed for privately saving files to any cloud provider. It allows you to create vaults that are stored on a virtual drive, the contents of which are encrypted and synced with your cloud storage provider.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://cryptomator.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://cryptomator.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.cryptomator.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/cryptomator){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://cryptomator.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.cryptomator)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/cryptomator-2/id1560822163)
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://cryptomator.org/android)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.cryptomator.Cryptomator)
+
+Cryptomator uses AES-256 encryption to encrypt both files and filenames. Cryptomator cannot encrypt metadata such as access, modification, and creation timestamps, nor the number and size of files and folders.
+
+Some Cryptomator cryptographic libraries have been [audited](https://community.cryptomator.org/t/has-there-been-a-security-review-audit-of-cryptomator/44) by Cure53. The scope of the audited libraries includes: [cryptolib](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptolib), [cryptofs](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptofs), [siv-mode](https://github.com/cryptomator/siv-mode) and [cryptomator-objc-cryptor](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptomator-objc-cryptor). The audit did not extend to [cryptolib-swift](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptolib-swift), which is a library used by Cryptomator for iOS.
+
+Cryptomator's documentation details its intended [security target](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/security-target/), [security architecture](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/architecture/), and [best practices](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/best-practices/) for use in further detail.
+
+### Picocrypt (File)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Picocrypt** is a small and simple encryption tool that provides modern encryption. Picocrypt uses the secure XChaCha20 cipher and the Argon2id key derivation function to provide a high level of security. It uses Go's standard x/crypto modules for its encryption features.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/picocrypt){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases)
+
+### VeraCrypt (Disk)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **VeraCrypt** is a source-available freeware utility used for on-the-fly encryption. It can create a virtual encrypted disk within a file, encrypt a partition, or encrypt the entire storage device with pre-boot authentication.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://veracrypt.fr){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/en/Documentation.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/code/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/en/Donation.html){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html)
+
+VeraCrypt is a fork of the discontinued TrueCrypt project. According to its developers, security improvements have been implemented and issues raised by the initial TrueCrypt code audit have been addressed.
+
+When encrypting with VeraCrypt, you have the option to select from different [hash functions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt#Encryption_scheme). We suggest you **only** select [SHA-512](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-512) and stick to the [AES](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard) block cipher.
+
+Truecrypt has been [audited a number of times](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TrueCrypt#Security_audits), and VeraCrypt has also been [audited separately](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt#VeraCrypt_audit).
+
+## OS Full Disk Encryption
+
+Modern operating systems include [FDE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_encryption) and will have a [secure cryptoprocessor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_cryptoprocessor).
+
+### BitLocker
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **BitLocker** is the full volume encryption solution bundled with Microsoft Windows. The main reason we recommend it is because of its [use of TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). [ElcomSoft](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ElcomSoft), a forensics company, has written about it in [Understanding BitLocker TPM Protection](https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2021/01/understanding-BitLocker-tpm-protection/).
+
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/BitLocker/BitLocker-overview){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+BitLocker is [only supported](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/turn-on-device-encryption-0c453637-bc88-5f74-5105-741561aae838) on Pro, Enterprise and Education editions of Windows. It can be enabled on Home editions provided that they meet the prerequisites.
+
+??? example "Enabling BitLocker on Windows Home"
+
+ To enable BitLocker on "Home" editions of Windows, you must have partitions formatted with a [GUID Partition Table](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GUID_Partition_Table) and have a dedicated TPM (v1.2, 2.0+) module.
+
+ 1. Open a command prompt and check your drive's partition table format with the following command. You should see "**GPT**" listed under "Partition Style":
+
+ ```
+ powershell Get-Disk
+ ```
+
+ 2. Run this command (in an admin command prompt) to check your TPM version. You should see `2.0` or `1.2` listed next to `SpecVersion`:
+
+ ```
+ powershell Get-WmiObject -Namespace "root/cimv2/security/microsofttpm" -Class WIN32_tpm
+ ```
+
+ 3. Access [Advanced Startup Options](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/advanced-startup-options-including-safe-mode-b90e7808-80b5-a291-d4b8-1a1af602b617). You need to reboot while pressing the F8 key before Windows starts and go into the *command prompt* in **Troubleshoot** → **Advanced Options** → **Command Prompt**.
+
+ 4. Login with your admin account and type this in the command prompt to start encryption:
+
+ ```
+ manage-bde -on c: -used
+ ```
+
+ 5. Close the command prompt and continue booting to regular Windows.
+
+ 6. Open an admin command prompt and run the following commands:
+
+ ```
+ manage-bde c: -protectors -add -rp -tpm
+ manage-bde -protectors -enable c:
+ manage-bde -protectors -get c: > %UserProfile%\Desktop\BitLocker-Recovery-Key.txt
+ ```
+
+ !!! tip
+
+ Backup `BitLocker-Recovery-Key.txt` on your Desktop to a separate storage device. Loss of this recovery code may result in loss of data.
+
+### FileVault
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FileVault** is the on-the-fly volume encryption solution built into macOS. FileVault is recommended because it [leverages](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/volume-encryption-with-filevault-sec4c6dc1b6e/web) hardware security capabilities present on an Apple silicon SoC or T2 Security Chip.
+
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/encrypt-mac-data-with-filevault-mh11785/mac){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+We recommend storing a local recovery key in a secure place as opposed to using your iCloud account for recovery.
+
+### Linux Unified Key Setup
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **LUKS** is the default FDE method for Linux. It can be used to encrypt full volumes, partitions, or create encrypted containers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/blob/main/README.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+??? example "Creating and opening encrypted containers"
+
+ ```
+ dd if=/dev/urandom of=/path-to-file bs=1M count=1024 status=progress
+ sudo cryptsetup luksFormat /path-to-file
+ ```
+
+
+ #### Opening encrypted containers
+ We recommend opening containers and volumes with `udisksctl` as this uses [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). Most file managers, such as those included with popular desktop environments, can unlock encrypted files. Tools like [udiskie](https://github.com/coldfix/udiskie) can run in the system tray and provide a helpful user interface.
+ ```
+ udisksctl loop-setup -f /path-to-file
+ udisksctl unlock -b /dev/loop0
+ ```
+
+!!! note "Remember to back up volume headers"
+
+ We recommend you always [back up your LUKS headers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Device_encryption#Backup_and_restore) in case of partial drive failure. This can be done with:
+
+ ```
+ cryptsetup luksHeaderBackup /dev/device --header-backup-file /mnt/backup/file.img
+ ```
+
+## Browser-based
+
+Browser-based encryption can be useful when you need to encrypt a file but cannot install software or apps on your device.
+
+### hat.sh
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Hat.sh** is a web application that provides secure client-side file encryption in your browser. It can also be self-hosted and is useful if you need to encrypt a file but cannot install any software on your device due to organizational policies.
+
+ [:octicons-globe-16: Website](https://hat.sh){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://hat.sh/about/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://hat.sh/about/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/sh-dv/hat.sh){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sh-dv/hat.sh#donations){ .card-link title="Donations methods can be found at the bottom of the website" }
+
+## Command-line
+
+Tools with command-line interfaces are useful for integrating [shell scripts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shell_script).
+
+### Kryptor
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Kryptor** is a free and open-source file encryption and signing tool that makes use of modern and secure cryptographic algorithms. It aims to be a better version of [age](https://github.com/FiloSottile/age) and [Minisign](https://jedisct1.github.io/minisign/) to provide a simple, easier alternative to GPG.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kryptor.co.uk){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/features#privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/tutorial){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/samuel-lucas6/Kryptor){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/#donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.kryptor.co.uk)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.kryptor.co.uk)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.kryptor.co.uk)
+
+### Tomb
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tomb** is a command-line shell wrapper for LUKS. It supports steganography via [third-party tools](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb#how-does-it-work).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.dyne.org/software/tomb){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.dyne.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+## OpenPGP
+
+OpenPGP is sometimes needed for specific tasks such as digitally signing and encrypting email. PGP has many features and is [complex](https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html) as it has been around a long time. For tasks such as signing or encrypting files, we suggest the above options.
+
+When encrypting with PGP, you have the option to configure different options in your `gpg.conf` file. We recommend staying with the standard options specified in the [GnuPG user FAQ](https://www.gnupg.org/faq/gnupg-faq.html#new_user_gpg_conf).
+
+!!! tip "Use future defaults when generating a key"
+
+ When [generating keys](https://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual/c14.html) we suggest using the `future-default` command as this will instruct GnuPG use modern cryptography such as [Curve25519](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curve25519#History) and [Ed25519](https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/):
+
+ ```bash
+ gpg --quick-gen-key alice@example.com future-default
+ ```
+
+### GNU Privacy Guard
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GnuPG** is a GPL-licensed alternative to the PGP suite of cryptographic software. GnuPG is compliant with [RFC 4880](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880), which is the current IETF specification of OpenPGP. The GnuPG project has been working on an [updated draft](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh/) in an attempt to modernize OpenPGP. GnuPG is a part of the Free Software Foundation's GNU software project and has received major [funding](https://gnupg.org/blog/20220102-a-new-future-for-gnupg.html) from the German government.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gnupg.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gnupg.org/privacy-policy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gnupg.org/documentation/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.sufficientlysecure.keychain)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://gpg4win.org/download.html)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://gpgtools.org)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://gnupg.org/download/index.html#binary)
+
+### GPG4win
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GPG4win** is a package for Windows from [Intevation and g10 Code](https://gpg4win.org/impressum.html). It includes [various tools](https://gpg4win.org/about.html) that can assist you in using GPG on Microsoft Windows. The project was initiated and originally [funded by](https://web.archive.org/web/20190425125223/https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/news/government-used-cryptography) Germany's Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) in 2005.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gpg4win.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gpg4win.org/privacy-policy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gpg4win.org/documentation.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gpg4win.git;a=summary){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://gpg4win.org/donate.html){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://gpg4win.org/download.html)
+
+### GPG Suite
+
+!!! note
+
+ We suggest [Canary Mail](email-clients.md#canary-mail) for using PGP with email on iOS devices.
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GPG Suite** provides OpenPGP support for [Apple Mail](email-clients.md#apple-mail) and macOS.
+
+ We recommend taking a look at their [First steps](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb/how-to/first-steps-where-do-i-start-where-do-i-begin-setup-gpgtools-create-a-new-key-your-first-encrypted-email) and [Knowledge base](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb) for support.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gpgtools.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gpgtools.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GPGTools){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://gpgtools.org)
+
+### OpenKeychain
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OpenKeychain** is an Android implementation of GnuPG. It's commonly required by mail clients such as [K-9 Mail](email-clients.md#k-9-mail) and [FairEmail](email-clients.md#fairemail) and other Android apps to provide encryption support. Cure53 completed a [security audit](https://www.openkeychain.org/openkeychain-3-6) of OpenKeychain 3.6 in October 2015. Technical details about the audit and OpenKeychain's solutions can be found [here](https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain/wiki/cure53-Security-Audit-2015).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.openkeychain.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.openkeychain.org/help/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.openkeychain.org/faq/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.sufficientlysecure.keychain)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Qualifications
+
+- Cross-platform encryption apps must be open-source.
+- File encryption apps must support decryption on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- External disk encryption apps must support decryption on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- Internal (OS) disk encryption apps must be cross-platform or built in to the operating system natively.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Operating System (FDE) encryption apps should utilize hardware security such as a TPM or Secure Enclave.
+- File encryption apps should have first- or third-party support for mobile platforms.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/file-sharing.md b/i18n/ar/file-sharing.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..73c7f8637
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/file-sharing.md
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+---
+title: "File Sharing and Sync"
+icon: material/share-variant
+---
+
+Discover how to privately share your files between your devices, with your friends and family, or anonymously online.
+
+## File Sharing
+
+### Send
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Send** is a fork of Mozilla’s discontinued Firefox Send service which allows you to send files to others with a link. Files are encrypted on your device so that they cannot be read by the server, and they can be optionally password-protected as well. The maintainer of Send hosts a [public instance](https://send.vis.ee/). You can use other public instances, or you can host Send yourself.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://send.vis.ee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send-instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/timvisee){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Send can be used via its web interface or via the [ffsend](https://github.com/timvisee/ffsend) CLI. If you are familiar with the command-line and send files frequently, we recommend using the CLI client to avoid JavaScript-based encryption. You can specify the `--host` flag to use a specific server:
+
+```bash
+ffsend upload --host https://send.vis.ee/ FILE
+```
+
+### OnionShare
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OnionShare** is an open-source tool that lets you securely and anonymously share a file of any size. It works by starting a web server accessible as a Tor onion service, with an unguessable URL that you can share with the recipients to download or send files.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://onionshare.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://lldan5gahapx5k7iafb3s4ikijc4ni7gx5iywdflkba5y2ezyg6sjgyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.onionshare.org){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/onionshare/onionshare){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://onionshare.org/#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://onionshare.org/#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://onionshare.org/#download)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must not store decrypted data on a remote server.
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must either have clients for Linux, macOS, and Windows; or have a web interface.
+
+## FreedomBox
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FreedomBox** is an operating system designed to be run on a [single-board computer (SBC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-board_computer). The purpose is to make it easy to set up server applications that you might want to self-host.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://freedombox.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://wiki.debian.org/FreedomBox/Manual){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://salsa.debian.org/freedombox-team/freedombox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://freedomboxfoundation.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+## File Sync
+
+### Nextcloud (Client-Server)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nextcloud** is a suite of free and open-source client-server software for creating your own file hosting services on a private server you control.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://nextcloud.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://nextcloud.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://nextcloud.com/support/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/nextcloud){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nextcloud.com/contribute/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nextcloud.client)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1125420102)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/nextcloud/android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/www/nextcloud)
+
+!!! danger
+
+ We don't recommend using the [E2EE App](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/end_to_end_encryption) for Nextcloud as it may lead to data loss; it is highly experimental and not production quality.
+
+### Syncthing (P2P)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Syncthing** is an open-source peer-to-peer continuous file synchronization utility. It is used to synchronize files between two or more devices over the local network or the internet. Syncthing does not use a centralized server; it uses the [Block Exchange Protocol](https://docs.syncthing.net/specs/bep-v1.html#bep-v1) to transfer data between devices. All data is encrypted using TLS.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://syncthing.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.syncthing.net){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/syncthing){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://syncthing.net/donations/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nutomic.syncthingandroid)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-openbsd: OpenBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-netbsd: NetBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+#### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must not require a third-party remote/cloud server.
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must either have clients for Linux, macOS, and Windows; or have a web interface.
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Has mobile clients for iOS and Android, which at least support document previews.
+- Supports photo backup from iOS and Android, and optionally supports file/folder sync on Android.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/frontends.md b/i18n/ar/frontends.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ece20287c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/frontends.md
@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+---
+title: "Frontends"
+icon: material/flip-to-front
+---
+
+Sometimes services will try to force you to sign up for an account by blocking access to content with annoying popups. They might also break without JavaScript enabled. These frontends can allow you to get around these restrictions.
+
+## LBRY
+
+### Librarian
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Librarian** is a free and open-source frontend for [Odysee](https://odysee.com/) (LBRY) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://librarian.codeberg.page/){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Librarian does not proxy video streams by default. Videos watched through Librarian will still make direct connections to Odysee's servers (e.g. `odycdn.com`); however, some instances may enable proxying which would be detailed in the instance's privacy policy.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Librarian is useful if you want watch LBRY content on mobile without mandatory telemetry and if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, as is the case with [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Librarian, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a Librarian instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Librarian instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect the default policy. Librarian instances feature a "privacy nutrition label" to provide an overview of their policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+## Twitter
+
+### Nitter
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nitter** is a free and open-source frontend for [Twitter](https://twitter.com) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter/wiki/Instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter#nitter){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Nitter is useful if you want to browse Twitter content without having to log in and if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, as is the case with [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level. It also allows you to [create RSS feeds for Twitter](news-aggregators.md#twitter).
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Nitter, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a Nitter instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Nitter instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect the default policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+## TikTok
+
+### ProxiTok
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **ProxiTok** is an open source frontend to the [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com) website that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok/wiki/Public-instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+!!! tip
+
+ ProxiTok is useful if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, such as [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting ProxiTok, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a ProxiTok instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. ProxiTok instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect their associated privacy policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+## YouTube
+
+### FreeTube
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FreeTube** is a free and open-source desktop application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com). When using FreeTube, your subscription list and playlists are saved locally on your device.
+
+ By default, FreeTube blocks all YouTube advertisements. In addition, FreeTube optionally integrates with [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://freetubeapp.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://freetubeapp.io/privacy.php){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.freetubeapp.io/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/FreeTubeApp/FreeTube){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/FreeTube){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/io.freetubeapp.FreeTube)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using FreeTube, your IP address may still be known to YouTube, [Invidious](https://instances.invidious.io) or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+### Yattee
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Yattee** is a free and open-source privacy oriented video player for iOS, tvOS and macOS for [YouTube](https://youtube.com). When using Yattee, your subscription list are saved locally on your device.
+
+ You will need to take a few [extra steps](https://gonzoknows.com/posts/Yattee/) before you can use Yattee to watch YouTube, due to App Store restrictions.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://github.com/yattee/yattee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://r.yattee.stream/docs/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/wiki/Donations){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-apple: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/yattee/id1595136629)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/releases)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using Yattee, your IP address may still be known to YouTube, [Invidious](https://instances.invidious.io), [Piped](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances) or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+By default, Yattee blocks all YouTube advertisements. In addition, Yattee optionally integrates with [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments.
+
+### LibreTube (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **LibreTube** is a free and open-source Android application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) which uses the [Piped](#piped) API.
+
+ LibreTube allows you to store your subscription list and playlists locally on your Android device, or to an account on your Piped instance of choice, which allows you to access them seamlessly on other devices as well.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://libre-tube.github.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube#privacy-policy-and-disclaimer){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube/releases)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using LibreTube, your IP address will be visible to the [Piped](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances) instance you choose and/or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+By default, LibreTube blocks all YouTube advertisements. Additionally, Libretube uses [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments. You are able to fully configure the types of segments that SponsorBlock will skip, or disable it completely. There is also a button on the video player itself to disable it for a specific video if desired.
+
+### NewPipe (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation annotate
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **NewPipe** is a free and open-source Android application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com), [SoundCloud](https://soundcloud.com), [media.ccc.de](https://media.ccc.de), [Bandcamp](https://bandcamp.com), and [PeerTube](https://joinpeertube.org/) (1).
+
+ Your subscription list and playlists are saved locally on your Android device.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://newpipe.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://newpipe.net/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://teamnewpipe.github.io/documentation/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamNewPipe/NewPipe){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://newpipe.net/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/TeamNewPipe/NewPipe/releases)
+
+1. The default instance is [FramaTube](https://framatube.org/), however more can be added via **Settings** → **Content** → **PeerTube instances**
+
+!!! Warning
+
+ When using NewPipe, your IP address will be visible to the video providers used. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+### Invidious
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Invidious** is a free and open-source frontend for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://invidious.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://instances.invidious.io){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.invidious.io/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/iv-org/invidious){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://invidious.io/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Invidious does not proxy video streams by default. Videos watched through Invidious will still make direct connections to Google's servers (e.g. `googlevideo.com`); however, some instances support video proxying—simply enable *Proxy videos* within the instances' settings or add `&local=true` to the URL.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Invidious is useful if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, such as [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level. It does not provide privacy by itself, and we don’t recommend logging into any accounts.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Invidious, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using an Invidious instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Invidious instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect their associated privacy policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+### Piped
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Piped** is a free and open-source frontend for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ Piped requires JavaScript in order to function and there are a number of public instances.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://piped.kavin.rocks/preferences#ddlInstanceSelection){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://piped-docs.kavin.rocks/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped#donations){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Piped is useful if you want to use [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) without installing an extension or to access age-restricted content without an account. It does not provide privacy by itself, and we don’t recommend logging into any accounts.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Piped, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a Piped instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Piped instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect their associated privacy policy.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+Recommended frontends...
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must be self-hostable.
+- Must provide all basic website functionality available to anonymous users.
+
+We only consider frontends for websites which are...
+
+- Not normally accessible without JavaScript.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/index.md b/i18n/ar/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b8eee47bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+---
+template: overrides/home.ar.html
+hide:
+ - navigation
+ - toc
+ - feedback
+---
+
+
+## Why should I care?
+
+##### “I have nothing to hide. Why should I care about my privacy?”
+
+Much like the right to interracial marriage, woman's suffrage, freedom of speech, and many others, our right to privacy hasn't always been upheld. In several dictatorships, it still isn't. Generations before ours fought for our right to privacy. ==Privacy is a human right, inherent to all of us,== that we are entitled to (without discrimination).
+
+You shouldn't confuse privacy with secrecy. We know what happens in the bathroom, but you still close the door. That's because you want privacy, not secrecy. **Everyone** has something to protect. Privacy is something that makes us human.
+
+[:material-target-account: Common Internet Threats](basics/common-threats.md ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+## What should I do?
+
+##### First, you need to make a plan
+
+Trying to protect all your data from everyone all the time is impractical, expensive, and exhausting. But don't worry! Security is a process, and, by thinking ahead, you can put together a plan that's right for you. Security isn't just about the tools you use or the software you download. Rather, it begins by understanding the unique threats you face, and how you can mitigate them.
+
+==This process of identifying threats and defining countermeasures is called **threat modeling**==, and it forms the basis of every good security and privacy plan.
+
+[:material-book-outline: Learn More About Threat Modeling](basics/threat-modeling.md ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+---
+
+## We need you! Here's how to get involved:
+
+[:simple-discourse:](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/){ title="Join our Forum" }
+[:simple-mastodon:](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides){ rel=me title="Follow us on Mastodon" }
+[:material-book-edit:](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org){ title="Contribute to this website" }
+[:material-translate:](https://matrix.to/#/#pg-i18n:aragon.sh){ title="Help translate this website" }
+[:simple-matrix:](https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org){ title="Chat with us on Matrix" }
+[:material-information-outline:](about/index.md){ title="Learn more about us" }
+[:material-hand-coin-outline:](about/donate.md){ title="Support the project" }
+
+It's important for a website like Privacy Guides to always stay up-to-date. We need our audience to keep an eye on software updates for the applications listed on our site and follow recent news about providers that we recommend. It's hard to keep up with the fast pace of the internet, but we try our best. If you spot an error, think a provider should not be listed, notice a qualified provider is missing, believe a browser plugin is no longer the best choice, or uncover any other issue, please let us know.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/kb-archive.md b/i18n/ar/kb-archive.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..501543e6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/kb-archive.md
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+---
+title: KB Archive
+icon: material/archive
+---
+
+# Pages Moved to Blog
+
+Some pages that used to be in our knowledge base can now be found on our blog:
+
+- [GrapheneOS vs. CalyxOS](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/)
+- [Signal Configuration Hardening](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening/)
+- [Linux - System Hardening](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/22/linux-system-hardening/)
+- [Linux - Application Sandboxing](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/22/linux-application-sandboxing/)
+- [Secure Data Erasure](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/05/25/secure-data-erasure/)
+- [Integrating Metadata Removal](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/09/integrating-metadata-removal/)
+- [iOS Configuration Guide](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/22/ios-configuration-guide/)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/meta/brand.md b/i18n/ar/meta/brand.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..290942563
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/meta/brand.md
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+---
+title: Branding Guidelines
+---
+
+The name of the website is **Privacy Guides** and should **not** be changed to:
+
+
+
+The name of the subreddit is **r/PrivacyGuides** or **the Privacy Guides Subreddit**.
+
+Additional branding guidelines can be found at [github.com/privacyguides/brand](https://github.com/privacyguides/brand)
+
+## Trademark
+
+"Privacy Guides" and the shield logo are trademarks owned by Jonah Aragon, unlimited usage is granted to the Privacy Guides project.
+
+Without waiving any of its rights, Privacy Guides does not advise others on the scope of its intellectual property rights. Privacy Guides does not permit or consent to any use of its trademarks in any manner that is likely to cause confusion by implying association with or sponsorship by Privacy Guides. If you are aware of any such use, please contact Jonah Aragon at jonah@privacyguides.org. Consult your legal counsel if you have questions.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/meta/git-recommendations.md b/i18n/ar/meta/git-recommendations.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7a740f1f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/meta/git-recommendations.md
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+---
+title: Git Recommendations
+---
+
+If you make changes to this website on GitHub.com's web editor directly, you shouldn't have to worry about this. If you are developing locally and/or are a long-term website editor (who should probably be developing locally!), consider these recommendations.
+
+## Enable SSH Key Commit Signing
+
+You can use an existing SSH key for signing, or [create a new one](https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/connecting-to-github-with-ssh/generating-a-new-ssh-key-and-adding-it-to-the-ssh-agent).
+
+1. Configure your Git client to sign commits and tags by default (remove `--global` to only sign by default for this repo):
+ ```
+ git config --global commit.gpgsign true
+ git config --global gpg.format ssh
+ git config --global tag.gpgSign true
+ ```
+2. Copy your SSH public key to your clipboard, for example:
+ ```
+ pbcopy < ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+ # Copies the contents of the id_ed25519.pub file to your clipboard
+ ```
+3. Set your SSH key for signing in Git with the following command, replacing the last string in quotes with the public key in your clipboard:
+ ```
+ git config --global user.signingkey 'ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3(...) user@example.com'
+ ```
+
+Ensure you [add your SSH key to your GitHub account](https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/connecting-to-github-with-ssh/adding-a-new-ssh-key-to-your-github-account#adding-a-new-ssh-key-to-your-account) **as a Signing Key** (as opposed to or in addition to as an Authentication Key).
+
+## Rebase on Git pull
+
+Use `git pull --rebase` instead of `git pull` when pulling in changes from GitHub to your local machine. This way your local changes will always be "on top of" the latest changes on GitHub, and you avoid merge commits (which are disallowed in this repo).
+
+You can set this to be the default behavior:
+
+```
+git config --global pull.rebase true
+```
+
+## Rebase from `main` before submitting a PR
+
+If you are working on your own branch, run these commands before submitting a PR:
+
+```
+git fetch origin
+git rebase origin/main
+```
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/meta/uploading-images.md b/i18n/ar/meta/uploading-images.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e6f60e702
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/meta/uploading-images.md
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+---
+title: Uploading Images
+---
+
+Here are a couple of general rules for contributing to Privacy Guides:
+
+## Images
+
+- We **prefer** SVG images, but if those do not exist we can use PNG images
+
+Company logos have canvas size of:
+
+- 128x128px
+- 384x128px
+
+## Optimization
+
+### PNG
+
+Use the [OptiPNG](https://sourceforge.net/projects/optipng/) to optimize the PNG image:
+
+```bash
+optipng -o7 file.png
+```
+
+### SVG
+
+#### Inkscape
+
+[Scour](https://github.com/scour-project/scour) all SVG images.
+
+In Inkscape:
+
+1. File Save As..
+2. Set type to Optimized SVG (*.svg)
+
+In the **Options** tab:
+
+- **Number of significant digits for coordinates** > **5**
+- [x] Turn on **Shorten color values**
+- [x] Turn on **Convert CSS attributes to XML attributes**
+- [x] Turn on **Collapse groups**
+- [x] Turn on **Create groups for similar attributes**
+- [ ] Turn off **Keep editor data**
+- [ ] Turn off **Keep unreferenced definitions**
+- [x] Turn on **Work around renderer bugs**
+
+In the **SVG Output** tab under **Document options**:
+
+- [ ] Turn off **Remove the XML declaration**
+- [x] Turn on **Remove metadata**
+- [x] Turn on **Remove comments**
+- [x] Turn on **Embeded raster images**
+- [x] Turn on **Enable viewboxing**
+
+In the **SVG Output** under **Pretty-printing**:
+
+- [ ] Turn off **Format output with line-breaks and indentation**
+- **Indentation characters** > Select **Space**
+- **Depth of indentation** > **1**
+- [ ] Turn off **Strip the "xml:space" attribute from the root SVG element**
+
+In the **IDs** tab:
+
+- [x] Turn on **Remove unused IDs**
+- [ ] Turn off **Shorten IDs**
+- **Prefix shortened IDs with** > `leave blank`
+- [x] Turn on **Preserve manually created IDs not ending with digits**
+- **Preserve the following IDs** > `leave blank`
+- **Preserve IDs starting with** > `leave blank`
+
+#### CLI
+
+The same can be achieved with the [Scour](https://github.com/scour-project/scour) command:
+
+```bash
+scour --set-precision=5 \
+ --create-groups \
+ --renderer-workaround \
+ --remove-descriptive-elements \
+ --enable-comment-stripping \
+ --enable-viewboxing \
+ --indent=space \
+ --nindent=1 \
+ --no-line-breaks \
+ --enable-id-stripping \
+ --protect-ids-noninkscape \
+ input.svg output.svg
+```
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/meta/writing-style.md b/i18n/ar/meta/writing-style.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1b725ee2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/meta/writing-style.md
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+---
+title: Writing Style
+---
+
+Privacy Guides is written in American English, and you should refer to [APA Style guidelines](https://apastyle.apa.org/style-grammar-guidelines/grammar) when in doubt.
+
+In general the [United States federal plain language guidelines](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/) provide a good overview of how to write clearly and concisely. We highlight a few important notes from these guidelines below.
+
+## Writing for our audience
+
+Privacy Guides' intended [audience](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/audience/) is primarily average, technology using adults. Don't dumb down content as if you are addressing a middle-school class, but don't overuse complicated terminology about concepts average computer users wouldn't be familiar with.
+
+### Address only what people want to know
+
+People don't need overly complex articles with little relevance to them. Figure out what you want people to accomplish when writing an article, and only include those details.
+
+> Tell your audience why the material is important to them. Say, “If you want a research grant, here’s what you have to do.” Or, “If you want to mine federal coal, here’s what you should know.” Or, “If you’re planning a trip to Rwanda, read this first.”
+
+### Address people directly
+
+We're writing *for* a wide variety of people, but we are writing *to* the person who is actually reading it. Use "you" to address the reader directly.
+
+> More than any other single technique, using “you” pulls users into the information and makes it relevant to them.
+>
+> When you use “you” to address users, they are more likely to understand what their responsibility is.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/audience/address-the-user/)
+
+### Avoid "users"
+
+Avoid calling people "users", in favor of "people", or a more specific description of the group of people you are writing for.
+
+## Organizing content
+
+Organization is key. Content should flow from most to least important information, and use headers as much as needed to logically separate different ideas.
+
+- Limit the document to around five or six sections. Long documents should probably be broken up into separate pages.
+- Mark important ideas with **bold** or *italics*.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/design/)
+
+### Begin with a topic sentence
+
+> If you tell your reader what they’re going to read about, they’re less likely to have to read your paragraph again. Headings help, but they’re not enough. Establish a context for your audience before you provide them with the details.
+>
+> We often write the way we think, putting our premises first and then our conclusion. It may be the natural way to develop thoughts, but we wind up with the topic sentence at the end of the paragraph. Move it up front and let users know where you’re going. Don’t make readers hold a lot of information in their heads before getting to the point.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/organize/have-a-topic-sentence/)
+
+## Choose your words carefully
+
+> Words matter. They are the most basic building blocks of written and spoken communication. Don’t complicate things by using jargon, technical terms, or abbreviations that people won’t understand.
+
+We should try to avoid abbreviations where possible, but technology is full of abbreviations. In general, spell out the abbreviation/acronym the first time it is used on a page, and add the abbreviation to the abbreviation glossary file when it is used repeatedly.
+
+> Kathy McGinty offers tongue-in-cheek instructions for bulking up your simple, direct sentences:
+>
+> > There is no escaping the fact that it is considered very important to note that a number of various available applicable studies ipso facto have generally identified the fact that additional appropriate nocturnal employment could usually keep juvenile adolescents off thoroughfares during the night hours, including but not limited to the time prior to midnight on weeknights and/or 2 a.m. on weekends.
+>
+> And the original, using stronger, simpler words:
+>
+> > More night jobs would keep youths off the streets.
+
+## Be concise
+
+> Unnecessary words waste your audience’s time. Great writing is like a conversation. Omit information that the audience doesn’t need to know. This can be difficult as a subject matter expert so it’s important to have someone look at the information from the audience’s perspective.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/concise/)
+
+## Keep text conversational
+
+> Verbs are the fuel of writing. They give your sentences power and direction. They enliven your writing and make it more interesting.
+>
+> Verbs tell your audience what to do. Make sure it’s clear who does what.
+
+### Use active voice
+
+> Active voice makes it clear who is supposed to do what. It eliminates ambiguity about responsibilities. Not “It must be done,” but “You must do it.”
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/conversational/use-active-voice/)
+
+### Use "must" for requirements
+
+> - “must” for an obligation
+> - “must not” for a prohibition
+> - “may” for a discretionary action
+> - “should” for a recommendation
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/mobile-browsers.md b/i18n/ar/mobile-browsers.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f0ff4cd22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/mobile-browsers.md
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+---
+title: "Mobile Browsers"
+icon: material/cellphone-information
+---
+
+These are our currently recommended mobile web browsers and configurations for standard/non-anonymous internet browsing. If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) instead. In general, we recommend keeping extensions to a minimum; they have privileged access within your browser, require you to trust the developer, can make you [stand out](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint), and [weaken](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/chromium-extensions/c/0ei-UCHNm34/m/lDaXwQhzBAAJ) site isolation.
+
+## Android
+
+On Android, Firefox is still less secure than Chromium-based alternatives: Mozilla's engine, [GeckoView](https://mozilla.github.io/geckoview/), has yet to support [site isolation](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2021/05/introducing-firefox-new-site-isolation-security-architecture) or enable [isolatedProcess](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1565196).
+
+### Brave
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Brave Browser** includes a built-in content blocker and [privacy features](https://brave.com/privacy-features/), many of which are enabled by default.
+
+ Brave is built upon the Chromium web browser project, so it should feel familiar and have minimal website compatibility issues.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://brave.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://brave4u7jddbv7cyviptqjc7jusxh72uik7zt6adtckl5f4nwy2v72qd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://brave.com/privacy/browser/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.brave.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads annotate
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.brave.browser)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/releases)
+
+#### Recommended Configuration
+
+Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. When you use Brave, we recommend changing the following settings to protect your privacy from certain parties, but all browsers other than the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) will be traceable by *somebody* in some regard or another.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Brave Shields & privacy**
+
+##### Shields
+
+Brave includes some anti-fingerprinting measures in its [Shields](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360022973471-What-is-Shields-) feature. We suggest configuring these options [globally](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360023646212-How-do-I-configure-global-and-site-specific-Shields-settings-) across all pages that you visit.
+
+##### Brave shields global defaults
+
+Shields' options can be downgraded on a per-site basis as needed, but by default we recommend setting the following:
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Aggressive** under Block trackers & ads
+
+ ??? warning "Use default filter lists"
+ Brave allows you to select additional content filters within the internal `brave://adblock` page. We advise against using this feature; instead, keep the default filter lists. Using extra lists will make you stand out from other Brave users and may also increase attack surface if there is an exploit in Brave and a malicious rule is added to one of the lists you use.
+
+- [x] Select **Upgrade connections to HTTPS**
+- [x] (Optional) Select **Block Scripts** (1)
+- [x] Select **Strict, may break sites** under **Block fingerprinting**
+
+
+
+1. This option provides functionality similar to uBlock Origin's advanced [blocking modes](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) or the [NoScript](https://noscript.net/) extension.
+
+##### Clear browsing data
+
+- [x] Select **Clear data on exit**
+
+##### Social Media Blocking
+
+- [ ] Uncheck all social media components
+
+##### Other privacy settings
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Disable non-proxied UDP** under [WebRTC IP Handling Policy](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360017989132-How-do-I-change-my-Privacy-Settings-#webrtc)
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow sites to check if you have payment methods saved**
+- [ ] Uncheck **IPFS Gateway** (1)
+- [x] Select **Close tabs on exit**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow privacy-preserving product analytics (P3A)**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send diagnostic reports**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send daily usage ping to Brave**
+
+1. InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is a decentralized, peer-to-peer network for storing and sharing data in a distributed filesystem. Unless you use the feature, disable it.
+
+
+
+#### Brave Sync
+
+[Brave Sync](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360059793111-Understanding-Brave-Sync) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices without requiring an account and protects it with E2EE.
+
+## iOS
+
+On iOS, any app that can browse the web is [restricted](https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines) to using an Apple-provided [WebKit framework](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/webkit), so there is little reason to use a third-party web browser.
+
+### Safari
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Safari** is the default browser in iOS. It includes [privacy features](https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/browse-the-web-privately-iphb01fc3c85/15.0/ios/15.0) such as Intelligent Tracking Protection, Privacy Report, isolated Private Browsing tabs, iCloud Private Relay, and automatic HTTPS upgrades.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.apple.com/safari/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/safari/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/safari/welcome/mac){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+#### Recommended Configuration
+
+These options can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Safari** → **Privacy and Security**.
+
+##### Cross-Site Tracking Prevention
+
+- [x] Enable **Prevent Cross-Site Tracking**
+
+This enables WebKit's [Intelligent Tracking Protection](https://webkit.org/tracking-prevention/#intelligent-tracking-prevention-itp). The feature helps protect against unwanted tracking by using on-device machine learning to stop trackers. ITP protects against many common threats, but it does not block all tracking avenues because it is designed to not interfere with website usability.
+
+##### Privacy Report
+
+Privacy Report provides a snapshot of cross-site trackers currently prevented from profiling you on the website you're visiting. It can also display a weekly report to show which trackers have been blocked over time.
+
+Privacy Report is accessible via the Page Settings menu.
+
+##### Privacy Preserving Ad Measurement
+
+- [ ] Disable **Privacy Preserving Ad Measurement**
+
+Ad click measurement has traditionally used tracking technology that infringes on user privacy. [Private Click Measurement](https://webkit.org/blog/11529/introducing-private-click-measurement-pcm/) is a WebKit feature and proposed web standard aimed towards allowing advertisers to measure the effectiveness of web campaigns without compromising on user privacy.
+
+The feature has little privacy concerns on its own, so while you can choose to leave it on, we consider the fact that it's automatically disabled in Private Browsing to be an indicator for disabling the feature.
+
+##### Always-on Private Browsing
+
+Open Safari and tap the Tabs button, located in the bottom right. Then, expand the Tab Groups list.
+
+- [x] Select **Private**
+
+Safari's Private Browsing mode offers additional privacy protections. Private Browsing uses a new [ephemeral](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/urlsessionconfiguration/1410529-ephemeral) session for each tab, meaning tabs are isolated from one another. There are also other smaller privacy benefits with Private Browsing, such as not sending a webpage’s address to Apple when using Safari's translation feature.
+
+Do note that Private Browsing does not save cookies and website data, so it won't be possible to remain signed into sites. This may be an inconvenience.
+
+##### iCloud Sync
+
+Synchronization of Safari History, Tab Groups, iCloud Tabs and saved passwords are E2EE. However, by default, bookmarks are [not](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303). Apple can decrypt and access them in accordance with their [privacy policy](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/).
+
+You can enable E2EE for you Safari bookmarks and downloads by enabling [Advanced Data Protection](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212520). Go to your **Apple ID name → iCloud → Advanced Data Protection**.
+
+- [x] Turn On **Advanced Data Protection**
+
+If you use iCloud with Advanced Data Protection disabled, we also recommend checking to ensure Safari's default download location is set to locally on your device. This option can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Safari** → **General** → **Downloads**.
+
+### AdGuard
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **AdGuard for iOS** is a free and open-source content-blocking extension for Safari that uses the native [Content Blocker API](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/safariservices/creating_a_content_blocker).
+
+ AdGuard for iOS has some premium features; however, standard Safari content blocking is free of charge.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://adguard.com/en/adguard-ios/overview.html){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://adguard.com/privacy/ios.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://kb.adguard.com/ios){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdguardForiOS){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id1047223162)
+
+Additional filter lists do slow things down and may increase your attack surface, so only apply what you need.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must support automatic updates.
+- Must receive engine updates in 0-1 days from upstream release.
+- Any changes required to make the browser more privacy-respecting should not negatively impact user experience.
+- Android browsers must use the Chromium engine.
+ - Unfortunately, Mozilla GeckoView is still less secure than Chromium on Android.
+ - iOS browsers are limited to WebKit.
+
+### Extension Criteria
+
+- Must not replicate built-in browser or OS functionality.
+- Must directly impact user privacy, i.e. must not simply provide information.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/multi-factor-authentication.md b/i18n/ar/multi-factor-authentication.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..62a364d84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/multi-factor-authentication.md
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+---
+title: "Multi-Factor Authenticators"
+icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication'
+---
+
+## Hardware Security Keys
+
+### YubiKey
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ 
+
+ The **YubiKeys** are among the most popular security keys. Some YubiKey models have a wide range of features such as: [Universal 2nd Factor (U2F)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_2nd_Factor), [FIDO2 and WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online), [Yubico OTP](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#yubico-otp), [Personal Identity Verification (PIV)](https://developers.yubico.com/PIV), [OpenPGP](https://developers.yubico.com/PGP/), [TOTP and HOTP](https://developers.yubico.com/OATH) authentication.
+
+ One of the benefits of the YubiKey is that one key can do almost everything (YubiKey 5), you could expect from a hardware security key. We do encourage you to take the [quiz](https://www.yubico.com/quiz/) before purchasing in order to make sure you make the right choice.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.yubico.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.yubico.com/support/terms-conditions/privacy-notice){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.yubico.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+The [comparison table](https://www.yubico.com/store/compare/) shows the features and how the YubiKeys compare. We highly recommend that you select keys from the YubiKey 5 Series.
+
+YubiKeys can be programmed using the [YubiKey Manager](https://www.yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-manager/) or [YubiKey Personalization Tools](https://www.yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-personalization-tools/). For managing TOTP codes, you can use the [Yubico Authenticator](https://www.yubico.com/products/yubico-authenticator/). All of Yubico's clients are open-source.
+
+For models which support HOTP and TOTP, there are 2 slots in the OTP interface which could be used for HOTP and 32 slots to store TOTP secrets. These secrets are stored encrypted on the key and never expose them to the devices they are plugged into. Once a seed (shared secret) is given to the Yubico Authenticator, it will only give out the six-digit codes, but never the seed. This security model helps limit what an attacker can do if they compromise one of the devices running the Yubico Authenticator and make the YubiKey resistant to a physical attacker.
+
+!!! warning
+ The firmware of YubiKey is not open-source and is not updatable. If you want features in newer firmware versions, or if there is a vulnerability in the firmware version you are using, you would need to purchase a new key.
+
+### Nitrokey / Librem Key
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nitrokey** has a security key capable of [FIDO2 and WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) called the **Nitrokey FIDO2**. For PGP support, you need to purchase one of their other keys such as the **Nitrokey Start**, **Nitrokey Pro 2** or the **Nitrokey Storage 2**.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.nitrokey.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.nitrokey.com/data-privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.nitrokey.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+The [comparison table](https://www.nitrokey.com/#comparison) shows the features and how the Nitrokey models compare. The **Nitrokey 3** listed will have a combined feature set.
+
+Nitrokey models can be configured using the [Nitrokey app](https://www.nitrokey.com/download).
+
+For the models which support HOTP and TOTP, there are 3 slots for HOTP and 15 for TOTP. Some Nitrokeys can act as a password manager. They can store 16 different credentials and encrypt them using the same password as the OpenPGP interface.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ While Nitrokeys do not release the HOTP/TOTP secrets to the device they are plugged into, the HOTP and TOTP storage is **not** encrypted and is vulnerable to physical attacks. If you are looking to store HOTP or TOTP these secrets, we highly recommend that you use a Yubikey instead.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Resetting the OpenPGP interface on a Nitrokey will also make the password database [inaccessible](https://docs.nitrokey.com/pro/linux/factory-reset).
+
+ The Nitrokey Pro 2, Nitrokey Storage 2, and the upcoming Nitrokey 3 supports system integrity verification for laptops with the [Coreboot](https://www.coreboot.org/) + [Heads](https://osresearch.net/) firmware. Purism's [Librem Key](https://puri.sm/products/librem-key/) is a rebranded NitroKey Pro 2 with similar firmware and can also be used for the same purposes.
+
+Nitrokey's firmware is open-source, unlike the YubiKey. The firmware on modern NitroKey models (except the **NitroKey Pro 2**) is updatable.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ The Nitrokey app, while compatible with Librem Keys, requires `libnitrokey` version 3.6 or above to recognize them. Currently, the package is outdated on Windows, macOS, and most Linux distributions' repository, so you will likely have to compile the Nitrokey app yourself to get it working with the Librem Key. On Linux, you can obtain an up-to-date version from [Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.nitrokey.nitrokey-app).
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+#### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must use high quality, tamper resistant hardware security modules.
+- Must support the latest FIDO2 specification.
+- Must not allow private key extraction.
+- Devices which cost over $35 must support handling OpenPGP and S/MIME.
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should be available in USB-C form-factor.
+- Should be available with NFC.
+- Should support TOTP secret storage.
+- Should support secure firmware updates.
+
+## Authenticator Apps
+
+Authenticator Apps implement a security standard adopted by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) called **Time-based One-time Passwords**, or **TOTP**. This is a method where websites share a secret with you which is used by your authenticator app to generate a six (usually) digit code based on the current time, which you enter while logging in for the website to check. Typically these codes are regenerated every 30 seconds, and once a new code is generated the old one becomes useless. Even if a hacker gets one six-digit code, there is no way for them to reverse that code to get the original secret or otherwise be able to predict what any future codes might be.
+
+We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternatives as Android and iOS have better security and app isolation than most desktop operating systems.
+
+### Aegis Authenticator (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Aegis Authenticator** is a free, secure and open-source app to manage your 2-step verification tokens for your online services.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getaegis.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://getaegis.app/aegis/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.buymeacoffee.com/beemdevelopment){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.beemdevelopment.aegis)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis/releases)
+
+### Raivo OTP (iOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Raivo OTP** is a native, lightweight and secure time-based (TOTP) & counter-based (HOTP) password client for iOS. Raivo OTP offers optional iCloud backup & sync. Raivo OTP is also available for macOS in the form of a status bar application, however the Mac app does not work independently of the iOS app.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://raivo-otp.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://raivo-otp.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/raivo-otp/ios-application){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://raivo-otp.com/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/raivo-otp/id1459042137)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must not require internet connectivity.
+- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
+ - **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/news-aggregators.md b/i18n/ar/news-aggregators.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..84a93fae0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/news-aggregators.md
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+---
+title: "News Aggregators"
+icon: material/rss
+---
+
+A [news aggregator](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/News_aggregator) is a way to keep up with your favourite blogs and news sites.
+
+## Aggregator clients
+
+### Akregator
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Akregator** is a news feed reader that is a part of the [KDE](https://kde.org) project. It comes with a fast search, advanced archiving functionality and an internal browser for easy news reading.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://apps.kde.org/akregator){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://kde.org/privacypolicy-apps){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.kde.org/?application=akregator){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://invent.kde.org/pim/akregator){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://kde.org/community/donations/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.kde.akregator)
+
+### Feeder
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Feeder** is a modern RSS client for Android that has many [features](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder#features) and works well with folders of RSS feeds. It supports [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS), [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)), [RDF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDF%2FXML) and [JSON Feed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Feed).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://ko-fi.com/spacecowboy){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nononsenseapps.feeder.play)
+
+### Fluent Reader
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Fluent Reader** is a secure cross-platform news aggregator that has useful privacy features such as deletion of cookies on exit, strict [content security policies (CSP)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy) and proxy support, meaning you can use it over [Tor](tor.md).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://hyliu.me/fluent-reader){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader/wiki/Privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader/wiki/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/yang991178){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://hyliu.me/fluent-reader)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1520907427)
+
+### GNOME Feeds
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GNOME Feeds** is an [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS) and [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)) news reader for [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org). It has a simple interface and is quite fast.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gfeeds.gabmus.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.gnome.org/World/gfeeds){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/gabmus/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://gfeeds.gabmus.org/#install)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.gabmus.gfeeds)
+
+### Miniflux
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Miniflux** is a web-based news aggregator that you can self-host. It supports [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS), [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)), [RDF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDF%2FXML) and [JSON Feed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Feed).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://miniflux.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://miniflux.app/docs/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/miniflux/v2){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://miniflux.app/#donations){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+### NetNewsWire
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **NetNewsWire** a free and open-source feed reader for macOS and iOS with a focus on a native design and feature set. It supports the typical feed formats alongside built-in support for Twitter and Reddit feeds.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://netnewswire.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://netnewswire.com/privacypolicy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://netnewswire.com/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Ranchero-Software/NetNewsWire){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/netnewswire-rss-reader/id1480640210)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://netnewswire.com)
+
+### Newsboat
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Newsboat** is an RSS/Atom feed reader for the text console. It's an actively maintained fork of [Newsbeuter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newsbeuter). It is very lightweight, and ideal for use over [Secure Shell](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Shell).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://newsboat.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://newsboat.org/releases/2.27/docs/newsboat.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/newsboat/newsboat){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must operate locally, i.e. must not be a cloud service.
+
+## Social Media RSS Support
+
+Some social media services also support RSS although it's not often advertised.
+
+### Reddit
+
+Reddit allows you to subscribe to subreddits via RSS.
+
+!!! example
+ Replace `subreddit_name` with the subreddit you wish to subscribe to.
+
+ ```text
+ https://www.reddit.com/r/{{ subreddit_name }}/new/.rss
+ ```
+
+### Twitter
+
+Using any of the Nitter [instances](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter/wiki/Instances) you can easily subscribe using RSS.
+
+!!! example
+ 1. Pick an instance and set `nitter_instance`.
+ 2. Replace `twitter_account` with the account name.
+
+ ```text
+ https://{{ nitter_instance }}/{{ twitter_account }}/rss
+ ```
+
+### YouTube
+
+You can subscribe YouTube channels without logging in and associating usage information with your Google Account.
+
+!!! example
+
+ To subscribe to a YouTube channel with an RSS client, first look for your [channel code](https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6180214), replace `[CHANNEL ID]` below:
+ ```text
+ https://www.youtube.com/feeds/videos.xml?channel_id=[CHANNEL ID]
+ ```
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/notebooks.md b/i18n/ar/notebooks.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..24fbfce93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/notebooks.md
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+---
+title: "Notebooks"
+icon: material/notebook-edit-outline
+---
+
+Keep track of your notes and journalings without giving them to a third-party.
+
+If you are currently using an application like Evernote, Google Keep, or Microsoft OneNote, we suggest you pick an alternative here that supports E2EE.
+
+## Cloud-based
+
+### Joplin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Joplin** is a free, open-source, and fully-featured note-taking and to-do application which can handle a large number of markdown notes organized into notebooks and tags. It offers E2EE and can sync through Nextcloud, Dropbox, and more. It also offers easy import from Evernote and plain-text notes.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://joplinapp.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://joplinapp.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://joplinapp.org/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://joplinapp.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.cozic.joplin)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/joplin/id1315599797)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/joplin-web-clipper/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/joplin-web-clipper/alofnhikmmkdbbbgpnglcpdollgjjfek)
+
+Joplin does not support password/PIN protection for the [application itself or individual notes and notebooks](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin/issues/289). However, your data is still encrypted in transit and at the sync location using your master key.
+
+### Standard Notes
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Standard Notes** is a simple and private notes app that makes your notes easy and available everywhere you are. It features E2EE on every platform, and a powerful desktop experience with themes and custom editors. It has also been [independently audited (PDF)](https://s3.amazonaws.com/standard-notes/security/Report-SN-Audit.pdf).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://standardnotes.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://standardnotes.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://standardnotes.com/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/standardnotes){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://standardnotes.com/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.standardnotes)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1285392450)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/standardnotes/app/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://standardnotes.com)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://standardnotes.com)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://standardnotes.com)
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://app.standardnotes.com/)
+
+### Cryptee
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Cryptee** is an open-source, web-based E2EE document editor and photo storage application. Cryptee is a PWA, which means that it works seamlessly across all modern devices without requiring native apps for each respective platform.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://crypt.ee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://crypt.ee/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://crypt.ee/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/cryptee){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: PWA](https://crypt.ee/download)
+
+Cryptee offers 100MB of storage for free, with paid options if you need more. Sign-up doesn't require an e-mail or other personally identifiable information.
+
+## Local notebooks
+
+### Org-mode
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Org-mode** is a [major mode](https://www.gnu.org/software/emacs/manual/html_node/elisp/Major-Modes.html) for GNU Emacs. Org-mode is for keeping notes, maintaining TODO lists, planning projects, and authoring documents with a fast and effective plain-text system. Synchronization is possible with [file synchronization](file-sharing.md#file-sync) tools.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orgmode.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://orgmode.org/manuals.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/emacs/org-mode.git){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/bzg){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Clients must be open-source.
+- Any cloud sync functionality must be E2EE.
+- Must support exporting documents into a standard format.
+
+### Best Case
+
+- Local backup/sync functionality should support encryption.
+- Cloud-based platforms should support document sharing.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/ar/os/android-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d1e74d51c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/os/android-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+---
+title: Android Overview
+icon: simple/android
+---
+
+Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system.
+
+## Choosing an Android Distribution
+
+When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has irrevocable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android.
+
+This problem could be solved by using a custom Android distribution that does not come with such invasive integration. Unfortunately, many custom Android distributions often violate the Android security model by not supporting critical security features such as AVB, rollback protection, firmware updates, and so on. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require [more permissive](https://github.com/LineageOS/android_system_sepolicy/search?q=userdebug&type=code) SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
+
+Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that it upholds the Android security model. At the very least, the distribution should have production builds, support for AVB, rollback protection, timely firmware and operating system updates, and SELinux in [enforcing mode](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts#enforcement_levels). All of our recommended Android distributions satisfy these criteria.
+
+[Our Android System Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Avoid Rooting
+
+[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
+
+Adblockers, which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For Adblocking we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or [VPN](../vpn.md) server blocking solutions instead. RethinkDNS, TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN) preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as Orbot or a real VPN server.
+
+AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
+
+We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps.
+
+## Verified Boot
+
+[Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection).
+
+Android 10 and above has moved away from full-disk encryption to more flexible [file-based encryption](https://source.android.com/security/encryption/file-based). Your data is encrypted using unique encryption keys, and the operating system files are left unencrypted.
+
+Verified Boot ensures the integrity of the operating system files, thereby preventing an adversary with physical access from tampering or installing malware on the device. In the unlikely case that malware is able to exploit other parts of the system and gain higher privileged access, Verified Boot will prevent and revert changes to the system partition upon rebooting the device.
+
+Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock Android distribution. Only a few OEMs such as Google support custom AVB key enrollment on their devices. Additionally, some AOSP derivatives such as LineageOS or /e/ OS do not support Verified Boot even on hardware with Verified Boot support for third-party operating systems. We recommend that you check for support **before** purchasing a new device. AOSP derivatives which do not support Verified Boot are **not** recommended.
+
+Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be aware of beyond their marketing. For example, the Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage.
+
+## Firmware Updates
+
+Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin).
+
+As the components of the phone, such as the processor and radio technologies rely on closed-source components, the updates must be provided by the respective manufacturers. Therefore, it is important that you purchase a device within an active support cycle. [Qualcomm](https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2020/12/16/qualcomm-and-google-announce-collaboration-extend-android-os-support-and) and [Samsung](https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-security-extending-updates-knox/) support their devices for 4 years, while cheaper products often have shorter support cycles. With the introduction of the [Pixel 6](https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/4457705), Google now makes their own SoC and they will provide a minimum of 5 years of support.
+
+EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive firmware updates from OEM vendors or after market Android distributors. This means that security issues with those devices will remain unfixed.
+
+Fairphone, for example, markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates.
+
+## Android Versions
+
+It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution.
+
+## Android Permissions
+
+[Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps. A smartphone with the latest version of Android will always be more secure than an old smartphone with an antivirus that you have paid for. It's better not to pay for antivirus software and to save money to buy a new smartphone such as a Google Pixel.
+
+Should you want to run an app that you're unsure about, consider using a user or work profile.
+
+## Media Access
+
+Quite a few applications allows you to "share" a file with them for media upload. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter.
+
+## User Profiles
+
+Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android.
+
+With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation.
+
+## Work Profile
+
+[Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles.
+
+A **device controller** app such as [Shelter](#recommended-apps) is required to create a Work Profile without an enterprise MDM, unless you're using a custom Android OS which includes one.
+
+The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such as *File Shuttle* and *contact search blocking* or any kind of isolation features must be implemented by the controller. You must also fully trust the device controller app, as it has full access to your data inside of the work profile.
+
+This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously.
+
+## VPN Killswitch
+
+Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+## Global Toggles
+
+Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled.
+
+## Google
+
+If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play.
+
+### Advanced Protection Program
+
+If you have a Google account we suggest enrolling in the [Advanced Protection Program](https://landing.google.com/advancedprotection/). It is available at no cost to anyone with two or more hardware security keys with [FIDO](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) support.
+
+The Advanced Protection Program provides enhanced threat monitoring and enables:
+
+- Stricter two factor authentication; e.g. that [FIDO](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) **must** be used and disallows the use of [SMS OTPs](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#sms-or-email-mfa), [TOTP](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp) and [OAuth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth)
+- Only Google and verified third-party apps can access account data
+- Scanning of incoming emails on Gmail accounts for [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing#Email_phishing) attempts
+- Stricter [safe browser scanning](https://www.google.com/chrome/privacy/whitepaper.html#malware) with Google Chrome
+- Stricter recovery process for accounts with lost credentials
+
+ If you use non-sandboxed Google Play Services (common on stock operating systems), the Advanced Protection Program also comes with [additional benefits](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/9764949?hl=en) such as:
+
+- Not allowing app installation outside of the Google Play Store, the OS vendor's app store, or via [`adb`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_Debug_Bridge)
+- Mandatory automatic device scanning with [Play Protect](https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/2812853?hl=en#zippy=%2Chow-malware-protection-works%2Chow-privacy-alerts-work)
+- Warning you about unverified applications
+
+### Google Play System Updates
+
+In the past, Android security updates had to be shipped by the operating system vendor. Android has become more modular beginning with Android 10, and Google can push security updates for **some** system components via the privileged Play Services.
+
+If you have an EOL device shipped with Android 10 or above and are unable to run any of our recommended operating systems on your device, you are likely going to be better off sticking with your OEM Android installation (as opposed to an operating system not listed here such as LineageOS or /e/ OS). This will allow you to receive **some** security fixes from Google, while not violating the Android security model by using an insecure Android derivative and increasing your attack surface. We would still recommend upgrading to a supported device as soon as possible.
+
+### Advertising ID
+
+All devices with Google Play Services installed automatically generate an [advertising ID](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/6048248?hl=en) used for targeted advertising. Disable this feature to limit the data collected about you.
+
+On Android distributions with [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), go to :gear: **Settings** → **Apps** → **Sandboxed Google Play** → **Google Settings** → **Ads**, and select *Delete advertising ID*.
+
+On Android distributions with privileged Google Play Services (such as stock OSes), the setting may be in one of several locations. Check
+
+- :gear: **Settings** → **Google** → **Ads**
+- :gear: **Settings** → **Privacy** → **Ads**
+
+You will either be given the option to delete your advertising ID or to *Opt out of interest-based ads*, this varies between OEM distributions of Android. If presented with the option to delete the advertising ID that is preferred. If not, then make sure to opt out and reset your advertising ID.
+
+### SafetyNet and Play Integrity API
+
+[SafetyNet](https://developer.android.com/training/safetynet/attestation) and the [Play Integrity APIs](https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity) are generally used for [banking apps](https://grapheneos.org/usage#banking-apps). Many banking apps will work fine in GrapheneOS with sandboxed Play services, however some non-financial apps have their own crude anti-tampering mechanisms which might fail. GrapheneOS passes the `basicIntegrity` check, but not the certification check `ctsProfileMatch`. Devices with Android 8 or later have hardware attestation support which cannot be bypassed without leaked keys or serious vulnerabilities.
+
+As for Google Wallet, we don't recommend this due to their [privacy policy](https://payments.google.com/payments/apis-secure/get_legal_document?ldo=0&ldt=privacynotice&ldl=en), which states you must opt-out if you don't want your credit rating and personal information shared with affiliate marketing services.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/ar/os/linux-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..937ae0213
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/os/linux-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+---
+title: Linux Overview
+icon: simple/linux
+---
+
+It is often believed that [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigour applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years.
+
+At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.:
+
+- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack)
+- A strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go
+- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations)
+
+Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are great if you want to:
+
+- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems
+- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms)
+- Have privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/)
+
+Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed here.
+
+[Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Choosing your distribution
+
+Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use.
+
+### Release cycle
+
+We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates.
+
+For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release.
+
+We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this:
+
+
+
+
+
+### Traditional vs Atomic updates
+
+Traditionally, Linux distributions update by sequentially updating the desired packages. Traditional updates such as those used in Fedora, Arch Linux, and Debian based distributions can be less reliable if an error occurs while updating.
+
+Atomic updating distributions apply updates in full or not at all. Typically, transactional update systems are also atomic.
+
+A transactional update system creates a snapshot that is made before and after an update is applied. If an update fails at any time (perhaps due to a power failure), the update can be easily rolled back to a “last known good state."
+
+The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tumbleweed, and NixOS and can achieve reliability with this model. [Adam Šamalík](https://twitter.com/adsamalik) provided a presentation on how `rpm-ostree` works with Silverblue:
+
+
+
+
+
+### “Security-focused” distributions
+
+There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use.
+
+### Arch-based distributions
+
+Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own.
+
+For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit).
+
+Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora.
+
+If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically:
+
+- **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories.
+- **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks.
+
+### Kicksecure
+
+While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default.
+
+### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions
+
+We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons.
+
+## General Recommendations
+
+### Drive Encryption
+
+Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS](../encryption.md#linux-unified-key-setup) FDE. If this option isn’t set at installation time, you will have to backup your data and re-install, as encryption is applied after [disk partitioning](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_partitioning), but before [file systems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_system) are formatted. We also suggest securely erasing your storage device:
+
+- [Secure Data Erasure :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/05/25/secure-data-erasure/)
+
+### Swap
+
+Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Swap#zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM).
+
+### Wayland
+
+We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland.
+
+Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)).
+
+We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do not have Wayland support, such as Cinnamon (default on Linux Mint), Pantheon (default on Elementary OS), MATE, Xfce, and i3.
+
+### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates)
+
+Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html).
+
+We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default.
+
+### Updates
+
+Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found.
+
+Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates.
+
+Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd).
+
+## Privacy Tweaks
+
+### MAC Address Randomization
+
+Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings.
+
+It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous.
+
+We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as suggested in the [article](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/).
+
+If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=).
+
+There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware.
+
+### Other Identifiers
+
+There are other system identifiers which you may wish to be careful about. You should give this some thought to see if it applies to your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md):
+
+- **Hostnames:** Your system's hostname is shared with the networks you connect to. You should avoid including identifying terms like your name or operating system in your hostname, instead sticking to generic terms or random strings.
+- **Usernames:** Similarly, your username is used in a variety of ways across your system. Consider using generic terms like "user" rather than your actual name.
+- **Machine ID:**: During installation a unique machine ID is generated and stored on your device. Consider [setting it to a generic ID](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#machine-id).
+
+### System Counting
+
+The Fedora Project [counts](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting) how many unique systems access its mirrors by using a [`countme`](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting#Detailed_Description) variable instead of a unique ID. Fedora does this to determine load and provision better servers for updates where necessary.
+
+This [option](https://dnf.readthedocs.io/en/latest/conf_ref.html#options-for-both-main-and-repo) is currently off by default. We recommend adding `countme=false` to `/etc/dnf/dnf.conf` just in case it is enabled in the future. On systems that use `rpm-ostree` such as Silverblue, the countme option is disabled by masking the [rpm-ostree-countme](https://fedoramagazine.org/getting-better-at-counting-rpm-ostree-based-systems/) timer.
+
+openSUSE also uses a [unique ID](https://en.opensuse.org/openSUSE:Statistics) to count systems, which can be disabled by deleting the `/var/lib/zypp/AnonymousUniqueId` file.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/ar/os/qubes-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..294fa7afd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/os/qubes-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+---
+title: "Qubes Overview"
+icon: simple/qubesos
+---
+
+[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/).
+
+## How does Qubes OS work?
+
+Qubes uses [compartmentalization](https://www.qubes-os.org/intro/) to keep the system secure. Qubes are created from templates, the defaults being for Fedora, Debian and [Whonix](../desktop.md#whonix). Qubes OS also allows you to create once-use [disposable](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-use-disposables/) virtual machines.
+
+
+Qubes Architecture, Credit: What is Qubes OS Intro
+
+Each Qubes application has a [colored border](https://www.qubes-os.org/screenshots/) that can help you keep track of the virtual machine it is running in. You could, for example, use a specific color for your banking browser, while using a different color for a general untrusted browser.
+
+
+Qubes window borders, Credit: Qubes Screenshots
+
+## Why Should I use Qubes?
+
+Qubes OS is useful if your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md) requires strong compartmentalization and security, such as if you think you'll be opening untrusted files from untrusted sources. A typical reason for using Qubes OS is to open documents from unknown sources.
+
+Qubes OS utilizes [Dom0](https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Dom0) Xen VM (i.e., an "AdminVM") for controlling other guest VMs or Qubes on the host OS. Other VMs display individual application windows within Dom0's desktop environment. It allows you to color code windows based on trust levels and run apps that can interact with each other with very granular control.
+
+### Copying and Pasting Text
+
+You can [copy and paste text](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-and-paste-text/) using `qvm-copy-to-vm` or the below instructions:
+
+1. Press **Ctrl+C** to tell the VM you're in that you want to copy something.
+2. Press **Ctrl+Shift+C** to tell the VM to make this buffer available to the global clipboard.
+3. Press **Ctrl+Shift+V** in the destination VM to make the global clipboard available.
+4. Press **Ctrl+V** in the destination VM to paste the contents in the buffer.
+
+### File Exchange
+
+To copy and paste files and directories (folders) from one VM to another, you can use the option **Copy to Other AppVM...** or **Move to Other AppVM...**. The difference is that the **Move** option will delete the original file. Either option will protect your clipboard from being leaked to any other Qubes. This is more secure than air-gapped file transfer because an air-gapped computer will still be forced to parse partitions or file systems. That is not required with the inter-qube copy system.
+
+??? info "AppVMs or qubes do not have their own file systems"
+
+ You can [copy and move files](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-and-move-files/) between Qubes. When doing so the changes aren't immediately made and can be easily undone in case of an accident.
+
+### Inter-VM Interactions
+
+The [qrexec framework](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec/) is a core part of Qubes which allows virtual machine communication between domains. It is built on top of the Xen library *vchan*, which facilitates [isolation through policies](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2020/06/22/new-qrexec-policy-system/).
+
+## Additional Resources
+
+For additional information we encourage you to consult the extensive Qubes OS documentation pages located on the [Qubes OS Website](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/). Offline copies can be downloaded from the Qubes OS [documentation repository](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-doc).
+
+- Open Technology Fund: [*Arguably the world's most secure operating system*](https://www.opentech.fund/news/qubes-os-arguably-the-worlds-most-secure-operating-system-motherboard/)
+- J. Rutkowska: [*Software compartmentalization vs. physical separation*](https://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/2014/Software_compartmentalization_vs_physical_separation.pdf)
+- J. Rutkowska: [*Partitioning my digital life into security domains*](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/03/13/partitioning-my-digital-life-into.html)
+- Qubes OS: [*Related Articles*](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/categories/#articles)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/passwords.md b/i18n/ar/passwords.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dcfdf1853
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/passwords.md
@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+---
+title: "Password Managers"
+icon: material/form-textbox-password
+---
+
+Password managers allow you to securely store and manage passwords and other credentials with the use of a master password.
+
+[Introduction to Passwords :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](./basics/passwords-overview.md)
+
+!!! info
+
+ Built-in password managers in software like browsers and operating systems are sometimes not as good as dedicated password manager software. The advantage of a built-in password manager is good integration with the software, but it can often be very simple and lack privacy and security features standalone offerings have.
+
+ For example, the password manager in Microsoft Edge doesn't offer E2EE at all. Google's password manager has [optional](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/11350823) E2EE, and [Apple's](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303) offers E2EE by default.
+
+## Cloud-based
+
+These password managers sync your passwords to a cloud server for easy accessibility from all your devices and safety against device loss.
+
+### Bitwarden
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Bitwarden** is a free and open-source password manager. It aims to solve password management problems for individuals, teams, and business organizations. Bitwarden is among the best and safest solutions to store all of your logins and passwords while conveniently keeping them synced between all of your devices.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://bitwarden.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://bitwarden.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://bitwarden.com/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/bitwarden){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.x8bit.bitwarden)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/bitwarden-password-manager/id1137397744)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/bitwarden/mobile/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://bitwarden.com/download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://bitwarden.com/download)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.bitwarden.desktop)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/bitwarden-password-manager)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/bitwarden-free-password-m/nngceckbapebfimnlniiiahkandclblb)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/jbkfoedolllekgbhcbcoahefnbanhhlh)
+
+Bitwarden also features [Bitwarden Send](https://bitwarden.com/products/send/), which allows you to share text and files securely with [end-to-end encryption](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-encryption). A [password](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-privacy/#send-passwords) can be required along with the send link. Bitwarden Send also features [automatic deletion](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-lifespan).
+
+You need the [Premium Plan](https://bitwarden.com/help/about-bitwarden-plans/#compare-personal-plans) to be able to share files. The free plan only allows text sharing.
+
+Bitwarden's server-side code is [open-source](https://github.com/bitwarden/server), so if you don't want to use the Bitwarden cloud, you can easily host your own Bitwarden sync server.
+
+**Vaultwarden** is an alternative implementation of Bitwarden's sync server written in Rust and compatible with official Bitwarden clients, perfect for self-hosted deployment where running the official resource-heavy service might not be ideal. If you are looking to self-host Bitwarden on your own server, you almost certainly want to use Vaultwarden over Bitwarden's official server code.
+
+[:octicons-repo-16: Vaultwarden Repository](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden ""){.md-button} [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/dani-garcia){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+### 1Password
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **1Password** is a password manager with a strong focus on security and ease-of-use, which allows you to store passwords, credit cards, software licenses, and any other sensitive information in a secure digital vault. Your vault is hosted on 1Password's servers for a [monthly fee](https://1password.com/sign-up/). 1Password is [audited](https://support.1password.com/security-assessments/) on a regular basis and provides exceptional customer support. 1Password is closed source; however, the security of the product is thoroughly documented in their [security white paper](https://1passwordstatic.com/files/security/1password-white-paper.pdf).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://1password.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://support.1password.com/1password-privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.1password.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.onepassword.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1511601750?mt=8)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://1password.com/downloads/windows/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://1password.com/downloads/mac/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://1password.com/downloads/linux/)
+
+Traditionally, **1Password** has offered the best password manager user experience for people using macOS and iOS; however, it has now achieved feature-parity across all platforms. It boasts many features geared towards families and less technical people, as well as advanced functionality.
+
+Your 1Password vault is secured with both your master password and a randomized 34-character security key to encrypt your data on their servers. This security key adds a layer of protection to your data because your data is secured with high entropy regardless of your master password. Many other password manager solutions are entirely reliant on the strength of your master password to secure your data.
+
+One advantage 1Password has over Bitwarden is its first-class support for native clients. While Bitwarden relegates many duties, especially account management features, to their web vault interface, 1Password makes nearly every feature available within its native mobile or desktop clients. 1Password's clients also have a more intuitive UI, which makes them easier to use and navigate.
+
+### Psono
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Psono** is a free and open-source password manager from Germany, with a focus on password management for teams. Psono supports secure sharing of passwords, files, bookmarks, and emails. All secrets are protected by a master password.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://psono.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://psono.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://doc.psono.com){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/psono){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.psono.psono)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/psono-password-manager/id1545581224)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/psono-pw-password-manager)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/psonopw-password-manager/eljmjmgjkbmpmfljlmklcfineebidmlo)
+ - [:simple-docker: Docker Hub](https://hub.docker.com/r/psono/psono-client)
+
+Psono provides extensive documentation for their product. The web-client for Psono can be self-hosted; alternatively, you can choose the full Community Edition or the Enterprise Edition with additional features.
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+#### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must utilize strong, standards-based/modern E2EE.
+- Must have thoroughly documented encryption and security practices.
+- Must have a published audit from a reputable, independent third-party.
+- All non-essential telemetry must be optional.
+- Must not collect more PII than is necessary for billing purposes.
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Telemetry should be opt-in (disabled by default) or not collected at all.
+- Should be open-source and reasonably self-hostable.
+
+## Local Storage
+
+These options allow you to manage an encrypted password database locally.
+
+### KeePassXC
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **KeePassXC** is a community fork of KeePassX, a native cross-platform port of KeePass Password Safe, with the goal to extend and improve it with new features and bugfixes to provide a feature-rich, cross-platform and modern open-source password manager.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://keepassxc.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://keepassxc.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://keepassxc.org/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://keepassxc.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://keepassxc.org/download/#windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://keepassxc.org/download/#mac)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://keepassxc.org/download/#linux)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flatpak](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.keepassxc.KeePassXC)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/keepassxc-browser)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/keepassxc-browser/oboonakemofpalcgghocfoadofidjkkk)
+
+KeePassXC stores its export data as [CSV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comma-separated_values) files. This may mean data loss if you import this file into another password manager. We advise you check each record manually.
+
+### KeePassDX (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **KeePassDX** is a lightweight password manager for Android, allows editing encrypted data in a single file in KeePass format and can fill in the forms in a secure way. [Contributor Pro](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kunzisoft.keepass.pro) allows unlocking cosmetic content and non-standard protocol features, but more importantly, it helps and encourages development.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.keepassdx.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.keepassdx.com/#donation){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kunzisoft.keepass.free)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX/releases)
+
+### Strongbox (iOS & macOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Strongbox** is a native, open-source password manager for iOS and macOS. Supporting both KeePass and Password Safe formats, Strongbox can be used in tandem with other password managers, like KeePassXC, on non-Apple platforms. By employing a [freemium model](https://strongboxsafe.com/pricing/), Strongbox offers most features under its free tier with more convenience-oriented [features](https://strongboxsafe.com/comparison/)—such as biometric authentication—locked behind a subscription or perpetual license.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://strongboxsafe.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://strongboxsafe.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://strongboxsafe.com/getting-started/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/strongbox-password-safe/Strongbox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/strongbox-password-safe/Strongbox#supporting-development){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/strongbox-keepass-pwsafe/id897283731)
+
+Additionally, there is an offline-only version offered: [Strongbox Zero](https://apps.apple.com/app/strongbox-keepass-pwsafe/id1581589638). This version is stripped down in an attempt to reduce attack surface.
+
+### Command-line
+
+These products are minimal password managers that can be used within scripting applications.
+
+#### gopass
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **gopass** is a password manager for the command line written in Go. It works on all major desktop and server operating systems (Linux, macOS, BSD, Windows).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.gopass.pw){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/gopasspw/gopass/tree/master/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/gopasspw/gopass){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/dominikschulz){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-macos)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-linux)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-bsd)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be cross-platform.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/productivity.md b/i18n/ar/productivity.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..45a24c212
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/productivity.md
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+---
+title: "Productivity Tools"
+icon: material/file-sign
+---
+
+Most online office suites do not support E2EE, meaning the cloud provider has access to everything you do. The privacy policy may legally protect your rights, but it does not provide technical access constraints.
+
+## Collaboration Platforms
+
+### Nextcloud
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nextcloud** is a suite of free and open-source client-server software for creating your own file hosting services on a private server you control.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://nextcloud.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://nextcloud.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://nextcloud.com/support/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/nextcloud){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nextcloud.com/contribute/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nextcloud.client)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1125420102)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/nextcloud/android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/www/nextcloud)
+
+!!! danger
+
+ We don't recommend using the [E2EE App](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/end_to_end_encryption) for Nextcloud as it may lead to data loss; it is highly experimental and not production quality. For this reason, we don't recommend third-party Nextcloud providers.
+
+### CryptPad
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **CryptPad** is a private-by-design alternative to popular office tools. All content on this web service is end-to-end encrypted and can be shared with other users easily.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://cryptpad.fr){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://cryptpad.fr/pad/#/2/pad/view/GcNjAWmK6YDB3EO2IipRZ0fUe89j43Ryqeb4fjkjehE/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.cryptpad.fr/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/xwiki-labs/cryptpad){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/cryptpad){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+In general, we define collaboration platforms as full-fledged suites which could reasonably act as a replacement to collaboration platforms like Google Drive.
+
+- Open-source.
+- Makes files accessible via WebDAV unless it is impossible due to E2EE.
+- Has sync clients for Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- Supports document and spreadsheet editing.
+- Supports real-time document collaboration.
+- Supports exporting documents to standard document formats (e.g. ODF).
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should store files in a conventional filesystem.
+- Should support TOTP or FIDO2 multi-factor authentication support, or Passkey logins.
+
+## Office Suites
+
+### LibreOffice
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **LibreOffice** is a free and open-source office suite with extensive functionality.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.libreoffice.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.libreoffice.org/about-us/privacy/privacy-policy-en/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://documentation.libreoffice.org/en/english-documentation/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://www.libreoffice.org/about-us/source-code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.libreoffice.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/android-and-ios/)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/android-and-ios/)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/download/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/download/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/download/)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.libreoffice.LibreOffice)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/editors/libreoffice/)
+
+### OnlyOffice
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OnlyOffice** is a cloud-based free and open-source office suite with extensive functionality, including integration with Nextcloud.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.onlyoffice.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://help.onlyoffice.com/products/files/doceditor.aspx?fileid=5048502&doc=SXhWMEVzSEYxNlVVaXJJeUVtS0kyYk14YWdXTEFUQmRWL250NllHNUFGbz0_IjUwNDg1MDIi0){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://helpcenter.onlyoffice.com/userguides.aspx){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ONLYOFFICE){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.onlyoffice.documents)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id944896972)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.onlyoffice.com/download-desktop.aspx)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.onlyoffice.com/download-desktop.aspx)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.onlyoffice.com/download-desktop.aspx)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.onlyoffice.desktopeditors)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/www/onlyoffice-documentserver/)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+In general, we define office suites as applications which could reasonably act as a replacement for Microsoft Word for most needs.
+
+- Must be cross-platform.
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must function offline.
+- Must support editing documents, spreadsheets, and slideshows.
+- Must export files to standard document formats.
+
+## Paste services
+
+### PrivateBin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **PrivateBin** is a minimalist, open-source online pastebin where the server has zero knowledge of pasted data. Data is encrypted/decrypted in the browser using 256-bit AES. It is the improved version of ZeroBin. There is a [list of instances](https://privatebin.info/directory/).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://privatebin.info){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://privatebin.info/directory/){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/wiki/FAQ){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/ar/real-time-communication.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..571441340
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/real-time-communication.md
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+---
+title: "Real-Time Communication"
+icon: material/chat-processing
+---
+
+These are our recommendations for encrypted real-time communication.
+
+[Types of Communication Networks :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](./advanced/communication-network-types.md)
+
+## Encrypted Messengers
+
+These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
+
+### Signal
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
+
+ All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/signalapp){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://signal.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.thoughtcrime.securesms)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id874139669)
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://signal.org/android/apk/)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://signal.org/download/windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://signal.org/download/macos)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://signal.org/download/linux)
+
+Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). The server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
+
+The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
+
+We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation:
+
+[Signal Configuration and Hardening :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening/)
+
+### SimpleX Chat
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **SimpleX** Chat is an instant messenger that is decentralized and doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Users of SimpleX Chat can scan a QR code or click an invite link to participate in group conversations.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://simplex.chat){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/blob/stable/PRIVACY.md){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/tree/stable/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=chat.simplex.app)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/simplex-chat/id1605771084)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/releases)
+
+SimpleX Chat [was audited](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website.html) by Trail of Bits in October 2022.
+
+Currently SimpleX Chat only provides a client for Android and iOS. Basic group chatting functionality, direct messaging, editing of messages and markdown are supported. E2EE Audio and Video calls are also supported.
+
+Your data can be exported, and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up.
+
+### Briar
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works/) to other clients using the Tor Network. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org/){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.briarproject.briar.android)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://briarproject.org/download-briar-desktop/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://briarproject.org/download-briar-desktop/)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.briarproject.Briar)
+
+To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby.
+
+The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit/), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited.
+
+Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
+
+Briar supports perfect forward secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
+
+## Additional Options
+
+!!! warning
+
+ These messengers do not have Perfect [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) (PFS), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
+
+### Element
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Element** is the reference client for the [Matrix](https://matrix.org/docs/guides/introduction) protocol, an [open standard](https://matrix.org/docs/spec) for secure decentralized real-time communication.
+
+ Messages and files shared in private rooms (those which require an invite) are by default E2EE as are one to one voice and video calls.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://element.io/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://element.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://element.io/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/vector-im){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=im.vector.app)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/vector/id1083446067)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/vector-im/element-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://element.io/get-started)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://element.io/get-started)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://element.io/get-started)
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://app.element.io)
+
+Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
+
+Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
+
+The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
+
+The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm](https://matrix.org/docs/projects/other/olm) cryptographic ratchet used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
+
+### Session
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Session** is a decentralized messenger with a focus on private, secure, and anonymous communications. Session offers support for direct messages, group chats, and voice calls.
+
+ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to store and route messages. Every encrypted message is routed through three nodes in the Oxen Service Node Network, making it virtually impossible for the nodes to compile meaningful information on those using the network.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getsession.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://getsession.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://getsession.org/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/oxen-io){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=network.loki.messenger)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1470168868)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/oxen-io/session-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://getsession.org/download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://getsession.org/download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://getsession.org/download)
+
+Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
+
+Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
+
+Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
+
+Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must have open-source clients.
+- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
+- Must support E2EE for all messages.
+- Must have been independently audited.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should have Perfect Forward Secrecy.
+- Should have open-source servers.
+- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
+- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
+- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/router.md b/i18n/ar/router.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..59839379f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/router.md
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+---
+title: "Router Firmware"
+icon: material/router-wireless
+---
+
+Below are a few alternative operating systems, that can be used on routers, Wi-Fi access points, etc.
+
+## OpenWrt
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OpenWrt** is a Linux-based operating system; it's primarily used on embedded devices to route network traffic. It includes util-linux, uClibc, and BusyBox. All of the components have been optimized for home routers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://openwrt.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://openwrt.org/docs/start){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://openwrt.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+You can consult OpenWrt's [table of hardware](https://openwrt.org/toh/start) to check if your device is supported.
+
+## OPNsense
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OPNsense** is an open source, FreeBSD-based firewall and routing platform which incorporates many advanced features such as traffic shaping, load balancing, and VPN capabilities, with many more features available in the form of plugins. OPNsense is commonly deployed as a perimeter firewall, router, wireless access point, DHCP server, DNS server, and VPN endpoint.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://opnsense.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.opnsense.org/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/opnsense){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opnsense.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+OPNsense was originally developed as a fork of [pfSense](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PfSense), and both projects are noted for being free and reliable firewall distributions which offer features often only found in expensive commercial firewalls. Launched in 2015, the developers of OPNsense [cited](https://docs.opnsense.org/history/thefork.html) a number of security and code-quality issues with pfSense which they felt necessitated a fork of the project, as well as concerns about Netgate's majority acquisition of pfSense and the future direction of the pfSense project.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be open source.
+- Must receive regular updates.
+- Must support a wide variety of hardware.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/search-engines.md b/i18n/ar/search-engines.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..99df76a91
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/search-engines.md
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+---
+title: "Search Engines"
+icon: material/search-web
+---
+
+Use a search engine that doesn't build an advertising profile based on your searches.
+
+The recommendations here are based on the merits of each service's privacy policy. There is **no guarantee** that these privacy policies are honored.
+
+Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) if your threat model requires hiding your IP address from the search provider.
+
+## Brave Search
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Brave Search** is developed by Brave and serves results primarily from its own, independent index. The index is optimized against Google Search and therefore may provide more contextually accurate results compared to other alternatives.
+
+ Brave Search includes unique features such as Discussions, which highlights conversation-focused results—such as forum posts.
+
+ We recommend you disable [Anonymous usage metrics](https://search.brave.com/help/usage-metrics) as it is enabled by default and can be disabled within settings.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://search.brave.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://search.brave4u7jddbv7cyviptqjc7jusxh72uik7zt6adtckl5f4nwy2v72qd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://search.brave.com/help/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://search.brave.com/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+Brave Search is based in the United States. Their [privacy policy](https://search.brave.com/help/privacy-policy) states they collect aggregated usage metrics, which includes the operating system and browser in use, however no personally identifiable information is collected. IP addresses are temporarily processed, but are not retained.
+
+## DuckDuckGo
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **DuckDuckGo** is one of the more mainstream private search engine options. Notable DuckDuckGo search features include [bangs](https://duckduckgo.com/bang) and many [instant answers](https://help.duckduckgo.com/duckduckgo-help-pages/features/instant-answers-and-other-features/). The search engine relies on a commercial Bing API to serve most results, but it does use numerous [other sources](https://help.duckduckgo.com/results/sources/) for instant answers and other non-primary results.
+
+ DuckDuckGo is the default search engine for the Tor Browser and is one of the few available options on Apple’s Safari browser.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://duckduckgo.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://duckduckgo.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://help.duckduckgo.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+DuckDuckGo is based in the United States. Their [privacy policy](https://duckduckgo.com/privacy) states they **do** log your searches for product improvement purposes, but not your IP address or any other personally identifying information.
+
+DuckDuckGo offers two [other versions](https://help.duckduckgo.com/features/non-javascript/) of their search engine, both of which do not require JavaScript. These versions do lack features, however. These versions can also be used in conjunction with their [Tor onion address](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/) by appending [/lite](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/lite) or [/html](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/html) for the respective version.
+
+## SearXNG
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **SearXNG** is an open-source, self-hostable, metasearch engine, aggregating the results of other search engines while not storing any information itself. It is an actively maintained fork of [SearX](https://github.com/searx/searx).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://searxng.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://searx.space/){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/searxng/searxng){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+SearXNG is a proxy between you and the search engines it aggregates from. Your search queries will still be sent to the search engines that SearXNG gets its results from.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance so that the queries would blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting SearXNG, as people looking up illegal content on your instance could draw unwanted attention from authorities.
+
+When you are using a SearXNG instance, be sure to go read their privacy policy. Since SearXNG instances may be modified by their owners, they do not necessarily reflect their privacy policy. Some instances run as a Tor hidden service, which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries does not contain PII.
+
+## Startpage
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Startpage** is a private search engine known for serving Google search results. One of Startpage's unique features is the [Anonymous View](https://www.startpage.com/en/anonymous-view/), which puts forth efforts to standardize user activity to make it more difficult to be uniquely identified. The feature can be useful for hiding [some](https://support.startpage.com/hc/en-us/articles/4455540212116-The-Anonymous-View-Proxy-technical-details) network and browser properties. Unlike the name suggests, the feature should not be relied upon for anonymity. If you are looking for anonymity, use the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) instead.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.startpage.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.startpage.com/en/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.startpage.com/hc/en-us/categories/4481917470356-Startpage-Search-Engine){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Startpage regularly limits service access to certain IP addresses, such as IPs reserved for VPNs or Tor. [DuckDuckGo](#duckduckgo) and [Brave Search](#brave-search) are friendlier options if your threat model requires hiding your IP address from the search provider.
+
+Startpage is based in the Netherlands. According to their [privacy policy](https://www.startpage.com/en/privacy-policy/), they log details such as: operating system, type of browser, and language. They do not log your IP address, search queries, or other personally identifying information.
+
+Startpage's majority shareholder is System1 who is an adtech company. We don't believe that to be an issue as they have a distinctly separate [privacy policy](https://system1.com/terms/privacy-policy). The Privacy Guides team reached out to Startpage [back in 2020](https://web.archive.org/web/20210118031008/https://blog.privacytools.io/relisting-startpage/) to clear up any concerns with System1's sizeable investment into the service. We were satisfied with the answers we received.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must not collect personally identifiable information per their privacy policy.
+- Must not allow users to create an account with them.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should be based on open-source software.
+- Should not block Tor exit node IP addresses.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/tools.md b/i18n/ar/tools.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a2c26648c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/tools.md
@@ -0,0 +1,443 @@
+---
+title: "Privacy Tools"
+icon: material/tools
+hide:
+ - toc
+---
+
+If you're looking for a specific solution to something, these are the hardware and software tools we recommend in a variety of categories. Our recommended privacy tools are primarily chosen based on security features, with additional emphasis on decentralized and open-source tools. They are applicable to a variety of threat models ranging from protection against global mass surveillance programs and avoiding big tech companies to mitigating attacks, but only you can determine what will work best for your needs.
+
+If you want assistance figuring out the best privacy tools and alternative programs for your needs, start a discussion on our [forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/) or our [Matrix](https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org) community!
+
+For more details about each project, why they were chosen, and additional tips or tricks we recommend, click the "Learn more" link in each section, or click on the recommendation itself to be taken to that specific section of the page.
+
+## Tor Network
+
+
+
+1. Snowflake does not increase privacy, however it allows you to easily contribute to the Tor network and help people in censored networks achieve better privacy.
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md)
+
+## Desktop Web Browsers
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](cloud.md)
+
+### DNS
+
+#### DNS Providers
+
+We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers based on a variety of criteria, such as [Mullvad](https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls) and [Quad9](https://quad9.net/) amongst others. We recommend for you to read our pages on DNS before choosing a provider. In many cases, using an alternative DNS provider is not recommended.
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](dns.md)
+
+#### Encrypted DNS Proxies
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](search-engines.md)
+
+### VPN Providers
+
+??? danger "VPNs do not provide anonymity"
+
+ Using a VPN will **not** keep your browsing habits anonymous, nor will it add additional security to non-secure (HTTP) traffic.
+
+ If you are looking for **anonymity**, you should use the Tor Browser **instead** of a VPN.
+
+ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connecting to websites using HTTPS. A VPN is not a replacement for good security practices.
+
+ [Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](vpn.md)
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](data-redaction.md)
+
+### Email Clients
+
+
+
+- { .twemoji } [Thunderbird](email-clients.md#thunderbird)
+- { .twemoji } [Apple Mail (macOS)](email-clients.md#apple-mail-macos)
+- { .twemoji } [Canary Mail (iOS)](email-clients.md#canary-mail-ios)
+- { .twemoji } [FairEmail (Android)](email-clients.md#fairemail-android)
+- { .twemoji } [GNOME Evolution (Linux)](email-clients.md#gnome-evolution-gnome)
+- { .twemoji } [K-9 Mail (Android)](email-clients.md#k-9-mail-android)
+- { .twemoji } [Kontact (Linux)](email-clients.md#kontact-kde)
+- { .twemoji } [Mailvelope (PGP in standard webmail)](email-clients.md#mailvelope-browser)
+- { .twemoji } [NeoMutt (CLI)](email-clients.md#neomutt-cli)
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](email-clients.md)
+
+### Encryption Software
+
+??? info "Operating System Disk Encryption"
+
+ For encrypting your operating system drive, we typically recommend using whichever encryption tool your operating system provides, whether that is **BitLocker** on Windows, **FileVault** on macOS, or **LUKS** on Linux. These tools are included with the operating system and typically use hardware encryption elements such as a TPM that other full-disk encryption software like VeraCrypt do not. VeraCrypt is still suitable for non-operating system disks such as external drives, especially drives that may be accessed from multiple operating systems.
+
+ [Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](encryption.md##operating-system-included-full-disk-encryption-fde)
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](video-streaming.md)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/tor.md b/i18n/ar/tor.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d4df42fc7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/tor.md
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+---
+title: "Tor Network"
+icon: simple/torproject
+---
+
+{ align=right }
+
+The **Tor** network is a group of volunteer-operated servers that allows you to connect for free and improve your privacy and security on the Internet. Individuals and organizations can also share information over the Tor network with ".onion hidden services" without compromising their privacy. Because Tor traffic is difficult to block and trace, Tor is an effective censorship circumvention tool.
+
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://www.torproject.org){ .card-link title=Homepage }
+[:simple-torbrowser:](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Tor works by routing your internet traffic through those volunteer-operated servers, instead of making a direct connection to the site you're trying to visit. This obfuscates where the traffic is coming from, and no server in the connection path is able to see the full path of where the traffic is coming from and going to, meaning even the servers you are using to connect cannot break your anonymity.
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ Tor circuit pathway - Nodes in the path can only see the servers they are directly connected to, for example the "Entry" node shown can see your IP address, and the address of the "Middle" node, but has no way to see which website you are visiting.
+
+
+- [More information about how Tor works :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md)
+
+## Connecting to Tor
+
+There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for anonymous browsing for desktop computers and Android. In addition to the apps listed below, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser.
+
+### Tor Browser
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tor Browser** is the choice if you need anonymity, as it provides you with access to the Tor network and bridges, and it includes default settings and extensions that are automatically configured by the default security levels: *Standard*, *Safer* and *Safest*.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.torproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.torbrowser)
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://www.torproject.org/download/#android)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.torproject.org/download/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.torproject.org/download/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.torproject.org/download/)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/security/tor)
+
+!!! danger
+
+ You should **never** install any additional extensions on Tor Browser or edit `about:config` settings, including the ones we suggest for Firefox. Browser extensions and non-standard settings make you stand out from others on the Tor network, thus making your browser easier to [fingerprint](https://support.torproject.org/glossary/browser-fingerprinting).
+
+The Tor Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting, or identifying you based on your browser configuration. Therefore, it is imperative that you do **not** modify the browser beyond the default [security levels](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/).
+
+### Orbot
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Orbot** is a free Tor VPN for smartphones which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/orbot/id1609461599)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+
+For resistance against traffic analysis attacks, consider enabling *Isolate Destination Address* in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Connectivity**. This will use a completely different Tor Circuit (different middle relay and exit nodes) for every domain you connect to.
+
+!!! tip "Tips for Android"
+
+ Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN killswitch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+ Orbot is often outdated on the Guardian Project's [F-Droid repository](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android), so consider downloading directly from the [GitHub repository](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases) instead.
+
+ All versions are signed using the same signature so they should be compatible with each other.
+
+## Relays and Bridges
+
+### Snowflake
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.
+
+ People who are censored can use Snowflake proxies to connect to the Tor network. Snowflake is a great way to contribute to the network even if you don't have the technical know-how to run a Tor relay or bridge.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://snowflake.torproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/wikis/Technical%20Overview){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/snowflake.git/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/torproject-snowflake/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/snowflake/mafpmfcccpbjnhfhjnllmmalhifmlcie)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://snowflake.torproject.org/embed "Leave this page open to be a Snowflake proxy")
+
+??? tip "Embedded Snowflake"
+
+ You can enable Snowflake in your browser by clicking the switch below and ==leaving this page open==. You can also install Snowflake as a browser extension to have it always run while your browser is open, however adding third-party extensions can increase your attack surface.
+
+
+ If the embed does not appear for you, ensure you are not blocking the third-party frame from `torproject.org`. Alternatively, visit [this page](https://snowflake.torproject.org/embed.html).
+
+Snowflake does not increase your privacy in any way, nor is it used to connect to the Tor network within your personal browser. However, if your internet connection is uncensored, you should consider running it to help people in censored networks achieve better privacy themselves. There is no need to worry about which websites people are accessing through your proxy—their visible browsing IP address will match their Tor exit node, not yours.
+
+Running a Snowflake proxy is low-risk, even moreso than running a Tor relay or bridge which are already not particularly risky endeavours. However, it does still proxy traffic through your network which can be impactful in some ways, especially if your network is bandwidth-limited. Make sure you understand [how Snowflake works](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/wikis/home) before deciding whether to run a proxy.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/video-streaming.md b/i18n/ar/video-streaming.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..52db5be02
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/video-streaming.md
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+---
+title: "Video Streaming"
+icon: material/video-wireless
+---
+
+The primary threat when using a video streaming platform is that your streaming habits and subscription lists could be used to profile you. You should combine these tools with a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) to make it harder to profile your usage.
+
+## LBRY
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **The LBRY network** is a decentralized video sharing network. It uses a [BitTorrent](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent)-like network to store the video content, and a [blockchain](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockchain) to store the indexes for those videos. The main benefit of this design is censorship resistance.
+
+ **The LBRY desktop client** helps you stream videos from the LBRY network and stores your subscription list in your own LBRY wallet.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://lbry.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://lbry.com/privacypolicy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://lbry.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/lbryio/lbry-desktop){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://lbry.com/windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://lbry.com/osx)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://lbry.com/linux)
+
+!!! note
+
+ Only the **LBRY desktop client** is recommended, as the [Odysee](https://odysee.com) website and the LBRY clients in F-Droid, Play Store, and the App Store have mandatory synchronization and telemetry.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ While watching and hosting videos, your IP address is visible to the LBRY network. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+We recommend **against** synchronizing your wallet with LBRY Inc., as synchronizing encrypted wallets is not supported yet. If you synchronize your wallet with LBRY Inc., you have to trust them to not look at your subscription list, [LBC](https://lbry.com/faq/earn-credits) funds, or take control of your channel.
+
+You can disable *Save hosting data to help the LBRY network* option in :gear: **Settings** → **Advanced Settings**, to avoid exposing your IP address and watched videos when using LBRY for a prolonged period of time.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must not require a centralized account to view videos.
+ - Decentralized authentication, such as via a mobile wallet's private key is acceptable.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/ar/vpn.md b/i18n/ar/vpn.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3aae14929
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/ar/vpn.md
@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+---
+title: "VPN Services"
+icon: material/vpn
+---
+
+Find a no-logging VPN operator who isn’t out to sell or read your web traffic.
+
+??? danger "VPNs do not provide anonymity"
+
+ Using a VPN will **not** keep your browsing habits anonymous, nor will it add additional security to non-secure (HTTP) traffic.
+
+ If you are looking for **anonymity**, you should use the Tor Browser **instead** of a VPN.
+
+ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connecting to websites using HTTPS. A VPN is not a replacement for good security practices.
+
+ [Download Tor](https://www.torproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Tor Myths & FAQ](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
+
+??? question "When are VPNs useful?"
+
+ If you're looking for additional **privacy** from your ISP, on a public Wi-Fi network, or while torrenting files, a VPN may be the solution for you as long as you understand the risks involved.
+
+ [More Info](basics/vpn-overview.md){ .md-button }
+
+## Recommended Providers
+
+!!! abstract "Criteria"
+
+ Our recommended providers use encryption, accept Monero, support WireGuard & OpenVPN, and have a no logging policy. Read our [full list of criteria](#our-criteria) for more information.
+
+### Proton VPN
+
+!!! recommendation annotate
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton VPN** is a strong contender in the VPN space, and they have been in operation since 2016. Proton AG is based in Switzerland and offers a limited free tier, as well as a more featured premium option.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://protonvpn.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://protonvpn.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://protonvpn.com/support/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonVPN){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonvpn.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id1437005085)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonVPN/android-app/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://protonvpn.com/download-windows)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://protonvpn.com/support/linux-vpn-setup/)
+
+??? success annotate "67 Countries"
+
+ Proton VPN has [servers in 67 countries](https://protonvpn.com/vpn-servers) (1). Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
+
+ We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if they use [dedicated servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), instead of cheaper shared solutions (with other customers) such as [virtual private servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
+
+1. Last checked: 2022-09-16
+
+??? success "Independently Audited"
+
+ As of January 2020, Proton VPN has undergone an independent audit by SEC Consult. SEC Consult found some medium and low risk vulnerabilities in Proton VPN's Windows, Android, and iOS applications, all of which were "properly fixed" by Proton VPN before the reports were published. None of the issues identified would have provided an attacker remote access to your device or traffic. You can view individual reports for each platform at [protonvpn.com](https://protonvpn.com/blog/open-source/). In April 2022 Proton VPN underwent [another audit](https://protonvpn.com/blog/no-logs-audit/) and the report was [produced by Securitum](https://protonvpn.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/securitum-protonvpn-nologs-20220330.pdf). A [letter of attestation](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps) was provided for Proton VPN's apps on 9th November 2021 by [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com).
+
+??? success "Open-Source Clients"
+
+ Proton VPN provides the source code for their desktop and mobile clients in their [GitHub organization](https://github.com/ProtonVPN).
+
+??? success "Accepts Cash"
+
+ Proton VPN, in addition to accepting credit/debit cards and PayPal, accepts Bitcoin, and **cash/local currency** as anonymous forms of payment.
+
+??? success "WireGuard Support"
+
+ Proton VPN mostly supports the WireGuard® protocol. [WireGuard](https://www.wireguard.com) is a newer protocol that uses state-of-the-art [cryptography](https://www.wireguard.com/protocol/). Additionally, WireGuard aims to be simpler and more performant.
+
+ Proton VPN [recommends](https://protonvpn.com/blog/wireguard/) the use of WireGuard with their service. On Proton VPN's Windows, macOS, iOS, Android, ChromeOS, and Android TV apps, WireGuard is the default protocol; however, [support](https://protonvpn.com/support/how-to-change-vpn-protocols/) for the protocol is not present in their Linux app.
+
+??? warning "Remote Port Forwarding"
+
+ Proton VPN currently only supports remote [port forwarding](https://protonvpn.com/support/port-forwarding/) on Windows, which may impact some applications. Especially Peer-to-peer applications like Torrent clients.
+
+??? success "Mobile Clients"
+
+ In addition to providing standard OpenVPN configuration files, Proton VPN has mobile clients for [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/protonvpn-fast-secure-vpn/id1437005085), [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonvpn.android&hl=en_US), and [GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonVPN/android-app/releases) allowing for easy connections to their servers.
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ Proton VPN clients support two factor authentication on all platforms except Linux at the moment. Proton VPN has their own servers and datacenters in Switzerland, Iceland and Sweden. They offer adblocking and known malware domains blocking with their DNS service. Additionally, Proton VPN also offers "Tor" servers allowing you to easily connect to onion sites, but we still strongly recommend using [the official Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) for this purpose.
+
+!!! danger "Killswitch feature is broken on Intel-based Macs"
+
+ System crashes [may occur](https://protonvpn.com/support/macos-t2-chip-kill-switch/) on Intel-based Macs when using the VPN killswitch. If you require this feature, and you are using a Mac with Intel chipset, you should consider using another VPN service.
+
+### IVPN
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **IVPN** is another premium VPN provider, and they have been in operation since 2009. IVPN is based in Gibraltar.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.ivpn.net/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.ivpn.net/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/general/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ivpn){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-android/)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/ivpn-serious-privacy-protection/id1193122683)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-windows/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-macos/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-linux/)
+
+??? success annotate "35 Countries"
+
+ IVPN has [servers in 35 countries](https://www.ivpn.net/server-locations) (1). Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
+
+ We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if they use [dedicated servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), instead of cheaper shared solutions (with other customers) such as [virtual private servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
+
+1. Last checked: 2022-09-16
+
+??? success "Independently Audited"
+
+ IVPN has undergone a [no-logging audit from Cure53](https://cure53.de/audit-report_ivpn.pdf) which concluded in agreement with IVPN's no-logging claim. IVPN has also completed a [comprehensive pentest report Cure53](https://cure53.de/summary-report_ivpn_2019.pdf) in January 2020. IVPN has also said they plan to have [annual reports](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/independent-security-audit-concluded) in the future. A further review was conducted [in April 2022](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/ivpn-apps-security-audit-2022-concluded/) and was produced by Cure53 [on their website](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_IVPN_2022.pdf).
+
+??? success "Open-Source Clients"
+
+ As of February 2020 [IVPN applications are now open-source](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/ivpn-applications-are-now-open-source). Source code can be obtained from their [GitHub organization](https://github.com/ivpn).
+
+??? success "Accepts Cash and Monero"
+
+ In addition to accepting credit/debit cards and PayPal, IVPN accepts Bitcoin, **Monero** and **cash/local currency** (on annual plans) as anonymous forms of payment.
+
+??? success "WireGuard Support"
+
+ IVPN supports the WireGuard® protocol. [WireGuard](https://www.wireguard.com) is a newer protocol that uses state-of-the-art [cryptography](https://www.wireguard.com/protocol/). Additionally, WireGuard aims to be simpler and more performant.
+
+ IVPN [recommends](https://www.ivpn.net/wireguard/) the use of WireGuard with their service and, as such, the protocol is the default on all of IVPN's apps. IVPN also offers a WireGuard configuration generator for use with the official WireGuard [apps](https://www.wireguard.com/install/).
+
+??? success "Remote Port Forwarding"
+
+ Remote [port forwarding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_forwarding) is possible with a Pro plan. Port forwarding [can be activated](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/81/How-do-I-activate-port-forwarding.html) via the client area. Port forwarding is only available on IVPN when using WireGuard or OpenVPN protocols and is [disabled on US servers](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/116/Port-forwarding-is-not-working-why.html).
+
+??? success "Mobile Clients"
+
+ In addition to providing standard OpenVPN configuration files, IVPN has mobile clients for [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/ivpn-serious-privacy-protection/id1193122683), [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.ivpn.client), and [GitHub](https://github.com/ivpn/android-app/releases) allowing for easy connections to their servers.
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ IVPN clients support two factor authentication (Mullvad's clients do not). IVPN also provides "[AntiTracker](https://www.ivpn.net/antitracker)" functionality, which blocks advertising networks and trackers from the network level.
+
+### Mullvad
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mullvad** is a fast and inexpensive VPN with a serious focus on transparency and security. They have been in operation since **2009**. Mullvad is based in Sweden and does not have a free trial.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mullvad.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://o54hon2e2vj6c7m3aqqu6uyece65by3vgoxxhlqlsvkmacw6a7m7kiad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/privacy-policy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mullvad){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.mullvad.mullvadvpn)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/mullvad-vpn/id1488466513)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://mullvad.net/en/download/windows/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://mullvad.net/en/download/macos/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://mullvad.net/en/download/linux/)
+
+??? success annotate "41 Countries"
+
+ Mullvad has [servers in 41 countries](https://mullvad.net/servers/) (1). Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
+
+ We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if they use [dedicated servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), instead of cheaper shared solutions (with other customers) such as [virtual private servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
+
+1. Last checked: 2023-01-19
+
+??? success "Independently Audited"
+
+ Mullvad's VPN clients have been audited by Cure53 and Assured AB in a pentest report [published at cure53.de](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_v2.pdf). The security researchers concluded:
+
+ > Cure53 and Assured AB are happy with the results of the audit and the software leaves an overall positive impression. With security dedication of the in-house team at the Mullvad VPN compound, the testers have no doubts about the project being on the right track from a security standpoint.
+
+ In 2020 a second audit [was announced](https://mullvad.net/blog/2020/6/25/results-available-audit-mullvad-app/) and the [final audit report](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_2020_v2.pdf) was made available on Cure53's website:
+
+ > The results of this May-June 2020 project targeting the Mullvad complex are quite positive. [...] The overall application ecosystem used by Mullvad leaves a sound and structured impression. The overall structure of the application makes it easy to roll out patches and fixes in a structured manner. More than anything, the findings spotted by Cure53 showcase the importance of constantly auditing and re-assessing the current leak vectors, in order to always ensure privacy of the end-users. With that being said, Mullvad does a great job protecting the end-user from common PII leaks and privacy related risks.
+
+ In 2021 an infrastructure audit [was announced](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2021/1/20/no-pii-or-privacy-leaks-found-cure53s-infrastructure-audit/) and the [final audit report](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_2021_v1.pdf) was made available on Cure53's website. Another report was commissioned [in June 2022](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2022/6/22/vpn-server-audit-found-no-information-leakage-or-logging-of-customer-data/) and is available on [Assured's website](https://www.assured.se/publications/Assured_Mullvad_relay_server_audit_report_2022.pdf).
+
+??? success "Open-Source Clients"
+
+ Mullvad provides the source code for their desktop and mobile clients in their [GitHub organization](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app).
+
+??? success "Accepts Cash and Monero"
+
+ Mullvad, in addition to accepting credit/debit cards and PayPal, accepts Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, **Monero** and **cash/local currency** as anonymous forms of payment. They also accept Swish and bank wire transfers.
+
+??? success "WireGuard Support"
+
+ Mullvad supports the WireGuard® protocol. [WireGuard](https://www.wireguard.com) is a newer protocol that uses state-of-the-art [cryptography](https://www.wireguard.com/protocol/). Additionally, WireGuard aims to be simpler and more performant.
+
+ Mullvad [recommends](https://mullvad.net/en/help/why-wireguard/) the use of WireGuard with their service. It is the default or only protocol on Mullvad's Android, iOS, macOS, and Linux apps, but on Windows you have to [manually enable](https://mullvad.net/en/help/how-turn-wireguard-mullvad-app/) WireGuard. Mullvad also offers a WireGuard configuration generator for use with the official WireGuard [apps](https://www.wireguard.com/install/).
+
+??? success "IPv6 Support"
+
+ Mullvad supports the future of networking [IPv6](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv6). Their network allows you to [access services hosted on IPv6](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2014/9/15/ipv6-support/) as opposed to other providers who block IPv6 connections.
+
+??? success "Remote Port Forwarding"
+
+ Remote [port forwarding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_forwarding) is allowed for people who make one-time payments, but not allowed for accounts with a recurring/subscription-based payment method. This is to prevent Mullvad from being able to identify you based on your port usage and stored subscription information. See [Port forwarding with Mullvad VPN](https://mullvad.net/help/port-forwarding-and-mullvad/) for more information.
+
+??? success "Mobile Clients"
+
+ Mullvad has published [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/mullvad-vpn/id1488466513) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.mullvad.mullvadvpn) clients, both supporting an easy-to-use interface as opposed to requiring you to manually configure your WireGuard connection. The Android client is also available on [GitHub](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/releases).
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ Mullvad is very transparent about which nodes they [own or rent](https://mullvad.net/en/servers/). They use [ShadowSocks](https://shadowsocks.org/) in their ShadowSocks + OpenVPN configuration, making them more resistant against firewalls with [Deep Packet Inspection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection) trying to block VPNs. Supposedly, [China has to use a different method to block ShadowSocks servers](https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/22). Mullvad's website is also accessible via Tor at [o54hon2e2vj6c7m3aqqu6uyece65by3vgoxxhlqlsvkmacw6a7m7kiad.onion](http://o54hon2e2vj6c7m3aqqu6uyece65by3vgoxxhlqlsvkmacw6a7m7kiad.onion).
+
+## Criteria
+
+!!! danger
+
+ It is important to note that using a VPN provider will not make you anonymous, but it will give you better privacy in certain situations. A VPN is not a tool for illegal activities. Don't rely on a "no log" policy.
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the providers we recommend. This allows us to provide completely objective recommendations.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements for any VPN provider wishing to be recommended, including strong encryption, independent security audits, modern technology, and more. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing a VPN provider, and conduct your own research to ensure the VPN provider you choose is as trustworthy as possible.
+
+### Technology
+
+We require all our recommended VPN providers to provide OpenVPN configuration files to be used in any client. **If** a VPN provides their own custom client, we require a killswitch to block network data leaks when disconnected.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Support for strong protocols such as WireGuard & OpenVPN.
+- Killswitch built in to clients.
+- Multihop support. Multihopping is important to keep data private in case of a single node compromise.
+- If VPN clients are provided, they should be [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_source), like the VPN software they generally have built into them. We believe that [source code](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Source_code) availability provides greater transparency about what your device is actually doing.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- WireGuard and OpenVPN support.
+- Killswitch with highly configurable options (enable/disable on certain networks, on boot, etc.)
+- Easy-to-use VPN clients
+- Supports [IPv6](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv6). We expect that servers will allow incoming connections via IPv6 and allow you to access services hosted on IPv6 addresses.
+- Capability of [remote port forwarding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_forwarding#Remote_port_forwarding) assists in creating connections when using P2P ([Peer-to-Peer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer-to-peer)) file sharing software or hosting a server (e.g., Mumble).
+
+### Privacy
+
+We prefer our recommended providers to collect as little data as possible. Not collecting personal information on registration, and accepting anonymous forms of payment are required.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Monero or cash payment option.
+- No personal information required to register: Only username, password, and email at most.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Accepts Monero, cash, and other forms of anonymous payment options (gift cards, etc.)
+- No personal information accepted (autogenerated username, no email required, etc.)
+
+### Security
+
+A VPN is pointless if it can't even provide adequate security. We require all our recommended providers to abide by current security standards for their OpenVPN connections. Ideally, they would use more future-proof encryption schemes by default. We also require an independent third-party to audit the provider's security, ideally in a very comprehensive manner and on a repeated (yearly) basis.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Strong Encryption Schemes: OpenVPN with SHA-256 authentication; RSA-2048 or better handshake; AES-256-GCM or AES-256-CBC data encryption.
+- Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).
+- Published security audits from a reputable third-party firm.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Strongest Encryption: RSA-4096.
+- Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).
+- Comprehensive published security audits from a reputable third-party firm.
+- Bug-bounty programs and/or a coordinated vulnerability-disclosure process.
+
+### Trust
+
+You wouldn't trust your finances to someone with a fake identity, so why trust them with your internet data? We require our recommended providers to be public about their ownership or leadership. We also would like to see frequent transparency reports, especially in regard to how government requests are handled.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership or ownership.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership.
+- Frequent transparency reports.
+
+### Marketing
+
+With the VPN providers we recommend we like to see responsible marketing.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Must self-host analytics (i.e., no Google Analytics). The provider's site must also comply with [DNT (Do Not Track)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Do_Not_Track) for people who want to opt-out.
+
+Must not have any marketing which is irresponsible:
+
+- Making guarantees of protecting anonymity 100%. When someone makes a claim that something is 100% it means there is no certainty for failure. We know people can quite easily deanonymize themselves in a number of ways, e.g.:
+ - Reusing personal information (e.g., email accounts, unique pseudonyms, etc) that they accessed without anonymity software (Tor, VPN, etc.)
+ - [Browser fingerprinting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint)
+- Claim that a single circuit VPN is "more anonymous" than Tor, which is a circuit of three or more hops that regularly changes.
+- Use responsible language: i.e., it is okay to say that a VPN is "disconnected" or "not connected", however claiming that someone is "exposed", "vulnerable" or "compromised" is needless use of alarming language that may be incorrect. For example, that person might simply be on another VPN provider's service or using Tor.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+Responsible marketing that is both educational and useful to the consumer could include:
+
+- An accurate comparison to when [Tor](tor.md) should be used instead.
+- Availability of the VPN provider's website over a [.onion service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.onion)
+
+### Additional Functionality
+
+While not strictly requirements, there are some factors we looked into when determining which providers to recommend. These include adblocking/tracker-blocking functionality, warrant canaries, multihop connections, excellent customer support, the number of allowed simultaneous connections, etc.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.ar.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/404.md b/i18n/bn/404.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5e69100cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/404.md
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+---
+hide:
+ - feedback
+---
+
+# 404 - Not Found
+
+We couldn't find the page you were looking for! Maybe you were looking for one of these?
+
+- [Introduction to Threat Modeling](basics/threat-modeling.md)
+- [Recommended DNS Providers](dns.md)
+- [Best Desktop Web Browsers](desktop-browsers.md)
+- [Best VPN Providers](vpn.md)
+- [Privacy Guides Forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net)
+- [Our Blog](https://blog.privacyguides.org)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md b/i18n/bn/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..88a0e9100
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# Community Code of Conduct
+
+**We pledge** to make our community a harassment-free experience for everyone.
+
+**We strive** to create a positive environment, using welcoming and inclusive language, and being respectful of the viewpoints of others.
+
+**We do not allow** inappropriate or otherwise unacceptable behavior, such as sexualized language, trolling and insulting comments, or otherwise promoting intolerance or harassment.
+
+## Community Standards
+
+What we expect from members of our communities:
+
+1. **Don't spread misinformation**
+
+ We are creating an evidence-based educational community around information privacy and security, not a home for conspiracy theories. For example, when making a claim that a certain piece of software is malicious or that certain telemetry data is privacy invasive, explain in detail what is collected and how it collected. Claims of this nature must be backed by technical evidence.
+
+1. **Don't abuse our willingness to help**
+
+ Our community members are not your free tech support. We are happy to help you with specific steps on your privacy journey if you are willing to put in effort on your end. We are not willing to answer endlessly repeated questions about generic computer problems you could have answered yourself with a 30-second internet search. Don't be a [help vampire](https://slash7.com/2006/12/22/vampires/).
+
+1. **Behave in a positive and constructive manner**
+
+ Examples of behavior that contributes to a positive environment for our community include:
+
+ - Demonstrating empathy and kindness toward other people
+ - Being respectful of differing opinions, viewpoints, and experiences
+ - Giving and gracefully accepting constructive feedback
+ - Accepting responsibility and apologizing to those affected by our mistakes, and learning from the experience
+ - Focusing on what is best not just for us as individuals, but for the overall community
+
+### Unacceptable Behavior
+
+The following behaviors are considered harassment and are unacceptable within our community:
+
+- The use of sexualized language or imagery, and sexual attention or advances of any kind
+- Trolling, insulting or derogatory comments, and personal or political attacks
+- Public or private harassment
+- Publishing others' private information, such as a physical or email address, without their explicit permission
+- Other conduct which could reasonably be considered inappropriate in a professional setting
+
+## Scope
+
+Our Code of Conduct applies within all project spaces, as well as when an individual is representing the Privacy Guides project in other communities.
+
+We are responsible for clarifying the standards of our community, and have the right to remove or alter the comments of those participating within our community, as necessary and at our discretion.
+
+### Contact
+
+If you observe a problem on a platform like Matrix or Reddit, please contact our moderators on that platform in chat, via DM, or through any designated "Modmail" system.
+
+If you have a problem elsewhere, or a problem our community moderators are unable to resolve, reach out to `jonah@privacyguides.org` and/or `dngray@privacyguides.org`.
+
+All community leaders are obligated to respect the privacy and security of the reporter of any incident.
diff --git a/i18n/bn/about/criteria.md b/i18n/bn/about/criteria.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fd7753d16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/about/criteria.md
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+---
+title: General Criteria
+---
+
+!!! example "Work in Progress"
+
+ The following page is a work in progress, and does not reflect the full criteria for our recommendations at this time. Past discussion on this topic: [#24](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/discussions/24)
+
+Below are some things that must apply to all submissions to Privacy Guides. Each category will have additional requirements for inclusion.
+
+## Financial Disclosure
+
+We do not make money from recommending certain products, we do not use affiliate links, and we do not provide special consideration to project donors.
+
+## General Guidelines
+
+We apply these priorities when considering new recommendations:
+
+- **Secure**: Tools should follow security best-practices wherever applicable.
+- **Source Availability**: Open source projects are generally preferred over equivalent proprietary alternatives.
+- **Cross-Platform**: We typically prefer recommendations to be cross-platform, to avoid vendor lock-in.
+- **Active Development**: The tools that we recommend should be actively developed, unmaintained projects will be removed in most cases.
+- **Usability**: Tools should be accessible to most computer users, an overly technical background should not be required.
+- **Documented**: Tools should have clear and extensive documentation for use.
+
+## Developer Self-Submissions
+
+We have these requirements in regard to developers which wish to submit their project or software for consideration.
+
+- Must disclose affiliation, i.e. your position within the project being submitted.
+
+- Must have a security whitepaper if it is a project that involves handling of sensitive information like a messenger, password manager, encrypted cloud storage etc.
+ - Third party audit status. We want to know if you have one, or have one planned. If possible please mention who will be conducting the audit.
+
+- Must explain what the project brings to the table in regard to privacy.
+ - Does it solve any new problem?
+ - Why should anyone use it over the alternatives?
+
+- Must state what the exact threat model is with their project.
+ - It should be clear to potential users what the project can provide, and what it cannot.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/about/donate.md b/i18n/bn/about/donate.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..10975cbd3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/about/donate.md
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+---
+title: Supporting Us
+---
+
+
+It takes a lot of [people](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors) and [work](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/pulse/monthly) to keep Privacy Guides up to date and spreading the word about privacy and mass surveillance. If you like what we do, consider getting involved by [editing the site](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org) or [contributing translations](https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides).
+
+If you want to support us financially, the most convenient method for us is contributing via Open Collective, a website operated by our fiscal host. Open Collective accepts payments via credit/debit card, PayPal, and bank transfers.
+
+[Donate on OpenCollective.com](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/donate ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+Donations made directly to us on Open Collective are generally tax-deductible in the US, because our fiscal host (the Open Collective Foundation) is a registered 501(c)3 organization. You will receive a receipt from the Open Collective Foundation after donating. Privacy Guides does not provide financial advice, and you should contact your tax advisor to find out whether this is applicable to you.
+
+If you already make use of GitHub sponsorships, you can also sponsor our organization there.
+
+[Sponsor us on GitHub](https://github.com/sponsors/privacyguides ""){.md-button}
+
+## Backers
+
+A special thanks to all those who support our mission! :heart:
+
+*Please note: This section loads a widget directly from Open Collective. This section does not reflect donations made outside of Open Collective, and we have no control over the specific donors featured in this section.*
+
+
+
+## How We Use Donations
+
+Privacy Guides is a **non-profit** organization. We use donations for a variety of purposes, including:
+
+**Domain Registrations**
+:
+
+We have a few domain names like `privacyguides.org` which cost us around $10 yearly to maintain their registration.
+
+**Web Hosting**
+:
+
+Traffic to this website uses hundreds of gigabytes of data per month, we use a variety of service providers to keep up with this traffic.
+
+**Online Services**
+:
+
+We host [internet services](https://privacyguides.net) for testing and showcasing different privacy-products we like and [recommend](../tools.md). Some of which are made publicly available for our community's use (SearXNG, Tor, etc.), and some are provided for our team members (email, etc.).
+
+**Product Purchases**
+:
+
+We occasionally purchase products and services for the purposes of testing our [recommended tools](../tools.md).
+
+We are still working with our fiscal host (the Open Collective Foundation) to receive cryptocurrency donations, at the moment the accounting is unfeasible for many smaller transactions, but this should change in the future. In the meantime, if you wish to make a sizable (> $100) cryptocurrency donation, please reach out to [jonah@privacyguides.org](mailto:jonah@privacyguides.org).
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/about/index.md b/i18n/bn/about/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0fdd7d653
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/about/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: "About Privacy Guides"
+---
+
+**Privacy Guides** is a socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy. We are a non-profit collective operated entirely by volunteer [team members](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/g/team) and contributors.
+
+[:material-hand-coin-outline: Support the project](donate.md ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+## Our Team
+
+??? person "@jonah"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/jonah)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/jonaharagon "@jonaharagon")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@jonah "@jonah@neat.computer"){rel=me}
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Homepage](https://www.jonaharagon.com)
+
+??? person "@niek-de-wilde"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/Niek-de-Wilde)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/blacklight447 "@blacklight447")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.social/@blacklight447 "@blacklight447@mastodon.social"){rel=me}
+
+??? person "@dngray"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/dngray)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/dngray "@dngray")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.social/@dngray "@dngray@mastodon.social"){rel=me}
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-envelope: Email](mailto:dngray@privacyguides.org)
+
+??? person "@freddy"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/freddy)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/freddy-m "@freddy-m")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://social.lol/@freddy "@freddy@social.lol"){rel=me}
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-envelope: Email](mailto:freddy@privacyguides.org)
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Homepage](https://freddy.omg.lol)
+
+??? person "@mfwmyfacewhen"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/mfwmyfacewhen)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/mfwmyfacewhen "@mfwmyfacewhen")
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Homepage](https://mfw.omg.lol)
+
+??? person "@olivia"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/olivia)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/hook9 "@hook9")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@oliviablob "@oliviablob@neat.computer"){rel=me}
+
+Additionally, [many people](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors) have made contributions to the project. You can too, we're open sourced on GitHub!
+
+Our team members review all changes made to the website and handle administrative duties such as web hosting and financials, however they do not personally profit from any contributions made to this site. Our financials are transparently hosted by the Open Collective Foundation 501(c)(3) at [opencollective.com/privacyguides](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides). Donations to Privacy Guides are generally tax deductible in the United States.
+
+## Site License
+
+*The following is a human-readable summary of (and not a substitute for) the [license](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE):*
+
+:fontawesome-brands-creative-commons: :fontawesome-brands-creative-commons-by: :fontawesome-brands-creative-commons-nd: Unless otherwise noted, the original content on this website is made available under the [Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE). This means that you are free to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format for any purpose, even commercially; as long as you give appropriate credit to `Privacy Guides (www.privacyguides.org)` and provide a link to the license. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests Privacy Guides endorses you or your use. If you remix, transform, or build upon the content of this website, you may not distribute the modified material.
+
+This license is in place to prevent people from sharing our work without giving proper credit, and to prevent people from modifying our work in a way that could be used to mislead people. If you find the terms of this license too restrictive for the project you're working on, please reach out to us at `jonah@privacyguides.org`. We are happy to provide alternative licensing options for well-intentioned projects in the privacy space!
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/about/notices.md b/i18n/bn/about/notices.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bd487e69f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/about/notices.md
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+---
+title: "Notices and Disclaimers"
+hide:
+ - toc
+---
+
+## Legal Disclaimer
+
+Privacy Guides is not a law firm. As such, the Privacy Guides website and contributors are not providing legal advice. The material and recommendations in our website and guides do not constitute legal advice nor does contributing to the website or communicating with Privacy Guides or other contributors about our website create an attorney-client relationship.
+
+Running this website, like any human endeavor, involves uncertainty and trade-offs. We hope this website helps, but it may include mistakes and can’t address every situation. If you have any questions about your situation, we encourage you to do your own research, seek out other experts, and engage in discussions with the Privacy Guides community. If you have any legal questions, you should consult with your own legal counsel before moving forward.
+
+Privacy Guides is an open source project contributed to under licenses that include terms that, for the protection of the website and its contributors, make clear that the Privacy Guides project and website is offered "as-is", without warranty, and disclaiming liability for damages resulting from using the website or any recommendations contained within. Privacy Guides does not warrant or make any representations concerning the accuracy, likely results, or reliability of the use of the materials on the website or otherwise relating to such materials on the website or on any third-party sites linked on this site.
+
+Privacy Guides additionally does not warrant that this website will be constantly available, or available at all.
+
+## Licenses
+
+Unless otherwise noted, all content on this website is made available under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE).
+
+This does not include third-party code embedded in this repository, or code where a superseding license is otherwise noted. The following are notable examples, but this list may not be all-inclusive:
+
+* [MathJax](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/docs/assets/javascripts/mathjax.js) is licensed under the [Apache License 2.0](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/docs/assets/javascripts/LICENSE.mathjax.txt).
+
+Portions of this notice itself were adopted from [opensource.guide](https://github.com/github/opensource.guide/blob/master/notices.md) on GitHub. That resource and this page itself are released under [CC-BY-4.0](https://github.com/github/opensource.guide/blob/master/LICENSE).
+
+This means that you can use the human-readable content in this repository for your own project, per the terms outlined in the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License text. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests Privacy Guides endorses you or your use. You **may not** use the Privacy Guides branding in your own project without express approval from this project. Privacy Guides's brand trademarks include the "Privacy Guides" wordmark and shield logo.
+
+We believe that the logos and other images in `assets` obtained from third-party providers are either in the public domain or **fair use**. In a nutshell, legal [fair use doctrine](https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/more-info.html) allows the use of copyrighted images in order to identify the subject matter for purposes of public comment. However, these logos and other images may still be subject to trademark laws in one or more jurisdictions. Before using this content, please ensure that it is used to identify the entity or organization that owns the trademark and that you have the right to use it under the laws which apply in the circumstances of your intended use. *When copying content from this website, you are solely responsible for ensuring that you do not infringe someone else's trademark or copyright.*
+
+When you contribute to this repository you are doing so under the above licenses, and you are granting Privacy Guides a perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive, transferable, royalty-free, irrevocable license with the right to sublicense such rights through multiple tiers of sublicensees, to reproduce, modify, display, perform and distribute your contribution as part of our project.
+
+## Acceptable Use
+
+You may not use this website in any way that causes or may cause damage to the website or impairment of the availability or accessibility of Privacy Guides, or in any way which is unlawful, illegal, fraudulent, harmful, or in connection with any unlawful, illegal, fraudulent, or harmful purpose or activity.
+
+You must not conduct any systematic or automated data collection activities on or in relation to this website without express written consent, including:
+
+* Excessive Automated Scans
+* Denial of Service Attacks
+* Scraping
+* Data Mining
+* 'Framing' (IFrames)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/about/privacy-policy.md b/i18n/bn/about/privacy-policy.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2cb20d13c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/about/privacy-policy.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: "Privacy Policy"
+---
+
+Privacy Guides is a community project operated by a number of active volunteer contributors. The public list of team members [can be found on GitHub](https://github.com/orgs/privacyguides/people).
+
+## Data We Collect From Visitors
+
+The privacy of our website visitors is important to us, so we do not track any individual people. As a visitor to our website:
+
+- No personal information is collected
+- No information such as cookies are stored in the browser
+- No information is shared with, sent to or sold to third-parties
+- No information is shared with advertising companies
+- No information is mined and harvested for personal and behavioral trends
+- No information is monetized
+
+You can view the data we collect on our [statistics](statistics.md) page.
+
+We run a self-hosted installation of [Plausible Analytics](https://plausible.io) to collect some anonymous usage data for statistical purposes. The goal is to track overall trends in our website traffic, it is not to track individual visitors. All the data is in aggregate only. No personal data is collected.
+
+Data collected includes referral sources, top pages, visit duration, information from the devices (device type, operating system, country and browser) used during the visit and more. You can learn more about how Plausible works and collects information in a privacy-respecting manner [here](https://plausible.io/data-policy).
+
+## Data We Collect From Account Holders
+
+On some websites and services we provide, many features may require an account. For example, an account may be required to post and reply to topics on a forum platform.
+
+To sign up for most accounts, we will collect a name, username, email, and password. In the event a website requires more information than just that data, that will be clearly marked and noted in a separate privacy statement per-site.
+
+We use your account data to identify you on the website and to create pages specific to you, such as your profile page. We will also use your account data to publish a public profile for you on our services.
+
+We use your email to:
+
+- Notify you about posts and other activity on the websites or services.
+- Reset your password and help keep your account secure.
+- Contact you in special circumstances related to your account.
+- Contact you about legal requests, such as DMCA takedown requests.
+
+On some websites and services you may provide additional information for your account, such as a short biography, avatar, your location, or your birthday. We make that information available to everyone who can access the website or service in question. This information is not required to use any of our services and can be erased at any time.
+
+We will store your account data as long as your account remains open. After closing an account, we may retain some or all of your account data in the form of backups or archives for up to 90 days.
+
+## Contacting Us
+
+The Privacy Guides team generally does not have access to personal data outside of limited access granted via some moderation panels. Inquiries regarding your personal information should be sent directly to:
+
+```text
+Jonah Aragon
+Services Administrator
+jonah@privacyguides.org
+```
+
+For all other inquiries, you can contact any member of our team.
+
+For complaints under GDPR more generally, you may lodge complaints with your local data protection supervisory authorities. In France it's the Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés which take care and handle the complaints. They provide a [template of complaint letter](https://www.cnil.fr/en/plaintes) to use.
+
+## About This Policy
+
+We will post any new versions of this statement [here](privacy-policy.md). We may change how we announce changes in future versions of this document. In the meantime we may update our contact information at any time without announcing a change. Please refer to the [Privacy Policy](privacy-policy.md) for the latest contact information at any time.
+
+A full revision [history](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/commits/main/docs/about/privacy-policy.md) of this page can be found on GitHub.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/about/privacytools.md b/i18n/bn/about/privacytools.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c5bab16ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/about/privacytools.md
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+---
+title: "PrivacyTools FAQ"
+---
+
+# Why we moved on from PrivacyTools
+
+In September 2021, every active contributor unanimously agreed to move from PrivacyTools to work on this site: Privacy Guides. This decision was made because PrivacyTools’ founder and controller of the domain name had disappeared for an extended period of time and could not be contacted.
+
+Having built a reputable site and set of services on PrivacyTools.io, this caused grave concerns for the future of PrivacyTools, as any future disruption could wipe out the entire organization with no recovery method. This transition was communicated to the PrivacyTools community many months in advance via a variety of channels including its blog, Twitter, Reddit, and Mastodon to ensure the entire process went as smoothly as possible. We did this to ensure nobody was kept in the dark, which has been our modus operandi since our team was created, and to make sure Privacy Guides was recognized as the same reliable organization that PrivacyTools was before the transition.
+
+After the organizational move was completed, the founder of PrivacyTools returned and began to spread misinformation about the Privacy Guides project. They continue to spread misinformation in addition to operating a paid link farm on the PrivacyTools domain. We are creating this page to clear up any misconceptions.
+
+## What is PrivacyTools?
+
+PrivacyTools was created in 2015 by "BurungHantu," who wanted to make a privacy information resource - helpful tools following the Snowden revelations. The site grew into a flourishing open-source project with [many contributors](https://github.com/privacytools/privacytools.io/graphs/contributors), some eventually given various organizational responsibilities, such as operating online services like Matrix and Mastodon, managing and reviewing changes to the site on GitHub, finding sponsors for the project, writing blog posts and operating social media outreach platforms like Twitter, etc.
+
+Beginning in 2019, BurungHantu grew more and more distant from the active development of the website and communities, and began delaying payments he was responsible for related to the servers we operated. To avoid having our system administrator pay server costs out of their own pocket, we changed the donation methods listed on the site from BurungHantu's personal PayPal and crypto accounts to a new OpenCollective page on [October 31, 2019](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184557/https://blog.privacytools.io/privacytools-io-joins-the-open-collective-foundation/). This had the added benefits of making our finances completely transparent, a value we strongly believe in, and tax-deductible in the United States, because they were being held by the Open Collective Foundation 501(c)3. This change was unanimously agreed upon by the team and went uncontested.
+
+## Why We Moved On
+
+In 2020, BurungHantu's absence grew much more noticeable. At one point, we required the domain's nameservers to be changed to nameservers controlled by our system administrator to avoid future disruption, and this change was not completed for over a month after the initial request. He would disappear from the public chat and private team chat rooms on Matrix for months at a time, occasionally popping in to give some small feedback or promise to be more active before disappearing once again.
+
+In October 2020, the PrivacyTools system administrator (Jonah) [left](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190742/https://blog.privacytools.io/blacklight447-taking-over/) the project because of these difficulties, handing control to another long-time contributor. Jonah had been operating nearly every PrivacyTools service and acting as the *de facto* project lead for website development in BurungHantu's absence, thus his departure was a significant change to the organization. At the time, because of these significant organizational changes, BurungHantu promised the remaining team he would return to take control of the project going forward. ==The PrivacyTools team reached out via several communication methods over the following months, but did not receive any response.==
+
+## Domain Name Reliance
+
+At the beginning of 2021, the PrivacyTools team grew worried about the future of the project, because the domain name was set to expire on 1st March 2021. The domain was ultimately renewed by BurungHantu with no comment.
+
+The team’s concerns were not addressed, and we realized this would be a problem every year: If the domain expired it would have allowed it to be stolen by squatters or spammers, thus ruining the organization's reputation. We also would have had trouble reaching the community to inform them of what took place.
+
+Without being in any contact with BurungHantu, we decided the best course of action would be to move to a new domain name while we still had guaranteed control over the old domain name, sometime before March 2022. This way, we would be able to cleanly redirect all PrivacyTools resources to the new site without any interruption in service. This decision was made many months in advance and communicated to the entire team in the hopes that BurungHantu would reach out and assure his continued support for the project, because with a recognizable brand name and large communities online, moving away from "PrivacyTools" was the least desirable possible outcome.
+
+In mid-2021 the PrivacyTools team reached out to Jonah, who agreed to rejoin the team to help with the transition.
+
+## Community Call to Action
+
+At the end of July 2021, we [informed](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184422/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-future-of-privacytools/) the PrivacyTools community of our intention to choose a new name and continue the project on a new domain, to be [chosen](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190935/https://aragon.cloud/apps/forms/cMPxG9KyopapBbcw) on 2nd August 2022. In the end, "Privacy Guides" was selected, with the `privacyguides.org` domain already owned by Jonah for a side-project from 2020 that went undeveloped.
+
+## Control of r/privacytoolsIO
+
+Simultaneously with the ongoing website issues at privacytools.io, the r/privacytoolsIO moderation team was facing challenges with managing the subreddit. The subreddit had always been operated mostly independently of the website's development, but BurungHantu was the primary moderator of the subreddit as well, and he was the only moderator granted "Full Control" privileges. u/trai_dep was the only active moderator at the time, and [posted](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/comments/o9tllh/requesting_rprivacytoolsio_im_only_active_mod_top/) a request to Reddit's administrators on June 28, 2021, asking to be granted the primary moderator position and full control privileges, in order to make necessary changes to the Subreddit.
+
+Reddit requires that subreddits have active moderators. If the primary moderator is inactive for a lengthy period of time (such as a year) the primary moderation position can be re-appointed to the next moderator in line. For this request to have been granted, BurungHantu had to have been completely absent from all Reddit activity for a long period of time, which was consistent with his behaviors on other platforms.
+
+> If you were removed as moderator from a subreddit through Reddit request it is because your lack of response and lack of activity qualified the subreddit for an r/redditrequest transfer.
+>
+> r/redditrequest is Reddit's way of making sure communities have active moderators and is part of the [Moderator Code of Conduct](https://www.redditinc.com/policies/moderator-code-of-conduct).
+
+## Beginning the Transition
+
+On September 14th, 2021, we [announced](https://www.privacyguides.org/blog/2021/09/14/welcome-to-privacy-guides/) the beginning of our migration to this new domain:
+
+> [...] we found it necessary to make this switch sooner rather than later to ensure people would find out about this transition as soon as possible. This gives us adequate time to transition the domain name, which is currently redirecting to www.privacyguides.org, and it hopefully gives everyone enough time to notice the change, update bookmarks and websites, etc.
+
+This change [entailed:](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pnhn4a/rprivacyguides_privacyguidesorg_what_you_need_to/)
+
+- Redirecting www.privacytools.io to [www.privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org).
+- Archiving the source code on GitHub to preserve our past work and issue tracker, which we continued to use for months of future development of this site.
+- Posting announcements to our subreddit and various other communities informing people of the official change.
+- Formally closing privacytools.io services, like Matrix and Mastodon, and encouraging existing users to migrate as soon as possible.
+
+Things appeared to be going smoothly, and most of our active community made the switch to our new project exactly as we hoped.
+
+## Following Events
+
+Roughly a week following the transition, BurungHantu returned online for the first time in nearly a year, however nobody on our team was willing to return to PrivacyTools because of his historic unreliability. Rather than apologize for his prolonged absence, he immediately went on the offensive and positioned the transition to Privacy Guides as an attack against him and his project. He subsequently [deleted](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/pp9yie/comment/hd49wbn) many of these posts when it was pointed out by the community that he had been absent and abandoned the project.
+
+At this point, BurungHantu claimed he wanted to continue working on privacytools.io on his own and requested that we remove the redirect from www.privacytools.io to [www.privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org). We obliged and requested that he keep the subdomains for Matrix, Mastodon, and PeerTube active for us to run as a public service to our community for at least a few months, in order to allow users on those platforms to easily migrate to other accounts. Due to the federated nature of the services we provided, they were tied to specific domain names making it very difficult to migrate (and in some cases impossible).
+
+Unfortunately, because control of the r/privacytoolsIO subreddit was not returned to BurungHantu at his demand (further information below), those subdomains were [cut off](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pymthv/comment/hexwrps/) at the beginning of October, ending any migration possibilities to any users still using those services.
+
+Following this, BurungHantu made false accusations about Jonah stealing donations from the project. BurungHantu had over a year since the alleged incident occurred, and yet he never made anyone aware of it until after the Privacy Guides migration. BurungHantu has been repeatedly asked for proof and to comment on the reason for his silence by the team [and the community](https://twitter.com/TommyTran732/status/1526153536962281474), and has not done so.
+
+BurungHantu also made a [twitter post](https://twitter.com/privacytoolsIO/status/1510560676967710728) alleging that an "attorney" had reached out to him on Twitter and was providing advice, in another attempt to bully us into giving him control of our subreddit, and as part of his smear campaign to muddy the waters surrounding the launch of Privacy Guides while pretending to be a victim.
+
+## PrivacyTools.io Now
+
+As of September 25th 2022 we are seeing BurungHantu's overall plans come to fruition on privacytools.io, and this is the very reason we decided to create this explainer page today. The website he is operating appears to be a heavily SEO-optimized version of the site which recommends tools in exchange for financial compensation. Very recently, IVPN and Mullvad, two VPN providers near-universally [recommended](../vpn.md) by the privacy community and notable for their stance against affiliate programs were removed from PrivacyTools. In their place? NordVPN, Surfshark, ExpressVPN, and hide.me; Giant VPN corporations with untrustworthy platforms and business practices, notorious for their aggressive marketing and affiliate programs.
+
+==**PrivacyTools has become exactly the type of site we [warned against](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729205249/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-reviews/) on the PrivacyTools blog in 2019.**== We've tried to keep our distance from PrivacyTools since the transition, but their continued harassment towards our project and now their absurd abuse of the credibility their brand gained over 6 years of open source contributions is extremely troubling to us. Those of us actually fighting for privacy are not fighting against each other, and are not getting our advice from the highest bidder.
+
+## r/privacytoolsIO Now
+
+After the launch of [r/PrivacyGuides](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacyguides), it was impractical for u/trai_dep to continue moderating both subreddits, and with the community on-board with the transition, r/privacytoolsIO was [made](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/qk7qrj/a_new_era_why_rptio_is_now_a_restricted_sub/) a restricted sub in a post on November 1st, 2021:
+
+> [...] The growth of this Sub was the result of great effort, across several years, by the PrivacyGuides.org team. And by every one of you.
+>
+> A Subreddit is a great deal of work to administer and moderate. Like a garden, it requires patient tending and daily care. It’s not a task for dilettantes or commitment-challenged people. It can’t thrive under a gardener who abandons it for several years, then shows up demanding this year’s harvest as their tribute. It’s unfair to the team formed years ago. It’s unfair to you. [...]
+
+Subreddits do not belong to anybody, and they especially do not belong to brand-holders. They belong to their communities, and the community and its moderators made the decision to support the move to r/PrivacyGuides.
+
+In the months since, BurungHantu has threatened and begged for returning subreddit control to his account in [violation](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/wiki/top_mod_removal/) of Reddit rules:
+
+> Retaliation from any moderator with regards to removal requests is disallowed.
+
+For a community with many thousands of remaining subscribers, we feel that it would be incredibly disrespectful to return control of that massive platform to the person who abandoned it for over a year, and who now operates a website that we feel provides very low-quality information. Preserving the years of past discussions in that community is more important to us, and thus u/trai_dep and the rest of the subreddit moderation team has made the decision to keep r/privacytoolsIO as-is.
+
+## OpenCollective Now
+
+Our fundraising platform, OpenCollective, is another source of contention. Our position is that OpenCollective was put in place by our team and managed by our team to fund services we currently operate and which PrivacyTools no longer does. We [reached out](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/updates/transitioning-to-privacy-guides) to all of our donors regarding our move to Privacy Guides, and we were unanimously supported by our sponsors and community.
+
+Thus, the funds in OpenCollective belong to Privacy Guides, they were given to our project, and not the owner of a well known domain name. In the announcement made to donors on September 17th, 2021, we offered refunds to any donor who disagrees with the stance we took, but nobody has taken us up on this offer:
+
+> If any sponsors or backers disagree with or feel misled by these recent events and would like to request a refund given these highly unusual circumstances, please get in touch with our project admin by emailing jonah@triplebit.net.
+
+## Further Reading
+
+This topic has been discussed extensively within our communities in various locations, and it seems likely that most people reading this page will already be familiar with the events leading up to the move to Privacy Guides. Some of our previous posts on the matter may have extra detail we omitted here for brevity. They have been linked below for the sake of completion.
+
+- [June 28, 2021 request for control of r/privacytoolsIO](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/comments/o9tllh/requesting_rprivacytoolsio_im_only_active_mod_top/)
+- [July 27, 2021 announcement of our intentions to move on the PrivacyTools blog, written by the team](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184422/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-future-of-privacytools/)
+- [Sept 13, 2021 announcement of the beginning of our transition to Privacy Guides on r/privacytoolsIO](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/pnql46/rprivacyguides_privacyguidesorg_what_you_need_to/)
+- [Sept 17, 2021 announcement on OpenCollective from Jonah](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/updates/transitioning-to-privacy-guides)
+- [Sept 30, 2021 Twitter thread detailing most of the events now described on this page](https://twitter.com/privacy_guides/status/1443633412800225280)
+- [Oct 1, 2021 post by u/dng99 noting subdomain failure](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pymthv/comment/hexwrps/)
+- [Apr 2, 2022 response by u/dng99 to PrivacyTools' accusatory blog post](https://www.reddit.com/comments/tuo7mm/comment/i35kw5a/)
+- [May 16, 2022 response by @TommyTran732 on Twitter](https://twitter.com/TommyTran732/status/1526153497984618496)
+- [Sep 3, 2022 post on Techlore's forum by @dngray](https://discuss.techlore.tech/t/has-anyone-seen-this-video-wondering-your-thoughts/792/20)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/about/services.md b/i18n/bn/about/services.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a6f2c070f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/about/services.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# Privacy Guides Services
+
+We run a number of web services to test out features and promote cool decentralized, federated, and/or open-source projects. Many of these services are available to the public and are detailed below.
+
+[:material-comment-alert: Report an issue](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/services/2 ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+## Discourse
+
+- Domain: [discuss.privacyguides.net](https://discuss.privacyguides.net)
+- Availability: Public
+- Source: [github.com/discourse/discourse](https://github.com/discourse/discourse)
+
+## Gitea
+
+- Domain: [code.privacyguides.dev](https://code.privacyguides.dev)
+- Availability: Invite-Only
+ Access may be granted upon request to any team working on *Privacy Guides*-related development or content.
+- Source: [snapcraft.io/gitea](https://snapcraft.io/gitea)
+
+## Matrix
+
+- Domain: [matrix.privacyguides.org](https://matrix.privacyguides.org)
+- Availability: Invite-Only
+ Access may be granted upon request to Privacy Guides team members, Matrix moderators, third-party Matrix community administrators, Matrix bot operators, and other individuals in need of a reliable Matrix presence.
+- Source: [github.com/spantaleev/matrix-docker-ansible-deploy](https://github.com/spantaleev/matrix-docker-ansible-deploy)
+
+## SearXNG
+
+- Domain: [search.privacyguides.net](https://search.privacyguides.net)
+- Availability: Public
+- Source: [github.com/searxng/searxng-docker](https://github.com/searxng/searxng-docker)
+
+## Invidious
+
+- Domain: [invidious.privacyguides.net](https://invidious.privacyguides.net)
+- Availability: Semi-Public
+ We host Invidious primarily to serve embedded YouTube videos on our website, this instance is not intended for general-purpose use and may be limited at any time.
+- Source: [github.com/iv-org/invidious](https://github.com/iv-org/invidious)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/about/statistics.md b/i18n/bn/about/statistics.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b5923edfc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/about/statistics.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: Traffic Statistics
+---
+
+## Website Statistics
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/advanced/communication-network-types.md b/i18n/bn/advanced/communication-network-types.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d451376a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/advanced/communication-network-types.md
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+---
+title: "Types of Communication Networks"
+icon: 'material/transit-connection-variant'
+---
+
+There are several network architectures commonly used to relay messages between people. These networks can provide different privacy guarantees, which is why it's worth considering your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md) when deciding which app to use.
+
+[Recommended Instant Messengers](../real-time-communication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Centralized Networks
+
+{ align=left }
+
+Centralized messengers are those where all participants are on the same server or network of servers controlled by the same organization.
+
+Some self-hosted messengers allow you to set up your own server. Self-hosting can provide additional privacy guarantees, such as no usage logs or limited access to metadata (data about who is talking to whom). Self-hosted centralized messengers are isolated and everyone must be on the same server to communicate.
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- New features and changes can be implemented more quickly.
+- Easier to get started with and to find contacts.
+- Most mature and stable features ecosystems, as they are easier to program in a centralized software.
+- Privacy issues may be reduced when you trust a server that you're self-hosting.
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Can include [restricted control or access](https://drewdevault.com/2018/08/08/Signal.html). This can include things like:
+- Being [forbidden from connecting third-party clients](https://github.com/LibreSignal/LibreSignal/issues/37#issuecomment-217211165) to the centralized network that might provide for greater customization or a better experience. Often defined in Terms and Conditions of usage.
+- Poor or no documentation for third-party developers.
+- The [ownership](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729191953/https://blog.privacytools.io/delisting-wire/), privacy policy, and operations of the service can change easily when a single entity controls it, potentially compromising the service later on.
+- Self-hosting requires effort and knowledge of how to set up a service.
+
+## Federated Networks
+
+{ align=left }
+
+Federated messengers use multiple, independent, decentralized servers that are able to talk to each other (email is one example of a federated service). Federation allows system administrators to control their own server and still be a part of the larger communications network.
+
+When self-hosted, members of a federated server can discover and communicate with members of other servers, although some servers may choose to remain private by being non-federated (e.g., work team server).
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- Allows for greater control over your own data when running your own server.
+- Allows you to choose whom to trust your data with by choosing between multiple "public" servers.
+- Often allows for third-party clients which can provide a more native, customized, or accessible experience.
+- Server software can be verified that it matches public source code, assuming you have access to the server or you trust the person who does (e.g., a family member).
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Adding new features is more complex because these features need to be standardized and tested to ensure they work with all servers on the network.
+- Due to the previous point, features can be lacking, or incomplete or working in unexpected ways compared to centralized platforms, such as message relay when offline or message deletion.
+- Some metadata may be available (e.g., information like "who is talking to whom," but not actual message content if E2EE is used).
+- Federated servers generally require trusting your server's administrator. They may be a hobbyist or otherwise not a "security professional," and may not serve standard documents like a privacy policy or terms of service detailing how your data is used.
+- Server administrators sometimes choose to block other servers, which are a source of unmoderated abuse or break general rules of accepted behavior. This will hinder your ability to communicate with members of those servers.
+
+## Peer-to-Peer Networks
+
+{ align=left }
+
+P2P messengers connect to a [distributed network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_networking) of nodes to relay a message to the recipient without a third-party server.
+
+Clients (peers) usually find each other through the use of a [distributed computing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_computing) network. Examples of this include [Distributed Hash Tables](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_hash_table) (DHT), used by [torrents](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent_(protocol)) and [IPFS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/InterPlanetary_File_System) for example. Another approach is proximity based networks, where a connection is established over WiFi or Bluetooth (for example, Briar or the [Scuttlebutt](https://www.scuttlebutt.nz) social network protocol).
+
+Once a peer has found a route to its contact via any of these methods, a direct connection between them is made. Although messages are usually encrypted, an observer can still deduce the location and identity of the sender and recipient.
+
+P2P networks do not use servers, as peers communicate directly between each other and hence cannot be self-hosted. However, some additional services may rely on centralized servers, such as user discovery or relaying offline messages, which can benefit from self-hosting.
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- Minimal information is exposed to third-parties.
+- Modern P2P platforms implement E2EE by default. There are no servers that could potentially intercept and decrypt your transmissions, unlike centralized and federated models.
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Reduced feature set:
+- Messages can only be sent when both peers are online, however, your client may store messages locally to wait for the contact to return online.
+- Generally increases battery usage on mobile devices, because the client must stay connected to the distributed network to learn about who is online.
+- Some common messenger features may not be implemented or incompletely, such as message deletion.
+- Your IP address and that of the contacts you're communicating with may be exposed if you do not use the software in conjunction with a [VPN](../vpn.md) or [Tor](../tor.md). Many countries have some form of mass surveillance and/or metadata retention.
+
+## Anonymous Routing
+
+{ align=left }
+
+A messenger using [anonymous routing](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_628) hides either the identity of the sender, the receiver, or evidence that they have been communicating. Ideally, a messenger should hide all three.
+
+There are [many](https://doi.org/10.1145/3182658) different ways to implement anonymous routing. One of the most famous is [onion routing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing) (i.e. [Tor](tor-overview.md)), which communicates encrypted messages through a virtual [overlay network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overlay_network) that hides the location of each node as well as the recipient and sender of each message. The sender and recipient never interact directly and only meet through a secret rendezvous node so that there is no leak of IP addresses nor physical location. Nodes cannot decrypt messages, nor the final destination; only the recipient can. Each intermediary node can only decrypt a part that indicates where to send the still encrypted message next, until it arrives at the recipient who can fully decrypt it, hence the "onion layers."
+
+Self-hosting a node in an anonymous routing network does not provide the hoster with additional privacy benefits, but rather contributes to the whole network's resilience against identification attacks for everyone's benefit.
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- Minimal to no information is exposed to other parties.
+- Messages can be relayed in a decentralized manner even if one of the parties is offline.
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Slow message propagation.
+- Often limited to fewer media types, mostly text, since the network is slow.
+- Less reliable if nodes are selected by randomized routing, some nodes may be very far from the sender and receiver, adding latency or even failing to transmit messages if one of the nodes goes offline.
+- More complex to get started, as the creation and secured backup of a cryptographic private key is required.
+- Just like other decentralized platforms, adding features is more complex for developers than on a centralized platform. Hence, features may be lacking or incompletely implemented, such as offline message relaying or message deletion.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/advanced/dns-overview.md b/i18n/bn/advanced/dns-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..55454a864
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/advanced/dns-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+---
+title: "DNS Overview"
+icon: material/dns
+---
+
+The [Domain Name System](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System) is the 'phonebook of the Internet'. DNS translates domain names to IP addresses so browsers and other services can load Internet resources, through a decentralized network of servers.
+
+## What is DNS?
+
+When you visit a website, a numerical address is returned. For example, when you visit `privacyguides.org`, the address `192.98.54.105` is returned.
+
+DNS has existed since the [early days](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System#History) of the Internet. DNS requests made to and from DNS servers are **not** generally encrypted. In a residential setting, a customer is given servers by the ISP via [DHCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dynamic_Host_Configuration_Protocol).
+
+Unencrypted DNS requests are able to be easily **surveilled** and **modified** in transit. In some parts of the world, ISPs are ordered to do primitive [DNS filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking). When you request the IP address of a domain that is blocked, the server may not respond or may respond with a different IP address. As the DNS protocol is not encrypted, the ISP (or any network operator) can use [DPI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection) to monitor requests. ISPs can also block requests based on common characteristics, regardless of which DNS server is used. Unencrypted DNS always uses [port](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_(computer_networking)) 53 and always uses UDP.
+
+Below, we discuss and provide a tutorial to prove what an outside observer may see using regular unencrypted DNS and [encrypted DNS](#what-is-encrypted-dns).
+
+### Unencrypted DNS
+
+1. Using [`tshark`](https://www.wireshark.org/docs/man-pages/tshark.html) (part of the [Wireshark](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wireshark) project) we can monitor and record internet packet flow. This command records packets that meet the rules specified:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/dns.pcap udp port 53 and host 1.1.1.1 or host 8.8.8.8
+ ```
+
+2. We can then use [`dig`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dig_(command)) (Linux, MacOS etc) or [`nslookup`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nslookup) (Windows) to send the DNS lookup to both servers. Software such as web browsers do these lookups automatically, unless they are configured to use encrypted DNS.
+
+ === "Linux, macOS"
+
+ ```
+ dig +noall +answer privacyguides.org @1.1.1.1
+ dig +noall +answer privacyguides.org @8.8.8.8
+ ```
+ === "Windows"
+
+ ```
+ nslookup privacyguides.org 1.1.1.1
+ nslookup privacyguides.org 8.8.8.8
+ ```
+
+3. Next, we want to [analyse](https://www.wireshark.org/docs/wsug_html_chunked/ChapterIntroduction.html#ChIntroWhatIs) the results:
+
+ === "Wireshark"
+
+ ```
+ wireshark -r /tmp/dns.pcap
+ ```
+
+ === "tshark"
+
+ ```
+ tshark -r /tmp/dns.pcap
+ ```
+
+If you run the Wireshark command above, the top pane shows the "[frames](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethernet_frame)", and the bottom pane shows all the data about the selected frame. Enterprise filtering and monitoring solutions (such as those purchased by governments) can do the process automatically, without human interaction, and can aggregate those frames to produce statistical data useful to the network observer.
+
+| No. | Time | Source | Destination | Protocol | Length | Info |
+| --- | -------- | --------- | ----------- | -------- | ------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| 1 | 0.000000 | 192.0.2.1 | 1.1.1.1 | DNS | 104 | Standard query 0x58ba A privacyguides.org OPT |
+| 2 | 0.293395 | 1.1.1.1 | 192.0.2.1 | DNS | 108 | Standard query response 0x58ba A privacyguides.org A 198.98.54.105 OPT |
+| 3 | 1.682109 | 192.0.2.1 | 8.8.8.8 | DNS | 104 | Standard query 0xf1a9 A privacyguides.org OPT |
+| 4 | 2.154698 | 8.8.8.8 | 192.0.2.1 | DNS | 108 | Standard query response 0xf1a9 A privacyguides.org A 198.98.54.105 OPT |
+
+An observer could modify any of these packets.
+
+## What is "encrypted DNS"?
+
+Encrypted DNS can refer to one of a number of protocols, the most common ones being:
+
+### DNSCrypt
+
+[**DNSCrypt**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNSCrypt) was one of the first methods of encrypting DNS queries. DNSCrypt operates on port 443 and works with both the TCP or UDP transport protocols. DNSCrypt has never been submitted to the [Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Engineering_Task_Force) nor has it gone through the [Request for Comments (RFC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Request_for_Comments) process, so it has not been used widely outside of a few [implementations](https://dnscrypt.info/implementations). As a result, it has been largely replaced by the more popular [DNS over HTTPS](#dns-over-https-doh).
+
+### DNS over TLS (DoT)
+
+[**DNS over TLS**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_TLS) is another method for encrypting DNS communication that is defined in [RFC 7858](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7858). Support was first implemented in Android 9, iOS 14, and on Linux in [systemd-resolved](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/resolved.conf.html#DNSOverTLS=) in version 237. Preference in the industry has been moving away from DoT to DoH in recent years, as DoT is a [complex protocol](https://dnscrypt.info/faq/) and has varying compliance to the RFC across the implementations that exist. DoT also operates on a dedicated port 853 which can be blocked easily by restrictive firewalls.
+
+### DNS over HTTPS (DoH)
+
+[**DNS over HTTPS**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_HTTPS) as defined in [RFC 8484](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8484) packages queries in the [HTTP/2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/2) protocol and provides security with HTTPS. Support was first added in web browsers such as Firefox 60 and Chrome 83.
+
+Native implementation of DoH showed up in iOS 14, macOS 11, Microsoft Windows, and Android 13 (however, it won't be enabled [by default](https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/packages/modules/DnsResolver/+/1833144)). General Linux desktop support is waiting on the systemd [implementation](https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/8639) so [installing third-party software is still required](../dns.md#encrypted-dns-proxies).
+
+## What can an outside party see?
+
+In this example we will record what happens when we make a DoH request:
+
+1. First, start `tshark`:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/dns_doh.pcap -f "tcp port https and host 1.1.1.1"
+ ```
+
+2. Second, make a request with `curl`:
+
+ ```bash
+ curl -vI --doh-url https://1.1.1.1/dns-query https://privacyguides.org
+ ```
+
+3. After making the request, we can stop the packet capture with CTRL + C.
+
+4. Analyse the results in Wireshark:
+
+ ```bash
+ wireshark -r /tmp/dns_doh.pcap
+ ```
+
+We can see the [connection establishment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol#Connection_establishment) and [TLS handshake](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ssl/what-happens-in-a-tls-handshake/) that occurs with any encrypted connection. When looking at the "application data" packets that follow, none of them contain the domain we requested or the IP address returned.
+
+## Why **shouldn't** I use encrypted DNS?
+
+In locations where there is internet filtering (or censorship), visiting forbidden resources may have its own consequences which you should consider in your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md). We do **not** suggest the use of encrypted DNS for this purpose. Use [Tor](https://torproject.org) or a [VPN](../vpn.md) instead. If you're using a VPN, you should use your VPN's DNS servers. When using a VPN, you are already trusting them with all your network activity.
+
+When we do a DNS lookup, it's generally because we want to access a resource. Below, we will discuss some of the methods that may disclose your browsing activities even when using encrypted DNS:
+
+### IP Address
+
+The simplest way to determine browsing activity might be to look at the IP addresses your devices are accessing. For example, if the observer knows that `privacyguides.org` is at `198.98.54.105`, and your device is requesting data from `198.98.54.105`, there is a good chance you're visiting Privacy Guides.
+
+This method is only useful when the IP address belongs to a server that only hosts few websites. It's also not very useful if the site is hosted on a shared platform (e.g. Github Pages, Cloudflare Pages, Netlify, WordPress, Blogger, etc). It also isn't very useful if the server is hosted behind a [reverse proxy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_proxy), which is very common on the modern Internet.
+
+### Server Name Indication (SNI)
+
+Server Name Indication is typically used when a IP address hosts many websites. This could be a service like Cloudflare, or some other [Denial-of-service attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial-of-service_attack) protection.
+
+1. Start capturing again with `tshark`. We've added a filter with our IP address so you don't capture many packets:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/pg.pcap port 443 and host 198.98.54.105
+ ```
+
+2. Then we visit [https://privacyguides.org](https://privacyguides.org).
+
+3. After visiting the website, we want to stop the packet capture with CTRL + C.
+
+4. Next we want to analyze the results:
+
+ ```bash
+ wireshark -r /tmp/pg.pcap
+ ```
+
+ We will see the connection establishment, followed by the TLS handshake for the Privacy Guides website. Around frame 5. you'll see a "Client Hello".
+
+5. Expand the triangle ▸ next to each field:
+
+ ```text
+ ▸ Transport Layer Security
+ ▸ TLSv1.3 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
+ ▸ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
+ ▸ Extension: server_name (len=22)
+ ▸ Server Name Indication extension
+ ```
+
+6. We can see the SNI value which discloses the website we are visiting. The `tshark` command can give you the value directly for all packets containing a SNI value:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -r /tmp/pg.pcap -Tfields -Y tls.handshake.extensions_server_name -e tls.handshake.extensions_server_name
+ ```
+
+This means even if we are using "Encrypted DNS" servers, the domain will likely be disclosed through SNI. The [TLS v1.3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#TLS_1.3) protocol brings with it [Encrypted Client Hello](https://blog.cloudflare.com/encrypted-client-hello/), which prevents this kind of leak.
+
+Governments, in particular [China](https://www.zdnet.com/article/china-is-now-blocking-all-encrypted-https-traffic-using-tls-1-3-and-esni/) and [Russia](https://www.zdnet.com/article/russia-wants-to-ban-the-use-of-secure-protocols-such-as-tls-1-3-doh-dot-esni/), have either already [started blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication#Encrypted_Client_Hello) it or expressed a desire to do so. Recently, Russia has [started blocking foreign websites](https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/108) that use the [HTTP/3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) standard. This is because the [QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QUIC) protocol that is a part of HTTP/3 requires that `ClientHello` also be encrypted.
+
+### Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
+
+Another way your browser can disclose your browsing activities is with the [Online Certificate Status Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_Certificate_Status_Protocol). When visiting an HTTPS website, the browser might check to see if the website's [certificate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_certificate) has been revoked. This is generally done through the HTTP protocol, meaning it is **not** encrypted.
+
+The OCSP request contains the certificate "[serial number](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_certificate#Common_fields)", which is unique. It is sent to the "OCSP responder" in order to check its status.
+
+We can simulate what a browser would do using the [`openssl`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenSSL) command.
+
+1. Get the server certificate and use [`sed`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sed) to keep just the important part and write it out to a file:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl s_client -connect privacyguides.org:443 < /dev/null 2>&1 |
+ sed -n '/^-*BEGIN/,/^-*END/p' > /tmp/pg_server.cert
+ ```
+
+2. Get the intermediate certificate. [Certificate Authorities (CA)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) normally don't sign a certificate directly; they use what is known as an "intermediate" certificate.
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl s_client -showcerts -connect privacyguides.org:443 < /dev/null 2>&1 |
+ sed -n '/^-*BEGIN/,/^-*END/p' > /tmp/pg_and_intermediate.cert
+ ```
+
+3. The first certificate in `pg_and_intermediate.cert` is actually the server certificate from step 1. We can use `sed` again to delete until the first instance of END:
+
+ ```bash
+ sed -n '/^-*END CERTIFICATE-*$/!d;:a n;p;ba' \
+ /tmp/pg_and_intermediate.cert > /tmp/intermediate_chain.cert
+ ```
+
+4. Get the OCSP responder for the server certificate:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl x509 -noout -ocsp_uri -in /tmp/pg_server.cert
+ ```
+
+ Our certificate shows the Lets Encrypt certificate responder. If we want to see all the details of the certificate we can use:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl x509 -text -noout -in /tmp/pg_server.cert
+ ```
+
+5. Start the packet capture:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap -f "tcp port http"
+ ```
+
+6. Make the OCSP request:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl ocsp -issuer /tmp/intermediate_chain.cert \
+ -cert /tmp/pg_server.cert \
+ -text \
+ -url http://r3.o.lencr.org
+ ```
+
+7. Open the capture:
+
+ ```bash
+ wireshark -r /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap
+ ```
+
+ There will be two packets with the "OCSP" protocol: a "Request" and a "Response". For the "Request" we can see the "serial number" by expanding the triangle ▸ next to each field:
+
+ ```bash
+ ▸ Online Certificate Status Protocol
+ ▸ tbsRequest
+ ▸ requestList: 1 item
+ ▸ Request
+ ▸ reqCert
+ serialNumber
+ ```
+
+ For the "Response" we can also see the "serial number":
+
+ ```bash
+ ▸ Online Certificate Status Protocol
+ ▸ responseBytes
+ ▸ BasicOCSPResponse
+ ▸ tbsResponseData
+ ▸ responses: 1 item
+ ▸ SingleResponse
+ ▸ certID
+ serialNumber
+ ```
+
+8. Or use `tshark` to filter the packets for the Serial Number:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -r /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap -Tfields -Y ocsp.serialNumber -e ocsp.serialNumber
+ ```
+
+If the network observer has the public certificate, which is publicly available, they can match the serial number with that certificate and therefore determine the site you're visiting from that. The process can be automated and can associate IP addresses with serial numbers. It is also possible to check [Certificate Transparency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_Transparency) logs for the serial number.
+
+## Should I use encrypted DNS?
+
+We made this flow chart to describe when you *should* use encrypted DNS:
+
+``` mermaid
+graph TB
+ Start[Start] --> anonymous{Trying to be anonymous?}
+ anonymous--> | Yes | tor(Use Tor)
+ anonymous --> | No | censorship{Avoiding censorship?}
+ censorship --> | Yes | vpnOrTor(Use VPN or Tor)
+ censorship --> | No | privacy{Want privacy from ISP?}
+ privacy --> | Yes | vpnOrTor
+ privacy --> | No | obnoxious{ISP makes obnoxious redirects?}
+ obnoxious --> | Yes | encryptedDNS(Use encrypted DNS with 3rd party)
+ obnoxious --> | No | ispDNS{Does ISP support encrypted DNS?}
+ ispDNS --> | Yes | useISP(Use encrypted DNS with ISP)
+ ispDNS --> | No | nothing(Do nothing)
+```
+
+Encrypted DNS with a third-party should only be used to get around redirects and basic [DNS blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) when you can be sure there won't be any consequences or you're interested in a provider that does some rudimentary filtering.
+
+[List of recommended DNS servers](../dns.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## What is DNSSEC?
+
+[Domain Name System Security Extensions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Extensions) (DNSSEC) is a feature of DNS that authenticates responses to domain name lookups. It does not provide privacy protections for those lookups, but rather prevents attackers from manipulating or poisoning the responses to DNS requests.
+
+In other words, DNSSEC digitally signs data to help ensure its validity. In order to ensure a secure lookup, the signing occurs at every level in the DNS lookup process. As a result, all answers from DNS can be trusted.
+
+The DNSSEC signing process is similar to someone signing a legal document with a pen; that person signs with a unique signature that no one else can create, and a court expert can look at that signature and verify that the document was signed by that person. These digital signatures ensure that data has not been tampered with.
+
+DNSSEC implements a hierarchical digital signing policy across all layers of DNS. For example, in the case of a `privacyguides.org` lookup, a root DNS server would sign a key for the `.org` nameserver, and the `.org` nameserver would then sign a key for `privacyguides.org`’s authoritative nameserver.
+
+Adapted from [DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) overview](https://cloud.google.com/dns/docs/dnssec) by Google and [DNSSEC: An Introduction](https://blog.cloudflare.com/dnssec-an-introduction/) by Cloudflare, both licensed under [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
+
+## What is QNAME minimization?
+
+A QNAME is a "qualified name", for example `privacyguides.org`. QNAME minimisation reduces the amount of information sent from the DNS server to the [authoritative name server](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Name_server#Authoritative_name_server).
+
+Instead of sending the whole domain `privacyguides.org`, QNAME minimization means the DNS server will ask for all the records that end in `.org`. Further technical description is defined in [RFC 7816](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7816).
+
+## What is EDNS Client Subnet (ECS)?
+
+The [EDNS Client Subnet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EDNS_Client_Subnet) is a method for a recursive DNS resolver to specify a [subnetwork](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subnetwork) for the [host or client](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Client_(computing)) which is making the DNS query.
+
+It's intended to "speed up" delivery of data by giving the client an answer that belongs to a server that is close to them such as a [content delivery network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_delivery_network), which are often used in video streaming and serving JavaScript web apps.
+
+This feature does come at a privacy cost, as it tells the DNS server some information about the client's location.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/advanced/tor-overview.md b/i18n/bn/advanced/tor-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..89d7f76ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/advanced/tor-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+---
+title: "Tor Overview"
+icon: 'simple/torproject'
+---
+
+Tor is a free to use, decentralized network designed for using the internet with as much privacy as possible. If used properly, the network enables private and anonymous browsing and communications.
+
+## Path Building
+
+Tor works by routing your traffic through a network comprised of thousands of volunteer-run servers called nodes (or relays).
+
+Every time you connect to Tor, it will choose three nodes to build a path to the internet—this path is called a "circuit." Each of these nodes has its own function:
+
+### The Entry Node
+
+The entry node, often called the guard node, is the first node to which your Tor client connects. The entry node is able to see your IP address, however it is unable to see what you are connecting to.
+
+Unlike the other nodes, the Tor client will randomly select an entry node and stick with it for two to three months to protect you from certain attacks.[^1]
+
+### The Middle Node
+
+The middle node is the second node to which your Tor client connects. It can see which node the traffic came from—the entry node—and to which node it goes to next. The middle node cannot, see your IP address or the domain you are connecting to.
+
+For each new circuit, the middle node is randomly selected out of all available Tor nodes.
+
+### The Exit Node
+
+The exit node is the point in which your web traffic leaves the Tor network and is forwarded to your desired destination. The exit node is unable to see your IP address, but it does know what site it's connecting to.
+
+The exit node will be chosen at random from all available Tor nodes ran with an exit relay flag.[^2]
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ Tor circuit pathway
+
+
+## Encryption
+
+Tor encrypts each packet (a block of transmitted data) three times with the keys from the exit, middle, and entry node—in that order.
+
+Once Tor has built a circuit, data transmission is done as follows:
+
+1. Firstly: when the packet arrives at the entry node, the first layer of encryption is removed. In this encrypted packet, the entry node will find another encrypted packet with the middle node’s address. The entry node will then forward the packet to the middle node.
+
+2. Secondly: when the middle node receives the packet from the entry node, it too will remove a layer of encryption with its key, and this time finds an encrypted packet with the exit node's address. The middle node will then forward the packet to the exit node.
+
+3. Lastly: when the exit node receives its packet, it will remove the last layer of encryption with its key. The exit node will see the destination address and forward the packet to that address.
+
+Below is an alternative diagram showing the process. Each node removes its own layer of encryption, and when the destination server returns data, the same process happens entirely in reverse. For example, the exit node does not know who you are, but it does know which node it came from, and so it adds its own layer of encryption and sends it back.
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sending and receiving data through the Tor Network
+
+
+Tor allows us to connect to a server without any single party knowing the entire path. The entry node knows who you are, but not where you are going; the middle node doesn’t know who you are or where you are going; and the exit node knows where you are going, but not who you are. Because the exit node is what makes the final connection, the destination server will never know your IP address.
+
+## Caveats
+
+Though Tor does provide strong privacy guarantees, one must be aware that Tor is not perfect:
+
+- Well-funded adversaries with the capability to passively watch most network traffic over the globe have a chance of deanonymizing Tor users by means of advanced traffic analysis. Nor does Tor protect you from exposing yourself by mistake, such as if you share too much information about your real identity.
+- Tor exit nodes can also monitor traffic that passes through them. This means traffic which is not encrypted, such as plain HTTP traffic, can be recorded and monitored. If such traffic contains personally identifiable information, then it can deanonymize you to that exit node. Thus, we recommend using HTTPS over Tor where possible.
+
+If you wish to use Tor for browsing the web, we only recommend the **official** Tor Browser—it is designed to prevent fingerprinting.
+
+- [Tor Browser :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../tor.md#tor-browser)
+
+## Additional Resources
+
+- [Tor Browser User Manual](https://tb-manual.torproject.org)
+- [How Tor Works - Computerphile](https://invidious.privacyguides.net/embed/QRYzre4bf7I?local=true) (YouTube)
+- [Tor Onion Services - Computerphile](https://invidious.privacyguides.net/embed/lVcbq_a5N9I?local=true) (YouTube)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
+
+[^1]: The first relay in your circuit is called an "entry guard" or "guard". It is a fast and stable relay that remains the first one in your circuit for 2-3 months in order to protect against a known anonymity-breaking attack. The rest of your circuit changes with every new website you visit, and all together these relays provide the full privacy protections of Tor. For more information on how guard relays work, see this [blog post](https://blog.torproject.org/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters) and [paper](https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/single_guard.pdf) on entry guards. ([https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2/](https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2/))
+
+[^2]: Relay flag: a special (dis-)qualification of relays for circuit positions (for example, "Guard", "Exit", "BadExit"), circuit properties (for example, "Fast", "Stable"), or roles (for example, "Authority", "HSDir"), as assigned by the directory authorities and further defined in the directory protocol specification. ([https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html](https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html))
diff --git a/i18n/bn/android.md b/i18n/bn/android.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..336d59d43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/android.md
@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+---
+title: "অ্যান্ড্রয়েড"
+icon: 'ফন্টঅ্যাওসাম/ ব্র্যান্ড / অ্যান্ড্রয়েড'
+---
+
+{ align=right }
+
+The **Android Open Source Project** is an open-source mobile operating system led by Google which powers the majority of the world's mobile devices. Most phones sold with Android are modified to include invasive integrations and apps such as Google Play Services, so you can significantly improve your privacy on your mobile device by replacing your phone's default installation with a version of Android without these invasive features.
+
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://source.android.com/){ .card-link title=Homepage }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://source.android.com/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+These are the Android operating systems, devices, and apps we recommend to maximize your mobile device's security and privacy. রেকমেন্ডেশন
+
+- [সাধারণ অ্যান্ড্রয়েড ওভারভিউ এবং সুপারিশ :hero-arrow-circle-right-fill:](os/android-overview.md)
+- [আমরা কেন GrapheneOS এর বদলে CalyxOS এর সুপারিশ করি :hero-arrow-circle-right-fill:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/)
+
+## AOSP এর ডেরিভেটিভস্
+
+We recommend installing one of these custom Android operating systems on your device, listed in order of preference, depending on your device's compatibility with these operating systems.
+
+!!! note
+
+ পুরোনো ডিভাইসগুলিতে (যেমন GrapheneOS CalyxOS এর "extended support" ডিভাইসগুলো) সম্পুর্ন সিকিউরিটি থাকে না, OEM সাপোর্ট দেওয়া বন্ধ করে দেওয়ার জন্য। যেকোনো সফটওয়্যার ইনস্টলড থাকুক না কেনো এইসমস্ত ডিভাইসগুলো কে কখনোই সম্পূর্ণ ভাবে নিরাপদ বিবেচনা করা যাবে না
+
+### GrapheneOS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ প্রাইভেসি এবং সিকিউরিটি এর জন্য **GrapheneOS** সবথেকে ভালো।
+
+ GrapheneOS তে কিছু বাড়তি [সিকিউরিটি](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardening_(computing)) এবং প্রাইভেসি রয়েছে। It has a [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), network and sensor permissions, and various other [security features](https://grapheneos.org/features). GrapheneOS also comes with full firmware updates and signed builds, so verified boot is fully supported.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://grapheneos.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://grapheneos.org/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+GrapheneOS supports [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), which runs [Google Play Services](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Play_Services) fully sandboxed like any other regular app. This means you can take advantage of most Google Play Services, such as [push notifications](https://firebase.google.com/docs/cloud-messaging/), while giving you full control over their permissions and access, and while containing them to a specific [work profile](os/android-overview.md#work-profile) or [user profile](os/android-overview.md#user-profiles) of your choice.
+
+Google Pixel phones are the only devices that currently meet GrapheneOS's [hardware security requirements](https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-support).
+
+### DivestOS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **DivestOS** is a soft-fork of [LineageOS](https://lineageos.org/).
+ DivestOS inherits many [supported devices](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=devices&base=LineageOS) from LineageOS. It has signed builds, making it possible to have [verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) on some non-Pixel devices.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://divestos.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://divestoseb5nncsydt7zzf5hrfg44md4bxqjs5ifcv4t7gt7u6ohjyyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=privacy_policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/divested-mobile){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+DivestOS has automated kernel vulnerability ([CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures)) [patching](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/cve_checker), fewer proprietary blobs, and a custom [hosts](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=dnsbl) file. Its hardened WebView, [Mulch](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/mulch), enables [CFI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity) for all architectures and [network state partitioning](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning), and receives out-of-band updates. DivestOS also includes kernel patches from GrapheneOS and enables all available kernel security features via [defconfig hardening](https://github.com/Divested-Mobile/DivestOS-Build/blob/master/Scripts/Common/Functions.sh#L758). All kernels newer than version 3.4 include full page [sanitization](https://lwn.net/Articles/334747/) and all ~22 Clang-compiled kernels have [`-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero`](https://reviews.llvm.org/D54604?id=174471) enabled.
+
+DivestOS implements some system hardening patches originally developed for GrapheneOS. DivestOS 16.0 and higher implements GrapheneOS's [`INTERNET`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) and SENSORS permission toggle, [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), [exec-spawning](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/#additional-hardening), [JNI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_Native_Interface) [constification](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Const_(computer_programming)), and partial [bionic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bionic_(software)) hardening patchsets. 17.1 and higher features GrapheneOS's per-network full [MAC randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address#Randomization) option, [`ptrace_scope`](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.html) control, and automatic reboot/Wi-Fi/Bluetooth [timeout options](https://grapheneos.org/features).
+
+DivestOS uses F-Droid as its default app store. Normally, we would recommend avoiding F-Droid due to its numerous [security issues](#f-droid). However, doing so on DivestOS isn't viable; the developers update their apps via their own F-Droid repositories ([DivestOS Official](https://divestos.org/fdroid/official/?fingerprint=E4BE8D6ABFA4D9D4FEEF03CDDA7FF62A73FD64B75566F6DD4E5E577550BE8467) and [DivestOS WebView](https://divestos.org/fdroid/webview/?fingerprint=FB426DA1750A53D7724C8A582B4D34174E64A84B38940E5D5A802E1DFF9A40D2)). We recommend disabling the official F-Droid app and using [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) with the DivestOS repositories enabled to keep those components up to date. For other apps, our recommended methods of obtaining them still apply.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ DivestOS firmware update [status](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/firmware-empty/-/blob/master/STATUS) and quality control varies across the devices it supports. We still recommend GrapheneOS depending on your device's compatibility. For other devices, DivestOS is a good alternative.
+
+ Not all of the supported devices have verified boot, and some perform it better than others.
+
+## Android Devices
+
+When purchasing a device, we recommend getting one as new as possible. The software and firmware of mobile devices are only supported for a limited time, so buying new extends that lifespan as much as possible.
+
+Avoid buying phones from mobile network operators. These often have a **locked bootloader** and do not support [OEM unlocking](https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/locking_unlocking). These phone variants will prevent you from installing any kind of alternative Android distribution.
+
+Be very **careful** about buying second hand phones from online marketplaces. Always check the reputation of the seller. If the device is stolen, there's a possibility of [IMEI blacklisting](https://www.gsma.com/security/resources/imei-blacklisting/). There is also a risk involved with you being associated with the activity of the previous owner.
+
+A few more tips regarding Android devices and operating system compatibility:
+
+- Do not buy devices that have reached or are near their end-of-life, additional firmware updates must be provided by the manufacturer.
+- Do not buy preloaded LineageOS or /e/ OS phones or any Android phones without proper [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) support and firmware updates. These devices also have no way for you to check whether they've been tampered with.
+- In short, if a device or Android distribution is not listed here, there is probably a good reason. Check out our [forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/) to find details!
+
+### Google Pixel
+
+Google Pixel phones are the **only** devices we recommend for purchase. Pixel phones have stronger hardware security than any other Android devices currently on the market, due to proper AVB support for third-party operating systems and Google's custom [Titan](https://security.googleblog.com/2021/10/pixel-6-setting-new-standard-for-mobile.html) security chips acting as the Secure Element.
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Google Pixel** devices are known to have good security and properly support [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), even when installing custom operating systems.
+
+ Beginning with the **Pixel 6** and **6 Pro**, Pixel devices receive a minimum of 5 years of guaranteed security updates, ensuring a much longer lifespan compared to the 2-4 years competing OEMs typically offer.
+
+ [:material-shopping: Store](https://store.google.com/category/phones){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+
+Secure Elements like the Titan M2 are more limited than the processor's Trusted Execution Environment used by most other phones as they are only used for secrets storage, hardware attestation, and rate limiting, not for running "trusted" programs. Phones without a Secure Element have to use the TEE for *all* of those functions, resulting in a larger attack surface.
+
+Google Pixel phones use a TEE OS called Trusty which is [open-source](https://source.android.com/security/trusty#whyTrusty), unlike many other phones.
+
+The installation of GrapheneOS on a Pixel phone is easy with their [web installer](https://grapheneos.org/install/web). If you don't feel comfortable doing it yourself and are willing to spend a bit of extra money, check out the [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) as they come preloaded with GrapheneOS from the reputable [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/about) company.
+
+A few more tips for purchasing a Google Pixel:
+
+- If you're after a bargain on a Pixel device, we suggest buying an "**a**" model, just after the next flagship is released. Discounts are usually available because Google will be trying to clear their stock.
+- Consider price beating options and specials offered at physical stores.
+- Look at online community bargain sites in your country. These can alert you to good sales.
+- Google provides a list showing the [support cycle](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) for each one of their devices. The price per day for a device can be calculated as: $\text{Cost} \over \text {EOL Date}-\text{Current Date}$, meaning that the longer use of the device the lower cost per day.
+
+## General Apps
+
+We recommend a wide variety of Android apps throughout this site. The apps listed here are Android-exclusive and specifically enhance or replace key system functionality.
+
+### Shelter
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Shelter** is an app that helps you leverage Android's Work Profile functionality to isolate or duplicate apps on your device.
+
+ Shelter supports blocking contact search cross profiles and sharing files across profiles via the default file manager ([DocumentsUI](https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/modular-system/documentsui)).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://gitea.angry.im/PeterCxy/Shelter#shelter){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitea.angry.im/PeterCxy/Shelter){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.patreon.com/PeterCxy){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.typeblog.shelter)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Shelter is recommended over [Insular](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/) and [Island](https://github.com/oasisfeng/island) as it supports [contact search blocking](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/faq.html).
+
+ When using Shelter, you are placing complete trust in its developer, as Shelter acts as a [Device Admin](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/admin/device-admin) to create the Work Profile, and it has extensive access to the data stored within the Work Profile.
+
+### Auditor
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Auditor** is an app which leverages hardware security features to provide device integrity monitoring for [supported devices](https://attestation.app/about#device-support). Currently, it only works with GrapheneOS and the device's stock operating system.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://attestation.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://attestation.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://attestation.app/about){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://attestation.app/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://attestation.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.attestation.auditor.play)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases)
+ - [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+Auditor performs attestation and intrusion detection by:
+
+- Using a [Trust On First Use (TOFU)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_on_first_use) model between an *auditor* and *auditee*, the pair establish a private key in the [hardware-backed keystore](https://source.android.com/security/keystore/) of the *Auditor*.
+- The *auditor* can either be another instance of the Auditor app or the [Remote Attestation Service](https://attestation.app).
+- The *auditor* records the current state and configuration of the *auditee*.
+- Should tampering with the operating system of the *auditee* happen after the pairing is complete, the auditor will be aware of the change in the device state and configurations.
+- You will be alerted to the change.
+
+No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
+
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service. To make sure that your hardware and operating system is genuine, [perform local attestation](https://grapheneos.org/install/web#verifying-installation) immediately after the device has been installed and prior to any internet connection.
+
+### Secure Camera
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Secure Camera** is a camera app focused on privacy and security which can capture images, videos and QR codes. CameraX vendor extensions (Portrait, HDR, Night Sight, Face Retouch, and Auto) are also supported on available devices.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://grapheneos.org/usage#camera){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.grapheneos.camera.play)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases)
+ - [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+Main privacy features include:
+
+- Auto removal of [Exif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exif) metadata (enabled by default)
+- Use of the new [Media](https://developer.android.com/training/data-storage/shared/media) API, therefore [storage permissions](https://developer.android.com/training/data-storage) are not required
+- Microphone permission not required unless you want to record sound
+
+!!! note
+
+ Metadata is not currently deleted from video files but that is planned.
+
+ The image orientation metadata is not deleted. If you enable location (in Secure Camera) that **won't** be deleted either. If you want to delete that later you will need to use an external app such as [ExifEraser](data-redaction.md#exiferaser).
+
+### Secure PDF Viewer
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Secure PDF Viewer** is a PDF viewer based on [pdf.js](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PDF.js) that doesn't require any permissions. The PDF is fed into a [sandboxed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandbox_(software_development)) [webview](https://developer.android.com/guide/webapps/webview). This means that it doesn't require permission directly to access content or files.
+
+ [Content-Security-Policy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy) is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.grapheneos.pdfviewer.play)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer/releases)
+ - [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+## Obtaining Applications
+
+### GrapheneOS App Store
+
+GrapheneOS's app store is available on [GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases). It supports Android 12 and above and is capable of updating itself. The app store has standalone applications built by the GrapheneOS project such as the [Auditor](https://attestation.app/), [Camera](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera), and [PDF Viewer](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer). If you are looking for these applications, we highly recommend that you get them from GrapheneOS's app store instead of the Play Store, as the apps on their store are signed by the GrapheneOS's project own signature that Google does not have access to.
+
+### Aurora Store
+
+The Google Play Store requires a Google account to login which is not great for privacy. You can get around this by using an alternative client, such as Aurora Store.
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Aurora Store** is a Google Play Store client which does not require a Google Account, Google Play Services, or microG to download apps.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://auroraoss.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-gitlab: GitLab](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore/-/releases)
+
+Aurora Store does not allow you to download paid apps with their anonymous account feature. You can optionally log in with your Google account with Aurora Store to download apps you have purchased, which does give access to the list of apps you've installed to Google, however you still benefit from not requiring the full Google Play client and Google Play Services or microG on your device.
+
+### Manually with RSS Notifications
+
+For apps that are released on platforms like GitHub and GitLab, you may be able to add an RSS feed to your [news aggregator](/news-aggregators) that will help you keep track of new releases.
+
+   
+
+#### GitHub
+
+On GitHub, using [Secure Camera](#secure-camera) as an example, you would navigate to its [releases page](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases) and append `.atom` to the URL:
+
+`https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases.atom`
+
+#### GitLab
+
+On GitLab, using [Aurora Store](#aurora-store) as an example, you would navigate to its [project repository](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore) and append `/-/tags?format=atom` to the URL:
+
+`https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore/-/tags?format=atom`
+
+#### Verifying APK Fingerprints
+
+If you download APK files to install manually, you can verify their signature with the [`apksigner`](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/apksigner) tool, which is a part of Android [build-tools](https://developer.android.com/studio/releases/build-tools).
+
+1. Install [Java JDK](https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/downloads/).
+
+2. Download the [Android Studio command line tools](https://developer.android.com/studio#command-tools).
+
+3. Extract the downloaded archive:
+
+ ```bash
+ unzip commandlinetools-*.zip
+ cd cmdline-tools
+ ./bin/sdkmanager --sdk_root=./ "build-tools;29.0.3"
+ ```
+
+4. Run the signature verification command:
+
+ ```bash
+ ./build-tools/29.0.3/apksigner verify --print-certs ../Camera-37.apk
+ ```
+
+5. The resulting hashes can then be compared with another source. Some developers such as Signal [show the fingerprints](https://signal.org/android/apk/) on their website.
+
+ ```bash
+ Signer #1 certificate DN: CN=GrapheneOS
+ Signer #1 certificate SHA-256 digest: 6436b155b917c2f9a9ed1d15c4993a5968ffabc94947c13f2aeee14b7b27ed59
+ Signer #1 certificate SHA-1 digest: 23e108677a2e1b1d6e6b056f3bb951df7ad5570c
+ Signer #1 certificate MD5 digest: dbbcd0cac71bd6fa2102a0297c6e0dd3
+ ```
+
+### F-Droid
+
+{ align=right width=120px }
+
+==We do **not** currently recommend F-Droid as a way to obtain apps.== F-Droid is often recommended as an alternative to Google Play, particularly in the privacy community. The option to add third-party repositories and not be confined to Google's walled garden has led to its popularity. F-Droid additionally has [reproducible builds](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Reproducible_Builds/) for some applications and is dedicated to free and open-source software. However, there are [notable problems](https://privsec.dev/posts/android/f-droid-security-issues/) with the official F-Droid client, their quality control, and how they build, sign, and deliver packages.
+
+Due to their process of building apps, apps in the official F-Droid repository often fall behind on updates. F-Droid maintainers also reuse package IDs while signing apps with their own keys, which is not ideal as it gives the F-Droid team ultimate trust.
+
+Other popular third-party repositories such as [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) alleviate some of these concerns. The IzzyOnDroid repository pulls builds directly from GitHub and is the next best thing to the developers' own repositories. However, it is not something that we can recommend, as apps are typically [removed](https://github.com/vfsfitvnm/ViMusic/issues/240#issuecomment-1225564446) from that respository when they make it to the main F-Droid repository. While that makes sense (since the goal of that particular repository is to host apps before they're accepted into the main F-Droid repository), it can leave you with installed apps which no longer receive updates.
+
+That said, the [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/) and [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) repositories are home to countless apps, so they can be a useful tool to search for and discover open-source apps that you can then download through Play Store, Aurora Store, or by getting the APK directly from the developer. It is important to keep in mind that some apps in these repositories have not been updated in years and may rely on unsupported libraries, among other things, posing a potential security risk. You should use your best judgement when looking for new apps via this method.
+
+!!! note
+
+ In some rare cases, the developer of an app will only distribute it through F-Droid ([Gadgetbridge](https://gadgetbridge.org/) is one example of this). If you really need an app like that, we recommend using [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) instead of the official F-Droid app to obtain it.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Operating Systems
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must support bootloader locking with custom AVB key support.
+- Must receive major Android updates within 0-1 months of release.
+- Must receive Android feature updates (minor version) within 0-14 days of release.
+- Must receive regular security patches within 0-5 days of release.
+- Must **not** be "rooted" out of the box.
+- Must **not** enable Google Play Services by default.
+- Must **not** require system modification to support Google Play Services.
+
+### Devices
+
+- Must support at least one of our recommended custom operating systems.
+- Must be currently sold new in stores.
+- Must receive a minimum of 5 years of security updates.
+- Must have dedicated secure element hardware.
+
+### Applications
+
+- Applications on this page must not be applicable to any other software category on the site.
+- General applications should extend or replace core system functionality.
+- Applications should receive regular updates and maintenance.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png b/i18n/bn/assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5295c902c
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/bn/assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/bn/assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png b/i18n/bn/assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..974869a4e
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/bn/assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/bn/assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png b/i18n/bn/assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..21d6ef03a
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/bn/assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/bn/assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png b/i18n/bn/assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b46283571
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/bn/assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/bn/assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png b/i18n/bn/assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f88f7b404
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/bn/assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/bn/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption-dark.svg b/i18n/bn/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption-dark.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..95e681571
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption-dark.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/bn/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg b/i18n/bn/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f5b1e2915
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/bn/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg b/i18n/bn/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9002c9b16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/bn/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg b/i18n/bn/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cb53d8b13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/bn/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png b/i18n/bn/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7a4a0d170
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/bn/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/bn/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png b/i18n/bn/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f81058d88
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/bn/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/bn/assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png b/i18n/bn/assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cde3771e0
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/bn/assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/bn/assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png b/i18n/bn/assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d71381491
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/bn/assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/bn/basics/account-creation.md b/i18n/bn/basics/account-creation.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dfba24166
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/basics/account-creation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+---
+title: "Account Creation"
+icon: 'material/account-plus'
+---
+
+Often people sign up for services without thinking. Maybe it's a streaming service so you can watch that new show everyone's talking about, or an account that gives you a discount for your favorite fast food place. Whatever the case may be, you should consider the implications for your data now and later on down the line.
+
+There are risks associated with every new service that you use. Data breaches; disclosure of customer information to third parties; rogue employees accessing data; all are possibilities that must be considered when giving your information out. You need to be confident that you can trust the service, which is why we don't recommend storing valuable data on anything but the most mature and battle-tested products. That usually means services which provide E2EE and have undergone a cryptographic audit. An audit increases assurance that the product was designed without glaring security issues caused by an inexperienced developer.
+
+It can also be difficult to delete the accounts on some services. Sometimes [overwriting data](account-deletion.md#overwriting-account-information) associated with an account can be possible, but in other cases the service will keep an entire history of changes to the account.
+
+## Terms of Service & Privacy Policy
+
+The ToS are the rules that you agree to follow when using the service. With larger services these rules are often enforced by automated systems. Sometimes these automated systems can make mistakes. For example, you may be banned or locked out of your account on some services for using a VPN or VOIP number. Appealing such bans is often difficult, and involves an automated process too, which isn't always successful. This would be one of the reasons why we wouldn't suggest using Gmail for email as an example. Email is crucial for access to other services you might have signed up for.
+
+The Privacy Policy is how the service says they will use your data and it is worth reading so that you understand how your data will be used. A company or organization might not be legally obligated to follow everything contained in the policy (it depends on the jurisdiction). We would recommend having some idea what your local laws are and what they permit a provider to collect.
+
+We recommend looking for particular terms such as "data collection", "data analysis", "cookies", "ads" or "3rd-party" services. Sometimes you will be able to opt-out from data collection or from sharing your data, but it is best to choose a service that respects your privacy from the start.
+
+Keep in mind you're also placing your trust in the company or organization and that they will comply with their own privacy policy.
+
+## Authentication methods
+
+There are usually multiple ways to sign up for an account, each with their own benefits and drawbacks.
+
+### Email and password
+
+The most common way to create a new account is by an email address and password. When using this method, you should use a password manager and follow [best practices](passwords-overview.md) regarding passwords.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ You can use your password manager to organize other authentication methods too! Just add the new entry and fill the appropriate fields, you can add notes for things like security questions or a backup key.
+
+You will be responsible for managing your login credentials. For added security, you can set up [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md) on your accounts.
+
+[Recommended password managers](../passwords.md ""){.md-button}
+
+#### Email aliases
+
+If you don't want to give your real email address to a service, you have the option to use an alias. We described them in more detail on our email services recommendation page. Essentially, alias services allow you to generate new email addresses that forward all emails to your main address. This can help prevent tracking across services and help you manage the marketing emails that sometimes come with the sign up process. Those can be filtered automatically based on the alias they are sent to.
+
+Should a service get hacked, you might start receiving phishing or spam emails to the address you used to sign up. Using unique aliases for each service can assist in identifying exactly what service was hacked.
+
+[Recommended email aliasing services](../email.md#email-aliasing-services ""){.md-button}
+
+### Single sign-on
+
+!!! note
+
+ We are discussing Single sign-on for personal use, not enterprise users.
+
+Single sign-on (SSO) is an authentication method that allows you to register for a service without sharing much information, if any. Whenever you see something along the lines of "Sign-in with *provider name*" on a registration form it's SSO.
+
+When you choose single sign-on in a website, it will prompt your SSO provider login page and after that your account will be connected. Your password won't be shared but some basic information will (you can review it during the login request). This process is needed every time you want to log in to the same account.
+
+The main advantages are:
+
+- **Security**: no risk of being involved in a [data breach](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_breach) because the website does not store your credentials.
+- **Ease of use**: multiple accounts are managed by a single login.
+
+But there are disadvantages:
+
+- **Privacy**: a SSO provider will know the services you use.
+- **Centralization**: if your SSO account gets compromised or you aren't able to login to it, all other accounts connected to it are affected.
+
+SSO can be especially useful in those situations where you could benefit from deeper integration between services. For example, one of those services may offer SSO for the others. Our recommendation is to limit SSO to only where you need it and protect the main account with [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md).
+
+All services that use SSO will be as secure as your SSO account. For example, if you want to secure an account with a hardware key but that service doesn't support hardware keys, you can secure your SSO account with a hardware key and now you essentially have hardware MFA on all your accounts. It is worth noting though that weak authentication on your SSO account means that any account tied to that login will also be weak.
+
+### Phone number
+
+We recommend avoiding services that require a phone number for sign up. A phone number can identity you across multiple services and depending on data sharing agreements this will make your usage easier to track, particularly if one of those services is breached as the phone number is often **not** encrypted.
+
+You should avoid giving out your real phone number if you can. Some services will allow the use of VOIP numbers, however these often trigger fraud detection systems, causing an account to be locked down, so we don't recommend that for important accounts.
+
+In many cases you will need to provide a number that you can receive SMS or calls from, particularly when shopping internationally, in case there is a problem with your order at border screening. It's common for services to use your number as a verification method; don't let yourself get locked out of an important account because you wanted to be clever and give a fake number!
+
+### Username and password
+
+Some services allow you to register without using an email address and only require you to set a username and password. These services may provide increased anonymity when combined with a VPN or Tor. Keep in mind that for these accounts there will most likely be **no way to recover your account** in the event you forget your username or password.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/basics/account-deletion.md b/i18n/bn/basics/account-deletion.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1c83935cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/basics/account-deletion.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: "Account Deletion"
+icon: 'material/account-remove'
+---
+
+Over time, it can be easy to accumulate a number of online accounts, many of which you may no longer use. Deleting these unused accounts is an important step in reclaiming your privacy, as dormant accounts are vulnerable to data breaches. A data breach is when a service's security is compromised and protected information is viewed, transmitted, or stolen by unauthorized actors. Data breaches are unfortunately all [too common](https://haveibeenpwned.com/PwnedWebsites) these days, and so practicing good digital hygiene is the best way to minimize the impact they have on your life. The goal of this guide then is to help navigate you through the irksome process of account deletion, often made difficult by [deceptive design](https://www.deceptive.design/), for the betterment of your online presence.
+
+## Finding Old Accounts
+
+### Password Manager
+
+If you have a password manager that you've used for your entire digital life, this part will be very easy. Oftentimes, they include built-in functionality for detecting if your credentials were exposed in a data breach—such as Bitwarden's [Data Breach Report](https://bitwarden.com/blog/have-you-been-pwned/).
+
+
+ 
+
+
+Even if you haven't explicitly used a password manager before, there's a chance you've used the one in your browser or your phone without even realizing it. For example: [Firefox Password Manager](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/password-manager-remember-delete-edit-logins), [Google Password Manager](https://passwords.google.com/intro) and [Edge Password Manager](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-edge/save-or-forget-passwords-in-microsoft-edge-b4beecb0-f2a8-1ca0-f26f-9ec247a3f336).
+
+Desktop platforms also often have a password manager which may help you recover passwords you've forgotten about:
+
+- Windows [Credential Manager](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/accessing-credential-manager-1b5c916a-6a16-889f-8581-fc16e8165ac0)
+- macOS [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211145)
+- iOS [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211146)
+- Linux, Gnome Keyring, which can be accessed through [Seahorse](https://help.gnome.org/users/seahorse/stable/passwords-view.html.en) or [KDE Wallet Manager](https://userbase.kde.org/KDE_Wallet_Manager)
+
+### Email
+
+If you didn't use a password manager in the past or you think you have accounts that were never added to your password manager, another option is to search the email account(s) that you believe you signed up on. On your email client, search for keywords such as "verify" or "welcome." Almost every time you make an online account, the service will send a verification link or an introductory message to your email. This can be a good way to find old, forgotten accounts.
+
+## Deleting Old Accounts
+
+### Log In
+
+In order to delete your old accounts, you'll need to first make sure you can log in to them. Again, if the account was in your password manager, this step is easy. If not, you can try to guess your password. Failing that, there are typically options to regain access to your account, commonly available through a "forgot password" link on the login page. It may also be possible that accounts you've abandoned have already been deleted—sometimes services prune all old accounts.
+
+When attempting to regain access, if the site returns an error message saying that email is not associated with an account, or you never receive a reset link after multiple attempts, then you do not have an account under that email address and should try a different one. If you can't figure out which email address you used, or you no longer have access to that email, you can try contacting the service's customer support. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that you will be able to reclaim access your account.
+
+### GDPR (EEA residents only)
+
+Residents of the EEA have additional rights regarding data erasure specified in [Article 17](https://www.gdpr.org/regulation/article-17.html) of the GDPR. If it's applicable to you, read the privacy policy for any given service to find information on how to exercise your right to erasure. Reading the privacy policy can prove important, as some services have a "Delete Account" option that only disables your account and for real deletion you have to take additional action. Sometimes actual deletion may involve filling out surveys, emailing the data protection officer of the service or even proving your residence in the EEA. If you plan to go this way, do **not** overwrite account information—your identity as an EEA resident may be required. Note that the location of the service does not matter; GDPR applies to anyone serving European users. If the service does not respect your right to erasure, you can contact your national [Data Protection Authority](https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/rights-citizens/redress/what-should-i-do-if-i-think-my-personal-data-protection-rights-havent-been-respected_en) and you may be entitled to monetary compensation.
+
+### Overwriting Account information
+
+In some situations where you plan to abandon an account, it may make sense to overwrite the account information with fake data. Once you've made sure you can log in, change all the information in your account to falsified information. The reason for this is that many sites will retain information you previously had even after account deletion. The hope is that they will overwrite the previous information with the newest data you entered. However, there is no guarantee that there won't be backups with the prior information.
+
+For the account email, either create a new alternate email account via your provider of choice or create an alias using an [email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services). You can then delete your alternate email address once you are done. We recommend against using temporary email providers, as oftentimes it is possible to reactivate temporary emails.
+
+### Delete
+
+You can check [JustDeleteMe](https://justdeleteme.xyz) for instructions on deleting the account for a specific service. Some sites will graciously have a "Delete Account" option, while others will go as far as to force you to speak with a support agent. The deletion process can vary from site to site, with account deletion being impossible on some.
+
+For services that don't allow account deletion, the best thing to do is falsify all your information as previously mentioned and strengthen account security. To do so, enable [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md) and any extra security features offered. As well, change the password to a randomly-generated one that is the maximum allowed size (a [password manager](../passwords.md) can be useful for this).
+
+If you're satisfied that all information you care about is removed, you can safely forget about this account. If not, it might be a good idea to keep the credentials stored with your other passwords and occasionally re-login to reset the password.
+
+Even when you are able to delete an account, there is no guarantee that all your information will be removed. In fact, some companies are required by law to keep certain information, particularly when related to financial transactions. It's mostly out of your control what happens to your data when it comes to websites and cloud services.
+
+## Avoid New Accounts
+
+As the old saying goes, "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." Whenever you feel tempted to sign up for a new account, ask yourself, "Do I really need this? Can I accomplish what I need to without an account?" It can often be much harder to delete an account than to create one. And even after deleting or changing the info on your account, there might be a cached version from a third-party—like the [Internet Archive](https://archive.org/). Avoid the temptation when you're able to—your future self will thank you!
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/bn/basics/common-misconceptions.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2dc2b6f0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/basics/common-misconceptions.md
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+---
+title: "Common Misconceptions"
+icon: 'material/robot-confused'
+---
+
+## "Open-source software is always secure" or "Proprietary software is more secure"
+
+These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis.
+
+Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities into even large projects.[^1]
+
+On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering.
+
+To avoid biased decisions, it's *vital* that you evaluate the privacy and security standards of the software you use.
+
+## "Shifting trust can increase privacy"
+
+We talk about "shifting trust" a lot when discussing solutions like VPNs (which shift the trust you place in your ISP to the VPN provider). While this protects your browsing data from your ISP *specifically*, the VPN provider you choose still has access to your browsing data: Your data isn't completely secured from all parties. This means that:
+
+1. You must exercise caution when choosing a provider to shift trust to.
+2. You should still use other techniques, like E2EE, to protect your data completely. Merely distrusting one provider to trust another is not securing your data.
+
+## "Privacy-focused solutions are inherently trustworthy"
+
+Focusing solely on the privacy policies and marketing of a tool or provider can blind you to its weaknesses. When you're looking for a more private solution, you should determine what the underlying problem is and find technical solutions to that problem. For example, you may want to avoid Google Drive, which gives Google access to all of your data. The underlying problem in this case is lack of E2EE, so you should make sure that the provider you switch to actually implements E2EE, or use a tool (like [Cryptomator](../encryption.md#cryptomator-cloud)) which provides E2EE on any cloud provider. Switching to a "privacy-focused" provider (that doesn't implement E2EE) doesn't solve your problem: it just shifts trust from Google to that provider.
+
+The privacy policies and business practices of providers you choose are very important, but should be considered secondary to technical guarantees of your privacy: You shouldn't shift trust to another provider when trusting a provider isn't a requirement at all.
+
+## "Complicated is better"
+
+We often see people describing privacy threat models that are overly complex. Often, these solutions include problems like many different email accounts or complicated setups with lots of moving parts and conditions. The replies are usually answers to "What is the best way to do *X*?"
+
+Finding the "best" solution for yourself doesn't necessarily mean you are after an infallible solution with dozens of conditions—these solutions are often difficult to work with realistically. As we discussed previously, security often comes at the cost of convenience. Below, we provide some tips:
+
+1. ==Actions need to serve a particular purpose:== think about how to do what you want with the fewest actions.
+2. ==Remove human failure points:== We fail, get tired, and forget things. To maintain security, avoid relying on manual conditions and processes that you have to remember.
+3. ==Use the right level of protection for what you intend.== We often see recommendations of so-called law-enforcement or subpoena-proof solutions. These often require specialist knowledge and generally aren't what people want. There's no point in building an intricate threat model for anonymity if you can be easily de-anonymized by a simple oversight.
+
+So, how might this look?
+
+One of the clearest threat models is one where people *know who you are* and one where they do not. There will always be situations where you must declare your legal name and there are others where you don't need to.
+
+1. **Known identity** - A known identity is used for things where you must declare your name. There are many legal documents and contracts where a legal identity is required. This could range from opening a bank account, signing a property lease, obtaining a passport, customs declarations when importing items, or otherwise dealing with your government. These things will usually lead to credentials such as credit cards, credit rating checks, account numbers, and possibly physical addresses.
+
+ We don't suggest using a VPN or Tor for any of these things, as your identity is already known through other means.
+
+ !!! tip
+
+ When shopping online, the use of a [parcel locker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parcel_locker) can help keep your physical address private.
+
+2. **Unknown identity** - An unknown identity could be a stable pseudonym that you regularly use. It is not anonymous because it doesn't change. If you're part of an online community, you may wish to retain a persona that others know. This pseudonym isn't anonymous because—if monitored for long enough—details about the owner can reveal further information, such as the way they write, their general knowledge about topics of interest, etc.
+
+ You may wish to use a VPN for this, to mask your IP address. Financial transactions are more difficult to mask: You could consider using anonymous cryptocurrencies, such as [Monero](https://www.getmonero.org/). Employing altcoin shifting may also help to disguise where your currency originated. Typically, exchanges require KYC (know your customer) to be completed before they'll allow you to exchange fiat currency into any kind of cryptocurrency. Local meet-up options may also be a solution; however, those are often more expensive and sometimes also require KYC.
+
+3. **Anonymous identity** - Even with experience, anonymous identities are difficult to maintain over long periods of time. They should be short-term and short-lived identities which are rotated regularly.
+
+ Using Tor can help with this. It is also worth noting that greater anonymity is possible through asynchronous communication: Real-time communication is vulnerable to analysis of typing patterns (i.e. more than a paragraph of text, distributed on a forum, via email, etc.)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
+
+[^1]: One notable example of this is the [2021 incident in which University of Minnesota researchers introduced three vulnerabilities into the Linux kernel development project](https://cse.umn.edu/cs/linux-incident).
diff --git a/i18n/bn/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/bn/basics/common-threats.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dd0c39891
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/basics/common-threats.md
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+---
+title: "Common Threats"
+icon: 'material/eye-outline'
+---
+
+Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside of these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat.
+
+- :material-incognito: Anonymity - Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically.
+- :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks - Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically.
+- :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks - Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once.
+- :material-server-network: Service Providers - Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server).
+- :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance - Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities.
+- :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism - Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors.
+- :material-account-search: Public Exposure - Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public.
+- :material-close-outline: Censorship - Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online.
+
+Some of these threats may be more important to you than others, depending on your specific concerns. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks, but they probably still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Similarly, many people may be primarily concerned with :material-account-search: Public Exposure of their personal data, but they should still be wary of security-focused issues, such as :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks—like malware affecting their devices.
+
+## Anonymity vs. Privacy
+
+:material-incognito: Anonymity
+
+Anonymity is often confused with privacy, but they're distinct concepts. While privacy is a set of choices you make about how your data is used and shared, anonymity is the complete disassociation of your online activities from your real identity.
+
+Whistleblowers and journalists, for example, can have a much more extreme threat model which requires total anonymity. That's not only hiding what they do, what data they have, and not getting hacked by malicious actors or governments, but also hiding who they are entirely. They will often sacrifice any kind of convenience if it means protecting their anonymity, privacy, or security, because their lives could depend on it. Most people don't need to go so far.
+
+## Security and Privacy
+
+:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks
+
+Security and privacy are also often confused, because you need security to obtain any semblance of privacy: Using tools—even if they're private by design—is futile if they could be easily exploited by attackers who later release your data. However, the inverse isn't necessarily true: The most secure service in the world *isn't necessarily* private. The best example of this is trusting data to Google who, given their scale, have had few security incidents by employing industry-leading security experts to secure their infrastructure. Even though Google provides very secure services, very few people would consider their data private in Google's free consumer products (Gmail, YouTube, etc.)
+
+When it comes to application security, we generally don't (and sometimes can't) know if the software we use is malicious, or might one day become malicious. Even with the most trustworthy developers, there's generally no guarantee that their software doesn't have a serious vulnerability that could later be exploited.
+
+To minimize the damage that a malicious piece of software *could* do, you should employ security by compartmentalization. For example, this could come in the form of using different computers for different jobs, using virtual machines to separate different groups of related applications, or using a secure operating system with a strong focus on application sandboxing and mandatory access control.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Mobile operating systems generally have better application sandboxing than desktop operating systems: Apps can't obtain root access, and require permission for access to system resources.
+
+ Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS has similar sandboxing capabilities to Android, and macOS has full system permission control (and developers can opt-in to sandboxing for applications). However, these operating systems do transmit identifying information to their respective OEMs. Linux tends to not submit information to system vendors, but it has poor protection against exploits and malicious apps. This can be mitigated somewhat with specialized distributions which make significant use of virtual machines or containers, such as [Qubes OS](../../desktop/#qubes-os).
+
+:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks
+
+Targeted attacks against a specific person are more problematic to deal with. Common attacks include sending malicious documents via email, exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g. in browsers and operating systems), and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you should employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typically run untrusted code, sent to you from third parties. Running multiple virtual machines—to separate applications like these from your host system, as well as each other—is one technique you can use to mitigate the chance of an exploit in these applications compromising the rest of your system. For example, technologies like Qubes OS or Microsoft Defender Application Guard on Windows provide convenient methods to do this.
+
+If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user.
+
+## Privacy From Service Providers
+
+:material-server-network: Service Providers
+
+We live in a world where almost everything is connected to the internet. Our "private" messages, emails, and social interactions are typically stored on a server, somewhere. Generally, when you send someone a message it's stored on a server, and when your friend wants to read the message the server will show it to them.
+
+The obvious problem with this is that the service provider (or a hacker who has compromised the server) can access your conversations whenever and however they want, without you ever knowing. This applies to many common services, like SMS messaging, Telegram, and Discord.
+
+Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between you and your desired recipients before they are even sent to the server. The confidentiality of your messages is guaranteed, assuming the service provider doesn't have access to the private keys of either party.
+
+!!! note "Note on Web-based Encryption"
+
+ In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering).
+
+ On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt.
+
+ Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible.
+
+Even with E2EE, service providers can still profile you based on **metadata**, which typically isn't protected. While the service provider can't read your messages, they can still observe important things, such as who you're talking to, how often you message them, and when you're typically active. Protection of metadata is fairly uncommon, and—if it's within your [threat model](threat-modeling.md)—you should pay close attention to the technical documentation of the software you're using to see if there's any metadata minimization or protection at all.
+
+## Mass Surveillance Programs
+
+:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance
+
+Mass surveillance is the intricate effort to monitor the "behavior, many activities, or information" of an entire (or substantial fraction of a) population.[^1] It often refers to government programs, such as the ones [disclosed by Edward Snowden in 2013](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_surveillance_disclosures_(2013%E2%80%93present)). However, it can also be carried out by corporations, either on behalf of government agencies or by their own initiative.
+
+!!! abstract "Atlas of Surveillance"
+
+ If you want to learn more about surveillance methods and how they're implemented in your city you can also take a look at the [Atlas of Surveillance](https://atlasofsurveillance.org/) by the [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.eff.org/).
+
+ In France you can take a look at the [Technolopolice website](https://technopolice.fr/villes/) maintained by the non-profit association La Quadrature du Net.
+
+Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, breaching human rights, it's most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.
+
+!!! quote "ACLU: [*The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward*](https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/the-privacy-lesson-of-9-11-mass-surveillance-is-not-the-way-forward)"
+
+ In the face of [Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRISM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM) and [Upstream](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upstream_collection)], intelligence officials also admitted that the NSA had for years been secretly collecting records about virtually every American’s phone calls — who’s calling whom, when those calls are made, and how long they last. This kind of information, when amassed by the NSA day after day, can reveal incredibly sensitive details about people’s lives and associations, such as whether they have called a pastor, an abortion provider, an addiction counselor, or a suicide hotline.
+
+Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^2]
+
+Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods:
+
+- Your IP address
+- Browser cookies
+- The data you submit to websites
+- Your browser or device fingerprint
+- Payment method correlation
+
+\[This list isn't exhaustive].
+
+If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategues like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information.
+
+:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism
+
+> Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^3]
+
+For many people, tracking and surveillance by private corporations is a growing concern. Pervasive ad networks, such as those operated by Google and Facebook, span the internet far beyond just the sites they control, tracking your actions along the way. Using tools like content blockers to limit network requests to their servers, and reading the privacy policies of the services you use can help you avoid many basic adversaries (although it can't completely prevent tracking).[^4]
+
+Additionally, even companies outside of the *AdTech* or tracking industry can share your information with [data brokers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_broker) (such as Cambridge Analytica, Experian, or Datalogix) or other parties. You can't automatically assume your data is safe just because the service you're using doesn't fall within the typical AdTech or tracking business model. The strongest protection against corporate data collection is to encrypt or obfuscate your data whenever possible, making it difficult for different providers to correlate data with each other and build a profile on you.
+
+## Limiting Public Information
+
+:material-account-search: Public Exposure
+
+The best way to keep your data private is simply not making it public in the first place. Deleting unwanted information you find about yourself online is one of the best first steps you can take to regain your privacy.
+
+- [View our guide on account deletion :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](account-deletion.md)
+
+On sites where you do share information, checking the privacy settings of your account to limit how widely that data is spread is very important. For example, enable "private mode" on your accounts if given the option: This ensures that your account isn't being indexed by search engines, and that it can't be viewed without your permission.
+
+If you've already submitted your real information to sites which shouldn't have it, consider using disinformation tactics, like submitting fictitious information related to that online identity. This makes your real information indistinguishable from the false information.
+
+## Avoiding Censorship
+
+:material-close-outline: Censorship
+
+Censorship online can be carried out (to varying degrees) by actors including totalitarian governments, network administrators, and service providers. These efforts to control communication and restrict access to information will always be incompatible with the human right to Freedom of Expression.[^5]
+
+Censorship on corporate platforms is increasingly common, as platforms like Twitter and Facebook give in to public demand, market pressures, and pressures from government agencies. Government pressures can be covert requests to businesses, such as the White House [requesting the takedown](https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/technology/on-the-web-a-fine-line-on-free-speech-across-globe.html) of a provocative YouTube video, or overt, such as the Chinese government requiring companies to adhere to a strict regime of censorship.
+
+People concerned with the threat of censorship can use technologies like [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) to circumvent it, and support censorship-resistant communication platforms like [Matrix](../real-time-communication.md#element), which doesn't have a centralized account authority that can close accounts arbitrarily.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ While evading censorship itself can be easy, hiding the fact that you are doing it can be very problematic.
+
+ You should consider which aspects of the network your adversary can observe, and whether you have plausible deniability for your actions. For example, using [encrypted DNS](../advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns) can help you bypass rudimentary, DNS-based censorship systems, but it can't truly hide what you are visiting from your ISP. A VPN or Tor can help hide what you are visiting from network administrators, but can't hide that you're using those networks in the first place. Pluggable transports (such as Obfs4proxy, Meek, or Shadowsocks) can help you evade firewalls that block common VPN protocols or Tor, but your circumvention attempts can still be detected by methods like probing or [deep packet inspection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection).
+
+You must always consider the risks of trying to bypass censorship, the potential consequences, and how sophisticated your adversary may be. You should be cautious with your software selection, and have a backup plan in case you are caught.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
+
+[^1]: Wikipedia: [*Mass Surveillance*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass_surveillance) and [*Surveillance*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance).
+[^2]: United States Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: [*Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215*](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/ec542143-1079-424a-84b3-acc354698560/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf)
+[^3]: Wikipedia: [*Surveillance capitalism*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance_capitalism)
+[^4]: "[Enumerating badness](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/)" (or, "listing all the bad things that we know about"), as many adblockers and antivirus programs do, fails to adequately protect you from new and unknown threats because they have not yet been added to the filter list. You should also employ other mitigation techniques.
+[^5]: United Nations: [*Universal Declaration of Human Rights*](https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights).
diff --git a/i18n/bn/basics/email-security.md b/i18n/bn/basics/email-security.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..253a3157b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/basics/email-security.md
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+---
+title: Email Security
+icon: material/email
+---
+
+Email is an insecure form of communication by default. You can improve your email security with tools such as OpenPGP, which add End-to-End Encryption to your messages, but OpenPGP still has a number of drawbacks compared to encryption in other messaging applications, and some email data can never be encrypted inherently due to how email is designed.
+
+As a result, email is best used for receiving transactional emails (like notifications, verification emails, password resets, etc.) from the services you sign up for online, not for communicating with others.
+
+## Email Encryption Overview
+
+The standard way to add E2EE to emails between different email providers is by using OpenPGP. There are different implementations of the OpenPGP standard, the most common being [GnuPG](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard) and [OpenPGP.js](https://openpgpjs.org).
+
+There is another standard which is popular with business called [S/MIME](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME), however, it requires a certificate issued from a [Certificate Authority](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) (not all of them issue S/MIME certificates). It has support in [Google Workplace](https://support.google.com/a/topic/9061730?hl=en&ref_topic=9061731) and [Outlook for Web or Exchange Server 2016, 2019](https://support.office.com/en-us/article/encrypt-messages-by-using-s-mime-in-outlook-on-the-web-878c79fc-7088-4b39-966f-14512658f480).
+
+Even if you use OpenPGP, it does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. This is why we recommend [instant messengers](../real-time-communication.md) which implement forward secrecy over email for person-to-person communications whenever possible.
+
+### What Email Clients Support E2EE?
+
+Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md). Depending on the authentication method, this may lead to the decrease security if either the provider or the email client does not support OATH or a bridge application as [multi-factor authentication](multi-factor-authentication.md) is not possible with plain password authentication.
+
+### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
+
+A smartcard (such as a [Yubikey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
+
+It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard so as to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.
+
+## Email Metadata Overview
+
+Email metadata is stored in the [message header](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) of the email message and includes some visible headers that you may have seen such as: `To`, `From`, `Cc`, `Date`, `Subject`. There are also a number of hidden headers included by many email clients and providers that can reveal information about your account.
+
+Client software may use email metadata to show who a message is from and what time it was received. Servers may use it to determine where an email message must be sent, among [other purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) which are not always transparent.
+
+### Who Can View Email Metadata?
+
+Email metadata is protected from outside observers with [Opportunistic TLS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunistic_TLS) protecting it from outside observers, but it is still able to be seen by your email client software (or webmail) and any servers relaying the message from you to any recipients including your email provider. Sometimes email servers will also use third-party services to protect against spam, which generally also have access to your messages.
+
+### Why Can't Metadata be E2EE?
+
+Email metadata is crucial to the most basic functionality of email (where it came from, and where it has to go). E2EE was not built into the email protocols originally, instead requiring add-on software like OpenPGP. Because OpenPGP messages still have to work with traditional email providers, it cannot encrypt email metadata, only the message body itself. That means that even when using OpenPGP, outside observers can see lots of information about your messages, such as who you're emailing, the subject lines, when you're emailing, etc.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md b/i18n/bn/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..86e96cadd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+---
+title: "Multi-Factor Authentication"
+icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication'
+---
+
+**Multi-Factor Authentication** (**MFA**) is a security mechanism that requires additional steps beyond entering your username (or email) and password. The most common method is time limited codes you might receive from SMS or an app.
+
+সাধারণত, যদি কোনো হ্যাকার (বা শত্রু) আপনার পাসওয়ার্ড ডিক্রিপ্ট করতে সক্ষম হয় তাহলে তারা যে অ্যাকাউন্টে ওই পাসওয়ার্ড আছে সেটিতে প্রবেশ করতে সক্ষম হবে। MFA আছে এমন একটি অ্যাকাউন্ট-এর ক্ষেত্রে হ্যাকারকে পাসওয়ার্ড ( যা আপনি *জানেন*) এবং আপনার মালিকানাধীন একটি ডিভাইস (যা আপনার *কাছে আছে*), যেমন আপনার ফোন,উভয়ই থাকলে তবে হ্যাকার হ্যাক করতে সক্ষম হবে।
+
+MFA পদ্ধতিগুলির নিরাপত্তা বিভিন্নরকম হতে পারে ,আক্রমণকারীর পক্ষে আপনার MFA পদ্ধতিতে অ্যাক্সেস লাভ করা যত কঠিন, ততই ভালো। Examples of MFA methods (from weakest to strongest) include SMS, Email codes, app push notifications, TOTP, Yubico OTP and FIDO.
+
+## MFA পদ্ধতিগুলির তুলনা
+
+### এসএমএস বা ইমেইল MFA
+
+এসএমএস বা ইমেলের ওটিপি কোডগুলির মাধ্যমে MFA-এর ব্যবহার অ্যাকাউন্টগুলিকে সুরক্ষিত করার একটি দুর্বল উপায়৷ ইমেল বা এসএমএস-এর মাধ্যমে কোড পাওয়া "যা আপনার *আছে*" ধারণা থেকে দূরে সরে যায়, কারণ হ্যাকার বিভিন্ন রকম ভাবে আপনার [ফোন নম্বর দখল করতে পারে](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam) বা আপনার কোনো ডিভাইস স্পর্শ না করেই আপনার ইমেলে অ্যাক্সেস পেতে পারে। যদি কোনো অননুমোদিত ব্যক্তি আপনার ইমেলের অ্যাক্সেস লাভ করে, তাহলে তারা আপনার সেই ইমেইল ব্যবহার করে পাসওয়ার্ড রিসেট করতে পারে এবং অথেনটিকেশন কোড পেতে পারে, যা শেষ পর্যন্ত তাকে আপনার একাউন্ট-এর সম্পূর্ণ এক্সেস দেবে।
+
+### মোবাইলের নোটিফিকেশন
+
+পুশ নোটিফিকেশন MFA এমন একটা পদ্ধতি যেখানে আপনার ফোনের একটি অ্যাপে নোটিফিকেশন পাঠানো হয়, যাতে আপনাকে নতুন অ্যাকাউন্ট লগইন নিশ্চিত করতে বলে। এই পদ্ধতিটি এসএমএস বা ইমেলের চেয়ে তুলনামূলকভাবে অনেক ভালো, যেহেতু একজন আক্রমণকারী সাধারণত লগগড -ইন করা ডিভাইস ছাড়া এই নোটিফিকেশনগুলি পেতে সক্ষম হবে না, যার মানে তাদের প্রথমে আপনার অন্য ডিভাইসগুলির মধ্যে একটিকে হ্যাক করতে হবে ৷
+
+আমরা প্রত্যেকেই ভুল করি, এবং আপনি অন্যমনস্কতাবশত লগইন এপ্রুভ করে দিতে পারেন তার সম্ভাবনা রয়েছে। লগইন এর জন্য নোটিফিকেশনগুলি সাধারণত আপনার *সমস্ত ডিভাইসে* একসঙ্গে পাঠানো হয়, যদি আপনার অনেকগুলি ডিভাইস থাকে তবে তা MFA কোড পাওয়ার সম্ভাবনা বৃদ্ধি করে৷
+
+পুশ নোটিফিকেশন MFA -এর নিরাপত্তা অ্যাপের গুণমান, সার্ভারের, এবং এটি তৈরিকারী ব্যাক্তির ওপর নির্ভর করে। একটি অ্যাপ্লিকেশন ইনস্টল করার অর্থ হল যে আপনাকে প্রায়ই ক্ষতিকারক পারমিশনগুলি একসেপ্ট করতে হবে, যা ওই অ্যাপ্লিকেশনকে ডিভাইসের অন্যান্য ডেটা অ্যাক্সেস করার অনুমতি দেয়৷ অনেক সময় বিভিন্ন পরিষেবার জন্য আপনাকে বিভিন্ন এপ্লিকেশন ইনস্টল করতে হতে পারে, সেই এপ্লিকেশন টি আবার কোনো পাসওয়ার্ড ছাড়াই ওপেন হতে পারে, যা মোটেও ভালো TOTP জেনারেটার এপ্লিকেশন এর লক্ষণ নয়।
+
+### সময়-সাপেক্ষ ওয়ান-টাইম পাসওয়ার্ড (TOTP)
+
+TOTP is one of the most common forms of MFA available. When you set up TOTP, you are generally required to scan a [QR Code](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QR_code) which establishes a "[shared secret](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_secret)" with the service that you intend to use. শেয়ার্ড সিক্রেট অথেনটিকেশন অ্যাপের ভিতরে সুরক্ষিত থাকে এবং কখনও কখনও পাসওয়ার্ড দ্বারা সুরক্ষিত থাকে।
+
+সময়-সাপেক্ষ কোড তারপর শেয়ার্ড সিক্রেট এবং সময় থেকে জেনারেট হয়। As the code is only valid for a short time, without access to the shared secret, an adversary cannot generate new codes.
+
+যদি আপনার কাছে TOTP সহ একটি হার্ডওয়্যার সিকিউরিটি কী থাকে (যেমন Yubico অথেন্টিকেটর সাথে একটি YubiKey), আমরা সুপারিশ করি যে আপনি হার্ডওয়্যারে আপনার "শেয়ার্ড সিক্রেট " রাখুন৷ YubiKey-এর মতো হার্ডওয়্যার এমনভাবে তৈরী করা হয়েছিল যাতে "শেয়ারড সিক্রেট" বের করা এবং কপি করা কঠিন হয় একটি YubiKey ইন্টারনেটের সাথে যুক্ত থাকে না, কিন্তু TOTP যুক্ত একটি ফোন ইন্টারনেট এর সাথে যুক্ত থাকে।
+
+[WebAuthn](#fido-fast-identity-online) এর অপরপক্ষে TOTP [ফিশিং](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing) বা রি-উজ এটাক এর বিরুদ্ধে কোন সুরক্ষা প্রদান করে না। If an adversary obtains a valid code from you, they may use it as many times as they like until it expires (generally 60 seconds).
+
+আপনার উজার-নেম, পাসওয়ার্ড এবং বর্তমান TOTP কোড হাতানোর জন্য, আপনাকে প্রতারণা করার চেষ্টায় একজন আক্ক্রমণকারী একটি অফিসিয়াল পরিষেবার অনুকরণ করে একটি ওয়েবসাইট সেট আপ করতে পারে। আক্রমণকারী সেই রেকর্ড করা তথ্যগুলি ব্যবহার করে প্রকৃত পরিষেবাতে লগ ইন করতে এবং অ্যাকাউন্ট হাইজ্যাক করতে সক্ষম হতে পারে।
+
+Although not perfect, TOTP is secure enough for most people, and when [hardware security keys](../multi-factor-authentication.md#hardware-security-keys) are not supported [authenticator apps](../multi-factor-authentication.md#authenticator-apps) are still a good option.
+
+### হার্ডওয়্যার সিকিউরিটি কী
+
+The YubiKey stores data on a tamper-resistant solid-state chip which is [impossible to access](https://security.stackexchange.com/a/245772) non-destructively without an expensive process and a forensics laboratory.
+
+These keys are generally multi-function and provide a number of methods to authenticate. Below are the most common ones.
+
+#### Yubico OTP
+
+Yubico OTP is an authentication protocol typically implemented in hardware security keys. When you decide to use Yubico OTP, the key will generate a public ID, private ID, and a Secret Key which is then uploaded to the Yubico OTP server.
+
+When logging into a website, all you need to do is to physically touch the security key. The security key will emulate a keyboard and print out a one-time password into the password field.
+
+The service will then forward the one-time password to the Yubico OTP server for validation. A counter is incremented both on the key and Yubico's validation server. The OTP can only be used once, and when a successful authentication occurs, the counter is increased which prevents reuse of the OTP. Yubico provides a [detailed document](https://developers.yubico.com/OTP/OTPs_Explained.html) about the process.
+
+
+ 
+
+
+There are some benefits and disadvantages to using Yubico OTP when compared to TOTP.
+
+The Yubico validation server is a cloud based service, and you're placing trust in Yubico that they are storing data securely and not profiling you. The public ID associated with Yubico OTP is reused on every website and could be another avenue for third-parties to profile you. Like TOTP, Yubico OTP does not provide phishing resistance.
+
+If your threat model requires you to have different identities on different websites, **do not** use Yubico OTP with the same hardware security key across those websites as public ID is unique to each security key.
+
+#### FIDO (Fast IDentity Online)
+
+[FIDO](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIDO_Alliance) includes a number of standards, first there was U2F and then later [FIDO2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIDO2_Project) which includes the web standard [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn).
+
+U2F and FIDO2 refer to the [Client to Authenticator Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Client_to_Authenticator_Protocol), which is the protocol between the security key and the computer, such as a laptop or phone. It complements WebAuthn which is the component used to authenticate with the website (the "Relying Party") you're trying to log in on.
+
+WebAuthn is the most secure and private form of second factor authentication. While the authentication experience is similar to Yubico OTP, the key does not print out a one-time password and validate with a third-party server. Instead, it uses [public key cryptography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography) for authentication.
+
+
+ 
+
+
+When you create an account, the public key is sent to the service, then when you log in, the service will require you to "sign" some data with your private key. The benefit of this is that no password data is ever stored by the service, so there is nothing for an adversary to steal.
+
+This presentation discusses the history of password authentication, the pitfalls (such as password reuse), and discussion of FIDO2 and [WebAuthn](https://webauthn.guide) standards.
+
+
+
+
+
+FIDO2 and WebAuthn have superior security and privacy properties when compared to any MFA methods.
+
+Typically for web services it is used with WebAuthn which is a part of the [W3C recommendations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Wide_Web_Consortium#W3C_recommendation_(REC)). It uses public key authentication and is more secure than shared secrets used in Yubico OTP and TOTP methods, as it includes the origin name (usually, the domain name) during authentication. Attestation is provided to protect you from phishing attacks, as it helps you to determine that you are using the authentic service and not a fake copy.
+
+Unlike Yubico OTP, WebAuthn does not use any public ID, so the key is **not** identifiable across different websites. It also does not use any third-party cloud server for authentication. All communication is completed between the key and the website you are logging into. FIDO also uses a counter which is incremented upon use in order to prevent session reuse and cloned keys.
+
+If a website or service supports WebAuthn for the authentication, it is highly recommended that you use it over any other form of MFA.
+
+## General Recommendations
+
+We have these general recommendations:
+
+### Which Method Should I Use?
+
+When configuring your MFA method, keep in mind that it is only as secure as your weakest authentication method you use. This means it is important that you only use the best MFA method available. For instance, if you are already using TOTP, you should disable email and SMS MFA. If you are already using FIDO2/WebAuthn, you should not be using Yubico OTP or TOTP on your account.
+
+### Backups
+
+You should always have backups for your MFA method. Hardware security keys can get lost, stolen or simply stop working over time. It is recommended that you have a pair of hardware security keys with the same access to your accounts instead of just one.
+
+When using TOTP with an authenticator app, be sure to back up your recovery keys or the app itself, or copy the "shared secrets" to another instance of the app on a different phone or to an encrypted container (e.g. [VeraCrypt](../encryption.md#veracrypt)).
+
+### Initial Set Up
+
+When buying a security key, it is important that you change the default credentials, set up password protection for the key, and enable touch confirmation if your key supports it. Products such as the YubiKey have multiple interfaces with separate credentials for each one of them, so you should go over each interface and set up protection as well.
+
+### Email and SMS
+
+If you have to use email for MFA, make sure that the email account itself is secured with a proper MFA method.
+
+If you use SMS MFA, use a carrier who will not switch your phone number to a new SIM card without account access, or use a dedicated VoIP number from a provider with similar security to avoid a [SIM swap attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam).
+
+[MFA tools we recommend](../multi-factor-authentication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## More Places to Set Up MFA
+
+Beyond just securing your website logins, multi-factor authentication can be used to secure your local logins, SSH keys or even password databases as well.
+
+### Windows
+
+Yubico has a dedicated [Credential Provider](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/credential-providers-in-windows) that adds Challenge-Response authentication for the username + password login flow for local Windows accounts. If you have a YubiKey with Challenge-Response authentication support, take a look at the [Yubico Login for Windows Configuration Guide](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013708460-Yubico-Login-for-Windows-Configuration-Guide), which will allow you to set up MFA on your Windows computer.
+
+### macOS
+
+macOS has [native support](https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/intro-to-smart-card-integration-depd0b888248/web) for authentication with smart cards (PIV). If you have a smartcard or a hardware security key that supports the PIV interface such as the YubiKey, we recommend that you follow your smartcard/hardware security vendor's documentation and set up second factor authentication for your macOS computer.
+
+Yubico have a guide [Using Your YubiKey as a Smart Card in macOS](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016649059) which can help you set up your YubiKey on macOS.
+
+After your smartcard/security key is set up, we recommend running this command in the Terminal:
+
+```text
+sudo defaults write /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow DisableFDEAutoLogin -bool YES
+```
+
+The command will prevent an adversary from bypassing MFA when the computer boots.
+
+### Linux
+
+!!! warning
+
+ If the hostname of your system changes (such as due to DHCP), you would be unable to login. It is vital that you set up a proper hostname for your computer before following this guide.
+
+The `pam_u2f` module on Linux can provide two-factor authentication for logging in on most popular Linux distributions. If you have a hardware security key that supports U2F, you can set up MFA authentication for your login. Yubico has a guide [Ubuntu Linux Login Guide - U2F](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016649099-Ubuntu-Linux-Login-Guide-U2F) which should work on any distribution. The package manager commands—such as `apt-get`—and package names may however differ. This guide does **not** apply to Qubes OS.
+
+### Qubes OS
+
+Qubes OS has support for Challenge-Response authentication with YubiKeys. If you have a YubiKey with Challenge-Response authentication support, take a look at the Qubes OS [YubiKey documentation](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/yubikey/) if you want to set up MFA on Qubes OS.
+
+### SSH
+
+#### Hardware Security Keys
+
+SSH MFA could be set up using multiple different authentication methods that are popular with hardware security keys. We recommend that you check out Yubico's [documentation](https://developers.yubico.com/SSH/) on how to set this up.
+
+#### সময়-সাপেক্ষ ওয়ান-টাইম পাসওয়ার্ড (TOTP)
+
+SSH MFA can also be set up using TOTP. DigitalOcean has provided a tutorial [How To Set Up Multi-Factor Authentication for SSH on Ubuntu 20.04](https://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/how-to-set-up-multi-factor-authentication-for-ssh-on-ubuntu-20-04). Most things should be the same regardless of distribution, however the package manager commands—such as `apt-get`—and package names may differ.
+
+### KeePass (and KeePassXC)
+
+KeePass and KeePassXC databases can be secured using Challenge-Response or HOTP as a second-factor authentication. Yubico has provided a document for KeePass [Using Your YubiKey with KeePass](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013779759-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-KeePass) and there is also one on the [KeePassXC](https://keepassxc.org/docs/#faq-yubikey-2fa) website.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/basics/passwords-overview.md b/i18n/bn/basics/passwords-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..08871e37b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/basics/passwords-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+---
+title: "Introduction to Passwords"
+icon: 'material/form-textbox-password'
+---
+
+Passwords are an essential part of our everyday digital lives. We use them to protect our accounts, our devices and our secrets. Despite often being the only thing between us and an adversary who's after our private information, not a lot of thought is put into them, which often leads to people using passwords that can be easily guessed or brute-forced.
+
+## Best Practices
+
+### Use unique passwords for every service
+
+Imagine this; you sign up for an account with the same e-mail and password on multiple online services. If one of those service providers is malicious, or their service has a data breach that exposes your password in an unencrypted format, all a bad actor would have to do is try that e-mail and password combination across multiple popular services until they get a hit. It doesn't matter how strong that one password is, because they already have it.
+
+This is called [credential stuffing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credential_stuffing), and it is one of the most common ways that your accounts can be compromised by bad actors. To avoid this, make sure that you never re-use your passwords.
+
+### Use randomly generated passwords
+
+==You should **never** rely on yourself to come up with a good password.== We recommend using [randomly generated passwords](#passwords) or [diceware passphrases](#diceware-passphrases) with sufficient entropy to protect your accounts and devices.
+
+All of our [recommended password managers](../passwords.md) include a built-in password generator that you can use.
+
+### Rotating Passwords
+
+You should avoid changing passwords that you have to remember (such as your password manager's master password) too often unless you have reason to believe it has been compromised, as changing it too often exposes you to the risk of forgetting it.
+
+When it comes to passwords that you don't have to remember (such as passwords stored inside your password manager), if your [threat model](threat-modeling.md) calls for it, we recommend going through important accounts (especially accounts that don't use multi-factor authentication) and changing their password every couple of months, in case they have been compromised in a data breach that hasn't become public yet. Most password managers allow you to set an expiry date for your password to make this easier to manage.
+
+!!! tip "Checking for data breaches"
+
+ If your password manager lets you check for compromised passwords, make sure to do so and promptly change any password that may have been exposed in a data breach. Alternatively, you could follow [Have I Been Pwned's Latest Breaches feed](https://feeds.feedburner.com/HaveIBeenPwnedLatestBreaches) with the help of a [news aggregator](../news-aggregators.md).
+
+## Creating strong passwords
+
+### Passwords
+
+A lot of services impose certain criteria when it comes to passwords, including a minimum or maximum length, as well as which special characters, if any, can be used. You should use your password manager's built-in password generator to create passwords that are as long and complex as the service will allow by including capitalized and lowercase letters, numbers and special characters.
+
+If you need a password you can memorize, we recommend a [diceware passphrase](#diceware-passphrases).
+
+### Diceware Passphrases
+
+Diceware is a method for creating passphrases which are easy to remember, but hard to guess.
+
+Diceware passphrases are a great option when you need to memorize or manually input your credentials, such as for your password manager's master password or your device's encryption password.
+
+An example of a diceware passphrase is `viewable fastness reluctant squishy seventeen shown pencil`.
+
+To generate a diceware passphrase using real dice, follow these steps:
+
+!!! note
+
+ These instructions assume that you are using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate the passphrase, which requires five dice rolls per word. Other wordlists may require more or less rolls per word, and may require a different amount of words to achieve the same entropy.
+
+1. Roll a six-sided die five times, noting down the number after each roll.
+
+2. As an example, let's say you rolled `2-5-2-6-6`. Look through the [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) for the word that corresponds to `25266`.
+
+3. You will find the word `encrypt`. Write that word down.
+
+4. Repeat this process until your passphrase has as many words as you need, which you should separate with a space.
+
+!!! warning "Important"
+
+ You should **not** re-roll words until you get a combination of words that appeal to you. The process should be completely random.
+
+If you don't have access to or would prefer to not use real dice, you can use your password manager's built-in password generator, as most of them have the option to generate diceware passphrases in addition to regular passwords.
+
+We recommend using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate your diceware passphrases, as it offers the exact same security as the original list, while containing words that are easier to memorize. There are also [other wordlists in different languages](https://theworld.com/~reinhold/diceware.html#Diceware%20in%20Other%20Languages|outline), if you do not want your passphrase to be in English.
+
+??? note "Explanation of entropy and strength of diceware passphrases"
+
+ To demonstrate how strong diceware passphrases are, we'll use the aforementioned seven word passphrase (`viewable fastness reluctant squishy seventeen shown pencil`) and [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) as an example.
+
+ One metric to determine the strength of a diceware passphrase is how much entropy it has. The entropy per word in a diceware passphrase is calculated as $\text{log}_2(\text{WordsInList})$ and the overall entropy of the passphrase is calculated as $\text{log}_2(\text{WordsInList}^\text{WordsInPhrase})$.
+
+ Therefore, each word in the aforementioned list results in ~12.9 bits of entropy ($\text{log}_2(7776)$), and a seven word passphrase derived from it has ~90.47 bits of entropy ($\text{log}_2(7776^7)$).
+
+ The [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) contains 7776 unique words. To calculate the amount of possible passphrases, all we have to do is $\text{WordsInList}^\text{WordsInPhrase}$, or in our case, $7776^7$.
+
+ Let's put all of this in perspective: A seven word passphrase using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) is one of ~1,719,070,799,748,422,500,000,000,000 possible passphrases.
+
+ On average, it takes trying 50% of all the possible combinations to guess your phrase. With that in mind, even if your adversary is capable of ~1,000,000,000,000 guesses per second, it would still take them ~27,255,689 years to guess your passphrase. That is the case even if the following things are true:
+
+ - Your adversary knows that you used the diceware method.
+ - Your adversary knows the specific wordlist that you used.
+ - Your adversary knows how many words your passphrase contains.
+
+To sum it up, diceware passphrases are your best option when you need something that is both easy to remember *and* exceptionally strong.
+
+## Storing Passwords
+
+### Password Managers
+
+The best way to store your passwords is by using a password manager. They allow you to store your passwords in a file or in the cloud and protect them with a single master password. That way, you will only have to remember one strong password, which lets you access the rest of them.
+
+There are many good options to choose from, both cloud-based and local. Choose one of our recommended password managers and use it to establish strong passwords across all of your accounts. We recommend securing your password manager with a [diceware passphrase](#diceware-passphrases) comprised of at least seven words.
+
+[List of recommended password managers](../passwords.md ""){.md-button}
+
+!!! warning "Don't place your passwords and TOTP tokens inside the same password manager"
+
+ When using TOTP codes as [multi-factor authentication](../multi-factor-authentication.md), the best security practice is to keep your TOTP codes in a [separate app](../multi-factor-authentication.md#authenticator-apps).
+
+ Storing your TOTP tokens in the same place as your passwords, while convenient, reduces the accounts to a single factor in the event that an adversary gains access to your password manager.
+
+ Furthermore, we do not recommend storing single-use recovery codes in your password manager. Those should be stored separately such as in an encrypted container on an offline storage device.
+
+### Backups
+
+You should store an [encrypted](../encryption.md) backup of your passwords on multiple storage devices or a cloud storage provider. This can help you access your passwords if something happens to your primary device or the service you are using.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/basics/threat-modeling.md b/i18n/bn/basics/threat-modeling.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b169f729c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/basics/threat-modeling.md
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+---
+title: "Threat Modeling"
+icon: 'material/target-account'
+---
+
+প্রাইভেসি সিকিউরিটি, এবং ব্যবহারযোগ্যতা এর মধ্যে ভারসাম্য রক্ষা করা আপনার প্রাইভেসি যাত্রার সবথেকে কঠিন কাজ। Everything is a trade-off: The more secure something is, the more restricting or inconvenient it generally is, etc. Often, people find that the problem with the tools they see recommended is that they're just too hard to start using!
+
+যদি আপনি **সবথেকে** সিকিউর সফটও়্যারগুলো ব্যাবহার করতে চান আপনাকে *কিছু* ব্যবহারযোগ্যতা বিসর্জন দিতে হবে। And, even then, ==nothing is ever fully secure.== There's **high** security, but never **full** security. একারণে থ্রেট মডেল তৈরি করা জরুরি।
+
+**So, what are these threat models, anyway?**
+
+==A threat model is a list of the most probable threats to your security and privacy endeavors.== Since it's impossible to protect yourself against **every** attack(er), you should focus on the **most probable** threats. In computer security, a threat is an event that could undermine your efforts to stay private and secure.
+
+Focusing on the threats that matter to you narrows down your thinking about the protection you need, so you can choose the tools that are right for the job.
+
+## Creating Your Threat Model
+
+To identify what could happen to the things you value and determine from whom you need to protect them, you should answer these five questions:
+
+1. আমি কি রক্ষা করতে চাই?
+2. কার থেকে আমি রক্ষা করতে চাই?
+3. এটি আমার কতটা রক্ষা করা প্রয়োজন?
+4. আমি ব্যর্থ হলে পরিণতি কতটা খারাপ?
+5. সম্ভাব্য ফল রোধ করার জন্য আমি কতটা সমস্যার মধ্য দিয়ে যেতে ইচ্ছুক?
+
+### আমি কি রক্ষা করতে চাই?
+
+An “asset” is something you value and want to protect. In the context of digital security, ==an asset is usually some kind of information.== For example, your emails, contact lists, instant messages, location, and files are all possible assets. Your devices themselves may also be assets.
+
+*Make a list of your assets: data that you keep, where it's kept, who has access to it, and what stops others from accessing it.*
+
+### কার থেকে আমি রক্ষা করতে চাই?
+
+To answer this question, it's important to identify who might want to target you or your information. ==A person or entity that poses a threat to your assets is an “adversary”.== Examples of potential adversaries are your boss, your former partner, your business competition, your government, or a hacker on a public network.
+
+*Make a list of your adversaries or those who might want to get ahold of your assets. Your list may include individuals, a government agency, or corporations.*
+
+Depending on who your adversaries are, under some circumstances, this list might be something you want to destroy after you're done security planning.
+
+### এটি আমার কতটা রক্ষা করা প্রয়োজন?
+
+==Risk is the likelihood that a particular threat against a particular asset will actually occur.== It goes hand-in-hand with capability. While your mobile phone provider has the capability to access all of your data, the risk of them posting your private data online to harm your reputation is low.
+
+It is important to distinguish between what might happen and the probability it may happen. For instance, there is a threat that your building might collapse, but the risk of this happening is far greater in San Francisco (where earthquakes are common) than in Stockholm (where they are not).
+
+Assessing risks is both a personal and subjective process. Many people find certain threats unacceptable, no matter the likelihood they will occur, because the mere presence of the threat is not worth the cost. In other cases, people disregard high risks because they don't view the threat as a problem.
+
+*Write down which threats you are going to take seriously, and which may be too rare or too harmless (or too difficult to combat) to worry about.*
+
+### আমি ব্যর্থ হলে পরিণতি কতটা খারাপ?
+
+There are many ways that an adversary could gain access to your data. For example, an adversary can read your private communications as they pass through the network, or they can delete or corrupt your data.
+
+==The motives of adversaries differ widely, as do their tactics.== A government trying to prevent the spread of a video showing police violence may be content to simply delete or reduce the availability of that video. In contrast, a political opponent may wish to gain access to secret content and publish that content without you knowing.
+
+Security planning involves understanding how bad the consequences could be if an adversary successfully gains access to one of your assets. To determine this, you should consider the capability of your adversary. For example, your mobile phone provider has access to all of your phone records. A hacker on an open Wi-Fi network can access your unencrypted communications. Your government might have stronger capabilities.
+
+*Write down what your adversary might want to do with your private data.*
+
+### সম্ভাব্য ফল রোধ করার জন্য আমি কতটা সমস্যার মধ্য দিয়ে যেতে ইচ্ছুক?
+
+==There is no perfect option for security.== Not everyone has the same priorities, concerns, or access to resources. Your risk assessment will allow you to plan the right strategy for you, balancing convenience, cost, and privacy.
+
+For example, an attorney representing a client in a national security case may be willing to go to greater lengths to protect communications about that case, such as using encrypted email, than a mother who regularly emails her daughter funny cat videos.
+
+*Write down what options you have available to you to help mitigate your unique threats. Note if you have any financial constraints, technical constraints, or social constraints.*
+
+### Try it yourself: Protecting Your Belongings
+
+These questions can apply to a wide variety of situations, online and offline. As a generic demonstration of how these questions work, let's build a plan to keep your house and possessions safe.
+
+**আপনি কি রক্ষা করতে চান? (অথবা, *আপনার কাছে কি এমন জিনিস আছে যা রক্ষা করার দরকার?*)**
+:
+
+আপনার জিনিসপত্র এর মধ্যে গয়না, ইলেকট্রনিকস, গুরুত্বপূর্ণ কাগজপত্র অথবা ফটো পড়তে পারে।
+
+**কার থেকে আপনি রক্ষা করতে চান?**
+:
+
+আপনার সিকিউরিটি এর আক্রমণকারী ডাকাত, রুমমেট বা অতিথি হতে পারে।
+
+**আপনাকে রক্ষা করতে হবে তার সম্ভাবনা কত?**
+:
+
+আপনার আশেপাশে কি চুরির ইতিহাস আছে? How trustworthy are your roommates or guests? আপনার প্রতিপক্ষের ক্ষমতা কি? আপনার কী কী ঝুঁকি বিবেচনা করা উচিত?
+
+**আপনি ব্যর্থ হলে পরিণতি কতটা খারাপ?**
+:
+
+আপনার বাড়িতে এমন কিছু আছে যা আপনি অন্য কিছু দিয়ে পরিবর্তন করতে পারবেন না? Do you have the time or money to replace those things? আপনার কি বীমা আছে যা আপনার বাড়ি থেকে চুরি হওয়া জিনিসগুলি কভার করে?
+
+**সম্ভাব্য ফল রোধ করার জন্য আপনি কতটা সমস্যার মধ্য দিয়ে যেতে ইচ্ছুক?**
+:
+
+আপনি সংবেদনশীল নথি রাখার জন্য একটি সেফ কিনতে ইচ্ছুক? আপনি কি একটি উচ্চ মানের তালা কিনতে সামর্থ্য? আপনার কি স্থানীয় ব্যাঙ্কে কোনও সিকিউরিটি বাক্স খোলার এবং সেখানে আপনার মূল্যবান জিনিসপত্র রাখার সময় আছে?
+
+আপনি একবার নিজেকে এই প্রশ্নগুলি জিজ্ঞাসা করলে আপনি কী পদক্ষেপ নেবেন তা বুঝতে পারবেন। যদি আপনার জিনিসপত্রগুলো দামী হয়, কিন্তু ডাকাতি হওয়ার সম্ভাবনা কম, তাহলে বেশি টাকা তলাতে খরচ করার দরকার হবে না। But, if the probability of a break-in is high, you'll want to get the best lock on the market and consider adding a security system.
+
+Making a security plan will help you to understand the threats that are unique to you and to evaluate your assets, your adversaries, and your adversaries' capabilities, along with the likelihood of risks you face.
+
+## Further Reading
+
+For people looking to increase their privacy and security online, we've compiled a list of common threats our visitors face or goals our visitors have, to give you some inspiration and demonstrate the basis of our recommendations.
+
+- [Common Goals and Threats :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](common-threats.md)
+
+## Sources
+
+- [EFF Surveillance Self Defense: Your Security Plan](https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/your-security-plan)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/basics/vpn-overview.md b/i18n/bn/basics/vpn-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..26a8eeac6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/basics/vpn-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+---
+title: VPN Overview
+icon: material/vpn
+---
+
+Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit somewhere else in the world. An ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (i.e. modem).
+
+Encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, so they may not be able to see exactly what you're posting or reading but they can get an idea of the [domains you request](../advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).
+
+A VPN can help as it can shift trust to a server somewhere else in the world. As a result, the ISP then only sees that you are connected to a VPN and nothing about the activity that you're passing into it.
+
+## Should I use a VPN?
+
+**Yes**, unless you are already using Tor. A VPN does two things: shifting the risks from your Internet Service Provider to itself and hiding your IP from a third-party service.
+
+VPNs cannot encrypt data outside of the connection between your device and the VPN server. VPN providers can see and modify your traffic the same way your ISP could. And there is no way to verify a VPN provider's "no logging" policies in any way.
+
+However, they do hide your actual IP from a third-party service, provided that there are no IP leaks. They help you blend in with others and mitigate IP based tracking.
+
+## When shouldn't I use a VPN?
+
+Using a VPN in cases where you're using your [known identity](common-threats.md#common-misconceptions) is unlikely be useful.
+
+Doing so may trigger spam and fraud detection systems, such as if you were to log into your bank's website.
+
+## What about encryption?
+
+Encryption offered by VPN providers are between your devices and their servers. It guarantees that this specific link is secure. This is a step up from using unencrypted proxies where an adversary on the network can intercept the communications between your devices and said proxies and modify them. However, encryption between your apps or browsers with the service providers are not handled by this encryption.
+
+In order to keep what you actually do on the websites you visit private and secure, you must use HTTPS. This will keep your passwords, session tokens, and queries safe from the VPN provider. Consider enabling "HTTPS everywhere" in your browser to mitigate downgrade attacks like [SSL Strip](https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Marlinspike/BlackHat-DC-09-Marlinspike-Defeating-SSL.pdf).
+
+## Should I use encrypted DNS with a VPN?
+
+Unless your VPN provider hosts the encrypted DNS servers, **no**. Using DOH/DOT (or any other form of encrypted DNS) with third-party servers will simply add more entities to trust and does **absolutely nothing** to improve your privacy/security. Your VPN provider can still see which websites you visit based on the IP addresses and other methods. Instead of just trusting your VPN provider, you are now trusting both the VPN provider and the DNS provider.
+
+A common reason to recommend encrypted DNS is that it helps against DNS spoofing. However, your browser should already be checking for [TLS certificates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Digital_certificates) with **HTTPS** and warn you about it. If you are not using **HTTPS**, then an adversary can still just modify anything other than your DNS queries and the end result will be little different.
+
+Needless to say, **you shouldn't use encrypted DNS with Tor**. This would direct all of your DNS requests through a single circuit and would allow the encrypted DNS provider to deanonymize you.
+
+## Should I use Tor *and* a VPN?
+
+By using a VPN with Tor, you're creating essentially a permanent entry node, often with a money trail attached. This provides zero additional benefits to you, while increasing the attack surface of your connection dramatically. If you wish to hide your Tor usage from your ISP or your government, Tor has a built-in solution for that: Tor bridges. [Read more about Tor bridges and why using a VPN is not necessary](../advanced/tor-overview.md).
+
+## What if I need anonymity?
+
+VPNs cannot provide anonymity. Your VPN provider will still see your real IP address, and often has a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. You cannot rely on "no logging" policies to protect your data. Use [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) instead.
+
+## What about VPN providers that provide Tor nodes?
+
+Do not use that feature. The point of using Tor is that you do not trust your VPN provider. Currently Tor only supports the [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol) protocol. [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol) (used in [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC) for voice and video sharing, the new [HTTP3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) protocol, etc), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol) and other packets will be dropped. To compensate for this, VPN providers typically will route all non-TCP packets through their VPN server (your first hop). This is the case with [ProtonVPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn/). Additionally, when using this Tor over VPN setup, you do not have control over other important Tor features such as [Isolated Destination Address](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (using a different Tor circuit for every domain you visit).
+
+The feature should be viewed as a convenient way to access the Tor Network, not to stay anonymous. For proper anonymity, use the Tor Browser, TorSocks, or a Tor gateway.
+
+## When are VPNs useful?
+
+A VPN may still be useful to you in a variety of scenarios, such as:
+
+1. Hiding your traffic from **only** your Internet Service Provider.
+1. Hiding your downloads (such as torrents) from your ISP and anti-piracy organizations.
+1. Hiding your IP from third-party websites and services, preventing IP based tracking.
+
+For situations like these, or if you have another compelling reason, the VPN providers we listed above are who we think are the most trustworthy. However, using a VPN provider still means you're *trusting* the provider. In pretty much any other scenario you should be using a secure**-by-design** tool such as Tor.
+
+## Sources and Further Reading
+
+1. [VPN - a Very Precarious Narrative](https://schub.io/blog/2019/04/08/very-precarious-narrative.html) by Dennis Schubert
+1. [Tor Network Overview](../advanced/tor-overview.md)
+1. [IVPN Privacy Guides](https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides)
+1. ["Do I need a VPN?"](https://www.doineedavpn.com), a tool developed by IVPN to challenge aggressive VPN marketing by helping individuals decide if a VPN is right for them.
+
+## Related VPN Information
+
+- [The Trouble with VPN and Privacy Review Sites](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2019/11/20/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-review-sites/)
+- [Free VPN App Investigation](https://www.top10vpn.com/free-vpn-app-investigation/)
+- [Hidden VPN owners unveiled: 101 VPN products run by just 23 companies](https://vpnpro.com/blog/hidden-vpn-owners-unveiled-97-vpns-23-companies/)
+- [This Chinese company is secretly behind 24 popular apps seeking dangerous permissions](https://vpnpro.com/blog/chinese-company-secretly-behind-popular-apps-seeking-dangerous-permissions/)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/calendar.md b/i18n/bn/calendar.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a50c72aca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/calendar.md
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+---
+title: "Calendar Sync"
+icon: material/calendar
+---
+
+Calendars contain some of your most sensitive data; use products that implement E2EE at rest to prevent a provider from reading them.
+
+## Tutanota
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tutanota** offers a free and encrypted calendar across their supported platforms. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, multi-factor authentication, and [more](https://tutanota.com/calendar-app-comparison/).
+
+ Multiple calendars and extended sharing functionality is limited to paid subscribers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tutanota.com/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tutanota.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tutanota.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tutanota.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/tutanota/id922429609)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.tutanota.Tutanota)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.tutanota.com/)
+
+## Proton Calendar
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton Calendar** is an encrypted calendar service available to Proton members via web or mobile clients. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, and [more](https://proton.me/support/proton-calendar-guide). Those on the free tier get access to a single calendar, whereas paid subscribers can create up to 20 calendars. Extended sharing functionality is also limited to paid subscribers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/proton-calendar-guide){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=me.proton.android.calendar)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://calendar.proton.me)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Qualifications
+
+- Must sync and store information with E2EE to ensure data is not visible to the service provider.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should integrate with native OS calendar and contact management apps if applicable.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/cloud.md b/i18n/bn/cloud.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d01a476f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/cloud.md
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+---
+title: "Cloud Storage"
+icon: material/file-cloud
+---
+
+Many cloud storage providers require your full trust that they will not look at your files. The alternatives listed below eliminate the need for trust by either putting you in control of your data or by implementing E2EE.
+
+If these alternatives do not fit your needs, we suggest you look into [Encryption Software](encryption.md).
+
+??? question "Looking for Nextcloud?"
+
+ Nextcloud is [still a recommended tool](productivity.md) for self-hosting a file management suite, however we do not recommend third-party Nextcloud storage providers at the moment, because we do not recommend Nextcloud's built-in E2EE functionality for home users.
+
+## Proton Drive
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton Drive** is an E2EE general file storage service by the popular encrypted email provider [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/mail).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/drive){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/drive){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=me.proton.android.drive)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1509667851)
+
+Proton Drive's mobile clients were released in December 2022 and are not yet open-source. Proton has historically delayed their source code releases until after initial product releases, and [plans to](https://www.reddit.com/r/ProtonDrive/comments/zf14i8/comment/izdwmme/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web2x&context=3) release the source code by the end of 2023. Proton Drive desktop clients are still in development.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must enforce end-to-end encryption.
+- Must offer a free plan or trial period for testing.
+- Must support TOTP or FIDO2 multi-factor authentication, or Passkey logins.
+- Must offer a web interface which supports basic file management functionality.
+- Must allow for easy exports of all files/documents.
+- Must use standard, audited encryption.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Clients should be open-source.
+- Clients should be audited in their entirety by an independent third-party.
+- Should offer native clients for Linux, Android, Windows, macOS, and iOS.
+ - These clients should integrate with native OS tools for cloud storage providers, such as Files app integration on iOS, or DocumentsProvider functionality on Android.
+- Should support easy file-sharing with other users.
+- Should offer at least basic file preview and editing functionality on the web interface.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/data-redaction.md b/i18n/bn/data-redaction.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e8eed0b50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/data-redaction.md
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+---
+title: "Data and Metadata Redaction"
+icon: material/tag-remove
+---
+
+When sharing files, be sure to remove associated metadata. Image files commonly include [Exif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exif) data. Photos sometimes even include GPS coordinates in the file metadata.
+
+## Desktop
+
+### MAT2
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **MAT2** is free software, which allows the metadata to be removed from image, audio, torrent, and document file types. It provides both a command line tool and a graphical user interface via an [extension for Nautilus](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/tree/master/nautilus), the default file manager of [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), and [Dolphin](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/tree/master/dolphin), the default file manager of [KDE](https://kde.org).
+
+ On Linux, a third-party graphical tool [Metadata Cleaner](https://gitlab.com/rmnvgr/metadata-cleaner) powered by MAT2 exists and is [available on Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/fr.romainvigier.MetadataCleaner).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/blob/master/README.md){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://pypi.org/project/mat2)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2#requirements-setup-on-macos-os-x-using-homebrew)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://pypi.org/project/mat2)
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2#web-interface)
+
+## Mobile
+
+### ExifEraser (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **ExifEraser** is a modern, permissionless image metadata erasing application for Android.
+
+ It currently supports JPEG, PNG and WebP files.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.none.tom.exiferaser)
+ - [:octicons-moon-16: Accrescent](https://accrescent.app/app/com.none.tom.exiferaser)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser/releases)
+
+The metadata that is erased depends on the image's file type:
+
+* **JPEG**: ICC Profile, Exif, Photoshop Image Resources and XMP/ExtendedXMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
+* **PNG**: ICC Profile, Exif and XMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
+* **WebP**: ICC Profile, Exif and XMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
+
+After processing the images, ExifEraser provides you with a full report about what exactly was removed from each image.
+
+The app offers multiple ways to erase metadata from images. Namely:
+
+* You can share an image from another application with ExifEraser.
+* Through the app itself, you can select a single image, multiple images at once, or even an entire directory.
+* It features a "Camera" option, which uses your operating system's camera app to take a photo, and then it removes the metadata from it.
+* It allows you to drag photos from another app into ExifEraser when they are both open in split-screen mode.
+* Lastly, it allows you to paste an image from your clipboard.
+
+### Metapho (iOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Metapho** is a simple and clean viewer for photo metadata such as date, file name, size, camera model, shutter speed, and location.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://zininworks.com/metapho){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://zininworks.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/metapho/id914457352)
+
+### PrivacyBlur
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **PrivacyBlur** is a free app which can blur sensitive portions of pictures before sharing them online.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://privacyblur.app/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://privacyblur.app/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/MATHEMA-GmbH/privacyblur#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/MATHEMA-GmbH/privacyblur){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.mathema.privacyblur)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/privacyblur/id1536274106)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ You should **never** use blur to redact [text in images](https://bishopfox.com/blog/unredacter-tool-never-pixelation). If you want to redact text in an image, draw a box over the text. For this, we suggest apps like [Pocket Paint](https://github.com/Catrobat/Paintroid).
+
+## Command-line
+
+### ExifTool
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **ExifTool** is the original perl library and command-line application for reading, writing, and editing meta information (Exif, IPTC, XMP, and more) in a wide variety of file formats (JPEG, TIFF, PNG, PDF, RAW, and more).
+
+ It's often a component of other Exif removal applications and is in most Linux distribution repositories.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://exiftool.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://exiftool.org/faq.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/exiftool/exiftool){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://exiftool.org/#donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://exiftool.org)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://exiftool.org)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://exiftool.org)
+
+!!! example "Deleting data from a directory of files"
+
+ ```bash
+ exiftool -all= *.file_extension
+ ```
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Apps developed for open-source operating systems must be open-source.
+- Apps must be free and should not include ads or other limitations.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/desktop-browsers.md b/i18n/bn/desktop-browsers.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f7928a495
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/desktop-browsers.md
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+---
+title: "Desktop Browsers"
+icon: material/laptop
+---
+
+These are our currently recommended desktop web browsers and configurations for standard/non-anonymous browsing. If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) instead. In general, we recommend keeping your browser extensions to a minimum; they have privileged access within your browser, require you to trust the developer, can make you [stand out](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint), and [weaken](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/chromium-extensions/c/0ei-UCHNm34/m/lDaXwQhzBAAJ) site isolation.
+
+## Firefox
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Firefox** provides strong privacy settings such as [Enhanced Tracking Protection](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/enhanced-tracking-protection-firefox-desktop), which can help block various [types of tracking](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/enhanced-tracking-protection-firefox-desktop#w_what-enhanced-tracking-protection-blocks).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://firefox.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mozilla.org/privacy/firefox/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.mozilla.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/mac)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/linux)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.mozilla.firefox)
+
+!!! warning
+ Firefox includes a unique [download token](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1677497#c0) in downloads from Mozilla's website and uses telemetry in Firefox to send the token. The token is **not** included in releases from the [Mozilla FTP](https://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/firefox/releases/).
+
+### Recommended Configuration
+
+Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. When you use Firefox, we recommend changing the following settings to protect your privacy from certain parties, but all browsers other than [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) will be traceable by *somebody* in some regard or another.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Privacy & Security**.
+
+##### Enhanced Tracking Protection
+
+- [x] Select **Strict** Enhanced Tracking Protection
+
+This protects you by blocking social media trackers, fingerprinting scripts (note that this does not protect you from *all* fingerprinting), cryptominers, cross-site tracking cookies, and some other tracking content. ETP protects against many common threats, but it does not block all tracking avenues because it is designed to have minimal to no impact on site usability.
+
+##### Sanitize on Close
+
+If you want to stay logged in to particular sites, you can allow exceptions in **Cookies and Site Data** → **Manage Exceptions...**
+
+- [x] Check **Delete cookies and site data when Firefox is closed**
+
+This protects you from persistent cookies, but does not protect you against cookies acquired during any one browsing session. When this is enabled, it becomes possible to easily cleanse your browser cookies by simply restarting Firefox. You can set exceptions on a per-site basis, if you wish to stay logged in to a particular site you visit often.
+
+##### Search Suggestions
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Provide search suggestions**
+
+Search suggestion features may not be available in your region.
+
+Search suggestions send everything you type in the address bar to the default search engine, regardless of whether you submit an actual search. Disabling search suggestions allows you to more precisely control what data you send to your search engine provider.
+
+##### Telemetry
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Firefox to send technical and interaction data to Mozilla**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Firefox to install and run studies**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Firefox to send backlogged crash reports on your behalf**
+
+> Firefox sends data about your Firefox version and language; device operating system and hardware configuration; memory, basic information about crashes and errors; outcome of automated processes like updates, safebrowsing, and activation to us. When Firefox sends data to us, your IP address is temporarily collected as part of our server logs.
+
+Additionally, the Firefox Accounts service collects [some technical data](https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/privacy/firefox/#firefox-accounts). If you use a Firefox Account you can opt-out:
+
+1. Open your [profile settings on accounts.firefox.com](https://accounts.firefox.com/settings#data-collection)
+2. Uncheck **Data Collection and Use** > **Help improve Firefox Accounts**
+
+##### HTTPS-Only Mode
+
+- [x] Select **Enable HTTPS-Only Mode in all windows**
+
+This prevents you from unintentionally connecting to a website in plain-text HTTP. Sites without HTTPS are uncommon nowadays, so this should have little to no impact on your day to day browsing.
+
+### Firefox Sync
+
+[Firefox Sync](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2018/11/firefox-sync-privacy/) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices and protects it with E2EE.
+
+### Arkenfox (advanced)
+
+The [Arkenfox project](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js) provides a set of carefully considered options for Firefox. If you [decide](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/1.1-To-Arkenfox-or-Not) to use Arkenfox, a [few options](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/3.2-Overrides-[Common]) are subjectively strict and/or may cause some websites to not work properly - [which you can easily change](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/3.1-Overrides) to suit your needs. We **strongly recommend** reading through their full [wiki](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki). Arkenfox also enables [container](https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/containers#w_for-advanced-users) support.
+
+## Brave
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Brave Browser** includes a built-in content blocker and [privacy features](https://brave.com/privacy-features/), many of which are enabled by default.
+
+ Brave is built upon the Chromium web browser project, so it should feel familiar and have minimal website compatibility issues.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://brave.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://brave4u7jddbv7cyviptqjc7jusxh72uik7zt6adtckl5f4nwy2v72qd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://brave.com/privacy/browser/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.brave.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads annotate
+
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://brave.com/download/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://brave.com/download/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://brave.com/linux/) (1)
+
+ 1. We advise against using the Flatpak version of Brave, as it replaces Chromium's sandbox with Flatpak's, which is less effective. Additionally, the package is not maintained by Brave Software, Inc.
+
+### Recommended Configuration
+
+Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. When you use Brave, we recommend changing the following settings to protect your privacy from certain parties, but all browsers other than the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) will be traceable by *somebody* in some regard or another.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings**.
+
+##### Shields
+
+Brave includes some anti-fingerprinting measures in its [Shields](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360022973471-What-is-Shields-) feature. We suggest configuring these options [globally](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360023646212-How-do-I-configure-global-and-site-specific-Shields-settings-) across all pages that you visit.
+
+Shields' options can be downgraded on a per-site basis as needed, but by default we recommend setting the following:
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Prevent sites from fingerprinting me based on my language preferences**
+- [x] Select **Aggressive** under Trackers & ads blocking
+
+ ??? warning "Use default filter lists"
+ Brave allows you to select additional content filters within the internal `brave://adblock` page. We advise against using this feature; instead, keep the default filter lists. Using extra lists will make you stand out from other Brave users and may also increase attack surface if there is an exploit in Brave and a malicious rule is added to one of the lists you use.
+
+- [x] (Optional) Select **Block Scripts** (1)
+- [x] Select **Strict, may break sites** under Block fingerprinting
+
+
+
+1. This option provides functionality similar to uBlock Origin's advanced [blocking modes](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) or the [NoScript](https://noscript.net/) extension.
+
+##### Social media blocking
+
+- [ ] Uncheck all social media components
+
+##### Privacy and security
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Disable non-proxied UDP** under [WebRTC IP Handling Policy](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360017989132-How-do-I-change-my-Privacy-Settings-#webrtc)
+- [ ] Uncheck **Use Google services for push messaging**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow privacy-preserving product analytics (P3A)**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send daily usage ping to Brave**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send diagnostic reports**
+- [x] Select **Always use secure connections** in the **Security** menu
+- [ ] Uncheck **Private window with Tor** (1)
+
+ !!! tip "Sanitizing on Close"
+ - [x] Select **Clear cookies and site data when you close all windows** in the *Cookies and other site data* menu
+
+ If you wish to stay logged in to a particular site you visit often, you can set exceptions on a per-site basis under the *Customized behaviors* section.
+
+
+
+1. Brave is **not** as resistant to fingerprinting as the Tor Browser and far fewer people use Brave with Tor, so you will stand out. Where [strong anonymity is required](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360018121491-What-is-a-Private-Window-with-Tor-Connectivity-) use the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser).
+
+##### Extensions
+
+Disable built-in extensions you do not use in **Extensions**
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Hangouts**
+- [ ] Uncheck **WebTorrent**
+
+##### IPFS
+
+InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is a decentralized, peer-to-peer network for storing and sharing data in a distributed filesystem. Unless you use the feature, disable it.
+
+- [x] Select **Disabled** on Method to resolve IPFS resources
+
+##### Additional settings
+
+Under the *System* menu
+
+
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Continue running apps when Brave is closed** to disable background apps (1)
+
+
+
+1. This option is not present on all platforms.
+
+### Brave Sync
+
+[Brave Sync](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360059793111-Understanding-Brave-Sync) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices without requiring an account and protects it with E2EE.
+
+## Additional Resources
+
+We generally do not recommend installing any extensions as they increase your attack surface. However, uBlock Origin may prove useful if you value content blocking functionality.
+
+### uBlock Origin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **uBlock Origin** is a popular content blocker that could help you block ads, trackers, and fingerprinting scripts.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/ublock-origin/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/ublock-origin/cjpalhdlnbpafiamejdnhcphjbkeiagm)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/ublock-origin/odfafepnkmbhccpbejgmiehpchacaeak)
+
+We suggest following the [developer's documentation](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) and picking one of the "modes". Additional filter lists can impact performance and [may increase attack surface](https://portswigger.net/research/ublock-i-exfiltrate-exploiting-ad-blockers-with-css).
+
+##### Other lists
+
+These are some other [filter lists](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Dashboard:-Filter-lists) that you may want to consider adding:
+
+- [x] Check **Privacy** > **AdGuard URL Tracking Protection**
+- Add [Actually Legitimate URL Shortener Tool](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DandelionSprout/adfilt/master/LegitimateURLShortener.txt)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Supports automatic updates.
+- Receives engine updates in 0-1 days from upstream release.
+- Available on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- Any changes required to make the browser more privacy-respecting should not negatively impact user experience.
+- Blocks third-party cookies by default.
+- Supports [state partitioning](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning) to mitigate cross-site tracking.[^1]
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Includes built-in content blocking functionality.
+- Supports cookie compartmentalization (à la [Multi-Account Containers](https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/containers)).
+- Supports Progressive Web Apps.
+ PWAs enable you to install certain websites as if they were native apps on your computer. This can have advantages over installing Electron-based apps, because you benefit from your browser's regular security updates.
+- Does not include add-on functionality (bloatware) that does not impact user privacy.
+- Does not collect telemetry by default.
+- Provides open-source sync server implementation.
+- Defaults to a [private search engine](search-engines.md).
+
+### Extension Criteria
+
+- Must not replicate built-in browser or OS functionality.
+- Must directly impact user privacy, i.e. must not simply provide information.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
+
+[^1]: Brave's implementation is detailed at [Brave Privacy Updates: Partitioning network-state for privacy](https://brave.com/privacy-updates/14-partitioning-network-state/).
diff --git a/i18n/bn/desktop.md b/i18n/bn/desktop.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..95b7f77f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/desktop.md
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+---
+title: "Desktop/PC"
+icon: simple/linux
+---
+
+Linux distributions are commonly recommended for privacy protection and software freedom. If you don't already use Linux, below are some distributions we suggest trying out, as well as some general privacy and security improvement tips that are applicable to many Linux distributions.
+
+- [General Linux Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/linux-overview.md)
+
+## Traditional Distributions
+
+### Fedora Workstation
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Fedora Workstation** is our recommended distribution for people new to Linux. Fedora generally adopts newer technologies before other distributions e.g., [Wayland](https://wayland.freedesktop.org/), [PipeWire](https://pipewire.org). These new technologies often come with improvements in security, privacy, and usability in general.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getfedora.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://whatcanidoforfedora.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Fedora has a semi-rolling release cycle. While some packages like [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org) are frozen until the next Fedora release, most packages (including the kernel) are updated frequently throughout the lifespan of the release. Each Fedora release is supported for one year, with a new version released every 6 months.
+
+### openSUSE Tumbleweed
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **openSUSE Tumbleweed** is a stable rolling release distribution.
+
+ openSUSE Tumbleweed has a [transactional update](https://kubic.opensuse.org/blog/2018-04-04-transactionalupdates/) system that uses [Btrfs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Btrfs) and [Snapper](https://en.opensuse.org/openSUSE:Snapper_Tutorial) to ensure that snapshots can be rolled back should there be a problem.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://get.opensuse.org/tumbleweed/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://doc.opensuse.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://shop.opensuse.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Tumbleweed follows a rolling release model where each update is released as a snapshot of the distribution. When you upgrade your system, a new snapshot is downloaded. Each snapshot is run through a series of automated tests by [openQA](https://openqa.opensuse.org) to ensure its quality.
+
+### Arch Linux
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Arch Linux** is a lightweight, do-it-yourself (DIY) distribution meaning that you only get what you install. For more information see their [FAQ](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Frequently_asked_questions).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://archlinux.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://wiki.archlinux.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://archlinux.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Arch Linux has a rolling release cycle. There is no fixed release schedule and packages are updated very frequently.
+
+Being a DIY distribution, you are [expected to set up and maintain](os/linux-overview.md#arch-based-distributions) your system on your own. Arch has an [official installer](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Archinstall) to make the installation process a little easier.
+
+A large portion of [Arch Linux’s packages](https://reproducible.archlinux.org) are [reproducible](https://reproducible-builds.org).
+
+## Immutable Distributions
+
+### Fedora Silverblue
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Fedora Silverblue** and **Fedora Kinoite** are immutable variants of Fedora with a strong focus on container workflows. Silverblue comes with the [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org/) desktop environment while Kinoite comes with [KDE](https://kde.org/). Silverblue and Kinoite follow the same release schedule as Fedora Workstation, benefiting from the same fast updates and staying very close to upstream.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://silverblue.fedoraproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora-silverblue/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://whatcanidoforfedora.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Silverblue (and Kinoite) differ from Fedora Workstation as they replace the [DNF](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/DNF) package manager with a much more advanced alternative called [`rpm-ostree`](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/rawhide/system-administrators-guide/package-management/rpm-ostree/). The `rpm-ostree` package manager works by downloading a base image for the system, then overlaying packages over it in a [git](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Git)-like commit tree. When the system is updated, a new base image is downloaded and the overlays will be applied to that new image.
+
+After the update is complete you will reboot the system into the new deployment. `rpm-ostree` keeps two deployments of the system so that you can easily rollback if something breaks in the new deployment. There is also the option to pin more deployments as needed.
+
+[Flatpak](https://www.flatpak.org) is the primary package installation method on these distributions, as `rpm-ostree` is only meant to overlay packages that cannot stay inside of a container on top of the base image.
+
+As an alternative to Flatpaks, there is the option of [Toolbox](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora-silverblue/toolbox/) to create [Podman](https://podman.io) containers with a shared home directory with the host operating system and mimic a traditional Fedora environment, which is a [useful feature](https://containertoolbx.org) for the discerning developer.
+
+### NixOS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ NixOS is an independent distribution based on the Nix package manager with a focus on reproducibility and reliability.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://nixos.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://nixos.org/learn.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nixos.org/donate.html){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+NixOS’s package manager keeps every version of every package in a different folder in the **Nix store**. Due to this you can have different versions of the same package installed on your system. After the package contents have been written to the folder, the folder is made read-only.
+
+NixOS also provides atomic updates; first it downloads (or builds) the packages and files for the new system generation and then switches to it. There are different ways to switch to a new generation; you can tell NixOS to activate it after reboot or you can switch to it at runtime. You can also *test* the new generation by switching to it at runtime, but not setting it as the current system generation. If something in the update process breaks, you can just reboot and automatically and return to a working version of your system.
+
+Nix the package manager uses a purely functional language - which is also called Nix - to define packages.
+
+[Nixpkgs](https://github.com/nixos/nixpkgs) (the main source of packages) are contained in a single GitHub repository. You can also define your own packages in the same language and then easily include them in your config.
+
+Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in the binary cache, Nix will just build the package from source using its definition. It builds each package in a sandboxed *pure* environment, which is as independent of the host system as possible, thus making binaries reproducible.
+
+## Anonymity-Focused Distributions
+
+### Whonix
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Whonix is meant to run as two virtual machines: a “Workstation” and a Tor “Gateway.” All communications from the Workstation must go through the Tor gateway. This means that even if the Workstation is compromised by malware of some kind, the true IP address remains hidden.
+
+Some of its features include Tor Stream Isolation, [keystroke anonymization](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Keystroke_Deanonymization#Kloak), [encrypted swap](https://github.com/Whonix/swap-file-creator), and a hardened memory allocator.
+
+Future versions of Whonix will likely include [full system AppArmor policies](https://github.com/Whonix/apparmor-profile-everything) and a [sandbox app launcher](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Sandbox-app-launcher) to fully confine all processes on the system.
+
+Whonix is best used [in conjunction with Qubes](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Why_use_Qubes_over_other_Virtualizers), Qubes-Whonix has various [disadvantages](https://forums.whonix.org/t/qubes-whonix-security-disadvantages-help-wanted/8581) when compared to other hypervisors.
+
+### Tails
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tails** is a live operating system based on Debian that routes all communications through Tor, which can boot on on almost any computer from a DVD, USB stick, or SD card installation. It uses [Tor](tor.md) to preserve privacy and anonymity while circumventing censorship, and it leaves no trace of itself on the computer it is used on after it is powered off.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tails.boum.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tails.boum.org/doc/index.en.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tails.boum.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Tails is great for counter forensics due to amnesia (meaning nothing is written to the disk); however, it is not a hardened distribution like Whonix. It lacks many anonymity and security features that Whonix has and gets updated much less often (only once every six weeks). A Tails system that is compromised by malware may potentially bypass the transparent proxy allowing for the user to be deanonymized.
+
+Tails includes [uBlock Origin](desktop-browsers.md#ublock-origin) in Tor Browser by default, which may potentially make it easier for adversaries to fingerprint Tails users. [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) virtual machines may be more leak-proof, however they are not amnesic, meaning data may be recovered from your storage device.
+
+By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypted [persistent storage](https://tails.boum.org/doc/persistent_storage/index.en.html) can be configured to store some data between reboots.
+
+## Security-focused Distributions
+
+### Qubes OS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*.
+
+The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/).
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+Our recommended operating systems:
+
+- Must be open-source.
+- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates.
+- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#Wayland).
+- Must support full-disk encryption during installation.
+- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage.
+- Must support a wide variety of hardware.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/dns.md b/i18n/bn/dns.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..551bd52fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/dns.md
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+---
+title: "DNS Resolvers"
+icon: material/dns
+---
+
+!!! question "Should I use encrypted DNS?"
+
+ Encrypted DNS with third-party servers should only be used to get around basic [DNS blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) when you can be sure there won't be any consequences. Encrypted DNS will not help you hide any of your browsing activity.
+
+ [Learn more about DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md){ .md-button }
+
+## Recommended Providers
+
+| DNS Provider | Privacy Policy | Protocols | Logging | ECS | Filtering |
+| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------ | -------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| [**AdGuard**](https://adguard.com/en/adguard-dns/overview.html) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT DNSCrypt | Some[^1] | No | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardDNS) |
+| [**Cloudflare**](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/setting-up-1.1.1.1/) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT | Some[^2] | No | Based on server choice. |
+| [**Control D**](https://controld.com/free-dns) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://controld.com/privacy) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT DoQ | Optional[^3] | No | Based on server choice. |
+| [**Mullvad**](https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/) | DoH DoT | No[^4] | No | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/mullvad/dns-adblock) |
+| [**NextDNS**](https://www.nextdns.io) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://www.nextdns.io/privacy) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT | Optional[^5] | Optional | Based on server choice. |
+| [**Quad9**](https://quad9.net) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://quad9.net/privacy/policy/) | Cleartext DoH DoT DNSCrypt | Some[^6] | Optional | Based on server choice, Malware blocking by default. |
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must support [DNSSEC](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-dnssec).
+- [QNAME Minimization](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-qname-minimization).
+- Allow for [ECS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-edns-client-subnet-ecs) to be disabled.
+- Prefer [anycast](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anycast#Addressing_methods) support or geo-steering support.
+
+## Native Operating System Support
+
+### অ্যান্ড্রয়েড
+
+Android 9 and above support DNS over TLS. The settings can be found in: **Settings** → **Network & Internet** → **Private DNS**.
+
+### Apple Devices
+
+The latest versions of iOS, iPadOS, tvOS, and macOS, support both DoT and DoH. Both protocols are supported natively via [configuration profiles](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/configuration-profile-enforcement-secf6fb9f053/web) or through the [DNS Settings API](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/networkextension/dns_settings).
+
+After installation of either a configuration profile or an app that uses the DNS Settings API, the DNS configuration can be selected. If a VPN is active, resolution within the VPN tunnel will use the VPN's DNS settings and not your system-wide settings.
+
+#### Signed Profiles
+
+Apple does not provide a native interface for creating encrypted DNS profiles. [Secure DNS profile creator](https://dns.notjakob.com/tool.html) is an unofficial tool for creating your own encrypted DNS profiles, however they will not be signed. Signed profiles are preferred; signing validates a profile's origin and helps to ensure the integrity of the profiles. A green "Verified" label is given to signed configuration profiles. For more information on code signing, see [About Code Signing](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/CodeSigningGuide/Introduction/Introduction.html). **Signed profiles** are offered by [AdGuard](https://adguard.com/en/blog/encrypted-dns-ios-14.html), [NextDNS](https://apple.nextdns.io), and [Quad9](https://www.quad9.net/news/blog/ios-mobile-provisioning-profiles/).
+
+!!! info
+
+ `systemd-resolved`, which many Linux distributions use to do their DNS lookups, doesn't yet [support DoH](https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/8639). If you want to use DoH, you'll need to install a proxy like [dnscrypt-proxy](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy) and [configure it](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dnscrypt-proxy) to take all the DNS queries from your system resolver and forward them over HTTPS.
+
+## Encrypted DNS Proxies
+
+Encrypted DNS proxy software provides a local proxy for the [unencrypted DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md#unencrypted-dns) resolver to forward to. Typically it is used on platforms that don't natively support [encrypted DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns).
+
+### RethinkDNS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **RethinkDNS** is an open-source Android client supporting [DNS-over-HTTPS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), [DNS-over-TLS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-tls-dot), [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt) and DNS Proxy along with caching DNS responses, locally logging DNS queries and can be used as a firewall too.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://rethinkdns.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://rethinkdns.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.rethinkdns.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/celzero/rethink-app){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.celzero.bravedns)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/celzero/rethink-app/releases)
+
+### dnscrypt-proxy
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **dnscrypt-proxy** is a DNS proxy with support for [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt), [DNS-over-HTTPS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), and [Anonymized DNS](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Anonymized-DNS).
+
+ !!! warning "The anonymized DNS feature does [**not**](advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns) anonymize other network traffic."
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/dnscrypt/contribute){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Installation-Windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Installation-macOS)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Installation-linux)
+
+## Self-hosted Solutions
+
+A self-hosted DNS solution is useful for providing filtering on controlled platforms, such as Smart TVs and other IoT devices, as no client-side software is needed.
+
+### AdGuard Home
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **AdGuard Home** is an open-source [DNS-sinkhole](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_sinkhole) which uses [DNS filtering](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/access-management/what-is-dns-filtering/) to block unwanted web content, such as advertisements.
+
+ AdGuard Home features a polished web interface to view insights and manage blocked content.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://adguard.com/adguard-home/overview.html){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://adguard.com/privacy/home.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+### Pi-hole
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Pi-hole** is an open-source [DNS-sinkhole](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_sinkhole) which uses [DNS filtering](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/access-management/what-is-dns-filtering/) to block unwanted web content, such as advertisements.
+
+ Pi-hole is designed to be hosted on a Raspberry Pi, but it is not limited to such hardware. The software features a friendly web interface to view insights and manage blocked content.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://pi-hole.net/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://pi-hole.net/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.pi-hole.net/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/pi-hole/pi-hole){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://pi-hole.net/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
+
+[^1]: AdGuard stores aggregated performance metrics of their DNS servers, namely the number of complete requests to a particular server, the number of blocked requests, and the speed of processing requests. They also keep and store the database of domains requested in within last 24 hours. "We need this information to identify and block new trackers and threats." "We also log how many times this or that tracker has been blocked. We need this information to remove outdated rules from our filters." [https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html](https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html)
+[^2]: Cloudflare collects and stores only the limited DNS query data that is sent to the 1.1.1.1 resolver. The 1.1.1.1 resolver service does not log personal data, and the bulk of the limited non-personally identifiable query data is stored only for 25 hours. [https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/)
+[^3]: Control D only logs for Premium resolvers with custom DNS profiles. Free resolvers do not log data. [https://controld.com/privacy](https://controld.com/privacy)
+[^4]: Mullvad's DNS service is available to both subscribers and non-subscribers of Mullvad VPN. Their privacy policy explicitly claims they do not log DNS requests in any way. [https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/](https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/)
+[^5]: NextDNS can provide insights and logging features on an opt-in basis. You can choose retention times and log storage locations for any logs you choose to keep. If it's not specifically requested, no data is logged. [https://nextdns.io/privacy](https://nextdns.io/privacy)
+[^6]: Quad9 collects some data for the purposes of threat monitoring and response. That data may then be remixed and shared, such as for the purpose of security research. Quad9 does not collect or record IP addresses or other data they deem personally identifiable. [https://www.quad9.net/privacy/policy/](https://www.quad9.net/privacy/policy/)
diff --git a/i18n/bn/email-clients.md b/i18n/bn/email-clients.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e83a7eaa3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/email-clients.md
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+---
+title: "Email Clients"
+icon: material/email-open
+---
+
+Our recommendation list contains email clients that support both [OpenPGP](encryption.md#openpgp) and strong authentication such as [Open Authorization (OAuth)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth). OAuth allows you to use [Multi-Factor Authentication](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md) and prevent account theft.
+
+??? warning "Email does not provide forward secrecy"
+
+ When using end-to-end encryption (E2EE) technology like OpenPGP, email will still have [some metadata](email.md#email-metadata-overview) that is not encrypted in the header of the email.
+
+ OpenPGP also does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed: [How do I protect my private keys?](basics/email-security.md) Consider using a medium that provides forward secrecy:
+
+ [Real-time Communication](real-time-communication.md){ .md-button }
+
+## Cross-Platform
+
+### Thunderbird
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Thunderbird** is a free, open-source, cross-platform email, newsgroup, news feed, and chat (XMPP, IRC, Twitter) client developed by the Thunderbird community, and previously by the Mozilla Foundation.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.thunderbird.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mozilla.org/privacy/thunderbird){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.mozilla.org/products/thunderbird){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://hg.mozilla.org/comm-central){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.thunderbird.net)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.thunderbird.net)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.thunderbird.net)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.mozilla.Thunderbird)
+
+#### Recommended Configuration
+
+We recommend changing some of these settings to make Thunderbird a little more private.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Privacy & Security**.
+
+##### Web Content
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Remember websites and links I've visited**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Accept cookies from sites**
+
+##### Telemetry
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Thunderbird to send technical and interaction data to Mozilla**
+
+#### Thunderbird-user.js (advanced)
+
+[`thunderbird-user.js`](https://github.com/HorlogeSkynet/thunderbird-user.js), is a set of configurations options that aims to disable as many of the web-browsing features within Thunderbird as possible in order to reduce surface area and maintain privacy. Some of the changes are backported from the [Arkenfox project](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js).
+
+## Platform Specific
+
+### Apple Mail (macOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Apple Mail** is included in macOS and can be extended to have OpenPGP support with [GPG Suite](encryption.md#gpg-suite), which adds the ability to send PGP-encrypted email.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/welcome/mac){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/toc){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+### Canary Mail (iOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Canary Mail** is a paid email client designed to make end-to-end encryption seamless with security features such as a biometric app lock.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://canarymail.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://canarymail.io/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://canarymail.zendesk.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.canarymail.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1236045954)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://canarymail.io/downloads.html)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Canary Mail only recently released a Windows and Android client, though we don't believe they are as stable as their iOS and Mac counterparts.
+
+Canary Mail is closed-source. We recommend it due to the few choices there are for email clients on iOS that support PGP E2EE.
+
+### FairEmail (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FairEmail** is a minimal, open-source email app, using open standards (IMAP, SMTP, OpenPGP) with a low data and battery usage.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://email.faircode.eu){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/blob/master/PRIVACY.md){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/blob/master/FAQ.md){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://email.faircode.eu/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=eu.faircode.email)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/releases)
+
+### GNOME Evolution (GNOME)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Evolution** is a personal information management application that provides integrated mail, calendaring and address book functionality. Evolution has extensive [documentation](https://help.gnome.org/users/evolution/stable/) to help you get started.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Evolution){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Evolution/PrivacyPolicy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://help.gnome.org/users/evolution/stable/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.gnome.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.gnome.Evolution)
+
+### K-9 Mail (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **K-9 Mail** is an independent mail application that supports both POP3 and IMAP mailboxes, but only supports push mail for IMAP.
+
+ In the future, K-9 Mail will be the [officially branded](https://k9mail.app/2022/06/13/K-9-Mail-and-Thunderbird.html) Thunderbird client for Android.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://k9mail.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://k9mail.app/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.k9mail.app/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/k9mail/k-9){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://k9mail.app/contribute){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.fsck.k9)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/k9mail/k-9/releases)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When replying to someone on a mailing list the "reply" option may also include the mailing list. For more information see [thundernest/k-9 #3738](https://github.com/thundernest/k-9/issues/3738).
+
+### Kontact (KDE)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Kontact** is a personal information manager (PIM) application from the [KDE](https://kde.org) project. It provides a mail client, address book, organizer and RSS client.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://kontact.kde.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://kde.org/privacypolicy-apps){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://kontact.kde.org/users/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://invent.kde.org/pim/kmail){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://kde.org/community/donations/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://kontact.kde.org/download)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.kde.kontact)
+
+### Mailvelope (Browser)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mailvelope** is a browser extension that enables the exchange of encrypted emails following the OpenPGP encryption standard.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.mailvelope.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mailvelope.com/en/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mailvelope.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailvelope/mailvelope){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/mailvelope)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/mailvelope/kajibbejlbohfaggdiogboambcijhkke)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/mailvelope/dgcbddhdhjppfdfjpciagmmibadmoapc)
+
+### NeoMutt (CLI)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **NeoMutt** is an open-source command line mail reader (or MUA) for Linux and BSD. It's a fork of [Mutt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutt_(email_client)) with added features.
+
+ NeoMutt is a text-based client that has a steep learning curve. It is however, very customizable.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://neomutt.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://neomutt.org/guide/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/russon/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://neomutt.org/distro)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://neomutt.org/distro)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Qualifications
+
+- Apps developed for open-source operating systems must be open-source.
+- Must not collect telemetry, or have an easy way to disable all telemetry.
+- Must support OpenPGP message encryption.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should be open-source.
+- Should be cross-platform.
+- Should not collect any telemetry by default.
+- Should support OpenPGP natively, i.e. without extensions.
+- Should support storing OpenPGP encrypted emails locally.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/email.md b/i18n/bn/email.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..808077f47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/email.md
@@ -0,0 +1,485 @@
+---
+title: "Email Services"
+icon: material/email
+---
+
+Email is practically a necessity for using any online service, however we do not recommend it for person-to-person conversations. Rather than using email to contact other people, consider using an instant messaging medium that supports forward secrecy.
+
+[Recommended Instant Messengers](real-time-communication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+For everything else, we recommend a variety of email providers based on sustainable business models and built-in security and privacy features.
+
+## OpenPGP Compatible Services
+
+These providers natively support OpenPGP encryption/decryption, allowing for provider-agnostic E2EE emails. For example, a Proton Mail user could send an E2EE message to a Mailbox.org user, or you could receive OpenPGP-encrypted notifications from internet services which support it.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using E2EE technology like OpenPGP, email will still have some metadata that is not encrypted in the header of the email. Read more about [email metadata](basics/email-security.md#email-metadata-overview).
+
+ OpenPGP also does not support Forward secrecy, which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. [How do I protect my private keys?](basics/email-security.md#how-do-i-protect-my-private-keys)
+
+### Proton Mail
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton Mail** is an email service with a focus on privacy, encryption, security, and ease of use. They have been in operation since **2013**. Proton AG is based in Genève, Switzerland. Accounts start with 500 MB storage with their free plan.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/mail){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://protonmailrmez3lotccipshtkleegetolb73fuirgj7r4o4vfu7ozyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/mail){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonmail.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id979659905)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonMail/proton-mail-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.proton.me)
+
+Free accounts have some limitations, such as not being able to search body text and not having access to [Proton Mail Bridge](https://proton.me/mail/bridge), which is required to use a [recommended desktop email client](email-clients.md) (e.g. Thunderbird). Paid accounts include features like Proton Mail Bridge, additional storage, and custom domain support. A [letter of attestation](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps) was provided for Proton Mail's apps on 9th November 2021 by [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com).
+
+If you have the Proton Unlimited, Business, or Visionary Plan, you also get [SimpleLogin](#simplelogin) Premium for free.
+
+Proton Mail has internal crash reports that they **do not** share with third parties. This can be disabled in: **Settings** > **Go to Settings** > **Account** > **Security and privacy** > **Send crash reports**.
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Paid Proton Mail subscribers can use their own domain with the service or a [catch-all](https://proton.me/support/catch-all) address. Proton Mail also supports [subaddressing](https://proton.me/support/creating-aliases), which is useful for people who don't want to purchase a domain.
+
+??? success "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ Proton Mail [accepts](https://proton.me/support/payment-options) Bitcoin and cash by mail in addition to standard credit/debit card and PayPal payments.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ Proton Mail supports TOTP [two factor authentication](https://proton.me/support/two-factor-authentication-2fa) only. The use of a U2F security key is not yet supported. Proton Mail is planning to implement U2F upon completion of their [Single Sign On (SSO)](https://reddit.com/comments/cheoy6/comment/feh2lw0/) code.
+
+??? success "Data Security"
+
+ Proton Mail has [zero-access encryption](https://proton.me/blog/zero-access-encryption) at rest for your emails and [calendars](https://proton.me/news/protoncalendar-security-model). Data secured with zero-access encryption is only accessible by you.
+
+ Certain information stored in [Proton Contacts](https://proton.me/support/proton-contacts), such as display names and email addresses, are not secured with zero-access encryption. Contact fields that support zero-access encryption, such as phone numbers, are indicated with a padlock icon.
+
+??? success "Email Encryption"
+
+ Proton Mail has [integrated OpenPGP encryption](https://proton.me/support/how-to-use-pgp) in their webmail. Emails to other Proton Mail accounts are encrypted automatically, and encryption to non-Proton Mail addresses with an OpenPGP key can be enabled easily in your account settings. They also allow you to [encrypt messages to non-Proton Mail addresses](https://proton.me/support/password-protected-emails) without the need for them to sign up for a Proton Mail account or use software like OpenPGP.
+
+ Proton Mail also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This allows people who don't use Proton Mail to find the OpenPGP keys of Proton Mail accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE.
+
+??? warning "Digital Legacy"
+
+ Proton Mail doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ If you have a paid account and your [bill is unpaid](https://proton.me/support/delinquency) after 14 days, you won't be able to access your data. After 30 days, your account will become delinquent and won't receive incoming mail. You will continue to be billed during this period.
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ Proton Mail offers an "Unlimited" account for €9.99/Month, which also enables access to Proton VPN in addition to providing multiple accounts, domains, aliases, and 500GB of storage.
+
+### Mailbox.org
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mailbox.org** is an email service with a focus on being secure, ad-free, and privately powered by 100% eco-friendly energy. They have been in operation since 2014. Mailbox.org is based in Berlin, Germany. Accounts start with 2 GB of storage, which can be upgraded as needed.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailbox.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://mailbox.org/en/data-protection-privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://login.mailbox.org)
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Mailbox.org lets you use your own domain, and they support [catch-all](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Using+catch-all+alias+with+own+domain) addresses. Mailbox.org also supports [subaddressing](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/BMBOKBEN/What+is+an+alias+and+how+do+I+use+it), which is useful if you don't want to purchase a domain.
+
+??? info "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ Mailbox.org doesn't accept Bitcoin or any other cryptocurrencies as a result of their payment processor BitPay suspending operations in Germany. However, they do accept Cash by mail, cash payment to bank account, bank transfer, credit card, PayPal and couple of German-specific processors: paydirekt and Sofortüberweisung.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ Mailbox.org supports [two factor authentication](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/How+to+use+two-factor+authentication+-+2FA) for their webmail only. You can use either TOTP or a [Yubikey](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YubiKey) via the [Yubicloud](https://www.yubico.com/products/services-software/yubicloud). Web standards such as [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn) are not yet supported.
+
+??? info "Data Security"
+
+ Mailbox.org allows for encryption of incoming mail using their [encrypted mailbox](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/The+Encrypted+Mailbox). New messages that you receive will then be immediately encrypted with your public key.
+
+ However, [Open-Exchange](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-Xchange), the software platform used by Mailbox.org, [does not support](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/BMBOKBEN/Encryption+of+calendar+and+address+book) the encryption of your address book and calendar. A [standalone option](calendar.md) may be more appropriate for that information.
+
+??? success "Email Encryption"
+
+ Mailbox.org has [integrated encryption](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Send+encrypted+e-mails+with+Guard) in their webmail, which simplifies sending messages to people with public OpenPGP keys. They also allow [remote recipients to decrypt an email](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/My+recipient+does+not+use+PGP) on Mailbox.org's servers. This feature is useful when the remote recipient does not have OpenPGP and cannot decrypt a copy of the email in their own mailbox.
+
+ Mailbox.org also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This allows people outside of Mailbox.org to find the OpenPGP keys of Mailbox.org accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE.
+
+??? success "Digital Legacy"
+
+ Mailbox.org has a digital legacy feature for all plans. You can choose whether you want any of your data to be passed to heirs providing that they apply and provide your testament. Alternatively, you can nominate a person by name and address.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ Your account will be set to a restricted user account when your contract ends, after [30 days it will be irrevocably deleted](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/payment-article/what-happens-at-the-end-of-my-contract).
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ You can access your Mailbox.org account via IMAP/SMTP using their [.onion service](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/The+Tor+exit+node+of+mailbox.org). However, their webmail interface cannot be accessed via their .onion service and you may experience TLS certificate errors.
+
+ All accounts come with limited cloud storage that [can be encrypted](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Encrypt+files+on+your+Drive). Mailbox.org also offers the alias [@secure.mailbox.org](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Ensuring+E-Mails+are+Sent+Securely), which enforces the TLS encryption on the connection between mail servers, otherwise the message will not be sent at all. Mailbox.org also supports [Exchange ActiveSync](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exchange_ActiveSync) in addition to standard access protocols like IMAP and POP3.
+
+### StartMail
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **StartMail** is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of standard OpenPGP encryption. StartMail has been in operation since 2014 and is based in Boulevard 11, Zeist Netherlands. Accounts start with 10GB. They offer a 30-day trial.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.startmail.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.startmail.com/en/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.startmail.com){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.startmail.com/login)
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Personal accounts can use [Custom or Quick](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360007297457-Aliases) aliases. [Custom domains](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/4403911432209-Setup-a-custom-domain) are also available.
+
+??? warning "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ StartMail accepts Visa, MasterCard, American Express and Paypal. StartMail also has other [payment options](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006620637-Payment-methods) such as Bitcoin (currently only for Personal accounts) and SEPA Direct Debit for accounts older than a year.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ StartMail supports TOTP two factor authentication [for webmail only](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006682158-Two-factor-authentication-2FA). They do not allow U2F security key authentication.
+
+??? info "Data Security"
+
+ StartMail has [zero access encryption at rest](https://www.startmail.com/en/whitepaper/#_Toc458527835), using their "user vault" system. When you log in, the vault is opened, and the email is then moved to the vault out of the queue where it is decrypted by the corresponding private key.
+
+ StartMail supports importing [contacts](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006495557-Import-contacts) however, they are only accessible in the webmail and not through protocols such as [CalDAV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CalDAV). Contacts are also not stored using zero knowledge encryption.
+
+??? success "Email Encryption"
+
+ StartMail has [integrated encryption](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/sections/360001889078-Encryption) in their webmail, which simplifies sending encrypted messages with public OpenPGP keys.
+
+??? warning "Digital Legacy"
+
+ StartMail does not offer a digital legacy feature.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ On account expiration, StartMail will permanently delete your account after [6 months in 3 phases](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006794398-Account-expiration).
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ StartMail allows for proxying of images within emails. If you allow the remote image to be loaded, the sender won't know what your IP address is.
+
+## More Providers
+
+These providers store your emails with zero-knowledge encryption, making them great options for keeping your stored emails secure. However, they don't support interoperable encryption standards for E2EE communications between providers.
+
+### Tutanota
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tutanota** is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of encryption. Tutanota has been in operation since **2011** and is based in Hanover, Germany. Accounts start with 1GB storage with their free plan.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tutanota.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tutanota.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tutanota.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tutanota.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/tutanota/id922429609)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.tutanota.com/)
+
+Tutanota doesn't support the [IMAP protocol](https://tutanota.com/faq/#imap) or the use of third-party [email clients](email-clients.md), and you also won't be able to add [external email accounts](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/544#issuecomment-670473647) to the Tutanota app. Neither [Email import](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/630) or [subfolders](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/927) are currently supported, though this is [due to be changed](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/kickoff-import). Emails can be exported [individually or by bulk selection](https://tutanota.com/howto#generalMail) per folder, which may be inconvenient if you have many folders.
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Paid Tutanota accounts can use up to 5 [aliases](https://tutanota.com/faq#alias) and [custom domains](https://tutanota.com/faq#custom-domain). Tutanota doesn't allow for [subaddressing (plus addresses)](https://tutanota.com/faq#plus), but you can use a [catch-all](https://tutanota.com/howto#settings-global) with a custom domain.
+
+??? warning "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ Tutanota only directly accepts credit cards and PayPal, however Bitcoin and Monero can be used to purchase gift cards via their [partnership](https://tutanota.com/faq/#cryptocurrency) with Proxystore.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ Tutanota supports [two factor authentication](https://tutanota.com/faq#2fa) with either TOTP or U2F.
+
+??? success "Data Security"
+
+ Tutanota has [zero access encryption at rest](https://tutanota.com/faq#what-encrypted) for your emails, [address book contacts](https://tutanota.com/faq#encrypted-address-book), and [calendars](https://tutanota.com/faq#calendar). This means the messages and other data stored in your account are only readable by you.
+
+??? warning "Email Encryption"
+
+ Tutanota [does not use OpenPGP](https://www.tutanota.com/faq/#pgp). Tutanota accounts can only receive encrypted emails from non-Tutanota email accounts when sent via a [temporary Tutanota mailbox](https://www.tutanota.com/howto/#encrypted-email-external).
+
+??? warning "Digital Legacy"
+
+ Tutanota doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ Tutanota will [delete inactive free accounts](https://tutanota.com/faq#inactive-accounts) after six months. You can reuse a deactivated free account if you pay.
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ Tutanota offers the business version of [Tutanota to non-profit organizations](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/secure-email-for-non-profit) for free or with a heavy discount.
+
+ Tutanota also has a business feature called [Secure Connect](https://tutanota.com/secure-connect/). This ensures customer contact to the business uses E2EE. The feature costs €240/y.
+
+## Email Aliasing Services
+
+An email aliasing service allows you to easily generate a new email address for every website you register for. The email aliases you generate are then forwarded to an email address of your choosing, hiding both your "main" email address and the identity of your email provider. True email aliasing is better than plus addressing commonly used and supported by many providers, which allows you to create aliases like yourname+[anythinghere]@example.com, because websites, advertisers, and tracking networks can trivially remove anything after the + sign to know your true email address.
+
+Email aliasing can act as a safeguard in case your email provider ever ceases operation. In that scenario, you can easily re-route your aliases to a new email address. In turn, however, you are placing trust in the aliasing service to continue functioning.
+
+Using a dedicated email aliasing service also has a number of benefits over a catch-all alias on a custom domain:
+
+- Aliases can be turned on and off individually when you need them, preventing websites from emailing you randomly.
+- Replies are sent from the alias address, shielding your real email address.
+
+They also have a number of benefits over "temporary email" services:
+
+- Aliases are permanent and can be turned on again if you need to receive something like a password reset.
+- Emails are sent to your trusted mailbox rather than stored by the alias provider.
+- Temporary email services typically have public mailboxes which can be accessed by anyone who knows the address, aliases are private to you.
+
+Our email aliasing recommendations are providers that allow you to create aliases on domains they control, as well as your own custom domain(s) for a modest yearly fee. They can also be self-hosted if you want maximum control. However, using a custom domain can have privacy-related drawbacks: If you are the only person using your custom domain, your actions can be easily tracked across websites simply by looking at the domain name in the email address and ignoring everything before the at (@) sign.
+
+Using an aliasing service requires trusting both your email provider and your aliasing provider with your unencrypted messages. Some providers mitigate this slightly with automatic PGP encryption, which reduces the number of parties you need to trust from two to one by encrypting incoming emails before they are delivered to your final mailbox provider.
+
+### AnonAddy
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **AnonAddy** lets you create 20 domain aliases on a shared domain for free, or unlimited "standard" aliases which are less anonymous.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://anonaddy.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://anonaddy.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://app.anonaddy.com/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/anonaddy){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://anonaddy.com/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://anonaddy.com/faq/#is-there-an-android-app)
+ - [:material-apple-ios: iOS](https://anonaddy.com/faq/#is-there-an-ios-app)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-GB/firefox/addon/anonaddy/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/anonaddy-anonymous-email/iadbdpnoknmbdeolbapdackdcogdmjpe)
+
+The number of shared aliases (which end in a shared domain like @anonaddy.me) that you can create is limited to 20 on AnonAddy's free plan and 50 on their $12/year plan. You can create unlimited standard aliases (which end in a domain like @[username].anonaddy.com or a custom domain on paid plans), however, as previously mentioned, this can be detrimental to privacy because people can trivially tie your standard aliases together based on the domain name alone. Unlimited shared aliases are available for $36/year.
+
+Notable free features:
+
+- [x] 20 Shared Aliases
+- [x] Unlimited Standard Aliases
+- [ ] No Outgoing Replies
+- [x] 2 Recipient Mailboxes
+- [x] Automatic PGP Encryption
+
+### SimpleLogin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **SimpleLogin** is a free service which provides email aliases on a variety of shared domain names, and optionally provides paid features like unlimited aliases and custom domains.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://simplelogin.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://simplelogin.io/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://simplelogin.io/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simple-login){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.simplelogin.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1494359858)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/simple-login/Simple-Login-Android/releases)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/simplelogin/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/dphilobhebphkdjbpfohgikllaljmgbn)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/simpleloginreceive-sen/diacfpipniklenphgljfkmhinphjlfff)
+ - [:simple-safari: Safari](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1494051017)
+
+SimpleLogin was [acquired by Proton AG](https://proton.me/news/proton-and-simplelogin-join-forces) as of April 8, 2022. If you use Proton Mail for your primary mailbox, SimpleLogin is a great choice. As both products are now owned by the same company you now only have to trust a single entity. We also expect that SimpleLogin will be more tightly integrated with Proton's offerings in the future. SimpleLogin continues to support forwarding to any email provider of your choosing. Securitum [audited](https://simplelogin.io/blog/security-audit/) SimpleLogin in early 2022 and all issues [were addressed](https://simplelogin.io/audit2022/web.pdf).
+
+You can link your SimpleLogin account in the settings with your Proton account. If you have the Proton Unlimited, Business, or Visionary Plan, you will have SimpleLogin Premium for free.
+
+Notable free features:
+
+- [x] 10 Shared Aliases
+- [x] Unlimited Replies
+- [x] 1 Recipient Mailbox
+
+## Self-Hosting Email
+
+Advanced system administrators may consider setting up their own email server. Mail servers require attention and continuous maintenance in order to keep things secure and mail delivery reliable.
+
+### Combined software solutions
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mailcow** is a more advanced mail server perfect for those with a bit more Linux experience. It has everything you need in a Docker container: A mail server with DKIM support, antivirus and spam monitoring, webmail and ActiveSync with SOGo, and web-based administration with 2FA support.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailcow.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mailcow.github.io/mailcow-dockerized-docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailcow/mailcow-dockerized){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.servercow.de/mailcow?lang=en#sal){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mail-in-a-Box** is an automated setup script for deploying a mail server on Ubuntu. Its goal is to make it easier for people to set up their own mail server.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailinabox.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mailinabox.email/guide.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mail-in-a-box/mailinabox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+For a more manual approach we've picked out these two articles:
+
+- [Setting up a mail server with OpenSMTPD, Dovecot and Rspamd](https://poolp.org/posts/2019-09-14/setting-up-a-mail-server-with-opensmtpd-dovecot-and-rspamd/) (2019)
+- [How To Run Your Own Mail Server](https://www.c0ffee.net/blog/mail-server-guide/) (August 2017)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the providers we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements for any Email provider wishing to be recommended, including implementing industry best practices, modern technology and more. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing an Email provider, and conduct your own research to ensure the Email provider you choose is the right choice for you.
+
+### Technology
+
+We regard these features as important in order to provide a safe and optimal service. You should consider whether the provider which has the features you require.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Encrypts email account data at rest with zero-access encryption.
+- Export capability as [Mbox](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mbox) or individual .eml with [RFC5322](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5322/) standard.
+- Allow users to use their own [domain name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name). Custom domain names are important to users because it allows them to maintain their agency from the service, should it turn bad or be acquired by another company which doesn't prioritize privacy.
+- Operates on owned infrastructure, i.e. not built upon third-party email service providers.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Encrypts all account data (Contacts, Calendars, etc) at rest with zero-access encryption.
+- Integrated webmail E2EE/PGP encryption provided as a convenience.
+- Support for [WKD](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD) to allow improved discovery of public OpenPGP keys via HTTP. GnuPG users can get a key by typing: `gpg --locate-key example_user@example.com`
+- Support for a temporary mailbox for external users. This is useful when you want to send an encrypted email, without sending an actual copy to your recipient. These emails usually have a limited lifespan and then are automatically deleted. They also don't require the recipient to configure any cryptography like OpenPGP.
+- Availability of the email provider's services via an [onion service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.onion).
+- [Subaddressing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email_address#Subaddressing) support.
+- Catch-all or alias functionality for those who own their own domains.
+- Use of standard email access protocols such as IMAP, SMTP or [JMAP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Meta_Application_Protocol). Standard access protocols ensure customers can easily download all of their email, should they want to switch to another provider.
+
+### Privacy
+
+We prefer our recommended providers to collect as little data as possible.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Protect sender's IP address. Filter it from showing in the `Received` header field.
+- Don't require personally identifiable information (PII) besides a username and a password.
+- Privacy policy that meets the requirements defined by the GDPR
+- Must not be hosted in the US due to [ECPA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_Communications_Privacy_Act#Criticism) which has [yet to be reformed](https://epic.org/ecpa/).
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Accepts Bitcoin, cash, and other forms of cryptocurrency and/or anonymous payment options (gift cards, etc.)
+
+### Security
+
+Email servers deal with a lot of very sensitive data. We expect that providers will adopt best industry practices in order to protect their members.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Protection of webmail with 2FA, such as TOTP.
+- Zero access encryption, builds on encryption at rest. The provider does not have the decryption keys to the data they hold. This prevents a rogue employee leaking data they have access to or remote adversary from releasing data they have stolen by gaining unauthorized access to the server.
+- [DNSSEC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Extensions) support.
+- No TLS errors or vulnerabilities when being profiled by tools such as [Hardenize](https://www.hardenize.com/), [testssl.sh](https://testssl.sh/), or [Qualys SSL Labs](https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest); this includes certificate related errors and weak DH parameters, such as those that led to [Logjam](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logjam_(computer_security)).
+- A server suite preference (optional on TLSv1.3) for strong cipher suites which support forward secrecy and authenticated encryption.
+- A valid [MTA-STS](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8461) and [TLS-RPT](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8460) policy.
+- Valid [DANE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS-based_Authentication_of_Named_Entities) records.
+- Valid [SPF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sender_Policy_Framework) and [DKIM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DomainKeys_Identified_Mail) records.
+- Have a proper [DMARC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DMARC) record and policy or use [ARC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain) for authentication. If DMARC authentication is being used, the policy must be set to `reject` or `quarantine`.
+- A server suite preference of TLS 1.2 or later and a plan for [Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate/).
+- [SMTPS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SMTPS) submission, assuming SMTP is used.
+- Website security standards such as:
+ - [HTTP Strict Transport Security](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security)
+ - [Subresource Integrity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subresource_Integrity) if loading things from external domains.
+- Must support viewing of [Message headers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header), as it is a crucial forensic feature to determine if an email is a phishing attempt.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Support for hardware authentication, i.e. U2F and [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn). U2F and WebAuthn are more secure as they use a private key stored on a client-side hardware device to authenticate people, as opposed to a shared secret that is stored on the web server and on the client side when using TOTP. Furthermore, U2F and WebAuthn are more resistant to phishing as their authentication response is based on the authenticated [domain name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name).
+- [DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844) in addition to DANE support.
+- Implementation of [Authenticated Received Chain (ARC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain), this is useful for people who post to mailing lists [RFC8617](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8617).
+- Bug-bounty programs and/or a coordinated vulnerability-disclosure process.
+- Website security standards such as:
+ - [Content Security Policy (CSP)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy)
+ - [Expect-CT](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-expect-ct)
+
+### Trust
+
+You wouldn't trust your finances to someone with a fake identity, so why trust them with your email? We require our recommended providers to be public about their ownership or leadership. We also would like to see frequent transparency reports, especially in regard to how government requests are handled.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership or ownership.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership.
+- Frequent transparency reports.
+
+### Marketing
+
+With the email providers we recommend we like to see responsible marketing.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Must self-host analytics (no Google Analytics, Adobe Analytics, etc). The provider's site must also comply with [DNT (Do Not Track)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Do_Not_Track) for those who wish to opt-out.
+
+Must not have any marketing which is irresponsible:
+
+- Claims of "unbreakable encryption." Encryption should be used with the intention that it may not be secret in the future when the technology exists to crack it.
+- Making guarantees of protecting anonymity 100%. When someone makes a claim that something is 100% it means there is no certainty for failure. We know people can quite easily deanonymize themselves in a number of ways, e.g.:
+
+- Reusing personal information e.g. (email accounts, unique pseudonyms, etc) that they accessed without anonymity software (Tor, VPN, etc)
+- [Browser fingerprinting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint)
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Clear and easy to read documentation. This includes things like, setting up 2FA, email clients, OpenPGP, etc.
+
+### Additional Functionality
+
+While not strictly requirements, there are some other convenience or privacy factors we looked into when determining which providers to recommend.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/encryption.md b/i18n/bn/encryption.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..47227a7bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/encryption.md
@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
+---
+title: "Encryption Software"
+icon: material/file-lock
+---
+
+Encryption of data is the only way to control who can access it. If you are currently not using encryption software for your hard disk, emails or files, you should pick an option here.
+
+## Multi-platform
+
+The options listed here are multi-platform and great for creating encrypted backups of your data.
+
+### Cryptomator (Cloud)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Cryptomator** is an encryption solution designed for privately saving files to any cloud provider. It allows you to create vaults that are stored on a virtual drive, the contents of which are encrypted and synced with your cloud storage provider.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://cryptomator.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://cryptomator.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.cryptomator.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/cryptomator){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://cryptomator.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.cryptomator)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/cryptomator-2/id1560822163)
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://cryptomator.org/android)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.cryptomator.Cryptomator)
+
+Cryptomator uses AES-256 encryption to encrypt both files and filenames. Cryptomator cannot encrypt metadata such as access, modification, and creation timestamps, nor the number and size of files and folders.
+
+Some Cryptomator cryptographic libraries have been [audited](https://community.cryptomator.org/t/has-there-been-a-security-review-audit-of-cryptomator/44) by Cure53. The scope of the audited libraries includes: [cryptolib](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptolib), [cryptofs](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptofs), [siv-mode](https://github.com/cryptomator/siv-mode) and [cryptomator-objc-cryptor](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptomator-objc-cryptor). The audit did not extend to [cryptolib-swift](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptolib-swift), which is a library used by Cryptomator for iOS.
+
+Cryptomator's documentation details its intended [security target](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/security-target/), [security architecture](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/architecture/), and [best practices](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/best-practices/) for use in further detail.
+
+### Picocrypt (File)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Picocrypt** is a small and simple encryption tool that provides modern encryption. Picocrypt uses the secure XChaCha20 cipher and the Argon2id key derivation function to provide a high level of security. It uses Go's standard x/crypto modules for its encryption features.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/picocrypt){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases)
+
+### VeraCrypt (Disk)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **VeraCrypt** is a source-available freeware utility used for on-the-fly encryption. It can create a virtual encrypted disk within a file, encrypt a partition, or encrypt the entire storage device with pre-boot authentication.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://veracrypt.fr){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/en/Documentation.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/code/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/en/Donation.html){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html)
+
+VeraCrypt is a fork of the discontinued TrueCrypt project. According to its developers, security improvements have been implemented and issues raised by the initial TrueCrypt code audit have been addressed.
+
+When encrypting with VeraCrypt, you have the option to select from different [hash functions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt#Encryption_scheme). We suggest you **only** select [SHA-512](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-512) and stick to the [AES](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard) block cipher.
+
+Truecrypt has been [audited a number of times](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TrueCrypt#Security_audits), and VeraCrypt has also been [audited separately](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt#VeraCrypt_audit).
+
+## OS Full Disk Encryption
+
+Modern operating systems include [FDE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_encryption) and will have a [secure cryptoprocessor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_cryptoprocessor).
+
+### BitLocker
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **BitLocker** is the full volume encryption solution bundled with Microsoft Windows. The main reason we recommend it is because of its [use of TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). [ElcomSoft](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ElcomSoft), a forensics company, has written about it in [Understanding BitLocker TPM Protection](https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2021/01/understanding-BitLocker-tpm-protection/).
+
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/BitLocker/BitLocker-overview){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+BitLocker is [only supported](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/turn-on-device-encryption-0c453637-bc88-5f74-5105-741561aae838) on Pro, Enterprise and Education editions of Windows. It can be enabled on Home editions provided that they meet the prerequisites.
+
+??? example "Enabling BitLocker on Windows Home"
+
+ To enable BitLocker on "Home" editions of Windows, you must have partitions formatted with a [GUID Partition Table](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GUID_Partition_Table) and have a dedicated TPM (v1.2, 2.0+) module.
+
+ 1. Open a command prompt and check your drive's partition table format with the following command. You should see "**GPT**" listed under "Partition Style":
+
+ ```
+ powershell Get-Disk
+ ```
+
+ 2. Run this command (in an admin command prompt) to check your TPM version. You should see `2.0` or `1.2` listed next to `SpecVersion`:
+
+ ```
+ powershell Get-WmiObject -Namespace "root/cimv2/security/microsofttpm" -Class WIN32_tpm
+ ```
+
+ 3. Access [Advanced Startup Options](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/advanced-startup-options-including-safe-mode-b90e7808-80b5-a291-d4b8-1a1af602b617). You need to reboot while pressing the F8 key before Windows starts and go into the *command prompt* in **Troubleshoot** → **Advanced Options** → **Command Prompt**.
+
+ 4. Login with your admin account and type this in the command prompt to start encryption:
+
+ ```
+ manage-bde -on c: -used
+ ```
+
+ 5. Close the command prompt and continue booting to regular Windows.
+
+ 6. Open an admin command prompt and run the following commands:
+
+ ```
+ manage-bde c: -protectors -add -rp -tpm
+ manage-bde -protectors -enable c:
+ manage-bde -protectors -get c: > %UserProfile%\Desktop\BitLocker-Recovery-Key.txt
+ ```
+
+ !!! tip
+
+ Backup `BitLocker-Recovery-Key.txt` on your Desktop to a separate storage device. Loss of this recovery code may result in loss of data.
+
+### FileVault
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FileVault** is the on-the-fly volume encryption solution built into macOS. FileVault is recommended because it [leverages](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/volume-encryption-with-filevault-sec4c6dc1b6e/web) hardware security capabilities present on an Apple silicon SoC or T2 Security Chip.
+
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/encrypt-mac-data-with-filevault-mh11785/mac){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+We recommend storing a local recovery key in a secure place as opposed to using your iCloud account for recovery.
+
+### Linux Unified Key Setup
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **LUKS** is the default FDE method for Linux. It can be used to encrypt full volumes, partitions, or create encrypted containers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/blob/main/README.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+??? example "Creating and opening encrypted containers"
+
+ ```
+ dd if=/dev/urandom of=/path-to-file bs=1M count=1024 status=progress
+ sudo cryptsetup luksFormat /path-to-file
+ ```
+
+
+ #### Opening encrypted containers
+ We recommend opening containers and volumes with `udisksctl` as this uses [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). Most file managers, such as those included with popular desktop environments, can unlock encrypted files. Tools like [udiskie](https://github.com/coldfix/udiskie) can run in the system tray and provide a helpful user interface.
+ ```
+ udisksctl loop-setup -f /path-to-file
+ udisksctl unlock -b /dev/loop0
+ ```
+
+!!! note "Remember to back up volume headers"
+
+ We recommend you always [back up your LUKS headers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Device_encryption#Backup_and_restore) in case of partial drive failure. This can be done with:
+
+ ```
+ cryptsetup luksHeaderBackup /dev/device --header-backup-file /mnt/backup/file.img
+ ```
+
+## Browser-based
+
+Browser-based encryption can be useful when you need to encrypt a file but cannot install software or apps on your device.
+
+### hat.sh
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Hat.sh** is a web application that provides secure client-side file encryption in your browser. It can also be self-hosted and is useful if you need to encrypt a file but cannot install any software on your device due to organizational policies.
+
+ [:octicons-globe-16: Website](https://hat.sh){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://hat.sh/about/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://hat.sh/about/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/sh-dv/hat.sh){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sh-dv/hat.sh#donations){ .card-link title="Donations methods can be found at the bottom of the website" }
+
+## Command-line
+
+Tools with command-line interfaces are useful for integrating [shell scripts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shell_script).
+
+### Kryptor
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Kryptor** is a free and open-source file encryption and signing tool that makes use of modern and secure cryptographic algorithms. It aims to be a better version of [age](https://github.com/FiloSottile/age) and [Minisign](https://jedisct1.github.io/minisign/) to provide a simple, easier alternative to GPG.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kryptor.co.uk){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/features#privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/tutorial){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/samuel-lucas6/Kryptor){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/#donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.kryptor.co.uk)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.kryptor.co.uk)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.kryptor.co.uk)
+
+### Tomb
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tomb** is a command-line shell wrapper for LUKS. It supports steganography via [third-party tools](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb#how-does-it-work).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.dyne.org/software/tomb){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.dyne.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+## OpenPGP
+
+OpenPGP is sometimes needed for specific tasks such as digitally signing and encrypting email. PGP has many features and is [complex](https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html) as it has been around a long time. For tasks such as signing or encrypting files, we suggest the above options.
+
+When encrypting with PGP, you have the option to configure different options in your `gpg.conf` file. We recommend staying with the standard options specified in the [GnuPG user FAQ](https://www.gnupg.org/faq/gnupg-faq.html#new_user_gpg_conf).
+
+!!! tip "Use future defaults when generating a key"
+
+ When [generating keys](https://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual/c14.html) we suggest using the `future-default` command as this will instruct GnuPG use modern cryptography such as [Curve25519](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curve25519#History) and [Ed25519](https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/):
+
+ ```bash
+ gpg --quick-gen-key alice@example.com future-default
+ ```
+
+### GNU Privacy Guard
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GnuPG** is a GPL-licensed alternative to the PGP suite of cryptographic software. GnuPG is compliant with [RFC 4880](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880), which is the current IETF specification of OpenPGP. The GnuPG project has been working on an [updated draft](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh/) in an attempt to modernize OpenPGP. GnuPG is a part of the Free Software Foundation's GNU software project and has received major [funding](https://gnupg.org/blog/20220102-a-new-future-for-gnupg.html) from the German government.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gnupg.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gnupg.org/privacy-policy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gnupg.org/documentation/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.sufficientlysecure.keychain)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://gpg4win.org/download.html)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://gpgtools.org)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://gnupg.org/download/index.html#binary)
+
+### GPG4win
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GPG4win** is a package for Windows from [Intevation and g10 Code](https://gpg4win.org/impressum.html). It includes [various tools](https://gpg4win.org/about.html) that can assist you in using GPG on Microsoft Windows. The project was initiated and originally [funded by](https://web.archive.org/web/20190425125223/https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/news/government-used-cryptography) Germany's Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) in 2005.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gpg4win.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gpg4win.org/privacy-policy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gpg4win.org/documentation.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gpg4win.git;a=summary){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://gpg4win.org/donate.html){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://gpg4win.org/download.html)
+
+### GPG Suite
+
+!!! note
+
+ We suggest [Canary Mail](email-clients.md#canary-mail) for using PGP with email on iOS devices.
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GPG Suite** provides OpenPGP support for [Apple Mail](email-clients.md#apple-mail) and macOS.
+
+ We recommend taking a look at their [First steps](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb/how-to/first-steps-where-do-i-start-where-do-i-begin-setup-gpgtools-create-a-new-key-your-first-encrypted-email) and [Knowledge base](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb) for support.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gpgtools.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gpgtools.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GPGTools){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://gpgtools.org)
+
+### OpenKeychain
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OpenKeychain** is an Android implementation of GnuPG. It's commonly required by mail clients such as [K-9 Mail](email-clients.md#k-9-mail) and [FairEmail](email-clients.md#fairemail) and other Android apps to provide encryption support. Cure53 completed a [security audit](https://www.openkeychain.org/openkeychain-3-6) of OpenKeychain 3.6 in October 2015. Technical details about the audit and OpenKeychain's solutions can be found [here](https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain/wiki/cure53-Security-Audit-2015).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.openkeychain.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.openkeychain.org/help/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.openkeychain.org/faq/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.sufficientlysecure.keychain)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Qualifications
+
+- Cross-platform encryption apps must be open-source.
+- File encryption apps must support decryption on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- External disk encryption apps must support decryption on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- Internal (OS) disk encryption apps must be cross-platform or built in to the operating system natively.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Operating System (FDE) encryption apps should utilize hardware security such as a TPM or Secure Enclave.
+- File encryption apps should have first- or third-party support for mobile platforms.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/file-sharing.md b/i18n/bn/file-sharing.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a13590e71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/file-sharing.md
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+---
+title: "File Sharing and Sync"
+icon: material/share-variant
+---
+
+Discover how to privately share your files between your devices, with your friends and family, or anonymously online.
+
+## File Sharing
+
+### Send
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Send** is a fork of Mozilla’s discontinued Firefox Send service which allows you to send files to others with a link. Files are encrypted on your device so that they cannot be read by the server, and they can be optionally password-protected as well. The maintainer of Send hosts a [public instance](https://send.vis.ee/). You can use other public instances, or you can host Send yourself.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://send.vis.ee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send-instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/timvisee){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Send can be used via its web interface or via the [ffsend](https://github.com/timvisee/ffsend) CLI. If you are familiar with the command-line and send files frequently, we recommend using the CLI client to avoid JavaScript-based encryption. You can specify the `--host` flag to use a specific server:
+
+```bash
+ffsend upload --host https://send.vis.ee/ FILE
+```
+
+### OnionShare
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OnionShare** is an open-source tool that lets you securely and anonymously share a file of any size. It works by starting a web server accessible as a Tor onion service, with an unguessable URL that you can share with the recipients to download or send files.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://onionshare.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://lldan5gahapx5k7iafb3s4ikijc4ni7gx5iywdflkba5y2ezyg6sjgyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.onionshare.org){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/onionshare/onionshare){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://onionshare.org/#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://onionshare.org/#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://onionshare.org/#download)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must not store decrypted data on a remote server.
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must either have clients for Linux, macOS, and Windows; or have a web interface.
+
+## FreedomBox
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FreedomBox** is an operating system designed to be run on a [single-board computer (SBC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-board_computer). The purpose is to make it easy to set up server applications that you might want to self-host.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://freedombox.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://wiki.debian.org/FreedomBox/Manual){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://salsa.debian.org/freedombox-team/freedombox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://freedomboxfoundation.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+## File Sync
+
+### Nextcloud (Client-Server)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nextcloud** is a suite of free and open-source client-server software for creating your own file hosting services on a private server you control.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://nextcloud.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://nextcloud.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://nextcloud.com/support/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/nextcloud){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nextcloud.com/contribute/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nextcloud.client)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1125420102)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/nextcloud/android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/www/nextcloud)
+
+!!! danger
+
+ We don't recommend using the [E2EE App](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/end_to_end_encryption) for Nextcloud as it may lead to data loss; it is highly experimental and not production quality.
+
+### Syncthing (P2P)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Syncthing** is an open-source peer-to-peer continuous file synchronization utility. It is used to synchronize files between two or more devices over the local network or the internet. Syncthing does not use a centralized server; it uses the [Block Exchange Protocol](https://docs.syncthing.net/specs/bep-v1.html#bep-v1) to transfer data between devices. All data is encrypted using TLS.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://syncthing.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.syncthing.net){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/syncthing){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://syncthing.net/donations/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nutomic.syncthingandroid)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-openbsd: OpenBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-netbsd: NetBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+#### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must not require a third-party remote/cloud server.
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must either have clients for Linux, macOS, and Windows; or have a web interface.
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Has mobile clients for iOS and Android, which at least support document previews.
+- Supports photo backup from iOS and Android, and optionally supports file/folder sync on Android.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/frontends.md b/i18n/bn/frontends.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..056d952a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/frontends.md
@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+---
+title: "Frontends"
+icon: material/flip-to-front
+---
+
+Sometimes services will try to force you to sign up for an account by blocking access to content with annoying popups. They might also break without JavaScript enabled. These frontends can allow you to get around these restrictions.
+
+## LBRY
+
+### Librarian
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Librarian** is a free and open-source frontend for [Odysee](https://odysee.com/) (LBRY) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://librarian.codeberg.page/){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Librarian does not proxy video streams by default. Videos watched through Librarian will still make direct connections to Odysee's servers (e.g. `odycdn.com`); however, some instances may enable proxying which would be detailed in the instance's privacy policy.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Librarian is useful if you want watch LBRY content on mobile without mandatory telemetry and if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, as is the case with [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Librarian, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a Librarian instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Librarian instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect the default policy. Librarian instances feature a "privacy nutrition label" to provide an overview of their policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+## Twitter
+
+### Nitter
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nitter** is a free and open-source frontend for [Twitter](https://twitter.com) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter/wiki/Instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter#nitter){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Nitter is useful if you want to browse Twitter content without having to log in and if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, as is the case with [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level. It also allows you to [create RSS feeds for Twitter](news-aggregators.md#twitter).
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Nitter, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a Nitter instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Nitter instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect the default policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+## TikTok
+
+### ProxiTok
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **ProxiTok** is an open source frontend to the [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com) website that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok/wiki/Public-instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+!!! tip
+
+ ProxiTok is useful if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, such as [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting ProxiTok, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a ProxiTok instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. ProxiTok instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect their associated privacy policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+## YouTube
+
+### FreeTube
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FreeTube** is a free and open-source desktop application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com). When using FreeTube, your subscription list and playlists are saved locally on your device.
+
+ By default, FreeTube blocks all YouTube advertisements. In addition, FreeTube optionally integrates with [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://freetubeapp.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://freetubeapp.io/privacy.php){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.freetubeapp.io/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/FreeTubeApp/FreeTube){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/FreeTube){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/io.freetubeapp.FreeTube)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using FreeTube, your IP address may still be known to YouTube, [Invidious](https://instances.invidious.io) or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+### Yattee
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Yattee** is a free and open-source privacy oriented video player for iOS, tvOS and macOS for [YouTube](https://youtube.com). When using Yattee, your subscription list are saved locally on your device.
+
+ You will need to take a few [extra steps](https://gonzoknows.com/posts/Yattee/) before you can use Yattee to watch YouTube, due to App Store restrictions.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://github.com/yattee/yattee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://r.yattee.stream/docs/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/wiki/Donations){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-apple: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/yattee/id1595136629)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/releases)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using Yattee, your IP address may still be known to YouTube, [Invidious](https://instances.invidious.io), [Piped](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances) or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+By default, Yattee blocks all YouTube advertisements. In addition, Yattee optionally integrates with [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments.
+
+### LibreTube (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **LibreTube** is a free and open-source Android application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) which uses the [Piped](#piped) API.
+
+ LibreTube allows you to store your subscription list and playlists locally on your Android device, or to an account on your Piped instance of choice, which allows you to access them seamlessly on other devices as well.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://libre-tube.github.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube#privacy-policy-and-disclaimer){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube/releases)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using LibreTube, your IP address will be visible to the [Piped](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances) instance you choose and/or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+By default, LibreTube blocks all YouTube advertisements. Additionally, Libretube uses [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments. You are able to fully configure the types of segments that SponsorBlock will skip, or disable it completely. There is also a button on the video player itself to disable it for a specific video if desired.
+
+### NewPipe (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation annotate
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **NewPipe** is a free and open-source Android application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com), [SoundCloud](https://soundcloud.com), [media.ccc.de](https://media.ccc.de), [Bandcamp](https://bandcamp.com), and [PeerTube](https://joinpeertube.org/) (1).
+
+ Your subscription list and playlists are saved locally on your Android device.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://newpipe.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://newpipe.net/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://teamnewpipe.github.io/documentation/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamNewPipe/NewPipe){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://newpipe.net/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/TeamNewPipe/NewPipe/releases)
+
+1. The default instance is [FramaTube](https://framatube.org/), however more can be added via **Settings** → **Content** → **PeerTube instances**
+
+!!! Warning
+
+ When using NewPipe, your IP address will be visible to the video providers used. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+### Invidious
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Invidious** is a free and open-source frontend for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://invidious.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://instances.invidious.io){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.invidious.io/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/iv-org/invidious){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://invidious.io/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Invidious does not proxy video streams by default. Videos watched through Invidious will still make direct connections to Google's servers (e.g. `googlevideo.com`); however, some instances support video proxying—simply enable *Proxy videos* within the instances' settings or add `&local=true` to the URL.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Invidious is useful if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, such as [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level. It does not provide privacy by itself, and we don’t recommend logging into any accounts.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Invidious, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using an Invidious instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Invidious instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect their associated privacy policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+### Piped
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Piped** is a free and open-source frontend for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ Piped requires JavaScript in order to function and there are a number of public instances.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://piped.kavin.rocks/preferences#ddlInstanceSelection){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://piped-docs.kavin.rocks/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped#donations){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Piped is useful if you want to use [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) without installing an extension or to access age-restricted content without an account. It does not provide privacy by itself, and we don’t recommend logging into any accounts.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Piped, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a Piped instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Piped instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect their associated privacy policy.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+Recommended frontends...
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must be self-hostable.
+- Must provide all basic website functionality available to anonymous users.
+
+We only consider frontends for websites which are...
+
+- Not normally accessible without JavaScript.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/index.md b/i18n/bn/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6c2023598
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+---
+template: overrides/home.bn.html
+hide:
+ - navigation
+ - toc
+ - feedback
+---
+
+
+## Why should I care?
+
+##### “I have nothing to hide. Why should I care about my privacy?”
+
+Much like the right to interracial marriage, woman's suffrage, freedom of speech, and many others, our right to privacy hasn't always been upheld. In several dictatorships, it still isn't. Generations before ours fought for our right to privacy. ==Privacy is a human right, inherent to all of us,== that we are entitled to (without discrimination).
+
+You shouldn't confuse privacy with secrecy. We know what happens in the bathroom, but you still close the door. That's because you want privacy, not secrecy. **Everyone** has something to protect. Privacy is something that makes us human.
+
+[:material-target-account: Common Internet Threats](basics/common-threats.md ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+## What should I do?
+
+##### First, you need to make a plan
+
+Trying to protect all your data from everyone all the time is impractical, expensive, and exhausting. But don't worry! Security is a process, and, by thinking ahead, you can put together a plan that's right for you. Security isn't just about the tools you use or the software you download. Rather, it begins by understanding the unique threats you face, and how you can mitigate them.
+
+==This process of identifying threats and defining countermeasures is called **threat modeling**==, and it forms the basis of every good security and privacy plan.
+
+[:material-book-outline: Learn More About Threat Modeling](basics/threat-modeling.md ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+---
+
+## We need you! Here's how to get involved:
+
+[:simple-discourse:](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/){ title="Join our Forum" }
+[:simple-mastodon:](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides){ rel=me title="Follow us on Mastodon" }
+[:material-book-edit:](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org){ title="Contribute to this website" }
+[:material-translate:](https://matrix.to/#/#pg-i18n:aragon.sh){ title="Help translate this website" }
+[:simple-matrix:](https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org){ title="Chat with us on Matrix" }
+[:material-information-outline:](about/index.md){ title="Learn more about us" }
+[:material-hand-coin-outline:](about/donate.md){ title="Support the project" }
+
+It's important for a website like Privacy Guides to always stay up-to-date. We need our audience to keep an eye on software updates for the applications listed on our site and follow recent news about providers that we recommend. It's hard to keep up with the fast pace of the internet, but we try our best. If you spot an error, think a provider should not be listed, notice a qualified provider is missing, believe a browser plugin is no longer the best choice, or uncover any other issue, please let us know.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/kb-archive.md b/i18n/bn/kb-archive.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9151eb10c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/kb-archive.md
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+---
+title: KB Archive
+icon: material/archive
+---
+
+# Pages Moved to Blog
+
+Some pages that used to be in our knowledge base can now be found on our blog:
+
+- [GrapheneOS vs. CalyxOS](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/)
+- [Signal Configuration Hardening](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening/)
+- [Linux - System Hardening](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/22/linux-system-hardening/)
+- [Linux - Application Sandboxing](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/22/linux-application-sandboxing/)
+- [Secure Data Erasure](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/05/25/secure-data-erasure/)
+- [Integrating Metadata Removal](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/09/integrating-metadata-removal/)
+- [iOS Configuration Guide](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/22/ios-configuration-guide/)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/meta/brand.md b/i18n/bn/meta/brand.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e2f6cc5f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/meta/brand.md
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+---
+title: Branding Guidelines
+---
+
+The name of the website is **Privacy Guides** and should **not** be changed to:
+
+
+
+The name of the subreddit is **r/PrivacyGuides** or **the Privacy Guides Subreddit**.
+
+Additional branding guidelines can be found at [github.com/privacyguides/brand](https://github.com/privacyguides/brand)
+
+## Trademark
+
+"Privacy Guides" and the shield logo are trademarks owned by Jonah Aragon, unlimited usage is granted to the Privacy Guides project.
+
+Without waiving any of its rights, Privacy Guides does not advise others on the scope of its intellectual property rights. Privacy Guides does not permit or consent to any use of its trademarks in any manner that is likely to cause confusion by implying association with or sponsorship by Privacy Guides. If you are aware of any such use, please contact Jonah Aragon at jonah@privacyguides.org. Consult your legal counsel if you have questions.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/meta/git-recommendations.md b/i18n/bn/meta/git-recommendations.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2a3f81e16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/meta/git-recommendations.md
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+---
+title: Git Recommendations
+---
+
+If you make changes to this website on GitHub.com's web editor directly, you shouldn't have to worry about this. If you are developing locally and/or are a long-term website editor (who should probably be developing locally!), consider these recommendations.
+
+## Enable SSH Key Commit Signing
+
+You can use an existing SSH key for signing, or [create a new one](https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/connecting-to-github-with-ssh/generating-a-new-ssh-key-and-adding-it-to-the-ssh-agent).
+
+1. Configure your Git client to sign commits and tags by default (remove `--global` to only sign by default for this repo):
+ ```
+ git config --global commit.gpgsign true
+ git config --global gpg.format ssh
+ git config --global tag.gpgSign true
+ ```
+2. Copy your SSH public key to your clipboard, for example:
+ ```
+ pbcopy < ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+ # Copies the contents of the id_ed25519.pub file to your clipboard
+ ```
+3. Set your SSH key for signing in Git with the following command, replacing the last string in quotes with the public key in your clipboard:
+ ```
+ git config --global user.signingkey 'ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3(...) user@example.com'
+ ```
+
+Ensure you [add your SSH key to your GitHub account](https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/connecting-to-github-with-ssh/adding-a-new-ssh-key-to-your-github-account#adding-a-new-ssh-key-to-your-account) **as a Signing Key** (as opposed to or in addition to as an Authentication Key).
+
+## Rebase on Git pull
+
+Use `git pull --rebase` instead of `git pull` when pulling in changes from GitHub to your local machine. This way your local changes will always be "on top of" the latest changes on GitHub, and you avoid merge commits (which are disallowed in this repo).
+
+You can set this to be the default behavior:
+
+```
+git config --global pull.rebase true
+```
+
+## Rebase from `main` before submitting a PR
+
+If you are working on your own branch, run these commands before submitting a PR:
+
+```
+git fetch origin
+git rebase origin/main
+```
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/meta/uploading-images.md b/i18n/bn/meta/uploading-images.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..75d599fb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/meta/uploading-images.md
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+---
+title: Uploading Images
+---
+
+Here are a couple of general rules for contributing to Privacy Guides:
+
+## Images
+
+- We **prefer** SVG images, but if those do not exist we can use PNG images
+
+Company logos have canvas size of:
+
+- 128x128px
+- 384x128px
+
+## Optimization
+
+### PNG
+
+Use the [OptiPNG](https://sourceforge.net/projects/optipng/) to optimize the PNG image:
+
+```bash
+optipng -o7 file.png
+```
+
+### SVG
+
+#### Inkscape
+
+[Scour](https://github.com/scour-project/scour) all SVG images.
+
+In Inkscape:
+
+1. File Save As..
+2. Set type to Optimized SVG (*.svg)
+
+In the **Options** tab:
+
+- **Number of significant digits for coordinates** > **5**
+- [x] Turn on **Shorten color values**
+- [x] Turn on **Convert CSS attributes to XML attributes**
+- [x] Turn on **Collapse groups**
+- [x] Turn on **Create groups for similar attributes**
+- [ ] Turn off **Keep editor data**
+- [ ] Turn off **Keep unreferenced definitions**
+- [x] Turn on **Work around renderer bugs**
+
+In the **SVG Output** tab under **Document options**:
+
+- [ ] Turn off **Remove the XML declaration**
+- [x] Turn on **Remove metadata**
+- [x] Turn on **Remove comments**
+- [x] Turn on **Embeded raster images**
+- [x] Turn on **Enable viewboxing**
+
+In the **SVG Output** under **Pretty-printing**:
+
+- [ ] Turn off **Format output with line-breaks and indentation**
+- **Indentation characters** > Select **Space**
+- **Depth of indentation** > **1**
+- [ ] Turn off **Strip the "xml:space" attribute from the root SVG element**
+
+In the **IDs** tab:
+
+- [x] Turn on **Remove unused IDs**
+- [ ] Turn off **Shorten IDs**
+- **Prefix shortened IDs with** > `leave blank`
+- [x] Turn on **Preserve manually created IDs not ending with digits**
+- **Preserve the following IDs** > `leave blank`
+- **Preserve IDs starting with** > `leave blank`
+
+#### CLI
+
+The same can be achieved with the [Scour](https://github.com/scour-project/scour) command:
+
+```bash
+scour --set-precision=5 \
+ --create-groups \
+ --renderer-workaround \
+ --remove-descriptive-elements \
+ --enable-comment-stripping \
+ --enable-viewboxing \
+ --indent=space \
+ --nindent=1 \
+ --no-line-breaks \
+ --enable-id-stripping \
+ --protect-ids-noninkscape \
+ input.svg output.svg
+```
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/meta/writing-style.md b/i18n/bn/meta/writing-style.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..50ac01821
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/meta/writing-style.md
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+---
+title: Writing Style
+---
+
+Privacy Guides is written in American English, and you should refer to [APA Style guidelines](https://apastyle.apa.org/style-grammar-guidelines/grammar) when in doubt.
+
+In general the [United States federal plain language guidelines](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/) provide a good overview of how to write clearly and concisely. We highlight a few important notes from these guidelines below.
+
+## Writing for our audience
+
+Privacy Guides' intended [audience](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/audience/) is primarily average, technology using adults. Don't dumb down content as if you are addressing a middle-school class, but don't overuse complicated terminology about concepts average computer users wouldn't be familiar with.
+
+### Address only what people want to know
+
+People don't need overly complex articles with little relevance to them. Figure out what you want people to accomplish when writing an article, and only include those details.
+
+> Tell your audience why the material is important to them. Say, “If you want a research grant, here’s what you have to do.” Or, “If you want to mine federal coal, here’s what you should know.” Or, “If you’re planning a trip to Rwanda, read this first.”
+
+### Address people directly
+
+We're writing *for* a wide variety of people, but we are writing *to* the person who is actually reading it. Use "you" to address the reader directly.
+
+> More than any other single technique, using “you” pulls users into the information and makes it relevant to them.
+>
+> When you use “you” to address users, they are more likely to understand what their responsibility is.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/audience/address-the-user/)
+
+### Avoid "users"
+
+Avoid calling people "users", in favor of "people", or a more specific description of the group of people you are writing for.
+
+## Organizing content
+
+Organization is key. Content should flow from most to least important information, and use headers as much as needed to logically separate different ideas.
+
+- Limit the document to around five or six sections. Long documents should probably be broken up into separate pages.
+- Mark important ideas with **bold** or *italics*.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/design/)
+
+### Begin with a topic sentence
+
+> If you tell your reader what they’re going to read about, they’re less likely to have to read your paragraph again. Headings help, but they’re not enough. Establish a context for your audience before you provide them with the details.
+>
+> We often write the way we think, putting our premises first and then our conclusion. It may be the natural way to develop thoughts, but we wind up with the topic sentence at the end of the paragraph. Move it up front and let users know where you’re going. Don’t make readers hold a lot of information in their heads before getting to the point.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/organize/have-a-topic-sentence/)
+
+## Choose your words carefully
+
+> Words matter. They are the most basic building blocks of written and spoken communication. Don’t complicate things by using jargon, technical terms, or abbreviations that people won’t understand.
+
+We should try to avoid abbreviations where possible, but technology is full of abbreviations. In general, spell out the abbreviation/acronym the first time it is used on a page, and add the abbreviation to the abbreviation glossary file when it is used repeatedly.
+
+> Kathy McGinty offers tongue-in-cheek instructions for bulking up your simple, direct sentences:
+>
+> > There is no escaping the fact that it is considered very important to note that a number of various available applicable studies ipso facto have generally identified the fact that additional appropriate nocturnal employment could usually keep juvenile adolescents off thoroughfares during the night hours, including but not limited to the time prior to midnight on weeknights and/or 2 a.m. on weekends.
+>
+> And the original, using stronger, simpler words:
+>
+> > More night jobs would keep youths off the streets.
+
+## Be concise
+
+> Unnecessary words waste your audience’s time. Great writing is like a conversation. Omit information that the audience doesn’t need to know. This can be difficult as a subject matter expert so it’s important to have someone look at the information from the audience’s perspective.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/concise/)
+
+## Keep text conversational
+
+> Verbs are the fuel of writing. They give your sentences power and direction. They enliven your writing and make it more interesting.
+>
+> Verbs tell your audience what to do. Make sure it’s clear who does what.
+
+### Use active voice
+
+> Active voice makes it clear who is supposed to do what. It eliminates ambiguity about responsibilities. Not “It must be done,” but “You must do it.”
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/conversational/use-active-voice/)
+
+### Use "must" for requirements
+
+> - “must” for an obligation
+> - “must not” for a prohibition
+> - “may” for a discretionary action
+> - “should” for a recommendation
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/mobile-browsers.md b/i18n/bn/mobile-browsers.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f014aca52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/mobile-browsers.md
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+---
+title: "Mobile Browsers"
+icon: material/cellphone-information
+---
+
+These are our currently recommended mobile web browsers and configurations for standard/non-anonymous internet browsing. If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) instead. In general, we recommend keeping extensions to a minimum; they have privileged access within your browser, require you to trust the developer, can make you [stand out](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint), and [weaken](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/chromium-extensions/c/0ei-UCHNm34/m/lDaXwQhzBAAJ) site isolation.
+
+## অ্যান্ড্রয়েড
+
+On Android, Firefox is still less secure than Chromium-based alternatives: Mozilla's engine, [GeckoView](https://mozilla.github.io/geckoview/), has yet to support [site isolation](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2021/05/introducing-firefox-new-site-isolation-security-architecture) or enable [isolatedProcess](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1565196).
+
+### Brave
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Brave Browser** includes a built-in content blocker and [privacy features](https://brave.com/privacy-features/), many of which are enabled by default.
+
+ Brave is built upon the Chromium web browser project, so it should feel familiar and have minimal website compatibility issues.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://brave.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://brave4u7jddbv7cyviptqjc7jusxh72uik7zt6adtckl5f4nwy2v72qd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://brave.com/privacy/browser/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.brave.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads annotate
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.brave.browser)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/releases)
+
+#### Recommended Configuration
+
+Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. When you use Brave, we recommend changing the following settings to protect your privacy from certain parties, but all browsers other than the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) will be traceable by *somebody* in some regard or another.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Brave Shields & privacy**
+
+##### Shields
+
+Brave includes some anti-fingerprinting measures in its [Shields](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360022973471-What-is-Shields-) feature. We suggest configuring these options [globally](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360023646212-How-do-I-configure-global-and-site-specific-Shields-settings-) across all pages that you visit.
+
+##### Brave shields global defaults
+
+Shields' options can be downgraded on a per-site basis as needed, but by default we recommend setting the following:
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Aggressive** under Block trackers & ads
+
+ ??? warning "Use default filter lists"
+ Brave allows you to select additional content filters within the internal `brave://adblock` page. We advise against using this feature; instead, keep the default filter lists. Using extra lists will make you stand out from other Brave users and may also increase attack surface if there is an exploit in Brave and a malicious rule is added to one of the lists you use.
+
+- [x] Select **Upgrade connections to HTTPS**
+- [x] (Optional) Select **Block Scripts** (1)
+- [x] Select **Strict, may break sites** under **Block fingerprinting**
+
+
+
+1. This option provides functionality similar to uBlock Origin's advanced [blocking modes](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) or the [NoScript](https://noscript.net/) extension.
+
+##### Clear browsing data
+
+- [x] Select **Clear data on exit**
+
+##### Social Media Blocking
+
+- [ ] Uncheck all social media components
+
+##### Other privacy settings
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Disable non-proxied UDP** under [WebRTC IP Handling Policy](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360017989132-How-do-I-change-my-Privacy-Settings-#webrtc)
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow sites to check if you have payment methods saved**
+- [ ] Uncheck **IPFS Gateway** (1)
+- [x] Select **Close tabs on exit**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow privacy-preserving product analytics (P3A)**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send diagnostic reports**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send daily usage ping to Brave**
+
+1. InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is a decentralized, peer-to-peer network for storing and sharing data in a distributed filesystem. Unless you use the feature, disable it.
+
+
+
+#### Brave Sync
+
+[Brave Sync](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360059793111-Understanding-Brave-Sync) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices without requiring an account and protects it with E2EE.
+
+## iOS
+
+On iOS, any app that can browse the web is [restricted](https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines) to using an Apple-provided [WebKit framework](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/webkit), so there is little reason to use a third-party web browser.
+
+### Safari
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Safari** is the default browser in iOS. It includes [privacy features](https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/browse-the-web-privately-iphb01fc3c85/15.0/ios/15.0) such as Intelligent Tracking Protection, Privacy Report, isolated Private Browsing tabs, iCloud Private Relay, and automatic HTTPS upgrades.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.apple.com/safari/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/safari/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/safari/welcome/mac){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+#### Recommended Configuration
+
+These options can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Safari** → **Privacy and Security**.
+
+##### Cross-Site Tracking Prevention
+
+- [x] Enable **Prevent Cross-Site Tracking**
+
+This enables WebKit's [Intelligent Tracking Protection](https://webkit.org/tracking-prevention/#intelligent-tracking-prevention-itp). The feature helps protect against unwanted tracking by using on-device machine learning to stop trackers. ITP protects against many common threats, but it does not block all tracking avenues because it is designed to not interfere with website usability.
+
+##### Privacy Report
+
+Privacy Report provides a snapshot of cross-site trackers currently prevented from profiling you on the website you're visiting. It can also display a weekly report to show which trackers have been blocked over time.
+
+Privacy Report is accessible via the Page Settings menu.
+
+##### Privacy Preserving Ad Measurement
+
+- [ ] Disable **Privacy Preserving Ad Measurement**
+
+Ad click measurement has traditionally used tracking technology that infringes on user privacy. [Private Click Measurement](https://webkit.org/blog/11529/introducing-private-click-measurement-pcm/) is a WebKit feature and proposed web standard aimed towards allowing advertisers to measure the effectiveness of web campaigns without compromising on user privacy.
+
+The feature has little privacy concerns on its own, so while you can choose to leave it on, we consider the fact that it's automatically disabled in Private Browsing to be an indicator for disabling the feature.
+
+##### Always-on Private Browsing
+
+Open Safari and tap the Tabs button, located in the bottom right. Then, expand the Tab Groups list.
+
+- [x] Select **Private**
+
+Safari's Private Browsing mode offers additional privacy protections. Private Browsing uses a new [ephemeral](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/urlsessionconfiguration/1410529-ephemeral) session for each tab, meaning tabs are isolated from one another. There are also other smaller privacy benefits with Private Browsing, such as not sending a webpage’s address to Apple when using Safari's translation feature.
+
+Do note that Private Browsing does not save cookies and website data, so it won't be possible to remain signed into sites. This may be an inconvenience.
+
+##### iCloud Sync
+
+Synchronization of Safari History, Tab Groups, iCloud Tabs and saved passwords are E2EE. However, by default, bookmarks are [not](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303). Apple can decrypt and access them in accordance with their [privacy policy](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/).
+
+You can enable E2EE for you Safari bookmarks and downloads by enabling [Advanced Data Protection](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212520). Go to your **Apple ID name → iCloud → Advanced Data Protection**.
+
+- [x] Turn On **Advanced Data Protection**
+
+If you use iCloud with Advanced Data Protection disabled, we also recommend checking to ensure Safari's default download location is set to locally on your device. This option can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Safari** → **General** → **Downloads**.
+
+### AdGuard
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **AdGuard for iOS** is a free and open-source content-blocking extension for Safari that uses the native [Content Blocker API](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/safariservices/creating_a_content_blocker).
+
+ AdGuard for iOS has some premium features; however, standard Safari content blocking is free of charge.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://adguard.com/en/adguard-ios/overview.html){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://adguard.com/privacy/ios.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://kb.adguard.com/ios){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdguardForiOS){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id1047223162)
+
+Additional filter lists do slow things down and may increase your attack surface, so only apply what you need.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must support automatic updates.
+- Must receive engine updates in 0-1 days from upstream release.
+- Any changes required to make the browser more privacy-respecting should not negatively impact user experience.
+- Android browsers must use the Chromium engine.
+ - Unfortunately, Mozilla GeckoView is still less secure than Chromium on Android.
+ - iOS browsers are limited to WebKit.
+
+### Extension Criteria
+
+- Must not replicate built-in browser or OS functionality.
+- Must directly impact user privacy, i.e. must not simply provide information.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/multi-factor-authentication.md b/i18n/bn/multi-factor-authentication.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5e1c1e302
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/multi-factor-authentication.md
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+---
+title: "Multi-Factor Authenticators"
+icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication'
+---
+
+## Hardware Security Keys
+
+### YubiKey
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ 
+
+ The **YubiKeys** are among the most popular security keys. Some YubiKey models have a wide range of features such as: [Universal 2nd Factor (U2F)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_2nd_Factor), [FIDO2 and WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online), [Yubico OTP](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#yubico-otp), [Personal Identity Verification (PIV)](https://developers.yubico.com/PIV), [OpenPGP](https://developers.yubico.com/PGP/), [TOTP and HOTP](https://developers.yubico.com/OATH) authentication.
+
+ One of the benefits of the YubiKey is that one key can do almost everything (YubiKey 5), you could expect from a hardware security key. We do encourage you to take the [quiz](https://www.yubico.com/quiz/) before purchasing in order to make sure you make the right choice.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.yubico.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.yubico.com/support/terms-conditions/privacy-notice){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.yubico.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+The [comparison table](https://www.yubico.com/store/compare/) shows the features and how the YubiKeys compare. We highly recommend that you select keys from the YubiKey 5 Series.
+
+YubiKeys can be programmed using the [YubiKey Manager](https://www.yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-manager/) or [YubiKey Personalization Tools](https://www.yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-personalization-tools/). For managing TOTP codes, you can use the [Yubico Authenticator](https://www.yubico.com/products/yubico-authenticator/). All of Yubico's clients are open-source.
+
+For models which support HOTP and TOTP, there are 2 slots in the OTP interface which could be used for HOTP and 32 slots to store TOTP secrets. These secrets are stored encrypted on the key and never expose them to the devices they are plugged into. Once a seed (shared secret) is given to the Yubico Authenticator, it will only give out the six-digit codes, but never the seed. This security model helps limit what an attacker can do if they compromise one of the devices running the Yubico Authenticator and make the YubiKey resistant to a physical attacker.
+
+!!! warning
+ The firmware of YubiKey is not open-source and is not updatable. If you want features in newer firmware versions, or if there is a vulnerability in the firmware version you are using, you would need to purchase a new key.
+
+### Nitrokey / Librem Key
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nitrokey** has a security key capable of [FIDO2 and WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) called the **Nitrokey FIDO2**. For PGP support, you need to purchase one of their other keys such as the **Nitrokey Start**, **Nitrokey Pro 2** or the **Nitrokey Storage 2**.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.nitrokey.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.nitrokey.com/data-privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.nitrokey.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+The [comparison table](https://www.nitrokey.com/#comparison) shows the features and how the Nitrokey models compare. The **Nitrokey 3** listed will have a combined feature set.
+
+Nitrokey models can be configured using the [Nitrokey app](https://www.nitrokey.com/download).
+
+For the models which support HOTP and TOTP, there are 3 slots for HOTP and 15 for TOTP. Some Nitrokeys can act as a password manager. They can store 16 different credentials and encrypt them using the same password as the OpenPGP interface.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ While Nitrokeys do not release the HOTP/TOTP secrets to the device they are plugged into, the HOTP and TOTP storage is **not** encrypted and is vulnerable to physical attacks. If you are looking to store HOTP or TOTP these secrets, we highly recommend that you use a Yubikey instead.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Resetting the OpenPGP interface on a Nitrokey will also make the password database [inaccessible](https://docs.nitrokey.com/pro/linux/factory-reset).
+
+ The Nitrokey Pro 2, Nitrokey Storage 2, and the upcoming Nitrokey 3 supports system integrity verification for laptops with the [Coreboot](https://www.coreboot.org/) + [Heads](https://osresearch.net/) firmware. Purism's [Librem Key](https://puri.sm/products/librem-key/) is a rebranded NitroKey Pro 2 with similar firmware and can also be used for the same purposes.
+
+Nitrokey's firmware is open-source, unlike the YubiKey. The firmware on modern NitroKey models (except the **NitroKey Pro 2**) is updatable.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ The Nitrokey app, while compatible with Librem Keys, requires `libnitrokey` version 3.6 or above to recognize them. Currently, the package is outdated on Windows, macOS, and most Linux distributions' repository, so you will likely have to compile the Nitrokey app yourself to get it working with the Librem Key. On Linux, you can obtain an up-to-date version from [Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.nitrokey.nitrokey-app).
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+#### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must use high quality, tamper resistant hardware security modules.
+- Must support the latest FIDO2 specification.
+- Must not allow private key extraction.
+- Devices which cost over $35 must support handling OpenPGP and S/MIME.
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should be available in USB-C form-factor.
+- Should be available with NFC.
+- Should support TOTP secret storage.
+- Should support secure firmware updates.
+
+## Authenticator Apps
+
+Authenticator Apps implement a security standard adopted by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) called **Time-based One-time Passwords**, or **TOTP**. This is a method where websites share a secret with you which is used by your authenticator app to generate a six (usually) digit code based on the current time, which you enter while logging in for the website to check. Typically these codes are regenerated every 30 seconds, and once a new code is generated the old one becomes useless. Even if a hacker gets one six-digit code, there is no way for them to reverse that code to get the original secret or otherwise be able to predict what any future codes might be.
+
+We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternatives as Android and iOS have better security and app isolation than most desktop operating systems.
+
+### Aegis Authenticator (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Aegis Authenticator** is a free, secure and open-source app to manage your 2-step verification tokens for your online services.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getaegis.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://getaegis.app/aegis/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.buymeacoffee.com/beemdevelopment){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.beemdevelopment.aegis)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis/releases)
+
+### Raivo OTP (iOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Raivo OTP** is a native, lightweight and secure time-based (TOTP) & counter-based (HOTP) password client for iOS. Raivo OTP offers optional iCloud backup & sync. Raivo OTP is also available for macOS in the form of a status bar application, however the Mac app does not work independently of the iOS app.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://raivo-otp.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://raivo-otp.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/raivo-otp/ios-application){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://raivo-otp.com/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/raivo-otp/id1459042137)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must not require internet connectivity.
+- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
+ - **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/news-aggregators.md b/i18n/bn/news-aggregators.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dc5f154d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/news-aggregators.md
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+---
+title: "News Aggregators"
+icon: material/rss
+---
+
+A [news aggregator](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/News_aggregator) is a way to keep up with your favourite blogs and news sites.
+
+## Aggregator clients
+
+### Akregator
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Akregator** is a news feed reader that is a part of the [KDE](https://kde.org) project. It comes with a fast search, advanced archiving functionality and an internal browser for easy news reading.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://apps.kde.org/akregator){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://kde.org/privacypolicy-apps){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.kde.org/?application=akregator){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://invent.kde.org/pim/akregator){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://kde.org/community/donations/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.kde.akregator)
+
+### Feeder
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Feeder** is a modern RSS client for Android that has many [features](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder#features) and works well with folders of RSS feeds. It supports [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS), [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)), [RDF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDF%2FXML) and [JSON Feed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Feed).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://ko-fi.com/spacecowboy){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nononsenseapps.feeder.play)
+
+### Fluent Reader
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Fluent Reader** is a secure cross-platform news aggregator that has useful privacy features such as deletion of cookies on exit, strict [content security policies (CSP)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy) and proxy support, meaning you can use it over [Tor](tor.md).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://hyliu.me/fluent-reader){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader/wiki/Privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader/wiki/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/yang991178){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://hyliu.me/fluent-reader)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1520907427)
+
+### GNOME Feeds
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GNOME Feeds** is an [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS) and [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)) news reader for [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org). It has a simple interface and is quite fast.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gfeeds.gabmus.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.gnome.org/World/gfeeds){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/gabmus/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://gfeeds.gabmus.org/#install)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.gabmus.gfeeds)
+
+### Miniflux
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Miniflux** is a web-based news aggregator that you can self-host. It supports [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS), [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)), [RDF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDF%2FXML) and [JSON Feed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Feed).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://miniflux.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://miniflux.app/docs/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/miniflux/v2){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://miniflux.app/#donations){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+### NetNewsWire
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **NetNewsWire** a free and open-source feed reader for macOS and iOS with a focus on a native design and feature set. It supports the typical feed formats alongside built-in support for Twitter and Reddit feeds.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://netnewswire.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://netnewswire.com/privacypolicy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://netnewswire.com/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Ranchero-Software/NetNewsWire){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/netnewswire-rss-reader/id1480640210)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://netnewswire.com)
+
+### Newsboat
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Newsboat** is an RSS/Atom feed reader for the text console. It's an actively maintained fork of [Newsbeuter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newsbeuter). It is very lightweight, and ideal for use over [Secure Shell](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Shell).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://newsboat.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://newsboat.org/releases/2.27/docs/newsboat.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/newsboat/newsboat){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must operate locally, i.e. must not be a cloud service.
+
+## Social Media RSS Support
+
+Some social media services also support RSS although it's not often advertised.
+
+### Reddit
+
+Reddit allows you to subscribe to subreddits via RSS.
+
+!!! example
+ Replace `subreddit_name` with the subreddit you wish to subscribe to.
+
+ ```text
+ https://www.reddit.com/r/{{ subreddit_name }}/new/.rss
+ ```
+
+### Twitter
+
+Using any of the Nitter [instances](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter/wiki/Instances) you can easily subscribe using RSS.
+
+!!! example
+ 1. Pick an instance and set `nitter_instance`.
+ 2. Replace `twitter_account` with the account name.
+
+ ```text
+ https://{{ nitter_instance }}/{{ twitter_account }}/rss
+ ```
+
+### YouTube
+
+You can subscribe YouTube channels without logging in and associating usage information with your Google Account.
+
+!!! example
+
+ To subscribe to a YouTube channel with an RSS client, first look for your [channel code](https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6180214), replace `[CHANNEL ID]` below:
+ ```text
+ https://www.youtube.com/feeds/videos.xml?channel_id=[CHANNEL ID]
+ ```
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/notebooks.md b/i18n/bn/notebooks.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..54f6524a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/notebooks.md
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+---
+title: "Notebooks"
+icon: material/notebook-edit-outline
+---
+
+Keep track of your notes and journalings without giving them to a third-party.
+
+If you are currently using an application like Evernote, Google Keep, or Microsoft OneNote, we suggest you pick an alternative here that supports E2EE.
+
+## Cloud-based
+
+### Joplin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Joplin** is a free, open-source, and fully-featured note-taking and to-do application which can handle a large number of markdown notes organized into notebooks and tags. It offers E2EE and can sync through Nextcloud, Dropbox, and more. It also offers easy import from Evernote and plain-text notes.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://joplinapp.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://joplinapp.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://joplinapp.org/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://joplinapp.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.cozic.joplin)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/joplin/id1315599797)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/joplin-web-clipper/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/joplin-web-clipper/alofnhikmmkdbbbgpnglcpdollgjjfek)
+
+Joplin does not support password/PIN protection for the [application itself or individual notes and notebooks](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin/issues/289). However, your data is still encrypted in transit and at the sync location using your master key.
+
+### Standard Notes
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Standard Notes** is a simple and private notes app that makes your notes easy and available everywhere you are. It features E2EE on every platform, and a powerful desktop experience with themes and custom editors. It has also been [independently audited (PDF)](https://s3.amazonaws.com/standard-notes/security/Report-SN-Audit.pdf).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://standardnotes.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://standardnotes.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://standardnotes.com/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/standardnotes){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://standardnotes.com/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.standardnotes)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1285392450)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/standardnotes/app/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://standardnotes.com)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://standardnotes.com)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://standardnotes.com)
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://app.standardnotes.com/)
+
+### Cryptee
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Cryptee** is an open-source, web-based E2EE document editor and photo storage application. Cryptee is a PWA, which means that it works seamlessly across all modern devices without requiring native apps for each respective platform.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://crypt.ee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://crypt.ee/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://crypt.ee/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/cryptee){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: PWA](https://crypt.ee/download)
+
+Cryptee offers 100MB of storage for free, with paid options if you need more. Sign-up doesn't require an e-mail or other personally identifiable information.
+
+## Local notebooks
+
+### Org-mode
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Org-mode** is a [major mode](https://www.gnu.org/software/emacs/manual/html_node/elisp/Major-Modes.html) for GNU Emacs. Org-mode is for keeping notes, maintaining TODO lists, planning projects, and authoring documents with a fast and effective plain-text system. Synchronization is possible with [file synchronization](file-sharing.md#file-sync) tools.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orgmode.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://orgmode.org/manuals.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/emacs/org-mode.git){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/bzg){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Clients must be open-source.
+- Any cloud sync functionality must be E2EE.
+- Must support exporting documents into a standard format.
+
+### Best Case
+
+- Local backup/sync functionality should support encryption.
+- Cloud-based platforms should support document sharing.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/bn/os/android-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4cd3f7b28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/os/android-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+---
+title: Android Overview
+icon: ফন্টঅ্যাওসাম/ ব্র্যান্ড / অ্যান্ড্রয়েড
+---
+
+Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system.
+
+## Choosing an Android Distribution
+
+When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has irrevocable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android.
+
+This problem could be solved by using a custom Android distribution that does not come with such invasive integration. Unfortunately, many custom Android distributions often violate the Android security model by not supporting critical security features such as AVB, rollback protection, firmware updates, and so on. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require [more permissive](https://github.com/LineageOS/android_system_sepolicy/search?q=userdebug&type=code) SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
+
+Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that it upholds the Android security model. At the very least, the distribution should have production builds, support for AVB, rollback protection, timely firmware and operating system updates, and SELinux in [enforcing mode](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts#enforcement_levels). All of our recommended Android distributions satisfy these criteria.
+
+[Our Android System Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Avoid Rooting
+
+[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
+
+Adblockers, which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For Adblocking we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or [VPN](../vpn.md) server blocking solutions instead. RethinkDNS, TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN) preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as Orbot or a real VPN server.
+
+AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
+
+We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps.
+
+## Verified Boot
+
+[Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection).
+
+Android 10 and above has moved away from full-disk encryption to more flexible [file-based encryption](https://source.android.com/security/encryption/file-based). Your data is encrypted using unique encryption keys, and the operating system files are left unencrypted.
+
+Verified Boot ensures the integrity of the operating system files, thereby preventing an adversary with physical access from tampering or installing malware on the device. In the unlikely case that malware is able to exploit other parts of the system and gain higher privileged access, Verified Boot will prevent and revert changes to the system partition upon rebooting the device.
+
+Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock Android distribution. Only a few OEMs such as Google support custom AVB key enrollment on their devices. Additionally, some AOSP derivatives such as LineageOS or /e/ OS do not support Verified Boot even on hardware with Verified Boot support for third-party operating systems. We recommend that you check for support **before** purchasing a new device. AOSP derivatives which do not support Verified Boot are **not** recommended.
+
+Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be aware of beyond their marketing. For example, the Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage.
+
+## Firmware Updates
+
+Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin).
+
+As the components of the phone, such as the processor and radio technologies rely on closed-source components, the updates must be provided by the respective manufacturers. Therefore, it is important that you purchase a device within an active support cycle. [Qualcomm](https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2020/12/16/qualcomm-and-google-announce-collaboration-extend-android-os-support-and) and [Samsung](https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-security-extending-updates-knox/) support their devices for 4 years, while cheaper products often have shorter support cycles. With the introduction of the [Pixel 6](https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/4457705), Google now makes their own SoC and they will provide a minimum of 5 years of support.
+
+EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive firmware updates from OEM vendors or after market Android distributors. This means that security issues with those devices will remain unfixed.
+
+Fairphone, for example, markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates.
+
+## Android Versions
+
+It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution.
+
+## Android Permissions
+
+[Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps. A smartphone with the latest version of Android will always be more secure than an old smartphone with an antivirus that you have paid for. It's better not to pay for antivirus software and to save money to buy a new smartphone such as a Google Pixel.
+
+Should you want to run an app that you're unsure about, consider using a user or work profile.
+
+## Media Access
+
+Quite a few applications allows you to "share" a file with them for media upload. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter.
+
+## User Profiles
+
+Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android.
+
+With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation.
+
+## Work Profile
+
+[Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles.
+
+A **device controller** app such as [Shelter](#recommended-apps) is required to create a Work Profile without an enterprise MDM, unless you're using a custom Android OS which includes one.
+
+The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such as *File Shuttle* and *contact search blocking* or any kind of isolation features must be implemented by the controller. You must also fully trust the device controller app, as it has full access to your data inside of the work profile.
+
+This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously.
+
+## VPN Killswitch
+
+Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+## Global Toggles
+
+Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled.
+
+## Google
+
+If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play.
+
+### Advanced Protection Program
+
+If you have a Google account we suggest enrolling in the [Advanced Protection Program](https://landing.google.com/advancedprotection/). It is available at no cost to anyone with two or more hardware security keys with [FIDO](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) support.
+
+The Advanced Protection Program provides enhanced threat monitoring and enables:
+
+- Stricter two factor authentication; e.g. that [FIDO](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) **must** be used and disallows the use of [SMS OTPs](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#sms-or-email-mfa), [TOTP](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp) and [OAuth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth)
+- Only Google and verified third-party apps can access account data
+- Scanning of incoming emails on Gmail accounts for [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing#Email_phishing) attempts
+- Stricter [safe browser scanning](https://www.google.com/chrome/privacy/whitepaper.html#malware) with Google Chrome
+- Stricter recovery process for accounts with lost credentials
+
+ If you use non-sandboxed Google Play Services (common on stock operating systems), the Advanced Protection Program also comes with [additional benefits](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/9764949?hl=en) such as:
+
+- Not allowing app installation outside of the Google Play Store, the OS vendor's app store, or via [`adb`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_Debug_Bridge)
+- Mandatory automatic device scanning with [Play Protect](https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/2812853?hl=en#zippy=%2Chow-malware-protection-works%2Chow-privacy-alerts-work)
+- Warning you about unverified applications
+
+### Google Play System Updates
+
+In the past, Android security updates had to be shipped by the operating system vendor. Android has become more modular beginning with Android 10, and Google can push security updates for **some** system components via the privileged Play Services.
+
+If you have an EOL device shipped with Android 10 or above and are unable to run any of our recommended operating systems on your device, you are likely going to be better off sticking with your OEM Android installation (as opposed to an operating system not listed here such as LineageOS or /e/ OS). This will allow you to receive **some** security fixes from Google, while not violating the Android security model by using an insecure Android derivative and increasing your attack surface. We would still recommend upgrading to a supported device as soon as possible.
+
+### Advertising ID
+
+All devices with Google Play Services installed automatically generate an [advertising ID](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/6048248?hl=en) used for targeted advertising. Disable this feature to limit the data collected about you.
+
+On Android distributions with [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), go to :gear: **Settings** → **Apps** → **Sandboxed Google Play** → **Google Settings** → **Ads**, and select *Delete advertising ID*.
+
+On Android distributions with privileged Google Play Services (such as stock OSes), the setting may be in one of several locations. Check
+
+- :gear: **Settings** → **Google** → **Ads**
+- :gear: **Settings** → **Privacy** → **Ads**
+
+You will either be given the option to delete your advertising ID or to *Opt out of interest-based ads*, this varies between OEM distributions of Android. If presented with the option to delete the advertising ID that is preferred. If not, then make sure to opt out and reset your advertising ID.
+
+### SafetyNet and Play Integrity API
+
+[SafetyNet](https://developer.android.com/training/safetynet/attestation) and the [Play Integrity APIs](https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity) are generally used for [banking apps](https://grapheneos.org/usage#banking-apps). Many banking apps will work fine in GrapheneOS with sandboxed Play services, however some non-financial apps have their own crude anti-tampering mechanisms which might fail. GrapheneOS passes the `basicIntegrity` check, but not the certification check `ctsProfileMatch`. Devices with Android 8 or later have hardware attestation support which cannot be bypassed without leaked keys or serious vulnerabilities.
+
+As for Google Wallet, we don't recommend this due to their [privacy policy](https://payments.google.com/payments/apis-secure/get_legal_document?ldo=0&ldt=privacynotice&ldl=en), which states you must opt-out if you don't want your credit rating and personal information shared with affiliate marketing services.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/bn/os/linux-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..13489c528
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/os/linux-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+---
+title: Linux Overview
+icon: simple/linux
+---
+
+It is often believed that [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigour applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years.
+
+At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.:
+
+- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack)
+- A strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go
+- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations)
+
+Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are great if you want to:
+
+- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems
+- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms)
+- Have privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/)
+
+Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed here.
+
+[Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Choosing your distribution
+
+Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use.
+
+### Release cycle
+
+We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates.
+
+For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release.
+
+We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this:
+
+
+
+
+
+### Traditional vs Atomic updates
+
+Traditionally, Linux distributions update by sequentially updating the desired packages. Traditional updates such as those used in Fedora, Arch Linux, and Debian based distributions can be less reliable if an error occurs while updating.
+
+Atomic updating distributions apply updates in full or not at all. Typically, transactional update systems are also atomic.
+
+A transactional update system creates a snapshot that is made before and after an update is applied. If an update fails at any time (perhaps due to a power failure), the update can be easily rolled back to a “last known good state."
+
+The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tumbleweed, and NixOS and can achieve reliability with this model. [Adam Šamalík](https://twitter.com/adsamalik) provided a presentation on how `rpm-ostree` works with Silverblue:
+
+
+
+
+
+### “Security-focused” distributions
+
+There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use.
+
+### Arch-based distributions
+
+Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own.
+
+For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit).
+
+Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora.
+
+If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically:
+
+- **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories.
+- **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks.
+
+### Kicksecure
+
+While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default.
+
+### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions
+
+We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons.
+
+## General Recommendations
+
+### Drive Encryption
+
+Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS](../encryption.md#linux-unified-key-setup) FDE. If this option isn’t set at installation time, you will have to backup your data and re-install, as encryption is applied after [disk partitioning](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_partitioning), but before [file systems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_system) are formatted. We also suggest securely erasing your storage device:
+
+- [Secure Data Erasure :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/05/25/secure-data-erasure/)
+
+### Swap
+
+Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Swap#zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM).
+
+### Wayland
+
+We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland.
+
+Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)).
+
+We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do not have Wayland support, such as Cinnamon (default on Linux Mint), Pantheon (default on Elementary OS), MATE, Xfce, and i3.
+
+### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates)
+
+Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html).
+
+We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default.
+
+### Updates
+
+Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found.
+
+Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates.
+
+Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd).
+
+## Privacy Tweaks
+
+### MAC Address Randomization
+
+Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings.
+
+It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous.
+
+We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as suggested in the [article](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/).
+
+If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=).
+
+There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware.
+
+### Other Identifiers
+
+There are other system identifiers which you may wish to be careful about. You should give this some thought to see if it applies to your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md):
+
+- **Hostnames:** Your system's hostname is shared with the networks you connect to. You should avoid including identifying terms like your name or operating system in your hostname, instead sticking to generic terms or random strings.
+- **Usernames:** Similarly, your username is used in a variety of ways across your system. Consider using generic terms like "user" rather than your actual name.
+- **Machine ID:**: During installation a unique machine ID is generated and stored on your device. Consider [setting it to a generic ID](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#machine-id).
+
+### System Counting
+
+The Fedora Project [counts](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting) how many unique systems access its mirrors by using a [`countme`](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting#Detailed_Description) variable instead of a unique ID. Fedora does this to determine load and provision better servers for updates where necessary.
+
+This [option](https://dnf.readthedocs.io/en/latest/conf_ref.html#options-for-both-main-and-repo) is currently off by default. We recommend adding `countme=false` to `/etc/dnf/dnf.conf` just in case it is enabled in the future. On systems that use `rpm-ostree` such as Silverblue, the countme option is disabled by masking the [rpm-ostree-countme](https://fedoramagazine.org/getting-better-at-counting-rpm-ostree-based-systems/) timer.
+
+openSUSE also uses a [unique ID](https://en.opensuse.org/openSUSE:Statistics) to count systems, which can be disabled by deleting the `/var/lib/zypp/AnonymousUniqueId` file.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/bn/os/qubes-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1ced5418d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/os/qubes-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+---
+title: "Qubes Overview"
+icon: simple/qubesos
+---
+
+[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/).
+
+## How does Qubes OS work?
+
+Qubes uses [compartmentalization](https://www.qubes-os.org/intro/) to keep the system secure. Qubes are created from templates, the defaults being for Fedora, Debian and [Whonix](../desktop.md#whonix). Qubes OS also allows you to create once-use [disposable](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-use-disposables/) virtual machines.
+
+
+Qubes Architecture, Credit: What is Qubes OS Intro
+
+Each Qubes application has a [colored border](https://www.qubes-os.org/screenshots/) that can help you keep track of the virtual machine it is running in. You could, for example, use a specific color for your banking browser, while using a different color for a general untrusted browser.
+
+
+Qubes window borders, Credit: Qubes Screenshots
+
+## Why Should I use Qubes?
+
+Qubes OS is useful if your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md) requires strong compartmentalization and security, such as if you think you'll be opening untrusted files from untrusted sources. A typical reason for using Qubes OS is to open documents from unknown sources.
+
+Qubes OS utilizes [Dom0](https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Dom0) Xen VM (i.e., an "AdminVM") for controlling other guest VMs or Qubes on the host OS. Other VMs display individual application windows within Dom0's desktop environment. It allows you to color code windows based on trust levels and run apps that can interact with each other with very granular control.
+
+### Copying and Pasting Text
+
+You can [copy and paste text](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-and-paste-text/) using `qvm-copy-to-vm` or the below instructions:
+
+1. Press **Ctrl+C** to tell the VM you're in that you want to copy something.
+2. Press **Ctrl+Shift+C** to tell the VM to make this buffer available to the global clipboard.
+3. Press **Ctrl+Shift+V** in the destination VM to make the global clipboard available.
+4. Press **Ctrl+V** in the destination VM to paste the contents in the buffer.
+
+### File Exchange
+
+To copy and paste files and directories (folders) from one VM to another, you can use the option **Copy to Other AppVM...** or **Move to Other AppVM...**. The difference is that the **Move** option will delete the original file. Either option will protect your clipboard from being leaked to any other Qubes. This is more secure than air-gapped file transfer because an air-gapped computer will still be forced to parse partitions or file systems. That is not required with the inter-qube copy system.
+
+??? info "AppVMs or qubes do not have their own file systems"
+
+ You can [copy and move files](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-and-move-files/) between Qubes. When doing so the changes aren't immediately made and can be easily undone in case of an accident.
+
+### Inter-VM Interactions
+
+The [qrexec framework](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec/) is a core part of Qubes which allows virtual machine communication between domains. It is built on top of the Xen library *vchan*, which facilitates [isolation through policies](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2020/06/22/new-qrexec-policy-system/).
+
+## Additional Resources
+
+For additional information we encourage you to consult the extensive Qubes OS documentation pages located on the [Qubes OS Website](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/). Offline copies can be downloaded from the Qubes OS [documentation repository](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-doc).
+
+- Open Technology Fund: [*Arguably the world's most secure operating system*](https://www.opentech.fund/news/qubes-os-arguably-the-worlds-most-secure-operating-system-motherboard/)
+- J. Rutkowska: [*Software compartmentalization vs. physical separation*](https://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/2014/Software_compartmentalization_vs_physical_separation.pdf)
+- J. Rutkowska: [*Partitioning my digital life into security domains*](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/03/13/partitioning-my-digital-life-into.html)
+- Qubes OS: [*Related Articles*](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/categories/#articles)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/passwords.md b/i18n/bn/passwords.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8ce00e78a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/passwords.md
@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+---
+title: "Password Managers"
+icon: material/form-textbox-password
+---
+
+Password managers allow you to securely store and manage passwords and other credentials with the use of a master password.
+
+[Introduction to Passwords :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](./basics/passwords-overview.md)
+
+!!! info
+
+ Built-in password managers in software like browsers and operating systems are sometimes not as good as dedicated password manager software. The advantage of a built-in password manager is good integration with the software, but it can often be very simple and lack privacy and security features standalone offerings have.
+
+ For example, the password manager in Microsoft Edge doesn't offer E2EE at all. Google's password manager has [optional](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/11350823) E2EE, and [Apple's](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303) offers E2EE by default.
+
+## Cloud-based
+
+These password managers sync your passwords to a cloud server for easy accessibility from all your devices and safety against device loss.
+
+### Bitwarden
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Bitwarden** is a free and open-source password manager. It aims to solve password management problems for individuals, teams, and business organizations. Bitwarden is among the best and safest solutions to store all of your logins and passwords while conveniently keeping them synced between all of your devices.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://bitwarden.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://bitwarden.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://bitwarden.com/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/bitwarden){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.x8bit.bitwarden)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/bitwarden-password-manager/id1137397744)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/bitwarden/mobile/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://bitwarden.com/download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://bitwarden.com/download)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.bitwarden.desktop)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/bitwarden-password-manager)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/bitwarden-free-password-m/nngceckbapebfimnlniiiahkandclblb)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/jbkfoedolllekgbhcbcoahefnbanhhlh)
+
+Bitwarden also features [Bitwarden Send](https://bitwarden.com/products/send/), which allows you to share text and files securely with [end-to-end encryption](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-encryption). A [password](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-privacy/#send-passwords) can be required along with the send link. Bitwarden Send also features [automatic deletion](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-lifespan).
+
+You need the [Premium Plan](https://bitwarden.com/help/about-bitwarden-plans/#compare-personal-plans) to be able to share files. The free plan only allows text sharing.
+
+Bitwarden's server-side code is [open-source](https://github.com/bitwarden/server), so if you don't want to use the Bitwarden cloud, you can easily host your own Bitwarden sync server.
+
+**Vaultwarden** is an alternative implementation of Bitwarden's sync server written in Rust and compatible with official Bitwarden clients, perfect for self-hosted deployment where running the official resource-heavy service might not be ideal. If you are looking to self-host Bitwarden on your own server, you almost certainly want to use Vaultwarden over Bitwarden's official server code.
+
+[:octicons-repo-16: Vaultwarden Repository](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden ""){.md-button} [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/dani-garcia){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+### 1Password
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **1Password** is a password manager with a strong focus on security and ease-of-use, which allows you to store passwords, credit cards, software licenses, and any other sensitive information in a secure digital vault. Your vault is hosted on 1Password's servers for a [monthly fee](https://1password.com/sign-up/). 1Password is [audited](https://support.1password.com/security-assessments/) on a regular basis and provides exceptional customer support. 1Password is closed source; however, the security of the product is thoroughly documented in their [security white paper](https://1passwordstatic.com/files/security/1password-white-paper.pdf).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://1password.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://support.1password.com/1password-privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.1password.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.onepassword.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1511601750?mt=8)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://1password.com/downloads/windows/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://1password.com/downloads/mac/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://1password.com/downloads/linux/)
+
+Traditionally, **1Password** has offered the best password manager user experience for people using macOS and iOS; however, it has now achieved feature-parity across all platforms. It boasts many features geared towards families and less technical people, as well as advanced functionality.
+
+Your 1Password vault is secured with both your master password and a randomized 34-character security key to encrypt your data on their servers. This security key adds a layer of protection to your data because your data is secured with high entropy regardless of your master password. Many other password manager solutions are entirely reliant on the strength of your master password to secure your data.
+
+One advantage 1Password has over Bitwarden is its first-class support for native clients. While Bitwarden relegates many duties, especially account management features, to their web vault interface, 1Password makes nearly every feature available within its native mobile or desktop clients. 1Password's clients also have a more intuitive UI, which makes them easier to use and navigate.
+
+### Psono
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Psono** is a free and open-source password manager from Germany, with a focus on password management for teams. Psono supports secure sharing of passwords, files, bookmarks, and emails. All secrets are protected by a master password.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://psono.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://psono.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://doc.psono.com){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/psono){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.psono.psono)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/psono-password-manager/id1545581224)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/psono-pw-password-manager)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/psonopw-password-manager/eljmjmgjkbmpmfljlmklcfineebidmlo)
+ - [:simple-docker: Docker Hub](https://hub.docker.com/r/psono/psono-client)
+
+Psono provides extensive documentation for their product. The web-client for Psono can be self-hosted; alternatively, you can choose the full Community Edition or the Enterprise Edition with additional features.
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+#### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must utilize strong, standards-based/modern E2EE.
+- Must have thoroughly documented encryption and security practices.
+- Must have a published audit from a reputable, independent third-party.
+- All non-essential telemetry must be optional.
+- Must not collect more PII than is necessary for billing purposes.
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Telemetry should be opt-in (disabled by default) or not collected at all.
+- Should be open-source and reasonably self-hostable.
+
+## Local Storage
+
+These options allow you to manage an encrypted password database locally.
+
+### KeePassXC
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **KeePassXC** is a community fork of KeePassX, a native cross-platform port of KeePass Password Safe, with the goal to extend and improve it with new features and bugfixes to provide a feature-rich, cross-platform and modern open-source password manager.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://keepassxc.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://keepassxc.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://keepassxc.org/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://keepassxc.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://keepassxc.org/download/#windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://keepassxc.org/download/#mac)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://keepassxc.org/download/#linux)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flatpak](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.keepassxc.KeePassXC)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/keepassxc-browser)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/keepassxc-browser/oboonakemofpalcgghocfoadofidjkkk)
+
+KeePassXC stores its export data as [CSV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comma-separated_values) files. This may mean data loss if you import this file into another password manager. We advise you check each record manually.
+
+### KeePassDX (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **KeePassDX** is a lightweight password manager for Android, allows editing encrypted data in a single file in KeePass format and can fill in the forms in a secure way. [Contributor Pro](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kunzisoft.keepass.pro) allows unlocking cosmetic content and non-standard protocol features, but more importantly, it helps and encourages development.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.keepassdx.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.keepassdx.com/#donation){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kunzisoft.keepass.free)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX/releases)
+
+### Strongbox (iOS & macOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Strongbox** is a native, open-source password manager for iOS and macOS. Supporting both KeePass and Password Safe formats, Strongbox can be used in tandem with other password managers, like KeePassXC, on non-Apple platforms. By employing a [freemium model](https://strongboxsafe.com/pricing/), Strongbox offers most features under its free tier with more convenience-oriented [features](https://strongboxsafe.com/comparison/)—such as biometric authentication—locked behind a subscription or perpetual license.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://strongboxsafe.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://strongboxsafe.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://strongboxsafe.com/getting-started/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/strongbox-password-safe/Strongbox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/strongbox-password-safe/Strongbox#supporting-development){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/strongbox-keepass-pwsafe/id897283731)
+
+Additionally, there is an offline-only version offered: [Strongbox Zero](https://apps.apple.com/app/strongbox-keepass-pwsafe/id1581589638). This version is stripped down in an attempt to reduce attack surface.
+
+### Command-line
+
+These products are minimal password managers that can be used within scripting applications.
+
+#### gopass
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **gopass** is a password manager for the command line written in Go. It works on all major desktop and server operating systems (Linux, macOS, BSD, Windows).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.gopass.pw){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/gopasspw/gopass/tree/master/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/gopasspw/gopass){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/dominikschulz){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-macos)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-linux)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-bsd)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be cross-platform.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/productivity.md b/i18n/bn/productivity.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8000471af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/productivity.md
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+---
+title: "Productivity Tools"
+icon: material/file-sign
+---
+
+Most online office suites do not support E2EE, meaning the cloud provider has access to everything you do. The privacy policy may legally protect your rights, but it does not provide technical access constraints.
+
+## Collaboration Platforms
+
+### Nextcloud
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nextcloud** is a suite of free and open-source client-server software for creating your own file hosting services on a private server you control.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://nextcloud.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://nextcloud.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://nextcloud.com/support/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/nextcloud){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nextcloud.com/contribute/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nextcloud.client)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1125420102)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/nextcloud/android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/www/nextcloud)
+
+!!! danger
+
+ We don't recommend using the [E2EE App](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/end_to_end_encryption) for Nextcloud as it may lead to data loss; it is highly experimental and not production quality. For this reason, we don't recommend third-party Nextcloud providers.
+
+### CryptPad
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **CryptPad** is a private-by-design alternative to popular office tools. All content on this web service is end-to-end encrypted and can be shared with other users easily.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://cryptpad.fr){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://cryptpad.fr/pad/#/2/pad/view/GcNjAWmK6YDB3EO2IipRZ0fUe89j43Ryqeb4fjkjehE/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.cryptpad.fr/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/xwiki-labs/cryptpad){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/cryptpad){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+In general, we define collaboration platforms as full-fledged suites which could reasonably act as a replacement to collaboration platforms like Google Drive.
+
+- Open-source.
+- Makes files accessible via WebDAV unless it is impossible due to E2EE.
+- Has sync clients for Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- Supports document and spreadsheet editing.
+- Supports real-time document collaboration.
+- Supports exporting documents to standard document formats (e.g. ODF).
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should store files in a conventional filesystem.
+- Should support TOTP or FIDO2 multi-factor authentication support, or Passkey logins.
+
+## Office Suites
+
+### LibreOffice
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **LibreOffice** is a free and open-source office suite with extensive functionality.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.libreoffice.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.libreoffice.org/about-us/privacy/privacy-policy-en/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://documentation.libreoffice.org/en/english-documentation/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://www.libreoffice.org/about-us/source-code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.libreoffice.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/android-and-ios/)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/android-and-ios/)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/download/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/download/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/download/)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.libreoffice.LibreOffice)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/editors/libreoffice/)
+
+### OnlyOffice
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OnlyOffice** is a cloud-based free and open-source office suite with extensive functionality, including integration with Nextcloud.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.onlyoffice.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://help.onlyoffice.com/products/files/doceditor.aspx?fileid=5048502&doc=SXhWMEVzSEYxNlVVaXJJeUVtS0kyYk14YWdXTEFUQmRWL250NllHNUFGbz0_IjUwNDg1MDIi0){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://helpcenter.onlyoffice.com/userguides.aspx){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ONLYOFFICE){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.onlyoffice.documents)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id944896972)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.onlyoffice.com/download-desktop.aspx)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.onlyoffice.com/download-desktop.aspx)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.onlyoffice.com/download-desktop.aspx)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.onlyoffice.desktopeditors)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/www/onlyoffice-documentserver/)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+In general, we define office suites as applications which could reasonably act as a replacement for Microsoft Word for most needs.
+
+- Must be cross-platform.
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must function offline.
+- Must support editing documents, spreadsheets, and slideshows.
+- Must export files to standard document formats.
+
+## Paste services
+
+### PrivateBin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **PrivateBin** is a minimalist, open-source online pastebin where the server has zero knowledge of pasted data. Data is encrypted/decrypted in the browser using 256-bit AES. It is the improved version of ZeroBin. There is a [list of instances](https://privatebin.info/directory/).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://privatebin.info){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://privatebin.info/directory/){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/wiki/FAQ){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/bn/real-time-communication.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9c8b56d32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/real-time-communication.md
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+---
+title: "Real-Time Communication"
+icon: material/chat-processing
+---
+
+These are our recommendations for encrypted real-time communication.
+
+[Types of Communication Networks :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](./advanced/communication-network-types.md)
+
+## Encrypted Messengers
+
+These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
+
+### Signal
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
+
+ All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/signalapp){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://signal.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.thoughtcrime.securesms)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id874139669)
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://signal.org/android/apk/)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://signal.org/download/windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://signal.org/download/macos)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://signal.org/download/linux)
+
+Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). The server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
+
+The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
+
+We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation:
+
+[Signal Configuration and Hardening :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening/)
+
+### SimpleX Chat
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **SimpleX** Chat is an instant messenger that is decentralized and doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Users of SimpleX Chat can scan a QR code or click an invite link to participate in group conversations.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://simplex.chat){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/blob/stable/PRIVACY.md){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/tree/stable/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=chat.simplex.app)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/simplex-chat/id1605771084)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/releases)
+
+SimpleX Chat [was audited](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website.html) by Trail of Bits in October 2022.
+
+Currently SimpleX Chat only provides a client for Android and iOS. Basic group chatting functionality, direct messaging, editing of messages and markdown are supported. E2EE Audio and Video calls are also supported.
+
+Your data can be exported, and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up.
+
+### Briar
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works/) to other clients using the Tor Network. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org/){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.briarproject.briar.android)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://briarproject.org/download-briar-desktop/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://briarproject.org/download-briar-desktop/)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.briarproject.Briar)
+
+To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby.
+
+The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit/), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited.
+
+Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
+
+Briar supports perfect forward secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
+
+## Additional Options
+
+!!! warning
+
+ These messengers do not have Perfect [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) (PFS), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
+
+### Element
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Element** is the reference client for the [Matrix](https://matrix.org/docs/guides/introduction) protocol, an [open standard](https://matrix.org/docs/spec) for secure decentralized real-time communication.
+
+ Messages and files shared in private rooms (those which require an invite) are by default E2EE as are one to one voice and video calls.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://element.io/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://element.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://element.io/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/vector-im){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=im.vector.app)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/vector/id1083446067)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/vector-im/element-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://element.io/get-started)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://element.io/get-started)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://element.io/get-started)
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://app.element.io)
+
+Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
+
+Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
+
+The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
+
+The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm](https://matrix.org/docs/projects/other/olm) cryptographic ratchet used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
+
+### Session
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Session** is a decentralized messenger with a focus on private, secure, and anonymous communications. Session offers support for direct messages, group chats, and voice calls.
+
+ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to store and route messages. Every encrypted message is routed through three nodes in the Oxen Service Node Network, making it virtually impossible for the nodes to compile meaningful information on those using the network.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getsession.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://getsession.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://getsession.org/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/oxen-io){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=network.loki.messenger)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1470168868)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/oxen-io/session-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://getsession.org/download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://getsession.org/download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://getsession.org/download)
+
+Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
+
+Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
+
+Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
+
+Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must have open-source clients.
+- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
+- Must support E2EE for all messages.
+- Must have been independently audited.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should have Perfect Forward Secrecy.
+- Should have open-source servers.
+- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
+- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
+- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/router.md b/i18n/bn/router.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6b9b1b3b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/router.md
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+---
+title: "Router Firmware"
+icon: material/router-wireless
+---
+
+Below are a few alternative operating systems, that can be used on routers, Wi-Fi access points, etc.
+
+## OpenWrt
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OpenWrt** is a Linux-based operating system; it's primarily used on embedded devices to route network traffic. It includes util-linux, uClibc, and BusyBox. All of the components have been optimized for home routers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://openwrt.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://openwrt.org/docs/start){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://openwrt.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+You can consult OpenWrt's [table of hardware](https://openwrt.org/toh/start) to check if your device is supported.
+
+## OPNsense
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OPNsense** is an open source, FreeBSD-based firewall and routing platform which incorporates many advanced features such as traffic shaping, load balancing, and VPN capabilities, with many more features available in the form of plugins. OPNsense is commonly deployed as a perimeter firewall, router, wireless access point, DHCP server, DNS server, and VPN endpoint.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://opnsense.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.opnsense.org/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/opnsense){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opnsense.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+OPNsense was originally developed as a fork of [pfSense](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PfSense), and both projects are noted for being free and reliable firewall distributions which offer features often only found in expensive commercial firewalls. Launched in 2015, the developers of OPNsense [cited](https://docs.opnsense.org/history/thefork.html) a number of security and code-quality issues with pfSense which they felt necessitated a fork of the project, as well as concerns about Netgate's majority acquisition of pfSense and the future direction of the pfSense project.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be open source.
+- Must receive regular updates.
+- Must support a wide variety of hardware.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/search-engines.md b/i18n/bn/search-engines.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cf9a37746
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/search-engines.md
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+---
+title: "Search Engines"
+icon: material/search-web
+---
+
+Use a search engine that doesn't build an advertising profile based on your searches.
+
+The recommendations here are based on the merits of each service's privacy policy. There is **no guarantee** that these privacy policies are honored.
+
+Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) if your threat model requires hiding your IP address from the search provider.
+
+## Brave Search
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Brave Search** is developed by Brave and serves results primarily from its own, independent index. The index is optimized against Google Search and therefore may provide more contextually accurate results compared to other alternatives.
+
+ Brave Search includes unique features such as Discussions, which highlights conversation-focused results—such as forum posts.
+
+ We recommend you disable [Anonymous usage metrics](https://search.brave.com/help/usage-metrics) as it is enabled by default and can be disabled within settings.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://search.brave.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://search.brave4u7jddbv7cyviptqjc7jusxh72uik7zt6adtckl5f4nwy2v72qd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://search.brave.com/help/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://search.brave.com/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+Brave Search is based in the United States. Their [privacy policy](https://search.brave.com/help/privacy-policy) states they collect aggregated usage metrics, which includes the operating system and browser in use, however no personally identifiable information is collected. IP addresses are temporarily processed, but are not retained.
+
+## DuckDuckGo
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **DuckDuckGo** is one of the more mainstream private search engine options. Notable DuckDuckGo search features include [bangs](https://duckduckgo.com/bang) and many [instant answers](https://help.duckduckgo.com/duckduckgo-help-pages/features/instant-answers-and-other-features/). The search engine relies on a commercial Bing API to serve most results, but it does use numerous [other sources](https://help.duckduckgo.com/results/sources/) for instant answers and other non-primary results.
+
+ DuckDuckGo is the default search engine for the Tor Browser and is one of the few available options on Apple’s Safari browser.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://duckduckgo.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://duckduckgo.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://help.duckduckgo.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+DuckDuckGo is based in the United States. Their [privacy policy](https://duckduckgo.com/privacy) states they **do** log your searches for product improvement purposes, but not your IP address or any other personally identifying information.
+
+DuckDuckGo offers two [other versions](https://help.duckduckgo.com/features/non-javascript/) of their search engine, both of which do not require JavaScript. These versions do lack features, however. These versions can also be used in conjunction with their [Tor onion address](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/) by appending [/lite](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/lite) or [/html](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/html) for the respective version.
+
+## SearXNG
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **SearXNG** is an open-source, self-hostable, metasearch engine, aggregating the results of other search engines while not storing any information itself. It is an actively maintained fork of [SearX](https://github.com/searx/searx).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://searxng.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://searx.space/){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/searxng/searxng){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+SearXNG is a proxy between you and the search engines it aggregates from. Your search queries will still be sent to the search engines that SearXNG gets its results from.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance so that the queries would blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting SearXNG, as people looking up illegal content on your instance could draw unwanted attention from authorities.
+
+When you are using a SearXNG instance, be sure to go read their privacy policy. Since SearXNG instances may be modified by their owners, they do not necessarily reflect their privacy policy. Some instances run as a Tor hidden service, which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries does not contain PII.
+
+## Startpage
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Startpage** is a private search engine known for serving Google search results. One of Startpage's unique features is the [Anonymous View](https://www.startpage.com/en/anonymous-view/), which puts forth efforts to standardize user activity to make it more difficult to be uniquely identified. The feature can be useful for hiding [some](https://support.startpage.com/hc/en-us/articles/4455540212116-The-Anonymous-View-Proxy-technical-details) network and browser properties. Unlike the name suggests, the feature should not be relied upon for anonymity. If you are looking for anonymity, use the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) instead.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.startpage.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.startpage.com/en/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.startpage.com/hc/en-us/categories/4481917470356-Startpage-Search-Engine){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Startpage regularly limits service access to certain IP addresses, such as IPs reserved for VPNs or Tor. [DuckDuckGo](#duckduckgo) and [Brave Search](#brave-search) are friendlier options if your threat model requires hiding your IP address from the search provider.
+
+Startpage is based in the Netherlands. According to their [privacy policy](https://www.startpage.com/en/privacy-policy/), they log details such as: operating system, type of browser, and language. They do not log your IP address, search queries, or other personally identifying information.
+
+Startpage's majority shareholder is System1 who is an adtech company. We don't believe that to be an issue as they have a distinctly separate [privacy policy](https://system1.com/terms/privacy-policy). The Privacy Guides team reached out to Startpage [back in 2020](https://web.archive.org/web/20210118031008/https://blog.privacytools.io/relisting-startpage/) to clear up any concerns with System1's sizeable investment into the service. We were satisfied with the answers we received.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must not collect personally identifiable information per their privacy policy.
+- Must not allow users to create an account with them.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should be based on open-source software.
+- Should not block Tor exit node IP addresses.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/tools.md b/i18n/bn/tools.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9f6147119
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/tools.md
@@ -0,0 +1,443 @@
+---
+title: "Privacy Tools"
+icon: material/tools
+hide:
+ - toc
+---
+
+If you're looking for a specific solution to something, these are the hardware and software tools we recommend in a variety of categories. Our recommended privacy tools are primarily chosen based on security features, with additional emphasis on decentralized and open-source tools. They are applicable to a variety of threat models ranging from protection against global mass surveillance programs and avoiding big tech companies to mitigating attacks, but only you can determine what will work best for your needs.
+
+If you want assistance figuring out the best privacy tools and alternative programs for your needs, start a discussion on our [forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/) or our [Matrix](https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org) community!
+
+For more details about each project, why they were chosen, and additional tips or tricks we recommend, click the "Learn more" link in each section, or click on the recommendation itself to be taken to that specific section of the page.
+
+## Tor Network
+
+
+
+1. Snowflake does not increase privacy, however it allows you to easily contribute to the Tor network and help people in censored networks achieve better privacy.
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md)
+
+## Desktop Web Browsers
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](cloud.md)
+
+### DNS
+
+#### DNS Providers
+
+We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers based on a variety of criteria, such as [Mullvad](https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls) and [Quad9](https://quad9.net/) amongst others. We recommend for you to read our pages on DNS before choosing a provider. In many cases, using an alternative DNS provider is not recommended.
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](dns.md)
+
+#### Encrypted DNS Proxies
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](search-engines.md)
+
+### VPN Providers
+
+??? danger "VPNs do not provide anonymity"
+
+ Using a VPN will **not** keep your browsing habits anonymous, nor will it add additional security to non-secure (HTTP) traffic.
+
+ If you are looking for **anonymity**, you should use the Tor Browser **instead** of a VPN.
+
+ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connecting to websites using HTTPS. A VPN is not a replacement for good security practices.
+
+ [Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](vpn.md)
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](data-redaction.md)
+
+### Email Clients
+
+
+
+- { .twemoji } [Thunderbird](email-clients.md#thunderbird)
+- { .twemoji } [Apple Mail (macOS)](email-clients.md#apple-mail-macos)
+- { .twemoji } [Canary Mail (iOS)](email-clients.md#canary-mail-ios)
+- { .twemoji } [FairEmail (Android)](email-clients.md#fairemail-android)
+- { .twemoji } [GNOME Evolution (Linux)](email-clients.md#gnome-evolution-gnome)
+- { .twemoji } [K-9 Mail (Android)](email-clients.md#k-9-mail-android)
+- { .twemoji } [Kontact (Linux)](email-clients.md#kontact-kde)
+- { .twemoji } [Mailvelope (PGP in standard webmail)](email-clients.md#mailvelope-browser)
+- { .twemoji } [NeoMutt (CLI)](email-clients.md#neomutt-cli)
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](email-clients.md)
+
+### Encryption Software
+
+??? info "Operating System Disk Encryption"
+
+ For encrypting your operating system drive, we typically recommend using whichever encryption tool your operating system provides, whether that is **BitLocker** on Windows, **FileVault** on macOS, or **LUKS** on Linux. These tools are included with the operating system and typically use hardware encryption elements such as a TPM that other full-disk encryption software like VeraCrypt do not. VeraCrypt is still suitable for non-operating system disks such as external drives, especially drives that may be accessed from multiple operating systems.
+
+ [Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](encryption.md##operating-system-included-full-disk-encryption-fde)
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](video-streaming.md)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/tor.md b/i18n/bn/tor.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e26da1758
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/tor.md
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+---
+title: "Tor Network"
+icon: simple/torproject
+---
+
+{ align=right }
+
+The **Tor** network is a group of volunteer-operated servers that allows you to connect for free and improve your privacy and security on the Internet. Individuals and organizations can also share information over the Tor network with ".onion hidden services" without compromising their privacy. Because Tor traffic is difficult to block and trace, Tor is an effective censorship circumvention tool.
+
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://www.torproject.org){ .card-link title=Homepage }
+[:simple-torbrowser:](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Tor works by routing your internet traffic through those volunteer-operated servers, instead of making a direct connection to the site you're trying to visit. This obfuscates where the traffic is coming from, and no server in the connection path is able to see the full path of where the traffic is coming from and going to, meaning even the servers you are using to connect cannot break your anonymity.
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ Tor circuit pathway - Nodes in the path can only see the servers they are directly connected to, for example the "Entry" node shown can see your IP address, and the address of the "Middle" node, but has no way to see which website you are visiting.
+
+
+- [More information about how Tor works :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md)
+
+## Connecting to Tor
+
+There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for anonymous browsing for desktop computers and Android. In addition to the apps listed below, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser.
+
+### Tor Browser
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tor Browser** is the choice if you need anonymity, as it provides you with access to the Tor network and bridges, and it includes default settings and extensions that are automatically configured by the default security levels: *Standard*, *Safer* and *Safest*.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.torproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.torbrowser)
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://www.torproject.org/download/#android)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.torproject.org/download/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.torproject.org/download/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.torproject.org/download/)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/security/tor)
+
+!!! danger
+
+ You should **never** install any additional extensions on Tor Browser or edit `about:config` settings, including the ones we suggest for Firefox. Browser extensions and non-standard settings make you stand out from others on the Tor network, thus making your browser easier to [fingerprint](https://support.torproject.org/glossary/browser-fingerprinting).
+
+The Tor Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting, or identifying you based on your browser configuration. Therefore, it is imperative that you do **not** modify the browser beyond the default [security levels](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/).
+
+### Orbot
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Orbot** is a free Tor VPN for smartphones which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/orbot/id1609461599)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+
+For resistance against traffic analysis attacks, consider enabling *Isolate Destination Address* in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Connectivity**. This will use a completely different Tor Circuit (different middle relay and exit nodes) for every domain you connect to.
+
+!!! tip "Tips for Android"
+
+ Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN killswitch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+ Orbot is often outdated on the Guardian Project's [F-Droid repository](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android), so consider downloading directly from the [GitHub repository](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases) instead.
+
+ All versions are signed using the same signature so they should be compatible with each other.
+
+## Relays and Bridges
+
+### Snowflake
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.
+
+ People who are censored can use Snowflake proxies to connect to the Tor network. Snowflake is a great way to contribute to the network even if you don't have the technical know-how to run a Tor relay or bridge.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://snowflake.torproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/wikis/Technical%20Overview){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/snowflake.git/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/torproject-snowflake/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/snowflake/mafpmfcccpbjnhfhjnllmmalhifmlcie)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://snowflake.torproject.org/embed "Leave this page open to be a Snowflake proxy")
+
+??? tip "Embedded Snowflake"
+
+ You can enable Snowflake in your browser by clicking the switch below and ==leaving this page open==. You can also install Snowflake as a browser extension to have it always run while your browser is open, however adding third-party extensions can increase your attack surface.
+
+
+ If the embed does not appear for you, ensure you are not blocking the third-party frame from `torproject.org`. Alternatively, visit [this page](https://snowflake.torproject.org/embed.html).
+
+Snowflake does not increase your privacy in any way, nor is it used to connect to the Tor network within your personal browser. However, if your internet connection is uncensored, you should consider running it to help people in censored networks achieve better privacy themselves. There is no need to worry about which websites people are accessing through your proxy—their visible browsing IP address will match their Tor exit node, not yours.
+
+Running a Snowflake proxy is low-risk, even moreso than running a Tor relay or bridge which are already not particularly risky endeavours. However, it does still proxy traffic through your network which can be impactful in some ways, especially if your network is bandwidth-limited. Make sure you understand [how Snowflake works](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/wikis/home) before deciding whether to run a proxy.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/video-streaming.md b/i18n/bn/video-streaming.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..993ccc678
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/video-streaming.md
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+---
+title: "Video Streaming"
+icon: material/video-wireless
+---
+
+The primary threat when using a video streaming platform is that your streaming habits and subscription lists could be used to profile you. You should combine these tools with a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) to make it harder to profile your usage.
+
+## LBRY
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **The LBRY network** is a decentralized video sharing network. It uses a [BitTorrent](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent)-like network to store the video content, and a [blockchain](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockchain) to store the indexes for those videos. The main benefit of this design is censorship resistance.
+
+ **The LBRY desktop client** helps you stream videos from the LBRY network and stores your subscription list in your own LBRY wallet.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://lbry.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://lbry.com/privacypolicy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://lbry.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/lbryio/lbry-desktop){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://lbry.com/windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://lbry.com/osx)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://lbry.com/linux)
+
+!!! note
+
+ Only the **LBRY desktop client** is recommended, as the [Odysee](https://odysee.com) website and the LBRY clients in F-Droid, Play Store, and the App Store have mandatory synchronization and telemetry.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ While watching and hosting videos, your IP address is visible to the LBRY network. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+We recommend **against** synchronizing your wallet with LBRY Inc., as synchronizing encrypted wallets is not supported yet. If you synchronize your wallet with LBRY Inc., you have to trust them to not look at your subscription list, [LBC](https://lbry.com/faq/earn-credits) funds, or take control of your channel.
+
+You can disable *Save hosting data to help the LBRY network* option in :gear: **Settings** → **Advanced Settings**, to avoid exposing your IP address and watched videos when using LBRY for a prolonged period of time.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must not require a centralized account to view videos.
+ - Decentralized authentication, such as via a mobile wallet's private key is acceptable.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/bn/vpn.md b/i18n/bn/vpn.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b5d2a6a17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/bn/vpn.md
@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+---
+title: "VPN Services"
+icon: material/vpn
+---
+
+Find a no-logging VPN operator who isn’t out to sell or read your web traffic.
+
+??? danger "VPNs do not provide anonymity"
+
+ Using a VPN will **not** keep your browsing habits anonymous, nor will it add additional security to non-secure (HTTP) traffic.
+
+ If you are looking for **anonymity**, you should use the Tor Browser **instead** of a VPN.
+
+ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connecting to websites using HTTPS. A VPN is not a replacement for good security practices.
+
+ [Download Tor](https://www.torproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Tor Myths & FAQ](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
+
+??? question "When are VPNs useful?"
+
+ If you're looking for additional **privacy** from your ISP, on a public Wi-Fi network, or while torrenting files, a VPN may be the solution for you as long as you understand the risks involved.
+
+ [More Info](basics/vpn-overview.md){ .md-button }
+
+## Recommended Providers
+
+!!! abstract "Criteria"
+
+ Our recommended providers use encryption, accept Monero, support WireGuard & OpenVPN, and have a no logging policy. Read our [full list of criteria](#our-criteria) for more information.
+
+### Proton VPN
+
+!!! recommendation annotate
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton VPN** is a strong contender in the VPN space, and they have been in operation since 2016. Proton AG is based in Switzerland and offers a limited free tier, as well as a more featured premium option.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://protonvpn.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://protonvpn.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://protonvpn.com/support/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonVPN){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonvpn.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id1437005085)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonVPN/android-app/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://protonvpn.com/download-windows)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://protonvpn.com/support/linux-vpn-setup/)
+
+??? success annotate "67 Countries"
+
+ Proton VPN has [servers in 67 countries](https://protonvpn.com/vpn-servers) (1). Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
+
+ We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if they use [dedicated servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), instead of cheaper shared solutions (with other customers) such as [virtual private servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
+
+1. Last checked: 2022-09-16
+
+??? success "Independently Audited"
+
+ As of January 2020, Proton VPN has undergone an independent audit by SEC Consult. SEC Consult found some medium and low risk vulnerabilities in Proton VPN's Windows, Android, and iOS applications, all of which were "properly fixed" by Proton VPN before the reports were published. None of the issues identified would have provided an attacker remote access to your device or traffic. You can view individual reports for each platform at [protonvpn.com](https://protonvpn.com/blog/open-source/). In April 2022 Proton VPN underwent [another audit](https://protonvpn.com/blog/no-logs-audit/) and the report was [produced by Securitum](https://protonvpn.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/securitum-protonvpn-nologs-20220330.pdf). A [letter of attestation](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps) was provided for Proton VPN's apps on 9th November 2021 by [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com).
+
+??? success "Open-Source Clients"
+
+ Proton VPN provides the source code for their desktop and mobile clients in their [GitHub organization](https://github.com/ProtonVPN).
+
+??? success "Accepts Cash"
+
+ Proton VPN, in addition to accepting credit/debit cards and PayPal, accepts Bitcoin, and **cash/local currency** as anonymous forms of payment.
+
+??? success "WireGuard Support"
+
+ Proton VPN mostly supports the WireGuard® protocol. [WireGuard](https://www.wireguard.com) is a newer protocol that uses state-of-the-art [cryptography](https://www.wireguard.com/protocol/). Additionally, WireGuard aims to be simpler and more performant.
+
+ Proton VPN [recommends](https://protonvpn.com/blog/wireguard/) the use of WireGuard with their service. On Proton VPN's Windows, macOS, iOS, Android, ChromeOS, and Android TV apps, WireGuard is the default protocol; however, [support](https://protonvpn.com/support/how-to-change-vpn-protocols/) for the protocol is not present in their Linux app.
+
+??? warning "Remote Port Forwarding"
+
+ Proton VPN currently only supports remote [port forwarding](https://protonvpn.com/support/port-forwarding/) on Windows, which may impact some applications. Especially Peer-to-peer applications like Torrent clients.
+
+??? success "Mobile Clients"
+
+ In addition to providing standard OpenVPN configuration files, Proton VPN has mobile clients for [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/protonvpn-fast-secure-vpn/id1437005085), [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonvpn.android&hl=en_US), and [GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonVPN/android-app/releases) allowing for easy connections to their servers.
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ Proton VPN clients support two factor authentication on all platforms except Linux at the moment. Proton VPN has their own servers and datacenters in Switzerland, Iceland and Sweden. They offer adblocking and known malware domains blocking with their DNS service. Additionally, Proton VPN also offers "Tor" servers allowing you to easily connect to onion sites, but we still strongly recommend using [the official Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) for this purpose.
+
+!!! danger "Killswitch feature is broken on Intel-based Macs"
+
+ System crashes [may occur](https://protonvpn.com/support/macos-t2-chip-kill-switch/) on Intel-based Macs when using the VPN killswitch. If you require this feature, and you are using a Mac with Intel chipset, you should consider using another VPN service.
+
+### IVPN
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **IVPN** is another premium VPN provider, and they have been in operation since 2009. IVPN is based in Gibraltar.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.ivpn.net/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.ivpn.net/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/general/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ivpn){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-android/)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/ivpn-serious-privacy-protection/id1193122683)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-windows/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-macos/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-linux/)
+
+??? success annotate "35 Countries"
+
+ IVPN has [servers in 35 countries](https://www.ivpn.net/server-locations) (1). Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
+
+ We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if they use [dedicated servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), instead of cheaper shared solutions (with other customers) such as [virtual private servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
+
+1. Last checked: 2022-09-16
+
+??? success "Independently Audited"
+
+ IVPN has undergone a [no-logging audit from Cure53](https://cure53.de/audit-report_ivpn.pdf) which concluded in agreement with IVPN's no-logging claim. IVPN has also completed a [comprehensive pentest report Cure53](https://cure53.de/summary-report_ivpn_2019.pdf) in January 2020. IVPN has also said they plan to have [annual reports](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/independent-security-audit-concluded) in the future. A further review was conducted [in April 2022](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/ivpn-apps-security-audit-2022-concluded/) and was produced by Cure53 [on their website](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_IVPN_2022.pdf).
+
+??? success "Open-Source Clients"
+
+ As of February 2020 [IVPN applications are now open-source](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/ivpn-applications-are-now-open-source). Source code can be obtained from their [GitHub organization](https://github.com/ivpn).
+
+??? success "Accepts Cash and Monero"
+
+ In addition to accepting credit/debit cards and PayPal, IVPN accepts Bitcoin, **Monero** and **cash/local currency** (on annual plans) as anonymous forms of payment.
+
+??? success "WireGuard Support"
+
+ IVPN supports the WireGuard® protocol. [WireGuard](https://www.wireguard.com) is a newer protocol that uses state-of-the-art [cryptography](https://www.wireguard.com/protocol/). Additionally, WireGuard aims to be simpler and more performant.
+
+ IVPN [recommends](https://www.ivpn.net/wireguard/) the use of WireGuard with their service and, as such, the protocol is the default on all of IVPN's apps. IVPN also offers a WireGuard configuration generator for use with the official WireGuard [apps](https://www.wireguard.com/install/).
+
+??? success "Remote Port Forwarding"
+
+ Remote [port forwarding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_forwarding) is possible with a Pro plan. Port forwarding [can be activated](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/81/How-do-I-activate-port-forwarding.html) via the client area. Port forwarding is only available on IVPN when using WireGuard or OpenVPN protocols and is [disabled on US servers](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/116/Port-forwarding-is-not-working-why.html).
+
+??? success "Mobile Clients"
+
+ In addition to providing standard OpenVPN configuration files, IVPN has mobile clients for [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/ivpn-serious-privacy-protection/id1193122683), [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.ivpn.client), and [GitHub](https://github.com/ivpn/android-app/releases) allowing for easy connections to their servers.
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ IVPN clients support two factor authentication (Mullvad's clients do not). IVPN also provides "[AntiTracker](https://www.ivpn.net/antitracker)" functionality, which blocks advertising networks and trackers from the network level.
+
+### Mullvad
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mullvad** is a fast and inexpensive VPN with a serious focus on transparency and security. They have been in operation since **2009**. Mullvad is based in Sweden and does not have a free trial.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mullvad.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://o54hon2e2vj6c7m3aqqu6uyece65by3vgoxxhlqlsvkmacw6a7m7kiad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/privacy-policy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mullvad){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.mullvad.mullvadvpn)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/mullvad-vpn/id1488466513)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://mullvad.net/en/download/windows/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://mullvad.net/en/download/macos/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://mullvad.net/en/download/linux/)
+
+??? success annotate "41 Countries"
+
+ Mullvad has [servers in 41 countries](https://mullvad.net/servers/) (1). Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
+
+ We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if they use [dedicated servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), instead of cheaper shared solutions (with other customers) such as [virtual private servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
+
+1. Last checked: 2023-01-19
+
+??? success "Independently Audited"
+
+ Mullvad's VPN clients have been audited by Cure53 and Assured AB in a pentest report [published at cure53.de](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_v2.pdf). The security researchers concluded:
+
+ > Cure53 and Assured AB are happy with the results of the audit and the software leaves an overall positive impression. With security dedication of the in-house team at the Mullvad VPN compound, the testers have no doubts about the project being on the right track from a security standpoint.
+
+ In 2020 a second audit [was announced](https://mullvad.net/blog/2020/6/25/results-available-audit-mullvad-app/) and the [final audit report](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_2020_v2.pdf) was made available on Cure53's website:
+
+ > The results of this May-June 2020 project targeting the Mullvad complex are quite positive. [...] The overall application ecosystem used by Mullvad leaves a sound and structured impression. The overall structure of the application makes it easy to roll out patches and fixes in a structured manner. More than anything, the findings spotted by Cure53 showcase the importance of constantly auditing and re-assessing the current leak vectors, in order to always ensure privacy of the end-users. With that being said, Mullvad does a great job protecting the end-user from common PII leaks and privacy related risks.
+
+ In 2021 an infrastructure audit [was announced](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2021/1/20/no-pii-or-privacy-leaks-found-cure53s-infrastructure-audit/) and the [final audit report](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_2021_v1.pdf) was made available on Cure53's website. Another report was commissioned [in June 2022](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2022/6/22/vpn-server-audit-found-no-information-leakage-or-logging-of-customer-data/) and is available on [Assured's website](https://www.assured.se/publications/Assured_Mullvad_relay_server_audit_report_2022.pdf).
+
+??? success "Open-Source Clients"
+
+ Mullvad provides the source code for their desktop and mobile clients in their [GitHub organization](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app).
+
+??? success "Accepts Cash and Monero"
+
+ Mullvad, in addition to accepting credit/debit cards and PayPal, accepts Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, **Monero** and **cash/local currency** as anonymous forms of payment. They also accept Swish and bank wire transfers.
+
+??? success "WireGuard Support"
+
+ Mullvad supports the WireGuard® protocol. [WireGuard](https://www.wireguard.com) is a newer protocol that uses state-of-the-art [cryptography](https://www.wireguard.com/protocol/). Additionally, WireGuard aims to be simpler and more performant.
+
+ Mullvad [recommends](https://mullvad.net/en/help/why-wireguard/) the use of WireGuard with their service. It is the default or only protocol on Mullvad's Android, iOS, macOS, and Linux apps, but on Windows you have to [manually enable](https://mullvad.net/en/help/how-turn-wireguard-mullvad-app/) WireGuard. Mullvad also offers a WireGuard configuration generator for use with the official WireGuard [apps](https://www.wireguard.com/install/).
+
+??? success "IPv6 Support"
+
+ Mullvad supports the future of networking [IPv6](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv6). Their network allows you to [access services hosted on IPv6](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2014/9/15/ipv6-support/) as opposed to other providers who block IPv6 connections.
+
+??? success "Remote Port Forwarding"
+
+ Remote [port forwarding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_forwarding) is allowed for people who make one-time payments, but not allowed for accounts with a recurring/subscription-based payment method. This is to prevent Mullvad from being able to identify you based on your port usage and stored subscription information. See [Port forwarding with Mullvad VPN](https://mullvad.net/help/port-forwarding-and-mullvad/) for more information.
+
+??? success "Mobile Clients"
+
+ Mullvad has published [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/mullvad-vpn/id1488466513) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.mullvad.mullvadvpn) clients, both supporting an easy-to-use interface as opposed to requiring you to manually configure your WireGuard connection. The Android client is also available on [GitHub](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/releases).
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ Mullvad is very transparent about which nodes they [own or rent](https://mullvad.net/en/servers/). They use [ShadowSocks](https://shadowsocks.org/) in their ShadowSocks + OpenVPN configuration, making them more resistant against firewalls with [Deep Packet Inspection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection) trying to block VPNs. Supposedly, [China has to use a different method to block ShadowSocks servers](https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/22). Mullvad's website is also accessible via Tor at [o54hon2e2vj6c7m3aqqu6uyece65by3vgoxxhlqlsvkmacw6a7m7kiad.onion](http://o54hon2e2vj6c7m3aqqu6uyece65by3vgoxxhlqlsvkmacw6a7m7kiad.onion).
+
+## Criteria
+
+!!! danger
+
+ It is important to note that using a VPN provider will not make you anonymous, but it will give you better privacy in certain situations. A VPN is not a tool for illegal activities. Don't rely on a "no log" policy.
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the providers we recommend. This allows us to provide completely objective recommendations.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements for any VPN provider wishing to be recommended, including strong encryption, independent security audits, modern technology, and more. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing a VPN provider, and conduct your own research to ensure the VPN provider you choose is as trustworthy as possible.
+
+### Technology
+
+We require all our recommended VPN providers to provide OpenVPN configuration files to be used in any client. **If** a VPN provides their own custom client, we require a killswitch to block network data leaks when disconnected.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Support for strong protocols such as WireGuard & OpenVPN.
+- Killswitch built in to clients.
+- Multihop support. Multihopping is important to keep data private in case of a single node compromise.
+- If VPN clients are provided, they should be [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_source), like the VPN software they generally have built into them. We believe that [source code](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Source_code) availability provides greater transparency about what your device is actually doing.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- WireGuard and OpenVPN support.
+- Killswitch with highly configurable options (enable/disable on certain networks, on boot, etc.)
+- Easy-to-use VPN clients
+- Supports [IPv6](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv6). We expect that servers will allow incoming connections via IPv6 and allow you to access services hosted on IPv6 addresses.
+- Capability of [remote port forwarding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_forwarding#Remote_port_forwarding) assists in creating connections when using P2P ([Peer-to-Peer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer-to-peer)) file sharing software or hosting a server (e.g., Mumble).
+
+### Privacy
+
+We prefer our recommended providers to collect as little data as possible. Not collecting personal information on registration, and accepting anonymous forms of payment are required.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Monero or cash payment option.
+- No personal information required to register: Only username, password, and email at most.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Accepts Monero, cash, and other forms of anonymous payment options (gift cards, etc.)
+- No personal information accepted (autogenerated username, no email required, etc.)
+
+### Security
+
+A VPN is pointless if it can't even provide adequate security. We require all our recommended providers to abide by current security standards for their OpenVPN connections. Ideally, they would use more future-proof encryption schemes by default. We also require an independent third-party to audit the provider's security, ideally in a very comprehensive manner and on a repeated (yearly) basis.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Strong Encryption Schemes: OpenVPN with SHA-256 authentication; RSA-2048 or better handshake; AES-256-GCM or AES-256-CBC data encryption.
+- Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).
+- Published security audits from a reputable third-party firm.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Strongest Encryption: RSA-4096.
+- Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).
+- Comprehensive published security audits from a reputable third-party firm.
+- Bug-bounty programs and/or a coordinated vulnerability-disclosure process.
+
+### Trust
+
+You wouldn't trust your finances to someone with a fake identity, so why trust them with your internet data? We require our recommended providers to be public about their ownership or leadership. We also would like to see frequent transparency reports, especially in regard to how government requests are handled.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership or ownership.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership.
+- Frequent transparency reports.
+
+### Marketing
+
+With the VPN providers we recommend we like to see responsible marketing.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Must self-host analytics (i.e., no Google Analytics). The provider's site must also comply with [DNT (Do Not Track)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Do_Not_Track) for people who want to opt-out.
+
+Must not have any marketing which is irresponsible:
+
+- Making guarantees of protecting anonymity 100%. When someone makes a claim that something is 100% it means there is no certainty for failure. We know people can quite easily deanonymize themselves in a number of ways, e.g.:
+ - Reusing personal information (e.g., email accounts, unique pseudonyms, etc) that they accessed without anonymity software (Tor, VPN, etc.)
+ - [Browser fingerprinting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint)
+- Claim that a single circuit VPN is "more anonymous" than Tor, which is a circuit of three or more hops that regularly changes.
+- Use responsible language: i.e., it is okay to say that a VPN is "disconnected" or "not connected", however claiming that someone is "exposed", "vulnerable" or "compromised" is needless use of alarming language that may be incorrect. For example, that person might simply be on another VPN provider's service or using Tor.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+Responsible marketing that is both educational and useful to the consumer could include:
+
+- An accurate comparison to when [Tor](tor.md) should be used instead.
+- Availability of the VPN provider's website over a [.onion service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.onion)
+
+### Additional Functionality
+
+While not strictly requirements, there are some factors we looked into when determining which providers to recommend. These include adblocking/tracker-blocking functionality, warrant canaries, multihop connections, excellent customer support, the number of allowed simultaneous connections, etc.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.bn.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/404.md b/i18n/de/404.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cf586962c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/404.md
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+---
+hide:
+ - feedback
+---
+
+# 404 - Seite nicht gefunden
+
+Wir konnten die Seite, nach der du gesucht hast, nicht finden! Vielleicht hast du nach einer dieser Seiten gesucht?
+
+- [Einführung in die Bedrohungsmodellierung](basics/threat-modeling.md)
+- [Empfohlene DNS-Anbieter](dns.md)
+- [Beste Desktop-Webbrowser](desktop-browsers.md)
+- [Beste VPN-Anbieter](vpn.md)
+- [Privacy Guides Forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net)
+- [Unser Blog](https://blog.privacyguides.org)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md b/i18n/de/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..88a0e9100
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# Community Code of Conduct
+
+**We pledge** to make our community a harassment-free experience for everyone.
+
+**We strive** to create a positive environment, using welcoming and inclusive language, and being respectful of the viewpoints of others.
+
+**We do not allow** inappropriate or otherwise unacceptable behavior, such as sexualized language, trolling and insulting comments, or otherwise promoting intolerance or harassment.
+
+## Community Standards
+
+What we expect from members of our communities:
+
+1. **Don't spread misinformation**
+
+ We are creating an evidence-based educational community around information privacy and security, not a home for conspiracy theories. For example, when making a claim that a certain piece of software is malicious or that certain telemetry data is privacy invasive, explain in detail what is collected and how it collected. Claims of this nature must be backed by technical evidence.
+
+1. **Don't abuse our willingness to help**
+
+ Our community members are not your free tech support. We are happy to help you with specific steps on your privacy journey if you are willing to put in effort on your end. We are not willing to answer endlessly repeated questions about generic computer problems you could have answered yourself with a 30-second internet search. Don't be a [help vampire](https://slash7.com/2006/12/22/vampires/).
+
+1. **Behave in a positive and constructive manner**
+
+ Examples of behavior that contributes to a positive environment for our community include:
+
+ - Demonstrating empathy and kindness toward other people
+ - Being respectful of differing opinions, viewpoints, and experiences
+ - Giving and gracefully accepting constructive feedback
+ - Accepting responsibility and apologizing to those affected by our mistakes, and learning from the experience
+ - Focusing on what is best not just for us as individuals, but for the overall community
+
+### Unacceptable Behavior
+
+The following behaviors are considered harassment and are unacceptable within our community:
+
+- The use of sexualized language or imagery, and sexual attention or advances of any kind
+- Trolling, insulting or derogatory comments, and personal or political attacks
+- Public or private harassment
+- Publishing others' private information, such as a physical or email address, without their explicit permission
+- Other conduct which could reasonably be considered inappropriate in a professional setting
+
+## Scope
+
+Our Code of Conduct applies within all project spaces, as well as when an individual is representing the Privacy Guides project in other communities.
+
+We are responsible for clarifying the standards of our community, and have the right to remove or alter the comments of those participating within our community, as necessary and at our discretion.
+
+### Contact
+
+If you observe a problem on a platform like Matrix or Reddit, please contact our moderators on that platform in chat, via DM, or through any designated "Modmail" system.
+
+If you have a problem elsewhere, or a problem our community moderators are unable to resolve, reach out to `jonah@privacyguides.org` and/or `dngray@privacyguides.org`.
+
+All community leaders are obligated to respect the privacy and security of the reporter of any incident.
diff --git a/i18n/de/about/criteria.md b/i18n/de/about/criteria.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f27f1e2b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/about/criteria.md
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+---
+title: Allgemeine Kriterien
+---
+
+!!! example "Work in Progress"
+
+ Die folgende Seite ist in Arbeit und spiegelt zum aktuell noch nicht die vollständigen Kriterien für unsere Empfehlungen wider. Frühere Diskussion zu diesem Thema: [#24](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/discussions/24)
+
+Nachfolgend sind einige Punkte aufgeführt, die für alle Einsendungen an Privacy Guides zutreffen müssen. Für jede Kategorie gelten zusätzliche Anforderungen für die Aufnahme.
+
+## Finanz-Offenlegung
+
+Wir verdienen kein Geld mit Empfehlungen bestimmter Produkte, wir verwenden keine Affiliate-Links, und wir gewähren keine besondere Gegenleistung für Projektspender.
+
+## Allgemeine Richtlinien
+
+Wir wenden diese Prioritäten beim Prüfen neuer Empfehlungen an:
+
+- **Sicher**: Tools sollten, wo möglich, bewährte Sicherheitspraktiken anwenden.
+- **Verfügbarkeit der Quellen**: Open-Source-Projekte werden meist gegenüber gleichwertigen proprietären Alternativen bevorzugt.
+- **Plattformübergreifend**: Wir bevorzugen Empfehlungen die plattformübergreifend sind, um eine Herstellerbindung zu vermeiden.
+- **Aktive Entwicklung**: Die von uns empfohlenen Tools sollten aktiv weiterentwickelt werden, nicht gewartete Projekte werden in den meisten Fällen entfernt.
+- **Benutzerfreundlichkeit**: Die Tools sollten für die meisten Computerbenutzer zugänglich sein, ein übermäßig technischer Hintergrund sollte nicht erforderlich sein.
+- **Dokumentiert**: Die Werkzeuge sollten über eine klare und ausführliche Dokumentation zum Gebrauch verfügen.
+
+## Selbsteinreichungen von Entwicklern
+
+Wir haben diese Anforderungen an Entwickler, die eigene Projekt oder Software zur Prüfung einreichen möchten.
+
+- Muss die Zugehörigkeit offenlegen, d.h. deine Position innerhalb des eingereichten Projekts.
+
+- Muss ein Sicherheits-Whitepaper haben, wenn es sich um ein Projekt handelt, das den Umgang mit sensiblen Informationen beinhaltet, wie z. B. Messenger, Passwort-Manager, verschlüsselte Cloud-Speicherung usw.
+ - Status der Prüfung durch Dritte. Wir möchten wissen, ob eine vorhanden oder geplant ist. Wenn möglich, gib bitte an, wer die Prüfung durchführen wird.
+
+- Muss erklären, was das Projekt im Hinblick auf den Schutz der Privatsphäre bietet.
+ - Löst es ein neues Problem?
+ - Warum sollte jemand es den Alternativen vorziehen?
+
+- Must state what the exact threat model is with their project.
+ - Den potenziellen Nutzern sollte klar sein, was das Projekt bieten kann und was nicht.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/about/donate.md b/i18n/de/about/donate.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..462e3730b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/about/donate.md
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+---
+title: Uns unterstützen
+---
+
+
+Es braucht eine Menge [Leute](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors) und [Arbeit](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/pulse/monthly) um die Privacy Guides auf dem neuesten Stand zu halten und Wissen über Datenschutz und Massenüberwachung zu verbreiten. Wenn dir gefällt, was wir tun, kannst du dich beteiligen, indem du [die Website bearbeitest](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org) oder [Übersetzungen](https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides) beisteuerst.
+
+If you want to support us financially, the most convenient method for us is contributing via Open Collective, a website operated by our fiscal host. Open Collective akzeptiert Zahlungen per Kredit-/Debitkarte, PayPal und Banküberweisung.
+
+[Auf OpenCollective.com spenden](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/donate ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+Spenden, die direkt über Open Collective gemacht werden, sind in den USA in der Regel steuerlich absetzbar, da unser steuerlicher Träger (die Open Collective Foundation) eine eingetragene 501(c)3 Organisation ist. Nach deiner Spende erhältst du eine Spendenbescheinigung von der Open Collective Foundation. Privacy Guides bietet keine Finanzberatung an, und Sie sollten sich an Ihren Steuerberater wenden, um herauszufinden, ob dies auf Sie zutrifft.
+
+Wenn du bereits GitHub-Sponsoring verwendest, kannst du unsere Organisation auch dort unterstützen.
+
+[Sponsor uns auf GitHub](https://github.com/sponsors/privacyguides ""){.md-button}
+
+## Unterstützer/-innen
+
+Ein besonderer Dank geht an alle, die unsere Mission unterstützen! :heart:
+
+*Bitte beachten Sie: Dieser Abschnitt lädt ein Widget direkt von Open Collective. This section does not reflect donations made outside of Open Collective, and we have no control over the specific donors featured in this section.*
+
+
+
+## How We Use Donations
+
+Privacy Guides is a **non-profit** organization. We use donations for a variety of purposes, including:
+
+**Domain Registrations**
+:
+
+We have a few domain names like `privacyguides.org` which cost us around $10 yearly to maintain their registration.
+
+**Web Hosting**
+:
+
+Traffic to this website uses hundreds of gigabytes of data per month, we use a variety of service providers to keep up with this traffic.
+
+**Online Services**
+:
+
+We host [internet services](https://privacyguides.net) for testing and showcasing different privacy-products we like and [recommend](../tools.md). Some of which are made publicly available for our community's use (SearXNG, Tor, etc.), and some are provided for our team members (email, etc.).
+
+**Product Purchases**
+:
+
+We occasionally purchase products and services for the purposes of testing our [recommended tools](../tools.md).
+
+We are still working with our fiscal host (the Open Collective Foundation) to receive cryptocurrency donations, at the moment the accounting is unfeasible for many smaller transactions, but this should change in the future. In the meantime, if you wish to make a sizable (> $100) cryptocurrency donation, please reach out to [jonah@privacyguides.org](mailto:jonah@privacyguides.org).
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/about/index.md b/i18n/de/about/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7b21da87a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/about/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: "Über Privacy Guides"
+---
+
+**Privacy Guides** ist ein sozial motivierte Website, die Informationen zum Schutz deiner Datensicherheit und Privatsphäre bereitstellt. Wir sind ein gemeinnütziges Kollektiv, welches ausschließlich von freiwilligen [Teammitgliedern](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/g/team) und Mitwirkenden betrieben wird.
+
+[:material-hand-coin-outline: Unterstütze das Projekts](donate.md ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+## Unser Team
+
+??? person "@jonah"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/jonah)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/jonaharagon "@jonaharagon")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@jonah "@jonah@neat.computer"){rel=me}
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Webseite](https://www.jonaharagon.com)
+
+??? person "@niek-de-wilde"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/Niek-de-Wilde)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/blacklight447 "@blacklight447")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.social/@blacklight447 "@blacklight447@mastodon.social"){rel=me}
+
+??? person "@dngray"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/dngray)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/dngray "@dngray")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.social/@dngray "@dngray@mastodon.social"){rel=me}
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-envelope: E-Mail](mailto:dngray@privacyguides.org)
+
+??? person "@freddy"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/freddy)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/freddy-m "@freddy-m")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://social.lol/@freddy "@freddy@social.lol"){rel=me}
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-envelope: E-Mail](mailto:freddy@privacyguides.org)
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Webseite](https://freddy.omg.lol)
+
+??? person "@mfwmyfacewhen"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/mfwmyfacewhen)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/mfwmyfacewhen "@mfwmyfacewhen")
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Webseite](https://mfw.omg.lol)
+
+??? person "@olivia"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/olivia)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/hook9 "@hook9")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@oliviablob "@oliviablob@neat.computer"){rel=me}
+
+Darüber hinaus haben [viele Menschen](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors) Beiträge zu dem Projekt geleistet. Du kannst das auch, wir sind Open Source auf GitHub!
+
+Unsere Teammitglieder überprüfen alle Änderungen, die an der Website vorgenommen werden, und kümmern sich um administrative Aufgaben wie Webhosting und Finanzen, allerdings profitieren sie nicht persönlich von den Beiträgen, die zu dieser Website geleistet werden. Our financials are transparently hosted by the Open Collective Foundation 501(c)(3) at [opencollective.com/privacyguides](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides). Donations to Privacy Guides are generally tax deductible in the United States.
+
+## Site License
+
+*The following is a human-readable summary of (and not a substitute for) the [license](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE):*
+
+:fontawesome-brands-creative-commons: :fontawesome-brands-creative-commons-by: :fontawesome-brands-creative-commons-nd: Unless otherwise noted, the original content on this website is made available under the [Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE). This means that you are free to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format for any purpose, even commercially; as long as you give appropriate credit to `Privacy Guides (www.privacyguides.org)` and provide a link to the license. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests Privacy Guides endorses you or your use. If you remix, transform, or build upon the content of this website, you may not distribute the modified material.
+
+This license is in place to prevent people from sharing our work without giving proper credit, and to prevent people from modifying our work in a way that could be used to mislead people. If you find the terms of this license too restrictive for the project you're working on, please reach out to us at `jonah@privacyguides.org`. We are happy to provide alternative licensing options for well-intentioned projects in the privacy space!
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/about/notices.md b/i18n/de/about/notices.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6b626371f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/about/notices.md
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+---
+title: "Notices and Disclaimers"
+hide:
+ - toc
+---
+
+## Legal Disclaimer
+
+Privacy Guides is not a law firm. As such, the Privacy Guides website and contributors are not providing legal advice. The material and recommendations in our website and guides do not constitute legal advice nor does contributing to the website or communicating with Privacy Guides or other contributors about our website create an attorney-client relationship.
+
+Running this website, like any human endeavor, involves uncertainty and trade-offs. We hope this website helps, but it may include mistakes and can’t address every situation. If you have any questions about your situation, we encourage you to do your own research, seek out other experts, and engage in discussions with the Privacy Guides community. If you have any legal questions, you should consult with your own legal counsel before moving forward.
+
+Privacy Guides is an open source project contributed to under licenses that include terms that, for the protection of the website and its contributors, make clear that the Privacy Guides project and website is offered "as-is", without warranty, and disclaiming liability for damages resulting from using the website or any recommendations contained within. Privacy Guides does not warrant or make any representations concerning the accuracy, likely results, or reliability of the use of the materials on the website or otherwise relating to such materials on the website or on any third-party sites linked on this site.
+
+Privacy Guides additionally does not warrant that this website will be constantly available, or available at all.
+
+## Licenses
+
+Unless otherwise noted, all content on this website is made available under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE).
+
+This does not include third-party code embedded in this repository, or code where a superseding license is otherwise noted. The following are notable examples, but this list may not be all-inclusive:
+
+* [MathJax](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/docs/assets/javascripts/mathjax.js) is licensed under the [Apache License 2.0](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/docs/assets/javascripts/LICENSE.mathjax.txt).
+
+Portions of this notice itself were adopted from [opensource.guide](https://github.com/github/opensource.guide/blob/master/notices.md) on GitHub. That resource and this page itself are released under [CC-BY-4.0](https://github.com/github/opensource.guide/blob/master/LICENSE).
+
+This means that you can use the human-readable content in this repository for your own project, per the terms outlined in the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License text. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests Privacy Guides endorses you or your use. You **may not** use the Privacy Guides branding in your own project without express approval from this project. Privacy Guides's brand trademarks include the "Privacy Guides" wordmark and shield logo.
+
+We believe that the logos and other images in `assets` obtained from third-party providers are either in the public domain or **fair use**. In a nutshell, legal [fair use doctrine](https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/more-info.html) allows the use of copyrighted images in order to identify the subject matter for purposes of public comment. However, these logos and other images may still be subject to trademark laws in one or more jurisdictions. Before using this content, please ensure that it is used to identify the entity or organization that owns the trademark and that you have the right to use it under the laws which apply in the circumstances of your intended use. *When copying content from this website, you are solely responsible for ensuring that you do not infringe someone else's trademark or copyright.*
+
+When you contribute to this repository you are doing so under the above licenses, and you are granting Privacy Guides a perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive, transferable, royalty-free, irrevocable license with the right to sublicense such rights through multiple tiers of sublicensees, to reproduce, modify, display, perform and distribute your contribution as part of our project.
+
+## Acceptable Use
+
+You may not use this website in any way that causes or may cause damage to the website or impairment of the availability or accessibility of Privacy Guides, or in any way which is unlawful, illegal, fraudulent, harmful, or in connection with any unlawful, illegal, fraudulent, or harmful purpose or activity.
+
+You must not conduct any systematic or automated data collection activities on or in relation to this website without express written consent, including:
+
+* Excessive Automated Scans
+* Denial of Service Attacks
+* Scraping
+* Data Mining
+* 'Framing' (IFrames)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/about/privacy-policy.md b/i18n/de/about/privacy-policy.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..27f28742a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/about/privacy-policy.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: "Privacy Policy"
+---
+
+Privacy Guides is a community project operated by a number of active volunteer contributors. The public list of team members [can be found on GitHub](https://github.com/orgs/privacyguides/people).
+
+## Data We Collect From Visitors
+
+The privacy of our website visitors is important to us, so we do not track any individual people. As a visitor to our website:
+
+- No personal information is collected
+- No information such as cookies are stored in the browser
+- No information is shared with, sent to or sold to third-parties
+- No information is shared with advertising companies
+- No information is mined and harvested for personal and behavioral trends
+- No information is monetized
+
+You can view the data we collect on our [statistics](statistics.md) page.
+
+We run a self-hosted installation of [Plausible Analytics](https://plausible.io) to collect some anonymous usage data for statistical purposes. The goal is to track overall trends in our website traffic, it is not to track individual visitors. All the data is in aggregate only. No personal data is collected.
+
+Data collected includes referral sources, top pages, visit duration, information from the devices (device type, operating system, country and browser) used during the visit and more. You can learn more about how Plausible works and collects information in a privacy-respecting manner [here](https://plausible.io/data-policy).
+
+## Data We Collect From Account Holders
+
+On some websites and services we provide, many features may require an account. For example, an account may be required to post and reply to topics on a forum platform.
+
+To sign up for most accounts, we will collect a name, username, email, and password. In the event a website requires more information than just that data, that will be clearly marked and noted in a separate privacy statement per-site.
+
+We use your account data to identify you on the website and to create pages specific to you, such as your profile page. We will also use your account data to publish a public profile for you on our services.
+
+We use your email to:
+
+- Notify you about posts and other activity on the websites or services.
+- Reset your password and help keep your account secure.
+- Contact you in special circumstances related to your account.
+- Contact you about legal requests, such as DMCA takedown requests.
+
+On some websites and services you may provide additional information for your account, such as a short biography, avatar, your location, or your birthday. We make that information available to everyone who can access the website or service in question. This information is not required to use any of our services and can be erased at any time.
+
+We will store your account data as long as your account remains open. After closing an account, we may retain some or all of your account data in the form of backups or archives for up to 90 days.
+
+## Contacting Us
+
+The Privacy Guides team generally does not have access to personal data outside of limited access granted via some moderation panels. Inquiries regarding your personal information should be sent directly to:
+
+```text
+Jonah Aragon
+Services Administrator
+jonah@privacyguides.org
+```
+
+For all other inquiries, you can contact any member of our team.
+
+For complaints under GDPR more generally, you may lodge complaints with your local data protection supervisory authorities. In France it's the Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés which take care and handle the complaints. They provide a [template of complaint letter](https://www.cnil.fr/en/plaintes) to use.
+
+## About This Policy
+
+We will post any new versions of this statement [here](privacy-policy.md). We may change how we announce changes in future versions of this document. In the meantime we may update our contact information at any time without announcing a change. Please refer to the [Privacy Policy](privacy-policy.md) for the latest contact information at any time.
+
+A full revision [history](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/commits/main/docs/about/privacy-policy.md) of this page can be found on GitHub.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/about/privacytools.md b/i18n/de/about/privacytools.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6161b3efd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/about/privacytools.md
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+---
+title: "PrivacyTools FAQ"
+---
+
+# Why we moved on from PrivacyTools
+
+In September 2021, every active contributor unanimously agreed to move from PrivacyTools to work on this site: Privacy Guides. This decision was made because PrivacyTools’ founder and controller of the domain name had disappeared for an extended period of time and could not be contacted.
+
+Having built a reputable site and set of services on PrivacyTools.io, this caused grave concerns for the future of PrivacyTools, as any future disruption could wipe out the entire organization with no recovery method. This transition was communicated to the PrivacyTools community many months in advance via a variety of channels including its blog, Twitter, Reddit, and Mastodon to ensure the entire process went as smoothly as possible. We did this to ensure nobody was kept in the dark, which has been our modus operandi since our team was created, and to make sure Privacy Guides was recognized as the same reliable organization that PrivacyTools was before the transition.
+
+After the organizational move was completed, the founder of PrivacyTools returned and began to spread misinformation about the Privacy Guides project. They continue to spread misinformation in addition to operating a paid link farm on the PrivacyTools domain. We are creating this page to clear up any misconceptions.
+
+## What is PrivacyTools?
+
+PrivacyTools was created in 2015 by "BurungHantu," who wanted to make a privacy information resource - helpful tools following the Snowden revelations. The site grew into a flourishing open-source project with [many contributors](https://github.com/privacytools/privacytools.io/graphs/contributors), some eventually given various organizational responsibilities, such as operating online services like Matrix and Mastodon, managing and reviewing changes to the site on GitHub, finding sponsors for the project, writing blog posts and operating social media outreach platforms like Twitter, etc.
+
+Beginning in 2019, BurungHantu grew more and more distant from the active development of the website and communities, and began delaying payments he was responsible for related to the servers we operated. To avoid having our system administrator pay server costs out of their own pocket, we changed the donation methods listed on the site from BurungHantu's personal PayPal and crypto accounts to a new OpenCollective page on [October 31, 2019](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184557/https://blog.privacytools.io/privacytools-io-joins-the-open-collective-foundation/). This had the added benefits of making our finances completely transparent, a value we strongly believe in, and tax-deductible in the United States, because they were being held by the Open Collective Foundation 501(c)3. This change was unanimously agreed upon by the team and went uncontested.
+
+## Why We Moved On
+
+In 2020, BurungHantu's absence grew much more noticeable. At one point, we required the domain's nameservers to be changed to nameservers controlled by our system administrator to avoid future disruption, and this change was not completed for over a month after the initial request. He would disappear from the public chat and private team chat rooms on Matrix for months at a time, occasionally popping in to give some small feedback or promise to be more active before disappearing once again.
+
+In October 2020, the PrivacyTools system administrator (Jonah) [left](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190742/https://blog.privacytools.io/blacklight447-taking-over/) the project because of these difficulties, handing control to another long-time contributor. Jonah had been operating nearly every PrivacyTools service and acting as the *de facto* project lead for website development in BurungHantu's absence, thus his departure was a significant change to the organization. At the time, because of these significant organizational changes, BurungHantu promised the remaining team he would return to take control of the project going forward. ==The PrivacyTools team reached out via several communication methods over the following months, but did not receive any response.==
+
+## Domain Name Reliance
+
+At the beginning of 2021, the PrivacyTools team grew worried about the future of the project, because the domain name was set to expire on 1st March 2021. The domain was ultimately renewed by BurungHantu with no comment.
+
+The team’s concerns were not addressed, and we realized this would be a problem every year: If the domain expired it would have allowed it to be stolen by squatters or spammers, thus ruining the organization's reputation. We also would have had trouble reaching the community to inform them of what took place.
+
+Without being in any contact with BurungHantu, we decided the best course of action would be to move to a new domain name while we still had guaranteed control over the old domain name, sometime before March 2022. This way, we would be able to cleanly redirect all PrivacyTools resources to the new site without any interruption in service. This decision was made many months in advance and communicated to the entire team in the hopes that BurungHantu would reach out and assure his continued support for the project, because with a recognizable brand name and large communities online, moving away from "PrivacyTools" was the least desirable possible outcome.
+
+In mid-2021 the PrivacyTools team reached out to Jonah, who agreed to rejoin the team to help with the transition.
+
+## Community Call to Action
+
+At the end of July 2021, we [informed](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184422/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-future-of-privacytools/) the PrivacyTools community of our intention to choose a new name and continue the project on a new domain, to be [chosen](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190935/https://aragon.cloud/apps/forms/cMPxG9KyopapBbcw) on 2nd August 2022. In the end, "Privacy Guides" was selected, with the `privacyguides.org` domain already owned by Jonah for a side-project from 2020 that went undeveloped.
+
+## Control of r/privacytoolsIO
+
+Simultaneously with the ongoing website issues at privacytools.io, the r/privacytoolsIO moderation team was facing challenges with managing the subreddit. The subreddit had always been operated mostly independently of the website's development, but BurungHantu was the primary moderator of the subreddit as well, and he was the only moderator granted "Full Control" privileges. u/trai_dep was the only active moderator at the time, and [posted](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/comments/o9tllh/requesting_rprivacytoolsio_im_only_active_mod_top/) a request to Reddit's administrators on June 28, 2021, asking to be granted the primary moderator position and full control privileges, in order to make necessary changes to the Subreddit.
+
+Reddit requires that subreddits have active moderators. If the primary moderator is inactive for a lengthy period of time (such as a year) the primary moderation position can be re-appointed to the next moderator in line. For this request to have been granted, BurungHantu had to have been completely absent from all Reddit activity for a long period of time, which was consistent with his behaviors on other platforms.
+
+> If you were removed as moderator from a subreddit through Reddit request it is because your lack of response and lack of activity qualified the subreddit for an r/redditrequest transfer.
+>
+> r/redditrequest is Reddit's way of making sure communities have active moderators and is part of the [Moderator Code of Conduct](https://www.redditinc.com/policies/moderator-code-of-conduct).
+
+## Beginning the Transition
+
+On September 14th, 2021, we [announced](https://www.privacyguides.org/blog/2021/09/14/welcome-to-privacy-guides/) the beginning of our migration to this new domain:
+
+> [...] we found it necessary to make this switch sooner rather than later to ensure people would find out about this transition as soon as possible. This gives us adequate time to transition the domain name, which is currently redirecting to www.privacyguides.org, and it hopefully gives everyone enough time to notice the change, update bookmarks and websites, etc.
+
+This change [entailed:](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pnhn4a/rprivacyguides_privacyguidesorg_what_you_need_to/)
+
+- Redirecting www.privacytools.io to [www.privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org).
+- Archiving the source code on GitHub to preserve our past work and issue tracker, which we continued to use for months of future development of this site.
+- Posting announcements to our subreddit and various other communities informing people of the official change.
+- Formally closing privacytools.io services, like Matrix and Mastodon, and encouraging existing users to migrate as soon as possible.
+
+Things appeared to be going smoothly, and most of our active community made the switch to our new project exactly as we hoped.
+
+## Following Events
+
+Roughly a week following the transition, BurungHantu returned online for the first time in nearly a year, however nobody on our team was willing to return to PrivacyTools because of his historic unreliability. Rather than apologize for his prolonged absence, he immediately went on the offensive and positioned the transition to Privacy Guides as an attack against him and his project. He subsequently [deleted](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/pp9yie/comment/hd49wbn) many of these posts when it was pointed out by the community that he had been absent and abandoned the project.
+
+At this point, BurungHantu claimed he wanted to continue working on privacytools.io on his own and requested that we remove the redirect from www.privacytools.io to [www.privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org). We obliged and requested that he keep the subdomains for Matrix, Mastodon, and PeerTube active for us to run as a public service to our community for at least a few months, in order to allow users on those platforms to easily migrate to other accounts. Due to the federated nature of the services we provided, they were tied to specific domain names making it very difficult to migrate (and in some cases impossible).
+
+Unfortunately, because control of the r/privacytoolsIO subreddit was not returned to BurungHantu at his demand (further information below), those subdomains were [cut off](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pymthv/comment/hexwrps/) at the beginning of October, ending any migration possibilities to any users still using those services.
+
+Following this, BurungHantu made false accusations about Jonah stealing donations from the project. BurungHantu had over a year since the alleged incident occurred, and yet he never made anyone aware of it until after the Privacy Guides migration. BurungHantu has been repeatedly asked for proof and to comment on the reason for his silence by the team [and the community](https://twitter.com/TommyTran732/status/1526153536962281474), and has not done so.
+
+BurungHantu also made a [twitter post](https://twitter.com/privacytoolsIO/status/1510560676967710728) alleging that an "attorney" had reached out to him on Twitter and was providing advice, in another attempt to bully us into giving him control of our subreddit, and as part of his smear campaign to muddy the waters surrounding the launch of Privacy Guides while pretending to be a victim.
+
+## PrivacyTools.io Now
+
+As of September 25th 2022 we are seeing BurungHantu's overall plans come to fruition on privacytools.io, and this is the very reason we decided to create this explainer page today. The website he is operating appears to be a heavily SEO-optimized version of the site which recommends tools in exchange for financial compensation. Very recently, IVPN and Mullvad, two VPN providers near-universally [recommended](../vpn.md) by the privacy community and notable for their stance against affiliate programs were removed from PrivacyTools. In their place? NordVPN, Surfshark, ExpressVPN, and hide.me; Giant VPN corporations with untrustworthy platforms and business practices, notorious for their aggressive marketing and affiliate programs.
+
+==**PrivacyTools has become exactly the type of site we [warned against](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729205249/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-reviews/) on the PrivacyTools blog in 2019.**== We've tried to keep our distance from PrivacyTools since the transition, but their continued harassment towards our project and now their absurd abuse of the credibility their brand gained over 6 years of open source contributions is extremely troubling to us. Those of us actually fighting for privacy are not fighting against each other, and are not getting our advice from the highest bidder.
+
+## r/privacytoolsIO Now
+
+After the launch of [r/PrivacyGuides](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacyguides), it was impractical for u/trai_dep to continue moderating both subreddits, and with the community on-board with the transition, r/privacytoolsIO was [made](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/qk7qrj/a_new_era_why_rptio_is_now_a_restricted_sub/) a restricted sub in a post on November 1st, 2021:
+
+> [...] The growth of this Sub was the result of great effort, across several years, by the PrivacyGuides.org team. And by every one of you.
+>
+> A Subreddit is a great deal of work to administer and moderate. Like a garden, it requires patient tending and daily care. It’s not a task for dilettantes or commitment-challenged people. It can’t thrive under a gardener who abandons it for several years, then shows up demanding this year’s harvest as their tribute. It’s unfair to the team formed years ago. It’s unfair to you. [...]
+
+Subreddits do not belong to anybody, and they especially do not belong to brand-holders. They belong to their communities, and the community and its moderators made the decision to support the move to r/PrivacyGuides.
+
+In the months since, BurungHantu has threatened and begged for returning subreddit control to his account in [violation](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/wiki/top_mod_removal/) of Reddit rules:
+
+> Retaliation from any moderator with regards to removal requests is disallowed.
+
+For a community with many thousands of remaining subscribers, we feel that it would be incredibly disrespectful to return control of that massive platform to the person who abandoned it for over a year, and who now operates a website that we feel provides very low-quality information. Preserving the years of past discussions in that community is more important to us, and thus u/trai_dep and the rest of the subreddit moderation team has made the decision to keep r/privacytoolsIO as-is.
+
+## OpenCollective Now
+
+Our fundraising platform, OpenCollective, is another source of contention. Our position is that OpenCollective was put in place by our team and managed by our team to fund services we currently operate and which PrivacyTools no longer does. We [reached out](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/updates/transitioning-to-privacy-guides) to all of our donors regarding our move to Privacy Guides, and we were unanimously supported by our sponsors and community.
+
+Thus, the funds in OpenCollective belong to Privacy Guides, they were given to our project, and not the owner of a well known domain name. In the announcement made to donors on September 17th, 2021, we offered refunds to any donor who disagrees with the stance we took, but nobody has taken us up on this offer:
+
+> If any sponsors or backers disagree with or feel misled by these recent events and would like to request a refund given these highly unusual circumstances, please get in touch with our project admin by emailing jonah@triplebit.net.
+
+## Further Reading
+
+This topic has been discussed extensively within our communities in various locations, and it seems likely that most people reading this page will already be familiar with the events leading up to the move to Privacy Guides. Some of our previous posts on the matter may have extra detail we omitted here for brevity. They have been linked below for the sake of completion.
+
+- [June 28, 2021 request for control of r/privacytoolsIO](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/comments/o9tllh/requesting_rprivacytoolsio_im_only_active_mod_top/)
+- [July 27, 2021 announcement of our intentions to move on the PrivacyTools blog, written by the team](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184422/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-future-of-privacytools/)
+- [Sept 13, 2021 announcement of the beginning of our transition to Privacy Guides on r/privacytoolsIO](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/pnql46/rprivacyguides_privacyguidesorg_what_you_need_to/)
+- [Sept 17, 2021 announcement on OpenCollective from Jonah](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/updates/transitioning-to-privacy-guides)
+- [Sept 30, 2021 Twitter thread detailing most of the events now described on this page](https://twitter.com/privacy_guides/status/1443633412800225280)
+- [Oct 1, 2021 post by u/dng99 noting subdomain failure](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pymthv/comment/hexwrps/)
+- [Apr 2, 2022 response by u/dng99 to PrivacyTools' accusatory blog post](https://www.reddit.com/comments/tuo7mm/comment/i35kw5a/)
+- [May 16, 2022 response by @TommyTran732 on Twitter](https://twitter.com/TommyTran732/status/1526153497984618496)
+- [Sep 3, 2022 post on Techlore's forum by @dngray](https://discuss.techlore.tech/t/has-anyone-seen-this-video-wondering-your-thoughts/792/20)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/about/services.md b/i18n/de/about/services.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2eeca9fea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/about/services.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# Privacy Guides Services
+
+We run a number of web services to test out features and promote cool decentralized, federated, and/or open-source projects. Many of these services are available to the public and are detailed below.
+
+[:material-comment-alert: Report an issue](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/services/2 ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+## Discourse
+
+- Domain: [discuss.privacyguides.net](https://discuss.privacyguides.net)
+- Availability: Public
+- Source: [github.com/discourse/discourse](https://github.com/discourse/discourse)
+
+## Gitea
+
+- Domain: [code.privacyguides.dev](https://code.privacyguides.dev)
+- Availability: Invite-Only
+ Access may be granted upon request to any team working on *Privacy Guides*-related development or content.
+- Source: [snapcraft.io/gitea](https://snapcraft.io/gitea)
+
+## Matrix
+
+- Domain: [matrix.privacyguides.org](https://matrix.privacyguides.org)
+- Availability: Invite-Only
+ Access may be granted upon request to Privacy Guides team members, Matrix moderators, third-party Matrix community administrators, Matrix bot operators, and other individuals in need of a reliable Matrix presence.
+- Source: [github.com/spantaleev/matrix-docker-ansible-deploy](https://github.com/spantaleev/matrix-docker-ansible-deploy)
+
+## SearXNG
+
+- Domain: [search.privacyguides.net](https://search.privacyguides.net)
+- Availability: Public
+- Source: [github.com/searxng/searxng-docker](https://github.com/searxng/searxng-docker)
+
+## Invidious
+
+- Domain: [invidious.privacyguides.net](https://invidious.privacyguides.net)
+- Availability: Semi-Public
+ We host Invidious primarily to serve embedded YouTube videos on our website, this instance is not intended for general-purpose use and may be limited at any time.
+- Source: [github.com/iv-org/invidious](https://github.com/iv-org/invidious)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/about/statistics.md b/i18n/de/about/statistics.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c0ca4f918
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/about/statistics.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: Traffic Statistics
+---
+
+## Website Statistics
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/advanced/communication-network-types.md b/i18n/de/advanced/communication-network-types.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bdac295f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/advanced/communication-network-types.md
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+---
+title: "Types of Communication Networks"
+icon: 'material/transit-connection-variant'
+---
+
+There are several network architectures commonly used to relay messages between people. These networks can provide different privacy guarantees, which is why it's worth considering your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md) when deciding which app to use.
+
+[Recommended Instant Messengers](../real-time-communication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Centralized Networks
+
+{ align=left }
+
+Centralized messengers are those where all participants are on the same server or network of servers controlled by the same organization.
+
+Some self-hosted messengers allow you to set up your own server. Self-hosting can provide additional privacy guarantees, such as no usage logs or limited access to metadata (data about who is talking to whom). Self-hosted centralized messengers are isolated and everyone must be on the same server to communicate.
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- New features and changes can be implemented more quickly.
+- Easier to get started with and to find contacts.
+- Most mature and stable features ecosystems, as they are easier to program in a centralized software.
+- Privacy issues may be reduced when you trust a server that you're self-hosting.
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Can include [restricted control or access](https://drewdevault.com/2018/08/08/Signal.html). This can include things like:
+- Being [forbidden from connecting third-party clients](https://github.com/LibreSignal/LibreSignal/issues/37#issuecomment-217211165) to the centralized network that might provide for greater customization or a better experience. Often defined in Terms and Conditions of usage.
+- Poor or no documentation for third-party developers.
+- The [ownership](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729191953/https://blog.privacytools.io/delisting-wire/), privacy policy, and operations of the service can change easily when a single entity controls it, potentially compromising the service later on.
+- Self-hosting requires effort and knowledge of how to set up a service.
+
+## Federated Networks
+
+{ align=left }
+
+Federated messengers use multiple, independent, decentralized servers that are able to talk to each other (email is one example of a federated service). Federation allows system administrators to control their own server and still be a part of the larger communications network.
+
+When self-hosted, members of a federated server can discover and communicate with members of other servers, although some servers may choose to remain private by being non-federated (e.g., work team server).
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- Allows for greater control over your own data when running your own server.
+- Allows you to choose whom to trust your data with by choosing between multiple "public" servers.
+- Often allows for third-party clients which can provide a more native, customized, or accessible experience.
+- Server software can be verified that it matches public source code, assuming you have access to the server or you trust the person who does (e.g., a family member).
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Adding new features is more complex because these features need to be standardized and tested to ensure they work with all servers on the network.
+- Due to the previous point, features can be lacking, or incomplete or working in unexpected ways compared to centralized platforms, such as message relay when offline or message deletion.
+- Some metadata may be available (e.g., information like "who is talking to whom," but not actual message content if E2EE is used).
+- Federated servers generally require trusting your server's administrator. They may be a hobbyist or otherwise not a "security professional," and may not serve standard documents like a privacy policy or terms of service detailing how your data is used.
+- Server administrators sometimes choose to block other servers, which are a source of unmoderated abuse or break general rules of accepted behavior. This will hinder your ability to communicate with members of those servers.
+
+## Peer-to-Peer Networks
+
+{ align=left }
+
+P2P messengers connect to a [distributed network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_networking) of nodes to relay a message to the recipient without a third-party server.
+
+Clients (peers) usually find each other through the use of a [distributed computing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_computing) network. Examples of this include [Distributed Hash Tables](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_hash_table) (DHT), used by [torrents](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent_(protocol)) and [IPFS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/InterPlanetary_File_System) for example. Another approach is proximity based networks, where a connection is established over WiFi or Bluetooth (for example, Briar or the [Scuttlebutt](https://www.scuttlebutt.nz) social network protocol).
+
+Once a peer has found a route to its contact via any of these methods, a direct connection between them is made. Although messages are usually encrypted, an observer can still deduce the location and identity of the sender and recipient.
+
+P2P networks do not use servers, as peers communicate directly between each other and hence cannot be self-hosted. However, some additional services may rely on centralized servers, such as user discovery or relaying offline messages, which can benefit from self-hosting.
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- Minimal information is exposed to third-parties.
+- Modern P2P platforms implement E2EE by default. There are no servers that could potentially intercept and decrypt your transmissions, unlike centralized and federated models.
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Reduced feature set:
+- Messages can only be sent when both peers are online, however, your client may store messages locally to wait for the contact to return online.
+- Generally increases battery usage on mobile devices, because the client must stay connected to the distributed network to learn about who is online.
+- Some common messenger features may not be implemented or incompletely, such as message deletion.
+- Your IP address and that of the contacts you're communicating with may be exposed if you do not use the software in conjunction with a [VPN](../vpn.md) or [Tor](../tor.md). Many countries have some form of mass surveillance and/or metadata retention.
+
+## Anonymous Routing
+
+{ align=left }
+
+A messenger using [anonymous routing](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_628) hides either the identity of the sender, the receiver, or evidence that they have been communicating. Ideally, a messenger should hide all three.
+
+There are [many](https://doi.org/10.1145/3182658) different ways to implement anonymous routing. One of the most famous is [onion routing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing) (i.e. [Tor](tor-overview.md)), which communicates encrypted messages through a virtual [overlay network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overlay_network) that hides the location of each node as well as the recipient and sender of each message. The sender and recipient never interact directly and only meet through a secret rendezvous node so that there is no leak of IP addresses nor physical location. Nodes cannot decrypt messages, nor the final destination; only the recipient can. Each intermediary node can only decrypt a part that indicates where to send the still encrypted message next, until it arrives at the recipient who can fully decrypt it, hence the "onion layers."
+
+Self-hosting a node in an anonymous routing network does not provide the hoster with additional privacy benefits, but rather contributes to the whole network's resilience against identification attacks for everyone's benefit.
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- Minimal to no information is exposed to other parties.
+- Messages can be relayed in a decentralized manner even if one of the parties is offline.
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Slow message propagation.
+- Often limited to fewer media types, mostly text, since the network is slow.
+- Less reliable if nodes are selected by randomized routing, some nodes may be very far from the sender and receiver, adding latency or even failing to transmit messages if one of the nodes goes offline.
+- More complex to get started, as the creation and secured backup of a cryptographic private key is required.
+- Just like other decentralized platforms, adding features is more complex for developers than on a centralized platform. Hence, features may be lacking or incompletely implemented, such as offline message relaying or message deletion.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/advanced/dns-overview.md b/i18n/de/advanced/dns-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8b85b70fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/advanced/dns-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+---
+title: "DNS Overview"
+icon: material/dns
+---
+
+The [Domain Name System](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System) is the 'phonebook of the Internet'. DNS translates domain names to IP addresses so browsers and other services can load Internet resources, through a decentralized network of servers.
+
+## What is DNS?
+
+When you visit a website, a numerical address is returned. For example, when you visit `privacyguides.org`, the address `192.98.54.105` is returned.
+
+DNS has existed since the [early days](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System#History) of the Internet. DNS requests made to and from DNS servers are **not** generally encrypted. In a residential setting, a customer is given servers by the ISP via [DHCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dynamic_Host_Configuration_Protocol).
+
+Unencrypted DNS requests are able to be easily **surveilled** and **modified** in transit. In some parts of the world, ISPs are ordered to do primitive [DNS filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking). When you request the IP address of a domain that is blocked, the server may not respond or may respond with a different IP address. As the DNS protocol is not encrypted, the ISP (or any network operator) can use [DPI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection) to monitor requests. ISPs can also block requests based on common characteristics, regardless of which DNS server is used. Unencrypted DNS always uses [port](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_(computer_networking)) 53 and always uses UDP.
+
+Below, we discuss and provide a tutorial to prove what an outside observer may see using regular unencrypted DNS and [encrypted DNS](#what-is-encrypted-dns).
+
+### Unencrypted DNS
+
+1. Using [`tshark`](https://www.wireshark.org/docs/man-pages/tshark.html) (part of the [Wireshark](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wireshark) project) we can monitor and record internet packet flow. This command records packets that meet the rules specified:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/dns.pcap udp port 53 and host 1.1.1.1 or host 8.8.8.8
+ ```
+
+2. We can then use [`dig`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dig_(command)) (Linux, MacOS etc) or [`nslookup`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nslookup) (Windows) to send the DNS lookup to both servers. Software such as web browsers do these lookups automatically, unless they are configured to use encrypted DNS.
+
+ === "Linux, macOS"
+
+ ```
+ dig +noall +answer privacyguides.org @1.1.1.1
+ dig +noall +answer privacyguides.org @8.8.8.8
+ ```
+ === "Windows"
+
+ ```
+ nslookup privacyguides.org 1.1.1.1
+ nslookup privacyguides.org 8.8.8.8
+ ```
+
+3. Next, we want to [analyse](https://www.wireshark.org/docs/wsug_html_chunked/ChapterIntroduction.html#ChIntroWhatIs) the results:
+
+ === "Wireshark"
+
+ ```
+ wireshark -r /tmp/dns.pcap
+ ```
+
+ === "tshark"
+
+ ```
+ tshark -r /tmp/dns.pcap
+ ```
+
+If you run the Wireshark command above, the top pane shows the "[frames](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethernet_frame)", and the bottom pane shows all the data about the selected frame. Enterprise filtering and monitoring solutions (such as those purchased by governments) can do the process automatically, without human interaction, and can aggregate those frames to produce statistical data useful to the network observer.
+
+| No. | Time | Source | Destination | Protocol | Length | Info |
+| --- | -------- | --------- | ----------- | -------- | ------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| 1 | 0.000000 | 192.0.2.1 | 1.1.1.1 | DNS | 104 | Standard query 0x58ba A privacyguides.org OPT |
+| 2 | 0.293395 | 1.1.1.1 | 192.0.2.1 | DNS | 108 | Standard query response 0x58ba A privacyguides.org A 198.98.54.105 OPT |
+| 3 | 1.682109 | 192.0.2.1 | 8.8.8.8 | DNS | 104 | Standard query 0xf1a9 A privacyguides.org OPT |
+| 4 | 2.154698 | 8.8.8.8 | 192.0.2.1 | DNS | 108 | Standard query response 0xf1a9 A privacyguides.org A 198.98.54.105 OPT |
+
+An observer could modify any of these packets.
+
+## What is "encrypted DNS"?
+
+Encrypted DNS can refer to one of a number of protocols, the most common ones being:
+
+### DNSCrypt
+
+[**DNSCrypt**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNSCrypt) was one of the first methods of encrypting DNS queries. DNSCrypt operates on port 443 and works with both the TCP or UDP transport protocols. DNSCrypt has never been submitted to the [Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Engineering_Task_Force) nor has it gone through the [Request for Comments (RFC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Request_for_Comments) process, so it has not been used widely outside of a few [implementations](https://dnscrypt.info/implementations). As a result, it has been largely replaced by the more popular [DNS over HTTPS](#dns-over-https-doh).
+
+### DNS over TLS (DoT)
+
+[**DNS over TLS**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_TLS) is another method for encrypting DNS communication that is defined in [RFC 7858](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7858). Support was first implemented in Android 9, iOS 14, and on Linux in [systemd-resolved](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/resolved.conf.html#DNSOverTLS=) in version 237. Preference in the industry has been moving away from DoT to DoH in recent years, as DoT is a [complex protocol](https://dnscrypt.info/faq/) and has varying compliance to the RFC across the implementations that exist. DoT also operates on a dedicated port 853 which can be blocked easily by restrictive firewalls.
+
+### DNS over HTTPS (DoH)
+
+[**DNS over HTTPS**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_HTTPS) as defined in [RFC 8484](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8484) packages queries in the [HTTP/2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/2) protocol and provides security with HTTPS. Support was first added in web browsers such as Firefox 60 and Chrome 83.
+
+Native implementation of DoH showed up in iOS 14, macOS 11, Microsoft Windows, and Android 13 (however, it won't be enabled [by default](https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/packages/modules/DnsResolver/+/1833144)). General Linux desktop support is waiting on the systemd [implementation](https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/8639) so [installing third-party software is still required](../dns.md#encrypted-dns-proxies).
+
+## What can an outside party see?
+
+In this example we will record what happens when we make a DoH request:
+
+1. First, start `tshark`:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/dns_doh.pcap -f "tcp port https and host 1.1.1.1"
+ ```
+
+2. Second, make a request with `curl`:
+
+ ```bash
+ curl -vI --doh-url https://1.1.1.1/dns-query https://privacyguides.org
+ ```
+
+3. After making the request, we can stop the packet capture with CTRL + C.
+
+4. Analyse the results in Wireshark:
+
+ ```bash
+ wireshark -r /tmp/dns_doh.pcap
+ ```
+
+We can see the [connection establishment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol#Connection_establishment) and [TLS handshake](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ssl/what-happens-in-a-tls-handshake/) that occurs with any encrypted connection. When looking at the "application data" packets that follow, none of them contain the domain we requested or the IP address returned.
+
+## Why **shouldn't** I use encrypted DNS?
+
+In locations where there is internet filtering (or censorship), visiting forbidden resources may have its own consequences which you should consider in your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md). We do **not** suggest the use of encrypted DNS for this purpose. Use [Tor](https://torproject.org) or a [VPN](../vpn.md) instead. If you're using a VPN, you should use your VPN's DNS servers. When using a VPN, you are already trusting them with all your network activity.
+
+When we do a DNS lookup, it's generally because we want to access a resource. Below, we will discuss some of the methods that may disclose your browsing activities even when using encrypted DNS:
+
+### IP Address
+
+The simplest way to determine browsing activity might be to look at the IP addresses your devices are accessing. For example, if the observer knows that `privacyguides.org` is at `198.98.54.105`, and your device is requesting data from `198.98.54.105`, there is a good chance you're visiting Privacy Guides.
+
+This method is only useful when the IP address belongs to a server that only hosts few websites. It's also not very useful if the site is hosted on a shared platform (e.g. Github Pages, Cloudflare Pages, Netlify, WordPress, Blogger, etc). It also isn't very useful if the server is hosted behind a [reverse proxy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_proxy), which is very common on the modern Internet.
+
+### Server Name Indication (SNI)
+
+Server Name Indication is typically used when a IP address hosts many websites. This could be a service like Cloudflare, or some other [Denial-of-service attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial-of-service_attack) protection.
+
+1. Start capturing again with `tshark`. We've added a filter with our IP address so you don't capture many packets:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/pg.pcap port 443 and host 198.98.54.105
+ ```
+
+2. Then we visit [https://privacyguides.org](https://privacyguides.org).
+
+3. After visiting the website, we want to stop the packet capture with CTRL + C.
+
+4. Next we want to analyze the results:
+
+ ```bash
+ wireshark -r /tmp/pg.pcap
+ ```
+
+ We will see the connection establishment, followed by the TLS handshake for the Privacy Guides website. Around frame 5. you'll see a "Client Hello".
+
+5. Expand the triangle ▸ next to each field:
+
+ ```text
+ ▸ Transport Layer Security
+ ▸ TLSv1.3 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
+ ▸ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
+ ▸ Extension: server_name (len=22)
+ ▸ Server Name Indication extension
+ ```
+
+6. We can see the SNI value which discloses the website we are visiting. The `tshark` command can give you the value directly for all packets containing a SNI value:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -r /tmp/pg.pcap -Tfields -Y tls.handshake.extensions_server_name -e tls.handshake.extensions_server_name
+ ```
+
+This means even if we are using "Encrypted DNS" servers, the domain will likely be disclosed through SNI. The [TLS v1.3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#TLS_1.3) protocol brings with it [Encrypted Client Hello](https://blog.cloudflare.com/encrypted-client-hello/), which prevents this kind of leak.
+
+Governments, in particular [China](https://www.zdnet.com/article/china-is-now-blocking-all-encrypted-https-traffic-using-tls-1-3-and-esni/) and [Russia](https://www.zdnet.com/article/russia-wants-to-ban-the-use-of-secure-protocols-such-as-tls-1-3-doh-dot-esni/), have either already [started blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication#Encrypted_Client_Hello) it or expressed a desire to do so. Recently, Russia has [started blocking foreign websites](https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/108) that use the [HTTP/3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) standard. This is because the [QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QUIC) protocol that is a part of HTTP/3 requires that `ClientHello` also be encrypted.
+
+### Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
+
+Another way your browser can disclose your browsing activities is with the [Online Certificate Status Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_Certificate_Status_Protocol). When visiting an HTTPS website, the browser might check to see if the website's [certificate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_certificate) has been revoked. This is generally done through the HTTP protocol, meaning it is **not** encrypted.
+
+The OCSP request contains the certificate "[serial number](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_certificate#Common_fields)", which is unique. It is sent to the "OCSP responder" in order to check its status.
+
+We can simulate what a browser would do using the [`openssl`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenSSL) command.
+
+1. Get the server certificate and use [`sed`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sed) to keep just the important part and write it out to a file:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl s_client -connect privacyguides.org:443 < /dev/null 2>&1 |
+ sed -n '/^-*BEGIN/,/^-*END/p' > /tmp/pg_server.cert
+ ```
+
+2. Get the intermediate certificate. [Certificate Authorities (CA)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) normally don't sign a certificate directly; they use what is known as an "intermediate" certificate.
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl s_client -showcerts -connect privacyguides.org:443 < /dev/null 2>&1 |
+ sed -n '/^-*BEGIN/,/^-*END/p' > /tmp/pg_and_intermediate.cert
+ ```
+
+3. The first certificate in `pg_and_intermediate.cert` is actually the server certificate from step 1. We can use `sed` again to delete until the first instance of END:
+
+ ```bash
+ sed -n '/^-*END CERTIFICATE-*$/!d;:a n;p;ba' \
+ /tmp/pg_and_intermediate.cert > /tmp/intermediate_chain.cert
+ ```
+
+4. Get the OCSP responder for the server certificate:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl x509 -noout -ocsp_uri -in /tmp/pg_server.cert
+ ```
+
+ Our certificate shows the Lets Encrypt certificate responder. If we want to see all the details of the certificate we can use:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl x509 -text -noout -in /tmp/pg_server.cert
+ ```
+
+5. Start the packet capture:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap -f "tcp port http"
+ ```
+
+6. Make the OCSP request:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl ocsp -issuer /tmp/intermediate_chain.cert \
+ -cert /tmp/pg_server.cert \
+ -text \
+ -url http://r3.o.lencr.org
+ ```
+
+7. Open the capture:
+
+ ```bash
+ wireshark -r /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap
+ ```
+
+ There will be two packets with the "OCSP" protocol: a "Request" and a "Response". For the "Request" we can see the "serial number" by expanding the triangle ▸ next to each field:
+
+ ```bash
+ ▸ Online Certificate Status Protocol
+ ▸ tbsRequest
+ ▸ requestList: 1 item
+ ▸ Request
+ ▸ reqCert
+ serialNumber
+ ```
+
+ For the "Response" we can also see the "serial number":
+
+ ```bash
+ ▸ Online Certificate Status Protocol
+ ▸ responseBytes
+ ▸ BasicOCSPResponse
+ ▸ tbsResponseData
+ ▸ responses: 1 item
+ ▸ SingleResponse
+ ▸ certID
+ serialNumber
+ ```
+
+8. Or use `tshark` to filter the packets for the Serial Number:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -r /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap -Tfields -Y ocsp.serialNumber -e ocsp.serialNumber
+ ```
+
+If the network observer has the public certificate, which is publicly available, they can match the serial number with that certificate and therefore determine the site you're visiting from that. The process can be automated and can associate IP addresses with serial numbers. It is also possible to check [Certificate Transparency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_Transparency) logs for the serial number.
+
+## Should I use encrypted DNS?
+
+We made this flow chart to describe when you *should* use encrypted DNS:
+
+``` mermaid
+graph TB
+ Start[Start] --> anonymous{Trying to be anonymous?}
+ anonymous--> | Yes | tor(Use Tor)
+ anonymous --> | No | censorship{Avoiding censorship?}
+ censorship --> | Yes | vpnOrTor(Use VPN or Tor)
+ censorship --> | No | privacy{Want privacy from ISP?}
+ privacy --> | Yes | vpnOrTor
+ privacy --> | No | obnoxious{ISP makes obnoxious redirects?}
+ obnoxious --> | Yes | encryptedDNS(Use encrypted DNS with 3rd party)
+ obnoxious --> | No | ispDNS{Does ISP support encrypted DNS?}
+ ispDNS --> | Yes | useISP(Use encrypted DNS with ISP)
+ ispDNS --> | No | nothing(Do nothing)
+```
+
+Encrypted DNS with a third-party should only be used to get around redirects and basic [DNS blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) when you can be sure there won't be any consequences or you're interested in a provider that does some rudimentary filtering.
+
+[List of recommended DNS servers](../dns.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## What is DNSSEC?
+
+[Domain Name System Security Extensions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Extensions) (DNSSEC) is a feature of DNS that authenticates responses to domain name lookups. It does not provide privacy protections for those lookups, but rather prevents attackers from manipulating or poisoning the responses to DNS requests.
+
+In other words, DNSSEC digitally signs data to help ensure its validity. In order to ensure a secure lookup, the signing occurs at every level in the DNS lookup process. As a result, all answers from DNS can be trusted.
+
+The DNSSEC signing process is similar to someone signing a legal document with a pen; that person signs with a unique signature that no one else can create, and a court expert can look at that signature and verify that the document was signed by that person. These digital signatures ensure that data has not been tampered with.
+
+DNSSEC implements a hierarchical digital signing policy across all layers of DNS. For example, in the case of a `privacyguides.org` lookup, a root DNS server would sign a key for the `.org` nameserver, and the `.org` nameserver would then sign a key for `privacyguides.org`’s authoritative nameserver.
+
+Adapted from [DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) overview](https://cloud.google.com/dns/docs/dnssec) by Google and [DNSSEC: An Introduction](https://blog.cloudflare.com/dnssec-an-introduction/) by Cloudflare, both licensed under [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
+
+## What is QNAME minimization?
+
+A QNAME is a "qualified name", for example `privacyguides.org`. QNAME minimisation reduces the amount of information sent from the DNS server to the [authoritative name server](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Name_server#Authoritative_name_server).
+
+Instead of sending the whole domain `privacyguides.org`, QNAME minimization means the DNS server will ask for all the records that end in `.org`. Further technical description is defined in [RFC 7816](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7816).
+
+## What is EDNS Client Subnet (ECS)?
+
+The [EDNS Client Subnet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EDNS_Client_Subnet) is a method for a recursive DNS resolver to specify a [subnetwork](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subnetwork) for the [host or client](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Client_(computing)) which is making the DNS query.
+
+It's intended to "speed up" delivery of data by giving the client an answer that belongs to a server that is close to them such as a [content delivery network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_delivery_network), which are often used in video streaming and serving JavaScript web apps.
+
+This feature does come at a privacy cost, as it tells the DNS server some information about the client's location.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/advanced/tor-overview.md b/i18n/de/advanced/tor-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cf1311b10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/advanced/tor-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+---
+title: "Tor Overview"
+icon: 'simple/torproject'
+---
+
+Tor is a free to use, decentralized network designed for using the internet with as much privacy as possible. If used properly, the network enables private and anonymous browsing and communications.
+
+## Path Building
+
+Tor works by routing your traffic through a network comprised of thousands of volunteer-run servers called nodes (or relays).
+
+Every time you connect to Tor, it will choose three nodes to build a path to the internet—this path is called a "circuit." Each of these nodes has its own function:
+
+### The Entry Node
+
+The entry node, often called the guard node, is the first node to which your Tor client connects. The entry node is able to see your IP address, however it is unable to see what you are connecting to.
+
+Unlike the other nodes, the Tor client will randomly select an entry node and stick with it for two to three months to protect you from certain attacks.[^1]
+
+### The Middle Node
+
+The middle node is the second node to which your Tor client connects. It can see which node the traffic came from—the entry node—and to which node it goes to next. The middle node cannot, see your IP address or the domain you are connecting to.
+
+For each new circuit, the middle node is randomly selected out of all available Tor nodes.
+
+### The Exit Node
+
+The exit node is the point in which your web traffic leaves the Tor network and is forwarded to your desired destination. The exit node is unable to see your IP address, but it does know what site it's connecting to.
+
+The exit node will be chosen at random from all available Tor nodes ran with an exit relay flag.[^2]
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ Tor circuit pathway
+
+
+## Encryption
+
+Tor encrypts each packet (a block of transmitted data) three times with the keys from the exit, middle, and entry node—in that order.
+
+Once Tor has built a circuit, data transmission is done as follows:
+
+1. Firstly: when the packet arrives at the entry node, the first layer of encryption is removed. In this encrypted packet, the entry node will find another encrypted packet with the middle node’s address. The entry node will then forward the packet to the middle node.
+
+2. Secondly: when the middle node receives the packet from the entry node, it too will remove a layer of encryption with its key, and this time finds an encrypted packet with the exit node's address. The middle node will then forward the packet to the exit node.
+
+3. Lastly: when the exit node receives its packet, it will remove the last layer of encryption with its key. The exit node will see the destination address and forward the packet to that address.
+
+Below is an alternative diagram showing the process. Each node removes its own layer of encryption, and when the destination server returns data, the same process happens entirely in reverse. For example, the exit node does not know who you are, but it does know which node it came from, and so it adds its own layer of encryption and sends it back.
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sending and receiving data through the Tor Network
+
+
+Tor allows us to connect to a server without any single party knowing the entire path. The entry node knows who you are, but not where you are going; the middle node doesn’t know who you are or where you are going; and the exit node knows where you are going, but not who you are. Because the exit node is what makes the final connection, the destination server will never know your IP address.
+
+## Caveats
+
+Though Tor does provide strong privacy guarantees, one must be aware that Tor is not perfect:
+
+- Well-funded adversaries with the capability to passively watch most network traffic over the globe have a chance of deanonymizing Tor users by means of advanced traffic analysis. Nor does Tor protect you from exposing yourself by mistake, such as if you share too much information about your real identity.
+- Tor exit nodes can also monitor traffic that passes through them. This means traffic which is not encrypted, such as plain HTTP traffic, can be recorded and monitored. If such traffic contains personally identifiable information, then it can deanonymize you to that exit node. Thus, we recommend using HTTPS over Tor where possible.
+
+If you wish to use Tor for browsing the web, we only recommend the **official** Tor Browser—it is designed to prevent fingerprinting.
+
+- [Tor Browser :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../tor.md#tor-browser)
+
+## Additional Resources
+
+- [Tor Browser User Manual](https://tb-manual.torproject.org)
+- [How Tor Works - Computerphile](https://invidious.privacyguides.net/embed/QRYzre4bf7I?local=true) (YouTube)
+- [Tor Onion Services - Computerphile](https://invidious.privacyguides.net/embed/lVcbq_a5N9I?local=true) (YouTube)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
+
+[^1]: The first relay in your circuit is called an "entry guard" or "guard". It is a fast and stable relay that remains the first one in your circuit for 2-3 months in order to protect against a known anonymity-breaking attack. The rest of your circuit changes with every new website you visit, and all together these relays provide the full privacy protections of Tor. For more information on how guard relays work, see this [blog post](https://blog.torproject.org/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters) and [paper](https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/single_guard.pdf) on entry guards. ([https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2/](https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2/))
+
+[^2]: Relay flag: a special (dis-)qualification of relays for circuit positions (for example, "Guard", "Exit", "BadExit"), circuit properties (for example, "Fast", "Stable"), or roles (for example, "Authority", "HSDir"), as assigned by the directory authorities and further defined in the directory protocol specification. ([https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html](https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html))
diff --git a/i18n/de/android.md b/i18n/de/android.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dd54ed063
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/android.md
@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+---
+title: "Android"
+icon: 'simple/android'
+---
+
+{ align=right }
+
+The **Android Open Source Project** is an open-source mobile operating system led by Google which powers the majority of the world's mobile devices. Most phones sold with Android are modified to include invasive integrations and apps such as Google Play Services, so you can significantly improve your privacy on your mobile device by replacing your phone's default installation with a version of Android without these invasive features.
+
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://source.android.com/){ .card-link title=Homepage }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://source.android.com/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+These are the Android operating systems, devices, and apps we recommend to maximize your mobile device's security and privacy. To learn more about Android:
+
+- [General Android Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/android-overview.md)
+- [Why we recommend GrapheneOS over CalyxOS :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/)
+
+## AOSP Derivatives
+
+We recommend installing one of these custom Android operating systems on your device, listed in order of preference, depending on your device's compatibility with these operating systems.
+
+!!! note
+
+ End-of-life devices (such as GrapheneOS or CalyxOS's "extended support" devices) do not have full security patches (firmware updates) due to the OEM discontinuing support. These devices cannot be considered completely secure regardless of installed software.
+
+### GrapheneOS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GrapheneOS** is the best choice when it comes to privacy and security.
+
+ GrapheneOS provides additional [security hardening](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardening_(computing)) and privacy improvements. It has a [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), network and sensor permissions, and various other [security features](https://grapheneos.org/features). GrapheneOS also comes with full firmware updates and signed builds, so verified boot is fully supported.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://grapheneos.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://grapheneos.org/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+GrapheneOS supports [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), which runs [Google Play Services](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Play_Services) fully sandboxed like any other regular app. This means you can take advantage of most Google Play Services, such as [push notifications](https://firebase.google.com/docs/cloud-messaging/), while giving you full control over their permissions and access, and while containing them to a specific [work profile](os/android-overview.md#work-profile) or [user profile](os/android-overview.md#user-profiles) of your choice.
+
+Google Pixel phones are the only devices that currently meet GrapheneOS's [hardware security requirements](https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-support).
+
+### DivestOS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **DivestOS** is a soft-fork of [LineageOS](https://lineageos.org/).
+ DivestOS inherits many [supported devices](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=devices&base=LineageOS) from LineageOS. It has signed builds, making it possible to have [verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) on some non-Pixel devices.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://divestos.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://divestoseb5nncsydt7zzf5hrfg44md4bxqjs5ifcv4t7gt7u6ohjyyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=privacy_policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/divested-mobile){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+DivestOS has automated kernel vulnerability ([CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures)) [patching](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/cve_checker), fewer proprietary blobs, and a custom [hosts](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=dnsbl) file. Its hardened WebView, [Mulch](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/mulch), enables [CFI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity) for all architectures and [network state partitioning](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning), and receives out-of-band updates. DivestOS also includes kernel patches from GrapheneOS and enables all available kernel security features via [defconfig hardening](https://github.com/Divested-Mobile/DivestOS-Build/blob/master/Scripts/Common/Functions.sh#L758). All kernels newer than version 3.4 include full page [sanitization](https://lwn.net/Articles/334747/) and all ~22 Clang-compiled kernels have [`-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero`](https://reviews.llvm.org/D54604?id=174471) enabled.
+
+DivestOS implements some system hardening patches originally developed for GrapheneOS. DivestOS 16.0 and higher implements GrapheneOS's [`INTERNET`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) and SENSORS permission toggle, [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), [exec-spawning](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/#additional-hardening), [JNI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_Native_Interface) [constification](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Const_(computer_programming)), and partial [bionic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bionic_(software)) hardening patchsets. 17.1 and higher features GrapheneOS's per-network full [MAC randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address#Randomization) option, [`ptrace_scope`](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.html) control, and automatic reboot/Wi-Fi/Bluetooth [timeout options](https://grapheneos.org/features).
+
+DivestOS uses F-Droid as its default app store. Normally, we would recommend avoiding F-Droid due to its numerous [security issues](#f-droid). However, doing so on DivestOS isn't viable; the developers update their apps via their own F-Droid repositories ([DivestOS Official](https://divestos.org/fdroid/official/?fingerprint=E4BE8D6ABFA4D9D4FEEF03CDDA7FF62A73FD64B75566F6DD4E5E577550BE8467) and [DivestOS WebView](https://divestos.org/fdroid/webview/?fingerprint=FB426DA1750A53D7724C8A582B4D34174E64A84B38940E5D5A802E1DFF9A40D2)). We recommend disabling the official F-Droid app and using [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) with the DivestOS repositories enabled to keep those components up to date. For other apps, our recommended methods of obtaining them still apply.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ DivestOS firmware update [status](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/firmware-empty/-/blob/master/STATUS) and quality control varies across the devices it supports. We still recommend GrapheneOS depending on your device's compatibility. For other devices, DivestOS is a good alternative.
+
+ Not all of the supported devices have verified boot, and some perform it better than others.
+
+## Android Devices
+
+When purchasing a device, we recommend getting one as new as possible. The software and firmware of mobile devices are only supported for a limited time, so buying new extends that lifespan as much as possible.
+
+Avoid buying phones from mobile network operators. These often have a **locked bootloader** and do not support [OEM unlocking](https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/locking_unlocking). These phone variants will prevent you from installing any kind of alternative Android distribution.
+
+Be very **careful** about buying second hand phones from online marketplaces. Always check the reputation of the seller. If the device is stolen, there's a possibility of [IMEI blacklisting](https://www.gsma.com/security/resources/imei-blacklisting/). There is also a risk involved with you being associated with the activity of the previous owner.
+
+A few more tips regarding Android devices and operating system compatibility:
+
+- Do not buy devices that have reached or are near their end-of-life, additional firmware updates must be provided by the manufacturer.
+- Do not buy preloaded LineageOS or /e/ OS phones or any Android phones without proper [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) support and firmware updates. These devices also have no way for you to check whether they've been tampered with.
+- In short, if a device or Android distribution is not listed here, there is probably a good reason. Check out our [forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/) to find details!
+
+### Google Pixel
+
+Google Pixel phones are the **only** devices we recommend for purchase. Pixel phones have stronger hardware security than any other Android devices currently on the market, due to proper AVB support for third-party operating systems and Google's custom [Titan](https://security.googleblog.com/2021/10/pixel-6-setting-new-standard-for-mobile.html) security chips acting as the Secure Element.
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Google Pixel** devices are known to have good security and properly support [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), even when installing custom operating systems.
+
+ Beginning with the **Pixel 6** and **6 Pro**, Pixel devices receive a minimum of 5 years of guaranteed security updates, ensuring a much longer lifespan compared to the 2-4 years competing OEMs typically offer.
+
+ [:material-shopping: Store](https://store.google.com/category/phones){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+
+Secure Elements like the Titan M2 are more limited than the processor's Trusted Execution Environment used by most other phones as they are only used for secrets storage, hardware attestation, and rate limiting, not for running "trusted" programs. Phones without a Secure Element have to use the TEE for *all* of those functions, resulting in a larger attack surface.
+
+Google Pixel phones use a TEE OS called Trusty which is [open-source](https://source.android.com/security/trusty#whyTrusty), unlike many other phones.
+
+The installation of GrapheneOS on a Pixel phone is easy with their [web installer](https://grapheneos.org/install/web). If you don't feel comfortable doing it yourself and are willing to spend a bit of extra money, check out the [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) as they come preloaded with GrapheneOS from the reputable [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/about) company.
+
+A few more tips for purchasing a Google Pixel:
+
+- If you're after a bargain on a Pixel device, we suggest buying an "**a**" model, just after the next flagship is released. Discounts are usually available because Google will be trying to clear their stock.
+- Consider price beating options and specials offered at physical stores.
+- Look at online community bargain sites in your country. These can alert you to good sales.
+- Google provides a list showing the [support cycle](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) for each one of their devices. The price per day for a device can be calculated as: $\text{Cost} \over \text {EOL Date}-\text{Current Date}$, meaning that the longer use of the device the lower cost per day.
+
+## General Apps
+
+We recommend a wide variety of Android apps throughout this site. The apps listed here are Android-exclusive and specifically enhance or replace key system functionality.
+
+### Shelter
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Shelter** is an app that helps you leverage Android's Work Profile functionality to isolate or duplicate apps on your device.
+
+ Shelter supports blocking contact search cross profiles and sharing files across profiles via the default file manager ([DocumentsUI](https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/modular-system/documentsui)).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://gitea.angry.im/PeterCxy/Shelter#shelter){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitea.angry.im/PeterCxy/Shelter){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.patreon.com/PeterCxy){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.typeblog.shelter)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Shelter is recommended over [Insular](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/) and [Island](https://github.com/oasisfeng/island) as it supports [contact search blocking](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/faq.html).
+
+ When using Shelter, you are placing complete trust in its developer, as Shelter acts as a [Device Admin](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/admin/device-admin) to create the Work Profile, and it has extensive access to the data stored within the Work Profile.
+
+### Auditor
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Auditor** is an app which leverages hardware security features to provide device integrity monitoring for [supported devices](https://attestation.app/about#device-support). Currently, it only works with GrapheneOS and the device's stock operating system.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://attestation.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://attestation.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://attestation.app/about){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://attestation.app/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://attestation.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.attestation.auditor.play)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases)
+ - [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+Auditor performs attestation and intrusion detection by:
+
+- Using a [Trust On First Use (TOFU)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_on_first_use) model between an *auditor* and *auditee*, the pair establish a private key in the [hardware-backed keystore](https://source.android.com/security/keystore/) of the *Auditor*.
+- The *auditor* can either be another instance of the Auditor app or the [Remote Attestation Service](https://attestation.app).
+- The *auditor* records the current state and configuration of the *auditee*.
+- Should tampering with the operating system of the *auditee* happen after the pairing is complete, the auditor will be aware of the change in the device state and configurations.
+- You will be alerted to the change.
+
+No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
+
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service. To make sure that your hardware and operating system is genuine, [perform local attestation](https://grapheneos.org/install/web#verifying-installation) immediately after the device has been installed and prior to any internet connection.
+
+### Secure Camera
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Secure Camera** is a camera app focused on privacy and security which can capture images, videos and QR codes. CameraX vendor extensions (Portrait, HDR, Night Sight, Face Retouch, and Auto) are also supported on available devices.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://grapheneos.org/usage#camera){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.grapheneos.camera.play)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases)
+ - [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+Main privacy features include:
+
+- Auto removal of [Exif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exif) metadata (enabled by default)
+- Use of the new [Media](https://developer.android.com/training/data-storage/shared/media) API, therefore [storage permissions](https://developer.android.com/training/data-storage) are not required
+- Microphone permission not required unless you want to record sound
+
+!!! note
+
+ Metadata is not currently deleted from video files but that is planned.
+
+ The image orientation metadata is not deleted. If you enable location (in Secure Camera) that **won't** be deleted either. If you want to delete that later you will need to use an external app such as [ExifEraser](data-redaction.md#exiferaser).
+
+### Secure PDF Viewer
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Secure PDF Viewer** is a PDF viewer based on [pdf.js](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PDF.js) that doesn't require any permissions. The PDF is fed into a [sandboxed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandbox_(software_development)) [webview](https://developer.android.com/guide/webapps/webview). This means that it doesn't require permission directly to access content or files.
+
+ [Content-Security-Policy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy) is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.grapheneos.pdfviewer.play)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer/releases)
+ - [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+## Obtaining Applications
+
+### GrapheneOS App Store
+
+GrapheneOS's app store is available on [GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases). It supports Android 12 and above and is capable of updating itself. The app store has standalone applications built by the GrapheneOS project such as the [Auditor](https://attestation.app/), [Camera](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera), and [PDF Viewer](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer). If you are looking for these applications, we highly recommend that you get them from GrapheneOS's app store instead of the Play Store, as the apps on their store are signed by the GrapheneOS's project own signature that Google does not have access to.
+
+### Aurora Store
+
+The Google Play Store requires a Google account to login which is not great for privacy. You can get around this by using an alternative client, such as Aurora Store.
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Aurora Store** is a Google Play Store client which does not require a Google Account, Google Play Services, or microG to download apps.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://auroraoss.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-gitlab: GitLab](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore/-/releases)
+
+Aurora Store does not allow you to download paid apps with their anonymous account feature. You can optionally log in with your Google account with Aurora Store to download apps you have purchased, which does give access to the list of apps you've installed to Google, however you still benefit from not requiring the full Google Play client and Google Play Services or microG on your device.
+
+### Manually with RSS Notifications
+
+For apps that are released on platforms like GitHub and GitLab, you may be able to add an RSS feed to your [news aggregator](/news-aggregators) that will help you keep track of new releases.
+
+   
+
+#### GitHub
+
+On GitHub, using [Secure Camera](#secure-camera) as an example, you would navigate to its [releases page](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases) and append `.atom` to the URL:
+
+`https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases.atom`
+
+#### GitLab
+
+On GitLab, using [Aurora Store](#aurora-store) as an example, you would navigate to its [project repository](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore) and append `/-/tags?format=atom` to the URL:
+
+`https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore/-/tags?format=atom`
+
+#### Verifying APK Fingerprints
+
+If you download APK files to install manually, you can verify their signature with the [`apksigner`](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/apksigner) tool, which is a part of Android [build-tools](https://developer.android.com/studio/releases/build-tools).
+
+1. Install [Java JDK](https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/downloads/).
+
+2. Download the [Android Studio command line tools](https://developer.android.com/studio#command-tools).
+
+3. Extract the downloaded archive:
+
+ ```bash
+ unzip commandlinetools-*.zip
+ cd cmdline-tools
+ ./bin/sdkmanager --sdk_root=./ "build-tools;29.0.3"
+ ```
+
+4. Run the signature verification command:
+
+ ```bash
+ ./build-tools/29.0.3/apksigner verify --print-certs ../Camera-37.apk
+ ```
+
+5. The resulting hashes can then be compared with another source. Some developers such as Signal [show the fingerprints](https://signal.org/android/apk/) on their website.
+
+ ```bash
+ Signer #1 certificate DN: CN=GrapheneOS
+ Signer #1 certificate SHA-256 digest: 6436b155b917c2f9a9ed1d15c4993a5968ffabc94947c13f2aeee14b7b27ed59
+ Signer #1 certificate SHA-1 digest: 23e108677a2e1b1d6e6b056f3bb951df7ad5570c
+ Signer #1 certificate MD5 digest: dbbcd0cac71bd6fa2102a0297c6e0dd3
+ ```
+
+### F-Droid
+
+{ align=right width=120px }
+
+==We do **not** currently recommend F-Droid as a way to obtain apps.== F-Droid is often recommended as an alternative to Google Play, particularly in the privacy community. The option to add third-party repositories and not be confined to Google's walled garden has led to its popularity. F-Droid additionally has [reproducible builds](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Reproducible_Builds/) for some applications and is dedicated to free and open-source software. However, there are [notable problems](https://privsec.dev/posts/android/f-droid-security-issues/) with the official F-Droid client, their quality control, and how they build, sign, and deliver packages.
+
+Due to their process of building apps, apps in the official F-Droid repository often fall behind on updates. F-Droid maintainers also reuse package IDs while signing apps with their own keys, which is not ideal as it gives the F-Droid team ultimate trust.
+
+Other popular third-party repositories such as [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) alleviate some of these concerns. The IzzyOnDroid repository pulls builds directly from GitHub and is the next best thing to the developers' own repositories. However, it is not something that we can recommend, as apps are typically [removed](https://github.com/vfsfitvnm/ViMusic/issues/240#issuecomment-1225564446) from that respository when they make it to the main F-Droid repository. While that makes sense (since the goal of that particular repository is to host apps before they're accepted into the main F-Droid repository), it can leave you with installed apps which no longer receive updates.
+
+That said, the [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/) and [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) repositories are home to countless apps, so they can be a useful tool to search for and discover open-source apps that you can then download through Play Store, Aurora Store, or by getting the APK directly from the developer. It is important to keep in mind that some apps in these repositories have not been updated in years and may rely on unsupported libraries, among other things, posing a potential security risk. You should use your best judgement when looking for new apps via this method.
+
+!!! note
+
+ In some rare cases, the developer of an app will only distribute it through F-Droid ([Gadgetbridge](https://gadgetbridge.org/) is one example of this). If you really need an app like that, we recommend using [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) instead of the official F-Droid app to obtain it.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Operating Systems
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must support bootloader locking with custom AVB key support.
+- Must receive major Android updates within 0-1 months of release.
+- Must receive Android feature updates (minor version) within 0-14 days of release.
+- Must receive regular security patches within 0-5 days of release.
+- Must **not** be "rooted" out of the box.
+- Must **not** enable Google Play Services by default.
+- Must **not** require system modification to support Google Play Services.
+
+### Devices
+
+- Must support at least one of our recommended custom operating systems.
+- Must be currently sold new in stores.
+- Must receive a minimum of 5 years of security updates.
+- Must have dedicated secure element hardware.
+
+### Applications
+
+- Applications on this page must not be applicable to any other software category on the site.
+- General applications should extend or replace core system functionality.
+- Applications should receive regular updates and maintenance.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png b/i18n/de/assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5295c902c
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/de/assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/de/assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png b/i18n/de/assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..974869a4e
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/de/assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/de/assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png b/i18n/de/assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..21d6ef03a
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/de/assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/de/assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png b/i18n/de/assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b46283571
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/de/assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/de/assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png b/i18n/de/assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f88f7b404
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/de/assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/de/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption-dark.svg b/i18n/de/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption-dark.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..95e681571
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption-dark.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/de/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg b/i18n/de/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f5b1e2915
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/de/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg b/i18n/de/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9002c9b16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/de/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg b/i18n/de/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cb53d8b13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/de/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png b/i18n/de/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7a4a0d170
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/de/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/de/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png b/i18n/de/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f81058d88
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/de/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/de/assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png b/i18n/de/assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cde3771e0
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/de/assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/de/assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png b/i18n/de/assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d71381491
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/de/assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/de/basics/account-creation.md b/i18n/de/basics/account-creation.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7d3533473
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/basics/account-creation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+---
+title: "Benutzerkontenerstellung"
+icon: 'material/account-plus'
+---
+
+Oft melden sich Menschen für Dienste an, ohne nachzudenken. Vielleicht ist es ein Streaming-Dienst, mit dem du die neue Serie, über die alle reden, sehen kannst, oder ein Konto, mit dem du einen Rabatt für dein Lieblingsrestaurant bekommst. In jedem Fall solltest du die Auswirkungen auf Ihre Daten jetzt und in Zukunft beachten.
+
+Mit jedem neuen Dienst, den du nutzt, sind Risiken verbunden. Data breaches; disclosure of customer information to third parties; rogue employees accessing data; all are possibilities that must be considered when giving your information out. You need to be confident that you can trust the service, which is why we don't recommend storing valuable data on anything but the most mature and battle-tested products. That usually means services which provide E2EE and have undergone a cryptographic audit. An audit increases assurance that the product was designed without glaring security issues caused by an inexperienced developer.
+
+It can also be difficult to delete the accounts on some services. Sometimes [overwriting data](account-deletion.md#overwriting-account-information) associated with an account can be possible, but in other cases the service will keep an entire history of changes to the account.
+
+## Terms of Service & Privacy Policy
+
+The ToS are the rules that you agree to follow when using the service. With larger services these rules are often enforced by automated systems. Sometimes these automated systems can make mistakes. For example, you may be banned or locked out of your account on some services for using a VPN or VOIP number. Appealing such bans is often difficult, and involves an automated process too, which isn't always successful. This would be one of the reasons why we wouldn't suggest using Gmail for email as an example. Email is crucial for access to other services you might have signed up for.
+
+The Privacy Policy is how the service says they will use your data and it is worth reading so that you understand how your data will be used. A company or organization might not be legally obligated to follow everything contained in the policy (it depends on the jurisdiction). We would recommend having some idea what your local laws are and what they permit a provider to collect.
+
+We recommend looking for particular terms such as "data collection", "data analysis", "cookies", "ads" or "3rd-party" services. Sometimes you will be able to opt-out from data collection or from sharing your data, but it is best to choose a service that respects your privacy from the start.
+
+Keep in mind you're also placing your trust in the company or organization and that they will comply with their own privacy policy.
+
+## Authentication methods
+
+There are usually multiple ways to sign up for an account, each with their own benefits and drawbacks.
+
+### Email and password
+
+The most common way to create a new account is by an email address and password. When using this method, you should use a password manager and follow [best practices](passwords-overview.md) regarding passwords.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ You can use your password manager to organize other authentication methods too! Just add the new entry and fill the appropriate fields, you can add notes for things like security questions or a backup key.
+
+You will be responsible for managing your login credentials. For added security, you can set up [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md) on your accounts.
+
+[Recommended password managers](../passwords.md ""){.md-button}
+
+#### Email aliases
+
+If you don't want to give your real email address to a service, you have the option to use an alias. We described them in more detail on our email services recommendation page. Essentially, alias services allow you to generate new email addresses that forward all emails to your main address. This can help prevent tracking across services and help you manage the marketing emails that sometimes come with the sign up process. Those can be filtered automatically based on the alias they are sent to.
+
+Should a service get hacked, you might start receiving phishing or spam emails to the address you used to sign up. Using unique aliases for each service can assist in identifying exactly what service was hacked.
+
+[Recommended email aliasing services](../email.md#email-aliasing-services ""){.md-button}
+
+### Single sign-on
+
+!!! note
+
+ We are discussing Single sign-on for personal use, not enterprise users.
+
+Single sign-on (SSO) is an authentication method that allows you to register for a service without sharing much information, if any. Whenever you see something along the lines of "Sign-in with *provider name*" on a registration form it's SSO.
+
+When you choose single sign-on in a website, it will prompt your SSO provider login page and after that your account will be connected. Your password won't be shared but some basic information will (you can review it during the login request). This process is needed every time you want to log in to the same account.
+
+The main advantages are:
+
+- **Security**: no risk of being involved in a [data breach](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_breach) because the website does not store your credentials.
+- **Ease of use**: multiple accounts are managed by a single login.
+
+But there are disadvantages:
+
+- **Privacy**: a SSO provider will know the services you use.
+- **Centralization**: if your SSO account gets compromised or you aren't able to login to it, all other accounts connected to it are affected.
+
+SSO can be especially useful in those situations where you could benefit from deeper integration between services. For example, one of those services may offer SSO for the others. Our recommendation is to limit SSO to only where you need it and protect the main account with [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md).
+
+All services that use SSO will be as secure as your SSO account. For example, if you want to secure an account with a hardware key but that service doesn't support hardware keys, you can secure your SSO account with a hardware key and now you essentially have hardware MFA on all your accounts. It is worth noting though that weak authentication on your SSO account means that any account tied to that login will also be weak.
+
+### Phone number
+
+We recommend avoiding services that require a phone number for sign up. A phone number can identity you across multiple services and depending on data sharing agreements this will make your usage easier to track, particularly if one of those services is breached as the phone number is often **not** encrypted.
+
+You should avoid giving out your real phone number if you can. Some services will allow the use of VOIP numbers, however these often trigger fraud detection systems, causing an account to be locked down, so we don't recommend that for important accounts.
+
+In many cases you will need to provide a number that you can receive SMS or calls from, particularly when shopping internationally, in case there is a problem with your order at border screening. It's common for services to use your number as a verification method; don't let yourself get locked out of an important account because you wanted to be clever and give a fake number!
+
+### Username and password
+
+Some services allow you to register without using an email address and only require you to set a username and password. These services may provide increased anonymity when combined with a VPN or Tor. Keep in mind that for these accounts there will most likely be **no way to recover your account** in the event you forget your username or password.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/basics/account-deletion.md b/i18n/de/basics/account-deletion.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d8f7cca28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/basics/account-deletion.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: "Account Deletion"
+icon: 'material/account-remove'
+---
+
+Over time, it can be easy to accumulate a number of online accounts, many of which you may no longer use. Deleting these unused accounts is an important step in reclaiming your privacy, as dormant accounts are vulnerable to data breaches. A data breach is when a service's security is compromised and protected information is viewed, transmitted, or stolen by unauthorized actors. Data breaches are unfortunately all [too common](https://haveibeenpwned.com/PwnedWebsites) these days, and so practicing good digital hygiene is the best way to minimize the impact they have on your life. The goal of this guide then is to help navigate you through the irksome process of account deletion, often made difficult by [deceptive design](https://www.deceptive.design/), for the betterment of your online presence.
+
+## Finding Old Accounts
+
+### Password Manager
+
+If you have a password manager that you've used for your entire digital life, this part will be very easy. Oftentimes, they include built-in functionality for detecting if your credentials were exposed in a data breach—such as Bitwarden's [Data Breach Report](https://bitwarden.com/blog/have-you-been-pwned/).
+
+
+ 
+
+
+Even if you haven't explicitly used a password manager before, there's a chance you've used the one in your browser or your phone without even realizing it. For example: [Firefox Password Manager](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/password-manager-remember-delete-edit-logins), [Google Password Manager](https://passwords.google.com/intro) and [Edge Password Manager](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-edge/save-or-forget-passwords-in-microsoft-edge-b4beecb0-f2a8-1ca0-f26f-9ec247a3f336).
+
+Desktop platforms also often have a password manager which may help you recover passwords you've forgotten about:
+
+- Windows [Credential Manager](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/accessing-credential-manager-1b5c916a-6a16-889f-8581-fc16e8165ac0)
+- macOS [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211145)
+- iOS [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211146)
+- Linux, Gnome Keyring, which can be accessed through [Seahorse](https://help.gnome.org/users/seahorse/stable/passwords-view.html.en) or [KDE Wallet Manager](https://userbase.kde.org/KDE_Wallet_Manager)
+
+### Email
+
+If you didn't use a password manager in the past or you think you have accounts that were never added to your password manager, another option is to search the email account(s) that you believe you signed up on. On your email client, search for keywords such as "verify" or "welcome." Almost every time you make an online account, the service will send a verification link or an introductory message to your email. This can be a good way to find old, forgotten accounts.
+
+## Deleting Old Accounts
+
+### Log In
+
+In order to delete your old accounts, you'll need to first make sure you can log in to them. Again, if the account was in your password manager, this step is easy. If not, you can try to guess your password. Failing that, there are typically options to regain access to your account, commonly available through a "forgot password" link on the login page. It may also be possible that accounts you've abandoned have already been deleted—sometimes services prune all old accounts.
+
+When attempting to regain access, if the site returns an error message saying that email is not associated with an account, or you never receive a reset link after multiple attempts, then you do not have an account under that email address and should try a different one. If you can't figure out which email address you used, or you no longer have access to that email, you can try contacting the service's customer support. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that you will be able to reclaim access your account.
+
+### GDPR (EEA residents only)
+
+Residents of the EEA have additional rights regarding data erasure specified in [Article 17](https://www.gdpr.org/regulation/article-17.html) of the GDPR. If it's applicable to you, read the privacy policy for any given service to find information on how to exercise your right to erasure. Reading the privacy policy can prove important, as some services have a "Delete Account" option that only disables your account and for real deletion you have to take additional action. Sometimes actual deletion may involve filling out surveys, emailing the data protection officer of the service or even proving your residence in the EEA. If you plan to go this way, do **not** overwrite account information—your identity as an EEA resident may be required. Note that the location of the service does not matter; GDPR applies to anyone serving European users. If the service does not respect your right to erasure, you can contact your national [Data Protection Authority](https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/rights-citizens/redress/what-should-i-do-if-i-think-my-personal-data-protection-rights-havent-been-respected_en) and you may be entitled to monetary compensation.
+
+### Overwriting Account information
+
+In some situations where you plan to abandon an account, it may make sense to overwrite the account information with fake data. Once you've made sure you can log in, change all the information in your account to falsified information. The reason for this is that many sites will retain information you previously had even after account deletion. The hope is that they will overwrite the previous information with the newest data you entered. However, there is no guarantee that there won't be backups with the prior information.
+
+For the account email, either create a new alternate email account via your provider of choice or create an alias using an [email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services). You can then delete your alternate email address once you are done. We recommend against using temporary email providers, as oftentimes it is possible to reactivate temporary emails.
+
+### Delete
+
+You can check [JustDeleteMe](https://justdeleteme.xyz) for instructions on deleting the account for a specific service. Some sites will graciously have a "Delete Account" option, while others will go as far as to force you to speak with a support agent. The deletion process can vary from site to site, with account deletion being impossible on some.
+
+For services that don't allow account deletion, the best thing to do is falsify all your information as previously mentioned and strengthen account security. To do so, enable [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md) and any extra security features offered. As well, change the password to a randomly-generated one that is the maximum allowed size (a [password manager](../passwords.md) can be useful for this).
+
+If you're satisfied that all information you care about is removed, you can safely forget about this account. If not, it might be a good idea to keep the credentials stored with your other passwords and occasionally re-login to reset the password.
+
+Even when you are able to delete an account, there is no guarantee that all your information will be removed. In fact, some companies are required by law to keep certain information, particularly when related to financial transactions. It's mostly out of your control what happens to your data when it comes to websites and cloud services.
+
+## Avoid New Accounts
+
+As the old saying goes, "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." Whenever you feel tempted to sign up for a new account, ask yourself, "Do I really need this? Can I accomplish what I need to without an account?" It can often be much harder to delete an account than to create one. And even after deleting or changing the info on your account, there might be a cached version from a third-party—like the [Internet Archive](https://archive.org/). Avoid the temptation when you're able to—your future self will thank you!
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/de/basics/common-misconceptions.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e7a13f6aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/basics/common-misconceptions.md
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+---
+title: "Common Misconceptions"
+icon: 'material/robot-confused'
+---
+
+## "Open-source software is always secure" or "Proprietary software is more secure"
+
+These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis.
+
+Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities into even large projects.[^1]
+
+On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering.
+
+To avoid biased decisions, it's *vital* that you evaluate the privacy and security standards of the software you use.
+
+## "Shifting trust can increase privacy"
+
+We talk about "shifting trust" a lot when discussing solutions like VPNs (which shift the trust you place in your ISP to the VPN provider). While this protects your browsing data from your ISP *specifically*, the VPN provider you choose still has access to your browsing data: Your data isn't completely secured from all parties. This means that:
+
+1. You must exercise caution when choosing a provider to shift trust to.
+2. You should still use other techniques, like E2EE, to protect your data completely. Merely distrusting one provider to trust another is not securing your data.
+
+## "Privacy-focused solutions are inherently trustworthy"
+
+Focusing solely on the privacy policies and marketing of a tool or provider can blind you to its weaknesses. When you're looking for a more private solution, you should determine what the underlying problem is and find technical solutions to that problem. For example, you may want to avoid Google Drive, which gives Google access to all of your data. The underlying problem in this case is lack of E2EE, so you should make sure that the provider you switch to actually implements E2EE, or use a tool (like [Cryptomator](../encryption.md#cryptomator-cloud)) which provides E2EE on any cloud provider. Switching to a "privacy-focused" provider (that doesn't implement E2EE) doesn't solve your problem: it just shifts trust from Google to that provider.
+
+The privacy policies and business practices of providers you choose are very important, but should be considered secondary to technical guarantees of your privacy: You shouldn't shift trust to another provider when trusting a provider isn't a requirement at all.
+
+## "Complicated is better"
+
+We often see people describing privacy threat models that are overly complex. Often, these solutions include problems like many different email accounts or complicated setups with lots of moving parts and conditions. The replies are usually answers to "What is the best way to do *X*?"
+
+Finding the "best" solution for yourself doesn't necessarily mean you are after an infallible solution with dozens of conditions—these solutions are often difficult to work with realistically. As we discussed previously, security often comes at the cost of convenience. Below, we provide some tips:
+
+1. ==Actions need to serve a particular purpose:== think about how to do what you want with the fewest actions.
+2. ==Remove human failure points:== We fail, get tired, and forget things. To maintain security, avoid relying on manual conditions and processes that you have to remember.
+3. ==Use the right level of protection for what you intend.== We often see recommendations of so-called law-enforcement or subpoena-proof solutions. These often require specialist knowledge and generally aren't what people want. There's no point in building an intricate threat model for anonymity if you can be easily de-anonymized by a simple oversight.
+
+So, how might this look?
+
+One of the clearest threat models is one where people *know who you are* and one where they do not. There will always be situations where you must declare your legal name and there are others where you don't need to.
+
+1. **Known identity** - A known identity is used for things where you must declare your name. There are many legal documents and contracts where a legal identity is required. This could range from opening a bank account, signing a property lease, obtaining a passport, customs declarations when importing items, or otherwise dealing with your government. These things will usually lead to credentials such as credit cards, credit rating checks, account numbers, and possibly physical addresses.
+
+ We don't suggest using a VPN or Tor for any of these things, as your identity is already known through other means.
+
+ !!! tip
+
+ When shopping online, the use of a [parcel locker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parcel_locker) can help keep your physical address private.
+
+2. **Unknown identity** - An unknown identity could be a stable pseudonym that you regularly use. It is not anonymous because it doesn't change. If you're part of an online community, you may wish to retain a persona that others know. This pseudonym isn't anonymous because—if monitored for long enough—details about the owner can reveal further information, such as the way they write, their general knowledge about topics of interest, etc.
+
+ You may wish to use a VPN for this, to mask your IP address. Financial transactions are more difficult to mask: You could consider using anonymous cryptocurrencies, such as [Monero](https://www.getmonero.org/). Employing altcoin shifting may also help to disguise where your currency originated. Typically, exchanges require KYC (know your customer) to be completed before they'll allow you to exchange fiat currency into any kind of cryptocurrency. Local meet-up options may also be a solution; however, those are often more expensive and sometimes also require KYC.
+
+3. **Anonymous identity** - Even with experience, anonymous identities are difficult to maintain over long periods of time. They should be short-term and short-lived identities which are rotated regularly.
+
+ Using Tor can help with this. It is also worth noting that greater anonymity is possible through asynchronous communication: Real-time communication is vulnerable to analysis of typing patterns (i.e. more than a paragraph of text, distributed on a forum, via email, etc.)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
+
+[^1]: One notable example of this is the [2021 incident in which University of Minnesota researchers introduced three vulnerabilities into the Linux kernel development project](https://cse.umn.edu/cs/linux-incident).
diff --git a/i18n/de/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/de/basics/common-threats.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..44b5add0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/basics/common-threats.md
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+---
+title: "Common Threats"
+icon: 'material/eye-outline'
+---
+
+Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside of these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat.
+
+- :material-incognito: Anonymity - Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically.
+- :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks - Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically.
+- :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks - Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once.
+- :material-server-network: Service Providers - Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server).
+- :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance - Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities.
+- :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism - Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors.
+- :material-account-search: Public Exposure - Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public.
+- :material-close-outline: Censorship - Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online.
+
+Some of these threats may be more important to you than others, depending on your specific concerns. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks, but they probably still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Similarly, many people may be primarily concerned with :material-account-search: Public Exposure of their personal data, but they should still be wary of security-focused issues, such as :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks—like malware affecting their devices.
+
+## Anonymity vs. Privacy
+
+:material-incognito: Anonymity
+
+Anonymity is often confused with privacy, but they're distinct concepts. While privacy is a set of choices you make about how your data is used and shared, anonymity is the complete disassociation of your online activities from your real identity.
+
+Whistleblowers and journalists, for example, can have a much more extreme threat model which requires total anonymity. That's not only hiding what they do, what data they have, and not getting hacked by malicious actors or governments, but also hiding who they are entirely. They will often sacrifice any kind of convenience if it means protecting their anonymity, privacy, or security, because their lives could depend on it. Most people don't need to go so far.
+
+## Security and Privacy
+
+:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks
+
+Security and privacy are also often confused, because you need security to obtain any semblance of privacy: Using tools—even if they're private by design—is futile if they could be easily exploited by attackers who later release your data. However, the inverse isn't necessarily true: The most secure service in the world *isn't necessarily* private. The best example of this is trusting data to Google who, given their scale, have had few security incidents by employing industry-leading security experts to secure their infrastructure. Even though Google provides very secure services, very few people would consider their data private in Google's free consumer products (Gmail, YouTube, etc.)
+
+When it comes to application security, we generally don't (and sometimes can't) know if the software we use is malicious, or might one day become malicious. Even with the most trustworthy developers, there's generally no guarantee that their software doesn't have a serious vulnerability that could later be exploited.
+
+To minimize the damage that a malicious piece of software *could* do, you should employ security by compartmentalization. For example, this could come in the form of using different computers for different jobs, using virtual machines to separate different groups of related applications, or using a secure operating system with a strong focus on application sandboxing and mandatory access control.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Mobile operating systems generally have better application sandboxing than desktop operating systems: Apps can't obtain root access, and require permission for access to system resources.
+
+ Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS has similar sandboxing capabilities to Android, and macOS has full system permission control (and developers can opt-in to sandboxing for applications). However, these operating systems do transmit identifying information to their respective OEMs. Linux tends to not submit information to system vendors, but it has poor protection against exploits and malicious apps. This can be mitigated somewhat with specialized distributions which make significant use of virtual machines or containers, such as [Qubes OS](../../desktop/#qubes-os).
+
+:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks
+
+Targeted attacks against a specific person are more problematic to deal with. Common attacks include sending malicious documents via email, exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g. in browsers and operating systems), and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you should employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typically run untrusted code, sent to you from third parties. Running multiple virtual machines—to separate applications like these from your host system, as well as each other—is one technique you can use to mitigate the chance of an exploit in these applications compromising the rest of your system. For example, technologies like Qubes OS or Microsoft Defender Application Guard on Windows provide convenient methods to do this.
+
+If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user.
+
+## Privacy From Service Providers
+
+:material-server-network: Service Providers
+
+We live in a world where almost everything is connected to the internet. Our "private" messages, emails, and social interactions are typically stored on a server, somewhere. Generally, when you send someone a message it's stored on a server, and when your friend wants to read the message the server will show it to them.
+
+The obvious problem with this is that the service provider (or a hacker who has compromised the server) can access your conversations whenever and however they want, without you ever knowing. This applies to many common services, like SMS messaging, Telegram, and Discord.
+
+Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between you and your desired recipients before they are even sent to the server. The confidentiality of your messages is guaranteed, assuming the service provider doesn't have access to the private keys of either party.
+
+!!! note "Note on Web-based Encryption"
+
+ In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering).
+
+ On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt.
+
+ Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible.
+
+Even with E2EE, service providers can still profile you based on **metadata**, which typically isn't protected. While the service provider can't read your messages, they can still observe important things, such as who you're talking to, how often you message them, and when you're typically active. Protection of metadata is fairly uncommon, and—if it's within your [threat model](threat-modeling.md)—you should pay close attention to the technical documentation of the software you're using to see if there's any metadata minimization or protection at all.
+
+## Mass Surveillance Programs
+
+:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance
+
+Mass surveillance is the intricate effort to monitor the "behavior, many activities, or information" of an entire (or substantial fraction of a) population.[^1] It often refers to government programs, such as the ones [disclosed by Edward Snowden in 2013](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_surveillance_disclosures_(2013%E2%80%93present)). However, it can also be carried out by corporations, either on behalf of government agencies or by their own initiative.
+
+!!! abstract "Atlas of Surveillance"
+
+ If you want to learn more about surveillance methods and how they're implemented in your city you can also take a look at the [Atlas of Surveillance](https://atlasofsurveillance.org/) by the [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.eff.org/).
+
+ In France you can take a look at the [Technolopolice website](https://technopolice.fr/villes/) maintained by the non-profit association La Quadrature du Net.
+
+Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, breaching human rights, it's most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.
+
+!!! quote "ACLU: [*The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward*](https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/the-privacy-lesson-of-9-11-mass-surveillance-is-not-the-way-forward)"
+
+ In the face of [Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRISM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM) and [Upstream](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upstream_collection)], intelligence officials also admitted that the NSA had for years been secretly collecting records about virtually every American’s phone calls — who’s calling whom, when those calls are made, and how long they last. This kind of information, when amassed by the NSA day after day, can reveal incredibly sensitive details about people’s lives and associations, such as whether they have called a pastor, an abortion provider, an addiction counselor, or a suicide hotline.
+
+Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^2]
+
+Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods:
+
+- Your IP address
+- Browser cookies
+- The data you submit to websites
+- Your browser or device fingerprint
+- Payment method correlation
+
+\[This list isn't exhaustive].
+
+If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategues like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information.
+
+:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism
+
+> Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^3]
+
+For many people, tracking and surveillance by private corporations is a growing concern. Pervasive ad networks, such as those operated by Google and Facebook, span the internet far beyond just the sites they control, tracking your actions along the way. Using tools like content blockers to limit network requests to their servers, and reading the privacy policies of the services you use can help you avoid many basic adversaries (although it can't completely prevent tracking).[^4]
+
+Additionally, even companies outside of the *AdTech* or tracking industry can share your information with [data brokers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_broker) (such as Cambridge Analytica, Experian, or Datalogix) or other parties. You can't automatically assume your data is safe just because the service you're using doesn't fall within the typical AdTech or tracking business model. The strongest protection against corporate data collection is to encrypt or obfuscate your data whenever possible, making it difficult for different providers to correlate data with each other and build a profile on you.
+
+## Limiting Public Information
+
+:material-account-search: Public Exposure
+
+The best way to keep your data private is simply not making it public in the first place. Deleting unwanted information you find about yourself online is one of the best first steps you can take to regain your privacy.
+
+- [View our guide on account deletion :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](account-deletion.md)
+
+On sites where you do share information, checking the privacy settings of your account to limit how widely that data is spread is very important. For example, enable "private mode" on your accounts if given the option: This ensures that your account isn't being indexed by search engines, and that it can't be viewed without your permission.
+
+If you've already submitted your real information to sites which shouldn't have it, consider using disinformation tactics, like submitting fictitious information related to that online identity. This makes your real information indistinguishable from the false information.
+
+## Avoiding Censorship
+
+:material-close-outline: Censorship
+
+Censorship online can be carried out (to varying degrees) by actors including totalitarian governments, network administrators, and service providers. These efforts to control communication and restrict access to information will always be incompatible with the human right to Freedom of Expression.[^5]
+
+Censorship on corporate platforms is increasingly common, as platforms like Twitter and Facebook give in to public demand, market pressures, and pressures from government agencies. Government pressures can be covert requests to businesses, such as the White House [requesting the takedown](https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/technology/on-the-web-a-fine-line-on-free-speech-across-globe.html) of a provocative YouTube video, or overt, such as the Chinese government requiring companies to adhere to a strict regime of censorship.
+
+People concerned with the threat of censorship can use technologies like [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) to circumvent it, and support censorship-resistant communication platforms like [Matrix](../real-time-communication.md#element), which doesn't have a centralized account authority that can close accounts arbitrarily.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ While evading censorship itself can be easy, hiding the fact that you are doing it can be very problematic.
+
+ You should consider which aspects of the network your adversary can observe, and whether you have plausible deniability for your actions. For example, using [encrypted DNS](../advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns) can help you bypass rudimentary, DNS-based censorship systems, but it can't truly hide what you are visiting from your ISP. A VPN or Tor can help hide what you are visiting from network administrators, but can't hide that you're using those networks in the first place. Pluggable transports (such as Obfs4proxy, Meek, or Shadowsocks) can help you evade firewalls that block common VPN protocols or Tor, but your circumvention attempts can still be detected by methods like probing or [deep packet inspection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection).
+
+You must always consider the risks of trying to bypass censorship, the potential consequences, and how sophisticated your adversary may be. You should be cautious with your software selection, and have a backup plan in case you are caught.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
+
+[^1]: Wikipedia: [*Mass Surveillance*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass_surveillance) and [*Surveillance*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance).
+[^2]: United States Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: [*Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215*](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/ec542143-1079-424a-84b3-acc354698560/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf)
+[^3]: Wikipedia: [*Surveillance capitalism*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance_capitalism)
+[^4]: "[Enumerating badness](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/)" (or, "listing all the bad things that we know about"), as many adblockers and antivirus programs do, fails to adequately protect you from new and unknown threats because they have not yet been added to the filter list. You should also employ other mitigation techniques.
+[^5]: United Nations: [*Universal Declaration of Human Rights*](https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights).
diff --git a/i18n/de/basics/email-security.md b/i18n/de/basics/email-security.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c35848181
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/basics/email-security.md
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+---
+title: Email Security
+icon: material/email
+---
+
+Email is an insecure form of communication by default. You can improve your email security with tools such as OpenPGP, which add End-to-End Encryption to your messages, but OpenPGP still has a number of drawbacks compared to encryption in other messaging applications, and some email data can never be encrypted inherently due to how email is designed.
+
+As a result, email is best used for receiving transactional emails (like notifications, verification emails, password resets, etc.) from the services you sign up for online, not for communicating with others.
+
+## Email Encryption Overview
+
+The standard way to add E2EE to emails between different email providers is by using OpenPGP. There are different implementations of the OpenPGP standard, the most common being [GnuPG](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard) and [OpenPGP.js](https://openpgpjs.org).
+
+There is another standard which is popular with business called [S/MIME](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME), however, it requires a certificate issued from a [Certificate Authority](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) (not all of them issue S/MIME certificates). It has support in [Google Workplace](https://support.google.com/a/topic/9061730?hl=en&ref_topic=9061731) and [Outlook for Web or Exchange Server 2016, 2019](https://support.office.com/en-us/article/encrypt-messages-by-using-s-mime-in-outlook-on-the-web-878c79fc-7088-4b39-966f-14512658f480).
+
+Even if you use OpenPGP, it does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. This is why we recommend [instant messengers](../real-time-communication.md) which implement forward secrecy over email for person-to-person communications whenever possible.
+
+### What Email Clients Support E2EE?
+
+Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md). Depending on the authentication method, this may lead to the decrease security if either the provider or the email client does not support OATH or a bridge application as [multi-factor authentication](multi-factor-authentication.md) is not possible with plain password authentication.
+
+### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
+
+A smartcard (such as a [Yubikey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
+
+It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard so as to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.
+
+## Email Metadata Overview
+
+Email metadata is stored in the [message header](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) of the email message and includes some visible headers that you may have seen such as: `To`, `From`, `Cc`, `Date`, `Subject`. There are also a number of hidden headers included by many email clients and providers that can reveal information about your account.
+
+Client software may use email metadata to show who a message is from and what time it was received. Servers may use it to determine where an email message must be sent, among [other purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) which are not always transparent.
+
+### Who Can View Email Metadata?
+
+Email metadata is protected from outside observers with [Opportunistic TLS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunistic_TLS) protecting it from outside observers, but it is still able to be seen by your email client software (or webmail) and any servers relaying the message from you to any recipients including your email provider. Sometimes email servers will also use third-party services to protect against spam, which generally also have access to your messages.
+
+### Why Can't Metadata be E2EE?
+
+Email metadata is crucial to the most basic functionality of email (where it came from, and where it has to go). E2EE was not built into the email protocols originally, instead requiring add-on software like OpenPGP. Because OpenPGP messages still have to work with traditional email providers, it cannot encrypt email metadata, only the message body itself. That means that even when using OpenPGP, outside observers can see lots of information about your messages, such as who you're emailing, the subject lines, when you're emailing, etc.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md b/i18n/de/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5dc67b88f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+---
+title: "Multi-Factor Authentication"
+icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication'
+---
+
+**Multi-Factor Authentication** (**MFA**) is a security mechanism that requires additional steps beyond entering your username (or email) and password. The most common method is time limited codes you might receive from SMS or an app.
+
+Normally, if a hacker (or adversary) is able to figure out your password then they’d gain access to the account that password belongs to. An account with MFA forces the hacker to have both the password (something you *know*) and a device that you own (something you *have*), like your phone.
+
+MFA methods vary in security, but are based on the premise that the more difficult it is for an attacker to gain access to your MFA method, the better. Examples of MFA methods (from weakest to strongest) include SMS, Email codes, app push notifications, TOTP, Yubico OTP and FIDO.
+
+## MFA Method Comparison
+
+### SMS or Email MFA
+
+Receiving OTP codes via SMS or email are one of the weaker ways to secure your accounts with MFA. Obtaining a code by email or SMS takes away from the "something you *have*" idea, because there are a variety of ways a hacker could [take over your phone number](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam) or gain access to your email without having physical access to any of your devices at all. If an unauthorized person gained access to your email, they would be able to use that access to both reset your password and receive the authentication code, giving them full access to your account.
+
+### Push Notifications
+
+Push notification MFA takes the form of a message being sent to an app on your phone asking you to confirm new account logins. This method is a lot better than SMS or email, since an attacker typically wouldn't be able to get these push notifications without having an already logged-in device, which means they would need to compromise one of your other devices first.
+
+We all make mistakes, and there is the risk that you might accept the login attempt by accident. Push notification login authorizations are typically sent to *all* your devices at once, widening the availability of the MFA code if you have many devices.
+
+The security of push notification MFA is dependent on both the quality of the app, the server component and the trust of the developer who produces it. Installing an app may also require you to accept invasive privileges that grant access to other data on your device. An individual app also requires that you have a specific app for each service which may not require a password to open, unlike a good TOTP generator app.
+
+### Time-based One-time Password (TOTP)
+
+TOTP is one of the most common forms of MFA available. When you set up TOTP, you are generally required to scan a [QR Code](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QR_code) which establishes a "[shared secret](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_secret)" with the service that you intend to use. The shared secret is secured inside of the authenticator app's data, and is sometimes protected by a password.
+
+The time-limited code is then derived from the shared secret and the current time. As the code is only valid for a short time, without access to the shared secret, an adversary cannot generate new codes.
+
+If you have a hardware security key with TOTP support (such as a YubiKey with [Yubico Authenticator](https://www.yubico.com/products/yubico-authenticator/)), we recommend that you store your "shared secrets" on the hardware. Hardware such as the YubiKey was developed with the intention of making the "shared secret" difficult to extract and copy. A YubiKey is also not connected to the Internet, unlike a phone with a TOTP app.
+
+Unlike [WebAuthn](#fido-fast-identity-online), TOTP offers no protection against [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing) or reuse attacks. If an adversary obtains a valid code from you, they may use it as many times as they like until it expires (generally 60 seconds).
+
+An adversary could set up a website to imitate an official service in an attempt to trick you into giving out your username, password and current TOTP code. If the adversary then uses those recorded credentials they may be able to log into the real service and hijack the account.
+
+Although not perfect, TOTP is secure enough for most people, and when [hardware security keys](../multi-factor-authentication.md#hardware-security-keys) are not supported [authenticator apps](../multi-factor-authentication.md#authenticator-apps) are still a good option.
+
+### Hardware security keys
+
+The YubiKey stores data on a tamper-resistant solid-state chip which is [impossible to access](https://security.stackexchange.com/a/245772) non-destructively without an expensive process and a forensics laboratory.
+
+These keys are generally multi-function and provide a number of methods to authenticate. Below are the most common ones.
+
+#### Yubico OTP
+
+Yubico OTP is an authentication protocol typically implemented in hardware security keys. When you decide to use Yubico OTP, the key will generate a public ID, private ID, and a Secret Key which is then uploaded to the Yubico OTP server.
+
+When logging into a website, all you need to do is to physically touch the security key. The security key will emulate a keyboard and print out a one-time password into the password field.
+
+The service will then forward the one-time password to the Yubico OTP server for validation. A counter is incremented both on the key and Yubico's validation server. The OTP can only be used once, and when a successful authentication occurs, the counter is increased which prevents reuse of the OTP. Yubico provides a [detailed document](https://developers.yubico.com/OTP/OTPs_Explained.html) about the process.
+
+
+ 
+
+
+There are some benefits and disadvantages to using Yubico OTP when compared to TOTP.
+
+The Yubico validation server is a cloud based service, and you're placing trust in Yubico that they are storing data securely and not profiling you. The public ID associated with Yubico OTP is reused on every website and could be another avenue for third-parties to profile you. Like TOTP, Yubico OTP does not provide phishing resistance.
+
+If your threat model requires you to have different identities on different websites, **do not** use Yubico OTP with the same hardware security key across those websites as public ID is unique to each security key.
+
+#### FIDO (Fast IDentity Online)
+
+[FIDO](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIDO_Alliance) includes a number of standards, first there was U2F and then later [FIDO2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIDO2_Project) which includes the web standard [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn).
+
+U2F and FIDO2 refer to the [Client to Authenticator Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Client_to_Authenticator_Protocol), which is the protocol between the security key and the computer, such as a laptop or phone. It complements WebAuthn which is the component used to authenticate with the website (the "Relying Party") you're trying to log in on.
+
+WebAuthn is the most secure and private form of second factor authentication. While the authentication experience is similar to Yubico OTP, the key does not print out a one-time password and validate with a third-party server. Instead, it uses [public key cryptography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography) for authentication.
+
+
+ 
+
+
+When you create an account, the public key is sent to the service, then when you log in, the service will require you to "sign" some data with your private key. The benefit of this is that no password data is ever stored by the service, so there is nothing for an adversary to steal.
+
+This presentation discusses the history of password authentication, the pitfalls (such as password reuse), and discussion of FIDO2 and [WebAuthn](https://webauthn.guide) standards.
+
+
+
+
+
+FIDO2 and WebAuthn have superior security and privacy properties when compared to any MFA methods.
+
+Typically for web services it is used with WebAuthn which is a part of the [W3C recommendations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Wide_Web_Consortium#W3C_recommendation_(REC)). It uses public key authentication and is more secure than shared secrets used in Yubico OTP and TOTP methods, as it includes the origin name (usually, the domain name) during authentication. Attestation is provided to protect you from phishing attacks, as it helps you to determine that you are using the authentic service and not a fake copy.
+
+Unlike Yubico OTP, WebAuthn does not use any public ID, so the key is **not** identifiable across different websites. It also does not use any third-party cloud server for authentication. All communication is completed between the key and the website you are logging into. FIDO also uses a counter which is incremented upon use in order to prevent session reuse and cloned keys.
+
+If a website or service supports WebAuthn for the authentication, it is highly recommended that you use it over any other form of MFA.
+
+## General Recommendations
+
+We have these general recommendations:
+
+### Which Method Should I Use?
+
+When configuring your MFA method, keep in mind that it is only as secure as your weakest authentication method you use. This means it is important that you only use the best MFA method available. For instance, if you are already using TOTP, you should disable email and SMS MFA. If you are already using FIDO2/WebAuthn, you should not be using Yubico OTP or TOTP on your account.
+
+### Backups
+
+You should always have backups for your MFA method. Hardware security keys can get lost, stolen or simply stop working over time. It is recommended that you have a pair of hardware security keys with the same access to your accounts instead of just one.
+
+When using TOTP with an authenticator app, be sure to back up your recovery keys or the app itself, or copy the "shared secrets" to another instance of the app on a different phone or to an encrypted container (e.g. [VeraCrypt](../encryption.md#veracrypt)).
+
+### Initial Set Up
+
+When buying a security key, it is important that you change the default credentials, set up password protection for the key, and enable touch confirmation if your key supports it. Products such as the YubiKey have multiple interfaces with separate credentials for each one of them, so you should go over each interface and set up protection as well.
+
+### Email and SMS
+
+If you have to use email for MFA, make sure that the email account itself is secured with a proper MFA method.
+
+If you use SMS MFA, use a carrier who will not switch your phone number to a new SIM card without account access, or use a dedicated VoIP number from a provider with similar security to avoid a [SIM swap attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam).
+
+[MFA tools we recommend](../multi-factor-authentication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## More Places to Set Up MFA
+
+Beyond just securing your website logins, multi-factor authentication can be used to secure your local logins, SSH keys or even password databases as well.
+
+### Windows
+
+Yubico has a dedicated [Credential Provider](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/credential-providers-in-windows) that adds Challenge-Response authentication for the username + password login flow for local Windows accounts. If you have a YubiKey with Challenge-Response authentication support, take a look at the [Yubico Login for Windows Configuration Guide](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013708460-Yubico-Login-for-Windows-Configuration-Guide), which will allow you to set up MFA on your Windows computer.
+
+### macOS
+
+macOS has [native support](https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/intro-to-smart-card-integration-depd0b888248/web) for authentication with smart cards (PIV). If you have a smartcard or a hardware security key that supports the PIV interface such as the YubiKey, we recommend that you follow your smartcard/hardware security vendor's documentation and set up second factor authentication for your macOS computer.
+
+Yubico have a guide [Using Your YubiKey as a Smart Card in macOS](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016649059) which can help you set up your YubiKey on macOS.
+
+After your smartcard/security key is set up, we recommend running this command in the Terminal:
+
+```text
+sudo defaults write /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow DisableFDEAutoLogin -bool YES
+```
+
+The command will prevent an adversary from bypassing MFA when the computer boots.
+
+### Linux
+
+!!! warning
+
+ If the hostname of your system changes (such as due to DHCP), you would be unable to login. It is vital that you set up a proper hostname for your computer before following this guide.
+
+The `pam_u2f` module on Linux can provide two-factor authentication for logging in on most popular Linux distributions. If you have a hardware security key that supports U2F, you can set up MFA authentication for your login. Yubico has a guide [Ubuntu Linux Login Guide - U2F](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016649099-Ubuntu-Linux-Login-Guide-U2F) which should work on any distribution. The package manager commands—such as `apt-get`—and package names may however differ. This guide does **not** apply to Qubes OS.
+
+### Qubes OS
+
+Qubes OS has support for Challenge-Response authentication with YubiKeys. If you have a YubiKey with Challenge-Response authentication support, take a look at the Qubes OS [YubiKey documentation](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/yubikey/) if you want to set up MFA on Qubes OS.
+
+### SSH
+
+#### Hardware Security Keys
+
+SSH MFA could be set up using multiple different authentication methods that are popular with hardware security keys. We recommend that you check out Yubico's [documentation](https://developers.yubico.com/SSH/) on how to set this up.
+
+#### Time-based One-time Password (TOTP)
+
+SSH MFA can also be set up using TOTP. DigitalOcean has provided a tutorial [How To Set Up Multi-Factor Authentication for SSH on Ubuntu 20.04](https://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/how-to-set-up-multi-factor-authentication-for-ssh-on-ubuntu-20-04). Most things should be the same regardless of distribution, however the package manager commands—such as `apt-get`—and package names may differ.
+
+### KeePass (and KeePassXC)
+
+KeePass and KeePassXC databases can be secured using Challenge-Response or HOTP as a second-factor authentication. Yubico has provided a document for KeePass [Using Your YubiKey with KeePass](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013779759-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-KeePass) and there is also one on the [KeePassXC](https://keepassxc.org/docs/#faq-yubikey-2fa) website.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/basics/passwords-overview.md b/i18n/de/basics/passwords-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b65268038
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/basics/passwords-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+---
+title: "Introduction to Passwords"
+icon: 'material/form-textbox-password'
+---
+
+Passwords are an essential part of our everyday digital lives. We use them to protect our accounts, our devices and our secrets. Despite often being the only thing between us and an adversary who's after our private information, not a lot of thought is put into them, which often leads to people using passwords that can be easily guessed or brute-forced.
+
+## Best Practices
+
+### Use unique passwords for every service
+
+Imagine this; you sign up for an account with the same e-mail and password on multiple online services. If one of those service providers is malicious, or their service has a data breach that exposes your password in an unencrypted format, all a bad actor would have to do is try that e-mail and password combination across multiple popular services until they get a hit. It doesn't matter how strong that one password is, because they already have it.
+
+This is called [credential stuffing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credential_stuffing), and it is one of the most common ways that your accounts can be compromised by bad actors. To avoid this, make sure that you never re-use your passwords.
+
+### Use randomly generated passwords
+
+==You should **never** rely on yourself to come up with a good password.== We recommend using [randomly generated passwords](#passwords) or [diceware passphrases](#diceware-passphrases) with sufficient entropy to protect your accounts and devices.
+
+All of our [recommended password managers](../passwords.md) include a built-in password generator that you can use.
+
+### Rotating Passwords
+
+You should avoid changing passwords that you have to remember (such as your password manager's master password) too often unless you have reason to believe it has been compromised, as changing it too often exposes you to the risk of forgetting it.
+
+When it comes to passwords that you don't have to remember (such as passwords stored inside your password manager), if your [threat model](threat-modeling.md) calls for it, we recommend going through important accounts (especially accounts that don't use multi-factor authentication) and changing their password every couple of months, in case they have been compromised in a data breach that hasn't become public yet. Most password managers allow you to set an expiry date for your password to make this easier to manage.
+
+!!! tip "Checking for data breaches"
+
+ If your password manager lets you check for compromised passwords, make sure to do so and promptly change any password that may have been exposed in a data breach. Alternatively, you could follow [Have I Been Pwned's Latest Breaches feed](https://feeds.feedburner.com/HaveIBeenPwnedLatestBreaches) with the help of a [news aggregator](../news-aggregators.md).
+
+## Creating strong passwords
+
+### Passwords
+
+A lot of services impose certain criteria when it comes to passwords, including a minimum or maximum length, as well as which special characters, if any, can be used. You should use your password manager's built-in password generator to create passwords that are as long and complex as the service will allow by including capitalized and lowercase letters, numbers and special characters.
+
+If you need a password you can memorize, we recommend a [diceware passphrase](#diceware-passphrases).
+
+### Diceware Passphrases
+
+Diceware is a method for creating passphrases which are easy to remember, but hard to guess.
+
+Diceware passphrases are a great option when you need to memorize or manually input your credentials, such as for your password manager's master password or your device's encryption password.
+
+An example of a diceware passphrase is `viewable fastness reluctant squishy seventeen shown pencil`.
+
+To generate a diceware passphrase using real dice, follow these steps:
+
+!!! note
+
+ These instructions assume that you are using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate the passphrase, which requires five dice rolls per word. Other wordlists may require more or less rolls per word, and may require a different amount of words to achieve the same entropy.
+
+1. Roll a six-sided die five times, noting down the number after each roll.
+
+2. As an example, let's say you rolled `2-5-2-6-6`. Look through the [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) for the word that corresponds to `25266`.
+
+3. You will find the word `encrypt`. Write that word down.
+
+4. Repeat this process until your passphrase has as many words as you need, which you should separate with a space.
+
+!!! warning "Important"
+
+ You should **not** re-roll words until you get a combination of words that appeal to you. The process should be completely random.
+
+If you don't have access to or would prefer to not use real dice, you can use your password manager's built-in password generator, as most of them have the option to generate diceware passphrases in addition to regular passwords.
+
+We recommend using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate your diceware passphrases, as it offers the exact same security as the original list, while containing words that are easier to memorize. There are also [other wordlists in different languages](https://theworld.com/~reinhold/diceware.html#Diceware%20in%20Other%20Languages|outline), if you do not want your passphrase to be in English.
+
+??? note "Explanation of entropy and strength of diceware passphrases"
+
+ To demonstrate how strong diceware passphrases are, we'll use the aforementioned seven word passphrase (`viewable fastness reluctant squishy seventeen shown pencil`) and [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) as an example.
+
+ One metric to determine the strength of a diceware passphrase is how much entropy it has. The entropy per word in a diceware passphrase is calculated as $\text{log}_2(\text{WordsInList})$ and the overall entropy of the passphrase is calculated as $\text{log}_2(\text{WordsInList}^\text{WordsInPhrase})$.
+
+ Therefore, each word in the aforementioned list results in ~12.9 bits of entropy ($\text{log}_2(7776)$), and a seven word passphrase derived from it has ~90.47 bits of entropy ($\text{log}_2(7776^7)$).
+
+ The [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) contains 7776 unique words. To calculate the amount of possible passphrases, all we have to do is $\text{WordsInList}^\text{WordsInPhrase}$, or in our case, $7776^7$.
+
+ Let's put all of this in perspective: A seven word passphrase using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) is one of ~1,719,070,799,748,422,500,000,000,000 possible passphrases.
+
+ On average, it takes trying 50% of all the possible combinations to guess your phrase. With that in mind, even if your adversary is capable of ~1,000,000,000,000 guesses per second, it would still take them ~27,255,689 years to guess your passphrase. That is the case even if the following things are true:
+
+ - Your adversary knows that you used the diceware method.
+ - Your adversary knows the specific wordlist that you used.
+ - Your adversary knows how many words your passphrase contains.
+
+To sum it up, diceware passphrases are your best option when you need something that is both easy to remember *and* exceptionally strong.
+
+## Storing Passwords
+
+### Password Managers
+
+The best way to store your passwords is by using a password manager. They allow you to store your passwords in a file or in the cloud and protect them with a single master password. That way, you will only have to remember one strong password, which lets you access the rest of them.
+
+There are many good options to choose from, both cloud-based and local. Choose one of our recommended password managers and use it to establish strong passwords across all of your accounts. We recommend securing your password manager with a [diceware passphrase](#diceware-passphrases) comprised of at least seven words.
+
+[List of recommended password managers](../passwords.md ""){.md-button}
+
+!!! warning "Don't place your passwords and TOTP tokens inside the same password manager"
+
+ When using TOTP codes as [multi-factor authentication](../multi-factor-authentication.md), the best security practice is to keep your TOTP codes in a [separate app](../multi-factor-authentication.md#authenticator-apps).
+
+ Storing your TOTP tokens in the same place as your passwords, while convenient, reduces the accounts to a single factor in the event that an adversary gains access to your password manager.
+
+ Furthermore, we do not recommend storing single-use recovery codes in your password manager. Those should be stored separately such as in an encrypted container on an offline storage device.
+
+### Backups
+
+You should store an [encrypted](../encryption.md) backup of your passwords on multiple storage devices or a cloud storage provider. This can help you access your passwords if something happens to your primary device or the service you are using.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/basics/threat-modeling.md b/i18n/de/basics/threat-modeling.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0d7ff8cf1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/basics/threat-modeling.md
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+---
+title: "Threat Modeling"
+icon: 'material/target-account'
+---
+
+Balancing security, privacy, and usability is one of the first and most difficult tasks you'll face on your privacy journey. Everything is a trade-off: The more secure something is, the more restricting or inconvenient it generally is, etc. Often, people find that the problem with the tools they see recommended is that they're just too hard to start using!
+
+If you wanted to use the **most** secure tools available, you'd have to sacrifice *a lot* of usability. And, even then, ==nothing is ever fully secure.== There's **high** security, but never **full** security. That's why threat models are important.
+
+**So, what are these threat models, anyway?**
+
+==A threat model is a list of the most probable threats to your security and privacy endeavors.== Since it's impossible to protect yourself against **every** attack(er), you should focus on the **most probable** threats. In computer security, a threat is an event that could undermine your efforts to stay private and secure.
+
+Focusing on the threats that matter to you narrows down your thinking about the protection you need, so you can choose the tools that are right for the job.
+
+## Creating Your Threat Model
+
+To identify what could happen to the things you value and determine from whom you need to protect them, you should answer these five questions:
+
+1. What do I want to protect?
+2. Who do I want to protect it from?
+3. How likely is it that I will need to protect it?
+4. How bad are the consequences if I fail?
+5. How much trouble am I willing to go through to try to prevent potential consequences?
+
+### What do I want to protect?
+
+An “asset” is something you value and want to protect. In the context of digital security, ==an asset is usually some kind of information.== For example, your emails, contact lists, instant messages, location, and files are all possible assets. Your devices themselves may also be assets.
+
+*Make a list of your assets: data that you keep, where it's kept, who has access to it, and what stops others from accessing it.*
+
+### Who do I want to protect it from?
+
+To answer this question, it's important to identify who might want to target you or your information. ==A person or entity that poses a threat to your assets is an “adversary”.== Examples of potential adversaries are your boss, your former partner, your business competition, your government, or a hacker on a public network.
+
+*Make a list of your adversaries or those who might want to get ahold of your assets. Your list may include individuals, a government agency, or corporations.*
+
+Depending on who your adversaries are, under some circumstances, this list might be something you want to destroy after you're done security planning.
+
+### How likely is it that I will need to protect it?
+
+==Risk is the likelihood that a particular threat against a particular asset will actually occur.== It goes hand-in-hand with capability. While your mobile phone provider has the capability to access all of your data, the risk of them posting your private data online to harm your reputation is low.
+
+It is important to distinguish between what might happen and the probability it may happen. For instance, there is a threat that your building might collapse, but the risk of this happening is far greater in San Francisco (where earthquakes are common) than in Stockholm (where they are not).
+
+Assessing risks is both a personal and subjective process. Many people find certain threats unacceptable, no matter the likelihood they will occur, because the mere presence of the threat is not worth the cost. In other cases, people disregard high risks because they don't view the threat as a problem.
+
+*Write down which threats you are going to take seriously, and which may be too rare or too harmless (or too difficult to combat) to worry about.*
+
+### How bad are the consequences if I fail?
+
+There are many ways that an adversary could gain access to your data. For example, an adversary can read your private communications as they pass through the network, or they can delete or corrupt your data.
+
+==The motives of adversaries differ widely, as do their tactics.== A government trying to prevent the spread of a video showing police violence may be content to simply delete or reduce the availability of that video. In contrast, a political opponent may wish to gain access to secret content and publish that content without you knowing.
+
+Security planning involves understanding how bad the consequences could be if an adversary successfully gains access to one of your assets. To determine this, you should consider the capability of your adversary. For example, your mobile phone provider has access to all of your phone records. A hacker on an open Wi-Fi network can access your unencrypted communications. Your government might have stronger capabilities.
+
+*Write down what your adversary might want to do with your private data.*
+
+### How much trouble am I willing to go through to try to prevent potential consequences?
+
+==There is no perfect option for security.== Not everyone has the same priorities, concerns, or access to resources. Your risk assessment will allow you to plan the right strategy for you, balancing convenience, cost, and privacy.
+
+For example, an attorney representing a client in a national security case may be willing to go to greater lengths to protect communications about that case, such as using encrypted email, than a mother who regularly emails her daughter funny cat videos.
+
+*Write down what options you have available to you to help mitigate your unique threats. Note if you have any financial constraints, technical constraints, or social constraints.*
+
+### Try it yourself: Protecting Your Belongings
+
+These questions can apply to a wide variety of situations, online and offline. As a generic demonstration of how these questions work, let's build a plan to keep your house and possessions safe.
+
+**What do you want to protect? (Or, *what do you have that is worth protecting?*)**
+:
+
+Your assets might include jewelry, electronics, important documents, or photos.
+
+**Who do you want to protect it from?**
+:
+
+Your adversaries might include burglars, roommates, or guests.
+
+**How likely is it that you will need to protect it?**
+:
+
+Does your neighborhood have a history of burglaries? How trustworthy are your roommates or guests? What are the capabilities of your adversaries? What are the risks you should consider?
+
+**How bad are the consequences if you fail?**
+:
+
+Do you have anything in your house that you cannot replace? Do you have the time or money to replace those things? Do you have insurance that covers goods stolen from your home?
+
+**How much trouble are you willing to go through to prevent these consequences?**
+:
+
+Are you willing to buy a safe for sensitive documents? Can you afford to buy a high-quality lock? Do you have time to open a security box at your local bank and keep your valuables there?
+
+Only once you have asked yourself these questions will you be in a position to assess what measures to take. If your possessions are valuable, but the probability of a break-in is low, then you may not want to invest too much money in a lock. But, if the probability of a break-in is high, you'll want to get the best lock on the market and consider adding a security system.
+
+Making a security plan will help you to understand the threats that are unique to you and to evaluate your assets, your adversaries, and your adversaries' capabilities, along with the likelihood of risks you face.
+
+## Further Reading
+
+For people looking to increase their privacy and security online, we've compiled a list of common threats our visitors face or goals our visitors have, to give you some inspiration and demonstrate the basis of our recommendations.
+
+- [Common Goals and Threats :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](common-threats.md)
+
+## Sources
+
+- [EFF Surveillance Self Defense: Your Security Plan](https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/your-security-plan)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/basics/vpn-overview.md b/i18n/de/basics/vpn-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c4f9bce1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/basics/vpn-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+---
+title: VPN Overview
+icon: material/vpn
+---
+
+Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit somewhere else in the world. An ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (i.e. modem).
+
+Encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, so they may not be able to see exactly what you're posting or reading but they can get an idea of the [domains you request](../advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).
+
+A VPN can help as it can shift trust to a server somewhere else in the world. As a result, the ISP then only sees that you are connected to a VPN and nothing about the activity that you're passing into it.
+
+## Should I use a VPN?
+
+**Yes**, unless you are already using Tor. A VPN does two things: shifting the risks from your Internet Service Provider to itself and hiding your IP from a third-party service.
+
+VPNs cannot encrypt data outside of the connection between your device and the VPN server. VPN providers can see and modify your traffic the same way your ISP could. And there is no way to verify a VPN provider's "no logging" policies in any way.
+
+However, they do hide your actual IP from a third-party service, provided that there are no IP leaks. They help you blend in with others and mitigate IP based tracking.
+
+## When shouldn't I use a VPN?
+
+Using a VPN in cases where you're using your [known identity](common-threats.md#common-misconceptions) is unlikely be useful.
+
+Doing so may trigger spam and fraud detection systems, such as if you were to log into your bank's website.
+
+## What about encryption?
+
+Encryption offered by VPN providers are between your devices and their servers. It guarantees that this specific link is secure. This is a step up from using unencrypted proxies where an adversary on the network can intercept the communications between your devices and said proxies and modify them. However, encryption between your apps or browsers with the service providers are not handled by this encryption.
+
+In order to keep what you actually do on the websites you visit private and secure, you must use HTTPS. This will keep your passwords, session tokens, and queries safe from the VPN provider. Consider enabling "HTTPS everywhere" in your browser to mitigate downgrade attacks like [SSL Strip](https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Marlinspike/BlackHat-DC-09-Marlinspike-Defeating-SSL.pdf).
+
+## Should I use encrypted DNS with a VPN?
+
+Unless your VPN provider hosts the encrypted DNS servers, **no**. Using DOH/DOT (or any other form of encrypted DNS) with third-party servers will simply add more entities to trust and does **absolutely nothing** to improve your privacy/security. Your VPN provider can still see which websites you visit based on the IP addresses and other methods. Instead of just trusting your VPN provider, you are now trusting both the VPN provider and the DNS provider.
+
+A common reason to recommend encrypted DNS is that it helps against DNS spoofing. However, your browser should already be checking for [TLS certificates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Digital_certificates) with **HTTPS** and warn you about it. If you are not using **HTTPS**, then an adversary can still just modify anything other than your DNS queries and the end result will be little different.
+
+Needless to say, **you shouldn't use encrypted DNS with Tor**. This would direct all of your DNS requests through a single circuit and would allow the encrypted DNS provider to deanonymize you.
+
+## Should I use Tor *and* a VPN?
+
+By using a VPN with Tor, you're creating essentially a permanent entry node, often with a money trail attached. This provides zero additional benefits to you, while increasing the attack surface of your connection dramatically. If you wish to hide your Tor usage from your ISP or your government, Tor has a built-in solution for that: Tor bridges. [Read more about Tor bridges and why using a VPN is not necessary](../advanced/tor-overview.md).
+
+## What if I need anonymity?
+
+VPNs cannot provide anonymity. Your VPN provider will still see your real IP address, and often has a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. You cannot rely on "no logging" policies to protect your data. Use [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) instead.
+
+## What about VPN providers that provide Tor nodes?
+
+Do not use that feature. The point of using Tor is that you do not trust your VPN provider. Currently Tor only supports the [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol) protocol. [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol) (used in [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC) for voice and video sharing, the new [HTTP3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) protocol, etc), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol) and other packets will be dropped. To compensate for this, VPN providers typically will route all non-TCP packets through their VPN server (your first hop). This is the case with [ProtonVPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn/). Additionally, when using this Tor over VPN setup, you do not have control over other important Tor features such as [Isolated Destination Address](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (using a different Tor circuit for every domain you visit).
+
+The feature should be viewed as a convenient way to access the Tor Network, not to stay anonymous. For proper anonymity, use the Tor Browser, TorSocks, or a Tor gateway.
+
+## When are VPNs useful?
+
+A VPN may still be useful to you in a variety of scenarios, such as:
+
+1. Hiding your traffic from **only** your Internet Service Provider.
+1. Hiding your downloads (such as torrents) from your ISP and anti-piracy organizations.
+1. Hiding your IP from third-party websites and services, preventing IP based tracking.
+
+For situations like these, or if you have another compelling reason, the VPN providers we listed above are who we think are the most trustworthy. However, using a VPN provider still means you're *trusting* the provider. In pretty much any other scenario you should be using a secure**-by-design** tool such as Tor.
+
+## Sources and Further Reading
+
+1. [VPN - a Very Precarious Narrative](https://schub.io/blog/2019/04/08/very-precarious-narrative.html) by Dennis Schubert
+1. [Tor Network Overview](../advanced/tor-overview.md)
+1. [IVPN Privacy Guides](https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides)
+1. ["Do I need a VPN?"](https://www.doineedavpn.com), a tool developed by IVPN to challenge aggressive VPN marketing by helping individuals decide if a VPN is right for them.
+
+## Related VPN Information
+
+- [The Trouble with VPN and Privacy Review Sites](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2019/11/20/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-review-sites/)
+- [Free VPN App Investigation](https://www.top10vpn.com/free-vpn-app-investigation/)
+- [Hidden VPN owners unveiled: 101 VPN products run by just 23 companies](https://vpnpro.com/blog/hidden-vpn-owners-unveiled-97-vpns-23-companies/)
+- [This Chinese company is secretly behind 24 popular apps seeking dangerous permissions](https://vpnpro.com/blog/chinese-company-secretly-behind-popular-apps-seeking-dangerous-permissions/)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/calendar.md b/i18n/de/calendar.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f050b6a0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/calendar.md
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+---
+title: "Calendar Sync"
+icon: material/calendar
+---
+
+Calendars contain some of your most sensitive data; use products that implement E2EE at rest to prevent a provider from reading them.
+
+## Tutanota
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tutanota** offers a free and encrypted calendar across their supported platforms. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, multi-factor authentication, and [more](https://tutanota.com/calendar-app-comparison/).
+
+ Multiple calendars and extended sharing functionality is limited to paid subscribers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tutanota.com/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tutanota.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tutanota.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tutanota.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/tutanota/id922429609)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.tutanota.Tutanota)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.tutanota.com/)
+
+## Proton Calendar
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton Calendar** is an encrypted calendar service available to Proton members via web or mobile clients. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, and [more](https://proton.me/support/proton-calendar-guide). Those on the free tier get access to a single calendar, whereas paid subscribers can create up to 20 calendars. Extended sharing functionality is also limited to paid subscribers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/proton-calendar-guide){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=me.proton.android.calendar)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://calendar.proton.me)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Qualifications
+
+- Must sync and store information with E2EE to ensure data is not visible to the service provider.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should integrate with native OS calendar and contact management apps if applicable.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/cloud.md b/i18n/de/cloud.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..69137bdd4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/cloud.md
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+---
+title: "Cloud Storage"
+icon: material/file-cloud
+---
+
+Many cloud storage providers require your full trust that they will not look at your files. The alternatives listed below eliminate the need for trust by either putting you in control of your data or by implementing E2EE.
+
+If these alternatives do not fit your needs, we suggest you look into [Encryption Software](encryption.md).
+
+??? question "Looking for Nextcloud?"
+
+ Nextcloud is [still a recommended tool](productivity.md) for self-hosting a file management suite, however we do not recommend third-party Nextcloud storage providers at the moment, because we do not recommend Nextcloud's built-in E2EE functionality for home users.
+
+## Proton Drive
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton Drive** is an E2EE general file storage service by the popular encrypted email provider [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/mail).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/drive){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/drive){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=me.proton.android.drive)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1509667851)
+
+Proton Drive's mobile clients were released in December 2022 and are not yet open-source. Proton has historically delayed their source code releases until after initial product releases, and [plans to](https://www.reddit.com/r/ProtonDrive/comments/zf14i8/comment/izdwmme/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web2x&context=3) release the source code by the end of 2023. Proton Drive desktop clients are still in development.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must enforce end-to-end encryption.
+- Must offer a free plan or trial period for testing.
+- Must support TOTP or FIDO2 multi-factor authentication, or Passkey logins.
+- Must offer a web interface which supports basic file management functionality.
+- Must allow for easy exports of all files/documents.
+- Must use standard, audited encryption.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Clients should be open-source.
+- Clients should be audited in their entirety by an independent third-party.
+- Should offer native clients for Linux, Android, Windows, macOS, and iOS.
+ - These clients should integrate with native OS tools for cloud storage providers, such as Files app integration on iOS, or DocumentsProvider functionality on Android.
+- Should support easy file-sharing with other users.
+- Should offer at least basic file preview and editing functionality on the web interface.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/data-redaction.md b/i18n/de/data-redaction.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fc71e3be5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/data-redaction.md
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+---
+title: "Data and Metadata Redaction"
+icon: material/tag-remove
+---
+
+When sharing files, be sure to remove associated metadata. Image files commonly include [Exif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exif) data. Photos sometimes even include GPS coordinates in the file metadata.
+
+## Desktop
+
+### MAT2
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **MAT2** is free software, which allows the metadata to be removed from image, audio, torrent, and document file types. It provides both a command line tool and a graphical user interface via an [extension for Nautilus](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/tree/master/nautilus), the default file manager of [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), and [Dolphin](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/tree/master/dolphin), the default file manager of [KDE](https://kde.org).
+
+ On Linux, a third-party graphical tool [Metadata Cleaner](https://gitlab.com/rmnvgr/metadata-cleaner) powered by MAT2 exists and is [available on Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/fr.romainvigier.MetadataCleaner).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/blob/master/README.md){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://pypi.org/project/mat2)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2#requirements-setup-on-macos-os-x-using-homebrew)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://pypi.org/project/mat2)
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2#web-interface)
+
+## Mobile
+
+### ExifEraser (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **ExifEraser** is a modern, permissionless image metadata erasing application for Android.
+
+ It currently supports JPEG, PNG and WebP files.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.none.tom.exiferaser)
+ - [:octicons-moon-16: Accrescent](https://accrescent.app/app/com.none.tom.exiferaser)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser/releases)
+
+The metadata that is erased depends on the image's file type:
+
+* **JPEG**: ICC Profile, Exif, Photoshop Image Resources and XMP/ExtendedXMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
+* **PNG**: ICC Profile, Exif and XMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
+* **WebP**: ICC Profile, Exif and XMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
+
+After processing the images, ExifEraser provides you with a full report about what exactly was removed from each image.
+
+The app offers multiple ways to erase metadata from images. Namely:
+
+* You can share an image from another application with ExifEraser.
+* Through the app itself, you can select a single image, multiple images at once, or even an entire directory.
+* It features a "Camera" option, which uses your operating system's camera app to take a photo, and then it removes the metadata from it.
+* It allows you to drag photos from another app into ExifEraser when they are both open in split-screen mode.
+* Lastly, it allows you to paste an image from your clipboard.
+
+### Metapho (iOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Metapho** is a simple and clean viewer for photo metadata such as date, file name, size, camera model, shutter speed, and location.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://zininworks.com/metapho){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://zininworks.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/metapho/id914457352)
+
+### PrivacyBlur
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **PrivacyBlur** is a free app which can blur sensitive portions of pictures before sharing them online.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://privacyblur.app/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://privacyblur.app/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/MATHEMA-GmbH/privacyblur#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/MATHEMA-GmbH/privacyblur){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.mathema.privacyblur)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/privacyblur/id1536274106)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ You should **never** use blur to redact [text in images](https://bishopfox.com/blog/unredacter-tool-never-pixelation). If you want to redact text in an image, draw a box over the text. For this, we suggest apps like [Pocket Paint](https://github.com/Catrobat/Paintroid).
+
+## Command-line
+
+### ExifTool
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **ExifTool** is the original perl library and command-line application for reading, writing, and editing meta information (Exif, IPTC, XMP, and more) in a wide variety of file formats (JPEG, TIFF, PNG, PDF, RAW, and more).
+
+ It's often a component of other Exif removal applications and is in most Linux distribution repositories.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://exiftool.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://exiftool.org/faq.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/exiftool/exiftool){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://exiftool.org/#donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://exiftool.org)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://exiftool.org)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://exiftool.org)
+
+!!! example "Deleting data from a directory of files"
+
+ ```bash
+ exiftool -all= *.file_extension
+ ```
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Apps developed for open-source operating systems must be open-source.
+- Apps must be free and should not include ads or other limitations.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/desktop-browsers.md b/i18n/de/desktop-browsers.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7b992e5a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/desktop-browsers.md
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+---
+title: "Desktop Browsers"
+icon: material/laptop
+---
+
+These are our currently recommended desktop web browsers and configurations for standard/non-anonymous browsing. If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) instead. In general, we recommend keeping your browser extensions to a minimum; they have privileged access within your browser, require you to trust the developer, can make you [stand out](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint), and [weaken](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/chromium-extensions/c/0ei-UCHNm34/m/lDaXwQhzBAAJ) site isolation.
+
+## Firefox
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Firefox** provides strong privacy settings such as [Enhanced Tracking Protection](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/enhanced-tracking-protection-firefox-desktop), which can help block various [types of tracking](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/enhanced-tracking-protection-firefox-desktop#w_what-enhanced-tracking-protection-blocks).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://firefox.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mozilla.org/privacy/firefox/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.mozilla.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/mac)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/linux)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.mozilla.firefox)
+
+!!! warning
+ Firefox includes a unique [download token](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1677497#c0) in downloads from Mozilla's website and uses telemetry in Firefox to send the token. The token is **not** included in releases from the [Mozilla FTP](https://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/firefox/releases/).
+
+### Recommended Configuration
+
+Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. When you use Firefox, we recommend changing the following settings to protect your privacy from certain parties, but all browsers other than [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) will be traceable by *somebody* in some regard or another.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Privacy & Security**.
+
+##### Enhanced Tracking Protection
+
+- [x] Select **Strict** Enhanced Tracking Protection
+
+This protects you by blocking social media trackers, fingerprinting scripts (note that this does not protect you from *all* fingerprinting), cryptominers, cross-site tracking cookies, and some other tracking content. ETP protects against many common threats, but it does not block all tracking avenues because it is designed to have minimal to no impact on site usability.
+
+##### Sanitize on Close
+
+If you want to stay logged in to particular sites, you can allow exceptions in **Cookies and Site Data** → **Manage Exceptions...**
+
+- [x] Check **Delete cookies and site data when Firefox is closed**
+
+This protects you from persistent cookies, but does not protect you against cookies acquired during any one browsing session. When this is enabled, it becomes possible to easily cleanse your browser cookies by simply restarting Firefox. You can set exceptions on a per-site basis, if you wish to stay logged in to a particular site you visit often.
+
+##### Search Suggestions
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Provide search suggestions**
+
+Search suggestion features may not be available in your region.
+
+Search suggestions send everything you type in the address bar to the default search engine, regardless of whether you submit an actual search. Disabling search suggestions allows you to more precisely control what data you send to your search engine provider.
+
+##### Telemetry
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Firefox to send technical and interaction data to Mozilla**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Firefox to install and run studies**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Firefox to send backlogged crash reports on your behalf**
+
+> Firefox sends data about your Firefox version and language; device operating system and hardware configuration; memory, basic information about crashes and errors; outcome of automated processes like updates, safebrowsing, and activation to us. When Firefox sends data to us, your IP address is temporarily collected as part of our server logs.
+
+Additionally, the Firefox Accounts service collects [some technical data](https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/privacy/firefox/#firefox-accounts). If you use a Firefox Account you can opt-out:
+
+1. Open your [profile settings on accounts.firefox.com](https://accounts.firefox.com/settings#data-collection)
+2. Uncheck **Data Collection and Use** > **Help improve Firefox Accounts**
+
+##### HTTPS-Only Mode
+
+- [x] Select **Enable HTTPS-Only Mode in all windows**
+
+This prevents you from unintentionally connecting to a website in plain-text HTTP. Sites without HTTPS are uncommon nowadays, so this should have little to no impact on your day to day browsing.
+
+### Firefox Sync
+
+[Firefox Sync](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2018/11/firefox-sync-privacy/) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices and protects it with E2EE.
+
+### Arkenfox (advanced)
+
+The [Arkenfox project](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js) provides a set of carefully considered options for Firefox. If you [decide](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/1.1-To-Arkenfox-or-Not) to use Arkenfox, a [few options](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/3.2-Overrides-[Common]) are subjectively strict and/or may cause some websites to not work properly - [which you can easily change](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/3.1-Overrides) to suit your needs. We **strongly recommend** reading through their full [wiki](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki). Arkenfox also enables [container](https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/containers#w_for-advanced-users) support.
+
+## Brave
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Brave Browser** includes a built-in content blocker and [privacy features](https://brave.com/privacy-features/), many of which are enabled by default.
+
+ Brave is built upon the Chromium web browser project, so it should feel familiar and have minimal website compatibility issues.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://brave.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://brave4u7jddbv7cyviptqjc7jusxh72uik7zt6adtckl5f4nwy2v72qd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://brave.com/privacy/browser/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.brave.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads annotate
+
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://brave.com/download/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://brave.com/download/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://brave.com/linux/) (1)
+
+ 1. We advise against using the Flatpak version of Brave, as it replaces Chromium's sandbox with Flatpak's, which is less effective. Additionally, the package is not maintained by Brave Software, Inc.
+
+### Recommended Configuration
+
+Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. When you use Brave, we recommend changing the following settings to protect your privacy from certain parties, but all browsers other than the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) will be traceable by *somebody* in some regard or another.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings**.
+
+##### Shields
+
+Brave includes some anti-fingerprinting measures in its [Shields](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360022973471-What-is-Shields-) feature. We suggest configuring these options [globally](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360023646212-How-do-I-configure-global-and-site-specific-Shields-settings-) across all pages that you visit.
+
+Shields' options can be downgraded on a per-site basis as needed, but by default we recommend setting the following:
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Prevent sites from fingerprinting me based on my language preferences**
+- [x] Select **Aggressive** under Trackers & ads blocking
+
+ ??? warning "Use default filter lists"
+ Brave allows you to select additional content filters within the internal `brave://adblock` page. We advise against using this feature; instead, keep the default filter lists. Using extra lists will make you stand out from other Brave users and may also increase attack surface if there is an exploit in Brave and a malicious rule is added to one of the lists you use.
+
+- [x] (Optional) Select **Block Scripts** (1)
+- [x] Select **Strict, may break sites** under Block fingerprinting
+
+
+
+1. This option provides functionality similar to uBlock Origin's advanced [blocking modes](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) or the [NoScript](https://noscript.net/) extension.
+
+##### Social media blocking
+
+- [ ] Uncheck all social media components
+
+##### Privacy and security
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Disable non-proxied UDP** under [WebRTC IP Handling Policy](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360017989132-How-do-I-change-my-Privacy-Settings-#webrtc)
+- [ ] Uncheck **Use Google services for push messaging**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow privacy-preserving product analytics (P3A)**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send daily usage ping to Brave**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send diagnostic reports**
+- [x] Select **Always use secure connections** in the **Security** menu
+- [ ] Uncheck **Private window with Tor** (1)
+
+ !!! tip "Sanitizing on Close"
+ - [x] Select **Clear cookies and site data when you close all windows** in the *Cookies and other site data* menu
+
+ If you wish to stay logged in to a particular site you visit often, you can set exceptions on a per-site basis under the *Customized behaviors* section.
+
+
+
+1. Brave is **not** as resistant to fingerprinting as the Tor Browser and far fewer people use Brave with Tor, so you will stand out. Where [strong anonymity is required](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360018121491-What-is-a-Private-Window-with-Tor-Connectivity-) use the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser).
+
+##### Extensions
+
+Disable built-in extensions you do not use in **Extensions**
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Hangouts**
+- [ ] Uncheck **WebTorrent**
+
+##### IPFS
+
+InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is a decentralized, peer-to-peer network for storing and sharing data in a distributed filesystem. Unless you use the feature, disable it.
+
+- [x] Select **Disabled** on Method to resolve IPFS resources
+
+##### Additional settings
+
+Under the *System* menu
+
+
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Continue running apps when Brave is closed** to disable background apps (1)
+
+
+
+1. This option is not present on all platforms.
+
+### Brave Sync
+
+[Brave Sync](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360059793111-Understanding-Brave-Sync) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices without requiring an account and protects it with E2EE.
+
+## Additional Resources
+
+We generally do not recommend installing any extensions as they increase your attack surface. However, uBlock Origin may prove useful if you value content blocking functionality.
+
+### uBlock Origin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **uBlock Origin** is a popular content blocker that could help you block ads, trackers, and fingerprinting scripts.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/ublock-origin/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/ublock-origin/cjpalhdlnbpafiamejdnhcphjbkeiagm)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/ublock-origin/odfafepnkmbhccpbejgmiehpchacaeak)
+
+We suggest following the [developer's documentation](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) and picking one of the "modes". Additional filter lists can impact performance and [may increase attack surface](https://portswigger.net/research/ublock-i-exfiltrate-exploiting-ad-blockers-with-css).
+
+##### Other lists
+
+These are some other [filter lists](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Dashboard:-Filter-lists) that you may want to consider adding:
+
+- [x] Check **Privacy** > **AdGuard URL Tracking Protection**
+- Add [Actually Legitimate URL Shortener Tool](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DandelionSprout/adfilt/master/LegitimateURLShortener.txt)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Supports automatic updates.
+- Receives engine updates in 0-1 days from upstream release.
+- Available on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- Any changes required to make the browser more privacy-respecting should not negatively impact user experience.
+- Blocks third-party cookies by default.
+- Supports [state partitioning](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning) to mitigate cross-site tracking.[^1]
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Includes built-in content blocking functionality.
+- Supports cookie compartmentalization (à la [Multi-Account Containers](https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/containers)).
+- Supports Progressive Web Apps.
+ PWAs enable you to install certain websites as if they were native apps on your computer. This can have advantages over installing Electron-based apps, because you benefit from your browser's regular security updates.
+- Does not include add-on functionality (bloatware) that does not impact user privacy.
+- Does not collect telemetry by default.
+- Provides open-source sync server implementation.
+- Defaults to a [private search engine](search-engines.md).
+
+### Extension Criteria
+
+- Must not replicate built-in browser or OS functionality.
+- Must directly impact user privacy, i.e. must not simply provide information.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
+
+[^1]: Brave's implementation is detailed at [Brave Privacy Updates: Partitioning network-state for privacy](https://brave.com/privacy-updates/14-partitioning-network-state/).
diff --git a/i18n/de/desktop.md b/i18n/de/desktop.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f32584a23
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/desktop.md
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+---
+title: "Desktop/PC"
+icon: simple/linux
+---
+
+Linux distributions are commonly recommended for privacy protection and software freedom. If you don't already use Linux, below are some distributions we suggest trying out, as well as some general privacy and security improvement tips that are applicable to many Linux distributions.
+
+- [General Linux Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/linux-overview.md)
+
+## Traditional Distributions
+
+### Fedora Workstation
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Fedora Workstation** is our recommended distribution for people new to Linux. Fedora generally adopts newer technologies before other distributions e.g., [Wayland](https://wayland.freedesktop.org/), [PipeWire](https://pipewire.org). These new technologies often come with improvements in security, privacy, and usability in general.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getfedora.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://whatcanidoforfedora.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Fedora has a semi-rolling release cycle. While some packages like [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org) are frozen until the next Fedora release, most packages (including the kernel) are updated frequently throughout the lifespan of the release. Each Fedora release is supported for one year, with a new version released every 6 months.
+
+### openSUSE Tumbleweed
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **openSUSE Tumbleweed** is a stable rolling release distribution.
+
+ openSUSE Tumbleweed has a [transactional update](https://kubic.opensuse.org/blog/2018-04-04-transactionalupdates/) system that uses [Btrfs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Btrfs) and [Snapper](https://en.opensuse.org/openSUSE:Snapper_Tutorial) to ensure that snapshots can be rolled back should there be a problem.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://get.opensuse.org/tumbleweed/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://doc.opensuse.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://shop.opensuse.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Tumbleweed follows a rolling release model where each update is released as a snapshot of the distribution. When you upgrade your system, a new snapshot is downloaded. Each snapshot is run through a series of automated tests by [openQA](https://openqa.opensuse.org) to ensure its quality.
+
+### Arch Linux
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Arch Linux** is a lightweight, do-it-yourself (DIY) distribution meaning that you only get what you install. For more information see their [FAQ](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Frequently_asked_questions).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://archlinux.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://wiki.archlinux.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://archlinux.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Arch Linux has a rolling release cycle. There is no fixed release schedule and packages are updated very frequently.
+
+Being a DIY distribution, you are [expected to set up and maintain](os/linux-overview.md#arch-based-distributions) your system on your own. Arch has an [official installer](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Archinstall) to make the installation process a little easier.
+
+A large portion of [Arch Linux’s packages](https://reproducible.archlinux.org) are [reproducible](https://reproducible-builds.org).
+
+## Immutable Distributions
+
+### Fedora Silverblue
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Fedora Silverblue** and **Fedora Kinoite** are immutable variants of Fedora with a strong focus on container workflows. Silverblue comes with the [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org/) desktop environment while Kinoite comes with [KDE](https://kde.org/). Silverblue and Kinoite follow the same release schedule as Fedora Workstation, benefiting from the same fast updates and staying very close to upstream.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://silverblue.fedoraproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora-silverblue/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://whatcanidoforfedora.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Silverblue (and Kinoite) differ from Fedora Workstation as they replace the [DNF](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/DNF) package manager with a much more advanced alternative called [`rpm-ostree`](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/rawhide/system-administrators-guide/package-management/rpm-ostree/). The `rpm-ostree` package manager works by downloading a base image for the system, then overlaying packages over it in a [git](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Git)-like commit tree. When the system is updated, a new base image is downloaded and the overlays will be applied to that new image.
+
+After the update is complete you will reboot the system into the new deployment. `rpm-ostree` keeps two deployments of the system so that you can easily rollback if something breaks in the new deployment. There is also the option to pin more deployments as needed.
+
+[Flatpak](https://www.flatpak.org) is the primary package installation method on these distributions, as `rpm-ostree` is only meant to overlay packages that cannot stay inside of a container on top of the base image.
+
+As an alternative to Flatpaks, there is the option of [Toolbox](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora-silverblue/toolbox/) to create [Podman](https://podman.io) containers with a shared home directory with the host operating system and mimic a traditional Fedora environment, which is a [useful feature](https://containertoolbx.org) for the discerning developer.
+
+### NixOS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ NixOS is an independent distribution based on the Nix package manager with a focus on reproducibility and reliability.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://nixos.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://nixos.org/learn.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nixos.org/donate.html){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+NixOS’s package manager keeps every version of every package in a different folder in the **Nix store**. Due to this you can have different versions of the same package installed on your system. After the package contents have been written to the folder, the folder is made read-only.
+
+NixOS also provides atomic updates; first it downloads (or builds) the packages and files for the new system generation and then switches to it. There are different ways to switch to a new generation; you can tell NixOS to activate it after reboot or you can switch to it at runtime. You can also *test* the new generation by switching to it at runtime, but not setting it as the current system generation. If something in the update process breaks, you can just reboot and automatically and return to a working version of your system.
+
+Nix the package manager uses a purely functional language - which is also called Nix - to define packages.
+
+[Nixpkgs](https://github.com/nixos/nixpkgs) (the main source of packages) are contained in a single GitHub repository. You can also define your own packages in the same language and then easily include them in your config.
+
+Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in the binary cache, Nix will just build the package from source using its definition. It builds each package in a sandboxed *pure* environment, which is as independent of the host system as possible, thus making binaries reproducible.
+
+## Anonymity-Focused Distributions
+
+### Whonix
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Whonix is meant to run as two virtual machines: a “Workstation” and a Tor “Gateway.” All communications from the Workstation must go through the Tor gateway. This means that even if the Workstation is compromised by malware of some kind, the true IP address remains hidden.
+
+Some of its features include Tor Stream Isolation, [keystroke anonymization](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Keystroke_Deanonymization#Kloak), [encrypted swap](https://github.com/Whonix/swap-file-creator), and a hardened memory allocator.
+
+Future versions of Whonix will likely include [full system AppArmor policies](https://github.com/Whonix/apparmor-profile-everything) and a [sandbox app launcher](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Sandbox-app-launcher) to fully confine all processes on the system.
+
+Whonix is best used [in conjunction with Qubes](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Why_use_Qubes_over_other_Virtualizers), Qubes-Whonix has various [disadvantages](https://forums.whonix.org/t/qubes-whonix-security-disadvantages-help-wanted/8581) when compared to other hypervisors.
+
+### Tails
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tails** is a live operating system based on Debian that routes all communications through Tor, which can boot on on almost any computer from a DVD, USB stick, or SD card installation. It uses [Tor](tor.md) to preserve privacy and anonymity while circumventing censorship, and it leaves no trace of itself on the computer it is used on after it is powered off.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tails.boum.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tails.boum.org/doc/index.en.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tails.boum.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Tails is great for counter forensics due to amnesia (meaning nothing is written to the disk); however, it is not a hardened distribution like Whonix. It lacks many anonymity and security features that Whonix has and gets updated much less often (only once every six weeks). A Tails system that is compromised by malware may potentially bypass the transparent proxy allowing for the user to be deanonymized.
+
+Tails includes [uBlock Origin](desktop-browsers.md#ublock-origin) in Tor Browser by default, which may potentially make it easier for adversaries to fingerprint Tails users. [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) virtual machines may be more leak-proof, however they are not amnesic, meaning data may be recovered from your storage device.
+
+By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypted [persistent storage](https://tails.boum.org/doc/persistent_storage/index.en.html) can be configured to store some data between reboots.
+
+## Security-focused Distributions
+
+### Qubes OS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*.
+
+The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/).
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+Our recommended operating systems:
+
+- Must be open-source.
+- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates.
+- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#Wayland).
+- Must support full-disk encryption during installation.
+- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage.
+- Must support a wide variety of hardware.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/dns.md b/i18n/de/dns.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2704f0ba4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/dns.md
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+---
+title: "DNS Resolvers"
+icon: material/dns
+---
+
+!!! question "Should I use encrypted DNS?"
+
+ Encrypted DNS with third-party servers should only be used to get around basic [DNS blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) when you can be sure there won't be any consequences. Encrypted DNS will not help you hide any of your browsing activity.
+
+ [Learn more about DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md){ .md-button }
+
+## Recommended Providers
+
+| DNS Provider | Privacy Policy | Protocols | Logging | ECS | Filtering |
+| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------ | -------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| [**AdGuard**](https://adguard.com/en/adguard-dns/overview.html) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT DNSCrypt | Some[^1] | No | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardDNS) |
+| [**Cloudflare**](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/setting-up-1.1.1.1/) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT | Some[^2] | No | Based on server choice. |
+| [**Control D**](https://controld.com/free-dns) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://controld.com/privacy) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT DoQ | Optional[^3] | No | Based on server choice. |
+| [**Mullvad**](https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/) | DoH DoT | No[^4] | No | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/mullvad/dns-adblock) |
+| [**NextDNS**](https://www.nextdns.io) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://www.nextdns.io/privacy) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT | Optional[^5] | Optional | Based on server choice. |
+| [**Quad9**](https://quad9.net) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://quad9.net/privacy/policy/) | Cleartext DoH DoT DNSCrypt | Some[^6] | Optional | Based on server choice, Malware blocking by default. |
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must support [DNSSEC](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-dnssec).
+- [QNAME Minimization](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-qname-minimization).
+- Allow for [ECS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-edns-client-subnet-ecs) to be disabled.
+- Prefer [anycast](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anycast#Addressing_methods) support or geo-steering support.
+
+## Native Operating System Support
+
+### Android
+
+Android 9 and above support DNS over TLS. The settings can be found in: **Settings** → **Network & Internet** → **Private DNS**.
+
+### Apple Devices
+
+The latest versions of iOS, iPadOS, tvOS, and macOS, support both DoT and DoH. Both protocols are supported natively via [configuration profiles](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/configuration-profile-enforcement-secf6fb9f053/web) or through the [DNS Settings API](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/networkextension/dns_settings).
+
+After installation of either a configuration profile or an app that uses the DNS Settings API, the DNS configuration can be selected. If a VPN is active, resolution within the VPN tunnel will use the VPN's DNS settings and not your system-wide settings.
+
+#### Signed Profiles
+
+Apple does not provide a native interface for creating encrypted DNS profiles. [Secure DNS profile creator](https://dns.notjakob.com/tool.html) is an unofficial tool for creating your own encrypted DNS profiles, however they will not be signed. Signed profiles are preferred; signing validates a profile's origin and helps to ensure the integrity of the profiles. A green "Verified" label is given to signed configuration profiles. For more information on code signing, see [About Code Signing](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/CodeSigningGuide/Introduction/Introduction.html). **Signed profiles** are offered by [AdGuard](https://adguard.com/en/blog/encrypted-dns-ios-14.html), [NextDNS](https://apple.nextdns.io), and [Quad9](https://www.quad9.net/news/blog/ios-mobile-provisioning-profiles/).
+
+!!! info
+
+ `systemd-resolved`, which many Linux distributions use to do their DNS lookups, doesn't yet [support DoH](https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/8639). If you want to use DoH, you'll need to install a proxy like [dnscrypt-proxy](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy) and [configure it](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dnscrypt-proxy) to take all the DNS queries from your system resolver and forward them over HTTPS.
+
+## Encrypted DNS Proxies
+
+Encrypted DNS proxy software provides a local proxy for the [unencrypted DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md#unencrypted-dns) resolver to forward to. Typically it is used on platforms that don't natively support [encrypted DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns).
+
+### RethinkDNS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **RethinkDNS** is an open-source Android client supporting [DNS-over-HTTPS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), [DNS-over-TLS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-tls-dot), [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt) and DNS Proxy along with caching DNS responses, locally logging DNS queries and can be used as a firewall too.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://rethinkdns.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://rethinkdns.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.rethinkdns.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/celzero/rethink-app){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.celzero.bravedns)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/celzero/rethink-app/releases)
+
+### dnscrypt-proxy
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **dnscrypt-proxy** is a DNS proxy with support for [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt), [DNS-over-HTTPS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), and [Anonymized DNS](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Anonymized-DNS).
+
+ !!! warning "The anonymized DNS feature does [**not**](advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns) anonymize other network traffic."
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/dnscrypt/contribute){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Installation-Windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Installation-macOS)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Installation-linux)
+
+## Self-hosted Solutions
+
+A self-hosted DNS solution is useful for providing filtering on controlled platforms, such as Smart TVs and other IoT devices, as no client-side software is needed.
+
+### AdGuard Home
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **AdGuard Home** is an open-source [DNS-sinkhole](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_sinkhole) which uses [DNS filtering](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/access-management/what-is-dns-filtering/) to block unwanted web content, such as advertisements.
+
+ AdGuard Home features a polished web interface to view insights and manage blocked content.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://adguard.com/adguard-home/overview.html){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://adguard.com/privacy/home.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+### Pi-hole
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Pi-hole** is an open-source [DNS-sinkhole](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_sinkhole) which uses [DNS filtering](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/access-management/what-is-dns-filtering/) to block unwanted web content, such as advertisements.
+
+ Pi-hole is designed to be hosted on a Raspberry Pi, but it is not limited to such hardware. The software features a friendly web interface to view insights and manage blocked content.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://pi-hole.net/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://pi-hole.net/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.pi-hole.net/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/pi-hole/pi-hole){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://pi-hole.net/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
+
+[^1]: AdGuard stores aggregated performance metrics of their DNS servers, namely the number of complete requests to a particular server, the number of blocked requests, and the speed of processing requests. They also keep and store the database of domains requested in within last 24 hours. "We need this information to identify and block new trackers and threats." "We also log how many times this or that tracker has been blocked. We need this information to remove outdated rules from our filters." [https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html](https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html)
+[^2]: Cloudflare collects and stores only the limited DNS query data that is sent to the 1.1.1.1 resolver. The 1.1.1.1 resolver service does not log personal data, and the bulk of the limited non-personally identifiable query data is stored only for 25 hours. [https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/)
+[^3]: Control D only logs for Premium resolvers with custom DNS profiles. Free resolvers do not log data. [https://controld.com/privacy](https://controld.com/privacy)
+[^4]: Mullvad's DNS service is available to both subscribers and non-subscribers of Mullvad VPN. Their privacy policy explicitly claims they do not log DNS requests in any way. [https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/](https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/)
+[^5]: NextDNS can provide insights and logging features on an opt-in basis. You can choose retention times and log storage locations for any logs you choose to keep. If it's not specifically requested, no data is logged. [https://nextdns.io/privacy](https://nextdns.io/privacy)
+[^6]: Quad9 collects some data for the purposes of threat monitoring and response. That data may then be remixed and shared, such as for the purpose of security research. Quad9 does not collect or record IP addresses or other data they deem personally identifiable. [https://www.quad9.net/privacy/policy/](https://www.quad9.net/privacy/policy/)
diff --git a/i18n/de/email-clients.md b/i18n/de/email-clients.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4fe1374c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/email-clients.md
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+---
+title: "Email Clients"
+icon: material/email-open
+---
+
+Our recommendation list contains email clients that support both [OpenPGP](encryption.md#openpgp) and strong authentication such as [Open Authorization (OAuth)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth). OAuth allows you to use [Multi-Factor Authentication](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md) and prevent account theft.
+
+??? warning "Email does not provide forward secrecy"
+
+ When using end-to-end encryption (E2EE) technology like OpenPGP, email will still have [some metadata](email.md#email-metadata-overview) that is not encrypted in the header of the email.
+
+ OpenPGP also does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed: [How do I protect my private keys?](basics/email-security.md) Consider using a medium that provides forward secrecy:
+
+ [Real-time Communication](real-time-communication.md){ .md-button }
+
+## Cross-Platform
+
+### Thunderbird
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Thunderbird** is a free, open-source, cross-platform email, newsgroup, news feed, and chat (XMPP, IRC, Twitter) client developed by the Thunderbird community, and previously by the Mozilla Foundation.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.thunderbird.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mozilla.org/privacy/thunderbird){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.mozilla.org/products/thunderbird){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://hg.mozilla.org/comm-central){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.thunderbird.net)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.thunderbird.net)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.thunderbird.net)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.mozilla.Thunderbird)
+
+#### Recommended Configuration
+
+We recommend changing some of these settings to make Thunderbird a little more private.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Privacy & Security**.
+
+##### Web Content
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Remember websites and links I've visited**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Accept cookies from sites**
+
+##### Telemetry
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Thunderbird to send technical and interaction data to Mozilla**
+
+#### Thunderbird-user.js (advanced)
+
+[`thunderbird-user.js`](https://github.com/HorlogeSkynet/thunderbird-user.js), is a set of configurations options that aims to disable as many of the web-browsing features within Thunderbird as possible in order to reduce surface area and maintain privacy. Some of the changes are backported from the [Arkenfox project](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js).
+
+## Platform Specific
+
+### Apple Mail (macOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Apple Mail** is included in macOS and can be extended to have OpenPGP support with [GPG Suite](encryption.md#gpg-suite), which adds the ability to send PGP-encrypted email.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/welcome/mac){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/toc){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+### Canary Mail (iOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Canary Mail** is a paid email client designed to make end-to-end encryption seamless with security features such as a biometric app lock.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://canarymail.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://canarymail.io/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://canarymail.zendesk.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.canarymail.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1236045954)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://canarymail.io/downloads.html)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Canary Mail only recently released a Windows and Android client, though we don't believe they are as stable as their iOS and Mac counterparts.
+
+Canary Mail is closed-source. We recommend it due to the few choices there are for email clients on iOS that support PGP E2EE.
+
+### FairEmail (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FairEmail** is a minimal, open-source email app, using open standards (IMAP, SMTP, OpenPGP) with a low data and battery usage.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://email.faircode.eu){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/blob/master/PRIVACY.md){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/blob/master/FAQ.md){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://email.faircode.eu/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=eu.faircode.email)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/releases)
+
+### GNOME Evolution (GNOME)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Evolution** is a personal information management application that provides integrated mail, calendaring and address book functionality. Evolution has extensive [documentation](https://help.gnome.org/users/evolution/stable/) to help you get started.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Evolution){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Evolution/PrivacyPolicy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://help.gnome.org/users/evolution/stable/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.gnome.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.gnome.Evolution)
+
+### K-9 Mail (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **K-9 Mail** is an independent mail application that supports both POP3 and IMAP mailboxes, but only supports push mail for IMAP.
+
+ In the future, K-9 Mail will be the [officially branded](https://k9mail.app/2022/06/13/K-9-Mail-and-Thunderbird.html) Thunderbird client for Android.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://k9mail.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://k9mail.app/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.k9mail.app/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/k9mail/k-9){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://k9mail.app/contribute){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.fsck.k9)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/k9mail/k-9/releases)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When replying to someone on a mailing list the "reply" option may also include the mailing list. For more information see [thundernest/k-9 #3738](https://github.com/thundernest/k-9/issues/3738).
+
+### Kontact (KDE)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Kontact** is a personal information manager (PIM) application from the [KDE](https://kde.org) project. It provides a mail client, address book, organizer and RSS client.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://kontact.kde.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://kde.org/privacypolicy-apps){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://kontact.kde.org/users/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://invent.kde.org/pim/kmail){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://kde.org/community/donations/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://kontact.kde.org/download)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.kde.kontact)
+
+### Mailvelope (Browser)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mailvelope** is a browser extension that enables the exchange of encrypted emails following the OpenPGP encryption standard.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.mailvelope.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mailvelope.com/en/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mailvelope.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailvelope/mailvelope){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/mailvelope)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/mailvelope/kajibbejlbohfaggdiogboambcijhkke)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/mailvelope/dgcbddhdhjppfdfjpciagmmibadmoapc)
+
+### NeoMutt (CLI)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **NeoMutt** is an open-source command line mail reader (or MUA) for Linux and BSD. It's a fork of [Mutt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutt_(email_client)) with added features.
+
+ NeoMutt is a text-based client that has a steep learning curve. It is however, very customizable.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://neomutt.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://neomutt.org/guide/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/russon/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://neomutt.org/distro)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://neomutt.org/distro)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Qualifications
+
+- Apps developed for open-source operating systems must be open-source.
+- Must not collect telemetry, or have an easy way to disable all telemetry.
+- Must support OpenPGP message encryption.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should be open-source.
+- Should be cross-platform.
+- Should not collect any telemetry by default.
+- Should support OpenPGP natively, i.e. without extensions.
+- Should support storing OpenPGP encrypted emails locally.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/email.md b/i18n/de/email.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..123f70a1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/email.md
@@ -0,0 +1,485 @@
+---
+title: "Email Services"
+icon: material/email
+---
+
+Email is practically a necessity for using any online service, however we do not recommend it for person-to-person conversations. Rather than using email to contact other people, consider using an instant messaging medium that supports forward secrecy.
+
+[Recommended Instant Messengers](real-time-communication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+For everything else, we recommend a variety of email providers based on sustainable business models and built-in security and privacy features.
+
+## OpenPGP Compatible Services
+
+These providers natively support OpenPGP encryption/decryption, allowing for provider-agnostic E2EE emails. For example, a Proton Mail user could send an E2EE message to a Mailbox.org user, or you could receive OpenPGP-encrypted notifications from internet services which support it.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using E2EE technology like OpenPGP, email will still have some metadata that is not encrypted in the header of the email. Read more about [email metadata](basics/email-security.md#email-metadata-overview).
+
+ OpenPGP also does not support Forward secrecy, which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. [How do I protect my private keys?](basics/email-security.md#how-do-i-protect-my-private-keys)
+
+### Proton Mail
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton Mail** is an email service with a focus on privacy, encryption, security, and ease of use. They have been in operation since **2013**. Proton AG is based in Genève, Switzerland. Accounts start with 500 MB storage with their free plan.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/mail){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://protonmailrmez3lotccipshtkleegetolb73fuirgj7r4o4vfu7ozyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/mail){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonmail.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id979659905)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonMail/proton-mail-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.proton.me)
+
+Free accounts have some limitations, such as not being able to search body text and not having access to [Proton Mail Bridge](https://proton.me/mail/bridge), which is required to use a [recommended desktop email client](email-clients.md) (e.g. Thunderbird). Paid accounts include features like Proton Mail Bridge, additional storage, and custom domain support. A [letter of attestation](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps) was provided for Proton Mail's apps on 9th November 2021 by [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com).
+
+If you have the Proton Unlimited, Business, or Visionary Plan, you also get [SimpleLogin](#simplelogin) Premium for free.
+
+Proton Mail has internal crash reports that they **do not** share with third parties. This can be disabled in: **Settings** > **Go to Settings** > **Account** > **Security and privacy** > **Send crash reports**.
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Paid Proton Mail subscribers can use their own domain with the service or a [catch-all](https://proton.me/support/catch-all) address. Proton Mail also supports [subaddressing](https://proton.me/support/creating-aliases), which is useful for people who don't want to purchase a domain.
+
+??? success "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ Proton Mail [accepts](https://proton.me/support/payment-options) Bitcoin and cash by mail in addition to standard credit/debit card and PayPal payments.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ Proton Mail supports TOTP [two factor authentication](https://proton.me/support/two-factor-authentication-2fa) only. The use of a U2F security key is not yet supported. Proton Mail is planning to implement U2F upon completion of their [Single Sign On (SSO)](https://reddit.com/comments/cheoy6/comment/feh2lw0/) code.
+
+??? success "Data Security"
+
+ Proton Mail has [zero-access encryption](https://proton.me/blog/zero-access-encryption) at rest for your emails and [calendars](https://proton.me/news/protoncalendar-security-model). Data secured with zero-access encryption is only accessible by you.
+
+ Certain information stored in [Proton Contacts](https://proton.me/support/proton-contacts), such as display names and email addresses, are not secured with zero-access encryption. Contact fields that support zero-access encryption, such as phone numbers, are indicated with a padlock icon.
+
+??? success "Email Encryption"
+
+ Proton Mail has [integrated OpenPGP encryption](https://proton.me/support/how-to-use-pgp) in their webmail. Emails to other Proton Mail accounts are encrypted automatically, and encryption to non-Proton Mail addresses with an OpenPGP key can be enabled easily in your account settings. They also allow you to [encrypt messages to non-Proton Mail addresses](https://proton.me/support/password-protected-emails) without the need for them to sign up for a Proton Mail account or use software like OpenPGP.
+
+ Proton Mail also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This allows people who don't use Proton Mail to find the OpenPGP keys of Proton Mail accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE.
+
+??? warning "Digital Legacy"
+
+ Proton Mail doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ If you have a paid account and your [bill is unpaid](https://proton.me/support/delinquency) after 14 days, you won't be able to access your data. After 30 days, your account will become delinquent and won't receive incoming mail. You will continue to be billed during this period.
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ Proton Mail offers an "Unlimited" account for €9.99/Month, which also enables access to Proton VPN in addition to providing multiple accounts, domains, aliases, and 500GB of storage.
+
+### Mailbox.org
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mailbox.org** is an email service with a focus on being secure, ad-free, and privately powered by 100% eco-friendly energy. They have been in operation since 2014. Mailbox.org is based in Berlin, Germany. Accounts start with 2 GB of storage, which can be upgraded as needed.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailbox.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://mailbox.org/en/data-protection-privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://login.mailbox.org)
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Mailbox.org lets you use your own domain, and they support [catch-all](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Using+catch-all+alias+with+own+domain) addresses. Mailbox.org also supports [subaddressing](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/BMBOKBEN/What+is+an+alias+and+how+do+I+use+it), which is useful if you don't want to purchase a domain.
+
+??? info "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ Mailbox.org doesn't accept Bitcoin or any other cryptocurrencies as a result of their payment processor BitPay suspending operations in Germany. However, they do accept Cash by mail, cash payment to bank account, bank transfer, credit card, PayPal and couple of German-specific processors: paydirekt and Sofortüberweisung.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ Mailbox.org supports [two factor authentication](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/How+to+use+two-factor+authentication+-+2FA) for their webmail only. You can use either TOTP or a [Yubikey](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YubiKey) via the [Yubicloud](https://www.yubico.com/products/services-software/yubicloud). Web standards such as [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn) are not yet supported.
+
+??? info "Data Security"
+
+ Mailbox.org allows for encryption of incoming mail using their [encrypted mailbox](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/The+Encrypted+Mailbox). New messages that you receive will then be immediately encrypted with your public key.
+
+ However, [Open-Exchange](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-Xchange), the software platform used by Mailbox.org, [does not support](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/BMBOKBEN/Encryption+of+calendar+and+address+book) the encryption of your address book and calendar. A [standalone option](calendar.md) may be more appropriate for that information.
+
+??? success "Email Encryption"
+
+ Mailbox.org has [integrated encryption](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Send+encrypted+e-mails+with+Guard) in their webmail, which simplifies sending messages to people with public OpenPGP keys. They also allow [remote recipients to decrypt an email](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/My+recipient+does+not+use+PGP) on Mailbox.org's servers. This feature is useful when the remote recipient does not have OpenPGP and cannot decrypt a copy of the email in their own mailbox.
+
+ Mailbox.org also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This allows people outside of Mailbox.org to find the OpenPGP keys of Mailbox.org accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE.
+
+??? success "Digital Legacy"
+
+ Mailbox.org has a digital legacy feature for all plans. You can choose whether you want any of your data to be passed to heirs providing that they apply and provide your testament. Alternatively, you can nominate a person by name and address.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ Your account will be set to a restricted user account when your contract ends, after [30 days it will be irrevocably deleted](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/payment-article/what-happens-at-the-end-of-my-contract).
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ You can access your Mailbox.org account via IMAP/SMTP using their [.onion service](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/The+Tor+exit+node+of+mailbox.org). However, their webmail interface cannot be accessed via their .onion service and you may experience TLS certificate errors.
+
+ All accounts come with limited cloud storage that [can be encrypted](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Encrypt+files+on+your+Drive). Mailbox.org also offers the alias [@secure.mailbox.org](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Ensuring+E-Mails+are+Sent+Securely), which enforces the TLS encryption on the connection between mail servers, otherwise the message will not be sent at all. Mailbox.org also supports [Exchange ActiveSync](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exchange_ActiveSync) in addition to standard access protocols like IMAP and POP3.
+
+### StartMail
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **StartMail** is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of standard OpenPGP encryption. StartMail has been in operation since 2014 and is based in Boulevard 11, Zeist Netherlands. Accounts start with 10GB. They offer a 30-day trial.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.startmail.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.startmail.com/en/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.startmail.com){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.startmail.com/login)
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Personal accounts can use [Custom or Quick](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360007297457-Aliases) aliases. [Custom domains](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/4403911432209-Setup-a-custom-domain) are also available.
+
+??? warning "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ StartMail accepts Visa, MasterCard, American Express and Paypal. StartMail also has other [payment options](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006620637-Payment-methods) such as Bitcoin (currently only for Personal accounts) and SEPA Direct Debit for accounts older than a year.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ StartMail supports TOTP two factor authentication [for webmail only](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006682158-Two-factor-authentication-2FA). They do not allow U2F security key authentication.
+
+??? info "Data Security"
+
+ StartMail has [zero access encryption at rest](https://www.startmail.com/en/whitepaper/#_Toc458527835), using their "user vault" system. When you log in, the vault is opened, and the email is then moved to the vault out of the queue where it is decrypted by the corresponding private key.
+
+ StartMail supports importing [contacts](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006495557-Import-contacts) however, they are only accessible in the webmail and not through protocols such as [CalDAV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CalDAV). Contacts are also not stored using zero knowledge encryption.
+
+??? success "Email Encryption"
+
+ StartMail has [integrated encryption](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/sections/360001889078-Encryption) in their webmail, which simplifies sending encrypted messages with public OpenPGP keys.
+
+??? warning "Digital Legacy"
+
+ StartMail does not offer a digital legacy feature.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ On account expiration, StartMail will permanently delete your account after [6 months in 3 phases](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006794398-Account-expiration).
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ StartMail allows for proxying of images within emails. If you allow the remote image to be loaded, the sender won't know what your IP address is.
+
+## More Providers
+
+These providers store your emails with zero-knowledge encryption, making them great options for keeping your stored emails secure. However, they don't support interoperable encryption standards for E2EE communications between providers.
+
+### Tutanota
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tutanota** is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of encryption. Tutanota has been in operation since **2011** and is based in Hanover, Germany. Accounts start with 1GB storage with their free plan.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tutanota.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tutanota.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tutanota.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tutanota.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/tutanota/id922429609)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.tutanota.com/)
+
+Tutanota doesn't support the [IMAP protocol](https://tutanota.com/faq/#imap) or the use of third-party [email clients](email-clients.md), and you also won't be able to add [external email accounts](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/544#issuecomment-670473647) to the Tutanota app. Neither [Email import](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/630) or [subfolders](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/927) are currently supported, though this is [due to be changed](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/kickoff-import). Emails can be exported [individually or by bulk selection](https://tutanota.com/howto#generalMail) per folder, which may be inconvenient if you have many folders.
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Paid Tutanota accounts can use up to 5 [aliases](https://tutanota.com/faq#alias) and [custom domains](https://tutanota.com/faq#custom-domain). Tutanota doesn't allow for [subaddressing (plus addresses)](https://tutanota.com/faq#plus), but you can use a [catch-all](https://tutanota.com/howto#settings-global) with a custom domain.
+
+??? warning "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ Tutanota only directly accepts credit cards and PayPal, however Bitcoin and Monero can be used to purchase gift cards via their [partnership](https://tutanota.com/faq/#cryptocurrency) with Proxystore.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ Tutanota supports [two factor authentication](https://tutanota.com/faq#2fa) with either TOTP or U2F.
+
+??? success "Data Security"
+
+ Tutanota has [zero access encryption at rest](https://tutanota.com/faq#what-encrypted) for your emails, [address book contacts](https://tutanota.com/faq#encrypted-address-book), and [calendars](https://tutanota.com/faq#calendar). This means the messages and other data stored in your account are only readable by you.
+
+??? warning "Email Encryption"
+
+ Tutanota [does not use OpenPGP](https://www.tutanota.com/faq/#pgp). Tutanota accounts can only receive encrypted emails from non-Tutanota email accounts when sent via a [temporary Tutanota mailbox](https://www.tutanota.com/howto/#encrypted-email-external).
+
+??? warning "Digital Legacy"
+
+ Tutanota doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ Tutanota will [delete inactive free accounts](https://tutanota.com/faq#inactive-accounts) after six months. You can reuse a deactivated free account if you pay.
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ Tutanota offers the business version of [Tutanota to non-profit organizations](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/secure-email-for-non-profit) for free or with a heavy discount.
+
+ Tutanota also has a business feature called [Secure Connect](https://tutanota.com/secure-connect/). This ensures customer contact to the business uses E2EE. The feature costs €240/y.
+
+## Email Aliasing Services
+
+An email aliasing service allows you to easily generate a new email address for every website you register for. The email aliases you generate are then forwarded to an email address of your choosing, hiding both your "main" email address and the identity of your email provider. True email aliasing is better than plus addressing commonly used and supported by many providers, which allows you to create aliases like yourname+[anythinghere]@example.com, because websites, advertisers, and tracking networks can trivially remove anything after the + sign to know your true email address.
+
+Email aliasing can act as a safeguard in case your email provider ever ceases operation. In that scenario, you can easily re-route your aliases to a new email address. In turn, however, you are placing trust in the aliasing service to continue functioning.
+
+Using a dedicated email aliasing service also has a number of benefits over a catch-all alias on a custom domain:
+
+- Aliases can be turned on and off individually when you need them, preventing websites from emailing you randomly.
+- Replies are sent from the alias address, shielding your real email address.
+
+They also have a number of benefits over "temporary email" services:
+
+- Aliases are permanent and can be turned on again if you need to receive something like a password reset.
+- Emails are sent to your trusted mailbox rather than stored by the alias provider.
+- Temporary email services typically have public mailboxes which can be accessed by anyone who knows the address, aliases are private to you.
+
+Our email aliasing recommendations are providers that allow you to create aliases on domains they control, as well as your own custom domain(s) for a modest yearly fee. They can also be self-hosted if you want maximum control. However, using a custom domain can have privacy-related drawbacks: If you are the only person using your custom domain, your actions can be easily tracked across websites simply by looking at the domain name in the email address and ignoring everything before the at (@) sign.
+
+Using an aliasing service requires trusting both your email provider and your aliasing provider with your unencrypted messages. Some providers mitigate this slightly with automatic PGP encryption, which reduces the number of parties you need to trust from two to one by encrypting incoming emails before they are delivered to your final mailbox provider.
+
+### AnonAddy
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **AnonAddy** lets you create 20 domain aliases on a shared domain for free, or unlimited "standard" aliases which are less anonymous.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://anonaddy.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://anonaddy.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://app.anonaddy.com/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/anonaddy){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://anonaddy.com/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://anonaddy.com/faq/#is-there-an-android-app)
+ - [:material-apple-ios: iOS](https://anonaddy.com/faq/#is-there-an-ios-app)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-GB/firefox/addon/anonaddy/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/anonaddy-anonymous-email/iadbdpnoknmbdeolbapdackdcogdmjpe)
+
+The number of shared aliases (which end in a shared domain like @anonaddy.me) that you can create is limited to 20 on AnonAddy's free plan and 50 on their $12/year plan. You can create unlimited standard aliases (which end in a domain like @[username].anonaddy.com or a custom domain on paid plans), however, as previously mentioned, this can be detrimental to privacy because people can trivially tie your standard aliases together based on the domain name alone. Unlimited shared aliases are available for $36/year.
+
+Notable free features:
+
+- [x] 20 Shared Aliases
+- [x] Unlimited Standard Aliases
+- [ ] No Outgoing Replies
+- [x] 2 Recipient Mailboxes
+- [x] Automatic PGP Encryption
+
+### SimpleLogin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **SimpleLogin** is a free service which provides email aliases on a variety of shared domain names, and optionally provides paid features like unlimited aliases and custom domains.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://simplelogin.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://simplelogin.io/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://simplelogin.io/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simple-login){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.simplelogin.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1494359858)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/simple-login/Simple-Login-Android/releases)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/simplelogin/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/dphilobhebphkdjbpfohgikllaljmgbn)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/simpleloginreceive-sen/diacfpipniklenphgljfkmhinphjlfff)
+ - [:simple-safari: Safari](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1494051017)
+
+SimpleLogin was [acquired by Proton AG](https://proton.me/news/proton-and-simplelogin-join-forces) as of April 8, 2022. If you use Proton Mail for your primary mailbox, SimpleLogin is a great choice. As both products are now owned by the same company you now only have to trust a single entity. We also expect that SimpleLogin will be more tightly integrated with Proton's offerings in the future. SimpleLogin continues to support forwarding to any email provider of your choosing. Securitum [audited](https://simplelogin.io/blog/security-audit/) SimpleLogin in early 2022 and all issues [were addressed](https://simplelogin.io/audit2022/web.pdf).
+
+You can link your SimpleLogin account in the settings with your Proton account. If you have the Proton Unlimited, Business, or Visionary Plan, you will have SimpleLogin Premium for free.
+
+Notable free features:
+
+- [x] 10 Shared Aliases
+- [x] Unlimited Replies
+- [x] 1 Recipient Mailbox
+
+## Self-Hosting Email
+
+Advanced system administrators may consider setting up their own email server. Mail servers require attention and continuous maintenance in order to keep things secure and mail delivery reliable.
+
+### Combined software solutions
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mailcow** is a more advanced mail server perfect for those with a bit more Linux experience. It has everything you need in a Docker container: A mail server with DKIM support, antivirus and spam monitoring, webmail and ActiveSync with SOGo, and web-based administration with 2FA support.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailcow.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mailcow.github.io/mailcow-dockerized-docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailcow/mailcow-dockerized){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.servercow.de/mailcow?lang=en#sal){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mail-in-a-Box** is an automated setup script for deploying a mail server on Ubuntu. Its goal is to make it easier for people to set up their own mail server.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailinabox.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mailinabox.email/guide.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mail-in-a-box/mailinabox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+For a more manual approach we've picked out these two articles:
+
+- [Setting up a mail server with OpenSMTPD, Dovecot and Rspamd](https://poolp.org/posts/2019-09-14/setting-up-a-mail-server-with-opensmtpd-dovecot-and-rspamd/) (2019)
+- [How To Run Your Own Mail Server](https://www.c0ffee.net/blog/mail-server-guide/) (August 2017)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the providers we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements for any Email provider wishing to be recommended, including implementing industry best practices, modern technology and more. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing an Email provider, and conduct your own research to ensure the Email provider you choose is the right choice for you.
+
+### Technology
+
+We regard these features as important in order to provide a safe and optimal service. You should consider whether the provider which has the features you require.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Encrypts email account data at rest with zero-access encryption.
+- Export capability as [Mbox](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mbox) or individual .eml with [RFC5322](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5322/) standard.
+- Allow users to use their own [domain name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name). Custom domain names are important to users because it allows them to maintain their agency from the service, should it turn bad or be acquired by another company which doesn't prioritize privacy.
+- Operates on owned infrastructure, i.e. not built upon third-party email service providers.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Encrypts all account data (Contacts, Calendars, etc) at rest with zero-access encryption.
+- Integrated webmail E2EE/PGP encryption provided as a convenience.
+- Support for [WKD](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD) to allow improved discovery of public OpenPGP keys via HTTP. GnuPG users can get a key by typing: `gpg --locate-key example_user@example.com`
+- Support for a temporary mailbox for external users. This is useful when you want to send an encrypted email, without sending an actual copy to your recipient. These emails usually have a limited lifespan and then are automatically deleted. They also don't require the recipient to configure any cryptography like OpenPGP.
+- Availability of the email provider's services via an [onion service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.onion).
+- [Subaddressing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email_address#Subaddressing) support.
+- Catch-all or alias functionality for those who own their own domains.
+- Use of standard email access protocols such as IMAP, SMTP or [JMAP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Meta_Application_Protocol). Standard access protocols ensure customers can easily download all of their email, should they want to switch to another provider.
+
+### Privacy
+
+We prefer our recommended providers to collect as little data as possible.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Protect sender's IP address. Filter it from showing in the `Received` header field.
+- Don't require personally identifiable information (PII) besides a username and a password.
+- Privacy policy that meets the requirements defined by the GDPR
+- Must not be hosted in the US due to [ECPA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_Communications_Privacy_Act#Criticism) which has [yet to be reformed](https://epic.org/ecpa/).
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Accepts Bitcoin, cash, and other forms of cryptocurrency and/or anonymous payment options (gift cards, etc.)
+
+### Security
+
+Email servers deal with a lot of very sensitive data. We expect that providers will adopt best industry practices in order to protect their members.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Protection of webmail with 2FA, such as TOTP.
+- Zero access encryption, builds on encryption at rest. The provider does not have the decryption keys to the data they hold. This prevents a rogue employee leaking data they have access to or remote adversary from releasing data they have stolen by gaining unauthorized access to the server.
+- [DNSSEC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Extensions) support.
+- No TLS errors or vulnerabilities when being profiled by tools such as [Hardenize](https://www.hardenize.com/), [testssl.sh](https://testssl.sh/), or [Qualys SSL Labs](https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest); this includes certificate related errors and weak DH parameters, such as those that led to [Logjam](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logjam_(computer_security)).
+- A server suite preference (optional on TLSv1.3) for strong cipher suites which support forward secrecy and authenticated encryption.
+- A valid [MTA-STS](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8461) and [TLS-RPT](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8460) policy.
+- Valid [DANE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS-based_Authentication_of_Named_Entities) records.
+- Valid [SPF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sender_Policy_Framework) and [DKIM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DomainKeys_Identified_Mail) records.
+- Have a proper [DMARC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DMARC) record and policy or use [ARC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain) for authentication. If DMARC authentication is being used, the policy must be set to `reject` or `quarantine`.
+- A server suite preference of TLS 1.2 or later and a plan for [Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate/).
+- [SMTPS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SMTPS) submission, assuming SMTP is used.
+- Website security standards such as:
+ - [HTTP Strict Transport Security](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security)
+ - [Subresource Integrity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subresource_Integrity) if loading things from external domains.
+- Must support viewing of [Message headers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header), as it is a crucial forensic feature to determine if an email is a phishing attempt.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Support for hardware authentication, i.e. U2F and [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn). U2F and WebAuthn are more secure as they use a private key stored on a client-side hardware device to authenticate people, as opposed to a shared secret that is stored on the web server and on the client side when using TOTP. Furthermore, U2F and WebAuthn are more resistant to phishing as their authentication response is based on the authenticated [domain name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name).
+- [DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844) in addition to DANE support.
+- Implementation of [Authenticated Received Chain (ARC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain), this is useful for people who post to mailing lists [RFC8617](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8617).
+- Bug-bounty programs and/or a coordinated vulnerability-disclosure process.
+- Website security standards such as:
+ - [Content Security Policy (CSP)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy)
+ - [Expect-CT](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-expect-ct)
+
+### Trust
+
+You wouldn't trust your finances to someone with a fake identity, so why trust them with your email? We require our recommended providers to be public about their ownership or leadership. We also would like to see frequent transparency reports, especially in regard to how government requests are handled.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership or ownership.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership.
+- Frequent transparency reports.
+
+### Marketing
+
+With the email providers we recommend we like to see responsible marketing.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Must self-host analytics (no Google Analytics, Adobe Analytics, etc). The provider's site must also comply with [DNT (Do Not Track)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Do_Not_Track) for those who wish to opt-out.
+
+Must not have any marketing which is irresponsible:
+
+- Claims of "unbreakable encryption." Encryption should be used with the intention that it may not be secret in the future when the technology exists to crack it.
+- Making guarantees of protecting anonymity 100%. When someone makes a claim that something is 100% it means there is no certainty for failure. We know people can quite easily deanonymize themselves in a number of ways, e.g.:
+
+- Reusing personal information e.g. (email accounts, unique pseudonyms, etc) that they accessed without anonymity software (Tor, VPN, etc)
+- [Browser fingerprinting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint)
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Clear and easy to read documentation. This includes things like, setting up 2FA, email clients, OpenPGP, etc.
+
+### Additional Functionality
+
+While not strictly requirements, there are some other convenience or privacy factors we looked into when determining which providers to recommend.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/encryption.md b/i18n/de/encryption.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..03e5431c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/encryption.md
@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
+---
+title: "Encryption Software"
+icon: material/file-lock
+---
+
+Encryption of data is the only way to control who can access it. If you are currently not using encryption software for your hard disk, emails or files, you should pick an option here.
+
+## Multi-platform
+
+The options listed here are multi-platform and great for creating encrypted backups of your data.
+
+### Cryptomator (Cloud)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Cryptomator** is an encryption solution designed for privately saving files to any cloud provider. It allows you to create vaults that are stored on a virtual drive, the contents of which are encrypted and synced with your cloud storage provider.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://cryptomator.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://cryptomator.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.cryptomator.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/cryptomator){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://cryptomator.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.cryptomator)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/cryptomator-2/id1560822163)
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://cryptomator.org/android)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.cryptomator.Cryptomator)
+
+Cryptomator uses AES-256 encryption to encrypt both files and filenames. Cryptomator cannot encrypt metadata such as access, modification, and creation timestamps, nor the number and size of files and folders.
+
+Some Cryptomator cryptographic libraries have been [audited](https://community.cryptomator.org/t/has-there-been-a-security-review-audit-of-cryptomator/44) by Cure53. The scope of the audited libraries includes: [cryptolib](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptolib), [cryptofs](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptofs), [siv-mode](https://github.com/cryptomator/siv-mode) and [cryptomator-objc-cryptor](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptomator-objc-cryptor). The audit did not extend to [cryptolib-swift](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptolib-swift), which is a library used by Cryptomator for iOS.
+
+Cryptomator's documentation details its intended [security target](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/security-target/), [security architecture](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/architecture/), and [best practices](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/best-practices/) for use in further detail.
+
+### Picocrypt (File)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Picocrypt** is a small and simple encryption tool that provides modern encryption. Picocrypt uses the secure XChaCha20 cipher and the Argon2id key derivation function to provide a high level of security. It uses Go's standard x/crypto modules for its encryption features.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/picocrypt){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases)
+
+### VeraCrypt (Disk)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **VeraCrypt** is a source-available freeware utility used for on-the-fly encryption. It can create a virtual encrypted disk within a file, encrypt a partition, or encrypt the entire storage device with pre-boot authentication.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://veracrypt.fr){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/en/Documentation.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/code/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/en/Donation.html){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html)
+
+VeraCrypt is a fork of the discontinued TrueCrypt project. According to its developers, security improvements have been implemented and issues raised by the initial TrueCrypt code audit have been addressed.
+
+When encrypting with VeraCrypt, you have the option to select from different [hash functions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt#Encryption_scheme). We suggest you **only** select [SHA-512](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-512) and stick to the [AES](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard) block cipher.
+
+Truecrypt has been [audited a number of times](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TrueCrypt#Security_audits), and VeraCrypt has also been [audited separately](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt#VeraCrypt_audit).
+
+## OS Full Disk Encryption
+
+Modern operating systems include [FDE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_encryption) and will have a [secure cryptoprocessor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_cryptoprocessor).
+
+### BitLocker
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **BitLocker** is the full volume encryption solution bundled with Microsoft Windows. The main reason we recommend it is because of its [use of TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). [ElcomSoft](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ElcomSoft), a forensics company, has written about it in [Understanding BitLocker TPM Protection](https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2021/01/understanding-BitLocker-tpm-protection/).
+
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/BitLocker/BitLocker-overview){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+BitLocker is [only supported](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/turn-on-device-encryption-0c453637-bc88-5f74-5105-741561aae838) on Pro, Enterprise and Education editions of Windows. It can be enabled on Home editions provided that they meet the prerequisites.
+
+??? example "Enabling BitLocker on Windows Home"
+
+ To enable BitLocker on "Home" editions of Windows, you must have partitions formatted with a [GUID Partition Table](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GUID_Partition_Table) and have a dedicated TPM (v1.2, 2.0+) module.
+
+ 1. Open a command prompt and check your drive's partition table format with the following command. You should see "**GPT**" listed under "Partition Style":
+
+ ```
+ powershell Get-Disk
+ ```
+
+ 2. Run this command (in an admin command prompt) to check your TPM version. You should see `2.0` or `1.2` listed next to `SpecVersion`:
+
+ ```
+ powershell Get-WmiObject -Namespace "root/cimv2/security/microsofttpm" -Class WIN32_tpm
+ ```
+
+ 3. Access [Advanced Startup Options](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/advanced-startup-options-including-safe-mode-b90e7808-80b5-a291-d4b8-1a1af602b617). You need to reboot while pressing the F8 key before Windows starts and go into the *command prompt* in **Troubleshoot** → **Advanced Options** → **Command Prompt**.
+
+ 4. Login with your admin account and type this in the command prompt to start encryption:
+
+ ```
+ manage-bde -on c: -used
+ ```
+
+ 5. Close the command prompt and continue booting to regular Windows.
+
+ 6. Open an admin command prompt and run the following commands:
+
+ ```
+ manage-bde c: -protectors -add -rp -tpm
+ manage-bde -protectors -enable c:
+ manage-bde -protectors -get c: > %UserProfile%\Desktop\BitLocker-Recovery-Key.txt
+ ```
+
+ !!! tip
+
+ Backup `BitLocker-Recovery-Key.txt` on your Desktop to a separate storage device. Loss of this recovery code may result in loss of data.
+
+### FileVault
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FileVault** is the on-the-fly volume encryption solution built into macOS. FileVault is recommended because it [leverages](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/volume-encryption-with-filevault-sec4c6dc1b6e/web) hardware security capabilities present on an Apple silicon SoC or T2 Security Chip.
+
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/encrypt-mac-data-with-filevault-mh11785/mac){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+We recommend storing a local recovery key in a secure place as opposed to using your iCloud account for recovery.
+
+### Linux Unified Key Setup
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **LUKS** is the default FDE method for Linux. It can be used to encrypt full volumes, partitions, or create encrypted containers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/blob/main/README.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+??? example "Creating and opening encrypted containers"
+
+ ```
+ dd if=/dev/urandom of=/path-to-file bs=1M count=1024 status=progress
+ sudo cryptsetup luksFormat /path-to-file
+ ```
+
+
+ #### Opening encrypted containers
+ We recommend opening containers and volumes with `udisksctl` as this uses [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). Most file managers, such as those included with popular desktop environments, can unlock encrypted files. Tools like [udiskie](https://github.com/coldfix/udiskie) can run in the system tray and provide a helpful user interface.
+ ```
+ udisksctl loop-setup -f /path-to-file
+ udisksctl unlock -b /dev/loop0
+ ```
+
+!!! note "Remember to back up volume headers"
+
+ We recommend you always [back up your LUKS headers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Device_encryption#Backup_and_restore) in case of partial drive failure. This can be done with:
+
+ ```
+ cryptsetup luksHeaderBackup /dev/device --header-backup-file /mnt/backup/file.img
+ ```
+
+## Browser-based
+
+Browser-based encryption can be useful when you need to encrypt a file but cannot install software or apps on your device.
+
+### hat.sh
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Hat.sh** is a web application that provides secure client-side file encryption in your browser. It can also be self-hosted and is useful if you need to encrypt a file but cannot install any software on your device due to organizational policies.
+
+ [:octicons-globe-16: Website](https://hat.sh){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://hat.sh/about/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://hat.sh/about/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/sh-dv/hat.sh){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sh-dv/hat.sh#donations){ .card-link title="Donations methods can be found at the bottom of the website" }
+
+## Command-line
+
+Tools with command-line interfaces are useful for integrating [shell scripts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shell_script).
+
+### Kryptor
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Kryptor** is a free and open-source file encryption and signing tool that makes use of modern and secure cryptographic algorithms. It aims to be a better version of [age](https://github.com/FiloSottile/age) and [Minisign](https://jedisct1.github.io/minisign/) to provide a simple, easier alternative to GPG.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kryptor.co.uk){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/features#privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/tutorial){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/samuel-lucas6/Kryptor){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/#donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.kryptor.co.uk)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.kryptor.co.uk)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.kryptor.co.uk)
+
+### Tomb
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tomb** is a command-line shell wrapper for LUKS. It supports steganography via [third-party tools](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb#how-does-it-work).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.dyne.org/software/tomb){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.dyne.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+## OpenPGP
+
+OpenPGP is sometimes needed for specific tasks such as digitally signing and encrypting email. PGP has many features and is [complex](https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html) as it has been around a long time. For tasks such as signing or encrypting files, we suggest the above options.
+
+When encrypting with PGP, you have the option to configure different options in your `gpg.conf` file. We recommend staying with the standard options specified in the [GnuPG user FAQ](https://www.gnupg.org/faq/gnupg-faq.html#new_user_gpg_conf).
+
+!!! tip "Use future defaults when generating a key"
+
+ When [generating keys](https://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual/c14.html) we suggest using the `future-default` command as this will instruct GnuPG use modern cryptography such as [Curve25519](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curve25519#History) and [Ed25519](https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/):
+
+ ```bash
+ gpg --quick-gen-key alice@example.com future-default
+ ```
+
+### GNU Privacy Guard
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GnuPG** is a GPL-licensed alternative to the PGP suite of cryptographic software. GnuPG is compliant with [RFC 4880](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880), which is the current IETF specification of OpenPGP. The GnuPG project has been working on an [updated draft](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh/) in an attempt to modernize OpenPGP. GnuPG is a part of the Free Software Foundation's GNU software project and has received major [funding](https://gnupg.org/blog/20220102-a-new-future-for-gnupg.html) from the German government.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gnupg.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gnupg.org/privacy-policy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gnupg.org/documentation/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.sufficientlysecure.keychain)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://gpg4win.org/download.html)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://gpgtools.org)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://gnupg.org/download/index.html#binary)
+
+### GPG4win
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GPG4win** is a package for Windows from [Intevation and g10 Code](https://gpg4win.org/impressum.html). It includes [various tools](https://gpg4win.org/about.html) that can assist you in using GPG on Microsoft Windows. The project was initiated and originally [funded by](https://web.archive.org/web/20190425125223/https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/news/government-used-cryptography) Germany's Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) in 2005.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gpg4win.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gpg4win.org/privacy-policy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gpg4win.org/documentation.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gpg4win.git;a=summary){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://gpg4win.org/donate.html){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://gpg4win.org/download.html)
+
+### GPG Suite
+
+!!! note
+
+ We suggest [Canary Mail](email-clients.md#canary-mail) for using PGP with email on iOS devices.
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GPG Suite** provides OpenPGP support for [Apple Mail](email-clients.md#apple-mail) and macOS.
+
+ We recommend taking a look at their [First steps](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb/how-to/first-steps-where-do-i-start-where-do-i-begin-setup-gpgtools-create-a-new-key-your-first-encrypted-email) and [Knowledge base](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb) for support.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gpgtools.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gpgtools.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GPGTools){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://gpgtools.org)
+
+### OpenKeychain
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OpenKeychain** is an Android implementation of GnuPG. It's commonly required by mail clients such as [K-9 Mail](email-clients.md#k-9-mail) and [FairEmail](email-clients.md#fairemail) and other Android apps to provide encryption support. Cure53 completed a [security audit](https://www.openkeychain.org/openkeychain-3-6) of OpenKeychain 3.6 in October 2015. Technical details about the audit and OpenKeychain's solutions can be found [here](https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain/wiki/cure53-Security-Audit-2015).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.openkeychain.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.openkeychain.org/help/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.openkeychain.org/faq/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.sufficientlysecure.keychain)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Qualifications
+
+- Cross-platform encryption apps must be open-source.
+- File encryption apps must support decryption on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- External disk encryption apps must support decryption on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- Internal (OS) disk encryption apps must be cross-platform or built in to the operating system natively.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Operating System (FDE) encryption apps should utilize hardware security such as a TPM or Secure Enclave.
+- File encryption apps should have first- or third-party support for mobile platforms.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/file-sharing.md b/i18n/de/file-sharing.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bed93f5f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/file-sharing.md
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+---
+title: "File Sharing and Sync"
+icon: material/share-variant
+---
+
+Discover how to privately share your files between your devices, with your friends and family, or anonymously online.
+
+## File Sharing
+
+### Send
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Send** is a fork of Mozilla’s discontinued Firefox Send service which allows you to send files to others with a link. Files are encrypted on your device so that they cannot be read by the server, and they can be optionally password-protected as well. The maintainer of Send hosts a [public instance](https://send.vis.ee/). You can use other public instances, or you can host Send yourself.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://send.vis.ee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send-instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/timvisee){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Send can be used via its web interface or via the [ffsend](https://github.com/timvisee/ffsend) CLI. If you are familiar with the command-line and send files frequently, we recommend using the CLI client to avoid JavaScript-based encryption. You can specify the `--host` flag to use a specific server:
+
+```bash
+ffsend upload --host https://send.vis.ee/ FILE
+```
+
+### OnionShare
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OnionShare** is an open-source tool that lets you securely and anonymously share a file of any size. It works by starting a web server accessible as a Tor onion service, with an unguessable URL that you can share with the recipients to download or send files.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://onionshare.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://lldan5gahapx5k7iafb3s4ikijc4ni7gx5iywdflkba5y2ezyg6sjgyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.onionshare.org){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/onionshare/onionshare){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://onionshare.org/#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://onionshare.org/#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://onionshare.org/#download)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must not store decrypted data on a remote server.
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must either have clients for Linux, macOS, and Windows; or have a web interface.
+
+## FreedomBox
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FreedomBox** is an operating system designed to be run on a [single-board computer (SBC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-board_computer). The purpose is to make it easy to set up server applications that you might want to self-host.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://freedombox.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://wiki.debian.org/FreedomBox/Manual){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://salsa.debian.org/freedombox-team/freedombox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://freedomboxfoundation.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+## File Sync
+
+### Nextcloud (Client-Server)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nextcloud** is a suite of free and open-source client-server software for creating your own file hosting services on a private server you control.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://nextcloud.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://nextcloud.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://nextcloud.com/support/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/nextcloud){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nextcloud.com/contribute/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nextcloud.client)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1125420102)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/nextcloud/android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/www/nextcloud)
+
+!!! danger
+
+ We don't recommend using the [E2EE App](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/end_to_end_encryption) for Nextcloud as it may lead to data loss; it is highly experimental and not production quality.
+
+### Syncthing (P2P)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Syncthing** is an open-source peer-to-peer continuous file synchronization utility. It is used to synchronize files between two or more devices over the local network or the internet. Syncthing does not use a centralized server; it uses the [Block Exchange Protocol](https://docs.syncthing.net/specs/bep-v1.html#bep-v1) to transfer data between devices. All data is encrypted using TLS.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://syncthing.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.syncthing.net){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/syncthing){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://syncthing.net/donations/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nutomic.syncthingandroid)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-openbsd: OpenBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-netbsd: NetBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+#### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must not require a third-party remote/cloud server.
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must either have clients for Linux, macOS, and Windows; or have a web interface.
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Has mobile clients for iOS and Android, which at least support document previews.
+- Supports photo backup from iOS and Android, and optionally supports file/folder sync on Android.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/frontends.md b/i18n/de/frontends.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9e68622bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/frontends.md
@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+---
+title: "Frontends"
+icon: material/flip-to-front
+---
+
+Sometimes services will try to force you to sign up for an account by blocking access to content with annoying popups. They might also break without JavaScript enabled. These frontends can allow you to get around these restrictions.
+
+## LBRY
+
+### Librarian
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Librarian** is a free and open-source frontend for [Odysee](https://odysee.com/) (LBRY) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://librarian.codeberg.page/){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Librarian does not proxy video streams by default. Videos watched through Librarian will still make direct connections to Odysee's servers (e.g. `odycdn.com`); however, some instances may enable proxying which would be detailed in the instance's privacy policy.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Librarian is useful if you want watch LBRY content on mobile without mandatory telemetry and if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, as is the case with [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Librarian, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a Librarian instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Librarian instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect the default policy. Librarian instances feature a "privacy nutrition label" to provide an overview of their policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+## Twitter
+
+### Nitter
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nitter** is a free and open-source frontend for [Twitter](https://twitter.com) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter/wiki/Instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter#nitter){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Nitter is useful if you want to browse Twitter content without having to log in and if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, as is the case with [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level. It also allows you to [create RSS feeds for Twitter](news-aggregators.md#twitter).
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Nitter, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a Nitter instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Nitter instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect the default policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+## TikTok
+
+### ProxiTok
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **ProxiTok** is an open source frontend to the [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com) website that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok/wiki/Public-instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+!!! tip
+
+ ProxiTok is useful if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, such as [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting ProxiTok, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a ProxiTok instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. ProxiTok instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect their associated privacy policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+## YouTube
+
+### FreeTube
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FreeTube** is a free and open-source desktop application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com). When using FreeTube, your subscription list and playlists are saved locally on your device.
+
+ By default, FreeTube blocks all YouTube advertisements. In addition, FreeTube optionally integrates with [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://freetubeapp.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://freetubeapp.io/privacy.php){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.freetubeapp.io/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/FreeTubeApp/FreeTube){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/FreeTube){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/io.freetubeapp.FreeTube)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using FreeTube, your IP address may still be known to YouTube, [Invidious](https://instances.invidious.io) or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+### Yattee
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Yattee** is a free and open-source privacy oriented video player for iOS, tvOS and macOS for [YouTube](https://youtube.com). When using Yattee, your subscription list are saved locally on your device.
+
+ You will need to take a few [extra steps](https://gonzoknows.com/posts/Yattee/) before you can use Yattee to watch YouTube, due to App Store restrictions.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://github.com/yattee/yattee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://r.yattee.stream/docs/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/wiki/Donations){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-apple: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/yattee/id1595136629)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/releases)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using Yattee, your IP address may still be known to YouTube, [Invidious](https://instances.invidious.io), [Piped](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances) or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+By default, Yattee blocks all YouTube advertisements. In addition, Yattee optionally integrates with [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments.
+
+### LibreTube (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **LibreTube** is a free and open-source Android application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) which uses the [Piped](#piped) API.
+
+ LibreTube allows you to store your subscription list and playlists locally on your Android device, or to an account on your Piped instance of choice, which allows you to access them seamlessly on other devices as well.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://libre-tube.github.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube#privacy-policy-and-disclaimer){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube/releases)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using LibreTube, your IP address will be visible to the [Piped](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances) instance you choose and/or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+By default, LibreTube blocks all YouTube advertisements. Additionally, Libretube uses [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments. You are able to fully configure the types of segments that SponsorBlock will skip, or disable it completely. There is also a button on the video player itself to disable it for a specific video if desired.
+
+### NewPipe (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation annotate
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **NewPipe** is a free and open-source Android application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com), [SoundCloud](https://soundcloud.com), [media.ccc.de](https://media.ccc.de), [Bandcamp](https://bandcamp.com), and [PeerTube](https://joinpeertube.org/) (1).
+
+ Your subscription list and playlists are saved locally on your Android device.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://newpipe.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://newpipe.net/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://teamnewpipe.github.io/documentation/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamNewPipe/NewPipe){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://newpipe.net/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/TeamNewPipe/NewPipe/releases)
+
+1. The default instance is [FramaTube](https://framatube.org/), however more can be added via **Settings** → **Content** → **PeerTube instances**
+
+!!! Warning
+
+ When using NewPipe, your IP address will be visible to the video providers used. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+### Invidious
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Invidious** is a free and open-source frontend for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://invidious.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://instances.invidious.io){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.invidious.io/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/iv-org/invidious){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://invidious.io/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Invidious does not proxy video streams by default. Videos watched through Invidious will still make direct connections to Google's servers (e.g. `googlevideo.com`); however, some instances support video proxying—simply enable *Proxy videos* within the instances' settings or add `&local=true` to the URL.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Invidious is useful if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, such as [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level. It does not provide privacy by itself, and we don’t recommend logging into any accounts.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Invidious, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using an Invidious instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Invidious instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect their associated privacy policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+### Piped
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Piped** is a free and open-source frontend for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ Piped requires JavaScript in order to function and there are a number of public instances.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://piped.kavin.rocks/preferences#ddlInstanceSelection){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://piped-docs.kavin.rocks/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped#donations){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Piped is useful if you want to use [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) without installing an extension or to access age-restricted content without an account. It does not provide privacy by itself, and we don’t recommend logging into any accounts.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Piped, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a Piped instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Piped instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect their associated privacy policy.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+Recommended frontends...
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must be self-hostable.
+- Must provide all basic website functionality available to anonymous users.
+
+We only consider frontends for websites which are...
+
+- Not normally accessible without JavaScript.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/index.md b/i18n/de/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1ca23af14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+---
+template: overrides/home.de.html
+hide:
+ - navigation
+ - toc
+ - feedback
+---
+
+
+## Why should I care?
+
+##### “I have nothing to hide. Why should I care about my privacy?”
+
+Much like the right to interracial marriage, woman's suffrage, freedom of speech, and many others, our right to privacy hasn't always been upheld. In several dictatorships, it still isn't. Generations before ours fought for our right to privacy. ==Privacy is a human right, inherent to all of us,== that we are entitled to (without discrimination).
+
+You shouldn't confuse privacy with secrecy. We know what happens in the bathroom, but you still close the door. That's because you want privacy, not secrecy. **Everyone** has something to protect. Privacy is something that makes us human.
+
+[:material-target-account: Common Internet Threats](basics/common-threats.md ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+## What should I do?
+
+##### First, you need to make a plan
+
+Trying to protect all your data from everyone all the time is impractical, expensive, and exhausting. But don't worry! Security is a process, and, by thinking ahead, you can put together a plan that's right for you. Security isn't just about the tools you use or the software you download. Rather, it begins by understanding the unique threats you face, and how you can mitigate them.
+
+==This process of identifying threats and defining countermeasures is called **threat modeling**==, and it forms the basis of every good security and privacy plan.
+
+[:material-book-outline: Learn More About Threat Modeling](basics/threat-modeling.md ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+---
+
+## We need you! Here's how to get involved:
+
+[:simple-discourse:](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/){ title="Join our Forum" }
+[:simple-mastodon:](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides){ rel=me title="Follow us on Mastodon" }
+[:material-book-edit:](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org){ title="Contribute to this website" }
+[:material-translate:](https://matrix.to/#/#pg-i18n:aragon.sh){ title="Help translate this website" }
+[:simple-matrix:](https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org){ title="Chat with us on Matrix" }
+[:material-information-outline:](about/index.md){ title="Learn more about us" }
+[:material-hand-coin-outline:](about/donate.md){ title="Support the project" }
+
+It's important for a website like Privacy Guides to always stay up-to-date. We need our audience to keep an eye on software updates for the applications listed on our site and follow recent news about providers that we recommend. It's hard to keep up with the fast pace of the internet, but we try our best. If you spot an error, think a provider should not be listed, notice a qualified provider is missing, believe a browser plugin is no longer the best choice, or uncover any other issue, please let us know.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/kb-archive.md b/i18n/de/kb-archive.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f05d9780c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/kb-archive.md
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+---
+title: KB Archive
+icon: material/archive
+---
+
+# Pages Moved to Blog
+
+Einige Seiten, die früher in unserer Wissensdatenbank waren, sind jetzt in unserem Blog zu finden:
+
+- [GrapheneOS vs. CalyxOS](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/)
+- [Signal Configuration Hardening](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening/)
+- [Linux - System Hardening](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/22/linux-system-hardening/)
+- [Linux - Application Sandboxing](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/22/linux-application-sandboxing/)
+- [Secure Data Erasure](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/05/25/secure-data-erasure/)
+- [Integrating Metadata Removal](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/09/integrating-metadata-removal/)
+- [iOS Configuration Guide](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/22/ios-configuration-guide/)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/meta/brand.md b/i18n/de/meta/brand.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..48e849002
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/meta/brand.md
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+---
+title: Branding Guidelines
+---
+
+The name of the website is **Privacy Guides** and should **not** be changed to:
+
+
+
+The name of the subreddit is **r/PrivacyGuides** or **the Privacy Guides Subreddit**.
+
+Additional branding guidelines can be found at [github.com/privacyguides/brand](https://github.com/privacyguides/brand)
+
+## Trademark
+
+"Privacy Guides" and the shield logo are trademarks owned by Jonah Aragon, unlimited usage is granted to the Privacy Guides project.
+
+Without waiving any of its rights, Privacy Guides does not advise others on the scope of its intellectual property rights. Privacy Guides does not permit or consent to any use of its trademarks in any manner that is likely to cause confusion by implying association with or sponsorship by Privacy Guides. If you are aware of any such use, please contact Jonah Aragon at jonah@privacyguides.org. Consult your legal counsel if you have questions.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/meta/git-recommendations.md b/i18n/de/meta/git-recommendations.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0837d5548
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/meta/git-recommendations.md
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+---
+title: Git Recommendations
+---
+
+If you make changes to this website on GitHub.com's web editor directly, you shouldn't have to worry about this. If you are developing locally and/or are a long-term website editor (who should probably be developing locally!), consider these recommendations.
+
+## Enable SSH Key Commit Signing
+
+You can use an existing SSH key for signing, or [create a new one](https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/connecting-to-github-with-ssh/generating-a-new-ssh-key-and-adding-it-to-the-ssh-agent).
+
+1. Configure your Git client to sign commits and tags by default (remove `--global` to only sign by default for this repo):
+ ```
+ git config --global commit.gpgsign true
+ git config --global gpg.format ssh
+ git config --global tag.gpgSign true
+ ```
+2. Copy your SSH public key to your clipboard, for example:
+ ```
+ pbcopy < ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+ # Copies the contents of the id_ed25519.pub file to your clipboard
+ ```
+3. Set your SSH key for signing in Git with the following command, replacing the last string in quotes with the public key in your clipboard:
+ ```
+ git config --global user.signingkey 'ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3(...) user@example.com'
+ ```
+
+Ensure you [add your SSH key to your GitHub account](https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/connecting-to-github-with-ssh/adding-a-new-ssh-key-to-your-github-account#adding-a-new-ssh-key-to-your-account) **as a Signing Key** (as opposed to or in addition to as an Authentication Key).
+
+## Rebase on Git pull
+
+Use `git pull --rebase` instead of `git pull` when pulling in changes from GitHub to your local machine. This way your local changes will always be "on top of" the latest changes on GitHub, and you avoid merge commits (which are disallowed in this repo).
+
+You can set this to be the default behavior:
+
+```
+git config --global pull.rebase true
+```
+
+## Rebase from `main` before submitting a PR
+
+If you are working on your own branch, run these commands before submitting a PR:
+
+```
+git fetch origin
+git rebase origin/main
+```
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/meta/uploading-images.md b/i18n/de/meta/uploading-images.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c9edf2123
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/meta/uploading-images.md
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+---
+title: Uploading Images
+---
+
+Here are a couple of general rules for contributing to Privacy Guides:
+
+## Images
+
+- We **prefer** SVG images, but if those do not exist we can use PNG images
+
+Company logos have canvas size of:
+
+- 128x128px
+- 384x128px
+
+## Optimization
+
+### PNG
+
+Use the [OptiPNG](https://sourceforge.net/projects/optipng/) to optimize the PNG image:
+
+```bash
+optipng -o7 file.png
+```
+
+### SVG
+
+#### Inkscape
+
+[Scour](https://github.com/scour-project/scour) all SVG images.
+
+In Inkscape:
+
+1. File Save As..
+2. Set type to Optimized SVG (*.svg)
+
+In the **Options** tab:
+
+- **Number of significant digits for coordinates** > **5**
+- [x] Turn on **Shorten color values**
+- [x] Turn on **Convert CSS attributes to XML attributes**
+- [x] Turn on **Collapse groups**
+- [x] Turn on **Create groups for similar attributes**
+- [ ] Turn off **Keep editor data**
+- [ ] Turn off **Keep unreferenced definitions**
+- [x] Turn on **Work around renderer bugs**
+
+In the **SVG Output** tab under **Document options**:
+
+- [ ] Turn off **Remove the XML declaration**
+- [x] Turn on **Remove metadata**
+- [x] Turn on **Remove comments**
+- [x] Turn on **Embeded raster images**
+- [x] Turn on **Enable viewboxing**
+
+In the **SVG Output** under **Pretty-printing**:
+
+- [ ] Turn off **Format output with line-breaks and indentation**
+- **Indentation characters** > Select **Space**
+- **Depth of indentation** > **1**
+- [ ] Turn off **Strip the "xml:space" attribute from the root SVG element**
+
+In the **IDs** tab:
+
+- [x] Turn on **Remove unused IDs**
+- [ ] Turn off **Shorten IDs**
+- **Prefix shortened IDs with** > `leave blank`
+- [x] Turn on **Preserve manually created IDs not ending with digits**
+- **Preserve the following IDs** > `leave blank`
+- **Preserve IDs starting with** > `leave blank`
+
+#### CLI
+
+The same can be achieved with the [Scour](https://github.com/scour-project/scour) command:
+
+```bash
+scour --set-precision=5 \
+ --create-groups \
+ --renderer-workaround \
+ --remove-descriptive-elements \
+ --enable-comment-stripping \
+ --enable-viewboxing \
+ --indent=space \
+ --nindent=1 \
+ --no-line-breaks \
+ --enable-id-stripping \
+ --protect-ids-noninkscape \
+ input.svg output.svg
+```
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/meta/writing-style.md b/i18n/de/meta/writing-style.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6e3870357
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/meta/writing-style.md
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+---
+title: Writing Style
+---
+
+Privacy Guides is written in American English, and you should refer to [APA Style guidelines](https://apastyle.apa.org/style-grammar-guidelines/grammar) when in doubt.
+
+In general the [United States federal plain language guidelines](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/) provide a good overview of how to write clearly and concisely. We highlight a few important notes from these guidelines below.
+
+## Writing for our audience
+
+Privacy Guides' intended [audience](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/audience/) is primarily average, technology using adults. Don't dumb down content as if you are addressing a middle-school class, but don't overuse complicated terminology about concepts average computer users wouldn't be familiar with.
+
+### Address only what people want to know
+
+People don't need overly complex articles with little relevance to them. Figure out what you want people to accomplish when writing an article, and only include those details.
+
+> Tell your audience why the material is important to them. Say, “If you want a research grant, here’s what you have to do.” Or, “If you want to mine federal coal, here’s what you should know.” Or, “If you’re planning a trip to Rwanda, read this first.”
+
+### Address people directly
+
+We're writing *for* a wide variety of people, but we are writing *to* the person who is actually reading it. Use "you" to address the reader directly.
+
+> More than any other single technique, using “you” pulls users into the information and makes it relevant to them.
+>
+> When you use “you” to address users, they are more likely to understand what their responsibility is.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/audience/address-the-user/)
+
+### Avoid "users"
+
+Avoid calling people "users", in favor of "people", or a more specific description of the group of people you are writing for.
+
+## Organizing content
+
+Organization is key. Content should flow from most to least important information, and use headers as much as needed to logically separate different ideas.
+
+- Limit the document to around five or six sections. Long documents should probably be broken up into separate pages.
+- Mark important ideas with **bold** or *italics*.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/design/)
+
+### Begin with a topic sentence
+
+> If you tell your reader what they’re going to read about, they’re less likely to have to read your paragraph again. Headings help, but they’re not enough. Establish a context for your audience before you provide them with the details.
+>
+> We often write the way we think, putting our premises first and then our conclusion. It may be the natural way to develop thoughts, but we wind up with the topic sentence at the end of the paragraph. Move it up front and let users know where you’re going. Don’t make readers hold a lot of information in their heads before getting to the point.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/organize/have-a-topic-sentence/)
+
+## Choose your words carefully
+
+> Words matter. They are the most basic building blocks of written and spoken communication. Don’t complicate things by using jargon, technical terms, or abbreviations that people won’t understand.
+
+We should try to avoid abbreviations where possible, but technology is full of abbreviations. In general, spell out the abbreviation/acronym the first time it is used on a page, and add the abbreviation to the abbreviation glossary file when it is used repeatedly.
+
+> Kathy McGinty offers tongue-in-cheek instructions for bulking up your simple, direct sentences:
+>
+> > There is no escaping the fact that it is considered very important to note that a number of various available applicable studies ipso facto have generally identified the fact that additional appropriate nocturnal employment could usually keep juvenile adolescents off thoroughfares during the night hours, including but not limited to the time prior to midnight on weeknights and/or 2 a.m. on weekends.
+>
+> And the original, using stronger, simpler words:
+>
+> > More night jobs would keep youths off the streets.
+
+## Be concise
+
+> Unnecessary words waste your audience’s time. Great writing is like a conversation. Omit information that the audience doesn’t need to know. This can be difficult as a subject matter expert so it’s important to have someone look at the information from the audience’s perspective.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/concise/)
+
+## Keep text conversational
+
+> Verbs are the fuel of writing. They give your sentences power and direction. They enliven your writing and make it more interesting.
+>
+> Verbs tell your audience what to do. Make sure it’s clear who does what.
+
+### Use active voice
+
+> Active voice makes it clear who is supposed to do what. It eliminates ambiguity about responsibilities. Not “It must be done,” but “You must do it.”
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/conversational/use-active-voice/)
+
+### Use "must" for requirements
+
+> - “must” for an obligation
+> - “must not” for a prohibition
+> - “may” for a discretionary action
+> - “should” for a recommendation
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/mobile-browsers.md b/i18n/de/mobile-browsers.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5e891156d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/mobile-browsers.md
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+---
+title: "Mobile Browsers"
+icon: material/cellphone-information
+---
+
+These are our currently recommended mobile web browsers and configurations for standard/non-anonymous internet browsing. If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) instead. In general, we recommend keeping extensions to a minimum; they have privileged access within your browser, require you to trust the developer, can make you [stand out](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint), and [weaken](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/chromium-extensions/c/0ei-UCHNm34/m/lDaXwQhzBAAJ) site isolation.
+
+## Android
+
+On Android, Firefox is still less secure than Chromium-based alternatives: Mozilla's engine, [GeckoView](https://mozilla.github.io/geckoview/), has yet to support [site isolation](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2021/05/introducing-firefox-new-site-isolation-security-architecture) or enable [isolatedProcess](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1565196).
+
+### Brave
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Brave Browser** includes a built-in content blocker and [privacy features](https://brave.com/privacy-features/), many of which are enabled by default.
+
+ Brave is built upon the Chromium web browser project, so it should feel familiar and have minimal website compatibility issues.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://brave.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://brave4u7jddbv7cyviptqjc7jusxh72uik7zt6adtckl5f4nwy2v72qd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://brave.com/privacy/browser/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.brave.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads annotate
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.brave.browser)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/releases)
+
+#### Recommended Configuration
+
+Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. When you use Brave, we recommend changing the following settings to protect your privacy from certain parties, but all browsers other than the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) will be traceable by *somebody* in some regard or another.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Brave Shields & privacy**
+
+##### Shields
+
+Brave includes some anti-fingerprinting measures in its [Shields](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360022973471-What-is-Shields-) feature. We suggest configuring these options [globally](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360023646212-How-do-I-configure-global-and-site-specific-Shields-settings-) across all pages that you visit.
+
+##### Brave shields global defaults
+
+Shields' options can be downgraded on a per-site basis as needed, but by default we recommend setting the following:
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Aggressive** under Block trackers & ads
+
+ ??? warning "Use default filter lists"
+ Brave allows you to select additional content filters within the internal `brave://adblock` page. We advise against using this feature; instead, keep the default filter lists. Using extra lists will make you stand out from other Brave users and may also increase attack surface if there is an exploit in Brave and a malicious rule is added to one of the lists you use.
+
+- [x] Select **Upgrade connections to HTTPS**
+- [x] (Optional) Select **Block Scripts** (1)
+- [x] Select **Strict, may break sites** under **Block fingerprinting**
+
+
+
+1. This option provides functionality similar to uBlock Origin's advanced [blocking modes](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) or the [NoScript](https://noscript.net/) extension.
+
+##### Clear browsing data
+
+- [x] Select **Clear data on exit**
+
+##### Social Media Blocking
+
+- [ ] Uncheck all social media components
+
+##### Other privacy settings
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Disable non-proxied UDP** under [WebRTC IP Handling Policy](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360017989132-How-do-I-change-my-Privacy-Settings-#webrtc)
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow sites to check if you have payment methods saved**
+- [ ] Uncheck **IPFS Gateway** (1)
+- [x] Select **Close tabs on exit**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow privacy-preserving product analytics (P3A)**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send diagnostic reports**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send daily usage ping to Brave**
+
+1. InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is a decentralized, peer-to-peer network for storing and sharing data in a distributed filesystem. Unless you use the feature, disable it.
+
+
+
+#### Brave Sync
+
+[Brave Sync](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360059793111-Understanding-Brave-Sync) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices without requiring an account and protects it with E2EE.
+
+## iOS
+
+On iOS, any app that can browse the web is [restricted](https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines) to using an Apple-provided [WebKit framework](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/webkit), so there is little reason to use a third-party web browser.
+
+### Safari
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Safari** is the default browser in iOS. It includes [privacy features](https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/browse-the-web-privately-iphb01fc3c85/15.0/ios/15.0) such as Intelligent Tracking Protection, Privacy Report, isolated Private Browsing tabs, iCloud Private Relay, and automatic HTTPS upgrades.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.apple.com/safari/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/safari/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/safari/welcome/mac){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+#### Recommended Configuration
+
+These options can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Safari** → **Privacy and Security**.
+
+##### Cross-Site Tracking Prevention
+
+- [x] Enable **Prevent Cross-Site Tracking**
+
+This enables WebKit's [Intelligent Tracking Protection](https://webkit.org/tracking-prevention/#intelligent-tracking-prevention-itp). The feature helps protect against unwanted tracking by using on-device machine learning to stop trackers. ITP protects against many common threats, but it does not block all tracking avenues because it is designed to not interfere with website usability.
+
+##### Privacy Report
+
+Privacy Report provides a snapshot of cross-site trackers currently prevented from profiling you on the website you're visiting. It can also display a weekly report to show which trackers have been blocked over time.
+
+Privacy Report is accessible via the Page Settings menu.
+
+##### Privacy Preserving Ad Measurement
+
+- [ ] Disable **Privacy Preserving Ad Measurement**
+
+Ad click measurement has traditionally used tracking technology that infringes on user privacy. [Private Click Measurement](https://webkit.org/blog/11529/introducing-private-click-measurement-pcm/) is a WebKit feature and proposed web standard aimed towards allowing advertisers to measure the effectiveness of web campaigns without compromising on user privacy.
+
+The feature has little privacy concerns on its own, so while you can choose to leave it on, we consider the fact that it's automatically disabled in Private Browsing to be an indicator for disabling the feature.
+
+##### Always-on Private Browsing
+
+Open Safari and tap the Tabs button, located in the bottom right. Then, expand the Tab Groups list.
+
+- [x] Select **Private**
+
+Safari's Private Browsing mode offers additional privacy protections. Private Browsing uses a new [ephemeral](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/urlsessionconfiguration/1410529-ephemeral) session for each tab, meaning tabs are isolated from one another. There are also other smaller privacy benefits with Private Browsing, such as not sending a webpage’s address to Apple when using Safari's translation feature.
+
+Do note that Private Browsing does not save cookies and website data, so it won't be possible to remain signed into sites. This may be an inconvenience.
+
+##### iCloud Sync
+
+Synchronization of Safari History, Tab Groups, iCloud Tabs and saved passwords are E2EE. However, by default, bookmarks are [not](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303). Apple can decrypt and access them in accordance with their [privacy policy](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/).
+
+You can enable E2EE for you Safari bookmarks and downloads by enabling [Advanced Data Protection](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212520). Go to your **Apple ID name → iCloud → Advanced Data Protection**.
+
+- [x] Turn On **Advanced Data Protection**
+
+If you use iCloud with Advanced Data Protection disabled, we also recommend checking to ensure Safari's default download location is set to locally on your device. This option can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Safari** → **General** → **Downloads**.
+
+### AdGuard
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **AdGuard for iOS** is a free and open-source content-blocking extension for Safari that uses the native [Content Blocker API](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/safariservices/creating_a_content_blocker).
+
+ AdGuard for iOS has some premium features; however, standard Safari content blocking is free of charge.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://adguard.com/en/adguard-ios/overview.html){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://adguard.com/privacy/ios.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://kb.adguard.com/ios){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdguardForiOS){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id1047223162)
+
+Additional filter lists do slow things down and may increase your attack surface, so only apply what you need.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must support automatic updates.
+- Must receive engine updates in 0-1 days from upstream release.
+- Any changes required to make the browser more privacy-respecting should not negatively impact user experience.
+- Android browsers must use the Chromium engine.
+ - Unfortunately, Mozilla GeckoView is still less secure than Chromium on Android.
+ - iOS browsers are limited to WebKit.
+
+### Extension Criteria
+
+- Must not replicate built-in browser or OS functionality.
+- Must directly impact user privacy, i.e. must not simply provide information.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/multi-factor-authentication.md b/i18n/de/multi-factor-authentication.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1a0e3c6fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/multi-factor-authentication.md
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+---
+title: "Multi-Factor Authenticators"
+icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication'
+---
+
+## Hardware Security Keys
+
+### YubiKey
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ 
+
+ The **YubiKeys** are among the most popular security keys. Some YubiKey models have a wide range of features such as: [Universal 2nd Factor (U2F)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_2nd_Factor), [FIDO2 and WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online), [Yubico OTP](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#yubico-otp), [Personal Identity Verification (PIV)](https://developers.yubico.com/PIV), [OpenPGP](https://developers.yubico.com/PGP/), [TOTP and HOTP](https://developers.yubico.com/OATH) authentication.
+
+ One of the benefits of the YubiKey is that one key can do almost everything (YubiKey 5), you could expect from a hardware security key. We do encourage you to take the [quiz](https://www.yubico.com/quiz/) before purchasing in order to make sure you make the right choice.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.yubico.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.yubico.com/support/terms-conditions/privacy-notice){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.yubico.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+The [comparison table](https://www.yubico.com/store/compare/) shows the features and how the YubiKeys compare. We highly recommend that you select keys from the YubiKey 5 Series.
+
+YubiKeys can be programmed using the [YubiKey Manager](https://www.yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-manager/) or [YubiKey Personalization Tools](https://www.yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-personalization-tools/). For managing TOTP codes, you can use the [Yubico Authenticator](https://www.yubico.com/products/yubico-authenticator/). All of Yubico's clients are open-source.
+
+For models which support HOTP and TOTP, there are 2 slots in the OTP interface which could be used for HOTP and 32 slots to store TOTP secrets. These secrets are stored encrypted on the key and never expose them to the devices they are plugged into. Once a seed (shared secret) is given to the Yubico Authenticator, it will only give out the six-digit codes, but never the seed. This security model helps limit what an attacker can do if they compromise one of the devices running the Yubico Authenticator and make the YubiKey resistant to a physical attacker.
+
+!!! warning
+ The firmware of YubiKey is not open-source and is not updatable. If you want features in newer firmware versions, or if there is a vulnerability in the firmware version you are using, you would need to purchase a new key.
+
+### Nitrokey / Librem Key
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nitrokey** has a security key capable of [FIDO2 and WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) called the **Nitrokey FIDO2**. For PGP support, you need to purchase one of their other keys such as the **Nitrokey Start**, **Nitrokey Pro 2** or the **Nitrokey Storage 2**.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.nitrokey.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.nitrokey.com/data-privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.nitrokey.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+The [comparison table](https://www.nitrokey.com/#comparison) shows the features and how the Nitrokey models compare. The **Nitrokey 3** listed will have a combined feature set.
+
+Nitrokey models can be configured using the [Nitrokey app](https://www.nitrokey.com/download).
+
+For the models which support HOTP and TOTP, there are 3 slots for HOTP and 15 for TOTP. Some Nitrokeys can act as a password manager. They can store 16 different credentials and encrypt them using the same password as the OpenPGP interface.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ While Nitrokeys do not release the HOTP/TOTP secrets to the device they are plugged into, the HOTP and TOTP storage is **not** encrypted and is vulnerable to physical attacks. If you are looking to store HOTP or TOTP these secrets, we highly recommend that you use a Yubikey instead.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Resetting the OpenPGP interface on a Nitrokey will also make the password database [inaccessible](https://docs.nitrokey.com/pro/linux/factory-reset).
+
+ The Nitrokey Pro 2, Nitrokey Storage 2, and the upcoming Nitrokey 3 supports system integrity verification for laptops with the [Coreboot](https://www.coreboot.org/) + [Heads](https://osresearch.net/) firmware. Purism's [Librem Key](https://puri.sm/products/librem-key/) is a rebranded NitroKey Pro 2 with similar firmware and can also be used for the same purposes.
+
+Nitrokey's firmware is open-source, unlike the YubiKey. The firmware on modern NitroKey models (except the **NitroKey Pro 2**) is updatable.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ The Nitrokey app, while compatible with Librem Keys, requires `libnitrokey` version 3.6 or above to recognize them. Currently, the package is outdated on Windows, macOS, and most Linux distributions' repository, so you will likely have to compile the Nitrokey app yourself to get it working with the Librem Key. On Linux, you can obtain an up-to-date version from [Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.nitrokey.nitrokey-app).
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+#### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must use high quality, tamper resistant hardware security modules.
+- Must support the latest FIDO2 specification.
+- Must not allow private key extraction.
+- Devices which cost over $35 must support handling OpenPGP and S/MIME.
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should be available in USB-C form-factor.
+- Should be available with NFC.
+- Should support TOTP secret storage.
+- Should support secure firmware updates.
+
+## Authenticator Apps
+
+Authenticator Apps implement a security standard adopted by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) called **Time-based One-time Passwords**, or **TOTP**. This is a method where websites share a secret with you which is used by your authenticator app to generate a six (usually) digit code based on the current time, which you enter while logging in for the website to check. Typically these codes are regenerated every 30 seconds, and once a new code is generated the old one becomes useless. Even if a hacker gets one six-digit code, there is no way for them to reverse that code to get the original secret or otherwise be able to predict what any future codes might be.
+
+We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternatives as Android and iOS have better security and app isolation than most desktop operating systems.
+
+### Aegis Authenticator (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Aegis Authenticator** is a free, secure and open-source app to manage your 2-step verification tokens for your online services.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getaegis.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://getaegis.app/aegis/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.buymeacoffee.com/beemdevelopment){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.beemdevelopment.aegis)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis/releases)
+
+### Raivo OTP (iOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Raivo OTP** is a native, lightweight and secure time-based (TOTP) & counter-based (HOTP) password client for iOS. Raivo OTP offers optional iCloud backup & sync. Raivo OTP is also available for macOS in the form of a status bar application, however the Mac app does not work independently of the iOS app.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://raivo-otp.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://raivo-otp.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/raivo-otp/ios-application){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://raivo-otp.com/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/raivo-otp/id1459042137)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must not require internet connectivity.
+- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
+ - **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/news-aggregators.md b/i18n/de/news-aggregators.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0f608abb9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/news-aggregators.md
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+---
+title: "News Aggregators"
+icon: material/rss
+---
+
+A [news aggregator](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/News_aggregator) is a way to keep up with your favourite blogs and news sites.
+
+## Aggregator clients
+
+### Akregator
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Akregator** is a news feed reader that is a part of the [KDE](https://kde.org) project. It comes with a fast search, advanced archiving functionality and an internal browser for easy news reading.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://apps.kde.org/akregator){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://kde.org/privacypolicy-apps){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.kde.org/?application=akregator){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://invent.kde.org/pim/akregator){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://kde.org/community/donations/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.kde.akregator)
+
+### Feeder
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Feeder** is a modern RSS client for Android that has many [features](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder#features) and works well with folders of RSS feeds. It supports [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS), [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)), [RDF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDF%2FXML) and [JSON Feed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Feed).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://ko-fi.com/spacecowboy){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nononsenseapps.feeder.play)
+
+### Fluent Reader
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Fluent Reader** is a secure cross-platform news aggregator that has useful privacy features such as deletion of cookies on exit, strict [content security policies (CSP)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy) and proxy support, meaning you can use it over [Tor](tor.md).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://hyliu.me/fluent-reader){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader/wiki/Privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader/wiki/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/yang991178){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://hyliu.me/fluent-reader)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1520907427)
+
+### GNOME Feeds
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GNOME Feeds** is an [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS) and [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)) news reader for [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org). It has a simple interface and is quite fast.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gfeeds.gabmus.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.gnome.org/World/gfeeds){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/gabmus/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://gfeeds.gabmus.org/#install)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.gabmus.gfeeds)
+
+### Miniflux
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Miniflux** is a web-based news aggregator that you can self-host. It supports [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS), [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)), [RDF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDF%2FXML) and [JSON Feed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Feed).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://miniflux.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://miniflux.app/docs/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/miniflux/v2){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://miniflux.app/#donations){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+### NetNewsWire
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **NetNewsWire** a free and open-source feed reader for macOS and iOS with a focus on a native design and feature set. It supports the typical feed formats alongside built-in support for Twitter and Reddit feeds.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://netnewswire.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://netnewswire.com/privacypolicy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://netnewswire.com/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Ranchero-Software/NetNewsWire){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/netnewswire-rss-reader/id1480640210)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://netnewswire.com)
+
+### Newsboat
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Newsboat** is an RSS/Atom feed reader for the text console. It's an actively maintained fork of [Newsbeuter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newsbeuter). It is very lightweight, and ideal for use over [Secure Shell](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Shell).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://newsboat.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://newsboat.org/releases/2.27/docs/newsboat.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/newsboat/newsboat){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must operate locally, i.e. must not be a cloud service.
+
+## Social Media RSS Support
+
+Some social media services also support RSS although it's not often advertised.
+
+### Reddit
+
+Reddit allows you to subscribe to subreddits via RSS.
+
+!!! example
+ Replace `subreddit_name` with the subreddit you wish to subscribe to.
+
+ ```text
+ https://www.reddit.com/r/{{ subreddit_name }}/new/.rss
+ ```
+
+### Twitter
+
+Using any of the Nitter [instances](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter/wiki/Instances) you can easily subscribe using RSS.
+
+!!! example
+ 1. Pick an instance and set `nitter_instance`.
+ 2. Replace `twitter_account` with the account name.
+
+ ```text
+ https://{{ nitter_instance }}/{{ twitter_account }}/rss
+ ```
+
+### YouTube
+
+You can subscribe YouTube channels without logging in and associating usage information with your Google Account.
+
+!!! example
+
+ To subscribe to a YouTube channel with an RSS client, first look for your [channel code](https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6180214), replace `[CHANNEL ID]` below:
+ ```text
+ https://www.youtube.com/feeds/videos.xml?channel_id=[CHANNEL ID]
+ ```
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/notebooks.md b/i18n/de/notebooks.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..125d26162
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/notebooks.md
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+---
+title: "Notebooks"
+icon: material/notebook-edit-outline
+---
+
+Keep track of your notes and journalings without giving them to a third-party.
+
+If you are currently using an application like Evernote, Google Keep, or Microsoft OneNote, we suggest you pick an alternative here that supports E2EE.
+
+## Cloud-based
+
+### Joplin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Joplin** is a free, open-source, and fully-featured note-taking and to-do application which can handle a large number of markdown notes organized into notebooks and tags. It offers E2EE and can sync through Nextcloud, Dropbox, and more. It also offers easy import from Evernote and plain-text notes.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://joplinapp.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://joplinapp.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://joplinapp.org/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://joplinapp.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.cozic.joplin)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/joplin/id1315599797)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/joplin-web-clipper/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/joplin-web-clipper/alofnhikmmkdbbbgpnglcpdollgjjfek)
+
+Joplin does not support password/PIN protection for the [application itself or individual notes and notebooks](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin/issues/289). However, your data is still encrypted in transit and at the sync location using your master key.
+
+### Standard Notes
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Standard Notes** is a simple and private notes app that makes your notes easy and available everywhere you are. It features E2EE on every platform, and a powerful desktop experience with themes and custom editors. It has also been [independently audited (PDF)](https://s3.amazonaws.com/standard-notes/security/Report-SN-Audit.pdf).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://standardnotes.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://standardnotes.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://standardnotes.com/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/standardnotes){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://standardnotes.com/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.standardnotes)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1285392450)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/standardnotes/app/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://standardnotes.com)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://standardnotes.com)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://standardnotes.com)
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://app.standardnotes.com/)
+
+### Cryptee
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Cryptee** is an open-source, web-based E2EE document editor and photo storage application. Cryptee is a PWA, which means that it works seamlessly across all modern devices without requiring native apps for each respective platform.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://crypt.ee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://crypt.ee/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://crypt.ee/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/cryptee){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: PWA](https://crypt.ee/download)
+
+Cryptee offers 100MB of storage for free, with paid options if you need more. Sign-up doesn't require an e-mail or other personally identifiable information.
+
+## Local notebooks
+
+### Org-mode
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Org-mode** is a [major mode](https://www.gnu.org/software/emacs/manual/html_node/elisp/Major-Modes.html) for GNU Emacs. Org-mode is for keeping notes, maintaining TODO lists, planning projects, and authoring documents with a fast and effective plain-text system. Synchronization is possible with [file synchronization](file-sharing.md#file-sync) tools.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orgmode.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://orgmode.org/manuals.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/emacs/org-mode.git){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/bzg){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Clients must be open-source.
+- Any cloud sync functionality must be E2EE.
+- Must support exporting documents into a standard format.
+
+### Best Case
+
+- Local backup/sync functionality should support encryption.
+- Cloud-based platforms should support document sharing.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/de/os/android-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..36c303d36
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/os/android-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+---
+title: Android Overview
+icon: simple/android
+---
+
+Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system.
+
+## Choosing an Android Distribution
+
+When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has irrevocable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android.
+
+This problem could be solved by using a custom Android distribution that does not come with such invasive integration. Unfortunately, many custom Android distributions often violate the Android security model by not supporting critical security features such as AVB, rollback protection, firmware updates, and so on. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require [more permissive](https://github.com/LineageOS/android_system_sepolicy/search?q=userdebug&type=code) SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
+
+Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that it upholds the Android security model. At the very least, the distribution should have production builds, support for AVB, rollback protection, timely firmware and operating system updates, and SELinux in [enforcing mode](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts#enforcement_levels). All of our recommended Android distributions satisfy these criteria.
+
+[Our Android System Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Avoid Rooting
+
+[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
+
+Adblockers, which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For Adblocking we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or [VPN](../vpn.md) server blocking solutions instead. RethinkDNS, TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN) preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as Orbot or a real VPN server.
+
+AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
+
+We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps.
+
+## Verified Boot
+
+[Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection).
+
+Android 10 and above has moved away from full-disk encryption to more flexible [file-based encryption](https://source.android.com/security/encryption/file-based). Your data is encrypted using unique encryption keys, and the operating system files are left unencrypted.
+
+Verified Boot ensures the integrity of the operating system files, thereby preventing an adversary with physical access from tampering or installing malware on the device. In the unlikely case that malware is able to exploit other parts of the system and gain higher privileged access, Verified Boot will prevent and revert changes to the system partition upon rebooting the device.
+
+Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock Android distribution. Only a few OEMs such as Google support custom AVB key enrollment on their devices. Additionally, some AOSP derivatives such as LineageOS or /e/ OS do not support Verified Boot even on hardware with Verified Boot support for third-party operating systems. We recommend that you check for support **before** purchasing a new device. AOSP derivatives which do not support Verified Boot are **not** recommended.
+
+Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be aware of beyond their marketing. For example, the Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage.
+
+## Firmware Updates
+
+Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin).
+
+As the components of the phone, such as the processor and radio technologies rely on closed-source components, the updates must be provided by the respective manufacturers. Therefore, it is important that you purchase a device within an active support cycle. [Qualcomm](https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2020/12/16/qualcomm-and-google-announce-collaboration-extend-android-os-support-and) and [Samsung](https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-security-extending-updates-knox/) support their devices for 4 years, while cheaper products often have shorter support cycles. With the introduction of the [Pixel 6](https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/4457705), Google now makes their own SoC and they will provide a minimum of 5 years of support.
+
+EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive firmware updates from OEM vendors or after market Android distributors. This means that security issues with those devices will remain unfixed.
+
+Fairphone, for example, markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates.
+
+## Android Versions
+
+It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution.
+
+## Android Permissions
+
+[Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps. A smartphone with the latest version of Android will always be more secure than an old smartphone with an antivirus that you have paid for. It's better not to pay for antivirus software and to save money to buy a new smartphone such as a Google Pixel.
+
+Should you want to run an app that you're unsure about, consider using a user or work profile.
+
+## Media Access
+
+Quite a few applications allows you to "share" a file with them for media upload. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter.
+
+## User Profiles
+
+Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android.
+
+With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation.
+
+## Work Profile
+
+[Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles.
+
+A **device controller** app such as [Shelter](#recommended-apps) is required to create a Work Profile without an enterprise MDM, unless you're using a custom Android OS which includes one.
+
+The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such as *File Shuttle* and *contact search blocking* or any kind of isolation features must be implemented by the controller. You must also fully trust the device controller app, as it has full access to your data inside of the work profile.
+
+This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously.
+
+## VPN Killswitch
+
+Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+## Global Toggles
+
+Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled.
+
+## Google
+
+If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play.
+
+### Advanced Protection Program
+
+If you have a Google account we suggest enrolling in the [Advanced Protection Program](https://landing.google.com/advancedprotection/). It is available at no cost to anyone with two or more hardware security keys with [FIDO](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) support.
+
+The Advanced Protection Program provides enhanced threat monitoring and enables:
+
+- Stricter two factor authentication; e.g. that [FIDO](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) **must** be used and disallows the use of [SMS OTPs](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#sms-or-email-mfa), [TOTP](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp) and [OAuth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth)
+- Only Google and verified third-party apps can access account data
+- Scanning of incoming emails on Gmail accounts for [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing#Email_phishing) attempts
+- Stricter [safe browser scanning](https://www.google.com/chrome/privacy/whitepaper.html#malware) with Google Chrome
+- Stricter recovery process for accounts with lost credentials
+
+ If you use non-sandboxed Google Play Services (common on stock operating systems), the Advanced Protection Program also comes with [additional benefits](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/9764949?hl=en) such as:
+
+- Not allowing app installation outside of the Google Play Store, the OS vendor's app store, or via [`adb`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_Debug_Bridge)
+- Mandatory automatic device scanning with [Play Protect](https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/2812853?hl=en#zippy=%2Chow-malware-protection-works%2Chow-privacy-alerts-work)
+- Warning you about unverified applications
+
+### Google Play System Updates
+
+In the past, Android security updates had to be shipped by the operating system vendor. Android has become more modular beginning with Android 10, and Google can push security updates for **some** system components via the privileged Play Services.
+
+If you have an EOL device shipped with Android 10 or above and are unable to run any of our recommended operating systems on your device, you are likely going to be better off sticking with your OEM Android installation (as opposed to an operating system not listed here such as LineageOS or /e/ OS). This will allow you to receive **some** security fixes from Google, while not violating the Android security model by using an insecure Android derivative and increasing your attack surface. We would still recommend upgrading to a supported device as soon as possible.
+
+### Advertising ID
+
+All devices with Google Play Services installed automatically generate an [advertising ID](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/6048248?hl=en) used for targeted advertising. Disable this feature to limit the data collected about you.
+
+On Android distributions with [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), go to :gear: **Settings** → **Apps** → **Sandboxed Google Play** → **Google Settings** → **Ads**, and select *Delete advertising ID*.
+
+On Android distributions with privileged Google Play Services (such as stock OSes), the setting may be in one of several locations. Check
+
+- :gear: **Settings** → **Google** → **Ads**
+- :gear: **Settings** → **Privacy** → **Ads**
+
+You will either be given the option to delete your advertising ID or to *Opt out of interest-based ads*, this varies between OEM distributions of Android. If presented with the option to delete the advertising ID that is preferred. If not, then make sure to opt out and reset your advertising ID.
+
+### SafetyNet and Play Integrity API
+
+[SafetyNet](https://developer.android.com/training/safetynet/attestation) and the [Play Integrity APIs](https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity) are generally used for [banking apps](https://grapheneos.org/usage#banking-apps). Many banking apps will work fine in GrapheneOS with sandboxed Play services, however some non-financial apps have their own crude anti-tampering mechanisms which might fail. GrapheneOS passes the `basicIntegrity` check, but not the certification check `ctsProfileMatch`. Devices with Android 8 or later have hardware attestation support which cannot be bypassed without leaked keys or serious vulnerabilities.
+
+As for Google Wallet, we don't recommend this due to their [privacy policy](https://payments.google.com/payments/apis-secure/get_legal_document?ldo=0&ldt=privacynotice&ldl=en), which states you must opt-out if you don't want your credit rating and personal information shared with affiliate marketing services.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/de/os/linux-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8a7d874d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/os/linux-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+---
+title: Linux Overview
+icon: simple/linux
+---
+
+It is often believed that [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigour applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years.
+
+At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.:
+
+- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack)
+- A strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go
+- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations)
+
+Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are great if you want to:
+
+- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems
+- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms)
+- Have privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/)
+
+Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed here.
+
+[Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Choosing your distribution
+
+Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use.
+
+### Release cycle
+
+We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates.
+
+For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release.
+
+We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this:
+
+
+
+
+
+### Traditional vs Atomic updates
+
+Traditionally, Linux distributions update by sequentially updating the desired packages. Traditional updates such as those used in Fedora, Arch Linux, and Debian based distributions can be less reliable if an error occurs while updating.
+
+Atomic updating distributions apply updates in full or not at all. Typically, transactional update systems are also atomic.
+
+A transactional update system creates a snapshot that is made before and after an update is applied. If an update fails at any time (perhaps due to a power failure), the update can be easily rolled back to a “last known good state."
+
+The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tumbleweed, and NixOS and can achieve reliability with this model. [Adam Šamalík](https://twitter.com/adsamalik) provided a presentation on how `rpm-ostree` works with Silverblue:
+
+
+
+
+
+### “Security-focused” distributions
+
+There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use.
+
+### Arch-based distributions
+
+Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own.
+
+For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit).
+
+Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora.
+
+If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically:
+
+- **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories.
+- **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks.
+
+### Kicksecure
+
+While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default.
+
+### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions
+
+We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons.
+
+## General Recommendations
+
+### Drive Encryption
+
+Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS](../encryption.md#linux-unified-key-setup) FDE. If this option isn’t set at installation time, you will have to backup your data and re-install, as encryption is applied after [disk partitioning](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_partitioning), but before [file systems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_system) are formatted. We also suggest securely erasing your storage device:
+
+- [Secure Data Erasure :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/05/25/secure-data-erasure/)
+
+### Swap
+
+Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Swap#zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM).
+
+### Wayland
+
+We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland.
+
+Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)).
+
+We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do not have Wayland support, such as Cinnamon (default on Linux Mint), Pantheon (default on Elementary OS), MATE, Xfce, and i3.
+
+### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates)
+
+Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html).
+
+We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default.
+
+### Updates
+
+Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found.
+
+Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates.
+
+Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd).
+
+## Privacy Tweaks
+
+### MAC Address Randomization
+
+Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings.
+
+It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous.
+
+We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as suggested in the [article](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/).
+
+If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=).
+
+There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware.
+
+### Other Identifiers
+
+There are other system identifiers which you may wish to be careful about. You should give this some thought to see if it applies to your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md):
+
+- **Hostnames:** Your system's hostname is shared with the networks you connect to. You should avoid including identifying terms like your name or operating system in your hostname, instead sticking to generic terms or random strings.
+- **Usernames:** Similarly, your username is used in a variety of ways across your system. Consider using generic terms like "user" rather than your actual name.
+- **Machine ID:**: During installation a unique machine ID is generated and stored on your device. Consider [setting it to a generic ID](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#machine-id).
+
+### System Counting
+
+The Fedora Project [counts](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting) how many unique systems access its mirrors by using a [`countme`](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting#Detailed_Description) variable instead of a unique ID. Fedora does this to determine load and provision better servers for updates where necessary.
+
+This [option](https://dnf.readthedocs.io/en/latest/conf_ref.html#options-for-both-main-and-repo) is currently off by default. We recommend adding `countme=false` to `/etc/dnf/dnf.conf` just in case it is enabled in the future. On systems that use `rpm-ostree` such as Silverblue, the countme option is disabled by masking the [rpm-ostree-countme](https://fedoramagazine.org/getting-better-at-counting-rpm-ostree-based-systems/) timer.
+
+openSUSE also uses a [unique ID](https://en.opensuse.org/openSUSE:Statistics) to count systems, which can be disabled by deleting the `/var/lib/zypp/AnonymousUniqueId` file.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/de/os/qubes-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c731f8a3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/os/qubes-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+---
+title: "Qubes Overview"
+icon: simple/qubesos
+---
+
+[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/).
+
+## How does Qubes OS work?
+
+Qubes uses [compartmentalization](https://www.qubes-os.org/intro/) to keep the system secure. Qubes are created from templates, the defaults being for Fedora, Debian and [Whonix](../desktop.md#whonix). Qubes OS also allows you to create once-use [disposable](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-use-disposables/) virtual machines.
+
+
+Qubes Architecture, Credit: What is Qubes OS Intro
+
+Each Qubes application has a [colored border](https://www.qubes-os.org/screenshots/) that can help you keep track of the virtual machine it is running in. You could, for example, use a specific color for your banking browser, while using a different color for a general untrusted browser.
+
+
+Qubes window borders, Credit: Qubes Screenshots
+
+## Why Should I use Qubes?
+
+Qubes OS is useful if your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md) requires strong compartmentalization and security, such as if you think you'll be opening untrusted files from untrusted sources. A typical reason for using Qubes OS is to open documents from unknown sources.
+
+Qubes OS utilizes [Dom0](https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Dom0) Xen VM (i.e., an "AdminVM") for controlling other guest VMs or Qubes on the host OS. Other VMs display individual application windows within Dom0's desktop environment. It allows you to color code windows based on trust levels and run apps that can interact with each other with very granular control.
+
+### Copying and Pasting Text
+
+You can [copy and paste text](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-and-paste-text/) using `qvm-copy-to-vm` or the below instructions:
+
+1. Press **Ctrl+C** to tell the VM you're in that you want to copy something.
+2. Press **Ctrl+Shift+C** to tell the VM to make this buffer available to the global clipboard.
+3. Press **Ctrl+Shift+V** in the destination VM to make the global clipboard available.
+4. Press **Ctrl+V** in the destination VM to paste the contents in the buffer.
+
+### File Exchange
+
+To copy and paste files and directories (folders) from one VM to another, you can use the option **Copy to Other AppVM...** or **Move to Other AppVM...**. The difference is that the **Move** option will delete the original file. Either option will protect your clipboard from being leaked to any other Qubes. This is more secure than air-gapped file transfer because an air-gapped computer will still be forced to parse partitions or file systems. That is not required with the inter-qube copy system.
+
+??? info "AppVMs or qubes do not have their own file systems"
+
+ You can [copy and move files](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-and-move-files/) between Qubes. When doing so the changes aren't immediately made and can be easily undone in case of an accident.
+
+### Inter-VM Interactions
+
+The [qrexec framework](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec/) is a core part of Qubes which allows virtual machine communication between domains. It is built on top of the Xen library *vchan*, which facilitates [isolation through policies](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2020/06/22/new-qrexec-policy-system/).
+
+## Additional Resources
+
+For additional information we encourage you to consult the extensive Qubes OS documentation pages located on the [Qubes OS Website](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/). Offline copies can be downloaded from the Qubes OS [documentation repository](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-doc).
+
+- Open Technology Fund: [*Arguably the world's most secure operating system*](https://www.opentech.fund/news/qubes-os-arguably-the-worlds-most-secure-operating-system-motherboard/)
+- J. Rutkowska: [*Software compartmentalization vs. physical separation*](https://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/2014/Software_compartmentalization_vs_physical_separation.pdf)
+- J. Rutkowska: [*Partitioning my digital life into security domains*](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/03/13/partitioning-my-digital-life-into.html)
+- Qubes OS: [*Related Articles*](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/categories/#articles)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/passwords.md b/i18n/de/passwords.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c927cdb0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/passwords.md
@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+---
+title: "Password Managers"
+icon: material/form-textbox-password
+---
+
+Password managers allow you to securely store and manage passwords and other credentials with the use of a master password.
+
+[Introduction to Passwords :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](./basics/passwords-overview.md)
+
+!!! info
+
+ Built-in password managers in software like browsers and operating systems are sometimes not as good as dedicated password manager software. The advantage of a built-in password manager is good integration with the software, but it can often be very simple and lack privacy and security features standalone offerings have.
+
+ For example, the password manager in Microsoft Edge doesn't offer E2EE at all. Google's password manager has [optional](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/11350823) E2EE, and [Apple's](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303) offers E2EE by default.
+
+## Cloud-based
+
+These password managers sync your passwords to a cloud server for easy accessibility from all your devices and safety against device loss.
+
+### Bitwarden
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Bitwarden** is a free and open-source password manager. It aims to solve password management problems for individuals, teams, and business organizations. Bitwarden is among the best and safest solutions to store all of your logins and passwords while conveniently keeping them synced between all of your devices.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://bitwarden.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://bitwarden.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://bitwarden.com/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/bitwarden){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.x8bit.bitwarden)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/bitwarden-password-manager/id1137397744)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/bitwarden/mobile/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://bitwarden.com/download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://bitwarden.com/download)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.bitwarden.desktop)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/bitwarden-password-manager)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/bitwarden-free-password-m/nngceckbapebfimnlniiiahkandclblb)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/jbkfoedolllekgbhcbcoahefnbanhhlh)
+
+Bitwarden also features [Bitwarden Send](https://bitwarden.com/products/send/), which allows you to share text and files securely with [end-to-end encryption](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-encryption). A [password](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-privacy/#send-passwords) can be required along with the send link. Bitwarden Send also features [automatic deletion](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-lifespan).
+
+You need the [Premium Plan](https://bitwarden.com/help/about-bitwarden-plans/#compare-personal-plans) to be able to share files. The free plan only allows text sharing.
+
+Bitwarden's server-side code is [open-source](https://github.com/bitwarden/server), so if you don't want to use the Bitwarden cloud, you can easily host your own Bitwarden sync server.
+
+**Vaultwarden** is an alternative implementation of Bitwarden's sync server written in Rust and compatible with official Bitwarden clients, perfect for self-hosted deployment where running the official resource-heavy service might not be ideal. If you are looking to self-host Bitwarden on your own server, you almost certainly want to use Vaultwarden over Bitwarden's official server code.
+
+[:octicons-repo-16: Vaultwarden Repository](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden ""){.md-button} [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/dani-garcia){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+### 1Password
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **1Password** is a password manager with a strong focus on security and ease-of-use, which allows you to store passwords, credit cards, software licenses, and any other sensitive information in a secure digital vault. Your vault is hosted on 1Password's servers for a [monthly fee](https://1password.com/sign-up/). 1Password is [audited](https://support.1password.com/security-assessments/) on a regular basis and provides exceptional customer support. 1Password is closed source; however, the security of the product is thoroughly documented in their [security white paper](https://1passwordstatic.com/files/security/1password-white-paper.pdf).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://1password.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://support.1password.com/1password-privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.1password.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.onepassword.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1511601750?mt=8)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://1password.com/downloads/windows/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://1password.com/downloads/mac/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://1password.com/downloads/linux/)
+
+Traditionally, **1Password** has offered the best password manager user experience for people using macOS and iOS; however, it has now achieved feature-parity across all platforms. It boasts many features geared towards families and less technical people, as well as advanced functionality.
+
+Your 1Password vault is secured with both your master password and a randomized 34-character security key to encrypt your data on their servers. This security key adds a layer of protection to your data because your data is secured with high entropy regardless of your master password. Many other password manager solutions are entirely reliant on the strength of your master password to secure your data.
+
+One advantage 1Password has over Bitwarden is its first-class support for native clients. While Bitwarden relegates many duties, especially account management features, to their web vault interface, 1Password makes nearly every feature available within its native mobile or desktop clients. 1Password's clients also have a more intuitive UI, which makes them easier to use and navigate.
+
+### Psono
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Psono** is a free and open-source password manager from Germany, with a focus on password management for teams. Psono supports secure sharing of passwords, files, bookmarks, and emails. All secrets are protected by a master password.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://psono.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://psono.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://doc.psono.com){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/psono){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.psono.psono)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/psono-password-manager/id1545581224)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/psono-pw-password-manager)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/psonopw-password-manager/eljmjmgjkbmpmfljlmklcfineebidmlo)
+ - [:simple-docker: Docker Hub](https://hub.docker.com/r/psono/psono-client)
+
+Psono provides extensive documentation for their product. The web-client for Psono can be self-hosted; alternatively, you can choose the full Community Edition or the Enterprise Edition with additional features.
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+#### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must utilize strong, standards-based/modern E2EE.
+- Must have thoroughly documented encryption and security practices.
+- Must have a published audit from a reputable, independent third-party.
+- All non-essential telemetry must be optional.
+- Must not collect more PII than is necessary for billing purposes.
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Telemetry should be opt-in (disabled by default) or not collected at all.
+- Should be open-source and reasonably self-hostable.
+
+## Local Storage
+
+These options allow you to manage an encrypted password database locally.
+
+### KeePassXC
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **KeePassXC** is a community fork of KeePassX, a native cross-platform port of KeePass Password Safe, with the goal to extend and improve it with new features and bugfixes to provide a feature-rich, cross-platform and modern open-source password manager.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://keepassxc.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://keepassxc.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://keepassxc.org/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://keepassxc.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://keepassxc.org/download/#windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://keepassxc.org/download/#mac)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://keepassxc.org/download/#linux)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flatpak](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.keepassxc.KeePassXC)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/keepassxc-browser)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/keepassxc-browser/oboonakemofpalcgghocfoadofidjkkk)
+
+KeePassXC stores its export data as [CSV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comma-separated_values) files. This may mean data loss if you import this file into another password manager. We advise you check each record manually.
+
+### KeePassDX (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **KeePassDX** is a lightweight password manager for Android, allows editing encrypted data in a single file in KeePass format and can fill in the forms in a secure way. [Contributor Pro](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kunzisoft.keepass.pro) allows unlocking cosmetic content and non-standard protocol features, but more importantly, it helps and encourages development.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.keepassdx.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.keepassdx.com/#donation){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kunzisoft.keepass.free)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX/releases)
+
+### Strongbox (iOS & macOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Strongbox** is a native, open-source password manager for iOS and macOS. Supporting both KeePass and Password Safe formats, Strongbox can be used in tandem with other password managers, like KeePassXC, on non-Apple platforms. By employing a [freemium model](https://strongboxsafe.com/pricing/), Strongbox offers most features under its free tier with more convenience-oriented [features](https://strongboxsafe.com/comparison/)—such as biometric authentication—locked behind a subscription or perpetual license.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://strongboxsafe.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://strongboxsafe.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://strongboxsafe.com/getting-started/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/strongbox-password-safe/Strongbox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/strongbox-password-safe/Strongbox#supporting-development){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/strongbox-keepass-pwsafe/id897283731)
+
+Additionally, there is an offline-only version offered: [Strongbox Zero](https://apps.apple.com/app/strongbox-keepass-pwsafe/id1581589638). This version is stripped down in an attempt to reduce attack surface.
+
+### Command-line
+
+These products are minimal password managers that can be used within scripting applications.
+
+#### gopass
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **gopass** is a password manager for the command line written in Go. It works on all major desktop and server operating systems (Linux, macOS, BSD, Windows).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.gopass.pw){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/gopasspw/gopass/tree/master/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/gopasspw/gopass){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/dominikschulz){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-macos)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-linux)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-bsd)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be cross-platform.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/productivity.md b/i18n/de/productivity.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bce9403ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/productivity.md
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+---
+title: "Productivity Tools"
+icon: material/file-sign
+---
+
+Most online office suites do not support E2EE, meaning the cloud provider has access to everything you do. The privacy policy may legally protect your rights, but it does not provide technical access constraints.
+
+## Collaboration Platforms
+
+### Nextcloud
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nextcloud** is a suite of free and open-source client-server software for creating your own file hosting services on a private server you control.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://nextcloud.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://nextcloud.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://nextcloud.com/support/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/nextcloud){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nextcloud.com/contribute/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nextcloud.client)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1125420102)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/nextcloud/android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/www/nextcloud)
+
+!!! danger
+
+ We don't recommend using the [E2EE App](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/end_to_end_encryption) for Nextcloud as it may lead to data loss; it is highly experimental and not production quality. For this reason, we don't recommend third-party Nextcloud providers.
+
+### CryptPad
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **CryptPad** is a private-by-design alternative to popular office tools. All content on this web service is end-to-end encrypted and can be shared with other users easily.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://cryptpad.fr){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://cryptpad.fr/pad/#/2/pad/view/GcNjAWmK6YDB3EO2IipRZ0fUe89j43Ryqeb4fjkjehE/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.cryptpad.fr/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/xwiki-labs/cryptpad){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/cryptpad){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+In general, we define collaboration platforms as full-fledged suites which could reasonably act as a replacement to collaboration platforms like Google Drive.
+
+- Open-source.
+- Makes files accessible via WebDAV unless it is impossible due to E2EE.
+- Has sync clients for Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- Supports document and spreadsheet editing.
+- Supports real-time document collaboration.
+- Supports exporting documents to standard document formats (e.g. ODF).
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should store files in a conventional filesystem.
+- Should support TOTP or FIDO2 multi-factor authentication support, or Passkey logins.
+
+## Office Suites
+
+### LibreOffice
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **LibreOffice** is a free and open-source office suite with extensive functionality.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.libreoffice.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.libreoffice.org/about-us/privacy/privacy-policy-en/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://documentation.libreoffice.org/en/english-documentation/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://www.libreoffice.org/about-us/source-code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.libreoffice.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/android-and-ios/)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/android-and-ios/)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/download/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/download/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/download/)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.libreoffice.LibreOffice)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/editors/libreoffice/)
+
+### OnlyOffice
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OnlyOffice** is a cloud-based free and open-source office suite with extensive functionality, including integration with Nextcloud.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.onlyoffice.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://help.onlyoffice.com/products/files/doceditor.aspx?fileid=5048502&doc=SXhWMEVzSEYxNlVVaXJJeUVtS0kyYk14YWdXTEFUQmRWL250NllHNUFGbz0_IjUwNDg1MDIi0){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://helpcenter.onlyoffice.com/userguides.aspx){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ONLYOFFICE){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.onlyoffice.documents)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id944896972)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.onlyoffice.com/download-desktop.aspx)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.onlyoffice.com/download-desktop.aspx)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.onlyoffice.com/download-desktop.aspx)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.onlyoffice.desktopeditors)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/www/onlyoffice-documentserver/)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+In general, we define office suites as applications which could reasonably act as a replacement for Microsoft Word for most needs.
+
+- Must be cross-platform.
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must function offline.
+- Must support editing documents, spreadsheets, and slideshows.
+- Must export files to standard document formats.
+
+## Paste services
+
+### PrivateBin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **PrivateBin** is a minimalist, open-source online pastebin where the server has zero knowledge of pasted data. Data is encrypted/decrypted in the browser using 256-bit AES. It is the improved version of ZeroBin. There is a [list of instances](https://privatebin.info/directory/).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://privatebin.info){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://privatebin.info/directory/){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/wiki/FAQ){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/de/real-time-communication.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..196ef5abc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/real-time-communication.md
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+---
+title: "Real-Time Communication"
+icon: material/chat-processing
+---
+
+These are our recommendations for encrypted real-time communication.
+
+[Types of Communication Networks :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](./advanced/communication-network-types.md)
+
+## Encrypted Messengers
+
+These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
+
+### Signal
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
+
+ All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/signalapp){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://signal.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.thoughtcrime.securesms)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id874139669)
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://signal.org/android/apk/)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://signal.org/download/windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://signal.org/download/macos)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://signal.org/download/linux)
+
+Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). The server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
+
+The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
+
+We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation:
+
+[Signal Configuration and Hardening :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening/)
+
+### SimpleX Chat
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **SimpleX** Chat is an instant messenger that is decentralized and doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Users of SimpleX Chat can scan a QR code or click an invite link to participate in group conversations.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://simplex.chat){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/blob/stable/PRIVACY.md){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/tree/stable/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=chat.simplex.app)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/simplex-chat/id1605771084)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/releases)
+
+SimpleX Chat [was audited](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website.html) by Trail of Bits in October 2022.
+
+Currently SimpleX Chat only provides a client for Android and iOS. Basic group chatting functionality, direct messaging, editing of messages and markdown are supported. E2EE Audio and Video calls are also supported.
+
+Your data can be exported, and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up.
+
+### Briar
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works/) to other clients using the Tor Network. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org/){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.briarproject.briar.android)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://briarproject.org/download-briar-desktop/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://briarproject.org/download-briar-desktop/)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.briarproject.Briar)
+
+To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby.
+
+The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit/), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited.
+
+Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
+
+Briar supports perfect forward secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
+
+## Additional Options
+
+!!! warning
+
+ These messengers do not have Perfect [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) (PFS), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
+
+### Element
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Element** is the reference client for the [Matrix](https://matrix.org/docs/guides/introduction) protocol, an [open standard](https://matrix.org/docs/spec) for secure decentralized real-time communication.
+
+ Messages and files shared in private rooms (those which require an invite) are by default E2EE as are one to one voice and video calls.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://element.io/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://element.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://element.io/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/vector-im){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=im.vector.app)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/vector/id1083446067)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/vector-im/element-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://element.io/get-started)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://element.io/get-started)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://element.io/get-started)
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://app.element.io)
+
+Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
+
+Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
+
+The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
+
+The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm](https://matrix.org/docs/projects/other/olm) cryptographic ratchet used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
+
+### Session
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Session** is a decentralized messenger with a focus on private, secure, and anonymous communications. Session offers support for direct messages, group chats, and voice calls.
+
+ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to store and route messages. Every encrypted message is routed through three nodes in the Oxen Service Node Network, making it virtually impossible for the nodes to compile meaningful information on those using the network.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getsession.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://getsession.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://getsession.org/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/oxen-io){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=network.loki.messenger)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1470168868)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/oxen-io/session-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://getsession.org/download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://getsession.org/download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://getsession.org/download)
+
+Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
+
+Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
+
+Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
+
+Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must have open-source clients.
+- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
+- Must support E2EE for all messages.
+- Must have been independently audited.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should have Perfect Forward Secrecy.
+- Should have open-source servers.
+- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
+- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
+- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/router.md b/i18n/de/router.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b14af0c76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/router.md
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+---
+title: "Router-Firmware"
+icon: material/router-wireless
+---
+
+Nachstehend sind ein paar alternative Betriebssysteme gelistet, die auf Routern, WLAN-Zugangspunkten usw. eingesetzt werden können.
+
+## OpenWrt
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OpenWrt* ist ein auf Linux basierendes Betriebssystem; es wird primär auf eingebetteten Geräten zum Weiterleiten des Netzwerkverkehrs genutzt. Es enthält util-linux, uClib und BusyBox. Alle Komponenten sind für Heim-Router optimiert.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Hauptseite](https://openwrt.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://openwrt.org/docs/start){ .card-link title=Dokumentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt){ .card-link title="Quellcode" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://openwrt.org/donate){ .card-link title=Mitwirken }
+
+Sie können in der [table of hardware](https://openwrt.org/toh/start) von OpenWrt nachsehen, ob Ihr Gerät unterstützt wird.
+
+## OPNsense
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OPNsense* ist eine FreeBSD-basierte Open-Source-Firewall- und Routing-Plattform, die viele erweiterte Funktionen wie Traffic Shaping, Load Balancing und VPN-Funktionen enthält, wobei viele weitere Funktionen in Form von Plugins verfügbar sind. OPNsense wird in der Regel als Perimeter-Firewall, Router, Wireless Access Point, DHCP-Server, DNS-Server und VPN-Endpunkt eingesetzt.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://opnsense.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.opnsense.org/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/opnsense){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opnsense.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+OPNsense wurde ursprünglich als Fork von [pfSense](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PfSense) entwickelt. Beide Projekte sind bekannt dafür, freie und zuverlässige Firewall-Distributionen zu sein, die Funktionen bieten, die oft nur in teuren kommerziellen Firewalls zu finden sind. Die Entwickler von OPNsense [zitierten](https://docs.opnsense.org/history/thefork.html) eine Reihe von Sicherheits- und Code-Qualitätsproblemen mit pfSense, die ihrer Meinung nach eine Abspaltung des Projekts erforderlich machten, sowie Bedenken hinsichtlich der Mehrheitsübernahme von pfSense durch Netgate und der zukünftigen Ausrichtung des pfSense-Projekts.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be open source.
+- Must receive regular updates.
+- Must support a wide variety of hardware.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/search-engines.md b/i18n/de/search-engines.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ff48997d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/search-engines.md
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+---
+title: "Search Engines"
+icon: material/search-web
+---
+
+Use a search engine that doesn't build an advertising profile based on your searches.
+
+The recommendations here are based on the merits of each service's privacy policy. There is **no guarantee** that these privacy policies are honored.
+
+Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) if your threat model requires hiding your IP address from the search provider.
+
+## Brave Search
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Brave Search** is developed by Brave and serves results primarily from its own, independent index. The index is optimized against Google Search and therefore may provide more contextually accurate results compared to other alternatives.
+
+ Brave Search includes unique features such as Discussions, which highlights conversation-focused results—such as forum posts.
+
+ We recommend you disable [Anonymous usage metrics](https://search.brave.com/help/usage-metrics) as it is enabled by default and can be disabled within settings.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://search.brave.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://search.brave4u7jddbv7cyviptqjc7jusxh72uik7zt6adtckl5f4nwy2v72qd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://search.brave.com/help/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://search.brave.com/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+Brave Search is based in the United States. Their [privacy policy](https://search.brave.com/help/privacy-policy) states they collect aggregated usage metrics, which includes the operating system and browser in use, however no personally identifiable information is collected. IP addresses are temporarily processed, but are not retained.
+
+## DuckDuckGo
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **DuckDuckGo** is one of the more mainstream private search engine options. Notable DuckDuckGo search features include [bangs](https://duckduckgo.com/bang) and many [instant answers](https://help.duckduckgo.com/duckduckgo-help-pages/features/instant-answers-and-other-features/). The search engine relies on a commercial Bing API to serve most results, but it does use numerous [other sources](https://help.duckduckgo.com/results/sources/) for instant answers and other non-primary results.
+
+ DuckDuckGo is the default search engine for the Tor Browser and is one of the few available options on Apple’s Safari browser.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://duckduckgo.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://duckduckgo.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://help.duckduckgo.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+DuckDuckGo is based in the United States. Their [privacy policy](https://duckduckgo.com/privacy) states they **do** log your searches for product improvement purposes, but not your IP address or any other personally identifying information.
+
+DuckDuckGo offers two [other versions](https://help.duckduckgo.com/features/non-javascript/) of their search engine, both of which do not require JavaScript. These versions do lack features, however. These versions can also be used in conjunction with their [Tor onion address](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/) by appending [/lite](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/lite) or [/html](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/html) for the respective version.
+
+## SearXNG
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **SearXNG** is an open-source, self-hostable, metasearch engine, aggregating the results of other search engines while not storing any information itself. It is an actively maintained fork of [SearX](https://github.com/searx/searx).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://searxng.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://searx.space/){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/searxng/searxng){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+SearXNG is a proxy between you and the search engines it aggregates from. Your search queries will still be sent to the search engines that SearXNG gets its results from.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance so that the queries would blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting SearXNG, as people looking up illegal content on your instance could draw unwanted attention from authorities.
+
+When you are using a SearXNG instance, be sure to go read their privacy policy. Since SearXNG instances may be modified by their owners, they do not necessarily reflect their privacy policy. Some instances run as a Tor hidden service, which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries does not contain PII.
+
+## Startpage
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Startpage** is a private search engine known for serving Google search results. One of Startpage's unique features is the [Anonymous View](https://www.startpage.com/en/anonymous-view/), which puts forth efforts to standardize user activity to make it more difficult to be uniquely identified. The feature can be useful for hiding [some](https://support.startpage.com/hc/en-us/articles/4455540212116-The-Anonymous-View-Proxy-technical-details) network and browser properties. Unlike the name suggests, the feature should not be relied upon for anonymity. If you are looking for anonymity, use the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) instead.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.startpage.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.startpage.com/en/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.startpage.com/hc/en-us/categories/4481917470356-Startpage-Search-Engine){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Startpage regularly limits service access to certain IP addresses, such as IPs reserved for VPNs or Tor. [DuckDuckGo](#duckduckgo) and [Brave Search](#brave-search) are friendlier options if your threat model requires hiding your IP address from the search provider.
+
+Startpage is based in the Netherlands. According to their [privacy policy](https://www.startpage.com/en/privacy-policy/), they log details such as: operating system, type of browser, and language. They do not log your IP address, search queries, or other personally identifying information.
+
+Startpage's majority shareholder is System1 who is an adtech company. We don't believe that to be an issue as they have a distinctly separate [privacy policy](https://system1.com/terms/privacy-policy). The Privacy Guides team reached out to Startpage [back in 2020](https://web.archive.org/web/20210118031008/https://blog.privacytools.io/relisting-startpage/) to clear up any concerns with System1's sizeable investment into the service. We were satisfied with the answers we received.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must not collect personally identifiable information per their privacy policy.
+- Must not allow users to create an account with them.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should be based on open-source software.
+- Should not block Tor exit node IP addresses.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/tools.md b/i18n/de/tools.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..46ddd66b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/tools.md
@@ -0,0 +1,443 @@
+---
+title: "Privacy Tools"
+icon: material/tools
+hide:
+ - toc
+---
+
+If you're looking for a specific solution to something, these are the hardware and software tools we recommend in a variety of categories. Our recommended privacy tools are primarily chosen based on security features, with additional emphasis on decentralized and open-source tools. They are applicable to a variety of threat models ranging from protection against global mass surveillance programs and avoiding big tech companies to mitigating attacks, but only you can determine what will work best for your needs.
+
+If you want assistance figuring out the best privacy tools and alternative programs for your needs, start a discussion on our [forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/) or our [Matrix](https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org) community!
+
+For more details about each project, why they were chosen, and additional tips or tricks we recommend, click the "Learn more" link in each section, or click on the recommendation itself to be taken to that specific section of the page.
+
+## Tor Network
+
+
+
+1. Snowflake does not increase privacy, however it allows you to easily contribute to the Tor network and help people in censored networks achieve better privacy.
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md)
+
+## Desktop Web Browsers
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](cloud.md)
+
+### DNS
+
+#### DNS Providers
+
+We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers based on a variety of criteria, such as [Mullvad](https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls) and [Quad9](https://quad9.net/) amongst others. We recommend for you to read our pages on DNS before choosing a provider. In many cases, using an alternative DNS provider is not recommended.
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](dns.md)
+
+#### Encrypted DNS Proxies
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](search-engines.md)
+
+### VPN Providers
+
+??? danger "VPNs do not provide anonymity"
+
+ Using a VPN will **not** keep your browsing habits anonymous, nor will it add additional security to non-secure (HTTP) traffic.
+
+ If you are looking for **anonymity**, you should use the Tor Browser **instead** of a VPN.
+
+ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connecting to websites using HTTPS. A VPN is not a replacement for good security practices.
+
+ [Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](vpn.md)
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](data-redaction.md)
+
+### Email Clients
+
+
+
+- { .twemoji } [Thunderbird](email-clients.md#thunderbird)
+- { .twemoji } [Apple Mail (macOS)](email-clients.md#apple-mail-macos)
+- { .twemoji } [Canary Mail (iOS)](email-clients.md#canary-mail-ios)
+- { .twemoji } [FairEmail (Android)](email-clients.md#fairemail-android)
+- { .twemoji } [GNOME Evolution (Linux)](email-clients.md#gnome-evolution-gnome)
+- { .twemoji } [K-9 Mail (Android)](email-clients.md#k-9-mail-android)
+- { .twemoji } [Kontact (Linux)](email-clients.md#kontact-kde)
+- { .twemoji } [Mailvelope (PGP in standard webmail)](email-clients.md#mailvelope-browser)
+- { .twemoji } [NeoMutt (CLI)](email-clients.md#neomutt-cli)
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](email-clients.md)
+
+### Encryption Software
+
+??? info "Operating System Disk Encryption"
+
+ For encrypting your operating system drive, we typically recommend using whichever encryption tool your operating system provides, whether that is **BitLocker** on Windows, **FileVault** on macOS, or **LUKS** on Linux. These tools are included with the operating system and typically use hardware encryption elements such as a TPM that other full-disk encryption software like VeraCrypt do not. VeraCrypt is still suitable for non-operating system disks such as external drives, especially drives that may be accessed from multiple operating systems.
+
+ [Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](encryption.md##operating-system-included-full-disk-encryption-fde)
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](video-streaming.md)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/tor.md b/i18n/de/tor.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8352feb5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/tor.md
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+---
+title: "Tor Network"
+icon: simple/torproject
+---
+
+{ align=right }
+
+The **Tor** network is a group of volunteer-operated servers that allows you to connect for free and improve your privacy and security on the Internet. Individuals and organizations can also share information over the Tor network with ".onion hidden services" without compromising their privacy. Because Tor traffic is difficult to block and trace, Tor is an effective censorship circumvention tool.
+
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://www.torproject.org){ .card-link title=Homepage }
+[:simple-torbrowser:](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Tor works by routing your internet traffic through those volunteer-operated servers, instead of making a direct connection to the site you're trying to visit. This obfuscates where the traffic is coming from, and no server in the connection path is able to see the full path of where the traffic is coming from and going to, meaning even the servers you are using to connect cannot break your anonymity.
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ Tor circuit pathway - Nodes in the path can only see the servers they are directly connected to, for example the "Entry" node shown can see your IP address, and the address of the "Middle" node, but has no way to see which website you are visiting.
+
+
+- [More information about how Tor works :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md)
+
+## Connecting to Tor
+
+There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for anonymous browsing for desktop computers and Android. In addition to the apps listed below, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser.
+
+### Tor Browser
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tor Browser** is the choice if you need anonymity, as it provides you with access to the Tor network and bridges, and it includes default settings and extensions that are automatically configured by the default security levels: *Standard*, *Safer* and *Safest*.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.torproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.torbrowser)
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://www.torproject.org/download/#android)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.torproject.org/download/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.torproject.org/download/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.torproject.org/download/)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/security/tor)
+
+!!! danger
+
+ You should **never** install any additional extensions on Tor Browser or edit `about:config` settings, including the ones we suggest for Firefox. Browser extensions and non-standard settings make you stand out from others on the Tor network, thus making your browser easier to [fingerprint](https://support.torproject.org/glossary/browser-fingerprinting).
+
+The Tor Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting, or identifying you based on your browser configuration. Therefore, it is imperative that you do **not** modify the browser beyond the default [security levels](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/).
+
+### Orbot
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Orbot** is a free Tor VPN for smartphones which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/orbot/id1609461599)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+
+For resistance against traffic analysis attacks, consider enabling *Isolate Destination Address* in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Connectivity**. This will use a completely different Tor Circuit (different middle relay and exit nodes) for every domain you connect to.
+
+!!! tip "Tips for Android"
+
+ Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN killswitch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+ Orbot is often outdated on the Guardian Project's [F-Droid repository](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android), so consider downloading directly from the [GitHub repository](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases) instead.
+
+ All versions are signed using the same signature so they should be compatible with each other.
+
+## Relays and Bridges
+
+### Snowflake
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.
+
+ People who are censored can use Snowflake proxies to connect to the Tor network. Snowflake is a great way to contribute to the network even if you don't have the technical know-how to run a Tor relay or bridge.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://snowflake.torproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/wikis/Technical%20Overview){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/snowflake.git/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/torproject-snowflake/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/snowflake/mafpmfcccpbjnhfhjnllmmalhifmlcie)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://snowflake.torproject.org/embed "Leave this page open to be a Snowflake proxy")
+
+??? tip "Embedded Snowflake"
+
+ You can enable Snowflake in your browser by clicking the switch below and ==leaving this page open==. You can also install Snowflake as a browser extension to have it always run while your browser is open, however adding third-party extensions can increase your attack surface.
+
+
+ If the embed does not appear for you, ensure you are not blocking the third-party frame from `torproject.org`. Alternatively, visit [this page](https://snowflake.torproject.org/embed.html).
+
+Snowflake does not increase your privacy in any way, nor is it used to connect to the Tor network within your personal browser. However, if your internet connection is uncensored, you should consider running it to help people in censored networks achieve better privacy themselves. There is no need to worry about which websites people are accessing through your proxy—their visible browsing IP address will match their Tor exit node, not yours.
+
+Running a Snowflake proxy is low-risk, even moreso than running a Tor relay or bridge which are already not particularly risky endeavours. However, it does still proxy traffic through your network which can be impactful in some ways, especially if your network is bandwidth-limited. Make sure you understand [how Snowflake works](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/wikis/home) before deciding whether to run a proxy.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/video-streaming.md b/i18n/de/video-streaming.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e42141dc0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/video-streaming.md
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+---
+title: "Video Streaming"
+icon: material/video-wireless
+---
+
+The primary threat when using a video streaming platform is that your streaming habits and subscription lists could be used to profile you. You should combine these tools with a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) to make it harder to profile your usage.
+
+## LBRY
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **The LBRY network** is a decentralized video sharing network. It uses a [BitTorrent](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent)-like network to store the video content, and a [blockchain](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockchain) to store the indexes for those videos. The main benefit of this design is censorship resistance.
+
+ **The LBRY desktop client** helps you stream videos from the LBRY network and stores your subscription list in your own LBRY wallet.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://lbry.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://lbry.com/privacypolicy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://lbry.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/lbryio/lbry-desktop){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://lbry.com/windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://lbry.com/osx)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://lbry.com/linux)
+
+!!! note
+
+ Only the **LBRY desktop client** is recommended, as the [Odysee](https://odysee.com) website and the LBRY clients in F-Droid, Play Store, and the App Store have mandatory synchronization and telemetry.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ While watching and hosting videos, your IP address is visible to the LBRY network. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+We recommend **against** synchronizing your wallet with LBRY Inc., as synchronizing encrypted wallets is not supported yet. If you synchronize your wallet with LBRY Inc., you have to trust them to not look at your subscription list, [LBC](https://lbry.com/faq/earn-credits) funds, or take control of your channel.
+
+You can disable *Save hosting data to help the LBRY network* option in :gear: **Settings** → **Advanced Settings**, to avoid exposing your IP address and watched videos when using LBRY for a prolonged period of time.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must not require a centralized account to view videos.
+ - Decentralized authentication, such as via a mobile wallet's private key is acceptable.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/de/vpn.md b/i18n/de/vpn.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b1576bdae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/de/vpn.md
@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+---
+title: "VPN Services"
+icon: material/vpn
+---
+
+Find a no-logging VPN operator who isn’t out to sell or read your web traffic.
+
+??? danger "VPNs do not provide anonymity"
+
+ Using a VPN will **not** keep your browsing habits anonymous, nor will it add additional security to non-secure (HTTP) traffic.
+
+ If you are looking for **anonymity**, you should use the Tor Browser **instead** of a VPN.
+
+ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connecting to websites using HTTPS. A VPN is not a replacement for good security practices.
+
+ [Download Tor](https://www.torproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Tor Myths & FAQ](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
+
+??? question "When are VPNs useful?"
+
+ If you're looking for additional **privacy** from your ISP, on a public Wi-Fi network, or while torrenting files, a VPN may be the solution for you as long as you understand the risks involved.
+
+ [More Info](basics/vpn-overview.md){ .md-button }
+
+## Recommended Providers
+
+!!! abstract "Criteria"
+
+ Our recommended providers use encryption, accept Monero, support WireGuard & OpenVPN, and have a no logging policy. Read our [full list of criteria](#our-criteria) for more information.
+
+### Proton VPN
+
+!!! recommendation annotate
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton VPN** is a strong contender in the VPN space, and they have been in operation since 2016. Proton AG is based in Switzerland and offers a limited free tier, as well as a more featured premium option.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://protonvpn.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://protonvpn.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://protonvpn.com/support/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonVPN){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonvpn.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id1437005085)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonVPN/android-app/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://protonvpn.com/download-windows)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://protonvpn.com/support/linux-vpn-setup/)
+
+??? success annotate "67 Countries"
+
+ Proton VPN has [servers in 67 countries](https://protonvpn.com/vpn-servers) (1). Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
+
+ We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if they use [dedicated servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), instead of cheaper shared solutions (with other customers) such as [virtual private servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
+
+1. Last checked: 2022-09-16
+
+??? success "Independently Audited"
+
+ As of January 2020, Proton VPN has undergone an independent audit by SEC Consult. SEC Consult found some medium and low risk vulnerabilities in Proton VPN's Windows, Android, and iOS applications, all of which were "properly fixed" by Proton VPN before the reports were published. None of the issues identified would have provided an attacker remote access to your device or traffic. You can view individual reports for each platform at [protonvpn.com](https://protonvpn.com/blog/open-source/). In April 2022 Proton VPN underwent [another audit](https://protonvpn.com/blog/no-logs-audit/) and the report was [produced by Securitum](https://protonvpn.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/securitum-protonvpn-nologs-20220330.pdf). A [letter of attestation](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps) was provided for Proton VPN's apps on 9th November 2021 by [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com).
+
+??? success "Open-Source Clients"
+
+ Proton VPN provides the source code for their desktop and mobile clients in their [GitHub organization](https://github.com/ProtonVPN).
+
+??? success "Accepts Cash"
+
+ Proton VPN, in addition to accepting credit/debit cards and PayPal, accepts Bitcoin, and **cash/local currency** as anonymous forms of payment.
+
+??? success "WireGuard Support"
+
+ Proton VPN mostly supports the WireGuard® protocol. [WireGuard](https://www.wireguard.com) is a newer protocol that uses state-of-the-art [cryptography](https://www.wireguard.com/protocol/). Additionally, WireGuard aims to be simpler and more performant.
+
+ Proton VPN [recommends](https://protonvpn.com/blog/wireguard/) the use of WireGuard with their service. On Proton VPN's Windows, macOS, iOS, Android, ChromeOS, and Android TV apps, WireGuard is the default protocol; however, [support](https://protonvpn.com/support/how-to-change-vpn-protocols/) for the protocol is not present in their Linux app.
+
+??? warning "Remote Port Forwarding"
+
+ Proton VPN currently only supports remote [port forwarding](https://protonvpn.com/support/port-forwarding/) on Windows, which may impact some applications. Especially Peer-to-peer applications like Torrent clients.
+
+??? success "Mobile Clients"
+
+ In addition to providing standard OpenVPN configuration files, Proton VPN has mobile clients for [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/protonvpn-fast-secure-vpn/id1437005085), [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonvpn.android&hl=en_US), and [GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonVPN/android-app/releases) allowing for easy connections to their servers.
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ Proton VPN clients support two factor authentication on all platforms except Linux at the moment. Proton VPN has their own servers and datacenters in Switzerland, Iceland and Sweden. They offer adblocking and known malware domains blocking with their DNS service. Additionally, Proton VPN also offers "Tor" servers allowing you to easily connect to onion sites, but we still strongly recommend using [the official Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) for this purpose.
+
+!!! danger "Killswitch feature is broken on Intel-based Macs"
+
+ System crashes [may occur](https://protonvpn.com/support/macos-t2-chip-kill-switch/) on Intel-based Macs when using the VPN killswitch. If you require this feature, and you are using a Mac with Intel chipset, you should consider using another VPN service.
+
+### IVPN
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **IVPN** is another premium VPN provider, and they have been in operation since 2009. IVPN is based in Gibraltar.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.ivpn.net/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.ivpn.net/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/general/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ivpn){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-android/)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/ivpn-serious-privacy-protection/id1193122683)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-windows/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-macos/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-linux/)
+
+??? success annotate "35 Countries"
+
+ IVPN has [servers in 35 countries](https://www.ivpn.net/server-locations) (1). Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
+
+ We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if they use [dedicated servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), instead of cheaper shared solutions (with other customers) such as [virtual private servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
+
+1. Last checked: 2022-09-16
+
+??? success "Independently Audited"
+
+ IVPN has undergone a [no-logging audit from Cure53](https://cure53.de/audit-report_ivpn.pdf) which concluded in agreement with IVPN's no-logging claim. IVPN has also completed a [comprehensive pentest report Cure53](https://cure53.de/summary-report_ivpn_2019.pdf) in January 2020. IVPN has also said they plan to have [annual reports](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/independent-security-audit-concluded) in the future. A further review was conducted [in April 2022](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/ivpn-apps-security-audit-2022-concluded/) and was produced by Cure53 [on their website](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_IVPN_2022.pdf).
+
+??? success "Open-Source Clients"
+
+ As of February 2020 [IVPN applications are now open-source](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/ivpn-applications-are-now-open-source). Source code can be obtained from their [GitHub organization](https://github.com/ivpn).
+
+??? success "Accepts Cash and Monero"
+
+ In addition to accepting credit/debit cards and PayPal, IVPN accepts Bitcoin, **Monero** and **cash/local currency** (on annual plans) as anonymous forms of payment.
+
+??? success "WireGuard Support"
+
+ IVPN supports the WireGuard® protocol. [WireGuard](https://www.wireguard.com) is a newer protocol that uses state-of-the-art [cryptography](https://www.wireguard.com/protocol/). Additionally, WireGuard aims to be simpler and more performant.
+
+ IVPN [recommends](https://www.ivpn.net/wireguard/) the use of WireGuard with their service and, as such, the protocol is the default on all of IVPN's apps. IVPN also offers a WireGuard configuration generator for use with the official WireGuard [apps](https://www.wireguard.com/install/).
+
+??? success "Remote Port Forwarding"
+
+ Remote [port forwarding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_forwarding) is possible with a Pro plan. Port forwarding [can be activated](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/81/How-do-I-activate-port-forwarding.html) via the client area. Port forwarding is only available on IVPN when using WireGuard or OpenVPN protocols and is [disabled on US servers](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/116/Port-forwarding-is-not-working-why.html).
+
+??? success "Mobile Clients"
+
+ In addition to providing standard OpenVPN configuration files, IVPN has mobile clients for [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/ivpn-serious-privacy-protection/id1193122683), [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.ivpn.client), and [GitHub](https://github.com/ivpn/android-app/releases) allowing for easy connections to their servers.
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ IVPN clients support two factor authentication (Mullvad's clients do not). IVPN also provides "[AntiTracker](https://www.ivpn.net/antitracker)" functionality, which blocks advertising networks and trackers from the network level.
+
+### Mullvad
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mullvad** is a fast and inexpensive VPN with a serious focus on transparency and security. They have been in operation since **2009**. Mullvad is based in Sweden and does not have a free trial.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mullvad.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://o54hon2e2vj6c7m3aqqu6uyece65by3vgoxxhlqlsvkmacw6a7m7kiad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/privacy-policy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mullvad){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.mullvad.mullvadvpn)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/mullvad-vpn/id1488466513)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://mullvad.net/en/download/windows/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://mullvad.net/en/download/macos/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://mullvad.net/en/download/linux/)
+
+??? success annotate "41 Countries"
+
+ Mullvad has [servers in 41 countries](https://mullvad.net/servers/) (1). Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
+
+ We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if they use [dedicated servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), instead of cheaper shared solutions (with other customers) such as [virtual private servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
+
+1. Last checked: 2023-01-19
+
+??? success "Independently Audited"
+
+ Mullvad's VPN clients have been audited by Cure53 and Assured AB in a pentest report [published at cure53.de](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_v2.pdf). The security researchers concluded:
+
+ > Cure53 and Assured AB are happy with the results of the audit and the software leaves an overall positive impression. With security dedication of the in-house team at the Mullvad VPN compound, the testers have no doubts about the project being on the right track from a security standpoint.
+
+ In 2020 a second audit [was announced](https://mullvad.net/blog/2020/6/25/results-available-audit-mullvad-app/) and the [final audit report](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_2020_v2.pdf) was made available on Cure53's website:
+
+ > The results of this May-June 2020 project targeting the Mullvad complex are quite positive. [...] The overall application ecosystem used by Mullvad leaves a sound and structured impression. The overall structure of the application makes it easy to roll out patches and fixes in a structured manner. More than anything, the findings spotted by Cure53 showcase the importance of constantly auditing and re-assessing the current leak vectors, in order to always ensure privacy of the end-users. With that being said, Mullvad does a great job protecting the end-user from common PII leaks and privacy related risks.
+
+ In 2021 an infrastructure audit [was announced](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2021/1/20/no-pii-or-privacy-leaks-found-cure53s-infrastructure-audit/) and the [final audit report](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_2021_v1.pdf) was made available on Cure53's website. Another report was commissioned [in June 2022](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2022/6/22/vpn-server-audit-found-no-information-leakage-or-logging-of-customer-data/) and is available on [Assured's website](https://www.assured.se/publications/Assured_Mullvad_relay_server_audit_report_2022.pdf).
+
+??? success "Open-Source Clients"
+
+ Mullvad provides the source code for their desktop and mobile clients in their [GitHub organization](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app).
+
+??? success "Accepts Cash and Monero"
+
+ Mullvad, in addition to accepting credit/debit cards and PayPal, accepts Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, **Monero** and **cash/local currency** as anonymous forms of payment. They also accept Swish and bank wire transfers.
+
+??? success "WireGuard Support"
+
+ Mullvad supports the WireGuard® protocol. [WireGuard](https://www.wireguard.com) is a newer protocol that uses state-of-the-art [cryptography](https://www.wireguard.com/protocol/). Additionally, WireGuard aims to be simpler and more performant.
+
+ Mullvad [recommends](https://mullvad.net/en/help/why-wireguard/) the use of WireGuard with their service. It is the default or only protocol on Mullvad's Android, iOS, macOS, and Linux apps, but on Windows you have to [manually enable](https://mullvad.net/en/help/how-turn-wireguard-mullvad-app/) WireGuard. Mullvad also offers a WireGuard configuration generator for use with the official WireGuard [apps](https://www.wireguard.com/install/).
+
+??? success "IPv6 Support"
+
+ Mullvad supports the future of networking [IPv6](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv6). Their network allows you to [access services hosted on IPv6](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2014/9/15/ipv6-support/) as opposed to other providers who block IPv6 connections.
+
+??? success "Remote Port Forwarding"
+
+ Remote [port forwarding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_forwarding) is allowed for people who make one-time payments, but not allowed for accounts with a recurring/subscription-based payment method. This is to prevent Mullvad from being able to identify you based on your port usage and stored subscription information. See [Port forwarding with Mullvad VPN](https://mullvad.net/help/port-forwarding-and-mullvad/) for more information.
+
+??? success "Mobile Clients"
+
+ Mullvad has published [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/mullvad-vpn/id1488466513) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.mullvad.mullvadvpn) clients, both supporting an easy-to-use interface as opposed to requiring you to manually configure your WireGuard connection. The Android client is also available on [GitHub](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/releases).
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ Mullvad is very transparent about which nodes they [own or rent](https://mullvad.net/en/servers/). They use [ShadowSocks](https://shadowsocks.org/) in their ShadowSocks + OpenVPN configuration, making them more resistant against firewalls with [Deep Packet Inspection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection) trying to block VPNs. Supposedly, [China has to use a different method to block ShadowSocks servers](https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/22). Mullvad's website is also accessible via Tor at [o54hon2e2vj6c7m3aqqu6uyece65by3vgoxxhlqlsvkmacw6a7m7kiad.onion](http://o54hon2e2vj6c7m3aqqu6uyece65by3vgoxxhlqlsvkmacw6a7m7kiad.onion).
+
+## Criteria
+
+!!! danger
+
+ It is important to note that using a VPN provider will not make you anonymous, but it will give you better privacy in certain situations. A VPN is not a tool for illegal activities. Don't rely on a "no log" policy.
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the providers we recommend. This allows us to provide completely objective recommendations.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements for any VPN provider wishing to be recommended, including strong encryption, independent security audits, modern technology, and more. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing a VPN provider, and conduct your own research to ensure the VPN provider you choose is as trustworthy as possible.
+
+### Technology
+
+We require all our recommended VPN providers to provide OpenVPN configuration files to be used in any client. **If** a VPN provides their own custom client, we require a killswitch to block network data leaks when disconnected.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Support for strong protocols such as WireGuard & OpenVPN.
+- Killswitch built in to clients.
+- Multihop support. Multihopping is important to keep data private in case of a single node compromise.
+- If VPN clients are provided, they should be [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_source), like the VPN software they generally have built into them. We believe that [source code](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Source_code) availability provides greater transparency about what your device is actually doing.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- WireGuard and OpenVPN support.
+- Killswitch with highly configurable options (enable/disable on certain networks, on boot, etc.)
+- Easy-to-use VPN clients
+- Supports [IPv6](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv6). We expect that servers will allow incoming connections via IPv6 and allow you to access services hosted on IPv6 addresses.
+- Capability of [remote port forwarding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_forwarding#Remote_port_forwarding) assists in creating connections when using P2P ([Peer-to-Peer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer-to-peer)) file sharing software or hosting a server (e.g., Mumble).
+
+### Privacy
+
+We prefer our recommended providers to collect as little data as possible. Not collecting personal information on registration, and accepting anonymous forms of payment are required.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Monero or cash payment option.
+- No personal information required to register: Only username, password, and email at most.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Accepts Monero, cash, and other forms of anonymous payment options (gift cards, etc.)
+- No personal information accepted (autogenerated username, no email required, etc.)
+
+### Security
+
+A VPN is pointless if it can't even provide adequate security. We require all our recommended providers to abide by current security standards for their OpenVPN connections. Ideally, they would use more future-proof encryption schemes by default. We also require an independent third-party to audit the provider's security, ideally in a very comprehensive manner and on a repeated (yearly) basis.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Strong Encryption Schemes: OpenVPN with SHA-256 authentication; RSA-2048 or better handshake; AES-256-GCM or AES-256-CBC data encryption.
+- Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).
+- Published security audits from a reputable third-party firm.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Strongest Encryption: RSA-4096.
+- Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).
+- Comprehensive published security audits from a reputable third-party firm.
+- Bug-bounty programs and/or a coordinated vulnerability-disclosure process.
+
+### Trust
+
+You wouldn't trust your finances to someone with a fake identity, so why trust them with your internet data? We require our recommended providers to be public about their ownership or leadership. We also would like to see frequent transparency reports, especially in regard to how government requests are handled.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership or ownership.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership.
+- Frequent transparency reports.
+
+### Marketing
+
+With the VPN providers we recommend we like to see responsible marketing.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Must self-host analytics (i.e., no Google Analytics). The provider's site must also comply with [DNT (Do Not Track)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Do_Not_Track) for people who want to opt-out.
+
+Must not have any marketing which is irresponsible:
+
+- Making guarantees of protecting anonymity 100%. When someone makes a claim that something is 100% it means there is no certainty for failure. We know people can quite easily deanonymize themselves in a number of ways, e.g.:
+ - Reusing personal information (e.g., email accounts, unique pseudonyms, etc) that they accessed without anonymity software (Tor, VPN, etc.)
+ - [Browser fingerprinting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint)
+- Claim that a single circuit VPN is "more anonymous" than Tor, which is a circuit of three or more hops that regularly changes.
+- Use responsible language: i.e., it is okay to say that a VPN is "disconnected" or "not connected", however claiming that someone is "exposed", "vulnerable" or "compromised" is needless use of alarming language that may be incorrect. For example, that person might simply be on another VPN provider's service or using Tor.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+Responsible marketing that is both educational and useful to the consumer could include:
+
+- An accurate comparison to when [Tor](tor.md) should be used instead.
+- Availability of the VPN provider's website over a [.onion service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.onion)
+
+### Additional Functionality
+
+While not strictly requirements, there are some factors we looked into when determining which providers to recommend. These include adblocking/tracker-blocking functionality, warrant canaries, multihop connections, excellent customer support, the number of allowed simultaneous connections, etc.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.de.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/404.md b/i18n/el/404.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c25b06d10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/404.md
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+---
+hide:
+ - feedback
+---
+
+# 404 - Δε βρέθηκε
+
+Δεν μπορέσαμε να βρούμε τη σελίδα που ψάχνατε! Ίσως ψάχνατε για ένα από αυτά;
+
+- [Εισαγωγή στα Μοντέλα Απειλών](basics/threat-modeling.md)
+- [Προτεινόμενοι Πάροχοι DNS](dns.md)
+- [Τα Καλύτερα Προγράμματα Περιήγησης Ιστού για Υπολογιστές](desktop-browsers.md)
+- [Οι καλύτεροι πάροχοι VPN](vpn.md)
+- [Φόρουμ Οδηγών Απορρήτου](https://discuss.privacyguides.net)
+- [Το Blog μας](https://blog.privacyguides.org)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md b/i18n/el/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..88a0e9100
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# Community Code of Conduct
+
+**We pledge** to make our community a harassment-free experience for everyone.
+
+**We strive** to create a positive environment, using welcoming and inclusive language, and being respectful of the viewpoints of others.
+
+**We do not allow** inappropriate or otherwise unacceptable behavior, such as sexualized language, trolling and insulting comments, or otherwise promoting intolerance or harassment.
+
+## Community Standards
+
+What we expect from members of our communities:
+
+1. **Don't spread misinformation**
+
+ We are creating an evidence-based educational community around information privacy and security, not a home for conspiracy theories. For example, when making a claim that a certain piece of software is malicious or that certain telemetry data is privacy invasive, explain in detail what is collected and how it collected. Claims of this nature must be backed by technical evidence.
+
+1. **Don't abuse our willingness to help**
+
+ Our community members are not your free tech support. We are happy to help you with specific steps on your privacy journey if you are willing to put in effort on your end. We are not willing to answer endlessly repeated questions about generic computer problems you could have answered yourself with a 30-second internet search. Don't be a [help vampire](https://slash7.com/2006/12/22/vampires/).
+
+1. **Behave in a positive and constructive manner**
+
+ Examples of behavior that contributes to a positive environment for our community include:
+
+ - Demonstrating empathy and kindness toward other people
+ - Being respectful of differing opinions, viewpoints, and experiences
+ - Giving and gracefully accepting constructive feedback
+ - Accepting responsibility and apologizing to those affected by our mistakes, and learning from the experience
+ - Focusing on what is best not just for us as individuals, but for the overall community
+
+### Unacceptable Behavior
+
+The following behaviors are considered harassment and are unacceptable within our community:
+
+- The use of sexualized language or imagery, and sexual attention or advances of any kind
+- Trolling, insulting or derogatory comments, and personal or political attacks
+- Public or private harassment
+- Publishing others' private information, such as a physical or email address, without their explicit permission
+- Other conduct which could reasonably be considered inappropriate in a professional setting
+
+## Scope
+
+Our Code of Conduct applies within all project spaces, as well as when an individual is representing the Privacy Guides project in other communities.
+
+We are responsible for clarifying the standards of our community, and have the right to remove or alter the comments of those participating within our community, as necessary and at our discretion.
+
+### Contact
+
+If you observe a problem on a platform like Matrix or Reddit, please contact our moderators on that platform in chat, via DM, or through any designated "Modmail" system.
+
+If you have a problem elsewhere, or a problem our community moderators are unable to resolve, reach out to `jonah@privacyguides.org` and/or `dngray@privacyguides.org`.
+
+All community leaders are obligated to respect the privacy and security of the reporter of any incident.
diff --git a/i18n/el/about/criteria.md b/i18n/el/about/criteria.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2f6e0138c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/about/criteria.md
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+---
+title: General Criteria
+---
+
+!!! example "Work in Progress"
+
+ The following page is a work in progress, and does not reflect the full criteria for our recommendations at this time. Past discussion on this topic: [#24](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/discussions/24)
+
+Below are some things that must apply to all submissions to Privacy Guides. Each category will have additional requirements for inclusion.
+
+## Financial Disclosure
+
+We do not make money from recommending certain products, we do not use affiliate links, and we do not provide special consideration to project donors.
+
+## General Guidelines
+
+We apply these priorities when considering new recommendations:
+
+- **Secure**: Tools should follow security best-practices wherever applicable.
+- **Source Availability**: Open source projects are generally preferred over equivalent proprietary alternatives.
+- **Cross-Platform**: We typically prefer recommendations to be cross-platform, to avoid vendor lock-in.
+- **Active Development**: The tools that we recommend should be actively developed, unmaintained projects will be removed in most cases.
+- **Usability**: Tools should be accessible to most computer users, an overly technical background should not be required.
+- **Documented**: Tools should have clear and extensive documentation for use.
+
+## Developer Self-Submissions
+
+We have these requirements in regard to developers which wish to submit their project or software for consideration.
+
+- Must disclose affiliation, i.e. your position within the project being submitted.
+
+- Must have a security whitepaper if it is a project that involves handling of sensitive information like a messenger, password manager, encrypted cloud storage etc.
+ - Third party audit status. We want to know if you have one, or have one planned. If possible please mention who will be conducting the audit.
+
+- Must explain what the project brings to the table in regard to privacy.
+ - Does it solve any new problem?
+ - Why should anyone use it over the alternatives?
+
+- Must state what the exact threat model is with their project.
+ - It should be clear to potential users what the project can provide, and what it cannot.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/about/donate.md b/i18n/el/about/donate.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ce55e01ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/about/donate.md
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+---
+title: Supporting Us
+---
+
+
+It takes a lot of [people](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors) and [work](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/pulse/monthly) to keep Privacy Guides up to date and spreading the word about privacy and mass surveillance. If you like what we do, consider getting involved by [editing the site](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org) or [contributing translations](https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides).
+
+If you want to support us financially, the most convenient method for us is contributing via Open Collective, a website operated by our fiscal host. Open Collective accepts payments via credit/debit card, PayPal, and bank transfers.
+
+[Donate on OpenCollective.com](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/donate ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+Donations made directly to us on Open Collective are generally tax-deductible in the US, because our fiscal host (the Open Collective Foundation) is a registered 501(c)3 organization. You will receive a receipt from the Open Collective Foundation after donating. Privacy Guides does not provide financial advice, and you should contact your tax advisor to find out whether this is applicable to you.
+
+If you already make use of GitHub sponsorships, you can also sponsor our organization there.
+
+[Sponsor us on GitHub](https://github.com/sponsors/privacyguides ""){.md-button}
+
+## Backers
+
+A special thanks to all those who support our mission! :heart:
+
+*Please note: This section loads a widget directly from Open Collective. This section does not reflect donations made outside of Open Collective, and we have no control over the specific donors featured in this section.*
+
+
+
+## How We Use Donations
+
+Privacy Guides is a **non-profit** organization. We use donations for a variety of purposes, including:
+
+**Domain Registrations**
+:
+
+We have a few domain names like `privacyguides.org` which cost us around $10 yearly to maintain their registration.
+
+**Web Hosting**
+:
+
+Traffic to this website uses hundreds of gigabytes of data per month, we use a variety of service providers to keep up with this traffic.
+
+**Online Services**
+:
+
+We host [internet services](https://privacyguides.net) for testing and showcasing different privacy-products we like and [recommend](../tools.md). Some of which are made publicly available for our community's use (SearXNG, Tor, etc.), and some are provided for our team members (email, etc.).
+
+**Product Purchases**
+:
+
+We occasionally purchase products and services for the purposes of testing our [recommended tools](../tools.md).
+
+We are still working with our fiscal host (the Open Collective Foundation) to receive cryptocurrency donations, at the moment the accounting is unfeasible for many smaller transactions, but this should change in the future. In the meantime, if you wish to make a sizable (> $100) cryptocurrency donation, please reach out to [jonah@privacyguides.org](mailto:jonah@privacyguides.org).
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/about/index.md b/i18n/el/about/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2ba94952d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/about/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: "About Privacy Guides"
+---
+
+**Privacy Guides** is a socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy. We are a non-profit collective operated entirely by volunteer [team members](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/g/team) and contributors.
+
+[:material-hand-coin-outline: Support the project](donate.md ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+## Our Team
+
+??? person "@jonah"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/jonah)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/jonaharagon "@jonaharagon")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@jonah "@jonah@neat.computer"){rel=me}
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Homepage](https://www.jonaharagon.com)
+
+??? person "@niek-de-wilde"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/Niek-de-Wilde)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/blacklight447 "@blacklight447")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.social/@blacklight447 "@blacklight447@mastodon.social"){rel=me}
+
+??? person "@dngray"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/dngray)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/dngray "@dngray")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.social/@dngray "@dngray@mastodon.social"){rel=me}
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-envelope: Email](mailto:dngray@privacyguides.org)
+
+??? person "@freddy"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/freddy)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/freddy-m "@freddy-m")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://social.lol/@freddy "@freddy@social.lol"){rel=me}
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-envelope: Email](mailto:freddy@privacyguides.org)
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Homepage](https://freddy.omg.lol)
+
+??? person "@mfwmyfacewhen"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/mfwmyfacewhen)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/mfwmyfacewhen "@mfwmyfacewhen")
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Homepage](https://mfw.omg.lol)
+
+??? person "@olivia"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/olivia)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/hook9 "@hook9")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@oliviablob "@oliviablob@neat.computer"){rel=me}
+
+Additionally, [many people](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors) have made contributions to the project. You can too, we're open sourced on GitHub!
+
+Our team members review all changes made to the website and handle administrative duties such as web hosting and financials, however they do not personally profit from any contributions made to this site. Our financials are transparently hosted by the Open Collective Foundation 501(c)(3) at [opencollective.com/privacyguides](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides). Donations to Privacy Guides are generally tax deductible in the United States.
+
+## Site License
+
+*The following is a human-readable summary of (and not a substitute for) the [license](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE):*
+
+:fontawesome-brands-creative-commons: :fontawesome-brands-creative-commons-by: :fontawesome-brands-creative-commons-nd: Unless otherwise noted, the original content on this website is made available under the [Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE). This means that you are free to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format for any purpose, even commercially; as long as you give appropriate credit to `Privacy Guides (www.privacyguides.org)` and provide a link to the license. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests Privacy Guides endorses you or your use. If you remix, transform, or build upon the content of this website, you may not distribute the modified material.
+
+This license is in place to prevent people from sharing our work without giving proper credit, and to prevent people from modifying our work in a way that could be used to mislead people. If you find the terms of this license too restrictive for the project you're working on, please reach out to us at `jonah@privacyguides.org`. We are happy to provide alternative licensing options for well-intentioned projects in the privacy space!
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/about/notices.md b/i18n/el/about/notices.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0d4aca096
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/about/notices.md
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+---
+title: "Notices and Disclaimers"
+hide:
+ - toc
+---
+
+## Legal Disclaimer
+
+Privacy Guides is not a law firm. As such, the Privacy Guides website and contributors are not providing legal advice. The material and recommendations in our website and guides do not constitute legal advice nor does contributing to the website or communicating with Privacy Guides or other contributors about our website create an attorney-client relationship.
+
+Running this website, like any human endeavor, involves uncertainty and trade-offs. We hope this website helps, but it may include mistakes and can’t address every situation. If you have any questions about your situation, we encourage you to do your own research, seek out other experts, and engage in discussions with the Privacy Guides community. If you have any legal questions, you should consult with your own legal counsel before moving forward.
+
+Privacy Guides is an open source project contributed to under licenses that include terms that, for the protection of the website and its contributors, make clear that the Privacy Guides project and website is offered "as-is", without warranty, and disclaiming liability for damages resulting from using the website or any recommendations contained within. Privacy Guides does not warrant or make any representations concerning the accuracy, likely results, or reliability of the use of the materials on the website or otherwise relating to such materials on the website or on any third-party sites linked on this site.
+
+Privacy Guides additionally does not warrant that this website will be constantly available, or available at all.
+
+## Licenses
+
+Unless otherwise noted, all content on this website is made available under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE).
+
+This does not include third-party code embedded in this repository, or code where a superseding license is otherwise noted. The following are notable examples, but this list may not be all-inclusive:
+
+* [MathJax](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/docs/assets/javascripts/mathjax.js) is licensed under the [Apache License 2.0](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/docs/assets/javascripts/LICENSE.mathjax.txt).
+
+Portions of this notice itself were adopted from [opensource.guide](https://github.com/github/opensource.guide/blob/master/notices.md) on GitHub. That resource and this page itself are released under [CC-BY-4.0](https://github.com/github/opensource.guide/blob/master/LICENSE).
+
+This means that you can use the human-readable content in this repository for your own project, per the terms outlined in the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License text. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests Privacy Guides endorses you or your use. You **may not** use the Privacy Guides branding in your own project without express approval from this project. Privacy Guides's brand trademarks include the "Privacy Guides" wordmark and shield logo.
+
+We believe that the logos and other images in `assets` obtained from third-party providers are either in the public domain or **fair use**. In a nutshell, legal [fair use doctrine](https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/more-info.html) allows the use of copyrighted images in order to identify the subject matter for purposes of public comment. However, these logos and other images may still be subject to trademark laws in one or more jurisdictions. Before using this content, please ensure that it is used to identify the entity or organization that owns the trademark and that you have the right to use it under the laws which apply in the circumstances of your intended use. *When copying content from this website, you are solely responsible for ensuring that you do not infringe someone else's trademark or copyright.*
+
+When you contribute to this repository you are doing so under the above licenses, and you are granting Privacy Guides a perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive, transferable, royalty-free, irrevocable license with the right to sublicense such rights through multiple tiers of sublicensees, to reproduce, modify, display, perform and distribute your contribution as part of our project.
+
+## Acceptable Use
+
+You may not use this website in any way that causes or may cause damage to the website or impairment of the availability or accessibility of Privacy Guides, or in any way which is unlawful, illegal, fraudulent, harmful, or in connection with any unlawful, illegal, fraudulent, or harmful purpose or activity.
+
+You must not conduct any systematic or automated data collection activities on or in relation to this website without express written consent, including:
+
+* Excessive Automated Scans
+* Denial of Service Attacks
+* Scraping
+* Data Mining
+* 'Framing' (IFrames)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/about/privacy-policy.md b/i18n/el/about/privacy-policy.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5e6c805f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/about/privacy-policy.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: "Privacy Policy"
+---
+
+Privacy Guides is a community project operated by a number of active volunteer contributors. The public list of team members [can be found on GitHub](https://github.com/orgs/privacyguides/people).
+
+## Data We Collect From Visitors
+
+The privacy of our website visitors is important to us, so we do not track any individual people. As a visitor to our website:
+
+- No personal information is collected
+- No information such as cookies are stored in the browser
+- No information is shared with, sent to or sold to third-parties
+- No information is shared with advertising companies
+- No information is mined and harvested for personal and behavioral trends
+- No information is monetized
+
+You can view the data we collect on our [statistics](statistics.md) page.
+
+We run a self-hosted installation of [Plausible Analytics](https://plausible.io) to collect some anonymous usage data for statistical purposes. The goal is to track overall trends in our website traffic, it is not to track individual visitors. All the data is in aggregate only. No personal data is collected.
+
+Data collected includes referral sources, top pages, visit duration, information from the devices (device type, operating system, country and browser) used during the visit and more. You can learn more about how Plausible works and collects information in a privacy-respecting manner [here](https://plausible.io/data-policy).
+
+## Data We Collect From Account Holders
+
+On some websites and services we provide, many features may require an account. For example, an account may be required to post and reply to topics on a forum platform.
+
+To sign up for most accounts, we will collect a name, username, email, and password. In the event a website requires more information than just that data, that will be clearly marked and noted in a separate privacy statement per-site.
+
+We use your account data to identify you on the website and to create pages specific to you, such as your profile page. We will also use your account data to publish a public profile for you on our services.
+
+We use your email to:
+
+- Notify you about posts and other activity on the websites or services.
+- Reset your password and help keep your account secure.
+- Contact you in special circumstances related to your account.
+- Contact you about legal requests, such as DMCA takedown requests.
+
+On some websites and services you may provide additional information for your account, such as a short biography, avatar, your location, or your birthday. We make that information available to everyone who can access the website or service in question. This information is not required to use any of our services and can be erased at any time.
+
+We will store your account data as long as your account remains open. After closing an account, we may retain some or all of your account data in the form of backups or archives for up to 90 days.
+
+## Contacting Us
+
+The Privacy Guides team generally does not have access to personal data outside of limited access granted via some moderation panels. Inquiries regarding your personal information should be sent directly to:
+
+```text
+Jonah Aragon
+Services Administrator
+jonah@privacyguides.org
+```
+
+For all other inquiries, you can contact any member of our team.
+
+For complaints under GDPR more generally, you may lodge complaints with your local data protection supervisory authorities. In France it's the Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés which take care and handle the complaints. They provide a [template of complaint letter](https://www.cnil.fr/en/plaintes) to use.
+
+## About This Policy
+
+We will post any new versions of this statement [here](privacy-policy.md). We may change how we announce changes in future versions of this document. In the meantime we may update our contact information at any time without announcing a change. Please refer to the [Privacy Policy](privacy-policy.md) for the latest contact information at any time.
+
+A full revision [history](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/commits/main/docs/about/privacy-policy.md) of this page can be found on GitHub.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/about/privacytools.md b/i18n/el/about/privacytools.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c8e9878a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/about/privacytools.md
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+---
+title: "PrivacyTools FAQ"
+---
+
+# Why we moved on from PrivacyTools
+
+In September 2021, every active contributor unanimously agreed to move from PrivacyTools to work on this site: Privacy Guides. This decision was made because PrivacyTools’ founder and controller of the domain name had disappeared for an extended period of time and could not be contacted.
+
+Having built a reputable site and set of services on PrivacyTools.io, this caused grave concerns for the future of PrivacyTools, as any future disruption could wipe out the entire organization with no recovery method. This transition was communicated to the PrivacyTools community many months in advance via a variety of channels including its blog, Twitter, Reddit, and Mastodon to ensure the entire process went as smoothly as possible. We did this to ensure nobody was kept in the dark, which has been our modus operandi since our team was created, and to make sure Privacy Guides was recognized as the same reliable organization that PrivacyTools was before the transition.
+
+After the organizational move was completed, the founder of PrivacyTools returned and began to spread misinformation about the Privacy Guides project. They continue to spread misinformation in addition to operating a paid link farm on the PrivacyTools domain. We are creating this page to clear up any misconceptions.
+
+## What is PrivacyTools?
+
+PrivacyTools was created in 2015 by "BurungHantu," who wanted to make a privacy information resource - helpful tools following the Snowden revelations. The site grew into a flourishing open-source project with [many contributors](https://github.com/privacytools/privacytools.io/graphs/contributors), some eventually given various organizational responsibilities, such as operating online services like Matrix and Mastodon, managing and reviewing changes to the site on GitHub, finding sponsors for the project, writing blog posts and operating social media outreach platforms like Twitter, etc.
+
+Beginning in 2019, BurungHantu grew more and more distant from the active development of the website and communities, and began delaying payments he was responsible for related to the servers we operated. To avoid having our system administrator pay server costs out of their own pocket, we changed the donation methods listed on the site from BurungHantu's personal PayPal and crypto accounts to a new OpenCollective page on [October 31, 2019](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184557/https://blog.privacytools.io/privacytools-io-joins-the-open-collective-foundation/). This had the added benefits of making our finances completely transparent, a value we strongly believe in, and tax-deductible in the United States, because they were being held by the Open Collective Foundation 501(c)3. This change was unanimously agreed upon by the team and went uncontested.
+
+## Why We Moved On
+
+In 2020, BurungHantu's absence grew much more noticeable. At one point, we required the domain's nameservers to be changed to nameservers controlled by our system administrator to avoid future disruption, and this change was not completed for over a month after the initial request. He would disappear from the public chat and private team chat rooms on Matrix for months at a time, occasionally popping in to give some small feedback or promise to be more active before disappearing once again.
+
+In October 2020, the PrivacyTools system administrator (Jonah) [left](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190742/https://blog.privacytools.io/blacklight447-taking-over/) the project because of these difficulties, handing control to another long-time contributor. Jonah had been operating nearly every PrivacyTools service and acting as the *de facto* project lead for website development in BurungHantu's absence, thus his departure was a significant change to the organization. At the time, because of these significant organizational changes, BurungHantu promised the remaining team he would return to take control of the project going forward. ==The PrivacyTools team reached out via several communication methods over the following months, but did not receive any response.==
+
+## Domain Name Reliance
+
+At the beginning of 2021, the PrivacyTools team grew worried about the future of the project, because the domain name was set to expire on 1st March 2021. The domain was ultimately renewed by BurungHantu with no comment.
+
+The team’s concerns were not addressed, and we realized this would be a problem every year: If the domain expired it would have allowed it to be stolen by squatters or spammers, thus ruining the organization's reputation. We also would have had trouble reaching the community to inform them of what took place.
+
+Without being in any contact with BurungHantu, we decided the best course of action would be to move to a new domain name while we still had guaranteed control over the old domain name, sometime before March 2022. This way, we would be able to cleanly redirect all PrivacyTools resources to the new site without any interruption in service. This decision was made many months in advance and communicated to the entire team in the hopes that BurungHantu would reach out and assure his continued support for the project, because with a recognizable brand name and large communities online, moving away from "PrivacyTools" was the least desirable possible outcome.
+
+In mid-2021 the PrivacyTools team reached out to Jonah, who agreed to rejoin the team to help with the transition.
+
+## Community Call to Action
+
+At the end of July 2021, we [informed](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184422/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-future-of-privacytools/) the PrivacyTools community of our intention to choose a new name and continue the project on a new domain, to be [chosen](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190935/https://aragon.cloud/apps/forms/cMPxG9KyopapBbcw) on 2nd August 2022. In the end, "Privacy Guides" was selected, with the `privacyguides.org` domain already owned by Jonah for a side-project from 2020 that went undeveloped.
+
+## Control of r/privacytoolsIO
+
+Simultaneously with the ongoing website issues at privacytools.io, the r/privacytoolsIO moderation team was facing challenges with managing the subreddit. The subreddit had always been operated mostly independently of the website's development, but BurungHantu was the primary moderator of the subreddit as well, and he was the only moderator granted "Full Control" privileges. u/trai_dep was the only active moderator at the time, and [posted](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/comments/o9tllh/requesting_rprivacytoolsio_im_only_active_mod_top/) a request to Reddit's administrators on June 28, 2021, asking to be granted the primary moderator position and full control privileges, in order to make necessary changes to the Subreddit.
+
+Reddit requires that subreddits have active moderators. If the primary moderator is inactive for a lengthy period of time (such as a year) the primary moderation position can be re-appointed to the next moderator in line. For this request to have been granted, BurungHantu had to have been completely absent from all Reddit activity for a long period of time, which was consistent with his behaviors on other platforms.
+
+> If you were removed as moderator from a subreddit through Reddit request it is because your lack of response and lack of activity qualified the subreddit for an r/redditrequest transfer.
+>
+> r/redditrequest is Reddit's way of making sure communities have active moderators and is part of the [Moderator Code of Conduct](https://www.redditinc.com/policies/moderator-code-of-conduct).
+
+## Beginning the Transition
+
+On September 14th, 2021, we [announced](https://www.privacyguides.org/blog/2021/09/14/welcome-to-privacy-guides/) the beginning of our migration to this new domain:
+
+> [...] we found it necessary to make this switch sooner rather than later to ensure people would find out about this transition as soon as possible. This gives us adequate time to transition the domain name, which is currently redirecting to www.privacyguides.org, and it hopefully gives everyone enough time to notice the change, update bookmarks and websites, etc.
+
+This change [entailed:](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pnhn4a/rprivacyguides_privacyguidesorg_what_you_need_to/)
+
+- Redirecting www.privacytools.io to [www.privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org).
+- Archiving the source code on GitHub to preserve our past work and issue tracker, which we continued to use for months of future development of this site.
+- Posting announcements to our subreddit and various other communities informing people of the official change.
+- Formally closing privacytools.io services, like Matrix and Mastodon, and encouraging existing users to migrate as soon as possible.
+
+Things appeared to be going smoothly, and most of our active community made the switch to our new project exactly as we hoped.
+
+## Following Events
+
+Roughly a week following the transition, BurungHantu returned online for the first time in nearly a year, however nobody on our team was willing to return to PrivacyTools because of his historic unreliability. Rather than apologize for his prolonged absence, he immediately went on the offensive and positioned the transition to Privacy Guides as an attack against him and his project. He subsequently [deleted](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/pp9yie/comment/hd49wbn) many of these posts when it was pointed out by the community that he had been absent and abandoned the project.
+
+At this point, BurungHantu claimed he wanted to continue working on privacytools.io on his own and requested that we remove the redirect from www.privacytools.io to [www.privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org). We obliged and requested that he keep the subdomains for Matrix, Mastodon, and PeerTube active for us to run as a public service to our community for at least a few months, in order to allow users on those platforms to easily migrate to other accounts. Due to the federated nature of the services we provided, they were tied to specific domain names making it very difficult to migrate (and in some cases impossible).
+
+Unfortunately, because control of the r/privacytoolsIO subreddit was not returned to BurungHantu at his demand (further information below), those subdomains were [cut off](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pymthv/comment/hexwrps/) at the beginning of October, ending any migration possibilities to any users still using those services.
+
+Following this, BurungHantu made false accusations about Jonah stealing donations from the project. BurungHantu had over a year since the alleged incident occurred, and yet he never made anyone aware of it until after the Privacy Guides migration. BurungHantu has been repeatedly asked for proof and to comment on the reason for his silence by the team [and the community](https://twitter.com/TommyTran732/status/1526153536962281474), and has not done so.
+
+BurungHantu also made a [twitter post](https://twitter.com/privacytoolsIO/status/1510560676967710728) alleging that an "attorney" had reached out to him on Twitter and was providing advice, in another attempt to bully us into giving him control of our subreddit, and as part of his smear campaign to muddy the waters surrounding the launch of Privacy Guides while pretending to be a victim.
+
+## PrivacyTools.io Now
+
+As of September 25th 2022 we are seeing BurungHantu's overall plans come to fruition on privacytools.io, and this is the very reason we decided to create this explainer page today. The website he is operating appears to be a heavily SEO-optimized version of the site which recommends tools in exchange for financial compensation. Very recently, IVPN and Mullvad, two VPN providers near-universally [recommended](../vpn.md) by the privacy community and notable for their stance against affiliate programs were removed from PrivacyTools. In their place? NordVPN, Surfshark, ExpressVPN, and hide.me; Giant VPN corporations with untrustworthy platforms and business practices, notorious for their aggressive marketing and affiliate programs.
+
+==**PrivacyTools has become exactly the type of site we [warned against](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729205249/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-reviews/) on the PrivacyTools blog in 2019.**== We've tried to keep our distance from PrivacyTools since the transition, but their continued harassment towards our project and now their absurd abuse of the credibility their brand gained over 6 years of open source contributions is extremely troubling to us. Those of us actually fighting for privacy are not fighting against each other, and are not getting our advice from the highest bidder.
+
+## r/privacytoolsIO Now
+
+After the launch of [r/PrivacyGuides](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacyguides), it was impractical for u/trai_dep to continue moderating both subreddits, and with the community on-board with the transition, r/privacytoolsIO was [made](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/qk7qrj/a_new_era_why_rptio_is_now_a_restricted_sub/) a restricted sub in a post on November 1st, 2021:
+
+> [...] The growth of this Sub was the result of great effort, across several years, by the PrivacyGuides.org team. And by every one of you.
+>
+> A Subreddit is a great deal of work to administer and moderate. Like a garden, it requires patient tending and daily care. It’s not a task for dilettantes or commitment-challenged people. It can’t thrive under a gardener who abandons it for several years, then shows up demanding this year’s harvest as their tribute. It’s unfair to the team formed years ago. It’s unfair to you. [...]
+
+Subreddits do not belong to anybody, and they especially do not belong to brand-holders. They belong to their communities, and the community and its moderators made the decision to support the move to r/PrivacyGuides.
+
+In the months since, BurungHantu has threatened and begged for returning subreddit control to his account in [violation](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/wiki/top_mod_removal/) of Reddit rules:
+
+> Retaliation from any moderator with regards to removal requests is disallowed.
+
+For a community with many thousands of remaining subscribers, we feel that it would be incredibly disrespectful to return control of that massive platform to the person who abandoned it for over a year, and who now operates a website that we feel provides very low-quality information. Preserving the years of past discussions in that community is more important to us, and thus u/trai_dep and the rest of the subreddit moderation team has made the decision to keep r/privacytoolsIO as-is.
+
+## OpenCollective Now
+
+Our fundraising platform, OpenCollective, is another source of contention. Our position is that OpenCollective was put in place by our team and managed by our team to fund services we currently operate and which PrivacyTools no longer does. We [reached out](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/updates/transitioning-to-privacy-guides) to all of our donors regarding our move to Privacy Guides, and we were unanimously supported by our sponsors and community.
+
+Thus, the funds in OpenCollective belong to Privacy Guides, they were given to our project, and not the owner of a well known domain name. In the announcement made to donors on September 17th, 2021, we offered refunds to any donor who disagrees with the stance we took, but nobody has taken us up on this offer:
+
+> If any sponsors or backers disagree with or feel misled by these recent events and would like to request a refund given these highly unusual circumstances, please get in touch with our project admin by emailing jonah@triplebit.net.
+
+## Further Reading
+
+This topic has been discussed extensively within our communities in various locations, and it seems likely that most people reading this page will already be familiar with the events leading up to the move to Privacy Guides. Some of our previous posts on the matter may have extra detail we omitted here for brevity. They have been linked below for the sake of completion.
+
+- [June 28, 2021 request for control of r/privacytoolsIO](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/comments/o9tllh/requesting_rprivacytoolsio_im_only_active_mod_top/)
+- [July 27, 2021 announcement of our intentions to move on the PrivacyTools blog, written by the team](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184422/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-future-of-privacytools/)
+- [Sept 13, 2021 announcement of the beginning of our transition to Privacy Guides on r/privacytoolsIO](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/pnql46/rprivacyguides_privacyguidesorg_what_you_need_to/)
+- [Sept 17, 2021 announcement on OpenCollective from Jonah](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/updates/transitioning-to-privacy-guides)
+- [Sept 30, 2021 Twitter thread detailing most of the events now described on this page](https://twitter.com/privacy_guides/status/1443633412800225280)
+- [Oct 1, 2021 post by u/dng99 noting subdomain failure](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pymthv/comment/hexwrps/)
+- [Apr 2, 2022 response by u/dng99 to PrivacyTools' accusatory blog post](https://www.reddit.com/comments/tuo7mm/comment/i35kw5a/)
+- [May 16, 2022 response by @TommyTran732 on Twitter](https://twitter.com/TommyTran732/status/1526153497984618496)
+- [Sep 3, 2022 post on Techlore's forum by @dngray](https://discuss.techlore.tech/t/has-anyone-seen-this-video-wondering-your-thoughts/792/20)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/about/services.md b/i18n/el/about/services.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7a8088afa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/about/services.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# Privacy Guides Services
+
+We run a number of web services to test out features and promote cool decentralized, federated, and/or open-source projects. Many of these services are available to the public and are detailed below.
+
+[:material-comment-alert: Report an issue](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/services/2 ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+## Discourse
+
+- Domain: [discuss.privacyguides.net](https://discuss.privacyguides.net)
+- Availability: Public
+- Source: [github.com/discourse/discourse](https://github.com/discourse/discourse)
+
+## Gitea
+
+- Domain: [code.privacyguides.dev](https://code.privacyguides.dev)
+- Availability: Invite-Only
+ Access may be granted upon request to any team working on *Privacy Guides*-related development or content.
+- Source: [snapcraft.io/gitea](https://snapcraft.io/gitea)
+
+## Matrix
+
+- Domain: [matrix.privacyguides.org](https://matrix.privacyguides.org)
+- Availability: Invite-Only
+ Access may be granted upon request to Privacy Guides team members, Matrix moderators, third-party Matrix community administrators, Matrix bot operators, and other individuals in need of a reliable Matrix presence.
+- Source: [github.com/spantaleev/matrix-docker-ansible-deploy](https://github.com/spantaleev/matrix-docker-ansible-deploy)
+
+## SearXNG
+
+- Domain: [search.privacyguides.net](https://search.privacyguides.net)
+- Availability: Public
+- Source: [github.com/searxng/searxng-docker](https://github.com/searxng/searxng-docker)
+
+## Invidious
+
+- Domain: [invidious.privacyguides.net](https://invidious.privacyguides.net)
+- Availability: Semi-Public
+ We host Invidious primarily to serve embedded YouTube videos on our website, this instance is not intended for general-purpose use and may be limited at any time.
+- Source: [github.com/iv-org/invidious](https://github.com/iv-org/invidious)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/about/statistics.md b/i18n/el/about/statistics.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e00eda7ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/about/statistics.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: Traffic Statistics
+---
+
+## Website Statistics
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/advanced/communication-network-types.md b/i18n/el/advanced/communication-network-types.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9e6d87cc7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/advanced/communication-network-types.md
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+---
+title: "Types of Communication Networks"
+icon: 'material/transit-connection-variant'
+---
+
+There are several network architectures commonly used to relay messages between people. These networks can provide different privacy guarantees, which is why it's worth considering your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md) when deciding which app to use.
+
+[Recommended Instant Messengers](../real-time-communication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Centralized Networks
+
+{ align=left }
+
+Centralized messengers are those where all participants are on the same server or network of servers controlled by the same organization.
+
+Some self-hosted messengers allow you to set up your own server. Self-hosting can provide additional privacy guarantees, such as no usage logs or limited access to metadata (data about who is talking to whom). Self-hosted centralized messengers are isolated and everyone must be on the same server to communicate.
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- New features and changes can be implemented more quickly.
+- Easier to get started with and to find contacts.
+- Most mature and stable features ecosystems, as they are easier to program in a centralized software.
+- Privacy issues may be reduced when you trust a server that you're self-hosting.
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Can include [restricted control or access](https://drewdevault.com/2018/08/08/Signal.html). This can include things like:
+- Being [forbidden from connecting third-party clients](https://github.com/LibreSignal/LibreSignal/issues/37#issuecomment-217211165) to the centralized network that might provide for greater customization or a better experience. Often defined in Terms and Conditions of usage.
+- Poor or no documentation for third-party developers.
+- The [ownership](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729191953/https://blog.privacytools.io/delisting-wire/), privacy policy, and operations of the service can change easily when a single entity controls it, potentially compromising the service later on.
+- Self-hosting requires effort and knowledge of how to set up a service.
+
+## Federated Networks
+
+{ align=left }
+
+Federated messengers use multiple, independent, decentralized servers that are able to talk to each other (email is one example of a federated service). Federation allows system administrators to control their own server and still be a part of the larger communications network.
+
+When self-hosted, members of a federated server can discover and communicate with members of other servers, although some servers may choose to remain private by being non-federated (e.g., work team server).
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- Allows for greater control over your own data when running your own server.
+- Allows you to choose whom to trust your data with by choosing between multiple "public" servers.
+- Often allows for third-party clients which can provide a more native, customized, or accessible experience.
+- Server software can be verified that it matches public source code, assuming you have access to the server or you trust the person who does (e.g., a family member).
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Adding new features is more complex because these features need to be standardized and tested to ensure they work with all servers on the network.
+- Due to the previous point, features can be lacking, or incomplete or working in unexpected ways compared to centralized platforms, such as message relay when offline or message deletion.
+- Some metadata may be available (e.g., information like "who is talking to whom," but not actual message content if E2EE is used).
+- Federated servers generally require trusting your server's administrator. They may be a hobbyist or otherwise not a "security professional," and may not serve standard documents like a privacy policy or terms of service detailing how your data is used.
+- Server administrators sometimes choose to block other servers, which are a source of unmoderated abuse or break general rules of accepted behavior. This will hinder your ability to communicate with members of those servers.
+
+## Peer-to-Peer Networks
+
+{ align=left }
+
+P2P messengers connect to a [distributed network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_networking) of nodes to relay a message to the recipient without a third-party server.
+
+Clients (peers) usually find each other through the use of a [distributed computing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_computing) network. Examples of this include [Distributed Hash Tables](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_hash_table) (DHT), used by [torrents](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent_(protocol)) and [IPFS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/InterPlanetary_File_System) for example. Another approach is proximity based networks, where a connection is established over WiFi or Bluetooth (for example, Briar or the [Scuttlebutt](https://www.scuttlebutt.nz) social network protocol).
+
+Once a peer has found a route to its contact via any of these methods, a direct connection between them is made. Although messages are usually encrypted, an observer can still deduce the location and identity of the sender and recipient.
+
+P2P networks do not use servers, as peers communicate directly between each other and hence cannot be self-hosted. However, some additional services may rely on centralized servers, such as user discovery or relaying offline messages, which can benefit from self-hosting.
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- Minimal information is exposed to third-parties.
+- Modern P2P platforms implement E2EE by default. There are no servers that could potentially intercept and decrypt your transmissions, unlike centralized and federated models.
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Reduced feature set:
+- Messages can only be sent when both peers are online, however, your client may store messages locally to wait for the contact to return online.
+- Generally increases battery usage on mobile devices, because the client must stay connected to the distributed network to learn about who is online.
+- Some common messenger features may not be implemented or incompletely, such as message deletion.
+- Your IP address and that of the contacts you're communicating with may be exposed if you do not use the software in conjunction with a [VPN](../vpn.md) or [Tor](../tor.md). Many countries have some form of mass surveillance and/or metadata retention.
+
+## Anonymous Routing
+
+{ align=left }
+
+A messenger using [anonymous routing](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_628) hides either the identity of the sender, the receiver, or evidence that they have been communicating. Ideally, a messenger should hide all three.
+
+There are [many](https://doi.org/10.1145/3182658) different ways to implement anonymous routing. One of the most famous is [onion routing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing) (i.e. [Tor](tor-overview.md)), which communicates encrypted messages through a virtual [overlay network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overlay_network) that hides the location of each node as well as the recipient and sender of each message. The sender and recipient never interact directly and only meet through a secret rendezvous node so that there is no leak of IP addresses nor physical location. Nodes cannot decrypt messages, nor the final destination; only the recipient can. Each intermediary node can only decrypt a part that indicates where to send the still encrypted message next, until it arrives at the recipient who can fully decrypt it, hence the "onion layers."
+
+Self-hosting a node in an anonymous routing network does not provide the hoster with additional privacy benefits, but rather contributes to the whole network's resilience against identification attacks for everyone's benefit.
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- Minimal to no information is exposed to other parties.
+- Messages can be relayed in a decentralized manner even if one of the parties is offline.
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Slow message propagation.
+- Often limited to fewer media types, mostly text, since the network is slow.
+- Less reliable if nodes are selected by randomized routing, some nodes may be very far from the sender and receiver, adding latency or even failing to transmit messages if one of the nodes goes offline.
+- More complex to get started, as the creation and secured backup of a cryptographic private key is required.
+- Just like other decentralized platforms, adding features is more complex for developers than on a centralized platform. Hence, features may be lacking or incompletely implemented, such as offline message relaying or message deletion.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/advanced/dns-overview.md b/i18n/el/advanced/dns-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a76c682fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/advanced/dns-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+---
+title: "DNS Overview"
+icon: material/dns
+---
+
+The [Domain Name System](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System) is the 'phonebook of the Internet'. DNS translates domain names to IP addresses so browsers and other services can load Internet resources, through a decentralized network of servers.
+
+## What is DNS?
+
+When you visit a website, a numerical address is returned. For example, when you visit `privacyguides.org`, the address `192.98.54.105` is returned.
+
+DNS has existed since the [early days](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System#History) of the Internet. DNS requests made to and from DNS servers are **not** generally encrypted. In a residential setting, a customer is given servers by the ISP via [DHCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dynamic_Host_Configuration_Protocol).
+
+Unencrypted DNS requests are able to be easily **surveilled** and **modified** in transit. In some parts of the world, ISPs are ordered to do primitive [DNS filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking). When you request the IP address of a domain that is blocked, the server may not respond or may respond with a different IP address. As the DNS protocol is not encrypted, the ISP (or any network operator) can use [DPI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection) to monitor requests. ISPs can also block requests based on common characteristics, regardless of which DNS server is used. Unencrypted DNS always uses [port](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_(computer_networking)) 53 and always uses UDP.
+
+Below, we discuss and provide a tutorial to prove what an outside observer may see using regular unencrypted DNS and [encrypted DNS](#what-is-encrypted-dns).
+
+### Unencrypted DNS
+
+1. Using [`tshark`](https://www.wireshark.org/docs/man-pages/tshark.html) (part of the [Wireshark](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wireshark) project) we can monitor and record internet packet flow. This command records packets that meet the rules specified:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/dns.pcap udp port 53 and host 1.1.1.1 or host 8.8.8.8
+ ```
+
+2. We can then use [`dig`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dig_(command)) (Linux, MacOS etc) or [`nslookup`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nslookup) (Windows) to send the DNS lookup to both servers. Software such as web browsers do these lookups automatically, unless they are configured to use encrypted DNS.
+
+ === "Linux, macOS"
+
+ ```
+ dig +noall +answer privacyguides.org @1.1.1.1
+ dig +noall +answer privacyguides.org @8.8.8.8
+ ```
+ === "Windows"
+
+ ```
+ nslookup privacyguides.org 1.1.1.1
+ nslookup privacyguides.org 8.8.8.8
+ ```
+
+3. Next, we want to [analyse](https://www.wireshark.org/docs/wsug_html_chunked/ChapterIntroduction.html#ChIntroWhatIs) the results:
+
+ === "Wireshark"
+
+ ```
+ wireshark -r /tmp/dns.pcap
+ ```
+
+ === "tshark"
+
+ ```
+ tshark -r /tmp/dns.pcap
+ ```
+
+If you run the Wireshark command above, the top pane shows the "[frames](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethernet_frame)", and the bottom pane shows all the data about the selected frame. Enterprise filtering and monitoring solutions (such as those purchased by governments) can do the process automatically, without human interaction, and can aggregate those frames to produce statistical data useful to the network observer.
+
+| No. | Time | Source | Destination | Protocol | Length | Info |
+| --- | -------- | --------- | ----------- | -------- | ------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| 1 | 0.000000 | 192.0.2.1 | 1.1.1.1 | DNS | 104 | Standard query 0x58ba A privacyguides.org OPT |
+| 2 | 0.293395 | 1.1.1.1 | 192.0.2.1 | DNS | 108 | Standard query response 0x58ba A privacyguides.org A 198.98.54.105 OPT |
+| 3 | 1.682109 | 192.0.2.1 | 8.8.8.8 | DNS | 104 | Standard query 0xf1a9 A privacyguides.org OPT |
+| 4 | 2.154698 | 8.8.8.8 | 192.0.2.1 | DNS | 108 | Standard query response 0xf1a9 A privacyguides.org A 198.98.54.105 OPT |
+
+An observer could modify any of these packets.
+
+## What is "encrypted DNS"?
+
+Encrypted DNS can refer to one of a number of protocols, the most common ones being:
+
+### DNSCrypt
+
+[**DNSCrypt**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNSCrypt) was one of the first methods of encrypting DNS queries. DNSCrypt operates on port 443 and works with both the TCP or UDP transport protocols. DNSCrypt has never been submitted to the [Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Engineering_Task_Force) nor has it gone through the [Request for Comments (RFC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Request_for_Comments) process, so it has not been used widely outside of a few [implementations](https://dnscrypt.info/implementations). As a result, it has been largely replaced by the more popular [DNS over HTTPS](#dns-over-https-doh).
+
+### DNS over TLS (DoT)
+
+[**DNS over TLS**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_TLS) is another method for encrypting DNS communication that is defined in [RFC 7858](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7858). Support was first implemented in Android 9, iOS 14, and on Linux in [systemd-resolved](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/resolved.conf.html#DNSOverTLS=) in version 237. Preference in the industry has been moving away from DoT to DoH in recent years, as DoT is a [complex protocol](https://dnscrypt.info/faq/) and has varying compliance to the RFC across the implementations that exist. DoT also operates on a dedicated port 853 which can be blocked easily by restrictive firewalls.
+
+### DNS over HTTPS (DoH)
+
+[**DNS over HTTPS**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_HTTPS) as defined in [RFC 8484](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8484) packages queries in the [HTTP/2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/2) protocol and provides security with HTTPS. Support was first added in web browsers such as Firefox 60 and Chrome 83.
+
+Native implementation of DoH showed up in iOS 14, macOS 11, Microsoft Windows, and Android 13 (however, it won't be enabled [by default](https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/packages/modules/DnsResolver/+/1833144)). General Linux desktop support is waiting on the systemd [implementation](https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/8639) so [installing third-party software is still required](../dns.md#encrypted-dns-proxies).
+
+## What can an outside party see?
+
+In this example we will record what happens when we make a DoH request:
+
+1. First, start `tshark`:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/dns_doh.pcap -f "tcp port https and host 1.1.1.1"
+ ```
+
+2. Second, make a request with `curl`:
+
+ ```bash
+ curl -vI --doh-url https://1.1.1.1/dns-query https://privacyguides.org
+ ```
+
+3. After making the request, we can stop the packet capture with CTRL + C.
+
+4. Analyse the results in Wireshark:
+
+ ```bash
+ wireshark -r /tmp/dns_doh.pcap
+ ```
+
+We can see the [connection establishment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol#Connection_establishment) and [TLS handshake](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ssl/what-happens-in-a-tls-handshake/) that occurs with any encrypted connection. When looking at the "application data" packets that follow, none of them contain the domain we requested or the IP address returned.
+
+## Why **shouldn't** I use encrypted DNS?
+
+In locations where there is internet filtering (or censorship), visiting forbidden resources may have its own consequences which you should consider in your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md). We do **not** suggest the use of encrypted DNS for this purpose. Use [Tor](https://torproject.org) or a [VPN](../vpn.md) instead. If you're using a VPN, you should use your VPN's DNS servers. When using a VPN, you are already trusting them with all your network activity.
+
+When we do a DNS lookup, it's generally because we want to access a resource. Below, we will discuss some of the methods that may disclose your browsing activities even when using encrypted DNS:
+
+### IP Address
+
+The simplest way to determine browsing activity might be to look at the IP addresses your devices are accessing. For example, if the observer knows that `privacyguides.org` is at `198.98.54.105`, and your device is requesting data from `198.98.54.105`, there is a good chance you're visiting Privacy Guides.
+
+This method is only useful when the IP address belongs to a server that only hosts few websites. It's also not very useful if the site is hosted on a shared platform (e.g. Github Pages, Cloudflare Pages, Netlify, WordPress, Blogger, etc). It also isn't very useful if the server is hosted behind a [reverse proxy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_proxy), which is very common on the modern Internet.
+
+### Server Name Indication (SNI)
+
+Server Name Indication is typically used when a IP address hosts many websites. This could be a service like Cloudflare, or some other [Denial-of-service attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial-of-service_attack) protection.
+
+1. Start capturing again with `tshark`. We've added a filter with our IP address so you don't capture many packets:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/pg.pcap port 443 and host 198.98.54.105
+ ```
+
+2. Then we visit [https://privacyguides.org](https://privacyguides.org).
+
+3. After visiting the website, we want to stop the packet capture with CTRL + C.
+
+4. Next we want to analyze the results:
+
+ ```bash
+ wireshark -r /tmp/pg.pcap
+ ```
+
+ We will see the connection establishment, followed by the TLS handshake for the Privacy Guides website. Around frame 5. you'll see a "Client Hello".
+
+5. Expand the triangle ▸ next to each field:
+
+ ```text
+ ▸ Transport Layer Security
+ ▸ TLSv1.3 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
+ ▸ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
+ ▸ Extension: server_name (len=22)
+ ▸ Server Name Indication extension
+ ```
+
+6. We can see the SNI value which discloses the website we are visiting. The `tshark` command can give you the value directly for all packets containing a SNI value:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -r /tmp/pg.pcap -Tfields -Y tls.handshake.extensions_server_name -e tls.handshake.extensions_server_name
+ ```
+
+This means even if we are using "Encrypted DNS" servers, the domain will likely be disclosed through SNI. The [TLS v1.3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#TLS_1.3) protocol brings with it [Encrypted Client Hello](https://blog.cloudflare.com/encrypted-client-hello/), which prevents this kind of leak.
+
+Governments, in particular [China](https://www.zdnet.com/article/china-is-now-blocking-all-encrypted-https-traffic-using-tls-1-3-and-esni/) and [Russia](https://www.zdnet.com/article/russia-wants-to-ban-the-use-of-secure-protocols-such-as-tls-1-3-doh-dot-esni/), have either already [started blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication#Encrypted_Client_Hello) it or expressed a desire to do so. Recently, Russia has [started blocking foreign websites](https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/108) that use the [HTTP/3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) standard. This is because the [QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QUIC) protocol that is a part of HTTP/3 requires that `ClientHello` also be encrypted.
+
+### Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
+
+Another way your browser can disclose your browsing activities is with the [Online Certificate Status Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_Certificate_Status_Protocol). When visiting an HTTPS website, the browser might check to see if the website's [certificate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_certificate) has been revoked. This is generally done through the HTTP protocol, meaning it is **not** encrypted.
+
+The OCSP request contains the certificate "[serial number](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_certificate#Common_fields)", which is unique. It is sent to the "OCSP responder" in order to check its status.
+
+We can simulate what a browser would do using the [`openssl`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenSSL) command.
+
+1. Get the server certificate and use [`sed`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sed) to keep just the important part and write it out to a file:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl s_client -connect privacyguides.org:443 < /dev/null 2>&1 |
+ sed -n '/^-*BEGIN/,/^-*END/p' > /tmp/pg_server.cert
+ ```
+
+2. Get the intermediate certificate. [Certificate Authorities (CA)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) normally don't sign a certificate directly; they use what is known as an "intermediate" certificate.
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl s_client -showcerts -connect privacyguides.org:443 < /dev/null 2>&1 |
+ sed -n '/^-*BEGIN/,/^-*END/p' > /tmp/pg_and_intermediate.cert
+ ```
+
+3. The first certificate in `pg_and_intermediate.cert` is actually the server certificate from step 1. We can use `sed` again to delete until the first instance of END:
+
+ ```bash
+ sed -n '/^-*END CERTIFICATE-*$/!d;:a n;p;ba' \
+ /tmp/pg_and_intermediate.cert > /tmp/intermediate_chain.cert
+ ```
+
+4. Get the OCSP responder for the server certificate:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl x509 -noout -ocsp_uri -in /tmp/pg_server.cert
+ ```
+
+ Our certificate shows the Lets Encrypt certificate responder. If we want to see all the details of the certificate we can use:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl x509 -text -noout -in /tmp/pg_server.cert
+ ```
+
+5. Start the packet capture:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap -f "tcp port http"
+ ```
+
+6. Make the OCSP request:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl ocsp -issuer /tmp/intermediate_chain.cert \
+ -cert /tmp/pg_server.cert \
+ -text \
+ -url http://r3.o.lencr.org
+ ```
+
+7. Open the capture:
+
+ ```bash
+ wireshark -r /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap
+ ```
+
+ There will be two packets with the "OCSP" protocol: a "Request" and a "Response". For the "Request" we can see the "serial number" by expanding the triangle ▸ next to each field:
+
+ ```bash
+ ▸ Online Certificate Status Protocol
+ ▸ tbsRequest
+ ▸ requestList: 1 item
+ ▸ Request
+ ▸ reqCert
+ serialNumber
+ ```
+
+ For the "Response" we can also see the "serial number":
+
+ ```bash
+ ▸ Online Certificate Status Protocol
+ ▸ responseBytes
+ ▸ BasicOCSPResponse
+ ▸ tbsResponseData
+ ▸ responses: 1 item
+ ▸ SingleResponse
+ ▸ certID
+ serialNumber
+ ```
+
+8. Or use `tshark` to filter the packets for the Serial Number:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -r /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap -Tfields -Y ocsp.serialNumber -e ocsp.serialNumber
+ ```
+
+If the network observer has the public certificate, which is publicly available, they can match the serial number with that certificate and therefore determine the site you're visiting from that. The process can be automated and can associate IP addresses with serial numbers. It is also possible to check [Certificate Transparency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_Transparency) logs for the serial number.
+
+## Should I use encrypted DNS?
+
+We made this flow chart to describe when you *should* use encrypted DNS:
+
+``` mermaid
+graph TB
+ Start[Start] --> anonymous{Trying to be anonymous?}
+ anonymous--> | Yes | tor(Use Tor)
+ anonymous --> | No | censorship{Avoiding censorship?}
+ censorship --> | Yes | vpnOrTor(Use VPN or Tor)
+ censorship --> | No | privacy{Want privacy from ISP?}
+ privacy --> | Yes | vpnOrTor
+ privacy --> | No | obnoxious{ISP makes obnoxious redirects?}
+ obnoxious --> | Yes | encryptedDNS(Use encrypted DNS with 3rd party)
+ obnoxious --> | No | ispDNS{Does ISP support encrypted DNS?}
+ ispDNS --> | Yes | useISP(Use encrypted DNS with ISP)
+ ispDNS --> | No | nothing(Do nothing)
+```
+
+Encrypted DNS with a third-party should only be used to get around redirects and basic [DNS blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) when you can be sure there won't be any consequences or you're interested in a provider that does some rudimentary filtering.
+
+[List of recommended DNS servers](../dns.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## What is DNSSEC?
+
+[Domain Name System Security Extensions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Extensions) (DNSSEC) is a feature of DNS that authenticates responses to domain name lookups. It does not provide privacy protections for those lookups, but rather prevents attackers from manipulating or poisoning the responses to DNS requests.
+
+In other words, DNSSEC digitally signs data to help ensure its validity. In order to ensure a secure lookup, the signing occurs at every level in the DNS lookup process. As a result, all answers from DNS can be trusted.
+
+The DNSSEC signing process is similar to someone signing a legal document with a pen; that person signs with a unique signature that no one else can create, and a court expert can look at that signature and verify that the document was signed by that person. These digital signatures ensure that data has not been tampered with.
+
+DNSSEC implements a hierarchical digital signing policy across all layers of DNS. For example, in the case of a `privacyguides.org` lookup, a root DNS server would sign a key for the `.org` nameserver, and the `.org` nameserver would then sign a key for `privacyguides.org`’s authoritative nameserver.
+
+Adapted from [DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) overview](https://cloud.google.com/dns/docs/dnssec) by Google and [DNSSEC: An Introduction](https://blog.cloudflare.com/dnssec-an-introduction/) by Cloudflare, both licensed under [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
+
+## What is QNAME minimization?
+
+A QNAME is a "qualified name", for example `privacyguides.org`. QNAME minimisation reduces the amount of information sent from the DNS server to the [authoritative name server](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Name_server#Authoritative_name_server).
+
+Instead of sending the whole domain `privacyguides.org`, QNAME minimization means the DNS server will ask for all the records that end in `.org`. Further technical description is defined in [RFC 7816](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7816).
+
+## What is EDNS Client Subnet (ECS)?
+
+The [EDNS Client Subnet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EDNS_Client_Subnet) is a method for a recursive DNS resolver to specify a [subnetwork](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subnetwork) for the [host or client](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Client_(computing)) which is making the DNS query.
+
+It's intended to "speed up" delivery of data by giving the client an answer that belongs to a server that is close to them such as a [content delivery network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_delivery_network), which are often used in video streaming and serving JavaScript web apps.
+
+This feature does come at a privacy cost, as it tells the DNS server some information about the client's location.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/advanced/tor-overview.md b/i18n/el/advanced/tor-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1a7f7c417
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/advanced/tor-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+---
+title: "Tor Overview"
+icon: 'simple/torproject'
+---
+
+Tor is a free to use, decentralized network designed for using the internet with as much privacy as possible. If used properly, the network enables private and anonymous browsing and communications.
+
+## Path Building
+
+Tor works by routing your traffic through a network comprised of thousands of volunteer-run servers called nodes (or relays).
+
+Every time you connect to Tor, it will choose three nodes to build a path to the internet—this path is called a "circuit." Each of these nodes has its own function:
+
+### The Entry Node
+
+The entry node, often called the guard node, is the first node to which your Tor client connects. The entry node is able to see your IP address, however it is unable to see what you are connecting to.
+
+Unlike the other nodes, the Tor client will randomly select an entry node and stick with it for two to three months to protect you from certain attacks.[^1]
+
+### The Middle Node
+
+The middle node is the second node to which your Tor client connects. It can see which node the traffic came from—the entry node—and to which node it goes to next. The middle node cannot, see your IP address or the domain you are connecting to.
+
+For each new circuit, the middle node is randomly selected out of all available Tor nodes.
+
+### The Exit Node
+
+The exit node is the point in which your web traffic leaves the Tor network and is forwarded to your desired destination. The exit node is unable to see your IP address, but it does know what site it's connecting to.
+
+The exit node will be chosen at random from all available Tor nodes ran with an exit relay flag.[^2]
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ Tor circuit pathway
+
+
+## Encryption
+
+Tor encrypts each packet (a block of transmitted data) three times with the keys from the exit, middle, and entry node—in that order.
+
+Once Tor has built a circuit, data transmission is done as follows:
+
+1. Firstly: when the packet arrives at the entry node, the first layer of encryption is removed. In this encrypted packet, the entry node will find another encrypted packet with the middle node’s address. The entry node will then forward the packet to the middle node.
+
+2. Secondly: when the middle node receives the packet from the entry node, it too will remove a layer of encryption with its key, and this time finds an encrypted packet with the exit node's address. The middle node will then forward the packet to the exit node.
+
+3. Lastly: when the exit node receives its packet, it will remove the last layer of encryption with its key. The exit node will see the destination address and forward the packet to that address.
+
+Below is an alternative diagram showing the process. Each node removes its own layer of encryption, and when the destination server returns data, the same process happens entirely in reverse. For example, the exit node does not know who you are, but it does know which node it came from, and so it adds its own layer of encryption and sends it back.
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sending and receiving data through the Tor Network
+
+
+Tor allows us to connect to a server without any single party knowing the entire path. The entry node knows who you are, but not where you are going; the middle node doesn’t know who you are or where you are going; and the exit node knows where you are going, but not who you are. Because the exit node is what makes the final connection, the destination server will never know your IP address.
+
+## Caveats
+
+Though Tor does provide strong privacy guarantees, one must be aware that Tor is not perfect:
+
+- Well-funded adversaries with the capability to passively watch most network traffic over the globe have a chance of deanonymizing Tor users by means of advanced traffic analysis. Nor does Tor protect you from exposing yourself by mistake, such as if you share too much information about your real identity.
+- Tor exit nodes can also monitor traffic that passes through them. This means traffic which is not encrypted, such as plain HTTP traffic, can be recorded and monitored. If such traffic contains personally identifiable information, then it can deanonymize you to that exit node. Thus, we recommend using HTTPS over Tor where possible.
+
+If you wish to use Tor for browsing the web, we only recommend the **official** Tor Browser—it is designed to prevent fingerprinting.
+
+- [Tor Browser :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../tor.md#tor-browser)
+
+## Additional Resources
+
+- [Tor Browser User Manual](https://tb-manual.torproject.org)
+- [How Tor Works - Computerphile](https://invidious.privacyguides.net/embed/QRYzre4bf7I?local=true) (YouTube)
+- [Tor Onion Services - Computerphile](https://invidious.privacyguides.net/embed/lVcbq_a5N9I?local=true) (YouTube)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
+
+[^1]: The first relay in your circuit is called an "entry guard" or "guard". It is a fast and stable relay that remains the first one in your circuit for 2-3 months in order to protect against a known anonymity-breaking attack. The rest of your circuit changes with every new website you visit, and all together these relays provide the full privacy protections of Tor. For more information on how guard relays work, see this [blog post](https://blog.torproject.org/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters) and [paper](https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/single_guard.pdf) on entry guards. ([https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2/](https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2/))
+
+[^2]: Relay flag: a special (dis-)qualification of relays for circuit positions (for example, "Guard", "Exit", "BadExit"), circuit properties (for example, "Fast", "Stable"), or roles (for example, "Authority", "HSDir"), as assigned by the directory authorities and further defined in the directory protocol specification. ([https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html](https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html))
diff --git a/i18n/el/android.md b/i18n/el/android.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..24c1c3d8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/android.md
@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+---
+title: "Android"
+icon: 'simple/android'
+---
+
+{ align=right }
+
+The **Android Open Source Project** is an open-source mobile operating system led by Google which powers the majority of the world's mobile devices. Most phones sold with Android are modified to include invasive integrations and apps such as Google Play Services, so you can significantly improve your privacy on your mobile device by replacing your phone's default installation with a version of Android without these invasive features.
+
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://source.android.com/){ .card-link title=Homepage }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://source.android.com/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+These are the Android operating systems, devices, and apps we recommend to maximize your mobile device's security and privacy. To learn more about Android:
+
+- [General Android Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/android-overview.md)
+- [Why we recommend GrapheneOS over CalyxOS :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/)
+
+## AOSP Derivatives
+
+We recommend installing one of these custom Android operating systems on your device, listed in order of preference, depending on your device's compatibility with these operating systems.
+
+!!! note
+
+ End-of-life devices (such as GrapheneOS or CalyxOS's "extended support" devices) do not have full security patches (firmware updates) due to the OEM discontinuing support. These devices cannot be considered completely secure regardless of installed software.
+
+### GrapheneOS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GrapheneOS** is the best choice when it comes to privacy and security.
+
+ GrapheneOS provides additional [security hardening](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardening_(computing)) and privacy improvements. It has a [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), network and sensor permissions, and various other [security features](https://grapheneos.org/features). GrapheneOS also comes with full firmware updates and signed builds, so verified boot is fully supported.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://grapheneos.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://grapheneos.org/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+GrapheneOS supports [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), which runs [Google Play Services](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Play_Services) fully sandboxed like any other regular app. This means you can take advantage of most Google Play Services, such as [push notifications](https://firebase.google.com/docs/cloud-messaging/), while giving you full control over their permissions and access, and while containing them to a specific [work profile](os/android-overview.md#work-profile) or [user profile](os/android-overview.md#user-profiles) of your choice.
+
+Google Pixel phones are the only devices that currently meet GrapheneOS's [hardware security requirements](https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-support).
+
+### DivestOS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **DivestOS** is a soft-fork of [LineageOS](https://lineageos.org/).
+ DivestOS inherits many [supported devices](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=devices&base=LineageOS) from LineageOS. It has signed builds, making it possible to have [verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) on some non-Pixel devices.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://divestos.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://divestoseb5nncsydt7zzf5hrfg44md4bxqjs5ifcv4t7gt7u6ohjyyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=privacy_policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/divested-mobile){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+DivestOS has automated kernel vulnerability ([CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures)) [patching](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/cve_checker), fewer proprietary blobs, and a custom [hosts](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=dnsbl) file. Its hardened WebView, [Mulch](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/mulch), enables [CFI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity) for all architectures and [network state partitioning](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning), and receives out-of-band updates. DivestOS also includes kernel patches from GrapheneOS and enables all available kernel security features via [defconfig hardening](https://github.com/Divested-Mobile/DivestOS-Build/blob/master/Scripts/Common/Functions.sh#L758). All kernels newer than version 3.4 include full page [sanitization](https://lwn.net/Articles/334747/) and all ~22 Clang-compiled kernels have [`-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero`](https://reviews.llvm.org/D54604?id=174471) enabled.
+
+DivestOS implements some system hardening patches originally developed for GrapheneOS. DivestOS 16.0 and higher implements GrapheneOS's [`INTERNET`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) and SENSORS permission toggle, [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), [exec-spawning](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/#additional-hardening), [JNI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_Native_Interface) [constification](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Const_(computer_programming)), and partial [bionic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bionic_(software)) hardening patchsets. 17.1 and higher features GrapheneOS's per-network full [MAC randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address#Randomization) option, [`ptrace_scope`](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.html) control, and automatic reboot/Wi-Fi/Bluetooth [timeout options](https://grapheneos.org/features).
+
+DivestOS uses F-Droid as its default app store. Normally, we would recommend avoiding F-Droid due to its numerous [security issues](#f-droid). However, doing so on DivestOS isn't viable; the developers update their apps via their own F-Droid repositories ([DivestOS Official](https://divestos.org/fdroid/official/?fingerprint=E4BE8D6ABFA4D9D4FEEF03CDDA7FF62A73FD64B75566F6DD4E5E577550BE8467) and [DivestOS WebView](https://divestos.org/fdroid/webview/?fingerprint=FB426DA1750A53D7724C8A582B4D34174E64A84B38940E5D5A802E1DFF9A40D2)). We recommend disabling the official F-Droid app and using [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) with the DivestOS repositories enabled to keep those components up to date. For other apps, our recommended methods of obtaining them still apply.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ DivestOS firmware update [status](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/firmware-empty/-/blob/master/STATUS) and quality control varies across the devices it supports. We still recommend GrapheneOS depending on your device's compatibility. For other devices, DivestOS is a good alternative.
+
+ Not all of the supported devices have verified boot, and some perform it better than others.
+
+## Android Devices
+
+When purchasing a device, we recommend getting one as new as possible. The software and firmware of mobile devices are only supported for a limited time, so buying new extends that lifespan as much as possible.
+
+Avoid buying phones from mobile network operators. These often have a **locked bootloader** and do not support [OEM unlocking](https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/locking_unlocking). These phone variants will prevent you from installing any kind of alternative Android distribution.
+
+Be very **careful** about buying second hand phones from online marketplaces. Always check the reputation of the seller. If the device is stolen, there's a possibility of [IMEI blacklisting](https://www.gsma.com/security/resources/imei-blacklisting/). There is also a risk involved with you being associated with the activity of the previous owner.
+
+A few more tips regarding Android devices and operating system compatibility:
+
+- Do not buy devices that have reached or are near their end-of-life, additional firmware updates must be provided by the manufacturer.
+- Do not buy preloaded LineageOS or /e/ OS phones or any Android phones without proper [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) support and firmware updates. These devices also have no way for you to check whether they've been tampered with.
+- In short, if a device or Android distribution is not listed here, there is probably a good reason. Check out our [forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/) to find details!
+
+### Google Pixel
+
+Google Pixel phones are the **only** devices we recommend for purchase. Pixel phones have stronger hardware security than any other Android devices currently on the market, due to proper AVB support for third-party operating systems and Google's custom [Titan](https://security.googleblog.com/2021/10/pixel-6-setting-new-standard-for-mobile.html) security chips acting as the Secure Element.
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Google Pixel** devices are known to have good security and properly support [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), even when installing custom operating systems.
+
+ Beginning with the **Pixel 6** and **6 Pro**, Pixel devices receive a minimum of 5 years of guaranteed security updates, ensuring a much longer lifespan compared to the 2-4 years competing OEMs typically offer.
+
+ [:material-shopping: Store](https://store.google.com/category/phones){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+
+Secure Elements like the Titan M2 are more limited than the processor's Trusted Execution Environment used by most other phones as they are only used for secrets storage, hardware attestation, and rate limiting, not for running "trusted" programs. Phones without a Secure Element have to use the TEE for *all* of those functions, resulting in a larger attack surface.
+
+Google Pixel phones use a TEE OS called Trusty which is [open-source](https://source.android.com/security/trusty#whyTrusty), unlike many other phones.
+
+The installation of GrapheneOS on a Pixel phone is easy with their [web installer](https://grapheneos.org/install/web). If you don't feel comfortable doing it yourself and are willing to spend a bit of extra money, check out the [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) as they come preloaded with GrapheneOS from the reputable [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/about) company.
+
+A few more tips for purchasing a Google Pixel:
+
+- If you're after a bargain on a Pixel device, we suggest buying an "**a**" model, just after the next flagship is released. Discounts are usually available because Google will be trying to clear their stock.
+- Consider price beating options and specials offered at physical stores.
+- Look at online community bargain sites in your country. These can alert you to good sales.
+- Google provides a list showing the [support cycle](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) for each one of their devices. The price per day for a device can be calculated as: $\text{Cost} \over \text {EOL Date}-\text{Current Date}$, meaning that the longer use of the device the lower cost per day.
+
+## General Apps
+
+We recommend a wide variety of Android apps throughout this site. The apps listed here are Android-exclusive and specifically enhance or replace key system functionality.
+
+### Shelter
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Shelter** is an app that helps you leverage Android's Work Profile functionality to isolate or duplicate apps on your device.
+
+ Shelter supports blocking contact search cross profiles and sharing files across profiles via the default file manager ([DocumentsUI](https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/modular-system/documentsui)).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://gitea.angry.im/PeterCxy/Shelter#shelter){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitea.angry.im/PeterCxy/Shelter){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.patreon.com/PeterCxy){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.typeblog.shelter)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Shelter is recommended over [Insular](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/) and [Island](https://github.com/oasisfeng/island) as it supports [contact search blocking](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/faq.html).
+
+ When using Shelter, you are placing complete trust in its developer, as Shelter acts as a [Device Admin](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/admin/device-admin) to create the Work Profile, and it has extensive access to the data stored within the Work Profile.
+
+### Auditor
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Auditor** is an app which leverages hardware security features to provide device integrity monitoring for [supported devices](https://attestation.app/about#device-support). Currently, it only works with GrapheneOS and the device's stock operating system.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://attestation.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://attestation.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://attestation.app/about){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://attestation.app/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://attestation.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.attestation.auditor.play)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases)
+ - [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+Auditor performs attestation and intrusion detection by:
+
+- Using a [Trust On First Use (TOFU)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_on_first_use) model between an *auditor* and *auditee*, the pair establish a private key in the [hardware-backed keystore](https://source.android.com/security/keystore/) of the *Auditor*.
+- The *auditor* can either be another instance of the Auditor app or the [Remote Attestation Service](https://attestation.app).
+- The *auditor* records the current state and configuration of the *auditee*.
+- Should tampering with the operating system of the *auditee* happen after the pairing is complete, the auditor will be aware of the change in the device state and configurations.
+- You will be alerted to the change.
+
+No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
+
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service. To make sure that your hardware and operating system is genuine, [perform local attestation](https://grapheneos.org/install/web#verifying-installation) immediately after the device has been installed and prior to any internet connection.
+
+### Secure Camera
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Secure Camera** is a camera app focused on privacy and security which can capture images, videos and QR codes. CameraX vendor extensions (Portrait, HDR, Night Sight, Face Retouch, and Auto) are also supported on available devices.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://grapheneos.org/usage#camera){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.grapheneos.camera.play)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases)
+ - [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+Main privacy features include:
+
+- Auto removal of [Exif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exif) metadata (enabled by default)
+- Use of the new [Media](https://developer.android.com/training/data-storage/shared/media) API, therefore [storage permissions](https://developer.android.com/training/data-storage) are not required
+- Microphone permission not required unless you want to record sound
+
+!!! note
+
+ Metadata is not currently deleted from video files but that is planned.
+
+ The image orientation metadata is not deleted. If you enable location (in Secure Camera) that **won't** be deleted either. If you want to delete that later you will need to use an external app such as [ExifEraser](data-redaction.md#exiferaser).
+
+### Secure PDF Viewer
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Secure PDF Viewer** is a PDF viewer based on [pdf.js](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PDF.js) that doesn't require any permissions. The PDF is fed into a [sandboxed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandbox_(software_development)) [webview](https://developer.android.com/guide/webapps/webview). This means that it doesn't require permission directly to access content or files.
+
+ [Content-Security-Policy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy) is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.grapheneos.pdfviewer.play)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer/releases)
+ - [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+## Obtaining Applications
+
+### GrapheneOS App Store
+
+GrapheneOS's app store is available on [GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases). It supports Android 12 and above and is capable of updating itself. The app store has standalone applications built by the GrapheneOS project such as the [Auditor](https://attestation.app/), [Camera](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera), and [PDF Viewer](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer). If you are looking for these applications, we highly recommend that you get them from GrapheneOS's app store instead of the Play Store, as the apps on their store are signed by the GrapheneOS's project own signature that Google does not have access to.
+
+### Aurora Store
+
+The Google Play Store requires a Google account to login which is not great for privacy. You can get around this by using an alternative client, such as Aurora Store.
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Aurora Store** is a Google Play Store client which does not require a Google Account, Google Play Services, or microG to download apps.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://auroraoss.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-gitlab: GitLab](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore/-/releases)
+
+Aurora Store does not allow you to download paid apps with their anonymous account feature. You can optionally log in with your Google account with Aurora Store to download apps you have purchased, which does give access to the list of apps you've installed to Google, however you still benefit from not requiring the full Google Play client and Google Play Services or microG on your device.
+
+### Manually with RSS Notifications
+
+For apps that are released on platforms like GitHub and GitLab, you may be able to add an RSS feed to your [news aggregator](/news-aggregators) that will help you keep track of new releases.
+
+   
+
+#### GitHub
+
+On GitHub, using [Secure Camera](#secure-camera) as an example, you would navigate to its [releases page](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases) and append `.atom` to the URL:
+
+`https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases.atom`
+
+#### GitLab
+
+On GitLab, using [Aurora Store](#aurora-store) as an example, you would navigate to its [project repository](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore) and append `/-/tags?format=atom` to the URL:
+
+`https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore/-/tags?format=atom`
+
+#### Verifying APK Fingerprints
+
+If you download APK files to install manually, you can verify their signature with the [`apksigner`](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/apksigner) tool, which is a part of Android [build-tools](https://developer.android.com/studio/releases/build-tools).
+
+1. Install [Java JDK](https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/downloads/).
+
+2. Download the [Android Studio command line tools](https://developer.android.com/studio#command-tools).
+
+3. Extract the downloaded archive:
+
+ ```bash
+ unzip commandlinetools-*.zip
+ cd cmdline-tools
+ ./bin/sdkmanager --sdk_root=./ "build-tools;29.0.3"
+ ```
+
+4. Run the signature verification command:
+
+ ```bash
+ ./build-tools/29.0.3/apksigner verify --print-certs ../Camera-37.apk
+ ```
+
+5. The resulting hashes can then be compared with another source. Some developers such as Signal [show the fingerprints](https://signal.org/android/apk/) on their website.
+
+ ```bash
+ Signer #1 certificate DN: CN=GrapheneOS
+ Signer #1 certificate SHA-256 digest: 6436b155b917c2f9a9ed1d15c4993a5968ffabc94947c13f2aeee14b7b27ed59
+ Signer #1 certificate SHA-1 digest: 23e108677a2e1b1d6e6b056f3bb951df7ad5570c
+ Signer #1 certificate MD5 digest: dbbcd0cac71bd6fa2102a0297c6e0dd3
+ ```
+
+### F-Droid
+
+{ align=right width=120px }
+
+==We do **not** currently recommend F-Droid as a way to obtain apps.== F-Droid is often recommended as an alternative to Google Play, particularly in the privacy community. The option to add third-party repositories and not be confined to Google's walled garden has led to its popularity. F-Droid additionally has [reproducible builds](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Reproducible_Builds/) for some applications and is dedicated to free and open-source software. However, there are [notable problems](https://privsec.dev/posts/android/f-droid-security-issues/) with the official F-Droid client, their quality control, and how they build, sign, and deliver packages.
+
+Due to their process of building apps, apps in the official F-Droid repository often fall behind on updates. F-Droid maintainers also reuse package IDs while signing apps with their own keys, which is not ideal as it gives the F-Droid team ultimate trust.
+
+Other popular third-party repositories such as [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) alleviate some of these concerns. The IzzyOnDroid repository pulls builds directly from GitHub and is the next best thing to the developers' own repositories. However, it is not something that we can recommend, as apps are typically [removed](https://github.com/vfsfitvnm/ViMusic/issues/240#issuecomment-1225564446) from that respository when they make it to the main F-Droid repository. While that makes sense (since the goal of that particular repository is to host apps before they're accepted into the main F-Droid repository), it can leave you with installed apps which no longer receive updates.
+
+That said, the [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/) and [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) repositories are home to countless apps, so they can be a useful tool to search for and discover open-source apps that you can then download through Play Store, Aurora Store, or by getting the APK directly from the developer. It is important to keep in mind that some apps in these repositories have not been updated in years and may rely on unsupported libraries, among other things, posing a potential security risk. You should use your best judgement when looking for new apps via this method.
+
+!!! note
+
+ In some rare cases, the developer of an app will only distribute it through F-Droid ([Gadgetbridge](https://gadgetbridge.org/) is one example of this). If you really need an app like that, we recommend using [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) instead of the official F-Droid app to obtain it.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Operating Systems
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must support bootloader locking with custom AVB key support.
+- Must receive major Android updates within 0-1 months of release.
+- Must receive Android feature updates (minor version) within 0-14 days of release.
+- Must receive regular security patches within 0-5 days of release.
+- Must **not** be "rooted" out of the box.
+- Must **not** enable Google Play Services by default.
+- Must **not** require system modification to support Google Play Services.
+
+### Devices
+
+- Must support at least one of our recommended custom operating systems.
+- Must be currently sold new in stores.
+- Must receive a minimum of 5 years of security updates.
+- Must have dedicated secure element hardware.
+
+### Applications
+
+- Applications on this page must not be applicable to any other software category on the site.
+- General applications should extend or replace core system functionality.
+- Applications should receive regular updates and maintenance.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png b/i18n/el/assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5295c902c
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/el/assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/el/assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png b/i18n/el/assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..974869a4e
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/el/assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/el/assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png b/i18n/el/assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..21d6ef03a
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/el/assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/el/assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png b/i18n/el/assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b46283571
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/el/assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/el/assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png b/i18n/el/assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f88f7b404
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/el/assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/el/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption-dark.svg b/i18n/el/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption-dark.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..95e681571
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption-dark.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/el/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg b/i18n/el/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f5b1e2915
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/el/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg b/i18n/el/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9002c9b16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/el/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg b/i18n/el/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cb53d8b13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/el/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png b/i18n/el/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7a4a0d170
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/el/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/el/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png b/i18n/el/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f81058d88
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/el/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/el/assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png b/i18n/el/assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cde3771e0
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/el/assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/el/assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png b/i18n/el/assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d71381491
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/el/assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/el/basics/account-creation.md b/i18n/el/basics/account-creation.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cd9942b29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/basics/account-creation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+---
+title: "Account Creation"
+icon: 'material/account-plus'
+---
+
+Often people sign up for services without thinking. Maybe it's a streaming service so you can watch that new show everyone's talking about, or an account that gives you a discount for your favorite fast food place. Whatever the case may be, you should consider the implications for your data now and later on down the line.
+
+There are risks associated with every new service that you use. Data breaches; disclosure of customer information to third parties; rogue employees accessing data; all are possibilities that must be considered when giving your information out. You need to be confident that you can trust the service, which is why we don't recommend storing valuable data on anything but the most mature and battle-tested products. That usually means services which provide E2EE and have undergone a cryptographic audit. An audit increases assurance that the product was designed without glaring security issues caused by an inexperienced developer.
+
+It can also be difficult to delete the accounts on some services. Sometimes [overwriting data](account-deletion.md#overwriting-account-information) associated with an account can be possible, but in other cases the service will keep an entire history of changes to the account.
+
+## Terms of Service & Privacy Policy
+
+The ToS are the rules that you agree to follow when using the service. With larger services these rules are often enforced by automated systems. Sometimes these automated systems can make mistakes. For example, you may be banned or locked out of your account on some services for using a VPN or VOIP number. Appealing such bans is often difficult, and involves an automated process too, which isn't always successful. This would be one of the reasons why we wouldn't suggest using Gmail for email as an example. Email is crucial for access to other services you might have signed up for.
+
+The Privacy Policy is how the service says they will use your data and it is worth reading so that you understand how your data will be used. A company or organization might not be legally obligated to follow everything contained in the policy (it depends on the jurisdiction). We would recommend having some idea what your local laws are and what they permit a provider to collect.
+
+We recommend looking for particular terms such as "data collection", "data analysis", "cookies", "ads" or "3rd-party" services. Sometimes you will be able to opt-out from data collection or from sharing your data, but it is best to choose a service that respects your privacy from the start.
+
+Keep in mind you're also placing your trust in the company or organization and that they will comply with their own privacy policy.
+
+## Authentication methods
+
+There are usually multiple ways to sign up for an account, each with their own benefits and drawbacks.
+
+### Email and password
+
+The most common way to create a new account is by an email address and password. When using this method, you should use a password manager and follow [best practices](passwords-overview.md) regarding passwords.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ You can use your password manager to organize other authentication methods too! Just add the new entry and fill the appropriate fields, you can add notes for things like security questions or a backup key.
+
+You will be responsible for managing your login credentials. For added security, you can set up [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md) on your accounts.
+
+[Recommended password managers](../passwords.md ""){.md-button}
+
+#### Email aliases
+
+If you don't want to give your real email address to a service, you have the option to use an alias. We described them in more detail on our email services recommendation page. Essentially, alias services allow you to generate new email addresses that forward all emails to your main address. This can help prevent tracking across services and help you manage the marketing emails that sometimes come with the sign up process. Those can be filtered automatically based on the alias they are sent to.
+
+Should a service get hacked, you might start receiving phishing or spam emails to the address you used to sign up. Using unique aliases for each service can assist in identifying exactly what service was hacked.
+
+[Recommended email aliasing services](../email.md#email-aliasing-services ""){.md-button}
+
+### Single sign-on
+
+!!! note
+
+ We are discussing Single sign-on for personal use, not enterprise users.
+
+Single sign-on (SSO) is an authentication method that allows you to register for a service without sharing much information, if any. Whenever you see something along the lines of "Sign-in with *provider name*" on a registration form it's SSO.
+
+When you choose single sign-on in a website, it will prompt your SSO provider login page and after that your account will be connected. Your password won't be shared but some basic information will (you can review it during the login request). This process is needed every time you want to log in to the same account.
+
+The main advantages are:
+
+- **Security**: no risk of being involved in a [data breach](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_breach) because the website does not store your credentials.
+- **Ease of use**: multiple accounts are managed by a single login.
+
+But there are disadvantages:
+
+- **Privacy**: a SSO provider will know the services you use.
+- **Centralization**: if your SSO account gets compromised or you aren't able to login to it, all other accounts connected to it are affected.
+
+SSO can be especially useful in those situations where you could benefit from deeper integration between services. For example, one of those services may offer SSO for the others. Our recommendation is to limit SSO to only where you need it and protect the main account with [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md).
+
+All services that use SSO will be as secure as your SSO account. For example, if you want to secure an account with a hardware key but that service doesn't support hardware keys, you can secure your SSO account with a hardware key and now you essentially have hardware MFA on all your accounts. It is worth noting though that weak authentication on your SSO account means that any account tied to that login will also be weak.
+
+### Phone number
+
+We recommend avoiding services that require a phone number for sign up. A phone number can identity you across multiple services and depending on data sharing agreements this will make your usage easier to track, particularly if one of those services is breached as the phone number is often **not** encrypted.
+
+You should avoid giving out your real phone number if you can. Some services will allow the use of VOIP numbers, however these often trigger fraud detection systems, causing an account to be locked down, so we don't recommend that for important accounts.
+
+In many cases you will need to provide a number that you can receive SMS or calls from, particularly when shopping internationally, in case there is a problem with your order at border screening. It's common for services to use your number as a verification method; don't let yourself get locked out of an important account because you wanted to be clever and give a fake number!
+
+### Username and password
+
+Some services allow you to register without using an email address and only require you to set a username and password. These services may provide increased anonymity when combined with a VPN or Tor. Keep in mind that for these accounts there will most likely be **no way to recover your account** in the event you forget your username or password.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/basics/account-deletion.md b/i18n/el/basics/account-deletion.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f0a0f0994
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/basics/account-deletion.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: "Account Deletion"
+icon: 'material/account-remove'
+---
+
+Over time, it can be easy to accumulate a number of online accounts, many of which you may no longer use. Deleting these unused accounts is an important step in reclaiming your privacy, as dormant accounts are vulnerable to data breaches. A data breach is when a service's security is compromised and protected information is viewed, transmitted, or stolen by unauthorized actors. Data breaches are unfortunately all [too common](https://haveibeenpwned.com/PwnedWebsites) these days, and so practicing good digital hygiene is the best way to minimize the impact they have on your life. The goal of this guide then is to help navigate you through the irksome process of account deletion, often made difficult by [deceptive design](https://www.deceptive.design/), for the betterment of your online presence.
+
+## Finding Old Accounts
+
+### Password Manager
+
+If you have a password manager that you've used for your entire digital life, this part will be very easy. Oftentimes, they include built-in functionality for detecting if your credentials were exposed in a data breach—such as Bitwarden's [Data Breach Report](https://bitwarden.com/blog/have-you-been-pwned/).
+
+
+ 
+
+
+Even if you haven't explicitly used a password manager before, there's a chance you've used the one in your browser or your phone without even realizing it. For example: [Firefox Password Manager](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/password-manager-remember-delete-edit-logins), [Google Password Manager](https://passwords.google.com/intro) and [Edge Password Manager](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-edge/save-or-forget-passwords-in-microsoft-edge-b4beecb0-f2a8-1ca0-f26f-9ec247a3f336).
+
+Desktop platforms also often have a password manager which may help you recover passwords you've forgotten about:
+
+- Windows [Credential Manager](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/accessing-credential-manager-1b5c916a-6a16-889f-8581-fc16e8165ac0)
+- macOS [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211145)
+- iOS [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211146)
+- Linux, Gnome Keyring, which can be accessed through [Seahorse](https://help.gnome.org/users/seahorse/stable/passwords-view.html.en) or [KDE Wallet Manager](https://userbase.kde.org/KDE_Wallet_Manager)
+
+### Email
+
+If you didn't use a password manager in the past or you think you have accounts that were never added to your password manager, another option is to search the email account(s) that you believe you signed up on. On your email client, search for keywords such as "verify" or "welcome." Almost every time you make an online account, the service will send a verification link or an introductory message to your email. This can be a good way to find old, forgotten accounts.
+
+## Deleting Old Accounts
+
+### Log In
+
+In order to delete your old accounts, you'll need to first make sure you can log in to them. Again, if the account was in your password manager, this step is easy. If not, you can try to guess your password. Failing that, there are typically options to regain access to your account, commonly available through a "forgot password" link on the login page. It may also be possible that accounts you've abandoned have already been deleted—sometimes services prune all old accounts.
+
+When attempting to regain access, if the site returns an error message saying that email is not associated with an account, or you never receive a reset link after multiple attempts, then you do not have an account under that email address and should try a different one. If you can't figure out which email address you used, or you no longer have access to that email, you can try contacting the service's customer support. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that you will be able to reclaim access your account.
+
+### GDPR (EEA residents only)
+
+Residents of the EEA have additional rights regarding data erasure specified in [Article 17](https://www.gdpr.org/regulation/article-17.html) of the GDPR. If it's applicable to you, read the privacy policy for any given service to find information on how to exercise your right to erasure. Reading the privacy policy can prove important, as some services have a "Delete Account" option that only disables your account and for real deletion you have to take additional action. Sometimes actual deletion may involve filling out surveys, emailing the data protection officer of the service or even proving your residence in the EEA. If you plan to go this way, do **not** overwrite account information—your identity as an EEA resident may be required. Note that the location of the service does not matter; GDPR applies to anyone serving European users. If the service does not respect your right to erasure, you can contact your national [Data Protection Authority](https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/rights-citizens/redress/what-should-i-do-if-i-think-my-personal-data-protection-rights-havent-been-respected_en) and you may be entitled to monetary compensation.
+
+### Overwriting Account information
+
+In some situations where you plan to abandon an account, it may make sense to overwrite the account information with fake data. Once you've made sure you can log in, change all the information in your account to falsified information. The reason for this is that many sites will retain information you previously had even after account deletion. The hope is that they will overwrite the previous information with the newest data you entered. However, there is no guarantee that there won't be backups with the prior information.
+
+For the account email, either create a new alternate email account via your provider of choice or create an alias using an [email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services). You can then delete your alternate email address once you are done. We recommend against using temporary email providers, as oftentimes it is possible to reactivate temporary emails.
+
+### Delete
+
+You can check [JustDeleteMe](https://justdeleteme.xyz) for instructions on deleting the account for a specific service. Some sites will graciously have a "Delete Account" option, while others will go as far as to force you to speak with a support agent. The deletion process can vary from site to site, with account deletion being impossible on some.
+
+For services that don't allow account deletion, the best thing to do is falsify all your information as previously mentioned and strengthen account security. To do so, enable [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md) and any extra security features offered. As well, change the password to a randomly-generated one that is the maximum allowed size (a [password manager](../passwords.md) can be useful for this).
+
+If you're satisfied that all information you care about is removed, you can safely forget about this account. If not, it might be a good idea to keep the credentials stored with your other passwords and occasionally re-login to reset the password.
+
+Even when you are able to delete an account, there is no guarantee that all your information will be removed. In fact, some companies are required by law to keep certain information, particularly when related to financial transactions. It's mostly out of your control what happens to your data when it comes to websites and cloud services.
+
+## Avoid New Accounts
+
+As the old saying goes, "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." Whenever you feel tempted to sign up for a new account, ask yourself, "Do I really need this? Can I accomplish what I need to without an account?" It can often be much harder to delete an account than to create one. And even after deleting or changing the info on your account, there might be a cached version from a third-party—like the [Internet Archive](https://archive.org/). Avoid the temptation when you're able to—your future self will thank you!
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/el/basics/common-misconceptions.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8bdda952a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/basics/common-misconceptions.md
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+---
+title: "Common Misconceptions"
+icon: 'material/robot-confused'
+---
+
+## "Open-source software is always secure" or "Proprietary software is more secure"
+
+These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis.
+
+Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities into even large projects.[^1]
+
+On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering.
+
+To avoid biased decisions, it's *vital* that you evaluate the privacy and security standards of the software you use.
+
+## "Shifting trust can increase privacy"
+
+We talk about "shifting trust" a lot when discussing solutions like VPNs (which shift the trust you place in your ISP to the VPN provider). While this protects your browsing data from your ISP *specifically*, the VPN provider you choose still has access to your browsing data: Your data isn't completely secured from all parties. This means that:
+
+1. You must exercise caution when choosing a provider to shift trust to.
+2. You should still use other techniques, like E2EE, to protect your data completely. Merely distrusting one provider to trust another is not securing your data.
+
+## "Privacy-focused solutions are inherently trustworthy"
+
+Focusing solely on the privacy policies and marketing of a tool or provider can blind you to its weaknesses. When you're looking for a more private solution, you should determine what the underlying problem is and find technical solutions to that problem. For example, you may want to avoid Google Drive, which gives Google access to all of your data. The underlying problem in this case is lack of E2EE, so you should make sure that the provider you switch to actually implements E2EE, or use a tool (like [Cryptomator](../encryption.md#cryptomator-cloud)) which provides E2EE on any cloud provider. Switching to a "privacy-focused" provider (that doesn't implement E2EE) doesn't solve your problem: it just shifts trust from Google to that provider.
+
+The privacy policies and business practices of providers you choose are very important, but should be considered secondary to technical guarantees of your privacy: You shouldn't shift trust to another provider when trusting a provider isn't a requirement at all.
+
+## "Complicated is better"
+
+We often see people describing privacy threat models that are overly complex. Often, these solutions include problems like many different email accounts or complicated setups with lots of moving parts and conditions. The replies are usually answers to "What is the best way to do *X*?"
+
+Finding the "best" solution for yourself doesn't necessarily mean you are after an infallible solution with dozens of conditions—these solutions are often difficult to work with realistically. As we discussed previously, security often comes at the cost of convenience. Below, we provide some tips:
+
+1. ==Actions need to serve a particular purpose:== think about how to do what you want with the fewest actions.
+2. ==Remove human failure points:== We fail, get tired, and forget things. To maintain security, avoid relying on manual conditions and processes that you have to remember.
+3. ==Use the right level of protection for what you intend.== We often see recommendations of so-called law-enforcement or subpoena-proof solutions. These often require specialist knowledge and generally aren't what people want. There's no point in building an intricate threat model for anonymity if you can be easily de-anonymized by a simple oversight.
+
+So, how might this look?
+
+One of the clearest threat models is one where people *know who you are* and one where they do not. There will always be situations where you must declare your legal name and there are others where you don't need to.
+
+1. **Known identity** - A known identity is used for things where you must declare your name. There are many legal documents and contracts where a legal identity is required. This could range from opening a bank account, signing a property lease, obtaining a passport, customs declarations when importing items, or otherwise dealing with your government. These things will usually lead to credentials such as credit cards, credit rating checks, account numbers, and possibly physical addresses.
+
+ We don't suggest using a VPN or Tor for any of these things, as your identity is already known through other means.
+
+ !!! tip
+
+ When shopping online, the use of a [parcel locker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parcel_locker) can help keep your physical address private.
+
+2. **Unknown identity** - An unknown identity could be a stable pseudonym that you regularly use. It is not anonymous because it doesn't change. If you're part of an online community, you may wish to retain a persona that others know. This pseudonym isn't anonymous because—if monitored for long enough—details about the owner can reveal further information, such as the way they write, their general knowledge about topics of interest, etc.
+
+ You may wish to use a VPN for this, to mask your IP address. Financial transactions are more difficult to mask: You could consider using anonymous cryptocurrencies, such as [Monero](https://www.getmonero.org/). Employing altcoin shifting may also help to disguise where your currency originated. Typically, exchanges require KYC (know your customer) to be completed before they'll allow you to exchange fiat currency into any kind of cryptocurrency. Local meet-up options may also be a solution; however, those are often more expensive and sometimes also require KYC.
+
+3. **Anonymous identity** - Even with experience, anonymous identities are difficult to maintain over long periods of time. They should be short-term and short-lived identities which are rotated regularly.
+
+ Using Tor can help with this. It is also worth noting that greater anonymity is possible through asynchronous communication: Real-time communication is vulnerable to analysis of typing patterns (i.e. more than a paragraph of text, distributed on a forum, via email, etc.)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
+
+[^1]: One notable example of this is the [2021 incident in which University of Minnesota researchers introduced three vulnerabilities into the Linux kernel development project](https://cse.umn.edu/cs/linux-incident).
diff --git a/i18n/el/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/el/basics/common-threats.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..93c32a777
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/basics/common-threats.md
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+---
+title: "Common Threats"
+icon: 'material/eye-outline'
+---
+
+Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside of these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat.
+
+- :material-incognito: Anonymity - Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically.
+- :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks - Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically.
+- :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks - Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once.
+- :material-server-network: Service Providers - Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server).
+- :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance - Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities.
+- :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism - Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors.
+- :material-account-search: Public Exposure - Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public.
+- :material-close-outline: Censorship - Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online.
+
+Some of these threats may be more important to you than others, depending on your specific concerns. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks, but they probably still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Similarly, many people may be primarily concerned with :material-account-search: Public Exposure of their personal data, but they should still be wary of security-focused issues, such as :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks—like malware affecting their devices.
+
+## Anonymity vs. Privacy
+
+:material-incognito: Anonymity
+
+Anonymity is often confused with privacy, but they're distinct concepts. While privacy is a set of choices you make about how your data is used and shared, anonymity is the complete disassociation of your online activities from your real identity.
+
+Whistleblowers and journalists, for example, can have a much more extreme threat model which requires total anonymity. That's not only hiding what they do, what data they have, and not getting hacked by malicious actors or governments, but also hiding who they are entirely. They will often sacrifice any kind of convenience if it means protecting their anonymity, privacy, or security, because their lives could depend on it. Most people don't need to go so far.
+
+## Security and Privacy
+
+:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks
+
+Security and privacy are also often confused, because you need security to obtain any semblance of privacy: Using tools—even if they're private by design—is futile if they could be easily exploited by attackers who later release your data. However, the inverse isn't necessarily true: The most secure service in the world *isn't necessarily* private. The best example of this is trusting data to Google who, given their scale, have had few security incidents by employing industry-leading security experts to secure their infrastructure. Even though Google provides very secure services, very few people would consider their data private in Google's free consumer products (Gmail, YouTube, etc.)
+
+When it comes to application security, we generally don't (and sometimes can't) know if the software we use is malicious, or might one day become malicious. Even with the most trustworthy developers, there's generally no guarantee that their software doesn't have a serious vulnerability that could later be exploited.
+
+To minimize the damage that a malicious piece of software *could* do, you should employ security by compartmentalization. For example, this could come in the form of using different computers for different jobs, using virtual machines to separate different groups of related applications, or using a secure operating system with a strong focus on application sandboxing and mandatory access control.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Mobile operating systems generally have better application sandboxing than desktop operating systems: Apps can't obtain root access, and require permission for access to system resources.
+
+ Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS has similar sandboxing capabilities to Android, and macOS has full system permission control (and developers can opt-in to sandboxing for applications). However, these operating systems do transmit identifying information to their respective OEMs. Linux tends to not submit information to system vendors, but it has poor protection against exploits and malicious apps. This can be mitigated somewhat with specialized distributions which make significant use of virtual machines or containers, such as [Qubes OS](../../desktop/#qubes-os).
+
+:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks
+
+Targeted attacks against a specific person are more problematic to deal with. Common attacks include sending malicious documents via email, exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g. in browsers and operating systems), and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you should employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typically run untrusted code, sent to you from third parties. Running multiple virtual machines—to separate applications like these from your host system, as well as each other—is one technique you can use to mitigate the chance of an exploit in these applications compromising the rest of your system. For example, technologies like Qubes OS or Microsoft Defender Application Guard on Windows provide convenient methods to do this.
+
+If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user.
+
+## Privacy From Service Providers
+
+:material-server-network: Service Providers
+
+We live in a world where almost everything is connected to the internet. Our "private" messages, emails, and social interactions are typically stored on a server, somewhere. Generally, when you send someone a message it's stored on a server, and when your friend wants to read the message the server will show it to them.
+
+The obvious problem with this is that the service provider (or a hacker who has compromised the server) can access your conversations whenever and however they want, without you ever knowing. This applies to many common services, like SMS messaging, Telegram, and Discord.
+
+Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between you and your desired recipients before they are even sent to the server. The confidentiality of your messages is guaranteed, assuming the service provider doesn't have access to the private keys of either party.
+
+!!! note "Note on Web-based Encryption"
+
+ In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering).
+
+ On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt.
+
+ Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible.
+
+Even with E2EE, service providers can still profile you based on **metadata**, which typically isn't protected. While the service provider can't read your messages, they can still observe important things, such as who you're talking to, how often you message them, and when you're typically active. Protection of metadata is fairly uncommon, and—if it's within your [threat model](threat-modeling.md)—you should pay close attention to the technical documentation of the software you're using to see if there's any metadata minimization or protection at all.
+
+## Mass Surveillance Programs
+
+:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance
+
+Mass surveillance is the intricate effort to monitor the "behavior, many activities, or information" of an entire (or substantial fraction of a) population.[^1] It often refers to government programs, such as the ones [disclosed by Edward Snowden in 2013](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_surveillance_disclosures_(2013%E2%80%93present)). However, it can also be carried out by corporations, either on behalf of government agencies or by their own initiative.
+
+!!! abstract "Atlas of Surveillance"
+
+ If you want to learn more about surveillance methods and how they're implemented in your city you can also take a look at the [Atlas of Surveillance](https://atlasofsurveillance.org/) by the [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.eff.org/).
+
+ In France you can take a look at the [Technolopolice website](https://technopolice.fr/villes/) maintained by the non-profit association La Quadrature du Net.
+
+Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, breaching human rights, it's most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.
+
+!!! quote "ACLU: [*The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward*](https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/the-privacy-lesson-of-9-11-mass-surveillance-is-not-the-way-forward)"
+
+ In the face of [Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRISM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM) and [Upstream](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upstream_collection)], intelligence officials also admitted that the NSA had for years been secretly collecting records about virtually every American’s phone calls — who’s calling whom, when those calls are made, and how long they last. This kind of information, when amassed by the NSA day after day, can reveal incredibly sensitive details about people’s lives and associations, such as whether they have called a pastor, an abortion provider, an addiction counselor, or a suicide hotline.
+
+Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^2]
+
+Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods:
+
+- Your IP address
+- Browser cookies
+- The data you submit to websites
+- Your browser or device fingerprint
+- Payment method correlation
+
+\[This list isn't exhaustive].
+
+If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategues like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information.
+
+:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism
+
+> Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^3]
+
+For many people, tracking and surveillance by private corporations is a growing concern. Pervasive ad networks, such as those operated by Google and Facebook, span the internet far beyond just the sites they control, tracking your actions along the way. Using tools like content blockers to limit network requests to their servers, and reading the privacy policies of the services you use can help you avoid many basic adversaries (although it can't completely prevent tracking).[^4]
+
+Additionally, even companies outside of the *AdTech* or tracking industry can share your information with [data brokers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_broker) (such as Cambridge Analytica, Experian, or Datalogix) or other parties. You can't automatically assume your data is safe just because the service you're using doesn't fall within the typical AdTech or tracking business model. The strongest protection against corporate data collection is to encrypt or obfuscate your data whenever possible, making it difficult for different providers to correlate data with each other and build a profile on you.
+
+## Limiting Public Information
+
+:material-account-search: Public Exposure
+
+The best way to keep your data private is simply not making it public in the first place. Deleting unwanted information you find about yourself online is one of the best first steps you can take to regain your privacy.
+
+- [View our guide on account deletion :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](account-deletion.md)
+
+On sites where you do share information, checking the privacy settings of your account to limit how widely that data is spread is very important. For example, enable "private mode" on your accounts if given the option: This ensures that your account isn't being indexed by search engines, and that it can't be viewed without your permission.
+
+If you've already submitted your real information to sites which shouldn't have it, consider using disinformation tactics, like submitting fictitious information related to that online identity. This makes your real information indistinguishable from the false information.
+
+## Avoiding Censorship
+
+:material-close-outline: Censorship
+
+Censorship online can be carried out (to varying degrees) by actors including totalitarian governments, network administrators, and service providers. These efforts to control communication and restrict access to information will always be incompatible with the human right to Freedom of Expression.[^5]
+
+Censorship on corporate platforms is increasingly common, as platforms like Twitter and Facebook give in to public demand, market pressures, and pressures from government agencies. Government pressures can be covert requests to businesses, such as the White House [requesting the takedown](https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/technology/on-the-web-a-fine-line-on-free-speech-across-globe.html) of a provocative YouTube video, or overt, such as the Chinese government requiring companies to adhere to a strict regime of censorship.
+
+People concerned with the threat of censorship can use technologies like [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) to circumvent it, and support censorship-resistant communication platforms like [Matrix](../real-time-communication.md#element), which doesn't have a centralized account authority that can close accounts arbitrarily.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ While evading censorship itself can be easy, hiding the fact that you are doing it can be very problematic.
+
+ You should consider which aspects of the network your adversary can observe, and whether you have plausible deniability for your actions. For example, using [encrypted DNS](../advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns) can help you bypass rudimentary, DNS-based censorship systems, but it can't truly hide what you are visiting from your ISP. A VPN or Tor can help hide what you are visiting from network administrators, but can't hide that you're using those networks in the first place. Pluggable transports (such as Obfs4proxy, Meek, or Shadowsocks) can help you evade firewalls that block common VPN protocols or Tor, but your circumvention attempts can still be detected by methods like probing or [deep packet inspection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection).
+
+You must always consider the risks of trying to bypass censorship, the potential consequences, and how sophisticated your adversary may be. You should be cautious with your software selection, and have a backup plan in case you are caught.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
+
+[^1]: Wikipedia: [*Mass Surveillance*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass_surveillance) and [*Surveillance*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance).
+[^2]: United States Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: [*Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215*](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/ec542143-1079-424a-84b3-acc354698560/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf)
+[^3]: Wikipedia: [*Surveillance capitalism*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance_capitalism)
+[^4]: "[Enumerating badness](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/)" (or, "listing all the bad things that we know about"), as many adblockers and antivirus programs do, fails to adequately protect you from new and unknown threats because they have not yet been added to the filter list. You should also employ other mitigation techniques.
+[^5]: United Nations: [*Universal Declaration of Human Rights*](https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights).
diff --git a/i18n/el/basics/email-security.md b/i18n/el/basics/email-security.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..76839778c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/basics/email-security.md
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+---
+title: Email Security
+icon: material/email
+---
+
+Email is an insecure form of communication by default. You can improve your email security with tools such as OpenPGP, which add End-to-End Encryption to your messages, but OpenPGP still has a number of drawbacks compared to encryption in other messaging applications, and some email data can never be encrypted inherently due to how email is designed.
+
+As a result, email is best used for receiving transactional emails (like notifications, verification emails, password resets, etc.) from the services you sign up for online, not for communicating with others.
+
+## Email Encryption Overview
+
+The standard way to add E2EE to emails between different email providers is by using OpenPGP. There are different implementations of the OpenPGP standard, the most common being [GnuPG](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard) and [OpenPGP.js](https://openpgpjs.org).
+
+There is another standard which is popular with business called [S/MIME](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME), however, it requires a certificate issued from a [Certificate Authority](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) (not all of them issue S/MIME certificates). It has support in [Google Workplace](https://support.google.com/a/topic/9061730?hl=en&ref_topic=9061731) and [Outlook for Web or Exchange Server 2016, 2019](https://support.office.com/en-us/article/encrypt-messages-by-using-s-mime-in-outlook-on-the-web-878c79fc-7088-4b39-966f-14512658f480).
+
+Even if you use OpenPGP, it does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. This is why we recommend [instant messengers](../real-time-communication.md) which implement forward secrecy over email for person-to-person communications whenever possible.
+
+### What Email Clients Support E2EE?
+
+Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md). Depending on the authentication method, this may lead to the decrease security if either the provider or the email client does not support OATH or a bridge application as [multi-factor authentication](multi-factor-authentication.md) is not possible with plain password authentication.
+
+### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
+
+A smartcard (such as a [Yubikey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
+
+It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard so as to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.
+
+## Email Metadata Overview
+
+Email metadata is stored in the [message header](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) of the email message and includes some visible headers that you may have seen such as: `To`, `From`, `Cc`, `Date`, `Subject`. There are also a number of hidden headers included by many email clients and providers that can reveal information about your account.
+
+Client software may use email metadata to show who a message is from and what time it was received. Servers may use it to determine where an email message must be sent, among [other purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) which are not always transparent.
+
+### Who Can View Email Metadata?
+
+Email metadata is protected from outside observers with [Opportunistic TLS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunistic_TLS) protecting it from outside observers, but it is still able to be seen by your email client software (or webmail) and any servers relaying the message from you to any recipients including your email provider. Sometimes email servers will also use third-party services to protect against spam, which generally also have access to your messages.
+
+### Why Can't Metadata be E2EE?
+
+Email metadata is crucial to the most basic functionality of email (where it came from, and where it has to go). E2EE was not built into the email protocols originally, instead requiring add-on software like OpenPGP. Because OpenPGP messages still have to work with traditional email providers, it cannot encrypt email metadata, only the message body itself. That means that even when using OpenPGP, outside observers can see lots of information about your messages, such as who you're emailing, the subject lines, when you're emailing, etc.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md b/i18n/el/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..851c87914
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+---
+title: "Multi-Factor Authentication"
+icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication'
+---
+
+**Multi-Factor Authentication** (**MFA**) is a security mechanism that requires additional steps beyond entering your username (or email) and password. The most common method is time limited codes you might receive from SMS or an app.
+
+Normally, if a hacker (or adversary) is able to figure out your password then they’d gain access to the account that password belongs to. An account with MFA forces the hacker to have both the password (something you *know*) and a device that you own (something you *have*), like your phone.
+
+MFA methods vary in security, but are based on the premise that the more difficult it is for an attacker to gain access to your MFA method, the better. Examples of MFA methods (from weakest to strongest) include SMS, Email codes, app push notifications, TOTP, Yubico OTP and FIDO.
+
+## MFA Method Comparison
+
+### SMS or Email MFA
+
+Receiving OTP codes via SMS or email are one of the weaker ways to secure your accounts with MFA. Obtaining a code by email or SMS takes away from the "something you *have*" idea, because there are a variety of ways a hacker could [take over your phone number](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam) or gain access to your email without having physical access to any of your devices at all. If an unauthorized person gained access to your email, they would be able to use that access to both reset your password and receive the authentication code, giving them full access to your account.
+
+### Push Notifications
+
+Push notification MFA takes the form of a message being sent to an app on your phone asking you to confirm new account logins. This method is a lot better than SMS or email, since an attacker typically wouldn't be able to get these push notifications without having an already logged-in device, which means they would need to compromise one of your other devices first.
+
+We all make mistakes, and there is the risk that you might accept the login attempt by accident. Push notification login authorizations are typically sent to *all* your devices at once, widening the availability of the MFA code if you have many devices.
+
+The security of push notification MFA is dependent on both the quality of the app, the server component and the trust of the developer who produces it. Installing an app may also require you to accept invasive privileges that grant access to other data on your device. An individual app also requires that you have a specific app for each service which may not require a password to open, unlike a good TOTP generator app.
+
+### Time-based One-time Password (TOTP)
+
+TOTP is one of the most common forms of MFA available. When you set up TOTP, you are generally required to scan a [QR Code](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QR_code) which establishes a "[shared secret](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_secret)" with the service that you intend to use. The shared secret is secured inside of the authenticator app's data, and is sometimes protected by a password.
+
+The time-limited code is then derived from the shared secret and the current time. As the code is only valid for a short time, without access to the shared secret, an adversary cannot generate new codes.
+
+If you have a hardware security key with TOTP support (such as a YubiKey with [Yubico Authenticator](https://www.yubico.com/products/yubico-authenticator/)), we recommend that you store your "shared secrets" on the hardware. Hardware such as the YubiKey was developed with the intention of making the "shared secret" difficult to extract and copy. A YubiKey is also not connected to the Internet, unlike a phone with a TOTP app.
+
+Unlike [WebAuthn](#fido-fast-identity-online), TOTP offers no protection against [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing) or reuse attacks. If an adversary obtains a valid code from you, they may use it as many times as they like until it expires (generally 60 seconds).
+
+An adversary could set up a website to imitate an official service in an attempt to trick you into giving out your username, password and current TOTP code. If the adversary then uses those recorded credentials they may be able to log into the real service and hijack the account.
+
+Although not perfect, TOTP is secure enough for most people, and when [hardware security keys](../multi-factor-authentication.md#hardware-security-keys) are not supported [authenticator apps](../multi-factor-authentication.md#authenticator-apps) are still a good option.
+
+### Hardware security keys
+
+The YubiKey stores data on a tamper-resistant solid-state chip which is [impossible to access](https://security.stackexchange.com/a/245772) non-destructively without an expensive process and a forensics laboratory.
+
+These keys are generally multi-function and provide a number of methods to authenticate. Below are the most common ones.
+
+#### Yubico OTP
+
+Yubico OTP is an authentication protocol typically implemented in hardware security keys. When you decide to use Yubico OTP, the key will generate a public ID, private ID, and a Secret Key which is then uploaded to the Yubico OTP server.
+
+When logging into a website, all you need to do is to physically touch the security key. The security key will emulate a keyboard and print out a one-time password into the password field.
+
+The service will then forward the one-time password to the Yubico OTP server for validation. A counter is incremented both on the key and Yubico's validation server. The OTP can only be used once, and when a successful authentication occurs, the counter is increased which prevents reuse of the OTP. Yubico provides a [detailed document](https://developers.yubico.com/OTP/OTPs_Explained.html) about the process.
+
+
+ 
+
+
+There are some benefits and disadvantages to using Yubico OTP when compared to TOTP.
+
+The Yubico validation server is a cloud based service, and you're placing trust in Yubico that they are storing data securely and not profiling you. The public ID associated with Yubico OTP is reused on every website and could be another avenue for third-parties to profile you. Like TOTP, Yubico OTP does not provide phishing resistance.
+
+If your threat model requires you to have different identities on different websites, **do not** use Yubico OTP with the same hardware security key across those websites as public ID is unique to each security key.
+
+#### FIDO (Fast IDentity Online)
+
+[FIDO](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIDO_Alliance) includes a number of standards, first there was U2F and then later [FIDO2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIDO2_Project) which includes the web standard [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn).
+
+U2F and FIDO2 refer to the [Client to Authenticator Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Client_to_Authenticator_Protocol), which is the protocol between the security key and the computer, such as a laptop or phone. It complements WebAuthn which is the component used to authenticate with the website (the "Relying Party") you're trying to log in on.
+
+WebAuthn is the most secure and private form of second factor authentication. While the authentication experience is similar to Yubico OTP, the key does not print out a one-time password and validate with a third-party server. Instead, it uses [public key cryptography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography) for authentication.
+
+
+ 
+
+
+When you create an account, the public key is sent to the service, then when you log in, the service will require you to "sign" some data with your private key. The benefit of this is that no password data is ever stored by the service, so there is nothing for an adversary to steal.
+
+This presentation discusses the history of password authentication, the pitfalls (such as password reuse), and discussion of FIDO2 and [WebAuthn](https://webauthn.guide) standards.
+
+
+
+
+
+FIDO2 and WebAuthn have superior security and privacy properties when compared to any MFA methods.
+
+Typically for web services it is used with WebAuthn which is a part of the [W3C recommendations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Wide_Web_Consortium#W3C_recommendation_(REC)). It uses public key authentication and is more secure than shared secrets used in Yubico OTP and TOTP methods, as it includes the origin name (usually, the domain name) during authentication. Attestation is provided to protect you from phishing attacks, as it helps you to determine that you are using the authentic service and not a fake copy.
+
+Unlike Yubico OTP, WebAuthn does not use any public ID, so the key is **not** identifiable across different websites. It also does not use any third-party cloud server for authentication. All communication is completed between the key and the website you are logging into. FIDO also uses a counter which is incremented upon use in order to prevent session reuse and cloned keys.
+
+If a website or service supports WebAuthn for the authentication, it is highly recommended that you use it over any other form of MFA.
+
+## General Recommendations
+
+We have these general recommendations:
+
+### Which Method Should I Use?
+
+When configuring your MFA method, keep in mind that it is only as secure as your weakest authentication method you use. This means it is important that you only use the best MFA method available. For instance, if you are already using TOTP, you should disable email and SMS MFA. If you are already using FIDO2/WebAuthn, you should not be using Yubico OTP or TOTP on your account.
+
+### Backups
+
+You should always have backups for your MFA method. Hardware security keys can get lost, stolen or simply stop working over time. It is recommended that you have a pair of hardware security keys with the same access to your accounts instead of just one.
+
+When using TOTP with an authenticator app, be sure to back up your recovery keys or the app itself, or copy the "shared secrets" to another instance of the app on a different phone or to an encrypted container (e.g. [VeraCrypt](../encryption.md#veracrypt)).
+
+### Initial Set Up
+
+When buying a security key, it is important that you change the default credentials, set up password protection for the key, and enable touch confirmation if your key supports it. Products such as the YubiKey have multiple interfaces with separate credentials for each one of them, so you should go over each interface and set up protection as well.
+
+### Email and SMS
+
+If you have to use email for MFA, make sure that the email account itself is secured with a proper MFA method.
+
+If you use SMS MFA, use a carrier who will not switch your phone number to a new SIM card without account access, or use a dedicated VoIP number from a provider with similar security to avoid a [SIM swap attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam).
+
+[MFA tools we recommend](../multi-factor-authentication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## More Places to Set Up MFA
+
+Beyond just securing your website logins, multi-factor authentication can be used to secure your local logins, SSH keys or even password databases as well.
+
+### Windows
+
+Yubico has a dedicated [Credential Provider](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/credential-providers-in-windows) that adds Challenge-Response authentication for the username + password login flow for local Windows accounts. If you have a YubiKey with Challenge-Response authentication support, take a look at the [Yubico Login for Windows Configuration Guide](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013708460-Yubico-Login-for-Windows-Configuration-Guide), which will allow you to set up MFA on your Windows computer.
+
+### macOS
+
+macOS has [native support](https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/intro-to-smart-card-integration-depd0b888248/web) for authentication with smart cards (PIV). If you have a smartcard or a hardware security key that supports the PIV interface such as the YubiKey, we recommend that you follow your smartcard/hardware security vendor's documentation and set up second factor authentication for your macOS computer.
+
+Yubico have a guide [Using Your YubiKey as a Smart Card in macOS](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016649059) which can help you set up your YubiKey on macOS.
+
+After your smartcard/security key is set up, we recommend running this command in the Terminal:
+
+```text
+sudo defaults write /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow DisableFDEAutoLogin -bool YES
+```
+
+The command will prevent an adversary from bypassing MFA when the computer boots.
+
+### Linux
+
+!!! warning
+
+ If the hostname of your system changes (such as due to DHCP), you would be unable to login. It is vital that you set up a proper hostname for your computer before following this guide.
+
+The `pam_u2f` module on Linux can provide two-factor authentication for logging in on most popular Linux distributions. If you have a hardware security key that supports U2F, you can set up MFA authentication for your login. Yubico has a guide [Ubuntu Linux Login Guide - U2F](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016649099-Ubuntu-Linux-Login-Guide-U2F) which should work on any distribution. The package manager commands—such as `apt-get`—and package names may however differ. This guide does **not** apply to Qubes OS.
+
+### Qubes OS
+
+Qubes OS has support for Challenge-Response authentication with YubiKeys. If you have a YubiKey with Challenge-Response authentication support, take a look at the Qubes OS [YubiKey documentation](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/yubikey/) if you want to set up MFA on Qubes OS.
+
+### SSH
+
+#### Hardware Security Keys
+
+SSH MFA could be set up using multiple different authentication methods that are popular with hardware security keys. We recommend that you check out Yubico's [documentation](https://developers.yubico.com/SSH/) on how to set this up.
+
+#### Time-based One-time Password (TOTP)
+
+SSH MFA can also be set up using TOTP. DigitalOcean has provided a tutorial [How To Set Up Multi-Factor Authentication for SSH on Ubuntu 20.04](https://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/how-to-set-up-multi-factor-authentication-for-ssh-on-ubuntu-20-04). Most things should be the same regardless of distribution, however the package manager commands—such as `apt-get`—and package names may differ.
+
+### KeePass (and KeePassXC)
+
+KeePass and KeePassXC databases can be secured using Challenge-Response or HOTP as a second-factor authentication. Yubico has provided a document for KeePass [Using Your YubiKey with KeePass](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013779759-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-KeePass) and there is also one on the [KeePassXC](https://keepassxc.org/docs/#faq-yubikey-2fa) website.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/basics/passwords-overview.md b/i18n/el/basics/passwords-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f60aaf5a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/basics/passwords-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+---
+title: "Introduction to Passwords"
+icon: 'material/form-textbox-password'
+---
+
+Passwords are an essential part of our everyday digital lives. We use them to protect our accounts, our devices and our secrets. Despite often being the only thing between us and an adversary who's after our private information, not a lot of thought is put into them, which often leads to people using passwords that can be easily guessed or brute-forced.
+
+## Best Practices
+
+### Use unique passwords for every service
+
+Imagine this; you sign up for an account with the same e-mail and password on multiple online services. If one of those service providers is malicious, or their service has a data breach that exposes your password in an unencrypted format, all a bad actor would have to do is try that e-mail and password combination across multiple popular services until they get a hit. It doesn't matter how strong that one password is, because they already have it.
+
+This is called [credential stuffing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credential_stuffing), and it is one of the most common ways that your accounts can be compromised by bad actors. To avoid this, make sure that you never re-use your passwords.
+
+### Use randomly generated passwords
+
+==You should **never** rely on yourself to come up with a good password.== We recommend using [randomly generated passwords](#passwords) or [diceware passphrases](#diceware-passphrases) with sufficient entropy to protect your accounts and devices.
+
+All of our [recommended password managers](../passwords.md) include a built-in password generator that you can use.
+
+### Rotating Passwords
+
+You should avoid changing passwords that you have to remember (such as your password manager's master password) too often unless you have reason to believe it has been compromised, as changing it too often exposes you to the risk of forgetting it.
+
+When it comes to passwords that you don't have to remember (such as passwords stored inside your password manager), if your [threat model](threat-modeling.md) calls for it, we recommend going through important accounts (especially accounts that don't use multi-factor authentication) and changing their password every couple of months, in case they have been compromised in a data breach that hasn't become public yet. Most password managers allow you to set an expiry date for your password to make this easier to manage.
+
+!!! tip "Checking for data breaches"
+
+ If your password manager lets you check for compromised passwords, make sure to do so and promptly change any password that may have been exposed in a data breach. Alternatively, you could follow [Have I Been Pwned's Latest Breaches feed](https://feeds.feedburner.com/HaveIBeenPwnedLatestBreaches) with the help of a [news aggregator](../news-aggregators.md).
+
+## Creating strong passwords
+
+### Passwords
+
+A lot of services impose certain criteria when it comes to passwords, including a minimum or maximum length, as well as which special characters, if any, can be used. You should use your password manager's built-in password generator to create passwords that are as long and complex as the service will allow by including capitalized and lowercase letters, numbers and special characters.
+
+If you need a password you can memorize, we recommend a [diceware passphrase](#diceware-passphrases).
+
+### Diceware Passphrases
+
+Diceware is a method for creating passphrases which are easy to remember, but hard to guess.
+
+Diceware passphrases are a great option when you need to memorize or manually input your credentials, such as for your password manager's master password or your device's encryption password.
+
+An example of a diceware passphrase is `viewable fastness reluctant squishy seventeen shown pencil`.
+
+To generate a diceware passphrase using real dice, follow these steps:
+
+!!! note
+
+ These instructions assume that you are using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate the passphrase, which requires five dice rolls per word. Other wordlists may require more or less rolls per word, and may require a different amount of words to achieve the same entropy.
+
+1. Roll a six-sided die five times, noting down the number after each roll.
+
+2. As an example, let's say you rolled `2-5-2-6-6`. Look through the [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) for the word that corresponds to `25266`.
+
+3. You will find the word `encrypt`. Write that word down.
+
+4. Repeat this process until your passphrase has as many words as you need, which you should separate with a space.
+
+!!! warning "Important"
+
+ You should **not** re-roll words until you get a combination of words that appeal to you. The process should be completely random.
+
+If you don't have access to or would prefer to not use real dice, you can use your password manager's built-in password generator, as most of them have the option to generate diceware passphrases in addition to regular passwords.
+
+We recommend using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate your diceware passphrases, as it offers the exact same security as the original list, while containing words that are easier to memorize. There are also [other wordlists in different languages](https://theworld.com/~reinhold/diceware.html#Diceware%20in%20Other%20Languages|outline), if you do not want your passphrase to be in English.
+
+??? note "Explanation of entropy and strength of diceware passphrases"
+
+ To demonstrate how strong diceware passphrases are, we'll use the aforementioned seven word passphrase (`viewable fastness reluctant squishy seventeen shown pencil`) and [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) as an example.
+
+ One metric to determine the strength of a diceware passphrase is how much entropy it has. The entropy per word in a diceware passphrase is calculated as $\text{log}_2(\text{WordsInList})$ and the overall entropy of the passphrase is calculated as $\text{log}_2(\text{WordsInList}^\text{WordsInPhrase})$.
+
+ Therefore, each word in the aforementioned list results in ~12.9 bits of entropy ($\text{log}_2(7776)$), and a seven word passphrase derived from it has ~90.47 bits of entropy ($\text{log}_2(7776^7)$).
+
+ The [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) contains 7776 unique words. To calculate the amount of possible passphrases, all we have to do is $\text{WordsInList}^\text{WordsInPhrase}$, or in our case, $7776^7$.
+
+ Let's put all of this in perspective: A seven word passphrase using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) is one of ~1,719,070,799,748,422,500,000,000,000 possible passphrases.
+
+ On average, it takes trying 50% of all the possible combinations to guess your phrase. With that in mind, even if your adversary is capable of ~1,000,000,000,000 guesses per second, it would still take them ~27,255,689 years to guess your passphrase. That is the case even if the following things are true:
+
+ - Your adversary knows that you used the diceware method.
+ - Your adversary knows the specific wordlist that you used.
+ - Your adversary knows how many words your passphrase contains.
+
+To sum it up, diceware passphrases are your best option when you need something that is both easy to remember *and* exceptionally strong.
+
+## Storing Passwords
+
+### Password Managers
+
+The best way to store your passwords is by using a password manager. They allow you to store your passwords in a file or in the cloud and protect them with a single master password. That way, you will only have to remember one strong password, which lets you access the rest of them.
+
+There are many good options to choose from, both cloud-based and local. Choose one of our recommended password managers and use it to establish strong passwords across all of your accounts. We recommend securing your password manager with a [diceware passphrase](#diceware-passphrases) comprised of at least seven words.
+
+[List of recommended password managers](../passwords.md ""){.md-button}
+
+!!! warning "Don't place your passwords and TOTP tokens inside the same password manager"
+
+ When using TOTP codes as [multi-factor authentication](../multi-factor-authentication.md), the best security practice is to keep your TOTP codes in a [separate app](../multi-factor-authentication.md#authenticator-apps).
+
+ Storing your TOTP tokens in the same place as your passwords, while convenient, reduces the accounts to a single factor in the event that an adversary gains access to your password manager.
+
+ Furthermore, we do not recommend storing single-use recovery codes in your password manager. Those should be stored separately such as in an encrypted container on an offline storage device.
+
+### Backups
+
+You should store an [encrypted](../encryption.md) backup of your passwords on multiple storage devices or a cloud storage provider. This can help you access your passwords if something happens to your primary device or the service you are using.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/basics/threat-modeling.md b/i18n/el/basics/threat-modeling.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3be5e402c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/basics/threat-modeling.md
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+---
+title: "Threat Modeling"
+icon: 'material/target-account'
+---
+
+Balancing security, privacy, and usability is one of the first and most difficult tasks you'll face on your privacy journey. Everything is a trade-off: The more secure something is, the more restricting or inconvenient it generally is, etc. Often, people find that the problem with the tools they see recommended is that they're just too hard to start using!
+
+If you wanted to use the **most** secure tools available, you'd have to sacrifice *a lot* of usability. And, even then, ==nothing is ever fully secure.== There's **high** security, but never **full** security. That's why threat models are important.
+
+**So, what are these threat models, anyway?**
+
+==A threat model is a list of the most probable threats to your security and privacy endeavors.== Since it's impossible to protect yourself against **every** attack(er), you should focus on the **most probable** threats. In computer security, a threat is an event that could undermine your efforts to stay private and secure.
+
+Focusing on the threats that matter to you narrows down your thinking about the protection you need, so you can choose the tools that are right for the job.
+
+## Creating Your Threat Model
+
+To identify what could happen to the things you value and determine from whom you need to protect them, you should answer these five questions:
+
+1. What do I want to protect?
+2. Who do I want to protect it from?
+3. How likely is it that I will need to protect it?
+4. How bad are the consequences if I fail?
+5. How much trouble am I willing to go through to try to prevent potential consequences?
+
+### What do I want to protect?
+
+An “asset” is something you value and want to protect. In the context of digital security, ==an asset is usually some kind of information.== For example, your emails, contact lists, instant messages, location, and files are all possible assets. Your devices themselves may also be assets.
+
+*Make a list of your assets: data that you keep, where it's kept, who has access to it, and what stops others from accessing it.*
+
+### Who do I want to protect it from?
+
+To answer this question, it's important to identify who might want to target you or your information. ==A person or entity that poses a threat to your assets is an “adversary”.== Examples of potential adversaries are your boss, your former partner, your business competition, your government, or a hacker on a public network.
+
+*Make a list of your adversaries or those who might want to get ahold of your assets. Your list may include individuals, a government agency, or corporations.*
+
+Depending on who your adversaries are, under some circumstances, this list might be something you want to destroy after you're done security planning.
+
+### How likely is it that I will need to protect it?
+
+==Risk is the likelihood that a particular threat against a particular asset will actually occur.== It goes hand-in-hand with capability. While your mobile phone provider has the capability to access all of your data, the risk of them posting your private data online to harm your reputation is low.
+
+It is important to distinguish between what might happen and the probability it may happen. For instance, there is a threat that your building might collapse, but the risk of this happening is far greater in San Francisco (where earthquakes are common) than in Stockholm (where they are not).
+
+Assessing risks is both a personal and subjective process. Many people find certain threats unacceptable, no matter the likelihood they will occur, because the mere presence of the threat is not worth the cost. In other cases, people disregard high risks because they don't view the threat as a problem.
+
+*Write down which threats you are going to take seriously, and which may be too rare or too harmless (or too difficult to combat) to worry about.*
+
+### How bad are the consequences if I fail?
+
+There are many ways that an adversary could gain access to your data. For example, an adversary can read your private communications as they pass through the network, or they can delete or corrupt your data.
+
+==The motives of adversaries differ widely, as do their tactics.== A government trying to prevent the spread of a video showing police violence may be content to simply delete or reduce the availability of that video. In contrast, a political opponent may wish to gain access to secret content and publish that content without you knowing.
+
+Security planning involves understanding how bad the consequences could be if an adversary successfully gains access to one of your assets. To determine this, you should consider the capability of your adversary. For example, your mobile phone provider has access to all of your phone records. A hacker on an open Wi-Fi network can access your unencrypted communications. Your government might have stronger capabilities.
+
+*Write down what your adversary might want to do with your private data.*
+
+### How much trouble am I willing to go through to try to prevent potential consequences?
+
+==There is no perfect option for security.== Not everyone has the same priorities, concerns, or access to resources. Your risk assessment will allow you to plan the right strategy for you, balancing convenience, cost, and privacy.
+
+For example, an attorney representing a client in a national security case may be willing to go to greater lengths to protect communications about that case, such as using encrypted email, than a mother who regularly emails her daughter funny cat videos.
+
+*Write down what options you have available to you to help mitigate your unique threats. Note if you have any financial constraints, technical constraints, or social constraints.*
+
+### Try it yourself: Protecting Your Belongings
+
+These questions can apply to a wide variety of situations, online and offline. As a generic demonstration of how these questions work, let's build a plan to keep your house and possessions safe.
+
+**What do you want to protect? (Or, *what do you have that is worth protecting?*)**
+:
+
+Your assets might include jewelry, electronics, important documents, or photos.
+
+**Who do you want to protect it from?**
+:
+
+Your adversaries might include burglars, roommates, or guests.
+
+**How likely is it that you will need to protect it?**
+:
+
+Does your neighborhood have a history of burglaries? How trustworthy are your roommates or guests? What are the capabilities of your adversaries? What are the risks you should consider?
+
+**How bad are the consequences if you fail?**
+:
+
+Do you have anything in your house that you cannot replace? Do you have the time or money to replace those things? Do you have insurance that covers goods stolen from your home?
+
+**How much trouble are you willing to go through to prevent these consequences?**
+:
+
+Are you willing to buy a safe for sensitive documents? Can you afford to buy a high-quality lock? Do you have time to open a security box at your local bank and keep your valuables there?
+
+Only once you have asked yourself these questions will you be in a position to assess what measures to take. If your possessions are valuable, but the probability of a break-in is low, then you may not want to invest too much money in a lock. But, if the probability of a break-in is high, you'll want to get the best lock on the market and consider adding a security system.
+
+Making a security plan will help you to understand the threats that are unique to you and to evaluate your assets, your adversaries, and your adversaries' capabilities, along with the likelihood of risks you face.
+
+## Further Reading
+
+For people looking to increase their privacy and security online, we've compiled a list of common threats our visitors face or goals our visitors have, to give you some inspiration and demonstrate the basis of our recommendations.
+
+- [Common Goals and Threats :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](common-threats.md)
+
+## Sources
+
+- [EFF Surveillance Self Defense: Your Security Plan](https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/your-security-plan)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/basics/vpn-overview.md b/i18n/el/basics/vpn-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7ac0e668b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/basics/vpn-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+---
+title: VPN Overview
+icon: material/vpn
+---
+
+Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit somewhere else in the world. An ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (i.e. modem).
+
+Encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, so they may not be able to see exactly what you're posting or reading but they can get an idea of the [domains you request](../advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).
+
+A VPN can help as it can shift trust to a server somewhere else in the world. As a result, the ISP then only sees that you are connected to a VPN and nothing about the activity that you're passing into it.
+
+## Should I use a VPN?
+
+**Yes**, unless you are already using Tor. A VPN does two things: shifting the risks from your Internet Service Provider to itself and hiding your IP from a third-party service.
+
+VPNs cannot encrypt data outside of the connection between your device and the VPN server. VPN providers can see and modify your traffic the same way your ISP could. And there is no way to verify a VPN provider's "no logging" policies in any way.
+
+However, they do hide your actual IP from a third-party service, provided that there are no IP leaks. They help you blend in with others and mitigate IP based tracking.
+
+## When shouldn't I use a VPN?
+
+Using a VPN in cases where you're using your [known identity](common-threats.md#common-misconceptions) is unlikely be useful.
+
+Doing so may trigger spam and fraud detection systems, such as if you were to log into your bank's website.
+
+## What about encryption?
+
+Encryption offered by VPN providers are between your devices and their servers. It guarantees that this specific link is secure. This is a step up from using unencrypted proxies where an adversary on the network can intercept the communications between your devices and said proxies and modify them. However, encryption between your apps or browsers with the service providers are not handled by this encryption.
+
+In order to keep what you actually do on the websites you visit private and secure, you must use HTTPS. This will keep your passwords, session tokens, and queries safe from the VPN provider. Consider enabling "HTTPS everywhere" in your browser to mitigate downgrade attacks like [SSL Strip](https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Marlinspike/BlackHat-DC-09-Marlinspike-Defeating-SSL.pdf).
+
+## Should I use encrypted DNS with a VPN?
+
+Unless your VPN provider hosts the encrypted DNS servers, **no**. Using DOH/DOT (or any other form of encrypted DNS) with third-party servers will simply add more entities to trust and does **absolutely nothing** to improve your privacy/security. Your VPN provider can still see which websites you visit based on the IP addresses and other methods. Instead of just trusting your VPN provider, you are now trusting both the VPN provider and the DNS provider.
+
+A common reason to recommend encrypted DNS is that it helps against DNS spoofing. However, your browser should already be checking for [TLS certificates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Digital_certificates) with **HTTPS** and warn you about it. If you are not using **HTTPS**, then an adversary can still just modify anything other than your DNS queries and the end result will be little different.
+
+Needless to say, **you shouldn't use encrypted DNS with Tor**. This would direct all of your DNS requests through a single circuit and would allow the encrypted DNS provider to deanonymize you.
+
+## Should I use Tor *and* a VPN?
+
+By using a VPN with Tor, you're creating essentially a permanent entry node, often with a money trail attached. This provides zero additional benefits to you, while increasing the attack surface of your connection dramatically. If you wish to hide your Tor usage from your ISP or your government, Tor has a built-in solution for that: Tor bridges. [Read more about Tor bridges and why using a VPN is not necessary](../advanced/tor-overview.md).
+
+## What if I need anonymity?
+
+VPNs cannot provide anonymity. Your VPN provider will still see your real IP address, and often has a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. You cannot rely on "no logging" policies to protect your data. Use [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) instead.
+
+## What about VPN providers that provide Tor nodes?
+
+Do not use that feature. The point of using Tor is that you do not trust your VPN provider. Currently Tor only supports the [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol) protocol. [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol) (used in [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC) for voice and video sharing, the new [HTTP3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) protocol, etc), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol) and other packets will be dropped. To compensate for this, VPN providers typically will route all non-TCP packets through their VPN server (your first hop). This is the case with [ProtonVPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn/). Additionally, when using this Tor over VPN setup, you do not have control over other important Tor features such as [Isolated Destination Address](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (using a different Tor circuit for every domain you visit).
+
+The feature should be viewed as a convenient way to access the Tor Network, not to stay anonymous. For proper anonymity, use the Tor Browser, TorSocks, or a Tor gateway.
+
+## When are VPNs useful?
+
+A VPN may still be useful to you in a variety of scenarios, such as:
+
+1. Hiding your traffic from **only** your Internet Service Provider.
+1. Hiding your downloads (such as torrents) from your ISP and anti-piracy organizations.
+1. Hiding your IP from third-party websites and services, preventing IP based tracking.
+
+For situations like these, or if you have another compelling reason, the VPN providers we listed above are who we think are the most trustworthy. However, using a VPN provider still means you're *trusting* the provider. In pretty much any other scenario you should be using a secure**-by-design** tool such as Tor.
+
+## Sources and Further Reading
+
+1. [VPN - a Very Precarious Narrative](https://schub.io/blog/2019/04/08/very-precarious-narrative.html) by Dennis Schubert
+1. [Tor Network Overview](../advanced/tor-overview.md)
+1. [IVPN Privacy Guides](https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides)
+1. ["Do I need a VPN?"](https://www.doineedavpn.com), a tool developed by IVPN to challenge aggressive VPN marketing by helping individuals decide if a VPN is right for them.
+
+## Related VPN Information
+
+- [The Trouble with VPN and Privacy Review Sites](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2019/11/20/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-review-sites/)
+- [Free VPN App Investigation](https://www.top10vpn.com/free-vpn-app-investigation/)
+- [Hidden VPN owners unveiled: 101 VPN products run by just 23 companies](https://vpnpro.com/blog/hidden-vpn-owners-unveiled-97-vpns-23-companies/)
+- [This Chinese company is secretly behind 24 popular apps seeking dangerous permissions](https://vpnpro.com/blog/chinese-company-secretly-behind-popular-apps-seeking-dangerous-permissions/)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/calendar.md b/i18n/el/calendar.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8f1795cad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/calendar.md
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+---
+title: "Calendar Sync"
+icon: material/calendar
+---
+
+Calendars contain some of your most sensitive data; use products that implement E2EE at rest to prevent a provider from reading them.
+
+## Tutanota
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tutanota** offers a free and encrypted calendar across their supported platforms. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, multi-factor authentication, and [more](https://tutanota.com/calendar-app-comparison/).
+
+ Multiple calendars and extended sharing functionality is limited to paid subscribers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tutanota.com/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tutanota.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tutanota.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tutanota.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/tutanota/id922429609)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.tutanota.Tutanota)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.tutanota.com/)
+
+## Proton Calendar
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton Calendar** is an encrypted calendar service available to Proton members via web or mobile clients. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, and [more](https://proton.me/support/proton-calendar-guide). Those on the free tier get access to a single calendar, whereas paid subscribers can create up to 20 calendars. Extended sharing functionality is also limited to paid subscribers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/proton-calendar-guide){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=me.proton.android.calendar)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://calendar.proton.me)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Qualifications
+
+- Must sync and store information with E2EE to ensure data is not visible to the service provider.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should integrate with native OS calendar and contact management apps if applicable.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/cloud.md b/i18n/el/cloud.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7c4c524ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/cloud.md
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+---
+title: "Cloud Storage"
+icon: material/file-cloud
+---
+
+Many cloud storage providers require your full trust that they will not look at your files. The alternatives listed below eliminate the need for trust by either putting you in control of your data or by implementing E2EE.
+
+If these alternatives do not fit your needs, we suggest you look into [Encryption Software](encryption.md).
+
+??? question "Looking for Nextcloud?"
+
+ Nextcloud is [still a recommended tool](productivity.md) for self-hosting a file management suite, however we do not recommend third-party Nextcloud storage providers at the moment, because we do not recommend Nextcloud's built-in E2EE functionality for home users.
+
+## Proton Drive
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton Drive** is an E2EE general file storage service by the popular encrypted email provider [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/mail).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/drive){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/drive){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=me.proton.android.drive)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1509667851)
+
+Proton Drive's mobile clients were released in December 2022 and are not yet open-source. Proton has historically delayed their source code releases until after initial product releases, and [plans to](https://www.reddit.com/r/ProtonDrive/comments/zf14i8/comment/izdwmme/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web2x&context=3) release the source code by the end of 2023. Proton Drive desktop clients are still in development.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must enforce end-to-end encryption.
+- Must offer a free plan or trial period for testing.
+- Must support TOTP or FIDO2 multi-factor authentication, or Passkey logins.
+- Must offer a web interface which supports basic file management functionality.
+- Must allow for easy exports of all files/documents.
+- Must use standard, audited encryption.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Clients should be open-source.
+- Clients should be audited in their entirety by an independent third-party.
+- Should offer native clients for Linux, Android, Windows, macOS, and iOS.
+ - These clients should integrate with native OS tools for cloud storage providers, such as Files app integration on iOS, or DocumentsProvider functionality on Android.
+- Should support easy file-sharing with other users.
+- Should offer at least basic file preview and editing functionality on the web interface.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/data-redaction.md b/i18n/el/data-redaction.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ebb667706
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/data-redaction.md
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+---
+title: "Data and Metadata Redaction"
+icon: material/tag-remove
+---
+
+When sharing files, be sure to remove associated metadata. Image files commonly include [Exif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exif) data. Photos sometimes even include GPS coordinates in the file metadata.
+
+## Desktop
+
+### MAT2
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **MAT2** is free software, which allows the metadata to be removed from image, audio, torrent, and document file types. It provides both a command line tool and a graphical user interface via an [extension for Nautilus](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/tree/master/nautilus), the default file manager of [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), and [Dolphin](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/tree/master/dolphin), the default file manager of [KDE](https://kde.org).
+
+ On Linux, a third-party graphical tool [Metadata Cleaner](https://gitlab.com/rmnvgr/metadata-cleaner) powered by MAT2 exists and is [available on Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/fr.romainvigier.MetadataCleaner).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/blob/master/README.md){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://pypi.org/project/mat2)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2#requirements-setup-on-macos-os-x-using-homebrew)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://pypi.org/project/mat2)
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2#web-interface)
+
+## Mobile
+
+### ExifEraser (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **ExifEraser** is a modern, permissionless image metadata erasing application for Android.
+
+ It currently supports JPEG, PNG and WebP files.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.none.tom.exiferaser)
+ - [:octicons-moon-16: Accrescent](https://accrescent.app/app/com.none.tom.exiferaser)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser/releases)
+
+The metadata that is erased depends on the image's file type:
+
+* **JPEG**: ICC Profile, Exif, Photoshop Image Resources and XMP/ExtendedXMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
+* **PNG**: ICC Profile, Exif and XMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
+* **WebP**: ICC Profile, Exif and XMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
+
+After processing the images, ExifEraser provides you with a full report about what exactly was removed from each image.
+
+The app offers multiple ways to erase metadata from images. Namely:
+
+* You can share an image from another application with ExifEraser.
+* Through the app itself, you can select a single image, multiple images at once, or even an entire directory.
+* It features a "Camera" option, which uses your operating system's camera app to take a photo, and then it removes the metadata from it.
+* It allows you to drag photos from another app into ExifEraser when they are both open in split-screen mode.
+* Lastly, it allows you to paste an image from your clipboard.
+
+### Metapho (iOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Metapho** is a simple and clean viewer for photo metadata such as date, file name, size, camera model, shutter speed, and location.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://zininworks.com/metapho){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://zininworks.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/metapho/id914457352)
+
+### PrivacyBlur
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **PrivacyBlur** is a free app which can blur sensitive portions of pictures before sharing them online.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://privacyblur.app/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://privacyblur.app/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/MATHEMA-GmbH/privacyblur#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/MATHEMA-GmbH/privacyblur){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.mathema.privacyblur)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/privacyblur/id1536274106)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ You should **never** use blur to redact [text in images](https://bishopfox.com/blog/unredacter-tool-never-pixelation). If you want to redact text in an image, draw a box over the text. For this, we suggest apps like [Pocket Paint](https://github.com/Catrobat/Paintroid).
+
+## Command-line
+
+### ExifTool
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **ExifTool** is the original perl library and command-line application for reading, writing, and editing meta information (Exif, IPTC, XMP, and more) in a wide variety of file formats (JPEG, TIFF, PNG, PDF, RAW, and more).
+
+ It's often a component of other Exif removal applications and is in most Linux distribution repositories.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://exiftool.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://exiftool.org/faq.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/exiftool/exiftool){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://exiftool.org/#donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://exiftool.org)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://exiftool.org)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://exiftool.org)
+
+!!! example "Deleting data from a directory of files"
+
+ ```bash
+ exiftool -all= *.file_extension
+ ```
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Apps developed for open-source operating systems must be open-source.
+- Apps must be free and should not include ads or other limitations.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/desktop-browsers.md b/i18n/el/desktop-browsers.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a29e6ffa5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/desktop-browsers.md
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+---
+title: "Desktop Browsers"
+icon: material/laptop
+---
+
+These are our currently recommended desktop web browsers and configurations for standard/non-anonymous browsing. If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) instead. In general, we recommend keeping your browser extensions to a minimum; they have privileged access within your browser, require you to trust the developer, can make you [stand out](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint), and [weaken](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/chromium-extensions/c/0ei-UCHNm34/m/lDaXwQhzBAAJ) site isolation.
+
+## Firefox
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Firefox** provides strong privacy settings such as [Enhanced Tracking Protection](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/enhanced-tracking-protection-firefox-desktop), which can help block various [types of tracking](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/enhanced-tracking-protection-firefox-desktop#w_what-enhanced-tracking-protection-blocks).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://firefox.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mozilla.org/privacy/firefox/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.mozilla.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/mac)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/linux)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.mozilla.firefox)
+
+!!! warning
+ Firefox includes a unique [download token](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1677497#c0) in downloads from Mozilla's website and uses telemetry in Firefox to send the token. The token is **not** included in releases from the [Mozilla FTP](https://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/firefox/releases/).
+
+### Recommended Configuration
+
+Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. When you use Firefox, we recommend changing the following settings to protect your privacy from certain parties, but all browsers other than [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) will be traceable by *somebody* in some regard or another.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Privacy & Security**.
+
+##### Enhanced Tracking Protection
+
+- [x] Select **Strict** Enhanced Tracking Protection
+
+This protects you by blocking social media trackers, fingerprinting scripts (note that this does not protect you from *all* fingerprinting), cryptominers, cross-site tracking cookies, and some other tracking content. ETP protects against many common threats, but it does not block all tracking avenues because it is designed to have minimal to no impact on site usability.
+
+##### Sanitize on Close
+
+If you want to stay logged in to particular sites, you can allow exceptions in **Cookies and Site Data** → **Manage Exceptions...**
+
+- [x] Check **Delete cookies and site data when Firefox is closed**
+
+This protects you from persistent cookies, but does not protect you against cookies acquired during any one browsing session. When this is enabled, it becomes possible to easily cleanse your browser cookies by simply restarting Firefox. You can set exceptions on a per-site basis, if you wish to stay logged in to a particular site you visit often.
+
+##### Search Suggestions
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Provide search suggestions**
+
+Search suggestion features may not be available in your region.
+
+Search suggestions send everything you type in the address bar to the default search engine, regardless of whether you submit an actual search. Disabling search suggestions allows you to more precisely control what data you send to your search engine provider.
+
+##### Telemetry
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Firefox to send technical and interaction data to Mozilla**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Firefox to install and run studies**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Firefox to send backlogged crash reports on your behalf**
+
+> Firefox sends data about your Firefox version and language; device operating system and hardware configuration; memory, basic information about crashes and errors; outcome of automated processes like updates, safebrowsing, and activation to us. When Firefox sends data to us, your IP address is temporarily collected as part of our server logs.
+
+Additionally, the Firefox Accounts service collects [some technical data](https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/privacy/firefox/#firefox-accounts). If you use a Firefox Account you can opt-out:
+
+1. Open your [profile settings on accounts.firefox.com](https://accounts.firefox.com/settings#data-collection)
+2. Uncheck **Data Collection and Use** > **Help improve Firefox Accounts**
+
+##### HTTPS-Only Mode
+
+- [x] Select **Enable HTTPS-Only Mode in all windows**
+
+This prevents you from unintentionally connecting to a website in plain-text HTTP. Sites without HTTPS are uncommon nowadays, so this should have little to no impact on your day to day browsing.
+
+### Firefox Sync
+
+[Firefox Sync](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2018/11/firefox-sync-privacy/) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices and protects it with E2EE.
+
+### Arkenfox (advanced)
+
+The [Arkenfox project](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js) provides a set of carefully considered options for Firefox. If you [decide](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/1.1-To-Arkenfox-or-Not) to use Arkenfox, a [few options](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/3.2-Overrides-[Common]) are subjectively strict and/or may cause some websites to not work properly - [which you can easily change](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/3.1-Overrides) to suit your needs. We **strongly recommend** reading through their full [wiki](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki). Arkenfox also enables [container](https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/containers#w_for-advanced-users) support.
+
+## Brave
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Brave Browser** includes a built-in content blocker and [privacy features](https://brave.com/privacy-features/), many of which are enabled by default.
+
+ Brave is built upon the Chromium web browser project, so it should feel familiar and have minimal website compatibility issues.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://brave.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://brave4u7jddbv7cyviptqjc7jusxh72uik7zt6adtckl5f4nwy2v72qd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://brave.com/privacy/browser/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.brave.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads annotate
+
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://brave.com/download/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://brave.com/download/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://brave.com/linux/) (1)
+
+ 1. We advise against using the Flatpak version of Brave, as it replaces Chromium's sandbox with Flatpak's, which is less effective. Additionally, the package is not maintained by Brave Software, Inc.
+
+### Recommended Configuration
+
+Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. When you use Brave, we recommend changing the following settings to protect your privacy from certain parties, but all browsers other than the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) will be traceable by *somebody* in some regard or another.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings**.
+
+##### Shields
+
+Brave includes some anti-fingerprinting measures in its [Shields](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360022973471-What-is-Shields-) feature. We suggest configuring these options [globally](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360023646212-How-do-I-configure-global-and-site-specific-Shields-settings-) across all pages that you visit.
+
+Shields' options can be downgraded on a per-site basis as needed, but by default we recommend setting the following:
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Prevent sites from fingerprinting me based on my language preferences**
+- [x] Select **Aggressive** under Trackers & ads blocking
+
+ ??? warning "Use default filter lists"
+ Brave allows you to select additional content filters within the internal `brave://adblock` page. We advise against using this feature; instead, keep the default filter lists. Using extra lists will make you stand out from other Brave users and may also increase attack surface if there is an exploit in Brave and a malicious rule is added to one of the lists you use.
+
+- [x] (Optional) Select **Block Scripts** (1)
+- [x] Select **Strict, may break sites** under Block fingerprinting
+
+
+
+1. This option provides functionality similar to uBlock Origin's advanced [blocking modes](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) or the [NoScript](https://noscript.net/) extension.
+
+##### Social media blocking
+
+- [ ] Uncheck all social media components
+
+##### Privacy and security
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Disable non-proxied UDP** under [WebRTC IP Handling Policy](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360017989132-How-do-I-change-my-Privacy-Settings-#webrtc)
+- [ ] Uncheck **Use Google services for push messaging**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow privacy-preserving product analytics (P3A)**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send daily usage ping to Brave**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send diagnostic reports**
+- [x] Select **Always use secure connections** in the **Security** menu
+- [ ] Uncheck **Private window with Tor** (1)
+
+ !!! tip "Sanitizing on Close"
+ - [x] Select **Clear cookies and site data when you close all windows** in the *Cookies and other site data* menu
+
+ If you wish to stay logged in to a particular site you visit often, you can set exceptions on a per-site basis under the *Customized behaviors* section.
+
+
+
+1. Brave is **not** as resistant to fingerprinting as the Tor Browser and far fewer people use Brave with Tor, so you will stand out. Where [strong anonymity is required](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360018121491-What-is-a-Private-Window-with-Tor-Connectivity-) use the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser).
+
+##### Extensions
+
+Disable built-in extensions you do not use in **Extensions**
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Hangouts**
+- [ ] Uncheck **WebTorrent**
+
+##### IPFS
+
+InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is a decentralized, peer-to-peer network for storing and sharing data in a distributed filesystem. Unless you use the feature, disable it.
+
+- [x] Select **Disabled** on Method to resolve IPFS resources
+
+##### Additional settings
+
+Under the *System* menu
+
+
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Continue running apps when Brave is closed** to disable background apps (1)
+
+
+
+1. This option is not present on all platforms.
+
+### Brave Sync
+
+[Brave Sync](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360059793111-Understanding-Brave-Sync) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices without requiring an account and protects it with E2EE.
+
+## Additional Resources
+
+We generally do not recommend installing any extensions as they increase your attack surface. However, uBlock Origin may prove useful if you value content blocking functionality.
+
+### uBlock Origin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **uBlock Origin** is a popular content blocker that could help you block ads, trackers, and fingerprinting scripts.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/ublock-origin/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/ublock-origin/cjpalhdlnbpafiamejdnhcphjbkeiagm)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/ublock-origin/odfafepnkmbhccpbejgmiehpchacaeak)
+
+We suggest following the [developer's documentation](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) and picking one of the "modes". Additional filter lists can impact performance and [may increase attack surface](https://portswigger.net/research/ublock-i-exfiltrate-exploiting-ad-blockers-with-css).
+
+##### Other lists
+
+These are some other [filter lists](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Dashboard:-Filter-lists) that you may want to consider adding:
+
+- [x] Check **Privacy** > **AdGuard URL Tracking Protection**
+- Add [Actually Legitimate URL Shortener Tool](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DandelionSprout/adfilt/master/LegitimateURLShortener.txt)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Supports automatic updates.
+- Receives engine updates in 0-1 days from upstream release.
+- Available on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- Any changes required to make the browser more privacy-respecting should not negatively impact user experience.
+- Blocks third-party cookies by default.
+- Supports [state partitioning](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning) to mitigate cross-site tracking.[^1]
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Includes built-in content blocking functionality.
+- Supports cookie compartmentalization (à la [Multi-Account Containers](https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/containers)).
+- Supports Progressive Web Apps.
+ PWAs enable you to install certain websites as if they were native apps on your computer. This can have advantages over installing Electron-based apps, because you benefit from your browser's regular security updates.
+- Does not include add-on functionality (bloatware) that does not impact user privacy.
+- Does not collect telemetry by default.
+- Provides open-source sync server implementation.
+- Defaults to a [private search engine](search-engines.md).
+
+### Extension Criteria
+
+- Must not replicate built-in browser or OS functionality.
+- Must directly impact user privacy, i.e. must not simply provide information.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
+
+[^1]: Brave's implementation is detailed at [Brave Privacy Updates: Partitioning network-state for privacy](https://brave.com/privacy-updates/14-partitioning-network-state/).
diff --git a/i18n/el/desktop.md b/i18n/el/desktop.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..492ef3a1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/desktop.md
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+---
+title: "Desktop/PC"
+icon: simple/linux
+---
+
+Linux distributions are commonly recommended for privacy protection and software freedom. If you don't already use Linux, below are some distributions we suggest trying out, as well as some general privacy and security improvement tips that are applicable to many Linux distributions.
+
+- [General Linux Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/linux-overview.md)
+
+## Traditional Distributions
+
+### Fedora Workstation
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Fedora Workstation** is our recommended distribution for people new to Linux. Fedora generally adopts newer technologies before other distributions e.g., [Wayland](https://wayland.freedesktop.org/), [PipeWire](https://pipewire.org). These new technologies often come with improvements in security, privacy, and usability in general.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getfedora.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://whatcanidoforfedora.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Fedora has a semi-rolling release cycle. While some packages like [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org) are frozen until the next Fedora release, most packages (including the kernel) are updated frequently throughout the lifespan of the release. Each Fedora release is supported for one year, with a new version released every 6 months.
+
+### openSUSE Tumbleweed
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **openSUSE Tumbleweed** is a stable rolling release distribution.
+
+ openSUSE Tumbleweed has a [transactional update](https://kubic.opensuse.org/blog/2018-04-04-transactionalupdates/) system that uses [Btrfs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Btrfs) and [Snapper](https://en.opensuse.org/openSUSE:Snapper_Tutorial) to ensure that snapshots can be rolled back should there be a problem.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://get.opensuse.org/tumbleweed/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://doc.opensuse.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://shop.opensuse.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Tumbleweed follows a rolling release model where each update is released as a snapshot of the distribution. When you upgrade your system, a new snapshot is downloaded. Each snapshot is run through a series of automated tests by [openQA](https://openqa.opensuse.org) to ensure its quality.
+
+### Arch Linux
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Arch Linux** is a lightweight, do-it-yourself (DIY) distribution meaning that you only get what you install. For more information see their [FAQ](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Frequently_asked_questions).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://archlinux.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://wiki.archlinux.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://archlinux.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Arch Linux has a rolling release cycle. There is no fixed release schedule and packages are updated very frequently.
+
+Being a DIY distribution, you are [expected to set up and maintain](os/linux-overview.md#arch-based-distributions) your system on your own. Arch has an [official installer](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Archinstall) to make the installation process a little easier.
+
+A large portion of [Arch Linux’s packages](https://reproducible.archlinux.org) are [reproducible](https://reproducible-builds.org).
+
+## Immutable Distributions
+
+### Fedora Silverblue
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Fedora Silverblue** and **Fedora Kinoite** are immutable variants of Fedora with a strong focus on container workflows. Silverblue comes with the [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org/) desktop environment while Kinoite comes with [KDE](https://kde.org/). Silverblue and Kinoite follow the same release schedule as Fedora Workstation, benefiting from the same fast updates and staying very close to upstream.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://silverblue.fedoraproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora-silverblue/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://whatcanidoforfedora.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Silverblue (and Kinoite) differ from Fedora Workstation as they replace the [DNF](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/DNF) package manager with a much more advanced alternative called [`rpm-ostree`](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/rawhide/system-administrators-guide/package-management/rpm-ostree/). The `rpm-ostree` package manager works by downloading a base image for the system, then overlaying packages over it in a [git](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Git)-like commit tree. When the system is updated, a new base image is downloaded and the overlays will be applied to that new image.
+
+After the update is complete you will reboot the system into the new deployment. `rpm-ostree` keeps two deployments of the system so that you can easily rollback if something breaks in the new deployment. There is also the option to pin more deployments as needed.
+
+[Flatpak](https://www.flatpak.org) is the primary package installation method on these distributions, as `rpm-ostree` is only meant to overlay packages that cannot stay inside of a container on top of the base image.
+
+As an alternative to Flatpaks, there is the option of [Toolbox](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora-silverblue/toolbox/) to create [Podman](https://podman.io) containers with a shared home directory with the host operating system and mimic a traditional Fedora environment, which is a [useful feature](https://containertoolbx.org) for the discerning developer.
+
+### NixOS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ NixOS is an independent distribution based on the Nix package manager with a focus on reproducibility and reliability.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://nixos.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://nixos.org/learn.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nixos.org/donate.html){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+NixOS’s package manager keeps every version of every package in a different folder in the **Nix store**. Due to this you can have different versions of the same package installed on your system. After the package contents have been written to the folder, the folder is made read-only.
+
+NixOS also provides atomic updates; first it downloads (or builds) the packages and files for the new system generation and then switches to it. There are different ways to switch to a new generation; you can tell NixOS to activate it after reboot or you can switch to it at runtime. You can also *test* the new generation by switching to it at runtime, but not setting it as the current system generation. If something in the update process breaks, you can just reboot and automatically and return to a working version of your system.
+
+Nix the package manager uses a purely functional language - which is also called Nix - to define packages.
+
+[Nixpkgs](https://github.com/nixos/nixpkgs) (the main source of packages) are contained in a single GitHub repository. You can also define your own packages in the same language and then easily include them in your config.
+
+Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in the binary cache, Nix will just build the package from source using its definition. It builds each package in a sandboxed *pure* environment, which is as independent of the host system as possible, thus making binaries reproducible.
+
+## Anonymity-Focused Distributions
+
+### Whonix
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Whonix is meant to run as two virtual machines: a “Workstation” and a Tor “Gateway.” All communications from the Workstation must go through the Tor gateway. This means that even if the Workstation is compromised by malware of some kind, the true IP address remains hidden.
+
+Some of its features include Tor Stream Isolation, [keystroke anonymization](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Keystroke_Deanonymization#Kloak), [encrypted swap](https://github.com/Whonix/swap-file-creator), and a hardened memory allocator.
+
+Future versions of Whonix will likely include [full system AppArmor policies](https://github.com/Whonix/apparmor-profile-everything) and a [sandbox app launcher](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Sandbox-app-launcher) to fully confine all processes on the system.
+
+Whonix is best used [in conjunction with Qubes](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Why_use_Qubes_over_other_Virtualizers), Qubes-Whonix has various [disadvantages](https://forums.whonix.org/t/qubes-whonix-security-disadvantages-help-wanted/8581) when compared to other hypervisors.
+
+### Tails
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tails** is a live operating system based on Debian that routes all communications through Tor, which can boot on on almost any computer from a DVD, USB stick, or SD card installation. It uses [Tor](tor.md) to preserve privacy and anonymity while circumventing censorship, and it leaves no trace of itself on the computer it is used on after it is powered off.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tails.boum.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tails.boum.org/doc/index.en.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tails.boum.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Tails is great for counter forensics due to amnesia (meaning nothing is written to the disk); however, it is not a hardened distribution like Whonix. It lacks many anonymity and security features that Whonix has and gets updated much less often (only once every six weeks). A Tails system that is compromised by malware may potentially bypass the transparent proxy allowing for the user to be deanonymized.
+
+Tails includes [uBlock Origin](desktop-browsers.md#ublock-origin) in Tor Browser by default, which may potentially make it easier for adversaries to fingerprint Tails users. [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) virtual machines may be more leak-proof, however they are not amnesic, meaning data may be recovered from your storage device.
+
+By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypted [persistent storage](https://tails.boum.org/doc/persistent_storage/index.en.html) can be configured to store some data between reboots.
+
+## Security-focused Distributions
+
+### Qubes OS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*.
+
+The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/).
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+Our recommended operating systems:
+
+- Must be open-source.
+- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates.
+- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#Wayland).
+- Must support full-disk encryption during installation.
+- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage.
+- Must support a wide variety of hardware.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/dns.md b/i18n/el/dns.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..abb7c79a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/dns.md
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+---
+title: "DNS Resolvers"
+icon: material/dns
+---
+
+!!! question "Should I use encrypted DNS?"
+
+ Encrypted DNS with third-party servers should only be used to get around basic [DNS blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) when you can be sure there won't be any consequences. Encrypted DNS will not help you hide any of your browsing activity.
+
+ [Learn more about DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md){ .md-button }
+
+## Recommended Providers
+
+| DNS Provider | Privacy Policy | Protocols | Logging | ECS | Filtering |
+| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------ | -------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| [**AdGuard**](https://adguard.com/en/adguard-dns/overview.html) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT DNSCrypt | Some[^1] | No | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardDNS) |
+| [**Cloudflare**](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/setting-up-1.1.1.1/) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT | Some[^2] | No | Based on server choice. |
+| [**Control D**](https://controld.com/free-dns) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://controld.com/privacy) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT DoQ | Optional[^3] | No | Based on server choice. |
+| [**Mullvad**](https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/) | DoH DoT | No[^4] | No | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/mullvad/dns-adblock) |
+| [**NextDNS**](https://www.nextdns.io) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://www.nextdns.io/privacy) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT | Optional[^5] | Optional | Based on server choice. |
+| [**Quad9**](https://quad9.net) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://quad9.net/privacy/policy/) | Cleartext DoH DoT DNSCrypt | Some[^6] | Optional | Based on server choice, Malware blocking by default. |
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must support [DNSSEC](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-dnssec).
+- [QNAME Minimization](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-qname-minimization).
+- Allow for [ECS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-edns-client-subnet-ecs) to be disabled.
+- Prefer [anycast](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anycast#Addressing_methods) support or geo-steering support.
+
+## Native Operating System Support
+
+### Android
+
+Android 9 and above support DNS over TLS. The settings can be found in: **Settings** → **Network & Internet** → **Private DNS**.
+
+### Apple Devices
+
+The latest versions of iOS, iPadOS, tvOS, and macOS, support both DoT and DoH. Both protocols are supported natively via [configuration profiles](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/configuration-profile-enforcement-secf6fb9f053/web) or through the [DNS Settings API](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/networkextension/dns_settings).
+
+After installation of either a configuration profile or an app that uses the DNS Settings API, the DNS configuration can be selected. If a VPN is active, resolution within the VPN tunnel will use the VPN's DNS settings and not your system-wide settings.
+
+#### Signed Profiles
+
+Apple does not provide a native interface for creating encrypted DNS profiles. [Secure DNS profile creator](https://dns.notjakob.com/tool.html) is an unofficial tool for creating your own encrypted DNS profiles, however they will not be signed. Signed profiles are preferred; signing validates a profile's origin and helps to ensure the integrity of the profiles. A green "Verified" label is given to signed configuration profiles. For more information on code signing, see [About Code Signing](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/CodeSigningGuide/Introduction/Introduction.html). **Signed profiles** are offered by [AdGuard](https://adguard.com/en/blog/encrypted-dns-ios-14.html), [NextDNS](https://apple.nextdns.io), and [Quad9](https://www.quad9.net/news/blog/ios-mobile-provisioning-profiles/).
+
+!!! info
+
+ `systemd-resolved`, which many Linux distributions use to do their DNS lookups, doesn't yet [support DoH](https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/8639). If you want to use DoH, you'll need to install a proxy like [dnscrypt-proxy](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy) and [configure it](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dnscrypt-proxy) to take all the DNS queries from your system resolver and forward them over HTTPS.
+
+## Encrypted DNS Proxies
+
+Encrypted DNS proxy software provides a local proxy for the [unencrypted DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md#unencrypted-dns) resolver to forward to. Typically it is used on platforms that don't natively support [encrypted DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns).
+
+### RethinkDNS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **RethinkDNS** is an open-source Android client supporting [DNS-over-HTTPS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), [DNS-over-TLS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-tls-dot), [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt) and DNS Proxy along with caching DNS responses, locally logging DNS queries and can be used as a firewall too.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://rethinkdns.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://rethinkdns.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.rethinkdns.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/celzero/rethink-app){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.celzero.bravedns)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/celzero/rethink-app/releases)
+
+### dnscrypt-proxy
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **dnscrypt-proxy** is a DNS proxy with support for [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt), [DNS-over-HTTPS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), and [Anonymized DNS](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Anonymized-DNS).
+
+ !!! warning "The anonymized DNS feature does [**not**](advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns) anonymize other network traffic."
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/dnscrypt/contribute){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Installation-Windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Installation-macOS)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Installation-linux)
+
+## Self-hosted Solutions
+
+A self-hosted DNS solution is useful for providing filtering on controlled platforms, such as Smart TVs and other IoT devices, as no client-side software is needed.
+
+### AdGuard Home
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **AdGuard Home** is an open-source [DNS-sinkhole](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_sinkhole) which uses [DNS filtering](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/access-management/what-is-dns-filtering/) to block unwanted web content, such as advertisements.
+
+ AdGuard Home features a polished web interface to view insights and manage blocked content.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://adguard.com/adguard-home/overview.html){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://adguard.com/privacy/home.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+### Pi-hole
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Pi-hole** is an open-source [DNS-sinkhole](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_sinkhole) which uses [DNS filtering](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/access-management/what-is-dns-filtering/) to block unwanted web content, such as advertisements.
+
+ Pi-hole is designed to be hosted on a Raspberry Pi, but it is not limited to such hardware. The software features a friendly web interface to view insights and manage blocked content.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://pi-hole.net/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://pi-hole.net/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.pi-hole.net/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/pi-hole/pi-hole){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://pi-hole.net/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
+
+[^1]: AdGuard stores aggregated performance metrics of their DNS servers, namely the number of complete requests to a particular server, the number of blocked requests, and the speed of processing requests. They also keep and store the database of domains requested in within last 24 hours. "We need this information to identify and block new trackers and threats." "We also log how many times this or that tracker has been blocked. We need this information to remove outdated rules from our filters." [https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html](https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html)
+[^2]: Cloudflare collects and stores only the limited DNS query data that is sent to the 1.1.1.1 resolver. The 1.1.1.1 resolver service does not log personal data, and the bulk of the limited non-personally identifiable query data is stored only for 25 hours. [https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/)
+[^3]: Control D only logs for Premium resolvers with custom DNS profiles. Free resolvers do not log data. [https://controld.com/privacy](https://controld.com/privacy)
+[^4]: Mullvad's DNS service is available to both subscribers and non-subscribers of Mullvad VPN. Their privacy policy explicitly claims they do not log DNS requests in any way. [https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/](https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/)
+[^5]: NextDNS can provide insights and logging features on an opt-in basis. You can choose retention times and log storage locations for any logs you choose to keep. If it's not specifically requested, no data is logged. [https://nextdns.io/privacy](https://nextdns.io/privacy)
+[^6]: Quad9 collects some data for the purposes of threat monitoring and response. That data may then be remixed and shared, such as for the purpose of security research. Quad9 does not collect or record IP addresses or other data they deem personally identifiable. [https://www.quad9.net/privacy/policy/](https://www.quad9.net/privacy/policy/)
diff --git a/i18n/el/email-clients.md b/i18n/el/email-clients.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..676e252b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/email-clients.md
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+---
+title: "Email Clients"
+icon: material/email-open
+---
+
+Our recommendation list contains email clients that support both [OpenPGP](encryption.md#openpgp) and strong authentication such as [Open Authorization (OAuth)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth). OAuth allows you to use [Multi-Factor Authentication](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md) and prevent account theft.
+
+??? warning "Email does not provide forward secrecy"
+
+ When using end-to-end encryption (E2EE) technology like OpenPGP, email will still have [some metadata](email.md#email-metadata-overview) that is not encrypted in the header of the email.
+
+ OpenPGP also does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed: [How do I protect my private keys?](basics/email-security.md) Consider using a medium that provides forward secrecy:
+
+ [Real-time Communication](real-time-communication.md){ .md-button }
+
+## Cross-Platform
+
+### Thunderbird
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Thunderbird** is a free, open-source, cross-platform email, newsgroup, news feed, and chat (XMPP, IRC, Twitter) client developed by the Thunderbird community, and previously by the Mozilla Foundation.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.thunderbird.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mozilla.org/privacy/thunderbird){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.mozilla.org/products/thunderbird){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://hg.mozilla.org/comm-central){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.thunderbird.net)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.thunderbird.net)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.thunderbird.net)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.mozilla.Thunderbird)
+
+#### Recommended Configuration
+
+We recommend changing some of these settings to make Thunderbird a little more private.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Privacy & Security**.
+
+##### Web Content
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Remember websites and links I've visited**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Accept cookies from sites**
+
+##### Telemetry
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Thunderbird to send technical and interaction data to Mozilla**
+
+#### Thunderbird-user.js (advanced)
+
+[`thunderbird-user.js`](https://github.com/HorlogeSkynet/thunderbird-user.js), is a set of configurations options that aims to disable as many of the web-browsing features within Thunderbird as possible in order to reduce surface area and maintain privacy. Some of the changes are backported from the [Arkenfox project](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js).
+
+## Platform Specific
+
+### Apple Mail (macOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Apple Mail** is included in macOS and can be extended to have OpenPGP support with [GPG Suite](encryption.md#gpg-suite), which adds the ability to send PGP-encrypted email.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/welcome/mac){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/toc){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+### Canary Mail (iOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Canary Mail** is a paid email client designed to make end-to-end encryption seamless with security features such as a biometric app lock.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://canarymail.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://canarymail.io/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://canarymail.zendesk.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.canarymail.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1236045954)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://canarymail.io/downloads.html)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Canary Mail only recently released a Windows and Android client, though we don't believe they are as stable as their iOS and Mac counterparts.
+
+Canary Mail is closed-source. We recommend it due to the few choices there are for email clients on iOS that support PGP E2EE.
+
+### FairEmail (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FairEmail** is a minimal, open-source email app, using open standards (IMAP, SMTP, OpenPGP) with a low data and battery usage.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://email.faircode.eu){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/blob/master/PRIVACY.md){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/blob/master/FAQ.md){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://email.faircode.eu/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=eu.faircode.email)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/releases)
+
+### GNOME Evolution (GNOME)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Evolution** is a personal information management application that provides integrated mail, calendaring and address book functionality. Evolution has extensive [documentation](https://help.gnome.org/users/evolution/stable/) to help you get started.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Evolution){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Evolution/PrivacyPolicy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://help.gnome.org/users/evolution/stable/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.gnome.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.gnome.Evolution)
+
+### K-9 Mail (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **K-9 Mail** is an independent mail application that supports both POP3 and IMAP mailboxes, but only supports push mail for IMAP.
+
+ In the future, K-9 Mail will be the [officially branded](https://k9mail.app/2022/06/13/K-9-Mail-and-Thunderbird.html) Thunderbird client for Android.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://k9mail.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://k9mail.app/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.k9mail.app/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/k9mail/k-9){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://k9mail.app/contribute){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.fsck.k9)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/k9mail/k-9/releases)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When replying to someone on a mailing list the "reply" option may also include the mailing list. For more information see [thundernest/k-9 #3738](https://github.com/thundernest/k-9/issues/3738).
+
+### Kontact (KDE)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Kontact** is a personal information manager (PIM) application from the [KDE](https://kde.org) project. It provides a mail client, address book, organizer and RSS client.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://kontact.kde.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://kde.org/privacypolicy-apps){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://kontact.kde.org/users/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://invent.kde.org/pim/kmail){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://kde.org/community/donations/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://kontact.kde.org/download)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.kde.kontact)
+
+### Mailvelope (Browser)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mailvelope** is a browser extension that enables the exchange of encrypted emails following the OpenPGP encryption standard.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.mailvelope.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mailvelope.com/en/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mailvelope.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailvelope/mailvelope){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/mailvelope)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/mailvelope/kajibbejlbohfaggdiogboambcijhkke)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/mailvelope/dgcbddhdhjppfdfjpciagmmibadmoapc)
+
+### NeoMutt (CLI)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **NeoMutt** is an open-source command line mail reader (or MUA) for Linux and BSD. It's a fork of [Mutt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutt_(email_client)) with added features.
+
+ NeoMutt is a text-based client that has a steep learning curve. It is however, very customizable.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://neomutt.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://neomutt.org/guide/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/russon/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://neomutt.org/distro)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://neomutt.org/distro)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Qualifications
+
+- Apps developed for open-source operating systems must be open-source.
+- Must not collect telemetry, or have an easy way to disable all telemetry.
+- Must support OpenPGP message encryption.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should be open-source.
+- Should be cross-platform.
+- Should not collect any telemetry by default.
+- Should support OpenPGP natively, i.e. without extensions.
+- Should support storing OpenPGP encrypted emails locally.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/email.md b/i18n/el/email.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d039b722f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/email.md
@@ -0,0 +1,485 @@
+---
+title: "Email Services"
+icon: material/email
+---
+
+Email is practically a necessity for using any online service, however we do not recommend it for person-to-person conversations. Rather than using email to contact other people, consider using an instant messaging medium that supports forward secrecy.
+
+[Recommended Instant Messengers](real-time-communication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+For everything else, we recommend a variety of email providers based on sustainable business models and built-in security and privacy features.
+
+## OpenPGP Compatible Services
+
+These providers natively support OpenPGP encryption/decryption, allowing for provider-agnostic E2EE emails. For example, a Proton Mail user could send an E2EE message to a Mailbox.org user, or you could receive OpenPGP-encrypted notifications from internet services which support it.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using E2EE technology like OpenPGP, email will still have some metadata that is not encrypted in the header of the email. Read more about [email metadata](basics/email-security.md#email-metadata-overview).
+
+ OpenPGP also does not support Forward secrecy, which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. [How do I protect my private keys?](basics/email-security.md#how-do-i-protect-my-private-keys)
+
+### Proton Mail
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton Mail** is an email service with a focus on privacy, encryption, security, and ease of use. They have been in operation since **2013**. Proton AG is based in Genève, Switzerland. Accounts start with 500 MB storage with their free plan.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/mail){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://protonmailrmez3lotccipshtkleegetolb73fuirgj7r4o4vfu7ozyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/mail){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonmail.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id979659905)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonMail/proton-mail-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.proton.me)
+
+Free accounts have some limitations, such as not being able to search body text and not having access to [Proton Mail Bridge](https://proton.me/mail/bridge), which is required to use a [recommended desktop email client](email-clients.md) (e.g. Thunderbird). Paid accounts include features like Proton Mail Bridge, additional storage, and custom domain support. A [letter of attestation](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps) was provided for Proton Mail's apps on 9th November 2021 by [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com).
+
+If you have the Proton Unlimited, Business, or Visionary Plan, you also get [SimpleLogin](#simplelogin) Premium for free.
+
+Proton Mail has internal crash reports that they **do not** share with third parties. This can be disabled in: **Settings** > **Go to Settings** > **Account** > **Security and privacy** > **Send crash reports**.
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Paid Proton Mail subscribers can use their own domain with the service or a [catch-all](https://proton.me/support/catch-all) address. Proton Mail also supports [subaddressing](https://proton.me/support/creating-aliases), which is useful for people who don't want to purchase a domain.
+
+??? success "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ Proton Mail [accepts](https://proton.me/support/payment-options) Bitcoin and cash by mail in addition to standard credit/debit card and PayPal payments.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ Proton Mail supports TOTP [two factor authentication](https://proton.me/support/two-factor-authentication-2fa) only. The use of a U2F security key is not yet supported. Proton Mail is planning to implement U2F upon completion of their [Single Sign On (SSO)](https://reddit.com/comments/cheoy6/comment/feh2lw0/) code.
+
+??? success "Data Security"
+
+ Proton Mail has [zero-access encryption](https://proton.me/blog/zero-access-encryption) at rest for your emails and [calendars](https://proton.me/news/protoncalendar-security-model). Data secured with zero-access encryption is only accessible by you.
+
+ Certain information stored in [Proton Contacts](https://proton.me/support/proton-contacts), such as display names and email addresses, are not secured with zero-access encryption. Contact fields that support zero-access encryption, such as phone numbers, are indicated with a padlock icon.
+
+??? success "Email Encryption"
+
+ Proton Mail has [integrated OpenPGP encryption](https://proton.me/support/how-to-use-pgp) in their webmail. Emails to other Proton Mail accounts are encrypted automatically, and encryption to non-Proton Mail addresses with an OpenPGP key can be enabled easily in your account settings. They also allow you to [encrypt messages to non-Proton Mail addresses](https://proton.me/support/password-protected-emails) without the need for them to sign up for a Proton Mail account or use software like OpenPGP.
+
+ Proton Mail also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This allows people who don't use Proton Mail to find the OpenPGP keys of Proton Mail accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE.
+
+??? warning "Digital Legacy"
+
+ Proton Mail doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ If you have a paid account and your [bill is unpaid](https://proton.me/support/delinquency) after 14 days, you won't be able to access your data. After 30 days, your account will become delinquent and won't receive incoming mail. You will continue to be billed during this period.
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ Proton Mail offers an "Unlimited" account for €9.99/Month, which also enables access to Proton VPN in addition to providing multiple accounts, domains, aliases, and 500GB of storage.
+
+### Mailbox.org
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mailbox.org** is an email service with a focus on being secure, ad-free, and privately powered by 100% eco-friendly energy. They have been in operation since 2014. Mailbox.org is based in Berlin, Germany. Accounts start with 2 GB of storage, which can be upgraded as needed.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailbox.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://mailbox.org/en/data-protection-privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://login.mailbox.org)
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Mailbox.org lets you use your own domain, and they support [catch-all](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Using+catch-all+alias+with+own+domain) addresses. Mailbox.org also supports [subaddressing](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/BMBOKBEN/What+is+an+alias+and+how+do+I+use+it), which is useful if you don't want to purchase a domain.
+
+??? info "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ Mailbox.org doesn't accept Bitcoin or any other cryptocurrencies as a result of their payment processor BitPay suspending operations in Germany. However, they do accept Cash by mail, cash payment to bank account, bank transfer, credit card, PayPal and couple of German-specific processors: paydirekt and Sofortüberweisung.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ Mailbox.org supports [two factor authentication](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/How+to+use+two-factor+authentication+-+2FA) for their webmail only. You can use either TOTP or a [Yubikey](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YubiKey) via the [Yubicloud](https://www.yubico.com/products/services-software/yubicloud). Web standards such as [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn) are not yet supported.
+
+??? info "Data Security"
+
+ Mailbox.org allows for encryption of incoming mail using their [encrypted mailbox](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/The+Encrypted+Mailbox). New messages that you receive will then be immediately encrypted with your public key.
+
+ However, [Open-Exchange](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-Xchange), the software platform used by Mailbox.org, [does not support](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/BMBOKBEN/Encryption+of+calendar+and+address+book) the encryption of your address book and calendar. A [standalone option](calendar.md) may be more appropriate for that information.
+
+??? success "Email Encryption"
+
+ Mailbox.org has [integrated encryption](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Send+encrypted+e-mails+with+Guard) in their webmail, which simplifies sending messages to people with public OpenPGP keys. They also allow [remote recipients to decrypt an email](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/My+recipient+does+not+use+PGP) on Mailbox.org's servers. This feature is useful when the remote recipient does not have OpenPGP and cannot decrypt a copy of the email in their own mailbox.
+
+ Mailbox.org also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This allows people outside of Mailbox.org to find the OpenPGP keys of Mailbox.org accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE.
+
+??? success "Digital Legacy"
+
+ Mailbox.org has a digital legacy feature for all plans. You can choose whether you want any of your data to be passed to heirs providing that they apply and provide your testament. Alternatively, you can nominate a person by name and address.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ Your account will be set to a restricted user account when your contract ends, after [30 days it will be irrevocably deleted](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/payment-article/what-happens-at-the-end-of-my-contract).
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ You can access your Mailbox.org account via IMAP/SMTP using their [.onion service](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/The+Tor+exit+node+of+mailbox.org). However, their webmail interface cannot be accessed via their .onion service and you may experience TLS certificate errors.
+
+ All accounts come with limited cloud storage that [can be encrypted](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Encrypt+files+on+your+Drive). Mailbox.org also offers the alias [@secure.mailbox.org](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Ensuring+E-Mails+are+Sent+Securely), which enforces the TLS encryption on the connection between mail servers, otherwise the message will not be sent at all. Mailbox.org also supports [Exchange ActiveSync](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exchange_ActiveSync) in addition to standard access protocols like IMAP and POP3.
+
+### StartMail
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **StartMail** is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of standard OpenPGP encryption. StartMail has been in operation since 2014 and is based in Boulevard 11, Zeist Netherlands. Accounts start with 10GB. They offer a 30-day trial.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.startmail.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.startmail.com/en/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.startmail.com){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.startmail.com/login)
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Personal accounts can use [Custom or Quick](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360007297457-Aliases) aliases. [Custom domains](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/4403911432209-Setup-a-custom-domain) are also available.
+
+??? warning "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ StartMail accepts Visa, MasterCard, American Express and Paypal. StartMail also has other [payment options](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006620637-Payment-methods) such as Bitcoin (currently only for Personal accounts) and SEPA Direct Debit for accounts older than a year.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ StartMail supports TOTP two factor authentication [for webmail only](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006682158-Two-factor-authentication-2FA). They do not allow U2F security key authentication.
+
+??? info "Data Security"
+
+ StartMail has [zero access encryption at rest](https://www.startmail.com/en/whitepaper/#_Toc458527835), using their "user vault" system. When you log in, the vault is opened, and the email is then moved to the vault out of the queue where it is decrypted by the corresponding private key.
+
+ StartMail supports importing [contacts](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006495557-Import-contacts) however, they are only accessible in the webmail and not through protocols such as [CalDAV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CalDAV). Contacts are also not stored using zero knowledge encryption.
+
+??? success "Email Encryption"
+
+ StartMail has [integrated encryption](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/sections/360001889078-Encryption) in their webmail, which simplifies sending encrypted messages with public OpenPGP keys.
+
+??? warning "Digital Legacy"
+
+ StartMail does not offer a digital legacy feature.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ On account expiration, StartMail will permanently delete your account after [6 months in 3 phases](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006794398-Account-expiration).
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ StartMail allows for proxying of images within emails. If you allow the remote image to be loaded, the sender won't know what your IP address is.
+
+## More Providers
+
+These providers store your emails with zero-knowledge encryption, making them great options for keeping your stored emails secure. However, they don't support interoperable encryption standards for E2EE communications between providers.
+
+### Tutanota
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tutanota** is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of encryption. Tutanota has been in operation since **2011** and is based in Hanover, Germany. Accounts start with 1GB storage with their free plan.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tutanota.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tutanota.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tutanota.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tutanota.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/tutanota/id922429609)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.tutanota.com/)
+
+Tutanota doesn't support the [IMAP protocol](https://tutanota.com/faq/#imap) or the use of third-party [email clients](email-clients.md), and you also won't be able to add [external email accounts](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/544#issuecomment-670473647) to the Tutanota app. Neither [Email import](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/630) or [subfolders](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/927) are currently supported, though this is [due to be changed](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/kickoff-import). Emails can be exported [individually or by bulk selection](https://tutanota.com/howto#generalMail) per folder, which may be inconvenient if you have many folders.
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Paid Tutanota accounts can use up to 5 [aliases](https://tutanota.com/faq#alias) and [custom domains](https://tutanota.com/faq#custom-domain). Tutanota doesn't allow for [subaddressing (plus addresses)](https://tutanota.com/faq#plus), but you can use a [catch-all](https://tutanota.com/howto#settings-global) with a custom domain.
+
+??? warning "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ Tutanota only directly accepts credit cards and PayPal, however Bitcoin and Monero can be used to purchase gift cards via their [partnership](https://tutanota.com/faq/#cryptocurrency) with Proxystore.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ Tutanota supports [two factor authentication](https://tutanota.com/faq#2fa) with either TOTP or U2F.
+
+??? success "Data Security"
+
+ Tutanota has [zero access encryption at rest](https://tutanota.com/faq#what-encrypted) for your emails, [address book contacts](https://tutanota.com/faq#encrypted-address-book), and [calendars](https://tutanota.com/faq#calendar). This means the messages and other data stored in your account are only readable by you.
+
+??? warning "Email Encryption"
+
+ Tutanota [does not use OpenPGP](https://www.tutanota.com/faq/#pgp). Tutanota accounts can only receive encrypted emails from non-Tutanota email accounts when sent via a [temporary Tutanota mailbox](https://www.tutanota.com/howto/#encrypted-email-external).
+
+??? warning "Digital Legacy"
+
+ Tutanota doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ Tutanota will [delete inactive free accounts](https://tutanota.com/faq#inactive-accounts) after six months. You can reuse a deactivated free account if you pay.
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ Tutanota offers the business version of [Tutanota to non-profit organizations](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/secure-email-for-non-profit) for free or with a heavy discount.
+
+ Tutanota also has a business feature called [Secure Connect](https://tutanota.com/secure-connect/). This ensures customer contact to the business uses E2EE. The feature costs €240/y.
+
+## Email Aliasing Services
+
+An email aliasing service allows you to easily generate a new email address for every website you register for. The email aliases you generate are then forwarded to an email address of your choosing, hiding both your "main" email address and the identity of your email provider. True email aliasing is better than plus addressing commonly used and supported by many providers, which allows you to create aliases like yourname+[anythinghere]@example.com, because websites, advertisers, and tracking networks can trivially remove anything after the + sign to know your true email address.
+
+Email aliasing can act as a safeguard in case your email provider ever ceases operation. In that scenario, you can easily re-route your aliases to a new email address. In turn, however, you are placing trust in the aliasing service to continue functioning.
+
+Using a dedicated email aliasing service also has a number of benefits over a catch-all alias on a custom domain:
+
+- Aliases can be turned on and off individually when you need them, preventing websites from emailing you randomly.
+- Replies are sent from the alias address, shielding your real email address.
+
+They also have a number of benefits over "temporary email" services:
+
+- Aliases are permanent and can be turned on again if you need to receive something like a password reset.
+- Emails are sent to your trusted mailbox rather than stored by the alias provider.
+- Temporary email services typically have public mailboxes which can be accessed by anyone who knows the address, aliases are private to you.
+
+Our email aliasing recommendations are providers that allow you to create aliases on domains they control, as well as your own custom domain(s) for a modest yearly fee. They can also be self-hosted if you want maximum control. However, using a custom domain can have privacy-related drawbacks: If you are the only person using your custom domain, your actions can be easily tracked across websites simply by looking at the domain name in the email address and ignoring everything before the at (@) sign.
+
+Using an aliasing service requires trusting both your email provider and your aliasing provider with your unencrypted messages. Some providers mitigate this slightly with automatic PGP encryption, which reduces the number of parties you need to trust from two to one by encrypting incoming emails before they are delivered to your final mailbox provider.
+
+### AnonAddy
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **AnonAddy** lets you create 20 domain aliases on a shared domain for free, or unlimited "standard" aliases which are less anonymous.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://anonaddy.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://anonaddy.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://app.anonaddy.com/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/anonaddy){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://anonaddy.com/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://anonaddy.com/faq/#is-there-an-android-app)
+ - [:material-apple-ios: iOS](https://anonaddy.com/faq/#is-there-an-ios-app)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-GB/firefox/addon/anonaddy/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/anonaddy-anonymous-email/iadbdpnoknmbdeolbapdackdcogdmjpe)
+
+The number of shared aliases (which end in a shared domain like @anonaddy.me) that you can create is limited to 20 on AnonAddy's free plan and 50 on their $12/year plan. You can create unlimited standard aliases (which end in a domain like @[username].anonaddy.com or a custom domain on paid plans), however, as previously mentioned, this can be detrimental to privacy because people can trivially tie your standard aliases together based on the domain name alone. Unlimited shared aliases are available for $36/year.
+
+Notable free features:
+
+- [x] 20 Shared Aliases
+- [x] Unlimited Standard Aliases
+- [ ] No Outgoing Replies
+- [x] 2 Recipient Mailboxes
+- [x] Automatic PGP Encryption
+
+### SimpleLogin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **SimpleLogin** is a free service which provides email aliases on a variety of shared domain names, and optionally provides paid features like unlimited aliases and custom domains.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://simplelogin.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://simplelogin.io/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://simplelogin.io/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simple-login){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.simplelogin.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1494359858)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/simple-login/Simple-Login-Android/releases)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/simplelogin/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/dphilobhebphkdjbpfohgikllaljmgbn)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/simpleloginreceive-sen/diacfpipniklenphgljfkmhinphjlfff)
+ - [:simple-safari: Safari](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1494051017)
+
+SimpleLogin was [acquired by Proton AG](https://proton.me/news/proton-and-simplelogin-join-forces) as of April 8, 2022. If you use Proton Mail for your primary mailbox, SimpleLogin is a great choice. As both products are now owned by the same company you now only have to trust a single entity. We also expect that SimpleLogin will be more tightly integrated with Proton's offerings in the future. SimpleLogin continues to support forwarding to any email provider of your choosing. Securitum [audited](https://simplelogin.io/blog/security-audit/) SimpleLogin in early 2022 and all issues [were addressed](https://simplelogin.io/audit2022/web.pdf).
+
+You can link your SimpleLogin account in the settings with your Proton account. If you have the Proton Unlimited, Business, or Visionary Plan, you will have SimpleLogin Premium for free.
+
+Notable free features:
+
+- [x] 10 Shared Aliases
+- [x] Unlimited Replies
+- [x] 1 Recipient Mailbox
+
+## Self-Hosting Email
+
+Advanced system administrators may consider setting up their own email server. Mail servers require attention and continuous maintenance in order to keep things secure and mail delivery reliable.
+
+### Combined software solutions
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mailcow** is a more advanced mail server perfect for those with a bit more Linux experience. It has everything you need in a Docker container: A mail server with DKIM support, antivirus and spam monitoring, webmail and ActiveSync with SOGo, and web-based administration with 2FA support.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailcow.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mailcow.github.io/mailcow-dockerized-docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailcow/mailcow-dockerized){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.servercow.de/mailcow?lang=en#sal){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mail-in-a-Box** is an automated setup script for deploying a mail server on Ubuntu. Its goal is to make it easier for people to set up their own mail server.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailinabox.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mailinabox.email/guide.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mail-in-a-box/mailinabox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+For a more manual approach we've picked out these two articles:
+
+- [Setting up a mail server with OpenSMTPD, Dovecot and Rspamd](https://poolp.org/posts/2019-09-14/setting-up-a-mail-server-with-opensmtpd-dovecot-and-rspamd/) (2019)
+- [How To Run Your Own Mail Server](https://www.c0ffee.net/blog/mail-server-guide/) (August 2017)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the providers we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements for any Email provider wishing to be recommended, including implementing industry best practices, modern technology and more. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing an Email provider, and conduct your own research to ensure the Email provider you choose is the right choice for you.
+
+### Technology
+
+We regard these features as important in order to provide a safe and optimal service. You should consider whether the provider which has the features you require.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Encrypts email account data at rest with zero-access encryption.
+- Export capability as [Mbox](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mbox) or individual .eml with [RFC5322](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5322/) standard.
+- Allow users to use their own [domain name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name). Custom domain names are important to users because it allows them to maintain their agency from the service, should it turn bad or be acquired by another company which doesn't prioritize privacy.
+- Operates on owned infrastructure, i.e. not built upon third-party email service providers.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Encrypts all account data (Contacts, Calendars, etc) at rest with zero-access encryption.
+- Integrated webmail E2EE/PGP encryption provided as a convenience.
+- Support for [WKD](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD) to allow improved discovery of public OpenPGP keys via HTTP. GnuPG users can get a key by typing: `gpg --locate-key example_user@example.com`
+- Support for a temporary mailbox for external users. This is useful when you want to send an encrypted email, without sending an actual copy to your recipient. These emails usually have a limited lifespan and then are automatically deleted. They also don't require the recipient to configure any cryptography like OpenPGP.
+- Availability of the email provider's services via an [onion service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.onion).
+- [Subaddressing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email_address#Subaddressing) support.
+- Catch-all or alias functionality for those who own their own domains.
+- Use of standard email access protocols such as IMAP, SMTP or [JMAP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Meta_Application_Protocol). Standard access protocols ensure customers can easily download all of their email, should they want to switch to another provider.
+
+### Privacy
+
+We prefer our recommended providers to collect as little data as possible.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Protect sender's IP address. Filter it from showing in the `Received` header field.
+- Don't require personally identifiable information (PII) besides a username and a password.
+- Privacy policy that meets the requirements defined by the GDPR
+- Must not be hosted in the US due to [ECPA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_Communications_Privacy_Act#Criticism) which has [yet to be reformed](https://epic.org/ecpa/).
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Accepts Bitcoin, cash, and other forms of cryptocurrency and/or anonymous payment options (gift cards, etc.)
+
+### Security
+
+Email servers deal with a lot of very sensitive data. We expect that providers will adopt best industry practices in order to protect their members.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Protection of webmail with 2FA, such as TOTP.
+- Zero access encryption, builds on encryption at rest. The provider does not have the decryption keys to the data they hold. This prevents a rogue employee leaking data they have access to or remote adversary from releasing data they have stolen by gaining unauthorized access to the server.
+- [DNSSEC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Extensions) support.
+- No TLS errors or vulnerabilities when being profiled by tools such as [Hardenize](https://www.hardenize.com/), [testssl.sh](https://testssl.sh/), or [Qualys SSL Labs](https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest); this includes certificate related errors and weak DH parameters, such as those that led to [Logjam](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logjam_(computer_security)).
+- A server suite preference (optional on TLSv1.3) for strong cipher suites which support forward secrecy and authenticated encryption.
+- A valid [MTA-STS](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8461) and [TLS-RPT](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8460) policy.
+- Valid [DANE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS-based_Authentication_of_Named_Entities) records.
+- Valid [SPF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sender_Policy_Framework) and [DKIM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DomainKeys_Identified_Mail) records.
+- Have a proper [DMARC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DMARC) record and policy or use [ARC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain) for authentication. If DMARC authentication is being used, the policy must be set to `reject` or `quarantine`.
+- A server suite preference of TLS 1.2 or later and a plan for [Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate/).
+- [SMTPS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SMTPS) submission, assuming SMTP is used.
+- Website security standards such as:
+ - [HTTP Strict Transport Security](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security)
+ - [Subresource Integrity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subresource_Integrity) if loading things from external domains.
+- Must support viewing of [Message headers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header), as it is a crucial forensic feature to determine if an email is a phishing attempt.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Support for hardware authentication, i.e. U2F and [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn). U2F and WebAuthn are more secure as they use a private key stored on a client-side hardware device to authenticate people, as opposed to a shared secret that is stored on the web server and on the client side when using TOTP. Furthermore, U2F and WebAuthn are more resistant to phishing as their authentication response is based on the authenticated [domain name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name).
+- [DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844) in addition to DANE support.
+- Implementation of [Authenticated Received Chain (ARC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain), this is useful for people who post to mailing lists [RFC8617](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8617).
+- Bug-bounty programs and/or a coordinated vulnerability-disclosure process.
+- Website security standards such as:
+ - [Content Security Policy (CSP)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy)
+ - [Expect-CT](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-expect-ct)
+
+### Trust
+
+You wouldn't trust your finances to someone with a fake identity, so why trust them with your email? We require our recommended providers to be public about their ownership or leadership. We also would like to see frequent transparency reports, especially in regard to how government requests are handled.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership or ownership.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership.
+- Frequent transparency reports.
+
+### Marketing
+
+With the email providers we recommend we like to see responsible marketing.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Must self-host analytics (no Google Analytics, Adobe Analytics, etc). The provider's site must also comply with [DNT (Do Not Track)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Do_Not_Track) for those who wish to opt-out.
+
+Must not have any marketing which is irresponsible:
+
+- Claims of "unbreakable encryption." Encryption should be used with the intention that it may not be secret in the future when the technology exists to crack it.
+- Making guarantees of protecting anonymity 100%. When someone makes a claim that something is 100% it means there is no certainty for failure. We know people can quite easily deanonymize themselves in a number of ways, e.g.:
+
+- Reusing personal information e.g. (email accounts, unique pseudonyms, etc) that they accessed without anonymity software (Tor, VPN, etc)
+- [Browser fingerprinting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint)
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Clear and easy to read documentation. This includes things like, setting up 2FA, email clients, OpenPGP, etc.
+
+### Additional Functionality
+
+While not strictly requirements, there are some other convenience or privacy factors we looked into when determining which providers to recommend.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/encryption.md b/i18n/el/encryption.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f680e0ad1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/encryption.md
@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
+---
+title: "Encryption Software"
+icon: material/file-lock
+---
+
+Encryption of data is the only way to control who can access it. If you are currently not using encryption software for your hard disk, emails or files, you should pick an option here.
+
+## Multi-platform
+
+The options listed here are multi-platform and great for creating encrypted backups of your data.
+
+### Cryptomator (Cloud)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Cryptomator** is an encryption solution designed for privately saving files to any cloud provider. It allows you to create vaults that are stored on a virtual drive, the contents of which are encrypted and synced with your cloud storage provider.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://cryptomator.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://cryptomator.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.cryptomator.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/cryptomator){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://cryptomator.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.cryptomator)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/cryptomator-2/id1560822163)
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://cryptomator.org/android)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.cryptomator.Cryptomator)
+
+Cryptomator uses AES-256 encryption to encrypt both files and filenames. Cryptomator cannot encrypt metadata such as access, modification, and creation timestamps, nor the number and size of files and folders.
+
+Some Cryptomator cryptographic libraries have been [audited](https://community.cryptomator.org/t/has-there-been-a-security-review-audit-of-cryptomator/44) by Cure53. The scope of the audited libraries includes: [cryptolib](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptolib), [cryptofs](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptofs), [siv-mode](https://github.com/cryptomator/siv-mode) and [cryptomator-objc-cryptor](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptomator-objc-cryptor). The audit did not extend to [cryptolib-swift](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptolib-swift), which is a library used by Cryptomator for iOS.
+
+Cryptomator's documentation details its intended [security target](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/security-target/), [security architecture](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/architecture/), and [best practices](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/best-practices/) for use in further detail.
+
+### Picocrypt (File)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Picocrypt** is a small and simple encryption tool that provides modern encryption. Picocrypt uses the secure XChaCha20 cipher and the Argon2id key derivation function to provide a high level of security. It uses Go's standard x/crypto modules for its encryption features.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/picocrypt){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases)
+
+### VeraCrypt (Disk)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **VeraCrypt** is a source-available freeware utility used for on-the-fly encryption. It can create a virtual encrypted disk within a file, encrypt a partition, or encrypt the entire storage device with pre-boot authentication.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://veracrypt.fr){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/en/Documentation.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/code/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/en/Donation.html){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html)
+
+VeraCrypt is a fork of the discontinued TrueCrypt project. According to its developers, security improvements have been implemented and issues raised by the initial TrueCrypt code audit have been addressed.
+
+When encrypting with VeraCrypt, you have the option to select from different [hash functions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt#Encryption_scheme). We suggest you **only** select [SHA-512](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-512) and stick to the [AES](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard) block cipher.
+
+Truecrypt has been [audited a number of times](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TrueCrypt#Security_audits), and VeraCrypt has also been [audited separately](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt#VeraCrypt_audit).
+
+## OS Full Disk Encryption
+
+Modern operating systems include [FDE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_encryption) and will have a [secure cryptoprocessor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_cryptoprocessor).
+
+### BitLocker
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **BitLocker** is the full volume encryption solution bundled with Microsoft Windows. The main reason we recommend it is because of its [use of TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). [ElcomSoft](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ElcomSoft), a forensics company, has written about it in [Understanding BitLocker TPM Protection](https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2021/01/understanding-BitLocker-tpm-protection/).
+
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/BitLocker/BitLocker-overview){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+BitLocker is [only supported](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/turn-on-device-encryption-0c453637-bc88-5f74-5105-741561aae838) on Pro, Enterprise and Education editions of Windows. It can be enabled on Home editions provided that they meet the prerequisites.
+
+??? example "Enabling BitLocker on Windows Home"
+
+ To enable BitLocker on "Home" editions of Windows, you must have partitions formatted with a [GUID Partition Table](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GUID_Partition_Table) and have a dedicated TPM (v1.2, 2.0+) module.
+
+ 1. Open a command prompt and check your drive's partition table format with the following command. You should see "**GPT**" listed under "Partition Style":
+
+ ```
+ powershell Get-Disk
+ ```
+
+ 2. Run this command (in an admin command prompt) to check your TPM version. You should see `2.0` or `1.2` listed next to `SpecVersion`:
+
+ ```
+ powershell Get-WmiObject -Namespace "root/cimv2/security/microsofttpm" -Class WIN32_tpm
+ ```
+
+ 3. Access [Advanced Startup Options](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/advanced-startup-options-including-safe-mode-b90e7808-80b5-a291-d4b8-1a1af602b617). You need to reboot while pressing the F8 key before Windows starts and go into the *command prompt* in **Troubleshoot** → **Advanced Options** → **Command Prompt**.
+
+ 4. Login with your admin account and type this in the command prompt to start encryption:
+
+ ```
+ manage-bde -on c: -used
+ ```
+
+ 5. Close the command prompt and continue booting to regular Windows.
+
+ 6. Open an admin command prompt and run the following commands:
+
+ ```
+ manage-bde c: -protectors -add -rp -tpm
+ manage-bde -protectors -enable c:
+ manage-bde -protectors -get c: > %UserProfile%\Desktop\BitLocker-Recovery-Key.txt
+ ```
+
+ !!! tip
+
+ Backup `BitLocker-Recovery-Key.txt` on your Desktop to a separate storage device. Loss of this recovery code may result in loss of data.
+
+### FileVault
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FileVault** is the on-the-fly volume encryption solution built into macOS. FileVault is recommended because it [leverages](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/volume-encryption-with-filevault-sec4c6dc1b6e/web) hardware security capabilities present on an Apple silicon SoC or T2 Security Chip.
+
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/encrypt-mac-data-with-filevault-mh11785/mac){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+We recommend storing a local recovery key in a secure place as opposed to using your iCloud account for recovery.
+
+### Linux Unified Key Setup
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **LUKS** is the default FDE method for Linux. It can be used to encrypt full volumes, partitions, or create encrypted containers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/blob/main/README.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+??? example "Creating and opening encrypted containers"
+
+ ```
+ dd if=/dev/urandom of=/path-to-file bs=1M count=1024 status=progress
+ sudo cryptsetup luksFormat /path-to-file
+ ```
+
+
+ #### Opening encrypted containers
+ We recommend opening containers and volumes with `udisksctl` as this uses [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). Most file managers, such as those included with popular desktop environments, can unlock encrypted files. Tools like [udiskie](https://github.com/coldfix/udiskie) can run in the system tray and provide a helpful user interface.
+ ```
+ udisksctl loop-setup -f /path-to-file
+ udisksctl unlock -b /dev/loop0
+ ```
+
+!!! note "Remember to back up volume headers"
+
+ We recommend you always [back up your LUKS headers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Device_encryption#Backup_and_restore) in case of partial drive failure. This can be done with:
+
+ ```
+ cryptsetup luksHeaderBackup /dev/device --header-backup-file /mnt/backup/file.img
+ ```
+
+## Browser-based
+
+Browser-based encryption can be useful when you need to encrypt a file but cannot install software or apps on your device.
+
+### hat.sh
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Hat.sh** is a web application that provides secure client-side file encryption in your browser. It can also be self-hosted and is useful if you need to encrypt a file but cannot install any software on your device due to organizational policies.
+
+ [:octicons-globe-16: Website](https://hat.sh){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://hat.sh/about/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://hat.sh/about/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/sh-dv/hat.sh){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sh-dv/hat.sh#donations){ .card-link title="Donations methods can be found at the bottom of the website" }
+
+## Command-line
+
+Tools with command-line interfaces are useful for integrating [shell scripts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shell_script).
+
+### Kryptor
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Kryptor** is a free and open-source file encryption and signing tool that makes use of modern and secure cryptographic algorithms. It aims to be a better version of [age](https://github.com/FiloSottile/age) and [Minisign](https://jedisct1.github.io/minisign/) to provide a simple, easier alternative to GPG.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kryptor.co.uk){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/features#privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/tutorial){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/samuel-lucas6/Kryptor){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/#donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.kryptor.co.uk)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.kryptor.co.uk)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.kryptor.co.uk)
+
+### Tomb
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tomb** is a command-line shell wrapper for LUKS. It supports steganography via [third-party tools](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb#how-does-it-work).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.dyne.org/software/tomb){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.dyne.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+## OpenPGP
+
+OpenPGP is sometimes needed for specific tasks such as digitally signing and encrypting email. PGP has many features and is [complex](https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html) as it has been around a long time. For tasks such as signing or encrypting files, we suggest the above options.
+
+When encrypting with PGP, you have the option to configure different options in your `gpg.conf` file. We recommend staying with the standard options specified in the [GnuPG user FAQ](https://www.gnupg.org/faq/gnupg-faq.html#new_user_gpg_conf).
+
+!!! tip "Use future defaults when generating a key"
+
+ When [generating keys](https://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual/c14.html) we suggest using the `future-default` command as this will instruct GnuPG use modern cryptography such as [Curve25519](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curve25519#History) and [Ed25519](https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/):
+
+ ```bash
+ gpg --quick-gen-key alice@example.com future-default
+ ```
+
+### GNU Privacy Guard
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GnuPG** is a GPL-licensed alternative to the PGP suite of cryptographic software. GnuPG is compliant with [RFC 4880](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880), which is the current IETF specification of OpenPGP. The GnuPG project has been working on an [updated draft](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh/) in an attempt to modernize OpenPGP. GnuPG is a part of the Free Software Foundation's GNU software project and has received major [funding](https://gnupg.org/blog/20220102-a-new-future-for-gnupg.html) from the German government.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gnupg.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gnupg.org/privacy-policy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gnupg.org/documentation/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.sufficientlysecure.keychain)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://gpg4win.org/download.html)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://gpgtools.org)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://gnupg.org/download/index.html#binary)
+
+### GPG4win
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GPG4win** is a package for Windows from [Intevation and g10 Code](https://gpg4win.org/impressum.html). It includes [various tools](https://gpg4win.org/about.html) that can assist you in using GPG on Microsoft Windows. The project was initiated and originally [funded by](https://web.archive.org/web/20190425125223/https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/news/government-used-cryptography) Germany's Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) in 2005.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gpg4win.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gpg4win.org/privacy-policy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gpg4win.org/documentation.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gpg4win.git;a=summary){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://gpg4win.org/donate.html){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://gpg4win.org/download.html)
+
+### GPG Suite
+
+!!! note
+
+ We suggest [Canary Mail](email-clients.md#canary-mail) for using PGP with email on iOS devices.
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GPG Suite** provides OpenPGP support for [Apple Mail](email-clients.md#apple-mail) and macOS.
+
+ We recommend taking a look at their [First steps](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb/how-to/first-steps-where-do-i-start-where-do-i-begin-setup-gpgtools-create-a-new-key-your-first-encrypted-email) and [Knowledge base](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb) for support.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gpgtools.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gpgtools.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GPGTools){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://gpgtools.org)
+
+### OpenKeychain
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OpenKeychain** is an Android implementation of GnuPG. It's commonly required by mail clients such as [K-9 Mail](email-clients.md#k-9-mail) and [FairEmail](email-clients.md#fairemail) and other Android apps to provide encryption support. Cure53 completed a [security audit](https://www.openkeychain.org/openkeychain-3-6) of OpenKeychain 3.6 in October 2015. Technical details about the audit and OpenKeychain's solutions can be found [here](https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain/wiki/cure53-Security-Audit-2015).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.openkeychain.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.openkeychain.org/help/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.openkeychain.org/faq/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.sufficientlysecure.keychain)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Qualifications
+
+- Cross-platform encryption apps must be open-source.
+- File encryption apps must support decryption on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- External disk encryption apps must support decryption on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- Internal (OS) disk encryption apps must be cross-platform or built in to the operating system natively.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Operating System (FDE) encryption apps should utilize hardware security such as a TPM or Secure Enclave.
+- File encryption apps should have first- or third-party support for mobile platforms.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/file-sharing.md b/i18n/el/file-sharing.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f499954b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/file-sharing.md
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+---
+title: "File Sharing and Sync"
+icon: material/share-variant
+---
+
+Discover how to privately share your files between your devices, with your friends and family, or anonymously online.
+
+## File Sharing
+
+### Send
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Send** is a fork of Mozilla’s discontinued Firefox Send service which allows you to send files to others with a link. Files are encrypted on your device so that they cannot be read by the server, and they can be optionally password-protected as well. The maintainer of Send hosts a [public instance](https://send.vis.ee/). You can use other public instances, or you can host Send yourself.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://send.vis.ee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send-instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/timvisee){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Send can be used via its web interface or via the [ffsend](https://github.com/timvisee/ffsend) CLI. If you are familiar with the command-line and send files frequently, we recommend using the CLI client to avoid JavaScript-based encryption. You can specify the `--host` flag to use a specific server:
+
+```bash
+ffsend upload --host https://send.vis.ee/ FILE
+```
+
+### OnionShare
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OnionShare** is an open-source tool that lets you securely and anonymously share a file of any size. It works by starting a web server accessible as a Tor onion service, with an unguessable URL that you can share with the recipients to download or send files.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://onionshare.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://lldan5gahapx5k7iafb3s4ikijc4ni7gx5iywdflkba5y2ezyg6sjgyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.onionshare.org){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/onionshare/onionshare){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://onionshare.org/#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://onionshare.org/#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://onionshare.org/#download)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must not store decrypted data on a remote server.
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must either have clients for Linux, macOS, and Windows; or have a web interface.
+
+## FreedomBox
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FreedomBox** is an operating system designed to be run on a [single-board computer (SBC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-board_computer). The purpose is to make it easy to set up server applications that you might want to self-host.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://freedombox.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://wiki.debian.org/FreedomBox/Manual){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://salsa.debian.org/freedombox-team/freedombox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://freedomboxfoundation.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+## File Sync
+
+### Nextcloud (Client-Server)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nextcloud** is a suite of free and open-source client-server software for creating your own file hosting services on a private server you control.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://nextcloud.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://nextcloud.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://nextcloud.com/support/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/nextcloud){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nextcloud.com/contribute/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nextcloud.client)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1125420102)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/nextcloud/android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/www/nextcloud)
+
+!!! danger
+
+ We don't recommend using the [E2EE App](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/end_to_end_encryption) for Nextcloud as it may lead to data loss; it is highly experimental and not production quality.
+
+### Syncthing (P2P)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Syncthing** is an open-source peer-to-peer continuous file synchronization utility. It is used to synchronize files between two or more devices over the local network or the internet. Syncthing does not use a centralized server; it uses the [Block Exchange Protocol](https://docs.syncthing.net/specs/bep-v1.html#bep-v1) to transfer data between devices. All data is encrypted using TLS.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://syncthing.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.syncthing.net){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/syncthing){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://syncthing.net/donations/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nutomic.syncthingandroid)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-openbsd: OpenBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-netbsd: NetBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+#### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must not require a third-party remote/cloud server.
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must either have clients for Linux, macOS, and Windows; or have a web interface.
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Has mobile clients for iOS and Android, which at least support document previews.
+- Supports photo backup from iOS and Android, and optionally supports file/folder sync on Android.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/frontends.md b/i18n/el/frontends.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c1c227615
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/frontends.md
@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+---
+title: "Frontends"
+icon: material/flip-to-front
+---
+
+Sometimes services will try to force you to sign up for an account by blocking access to content with annoying popups. They might also break without JavaScript enabled. These frontends can allow you to get around these restrictions.
+
+## LBRY
+
+### Librarian
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Librarian** is a free and open-source frontend for [Odysee](https://odysee.com/) (LBRY) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://librarian.codeberg.page/){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Librarian does not proxy video streams by default. Videos watched through Librarian will still make direct connections to Odysee's servers (e.g. `odycdn.com`); however, some instances may enable proxying which would be detailed in the instance's privacy policy.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Librarian is useful if you want watch LBRY content on mobile without mandatory telemetry and if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, as is the case with [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Librarian, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a Librarian instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Librarian instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect the default policy. Librarian instances feature a "privacy nutrition label" to provide an overview of their policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+## Twitter
+
+### Nitter
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nitter** is a free and open-source frontend for [Twitter](https://twitter.com) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter/wiki/Instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter#nitter){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Nitter is useful if you want to browse Twitter content without having to log in and if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, as is the case with [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level. It also allows you to [create RSS feeds for Twitter](news-aggregators.md#twitter).
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Nitter, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a Nitter instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Nitter instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect the default policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+## TikTok
+
+### ProxiTok
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **ProxiTok** is an open source frontend to the [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com) website that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok/wiki/Public-instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+!!! tip
+
+ ProxiTok is useful if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, such as [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting ProxiTok, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a ProxiTok instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. ProxiTok instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect their associated privacy policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+## YouTube
+
+### FreeTube
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FreeTube** is a free and open-source desktop application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com). When using FreeTube, your subscription list and playlists are saved locally on your device.
+
+ By default, FreeTube blocks all YouTube advertisements. In addition, FreeTube optionally integrates with [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://freetubeapp.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://freetubeapp.io/privacy.php){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.freetubeapp.io/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/FreeTubeApp/FreeTube){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/FreeTube){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/io.freetubeapp.FreeTube)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using FreeTube, your IP address may still be known to YouTube, [Invidious](https://instances.invidious.io) or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+### Yattee
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Yattee** is a free and open-source privacy oriented video player for iOS, tvOS and macOS for [YouTube](https://youtube.com). When using Yattee, your subscription list are saved locally on your device.
+
+ You will need to take a few [extra steps](https://gonzoknows.com/posts/Yattee/) before you can use Yattee to watch YouTube, due to App Store restrictions.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://github.com/yattee/yattee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://r.yattee.stream/docs/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/wiki/Donations){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-apple: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/yattee/id1595136629)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/releases)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using Yattee, your IP address may still be known to YouTube, [Invidious](https://instances.invidious.io), [Piped](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances) or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+By default, Yattee blocks all YouTube advertisements. In addition, Yattee optionally integrates with [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments.
+
+### LibreTube (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **LibreTube** is a free and open-source Android application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) which uses the [Piped](#piped) API.
+
+ LibreTube allows you to store your subscription list and playlists locally on your Android device, or to an account on your Piped instance of choice, which allows you to access them seamlessly on other devices as well.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://libre-tube.github.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube#privacy-policy-and-disclaimer){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube/releases)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using LibreTube, your IP address will be visible to the [Piped](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances) instance you choose and/or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+By default, LibreTube blocks all YouTube advertisements. Additionally, Libretube uses [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments. You are able to fully configure the types of segments that SponsorBlock will skip, or disable it completely. There is also a button on the video player itself to disable it for a specific video if desired.
+
+### NewPipe (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation annotate
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **NewPipe** is a free and open-source Android application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com), [SoundCloud](https://soundcloud.com), [media.ccc.de](https://media.ccc.de), [Bandcamp](https://bandcamp.com), and [PeerTube](https://joinpeertube.org/) (1).
+
+ Your subscription list and playlists are saved locally on your Android device.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://newpipe.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://newpipe.net/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://teamnewpipe.github.io/documentation/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamNewPipe/NewPipe){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://newpipe.net/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/TeamNewPipe/NewPipe/releases)
+
+1. The default instance is [FramaTube](https://framatube.org/), however more can be added via **Settings** → **Content** → **PeerTube instances**
+
+!!! Warning
+
+ When using NewPipe, your IP address will be visible to the video providers used. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+### Invidious
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Invidious** is a free and open-source frontend for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://invidious.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://instances.invidious.io){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.invidious.io/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/iv-org/invidious){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://invidious.io/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Invidious does not proxy video streams by default. Videos watched through Invidious will still make direct connections to Google's servers (e.g. `googlevideo.com`); however, some instances support video proxying—simply enable *Proxy videos* within the instances' settings or add `&local=true` to the URL.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Invidious is useful if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, such as [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level. It does not provide privacy by itself, and we don’t recommend logging into any accounts.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Invidious, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using an Invidious instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Invidious instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect their associated privacy policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+### Piped
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Piped** is a free and open-source frontend for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ Piped requires JavaScript in order to function and there are a number of public instances.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://piped.kavin.rocks/preferences#ddlInstanceSelection){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://piped-docs.kavin.rocks/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped#donations){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Piped is useful if you want to use [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) without installing an extension or to access age-restricted content without an account. It does not provide privacy by itself, and we don’t recommend logging into any accounts.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Piped, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a Piped instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Piped instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect their associated privacy policy.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+Recommended frontends...
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must be self-hostable.
+- Must provide all basic website functionality available to anonymous users.
+
+We only consider frontends for websites which are...
+
+- Not normally accessible without JavaScript.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/index.md b/i18n/el/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..476ba4a06
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+---
+template: overrides/home.el.html
+hide:
+ - navigation
+ - toc
+ - feedback
+---
+
+
+## Γιατί πρέπει να με νοιάζει;
+
+##### "Δεν έχω κάτι να κρύψω. Γιατί πρέπει να με νοιάζει η ιδιωτικότητα μου;"
+
+Όπως το δικαίωμα για τον διαφυλετικό γάμο, το δικαίωμα ψήφου για τις γυναικών, η ελευθερία του λόγου και πολλά άλλα, έτσι και το δικαίωμά για την ιδιωτικότητα μας δεν έχει πάντα υποστηριχθεί. Σε πολλές δικτατορίες, αυτό δεν ισχύει. Γενιές πριν από τη δική μας αγωνίστηκαν για το δικαίωμα της ιδιωτικότητας μας. ==Η ιδιωτικότητα είναι ένα ανθρώπινο δικαίωμα, εγγενές σε όλους μας,== το οποίο δικαιούμαστε (χωρίς διακρίσεις).
+
+Δεν πρέπει να μπερδεύεις την ιδιωτικότητα με τη μυστικότητα. Ξέρουμε τι συμβαίνει όσο είσαι στο μπάνιο, αλλά εξακολουθείς να κλείνεις την πόρτα. Αυτό συμβαίνει επειδή θέλεις ιδιωτικότητα, όχι μυστικότητα. **Όλοι** έχουν κάτι να προστατεύσουν. Η ιδιωτικότητα είναι κάτι που μας κάνει ανθρώπους.
+
+[:material-target-account: Συχνές Απειλές Στο Διαδίκτυο](basics/common-threats.md ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+## Τι πρέπει να κάνω;
+
+##### Πρώτα απ 'όλα, πρέπει να φτιάξεις ένα σχέδιο
+
+Το να προσπαθείς να προστατεύσεις συνέχεια όλα τα δεδομένα σου από όλους είναι ανέφικτο, δαπανηρό και εξαντλητικό. Αλλά μην ανησυχείς! Η ασφάλεια είναι μια διαδικασία και, αν σκέφτεσαι εκ των προτέρων, μπορείς να δημιουργήσεις ένα σχέδιο που είναι κατάλληλο για εσένα. Η ασφάλεια δεν αφορά μόνο τα εργαλεία που χρησιμοποιείς ή το λογισμικό που κατεβάζεις. Rather, it begins by understanding the unique threats you face, and how you can mitigate them.
+
+==This process of identifying threats and defining countermeasures is called **threat modeling**==, and it forms the basis of every good security and privacy plan.
+
+[:material-book-outline: Learn More About Threat Modeling](basics/threat-modeling.md ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+---
+
+## We need you! Here's how to get involved:
+
+[:simple-discourse:](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/){ title="Join our Forum" }
+[:simple-mastodon:](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides){ rel=me title="Follow us on Mastodon" }
+[:material-book-edit:](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org){ title="Contribute to this website" }
+[:material-translate:](https://matrix.to/#/#pg-i18n:aragon.sh){ title="Help translate this website" }
+[:simple-matrix:](https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org){ title="Chat with us on Matrix" }
+[:material-information-outline:](about/index.md){ title="Learn more about us" }
+[:material-hand-coin-outline:](about/donate.md){ title="Support the project" }
+
+It's important for a website like Privacy Guides to always stay up-to-date. We need our audience to keep an eye on software updates for the applications listed on our site and follow recent news about providers that we recommend. It's hard to keep up with the fast pace of the internet, but we try our best. If you spot an error, think a provider should not be listed, notice a qualified provider is missing, believe a browser plugin is no longer the best choice, or uncover any other issue, please let us know.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/kb-archive.md b/i18n/el/kb-archive.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b5680249c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/kb-archive.md
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+---
+title: KB Archive
+icon: material/archive
+---
+
+# Pages Moved to Blog
+
+Some pages that used to be in our knowledge base can now be found on our blog:
+
+- [GrapheneOS vs. CalyxOS](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/)
+- [Signal Configuration Hardening](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening/)
+- [Linux - System Hardening](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/22/linux-system-hardening/)
+- [Linux - Application Sandboxing](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/22/linux-application-sandboxing/)
+- [Secure Data Erasure](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/05/25/secure-data-erasure/)
+- [Integrating Metadata Removal](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/09/integrating-metadata-removal/)
+- [iOS Configuration Guide](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/22/ios-configuration-guide/)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/meta/brand.md b/i18n/el/meta/brand.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..69575141a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/meta/brand.md
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+---
+title: Branding Guidelines
+---
+
+The name of the website is **Privacy Guides** and should **not** be changed to:
+
+
+
+The name of the subreddit is **r/PrivacyGuides** or **the Privacy Guides Subreddit**.
+
+Additional branding guidelines can be found at [github.com/privacyguides/brand](https://github.com/privacyguides/brand)
+
+## Trademark
+
+"Privacy Guides" and the shield logo are trademarks owned by Jonah Aragon, unlimited usage is granted to the Privacy Guides project.
+
+Without waiving any of its rights, Privacy Guides does not advise others on the scope of its intellectual property rights. Privacy Guides does not permit or consent to any use of its trademarks in any manner that is likely to cause confusion by implying association with or sponsorship by Privacy Guides. If you are aware of any such use, please contact Jonah Aragon at jonah@privacyguides.org. Consult your legal counsel if you have questions.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/meta/git-recommendations.md b/i18n/el/meta/git-recommendations.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e9b9a7191
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/meta/git-recommendations.md
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+---
+title: Git Recommendations
+---
+
+If you make changes to this website on GitHub.com's web editor directly, you shouldn't have to worry about this. If you are developing locally and/or are a long-term website editor (who should probably be developing locally!), consider these recommendations.
+
+## Enable SSH Key Commit Signing
+
+You can use an existing SSH key for signing, or [create a new one](https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/connecting-to-github-with-ssh/generating-a-new-ssh-key-and-adding-it-to-the-ssh-agent).
+
+1. Configure your Git client to sign commits and tags by default (remove `--global` to only sign by default for this repo):
+ ```
+ git config --global commit.gpgsign true
+ git config --global gpg.format ssh
+ git config --global tag.gpgSign true
+ ```
+2. Copy your SSH public key to your clipboard, for example:
+ ```
+ pbcopy < ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+ # Copies the contents of the id_ed25519.pub file to your clipboard
+ ```
+3. Set your SSH key for signing in Git with the following command, replacing the last string in quotes with the public key in your clipboard:
+ ```
+ git config --global user.signingkey 'ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3(...) user@example.com'
+ ```
+
+Ensure you [add your SSH key to your GitHub account](https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/connecting-to-github-with-ssh/adding-a-new-ssh-key-to-your-github-account#adding-a-new-ssh-key-to-your-account) **as a Signing Key** (as opposed to or in addition to as an Authentication Key).
+
+## Rebase on Git pull
+
+Use `git pull --rebase` instead of `git pull` when pulling in changes from GitHub to your local machine. This way your local changes will always be "on top of" the latest changes on GitHub, and you avoid merge commits (which are disallowed in this repo).
+
+You can set this to be the default behavior:
+
+```
+git config --global pull.rebase true
+```
+
+## Rebase from `main` before submitting a PR
+
+If you are working on your own branch, run these commands before submitting a PR:
+
+```
+git fetch origin
+git rebase origin/main
+```
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/meta/uploading-images.md b/i18n/el/meta/uploading-images.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..69102f6de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/meta/uploading-images.md
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+---
+title: Uploading Images
+---
+
+Here are a couple of general rules for contributing to Privacy Guides:
+
+## Images
+
+- We **prefer** SVG images, but if those do not exist we can use PNG images
+
+Company logos have canvas size of:
+
+- 128x128px
+- 384x128px
+
+## Optimization
+
+### PNG
+
+Use the [OptiPNG](https://sourceforge.net/projects/optipng/) to optimize the PNG image:
+
+```bash
+optipng -o7 file.png
+```
+
+### SVG
+
+#### Inkscape
+
+[Scour](https://github.com/scour-project/scour) all SVG images.
+
+In Inkscape:
+
+1. File Save As..
+2. Set type to Optimized SVG (*.svg)
+
+In the **Options** tab:
+
+- **Number of significant digits for coordinates** > **5**
+- [x] Turn on **Shorten color values**
+- [x] Turn on **Convert CSS attributes to XML attributes**
+- [x] Turn on **Collapse groups**
+- [x] Turn on **Create groups for similar attributes**
+- [ ] Turn off **Keep editor data**
+- [ ] Turn off **Keep unreferenced definitions**
+- [x] Turn on **Work around renderer bugs**
+
+In the **SVG Output** tab under **Document options**:
+
+- [ ] Turn off **Remove the XML declaration**
+- [x] Turn on **Remove metadata**
+- [x] Turn on **Remove comments**
+- [x] Turn on **Embeded raster images**
+- [x] Turn on **Enable viewboxing**
+
+In the **SVG Output** under **Pretty-printing**:
+
+- [ ] Turn off **Format output with line-breaks and indentation**
+- **Indentation characters** > Select **Space**
+- **Depth of indentation** > **1**
+- [ ] Turn off **Strip the "xml:space" attribute from the root SVG element**
+
+In the **IDs** tab:
+
+- [x] Turn on **Remove unused IDs**
+- [ ] Turn off **Shorten IDs**
+- **Prefix shortened IDs with** > `leave blank`
+- [x] Turn on **Preserve manually created IDs not ending with digits**
+- **Preserve the following IDs** > `leave blank`
+- **Preserve IDs starting with** > `leave blank`
+
+#### CLI
+
+The same can be achieved with the [Scour](https://github.com/scour-project/scour) command:
+
+```bash
+scour --set-precision=5 \
+ --create-groups \
+ --renderer-workaround \
+ --remove-descriptive-elements \
+ --enable-comment-stripping \
+ --enable-viewboxing \
+ --indent=space \
+ --nindent=1 \
+ --no-line-breaks \
+ --enable-id-stripping \
+ --protect-ids-noninkscape \
+ input.svg output.svg
+```
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/meta/writing-style.md b/i18n/el/meta/writing-style.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9a1019ea2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/meta/writing-style.md
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+---
+title: Writing Style
+---
+
+Privacy Guides is written in American English, and you should refer to [APA Style guidelines](https://apastyle.apa.org/style-grammar-guidelines/grammar) when in doubt.
+
+In general the [United States federal plain language guidelines](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/) provide a good overview of how to write clearly and concisely. We highlight a few important notes from these guidelines below.
+
+## Writing for our audience
+
+Privacy Guides' intended [audience](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/audience/) is primarily average, technology using adults. Don't dumb down content as if you are addressing a middle-school class, but don't overuse complicated terminology about concepts average computer users wouldn't be familiar with.
+
+### Address only what people want to know
+
+People don't need overly complex articles with little relevance to them. Figure out what you want people to accomplish when writing an article, and only include those details.
+
+> Tell your audience why the material is important to them. Say, “If you want a research grant, here’s what you have to do.” Or, “If you want to mine federal coal, here’s what you should know.” Or, “If you’re planning a trip to Rwanda, read this first.”
+
+### Address people directly
+
+We're writing *for* a wide variety of people, but we are writing *to* the person who is actually reading it. Use "you" to address the reader directly.
+
+> More than any other single technique, using “you” pulls users into the information and makes it relevant to them.
+>
+> When you use “you” to address users, they are more likely to understand what their responsibility is.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/audience/address-the-user/)
+
+### Avoid "users"
+
+Avoid calling people "users", in favor of "people", or a more specific description of the group of people you are writing for.
+
+## Organizing content
+
+Organization is key. Content should flow from most to least important information, and use headers as much as needed to logically separate different ideas.
+
+- Limit the document to around five or six sections. Long documents should probably be broken up into separate pages.
+- Mark important ideas with **bold** or *italics*.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/design/)
+
+### Begin with a topic sentence
+
+> If you tell your reader what they’re going to read about, they’re less likely to have to read your paragraph again. Headings help, but they’re not enough. Establish a context for your audience before you provide them with the details.
+>
+> We often write the way we think, putting our premises first and then our conclusion. It may be the natural way to develop thoughts, but we wind up with the topic sentence at the end of the paragraph. Move it up front and let users know where you’re going. Don’t make readers hold a lot of information in their heads before getting to the point.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/organize/have-a-topic-sentence/)
+
+## Choose your words carefully
+
+> Words matter. They are the most basic building blocks of written and spoken communication. Don’t complicate things by using jargon, technical terms, or abbreviations that people won’t understand.
+
+We should try to avoid abbreviations where possible, but technology is full of abbreviations. In general, spell out the abbreviation/acronym the first time it is used on a page, and add the abbreviation to the abbreviation glossary file when it is used repeatedly.
+
+> Kathy McGinty offers tongue-in-cheek instructions for bulking up your simple, direct sentences:
+>
+> > There is no escaping the fact that it is considered very important to note that a number of various available applicable studies ipso facto have generally identified the fact that additional appropriate nocturnal employment could usually keep juvenile adolescents off thoroughfares during the night hours, including but not limited to the time prior to midnight on weeknights and/or 2 a.m. on weekends.
+>
+> And the original, using stronger, simpler words:
+>
+> > More night jobs would keep youths off the streets.
+
+## Be concise
+
+> Unnecessary words waste your audience’s time. Great writing is like a conversation. Omit information that the audience doesn’t need to know. This can be difficult as a subject matter expert so it’s important to have someone look at the information from the audience’s perspective.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/concise/)
+
+## Keep text conversational
+
+> Verbs are the fuel of writing. They give your sentences power and direction. They enliven your writing and make it more interesting.
+>
+> Verbs tell your audience what to do. Make sure it’s clear who does what.
+
+### Use active voice
+
+> Active voice makes it clear who is supposed to do what. It eliminates ambiguity about responsibilities. Not “It must be done,” but “You must do it.”
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/conversational/use-active-voice/)
+
+### Use "must" for requirements
+
+> - “must” for an obligation
+> - “must not” for a prohibition
+> - “may” for a discretionary action
+> - “should” for a recommendation
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/mobile-browsers.md b/i18n/el/mobile-browsers.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d13bfb6af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/mobile-browsers.md
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+---
+title: "Mobile Browsers"
+icon: material/cellphone-information
+---
+
+These are our currently recommended mobile web browsers and configurations for standard/non-anonymous internet browsing. If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) instead. In general, we recommend keeping extensions to a minimum; they have privileged access within your browser, require you to trust the developer, can make you [stand out](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint), and [weaken](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/chromium-extensions/c/0ei-UCHNm34/m/lDaXwQhzBAAJ) site isolation.
+
+## Android
+
+On Android, Firefox is still less secure than Chromium-based alternatives: Mozilla's engine, [GeckoView](https://mozilla.github.io/geckoview/), has yet to support [site isolation](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2021/05/introducing-firefox-new-site-isolation-security-architecture) or enable [isolatedProcess](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1565196).
+
+### Brave
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Brave Browser** includes a built-in content blocker and [privacy features](https://brave.com/privacy-features/), many of which are enabled by default.
+
+ Brave is built upon the Chromium web browser project, so it should feel familiar and have minimal website compatibility issues.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://brave.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://brave4u7jddbv7cyviptqjc7jusxh72uik7zt6adtckl5f4nwy2v72qd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://brave.com/privacy/browser/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.brave.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads annotate
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.brave.browser)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/releases)
+
+#### Recommended Configuration
+
+Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. When you use Brave, we recommend changing the following settings to protect your privacy from certain parties, but all browsers other than the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) will be traceable by *somebody* in some regard or another.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Brave Shields & privacy**
+
+##### Shields
+
+Brave includes some anti-fingerprinting measures in its [Shields](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360022973471-What-is-Shields-) feature. We suggest configuring these options [globally](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360023646212-How-do-I-configure-global-and-site-specific-Shields-settings-) across all pages that you visit.
+
+##### Brave shields global defaults
+
+Shields' options can be downgraded on a per-site basis as needed, but by default we recommend setting the following:
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Aggressive** under Block trackers & ads
+
+ ??? warning "Use default filter lists"
+ Brave allows you to select additional content filters within the internal `brave://adblock` page. We advise against using this feature; instead, keep the default filter lists. Using extra lists will make you stand out from other Brave users and may also increase attack surface if there is an exploit in Brave and a malicious rule is added to one of the lists you use.
+
+- [x] Select **Upgrade connections to HTTPS**
+- [x] (Optional) Select **Block Scripts** (1)
+- [x] Select **Strict, may break sites** under **Block fingerprinting**
+
+
+
+1. This option provides functionality similar to uBlock Origin's advanced [blocking modes](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) or the [NoScript](https://noscript.net/) extension.
+
+##### Clear browsing data
+
+- [x] Select **Clear data on exit**
+
+##### Social Media Blocking
+
+- [ ] Uncheck all social media components
+
+##### Other privacy settings
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Disable non-proxied UDP** under [WebRTC IP Handling Policy](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360017989132-How-do-I-change-my-Privacy-Settings-#webrtc)
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow sites to check if you have payment methods saved**
+- [ ] Uncheck **IPFS Gateway** (1)
+- [x] Select **Close tabs on exit**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow privacy-preserving product analytics (P3A)**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send diagnostic reports**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send daily usage ping to Brave**
+
+1. InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is a decentralized, peer-to-peer network for storing and sharing data in a distributed filesystem. Unless you use the feature, disable it.
+
+
+
+#### Brave Sync
+
+[Brave Sync](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360059793111-Understanding-Brave-Sync) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices without requiring an account and protects it with E2EE.
+
+## iOS
+
+On iOS, any app that can browse the web is [restricted](https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines) to using an Apple-provided [WebKit framework](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/webkit), so there is little reason to use a third-party web browser.
+
+### Safari
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Safari** is the default browser in iOS. It includes [privacy features](https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/browse-the-web-privately-iphb01fc3c85/15.0/ios/15.0) such as Intelligent Tracking Protection, Privacy Report, isolated Private Browsing tabs, iCloud Private Relay, and automatic HTTPS upgrades.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.apple.com/safari/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/safari/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/safari/welcome/mac){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+#### Recommended Configuration
+
+These options can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Safari** → **Privacy and Security**.
+
+##### Cross-Site Tracking Prevention
+
+- [x] Enable **Prevent Cross-Site Tracking**
+
+This enables WebKit's [Intelligent Tracking Protection](https://webkit.org/tracking-prevention/#intelligent-tracking-prevention-itp). The feature helps protect against unwanted tracking by using on-device machine learning to stop trackers. ITP protects against many common threats, but it does not block all tracking avenues because it is designed to not interfere with website usability.
+
+##### Privacy Report
+
+Privacy Report provides a snapshot of cross-site trackers currently prevented from profiling you on the website you're visiting. It can also display a weekly report to show which trackers have been blocked over time.
+
+Privacy Report is accessible via the Page Settings menu.
+
+##### Privacy Preserving Ad Measurement
+
+- [ ] Disable **Privacy Preserving Ad Measurement**
+
+Ad click measurement has traditionally used tracking technology that infringes on user privacy. [Private Click Measurement](https://webkit.org/blog/11529/introducing-private-click-measurement-pcm/) is a WebKit feature and proposed web standard aimed towards allowing advertisers to measure the effectiveness of web campaigns without compromising on user privacy.
+
+The feature has little privacy concerns on its own, so while you can choose to leave it on, we consider the fact that it's automatically disabled in Private Browsing to be an indicator for disabling the feature.
+
+##### Always-on Private Browsing
+
+Open Safari and tap the Tabs button, located in the bottom right. Then, expand the Tab Groups list.
+
+- [x] Select **Private**
+
+Safari's Private Browsing mode offers additional privacy protections. Private Browsing uses a new [ephemeral](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/urlsessionconfiguration/1410529-ephemeral) session for each tab, meaning tabs are isolated from one another. There are also other smaller privacy benefits with Private Browsing, such as not sending a webpage’s address to Apple when using Safari's translation feature.
+
+Do note that Private Browsing does not save cookies and website data, so it won't be possible to remain signed into sites. This may be an inconvenience.
+
+##### iCloud Sync
+
+Synchronization of Safari History, Tab Groups, iCloud Tabs and saved passwords are E2EE. However, by default, bookmarks are [not](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303). Apple can decrypt and access them in accordance with their [privacy policy](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/).
+
+You can enable E2EE for you Safari bookmarks and downloads by enabling [Advanced Data Protection](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212520). Go to your **Apple ID name → iCloud → Advanced Data Protection**.
+
+- [x] Turn On **Advanced Data Protection**
+
+If you use iCloud with Advanced Data Protection disabled, we also recommend checking to ensure Safari's default download location is set to locally on your device. This option can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Safari** → **General** → **Downloads**.
+
+### AdGuard
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **AdGuard for iOS** is a free and open-source content-blocking extension for Safari that uses the native [Content Blocker API](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/safariservices/creating_a_content_blocker).
+
+ AdGuard for iOS has some premium features; however, standard Safari content blocking is free of charge.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://adguard.com/en/adguard-ios/overview.html){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://adguard.com/privacy/ios.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://kb.adguard.com/ios){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdguardForiOS){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id1047223162)
+
+Additional filter lists do slow things down and may increase your attack surface, so only apply what you need.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must support automatic updates.
+- Must receive engine updates in 0-1 days from upstream release.
+- Any changes required to make the browser more privacy-respecting should not negatively impact user experience.
+- Android browsers must use the Chromium engine.
+ - Unfortunately, Mozilla GeckoView is still less secure than Chromium on Android.
+ - iOS browsers are limited to WebKit.
+
+### Extension Criteria
+
+- Must not replicate built-in browser or OS functionality.
+- Must directly impact user privacy, i.e. must not simply provide information.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/multi-factor-authentication.md b/i18n/el/multi-factor-authentication.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..045a019b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/multi-factor-authentication.md
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+---
+title: "Multi-Factor Authenticators"
+icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication'
+---
+
+## Hardware Security Keys
+
+### YubiKey
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ 
+
+ The **YubiKeys** are among the most popular security keys. Some YubiKey models have a wide range of features such as: [Universal 2nd Factor (U2F)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_2nd_Factor), [FIDO2 and WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online), [Yubico OTP](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#yubico-otp), [Personal Identity Verification (PIV)](https://developers.yubico.com/PIV), [OpenPGP](https://developers.yubico.com/PGP/), [TOTP and HOTP](https://developers.yubico.com/OATH) authentication.
+
+ One of the benefits of the YubiKey is that one key can do almost everything (YubiKey 5), you could expect from a hardware security key. We do encourage you to take the [quiz](https://www.yubico.com/quiz/) before purchasing in order to make sure you make the right choice.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.yubico.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.yubico.com/support/terms-conditions/privacy-notice){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.yubico.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+The [comparison table](https://www.yubico.com/store/compare/) shows the features and how the YubiKeys compare. We highly recommend that you select keys from the YubiKey 5 Series.
+
+YubiKeys can be programmed using the [YubiKey Manager](https://www.yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-manager/) or [YubiKey Personalization Tools](https://www.yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-personalization-tools/). For managing TOTP codes, you can use the [Yubico Authenticator](https://www.yubico.com/products/yubico-authenticator/). All of Yubico's clients are open-source.
+
+For models which support HOTP and TOTP, there are 2 slots in the OTP interface which could be used for HOTP and 32 slots to store TOTP secrets. These secrets are stored encrypted on the key and never expose them to the devices they are plugged into. Once a seed (shared secret) is given to the Yubico Authenticator, it will only give out the six-digit codes, but never the seed. This security model helps limit what an attacker can do if they compromise one of the devices running the Yubico Authenticator and make the YubiKey resistant to a physical attacker.
+
+!!! warning
+ The firmware of YubiKey is not open-source and is not updatable. If you want features in newer firmware versions, or if there is a vulnerability in the firmware version you are using, you would need to purchase a new key.
+
+### Nitrokey / Librem Key
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nitrokey** has a security key capable of [FIDO2 and WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) called the **Nitrokey FIDO2**. For PGP support, you need to purchase one of their other keys such as the **Nitrokey Start**, **Nitrokey Pro 2** or the **Nitrokey Storage 2**.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.nitrokey.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.nitrokey.com/data-privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.nitrokey.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+The [comparison table](https://www.nitrokey.com/#comparison) shows the features and how the Nitrokey models compare. The **Nitrokey 3** listed will have a combined feature set.
+
+Nitrokey models can be configured using the [Nitrokey app](https://www.nitrokey.com/download).
+
+For the models which support HOTP and TOTP, there are 3 slots for HOTP and 15 for TOTP. Some Nitrokeys can act as a password manager. They can store 16 different credentials and encrypt them using the same password as the OpenPGP interface.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ While Nitrokeys do not release the HOTP/TOTP secrets to the device they are plugged into, the HOTP and TOTP storage is **not** encrypted and is vulnerable to physical attacks. If you are looking to store HOTP or TOTP these secrets, we highly recommend that you use a Yubikey instead.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Resetting the OpenPGP interface on a Nitrokey will also make the password database [inaccessible](https://docs.nitrokey.com/pro/linux/factory-reset).
+
+ The Nitrokey Pro 2, Nitrokey Storage 2, and the upcoming Nitrokey 3 supports system integrity verification for laptops with the [Coreboot](https://www.coreboot.org/) + [Heads](https://osresearch.net/) firmware. Purism's [Librem Key](https://puri.sm/products/librem-key/) is a rebranded NitroKey Pro 2 with similar firmware and can also be used for the same purposes.
+
+Nitrokey's firmware is open-source, unlike the YubiKey. The firmware on modern NitroKey models (except the **NitroKey Pro 2**) is updatable.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ The Nitrokey app, while compatible with Librem Keys, requires `libnitrokey` version 3.6 or above to recognize them. Currently, the package is outdated on Windows, macOS, and most Linux distributions' repository, so you will likely have to compile the Nitrokey app yourself to get it working with the Librem Key. On Linux, you can obtain an up-to-date version from [Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.nitrokey.nitrokey-app).
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+#### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must use high quality, tamper resistant hardware security modules.
+- Must support the latest FIDO2 specification.
+- Must not allow private key extraction.
+- Devices which cost over $35 must support handling OpenPGP and S/MIME.
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should be available in USB-C form-factor.
+- Should be available with NFC.
+- Should support TOTP secret storage.
+- Should support secure firmware updates.
+
+## Authenticator Apps
+
+Authenticator Apps implement a security standard adopted by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) called **Time-based One-time Passwords**, or **TOTP**. This is a method where websites share a secret with you which is used by your authenticator app to generate a six (usually) digit code based on the current time, which you enter while logging in for the website to check. Typically these codes are regenerated every 30 seconds, and once a new code is generated the old one becomes useless. Even if a hacker gets one six-digit code, there is no way for them to reverse that code to get the original secret or otherwise be able to predict what any future codes might be.
+
+We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternatives as Android and iOS have better security and app isolation than most desktop operating systems.
+
+### Aegis Authenticator (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Aegis Authenticator** is a free, secure and open-source app to manage your 2-step verification tokens for your online services.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getaegis.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://getaegis.app/aegis/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.buymeacoffee.com/beemdevelopment){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.beemdevelopment.aegis)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis/releases)
+
+### Raivo OTP (iOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Raivo OTP** is a native, lightweight and secure time-based (TOTP) & counter-based (HOTP) password client for iOS. Raivo OTP offers optional iCloud backup & sync. Raivo OTP is also available for macOS in the form of a status bar application, however the Mac app does not work independently of the iOS app.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://raivo-otp.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://raivo-otp.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/raivo-otp/ios-application){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://raivo-otp.com/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/raivo-otp/id1459042137)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must not require internet connectivity.
+- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
+ - **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/news-aggregators.md b/i18n/el/news-aggregators.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e6ca3a16e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/news-aggregators.md
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+---
+title: "News Aggregators"
+icon: material/rss
+---
+
+A [news aggregator](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/News_aggregator) is a way to keep up with your favourite blogs and news sites.
+
+## Aggregator clients
+
+### Akregator
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Akregator** is a news feed reader that is a part of the [KDE](https://kde.org) project. It comes with a fast search, advanced archiving functionality and an internal browser for easy news reading.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://apps.kde.org/akregator){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://kde.org/privacypolicy-apps){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.kde.org/?application=akregator){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://invent.kde.org/pim/akregator){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://kde.org/community/donations/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.kde.akregator)
+
+### Feeder
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Feeder** is a modern RSS client for Android that has many [features](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder#features) and works well with folders of RSS feeds. It supports [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS), [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)), [RDF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDF%2FXML) and [JSON Feed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Feed).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://ko-fi.com/spacecowboy){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nononsenseapps.feeder.play)
+
+### Fluent Reader
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Fluent Reader** is a secure cross-platform news aggregator that has useful privacy features such as deletion of cookies on exit, strict [content security policies (CSP)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy) and proxy support, meaning you can use it over [Tor](tor.md).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://hyliu.me/fluent-reader){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader/wiki/Privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader/wiki/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/yang991178){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://hyliu.me/fluent-reader)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1520907427)
+
+### GNOME Feeds
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GNOME Feeds** is an [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS) and [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)) news reader for [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org). It has a simple interface and is quite fast.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gfeeds.gabmus.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.gnome.org/World/gfeeds){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/gabmus/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://gfeeds.gabmus.org/#install)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.gabmus.gfeeds)
+
+### Miniflux
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Miniflux** is a web-based news aggregator that you can self-host. It supports [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS), [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)), [RDF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDF%2FXML) and [JSON Feed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Feed).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://miniflux.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://miniflux.app/docs/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/miniflux/v2){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://miniflux.app/#donations){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+### NetNewsWire
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **NetNewsWire** a free and open-source feed reader for macOS and iOS with a focus on a native design and feature set. It supports the typical feed formats alongside built-in support for Twitter and Reddit feeds.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://netnewswire.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://netnewswire.com/privacypolicy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://netnewswire.com/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Ranchero-Software/NetNewsWire){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/netnewswire-rss-reader/id1480640210)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://netnewswire.com)
+
+### Newsboat
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Newsboat** is an RSS/Atom feed reader for the text console. It's an actively maintained fork of [Newsbeuter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newsbeuter). It is very lightweight, and ideal for use over [Secure Shell](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Shell).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://newsboat.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://newsboat.org/releases/2.27/docs/newsboat.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/newsboat/newsboat){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must operate locally, i.e. must not be a cloud service.
+
+## Social Media RSS Support
+
+Some social media services also support RSS although it's not often advertised.
+
+### Reddit
+
+Reddit allows you to subscribe to subreddits via RSS.
+
+!!! example
+ Replace `subreddit_name` with the subreddit you wish to subscribe to.
+
+ ```text
+ https://www.reddit.com/r/{{ subreddit_name }}/new/.rss
+ ```
+
+### Twitter
+
+Using any of the Nitter [instances](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter/wiki/Instances) you can easily subscribe using RSS.
+
+!!! example
+ 1. Pick an instance and set `nitter_instance`.
+ 2. Replace `twitter_account` with the account name.
+
+ ```text
+ https://{{ nitter_instance }}/{{ twitter_account }}/rss
+ ```
+
+### YouTube
+
+You can subscribe YouTube channels without logging in and associating usage information with your Google Account.
+
+!!! example
+
+ To subscribe to a YouTube channel with an RSS client, first look for your [channel code](https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6180214), replace `[CHANNEL ID]` below:
+ ```text
+ https://www.youtube.com/feeds/videos.xml?channel_id=[CHANNEL ID]
+ ```
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/notebooks.md b/i18n/el/notebooks.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3e9f8fbe1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/notebooks.md
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+---
+title: "Notebooks"
+icon: material/notebook-edit-outline
+---
+
+Keep track of your notes and journalings without giving them to a third-party.
+
+If you are currently using an application like Evernote, Google Keep, or Microsoft OneNote, we suggest you pick an alternative here that supports E2EE.
+
+## Cloud-based
+
+### Joplin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Joplin** is a free, open-source, and fully-featured note-taking and to-do application which can handle a large number of markdown notes organized into notebooks and tags. It offers E2EE and can sync through Nextcloud, Dropbox, and more. It also offers easy import from Evernote and plain-text notes.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://joplinapp.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://joplinapp.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://joplinapp.org/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://joplinapp.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.cozic.joplin)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/joplin/id1315599797)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/joplin-web-clipper/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/joplin-web-clipper/alofnhikmmkdbbbgpnglcpdollgjjfek)
+
+Joplin does not support password/PIN protection for the [application itself or individual notes and notebooks](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin/issues/289). However, your data is still encrypted in transit and at the sync location using your master key.
+
+### Standard Notes
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Standard Notes** is a simple and private notes app that makes your notes easy and available everywhere you are. It features E2EE on every platform, and a powerful desktop experience with themes and custom editors. It has also been [independently audited (PDF)](https://s3.amazonaws.com/standard-notes/security/Report-SN-Audit.pdf).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://standardnotes.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://standardnotes.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://standardnotes.com/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/standardnotes){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://standardnotes.com/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.standardnotes)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1285392450)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/standardnotes/app/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://standardnotes.com)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://standardnotes.com)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://standardnotes.com)
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://app.standardnotes.com/)
+
+### Cryptee
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Cryptee** is an open-source, web-based E2EE document editor and photo storage application. Cryptee is a PWA, which means that it works seamlessly across all modern devices without requiring native apps for each respective platform.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://crypt.ee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://crypt.ee/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://crypt.ee/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/cryptee){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: PWA](https://crypt.ee/download)
+
+Cryptee offers 100MB of storage for free, with paid options if you need more. Sign-up doesn't require an e-mail or other personally identifiable information.
+
+## Local notebooks
+
+### Org-mode
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Org-mode** is a [major mode](https://www.gnu.org/software/emacs/manual/html_node/elisp/Major-Modes.html) for GNU Emacs. Org-mode is for keeping notes, maintaining TODO lists, planning projects, and authoring documents with a fast and effective plain-text system. Synchronization is possible with [file synchronization](file-sharing.md#file-sync) tools.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orgmode.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://orgmode.org/manuals.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/emacs/org-mode.git){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/bzg){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Clients must be open-source.
+- Any cloud sync functionality must be E2EE.
+- Must support exporting documents into a standard format.
+
+### Best Case
+
+- Local backup/sync functionality should support encryption.
+- Cloud-based platforms should support document sharing.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/el/os/android-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..30ae41da7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/os/android-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+---
+title: Android Overview
+icon: simple/android
+---
+
+Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system.
+
+## Choosing an Android Distribution
+
+When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has irrevocable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android.
+
+This problem could be solved by using a custom Android distribution that does not come with such invasive integration. Unfortunately, many custom Android distributions often violate the Android security model by not supporting critical security features such as AVB, rollback protection, firmware updates, and so on. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require [more permissive](https://github.com/LineageOS/android_system_sepolicy/search?q=userdebug&type=code) SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
+
+Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that it upholds the Android security model. At the very least, the distribution should have production builds, support for AVB, rollback protection, timely firmware and operating system updates, and SELinux in [enforcing mode](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts#enforcement_levels). All of our recommended Android distributions satisfy these criteria.
+
+[Our Android System Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Avoid Rooting
+
+[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
+
+Adblockers, which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For Adblocking we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or [VPN](../vpn.md) server blocking solutions instead. RethinkDNS, TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN) preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as Orbot or a real VPN server.
+
+AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
+
+We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps.
+
+## Verified Boot
+
+[Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection).
+
+Android 10 and above has moved away from full-disk encryption to more flexible [file-based encryption](https://source.android.com/security/encryption/file-based). Your data is encrypted using unique encryption keys, and the operating system files are left unencrypted.
+
+Verified Boot ensures the integrity of the operating system files, thereby preventing an adversary with physical access from tampering or installing malware on the device. In the unlikely case that malware is able to exploit other parts of the system and gain higher privileged access, Verified Boot will prevent and revert changes to the system partition upon rebooting the device.
+
+Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock Android distribution. Only a few OEMs such as Google support custom AVB key enrollment on their devices. Additionally, some AOSP derivatives such as LineageOS or /e/ OS do not support Verified Boot even on hardware with Verified Boot support for third-party operating systems. We recommend that you check for support **before** purchasing a new device. AOSP derivatives which do not support Verified Boot are **not** recommended.
+
+Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be aware of beyond their marketing. For example, the Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage.
+
+## Firmware Updates
+
+Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin).
+
+As the components of the phone, such as the processor and radio technologies rely on closed-source components, the updates must be provided by the respective manufacturers. Therefore, it is important that you purchase a device within an active support cycle. [Qualcomm](https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2020/12/16/qualcomm-and-google-announce-collaboration-extend-android-os-support-and) and [Samsung](https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-security-extending-updates-knox/) support their devices for 4 years, while cheaper products often have shorter support cycles. With the introduction of the [Pixel 6](https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/4457705), Google now makes their own SoC and they will provide a minimum of 5 years of support.
+
+EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive firmware updates from OEM vendors or after market Android distributors. This means that security issues with those devices will remain unfixed.
+
+Fairphone, for example, markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates.
+
+## Android Versions
+
+It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution.
+
+## Android Permissions
+
+[Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps. A smartphone with the latest version of Android will always be more secure than an old smartphone with an antivirus that you have paid for. It's better not to pay for antivirus software and to save money to buy a new smartphone such as a Google Pixel.
+
+Should you want to run an app that you're unsure about, consider using a user or work profile.
+
+## Media Access
+
+Quite a few applications allows you to "share" a file with them for media upload. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter.
+
+## User Profiles
+
+Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android.
+
+With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation.
+
+## Work Profile
+
+[Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles.
+
+A **device controller** app such as [Shelter](#recommended-apps) is required to create a Work Profile without an enterprise MDM, unless you're using a custom Android OS which includes one.
+
+The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such as *File Shuttle* and *contact search blocking* or any kind of isolation features must be implemented by the controller. You must also fully trust the device controller app, as it has full access to your data inside of the work profile.
+
+This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously.
+
+## VPN Killswitch
+
+Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+## Global Toggles
+
+Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled.
+
+## Google
+
+If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play.
+
+### Advanced Protection Program
+
+If you have a Google account we suggest enrolling in the [Advanced Protection Program](https://landing.google.com/advancedprotection/). It is available at no cost to anyone with two or more hardware security keys with [FIDO](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) support.
+
+The Advanced Protection Program provides enhanced threat monitoring and enables:
+
+- Stricter two factor authentication; e.g. that [FIDO](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) **must** be used and disallows the use of [SMS OTPs](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#sms-or-email-mfa), [TOTP](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp) and [OAuth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth)
+- Only Google and verified third-party apps can access account data
+- Scanning of incoming emails on Gmail accounts for [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing#Email_phishing) attempts
+- Stricter [safe browser scanning](https://www.google.com/chrome/privacy/whitepaper.html#malware) with Google Chrome
+- Stricter recovery process for accounts with lost credentials
+
+ If you use non-sandboxed Google Play Services (common on stock operating systems), the Advanced Protection Program also comes with [additional benefits](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/9764949?hl=en) such as:
+
+- Not allowing app installation outside of the Google Play Store, the OS vendor's app store, or via [`adb`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_Debug_Bridge)
+- Mandatory automatic device scanning with [Play Protect](https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/2812853?hl=en#zippy=%2Chow-malware-protection-works%2Chow-privacy-alerts-work)
+- Warning you about unverified applications
+
+### Google Play System Updates
+
+In the past, Android security updates had to be shipped by the operating system vendor. Android has become more modular beginning with Android 10, and Google can push security updates for **some** system components via the privileged Play Services.
+
+If you have an EOL device shipped with Android 10 or above and are unable to run any of our recommended operating systems on your device, you are likely going to be better off sticking with your OEM Android installation (as opposed to an operating system not listed here such as LineageOS or /e/ OS). This will allow you to receive **some** security fixes from Google, while not violating the Android security model by using an insecure Android derivative and increasing your attack surface. We would still recommend upgrading to a supported device as soon as possible.
+
+### Advertising ID
+
+All devices with Google Play Services installed automatically generate an [advertising ID](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/6048248?hl=en) used for targeted advertising. Disable this feature to limit the data collected about you.
+
+On Android distributions with [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), go to :gear: **Settings** → **Apps** → **Sandboxed Google Play** → **Google Settings** → **Ads**, and select *Delete advertising ID*.
+
+On Android distributions with privileged Google Play Services (such as stock OSes), the setting may be in one of several locations. Check
+
+- :gear: **Settings** → **Google** → **Ads**
+- :gear: **Settings** → **Privacy** → **Ads**
+
+You will either be given the option to delete your advertising ID or to *Opt out of interest-based ads*, this varies between OEM distributions of Android. If presented with the option to delete the advertising ID that is preferred. If not, then make sure to opt out and reset your advertising ID.
+
+### SafetyNet and Play Integrity API
+
+[SafetyNet](https://developer.android.com/training/safetynet/attestation) and the [Play Integrity APIs](https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity) are generally used for [banking apps](https://grapheneos.org/usage#banking-apps). Many banking apps will work fine in GrapheneOS with sandboxed Play services, however some non-financial apps have their own crude anti-tampering mechanisms which might fail. GrapheneOS passes the `basicIntegrity` check, but not the certification check `ctsProfileMatch`. Devices with Android 8 or later have hardware attestation support which cannot be bypassed without leaked keys or serious vulnerabilities.
+
+As for Google Wallet, we don't recommend this due to their [privacy policy](https://payments.google.com/payments/apis-secure/get_legal_document?ldo=0&ldt=privacynotice&ldl=en), which states you must opt-out if you don't want your credit rating and personal information shared with affiliate marketing services.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/el/os/linux-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1c2376e62
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/os/linux-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+---
+title: Linux Overview
+icon: simple/linux
+---
+
+It is often believed that [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigour applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years.
+
+At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.:
+
+- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack)
+- A strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go
+- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations)
+
+Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are great if you want to:
+
+- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems
+- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms)
+- Have privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/)
+
+Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed here.
+
+[Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Choosing your distribution
+
+Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use.
+
+### Release cycle
+
+We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates.
+
+For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release.
+
+We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this:
+
+
+
+
+
+### Traditional vs Atomic updates
+
+Traditionally, Linux distributions update by sequentially updating the desired packages. Traditional updates such as those used in Fedora, Arch Linux, and Debian based distributions can be less reliable if an error occurs while updating.
+
+Atomic updating distributions apply updates in full or not at all. Typically, transactional update systems are also atomic.
+
+A transactional update system creates a snapshot that is made before and after an update is applied. If an update fails at any time (perhaps due to a power failure), the update can be easily rolled back to a “last known good state."
+
+The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tumbleweed, and NixOS and can achieve reliability with this model. [Adam Šamalík](https://twitter.com/adsamalik) provided a presentation on how `rpm-ostree` works with Silverblue:
+
+
+
+
+
+### “Security-focused” distributions
+
+There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use.
+
+### Arch-based distributions
+
+Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own.
+
+For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit).
+
+Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora.
+
+If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically:
+
+- **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories.
+- **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks.
+
+### Kicksecure
+
+While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default.
+
+### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions
+
+We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons.
+
+## General Recommendations
+
+### Drive Encryption
+
+Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS](../encryption.md#linux-unified-key-setup) FDE. If this option isn’t set at installation time, you will have to backup your data and re-install, as encryption is applied after [disk partitioning](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_partitioning), but before [file systems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_system) are formatted. We also suggest securely erasing your storage device:
+
+- [Secure Data Erasure :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/05/25/secure-data-erasure/)
+
+### Swap
+
+Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Swap#zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM).
+
+### Wayland
+
+We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland.
+
+Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)).
+
+We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do not have Wayland support, such as Cinnamon (default on Linux Mint), Pantheon (default on Elementary OS), MATE, Xfce, and i3.
+
+### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates)
+
+Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html).
+
+We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default.
+
+### Updates
+
+Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found.
+
+Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates.
+
+Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd).
+
+## Privacy Tweaks
+
+### MAC Address Randomization
+
+Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings.
+
+It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous.
+
+We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as suggested in the [article](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/).
+
+If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=).
+
+There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware.
+
+### Other Identifiers
+
+There are other system identifiers which you may wish to be careful about. You should give this some thought to see if it applies to your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md):
+
+- **Hostnames:** Your system's hostname is shared with the networks you connect to. You should avoid including identifying terms like your name or operating system in your hostname, instead sticking to generic terms or random strings.
+- **Usernames:** Similarly, your username is used in a variety of ways across your system. Consider using generic terms like "user" rather than your actual name.
+- **Machine ID:**: During installation a unique machine ID is generated and stored on your device. Consider [setting it to a generic ID](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#machine-id).
+
+### System Counting
+
+The Fedora Project [counts](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting) how many unique systems access its mirrors by using a [`countme`](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting#Detailed_Description) variable instead of a unique ID. Fedora does this to determine load and provision better servers for updates where necessary.
+
+This [option](https://dnf.readthedocs.io/en/latest/conf_ref.html#options-for-both-main-and-repo) is currently off by default. We recommend adding `countme=false` to `/etc/dnf/dnf.conf` just in case it is enabled in the future. On systems that use `rpm-ostree` such as Silverblue, the countme option is disabled by masking the [rpm-ostree-countme](https://fedoramagazine.org/getting-better-at-counting-rpm-ostree-based-systems/) timer.
+
+openSUSE also uses a [unique ID](https://en.opensuse.org/openSUSE:Statistics) to count systems, which can be disabled by deleting the `/var/lib/zypp/AnonymousUniqueId` file.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/el/os/qubes-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..590c26391
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/os/qubes-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+---
+title: "Qubes Overview"
+icon: simple/qubesos
+---
+
+[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/).
+
+## How does Qubes OS work?
+
+Qubes uses [compartmentalization](https://www.qubes-os.org/intro/) to keep the system secure. Qubes are created from templates, the defaults being for Fedora, Debian and [Whonix](../desktop.md#whonix). Qubes OS also allows you to create once-use [disposable](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-use-disposables/) virtual machines.
+
+
+Qubes Architecture, Credit: What is Qubes OS Intro
+
+Each Qubes application has a [colored border](https://www.qubes-os.org/screenshots/) that can help you keep track of the virtual machine it is running in. You could, for example, use a specific color for your banking browser, while using a different color for a general untrusted browser.
+
+
+Qubes window borders, Credit: Qubes Screenshots
+
+## Why Should I use Qubes?
+
+Qubes OS is useful if your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md) requires strong compartmentalization and security, such as if you think you'll be opening untrusted files from untrusted sources. A typical reason for using Qubes OS is to open documents from unknown sources.
+
+Qubes OS utilizes [Dom0](https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Dom0) Xen VM (i.e., an "AdminVM") for controlling other guest VMs or Qubes on the host OS. Other VMs display individual application windows within Dom0's desktop environment. It allows you to color code windows based on trust levels and run apps that can interact with each other with very granular control.
+
+### Copying and Pasting Text
+
+You can [copy and paste text](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-and-paste-text/) using `qvm-copy-to-vm` or the below instructions:
+
+1. Press **Ctrl+C** to tell the VM you're in that you want to copy something.
+2. Press **Ctrl+Shift+C** to tell the VM to make this buffer available to the global clipboard.
+3. Press **Ctrl+Shift+V** in the destination VM to make the global clipboard available.
+4. Press **Ctrl+V** in the destination VM to paste the contents in the buffer.
+
+### File Exchange
+
+To copy and paste files and directories (folders) from one VM to another, you can use the option **Copy to Other AppVM...** or **Move to Other AppVM...**. The difference is that the **Move** option will delete the original file. Either option will protect your clipboard from being leaked to any other Qubes. This is more secure than air-gapped file transfer because an air-gapped computer will still be forced to parse partitions or file systems. That is not required with the inter-qube copy system.
+
+??? info "AppVMs or qubes do not have their own file systems"
+
+ You can [copy and move files](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-and-move-files/) between Qubes. When doing so the changes aren't immediately made and can be easily undone in case of an accident.
+
+### Inter-VM Interactions
+
+The [qrexec framework](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec/) is a core part of Qubes which allows virtual machine communication between domains. It is built on top of the Xen library *vchan*, which facilitates [isolation through policies](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2020/06/22/new-qrexec-policy-system/).
+
+## Additional Resources
+
+For additional information we encourage you to consult the extensive Qubes OS documentation pages located on the [Qubes OS Website](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/). Offline copies can be downloaded from the Qubes OS [documentation repository](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-doc).
+
+- Open Technology Fund: [*Arguably the world's most secure operating system*](https://www.opentech.fund/news/qubes-os-arguably-the-worlds-most-secure-operating-system-motherboard/)
+- J. Rutkowska: [*Software compartmentalization vs. physical separation*](https://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/2014/Software_compartmentalization_vs_physical_separation.pdf)
+- J. Rutkowska: [*Partitioning my digital life into security domains*](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/03/13/partitioning-my-digital-life-into.html)
+- Qubes OS: [*Related Articles*](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/categories/#articles)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/passwords.md b/i18n/el/passwords.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ee998008d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/passwords.md
@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+---
+title: "Password Managers"
+icon: material/form-textbox-password
+---
+
+Password managers allow you to securely store and manage passwords and other credentials with the use of a master password.
+
+[Introduction to Passwords :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](./basics/passwords-overview.md)
+
+!!! info
+
+ Built-in password managers in software like browsers and operating systems are sometimes not as good as dedicated password manager software. The advantage of a built-in password manager is good integration with the software, but it can often be very simple and lack privacy and security features standalone offerings have.
+
+ For example, the password manager in Microsoft Edge doesn't offer E2EE at all. Google's password manager has [optional](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/11350823) E2EE, and [Apple's](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303) offers E2EE by default.
+
+## Cloud-based
+
+These password managers sync your passwords to a cloud server for easy accessibility from all your devices and safety against device loss.
+
+### Bitwarden
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Bitwarden** is a free and open-source password manager. It aims to solve password management problems for individuals, teams, and business organizations. Bitwarden is among the best and safest solutions to store all of your logins and passwords while conveniently keeping them synced between all of your devices.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://bitwarden.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://bitwarden.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://bitwarden.com/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/bitwarden){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.x8bit.bitwarden)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/bitwarden-password-manager/id1137397744)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/bitwarden/mobile/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://bitwarden.com/download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://bitwarden.com/download)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.bitwarden.desktop)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/bitwarden-password-manager)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/bitwarden-free-password-m/nngceckbapebfimnlniiiahkandclblb)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/jbkfoedolllekgbhcbcoahefnbanhhlh)
+
+Bitwarden also features [Bitwarden Send](https://bitwarden.com/products/send/), which allows you to share text and files securely with [end-to-end encryption](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-encryption). A [password](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-privacy/#send-passwords) can be required along with the send link. Bitwarden Send also features [automatic deletion](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-lifespan).
+
+You need the [Premium Plan](https://bitwarden.com/help/about-bitwarden-plans/#compare-personal-plans) to be able to share files. The free plan only allows text sharing.
+
+Bitwarden's server-side code is [open-source](https://github.com/bitwarden/server), so if you don't want to use the Bitwarden cloud, you can easily host your own Bitwarden sync server.
+
+**Vaultwarden** is an alternative implementation of Bitwarden's sync server written in Rust and compatible with official Bitwarden clients, perfect for self-hosted deployment where running the official resource-heavy service might not be ideal. If you are looking to self-host Bitwarden on your own server, you almost certainly want to use Vaultwarden over Bitwarden's official server code.
+
+[:octicons-repo-16: Vaultwarden Repository](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden ""){.md-button} [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/dani-garcia){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+### 1Password
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **1Password** is a password manager with a strong focus on security and ease-of-use, which allows you to store passwords, credit cards, software licenses, and any other sensitive information in a secure digital vault. Your vault is hosted on 1Password's servers for a [monthly fee](https://1password.com/sign-up/). 1Password is [audited](https://support.1password.com/security-assessments/) on a regular basis and provides exceptional customer support. 1Password is closed source; however, the security of the product is thoroughly documented in their [security white paper](https://1passwordstatic.com/files/security/1password-white-paper.pdf).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://1password.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://support.1password.com/1password-privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.1password.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.onepassword.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1511601750?mt=8)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://1password.com/downloads/windows/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://1password.com/downloads/mac/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://1password.com/downloads/linux/)
+
+Traditionally, **1Password** has offered the best password manager user experience for people using macOS and iOS; however, it has now achieved feature-parity across all platforms. It boasts many features geared towards families and less technical people, as well as advanced functionality.
+
+Your 1Password vault is secured with both your master password and a randomized 34-character security key to encrypt your data on their servers. This security key adds a layer of protection to your data because your data is secured with high entropy regardless of your master password. Many other password manager solutions are entirely reliant on the strength of your master password to secure your data.
+
+One advantage 1Password has over Bitwarden is its first-class support for native clients. While Bitwarden relegates many duties, especially account management features, to their web vault interface, 1Password makes nearly every feature available within its native mobile or desktop clients. 1Password's clients also have a more intuitive UI, which makes them easier to use and navigate.
+
+### Psono
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Psono** is a free and open-source password manager from Germany, with a focus on password management for teams. Psono supports secure sharing of passwords, files, bookmarks, and emails. All secrets are protected by a master password.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://psono.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://psono.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://doc.psono.com){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/psono){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.psono.psono)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/psono-password-manager/id1545581224)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/psono-pw-password-manager)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/psonopw-password-manager/eljmjmgjkbmpmfljlmklcfineebidmlo)
+ - [:simple-docker: Docker Hub](https://hub.docker.com/r/psono/psono-client)
+
+Psono provides extensive documentation for their product. The web-client for Psono can be self-hosted; alternatively, you can choose the full Community Edition or the Enterprise Edition with additional features.
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+#### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must utilize strong, standards-based/modern E2EE.
+- Must have thoroughly documented encryption and security practices.
+- Must have a published audit from a reputable, independent third-party.
+- All non-essential telemetry must be optional.
+- Must not collect more PII than is necessary for billing purposes.
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Telemetry should be opt-in (disabled by default) or not collected at all.
+- Should be open-source and reasonably self-hostable.
+
+## Local Storage
+
+These options allow you to manage an encrypted password database locally.
+
+### KeePassXC
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **KeePassXC** is a community fork of KeePassX, a native cross-platform port of KeePass Password Safe, with the goal to extend and improve it with new features and bugfixes to provide a feature-rich, cross-platform and modern open-source password manager.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://keepassxc.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://keepassxc.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://keepassxc.org/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://keepassxc.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://keepassxc.org/download/#windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://keepassxc.org/download/#mac)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://keepassxc.org/download/#linux)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flatpak](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.keepassxc.KeePassXC)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/keepassxc-browser)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/keepassxc-browser/oboonakemofpalcgghocfoadofidjkkk)
+
+KeePassXC stores its export data as [CSV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comma-separated_values) files. This may mean data loss if you import this file into another password manager. We advise you check each record manually.
+
+### KeePassDX (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **KeePassDX** is a lightweight password manager for Android, allows editing encrypted data in a single file in KeePass format and can fill in the forms in a secure way. [Contributor Pro](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kunzisoft.keepass.pro) allows unlocking cosmetic content and non-standard protocol features, but more importantly, it helps and encourages development.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.keepassdx.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.keepassdx.com/#donation){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kunzisoft.keepass.free)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX/releases)
+
+### Strongbox (iOS & macOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Strongbox** is a native, open-source password manager for iOS and macOS. Supporting both KeePass and Password Safe formats, Strongbox can be used in tandem with other password managers, like KeePassXC, on non-Apple platforms. By employing a [freemium model](https://strongboxsafe.com/pricing/), Strongbox offers most features under its free tier with more convenience-oriented [features](https://strongboxsafe.com/comparison/)—such as biometric authentication—locked behind a subscription or perpetual license.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://strongboxsafe.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://strongboxsafe.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://strongboxsafe.com/getting-started/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/strongbox-password-safe/Strongbox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/strongbox-password-safe/Strongbox#supporting-development){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/strongbox-keepass-pwsafe/id897283731)
+
+Additionally, there is an offline-only version offered: [Strongbox Zero](https://apps.apple.com/app/strongbox-keepass-pwsafe/id1581589638). This version is stripped down in an attempt to reduce attack surface.
+
+### Command-line
+
+These products are minimal password managers that can be used within scripting applications.
+
+#### gopass
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **gopass** is a password manager for the command line written in Go. It works on all major desktop and server operating systems (Linux, macOS, BSD, Windows).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.gopass.pw){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/gopasspw/gopass/tree/master/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/gopasspw/gopass){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/dominikschulz){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-macos)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-linux)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-bsd)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be cross-platform.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/productivity.md b/i18n/el/productivity.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c53e341c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/productivity.md
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+---
+title: "Productivity Tools"
+icon: material/file-sign
+---
+
+Most online office suites do not support E2EE, meaning the cloud provider has access to everything you do. The privacy policy may legally protect your rights, but it does not provide technical access constraints.
+
+## Collaboration Platforms
+
+### Nextcloud
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nextcloud** is a suite of free and open-source client-server software for creating your own file hosting services on a private server you control.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://nextcloud.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://nextcloud.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://nextcloud.com/support/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/nextcloud){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nextcloud.com/contribute/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nextcloud.client)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1125420102)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/nextcloud/android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/www/nextcloud)
+
+!!! danger
+
+ We don't recommend using the [E2EE App](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/end_to_end_encryption) for Nextcloud as it may lead to data loss; it is highly experimental and not production quality. For this reason, we don't recommend third-party Nextcloud providers.
+
+### CryptPad
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **CryptPad** is a private-by-design alternative to popular office tools. All content on this web service is end-to-end encrypted and can be shared with other users easily.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://cryptpad.fr){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://cryptpad.fr/pad/#/2/pad/view/GcNjAWmK6YDB3EO2IipRZ0fUe89j43Ryqeb4fjkjehE/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.cryptpad.fr/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/xwiki-labs/cryptpad){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/cryptpad){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+In general, we define collaboration platforms as full-fledged suites which could reasonably act as a replacement to collaboration platforms like Google Drive.
+
+- Open-source.
+- Makes files accessible via WebDAV unless it is impossible due to E2EE.
+- Has sync clients for Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- Supports document and spreadsheet editing.
+- Supports real-time document collaboration.
+- Supports exporting documents to standard document formats (e.g. ODF).
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should store files in a conventional filesystem.
+- Should support TOTP or FIDO2 multi-factor authentication support, or Passkey logins.
+
+## Office Suites
+
+### LibreOffice
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **LibreOffice** is a free and open-source office suite with extensive functionality.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.libreoffice.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.libreoffice.org/about-us/privacy/privacy-policy-en/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://documentation.libreoffice.org/en/english-documentation/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://www.libreoffice.org/about-us/source-code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.libreoffice.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/android-and-ios/)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/android-and-ios/)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/download/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/download/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/download/)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.libreoffice.LibreOffice)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/editors/libreoffice/)
+
+### OnlyOffice
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OnlyOffice** is a cloud-based free and open-source office suite with extensive functionality, including integration with Nextcloud.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.onlyoffice.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://help.onlyoffice.com/products/files/doceditor.aspx?fileid=5048502&doc=SXhWMEVzSEYxNlVVaXJJeUVtS0kyYk14YWdXTEFUQmRWL250NllHNUFGbz0_IjUwNDg1MDIi0){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://helpcenter.onlyoffice.com/userguides.aspx){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ONLYOFFICE){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.onlyoffice.documents)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id944896972)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.onlyoffice.com/download-desktop.aspx)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.onlyoffice.com/download-desktop.aspx)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.onlyoffice.com/download-desktop.aspx)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.onlyoffice.desktopeditors)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/www/onlyoffice-documentserver/)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+In general, we define office suites as applications which could reasonably act as a replacement for Microsoft Word for most needs.
+
+- Must be cross-platform.
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must function offline.
+- Must support editing documents, spreadsheets, and slideshows.
+- Must export files to standard document formats.
+
+## Paste services
+
+### PrivateBin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **PrivateBin** is a minimalist, open-source online pastebin where the server has zero knowledge of pasted data. Data is encrypted/decrypted in the browser using 256-bit AES. It is the improved version of ZeroBin. There is a [list of instances](https://privatebin.info/directory/).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://privatebin.info){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://privatebin.info/directory/){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/wiki/FAQ){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/el/real-time-communication.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..424b6c62c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/real-time-communication.md
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+---
+title: "Real-Time Communication"
+icon: material/chat-processing
+---
+
+These are our recommendations for encrypted real-time communication.
+
+[Types of Communication Networks :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](./advanced/communication-network-types.md)
+
+## Encrypted Messengers
+
+These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
+
+### Signal
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
+
+ All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/signalapp){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://signal.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.thoughtcrime.securesms)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id874139669)
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://signal.org/android/apk/)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://signal.org/download/windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://signal.org/download/macos)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://signal.org/download/linux)
+
+Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). The server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
+
+The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
+
+We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation:
+
+[Signal Configuration and Hardening :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening/)
+
+### SimpleX Chat
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **SimpleX** Chat is an instant messenger that is decentralized and doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Users of SimpleX Chat can scan a QR code or click an invite link to participate in group conversations.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://simplex.chat){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/blob/stable/PRIVACY.md){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/tree/stable/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=chat.simplex.app)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/simplex-chat/id1605771084)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/releases)
+
+SimpleX Chat [was audited](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website.html) by Trail of Bits in October 2022.
+
+Currently SimpleX Chat only provides a client for Android and iOS. Basic group chatting functionality, direct messaging, editing of messages and markdown are supported. E2EE Audio and Video calls are also supported.
+
+Your data can be exported, and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up.
+
+### Briar
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works/) to other clients using the Tor Network. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org/){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.briarproject.briar.android)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://briarproject.org/download-briar-desktop/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://briarproject.org/download-briar-desktop/)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.briarproject.Briar)
+
+To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby.
+
+The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit/), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited.
+
+Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
+
+Briar supports perfect forward secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
+
+## Additional Options
+
+!!! warning
+
+ These messengers do not have Perfect [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) (PFS), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
+
+### Element
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Element** is the reference client for the [Matrix](https://matrix.org/docs/guides/introduction) protocol, an [open standard](https://matrix.org/docs/spec) for secure decentralized real-time communication.
+
+ Messages and files shared in private rooms (those which require an invite) are by default E2EE as are one to one voice and video calls.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://element.io/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://element.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://element.io/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/vector-im){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=im.vector.app)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/vector/id1083446067)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/vector-im/element-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://element.io/get-started)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://element.io/get-started)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://element.io/get-started)
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://app.element.io)
+
+Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
+
+Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
+
+The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
+
+The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm](https://matrix.org/docs/projects/other/olm) cryptographic ratchet used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
+
+### Session
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Session** is a decentralized messenger with a focus on private, secure, and anonymous communications. Session offers support for direct messages, group chats, and voice calls.
+
+ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to store and route messages. Every encrypted message is routed through three nodes in the Oxen Service Node Network, making it virtually impossible for the nodes to compile meaningful information on those using the network.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getsession.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://getsession.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://getsession.org/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/oxen-io){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=network.loki.messenger)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1470168868)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/oxen-io/session-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://getsession.org/download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://getsession.org/download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://getsession.org/download)
+
+Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
+
+Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
+
+Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
+
+Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must have open-source clients.
+- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
+- Must support E2EE for all messages.
+- Must have been independently audited.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should have Perfect Forward Secrecy.
+- Should have open-source servers.
+- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
+- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
+- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/router.md b/i18n/el/router.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..19734e7bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/router.md
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+---
+title: "Υλικολογισμικό Δρομολογητή"
+icon: material/router-wireless
+---
+
+Παρακάτω είναι μερικά εναλλακτικά λειτουργικά συστήματα τα οποία μπορούν να χρησιμοποιηθούν σε δρομολογητές, σημεία πρόσβασης Wi-Fi, κλπ.
+
+## OpenWrt
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ Το **OpenWrt** είναι ένα λειτουργικό σύστημα βασισμένο στο Linux, χρησιμοποιείται κυρίως σε ενσωματωμένες συσκευές για τη δρομολόγηση της δικτυακής κίνησης. Περιλαμβάνει το util-linux, το uClibc και το BusyBox. Όλα τα εξαρτήματα έχουν βελτιστοποιηθεί για οικιακούς δρομολογητές.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://openwrt.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://openwrt.org/docs/start){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://openwrt.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+You can consult OpenWrt's [table of hardware](https://openwrt.org/toh/start) to check if your device is supported.
+
+## OPNsense
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OPNsense** is an open source, FreeBSD-based firewall and routing platform which incorporates many advanced features such as traffic shaping, load balancing, and VPN capabilities, with many more features available in the form of plugins. OPNsense is commonly deployed as a perimeter firewall, router, wireless access point, DHCP server, DNS server, and VPN endpoint.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://opnsense.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.opnsense.org/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/opnsense){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opnsense.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+OPNsense was originally developed as a fork of [pfSense](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PfSense), and both projects are noted for being free and reliable firewall distributions which offer features often only found in expensive commercial firewalls. Launched in 2015, the developers of OPNsense [cited](https://docs.opnsense.org/history/thefork.html) a number of security and code-quality issues with pfSense which they felt necessitated a fork of the project, as well as concerns about Netgate's majority acquisition of pfSense and the future direction of the pfSense project.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be open source.
+- Must receive regular updates.
+- Must support a wide variety of hardware.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/search-engines.md b/i18n/el/search-engines.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5f03536a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/search-engines.md
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+---
+title: "Search Engines"
+icon: material/search-web
+---
+
+Use a search engine that doesn't build an advertising profile based on your searches.
+
+The recommendations here are based on the merits of each service's privacy policy. There is **no guarantee** that these privacy policies are honored.
+
+Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) if your threat model requires hiding your IP address from the search provider.
+
+## Brave Search
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Brave Search** is developed by Brave and serves results primarily from its own, independent index. The index is optimized against Google Search and therefore may provide more contextually accurate results compared to other alternatives.
+
+ Brave Search includes unique features such as Discussions, which highlights conversation-focused results—such as forum posts.
+
+ We recommend you disable [Anonymous usage metrics](https://search.brave.com/help/usage-metrics) as it is enabled by default and can be disabled within settings.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://search.brave.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://search.brave4u7jddbv7cyviptqjc7jusxh72uik7zt6adtckl5f4nwy2v72qd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://search.brave.com/help/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://search.brave.com/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+Brave Search is based in the United States. Their [privacy policy](https://search.brave.com/help/privacy-policy) states they collect aggregated usage metrics, which includes the operating system and browser in use, however no personally identifiable information is collected. IP addresses are temporarily processed, but are not retained.
+
+## DuckDuckGo
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **DuckDuckGo** is one of the more mainstream private search engine options. Notable DuckDuckGo search features include [bangs](https://duckduckgo.com/bang) and many [instant answers](https://help.duckduckgo.com/duckduckgo-help-pages/features/instant-answers-and-other-features/). The search engine relies on a commercial Bing API to serve most results, but it does use numerous [other sources](https://help.duckduckgo.com/results/sources/) for instant answers and other non-primary results.
+
+ DuckDuckGo is the default search engine for the Tor Browser and is one of the few available options on Apple’s Safari browser.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://duckduckgo.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://duckduckgo.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://help.duckduckgo.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+DuckDuckGo is based in the United States. Their [privacy policy](https://duckduckgo.com/privacy) states they **do** log your searches for product improvement purposes, but not your IP address or any other personally identifying information.
+
+DuckDuckGo offers two [other versions](https://help.duckduckgo.com/features/non-javascript/) of their search engine, both of which do not require JavaScript. These versions do lack features, however. These versions can also be used in conjunction with their [Tor onion address](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/) by appending [/lite](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/lite) or [/html](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/html) for the respective version.
+
+## SearXNG
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **SearXNG** is an open-source, self-hostable, metasearch engine, aggregating the results of other search engines while not storing any information itself. It is an actively maintained fork of [SearX](https://github.com/searx/searx).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://searxng.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://searx.space/){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/searxng/searxng){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+SearXNG is a proxy between you and the search engines it aggregates from. Your search queries will still be sent to the search engines that SearXNG gets its results from.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance so that the queries would blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting SearXNG, as people looking up illegal content on your instance could draw unwanted attention from authorities.
+
+When you are using a SearXNG instance, be sure to go read their privacy policy. Since SearXNG instances may be modified by their owners, they do not necessarily reflect their privacy policy. Some instances run as a Tor hidden service, which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries does not contain PII.
+
+## Startpage
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Startpage** is a private search engine known for serving Google search results. One of Startpage's unique features is the [Anonymous View](https://www.startpage.com/en/anonymous-view/), which puts forth efforts to standardize user activity to make it more difficult to be uniquely identified. The feature can be useful for hiding [some](https://support.startpage.com/hc/en-us/articles/4455540212116-The-Anonymous-View-Proxy-technical-details) network and browser properties. Unlike the name suggests, the feature should not be relied upon for anonymity. If you are looking for anonymity, use the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) instead.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.startpage.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.startpage.com/en/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.startpage.com/hc/en-us/categories/4481917470356-Startpage-Search-Engine){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Startpage regularly limits service access to certain IP addresses, such as IPs reserved for VPNs or Tor. [DuckDuckGo](#duckduckgo) and [Brave Search](#brave-search) are friendlier options if your threat model requires hiding your IP address from the search provider.
+
+Startpage is based in the Netherlands. According to their [privacy policy](https://www.startpage.com/en/privacy-policy/), they log details such as: operating system, type of browser, and language. They do not log your IP address, search queries, or other personally identifying information.
+
+Startpage's majority shareholder is System1 who is an adtech company. We don't believe that to be an issue as they have a distinctly separate [privacy policy](https://system1.com/terms/privacy-policy). The Privacy Guides team reached out to Startpage [back in 2020](https://web.archive.org/web/20210118031008/https://blog.privacytools.io/relisting-startpage/) to clear up any concerns with System1's sizeable investment into the service. We were satisfied with the answers we received.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must not collect personally identifiable information per their privacy policy.
+- Must not allow users to create an account with them.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should be based on open-source software.
+- Should not block Tor exit node IP addresses.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/tools.md b/i18n/el/tools.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3816fef52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/tools.md
@@ -0,0 +1,443 @@
+---
+title: "Privacy Tools"
+icon: material/tools
+hide:
+ - toc
+---
+
+If you're looking for a specific solution to something, these are the hardware and software tools we recommend in a variety of categories. Our recommended privacy tools are primarily chosen based on security features, with additional emphasis on decentralized and open-source tools. They are applicable to a variety of threat models ranging from protection against global mass surveillance programs and avoiding big tech companies to mitigating attacks, but only you can determine what will work best for your needs.
+
+If you want assistance figuring out the best privacy tools and alternative programs for your needs, start a discussion on our [forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/) or our [Matrix](https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org) community!
+
+For more details about each project, why they were chosen, and additional tips or tricks we recommend, click the "Learn more" link in each section, or click on the recommendation itself to be taken to that specific section of the page.
+
+## Tor Network
+
+
+
+1. Snowflake does not increase privacy, however it allows you to easily contribute to the Tor network and help people in censored networks achieve better privacy.
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md)
+
+## Desktop Web Browsers
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](cloud.md)
+
+### DNS
+
+#### DNS Providers
+
+We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers based on a variety of criteria, such as [Mullvad](https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls) and [Quad9](https://quad9.net/) amongst others. We recommend for you to read our pages on DNS before choosing a provider. In many cases, using an alternative DNS provider is not recommended.
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](dns.md)
+
+#### Encrypted DNS Proxies
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](search-engines.md)
+
+### VPN Providers
+
+??? κίνδυνος "Τα VPN δεν παρέχουν ανωνυμία"
+
+ Using a VPN will **not** keep your browsing habits anonymous, nor will it add additional security to non-secure (HTTP) traffic.
+
+ If you are looking for **anonymity**, you should use the Tor Browser **instead** of a VPN.
+
+ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connecting to websites using HTTPS. A VPN is not a replacement for good security practices.
+
+ [Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](vpn.md)
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](data-redaction.md)
+
+### Email Clients
+
+
+
+- { .twemoji } [Thunderbird](email-clients.md#thunderbird)
+- { .twemoji } [Apple Mail (macOS)](email-clients.md#apple-mail-macos)
+- { .twemoji } [Canary Mail (iOS)](email-clients.md#canary-mail-ios)
+- { .twemoji } [FairEmail (Android)](email-clients.md#fairemail-android)
+- { .twemoji } [GNOME Evolution (Linux)](email-clients.md#gnome-evolution-gnome)
+- { .twemoji } [K-9 Mail (Android)](email-clients.md#k-9-mail-android)
+- { .twemoji } [Kontact (Linux)](email-clients.md#kontact-kde)
+- { .twemoji } [Mailvelope (PGP in standard webmail)](email-clients.md#mailvelope-browser)
+- { .twemoji } [NeoMutt (CLI)](email-clients.md#neomutt-cli)
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](email-clients.md)
+
+### Encryption Software
+
+??? info "Operating System Disk Encryption"
+
+ For encrypting your operating system drive, we typically recommend using whichever encryption tool your operating system provides, whether that is **BitLocker** on Windows, **FileVault** on macOS, or **LUKS** on Linux. These tools are included with the operating system and typically use hardware encryption elements such as a TPM that other full-disk encryption software like VeraCrypt do not. VeraCrypt is still suitable for non-operating system disks such as external drives, especially drives that may be accessed from multiple operating systems.
+
+ [Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](encryption.md##operating-system-included-full-disk-encryption-fde)
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](video-streaming.md)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/tor.md b/i18n/el/tor.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8129b3190
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/tor.md
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+---
+title: "Tor Network"
+icon: simple/torproject
+---
+
+{ align=right }
+
+The **Tor** network is a group of volunteer-operated servers that allows you to connect for free and improve your privacy and security on the Internet. Individuals and organizations can also share information over the Tor network with ".onion hidden services" without compromising their privacy. Because Tor traffic is difficult to block and trace, Tor is an effective censorship circumvention tool.
+
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://www.torproject.org){ .card-link title=Homepage }
+[:simple-torbrowser:](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Tor works by routing your internet traffic through those volunteer-operated servers, instead of making a direct connection to the site you're trying to visit. This obfuscates where the traffic is coming from, and no server in the connection path is able to see the full path of where the traffic is coming from and going to, meaning even the servers you are using to connect cannot break your anonymity.
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ Tor circuit pathway - Nodes in the path can only see the servers they are directly connected to, for example the "Entry" node shown can see your IP address, and the address of the "Middle" node, but has no way to see which website you are visiting.
+
+
+- [More information about how Tor works :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md)
+
+## Connecting to Tor
+
+There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for anonymous browsing for desktop computers and Android. In addition to the apps listed below, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser.
+
+### Tor Browser
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tor Browser** is the choice if you need anonymity, as it provides you with access to the Tor network and bridges, and it includes default settings and extensions that are automatically configured by the default security levels: *Standard*, *Safer* and *Safest*.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.torproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.torbrowser)
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://www.torproject.org/download/#android)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.torproject.org/download/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.torproject.org/download/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.torproject.org/download/)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/security/tor)
+
+!!! danger
+
+ You should **never** install any additional extensions on Tor Browser or edit `about:config` settings, including the ones we suggest for Firefox. Browser extensions and non-standard settings make you stand out from others on the Tor network, thus making your browser easier to [fingerprint](https://support.torproject.org/glossary/browser-fingerprinting).
+
+The Tor Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting, or identifying you based on your browser configuration. Therefore, it is imperative that you do **not** modify the browser beyond the default [security levels](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/).
+
+### Orbot
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Orbot** is a free Tor VPN for smartphones which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/orbot/id1609461599)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+
+For resistance against traffic analysis attacks, consider enabling *Isolate Destination Address* in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Connectivity**. This will use a completely different Tor Circuit (different middle relay and exit nodes) for every domain you connect to.
+
+!!! tip "Tips for Android"
+
+ Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN killswitch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+ Orbot is often outdated on the Guardian Project's [F-Droid repository](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android), so consider downloading directly from the [GitHub repository](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases) instead.
+
+ All versions are signed using the same signature so they should be compatible with each other.
+
+## Relays and Bridges
+
+### Snowflake
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.
+
+ People who are censored can use Snowflake proxies to connect to the Tor network. Snowflake is a great way to contribute to the network even if you don't have the technical know-how to run a Tor relay or bridge.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://snowflake.torproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/wikis/Technical%20Overview){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/snowflake.git/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/torproject-snowflake/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/snowflake/mafpmfcccpbjnhfhjnllmmalhifmlcie)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://snowflake.torproject.org/embed "Leave this page open to be a Snowflake proxy")
+
+??? tip "Embedded Snowflake"
+
+ You can enable Snowflake in your browser by clicking the switch below and ==leaving this page open==. You can also install Snowflake as a browser extension to have it always run while your browser is open, however adding third-party extensions can increase your attack surface.
+
+
+ If the embed does not appear for you, ensure you are not blocking the third-party frame from `torproject.org`. Alternatively, visit [this page](https://snowflake.torproject.org/embed.html).
+
+Snowflake does not increase your privacy in any way, nor is it used to connect to the Tor network within your personal browser. However, if your internet connection is uncensored, you should consider running it to help people in censored networks achieve better privacy themselves. There is no need to worry about which websites people are accessing through your proxy—their visible browsing IP address will match their Tor exit node, not yours.
+
+Running a Snowflake proxy is low-risk, even moreso than running a Tor relay or bridge which are already not particularly risky endeavours. However, it does still proxy traffic through your network which can be impactful in some ways, especially if your network is bandwidth-limited. Make sure you understand [how Snowflake works](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/wikis/home) before deciding whether to run a proxy.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/video-streaming.md b/i18n/el/video-streaming.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3d579fc29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/video-streaming.md
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+---
+title: "Video Streaming"
+icon: material/video-wireless
+---
+
+The primary threat when using a video streaming platform is that your streaming habits and subscription lists could be used to profile you. You should combine these tools with a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) to make it harder to profile your usage.
+
+## LBRY
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **The LBRY network** is a decentralized video sharing network. It uses a [BitTorrent](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent)-like network to store the video content, and a [blockchain](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockchain) to store the indexes for those videos. The main benefit of this design is censorship resistance.
+
+ **The LBRY desktop client** helps you stream videos from the LBRY network and stores your subscription list in your own LBRY wallet.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://lbry.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://lbry.com/privacypolicy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://lbry.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/lbryio/lbry-desktop){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://lbry.com/windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://lbry.com/osx)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://lbry.com/linux)
+
+!!! note
+
+ Only the **LBRY desktop client** is recommended, as the [Odysee](https://odysee.com) website and the LBRY clients in F-Droid, Play Store, and the App Store have mandatory synchronization and telemetry.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ While watching and hosting videos, your IP address is visible to the LBRY network. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+We recommend **against** synchronizing your wallet with LBRY Inc., as synchronizing encrypted wallets is not supported yet. If you synchronize your wallet with LBRY Inc., you have to trust them to not look at your subscription list, [LBC](https://lbry.com/faq/earn-credits) funds, or take control of your channel.
+
+You can disable *Save hosting data to help the LBRY network* option in :gear: **Settings** → **Advanced Settings**, to avoid exposing your IP address and watched videos when using LBRY for a prolonged period of time.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must not require a centralized account to view videos.
+ - Decentralized authentication, such as via a mobile wallet's private key is acceptable.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/el/vpn.md b/i18n/el/vpn.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..625d3623c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/el/vpn.md
@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+---
+title: "Υπηρεσίες VPN"
+icon: material/vpn
+---
+
+Βρείτε έναν πάροχο VPN χωρίς καταγραφή που δεν έχει σκοπό να πουλήσει ή να διαβάσει την κυκλοφορία σας στο διαδίκτυο.
+
+??? κίνδυνος "Τα VPN δεν παρέχουν ανωνυμία"
+
+ Using a VPN will **not** keep your browsing habits anonymous, nor will it add additional security to non-secure (HTTP) traffic.
+
+ If you are looking for **anonymity**, you should use the Tor Browser **instead** of a VPN.
+
+ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connecting to websites using HTTPS. A VPN is not a replacement for good security practices.
+
+ [Download Tor](https://www.torproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Tor Myths & FAQ](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
+
+??? question "When are VPNs useful?"
+
+ If you're looking for additional **privacy** from your ISP, on a public Wi-Fi network, or while torrenting files, a VPN may be the solution for you as long as you understand the risks involved.
+
+ [More Info](basics/vpn-overview.md){ .md-button }
+
+## Recommended Providers
+
+!!! abstract "Criteria"
+
+ Our recommended providers use encryption, accept Monero, support WireGuard & OpenVPN, and have a no logging policy. Read our [full list of criteria](#our-criteria) for more information.
+
+### Proton VPN
+
+!!! recommendation annotate
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton VPN** is a strong contender in the VPN space, and they have been in operation since 2016. Proton AG is based in Switzerland and offers a limited free tier, as well as a more featured premium option.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://protonvpn.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://protonvpn.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://protonvpn.com/support/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonVPN){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonvpn.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id1437005085)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonVPN/android-app/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://protonvpn.com/download-windows)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://protonvpn.com/support/linux-vpn-setup/)
+
+??? success annotate "67 Countries"
+
+ Proton VPN has [servers in 67 countries](https://protonvpn.com/vpn-servers) (1). Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
+
+ We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if they use [dedicated servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), instead of cheaper shared solutions (with other customers) such as [virtual private servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
+
+1. Last checked: 2022-09-16
+
+??? success "Independently Audited"
+
+ As of January 2020, Proton VPN has undergone an independent audit by SEC Consult. SEC Consult found some medium and low risk vulnerabilities in Proton VPN's Windows, Android, and iOS applications, all of which were "properly fixed" by Proton VPN before the reports were published. None of the issues identified would have provided an attacker remote access to your device or traffic. You can view individual reports for each platform at [protonvpn.com](https://protonvpn.com/blog/open-source/). In April 2022 Proton VPN underwent [another audit](https://protonvpn.com/blog/no-logs-audit/) and the report was [produced by Securitum](https://protonvpn.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/securitum-protonvpn-nologs-20220330.pdf). A [letter of attestation](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps) was provided for Proton VPN's apps on 9th November 2021 by [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com).
+
+??? success "Open-Source Clients"
+
+ Proton VPN provides the source code for their desktop and mobile clients in their [GitHub organization](https://github.com/ProtonVPN).
+
+??? success "Accepts Cash"
+
+ Proton VPN, in addition to accepting credit/debit cards and PayPal, accepts Bitcoin, and **cash/local currency** as anonymous forms of payment.
+
+??? success "WireGuard Support"
+
+ Proton VPN mostly supports the WireGuard® protocol. [WireGuard](https://www.wireguard.com) is a newer protocol that uses state-of-the-art [cryptography](https://www.wireguard.com/protocol/). Additionally, WireGuard aims to be simpler and more performant.
+
+ Proton VPN [recommends](https://protonvpn.com/blog/wireguard/) the use of WireGuard with their service. On Proton VPN's Windows, macOS, iOS, Android, ChromeOS, and Android TV apps, WireGuard is the default protocol; however, [support](https://protonvpn.com/support/how-to-change-vpn-protocols/) for the protocol is not present in their Linux app.
+
+??? warning "Remote Port Forwarding"
+
+ Proton VPN currently only supports remote [port forwarding](https://protonvpn.com/support/port-forwarding/) on Windows, which may impact some applications. Especially Peer-to-peer applications like Torrent clients.
+
+??? success "Mobile Clients"
+
+ In addition to providing standard OpenVPN configuration files, Proton VPN has mobile clients for [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/protonvpn-fast-secure-vpn/id1437005085), [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonvpn.android&hl=en_US), and [GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonVPN/android-app/releases) allowing for easy connections to their servers.
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ Proton VPN clients support two factor authentication on all platforms except Linux at the moment. Proton VPN has their own servers and datacenters in Switzerland, Iceland and Sweden. They offer adblocking and known malware domains blocking with their DNS service. Additionally, Proton VPN also offers "Tor" servers allowing you to easily connect to onion sites, but we still strongly recommend using [the official Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) for this purpose.
+
+!!! danger "Killswitch feature is broken on Intel-based Macs"
+
+ System crashes [may occur](https://protonvpn.com/support/macos-t2-chip-kill-switch/) on Intel-based Macs when using the VPN killswitch. If you require this feature, and you are using a Mac with Intel chipset, you should consider using another VPN service.
+
+### IVPN
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **IVPN** is another premium VPN provider, and they have been in operation since 2009. IVPN is based in Gibraltar.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.ivpn.net/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.ivpn.net/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/general/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ivpn){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-android/)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/ivpn-serious-privacy-protection/id1193122683)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-windows/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-macos/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-linux/)
+
+??? success annotate "35 Countries"
+
+ IVPN has [servers in 35 countries](https://www.ivpn.net/server-locations) (1). Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
+
+ We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if they use [dedicated servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), instead of cheaper shared solutions (with other customers) such as [virtual private servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
+
+1. Last checked: 2022-09-16
+
+??? success "Independently Audited"
+
+ IVPN has undergone a [no-logging audit from Cure53](https://cure53.de/audit-report_ivpn.pdf) which concluded in agreement with IVPN's no-logging claim. IVPN has also completed a [comprehensive pentest report Cure53](https://cure53.de/summary-report_ivpn_2019.pdf) in January 2020. IVPN has also said they plan to have [annual reports](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/independent-security-audit-concluded) in the future. A further review was conducted [in April 2022](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/ivpn-apps-security-audit-2022-concluded/) and was produced by Cure53 [on their website](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_IVPN_2022.pdf).
+
+??? success "Open-Source Clients"
+
+ As of February 2020 [IVPN applications are now open-source](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/ivpn-applications-are-now-open-source). Source code can be obtained from their [GitHub organization](https://github.com/ivpn).
+
+??? success "Accepts Cash and Monero"
+
+ In addition to accepting credit/debit cards and PayPal, IVPN accepts Bitcoin, **Monero** and **cash/local currency** (on annual plans) as anonymous forms of payment.
+
+??? success "WireGuard Support"
+
+ IVPN supports the WireGuard® protocol. [WireGuard](https://www.wireguard.com) is a newer protocol that uses state-of-the-art [cryptography](https://www.wireguard.com/protocol/). Additionally, WireGuard aims to be simpler and more performant.
+
+ IVPN [recommends](https://www.ivpn.net/wireguard/) the use of WireGuard with their service and, as such, the protocol is the default on all of IVPN's apps. IVPN also offers a WireGuard configuration generator for use with the official WireGuard [apps](https://www.wireguard.com/install/).
+
+??? success "Remote Port Forwarding"
+
+ Remote [port forwarding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_forwarding) is possible with a Pro plan. Port forwarding [can be activated](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/81/How-do-I-activate-port-forwarding.html) via the client area. Port forwarding is only available on IVPN when using WireGuard or OpenVPN protocols and is [disabled on US servers](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/116/Port-forwarding-is-not-working-why.html).
+
+??? success "Mobile Clients"
+
+ In addition to providing standard OpenVPN configuration files, IVPN has mobile clients for [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/ivpn-serious-privacy-protection/id1193122683), [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.ivpn.client), and [GitHub](https://github.com/ivpn/android-app/releases) allowing for easy connections to their servers.
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ IVPN clients support two factor authentication (Mullvad's clients do not). IVPN also provides "[AntiTracker](https://www.ivpn.net/antitracker)" functionality, which blocks advertising networks and trackers from the network level.
+
+### Mullvad
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mullvad** is a fast and inexpensive VPN with a serious focus on transparency and security. They have been in operation since **2009**. Mullvad is based in Sweden and does not have a free trial.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mullvad.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://o54hon2e2vj6c7m3aqqu6uyece65by3vgoxxhlqlsvkmacw6a7m7kiad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/privacy-policy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mullvad){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.mullvad.mullvadvpn)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/mullvad-vpn/id1488466513)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://mullvad.net/en/download/windows/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://mullvad.net/en/download/macos/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://mullvad.net/en/download/linux/)
+
+??? success annotate "41 Countries"
+
+ Mullvad has [servers in 41 countries](https://mullvad.net/servers/) (1). Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
+
+ We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if they use [dedicated servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), instead of cheaper shared solutions (with other customers) such as [virtual private servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
+
+1. Last checked: 2023-01-19
+
+??? success "Independently Audited"
+
+ Mullvad's VPN clients have been audited by Cure53 and Assured AB in a pentest report [published at cure53.de](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_v2.pdf). The security researchers concluded:
+
+ > Cure53 and Assured AB are happy with the results of the audit and the software leaves an overall positive impression. With security dedication of the in-house team at the Mullvad VPN compound, the testers have no doubts about the project being on the right track from a security standpoint.
+
+ In 2020 a second audit [was announced](https://mullvad.net/blog/2020/6/25/results-available-audit-mullvad-app/) and the [final audit report](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_2020_v2.pdf) was made available on Cure53's website:
+
+ > The results of this May-June 2020 project targeting the Mullvad complex are quite positive. [...] The overall application ecosystem used by Mullvad leaves a sound and structured impression. The overall structure of the application makes it easy to roll out patches and fixes in a structured manner. More than anything, the findings spotted by Cure53 showcase the importance of constantly auditing and re-assessing the current leak vectors, in order to always ensure privacy of the end-users. With that being said, Mullvad does a great job protecting the end-user from common PII leaks and privacy related risks.
+
+ In 2021 an infrastructure audit [was announced](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2021/1/20/no-pii-or-privacy-leaks-found-cure53s-infrastructure-audit/) and the [final audit report](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_2021_v1.pdf) was made available on Cure53's website. Another report was commissioned [in June 2022](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2022/6/22/vpn-server-audit-found-no-information-leakage-or-logging-of-customer-data/) and is available on [Assured's website](https://www.assured.se/publications/Assured_Mullvad_relay_server_audit_report_2022.pdf).
+
+??? success "Open-Source Clients"
+
+ Mullvad provides the source code for their desktop and mobile clients in their [GitHub organization](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app).
+
+??? success "Accepts Cash and Monero"
+
+ Mullvad, in addition to accepting credit/debit cards and PayPal, accepts Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, **Monero** and **cash/local currency** as anonymous forms of payment. They also accept Swish and bank wire transfers.
+
+??? success "WireGuard Support"
+
+ Mullvad supports the WireGuard® protocol. [WireGuard](https://www.wireguard.com) is a newer protocol that uses state-of-the-art [cryptography](https://www.wireguard.com/protocol/). Additionally, WireGuard aims to be simpler and more performant.
+
+ Mullvad [recommends](https://mullvad.net/en/help/why-wireguard/) the use of WireGuard with their service. It is the default or only protocol on Mullvad's Android, iOS, macOS, and Linux apps, but on Windows you have to [manually enable](https://mullvad.net/en/help/how-turn-wireguard-mullvad-app/) WireGuard. Mullvad also offers a WireGuard configuration generator for use with the official WireGuard [apps](https://www.wireguard.com/install/).
+
+??? success "IPv6 Support"
+
+ Mullvad supports the future of networking [IPv6](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv6). Their network allows you to [access services hosted on IPv6](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2014/9/15/ipv6-support/) as opposed to other providers who block IPv6 connections.
+
+??? success "Remote Port Forwarding"
+
+ Remote [port forwarding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_forwarding) is allowed for people who make one-time payments, but not allowed for accounts with a recurring/subscription-based payment method. This is to prevent Mullvad from being able to identify you based on your port usage and stored subscription information. See [Port forwarding with Mullvad VPN](https://mullvad.net/help/port-forwarding-and-mullvad/) for more information.
+
+??? success "Mobile Clients"
+
+ Mullvad has published [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/mullvad-vpn/id1488466513) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.mullvad.mullvadvpn) clients, both supporting an easy-to-use interface as opposed to requiring you to manually configure your WireGuard connection. The Android client is also available on [GitHub](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/releases).
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ Mullvad is very transparent about which nodes they [own or rent](https://mullvad.net/en/servers/). They use [ShadowSocks](https://shadowsocks.org/) in their ShadowSocks + OpenVPN configuration, making them more resistant against firewalls with [Deep Packet Inspection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection) trying to block VPNs. Supposedly, [China has to use a different method to block ShadowSocks servers](https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/22). Mullvad's website is also accessible via Tor at [o54hon2e2vj6c7m3aqqu6uyece65by3vgoxxhlqlsvkmacw6a7m7kiad.onion](http://o54hon2e2vj6c7m3aqqu6uyece65by3vgoxxhlqlsvkmacw6a7m7kiad.onion).
+
+## Criteria
+
+!!! danger
+
+ It is important to note that using a VPN provider will not make you anonymous, but it will give you better privacy in certain situations. A VPN is not a tool for illegal activities. Don't rely on a "no log" policy.
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the providers we recommend. This allows us to provide completely objective recommendations.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements for any VPN provider wishing to be recommended, including strong encryption, independent security audits, modern technology, and more. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing a VPN provider, and conduct your own research to ensure the VPN provider you choose is as trustworthy as possible.
+
+### Technology
+
+We require all our recommended VPN providers to provide OpenVPN configuration files to be used in any client. **If** a VPN provides their own custom client, we require a killswitch to block network data leaks when disconnected.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Support for strong protocols such as WireGuard & OpenVPN.
+- Killswitch built in to clients.
+- Multihop support. Multihopping is important to keep data private in case of a single node compromise.
+- If VPN clients are provided, they should be [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_source), like the VPN software they generally have built into them. We believe that [source code](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Source_code) availability provides greater transparency about what your device is actually doing.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- WireGuard and OpenVPN support.
+- Killswitch with highly configurable options (enable/disable on certain networks, on boot, etc.)
+- Easy-to-use VPN clients
+- Supports [IPv6](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv6). We expect that servers will allow incoming connections via IPv6 and allow you to access services hosted on IPv6 addresses.
+- Capability of [remote port forwarding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_forwarding#Remote_port_forwarding) assists in creating connections when using P2P ([Peer-to-Peer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer-to-peer)) file sharing software or hosting a server (e.g., Mumble).
+
+### Privacy
+
+We prefer our recommended providers to collect as little data as possible. Not collecting personal information on registration, and accepting anonymous forms of payment are required.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Monero or cash payment option.
+- No personal information required to register: Only username, password, and email at most.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Accepts Monero, cash, and other forms of anonymous payment options (gift cards, etc.)
+- No personal information accepted (autogenerated username, no email required, etc.)
+
+### Security
+
+A VPN is pointless if it can't even provide adequate security. We require all our recommended providers to abide by current security standards for their OpenVPN connections. Ideally, they would use more future-proof encryption schemes by default. We also require an independent third-party to audit the provider's security, ideally in a very comprehensive manner and on a repeated (yearly) basis.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Strong Encryption Schemes: OpenVPN with SHA-256 authentication; RSA-2048 or better handshake; AES-256-GCM or AES-256-CBC data encryption.
+- Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).
+- Published security audits from a reputable third-party firm.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Strongest Encryption: RSA-4096.
+- Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).
+- Comprehensive published security audits from a reputable third-party firm.
+- Bug-bounty programs and/or a coordinated vulnerability-disclosure process.
+
+### Trust
+
+You wouldn't trust your finances to someone with a fake identity, so why trust them with your internet data? We require our recommended providers to be public about their ownership or leadership. We also would like to see frequent transparency reports, especially in regard to how government requests are handled.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership or ownership.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership.
+- Frequent transparency reports.
+
+### Marketing
+
+With the VPN providers we recommend we like to see responsible marketing.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Must self-host analytics (i.e., no Google Analytics). The provider's site must also comply with [DNT (Do Not Track)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Do_Not_Track) for people who want to opt-out.
+
+Must not have any marketing which is irresponsible:
+
+- Making guarantees of protecting anonymity 100%. When someone makes a claim that something is 100% it means there is no certainty for failure. We know people can quite easily deanonymize themselves in a number of ways, e.g.:
+ - Reusing personal information (e.g., email accounts, unique pseudonyms, etc) that they accessed without anonymity software (Tor, VPN, etc.)
+ - [Browser fingerprinting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint)
+- Claim that a single circuit VPN is "more anonymous" than Tor, which is a circuit of three or more hops that regularly changes.
+- Use responsible language: i.e., it is okay to say that a VPN is "disconnected" or "not connected", however claiming that someone is "exposed", "vulnerable" or "compromised" is needless use of alarming language that may be incorrect. For example, that person might simply be on another VPN provider's service or using Tor.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+Responsible marketing that is both educational and useful to the consumer could include:
+
+- An accurate comparison to when [Tor](tor.md) should be used instead.
+- Availability of the VPN provider's website over a [.onion service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.onion)
+
+### Additional Functionality
+
+While not strictly requirements, there are some factors we looked into when determining which providers to recommend. These include adblocking/tracker-blocking functionality, warrant canaries, multihop connections, excellent customer support, the number of allowed simultaneous connections, etc.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.el.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/404.md b/i18n/eo/404.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..846e41b29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/404.md
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+---
+hide:
+ - feedback
+---
+
+# 404 - Not Found
+
+We couldn't find the page you were looking for! Maybe you were looking for one of these?
+
+- [Introduction to Threat Modeling](basics/threat-modeling.md)
+- [Recommended DNS Providers](dns.md)
+- [Best Desktop Web Browsers](desktop-browsers.md)
+- [Best VPN Providers](vpn.md)
+- [Privacy Guides Forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net)
+- [Our Blog](https://blog.privacyguides.org)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md b/i18n/eo/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..88a0e9100
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# Community Code of Conduct
+
+**We pledge** to make our community a harassment-free experience for everyone.
+
+**We strive** to create a positive environment, using welcoming and inclusive language, and being respectful of the viewpoints of others.
+
+**We do not allow** inappropriate or otherwise unacceptable behavior, such as sexualized language, trolling and insulting comments, or otherwise promoting intolerance or harassment.
+
+## Community Standards
+
+What we expect from members of our communities:
+
+1. **Don't spread misinformation**
+
+ We are creating an evidence-based educational community around information privacy and security, not a home for conspiracy theories. For example, when making a claim that a certain piece of software is malicious or that certain telemetry data is privacy invasive, explain in detail what is collected and how it collected. Claims of this nature must be backed by technical evidence.
+
+1. **Don't abuse our willingness to help**
+
+ Our community members are not your free tech support. We are happy to help you with specific steps on your privacy journey if you are willing to put in effort on your end. We are not willing to answer endlessly repeated questions about generic computer problems you could have answered yourself with a 30-second internet search. Don't be a [help vampire](https://slash7.com/2006/12/22/vampires/).
+
+1. **Behave in a positive and constructive manner**
+
+ Examples of behavior that contributes to a positive environment for our community include:
+
+ - Demonstrating empathy and kindness toward other people
+ - Being respectful of differing opinions, viewpoints, and experiences
+ - Giving and gracefully accepting constructive feedback
+ - Accepting responsibility and apologizing to those affected by our mistakes, and learning from the experience
+ - Focusing on what is best not just for us as individuals, but for the overall community
+
+### Unacceptable Behavior
+
+The following behaviors are considered harassment and are unacceptable within our community:
+
+- The use of sexualized language or imagery, and sexual attention or advances of any kind
+- Trolling, insulting or derogatory comments, and personal or political attacks
+- Public or private harassment
+- Publishing others' private information, such as a physical or email address, without their explicit permission
+- Other conduct which could reasonably be considered inappropriate in a professional setting
+
+## Scope
+
+Our Code of Conduct applies within all project spaces, as well as when an individual is representing the Privacy Guides project in other communities.
+
+We are responsible for clarifying the standards of our community, and have the right to remove or alter the comments of those participating within our community, as necessary and at our discretion.
+
+### Contact
+
+If you observe a problem on a platform like Matrix or Reddit, please contact our moderators on that platform in chat, via DM, or through any designated "Modmail" system.
+
+If you have a problem elsewhere, or a problem our community moderators are unable to resolve, reach out to `jonah@privacyguides.org` and/or `dngray@privacyguides.org`.
+
+All community leaders are obligated to respect the privacy and security of the reporter of any incident.
diff --git a/i18n/eo/about/criteria.md b/i18n/eo/about/criteria.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..edd3f3d97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/about/criteria.md
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+---
+title: General Criteria
+---
+
+!!! example "Work in Progress"
+
+ The following page is a work in progress, and does not reflect the full criteria for our recommendations at this time. Past discussion on this topic: [#24](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/discussions/24)
+
+Below are some things that must apply to all submissions to Privacy Guides. Each category will have additional requirements for inclusion.
+
+## Financial Disclosure
+
+We do not make money from recommending certain products, we do not use affiliate links, and we do not provide special consideration to project donors.
+
+## General Guidelines
+
+We apply these priorities when considering new recommendations:
+
+- **Secure**: Tools should follow security best-practices wherever applicable.
+- **Source Availability**: Open source projects are generally preferred over equivalent proprietary alternatives.
+- **Cross-Platform**: We typically prefer recommendations to be cross-platform, to avoid vendor lock-in.
+- **Active Development**: The tools that we recommend should be actively developed, unmaintained projects will be removed in most cases.
+- **Usability**: Tools should be accessible to most computer users, an overly technical background should not be required.
+- **Documented**: Tools should have clear and extensive documentation for use.
+
+## Developer Self-Submissions
+
+We have these requirements in regard to developers which wish to submit their project or software for consideration.
+
+- Must disclose affiliation, i.e. your position within the project being submitted.
+
+- Must have a security whitepaper if it is a project that involves handling of sensitive information like a messenger, password manager, encrypted cloud storage etc.
+ - Third party audit status. We want to know if you have one, or have one planned. If possible please mention who will be conducting the audit.
+
+- Must explain what the project brings to the table in regard to privacy.
+ - Does it solve any new problem?
+ - Why should anyone use it over the alternatives?
+
+- Must state what the exact threat model is with their project.
+ - It should be clear to potential users what the project can provide, and what it cannot.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/about/donate.md b/i18n/eo/about/donate.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2f51128c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/about/donate.md
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+---
+title: Supporting Us
+---
+
+
+It takes a lot of [people](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors) and [work](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/pulse/monthly) to keep Privacy Guides up to date and spreading the word about privacy and mass surveillance. If you like what we do, consider getting involved by [editing the site](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org) or [contributing translations](https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides).
+
+If you want to support us financially, the most convenient method for us is contributing via Open Collective, a website operated by our fiscal host. Open Collective accepts payments via credit/debit card, PayPal, and bank transfers.
+
+[Donate on OpenCollective.com](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/donate ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+Donations made directly to us on Open Collective are generally tax-deductible in the US, because our fiscal host (the Open Collective Foundation) is a registered 501(c)3 organization. You will receive a receipt from the Open Collective Foundation after donating. Privacy Guides does not provide financial advice, and you should contact your tax advisor to find out whether this is applicable to you.
+
+If you already make use of GitHub sponsorships, you can also sponsor our organization there.
+
+[Sponsor us on GitHub](https://github.com/sponsors/privacyguides ""){.md-button}
+
+## Backers
+
+A special thanks to all those who support our mission! :heart:
+
+*Please note: This section loads a widget directly from Open Collective. This section does not reflect donations made outside of Open Collective, and we have no control over the specific donors featured in this section.*
+
+
+
+## How We Use Donations
+
+Privacy Guides is a **non-profit** organization. We use donations for a variety of purposes, including:
+
+**Domain Registrations**
+:
+
+We have a few domain names like `privacyguides.org` which cost us around $10 yearly to maintain their registration.
+
+**Web Hosting**
+:
+
+Traffic to this website uses hundreds of gigabytes of data per month, we use a variety of service providers to keep up with this traffic.
+
+**Online Services**
+:
+
+We host [internet services](https://privacyguides.net) for testing and showcasing different privacy-products we like and [recommend](../tools.md). Some of which are made publicly available for our community's use (SearXNG, Tor, etc.), and some are provided for our team members (email, etc.).
+
+**Product Purchases**
+:
+
+We occasionally purchase products and services for the purposes of testing our [recommended tools](../tools.md).
+
+We are still working with our fiscal host (the Open Collective Foundation) to receive cryptocurrency donations, at the moment the accounting is unfeasible for many smaller transactions, but this should change in the future. In the meantime, if you wish to make a sizable (> $100) cryptocurrency donation, please reach out to [jonah@privacyguides.org](mailto:jonah@privacyguides.org).
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/about/index.md b/i18n/eo/about/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f8c7ce84b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/about/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: "About Privacy Guides"
+---
+
+**Privacy Guides** is a socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy. We are a non-profit collective operated entirely by volunteer [team members](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/g/team) and contributors.
+
+[:material-hand-coin-outline: Support the project](donate.md ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+## Our Team
+
+??? person "@jonah"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/jonah)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/jonaharagon "@jonaharagon")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@jonah "@jonah@neat.computer"){rel=me}
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Homepage](https://www.jonaharagon.com)
+
+??? person "@niek-de-wilde"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/Niek-de-Wilde)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/blacklight447 "@blacklight447")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.social/@blacklight447 "@blacklight447@mastodon.social"){rel=me}
+
+??? person "@dngray"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/dngray)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/dngray "@dngray")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.social/@dngray "@dngray@mastodon.social"){rel=me}
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-envelope: Email](mailto:dngray@privacyguides.org)
+
+??? person "@freddy"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/freddy)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/freddy-m "@freddy-m")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://social.lol/@freddy "@freddy@social.lol"){rel=me}
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-envelope: Email](mailto:freddy@privacyguides.org)
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Homepage](https://freddy.omg.lol)
+
+??? person "@mfwmyfacewhen"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/mfwmyfacewhen)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/mfwmyfacewhen "@mfwmyfacewhen")
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Homepage](https://mfw.omg.lol)
+
+??? person "@olivia"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/olivia)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/hook9 "@hook9")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@oliviablob "@oliviablob@neat.computer"){rel=me}
+
+Additionally, [many people](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors) have made contributions to the project. You can too, we're open sourced on GitHub!
+
+Our team members review all changes made to the website and handle administrative duties such as web hosting and financials, however they do not personally profit from any contributions made to this site. Our financials are transparently hosted by the Open Collective Foundation 501(c)(3) at [opencollective.com/privacyguides](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides). Donations to Privacy Guides are generally tax deductible in the United States.
+
+## Site License
+
+*The following is a human-readable summary of (and not a substitute for) the [license](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE):*
+
+:fontawesome-brands-creative-commons: :fontawesome-brands-creative-commons-by: :fontawesome-brands-creative-commons-nd: Unless otherwise noted, the original content on this website is made available under the [Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE). This means that you are free to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format for any purpose, even commercially; as long as you give appropriate credit to `Privacy Guides (www.privacyguides.org)` and provide a link to the license. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests Privacy Guides endorses you or your use. If you remix, transform, or build upon the content of this website, you may not distribute the modified material.
+
+This license is in place to prevent people from sharing our work without giving proper credit, and to prevent people from modifying our work in a way that could be used to mislead people. If you find the terms of this license too restrictive for the project you're working on, please reach out to us at `jonah@privacyguides.org`. We are happy to provide alternative licensing options for well-intentioned projects in the privacy space!
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/about/notices.md b/i18n/eo/about/notices.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7f22b4b28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/about/notices.md
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+---
+title: "Notices and Disclaimers"
+hide:
+ - toc
+---
+
+## Legal Disclaimer
+
+Privacy Guides is not a law firm. As such, the Privacy Guides website and contributors are not providing legal advice. The material and recommendations in our website and guides do not constitute legal advice nor does contributing to the website or communicating with Privacy Guides or other contributors about our website create an attorney-client relationship.
+
+Running this website, like any human endeavor, involves uncertainty and trade-offs. We hope this website helps, but it may include mistakes and can’t address every situation. If you have any questions about your situation, we encourage you to do your own research, seek out other experts, and engage in discussions with the Privacy Guides community. If you have any legal questions, you should consult with your own legal counsel before moving forward.
+
+Privacy Guides is an open source project contributed to under licenses that include terms that, for the protection of the website and its contributors, make clear that the Privacy Guides project and website is offered "as-is", without warranty, and disclaiming liability for damages resulting from using the website or any recommendations contained within. Privacy Guides does not warrant or make any representations concerning the accuracy, likely results, or reliability of the use of the materials on the website or otherwise relating to such materials on the website or on any third-party sites linked on this site.
+
+Privacy Guides additionally does not warrant that this website will be constantly available, or available at all.
+
+## Licenses
+
+Unless otherwise noted, all content on this website is made available under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE).
+
+This does not include third-party code embedded in this repository, or code where a superseding license is otherwise noted. The following are notable examples, but this list may not be all-inclusive:
+
+* [MathJax](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/docs/assets/javascripts/mathjax.js) is licensed under the [Apache License 2.0](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/docs/assets/javascripts/LICENSE.mathjax.txt).
+
+Portions of this notice itself were adopted from [opensource.guide](https://github.com/github/opensource.guide/blob/master/notices.md) on GitHub. That resource and this page itself are released under [CC-BY-4.0](https://github.com/github/opensource.guide/blob/master/LICENSE).
+
+This means that you can use the human-readable content in this repository for your own project, per the terms outlined in the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License text. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests Privacy Guides endorses you or your use. You **may not** use the Privacy Guides branding in your own project without express approval from this project. Privacy Guides's brand trademarks include the "Privacy Guides" wordmark and shield logo.
+
+We believe that the logos and other images in `assets` obtained from third-party providers are either in the public domain or **fair use**. In a nutshell, legal [fair use doctrine](https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/more-info.html) allows the use of copyrighted images in order to identify the subject matter for purposes of public comment. However, these logos and other images may still be subject to trademark laws in one or more jurisdictions. Before using this content, please ensure that it is used to identify the entity or organization that owns the trademark and that you have the right to use it under the laws which apply in the circumstances of your intended use. *When copying content from this website, you are solely responsible for ensuring that you do not infringe someone else's trademark or copyright.*
+
+When you contribute to this repository you are doing so under the above licenses, and you are granting Privacy Guides a perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive, transferable, royalty-free, irrevocable license with the right to sublicense such rights through multiple tiers of sublicensees, to reproduce, modify, display, perform and distribute your contribution as part of our project.
+
+## Acceptable Use
+
+You may not use this website in any way that causes or may cause damage to the website or impairment of the availability or accessibility of Privacy Guides, or in any way which is unlawful, illegal, fraudulent, harmful, or in connection with any unlawful, illegal, fraudulent, or harmful purpose or activity.
+
+You must not conduct any systematic or automated data collection activities on or in relation to this website without express written consent, including:
+
+* Excessive Automated Scans
+* Denial of Service Attacks
+* Scraping
+* Data Mining
+* 'Framing' (IFrames)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/about/privacy-policy.md b/i18n/eo/about/privacy-policy.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8c2e3dc72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/about/privacy-policy.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: "Privacy Policy"
+---
+
+Privacy Guides is a community project operated by a number of active volunteer contributors. The public list of team members [can be found on GitHub](https://github.com/orgs/privacyguides/people).
+
+## Data We Collect From Visitors
+
+The privacy of our website visitors is important to us, so we do not track any individual people. As a visitor to our website:
+
+- No personal information is collected
+- No information such as cookies are stored in the browser
+- No information is shared with, sent to or sold to third-parties
+- No information is shared with advertising companies
+- No information is mined and harvested for personal and behavioral trends
+- No information is monetized
+
+You can view the data we collect on our [statistics](statistics.md) page.
+
+We run a self-hosted installation of [Plausible Analytics](https://plausible.io) to collect some anonymous usage data for statistical purposes. The goal is to track overall trends in our website traffic, it is not to track individual visitors. All the data is in aggregate only. No personal data is collected.
+
+Data collected includes referral sources, top pages, visit duration, information from the devices (device type, operating system, country and browser) used during the visit and more. You can learn more about how Plausible works and collects information in a privacy-respecting manner [here](https://plausible.io/data-policy).
+
+## Data We Collect From Account Holders
+
+On some websites and services we provide, many features may require an account. For example, an account may be required to post and reply to topics on a forum platform.
+
+To sign up for most accounts, we will collect a name, username, email, and password. In the event a website requires more information than just that data, that will be clearly marked and noted in a separate privacy statement per-site.
+
+We use your account data to identify you on the website and to create pages specific to you, such as your profile page. We will also use your account data to publish a public profile for you on our services.
+
+We use your email to:
+
+- Notify you about posts and other activity on the websites or services.
+- Reset your password and help keep your account secure.
+- Contact you in special circumstances related to your account.
+- Contact you about legal requests, such as DMCA takedown requests.
+
+On some websites and services you may provide additional information for your account, such as a short biography, avatar, your location, or your birthday. We make that information available to everyone who can access the website or service in question. This information is not required to use any of our services and can be erased at any time.
+
+We will store your account data as long as your account remains open. After closing an account, we may retain some or all of your account data in the form of backups or archives for up to 90 days.
+
+## Contacting Us
+
+The Privacy Guides team generally does not have access to personal data outside of limited access granted via some moderation panels. Inquiries regarding your personal information should be sent directly to:
+
+```text
+Jonah Aragon
+Services Administrator
+jonah@privacyguides.org
+```
+
+For all other inquiries, you can contact any member of our team.
+
+For complaints under GDPR more generally, you may lodge complaints with your local data protection supervisory authorities. In France it's the Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés which take care and handle the complaints. They provide a [template of complaint letter](https://www.cnil.fr/en/plaintes) to use.
+
+## About This Policy
+
+We will post any new versions of this statement [here](privacy-policy.md). We may change how we announce changes in future versions of this document. In the meantime we may update our contact information at any time without announcing a change. Please refer to the [Privacy Policy](privacy-policy.md) for the latest contact information at any time.
+
+A full revision [history](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/commits/main/docs/about/privacy-policy.md) of this page can be found on GitHub.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/about/privacytools.md b/i18n/eo/about/privacytools.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7f1de5984
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/about/privacytools.md
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+---
+title: "PrivacyTools FAQ"
+---
+
+# Why we moved on from PrivacyTools
+
+In September 2021, every active contributor unanimously agreed to move from PrivacyTools to work on this site: Privacy Guides. This decision was made because PrivacyTools’ founder and controller of the domain name had disappeared for an extended period of time and could not be contacted.
+
+Having built a reputable site and set of services on PrivacyTools.io, this caused grave concerns for the future of PrivacyTools, as any future disruption could wipe out the entire organization with no recovery method. This transition was communicated to the PrivacyTools community many months in advance via a variety of channels including its blog, Twitter, Reddit, and Mastodon to ensure the entire process went as smoothly as possible. We did this to ensure nobody was kept in the dark, which has been our modus operandi since our team was created, and to make sure Privacy Guides was recognized as the same reliable organization that PrivacyTools was before the transition.
+
+After the organizational move was completed, the founder of PrivacyTools returned and began to spread misinformation about the Privacy Guides project. They continue to spread misinformation in addition to operating a paid link farm on the PrivacyTools domain. We are creating this page to clear up any misconceptions.
+
+## What is PrivacyTools?
+
+PrivacyTools was created in 2015 by "BurungHantu," who wanted to make a privacy information resource - helpful tools following the Snowden revelations. The site grew into a flourishing open-source project with [many contributors](https://github.com/privacytools/privacytools.io/graphs/contributors), some eventually given various organizational responsibilities, such as operating online services like Matrix and Mastodon, managing and reviewing changes to the site on GitHub, finding sponsors for the project, writing blog posts and operating social media outreach platforms like Twitter, etc.
+
+Beginning in 2019, BurungHantu grew more and more distant from the active development of the website and communities, and began delaying payments he was responsible for related to the servers we operated. To avoid having our system administrator pay server costs out of their own pocket, we changed the donation methods listed on the site from BurungHantu's personal PayPal and crypto accounts to a new OpenCollective page on [October 31, 2019](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184557/https://blog.privacytools.io/privacytools-io-joins-the-open-collective-foundation/). This had the added benefits of making our finances completely transparent, a value we strongly believe in, and tax-deductible in the United States, because they were being held by the Open Collective Foundation 501(c)3. This change was unanimously agreed upon by the team and went uncontested.
+
+## Why We Moved On
+
+In 2020, BurungHantu's absence grew much more noticeable. At one point, we required the domain's nameservers to be changed to nameservers controlled by our system administrator to avoid future disruption, and this change was not completed for over a month after the initial request. He would disappear from the public chat and private team chat rooms on Matrix for months at a time, occasionally popping in to give some small feedback or promise to be more active before disappearing once again.
+
+In October 2020, the PrivacyTools system administrator (Jonah) [left](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190742/https://blog.privacytools.io/blacklight447-taking-over/) the project because of these difficulties, handing control to another long-time contributor. Jonah had been operating nearly every PrivacyTools service and acting as the *de facto* project lead for website development in BurungHantu's absence, thus his departure was a significant change to the organization. At the time, because of these significant organizational changes, BurungHantu promised the remaining team he would return to take control of the project going forward. ==The PrivacyTools team reached out via several communication methods over the following months, but did not receive any response.==
+
+## Domain Name Reliance
+
+At the beginning of 2021, the PrivacyTools team grew worried about the future of the project, because the domain name was set to expire on 1st March 2021. The domain was ultimately renewed by BurungHantu with no comment.
+
+The team’s concerns were not addressed, and we realized this would be a problem every year: If the domain expired it would have allowed it to be stolen by squatters or spammers, thus ruining the organization's reputation. We also would have had trouble reaching the community to inform them of what took place.
+
+Without being in any contact with BurungHantu, we decided the best course of action would be to move to a new domain name while we still had guaranteed control over the old domain name, sometime before March 2022. This way, we would be able to cleanly redirect all PrivacyTools resources to the new site without any interruption in service. This decision was made many months in advance and communicated to the entire team in the hopes that BurungHantu would reach out and assure his continued support for the project, because with a recognizable brand name and large communities online, moving away from "PrivacyTools" was the least desirable possible outcome.
+
+In mid-2021 the PrivacyTools team reached out to Jonah, who agreed to rejoin the team to help with the transition.
+
+## Community Call to Action
+
+At the end of July 2021, we [informed](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184422/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-future-of-privacytools/) the PrivacyTools community of our intention to choose a new name and continue the project on a new domain, to be [chosen](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190935/https://aragon.cloud/apps/forms/cMPxG9KyopapBbcw) on 2nd August 2022. In the end, "Privacy Guides" was selected, with the `privacyguides.org` domain already owned by Jonah for a side-project from 2020 that went undeveloped.
+
+## Control of r/privacytoolsIO
+
+Simultaneously with the ongoing website issues at privacytools.io, the r/privacytoolsIO moderation team was facing challenges with managing the subreddit. The subreddit had always been operated mostly independently of the website's development, but BurungHantu was the primary moderator of the subreddit as well, and he was the only moderator granted "Full Control" privileges. u/trai_dep was the only active moderator at the time, and [posted](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/comments/o9tllh/requesting_rprivacytoolsio_im_only_active_mod_top/) a request to Reddit's administrators on June 28, 2021, asking to be granted the primary moderator position and full control privileges, in order to make necessary changes to the Subreddit.
+
+Reddit requires that subreddits have active moderators. If the primary moderator is inactive for a lengthy period of time (such as a year) the primary moderation position can be re-appointed to the next moderator in line. For this request to have been granted, BurungHantu had to have been completely absent from all Reddit activity for a long period of time, which was consistent with his behaviors on other platforms.
+
+> If you were removed as moderator from a subreddit through Reddit request it is because your lack of response and lack of activity qualified the subreddit for an r/redditrequest transfer.
+>
+> r/redditrequest is Reddit's way of making sure communities have active moderators and is part of the [Moderator Code of Conduct](https://www.redditinc.com/policies/moderator-code-of-conduct).
+
+## Beginning the Transition
+
+On September 14th, 2021, we [announced](https://www.privacyguides.org/blog/2021/09/14/welcome-to-privacy-guides/) the beginning of our migration to this new domain:
+
+> [...] we found it necessary to make this switch sooner rather than later to ensure people would find out about this transition as soon as possible. This gives us adequate time to transition the domain name, which is currently redirecting to www.privacyguides.org, and it hopefully gives everyone enough time to notice the change, update bookmarks and websites, etc.
+
+This change [entailed:](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pnhn4a/rprivacyguides_privacyguidesorg_what_you_need_to/)
+
+- Redirecting www.privacytools.io to [www.privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org).
+- Archiving the source code on GitHub to preserve our past work and issue tracker, which we continued to use for months of future development of this site.
+- Posting announcements to our subreddit and various other communities informing people of the official change.
+- Formally closing privacytools.io services, like Matrix and Mastodon, and encouraging existing users to migrate as soon as possible.
+
+Things appeared to be going smoothly, and most of our active community made the switch to our new project exactly as we hoped.
+
+## Following Events
+
+Roughly a week following the transition, BurungHantu returned online for the first time in nearly a year, however nobody on our team was willing to return to PrivacyTools because of his historic unreliability. Rather than apologize for his prolonged absence, he immediately went on the offensive and positioned the transition to Privacy Guides as an attack against him and his project. He subsequently [deleted](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/pp9yie/comment/hd49wbn) many of these posts when it was pointed out by the community that he had been absent and abandoned the project.
+
+At this point, BurungHantu claimed he wanted to continue working on privacytools.io on his own and requested that we remove the redirect from www.privacytools.io to [www.privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org). We obliged and requested that he keep the subdomains for Matrix, Mastodon, and PeerTube active for us to run as a public service to our community for at least a few months, in order to allow users on those platforms to easily migrate to other accounts. Due to the federated nature of the services we provided, they were tied to specific domain names making it very difficult to migrate (and in some cases impossible).
+
+Unfortunately, because control of the r/privacytoolsIO subreddit was not returned to BurungHantu at his demand (further information below), those subdomains were [cut off](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pymthv/comment/hexwrps/) at the beginning of October, ending any migration possibilities to any users still using those services.
+
+Following this, BurungHantu made false accusations about Jonah stealing donations from the project. BurungHantu had over a year since the alleged incident occurred, and yet he never made anyone aware of it until after the Privacy Guides migration. BurungHantu has been repeatedly asked for proof and to comment on the reason for his silence by the team [and the community](https://twitter.com/TommyTran732/status/1526153536962281474), and has not done so.
+
+BurungHantu also made a [twitter post](https://twitter.com/privacytoolsIO/status/1510560676967710728) alleging that an "attorney" had reached out to him on Twitter and was providing advice, in another attempt to bully us into giving him control of our subreddit, and as part of his smear campaign to muddy the waters surrounding the launch of Privacy Guides while pretending to be a victim.
+
+## PrivacyTools.io Now
+
+As of September 25th 2022 we are seeing BurungHantu's overall plans come to fruition on privacytools.io, and this is the very reason we decided to create this explainer page today. The website he is operating appears to be a heavily SEO-optimized version of the site which recommends tools in exchange for financial compensation. Very recently, IVPN and Mullvad, two VPN providers near-universally [recommended](../vpn.md) by the privacy community and notable for their stance against affiliate programs were removed from PrivacyTools. In their place? NordVPN, Surfshark, ExpressVPN, and hide.me; Giant VPN corporations with untrustworthy platforms and business practices, notorious for their aggressive marketing and affiliate programs.
+
+==**PrivacyTools has become exactly the type of site we [warned against](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729205249/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-reviews/) on the PrivacyTools blog in 2019.**== We've tried to keep our distance from PrivacyTools since the transition, but their continued harassment towards our project and now their absurd abuse of the credibility their brand gained over 6 years of open source contributions is extremely troubling to us. Those of us actually fighting for privacy are not fighting against each other, and are not getting our advice from the highest bidder.
+
+## r/privacytoolsIO Now
+
+After the launch of [r/PrivacyGuides](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacyguides), it was impractical for u/trai_dep to continue moderating both subreddits, and with the community on-board with the transition, r/privacytoolsIO was [made](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/qk7qrj/a_new_era_why_rptio_is_now_a_restricted_sub/) a restricted sub in a post on November 1st, 2021:
+
+> [...] The growth of this Sub was the result of great effort, across several years, by the PrivacyGuides.org team. And by every one of you.
+>
+> A Subreddit is a great deal of work to administer and moderate. Like a garden, it requires patient tending and daily care. It’s not a task for dilettantes or commitment-challenged people. It can’t thrive under a gardener who abandons it for several years, then shows up demanding this year’s harvest as their tribute. It’s unfair to the team formed years ago. It’s unfair to you. [...]
+
+Subreddits do not belong to anybody, and they especially do not belong to brand-holders. They belong to their communities, and the community and its moderators made the decision to support the move to r/PrivacyGuides.
+
+In the months since, BurungHantu has threatened and begged for returning subreddit control to his account in [violation](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/wiki/top_mod_removal/) of Reddit rules:
+
+> Retaliation from any moderator with regards to removal requests is disallowed.
+
+For a community with many thousands of remaining subscribers, we feel that it would be incredibly disrespectful to return control of that massive platform to the person who abandoned it for over a year, and who now operates a website that we feel provides very low-quality information. Preserving the years of past discussions in that community is more important to us, and thus u/trai_dep and the rest of the subreddit moderation team has made the decision to keep r/privacytoolsIO as-is.
+
+## OpenCollective Now
+
+Our fundraising platform, OpenCollective, is another source of contention. Our position is that OpenCollective was put in place by our team and managed by our team to fund services we currently operate and which PrivacyTools no longer does. We [reached out](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/updates/transitioning-to-privacy-guides) to all of our donors regarding our move to Privacy Guides, and we were unanimously supported by our sponsors and community.
+
+Thus, the funds in OpenCollective belong to Privacy Guides, they were given to our project, and not the owner of a well known domain name. In the announcement made to donors on September 17th, 2021, we offered refunds to any donor who disagrees with the stance we took, but nobody has taken us up on this offer:
+
+> If any sponsors or backers disagree with or feel misled by these recent events and would like to request a refund given these highly unusual circumstances, please get in touch with our project admin by emailing jonah@triplebit.net.
+
+## Further Reading
+
+This topic has been discussed extensively within our communities in various locations, and it seems likely that most people reading this page will already be familiar with the events leading up to the move to Privacy Guides. Some of our previous posts on the matter may have extra detail we omitted here for brevity. They have been linked below for the sake of completion.
+
+- [June 28, 2021 request for control of r/privacytoolsIO](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/comments/o9tllh/requesting_rprivacytoolsio_im_only_active_mod_top/)
+- [July 27, 2021 announcement of our intentions to move on the PrivacyTools blog, written by the team](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184422/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-future-of-privacytools/)
+- [Sept 13, 2021 announcement of the beginning of our transition to Privacy Guides on r/privacytoolsIO](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/pnql46/rprivacyguides_privacyguidesorg_what_you_need_to/)
+- [Sept 17, 2021 announcement on OpenCollective from Jonah](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/updates/transitioning-to-privacy-guides)
+- [Sept 30, 2021 Twitter thread detailing most of the events now described on this page](https://twitter.com/privacy_guides/status/1443633412800225280)
+- [Oct 1, 2021 post by u/dng99 noting subdomain failure](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pymthv/comment/hexwrps/)
+- [Apr 2, 2022 response by u/dng99 to PrivacyTools' accusatory blog post](https://www.reddit.com/comments/tuo7mm/comment/i35kw5a/)
+- [May 16, 2022 response by @TommyTran732 on Twitter](https://twitter.com/TommyTran732/status/1526153497984618496)
+- [Sep 3, 2022 post on Techlore's forum by @dngray](https://discuss.techlore.tech/t/has-anyone-seen-this-video-wondering-your-thoughts/792/20)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/about/services.md b/i18n/eo/about/services.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aa4c6f2ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/about/services.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# Privacy Guides Services
+
+We run a number of web services to test out features and promote cool decentralized, federated, and/or open-source projects. Many of these services are available to the public and are detailed below.
+
+[:material-comment-alert: Report an issue](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/services/2 ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+## Discourse
+
+- Domain: [discuss.privacyguides.net](https://discuss.privacyguides.net)
+- Availability: Public
+- Source: [github.com/discourse/discourse](https://github.com/discourse/discourse)
+
+## Gitea
+
+- Domain: [code.privacyguides.dev](https://code.privacyguides.dev)
+- Availability: Invite-Only
+ Access may be granted upon request to any team working on *Privacy Guides*-related development or content.
+- Source: [snapcraft.io/gitea](https://snapcraft.io/gitea)
+
+## Matrix
+
+- Domain: [matrix.privacyguides.org](https://matrix.privacyguides.org)
+- Availability: Invite-Only
+ Access may be granted upon request to Privacy Guides team members, Matrix moderators, third-party Matrix community administrators, Matrix bot operators, and other individuals in need of a reliable Matrix presence.
+- Source: [github.com/spantaleev/matrix-docker-ansible-deploy](https://github.com/spantaleev/matrix-docker-ansible-deploy)
+
+## SearXNG
+
+- Domain: [search.privacyguides.net](https://search.privacyguides.net)
+- Availability: Public
+- Source: [github.com/searxng/searxng-docker](https://github.com/searxng/searxng-docker)
+
+## Invidious
+
+- Domain: [invidious.privacyguides.net](https://invidious.privacyguides.net)
+- Availability: Semi-Public
+ We host Invidious primarily to serve embedded YouTube videos on our website, this instance is not intended for general-purpose use and may be limited at any time.
+- Source: [github.com/iv-org/invidious](https://github.com/iv-org/invidious)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/about/statistics.md b/i18n/eo/about/statistics.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2636d7b93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/about/statistics.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: Traffic Statistics
+---
+
+## Website Statistics
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/advanced/communication-network-types.md b/i18n/eo/advanced/communication-network-types.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f46da32dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/advanced/communication-network-types.md
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+---
+title: "Types of Communication Networks"
+icon: 'material/transit-connection-variant'
+---
+
+There are several network architectures commonly used to relay messages between people. These networks can provide different privacy guarantees, which is why it's worth considering your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md) when deciding which app to use.
+
+[Recommended Instant Messengers](../real-time-communication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Centralized Networks
+
+{ align=left }
+
+Centralized messengers are those where all participants are on the same server or network of servers controlled by the same organization.
+
+Some self-hosted messengers allow you to set up your own server. Self-hosting can provide additional privacy guarantees, such as no usage logs or limited access to metadata (data about who is talking to whom). Self-hosted centralized messengers are isolated and everyone must be on the same server to communicate.
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- New features and changes can be implemented more quickly.
+- Easier to get started with and to find contacts.
+- Most mature and stable features ecosystems, as they are easier to program in a centralized software.
+- Privacy issues may be reduced when you trust a server that you're self-hosting.
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Can include [restricted control or access](https://drewdevault.com/2018/08/08/Signal.html). This can include things like:
+- Being [forbidden from connecting third-party clients](https://github.com/LibreSignal/LibreSignal/issues/37#issuecomment-217211165) to the centralized network that might provide for greater customization or a better experience. Often defined in Terms and Conditions of usage.
+- Poor or no documentation for third-party developers.
+- The [ownership](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729191953/https://blog.privacytools.io/delisting-wire/), privacy policy, and operations of the service can change easily when a single entity controls it, potentially compromising the service later on.
+- Self-hosting requires effort and knowledge of how to set up a service.
+
+## Federated Networks
+
+{ align=left }
+
+Federated messengers use multiple, independent, decentralized servers that are able to talk to each other (email is one example of a federated service). Federation allows system administrators to control their own server and still be a part of the larger communications network.
+
+When self-hosted, members of a federated server can discover and communicate with members of other servers, although some servers may choose to remain private by being non-federated (e.g., work team server).
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- Allows for greater control over your own data when running your own server.
+- Allows you to choose whom to trust your data with by choosing between multiple "public" servers.
+- Often allows for third-party clients which can provide a more native, customized, or accessible experience.
+- Server software can be verified that it matches public source code, assuming you have access to the server or you trust the person who does (e.g., a family member).
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Adding new features is more complex because these features need to be standardized and tested to ensure they work with all servers on the network.
+- Due to the previous point, features can be lacking, or incomplete or working in unexpected ways compared to centralized platforms, such as message relay when offline or message deletion.
+- Some metadata may be available (e.g., information like "who is talking to whom," but not actual message content if E2EE is used).
+- Federated servers generally require trusting your server's administrator. They may be a hobbyist or otherwise not a "security professional," and may not serve standard documents like a privacy policy or terms of service detailing how your data is used.
+- Server administrators sometimes choose to block other servers, which are a source of unmoderated abuse or break general rules of accepted behavior. This will hinder your ability to communicate with members of those servers.
+
+## Peer-to-Peer Networks
+
+{ align=left }
+
+P2P messengers connect to a [distributed network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_networking) of nodes to relay a message to the recipient without a third-party server.
+
+Clients (peers) usually find each other through the use of a [distributed computing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_computing) network. Examples of this include [Distributed Hash Tables](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_hash_table) (DHT), used by [torrents](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent_(protocol)) and [IPFS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/InterPlanetary_File_System) for example. Another approach is proximity based networks, where a connection is established over WiFi or Bluetooth (for example, Briar or the [Scuttlebutt](https://www.scuttlebutt.nz) social network protocol).
+
+Once a peer has found a route to its contact via any of these methods, a direct connection between them is made. Although messages are usually encrypted, an observer can still deduce the location and identity of the sender and recipient.
+
+P2P networks do not use servers, as peers communicate directly between each other and hence cannot be self-hosted. However, some additional services may rely on centralized servers, such as user discovery or relaying offline messages, which can benefit from self-hosting.
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- Minimal information is exposed to third-parties.
+- Modern P2P platforms implement E2EE by default. There are no servers that could potentially intercept and decrypt your transmissions, unlike centralized and federated models.
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Reduced feature set:
+- Messages can only be sent when both peers are online, however, your client may store messages locally to wait for the contact to return online.
+- Generally increases battery usage on mobile devices, because the client must stay connected to the distributed network to learn about who is online.
+- Some common messenger features may not be implemented or incompletely, such as message deletion.
+- Your IP address and that of the contacts you're communicating with may be exposed if you do not use the software in conjunction with a [VPN](../vpn.md) or [Tor](../tor.md). Many countries have some form of mass surveillance and/or metadata retention.
+
+## Anonymous Routing
+
+{ align=left }
+
+A messenger using [anonymous routing](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_628) hides either the identity of the sender, the receiver, or evidence that they have been communicating. Ideally, a messenger should hide all three.
+
+There are [many](https://doi.org/10.1145/3182658) different ways to implement anonymous routing. One of the most famous is [onion routing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing) (i.e. [Tor](tor-overview.md)), which communicates encrypted messages through a virtual [overlay network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overlay_network) that hides the location of each node as well as the recipient and sender of each message. The sender and recipient never interact directly and only meet through a secret rendezvous node so that there is no leak of IP addresses nor physical location. Nodes cannot decrypt messages, nor the final destination; only the recipient can. Each intermediary node can only decrypt a part that indicates where to send the still encrypted message next, until it arrives at the recipient who can fully decrypt it, hence the "onion layers."
+
+Self-hosting a node in an anonymous routing network does not provide the hoster with additional privacy benefits, but rather contributes to the whole network's resilience against identification attacks for everyone's benefit.
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- Minimal to no information is exposed to other parties.
+- Messages can be relayed in a decentralized manner even if one of the parties is offline.
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Slow message propagation.
+- Often limited to fewer media types, mostly text, since the network is slow.
+- Less reliable if nodes are selected by randomized routing, some nodes may be very far from the sender and receiver, adding latency or even failing to transmit messages if one of the nodes goes offline.
+- More complex to get started, as the creation and secured backup of a cryptographic private key is required.
+- Just like other decentralized platforms, adding features is more complex for developers than on a centralized platform. Hence, features may be lacking or incompletely implemented, such as offline message relaying or message deletion.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/advanced/dns-overview.md b/i18n/eo/advanced/dns-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ab70aabd5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/advanced/dns-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+---
+title: "DNS Overview"
+icon: material/dns
+---
+
+The [Domain Name System](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System) is the 'phonebook of the Internet'. DNS translates domain names to IP addresses so browsers and other services can load Internet resources, through a decentralized network of servers.
+
+## What is DNS?
+
+When you visit a website, a numerical address is returned. For example, when you visit `privacyguides.org`, the address `192.98.54.105` is returned.
+
+DNS has existed since the [early days](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System#History) of the Internet. DNS requests made to and from DNS servers are **not** generally encrypted. In a residential setting, a customer is given servers by the ISP via [DHCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dynamic_Host_Configuration_Protocol).
+
+Unencrypted DNS requests are able to be easily **surveilled** and **modified** in transit. In some parts of the world, ISPs are ordered to do primitive [DNS filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking). When you request the IP address of a domain that is blocked, the server may not respond or may respond with a different IP address. As the DNS protocol is not encrypted, the ISP (or any network operator) can use [DPI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection) to monitor requests. ISPs can also block requests based on common characteristics, regardless of which DNS server is used. Unencrypted DNS always uses [port](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_(computer_networking)) 53 and always uses UDP.
+
+Below, we discuss and provide a tutorial to prove what an outside observer may see using regular unencrypted DNS and [encrypted DNS](#what-is-encrypted-dns).
+
+### Unencrypted DNS
+
+1. Using [`tshark`](https://www.wireshark.org/docs/man-pages/tshark.html) (part of the [Wireshark](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wireshark) project) we can monitor and record internet packet flow. This command records packets that meet the rules specified:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/dns.pcap udp port 53 and host 1.1.1.1 or host 8.8.8.8
+ ```
+
+2. We can then use [`dig`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dig_(command)) (Linux, MacOS etc) or [`nslookup`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nslookup) (Windows) to send the DNS lookup to both servers. Software such as web browsers do these lookups automatically, unless they are configured to use encrypted DNS.
+
+ === "Linux, macOS"
+
+ ```
+ dig +noall +answer privacyguides.org @1.1.1.1
+ dig +noall +answer privacyguides.org @8.8.8.8
+ ```
+ === "Windows"
+
+ ```
+ nslookup privacyguides.org 1.1.1.1
+ nslookup privacyguides.org 8.8.8.8
+ ```
+
+3. Next, we want to [analyse](https://www.wireshark.org/docs/wsug_html_chunked/ChapterIntroduction.html#ChIntroWhatIs) the results:
+
+ === "Wireshark"
+
+ ```
+ wireshark -r /tmp/dns.pcap
+ ```
+
+ === "tshark"
+
+ ```
+ tshark -r /tmp/dns.pcap
+ ```
+
+If you run the Wireshark command above, the top pane shows the "[frames](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethernet_frame)", and the bottom pane shows all the data about the selected frame. Enterprise filtering and monitoring solutions (such as those purchased by governments) can do the process automatically, without human interaction, and can aggregate those frames to produce statistical data useful to the network observer.
+
+| No. | Time | Source | Destination | Protocol | Length | Info |
+| --- | -------- | --------- | ----------- | -------- | ------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| 1 | 0.000000 | 192.0.2.1 | 1.1.1.1 | DNS | 104 | Standard query 0x58ba A privacyguides.org OPT |
+| 2 | 0.293395 | 1.1.1.1 | 192.0.2.1 | DNS | 108 | Standard query response 0x58ba A privacyguides.org A 198.98.54.105 OPT |
+| 3 | 1.682109 | 192.0.2.1 | 8.8.8.8 | DNS | 104 | Standard query 0xf1a9 A privacyguides.org OPT |
+| 4 | 2.154698 | 8.8.8.8 | 192.0.2.1 | DNS | 108 | Standard query response 0xf1a9 A privacyguides.org A 198.98.54.105 OPT |
+
+An observer could modify any of these packets.
+
+## What is "encrypted DNS"?
+
+Encrypted DNS can refer to one of a number of protocols, the most common ones being:
+
+### DNSCrypt
+
+[**DNSCrypt**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNSCrypt) was one of the first methods of encrypting DNS queries. DNSCrypt operates on port 443 and works with both the TCP or UDP transport protocols. DNSCrypt has never been submitted to the [Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Engineering_Task_Force) nor has it gone through the [Request for Comments (RFC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Request_for_Comments) process, so it has not been used widely outside of a few [implementations](https://dnscrypt.info/implementations). As a result, it has been largely replaced by the more popular [DNS over HTTPS](#dns-over-https-doh).
+
+### DNS over TLS (DoT)
+
+[**DNS over TLS**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_TLS) is another method for encrypting DNS communication that is defined in [RFC 7858](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7858). Support was first implemented in Android 9, iOS 14, and on Linux in [systemd-resolved](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/resolved.conf.html#DNSOverTLS=) in version 237. Preference in the industry has been moving away from DoT to DoH in recent years, as DoT is a [complex protocol](https://dnscrypt.info/faq/) and has varying compliance to the RFC across the implementations that exist. DoT also operates on a dedicated port 853 which can be blocked easily by restrictive firewalls.
+
+### DNS over HTTPS (DoH)
+
+[**DNS over HTTPS**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_HTTPS) as defined in [RFC 8484](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8484) packages queries in the [HTTP/2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/2) protocol and provides security with HTTPS. Support was first added in web browsers such as Firefox 60 and Chrome 83.
+
+Native implementation of DoH showed up in iOS 14, macOS 11, Microsoft Windows, and Android 13 (however, it won't be enabled [by default](https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/packages/modules/DnsResolver/+/1833144)). General Linux desktop support is waiting on the systemd [implementation](https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/8639) so [installing third-party software is still required](../dns.md#encrypted-dns-proxies).
+
+## What can an outside party see?
+
+In this example we will record what happens when we make a DoH request:
+
+1. First, start `tshark`:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/dns_doh.pcap -f "tcp port https and host 1.1.1.1"
+ ```
+
+2. Second, make a request with `curl`:
+
+ ```bash
+ curl -vI --doh-url https://1.1.1.1/dns-query https://privacyguides.org
+ ```
+
+3. After making the request, we can stop the packet capture with CTRL + C.
+
+4. Analyse the results in Wireshark:
+
+ ```bash
+ wireshark -r /tmp/dns_doh.pcap
+ ```
+
+We can see the [connection establishment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol#Connection_establishment) and [TLS handshake](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ssl/what-happens-in-a-tls-handshake/) that occurs with any encrypted connection. When looking at the "application data" packets that follow, none of them contain the domain we requested or the IP address returned.
+
+## Why **shouldn't** I use encrypted DNS?
+
+In locations where there is internet filtering (or censorship), visiting forbidden resources may have its own consequences which you should consider in your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md). We do **not** suggest the use of encrypted DNS for this purpose. Use [Tor](https://torproject.org) or a [VPN](../vpn.md) instead. If you're using a VPN, you should use your VPN's DNS servers. When using a VPN, you are already trusting them with all your network activity.
+
+When we do a DNS lookup, it's generally because we want to access a resource. Below, we will discuss some of the methods that may disclose your browsing activities even when using encrypted DNS:
+
+### IP Address
+
+The simplest way to determine browsing activity might be to look at the IP addresses your devices are accessing. For example, if the observer knows that `privacyguides.org` is at `198.98.54.105`, and your device is requesting data from `198.98.54.105`, there is a good chance you're visiting Privacy Guides.
+
+This method is only useful when the IP address belongs to a server that only hosts few websites. It's also not very useful if the site is hosted on a shared platform (e.g. Github Pages, Cloudflare Pages, Netlify, WordPress, Blogger, etc). It also isn't very useful if the server is hosted behind a [reverse proxy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_proxy), which is very common on the modern Internet.
+
+### Server Name Indication (SNI)
+
+Server Name Indication is typically used when a IP address hosts many websites. This could be a service like Cloudflare, or some other [Denial-of-service attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial-of-service_attack) protection.
+
+1. Start capturing again with `tshark`. We've added a filter with our IP address so you don't capture many packets:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/pg.pcap port 443 and host 198.98.54.105
+ ```
+
+2. Then we visit [https://privacyguides.org](https://privacyguides.org).
+
+3. After visiting the website, we want to stop the packet capture with CTRL + C.
+
+4. Next we want to analyze the results:
+
+ ```bash
+ wireshark -r /tmp/pg.pcap
+ ```
+
+ We will see the connection establishment, followed by the TLS handshake for the Privacy Guides website. Around frame 5. you'll see a "Client Hello".
+
+5. Expand the triangle ▸ next to each field:
+
+ ```text
+ ▸ Transport Layer Security
+ ▸ TLSv1.3 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
+ ▸ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
+ ▸ Extension: server_name (len=22)
+ ▸ Server Name Indication extension
+ ```
+
+6. We can see the SNI value which discloses the website we are visiting. The `tshark` command can give you the value directly for all packets containing a SNI value:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -r /tmp/pg.pcap -Tfields -Y tls.handshake.extensions_server_name -e tls.handshake.extensions_server_name
+ ```
+
+This means even if we are using "Encrypted DNS" servers, the domain will likely be disclosed through SNI. The [TLS v1.3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#TLS_1.3) protocol brings with it [Encrypted Client Hello](https://blog.cloudflare.com/encrypted-client-hello/), which prevents this kind of leak.
+
+Governments, in particular [China](https://www.zdnet.com/article/china-is-now-blocking-all-encrypted-https-traffic-using-tls-1-3-and-esni/) and [Russia](https://www.zdnet.com/article/russia-wants-to-ban-the-use-of-secure-protocols-such-as-tls-1-3-doh-dot-esni/), have either already [started blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication#Encrypted_Client_Hello) it or expressed a desire to do so. Recently, Russia has [started blocking foreign websites](https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/108) that use the [HTTP/3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) standard. This is because the [QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QUIC) protocol that is a part of HTTP/3 requires that `ClientHello` also be encrypted.
+
+### Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
+
+Another way your browser can disclose your browsing activities is with the [Online Certificate Status Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_Certificate_Status_Protocol). When visiting an HTTPS website, the browser might check to see if the website's [certificate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_certificate) has been revoked. This is generally done through the HTTP protocol, meaning it is **not** encrypted.
+
+The OCSP request contains the certificate "[serial number](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_certificate#Common_fields)", which is unique. It is sent to the "OCSP responder" in order to check its status.
+
+We can simulate what a browser would do using the [`openssl`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenSSL) command.
+
+1. Get the server certificate and use [`sed`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sed) to keep just the important part and write it out to a file:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl s_client -connect privacyguides.org:443 < /dev/null 2>&1 |
+ sed -n '/^-*BEGIN/,/^-*END/p' > /tmp/pg_server.cert
+ ```
+
+2. Get the intermediate certificate. [Certificate Authorities (CA)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) normally don't sign a certificate directly; they use what is known as an "intermediate" certificate.
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl s_client -showcerts -connect privacyguides.org:443 < /dev/null 2>&1 |
+ sed -n '/^-*BEGIN/,/^-*END/p' > /tmp/pg_and_intermediate.cert
+ ```
+
+3. The first certificate in `pg_and_intermediate.cert` is actually the server certificate from step 1. We can use `sed` again to delete until the first instance of END:
+
+ ```bash
+ sed -n '/^-*END CERTIFICATE-*$/!d;:a n;p;ba' \
+ /tmp/pg_and_intermediate.cert > /tmp/intermediate_chain.cert
+ ```
+
+4. Get the OCSP responder for the server certificate:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl x509 -noout -ocsp_uri -in /tmp/pg_server.cert
+ ```
+
+ Our certificate shows the Lets Encrypt certificate responder. If we want to see all the details of the certificate we can use:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl x509 -text -noout -in /tmp/pg_server.cert
+ ```
+
+5. Start the packet capture:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap -f "tcp port http"
+ ```
+
+6. Make the OCSP request:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl ocsp -issuer /tmp/intermediate_chain.cert \
+ -cert /tmp/pg_server.cert \
+ -text \
+ -url http://r3.o.lencr.org
+ ```
+
+7. Open the capture:
+
+ ```bash
+ wireshark -r /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap
+ ```
+
+ There will be two packets with the "OCSP" protocol: a "Request" and a "Response". For the "Request" we can see the "serial number" by expanding the triangle ▸ next to each field:
+
+ ```bash
+ ▸ Online Certificate Status Protocol
+ ▸ tbsRequest
+ ▸ requestList: 1 item
+ ▸ Request
+ ▸ reqCert
+ serialNumber
+ ```
+
+ For the "Response" we can also see the "serial number":
+
+ ```bash
+ ▸ Online Certificate Status Protocol
+ ▸ responseBytes
+ ▸ BasicOCSPResponse
+ ▸ tbsResponseData
+ ▸ responses: 1 item
+ ▸ SingleResponse
+ ▸ certID
+ serialNumber
+ ```
+
+8. Or use `tshark` to filter the packets for the Serial Number:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -r /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap -Tfields -Y ocsp.serialNumber -e ocsp.serialNumber
+ ```
+
+If the network observer has the public certificate, which is publicly available, they can match the serial number with that certificate and therefore determine the site you're visiting from that. The process can be automated and can associate IP addresses with serial numbers. It is also possible to check [Certificate Transparency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_Transparency) logs for the serial number.
+
+## Should I use encrypted DNS?
+
+We made this flow chart to describe when you *should* use encrypted DNS:
+
+``` mermaid
+graph TB
+ Start[Start] --> anonymous{Trying to be anonymous?}
+ anonymous--> | Yes | tor(Use Tor)
+ anonymous --> | No | censorship{Avoiding censorship?}
+ censorship --> | Yes | vpnOrTor(Use VPN or Tor)
+ censorship --> | No | privacy{Want privacy from ISP?}
+ privacy --> | Yes | vpnOrTor
+ privacy --> | No | obnoxious{ISP makes obnoxious redirects?}
+ obnoxious --> | Yes | encryptedDNS(Use encrypted DNS with 3rd party)
+ obnoxious --> | No | ispDNS{Does ISP support encrypted DNS?}
+ ispDNS --> | Yes | useISP(Use encrypted DNS with ISP)
+ ispDNS --> | No | nothing(Do nothing)
+```
+
+Encrypted DNS with a third-party should only be used to get around redirects and basic [DNS blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) when you can be sure there won't be any consequences or you're interested in a provider that does some rudimentary filtering.
+
+[List of recommended DNS servers](../dns.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## What is DNSSEC?
+
+[Domain Name System Security Extensions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Extensions) (DNSSEC) is a feature of DNS that authenticates responses to domain name lookups. It does not provide privacy protections for those lookups, but rather prevents attackers from manipulating or poisoning the responses to DNS requests.
+
+In other words, DNSSEC digitally signs data to help ensure its validity. In order to ensure a secure lookup, the signing occurs at every level in the DNS lookup process. As a result, all answers from DNS can be trusted.
+
+The DNSSEC signing process is similar to someone signing a legal document with a pen; that person signs with a unique signature that no one else can create, and a court expert can look at that signature and verify that the document was signed by that person. These digital signatures ensure that data has not been tampered with.
+
+DNSSEC implements a hierarchical digital signing policy across all layers of DNS. For example, in the case of a `privacyguides.org` lookup, a root DNS server would sign a key for the `.org` nameserver, and the `.org` nameserver would then sign a key for `privacyguides.org`’s authoritative nameserver.
+
+Adapted from [DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) overview](https://cloud.google.com/dns/docs/dnssec) by Google and [DNSSEC: An Introduction](https://blog.cloudflare.com/dnssec-an-introduction/) by Cloudflare, both licensed under [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
+
+## What is QNAME minimization?
+
+A QNAME is a "qualified name", for example `privacyguides.org`. QNAME minimisation reduces the amount of information sent from the DNS server to the [authoritative name server](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Name_server#Authoritative_name_server).
+
+Instead of sending the whole domain `privacyguides.org`, QNAME minimization means the DNS server will ask for all the records that end in `.org`. Further technical description is defined in [RFC 7816](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7816).
+
+## What is EDNS Client Subnet (ECS)?
+
+The [EDNS Client Subnet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EDNS_Client_Subnet) is a method for a recursive DNS resolver to specify a [subnetwork](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subnetwork) for the [host or client](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Client_(computing)) which is making the DNS query.
+
+It's intended to "speed up" delivery of data by giving the client an answer that belongs to a server that is close to them such as a [content delivery network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_delivery_network), which are often used in video streaming and serving JavaScript web apps.
+
+This feature does come at a privacy cost, as it tells the DNS server some information about the client's location.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/advanced/tor-overview.md b/i18n/eo/advanced/tor-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c78d220b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/advanced/tor-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+---
+title: "Tor Overview"
+icon: 'simple/torproject'
+---
+
+Tor is a free to use, decentralized network designed for using the internet with as much privacy as possible. If used properly, the network enables private and anonymous browsing and communications.
+
+## Path Building
+
+Tor works by routing your traffic through a network comprised of thousands of volunteer-run servers called nodes (or relays).
+
+Every time you connect to Tor, it will choose three nodes to build a path to the internet—this path is called a "circuit." Each of these nodes has its own function:
+
+### The Entry Node
+
+The entry node, often called the guard node, is the first node to which your Tor client connects. The entry node is able to see your IP address, however it is unable to see what you are connecting to.
+
+Unlike the other nodes, the Tor client will randomly select an entry node and stick with it for two to three months to protect you from certain attacks.[^1]
+
+### The Middle Node
+
+The middle node is the second node to which your Tor client connects. It can see which node the traffic came from—the entry node—and to which node it goes to next. The middle node cannot, see your IP address or the domain you are connecting to.
+
+For each new circuit, the middle node is randomly selected out of all available Tor nodes.
+
+### The Exit Node
+
+The exit node is the point in which your web traffic leaves the Tor network and is forwarded to your desired destination. The exit node is unable to see your IP address, but it does know what site it's connecting to.
+
+The exit node will be chosen at random from all available Tor nodes ran with an exit relay flag.[^2]
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ Tor circuit pathway
+
+
+## Encryption
+
+Tor encrypts each packet (a block of transmitted data) three times with the keys from the exit, middle, and entry node—in that order.
+
+Once Tor has built a circuit, data transmission is done as follows:
+
+1. Firstly: when the packet arrives at the entry node, the first layer of encryption is removed. In this encrypted packet, the entry node will find another encrypted packet with the middle node’s address. The entry node will then forward the packet to the middle node.
+
+2. Secondly: when the middle node receives the packet from the entry node, it too will remove a layer of encryption with its key, and this time finds an encrypted packet with the exit node's address. The middle node will then forward the packet to the exit node.
+
+3. Lastly: when the exit node receives its packet, it will remove the last layer of encryption with its key. The exit node will see the destination address and forward the packet to that address.
+
+Below is an alternative diagram showing the process. Each node removes its own layer of encryption, and when the destination server returns data, the same process happens entirely in reverse. For example, the exit node does not know who you are, but it does know which node it came from, and so it adds its own layer of encryption and sends it back.
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sending and receiving data through the Tor Network
+
+
+Tor allows us to connect to a server without any single party knowing the entire path. The entry node knows who you are, but not where you are going; the middle node doesn’t know who you are or where you are going; and the exit node knows where you are going, but not who you are. Because the exit node is what makes the final connection, the destination server will never know your IP address.
+
+## Caveats
+
+Though Tor does provide strong privacy guarantees, one must be aware that Tor is not perfect:
+
+- Well-funded adversaries with the capability to passively watch most network traffic over the globe have a chance of deanonymizing Tor users by means of advanced traffic analysis. Nor does Tor protect you from exposing yourself by mistake, such as if you share too much information about your real identity.
+- Tor exit nodes can also monitor traffic that passes through them. This means traffic which is not encrypted, such as plain HTTP traffic, can be recorded and monitored. If such traffic contains personally identifiable information, then it can deanonymize you to that exit node. Thus, we recommend using HTTPS over Tor where possible.
+
+If you wish to use Tor for browsing the web, we only recommend the **official** Tor Browser—it is designed to prevent fingerprinting.
+
+- [Tor Browser :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../tor.md#tor-browser)
+
+## Additional Resources
+
+- [Tor Browser User Manual](https://tb-manual.torproject.org)
+- [How Tor Works - Computerphile](https://invidious.privacyguides.net/embed/QRYzre4bf7I?local=true) (YouTube)
+- [Tor Onion Services - Computerphile](https://invidious.privacyguides.net/embed/lVcbq_a5N9I?local=true) (YouTube)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
+
+[^1]: The first relay in your circuit is called an "entry guard" or "guard". It is a fast and stable relay that remains the first one in your circuit for 2-3 months in order to protect against a known anonymity-breaking attack. The rest of your circuit changes with every new website you visit, and all together these relays provide the full privacy protections of Tor. For more information on how guard relays work, see this [blog post](https://blog.torproject.org/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters) and [paper](https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/single_guard.pdf) on entry guards. ([https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2/](https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2/))
+
+[^2]: Relay flag: a special (dis-)qualification of relays for circuit positions (for example, "Guard", "Exit", "BadExit"), circuit properties (for example, "Fast", "Stable"), or roles (for example, "Authority", "HSDir"), as assigned by the directory authorities and further defined in the directory protocol specification. ([https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html](https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html))
diff --git a/i18n/eo/android.md b/i18n/eo/android.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..11fc0ea19
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/android.md
@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+---
+title: "Android"
+icon: 'simple/android'
+---
+
+{ align=right }
+
+The **Android Open Source Project** is an open-source mobile operating system led by Google which powers the majority of the world's mobile devices. Most phones sold with Android are modified to include invasive integrations and apps such as Google Play Services, so you can significantly improve your privacy on your mobile device by replacing your phone's default installation with a version of Android without these invasive features.
+
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://source.android.com/){ .card-link title=Homepage }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://source.android.com/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+These are the Android operating systems, devices, and apps we recommend to maximize your mobile device's security and privacy. To learn more about Android:
+
+- [General Android Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/android-overview.md)
+- [Why we recommend GrapheneOS over CalyxOS :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/)
+
+## AOSP Derivatives
+
+We recommend installing one of these custom Android operating systems on your device, listed in order of preference, depending on your device's compatibility with these operating systems.
+
+!!! note
+
+ End-of-life devices (such as GrapheneOS or CalyxOS's "extended support" devices) do not have full security patches (firmware updates) due to the OEM discontinuing support. These devices cannot be considered completely secure regardless of installed software.
+
+### GrapheneOS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GrapheneOS** is the best choice when it comes to privacy and security.
+
+ GrapheneOS provides additional [security hardening](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardening_(computing)) and privacy improvements. It has a [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), network and sensor permissions, and various other [security features](https://grapheneos.org/features). GrapheneOS also comes with full firmware updates and signed builds, so verified boot is fully supported.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://grapheneos.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://grapheneos.org/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+GrapheneOS supports [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), which runs [Google Play Services](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Play_Services) fully sandboxed like any other regular app. This means you can take advantage of most Google Play Services, such as [push notifications](https://firebase.google.com/docs/cloud-messaging/), while giving you full control over their permissions and access, and while containing them to a specific [work profile](os/android-overview.md#work-profile) or [user profile](os/android-overview.md#user-profiles) of your choice.
+
+Google Pixel phones are the only devices that currently meet GrapheneOS's [hardware security requirements](https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-support).
+
+### DivestOS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **DivestOS** is a soft-fork of [LineageOS](https://lineageos.org/).
+ DivestOS inherits many [supported devices](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=devices&base=LineageOS) from LineageOS. It has signed builds, making it possible to have [verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) on some non-Pixel devices.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://divestos.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://divestoseb5nncsydt7zzf5hrfg44md4bxqjs5ifcv4t7gt7u6ohjyyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=privacy_policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/divested-mobile){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+DivestOS has automated kernel vulnerability ([CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures)) [patching](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/cve_checker), fewer proprietary blobs, and a custom [hosts](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=dnsbl) file. Its hardened WebView, [Mulch](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/mulch), enables [CFI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity) for all architectures and [network state partitioning](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning), and receives out-of-band updates. DivestOS also includes kernel patches from GrapheneOS and enables all available kernel security features via [defconfig hardening](https://github.com/Divested-Mobile/DivestOS-Build/blob/master/Scripts/Common/Functions.sh#L758). All kernels newer than version 3.4 include full page [sanitization](https://lwn.net/Articles/334747/) and all ~22 Clang-compiled kernels have [`-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero`](https://reviews.llvm.org/D54604?id=174471) enabled.
+
+DivestOS implements some system hardening patches originally developed for GrapheneOS. DivestOS 16.0 and higher implements GrapheneOS's [`INTERNET`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) and SENSORS permission toggle, [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), [exec-spawning](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/#additional-hardening), [JNI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_Native_Interface) [constification](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Const_(computer_programming)), and partial [bionic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bionic_(software)) hardening patchsets. 17.1 and higher features GrapheneOS's per-network full [MAC randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address#Randomization) option, [`ptrace_scope`](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.html) control, and automatic reboot/Wi-Fi/Bluetooth [timeout options](https://grapheneos.org/features).
+
+DivestOS uses F-Droid as its default app store. Normally, we would recommend avoiding F-Droid due to its numerous [security issues](#f-droid). However, doing so on DivestOS isn't viable; the developers update their apps via their own F-Droid repositories ([DivestOS Official](https://divestos.org/fdroid/official/?fingerprint=E4BE8D6ABFA4D9D4FEEF03CDDA7FF62A73FD64B75566F6DD4E5E577550BE8467) and [DivestOS WebView](https://divestos.org/fdroid/webview/?fingerprint=FB426DA1750A53D7724C8A582B4D34174E64A84B38940E5D5A802E1DFF9A40D2)). We recommend disabling the official F-Droid app and using [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) with the DivestOS repositories enabled to keep those components up to date. For other apps, our recommended methods of obtaining them still apply.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ DivestOS firmware update [status](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/firmware-empty/-/blob/master/STATUS) and quality control varies across the devices it supports. We still recommend GrapheneOS depending on your device's compatibility. For other devices, DivestOS is a good alternative.
+
+ Not all of the supported devices have verified boot, and some perform it better than others.
+
+## Android Devices
+
+When purchasing a device, we recommend getting one as new as possible. The software and firmware of mobile devices are only supported for a limited time, so buying new extends that lifespan as much as possible.
+
+Avoid buying phones from mobile network operators. These often have a **locked bootloader** and do not support [OEM unlocking](https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/locking_unlocking). These phone variants will prevent you from installing any kind of alternative Android distribution.
+
+Be very **careful** about buying second hand phones from online marketplaces. Always check the reputation of the seller. If the device is stolen, there's a possibility of [IMEI blacklisting](https://www.gsma.com/security/resources/imei-blacklisting/). There is also a risk involved with you being associated with the activity of the previous owner.
+
+A few more tips regarding Android devices and operating system compatibility:
+
+- Do not buy devices that have reached or are near their end-of-life, additional firmware updates must be provided by the manufacturer.
+- Do not buy preloaded LineageOS or /e/ OS phones or any Android phones without proper [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) support and firmware updates. These devices also have no way for you to check whether they've been tampered with.
+- In short, if a device or Android distribution is not listed here, there is probably a good reason. Check out our [forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/) to find details!
+
+### Google Pixel
+
+Google Pixel phones are the **only** devices we recommend for purchase. Pixel phones have stronger hardware security than any other Android devices currently on the market, due to proper AVB support for third-party operating systems and Google's custom [Titan](https://security.googleblog.com/2021/10/pixel-6-setting-new-standard-for-mobile.html) security chips acting as the Secure Element.
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Google Pixel** devices are known to have good security and properly support [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), even when installing custom operating systems.
+
+ Beginning with the **Pixel 6** and **6 Pro**, Pixel devices receive a minimum of 5 years of guaranteed security updates, ensuring a much longer lifespan compared to the 2-4 years competing OEMs typically offer.
+
+ [:material-shopping: Store](https://store.google.com/category/phones){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+
+Secure Elements like the Titan M2 are more limited than the processor's Trusted Execution Environment used by most other phones as they are only used for secrets storage, hardware attestation, and rate limiting, not for running "trusted" programs. Phones without a Secure Element have to use the TEE for *all* of those functions, resulting in a larger attack surface.
+
+Google Pixel phones use a TEE OS called Trusty which is [open-source](https://source.android.com/security/trusty#whyTrusty), unlike many other phones.
+
+The installation of GrapheneOS on a Pixel phone is easy with their [web installer](https://grapheneos.org/install/web). If you don't feel comfortable doing it yourself and are willing to spend a bit of extra money, check out the [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) as they come preloaded with GrapheneOS from the reputable [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/about) company.
+
+A few more tips for purchasing a Google Pixel:
+
+- If you're after a bargain on a Pixel device, we suggest buying an "**a**" model, just after the next flagship is released. Discounts are usually available because Google will be trying to clear their stock.
+- Consider price beating options and specials offered at physical stores.
+- Look at online community bargain sites in your country. These can alert you to good sales.
+- Google provides a list showing the [support cycle](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) for each one of their devices. The price per day for a device can be calculated as: $\text{Cost} \over \text {EOL Date}-\text{Current Date}$, meaning that the longer use of the device the lower cost per day.
+
+## General Apps
+
+We recommend a wide variety of Android apps throughout this site. The apps listed here are Android-exclusive and specifically enhance or replace key system functionality.
+
+### Shelter
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Shelter** is an app that helps you leverage Android's Work Profile functionality to isolate or duplicate apps on your device.
+
+ Shelter supports blocking contact search cross profiles and sharing files across profiles via the default file manager ([DocumentsUI](https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/modular-system/documentsui)).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://gitea.angry.im/PeterCxy/Shelter#shelter){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitea.angry.im/PeterCxy/Shelter){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.patreon.com/PeterCxy){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.typeblog.shelter)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Shelter is recommended over [Insular](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/) and [Island](https://github.com/oasisfeng/island) as it supports [contact search blocking](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/faq.html).
+
+ When using Shelter, you are placing complete trust in its developer, as Shelter acts as a [Device Admin](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/admin/device-admin) to create the Work Profile, and it has extensive access to the data stored within the Work Profile.
+
+### Auditor
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Auditor** is an app which leverages hardware security features to provide device integrity monitoring for [supported devices](https://attestation.app/about#device-support). Currently, it only works with GrapheneOS and the device's stock operating system.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://attestation.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://attestation.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://attestation.app/about){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://attestation.app/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://attestation.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.attestation.auditor.play)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases)
+ - [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+Auditor performs attestation and intrusion detection by:
+
+- Using a [Trust On First Use (TOFU)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_on_first_use) model between an *auditor* and *auditee*, the pair establish a private key in the [hardware-backed keystore](https://source.android.com/security/keystore/) of the *Auditor*.
+- The *auditor* can either be another instance of the Auditor app or the [Remote Attestation Service](https://attestation.app).
+- The *auditor* records the current state and configuration of the *auditee*.
+- Should tampering with the operating system of the *auditee* happen after the pairing is complete, the auditor will be aware of the change in the device state and configurations.
+- You will be alerted to the change.
+
+No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
+
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service. To make sure that your hardware and operating system is genuine, [perform local attestation](https://grapheneos.org/install/web#verifying-installation) immediately after the device has been installed and prior to any internet connection.
+
+### Secure Camera
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Secure Camera** is a camera app focused on privacy and security which can capture images, videos and QR codes. CameraX vendor extensions (Portrait, HDR, Night Sight, Face Retouch, and Auto) are also supported on available devices.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://grapheneos.org/usage#camera){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.grapheneos.camera.play)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases)
+ - [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+Main privacy features include:
+
+- Auto removal of [Exif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exif) metadata (enabled by default)
+- Use of the new [Media](https://developer.android.com/training/data-storage/shared/media) API, therefore [storage permissions](https://developer.android.com/training/data-storage) are not required
+- Microphone permission not required unless you want to record sound
+
+!!! note
+
+ Metadata is not currently deleted from video files but that is planned.
+
+ The image orientation metadata is not deleted. If you enable location (in Secure Camera) that **won't** be deleted either. If you want to delete that later you will need to use an external app such as [ExifEraser](data-redaction.md#exiferaser).
+
+### Secure PDF Viewer
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Secure PDF Viewer** is a PDF viewer based on [pdf.js](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PDF.js) that doesn't require any permissions. The PDF is fed into a [sandboxed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandbox_(software_development)) [webview](https://developer.android.com/guide/webapps/webview). This means that it doesn't require permission directly to access content or files.
+
+ [Content-Security-Policy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy) is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.grapheneos.pdfviewer.play)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer/releases)
+ - [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+## Obtaining Applications
+
+### GrapheneOS App Store
+
+GrapheneOS's app store is available on [GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases). It supports Android 12 and above and is capable of updating itself. The app store has standalone applications built by the GrapheneOS project such as the [Auditor](https://attestation.app/), [Camera](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera), and [PDF Viewer](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer). If you are looking for these applications, we highly recommend that you get them from GrapheneOS's app store instead of the Play Store, as the apps on their store are signed by the GrapheneOS's project own signature that Google does not have access to.
+
+### Aurora Store
+
+The Google Play Store requires a Google account to login which is not great for privacy. You can get around this by using an alternative client, such as Aurora Store.
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Aurora Store** is a Google Play Store client which does not require a Google Account, Google Play Services, or microG to download apps.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://auroraoss.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-gitlab: GitLab](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore/-/releases)
+
+Aurora Store does not allow you to download paid apps with their anonymous account feature. You can optionally log in with your Google account with Aurora Store to download apps you have purchased, which does give access to the list of apps you've installed to Google, however you still benefit from not requiring the full Google Play client and Google Play Services or microG on your device.
+
+### Manually with RSS Notifications
+
+For apps that are released on platforms like GitHub and GitLab, you may be able to add an RSS feed to your [news aggregator](/news-aggregators) that will help you keep track of new releases.
+
+   
+
+#### GitHub
+
+On GitHub, using [Secure Camera](#secure-camera) as an example, you would navigate to its [releases page](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases) and append `.atom` to the URL:
+
+`https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases.atom`
+
+#### GitLab
+
+On GitLab, using [Aurora Store](#aurora-store) as an example, you would navigate to its [project repository](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore) and append `/-/tags?format=atom` to the URL:
+
+`https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore/-/tags?format=atom`
+
+#### Verifying APK Fingerprints
+
+If you download APK files to install manually, you can verify their signature with the [`apksigner`](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/apksigner) tool, which is a part of Android [build-tools](https://developer.android.com/studio/releases/build-tools).
+
+1. Install [Java JDK](https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/downloads/).
+
+2. Download the [Android Studio command line tools](https://developer.android.com/studio#command-tools).
+
+3. Extract the downloaded archive:
+
+ ```bash
+ unzip commandlinetools-*.zip
+ cd cmdline-tools
+ ./bin/sdkmanager --sdk_root=./ "build-tools;29.0.3"
+ ```
+
+4. Run the signature verification command:
+
+ ```bash
+ ./build-tools/29.0.3/apksigner verify --print-certs ../Camera-37.apk
+ ```
+
+5. The resulting hashes can then be compared with another source. Some developers such as Signal [show the fingerprints](https://signal.org/android/apk/) on their website.
+
+ ```bash
+ Signer #1 certificate DN: CN=GrapheneOS
+ Signer #1 certificate SHA-256 digest: 6436b155b917c2f9a9ed1d15c4993a5968ffabc94947c13f2aeee14b7b27ed59
+ Signer #1 certificate SHA-1 digest: 23e108677a2e1b1d6e6b056f3bb951df7ad5570c
+ Signer #1 certificate MD5 digest: dbbcd0cac71bd6fa2102a0297c6e0dd3
+ ```
+
+### F-Droid
+
+{ align=right width=120px }
+
+==We do **not** currently recommend F-Droid as a way to obtain apps.== F-Droid is often recommended as an alternative to Google Play, particularly in the privacy community. The option to add third-party repositories and not be confined to Google's walled garden has led to its popularity. F-Droid additionally has [reproducible builds](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Reproducible_Builds/) for some applications and is dedicated to free and open-source software. However, there are [notable problems](https://privsec.dev/posts/android/f-droid-security-issues/) with the official F-Droid client, their quality control, and how they build, sign, and deliver packages.
+
+Due to their process of building apps, apps in the official F-Droid repository often fall behind on updates. F-Droid maintainers also reuse package IDs while signing apps with their own keys, which is not ideal as it gives the F-Droid team ultimate trust.
+
+Other popular third-party repositories such as [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) alleviate some of these concerns. The IzzyOnDroid repository pulls builds directly from GitHub and is the next best thing to the developers' own repositories. However, it is not something that we can recommend, as apps are typically [removed](https://github.com/vfsfitvnm/ViMusic/issues/240#issuecomment-1225564446) from that respository when they make it to the main F-Droid repository. While that makes sense (since the goal of that particular repository is to host apps before they're accepted into the main F-Droid repository), it can leave you with installed apps which no longer receive updates.
+
+That said, the [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/) and [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) repositories are home to countless apps, so they can be a useful tool to search for and discover open-source apps that you can then download through Play Store, Aurora Store, or by getting the APK directly from the developer. It is important to keep in mind that some apps in these repositories have not been updated in years and may rely on unsupported libraries, among other things, posing a potential security risk. You should use your best judgement when looking for new apps via this method.
+
+!!! note
+
+ In some rare cases, the developer of an app will only distribute it through F-Droid ([Gadgetbridge](https://gadgetbridge.org/) is one example of this). If you really need an app like that, we recommend using [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) instead of the official F-Droid app to obtain it.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Operating Systems
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must support bootloader locking with custom AVB key support.
+- Must receive major Android updates within 0-1 months of release.
+- Must receive Android feature updates (minor version) within 0-14 days of release.
+- Must receive regular security patches within 0-5 days of release.
+- Must **not** be "rooted" out of the box.
+- Must **not** enable Google Play Services by default.
+- Must **not** require system modification to support Google Play Services.
+
+### Devices
+
+- Must support at least one of our recommended custom operating systems.
+- Must be currently sold new in stores.
+- Must receive a minimum of 5 years of security updates.
+- Must have dedicated secure element hardware.
+
+### Applications
+
+- Applications on this page must not be applicable to any other software category on the site.
+- General applications should extend or replace core system functionality.
+- Applications should receive regular updates and maintenance.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png b/i18n/eo/assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5295c902c
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/eo/assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/eo/assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png b/i18n/eo/assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..974869a4e
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/eo/assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/eo/assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png b/i18n/eo/assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..21d6ef03a
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/eo/assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/eo/assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png b/i18n/eo/assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b46283571
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/eo/assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/eo/assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png b/i18n/eo/assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f88f7b404
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/eo/assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/eo/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption-dark.svg b/i18n/eo/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption-dark.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..95e681571
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption-dark.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/eo/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg b/i18n/eo/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f5b1e2915
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/eo/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg b/i18n/eo/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9002c9b16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/eo/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg b/i18n/eo/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cb53d8b13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/eo/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png b/i18n/eo/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7a4a0d170
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/eo/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/eo/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png b/i18n/eo/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f81058d88
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/eo/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/eo/assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png b/i18n/eo/assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cde3771e0
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/eo/assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/eo/assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png b/i18n/eo/assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d71381491
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/eo/assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/eo/basics/account-creation.md b/i18n/eo/basics/account-creation.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3c8b01ee1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/basics/account-creation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+---
+title: "Account Creation"
+icon: 'material/account-plus'
+---
+
+Often people sign up for services without thinking. Maybe it's a streaming service so you can watch that new show everyone's talking about, or an account that gives you a discount for your favorite fast food place. Whatever the case may be, you should consider the implications for your data now and later on down the line.
+
+There are risks associated with every new service that you use. Data breaches; disclosure of customer information to third parties; rogue employees accessing data; all are possibilities that must be considered when giving your information out. You need to be confident that you can trust the service, which is why we don't recommend storing valuable data on anything but the most mature and battle-tested products. That usually means services which provide E2EE and have undergone a cryptographic audit. An audit increases assurance that the product was designed without glaring security issues caused by an inexperienced developer.
+
+It can also be difficult to delete the accounts on some services. Sometimes [overwriting data](account-deletion.md#overwriting-account-information) associated with an account can be possible, but in other cases the service will keep an entire history of changes to the account.
+
+## Terms of Service & Privacy Policy
+
+The ToS are the rules that you agree to follow when using the service. With larger services these rules are often enforced by automated systems. Sometimes these automated systems can make mistakes. For example, you may be banned or locked out of your account on some services for using a VPN or VOIP number. Appealing such bans is often difficult, and involves an automated process too, which isn't always successful. This would be one of the reasons why we wouldn't suggest using Gmail for email as an example. Email is crucial for access to other services you might have signed up for.
+
+The Privacy Policy is how the service says they will use your data and it is worth reading so that you understand how your data will be used. A company or organization might not be legally obligated to follow everything contained in the policy (it depends on the jurisdiction). We would recommend having some idea what your local laws are and what they permit a provider to collect.
+
+We recommend looking for particular terms such as "data collection", "data analysis", "cookies", "ads" or "3rd-party" services. Sometimes you will be able to opt-out from data collection or from sharing your data, but it is best to choose a service that respects your privacy from the start.
+
+Keep in mind you're also placing your trust in the company or organization and that they will comply with their own privacy policy.
+
+## Authentication methods
+
+There are usually multiple ways to sign up for an account, each with their own benefits and drawbacks.
+
+### Email and password
+
+The most common way to create a new account is by an email address and password. When using this method, you should use a password manager and follow [best practices](passwords-overview.md) regarding passwords.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ You can use your password manager to organize other authentication methods too! Just add the new entry and fill the appropriate fields, you can add notes for things like security questions or a backup key.
+
+You will be responsible for managing your login credentials. For added security, you can set up [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md) on your accounts.
+
+[Recommended password managers](../passwords.md ""){.md-button}
+
+#### Email aliases
+
+If you don't want to give your real email address to a service, you have the option to use an alias. We described them in more detail on our email services recommendation page. Essentially, alias services allow you to generate new email addresses that forward all emails to your main address. This can help prevent tracking across services and help you manage the marketing emails that sometimes come with the sign up process. Those can be filtered automatically based on the alias they are sent to.
+
+Should a service get hacked, you might start receiving phishing or spam emails to the address you used to sign up. Using unique aliases for each service can assist in identifying exactly what service was hacked.
+
+[Recommended email aliasing services](../email.md#email-aliasing-services ""){.md-button}
+
+### Single sign-on
+
+!!! note
+
+ We are discussing Single sign-on for personal use, not enterprise users.
+
+Single sign-on (SSO) is an authentication method that allows you to register for a service without sharing much information, if any. Whenever you see something along the lines of "Sign-in with *provider name*" on a registration form it's SSO.
+
+When you choose single sign-on in a website, it will prompt your SSO provider login page and after that your account will be connected. Your password won't be shared but some basic information will (you can review it during the login request). This process is needed every time you want to log in to the same account.
+
+The main advantages are:
+
+- **Security**: no risk of being involved in a [data breach](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_breach) because the website does not store your credentials.
+- **Ease of use**: multiple accounts are managed by a single login.
+
+But there are disadvantages:
+
+- **Privacy**: a SSO provider will know the services you use.
+- **Centralization**: if your SSO account gets compromised or you aren't able to login to it, all other accounts connected to it are affected.
+
+SSO can be especially useful in those situations where you could benefit from deeper integration between services. For example, one of those services may offer SSO for the others. Our recommendation is to limit SSO to only where you need it and protect the main account with [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md).
+
+All services that use SSO will be as secure as your SSO account. For example, if you want to secure an account with a hardware key but that service doesn't support hardware keys, you can secure your SSO account with a hardware key and now you essentially have hardware MFA on all your accounts. It is worth noting though that weak authentication on your SSO account means that any account tied to that login will also be weak.
+
+### Phone number
+
+We recommend avoiding services that require a phone number for sign up. A phone number can identity you across multiple services and depending on data sharing agreements this will make your usage easier to track, particularly if one of those services is breached as the phone number is often **not** encrypted.
+
+You should avoid giving out your real phone number if you can. Some services will allow the use of VOIP numbers, however these often trigger fraud detection systems, causing an account to be locked down, so we don't recommend that for important accounts.
+
+In many cases you will need to provide a number that you can receive SMS or calls from, particularly when shopping internationally, in case there is a problem with your order at border screening. It's common for services to use your number as a verification method; don't let yourself get locked out of an important account because you wanted to be clever and give a fake number!
+
+### Username and password
+
+Some services allow you to register without using an email address and only require you to set a username and password. These services may provide increased anonymity when combined with a VPN or Tor. Keep in mind that for these accounts there will most likely be **no way to recover your account** in the event you forget your username or password.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/basics/account-deletion.md b/i18n/eo/basics/account-deletion.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bd6c07fb3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/basics/account-deletion.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: "Account Deletion"
+icon: 'material/account-remove'
+---
+
+Over time, it can be easy to accumulate a number of online accounts, many of which you may no longer use. Deleting these unused accounts is an important step in reclaiming your privacy, as dormant accounts are vulnerable to data breaches. A data breach is when a service's security is compromised and protected information is viewed, transmitted, or stolen by unauthorized actors. Data breaches are unfortunately all [too common](https://haveibeenpwned.com/PwnedWebsites) these days, and so practicing good digital hygiene is the best way to minimize the impact they have on your life. The goal of this guide then is to help navigate you through the irksome process of account deletion, often made difficult by [deceptive design](https://www.deceptive.design/), for the betterment of your online presence.
+
+## Finding Old Accounts
+
+### Password Manager
+
+If you have a password manager that you've used for your entire digital life, this part will be very easy. Oftentimes, they include built-in functionality for detecting if your credentials were exposed in a data breach—such as Bitwarden's [Data Breach Report](https://bitwarden.com/blog/have-you-been-pwned/).
+
+
+ 
+
+
+Even if you haven't explicitly used a password manager before, there's a chance you've used the one in your browser or your phone without even realizing it. For example: [Firefox Password Manager](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/password-manager-remember-delete-edit-logins), [Google Password Manager](https://passwords.google.com/intro) and [Edge Password Manager](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-edge/save-or-forget-passwords-in-microsoft-edge-b4beecb0-f2a8-1ca0-f26f-9ec247a3f336).
+
+Desktop platforms also often have a password manager which may help you recover passwords you've forgotten about:
+
+- Windows [Credential Manager](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/accessing-credential-manager-1b5c916a-6a16-889f-8581-fc16e8165ac0)
+- macOS [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211145)
+- iOS [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211146)
+- Linux, Gnome Keyring, which can be accessed through [Seahorse](https://help.gnome.org/users/seahorse/stable/passwords-view.html.en) or [KDE Wallet Manager](https://userbase.kde.org/KDE_Wallet_Manager)
+
+### Email
+
+If you didn't use a password manager in the past or you think you have accounts that were never added to your password manager, another option is to search the email account(s) that you believe you signed up on. On your email client, search for keywords such as "verify" or "welcome." Almost every time you make an online account, the service will send a verification link or an introductory message to your email. This can be a good way to find old, forgotten accounts.
+
+## Deleting Old Accounts
+
+### Log In
+
+In order to delete your old accounts, you'll need to first make sure you can log in to them. Again, if the account was in your password manager, this step is easy. If not, you can try to guess your password. Failing that, there are typically options to regain access to your account, commonly available through a "forgot password" link on the login page. It may also be possible that accounts you've abandoned have already been deleted—sometimes services prune all old accounts.
+
+When attempting to regain access, if the site returns an error message saying that email is not associated with an account, or you never receive a reset link after multiple attempts, then you do not have an account under that email address and should try a different one. If you can't figure out which email address you used, or you no longer have access to that email, you can try contacting the service's customer support. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that you will be able to reclaim access your account.
+
+### GDPR (EEA residents only)
+
+Residents of the EEA have additional rights regarding data erasure specified in [Article 17](https://www.gdpr.org/regulation/article-17.html) of the GDPR. If it's applicable to you, read the privacy policy for any given service to find information on how to exercise your right to erasure. Reading the privacy policy can prove important, as some services have a "Delete Account" option that only disables your account and for real deletion you have to take additional action. Sometimes actual deletion may involve filling out surveys, emailing the data protection officer of the service or even proving your residence in the EEA. If you plan to go this way, do **not** overwrite account information—your identity as an EEA resident may be required. Note that the location of the service does not matter; GDPR applies to anyone serving European users. If the service does not respect your right to erasure, you can contact your national [Data Protection Authority](https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/rights-citizens/redress/what-should-i-do-if-i-think-my-personal-data-protection-rights-havent-been-respected_en) and you may be entitled to monetary compensation.
+
+### Overwriting Account information
+
+In some situations where you plan to abandon an account, it may make sense to overwrite the account information with fake data. Once you've made sure you can log in, change all the information in your account to falsified information. The reason for this is that many sites will retain information you previously had even after account deletion. The hope is that they will overwrite the previous information with the newest data you entered. However, there is no guarantee that there won't be backups with the prior information.
+
+For the account email, either create a new alternate email account via your provider of choice or create an alias using an [email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services). You can then delete your alternate email address once you are done. We recommend against using temporary email providers, as oftentimes it is possible to reactivate temporary emails.
+
+### Delete
+
+You can check [JustDeleteMe](https://justdeleteme.xyz) for instructions on deleting the account for a specific service. Some sites will graciously have a "Delete Account" option, while others will go as far as to force you to speak with a support agent. The deletion process can vary from site to site, with account deletion being impossible on some.
+
+For services that don't allow account deletion, the best thing to do is falsify all your information as previously mentioned and strengthen account security. To do so, enable [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md) and any extra security features offered. As well, change the password to a randomly-generated one that is the maximum allowed size (a [password manager](../passwords.md) can be useful for this).
+
+If you're satisfied that all information you care about is removed, you can safely forget about this account. If not, it might be a good idea to keep the credentials stored with your other passwords and occasionally re-login to reset the password.
+
+Even when you are able to delete an account, there is no guarantee that all your information will be removed. In fact, some companies are required by law to keep certain information, particularly when related to financial transactions. It's mostly out of your control what happens to your data when it comes to websites and cloud services.
+
+## Avoid New Accounts
+
+As the old saying goes, "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." Whenever you feel tempted to sign up for a new account, ask yourself, "Do I really need this? Can I accomplish what I need to without an account?" It can often be much harder to delete an account than to create one. And even after deleting or changing the info on your account, there might be a cached version from a third-party—like the [Internet Archive](https://archive.org/). Avoid the temptation when you're able to—your future self will thank you!
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/eo/basics/common-misconceptions.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..db6ea35db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/basics/common-misconceptions.md
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+---
+title: "Common Misconceptions"
+icon: 'material/robot-confused'
+---
+
+## "Open-source software is always secure" or "Proprietary software is more secure"
+
+These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis.
+
+Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities into even large projects.[^1]
+
+On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering.
+
+To avoid biased decisions, it's *vital* that you evaluate the privacy and security standards of the software you use.
+
+## "Shifting trust can increase privacy"
+
+We talk about "shifting trust" a lot when discussing solutions like VPNs (which shift the trust you place in your ISP to the VPN provider). While this protects your browsing data from your ISP *specifically*, the VPN provider you choose still has access to your browsing data: Your data isn't completely secured from all parties. This means that:
+
+1. You must exercise caution when choosing a provider to shift trust to.
+2. You should still use other techniques, like E2EE, to protect your data completely. Merely distrusting one provider to trust another is not securing your data.
+
+## "Privacy-focused solutions are inherently trustworthy"
+
+Focusing solely on the privacy policies and marketing of a tool or provider can blind you to its weaknesses. When you're looking for a more private solution, you should determine what the underlying problem is and find technical solutions to that problem. For example, you may want to avoid Google Drive, which gives Google access to all of your data. The underlying problem in this case is lack of E2EE, so you should make sure that the provider you switch to actually implements E2EE, or use a tool (like [Cryptomator](../encryption.md#cryptomator-cloud)) which provides E2EE on any cloud provider. Switching to a "privacy-focused" provider (that doesn't implement E2EE) doesn't solve your problem: it just shifts trust from Google to that provider.
+
+The privacy policies and business practices of providers you choose are very important, but should be considered secondary to technical guarantees of your privacy: You shouldn't shift trust to another provider when trusting a provider isn't a requirement at all.
+
+## "Complicated is better"
+
+We often see people describing privacy threat models that are overly complex. Often, these solutions include problems like many different email accounts or complicated setups with lots of moving parts and conditions. The replies are usually answers to "What is the best way to do *X*?"
+
+Finding the "best" solution for yourself doesn't necessarily mean you are after an infallible solution with dozens of conditions—these solutions are often difficult to work with realistically. As we discussed previously, security often comes at the cost of convenience. Below, we provide some tips:
+
+1. ==Actions need to serve a particular purpose:== think about how to do what you want with the fewest actions.
+2. ==Remove human failure points:== We fail, get tired, and forget things. To maintain security, avoid relying on manual conditions and processes that you have to remember.
+3. ==Use the right level of protection for what you intend.== We often see recommendations of so-called law-enforcement or subpoena-proof solutions. These often require specialist knowledge and generally aren't what people want. There's no point in building an intricate threat model for anonymity if you can be easily de-anonymized by a simple oversight.
+
+So, how might this look?
+
+One of the clearest threat models is one where people *know who you are* and one where they do not. There will always be situations where you must declare your legal name and there are others where you don't need to.
+
+1. **Known identity** - A known identity is used for things where you must declare your name. There are many legal documents and contracts where a legal identity is required. This could range from opening a bank account, signing a property lease, obtaining a passport, customs declarations when importing items, or otherwise dealing with your government. These things will usually lead to credentials such as credit cards, credit rating checks, account numbers, and possibly physical addresses.
+
+ We don't suggest using a VPN or Tor for any of these things, as your identity is already known through other means.
+
+ !!! tip
+
+ When shopping online, the use of a [parcel locker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parcel_locker) can help keep your physical address private.
+
+2. **Unknown identity** - An unknown identity could be a stable pseudonym that you regularly use. It is not anonymous because it doesn't change. If you're part of an online community, you may wish to retain a persona that others know. This pseudonym isn't anonymous because—if monitored for long enough—details about the owner can reveal further information, such as the way they write, their general knowledge about topics of interest, etc.
+
+ You may wish to use a VPN for this, to mask your IP address. Financial transactions are more difficult to mask: You could consider using anonymous cryptocurrencies, such as [Monero](https://www.getmonero.org/). Employing altcoin shifting may also help to disguise where your currency originated. Typically, exchanges require KYC (know your customer) to be completed before they'll allow you to exchange fiat currency into any kind of cryptocurrency. Local meet-up options may also be a solution; however, those are often more expensive and sometimes also require KYC.
+
+3. **Anonymous identity** - Even with experience, anonymous identities are difficult to maintain over long periods of time. They should be short-term and short-lived identities which are rotated regularly.
+
+ Using Tor can help with this. It is also worth noting that greater anonymity is possible through asynchronous communication: Real-time communication is vulnerable to analysis of typing patterns (i.e. more than a paragraph of text, distributed on a forum, via email, etc.)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
+
+[^1]: One notable example of this is the [2021 incident in which University of Minnesota researchers introduced three vulnerabilities into the Linux kernel development project](https://cse.umn.edu/cs/linux-incident).
diff --git a/i18n/eo/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/eo/basics/common-threats.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b325bdcb9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/basics/common-threats.md
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+---
+title: "Common Threats"
+icon: 'material/eye-outline'
+---
+
+Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside of these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat.
+
+- :material-incognito: Anonymity - Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically.
+- :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks - Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically.
+- :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks - Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once.
+- :material-server-network: Service Providers - Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server).
+- :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance - Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities.
+- :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism - Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors.
+- :material-account-search: Public Exposure - Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public.
+- :material-close-outline: Censorship - Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online.
+
+Some of these threats may be more important to you than others, depending on your specific concerns. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks, but they probably still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Similarly, many people may be primarily concerned with :material-account-search: Public Exposure of their personal data, but they should still be wary of security-focused issues, such as :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks—like malware affecting their devices.
+
+## Anonymity vs. Privacy
+
+:material-incognito: Anonymity
+
+Anonymity is often confused with privacy, but they're distinct concepts. While privacy is a set of choices you make about how your data is used and shared, anonymity is the complete disassociation of your online activities from your real identity.
+
+Whistleblowers and journalists, for example, can have a much more extreme threat model which requires total anonymity. That's not only hiding what they do, what data they have, and not getting hacked by malicious actors or governments, but also hiding who they are entirely. They will often sacrifice any kind of convenience if it means protecting their anonymity, privacy, or security, because their lives could depend on it. Most people don't need to go so far.
+
+## Security and Privacy
+
+:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks
+
+Security and privacy are also often confused, because you need security to obtain any semblance of privacy: Using tools—even if they're private by design—is futile if they could be easily exploited by attackers who later release your data. However, the inverse isn't necessarily true: The most secure service in the world *isn't necessarily* private. The best example of this is trusting data to Google who, given their scale, have had few security incidents by employing industry-leading security experts to secure their infrastructure. Even though Google provides very secure services, very few people would consider their data private in Google's free consumer products (Gmail, YouTube, etc.)
+
+When it comes to application security, we generally don't (and sometimes can't) know if the software we use is malicious, or might one day become malicious. Even with the most trustworthy developers, there's generally no guarantee that their software doesn't have a serious vulnerability that could later be exploited.
+
+To minimize the damage that a malicious piece of software *could* do, you should employ security by compartmentalization. For example, this could come in the form of using different computers for different jobs, using virtual machines to separate different groups of related applications, or using a secure operating system with a strong focus on application sandboxing and mandatory access control.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Mobile operating systems generally have better application sandboxing than desktop operating systems: Apps can't obtain root access, and require permission for access to system resources.
+
+ Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS has similar sandboxing capabilities to Android, and macOS has full system permission control (and developers can opt-in to sandboxing for applications). However, these operating systems do transmit identifying information to their respective OEMs. Linux tends to not submit information to system vendors, but it has poor protection against exploits and malicious apps. This can be mitigated somewhat with specialized distributions which make significant use of virtual machines or containers, such as [Qubes OS](../../desktop/#qubes-os).
+
+:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks
+
+Targeted attacks against a specific person are more problematic to deal with. Common attacks include sending malicious documents via email, exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g. in browsers and operating systems), and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you should employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typically run untrusted code, sent to you from third parties. Running multiple virtual machines—to separate applications like these from your host system, as well as each other—is one technique you can use to mitigate the chance of an exploit in these applications compromising the rest of your system. For example, technologies like Qubes OS or Microsoft Defender Application Guard on Windows provide convenient methods to do this.
+
+If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user.
+
+## Privacy From Service Providers
+
+:material-server-network: Service Providers
+
+We live in a world where almost everything is connected to the internet. Our "private" messages, emails, and social interactions are typically stored on a server, somewhere. Generally, when you send someone a message it's stored on a server, and when your friend wants to read the message the server will show it to them.
+
+The obvious problem with this is that the service provider (or a hacker who has compromised the server) can access your conversations whenever and however they want, without you ever knowing. This applies to many common services, like SMS messaging, Telegram, and Discord.
+
+Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between you and your desired recipients before they are even sent to the server. The confidentiality of your messages is guaranteed, assuming the service provider doesn't have access to the private keys of either party.
+
+!!! note "Note on Web-based Encryption"
+
+ In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering).
+
+ On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt.
+
+ Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible.
+
+Even with E2EE, service providers can still profile you based on **metadata**, which typically isn't protected. While the service provider can't read your messages, they can still observe important things, such as who you're talking to, how often you message them, and when you're typically active. Protection of metadata is fairly uncommon, and—if it's within your [threat model](threat-modeling.md)—you should pay close attention to the technical documentation of the software you're using to see if there's any metadata minimization or protection at all.
+
+## Mass Surveillance Programs
+
+:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance
+
+Mass surveillance is the intricate effort to monitor the "behavior, many activities, or information" of an entire (or substantial fraction of a) population.[^1] It often refers to government programs, such as the ones [disclosed by Edward Snowden in 2013](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_surveillance_disclosures_(2013%E2%80%93present)). However, it can also be carried out by corporations, either on behalf of government agencies or by their own initiative.
+
+!!! abstract "Atlas of Surveillance"
+
+ If you want to learn more about surveillance methods and how they're implemented in your city you can also take a look at the [Atlas of Surveillance](https://atlasofsurveillance.org/) by the [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.eff.org/).
+
+ In France you can take a look at the [Technolopolice website](https://technopolice.fr/villes/) maintained by the non-profit association La Quadrature du Net.
+
+Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, breaching human rights, it's most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.
+
+!!! quote "ACLU: [*The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward*](https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/the-privacy-lesson-of-9-11-mass-surveillance-is-not-the-way-forward)"
+
+ In the face of [Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRISM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM) and [Upstream](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upstream_collection)], intelligence officials also admitted that the NSA had for years been secretly collecting records about virtually every American’s phone calls — who’s calling whom, when those calls are made, and how long they last. This kind of information, when amassed by the NSA day after day, can reveal incredibly sensitive details about people’s lives and associations, such as whether they have called a pastor, an abortion provider, an addiction counselor, or a suicide hotline.
+
+Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^2]
+
+Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods:
+
+- Your IP address
+- Browser cookies
+- The data you submit to websites
+- Your browser or device fingerprint
+- Payment method correlation
+
+\[This list isn't exhaustive].
+
+If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategues like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information.
+
+:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism
+
+> Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^3]
+
+For many people, tracking and surveillance by private corporations is a growing concern. Pervasive ad networks, such as those operated by Google and Facebook, span the internet far beyond just the sites they control, tracking your actions along the way. Using tools like content blockers to limit network requests to their servers, and reading the privacy policies of the services you use can help you avoid many basic adversaries (although it can't completely prevent tracking).[^4]
+
+Additionally, even companies outside of the *AdTech* or tracking industry can share your information with [data brokers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_broker) (such as Cambridge Analytica, Experian, or Datalogix) or other parties. You can't automatically assume your data is safe just because the service you're using doesn't fall within the typical AdTech or tracking business model. The strongest protection against corporate data collection is to encrypt or obfuscate your data whenever possible, making it difficult for different providers to correlate data with each other and build a profile on you.
+
+## Limiting Public Information
+
+:material-account-search: Public Exposure
+
+The best way to keep your data private is simply not making it public in the first place. Deleting unwanted information you find about yourself online is one of the best first steps you can take to regain your privacy.
+
+- [View our guide on account deletion :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](account-deletion.md)
+
+On sites where you do share information, checking the privacy settings of your account to limit how widely that data is spread is very important. For example, enable "private mode" on your accounts if given the option: This ensures that your account isn't being indexed by search engines, and that it can't be viewed without your permission.
+
+If you've already submitted your real information to sites which shouldn't have it, consider using disinformation tactics, like submitting fictitious information related to that online identity. This makes your real information indistinguishable from the false information.
+
+## Avoiding Censorship
+
+:material-close-outline: Censorship
+
+Censorship online can be carried out (to varying degrees) by actors including totalitarian governments, network administrators, and service providers. These efforts to control communication and restrict access to information will always be incompatible with the human right to Freedom of Expression.[^5]
+
+Censorship on corporate platforms is increasingly common, as platforms like Twitter and Facebook give in to public demand, market pressures, and pressures from government agencies. Government pressures can be covert requests to businesses, such as the White House [requesting the takedown](https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/technology/on-the-web-a-fine-line-on-free-speech-across-globe.html) of a provocative YouTube video, or overt, such as the Chinese government requiring companies to adhere to a strict regime of censorship.
+
+People concerned with the threat of censorship can use technologies like [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) to circumvent it, and support censorship-resistant communication platforms like [Matrix](../real-time-communication.md#element), which doesn't have a centralized account authority that can close accounts arbitrarily.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ While evading censorship itself can be easy, hiding the fact that you are doing it can be very problematic.
+
+ You should consider which aspects of the network your adversary can observe, and whether you have plausible deniability for your actions. For example, using [encrypted DNS](../advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns) can help you bypass rudimentary, DNS-based censorship systems, but it can't truly hide what you are visiting from your ISP. A VPN or Tor can help hide what you are visiting from network administrators, but can't hide that you're using those networks in the first place. Pluggable transports (such as Obfs4proxy, Meek, or Shadowsocks) can help you evade firewalls that block common VPN protocols or Tor, but your circumvention attempts can still be detected by methods like probing or [deep packet inspection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection).
+
+You must always consider the risks of trying to bypass censorship, the potential consequences, and how sophisticated your adversary may be. You should be cautious with your software selection, and have a backup plan in case you are caught.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
+
+[^1]: Wikipedia: [*Mass Surveillance*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass_surveillance) and [*Surveillance*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance).
+[^2]: United States Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: [*Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215*](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/ec542143-1079-424a-84b3-acc354698560/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf)
+[^3]: Wikipedia: [*Surveillance capitalism*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance_capitalism)
+[^4]: "[Enumerating badness](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/)" (or, "listing all the bad things that we know about"), as many adblockers and antivirus programs do, fails to adequately protect you from new and unknown threats because they have not yet been added to the filter list. You should also employ other mitigation techniques.
+[^5]: United Nations: [*Universal Declaration of Human Rights*](https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights).
diff --git a/i18n/eo/basics/email-security.md b/i18n/eo/basics/email-security.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c9391a1ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/basics/email-security.md
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+---
+title: Email Security
+icon: material/email
+---
+
+Email is an insecure form of communication by default. You can improve your email security with tools such as OpenPGP, which add End-to-End Encryption to your messages, but OpenPGP still has a number of drawbacks compared to encryption in other messaging applications, and some email data can never be encrypted inherently due to how email is designed.
+
+As a result, email is best used for receiving transactional emails (like notifications, verification emails, password resets, etc.) from the services you sign up for online, not for communicating with others.
+
+## Email Encryption Overview
+
+The standard way to add E2EE to emails between different email providers is by using OpenPGP. There are different implementations of the OpenPGP standard, the most common being [GnuPG](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard) and [OpenPGP.js](https://openpgpjs.org).
+
+There is another standard which is popular with business called [S/MIME](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME), however, it requires a certificate issued from a [Certificate Authority](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) (not all of them issue S/MIME certificates). It has support in [Google Workplace](https://support.google.com/a/topic/9061730?hl=en&ref_topic=9061731) and [Outlook for Web or Exchange Server 2016, 2019](https://support.office.com/en-us/article/encrypt-messages-by-using-s-mime-in-outlook-on-the-web-878c79fc-7088-4b39-966f-14512658f480).
+
+Even if you use OpenPGP, it does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. This is why we recommend [instant messengers](../real-time-communication.md) which implement forward secrecy over email for person-to-person communications whenever possible.
+
+### What Email Clients Support E2EE?
+
+Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md). Depending on the authentication method, this may lead to the decrease security if either the provider or the email client does not support OATH or a bridge application as [multi-factor authentication](multi-factor-authentication.md) is not possible with plain password authentication.
+
+### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
+
+A smartcard (such as a [Yubikey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
+
+It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard so as to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.
+
+## Email Metadata Overview
+
+Email metadata is stored in the [message header](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) of the email message and includes some visible headers that you may have seen such as: `To`, `From`, `Cc`, `Date`, `Subject`. There are also a number of hidden headers included by many email clients and providers that can reveal information about your account.
+
+Client software may use email metadata to show who a message is from and what time it was received. Servers may use it to determine where an email message must be sent, among [other purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) which are not always transparent.
+
+### Who Can View Email Metadata?
+
+Email metadata is protected from outside observers with [Opportunistic TLS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunistic_TLS) protecting it from outside observers, but it is still able to be seen by your email client software (or webmail) and any servers relaying the message from you to any recipients including your email provider. Sometimes email servers will also use third-party services to protect against spam, which generally also have access to your messages.
+
+### Why Can't Metadata be E2EE?
+
+Email metadata is crucial to the most basic functionality of email (where it came from, and where it has to go). E2EE was not built into the email protocols originally, instead requiring add-on software like OpenPGP. Because OpenPGP messages still have to work with traditional email providers, it cannot encrypt email metadata, only the message body itself. That means that even when using OpenPGP, outside observers can see lots of information about your messages, such as who you're emailing, the subject lines, when you're emailing, etc.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md b/i18n/eo/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..11db51597
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+---
+title: "Multi-Factor Authentication"
+icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication'
+---
+
+**Multi-Factor Authentication** (**MFA**) is a security mechanism that requires additional steps beyond entering your username (or email) and password. The most common method is time limited codes you might receive from SMS or an app.
+
+Normally, if a hacker (or adversary) is able to figure out your password then they’d gain access to the account that password belongs to. An account with MFA forces the hacker to have both the password (something you *know*) and a device that you own (something you *have*), like your phone.
+
+MFA methods vary in security, but are based on the premise that the more difficult it is for an attacker to gain access to your MFA method, the better. Examples of MFA methods (from weakest to strongest) include SMS, Email codes, app push notifications, TOTP, Yubico OTP and FIDO.
+
+## MFA Method Comparison
+
+### SMS or Email MFA
+
+Receiving OTP codes via SMS or email are one of the weaker ways to secure your accounts with MFA. Obtaining a code by email or SMS takes away from the "something you *have*" idea, because there are a variety of ways a hacker could [take over your phone number](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam) or gain access to your email without having physical access to any of your devices at all. If an unauthorized person gained access to your email, they would be able to use that access to both reset your password and receive the authentication code, giving them full access to your account.
+
+### Push Notifications
+
+Push notification MFA takes the form of a message being sent to an app on your phone asking you to confirm new account logins. This method is a lot better than SMS or email, since an attacker typically wouldn't be able to get these push notifications without having an already logged-in device, which means they would need to compromise one of your other devices first.
+
+We all make mistakes, and there is the risk that you might accept the login attempt by accident. Push notification login authorizations are typically sent to *all* your devices at once, widening the availability of the MFA code if you have many devices.
+
+The security of push notification MFA is dependent on both the quality of the app, the server component and the trust of the developer who produces it. Installing an app may also require you to accept invasive privileges that grant access to other data on your device. An individual app also requires that you have a specific app for each service which may not require a password to open, unlike a good TOTP generator app.
+
+### Time-based One-time Password (TOTP)
+
+TOTP is one of the most common forms of MFA available. When you set up TOTP, you are generally required to scan a [QR Code](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QR_code) which establishes a "[shared secret](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_secret)" with the service that you intend to use. The shared secret is secured inside of the authenticator app's data, and is sometimes protected by a password.
+
+The time-limited code is then derived from the shared secret and the current time. As the code is only valid for a short time, without access to the shared secret, an adversary cannot generate new codes.
+
+If you have a hardware security key with TOTP support (such as a YubiKey with [Yubico Authenticator](https://www.yubico.com/products/yubico-authenticator/)), we recommend that you store your "shared secrets" on the hardware. Hardware such as the YubiKey was developed with the intention of making the "shared secret" difficult to extract and copy. A YubiKey is also not connected to the Internet, unlike a phone with a TOTP app.
+
+Unlike [WebAuthn](#fido-fast-identity-online), TOTP offers no protection against [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing) or reuse attacks. If an adversary obtains a valid code from you, they may use it as many times as they like until it expires (generally 60 seconds).
+
+An adversary could set up a website to imitate an official service in an attempt to trick you into giving out your username, password and current TOTP code. If the adversary then uses those recorded credentials they may be able to log into the real service and hijack the account.
+
+Although not perfect, TOTP is secure enough for most people, and when [hardware security keys](../multi-factor-authentication.md#hardware-security-keys) are not supported [authenticator apps](../multi-factor-authentication.md#authenticator-apps) are still a good option.
+
+### Hardware security keys
+
+The YubiKey stores data on a tamper-resistant solid-state chip which is [impossible to access](https://security.stackexchange.com/a/245772) non-destructively without an expensive process and a forensics laboratory.
+
+These keys are generally multi-function and provide a number of methods to authenticate. Below are the most common ones.
+
+#### Yubico OTP
+
+Yubico OTP is an authentication protocol typically implemented in hardware security keys. When you decide to use Yubico OTP, the key will generate a public ID, private ID, and a Secret Key which is then uploaded to the Yubico OTP server.
+
+When logging into a website, all you need to do is to physically touch the security key. The security key will emulate a keyboard and print out a one-time password into the password field.
+
+The service will then forward the one-time password to the Yubico OTP server for validation. A counter is incremented both on the key and Yubico's validation server. The OTP can only be used once, and when a successful authentication occurs, the counter is increased which prevents reuse of the OTP. Yubico provides a [detailed document](https://developers.yubico.com/OTP/OTPs_Explained.html) about the process.
+
+
+ 
+
+
+There are some benefits and disadvantages to using Yubico OTP when compared to TOTP.
+
+The Yubico validation server is a cloud based service, and you're placing trust in Yubico that they are storing data securely and not profiling you. The public ID associated with Yubico OTP is reused on every website and could be another avenue for third-parties to profile you. Like TOTP, Yubico OTP does not provide phishing resistance.
+
+If your threat model requires you to have different identities on different websites, **do not** use Yubico OTP with the same hardware security key across those websites as public ID is unique to each security key.
+
+#### FIDO (Fast IDentity Online)
+
+[FIDO](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIDO_Alliance) includes a number of standards, first there was U2F and then later [FIDO2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIDO2_Project) which includes the web standard [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn).
+
+U2F and FIDO2 refer to the [Client to Authenticator Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Client_to_Authenticator_Protocol), which is the protocol between the security key and the computer, such as a laptop or phone. It complements WebAuthn which is the component used to authenticate with the website (the "Relying Party") you're trying to log in on.
+
+WebAuthn is the most secure and private form of second factor authentication. While the authentication experience is similar to Yubico OTP, the key does not print out a one-time password and validate with a third-party server. Instead, it uses [public key cryptography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography) for authentication.
+
+
+ 
+
+
+When you create an account, the public key is sent to the service, then when you log in, the service will require you to "sign" some data with your private key. The benefit of this is that no password data is ever stored by the service, so there is nothing for an adversary to steal.
+
+This presentation discusses the history of password authentication, the pitfalls (such as password reuse), and discussion of FIDO2 and [WebAuthn](https://webauthn.guide) standards.
+
+
+
+
+
+FIDO2 and WebAuthn have superior security and privacy properties when compared to any MFA methods.
+
+Typically for web services it is used with WebAuthn which is a part of the [W3C recommendations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Wide_Web_Consortium#W3C_recommendation_(REC)). It uses public key authentication and is more secure than shared secrets used in Yubico OTP and TOTP methods, as it includes the origin name (usually, the domain name) during authentication. Attestation is provided to protect you from phishing attacks, as it helps you to determine that you are using the authentic service and not a fake copy.
+
+Unlike Yubico OTP, WebAuthn does not use any public ID, so the key is **not** identifiable across different websites. It also does not use any third-party cloud server for authentication. All communication is completed between the key and the website you are logging into. FIDO also uses a counter which is incremented upon use in order to prevent session reuse and cloned keys.
+
+If a website or service supports WebAuthn for the authentication, it is highly recommended that you use it over any other form of MFA.
+
+## General Recommendations
+
+We have these general recommendations:
+
+### Which Method Should I Use?
+
+When configuring your MFA method, keep in mind that it is only as secure as your weakest authentication method you use. This means it is important that you only use the best MFA method available. For instance, if you are already using TOTP, you should disable email and SMS MFA. If you are already using FIDO2/WebAuthn, you should not be using Yubico OTP or TOTP on your account.
+
+### Backups
+
+You should always have backups for your MFA method. Hardware security keys can get lost, stolen or simply stop working over time. It is recommended that you have a pair of hardware security keys with the same access to your accounts instead of just one.
+
+When using TOTP with an authenticator app, be sure to back up your recovery keys or the app itself, or copy the "shared secrets" to another instance of the app on a different phone or to an encrypted container (e.g. [VeraCrypt](../encryption.md#veracrypt)).
+
+### Initial Set Up
+
+When buying a security key, it is important that you change the default credentials, set up password protection for the key, and enable touch confirmation if your key supports it. Products such as the YubiKey have multiple interfaces with separate credentials for each one of them, so you should go over each interface and set up protection as well.
+
+### Email and SMS
+
+If you have to use email for MFA, make sure that the email account itself is secured with a proper MFA method.
+
+If you use SMS MFA, use a carrier who will not switch your phone number to a new SIM card without account access, or use a dedicated VoIP number from a provider with similar security to avoid a [SIM swap attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam).
+
+[MFA tools we recommend](../multi-factor-authentication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## More Places to Set Up MFA
+
+Beyond just securing your website logins, multi-factor authentication can be used to secure your local logins, SSH keys or even password databases as well.
+
+### Windows
+
+Yubico has a dedicated [Credential Provider](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/credential-providers-in-windows) that adds Challenge-Response authentication for the username + password login flow for local Windows accounts. If you have a YubiKey with Challenge-Response authentication support, take a look at the [Yubico Login for Windows Configuration Guide](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013708460-Yubico-Login-for-Windows-Configuration-Guide), which will allow you to set up MFA on your Windows computer.
+
+### macOS
+
+macOS has [native support](https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/intro-to-smart-card-integration-depd0b888248/web) for authentication with smart cards (PIV). If you have a smartcard or a hardware security key that supports the PIV interface such as the YubiKey, we recommend that you follow your smartcard/hardware security vendor's documentation and set up second factor authentication for your macOS computer.
+
+Yubico have a guide [Using Your YubiKey as a Smart Card in macOS](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016649059) which can help you set up your YubiKey on macOS.
+
+After your smartcard/security key is set up, we recommend running this command in the Terminal:
+
+```text
+sudo defaults write /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow DisableFDEAutoLogin -bool YES
+```
+
+The command will prevent an adversary from bypassing MFA when the computer boots.
+
+### Linux
+
+!!! warning
+
+ If the hostname of your system changes (such as due to DHCP), you would be unable to login. It is vital that you set up a proper hostname for your computer before following this guide.
+
+The `pam_u2f` module on Linux can provide two-factor authentication for logging in on most popular Linux distributions. If you have a hardware security key that supports U2F, you can set up MFA authentication for your login. Yubico has a guide [Ubuntu Linux Login Guide - U2F](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016649099-Ubuntu-Linux-Login-Guide-U2F) which should work on any distribution. The package manager commands—such as `apt-get`—and package names may however differ. This guide does **not** apply to Qubes OS.
+
+### Qubes OS
+
+Qubes OS has support for Challenge-Response authentication with YubiKeys. If you have a YubiKey with Challenge-Response authentication support, take a look at the Qubes OS [YubiKey documentation](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/yubikey/) if you want to set up MFA on Qubes OS.
+
+### SSH
+
+#### Hardware Security Keys
+
+SSH MFA could be set up using multiple different authentication methods that are popular with hardware security keys. We recommend that you check out Yubico's [documentation](https://developers.yubico.com/SSH/) on how to set this up.
+
+#### Time-based One-time Password (TOTP)
+
+SSH MFA can also be set up using TOTP. DigitalOcean has provided a tutorial [How To Set Up Multi-Factor Authentication for SSH on Ubuntu 20.04](https://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/how-to-set-up-multi-factor-authentication-for-ssh-on-ubuntu-20-04). Most things should be the same regardless of distribution, however the package manager commands—such as `apt-get`—and package names may differ.
+
+### KeePass (and KeePassXC)
+
+KeePass and KeePassXC databases can be secured using Challenge-Response or HOTP as a second-factor authentication. Yubico has provided a document for KeePass [Using Your YubiKey with KeePass](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013779759-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-KeePass) and there is also one on the [KeePassXC](https://keepassxc.org/docs/#faq-yubikey-2fa) website.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/basics/passwords-overview.md b/i18n/eo/basics/passwords-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f464ddac8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/basics/passwords-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+---
+title: "Introduction to Passwords"
+icon: 'material/form-textbox-password'
+---
+
+Passwords are an essential part of our everyday digital lives. We use them to protect our accounts, our devices and our secrets. Despite often being the only thing between us and an adversary who's after our private information, not a lot of thought is put into them, which often leads to people using passwords that can be easily guessed or brute-forced.
+
+## Best Practices
+
+### Use unique passwords for every service
+
+Imagine this; you sign up for an account with the same e-mail and password on multiple online services. If one of those service providers is malicious, or their service has a data breach that exposes your password in an unencrypted format, all a bad actor would have to do is try that e-mail and password combination across multiple popular services until they get a hit. It doesn't matter how strong that one password is, because they already have it.
+
+This is called [credential stuffing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credential_stuffing), and it is one of the most common ways that your accounts can be compromised by bad actors. To avoid this, make sure that you never re-use your passwords.
+
+### Use randomly generated passwords
+
+==You should **never** rely on yourself to come up with a good password.== We recommend using [randomly generated passwords](#passwords) or [diceware passphrases](#diceware-passphrases) with sufficient entropy to protect your accounts and devices.
+
+All of our [recommended password managers](../passwords.md) include a built-in password generator that you can use.
+
+### Rotating Passwords
+
+You should avoid changing passwords that you have to remember (such as your password manager's master password) too often unless you have reason to believe it has been compromised, as changing it too often exposes you to the risk of forgetting it.
+
+When it comes to passwords that you don't have to remember (such as passwords stored inside your password manager), if your [threat model](threat-modeling.md) calls for it, we recommend going through important accounts (especially accounts that don't use multi-factor authentication) and changing their password every couple of months, in case they have been compromised in a data breach that hasn't become public yet. Most password managers allow you to set an expiry date for your password to make this easier to manage.
+
+!!! tip "Checking for data breaches"
+
+ If your password manager lets you check for compromised passwords, make sure to do so and promptly change any password that may have been exposed in a data breach. Alternatively, you could follow [Have I Been Pwned's Latest Breaches feed](https://feeds.feedburner.com/HaveIBeenPwnedLatestBreaches) with the help of a [news aggregator](../news-aggregators.md).
+
+## Creating strong passwords
+
+### Passwords
+
+A lot of services impose certain criteria when it comes to passwords, including a minimum or maximum length, as well as which special characters, if any, can be used. You should use your password manager's built-in password generator to create passwords that are as long and complex as the service will allow by including capitalized and lowercase letters, numbers and special characters.
+
+If you need a password you can memorize, we recommend a [diceware passphrase](#diceware-passphrases).
+
+### Diceware Passphrases
+
+Diceware is a method for creating passphrases which are easy to remember, but hard to guess.
+
+Diceware passphrases are a great option when you need to memorize or manually input your credentials, such as for your password manager's master password or your device's encryption password.
+
+An example of a diceware passphrase is `viewable fastness reluctant squishy seventeen shown pencil`.
+
+To generate a diceware passphrase using real dice, follow these steps:
+
+!!! note
+
+ These instructions assume that you are using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate the passphrase, which requires five dice rolls per word. Other wordlists may require more or less rolls per word, and may require a different amount of words to achieve the same entropy.
+
+1. Roll a six-sided die five times, noting down the number after each roll.
+
+2. As an example, let's say you rolled `2-5-2-6-6`. Look through the [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) for the word that corresponds to `25266`.
+
+3. You will find the word `encrypt`. Write that word down.
+
+4. Repeat this process until your passphrase has as many words as you need, which you should separate with a space.
+
+!!! warning "Important"
+
+ You should **not** re-roll words until you get a combination of words that appeal to you. The process should be completely random.
+
+If you don't have access to or would prefer to not use real dice, you can use your password manager's built-in password generator, as most of them have the option to generate diceware passphrases in addition to regular passwords.
+
+We recommend using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate your diceware passphrases, as it offers the exact same security as the original list, while containing words that are easier to memorize. There are also [other wordlists in different languages](https://theworld.com/~reinhold/diceware.html#Diceware%20in%20Other%20Languages|outline), if you do not want your passphrase to be in English.
+
+??? note "Explanation of entropy and strength of diceware passphrases"
+
+ To demonstrate how strong diceware passphrases are, we'll use the aforementioned seven word passphrase (`viewable fastness reluctant squishy seventeen shown pencil`) and [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) as an example.
+
+ One metric to determine the strength of a diceware passphrase is how much entropy it has. The entropy per word in a diceware passphrase is calculated as $\text{log}_2(\text{WordsInList})$ and the overall entropy of the passphrase is calculated as $\text{log}_2(\text{WordsInList}^\text{WordsInPhrase})$.
+
+ Therefore, each word in the aforementioned list results in ~12.9 bits of entropy ($\text{log}_2(7776)$), and a seven word passphrase derived from it has ~90.47 bits of entropy ($\text{log}_2(7776^7)$).
+
+ The [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) contains 7776 unique words. To calculate the amount of possible passphrases, all we have to do is $\text{WordsInList}^\text{WordsInPhrase}$, or in our case, $7776^7$.
+
+ Let's put all of this in perspective: A seven word passphrase using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) is one of ~1,719,070,799,748,422,500,000,000,000 possible passphrases.
+
+ On average, it takes trying 50% of all the possible combinations to guess your phrase. With that in mind, even if your adversary is capable of ~1,000,000,000,000 guesses per second, it would still take them ~27,255,689 years to guess your passphrase. That is the case even if the following things are true:
+
+ - Your adversary knows that you used the diceware method.
+ - Your adversary knows the specific wordlist that you used.
+ - Your adversary knows how many words your passphrase contains.
+
+To sum it up, diceware passphrases are your best option when you need something that is both easy to remember *and* exceptionally strong.
+
+## Storing Passwords
+
+### Password Managers
+
+The best way to store your passwords is by using a password manager. They allow you to store your passwords in a file or in the cloud and protect them with a single master password. That way, you will only have to remember one strong password, which lets you access the rest of them.
+
+There are many good options to choose from, both cloud-based and local. Choose one of our recommended password managers and use it to establish strong passwords across all of your accounts. We recommend securing your password manager with a [diceware passphrase](#diceware-passphrases) comprised of at least seven words.
+
+[List of recommended password managers](../passwords.md ""){.md-button}
+
+!!! warning "Don't place your passwords and TOTP tokens inside the same password manager"
+
+ When using TOTP codes as [multi-factor authentication](../multi-factor-authentication.md), the best security practice is to keep your TOTP codes in a [separate app](../multi-factor-authentication.md#authenticator-apps).
+
+ Storing your TOTP tokens in the same place as your passwords, while convenient, reduces the accounts to a single factor in the event that an adversary gains access to your password manager.
+
+ Furthermore, we do not recommend storing single-use recovery codes in your password manager. Those should be stored separately such as in an encrypted container on an offline storage device.
+
+### Backups
+
+You should store an [encrypted](../encryption.md) backup of your passwords on multiple storage devices or a cloud storage provider. This can help you access your passwords if something happens to your primary device or the service you are using.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/basics/threat-modeling.md b/i18n/eo/basics/threat-modeling.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4cee1776c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/basics/threat-modeling.md
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+---
+title: "Threat Modeling"
+icon: 'material/target-account'
+---
+
+Balancing security, privacy, and usability is one of the first and most difficult tasks you'll face on your privacy journey. Everything is a trade-off: The more secure something is, the more restricting or inconvenient it generally is, etc. Often, people find that the problem with the tools they see recommended is that they're just too hard to start using!
+
+If you wanted to use the **most** secure tools available, you'd have to sacrifice *a lot* of usability. And, even then, ==nothing is ever fully secure.== There's **high** security, but never **full** security. That's why threat models are important.
+
+**So, what are these threat models, anyway?**
+
+==A threat model is a list of the most probable threats to your security and privacy endeavors.== Since it's impossible to protect yourself against **every** attack(er), you should focus on the **most probable** threats. In computer security, a threat is an event that could undermine your efforts to stay private and secure.
+
+Focusing on the threats that matter to you narrows down your thinking about the protection you need, so you can choose the tools that are right for the job.
+
+## Creating Your Threat Model
+
+To identify what could happen to the things you value and determine from whom you need to protect them, you should answer these five questions:
+
+1. What do I want to protect?
+2. Who do I want to protect it from?
+3. How likely is it that I will need to protect it?
+4. How bad are the consequences if I fail?
+5. How much trouble am I willing to go through to try to prevent potential consequences?
+
+### What do I want to protect?
+
+An “asset” is something you value and want to protect. In the context of digital security, ==an asset is usually some kind of information.== For example, your emails, contact lists, instant messages, location, and files are all possible assets. Your devices themselves may also be assets.
+
+*Make a list of your assets: data that you keep, where it's kept, who has access to it, and what stops others from accessing it.*
+
+### Who do I want to protect it from?
+
+To answer this question, it's important to identify who might want to target you or your information. ==A person or entity that poses a threat to your assets is an “adversary”.== Examples of potential adversaries are your boss, your former partner, your business competition, your government, or a hacker on a public network.
+
+*Make a list of your adversaries or those who might want to get ahold of your assets. Your list may include individuals, a government agency, or corporations.*
+
+Depending on who your adversaries are, under some circumstances, this list might be something you want to destroy after you're done security planning.
+
+### How likely is it that I will need to protect it?
+
+==Risk is the likelihood that a particular threat against a particular asset will actually occur.== It goes hand-in-hand with capability. While your mobile phone provider has the capability to access all of your data, the risk of them posting your private data online to harm your reputation is low.
+
+It is important to distinguish between what might happen and the probability it may happen. For instance, there is a threat that your building might collapse, but the risk of this happening is far greater in San Francisco (where earthquakes are common) than in Stockholm (where they are not).
+
+Assessing risks is both a personal and subjective process. Many people find certain threats unacceptable, no matter the likelihood they will occur, because the mere presence of the threat is not worth the cost. In other cases, people disregard high risks because they don't view the threat as a problem.
+
+*Write down which threats you are going to take seriously, and which may be too rare or too harmless (or too difficult to combat) to worry about.*
+
+### How bad are the consequences if I fail?
+
+There are many ways that an adversary could gain access to your data. For example, an adversary can read your private communications as they pass through the network, or they can delete or corrupt your data.
+
+==The motives of adversaries differ widely, as do their tactics.== A government trying to prevent the spread of a video showing police violence may be content to simply delete or reduce the availability of that video. In contrast, a political opponent may wish to gain access to secret content and publish that content without you knowing.
+
+Security planning involves understanding how bad the consequences could be if an adversary successfully gains access to one of your assets. To determine this, you should consider the capability of your adversary. For example, your mobile phone provider has access to all of your phone records. A hacker on an open Wi-Fi network can access your unencrypted communications. Your government might have stronger capabilities.
+
+*Write down what your adversary might want to do with your private data.*
+
+### How much trouble am I willing to go through to try to prevent potential consequences?
+
+==There is no perfect option for security.== Not everyone has the same priorities, concerns, or access to resources. Your risk assessment will allow you to plan the right strategy for you, balancing convenience, cost, and privacy.
+
+For example, an attorney representing a client in a national security case may be willing to go to greater lengths to protect communications about that case, such as using encrypted email, than a mother who regularly emails her daughter funny cat videos.
+
+*Write down what options you have available to you to help mitigate your unique threats. Note if you have any financial constraints, technical constraints, or social constraints.*
+
+### Try it yourself: Protecting Your Belongings
+
+These questions can apply to a wide variety of situations, online and offline. As a generic demonstration of how these questions work, let's build a plan to keep your house and possessions safe.
+
+**What do you want to protect? (Or, *what do you have that is worth protecting?*)**
+:
+
+Your assets might include jewelry, electronics, important documents, or photos.
+
+**Who do you want to protect it from?**
+:
+
+Your adversaries might include burglars, roommates, or guests.
+
+**How likely is it that you will need to protect it?**
+:
+
+Does your neighborhood have a history of burglaries? How trustworthy are your roommates or guests? What are the capabilities of your adversaries? What are the risks you should consider?
+
+**How bad are the consequences if you fail?**
+:
+
+Do you have anything in your house that you cannot replace? Do you have the time or money to replace those things? Do you have insurance that covers goods stolen from your home?
+
+**How much trouble are you willing to go through to prevent these consequences?**
+:
+
+Are you willing to buy a safe for sensitive documents? Can you afford to buy a high-quality lock? Do you have time to open a security box at your local bank and keep your valuables there?
+
+Only once you have asked yourself these questions will you be in a position to assess what measures to take. If your possessions are valuable, but the probability of a break-in is low, then you may not want to invest too much money in a lock. But, if the probability of a break-in is high, you'll want to get the best lock on the market and consider adding a security system.
+
+Making a security plan will help you to understand the threats that are unique to you and to evaluate your assets, your adversaries, and your adversaries' capabilities, along with the likelihood of risks you face.
+
+## Further Reading
+
+For people looking to increase their privacy and security online, we've compiled a list of common threats our visitors face or goals our visitors have, to give you some inspiration and demonstrate the basis of our recommendations.
+
+- [Common Goals and Threats :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](common-threats.md)
+
+## Sources
+
+- [EFF Surveillance Self Defense: Your Security Plan](https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/your-security-plan)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/basics/vpn-overview.md b/i18n/eo/basics/vpn-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a0727def6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/basics/vpn-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+---
+title: VPN Overview
+icon: material/vpn
+---
+
+Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit somewhere else in the world. An ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (i.e. modem).
+
+Encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, so they may not be able to see exactly what you're posting or reading but they can get an idea of the [domains you request](../advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).
+
+A VPN can help as it can shift trust to a server somewhere else in the world. As a result, the ISP then only sees that you are connected to a VPN and nothing about the activity that you're passing into it.
+
+## Should I use a VPN?
+
+**Yes**, unless you are already using Tor. A VPN does two things: shifting the risks from your Internet Service Provider to itself and hiding your IP from a third-party service.
+
+VPNs cannot encrypt data outside of the connection between your device and the VPN server. VPN providers can see and modify your traffic the same way your ISP could. And there is no way to verify a VPN provider's "no logging" policies in any way.
+
+However, they do hide your actual IP from a third-party service, provided that there are no IP leaks. They help you blend in with others and mitigate IP based tracking.
+
+## When shouldn't I use a VPN?
+
+Using a VPN in cases where you're using your [known identity](common-threats.md#common-misconceptions) is unlikely be useful.
+
+Doing so may trigger spam and fraud detection systems, such as if you were to log into your bank's website.
+
+## What about encryption?
+
+Encryption offered by VPN providers are between your devices and their servers. It guarantees that this specific link is secure. This is a step up from using unencrypted proxies where an adversary on the network can intercept the communications between your devices and said proxies and modify them. However, encryption between your apps or browsers with the service providers are not handled by this encryption.
+
+In order to keep what you actually do on the websites you visit private and secure, you must use HTTPS. This will keep your passwords, session tokens, and queries safe from the VPN provider. Consider enabling "HTTPS everywhere" in your browser to mitigate downgrade attacks like [SSL Strip](https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Marlinspike/BlackHat-DC-09-Marlinspike-Defeating-SSL.pdf).
+
+## Should I use encrypted DNS with a VPN?
+
+Unless your VPN provider hosts the encrypted DNS servers, **no**. Using DOH/DOT (or any other form of encrypted DNS) with third-party servers will simply add more entities to trust and does **absolutely nothing** to improve your privacy/security. Your VPN provider can still see which websites you visit based on the IP addresses and other methods. Instead of just trusting your VPN provider, you are now trusting both the VPN provider and the DNS provider.
+
+A common reason to recommend encrypted DNS is that it helps against DNS spoofing. However, your browser should already be checking for [TLS certificates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Digital_certificates) with **HTTPS** and warn you about it. If you are not using **HTTPS**, then an adversary can still just modify anything other than your DNS queries and the end result will be little different.
+
+Needless to say, **you shouldn't use encrypted DNS with Tor**. This would direct all of your DNS requests through a single circuit and would allow the encrypted DNS provider to deanonymize you.
+
+## Should I use Tor *and* a VPN?
+
+By using a VPN with Tor, you're creating essentially a permanent entry node, often with a money trail attached. This provides zero additional benefits to you, while increasing the attack surface of your connection dramatically. If you wish to hide your Tor usage from your ISP or your government, Tor has a built-in solution for that: Tor bridges. [Read more about Tor bridges and why using a VPN is not necessary](../advanced/tor-overview.md).
+
+## What if I need anonymity?
+
+VPNs cannot provide anonymity. Your VPN provider will still see your real IP address, and often has a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. You cannot rely on "no logging" policies to protect your data. Use [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) instead.
+
+## What about VPN providers that provide Tor nodes?
+
+Do not use that feature. The point of using Tor is that you do not trust your VPN provider. Currently Tor only supports the [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol) protocol. [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol) (used in [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC) for voice and video sharing, the new [HTTP3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) protocol, etc), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol) and other packets will be dropped. To compensate for this, VPN providers typically will route all non-TCP packets through their VPN server (your first hop). This is the case with [ProtonVPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn/). Additionally, when using this Tor over VPN setup, you do not have control over other important Tor features such as [Isolated Destination Address](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (using a different Tor circuit for every domain you visit).
+
+The feature should be viewed as a convenient way to access the Tor Network, not to stay anonymous. For proper anonymity, use the Tor Browser, TorSocks, or a Tor gateway.
+
+## When are VPNs useful?
+
+A VPN may still be useful to you in a variety of scenarios, such as:
+
+1. Hiding your traffic from **only** your Internet Service Provider.
+1. Hiding your downloads (such as torrents) from your ISP and anti-piracy organizations.
+1. Hiding your IP from third-party websites and services, preventing IP based tracking.
+
+For situations like these, or if you have another compelling reason, the VPN providers we listed above are who we think are the most trustworthy. However, using a VPN provider still means you're *trusting* the provider. In pretty much any other scenario you should be using a secure**-by-design** tool such as Tor.
+
+## Sources and Further Reading
+
+1. [VPN - a Very Precarious Narrative](https://schub.io/blog/2019/04/08/very-precarious-narrative.html) by Dennis Schubert
+1. [Tor Network Overview](../advanced/tor-overview.md)
+1. [IVPN Privacy Guides](https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides)
+1. ["Do I need a VPN?"](https://www.doineedavpn.com), a tool developed by IVPN to challenge aggressive VPN marketing by helping individuals decide if a VPN is right for them.
+
+## Related VPN Information
+
+- [The Trouble with VPN and Privacy Review Sites](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2019/11/20/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-review-sites/)
+- [Free VPN App Investigation](https://www.top10vpn.com/free-vpn-app-investigation/)
+- [Hidden VPN owners unveiled: 101 VPN products run by just 23 companies](https://vpnpro.com/blog/hidden-vpn-owners-unveiled-97-vpns-23-companies/)
+- [This Chinese company is secretly behind 24 popular apps seeking dangerous permissions](https://vpnpro.com/blog/chinese-company-secretly-behind-popular-apps-seeking-dangerous-permissions/)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/calendar.md b/i18n/eo/calendar.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..451b4ca56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/calendar.md
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+---
+title: "Calendar Sync"
+icon: material/calendar
+---
+
+Calendars contain some of your most sensitive data; use products that implement E2EE at rest to prevent a provider from reading them.
+
+## Tutanota
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tutanota** offers a free and encrypted calendar across their supported platforms. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, multi-factor authentication, and [more](https://tutanota.com/calendar-app-comparison/).
+
+ Multiple calendars and extended sharing functionality is limited to paid subscribers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tutanota.com/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tutanota.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tutanota.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tutanota.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/tutanota/id922429609)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.tutanota.Tutanota)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.tutanota.com/)
+
+## Proton Calendar
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton Calendar** is an encrypted calendar service available to Proton members via web or mobile clients. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, and [more](https://proton.me/support/proton-calendar-guide). Those on the free tier get access to a single calendar, whereas paid subscribers can create up to 20 calendars. Extended sharing functionality is also limited to paid subscribers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/proton-calendar-guide){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=me.proton.android.calendar)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://calendar.proton.me)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Qualifications
+
+- Must sync and store information with E2EE to ensure data is not visible to the service provider.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should integrate with native OS calendar and contact management apps if applicable.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/cloud.md b/i18n/eo/cloud.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..53133b8b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/cloud.md
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+---
+title: "Cloud Storage"
+icon: material/file-cloud
+---
+
+Many cloud storage providers require your full trust that they will not look at your files. The alternatives listed below eliminate the need for trust by either putting you in control of your data or by implementing E2EE.
+
+If these alternatives do not fit your needs, we suggest you look into [Encryption Software](encryption.md).
+
+??? question "Looking for Nextcloud?"
+
+ Nextcloud is [still a recommended tool](productivity.md) for self-hosting a file management suite, however we do not recommend third-party Nextcloud storage providers at the moment, because we do not recommend Nextcloud's built-in E2EE functionality for home users.
+
+## Proton Drive
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton Drive** is an E2EE general file storage service by the popular encrypted email provider [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/mail).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/drive){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/drive){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=me.proton.android.drive)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1509667851)
+
+Proton Drive's mobile clients were released in December 2022 and are not yet open-source. Proton has historically delayed their source code releases until after initial product releases, and [plans to](https://www.reddit.com/r/ProtonDrive/comments/zf14i8/comment/izdwmme/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web2x&context=3) release the source code by the end of 2023. Proton Drive desktop clients are still in development.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must enforce end-to-end encryption.
+- Must offer a free plan or trial period for testing.
+- Must support TOTP or FIDO2 multi-factor authentication, or Passkey logins.
+- Must offer a web interface which supports basic file management functionality.
+- Must allow for easy exports of all files/documents.
+- Must use standard, audited encryption.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Clients should be open-source.
+- Clients should be audited in their entirety by an independent third-party.
+- Should offer native clients for Linux, Android, Windows, macOS, and iOS.
+ - These clients should integrate with native OS tools for cloud storage providers, such as Files app integration on iOS, or DocumentsProvider functionality on Android.
+- Should support easy file-sharing with other users.
+- Should offer at least basic file preview and editing functionality on the web interface.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/data-redaction.md b/i18n/eo/data-redaction.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..16afe85de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/data-redaction.md
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+---
+title: "Data and Metadata Redaction"
+icon: material/tag-remove
+---
+
+When sharing files, be sure to remove associated metadata. Image files commonly include [Exif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exif) data. Photos sometimes even include GPS coordinates in the file metadata.
+
+## Desktop
+
+### MAT2
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **MAT2** is free software, which allows the metadata to be removed from image, audio, torrent, and document file types. It provides both a command line tool and a graphical user interface via an [extension for Nautilus](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/tree/master/nautilus), the default file manager of [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), and [Dolphin](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/tree/master/dolphin), the default file manager of [KDE](https://kde.org).
+
+ On Linux, a third-party graphical tool [Metadata Cleaner](https://gitlab.com/rmnvgr/metadata-cleaner) powered by MAT2 exists and is [available on Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/fr.romainvigier.MetadataCleaner).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/blob/master/README.md){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://pypi.org/project/mat2)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2#requirements-setup-on-macos-os-x-using-homebrew)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://pypi.org/project/mat2)
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2#web-interface)
+
+## Mobile
+
+### ExifEraser (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **ExifEraser** is a modern, permissionless image metadata erasing application for Android.
+
+ It currently supports JPEG, PNG and WebP files.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.none.tom.exiferaser)
+ - [:octicons-moon-16: Accrescent](https://accrescent.app/app/com.none.tom.exiferaser)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser/releases)
+
+The metadata that is erased depends on the image's file type:
+
+* **JPEG**: ICC Profile, Exif, Photoshop Image Resources and XMP/ExtendedXMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
+* **PNG**: ICC Profile, Exif and XMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
+* **WebP**: ICC Profile, Exif and XMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
+
+After processing the images, ExifEraser provides you with a full report about what exactly was removed from each image.
+
+The app offers multiple ways to erase metadata from images. Namely:
+
+* You can share an image from another application with ExifEraser.
+* Through the app itself, you can select a single image, multiple images at once, or even an entire directory.
+* It features a "Camera" option, which uses your operating system's camera app to take a photo, and then it removes the metadata from it.
+* It allows you to drag photos from another app into ExifEraser when they are both open in split-screen mode.
+* Lastly, it allows you to paste an image from your clipboard.
+
+### Metapho (iOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Metapho** is a simple and clean viewer for photo metadata such as date, file name, size, camera model, shutter speed, and location.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://zininworks.com/metapho){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://zininworks.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/metapho/id914457352)
+
+### PrivacyBlur
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **PrivacyBlur** is a free app which can blur sensitive portions of pictures before sharing them online.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://privacyblur.app/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://privacyblur.app/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/MATHEMA-GmbH/privacyblur#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/MATHEMA-GmbH/privacyblur){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.mathema.privacyblur)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/privacyblur/id1536274106)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ You should **never** use blur to redact [text in images](https://bishopfox.com/blog/unredacter-tool-never-pixelation). If you want to redact text in an image, draw a box over the text. For this, we suggest apps like [Pocket Paint](https://github.com/Catrobat/Paintroid).
+
+## Command-line
+
+### ExifTool
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **ExifTool** is the original perl library and command-line application for reading, writing, and editing meta information (Exif, IPTC, XMP, and more) in a wide variety of file formats (JPEG, TIFF, PNG, PDF, RAW, and more).
+
+ It's often a component of other Exif removal applications and is in most Linux distribution repositories.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://exiftool.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://exiftool.org/faq.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/exiftool/exiftool){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://exiftool.org/#donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://exiftool.org)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://exiftool.org)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://exiftool.org)
+
+!!! example "Deleting data from a directory of files"
+
+ ```bash
+ exiftool -all= *.file_extension
+ ```
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Apps developed for open-source operating systems must be open-source.
+- Apps must be free and should not include ads or other limitations.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/desktop-browsers.md b/i18n/eo/desktop-browsers.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..210429edc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/desktop-browsers.md
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+---
+title: "Desktop Browsers"
+icon: material/laptop
+---
+
+These are our currently recommended desktop web browsers and configurations for standard/non-anonymous browsing. If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) instead. In general, we recommend keeping your browser extensions to a minimum; they have privileged access within your browser, require you to trust the developer, can make you [stand out](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint), and [weaken](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/chromium-extensions/c/0ei-UCHNm34/m/lDaXwQhzBAAJ) site isolation.
+
+## Firefox
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Firefox** provides strong privacy settings such as [Enhanced Tracking Protection](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/enhanced-tracking-protection-firefox-desktop), which can help block various [types of tracking](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/enhanced-tracking-protection-firefox-desktop#w_what-enhanced-tracking-protection-blocks).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://firefox.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mozilla.org/privacy/firefox/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.mozilla.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/mac)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/linux)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.mozilla.firefox)
+
+!!! warning
+ Firefox includes a unique [download token](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1677497#c0) in downloads from Mozilla's website and uses telemetry in Firefox to send the token. The token is **not** included in releases from the [Mozilla FTP](https://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/firefox/releases/).
+
+### Recommended Configuration
+
+Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. When you use Firefox, we recommend changing the following settings to protect your privacy from certain parties, but all browsers other than [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) will be traceable by *somebody* in some regard or another.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Privacy & Security**.
+
+##### Enhanced Tracking Protection
+
+- [x] Select **Strict** Enhanced Tracking Protection
+
+This protects you by blocking social media trackers, fingerprinting scripts (note that this does not protect you from *all* fingerprinting), cryptominers, cross-site tracking cookies, and some other tracking content. ETP protects against many common threats, but it does not block all tracking avenues because it is designed to have minimal to no impact on site usability.
+
+##### Sanitize on Close
+
+If you want to stay logged in to particular sites, you can allow exceptions in **Cookies and Site Data** → **Manage Exceptions...**
+
+- [x] Check **Delete cookies and site data when Firefox is closed**
+
+This protects you from persistent cookies, but does not protect you against cookies acquired during any one browsing session. When this is enabled, it becomes possible to easily cleanse your browser cookies by simply restarting Firefox. You can set exceptions on a per-site basis, if you wish to stay logged in to a particular site you visit often.
+
+##### Search Suggestions
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Provide search suggestions**
+
+Search suggestion features may not be available in your region.
+
+Search suggestions send everything you type in the address bar to the default search engine, regardless of whether you submit an actual search. Disabling search suggestions allows you to more precisely control what data you send to your search engine provider.
+
+##### Telemetry
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Firefox to send technical and interaction data to Mozilla**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Firefox to install and run studies**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Firefox to send backlogged crash reports on your behalf**
+
+> Firefox sends data about your Firefox version and language; device operating system and hardware configuration; memory, basic information about crashes and errors; outcome of automated processes like updates, safebrowsing, and activation to us. When Firefox sends data to us, your IP address is temporarily collected as part of our server logs.
+
+Additionally, the Firefox Accounts service collects [some technical data](https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/privacy/firefox/#firefox-accounts). If you use a Firefox Account you can opt-out:
+
+1. Open your [profile settings on accounts.firefox.com](https://accounts.firefox.com/settings#data-collection)
+2. Uncheck **Data Collection and Use** > **Help improve Firefox Accounts**
+
+##### HTTPS-Only Mode
+
+- [x] Select **Enable HTTPS-Only Mode in all windows**
+
+This prevents you from unintentionally connecting to a website in plain-text HTTP. Sites without HTTPS are uncommon nowadays, so this should have little to no impact on your day to day browsing.
+
+### Firefox Sync
+
+[Firefox Sync](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2018/11/firefox-sync-privacy/) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices and protects it with E2EE.
+
+### Arkenfox (advanced)
+
+The [Arkenfox project](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js) provides a set of carefully considered options for Firefox. If you [decide](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/1.1-To-Arkenfox-or-Not) to use Arkenfox, a [few options](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/3.2-Overrides-[Common]) are subjectively strict and/or may cause some websites to not work properly - [which you can easily change](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/3.1-Overrides) to suit your needs. We **strongly recommend** reading through their full [wiki](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki). Arkenfox also enables [container](https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/containers#w_for-advanced-users) support.
+
+## Brave
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Brave Browser** includes a built-in content blocker and [privacy features](https://brave.com/privacy-features/), many of which are enabled by default.
+
+ Brave is built upon the Chromium web browser project, so it should feel familiar and have minimal website compatibility issues.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://brave.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://brave4u7jddbv7cyviptqjc7jusxh72uik7zt6adtckl5f4nwy2v72qd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://brave.com/privacy/browser/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.brave.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads annotate
+
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://brave.com/download/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://brave.com/download/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://brave.com/linux/) (1)
+
+ 1. We advise against using the Flatpak version of Brave, as it replaces Chromium's sandbox with Flatpak's, which is less effective. Additionally, the package is not maintained by Brave Software, Inc.
+
+### Recommended Configuration
+
+Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. When you use Brave, we recommend changing the following settings to protect your privacy from certain parties, but all browsers other than the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) will be traceable by *somebody* in some regard or another.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings**.
+
+##### Shields
+
+Brave includes some anti-fingerprinting measures in its [Shields](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360022973471-What-is-Shields-) feature. We suggest configuring these options [globally](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360023646212-How-do-I-configure-global-and-site-specific-Shields-settings-) across all pages that you visit.
+
+Shields' options can be downgraded on a per-site basis as needed, but by default we recommend setting the following:
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Prevent sites from fingerprinting me based on my language preferences**
+- [x] Select **Aggressive** under Trackers & ads blocking
+
+ ??? warning "Use default filter lists"
+ Brave allows you to select additional content filters within the internal `brave://adblock` page. We advise against using this feature; instead, keep the default filter lists. Using extra lists will make you stand out from other Brave users and may also increase attack surface if there is an exploit in Brave and a malicious rule is added to one of the lists you use.
+
+- [x] (Optional) Select **Block Scripts** (1)
+- [x] Select **Strict, may break sites** under Block fingerprinting
+
+
+
+1. This option provides functionality similar to uBlock Origin's advanced [blocking modes](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) or the [NoScript](https://noscript.net/) extension.
+
+##### Social media blocking
+
+- [ ] Uncheck all social media components
+
+##### Privacy and security
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Disable non-proxied UDP** under [WebRTC IP Handling Policy](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360017989132-How-do-I-change-my-Privacy-Settings-#webrtc)
+- [ ] Uncheck **Use Google services for push messaging**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow privacy-preserving product analytics (P3A)**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send daily usage ping to Brave**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send diagnostic reports**
+- [x] Select **Always use secure connections** in the **Security** menu
+- [ ] Uncheck **Private window with Tor** (1)
+
+ !!! tip "Sanitizing on Close"
+ - [x] Select **Clear cookies and site data when you close all windows** in the *Cookies and other site data* menu
+
+ If you wish to stay logged in to a particular site you visit often, you can set exceptions on a per-site basis under the *Customized behaviors* section.
+
+
+
+1. Brave is **not** as resistant to fingerprinting as the Tor Browser and far fewer people use Brave with Tor, so you will stand out. Where [strong anonymity is required](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360018121491-What-is-a-Private-Window-with-Tor-Connectivity-) use the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser).
+
+##### Extensions
+
+Disable built-in extensions you do not use in **Extensions**
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Hangouts**
+- [ ] Uncheck **WebTorrent**
+
+##### IPFS
+
+InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is a decentralized, peer-to-peer network for storing and sharing data in a distributed filesystem. Unless you use the feature, disable it.
+
+- [x] Select **Disabled** on Method to resolve IPFS resources
+
+##### Additional settings
+
+Under the *System* menu
+
+
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Continue running apps when Brave is closed** to disable background apps (1)
+
+
+
+1. This option is not present on all platforms.
+
+### Brave Sync
+
+[Brave Sync](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360059793111-Understanding-Brave-Sync) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices without requiring an account and protects it with E2EE.
+
+## Additional Resources
+
+We generally do not recommend installing any extensions as they increase your attack surface. However, uBlock Origin may prove useful if you value content blocking functionality.
+
+### uBlock Origin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **uBlock Origin** is a popular content blocker that could help you block ads, trackers, and fingerprinting scripts.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/ublock-origin/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/ublock-origin/cjpalhdlnbpafiamejdnhcphjbkeiagm)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/ublock-origin/odfafepnkmbhccpbejgmiehpchacaeak)
+
+We suggest following the [developer's documentation](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) and picking one of the "modes". Additional filter lists can impact performance and [may increase attack surface](https://portswigger.net/research/ublock-i-exfiltrate-exploiting-ad-blockers-with-css).
+
+##### Other lists
+
+These are some other [filter lists](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Dashboard:-Filter-lists) that you may want to consider adding:
+
+- [x] Check **Privacy** > **AdGuard URL Tracking Protection**
+- Add [Actually Legitimate URL Shortener Tool](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DandelionSprout/adfilt/master/LegitimateURLShortener.txt)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Supports automatic updates.
+- Receives engine updates in 0-1 days from upstream release.
+- Available on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- Any changes required to make the browser more privacy-respecting should not negatively impact user experience.
+- Blocks third-party cookies by default.
+- Supports [state partitioning](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning) to mitigate cross-site tracking.[^1]
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Includes built-in content blocking functionality.
+- Supports cookie compartmentalization (à la [Multi-Account Containers](https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/containers)).
+- Supports Progressive Web Apps.
+ PWAs enable you to install certain websites as if they were native apps on your computer. This can have advantages over installing Electron-based apps, because you benefit from your browser's regular security updates.
+- Does not include add-on functionality (bloatware) that does not impact user privacy.
+- Does not collect telemetry by default.
+- Provides open-source sync server implementation.
+- Defaults to a [private search engine](search-engines.md).
+
+### Extension Criteria
+
+- Must not replicate built-in browser or OS functionality.
+- Must directly impact user privacy, i.e. must not simply provide information.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
+
+[^1]: Brave's implementation is detailed at [Brave Privacy Updates: Partitioning network-state for privacy](https://brave.com/privacy-updates/14-partitioning-network-state/).
diff --git a/i18n/eo/desktop.md b/i18n/eo/desktop.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d938506d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/desktop.md
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+---
+title: "Desktop/PC"
+icon: simple/linux
+---
+
+Linux distributions are commonly recommended for privacy protection and software freedom. If you don't already use Linux, below are some distributions we suggest trying out, as well as some general privacy and security improvement tips that are applicable to many Linux distributions.
+
+- [General Linux Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/linux-overview.md)
+
+## Traditional Distributions
+
+### Fedora Workstation
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Fedora Workstation** is our recommended distribution for people new to Linux. Fedora generally adopts newer technologies before other distributions e.g., [Wayland](https://wayland.freedesktop.org/), [PipeWire](https://pipewire.org). These new technologies often come with improvements in security, privacy, and usability in general.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getfedora.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://whatcanidoforfedora.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Fedora has a semi-rolling release cycle. While some packages like [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org) are frozen until the next Fedora release, most packages (including the kernel) are updated frequently throughout the lifespan of the release. Each Fedora release is supported for one year, with a new version released every 6 months.
+
+### openSUSE Tumbleweed
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **openSUSE Tumbleweed** is a stable rolling release distribution.
+
+ openSUSE Tumbleweed has a [transactional update](https://kubic.opensuse.org/blog/2018-04-04-transactionalupdates/) system that uses [Btrfs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Btrfs) and [Snapper](https://en.opensuse.org/openSUSE:Snapper_Tutorial) to ensure that snapshots can be rolled back should there be a problem.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://get.opensuse.org/tumbleweed/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://doc.opensuse.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://shop.opensuse.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Tumbleweed follows a rolling release model where each update is released as a snapshot of the distribution. When you upgrade your system, a new snapshot is downloaded. Each snapshot is run through a series of automated tests by [openQA](https://openqa.opensuse.org) to ensure its quality.
+
+### Arch Linux
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Arch Linux** is a lightweight, do-it-yourself (DIY) distribution meaning that you only get what you install. For more information see their [FAQ](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Frequently_asked_questions).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://archlinux.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://wiki.archlinux.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://archlinux.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Arch Linux has a rolling release cycle. There is no fixed release schedule and packages are updated very frequently.
+
+Being a DIY distribution, you are [expected to set up and maintain](os/linux-overview.md#arch-based-distributions) your system on your own. Arch has an [official installer](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Archinstall) to make the installation process a little easier.
+
+A large portion of [Arch Linux’s packages](https://reproducible.archlinux.org) are [reproducible](https://reproducible-builds.org).
+
+## Immutable Distributions
+
+### Fedora Silverblue
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Fedora Silverblue** and **Fedora Kinoite** are immutable variants of Fedora with a strong focus on container workflows. Silverblue comes with the [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org/) desktop environment while Kinoite comes with [KDE](https://kde.org/). Silverblue and Kinoite follow the same release schedule as Fedora Workstation, benefiting from the same fast updates and staying very close to upstream.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://silverblue.fedoraproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora-silverblue/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://whatcanidoforfedora.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Silverblue (and Kinoite) differ from Fedora Workstation as they replace the [DNF](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/DNF) package manager with a much more advanced alternative called [`rpm-ostree`](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/rawhide/system-administrators-guide/package-management/rpm-ostree/). The `rpm-ostree` package manager works by downloading a base image for the system, then overlaying packages over it in a [git](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Git)-like commit tree. When the system is updated, a new base image is downloaded and the overlays will be applied to that new image.
+
+After the update is complete you will reboot the system into the new deployment. `rpm-ostree` keeps two deployments of the system so that you can easily rollback if something breaks in the new deployment. There is also the option to pin more deployments as needed.
+
+[Flatpak](https://www.flatpak.org) is the primary package installation method on these distributions, as `rpm-ostree` is only meant to overlay packages that cannot stay inside of a container on top of the base image.
+
+As an alternative to Flatpaks, there is the option of [Toolbox](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora-silverblue/toolbox/) to create [Podman](https://podman.io) containers with a shared home directory with the host operating system and mimic a traditional Fedora environment, which is a [useful feature](https://containertoolbx.org) for the discerning developer.
+
+### NixOS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ NixOS is an independent distribution based on the Nix package manager with a focus on reproducibility and reliability.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://nixos.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://nixos.org/learn.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nixos.org/donate.html){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+NixOS’s package manager keeps every version of every package in a different folder in the **Nix store**. Due to this you can have different versions of the same package installed on your system. After the package contents have been written to the folder, the folder is made read-only.
+
+NixOS also provides atomic updates; first it downloads (or builds) the packages and files for the new system generation and then switches to it. There are different ways to switch to a new generation; you can tell NixOS to activate it after reboot or you can switch to it at runtime. You can also *test* the new generation by switching to it at runtime, but not setting it as the current system generation. If something in the update process breaks, you can just reboot and automatically and return to a working version of your system.
+
+Nix the package manager uses a purely functional language - which is also called Nix - to define packages.
+
+[Nixpkgs](https://github.com/nixos/nixpkgs) (the main source of packages) are contained in a single GitHub repository. You can also define your own packages in the same language and then easily include them in your config.
+
+Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in the binary cache, Nix will just build the package from source using its definition. It builds each package in a sandboxed *pure* environment, which is as independent of the host system as possible, thus making binaries reproducible.
+
+## Anonymity-Focused Distributions
+
+### Whonix
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Whonix is meant to run as two virtual machines: a “Workstation” and a Tor “Gateway.” All communications from the Workstation must go through the Tor gateway. This means that even if the Workstation is compromised by malware of some kind, the true IP address remains hidden.
+
+Some of its features include Tor Stream Isolation, [keystroke anonymization](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Keystroke_Deanonymization#Kloak), [encrypted swap](https://github.com/Whonix/swap-file-creator), and a hardened memory allocator.
+
+Future versions of Whonix will likely include [full system AppArmor policies](https://github.com/Whonix/apparmor-profile-everything) and a [sandbox app launcher](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Sandbox-app-launcher) to fully confine all processes on the system.
+
+Whonix is best used [in conjunction with Qubes](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Why_use_Qubes_over_other_Virtualizers), Qubes-Whonix has various [disadvantages](https://forums.whonix.org/t/qubes-whonix-security-disadvantages-help-wanted/8581) when compared to other hypervisors.
+
+### Tails
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tails** is a live operating system based on Debian that routes all communications through Tor, which can boot on on almost any computer from a DVD, USB stick, or SD card installation. It uses [Tor](tor.md) to preserve privacy and anonymity while circumventing censorship, and it leaves no trace of itself on the computer it is used on after it is powered off.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tails.boum.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tails.boum.org/doc/index.en.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tails.boum.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Tails is great for counter forensics due to amnesia (meaning nothing is written to the disk); however, it is not a hardened distribution like Whonix. It lacks many anonymity and security features that Whonix has and gets updated much less often (only once every six weeks). A Tails system that is compromised by malware may potentially bypass the transparent proxy allowing for the user to be deanonymized.
+
+Tails includes [uBlock Origin](desktop-browsers.md#ublock-origin) in Tor Browser by default, which may potentially make it easier for adversaries to fingerprint Tails users. [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) virtual machines may be more leak-proof, however they are not amnesic, meaning data may be recovered from your storage device.
+
+By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypted [persistent storage](https://tails.boum.org/doc/persistent_storage/index.en.html) can be configured to store some data between reboots.
+
+## Security-focused Distributions
+
+### Qubes OS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*.
+
+The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/).
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+Our recommended operating systems:
+
+- Must be open-source.
+- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates.
+- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#Wayland).
+- Must support full-disk encryption during installation.
+- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage.
+- Must support a wide variety of hardware.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/dns.md b/i18n/eo/dns.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fdc950027
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/dns.md
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+---
+title: "DNS Resolvers"
+icon: material/dns
+---
+
+!!! question "Should I use encrypted DNS?"
+
+ Encrypted DNS with third-party servers should only be used to get around basic [DNS blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) when you can be sure there won't be any consequences. Encrypted DNS will not help you hide any of your browsing activity.
+
+ [Learn more about DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md){ .md-button }
+
+## Recommended Providers
+
+| DNS Provider | Privacy Policy | Protocols | Logging | ECS | Filtering |
+| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------ | -------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| [**AdGuard**](https://adguard.com/en/adguard-dns/overview.html) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT DNSCrypt | Some[^1] | No | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardDNS) |
+| [**Cloudflare**](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/setting-up-1.1.1.1/) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT | Some[^2] | No | Based on server choice. |
+| [**Control D**](https://controld.com/free-dns) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://controld.com/privacy) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT DoQ | Optional[^3] | No | Based on server choice. |
+| [**Mullvad**](https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/) | DoH DoT | No[^4] | No | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/mullvad/dns-adblock) |
+| [**NextDNS**](https://www.nextdns.io) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://www.nextdns.io/privacy) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT | Optional[^5] | Optional | Based on server choice. |
+| [**Quad9**](https://quad9.net) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://quad9.net/privacy/policy/) | Cleartext DoH DoT DNSCrypt | Some[^6] | Optional | Based on server choice, Malware blocking by default. |
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must support [DNSSEC](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-dnssec).
+- [QNAME Minimization](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-qname-minimization).
+- Allow for [ECS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-edns-client-subnet-ecs) to be disabled.
+- Prefer [anycast](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anycast#Addressing_methods) support or geo-steering support.
+
+## Native Operating System Support
+
+### Android
+
+Android 9 and above support DNS over TLS. The settings can be found in: **Settings** → **Network & Internet** → **Private DNS**.
+
+### Apple Devices
+
+The latest versions of iOS, iPadOS, tvOS, and macOS, support both DoT and DoH. Both protocols are supported natively via [configuration profiles](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/configuration-profile-enforcement-secf6fb9f053/web) or through the [DNS Settings API](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/networkextension/dns_settings).
+
+After installation of either a configuration profile or an app that uses the DNS Settings API, the DNS configuration can be selected. If a VPN is active, resolution within the VPN tunnel will use the VPN's DNS settings and not your system-wide settings.
+
+#### Signed Profiles
+
+Apple does not provide a native interface for creating encrypted DNS profiles. [Secure DNS profile creator](https://dns.notjakob.com/tool.html) is an unofficial tool for creating your own encrypted DNS profiles, however they will not be signed. Signed profiles are preferred; signing validates a profile's origin and helps to ensure the integrity of the profiles. A green "Verified" label is given to signed configuration profiles. For more information on code signing, see [About Code Signing](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/CodeSigningGuide/Introduction/Introduction.html). **Signed profiles** are offered by [AdGuard](https://adguard.com/en/blog/encrypted-dns-ios-14.html), [NextDNS](https://apple.nextdns.io), and [Quad9](https://www.quad9.net/news/blog/ios-mobile-provisioning-profiles/).
+
+!!! info
+
+ `systemd-resolved`, which many Linux distributions use to do their DNS lookups, doesn't yet [support DoH](https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/8639). If you want to use DoH, you'll need to install a proxy like [dnscrypt-proxy](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy) and [configure it](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dnscrypt-proxy) to take all the DNS queries from your system resolver and forward them over HTTPS.
+
+## Encrypted DNS Proxies
+
+Encrypted DNS proxy software provides a local proxy for the [unencrypted DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md#unencrypted-dns) resolver to forward to. Typically it is used on platforms that don't natively support [encrypted DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns).
+
+### RethinkDNS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **RethinkDNS** is an open-source Android client supporting [DNS-over-HTTPS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), [DNS-over-TLS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-tls-dot), [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt) and DNS Proxy along with caching DNS responses, locally logging DNS queries and can be used as a firewall too.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://rethinkdns.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://rethinkdns.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.rethinkdns.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/celzero/rethink-app){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.celzero.bravedns)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/celzero/rethink-app/releases)
+
+### dnscrypt-proxy
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **dnscrypt-proxy** is a DNS proxy with support for [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt), [DNS-over-HTTPS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), and [Anonymized DNS](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Anonymized-DNS).
+
+ !!! warning "The anonymized DNS feature does [**not**](advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns) anonymize other network traffic."
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/dnscrypt/contribute){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Installation-Windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Installation-macOS)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Installation-linux)
+
+## Self-hosted Solutions
+
+A self-hosted DNS solution is useful for providing filtering on controlled platforms, such as Smart TVs and other IoT devices, as no client-side software is needed.
+
+### AdGuard Home
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **AdGuard Home** is an open-source [DNS-sinkhole](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_sinkhole) which uses [DNS filtering](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/access-management/what-is-dns-filtering/) to block unwanted web content, such as advertisements.
+
+ AdGuard Home features a polished web interface to view insights and manage blocked content.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://adguard.com/adguard-home/overview.html){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://adguard.com/privacy/home.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+### Pi-hole
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Pi-hole** is an open-source [DNS-sinkhole](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_sinkhole) which uses [DNS filtering](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/access-management/what-is-dns-filtering/) to block unwanted web content, such as advertisements.
+
+ Pi-hole is designed to be hosted on a Raspberry Pi, but it is not limited to such hardware. The software features a friendly web interface to view insights and manage blocked content.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://pi-hole.net/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://pi-hole.net/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.pi-hole.net/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/pi-hole/pi-hole){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://pi-hole.net/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
+
+[^1]: AdGuard stores aggregated performance metrics of their DNS servers, namely the number of complete requests to a particular server, the number of blocked requests, and the speed of processing requests. They also keep and store the database of domains requested in within last 24 hours. "We need this information to identify and block new trackers and threats." "We also log how many times this or that tracker has been blocked. We need this information to remove outdated rules from our filters." [https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html](https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html)
+[^2]: Cloudflare collects and stores only the limited DNS query data that is sent to the 1.1.1.1 resolver. The 1.1.1.1 resolver service does not log personal data, and the bulk of the limited non-personally identifiable query data is stored only for 25 hours. [https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/)
+[^3]: Control D only logs for Premium resolvers with custom DNS profiles. Free resolvers do not log data. [https://controld.com/privacy](https://controld.com/privacy)
+[^4]: Mullvad's DNS service is available to both subscribers and non-subscribers of Mullvad VPN. Their privacy policy explicitly claims they do not log DNS requests in any way. [https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/](https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/)
+[^5]: NextDNS can provide insights and logging features on an opt-in basis. You can choose retention times and log storage locations for any logs you choose to keep. If it's not specifically requested, no data is logged. [https://nextdns.io/privacy](https://nextdns.io/privacy)
+[^6]: Quad9 collects some data for the purposes of threat monitoring and response. That data may then be remixed and shared, such as for the purpose of security research. Quad9 does not collect or record IP addresses or other data they deem personally identifiable. [https://www.quad9.net/privacy/policy/](https://www.quad9.net/privacy/policy/)
diff --git a/i18n/eo/email-clients.md b/i18n/eo/email-clients.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9239238df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/email-clients.md
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+---
+title: "Email Clients"
+icon: material/email-open
+---
+
+Our recommendation list contains email clients that support both [OpenPGP](encryption.md#openpgp) and strong authentication such as [Open Authorization (OAuth)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth). OAuth allows you to use [Multi-Factor Authentication](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md) and prevent account theft.
+
+??? warning "Email does not provide forward secrecy"
+
+ When using end-to-end encryption (E2EE) technology like OpenPGP, email will still have [some metadata](email.md#email-metadata-overview) that is not encrypted in the header of the email.
+
+ OpenPGP also does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed: [How do I protect my private keys?](basics/email-security.md) Consider using a medium that provides forward secrecy:
+
+ [Real-time Communication](real-time-communication.md){ .md-button }
+
+## Cross-Platform
+
+### Thunderbird
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Thunderbird** is a free, open-source, cross-platform email, newsgroup, news feed, and chat (XMPP, IRC, Twitter) client developed by the Thunderbird community, and previously by the Mozilla Foundation.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.thunderbird.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mozilla.org/privacy/thunderbird){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.mozilla.org/products/thunderbird){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://hg.mozilla.org/comm-central){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.thunderbird.net)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.thunderbird.net)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.thunderbird.net)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.mozilla.Thunderbird)
+
+#### Recommended Configuration
+
+We recommend changing some of these settings to make Thunderbird a little more private.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Privacy & Security**.
+
+##### Web Content
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Remember websites and links I've visited**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Accept cookies from sites**
+
+##### Telemetry
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Thunderbird to send technical and interaction data to Mozilla**
+
+#### Thunderbird-user.js (advanced)
+
+[`thunderbird-user.js`](https://github.com/HorlogeSkynet/thunderbird-user.js), is a set of configurations options that aims to disable as many of the web-browsing features within Thunderbird as possible in order to reduce surface area and maintain privacy. Some of the changes are backported from the [Arkenfox project](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js).
+
+## Platform Specific
+
+### Apple Mail (macOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Apple Mail** is included in macOS and can be extended to have OpenPGP support with [GPG Suite](encryption.md#gpg-suite), which adds the ability to send PGP-encrypted email.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/welcome/mac){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/toc){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+### Canary Mail (iOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Canary Mail** is a paid email client designed to make end-to-end encryption seamless with security features such as a biometric app lock.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://canarymail.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://canarymail.io/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://canarymail.zendesk.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.canarymail.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1236045954)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://canarymail.io/downloads.html)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Canary Mail only recently released a Windows and Android client, though we don't believe they are as stable as their iOS and Mac counterparts.
+
+Canary Mail is closed-source. We recommend it due to the few choices there are for email clients on iOS that support PGP E2EE.
+
+### FairEmail (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FairEmail** is a minimal, open-source email app, using open standards (IMAP, SMTP, OpenPGP) with a low data and battery usage.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://email.faircode.eu){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/blob/master/PRIVACY.md){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/blob/master/FAQ.md){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://email.faircode.eu/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=eu.faircode.email)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/releases)
+
+### GNOME Evolution (GNOME)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Evolution** is a personal information management application that provides integrated mail, calendaring and address book functionality. Evolution has extensive [documentation](https://help.gnome.org/users/evolution/stable/) to help you get started.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Evolution){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Evolution/PrivacyPolicy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://help.gnome.org/users/evolution/stable/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.gnome.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.gnome.Evolution)
+
+### K-9 Mail (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **K-9 Mail** is an independent mail application that supports both POP3 and IMAP mailboxes, but only supports push mail for IMAP.
+
+ In the future, K-9 Mail will be the [officially branded](https://k9mail.app/2022/06/13/K-9-Mail-and-Thunderbird.html) Thunderbird client for Android.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://k9mail.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://k9mail.app/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.k9mail.app/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/k9mail/k-9){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://k9mail.app/contribute){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.fsck.k9)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/k9mail/k-9/releases)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When replying to someone on a mailing list the "reply" option may also include the mailing list. For more information see [thundernest/k-9 #3738](https://github.com/thundernest/k-9/issues/3738).
+
+### Kontact (KDE)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Kontact** is a personal information manager (PIM) application from the [KDE](https://kde.org) project. It provides a mail client, address book, organizer and RSS client.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://kontact.kde.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://kde.org/privacypolicy-apps){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://kontact.kde.org/users/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://invent.kde.org/pim/kmail){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://kde.org/community/donations/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://kontact.kde.org/download)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.kde.kontact)
+
+### Mailvelope (Browser)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mailvelope** is a browser extension that enables the exchange of encrypted emails following the OpenPGP encryption standard.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.mailvelope.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mailvelope.com/en/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mailvelope.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailvelope/mailvelope){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/mailvelope)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/mailvelope/kajibbejlbohfaggdiogboambcijhkke)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/mailvelope/dgcbddhdhjppfdfjpciagmmibadmoapc)
+
+### NeoMutt (CLI)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **NeoMutt** is an open-source command line mail reader (or MUA) for Linux and BSD. It's a fork of [Mutt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutt_(email_client)) with added features.
+
+ NeoMutt is a text-based client that has a steep learning curve. It is however, very customizable.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://neomutt.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://neomutt.org/guide/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/russon/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://neomutt.org/distro)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://neomutt.org/distro)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Qualifications
+
+- Apps developed for open-source operating systems must be open-source.
+- Must not collect telemetry, or have an easy way to disable all telemetry.
+- Must support OpenPGP message encryption.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should be open-source.
+- Should be cross-platform.
+- Should not collect any telemetry by default.
+- Should support OpenPGP natively, i.e. without extensions.
+- Should support storing OpenPGP encrypted emails locally.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/email.md b/i18n/eo/email.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3a6847ca6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/email.md
@@ -0,0 +1,485 @@
+---
+title: "Email Services"
+icon: material/email
+---
+
+Email is practically a necessity for using any online service, however we do not recommend it for person-to-person conversations. Rather than using email to contact other people, consider using an instant messaging medium that supports forward secrecy.
+
+[Recommended Instant Messengers](real-time-communication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+For everything else, we recommend a variety of email providers based on sustainable business models and built-in security and privacy features.
+
+## OpenPGP Compatible Services
+
+These providers natively support OpenPGP encryption/decryption, allowing for provider-agnostic E2EE emails. For example, a Proton Mail user could send an E2EE message to a Mailbox.org user, or you could receive OpenPGP-encrypted notifications from internet services which support it.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using E2EE technology like OpenPGP, email will still have some metadata that is not encrypted in the header of the email. Read more about [email metadata](basics/email-security.md#email-metadata-overview).
+
+ OpenPGP also does not support Forward secrecy, which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. [How do I protect my private keys?](basics/email-security.md#how-do-i-protect-my-private-keys)
+
+### Proton Mail
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton Mail** is an email service with a focus on privacy, encryption, security, and ease of use. They have been in operation since **2013**. Proton AG is based in Genève, Switzerland. Accounts start with 500 MB storage with their free plan.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/mail){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://protonmailrmez3lotccipshtkleegetolb73fuirgj7r4o4vfu7ozyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/mail){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonmail.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id979659905)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonMail/proton-mail-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.proton.me)
+
+Free accounts have some limitations, such as not being able to search body text and not having access to [Proton Mail Bridge](https://proton.me/mail/bridge), which is required to use a [recommended desktop email client](email-clients.md) (e.g. Thunderbird). Paid accounts include features like Proton Mail Bridge, additional storage, and custom domain support. A [letter of attestation](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps) was provided for Proton Mail's apps on 9th November 2021 by [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com).
+
+If you have the Proton Unlimited, Business, or Visionary Plan, you also get [SimpleLogin](#simplelogin) Premium for free.
+
+Proton Mail has internal crash reports that they **do not** share with third parties. This can be disabled in: **Settings** > **Go to Settings** > **Account** > **Security and privacy** > **Send crash reports**.
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Paid Proton Mail subscribers can use their own domain with the service or a [catch-all](https://proton.me/support/catch-all) address. Proton Mail also supports [subaddressing](https://proton.me/support/creating-aliases), which is useful for people who don't want to purchase a domain.
+
+??? success "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ Proton Mail [accepts](https://proton.me/support/payment-options) Bitcoin and cash by mail in addition to standard credit/debit card and PayPal payments.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ Proton Mail supports TOTP [two factor authentication](https://proton.me/support/two-factor-authentication-2fa) only. The use of a U2F security key is not yet supported. Proton Mail is planning to implement U2F upon completion of their [Single Sign On (SSO)](https://reddit.com/comments/cheoy6/comment/feh2lw0/) code.
+
+??? success "Data Security"
+
+ Proton Mail has [zero-access encryption](https://proton.me/blog/zero-access-encryption) at rest for your emails and [calendars](https://proton.me/news/protoncalendar-security-model). Data secured with zero-access encryption is only accessible by you.
+
+ Certain information stored in [Proton Contacts](https://proton.me/support/proton-contacts), such as display names and email addresses, are not secured with zero-access encryption. Contact fields that support zero-access encryption, such as phone numbers, are indicated with a padlock icon.
+
+??? success "Email Encryption"
+
+ Proton Mail has [integrated OpenPGP encryption](https://proton.me/support/how-to-use-pgp) in their webmail. Emails to other Proton Mail accounts are encrypted automatically, and encryption to non-Proton Mail addresses with an OpenPGP key can be enabled easily in your account settings. They also allow you to [encrypt messages to non-Proton Mail addresses](https://proton.me/support/password-protected-emails) without the need for them to sign up for a Proton Mail account or use software like OpenPGP.
+
+ Proton Mail also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This allows people who don't use Proton Mail to find the OpenPGP keys of Proton Mail accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE.
+
+??? warning "Digital Legacy"
+
+ Proton Mail doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ If you have a paid account and your [bill is unpaid](https://proton.me/support/delinquency) after 14 days, you won't be able to access your data. After 30 days, your account will become delinquent and won't receive incoming mail. You will continue to be billed during this period.
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ Proton Mail offers an "Unlimited" account for €9.99/Month, which also enables access to Proton VPN in addition to providing multiple accounts, domains, aliases, and 500GB of storage.
+
+### Mailbox.org
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mailbox.org** is an email service with a focus on being secure, ad-free, and privately powered by 100% eco-friendly energy. They have been in operation since 2014. Mailbox.org is based in Berlin, Germany. Accounts start with 2 GB of storage, which can be upgraded as needed.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailbox.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://mailbox.org/en/data-protection-privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://login.mailbox.org)
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Mailbox.org lets you use your own domain, and they support [catch-all](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Using+catch-all+alias+with+own+domain) addresses. Mailbox.org also supports [subaddressing](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/BMBOKBEN/What+is+an+alias+and+how+do+I+use+it), which is useful if you don't want to purchase a domain.
+
+??? info "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ Mailbox.org doesn't accept Bitcoin or any other cryptocurrencies as a result of their payment processor BitPay suspending operations in Germany. However, they do accept Cash by mail, cash payment to bank account, bank transfer, credit card, PayPal and couple of German-specific processors: paydirekt and Sofortüberweisung.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ Mailbox.org supports [two factor authentication](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/How+to+use+two-factor+authentication+-+2FA) for their webmail only. You can use either TOTP or a [Yubikey](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YubiKey) via the [Yubicloud](https://www.yubico.com/products/services-software/yubicloud). Web standards such as [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn) are not yet supported.
+
+??? info "Data Security"
+
+ Mailbox.org allows for encryption of incoming mail using their [encrypted mailbox](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/The+Encrypted+Mailbox). New messages that you receive will then be immediately encrypted with your public key.
+
+ However, [Open-Exchange](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-Xchange), the software platform used by Mailbox.org, [does not support](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/BMBOKBEN/Encryption+of+calendar+and+address+book) the encryption of your address book and calendar. A [standalone option](calendar.md) may be more appropriate for that information.
+
+??? success "Email Encryption"
+
+ Mailbox.org has [integrated encryption](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Send+encrypted+e-mails+with+Guard) in their webmail, which simplifies sending messages to people with public OpenPGP keys. They also allow [remote recipients to decrypt an email](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/My+recipient+does+not+use+PGP) on Mailbox.org's servers. This feature is useful when the remote recipient does not have OpenPGP and cannot decrypt a copy of the email in their own mailbox.
+
+ Mailbox.org also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This allows people outside of Mailbox.org to find the OpenPGP keys of Mailbox.org accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE.
+
+??? success "Digital Legacy"
+
+ Mailbox.org has a digital legacy feature for all plans. You can choose whether you want any of your data to be passed to heirs providing that they apply and provide your testament. Alternatively, you can nominate a person by name and address.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ Your account will be set to a restricted user account when your contract ends, after [30 days it will be irrevocably deleted](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/payment-article/what-happens-at-the-end-of-my-contract).
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ You can access your Mailbox.org account via IMAP/SMTP using their [.onion service](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/The+Tor+exit+node+of+mailbox.org). However, their webmail interface cannot be accessed via their .onion service and you may experience TLS certificate errors.
+
+ All accounts come with limited cloud storage that [can be encrypted](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Encrypt+files+on+your+Drive). Mailbox.org also offers the alias [@secure.mailbox.org](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Ensuring+E-Mails+are+Sent+Securely), which enforces the TLS encryption on the connection between mail servers, otherwise the message will not be sent at all. Mailbox.org also supports [Exchange ActiveSync](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exchange_ActiveSync) in addition to standard access protocols like IMAP and POP3.
+
+### StartMail
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **StartMail** is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of standard OpenPGP encryption. StartMail has been in operation since 2014 and is based in Boulevard 11, Zeist Netherlands. Accounts start with 10GB. They offer a 30-day trial.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.startmail.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.startmail.com/en/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.startmail.com){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.startmail.com/login)
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Personal accounts can use [Custom or Quick](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360007297457-Aliases) aliases. [Custom domains](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/4403911432209-Setup-a-custom-domain) are also available.
+
+??? warning "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ StartMail accepts Visa, MasterCard, American Express and Paypal. StartMail also has other [payment options](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006620637-Payment-methods) such as Bitcoin (currently only for Personal accounts) and SEPA Direct Debit for accounts older than a year.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ StartMail supports TOTP two factor authentication [for webmail only](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006682158-Two-factor-authentication-2FA). They do not allow U2F security key authentication.
+
+??? info "Data Security"
+
+ StartMail has [zero access encryption at rest](https://www.startmail.com/en/whitepaper/#_Toc458527835), using their "user vault" system. When you log in, the vault is opened, and the email is then moved to the vault out of the queue where it is decrypted by the corresponding private key.
+
+ StartMail supports importing [contacts](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006495557-Import-contacts) however, they are only accessible in the webmail and not through protocols such as [CalDAV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CalDAV). Contacts are also not stored using zero knowledge encryption.
+
+??? success "Email Encryption"
+
+ StartMail has [integrated encryption](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/sections/360001889078-Encryption) in their webmail, which simplifies sending encrypted messages with public OpenPGP keys.
+
+??? warning "Digital Legacy"
+
+ StartMail does not offer a digital legacy feature.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ On account expiration, StartMail will permanently delete your account after [6 months in 3 phases](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006794398-Account-expiration).
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ StartMail allows for proxying of images within emails. If you allow the remote image to be loaded, the sender won't know what your IP address is.
+
+## More Providers
+
+These providers store your emails with zero-knowledge encryption, making them great options for keeping your stored emails secure. However, they don't support interoperable encryption standards for E2EE communications between providers.
+
+### Tutanota
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tutanota** is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of encryption. Tutanota has been in operation since **2011** and is based in Hanover, Germany. Accounts start with 1GB storage with their free plan.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tutanota.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tutanota.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tutanota.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tutanota.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/tutanota/id922429609)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.tutanota.com/)
+
+Tutanota doesn't support the [IMAP protocol](https://tutanota.com/faq/#imap) or the use of third-party [email clients](email-clients.md), and you also won't be able to add [external email accounts](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/544#issuecomment-670473647) to the Tutanota app. Neither [Email import](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/630) or [subfolders](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/927) are currently supported, though this is [due to be changed](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/kickoff-import). Emails can be exported [individually or by bulk selection](https://tutanota.com/howto#generalMail) per folder, which may be inconvenient if you have many folders.
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Paid Tutanota accounts can use up to 5 [aliases](https://tutanota.com/faq#alias) and [custom domains](https://tutanota.com/faq#custom-domain). Tutanota doesn't allow for [subaddressing (plus addresses)](https://tutanota.com/faq#plus), but you can use a [catch-all](https://tutanota.com/howto#settings-global) with a custom domain.
+
+??? warning "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ Tutanota only directly accepts credit cards and PayPal, however Bitcoin and Monero can be used to purchase gift cards via their [partnership](https://tutanota.com/faq/#cryptocurrency) with Proxystore.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ Tutanota supports [two factor authentication](https://tutanota.com/faq#2fa) with either TOTP or U2F.
+
+??? success "Data Security"
+
+ Tutanota has [zero access encryption at rest](https://tutanota.com/faq#what-encrypted) for your emails, [address book contacts](https://tutanota.com/faq#encrypted-address-book), and [calendars](https://tutanota.com/faq#calendar). This means the messages and other data stored in your account are only readable by you.
+
+??? warning "Email Encryption"
+
+ Tutanota [does not use OpenPGP](https://www.tutanota.com/faq/#pgp). Tutanota accounts can only receive encrypted emails from non-Tutanota email accounts when sent via a [temporary Tutanota mailbox](https://www.tutanota.com/howto/#encrypted-email-external).
+
+??? warning "Digital Legacy"
+
+ Tutanota doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ Tutanota will [delete inactive free accounts](https://tutanota.com/faq#inactive-accounts) after six months. You can reuse a deactivated free account if you pay.
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ Tutanota offers the business version of [Tutanota to non-profit organizations](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/secure-email-for-non-profit) for free or with a heavy discount.
+
+ Tutanota also has a business feature called [Secure Connect](https://tutanota.com/secure-connect/). This ensures customer contact to the business uses E2EE. The feature costs €240/y.
+
+## Email Aliasing Services
+
+An email aliasing service allows you to easily generate a new email address for every website you register for. The email aliases you generate are then forwarded to an email address of your choosing, hiding both your "main" email address and the identity of your email provider. True email aliasing is better than plus addressing commonly used and supported by many providers, which allows you to create aliases like yourname+[anythinghere]@example.com, because websites, advertisers, and tracking networks can trivially remove anything after the + sign to know your true email address.
+
+Email aliasing can act as a safeguard in case your email provider ever ceases operation. In that scenario, you can easily re-route your aliases to a new email address. In turn, however, you are placing trust in the aliasing service to continue functioning.
+
+Using a dedicated email aliasing service also has a number of benefits over a catch-all alias on a custom domain:
+
+- Aliases can be turned on and off individually when you need them, preventing websites from emailing you randomly.
+- Replies are sent from the alias address, shielding your real email address.
+
+They also have a number of benefits over "temporary email" services:
+
+- Aliases are permanent and can be turned on again if you need to receive something like a password reset.
+- Emails are sent to your trusted mailbox rather than stored by the alias provider.
+- Temporary email services typically have public mailboxes which can be accessed by anyone who knows the address, aliases are private to you.
+
+Our email aliasing recommendations are providers that allow you to create aliases on domains they control, as well as your own custom domain(s) for a modest yearly fee. They can also be self-hosted if you want maximum control. However, using a custom domain can have privacy-related drawbacks: If you are the only person using your custom domain, your actions can be easily tracked across websites simply by looking at the domain name in the email address and ignoring everything before the at (@) sign.
+
+Using an aliasing service requires trusting both your email provider and your aliasing provider with your unencrypted messages. Some providers mitigate this slightly with automatic PGP encryption, which reduces the number of parties you need to trust from two to one by encrypting incoming emails before they are delivered to your final mailbox provider.
+
+### AnonAddy
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **AnonAddy** lets you create 20 domain aliases on a shared domain for free, or unlimited "standard" aliases which are less anonymous.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://anonaddy.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://anonaddy.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://app.anonaddy.com/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/anonaddy){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://anonaddy.com/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://anonaddy.com/faq/#is-there-an-android-app)
+ - [:material-apple-ios: iOS](https://anonaddy.com/faq/#is-there-an-ios-app)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-GB/firefox/addon/anonaddy/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/anonaddy-anonymous-email/iadbdpnoknmbdeolbapdackdcogdmjpe)
+
+The number of shared aliases (which end in a shared domain like @anonaddy.me) that you can create is limited to 20 on AnonAddy's free plan and 50 on their $12/year plan. You can create unlimited standard aliases (which end in a domain like @[username].anonaddy.com or a custom domain on paid plans), however, as previously mentioned, this can be detrimental to privacy because people can trivially tie your standard aliases together based on the domain name alone. Unlimited shared aliases are available for $36/year.
+
+Notable free features:
+
+- [x] 20 Shared Aliases
+- [x] Unlimited Standard Aliases
+- [ ] No Outgoing Replies
+- [x] 2 Recipient Mailboxes
+- [x] Automatic PGP Encryption
+
+### SimpleLogin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **SimpleLogin** is a free service which provides email aliases on a variety of shared domain names, and optionally provides paid features like unlimited aliases and custom domains.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://simplelogin.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://simplelogin.io/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://simplelogin.io/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simple-login){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.simplelogin.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1494359858)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/simple-login/Simple-Login-Android/releases)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/simplelogin/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/dphilobhebphkdjbpfohgikllaljmgbn)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/simpleloginreceive-sen/diacfpipniklenphgljfkmhinphjlfff)
+ - [:simple-safari: Safari](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1494051017)
+
+SimpleLogin was [acquired by Proton AG](https://proton.me/news/proton-and-simplelogin-join-forces) as of April 8, 2022. If you use Proton Mail for your primary mailbox, SimpleLogin is a great choice. As both products are now owned by the same company you now only have to trust a single entity. We also expect that SimpleLogin will be more tightly integrated with Proton's offerings in the future. SimpleLogin continues to support forwarding to any email provider of your choosing. Securitum [audited](https://simplelogin.io/blog/security-audit/) SimpleLogin in early 2022 and all issues [were addressed](https://simplelogin.io/audit2022/web.pdf).
+
+You can link your SimpleLogin account in the settings with your Proton account. If you have the Proton Unlimited, Business, or Visionary Plan, you will have SimpleLogin Premium for free.
+
+Notable free features:
+
+- [x] 10 Shared Aliases
+- [x] Unlimited Replies
+- [x] 1 Recipient Mailbox
+
+## Self-Hosting Email
+
+Advanced system administrators may consider setting up their own email server. Mail servers require attention and continuous maintenance in order to keep things secure and mail delivery reliable.
+
+### Combined software solutions
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mailcow** is a more advanced mail server perfect for those with a bit more Linux experience. It has everything you need in a Docker container: A mail server with DKIM support, antivirus and spam monitoring, webmail and ActiveSync with SOGo, and web-based administration with 2FA support.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailcow.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mailcow.github.io/mailcow-dockerized-docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailcow/mailcow-dockerized){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.servercow.de/mailcow?lang=en#sal){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mail-in-a-Box** is an automated setup script for deploying a mail server on Ubuntu. Its goal is to make it easier for people to set up their own mail server.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailinabox.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mailinabox.email/guide.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mail-in-a-box/mailinabox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+For a more manual approach we've picked out these two articles:
+
+- [Setting up a mail server with OpenSMTPD, Dovecot and Rspamd](https://poolp.org/posts/2019-09-14/setting-up-a-mail-server-with-opensmtpd-dovecot-and-rspamd/) (2019)
+- [How To Run Your Own Mail Server](https://www.c0ffee.net/blog/mail-server-guide/) (August 2017)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the providers we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements for any Email provider wishing to be recommended, including implementing industry best practices, modern technology and more. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing an Email provider, and conduct your own research to ensure the Email provider you choose is the right choice for you.
+
+### Technology
+
+We regard these features as important in order to provide a safe and optimal service. You should consider whether the provider which has the features you require.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Encrypts email account data at rest with zero-access encryption.
+- Export capability as [Mbox](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mbox) or individual .eml with [RFC5322](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5322/) standard.
+- Allow users to use their own [domain name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name). Custom domain names are important to users because it allows them to maintain their agency from the service, should it turn bad or be acquired by another company which doesn't prioritize privacy.
+- Operates on owned infrastructure, i.e. not built upon third-party email service providers.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Encrypts all account data (Contacts, Calendars, etc) at rest with zero-access encryption.
+- Integrated webmail E2EE/PGP encryption provided as a convenience.
+- Support for [WKD](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD) to allow improved discovery of public OpenPGP keys via HTTP. GnuPG users can get a key by typing: `gpg --locate-key example_user@example.com`
+- Support for a temporary mailbox for external users. This is useful when you want to send an encrypted email, without sending an actual copy to your recipient. These emails usually have a limited lifespan and then are automatically deleted. They also don't require the recipient to configure any cryptography like OpenPGP.
+- Availability of the email provider's services via an [onion service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.onion).
+- [Subaddressing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email_address#Subaddressing) support.
+- Catch-all or alias functionality for those who own their own domains.
+- Use of standard email access protocols such as IMAP, SMTP or [JMAP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Meta_Application_Protocol). Standard access protocols ensure customers can easily download all of their email, should they want to switch to another provider.
+
+### Privacy
+
+We prefer our recommended providers to collect as little data as possible.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Protect sender's IP address. Filter it from showing in the `Received` header field.
+- Don't require personally identifiable information (PII) besides a username and a password.
+- Privacy policy that meets the requirements defined by the GDPR
+- Must not be hosted in the US due to [ECPA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_Communications_Privacy_Act#Criticism) which has [yet to be reformed](https://epic.org/ecpa/).
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Accepts Bitcoin, cash, and other forms of cryptocurrency and/or anonymous payment options (gift cards, etc.)
+
+### Security
+
+Email servers deal with a lot of very sensitive data. We expect that providers will adopt best industry practices in order to protect their members.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Protection of webmail with 2FA, such as TOTP.
+- Zero access encryption, builds on encryption at rest. The provider does not have the decryption keys to the data they hold. This prevents a rogue employee leaking data they have access to or remote adversary from releasing data they have stolen by gaining unauthorized access to the server.
+- [DNSSEC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Extensions) support.
+- No TLS errors or vulnerabilities when being profiled by tools such as [Hardenize](https://www.hardenize.com/), [testssl.sh](https://testssl.sh/), or [Qualys SSL Labs](https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest); this includes certificate related errors and weak DH parameters, such as those that led to [Logjam](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logjam_(computer_security)).
+- A server suite preference (optional on TLSv1.3) for strong cipher suites which support forward secrecy and authenticated encryption.
+- A valid [MTA-STS](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8461) and [TLS-RPT](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8460) policy.
+- Valid [DANE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS-based_Authentication_of_Named_Entities) records.
+- Valid [SPF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sender_Policy_Framework) and [DKIM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DomainKeys_Identified_Mail) records.
+- Have a proper [DMARC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DMARC) record and policy or use [ARC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain) for authentication. If DMARC authentication is being used, the policy must be set to `reject` or `quarantine`.
+- A server suite preference of TLS 1.2 or later and a plan for [Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate/).
+- [SMTPS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SMTPS) submission, assuming SMTP is used.
+- Website security standards such as:
+ - [HTTP Strict Transport Security](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security)
+ - [Subresource Integrity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subresource_Integrity) if loading things from external domains.
+- Must support viewing of [Message headers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header), as it is a crucial forensic feature to determine if an email is a phishing attempt.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Support for hardware authentication, i.e. U2F and [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn). U2F and WebAuthn are more secure as they use a private key stored on a client-side hardware device to authenticate people, as opposed to a shared secret that is stored on the web server and on the client side when using TOTP. Furthermore, U2F and WebAuthn are more resistant to phishing as their authentication response is based on the authenticated [domain name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name).
+- [DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844) in addition to DANE support.
+- Implementation of [Authenticated Received Chain (ARC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain), this is useful for people who post to mailing lists [RFC8617](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8617).
+- Bug-bounty programs and/or a coordinated vulnerability-disclosure process.
+- Website security standards such as:
+ - [Content Security Policy (CSP)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy)
+ - [Expect-CT](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-expect-ct)
+
+### Trust
+
+You wouldn't trust your finances to someone with a fake identity, so why trust them with your email? We require our recommended providers to be public about their ownership or leadership. We also would like to see frequent transparency reports, especially in regard to how government requests are handled.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership or ownership.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership.
+- Frequent transparency reports.
+
+### Marketing
+
+With the email providers we recommend we like to see responsible marketing.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Must self-host analytics (no Google Analytics, Adobe Analytics, etc). The provider's site must also comply with [DNT (Do Not Track)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Do_Not_Track) for those who wish to opt-out.
+
+Must not have any marketing which is irresponsible:
+
+- Claims of "unbreakable encryption." Encryption should be used with the intention that it may not be secret in the future when the technology exists to crack it.
+- Making guarantees of protecting anonymity 100%. When someone makes a claim that something is 100% it means there is no certainty for failure. We know people can quite easily deanonymize themselves in a number of ways, e.g.:
+
+- Reusing personal information e.g. (email accounts, unique pseudonyms, etc) that they accessed without anonymity software (Tor, VPN, etc)
+- [Browser fingerprinting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint)
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Clear and easy to read documentation. This includes things like, setting up 2FA, email clients, OpenPGP, etc.
+
+### Additional Functionality
+
+While not strictly requirements, there are some other convenience or privacy factors we looked into when determining which providers to recommend.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/encryption.md b/i18n/eo/encryption.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3268a8a51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/encryption.md
@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
+---
+title: "Encryption Software"
+icon: material/file-lock
+---
+
+Encryption of data is the only way to control who can access it. If you are currently not using encryption software for your hard disk, emails or files, you should pick an option here.
+
+## Multi-platform
+
+The options listed here are multi-platform and great for creating encrypted backups of your data.
+
+### Cryptomator (Cloud)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Cryptomator** is an encryption solution designed for privately saving files to any cloud provider. It allows you to create vaults that are stored on a virtual drive, the contents of which are encrypted and synced with your cloud storage provider.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://cryptomator.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://cryptomator.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.cryptomator.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/cryptomator){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://cryptomator.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.cryptomator)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/cryptomator-2/id1560822163)
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://cryptomator.org/android)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.cryptomator.Cryptomator)
+
+Cryptomator uses AES-256 encryption to encrypt both files and filenames. Cryptomator cannot encrypt metadata such as access, modification, and creation timestamps, nor the number and size of files and folders.
+
+Some Cryptomator cryptographic libraries have been [audited](https://community.cryptomator.org/t/has-there-been-a-security-review-audit-of-cryptomator/44) by Cure53. The scope of the audited libraries includes: [cryptolib](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptolib), [cryptofs](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptofs), [siv-mode](https://github.com/cryptomator/siv-mode) and [cryptomator-objc-cryptor](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptomator-objc-cryptor). The audit did not extend to [cryptolib-swift](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptolib-swift), which is a library used by Cryptomator for iOS.
+
+Cryptomator's documentation details its intended [security target](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/security-target/), [security architecture](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/architecture/), and [best practices](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/best-practices/) for use in further detail.
+
+### Picocrypt (File)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Picocrypt** is a small and simple encryption tool that provides modern encryption. Picocrypt uses the secure XChaCha20 cipher and the Argon2id key derivation function to provide a high level of security. It uses Go's standard x/crypto modules for its encryption features.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/picocrypt){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases)
+
+### VeraCrypt (Disk)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **VeraCrypt** is a source-available freeware utility used for on-the-fly encryption. It can create a virtual encrypted disk within a file, encrypt a partition, or encrypt the entire storage device with pre-boot authentication.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://veracrypt.fr){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/en/Documentation.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/code/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/en/Donation.html){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html)
+
+VeraCrypt is a fork of the discontinued TrueCrypt project. According to its developers, security improvements have been implemented and issues raised by the initial TrueCrypt code audit have been addressed.
+
+When encrypting with VeraCrypt, you have the option to select from different [hash functions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt#Encryption_scheme). We suggest you **only** select [SHA-512](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-512) and stick to the [AES](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard) block cipher.
+
+Truecrypt has been [audited a number of times](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TrueCrypt#Security_audits), and VeraCrypt has also been [audited separately](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt#VeraCrypt_audit).
+
+## OS Full Disk Encryption
+
+Modern operating systems include [FDE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_encryption) and will have a [secure cryptoprocessor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_cryptoprocessor).
+
+### BitLocker
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **BitLocker** is the full volume encryption solution bundled with Microsoft Windows. The main reason we recommend it is because of its [use of TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). [ElcomSoft](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ElcomSoft), a forensics company, has written about it in [Understanding BitLocker TPM Protection](https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2021/01/understanding-BitLocker-tpm-protection/).
+
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/BitLocker/BitLocker-overview){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+BitLocker is [only supported](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/turn-on-device-encryption-0c453637-bc88-5f74-5105-741561aae838) on Pro, Enterprise and Education editions of Windows. It can be enabled on Home editions provided that they meet the prerequisites.
+
+??? example "Enabling BitLocker on Windows Home"
+
+ To enable BitLocker on "Home" editions of Windows, you must have partitions formatted with a [GUID Partition Table](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GUID_Partition_Table) and have a dedicated TPM (v1.2, 2.0+) module.
+
+ 1. Open a command prompt and check your drive's partition table format with the following command. You should see "**GPT**" listed under "Partition Style":
+
+ ```
+ powershell Get-Disk
+ ```
+
+ 2. Run this command (in an admin command prompt) to check your TPM version. You should see `2.0` or `1.2` listed next to `SpecVersion`:
+
+ ```
+ powershell Get-WmiObject -Namespace "root/cimv2/security/microsofttpm" -Class WIN32_tpm
+ ```
+
+ 3. Access [Advanced Startup Options](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/advanced-startup-options-including-safe-mode-b90e7808-80b5-a291-d4b8-1a1af602b617). You need to reboot while pressing the F8 key before Windows starts and go into the *command prompt* in **Troubleshoot** → **Advanced Options** → **Command Prompt**.
+
+ 4. Login with your admin account and type this in the command prompt to start encryption:
+
+ ```
+ manage-bde -on c: -used
+ ```
+
+ 5. Close the command prompt and continue booting to regular Windows.
+
+ 6. Open an admin command prompt and run the following commands:
+
+ ```
+ manage-bde c: -protectors -add -rp -tpm
+ manage-bde -protectors -enable c:
+ manage-bde -protectors -get c: > %UserProfile%\Desktop\BitLocker-Recovery-Key.txt
+ ```
+
+ !!! tip
+
+ Backup `BitLocker-Recovery-Key.txt` on your Desktop to a separate storage device. Loss of this recovery code may result in loss of data.
+
+### FileVault
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FileVault** is the on-the-fly volume encryption solution built into macOS. FileVault is recommended because it [leverages](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/volume-encryption-with-filevault-sec4c6dc1b6e/web) hardware security capabilities present on an Apple silicon SoC or T2 Security Chip.
+
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/encrypt-mac-data-with-filevault-mh11785/mac){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+We recommend storing a local recovery key in a secure place as opposed to using your iCloud account for recovery.
+
+### Linux Unified Key Setup
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **LUKS** is the default FDE method for Linux. It can be used to encrypt full volumes, partitions, or create encrypted containers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/blob/main/README.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+??? example "Creating and opening encrypted containers"
+
+ ```
+ dd if=/dev/urandom of=/path-to-file bs=1M count=1024 status=progress
+ sudo cryptsetup luksFormat /path-to-file
+ ```
+
+
+ #### Opening encrypted containers
+ We recommend opening containers and volumes with `udisksctl` as this uses [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). Most file managers, such as those included with popular desktop environments, can unlock encrypted files. Tools like [udiskie](https://github.com/coldfix/udiskie) can run in the system tray and provide a helpful user interface.
+ ```
+ udisksctl loop-setup -f /path-to-file
+ udisksctl unlock -b /dev/loop0
+ ```
+
+!!! note "Remember to back up volume headers"
+
+ We recommend you always [back up your LUKS headers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Device_encryption#Backup_and_restore) in case of partial drive failure. This can be done with:
+
+ ```
+ cryptsetup luksHeaderBackup /dev/device --header-backup-file /mnt/backup/file.img
+ ```
+
+## Browser-based
+
+Browser-based encryption can be useful when you need to encrypt a file but cannot install software or apps on your device.
+
+### hat.sh
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Hat.sh** is a web application that provides secure client-side file encryption in your browser. It can also be self-hosted and is useful if you need to encrypt a file but cannot install any software on your device due to organizational policies.
+
+ [:octicons-globe-16: Website](https://hat.sh){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://hat.sh/about/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://hat.sh/about/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/sh-dv/hat.sh){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sh-dv/hat.sh#donations){ .card-link title="Donations methods can be found at the bottom of the website" }
+
+## Command-line
+
+Tools with command-line interfaces are useful for integrating [shell scripts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shell_script).
+
+### Kryptor
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Kryptor** is a free and open-source file encryption and signing tool that makes use of modern and secure cryptographic algorithms. It aims to be a better version of [age](https://github.com/FiloSottile/age) and [Minisign](https://jedisct1.github.io/minisign/) to provide a simple, easier alternative to GPG.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kryptor.co.uk){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/features#privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/tutorial){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/samuel-lucas6/Kryptor){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/#donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.kryptor.co.uk)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.kryptor.co.uk)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.kryptor.co.uk)
+
+### Tomb
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tomb** is a command-line shell wrapper for LUKS. It supports steganography via [third-party tools](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb#how-does-it-work).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.dyne.org/software/tomb){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.dyne.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+## OpenPGP
+
+OpenPGP is sometimes needed for specific tasks such as digitally signing and encrypting email. PGP has many features and is [complex](https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html) as it has been around a long time. For tasks such as signing or encrypting files, we suggest the above options.
+
+When encrypting with PGP, you have the option to configure different options in your `gpg.conf` file. We recommend staying with the standard options specified in the [GnuPG user FAQ](https://www.gnupg.org/faq/gnupg-faq.html#new_user_gpg_conf).
+
+!!! tip "Use future defaults when generating a key"
+
+ When [generating keys](https://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual/c14.html) we suggest using the `future-default` command as this will instruct GnuPG use modern cryptography such as [Curve25519](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curve25519#History) and [Ed25519](https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/):
+
+ ```bash
+ gpg --quick-gen-key alice@example.com future-default
+ ```
+
+### GNU Privacy Guard
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GnuPG** is a GPL-licensed alternative to the PGP suite of cryptographic software. GnuPG is compliant with [RFC 4880](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880), which is the current IETF specification of OpenPGP. The GnuPG project has been working on an [updated draft](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh/) in an attempt to modernize OpenPGP. GnuPG is a part of the Free Software Foundation's GNU software project and has received major [funding](https://gnupg.org/blog/20220102-a-new-future-for-gnupg.html) from the German government.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gnupg.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gnupg.org/privacy-policy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gnupg.org/documentation/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.sufficientlysecure.keychain)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://gpg4win.org/download.html)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://gpgtools.org)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://gnupg.org/download/index.html#binary)
+
+### GPG4win
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GPG4win** is a package for Windows from [Intevation and g10 Code](https://gpg4win.org/impressum.html). It includes [various tools](https://gpg4win.org/about.html) that can assist you in using GPG on Microsoft Windows. The project was initiated and originally [funded by](https://web.archive.org/web/20190425125223/https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/news/government-used-cryptography) Germany's Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) in 2005.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gpg4win.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gpg4win.org/privacy-policy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gpg4win.org/documentation.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gpg4win.git;a=summary){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://gpg4win.org/donate.html){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://gpg4win.org/download.html)
+
+### GPG Suite
+
+!!! note
+
+ We suggest [Canary Mail](email-clients.md#canary-mail) for using PGP with email on iOS devices.
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GPG Suite** provides OpenPGP support for [Apple Mail](email-clients.md#apple-mail) and macOS.
+
+ We recommend taking a look at their [First steps](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb/how-to/first-steps-where-do-i-start-where-do-i-begin-setup-gpgtools-create-a-new-key-your-first-encrypted-email) and [Knowledge base](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb) for support.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gpgtools.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gpgtools.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GPGTools){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://gpgtools.org)
+
+### OpenKeychain
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OpenKeychain** is an Android implementation of GnuPG. It's commonly required by mail clients such as [K-9 Mail](email-clients.md#k-9-mail) and [FairEmail](email-clients.md#fairemail) and other Android apps to provide encryption support. Cure53 completed a [security audit](https://www.openkeychain.org/openkeychain-3-6) of OpenKeychain 3.6 in October 2015. Technical details about the audit and OpenKeychain's solutions can be found [here](https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain/wiki/cure53-Security-Audit-2015).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.openkeychain.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.openkeychain.org/help/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.openkeychain.org/faq/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.sufficientlysecure.keychain)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Qualifications
+
+- Cross-platform encryption apps must be open-source.
+- File encryption apps must support decryption on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- External disk encryption apps must support decryption on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- Internal (OS) disk encryption apps must be cross-platform or built in to the operating system natively.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Operating System (FDE) encryption apps should utilize hardware security such as a TPM or Secure Enclave.
+- File encryption apps should have first- or third-party support for mobile platforms.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/file-sharing.md b/i18n/eo/file-sharing.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7039a9861
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/file-sharing.md
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+---
+title: "File Sharing and Sync"
+icon: material/share-variant
+---
+
+Discover how to privately share your files between your devices, with your friends and family, or anonymously online.
+
+## File Sharing
+
+### Send
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Send** is a fork of Mozilla’s discontinued Firefox Send service which allows you to send files to others with a link. Files are encrypted on your device so that they cannot be read by the server, and they can be optionally password-protected as well. The maintainer of Send hosts a [public instance](https://send.vis.ee/). You can use other public instances, or you can host Send yourself.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://send.vis.ee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send-instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/timvisee){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Send can be used via its web interface or via the [ffsend](https://github.com/timvisee/ffsend) CLI. If you are familiar with the command-line and send files frequently, we recommend using the CLI client to avoid JavaScript-based encryption. You can specify the `--host` flag to use a specific server:
+
+```bash
+ffsend upload --host https://send.vis.ee/ FILE
+```
+
+### OnionShare
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OnionShare** is an open-source tool that lets you securely and anonymously share a file of any size. It works by starting a web server accessible as a Tor onion service, with an unguessable URL that you can share with the recipients to download or send files.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://onionshare.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://lldan5gahapx5k7iafb3s4ikijc4ni7gx5iywdflkba5y2ezyg6sjgyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.onionshare.org){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/onionshare/onionshare){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://onionshare.org/#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://onionshare.org/#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://onionshare.org/#download)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must not store decrypted data on a remote server.
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must either have clients for Linux, macOS, and Windows; or have a web interface.
+
+## FreedomBox
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FreedomBox** is an operating system designed to be run on a [single-board computer (SBC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-board_computer). The purpose is to make it easy to set up server applications that you might want to self-host.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://freedombox.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://wiki.debian.org/FreedomBox/Manual){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://salsa.debian.org/freedombox-team/freedombox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://freedomboxfoundation.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+## File Sync
+
+### Nextcloud (Client-Server)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nextcloud** is a suite of free and open-source client-server software for creating your own file hosting services on a private server you control.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://nextcloud.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://nextcloud.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://nextcloud.com/support/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/nextcloud){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nextcloud.com/contribute/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nextcloud.client)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1125420102)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/nextcloud/android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/www/nextcloud)
+
+!!! danger
+
+ We don't recommend using the [E2EE App](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/end_to_end_encryption) for Nextcloud as it may lead to data loss; it is highly experimental and not production quality.
+
+### Syncthing (P2P)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Syncthing** is an open-source peer-to-peer continuous file synchronization utility. It is used to synchronize files between two or more devices over the local network or the internet. Syncthing does not use a centralized server; it uses the [Block Exchange Protocol](https://docs.syncthing.net/specs/bep-v1.html#bep-v1) to transfer data between devices. All data is encrypted using TLS.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://syncthing.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.syncthing.net){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/syncthing){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://syncthing.net/donations/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nutomic.syncthingandroid)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-openbsd: OpenBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-netbsd: NetBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+#### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must not require a third-party remote/cloud server.
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must either have clients for Linux, macOS, and Windows; or have a web interface.
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Has mobile clients for iOS and Android, which at least support document previews.
+- Supports photo backup from iOS and Android, and optionally supports file/folder sync on Android.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/frontends.md b/i18n/eo/frontends.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..12162dc91
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/frontends.md
@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+---
+title: "Frontends"
+icon: material/flip-to-front
+---
+
+Sometimes services will try to force you to sign up for an account by blocking access to content with annoying popups. They might also break without JavaScript enabled. These frontends can allow you to get around these restrictions.
+
+## LBRY
+
+### Librarian
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Librarian** is a free and open-source frontend for [Odysee](https://odysee.com/) (LBRY) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://librarian.codeberg.page/){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Librarian does not proxy video streams by default. Videos watched through Librarian will still make direct connections to Odysee's servers (e.g. `odycdn.com`); however, some instances may enable proxying which would be detailed in the instance's privacy policy.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Librarian is useful if you want watch LBRY content on mobile without mandatory telemetry and if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, as is the case with [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Librarian, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a Librarian instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Librarian instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect the default policy. Librarian instances feature a "privacy nutrition label" to provide an overview of their policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+## Twitter
+
+### Nitter
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nitter** is a free and open-source frontend for [Twitter](https://twitter.com) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter/wiki/Instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter#nitter){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Nitter is useful if you want to browse Twitter content without having to log in and if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, as is the case with [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level. It also allows you to [create RSS feeds for Twitter](news-aggregators.md#twitter).
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Nitter, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a Nitter instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Nitter instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect the default policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+## TikTok
+
+### ProxiTok
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **ProxiTok** is an open source frontend to the [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com) website that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok/wiki/Public-instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+!!! tip
+
+ ProxiTok is useful if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, such as [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting ProxiTok, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a ProxiTok instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. ProxiTok instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect their associated privacy policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+## YouTube
+
+### FreeTube
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FreeTube** is a free and open-source desktop application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com). When using FreeTube, your subscription list and playlists are saved locally on your device.
+
+ By default, FreeTube blocks all YouTube advertisements. In addition, FreeTube optionally integrates with [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://freetubeapp.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://freetubeapp.io/privacy.php){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.freetubeapp.io/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/FreeTubeApp/FreeTube){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/FreeTube){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/io.freetubeapp.FreeTube)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using FreeTube, your IP address may still be known to YouTube, [Invidious](https://instances.invidious.io) or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+### Yattee
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Yattee** is a free and open-source privacy oriented video player for iOS, tvOS and macOS for [YouTube](https://youtube.com). When using Yattee, your subscription list are saved locally on your device.
+
+ You will need to take a few [extra steps](https://gonzoknows.com/posts/Yattee/) before you can use Yattee to watch YouTube, due to App Store restrictions.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://github.com/yattee/yattee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://r.yattee.stream/docs/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/wiki/Donations){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-apple: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/yattee/id1595136629)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/releases)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using Yattee, your IP address may still be known to YouTube, [Invidious](https://instances.invidious.io), [Piped](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances) or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+By default, Yattee blocks all YouTube advertisements. In addition, Yattee optionally integrates with [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments.
+
+### LibreTube (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **LibreTube** is a free and open-source Android application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) which uses the [Piped](#piped) API.
+
+ LibreTube allows you to store your subscription list and playlists locally on your Android device, or to an account on your Piped instance of choice, which allows you to access them seamlessly on other devices as well.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://libre-tube.github.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube#privacy-policy-and-disclaimer){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube/releases)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using LibreTube, your IP address will be visible to the [Piped](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances) instance you choose and/or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+By default, LibreTube blocks all YouTube advertisements. Additionally, Libretube uses [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments. You are able to fully configure the types of segments that SponsorBlock will skip, or disable it completely. There is also a button on the video player itself to disable it for a specific video if desired.
+
+### NewPipe (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation annotate
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **NewPipe** is a free and open-source Android application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com), [SoundCloud](https://soundcloud.com), [media.ccc.de](https://media.ccc.de), [Bandcamp](https://bandcamp.com), and [PeerTube](https://joinpeertube.org/) (1).
+
+ Your subscription list and playlists are saved locally on your Android device.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://newpipe.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://newpipe.net/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://teamnewpipe.github.io/documentation/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamNewPipe/NewPipe){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://newpipe.net/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/TeamNewPipe/NewPipe/releases)
+
+1. The default instance is [FramaTube](https://framatube.org/), however more can be added via **Settings** → **Content** → **PeerTube instances**
+
+!!! Warning
+
+ When using NewPipe, your IP address will be visible to the video providers used. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+### Invidious
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Invidious** is a free and open-source frontend for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://invidious.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://instances.invidious.io){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.invidious.io/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/iv-org/invidious){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://invidious.io/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Invidious does not proxy video streams by default. Videos watched through Invidious will still make direct connections to Google's servers (e.g. `googlevideo.com`); however, some instances support video proxying—simply enable *Proxy videos* within the instances' settings or add `&local=true` to the URL.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Invidious is useful if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, such as [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level. It does not provide privacy by itself, and we don’t recommend logging into any accounts.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Invidious, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using an Invidious instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Invidious instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect their associated privacy policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+### Piped
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Piped** is a free and open-source frontend for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ Piped requires JavaScript in order to function and there are a number of public instances.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://piped.kavin.rocks/preferences#ddlInstanceSelection){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://piped-docs.kavin.rocks/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped#donations){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Piped is useful if you want to use [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) without installing an extension or to access age-restricted content without an account. It does not provide privacy by itself, and we don’t recommend logging into any accounts.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Piped, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a Piped instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Piped instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect their associated privacy policy.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+Recommended frontends...
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must be self-hostable.
+- Must provide all basic website functionality available to anonymous users.
+
+We only consider frontends for websites which are...
+
+- Not normally accessible without JavaScript.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/index.md b/i18n/eo/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4cb105105
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+---
+template: overrides/home.eo.html
+hide:
+ - navigation
+ - toc
+ - feedback
+---
+
+
+## Why should I care?
+
+##### “I have nothing to hide. Why should I care about my privacy?”
+
+Much like the right to interracial marriage, woman's suffrage, freedom of speech, and many others, our right to privacy hasn't always been upheld. In several dictatorships, it still isn't. Generations before ours fought for our right to privacy. ==Privacy is a human right, inherent to all of us,== that we are entitled to (without discrimination).
+
+You shouldn't confuse privacy with secrecy. We know what happens in the bathroom, but you still close the door. That's because you want privacy, not secrecy. **Everyone** has something to protect. Privacy is something that makes us human.
+
+[:material-target-account: Common Internet Threats](basics/common-threats.md ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+## What should I do?
+
+##### First, you need to make a plan
+
+Trying to protect all your data from everyone all the time is impractical, expensive, and exhausting. But don't worry! Security is a process, and, by thinking ahead, you can put together a plan that's right for you. Security isn't just about the tools you use or the software you download. Rather, it begins by understanding the unique threats you face, and how you can mitigate them.
+
+==This process of identifying threats and defining countermeasures is called **threat modeling**==, and it forms the basis of every good security and privacy plan.
+
+[:material-book-outline: Learn More About Threat Modeling](basics/threat-modeling.md ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+---
+
+## We need you! Here's how to get involved:
+
+[:simple-discourse:](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/){ title="Join our Forum" }
+[:simple-mastodon:](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides){ rel=me title="Follow us on Mastodon" }
+[:material-book-edit:](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org){ title="Contribute to this website" }
+[:material-translate:](https://matrix.to/#/#pg-i18n:aragon.sh){ title="Help translate this website" }
+[:simple-matrix:](https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org){ title="Chat with us on Matrix" }
+[:material-information-outline:](about/index.md){ title="Learn more about us" }
+[:material-hand-coin-outline:](about/donate.md){ title="Support the project" }
+
+It's important for a website like Privacy Guides to always stay up-to-date. We need our audience to keep an eye on software updates for the applications listed on our site and follow recent news about providers that we recommend. It's hard to keep up with the fast pace of the internet, but we try our best. If you spot an error, think a provider should not be listed, notice a qualified provider is missing, believe a browser plugin is no longer the best choice, or uncover any other issue, please let us know.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/kb-archive.md b/i18n/eo/kb-archive.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..514697e3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/kb-archive.md
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+---
+title: KB Archive
+icon: material/archive
+---
+
+# Pages Moved to Blog
+
+Some pages that used to be in our knowledge base can now be found on our blog:
+
+- [GrapheneOS vs. CalyxOS](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/)
+- [Signal Configuration Hardening](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening/)
+- [Linux - System Hardening](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/22/linux-system-hardening/)
+- [Linux - Application Sandboxing](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/22/linux-application-sandboxing/)
+- [Secure Data Erasure](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/05/25/secure-data-erasure/)
+- [Integrating Metadata Removal](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/09/integrating-metadata-removal/)
+- [iOS Configuration Guide](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/22/ios-configuration-guide/)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/meta/brand.md b/i18n/eo/meta/brand.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bb7788417
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/meta/brand.md
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+---
+title: Branding Guidelines
+---
+
+The name of the website is **Privacy Guides** and should **not** be changed to:
+
+
+
+The name of the subreddit is **r/PrivacyGuides** or **the Privacy Guides Subreddit**.
+
+Additional branding guidelines can be found at [github.com/privacyguides/brand](https://github.com/privacyguides/brand)
+
+## Trademark
+
+"Privacy Guides" and the shield logo are trademarks owned by Jonah Aragon, unlimited usage is granted to the Privacy Guides project.
+
+Without waiving any of its rights, Privacy Guides does not advise others on the scope of its intellectual property rights. Privacy Guides does not permit or consent to any use of its trademarks in any manner that is likely to cause confusion by implying association with or sponsorship by Privacy Guides. If you are aware of any such use, please contact Jonah Aragon at jonah@privacyguides.org. Consult your legal counsel if you have questions.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/meta/git-recommendations.md b/i18n/eo/meta/git-recommendations.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6159e50d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/meta/git-recommendations.md
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+---
+title: Git Recommendations
+---
+
+If you make changes to this website on GitHub.com's web editor directly, you shouldn't have to worry about this. If you are developing locally and/or are a long-term website editor (who should probably be developing locally!), consider these recommendations.
+
+## Enable SSH Key Commit Signing
+
+You can use an existing SSH key for signing, or [create a new one](https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/connecting-to-github-with-ssh/generating-a-new-ssh-key-and-adding-it-to-the-ssh-agent).
+
+1. Configure your Git client to sign commits and tags by default (remove `--global` to only sign by default for this repo):
+ ```
+ git config --global commit.gpgsign true
+ git config --global gpg.format ssh
+ git config --global tag.gpgSign true
+ ```
+2. Copy your SSH public key to your clipboard, for example:
+ ```
+ pbcopy < ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+ # Copies the contents of the id_ed25519.pub file to your clipboard
+ ```
+3. Set your SSH key for signing in Git with the following command, replacing the last string in quotes with the public key in your clipboard:
+ ```
+ git config --global user.signingkey 'ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3(...) user@example.com'
+ ```
+
+Ensure you [add your SSH key to your GitHub account](https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/connecting-to-github-with-ssh/adding-a-new-ssh-key-to-your-github-account#adding-a-new-ssh-key-to-your-account) **as a Signing Key** (as opposed to or in addition to as an Authentication Key).
+
+## Rebase on Git pull
+
+Use `git pull --rebase` instead of `git pull` when pulling in changes from GitHub to your local machine. This way your local changes will always be "on top of" the latest changes on GitHub, and you avoid merge commits (which are disallowed in this repo).
+
+You can set this to be the default behavior:
+
+```
+git config --global pull.rebase true
+```
+
+## Rebase from `main` before submitting a PR
+
+If you are working on your own branch, run these commands before submitting a PR:
+
+```
+git fetch origin
+git rebase origin/main
+```
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/meta/uploading-images.md b/i18n/eo/meta/uploading-images.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..20b8a71fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/meta/uploading-images.md
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+---
+title: Uploading Images
+---
+
+Here are a couple of general rules for contributing to Privacy Guides:
+
+## Images
+
+- We **prefer** SVG images, but if those do not exist we can use PNG images
+
+Company logos have canvas size of:
+
+- 128x128px
+- 384x128px
+
+## Optimization
+
+### PNG
+
+Use the [OptiPNG](https://sourceforge.net/projects/optipng/) to optimize the PNG image:
+
+```bash
+optipng -o7 file.png
+```
+
+### SVG
+
+#### Inkscape
+
+[Scour](https://github.com/scour-project/scour) all SVG images.
+
+In Inkscape:
+
+1. File Save As..
+2. Set type to Optimized SVG (*.svg)
+
+In the **Options** tab:
+
+- **Number of significant digits for coordinates** > **5**
+- [x] Turn on **Shorten color values**
+- [x] Turn on **Convert CSS attributes to XML attributes**
+- [x] Turn on **Collapse groups**
+- [x] Turn on **Create groups for similar attributes**
+- [ ] Turn off **Keep editor data**
+- [ ] Turn off **Keep unreferenced definitions**
+- [x] Turn on **Work around renderer bugs**
+
+In the **SVG Output** tab under **Document options**:
+
+- [ ] Turn off **Remove the XML declaration**
+- [x] Turn on **Remove metadata**
+- [x] Turn on **Remove comments**
+- [x] Turn on **Embeded raster images**
+- [x] Turn on **Enable viewboxing**
+
+In the **SVG Output** under **Pretty-printing**:
+
+- [ ] Turn off **Format output with line-breaks and indentation**
+- **Indentation characters** > Select **Space**
+- **Depth of indentation** > **1**
+- [ ] Turn off **Strip the "xml:space" attribute from the root SVG element**
+
+In the **IDs** tab:
+
+- [x] Turn on **Remove unused IDs**
+- [ ] Turn off **Shorten IDs**
+- **Prefix shortened IDs with** > `leave blank`
+- [x] Turn on **Preserve manually created IDs not ending with digits**
+- **Preserve the following IDs** > `leave blank`
+- **Preserve IDs starting with** > `leave blank`
+
+#### CLI
+
+The same can be achieved with the [Scour](https://github.com/scour-project/scour) command:
+
+```bash
+scour --set-precision=5 \
+ --create-groups \
+ --renderer-workaround \
+ --remove-descriptive-elements \
+ --enable-comment-stripping \
+ --enable-viewboxing \
+ --indent=space \
+ --nindent=1 \
+ --no-line-breaks \
+ --enable-id-stripping \
+ --protect-ids-noninkscape \
+ input.svg output.svg
+```
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/meta/writing-style.md b/i18n/eo/meta/writing-style.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..43c8df7f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/meta/writing-style.md
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+---
+title: Writing Style
+---
+
+Privacy Guides is written in American English, and you should refer to [APA Style guidelines](https://apastyle.apa.org/style-grammar-guidelines/grammar) when in doubt.
+
+In general the [United States federal plain language guidelines](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/) provide a good overview of how to write clearly and concisely. We highlight a few important notes from these guidelines below.
+
+## Writing for our audience
+
+Privacy Guides' intended [audience](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/audience/) is primarily average, technology using adults. Don't dumb down content as if you are addressing a middle-school class, but don't overuse complicated terminology about concepts average computer users wouldn't be familiar with.
+
+### Address only what people want to know
+
+People don't need overly complex articles with little relevance to them. Figure out what you want people to accomplish when writing an article, and only include those details.
+
+> Tell your audience why the material is important to them. Say, “If you want a research grant, here’s what you have to do.” Or, “If you want to mine federal coal, here’s what you should know.” Or, “If you’re planning a trip to Rwanda, read this first.”
+
+### Address people directly
+
+We're writing *for* a wide variety of people, but we are writing *to* the person who is actually reading it. Use "you" to address the reader directly.
+
+> More than any other single technique, using “you” pulls users into the information and makes it relevant to them.
+>
+> When you use “you” to address users, they are more likely to understand what their responsibility is.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/audience/address-the-user/)
+
+### Avoid "users"
+
+Avoid calling people "users", in favor of "people", or a more specific description of the group of people you are writing for.
+
+## Organizing content
+
+Organization is key. Content should flow from most to least important information, and use headers as much as needed to logically separate different ideas.
+
+- Limit the document to around five or six sections. Long documents should probably be broken up into separate pages.
+- Mark important ideas with **bold** or *italics*.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/design/)
+
+### Begin with a topic sentence
+
+> If you tell your reader what they’re going to read about, they’re less likely to have to read your paragraph again. Headings help, but they’re not enough. Establish a context for your audience before you provide them with the details.
+>
+> We often write the way we think, putting our premises first and then our conclusion. It may be the natural way to develop thoughts, but we wind up with the topic sentence at the end of the paragraph. Move it up front and let users know where you’re going. Don’t make readers hold a lot of information in their heads before getting to the point.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/organize/have-a-topic-sentence/)
+
+## Choose your words carefully
+
+> Words matter. They are the most basic building blocks of written and spoken communication. Don’t complicate things by using jargon, technical terms, or abbreviations that people won’t understand.
+
+We should try to avoid abbreviations where possible, but technology is full of abbreviations. In general, spell out the abbreviation/acronym the first time it is used on a page, and add the abbreviation to the abbreviation glossary file when it is used repeatedly.
+
+> Kathy McGinty offers tongue-in-cheek instructions for bulking up your simple, direct sentences:
+>
+> > There is no escaping the fact that it is considered very important to note that a number of various available applicable studies ipso facto have generally identified the fact that additional appropriate nocturnal employment could usually keep juvenile adolescents off thoroughfares during the night hours, including but not limited to the time prior to midnight on weeknights and/or 2 a.m. on weekends.
+>
+> And the original, using stronger, simpler words:
+>
+> > More night jobs would keep youths off the streets.
+
+## Be concise
+
+> Unnecessary words waste your audience’s time. Great writing is like a conversation. Omit information that the audience doesn’t need to know. This can be difficult as a subject matter expert so it’s important to have someone look at the information from the audience’s perspective.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/concise/)
+
+## Keep text conversational
+
+> Verbs are the fuel of writing. They give your sentences power and direction. They enliven your writing and make it more interesting.
+>
+> Verbs tell your audience what to do. Make sure it’s clear who does what.
+
+### Use active voice
+
+> Active voice makes it clear who is supposed to do what. It eliminates ambiguity about responsibilities. Not “It must be done,” but “You must do it.”
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/conversational/use-active-voice/)
+
+### Use "must" for requirements
+
+> - “must” for an obligation
+> - “must not” for a prohibition
+> - “may” for a discretionary action
+> - “should” for a recommendation
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/mobile-browsers.md b/i18n/eo/mobile-browsers.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c427f0112
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/mobile-browsers.md
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+---
+title: "Mobile Browsers"
+icon: material/cellphone-information
+---
+
+These are our currently recommended mobile web browsers and configurations for standard/non-anonymous internet browsing. If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) instead. In general, we recommend keeping extensions to a minimum; they have privileged access within your browser, require you to trust the developer, can make you [stand out](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint), and [weaken](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/chromium-extensions/c/0ei-UCHNm34/m/lDaXwQhzBAAJ) site isolation.
+
+## Android
+
+On Android, Firefox is still less secure than Chromium-based alternatives: Mozilla's engine, [GeckoView](https://mozilla.github.io/geckoview/), has yet to support [site isolation](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2021/05/introducing-firefox-new-site-isolation-security-architecture) or enable [isolatedProcess](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1565196).
+
+### Brave
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Brave Browser** includes a built-in content blocker and [privacy features](https://brave.com/privacy-features/), many of which are enabled by default.
+
+ Brave is built upon the Chromium web browser project, so it should feel familiar and have minimal website compatibility issues.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://brave.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://brave4u7jddbv7cyviptqjc7jusxh72uik7zt6adtckl5f4nwy2v72qd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://brave.com/privacy/browser/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.brave.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads annotate
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.brave.browser)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/releases)
+
+#### Recommended Configuration
+
+Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. When you use Brave, we recommend changing the following settings to protect your privacy from certain parties, but all browsers other than the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) will be traceable by *somebody* in some regard or another.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Brave Shields & privacy**
+
+##### Shields
+
+Brave includes some anti-fingerprinting measures in its [Shields](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360022973471-What-is-Shields-) feature. We suggest configuring these options [globally](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360023646212-How-do-I-configure-global-and-site-specific-Shields-settings-) across all pages that you visit.
+
+##### Brave shields global defaults
+
+Shields' options can be downgraded on a per-site basis as needed, but by default we recommend setting the following:
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Aggressive** under Block trackers & ads
+
+ ??? warning "Use default filter lists"
+ Brave allows you to select additional content filters within the internal `brave://adblock` page. We advise against using this feature; instead, keep the default filter lists. Using extra lists will make you stand out from other Brave users and may also increase attack surface if there is an exploit in Brave and a malicious rule is added to one of the lists you use.
+
+- [x] Select **Upgrade connections to HTTPS**
+- [x] (Optional) Select **Block Scripts** (1)
+- [x] Select **Strict, may break sites** under **Block fingerprinting**
+
+
+
+1. This option provides functionality similar to uBlock Origin's advanced [blocking modes](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) or the [NoScript](https://noscript.net/) extension.
+
+##### Clear browsing data
+
+- [x] Select **Clear data on exit**
+
+##### Social Media Blocking
+
+- [ ] Uncheck all social media components
+
+##### Other privacy settings
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Disable non-proxied UDP** under [WebRTC IP Handling Policy](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360017989132-How-do-I-change-my-Privacy-Settings-#webrtc)
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow sites to check if you have payment methods saved**
+- [ ] Uncheck **IPFS Gateway** (1)
+- [x] Select **Close tabs on exit**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow privacy-preserving product analytics (P3A)**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send diagnostic reports**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send daily usage ping to Brave**
+
+1. InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is a decentralized, peer-to-peer network for storing and sharing data in a distributed filesystem. Unless you use the feature, disable it.
+
+
+
+#### Brave Sync
+
+[Brave Sync](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360059793111-Understanding-Brave-Sync) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices without requiring an account and protects it with E2EE.
+
+## iOS
+
+On iOS, any app that can browse the web is [restricted](https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines) to using an Apple-provided [WebKit framework](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/webkit), so there is little reason to use a third-party web browser.
+
+### Safari
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Safari** is the default browser in iOS. It includes [privacy features](https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/browse-the-web-privately-iphb01fc3c85/15.0/ios/15.0) such as Intelligent Tracking Protection, Privacy Report, isolated Private Browsing tabs, iCloud Private Relay, and automatic HTTPS upgrades.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.apple.com/safari/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/safari/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/safari/welcome/mac){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+#### Recommended Configuration
+
+These options can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Safari** → **Privacy and Security**.
+
+##### Cross-Site Tracking Prevention
+
+- [x] Enable **Prevent Cross-Site Tracking**
+
+This enables WebKit's [Intelligent Tracking Protection](https://webkit.org/tracking-prevention/#intelligent-tracking-prevention-itp). The feature helps protect against unwanted tracking by using on-device machine learning to stop trackers. ITP protects against many common threats, but it does not block all tracking avenues because it is designed to not interfere with website usability.
+
+##### Privacy Report
+
+Privacy Report provides a snapshot of cross-site trackers currently prevented from profiling you on the website you're visiting. It can also display a weekly report to show which trackers have been blocked over time.
+
+Privacy Report is accessible via the Page Settings menu.
+
+##### Privacy Preserving Ad Measurement
+
+- [ ] Disable **Privacy Preserving Ad Measurement**
+
+Ad click measurement has traditionally used tracking technology that infringes on user privacy. [Private Click Measurement](https://webkit.org/blog/11529/introducing-private-click-measurement-pcm/) is a WebKit feature and proposed web standard aimed towards allowing advertisers to measure the effectiveness of web campaigns without compromising on user privacy.
+
+The feature has little privacy concerns on its own, so while you can choose to leave it on, we consider the fact that it's automatically disabled in Private Browsing to be an indicator for disabling the feature.
+
+##### Always-on Private Browsing
+
+Open Safari and tap the Tabs button, located in the bottom right. Then, expand the Tab Groups list.
+
+- [x] Select **Private**
+
+Safari's Private Browsing mode offers additional privacy protections. Private Browsing uses a new [ephemeral](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/urlsessionconfiguration/1410529-ephemeral) session for each tab, meaning tabs are isolated from one another. There are also other smaller privacy benefits with Private Browsing, such as not sending a webpage’s address to Apple when using Safari's translation feature.
+
+Do note that Private Browsing does not save cookies and website data, so it won't be possible to remain signed into sites. This may be an inconvenience.
+
+##### iCloud Sync
+
+Synchronization of Safari History, Tab Groups, iCloud Tabs and saved passwords are E2EE. However, by default, bookmarks are [not](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303). Apple can decrypt and access them in accordance with their [privacy policy](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/).
+
+You can enable E2EE for you Safari bookmarks and downloads by enabling [Advanced Data Protection](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212520). Go to your **Apple ID name → iCloud → Advanced Data Protection**.
+
+- [x] Turn On **Advanced Data Protection**
+
+If you use iCloud with Advanced Data Protection disabled, we also recommend checking to ensure Safari's default download location is set to locally on your device. This option can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Safari** → **General** → **Downloads**.
+
+### AdGuard
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **AdGuard for iOS** is a free and open-source content-blocking extension for Safari that uses the native [Content Blocker API](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/safariservices/creating_a_content_blocker).
+
+ AdGuard for iOS has some premium features; however, standard Safari content blocking is free of charge.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://adguard.com/en/adguard-ios/overview.html){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://adguard.com/privacy/ios.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://kb.adguard.com/ios){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdguardForiOS){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id1047223162)
+
+Additional filter lists do slow things down and may increase your attack surface, so only apply what you need.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must support automatic updates.
+- Must receive engine updates in 0-1 days from upstream release.
+- Any changes required to make the browser more privacy-respecting should not negatively impact user experience.
+- Android browsers must use the Chromium engine.
+ - Unfortunately, Mozilla GeckoView is still less secure than Chromium on Android.
+ - iOS browsers are limited to WebKit.
+
+### Extension Criteria
+
+- Must not replicate built-in browser or OS functionality.
+- Must directly impact user privacy, i.e. must not simply provide information.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/multi-factor-authentication.md b/i18n/eo/multi-factor-authentication.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f30f3a361
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/multi-factor-authentication.md
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+---
+title: "Multi-Factor Authenticators"
+icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication'
+---
+
+## Hardware Security Keys
+
+### YubiKey
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ 
+
+ The **YubiKeys** are among the most popular security keys. Some YubiKey models have a wide range of features such as: [Universal 2nd Factor (U2F)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_2nd_Factor), [FIDO2 and WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online), [Yubico OTP](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#yubico-otp), [Personal Identity Verification (PIV)](https://developers.yubico.com/PIV), [OpenPGP](https://developers.yubico.com/PGP/), [TOTP and HOTP](https://developers.yubico.com/OATH) authentication.
+
+ One of the benefits of the YubiKey is that one key can do almost everything (YubiKey 5), you could expect from a hardware security key. We do encourage you to take the [quiz](https://www.yubico.com/quiz/) before purchasing in order to make sure you make the right choice.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.yubico.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.yubico.com/support/terms-conditions/privacy-notice){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.yubico.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+The [comparison table](https://www.yubico.com/store/compare/) shows the features and how the YubiKeys compare. We highly recommend that you select keys from the YubiKey 5 Series.
+
+YubiKeys can be programmed using the [YubiKey Manager](https://www.yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-manager/) or [YubiKey Personalization Tools](https://www.yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-personalization-tools/). For managing TOTP codes, you can use the [Yubico Authenticator](https://www.yubico.com/products/yubico-authenticator/). All of Yubico's clients are open-source.
+
+For models which support HOTP and TOTP, there are 2 slots in the OTP interface which could be used for HOTP and 32 slots to store TOTP secrets. These secrets are stored encrypted on the key and never expose them to the devices they are plugged into. Once a seed (shared secret) is given to the Yubico Authenticator, it will only give out the six-digit codes, but never the seed. This security model helps limit what an attacker can do if they compromise one of the devices running the Yubico Authenticator and make the YubiKey resistant to a physical attacker.
+
+!!! warning
+ The firmware of YubiKey is not open-source and is not updatable. If you want features in newer firmware versions, or if there is a vulnerability in the firmware version you are using, you would need to purchase a new key.
+
+### Nitrokey / Librem Key
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nitrokey** has a security key capable of [FIDO2 and WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) called the **Nitrokey FIDO2**. For PGP support, you need to purchase one of their other keys such as the **Nitrokey Start**, **Nitrokey Pro 2** or the **Nitrokey Storage 2**.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.nitrokey.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.nitrokey.com/data-privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.nitrokey.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+The [comparison table](https://www.nitrokey.com/#comparison) shows the features and how the Nitrokey models compare. The **Nitrokey 3** listed will have a combined feature set.
+
+Nitrokey models can be configured using the [Nitrokey app](https://www.nitrokey.com/download).
+
+For the models which support HOTP and TOTP, there are 3 slots for HOTP and 15 for TOTP. Some Nitrokeys can act as a password manager. They can store 16 different credentials and encrypt them using the same password as the OpenPGP interface.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ While Nitrokeys do not release the HOTP/TOTP secrets to the device they are plugged into, the HOTP and TOTP storage is **not** encrypted and is vulnerable to physical attacks. If you are looking to store HOTP or TOTP these secrets, we highly recommend that you use a Yubikey instead.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Resetting the OpenPGP interface on a Nitrokey will also make the password database [inaccessible](https://docs.nitrokey.com/pro/linux/factory-reset).
+
+ The Nitrokey Pro 2, Nitrokey Storage 2, and the upcoming Nitrokey 3 supports system integrity verification for laptops with the [Coreboot](https://www.coreboot.org/) + [Heads](https://osresearch.net/) firmware. Purism's [Librem Key](https://puri.sm/products/librem-key/) is a rebranded NitroKey Pro 2 with similar firmware and can also be used for the same purposes.
+
+Nitrokey's firmware is open-source, unlike the YubiKey. The firmware on modern NitroKey models (except the **NitroKey Pro 2**) is updatable.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ The Nitrokey app, while compatible with Librem Keys, requires `libnitrokey` version 3.6 or above to recognize them. Currently, the package is outdated on Windows, macOS, and most Linux distributions' repository, so you will likely have to compile the Nitrokey app yourself to get it working with the Librem Key. On Linux, you can obtain an up-to-date version from [Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.nitrokey.nitrokey-app).
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+#### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must use high quality, tamper resistant hardware security modules.
+- Must support the latest FIDO2 specification.
+- Must not allow private key extraction.
+- Devices which cost over $35 must support handling OpenPGP and S/MIME.
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should be available in USB-C form-factor.
+- Should be available with NFC.
+- Should support TOTP secret storage.
+- Should support secure firmware updates.
+
+## Authenticator Apps
+
+Authenticator Apps implement a security standard adopted by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) called **Time-based One-time Passwords**, or **TOTP**. This is a method where websites share a secret with you which is used by your authenticator app to generate a six (usually) digit code based on the current time, which you enter while logging in for the website to check. Typically these codes are regenerated every 30 seconds, and once a new code is generated the old one becomes useless. Even if a hacker gets one six-digit code, there is no way for them to reverse that code to get the original secret or otherwise be able to predict what any future codes might be.
+
+We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternatives as Android and iOS have better security and app isolation than most desktop operating systems.
+
+### Aegis Authenticator (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Aegis Authenticator** is a free, secure and open-source app to manage your 2-step verification tokens for your online services.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getaegis.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://getaegis.app/aegis/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.buymeacoffee.com/beemdevelopment){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.beemdevelopment.aegis)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis/releases)
+
+### Raivo OTP (iOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Raivo OTP** is a native, lightweight and secure time-based (TOTP) & counter-based (HOTP) password client for iOS. Raivo OTP offers optional iCloud backup & sync. Raivo OTP is also available for macOS in the form of a status bar application, however the Mac app does not work independently of the iOS app.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://raivo-otp.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://raivo-otp.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/raivo-otp/ios-application){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://raivo-otp.com/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/raivo-otp/id1459042137)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must not require internet connectivity.
+- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
+ - **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/news-aggregators.md b/i18n/eo/news-aggregators.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4c609d2e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/news-aggregators.md
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+---
+title: "News Aggregators"
+icon: material/rss
+---
+
+A [news aggregator](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/News_aggregator) is a way to keep up with your favourite blogs and news sites.
+
+## Aggregator clients
+
+### Akregator
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Akregator** is a news feed reader that is a part of the [KDE](https://kde.org) project. It comes with a fast search, advanced archiving functionality and an internal browser for easy news reading.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://apps.kde.org/akregator){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://kde.org/privacypolicy-apps){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.kde.org/?application=akregator){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://invent.kde.org/pim/akregator){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://kde.org/community/donations/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.kde.akregator)
+
+### Feeder
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Feeder** is a modern RSS client for Android that has many [features](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder#features) and works well with folders of RSS feeds. It supports [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS), [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)), [RDF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDF%2FXML) and [JSON Feed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Feed).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://ko-fi.com/spacecowboy){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nononsenseapps.feeder.play)
+
+### Fluent Reader
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Fluent Reader** is a secure cross-platform news aggregator that has useful privacy features such as deletion of cookies on exit, strict [content security policies (CSP)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy) and proxy support, meaning you can use it over [Tor](tor.md).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://hyliu.me/fluent-reader){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader/wiki/Privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader/wiki/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/yang991178){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://hyliu.me/fluent-reader)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1520907427)
+
+### GNOME Feeds
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GNOME Feeds** is an [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS) and [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)) news reader for [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org). It has a simple interface and is quite fast.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gfeeds.gabmus.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.gnome.org/World/gfeeds){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/gabmus/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://gfeeds.gabmus.org/#install)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.gabmus.gfeeds)
+
+### Miniflux
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Miniflux** is a web-based news aggregator that you can self-host. It supports [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS), [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)), [RDF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDF%2FXML) and [JSON Feed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Feed).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://miniflux.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://miniflux.app/docs/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/miniflux/v2){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://miniflux.app/#donations){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+### NetNewsWire
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **NetNewsWire** a free and open-source feed reader for macOS and iOS with a focus on a native design and feature set. It supports the typical feed formats alongside built-in support for Twitter and Reddit feeds.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://netnewswire.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://netnewswire.com/privacypolicy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://netnewswire.com/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Ranchero-Software/NetNewsWire){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/netnewswire-rss-reader/id1480640210)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://netnewswire.com)
+
+### Newsboat
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Newsboat** is an RSS/Atom feed reader for the text console. It's an actively maintained fork of [Newsbeuter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newsbeuter). It is very lightweight, and ideal for use over [Secure Shell](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Shell).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://newsboat.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://newsboat.org/releases/2.27/docs/newsboat.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/newsboat/newsboat){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must operate locally, i.e. must not be a cloud service.
+
+## Social Media RSS Support
+
+Some social media services also support RSS although it's not often advertised.
+
+### Reddit
+
+Reddit allows you to subscribe to subreddits via RSS.
+
+!!! example
+ Replace `subreddit_name` with the subreddit you wish to subscribe to.
+
+ ```text
+ https://www.reddit.com/r/{{ subreddit_name }}/new/.rss
+ ```
+
+### Twitter
+
+Using any of the Nitter [instances](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter/wiki/Instances) you can easily subscribe using RSS.
+
+!!! example
+ 1. Pick an instance and set `nitter_instance`.
+ 2. Replace `twitter_account` with the account name.
+
+ ```text
+ https://{{ nitter_instance }}/{{ twitter_account }}/rss
+ ```
+
+### YouTube
+
+You can subscribe YouTube channels without logging in and associating usage information with your Google Account.
+
+!!! example
+
+ To subscribe to a YouTube channel with an RSS client, first look for your [channel code](https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6180214), replace `[CHANNEL ID]` below:
+ ```text
+ https://www.youtube.com/feeds/videos.xml?channel_id=[CHANNEL ID]
+ ```
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/notebooks.md b/i18n/eo/notebooks.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7188f15e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/notebooks.md
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+---
+title: "Notebooks"
+icon: material/notebook-edit-outline
+---
+
+Keep track of your notes and journalings without giving them to a third-party.
+
+If you are currently using an application like Evernote, Google Keep, or Microsoft OneNote, we suggest you pick an alternative here that supports E2EE.
+
+## Cloud-based
+
+### Joplin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Joplin** is a free, open-source, and fully-featured note-taking and to-do application which can handle a large number of markdown notes organized into notebooks and tags. It offers E2EE and can sync through Nextcloud, Dropbox, and more. It also offers easy import from Evernote and plain-text notes.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://joplinapp.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://joplinapp.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://joplinapp.org/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://joplinapp.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.cozic.joplin)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/joplin/id1315599797)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/joplin-web-clipper/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/joplin-web-clipper/alofnhikmmkdbbbgpnglcpdollgjjfek)
+
+Joplin does not support password/PIN protection for the [application itself or individual notes and notebooks](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin/issues/289). However, your data is still encrypted in transit and at the sync location using your master key.
+
+### Standard Notes
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Standard Notes** is a simple and private notes app that makes your notes easy and available everywhere you are. It features E2EE on every platform, and a powerful desktop experience with themes and custom editors. It has also been [independently audited (PDF)](https://s3.amazonaws.com/standard-notes/security/Report-SN-Audit.pdf).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://standardnotes.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://standardnotes.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://standardnotes.com/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/standardnotes){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://standardnotes.com/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.standardnotes)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1285392450)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/standardnotes/app/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://standardnotes.com)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://standardnotes.com)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://standardnotes.com)
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://app.standardnotes.com/)
+
+### Cryptee
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Cryptee** is an open-source, web-based E2EE document editor and photo storage application. Cryptee is a PWA, which means that it works seamlessly across all modern devices without requiring native apps for each respective platform.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://crypt.ee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://crypt.ee/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://crypt.ee/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/cryptee){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: PWA](https://crypt.ee/download)
+
+Cryptee offers 100MB of storage for free, with paid options if you need more. Sign-up doesn't require an e-mail or other personally identifiable information.
+
+## Local notebooks
+
+### Org-mode
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Org-mode** is a [major mode](https://www.gnu.org/software/emacs/manual/html_node/elisp/Major-Modes.html) for GNU Emacs. Org-mode is for keeping notes, maintaining TODO lists, planning projects, and authoring documents with a fast and effective plain-text system. Synchronization is possible with [file synchronization](file-sharing.md#file-sync) tools.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orgmode.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://orgmode.org/manuals.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/emacs/org-mode.git){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/bzg){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Clients must be open-source.
+- Any cloud sync functionality must be E2EE.
+- Must support exporting documents into a standard format.
+
+### Best Case
+
+- Local backup/sync functionality should support encryption.
+- Cloud-based platforms should support document sharing.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/eo/os/android-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a7eb6b064
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/os/android-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+---
+title: Android Overview
+icon: simple/android
+---
+
+Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system.
+
+## Choosing an Android Distribution
+
+When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has irrevocable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android.
+
+This problem could be solved by using a custom Android distribution that does not come with such invasive integration. Unfortunately, many custom Android distributions often violate the Android security model by not supporting critical security features such as AVB, rollback protection, firmware updates, and so on. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require [more permissive](https://github.com/LineageOS/android_system_sepolicy/search?q=userdebug&type=code) SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
+
+Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that it upholds the Android security model. At the very least, the distribution should have production builds, support for AVB, rollback protection, timely firmware and operating system updates, and SELinux in [enforcing mode](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts#enforcement_levels). All of our recommended Android distributions satisfy these criteria.
+
+[Our Android System Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Avoid Rooting
+
+[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
+
+Adblockers, which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For Adblocking we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or [VPN](../vpn.md) server blocking solutions instead. RethinkDNS, TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN) preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as Orbot or a real VPN server.
+
+AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
+
+We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps.
+
+## Verified Boot
+
+[Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection).
+
+Android 10 and above has moved away from full-disk encryption to more flexible [file-based encryption](https://source.android.com/security/encryption/file-based). Your data is encrypted using unique encryption keys, and the operating system files are left unencrypted.
+
+Verified Boot ensures the integrity of the operating system files, thereby preventing an adversary with physical access from tampering or installing malware on the device. In the unlikely case that malware is able to exploit other parts of the system and gain higher privileged access, Verified Boot will prevent and revert changes to the system partition upon rebooting the device.
+
+Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock Android distribution. Only a few OEMs such as Google support custom AVB key enrollment on their devices. Additionally, some AOSP derivatives such as LineageOS or /e/ OS do not support Verified Boot even on hardware with Verified Boot support for third-party operating systems. We recommend that you check for support **before** purchasing a new device. AOSP derivatives which do not support Verified Boot are **not** recommended.
+
+Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be aware of beyond their marketing. For example, the Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage.
+
+## Firmware Updates
+
+Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin).
+
+As the components of the phone, such as the processor and radio technologies rely on closed-source components, the updates must be provided by the respective manufacturers. Therefore, it is important that you purchase a device within an active support cycle. [Qualcomm](https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2020/12/16/qualcomm-and-google-announce-collaboration-extend-android-os-support-and) and [Samsung](https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-security-extending-updates-knox/) support their devices for 4 years, while cheaper products often have shorter support cycles. With the introduction of the [Pixel 6](https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/4457705), Google now makes their own SoC and they will provide a minimum of 5 years of support.
+
+EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive firmware updates from OEM vendors or after market Android distributors. This means that security issues with those devices will remain unfixed.
+
+Fairphone, for example, markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates.
+
+## Android Versions
+
+It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution.
+
+## Android Permissions
+
+[Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps. A smartphone with the latest version of Android will always be more secure than an old smartphone with an antivirus that you have paid for. It's better not to pay for antivirus software and to save money to buy a new smartphone such as a Google Pixel.
+
+Should you want to run an app that you're unsure about, consider using a user or work profile.
+
+## Media Access
+
+Quite a few applications allows you to "share" a file with them for media upload. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter.
+
+## User Profiles
+
+Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android.
+
+With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation.
+
+## Work Profile
+
+[Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles.
+
+A **device controller** app such as [Shelter](#recommended-apps) is required to create a Work Profile without an enterprise MDM, unless you're using a custom Android OS which includes one.
+
+The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such as *File Shuttle* and *contact search blocking* or any kind of isolation features must be implemented by the controller. You must also fully trust the device controller app, as it has full access to your data inside of the work profile.
+
+This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously.
+
+## VPN Killswitch
+
+Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+## Global Toggles
+
+Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled.
+
+## Google
+
+If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play.
+
+### Advanced Protection Program
+
+If you have a Google account we suggest enrolling in the [Advanced Protection Program](https://landing.google.com/advancedprotection/). It is available at no cost to anyone with two or more hardware security keys with [FIDO](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) support.
+
+The Advanced Protection Program provides enhanced threat monitoring and enables:
+
+- Stricter two factor authentication; e.g. that [FIDO](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) **must** be used and disallows the use of [SMS OTPs](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#sms-or-email-mfa), [TOTP](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp) and [OAuth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth)
+- Only Google and verified third-party apps can access account data
+- Scanning of incoming emails on Gmail accounts for [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing#Email_phishing) attempts
+- Stricter [safe browser scanning](https://www.google.com/chrome/privacy/whitepaper.html#malware) with Google Chrome
+- Stricter recovery process for accounts with lost credentials
+
+ If you use non-sandboxed Google Play Services (common on stock operating systems), the Advanced Protection Program also comes with [additional benefits](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/9764949?hl=en) such as:
+
+- Not allowing app installation outside of the Google Play Store, the OS vendor's app store, or via [`adb`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_Debug_Bridge)
+- Mandatory automatic device scanning with [Play Protect](https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/2812853?hl=en#zippy=%2Chow-malware-protection-works%2Chow-privacy-alerts-work)
+- Warning you about unverified applications
+
+### Google Play System Updates
+
+In the past, Android security updates had to be shipped by the operating system vendor. Android has become more modular beginning with Android 10, and Google can push security updates for **some** system components via the privileged Play Services.
+
+If you have an EOL device shipped with Android 10 or above and are unable to run any of our recommended operating systems on your device, you are likely going to be better off sticking with your OEM Android installation (as opposed to an operating system not listed here such as LineageOS or /e/ OS). This will allow you to receive **some** security fixes from Google, while not violating the Android security model by using an insecure Android derivative and increasing your attack surface. We would still recommend upgrading to a supported device as soon as possible.
+
+### Advertising ID
+
+All devices with Google Play Services installed automatically generate an [advertising ID](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/6048248?hl=en) used for targeted advertising. Disable this feature to limit the data collected about you.
+
+On Android distributions with [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), go to :gear: **Settings** → **Apps** → **Sandboxed Google Play** → **Google Settings** → **Ads**, and select *Delete advertising ID*.
+
+On Android distributions with privileged Google Play Services (such as stock OSes), the setting may be in one of several locations. Check
+
+- :gear: **Settings** → **Google** → **Ads**
+- :gear: **Settings** → **Privacy** → **Ads**
+
+You will either be given the option to delete your advertising ID or to *Opt out of interest-based ads*, this varies between OEM distributions of Android. If presented with the option to delete the advertising ID that is preferred. If not, then make sure to opt out and reset your advertising ID.
+
+### SafetyNet and Play Integrity API
+
+[SafetyNet](https://developer.android.com/training/safetynet/attestation) and the [Play Integrity APIs](https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity) are generally used for [banking apps](https://grapheneos.org/usage#banking-apps). Many banking apps will work fine in GrapheneOS with sandboxed Play services, however some non-financial apps have their own crude anti-tampering mechanisms which might fail. GrapheneOS passes the `basicIntegrity` check, but not the certification check `ctsProfileMatch`. Devices with Android 8 or later have hardware attestation support which cannot be bypassed without leaked keys or serious vulnerabilities.
+
+As for Google Wallet, we don't recommend this due to their [privacy policy](https://payments.google.com/payments/apis-secure/get_legal_document?ldo=0&ldt=privacynotice&ldl=en), which states you must opt-out if you don't want your credit rating and personal information shared with affiliate marketing services.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/eo/os/linux-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0ba653e0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/os/linux-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+---
+title: Linux Overview
+icon: simple/linux
+---
+
+It is often believed that [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigour applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years.
+
+At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.:
+
+- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack)
+- A strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go
+- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations)
+
+Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are great if you want to:
+
+- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems
+- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms)
+- Have privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/)
+
+Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed here.
+
+[Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Choosing your distribution
+
+Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use.
+
+### Release cycle
+
+We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates.
+
+For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release.
+
+We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this:
+
+
+
+
+
+### Traditional vs Atomic updates
+
+Traditionally, Linux distributions update by sequentially updating the desired packages. Traditional updates such as those used in Fedora, Arch Linux, and Debian based distributions can be less reliable if an error occurs while updating.
+
+Atomic updating distributions apply updates in full or not at all. Typically, transactional update systems are also atomic.
+
+A transactional update system creates a snapshot that is made before and after an update is applied. If an update fails at any time (perhaps due to a power failure), the update can be easily rolled back to a “last known good state."
+
+The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tumbleweed, and NixOS and can achieve reliability with this model. [Adam Šamalík](https://twitter.com/adsamalik) provided a presentation on how `rpm-ostree` works with Silverblue:
+
+
+
+
+
+### “Security-focused” distributions
+
+There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use.
+
+### Arch-based distributions
+
+Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own.
+
+For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit).
+
+Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora.
+
+If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically:
+
+- **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories.
+- **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks.
+
+### Kicksecure
+
+While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default.
+
+### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions
+
+We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons.
+
+## General Recommendations
+
+### Drive Encryption
+
+Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS](../encryption.md#linux-unified-key-setup) FDE. If this option isn’t set at installation time, you will have to backup your data and re-install, as encryption is applied after [disk partitioning](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_partitioning), but before [file systems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_system) are formatted. We also suggest securely erasing your storage device:
+
+- [Secure Data Erasure :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/05/25/secure-data-erasure/)
+
+### Swap
+
+Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Swap#zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM).
+
+### Wayland
+
+We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland.
+
+Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)).
+
+We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do not have Wayland support, such as Cinnamon (default on Linux Mint), Pantheon (default on Elementary OS), MATE, Xfce, and i3.
+
+### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates)
+
+Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html).
+
+We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default.
+
+### Updates
+
+Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found.
+
+Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates.
+
+Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd).
+
+## Privacy Tweaks
+
+### MAC Address Randomization
+
+Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings.
+
+It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous.
+
+We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as suggested in the [article](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/).
+
+If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=).
+
+There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware.
+
+### Other Identifiers
+
+There are other system identifiers which you may wish to be careful about. You should give this some thought to see if it applies to your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md):
+
+- **Hostnames:** Your system's hostname is shared with the networks you connect to. You should avoid including identifying terms like your name or operating system in your hostname, instead sticking to generic terms or random strings.
+- **Usernames:** Similarly, your username is used in a variety of ways across your system. Consider using generic terms like "user" rather than your actual name.
+- **Machine ID:**: During installation a unique machine ID is generated and stored on your device. Consider [setting it to a generic ID](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#machine-id).
+
+### System Counting
+
+The Fedora Project [counts](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting) how many unique systems access its mirrors by using a [`countme`](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting#Detailed_Description) variable instead of a unique ID. Fedora does this to determine load and provision better servers for updates where necessary.
+
+This [option](https://dnf.readthedocs.io/en/latest/conf_ref.html#options-for-both-main-and-repo) is currently off by default. We recommend adding `countme=false` to `/etc/dnf/dnf.conf` just in case it is enabled in the future. On systems that use `rpm-ostree` such as Silverblue, the countme option is disabled by masking the [rpm-ostree-countme](https://fedoramagazine.org/getting-better-at-counting-rpm-ostree-based-systems/) timer.
+
+openSUSE also uses a [unique ID](https://en.opensuse.org/openSUSE:Statistics) to count systems, which can be disabled by deleting the `/var/lib/zypp/AnonymousUniqueId` file.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/eo/os/qubes-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e706713d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/os/qubes-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+---
+title: "Qubes Overview"
+icon: simple/qubesos
+---
+
+[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/).
+
+## How does Qubes OS work?
+
+Qubes uses [compartmentalization](https://www.qubes-os.org/intro/) to keep the system secure. Qubes are created from templates, the defaults being for Fedora, Debian and [Whonix](../desktop.md#whonix). Qubes OS also allows you to create once-use [disposable](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-use-disposables/) virtual machines.
+
+
+Qubes Architecture, Credit: What is Qubes OS Intro
+
+Each Qubes application has a [colored border](https://www.qubes-os.org/screenshots/) that can help you keep track of the virtual machine it is running in. You could, for example, use a specific color for your banking browser, while using a different color for a general untrusted browser.
+
+
+Qubes window borders, Credit: Qubes Screenshots
+
+## Why Should I use Qubes?
+
+Qubes OS is useful if your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md) requires strong compartmentalization and security, such as if you think you'll be opening untrusted files from untrusted sources. A typical reason for using Qubes OS is to open documents from unknown sources.
+
+Qubes OS utilizes [Dom0](https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Dom0) Xen VM (i.e., an "AdminVM") for controlling other guest VMs or Qubes on the host OS. Other VMs display individual application windows within Dom0's desktop environment. It allows you to color code windows based on trust levels and run apps that can interact with each other with very granular control.
+
+### Copying and Pasting Text
+
+You can [copy and paste text](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-and-paste-text/) using `qvm-copy-to-vm` or the below instructions:
+
+1. Press **Ctrl+C** to tell the VM you're in that you want to copy something.
+2. Press **Ctrl+Shift+C** to tell the VM to make this buffer available to the global clipboard.
+3. Press **Ctrl+Shift+V** in the destination VM to make the global clipboard available.
+4. Press **Ctrl+V** in the destination VM to paste the contents in the buffer.
+
+### File Exchange
+
+To copy and paste files and directories (folders) from one VM to another, you can use the option **Copy to Other AppVM...** or **Move to Other AppVM...**. The difference is that the **Move** option will delete the original file. Either option will protect your clipboard from being leaked to any other Qubes. This is more secure than air-gapped file transfer because an air-gapped computer will still be forced to parse partitions or file systems. That is not required with the inter-qube copy system.
+
+??? info "AppVMs or qubes do not have their own file systems"
+
+ You can [copy and move files](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-and-move-files/) between Qubes. When doing so the changes aren't immediately made and can be easily undone in case of an accident.
+
+### Inter-VM Interactions
+
+The [qrexec framework](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec/) is a core part of Qubes which allows virtual machine communication between domains. It is built on top of the Xen library *vchan*, which facilitates [isolation through policies](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2020/06/22/new-qrexec-policy-system/).
+
+## Additional Resources
+
+For additional information we encourage you to consult the extensive Qubes OS documentation pages located on the [Qubes OS Website](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/). Offline copies can be downloaded from the Qubes OS [documentation repository](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-doc).
+
+- Open Technology Fund: [*Arguably the world's most secure operating system*](https://www.opentech.fund/news/qubes-os-arguably-the-worlds-most-secure-operating-system-motherboard/)
+- J. Rutkowska: [*Software compartmentalization vs. physical separation*](https://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/2014/Software_compartmentalization_vs_physical_separation.pdf)
+- J. Rutkowska: [*Partitioning my digital life into security domains*](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/03/13/partitioning-my-digital-life-into.html)
+- Qubes OS: [*Related Articles*](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/categories/#articles)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/passwords.md b/i18n/eo/passwords.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9b09e8487
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/passwords.md
@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+---
+title: "Password Managers"
+icon: material/form-textbox-password
+---
+
+Password managers allow you to securely store and manage passwords and other credentials with the use of a master password.
+
+[Introduction to Passwords :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](./basics/passwords-overview.md)
+
+!!! info
+
+ Built-in password managers in software like browsers and operating systems are sometimes not as good as dedicated password manager software. The advantage of a built-in password manager is good integration with the software, but it can often be very simple and lack privacy and security features standalone offerings have.
+
+ For example, the password manager in Microsoft Edge doesn't offer E2EE at all. Google's password manager has [optional](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/11350823) E2EE, and [Apple's](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303) offers E2EE by default.
+
+## Cloud-based
+
+These password managers sync your passwords to a cloud server for easy accessibility from all your devices and safety against device loss.
+
+### Bitwarden
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Bitwarden** is a free and open-source password manager. It aims to solve password management problems for individuals, teams, and business organizations. Bitwarden is among the best and safest solutions to store all of your logins and passwords while conveniently keeping them synced between all of your devices.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://bitwarden.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://bitwarden.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://bitwarden.com/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/bitwarden){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.x8bit.bitwarden)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/bitwarden-password-manager/id1137397744)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/bitwarden/mobile/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://bitwarden.com/download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://bitwarden.com/download)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.bitwarden.desktop)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/bitwarden-password-manager)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/bitwarden-free-password-m/nngceckbapebfimnlniiiahkandclblb)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/jbkfoedolllekgbhcbcoahefnbanhhlh)
+
+Bitwarden also features [Bitwarden Send](https://bitwarden.com/products/send/), which allows you to share text and files securely with [end-to-end encryption](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-encryption). A [password](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-privacy/#send-passwords) can be required along with the send link. Bitwarden Send also features [automatic deletion](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-lifespan).
+
+You need the [Premium Plan](https://bitwarden.com/help/about-bitwarden-plans/#compare-personal-plans) to be able to share files. The free plan only allows text sharing.
+
+Bitwarden's server-side code is [open-source](https://github.com/bitwarden/server), so if you don't want to use the Bitwarden cloud, you can easily host your own Bitwarden sync server.
+
+**Vaultwarden** is an alternative implementation of Bitwarden's sync server written in Rust and compatible with official Bitwarden clients, perfect for self-hosted deployment where running the official resource-heavy service might not be ideal. If you are looking to self-host Bitwarden on your own server, you almost certainly want to use Vaultwarden over Bitwarden's official server code.
+
+[:octicons-repo-16: Vaultwarden Repository](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden ""){.md-button} [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/dani-garcia){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+### 1Password
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **1Password** is a password manager with a strong focus on security and ease-of-use, which allows you to store passwords, credit cards, software licenses, and any other sensitive information in a secure digital vault. Your vault is hosted on 1Password's servers for a [monthly fee](https://1password.com/sign-up/). 1Password is [audited](https://support.1password.com/security-assessments/) on a regular basis and provides exceptional customer support. 1Password is closed source; however, the security of the product is thoroughly documented in their [security white paper](https://1passwordstatic.com/files/security/1password-white-paper.pdf).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://1password.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://support.1password.com/1password-privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.1password.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.onepassword.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1511601750?mt=8)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://1password.com/downloads/windows/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://1password.com/downloads/mac/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://1password.com/downloads/linux/)
+
+Traditionally, **1Password** has offered the best password manager user experience for people using macOS and iOS; however, it has now achieved feature-parity across all platforms. It boasts many features geared towards families and less technical people, as well as advanced functionality.
+
+Your 1Password vault is secured with both your master password and a randomized 34-character security key to encrypt your data on their servers. This security key adds a layer of protection to your data because your data is secured with high entropy regardless of your master password. Many other password manager solutions are entirely reliant on the strength of your master password to secure your data.
+
+One advantage 1Password has over Bitwarden is its first-class support for native clients. While Bitwarden relegates many duties, especially account management features, to their web vault interface, 1Password makes nearly every feature available within its native mobile or desktop clients. 1Password's clients also have a more intuitive UI, which makes them easier to use and navigate.
+
+### Psono
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Psono** is a free and open-source password manager from Germany, with a focus on password management for teams. Psono supports secure sharing of passwords, files, bookmarks, and emails. All secrets are protected by a master password.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://psono.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://psono.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://doc.psono.com){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/psono){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.psono.psono)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/psono-password-manager/id1545581224)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/psono-pw-password-manager)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/psonopw-password-manager/eljmjmgjkbmpmfljlmklcfineebidmlo)
+ - [:simple-docker: Docker Hub](https://hub.docker.com/r/psono/psono-client)
+
+Psono provides extensive documentation for their product. The web-client for Psono can be self-hosted; alternatively, you can choose the full Community Edition or the Enterprise Edition with additional features.
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+#### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must utilize strong, standards-based/modern E2EE.
+- Must have thoroughly documented encryption and security practices.
+- Must have a published audit from a reputable, independent third-party.
+- All non-essential telemetry must be optional.
+- Must not collect more PII than is necessary for billing purposes.
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Telemetry should be opt-in (disabled by default) or not collected at all.
+- Should be open-source and reasonably self-hostable.
+
+## Local Storage
+
+These options allow you to manage an encrypted password database locally.
+
+### KeePassXC
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **KeePassXC** is a community fork of KeePassX, a native cross-platform port of KeePass Password Safe, with the goal to extend and improve it with new features and bugfixes to provide a feature-rich, cross-platform and modern open-source password manager.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://keepassxc.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://keepassxc.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://keepassxc.org/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://keepassxc.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://keepassxc.org/download/#windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://keepassxc.org/download/#mac)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://keepassxc.org/download/#linux)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flatpak](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.keepassxc.KeePassXC)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/keepassxc-browser)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/keepassxc-browser/oboonakemofpalcgghocfoadofidjkkk)
+
+KeePassXC stores its export data as [CSV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comma-separated_values) files. This may mean data loss if you import this file into another password manager. We advise you check each record manually.
+
+### KeePassDX (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **KeePassDX** is a lightweight password manager for Android, allows editing encrypted data in a single file in KeePass format and can fill in the forms in a secure way. [Contributor Pro](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kunzisoft.keepass.pro) allows unlocking cosmetic content and non-standard protocol features, but more importantly, it helps and encourages development.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.keepassdx.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.keepassdx.com/#donation){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kunzisoft.keepass.free)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX/releases)
+
+### Strongbox (iOS & macOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Strongbox** is a native, open-source password manager for iOS and macOS. Supporting both KeePass and Password Safe formats, Strongbox can be used in tandem with other password managers, like KeePassXC, on non-Apple platforms. By employing a [freemium model](https://strongboxsafe.com/pricing/), Strongbox offers most features under its free tier with more convenience-oriented [features](https://strongboxsafe.com/comparison/)—such as biometric authentication—locked behind a subscription or perpetual license.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://strongboxsafe.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://strongboxsafe.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://strongboxsafe.com/getting-started/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/strongbox-password-safe/Strongbox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/strongbox-password-safe/Strongbox#supporting-development){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/strongbox-keepass-pwsafe/id897283731)
+
+Additionally, there is an offline-only version offered: [Strongbox Zero](https://apps.apple.com/app/strongbox-keepass-pwsafe/id1581589638). This version is stripped down in an attempt to reduce attack surface.
+
+### Command-line
+
+These products are minimal password managers that can be used within scripting applications.
+
+#### gopass
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **gopass** is a password manager for the command line written in Go. It works on all major desktop and server operating systems (Linux, macOS, BSD, Windows).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.gopass.pw){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/gopasspw/gopass/tree/master/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/gopasspw/gopass){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/dominikschulz){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-macos)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-linux)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-bsd)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be cross-platform.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/productivity.md b/i18n/eo/productivity.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cb5d4e323
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/productivity.md
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+---
+title: "Productivity Tools"
+icon: material/file-sign
+---
+
+Most online office suites do not support E2EE, meaning the cloud provider has access to everything you do. The privacy policy may legally protect your rights, but it does not provide technical access constraints.
+
+## Collaboration Platforms
+
+### Nextcloud
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nextcloud** is a suite of free and open-source client-server software for creating your own file hosting services on a private server you control.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://nextcloud.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://nextcloud.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://nextcloud.com/support/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/nextcloud){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nextcloud.com/contribute/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nextcloud.client)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1125420102)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/nextcloud/android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/www/nextcloud)
+
+!!! danger
+
+ We don't recommend using the [E2EE App](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/end_to_end_encryption) for Nextcloud as it may lead to data loss; it is highly experimental and not production quality. For this reason, we don't recommend third-party Nextcloud providers.
+
+### CryptPad
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **CryptPad** is a private-by-design alternative to popular office tools. All content on this web service is end-to-end encrypted and can be shared with other users easily.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://cryptpad.fr){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://cryptpad.fr/pad/#/2/pad/view/GcNjAWmK6YDB3EO2IipRZ0fUe89j43Ryqeb4fjkjehE/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.cryptpad.fr/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/xwiki-labs/cryptpad){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/cryptpad){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+In general, we define collaboration platforms as full-fledged suites which could reasonably act as a replacement to collaboration platforms like Google Drive.
+
+- Open-source.
+- Makes files accessible via WebDAV unless it is impossible due to E2EE.
+- Has sync clients for Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- Supports document and spreadsheet editing.
+- Supports real-time document collaboration.
+- Supports exporting documents to standard document formats (e.g. ODF).
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should store files in a conventional filesystem.
+- Should support TOTP or FIDO2 multi-factor authentication support, or Passkey logins.
+
+## Office Suites
+
+### LibreOffice
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **LibreOffice** is a free and open-source office suite with extensive functionality.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.libreoffice.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.libreoffice.org/about-us/privacy/privacy-policy-en/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://documentation.libreoffice.org/en/english-documentation/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://www.libreoffice.org/about-us/source-code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.libreoffice.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/android-and-ios/)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/android-and-ios/)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/download/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/download/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/download/)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.libreoffice.LibreOffice)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/editors/libreoffice/)
+
+### OnlyOffice
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OnlyOffice** is a cloud-based free and open-source office suite with extensive functionality, including integration with Nextcloud.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.onlyoffice.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://help.onlyoffice.com/products/files/doceditor.aspx?fileid=5048502&doc=SXhWMEVzSEYxNlVVaXJJeUVtS0kyYk14YWdXTEFUQmRWL250NllHNUFGbz0_IjUwNDg1MDIi0){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://helpcenter.onlyoffice.com/userguides.aspx){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ONLYOFFICE){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.onlyoffice.documents)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id944896972)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.onlyoffice.com/download-desktop.aspx)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.onlyoffice.com/download-desktop.aspx)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.onlyoffice.com/download-desktop.aspx)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.onlyoffice.desktopeditors)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/www/onlyoffice-documentserver/)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+In general, we define office suites as applications which could reasonably act as a replacement for Microsoft Word for most needs.
+
+- Must be cross-platform.
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must function offline.
+- Must support editing documents, spreadsheets, and slideshows.
+- Must export files to standard document formats.
+
+## Paste services
+
+### PrivateBin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **PrivateBin** is a minimalist, open-source online pastebin where the server has zero knowledge of pasted data. Data is encrypted/decrypted in the browser using 256-bit AES. It is the improved version of ZeroBin. There is a [list of instances](https://privatebin.info/directory/).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://privatebin.info){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://privatebin.info/directory/){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/wiki/FAQ){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/eo/real-time-communication.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f2bcd2fcb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/real-time-communication.md
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+---
+title: "Real-Time Communication"
+icon: material/chat-processing
+---
+
+These are our recommendations for encrypted real-time communication.
+
+[Types of Communication Networks :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](./advanced/communication-network-types.md)
+
+## Encrypted Messengers
+
+These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
+
+### Signal
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
+
+ All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/signalapp){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://signal.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.thoughtcrime.securesms)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id874139669)
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://signal.org/android/apk/)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://signal.org/download/windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://signal.org/download/macos)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://signal.org/download/linux)
+
+Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). The server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
+
+The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
+
+We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation:
+
+[Signal Configuration and Hardening :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening/)
+
+### SimpleX Chat
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **SimpleX** Chat is an instant messenger that is decentralized and doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Users of SimpleX Chat can scan a QR code or click an invite link to participate in group conversations.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://simplex.chat){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/blob/stable/PRIVACY.md){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/tree/stable/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=chat.simplex.app)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/simplex-chat/id1605771084)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/releases)
+
+SimpleX Chat [was audited](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website.html) by Trail of Bits in October 2022.
+
+Currently SimpleX Chat only provides a client for Android and iOS. Basic group chatting functionality, direct messaging, editing of messages and markdown are supported. E2EE Audio and Video calls are also supported.
+
+Your data can be exported, and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up.
+
+### Briar
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works/) to other clients using the Tor Network. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org/){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.briarproject.briar.android)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://briarproject.org/download-briar-desktop/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://briarproject.org/download-briar-desktop/)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.briarproject.Briar)
+
+To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby.
+
+The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit/), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited.
+
+Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
+
+Briar supports perfect forward secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
+
+## Additional Options
+
+!!! warning
+
+ These messengers do not have Perfect [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) (PFS), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
+
+### Element
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Element** is the reference client for the [Matrix](https://matrix.org/docs/guides/introduction) protocol, an [open standard](https://matrix.org/docs/spec) for secure decentralized real-time communication.
+
+ Messages and files shared in private rooms (those which require an invite) are by default E2EE as are one to one voice and video calls.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://element.io/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://element.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://element.io/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/vector-im){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=im.vector.app)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/vector/id1083446067)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/vector-im/element-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://element.io/get-started)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://element.io/get-started)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://element.io/get-started)
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://app.element.io)
+
+Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
+
+Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
+
+The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
+
+The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm](https://matrix.org/docs/projects/other/olm) cryptographic ratchet used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
+
+### Session
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Session** is a decentralized messenger with a focus on private, secure, and anonymous communications. Session offers support for direct messages, group chats, and voice calls.
+
+ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to store and route messages. Every encrypted message is routed through three nodes in the Oxen Service Node Network, making it virtually impossible for the nodes to compile meaningful information on those using the network.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getsession.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://getsession.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://getsession.org/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/oxen-io){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=network.loki.messenger)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1470168868)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/oxen-io/session-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://getsession.org/download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://getsession.org/download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://getsession.org/download)
+
+Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
+
+Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
+
+Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
+
+Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must have open-source clients.
+- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
+- Must support E2EE for all messages.
+- Must have been independently audited.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should have Perfect Forward Secrecy.
+- Should have open-source servers.
+- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
+- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
+- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/router.md b/i18n/eo/router.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..600269394
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/router.md
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+---
+title: "Router Firmware"
+icon: material/router-wireless
+---
+
+Below are a few alternative operating systems, that can be used on routers, Wi-Fi access points, etc.
+
+## OpenWrt
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OpenWrt** is a Linux-based operating system; it's primarily used on embedded devices to route network traffic. It includes util-linux, uClibc, and BusyBox. All of the components have been optimized for home routers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://openwrt.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://openwrt.org/docs/start){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://openwrt.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+You can consult OpenWrt's [table of hardware](https://openwrt.org/toh/start) to check if your device is supported.
+
+## OPNsense
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OPNsense** is an open source, FreeBSD-based firewall and routing platform which incorporates many advanced features such as traffic shaping, load balancing, and VPN capabilities, with many more features available in the form of plugins. OPNsense is commonly deployed as a perimeter firewall, router, wireless access point, DHCP server, DNS server, and VPN endpoint.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://opnsense.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.opnsense.org/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/opnsense){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opnsense.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+OPNsense was originally developed as a fork of [pfSense](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PfSense), and both projects are noted for being free and reliable firewall distributions which offer features often only found in expensive commercial firewalls. Launched in 2015, the developers of OPNsense [cited](https://docs.opnsense.org/history/thefork.html) a number of security and code-quality issues with pfSense which they felt necessitated a fork of the project, as well as concerns about Netgate's majority acquisition of pfSense and the future direction of the pfSense project.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be open source.
+- Must receive regular updates.
+- Must support a wide variety of hardware.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/search-engines.md b/i18n/eo/search-engines.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8a0ed19af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/search-engines.md
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+---
+title: "Search Engines"
+icon: material/search-web
+---
+
+Use a search engine that doesn't build an advertising profile based on your searches.
+
+The recommendations here are based on the merits of each service's privacy policy. There is **no guarantee** that these privacy policies are honored.
+
+Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) if your threat model requires hiding your IP address from the search provider.
+
+## Brave Search
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Brave Search** is developed by Brave and serves results primarily from its own, independent index. The index is optimized against Google Search and therefore may provide more contextually accurate results compared to other alternatives.
+
+ Brave Search includes unique features such as Discussions, which highlights conversation-focused results—such as forum posts.
+
+ We recommend you disable [Anonymous usage metrics](https://search.brave.com/help/usage-metrics) as it is enabled by default and can be disabled within settings.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://search.brave.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://search.brave4u7jddbv7cyviptqjc7jusxh72uik7zt6adtckl5f4nwy2v72qd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://search.brave.com/help/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://search.brave.com/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+Brave Search is based in the United States. Their [privacy policy](https://search.brave.com/help/privacy-policy) states they collect aggregated usage metrics, which includes the operating system and browser in use, however no personally identifiable information is collected. IP addresses are temporarily processed, but are not retained.
+
+## DuckDuckGo
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **DuckDuckGo** is one of the more mainstream private search engine options. Notable DuckDuckGo search features include [bangs](https://duckduckgo.com/bang) and many [instant answers](https://help.duckduckgo.com/duckduckgo-help-pages/features/instant-answers-and-other-features/). The search engine relies on a commercial Bing API to serve most results, but it does use numerous [other sources](https://help.duckduckgo.com/results/sources/) for instant answers and other non-primary results.
+
+ DuckDuckGo is the default search engine for the Tor Browser and is one of the few available options on Apple’s Safari browser.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://duckduckgo.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://duckduckgo.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://help.duckduckgo.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+DuckDuckGo is based in the United States. Their [privacy policy](https://duckduckgo.com/privacy) states they **do** log your searches for product improvement purposes, but not your IP address or any other personally identifying information.
+
+DuckDuckGo offers two [other versions](https://help.duckduckgo.com/features/non-javascript/) of their search engine, both of which do not require JavaScript. These versions do lack features, however. These versions can also be used in conjunction with their [Tor onion address](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/) by appending [/lite](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/lite) or [/html](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/html) for the respective version.
+
+## SearXNG
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **SearXNG** is an open-source, self-hostable, metasearch engine, aggregating the results of other search engines while not storing any information itself. It is an actively maintained fork of [SearX](https://github.com/searx/searx).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://searxng.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://searx.space/){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/searxng/searxng){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+SearXNG is a proxy between you and the search engines it aggregates from. Your search queries will still be sent to the search engines that SearXNG gets its results from.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance so that the queries would blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting SearXNG, as people looking up illegal content on your instance could draw unwanted attention from authorities.
+
+When you are using a SearXNG instance, be sure to go read their privacy policy. Since SearXNG instances may be modified by their owners, they do not necessarily reflect their privacy policy. Some instances run as a Tor hidden service, which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries does not contain PII.
+
+## Startpage
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Startpage** is a private search engine known for serving Google search results. One of Startpage's unique features is the [Anonymous View](https://www.startpage.com/en/anonymous-view/), which puts forth efforts to standardize user activity to make it more difficult to be uniquely identified. The feature can be useful for hiding [some](https://support.startpage.com/hc/en-us/articles/4455540212116-The-Anonymous-View-Proxy-technical-details) network and browser properties. Unlike the name suggests, the feature should not be relied upon for anonymity. If you are looking for anonymity, use the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) instead.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.startpage.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.startpage.com/en/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.startpage.com/hc/en-us/categories/4481917470356-Startpage-Search-Engine){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Startpage regularly limits service access to certain IP addresses, such as IPs reserved for VPNs or Tor. [DuckDuckGo](#duckduckgo) and [Brave Search](#brave-search) are friendlier options if your threat model requires hiding your IP address from the search provider.
+
+Startpage is based in the Netherlands. According to their [privacy policy](https://www.startpage.com/en/privacy-policy/), they log details such as: operating system, type of browser, and language. They do not log your IP address, search queries, or other personally identifying information.
+
+Startpage's majority shareholder is System1 who is an adtech company. We don't believe that to be an issue as they have a distinctly separate [privacy policy](https://system1.com/terms/privacy-policy). The Privacy Guides team reached out to Startpage [back in 2020](https://web.archive.org/web/20210118031008/https://blog.privacytools.io/relisting-startpage/) to clear up any concerns with System1's sizeable investment into the service. We were satisfied with the answers we received.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must not collect personally identifiable information per their privacy policy.
+- Must not allow users to create an account with them.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should be based on open-source software.
+- Should not block Tor exit node IP addresses.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/tools.md b/i18n/eo/tools.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d523143ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/tools.md
@@ -0,0 +1,443 @@
+---
+title: "Privacy Tools"
+icon: material/tools
+hide:
+ - toc
+---
+
+If you're looking for a specific solution to something, these are the hardware and software tools we recommend in a variety of categories. Our recommended privacy tools are primarily chosen based on security features, with additional emphasis on decentralized and open-source tools. They are applicable to a variety of threat models ranging from protection against global mass surveillance programs and avoiding big tech companies to mitigating attacks, but only you can determine what will work best for your needs.
+
+If you want assistance figuring out the best privacy tools and alternative programs for your needs, start a discussion on our [forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/) or our [Matrix](https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org) community!
+
+For more details about each project, why they were chosen, and additional tips or tricks we recommend, click the "Learn more" link in each section, or click on the recommendation itself to be taken to that specific section of the page.
+
+## Tor Network
+
+
+
+1. Snowflake does not increase privacy, however it allows you to easily contribute to the Tor network and help people in censored networks achieve better privacy.
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md)
+
+## Desktop Web Browsers
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](cloud.md)
+
+### DNS
+
+#### DNS Providers
+
+We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers based on a variety of criteria, such as [Mullvad](https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls) and [Quad9](https://quad9.net/) amongst others. We recommend for you to read our pages on DNS before choosing a provider. In many cases, using an alternative DNS provider is not recommended.
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](dns.md)
+
+#### Encrypted DNS Proxies
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](search-engines.md)
+
+### VPN Providers
+
+??? danger "VPNs do not provide anonymity"
+
+ Using a VPN will **not** keep your browsing habits anonymous, nor will it add additional security to non-secure (HTTP) traffic.
+
+ If you are looking for **anonymity**, you should use the Tor Browser **instead** of a VPN.
+
+ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connecting to websites using HTTPS. A VPN is not a replacement for good security practices.
+
+ [Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](vpn.md)
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](data-redaction.md)
+
+### Email Clients
+
+
+
+- { .twemoji } [Thunderbird](email-clients.md#thunderbird)
+- { .twemoji } [Apple Mail (macOS)](email-clients.md#apple-mail-macos)
+- { .twemoji } [Canary Mail (iOS)](email-clients.md#canary-mail-ios)
+- { .twemoji } [FairEmail (Android)](email-clients.md#fairemail-android)
+- { .twemoji } [GNOME Evolution (Linux)](email-clients.md#gnome-evolution-gnome)
+- { .twemoji } [K-9 Mail (Android)](email-clients.md#k-9-mail-android)
+- { .twemoji } [Kontact (Linux)](email-clients.md#kontact-kde)
+- { .twemoji } [Mailvelope (PGP in standard webmail)](email-clients.md#mailvelope-browser)
+- { .twemoji } [NeoMutt (CLI)](email-clients.md#neomutt-cli)
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](email-clients.md)
+
+### Encryption Software
+
+??? info "Operating System Disk Encryption"
+
+ For encrypting your operating system drive, we typically recommend using whichever encryption tool your operating system provides, whether that is **BitLocker** on Windows, **FileVault** on macOS, or **LUKS** on Linux. These tools are included with the operating system and typically use hardware encryption elements such as a TPM that other full-disk encryption software like VeraCrypt do not. VeraCrypt is still suitable for non-operating system disks such as external drives, especially drives that may be accessed from multiple operating systems.
+
+ [Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](encryption.md##operating-system-included-full-disk-encryption-fde)
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](video-streaming.md)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/tor.md b/i18n/eo/tor.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d7df32e97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/tor.md
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+---
+title: "Tor Network"
+icon: simple/torproject
+---
+
+{ align=right }
+
+The **Tor** network is a group of volunteer-operated servers that allows you to connect for free and improve your privacy and security on the Internet. Individuals and organizations can also share information over the Tor network with ".onion hidden services" without compromising their privacy. Because Tor traffic is difficult to block and trace, Tor is an effective censorship circumvention tool.
+
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://www.torproject.org){ .card-link title=Homepage }
+[:simple-torbrowser:](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Tor works by routing your internet traffic through those volunteer-operated servers, instead of making a direct connection to the site you're trying to visit. This obfuscates where the traffic is coming from, and no server in the connection path is able to see the full path of where the traffic is coming from and going to, meaning even the servers you are using to connect cannot break your anonymity.
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ Tor circuit pathway - Nodes in the path can only see the servers they are directly connected to, for example the "Entry" node shown can see your IP address, and the address of the "Middle" node, but has no way to see which website you are visiting.
+
+
+- [More information about how Tor works :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md)
+
+## Connecting to Tor
+
+There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for anonymous browsing for desktop computers and Android. In addition to the apps listed below, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser.
+
+### Tor Browser
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tor Browser** is the choice if you need anonymity, as it provides you with access to the Tor network and bridges, and it includes default settings and extensions that are automatically configured by the default security levels: *Standard*, *Safer* and *Safest*.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.torproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.torbrowser)
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://www.torproject.org/download/#android)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.torproject.org/download/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.torproject.org/download/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.torproject.org/download/)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/security/tor)
+
+!!! danger
+
+ You should **never** install any additional extensions on Tor Browser or edit `about:config` settings, including the ones we suggest for Firefox. Browser extensions and non-standard settings make you stand out from others on the Tor network, thus making your browser easier to [fingerprint](https://support.torproject.org/glossary/browser-fingerprinting).
+
+The Tor Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting, or identifying you based on your browser configuration. Therefore, it is imperative that you do **not** modify the browser beyond the default [security levels](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/).
+
+### Orbot
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Orbot** is a free Tor VPN for smartphones which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/orbot/id1609461599)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+
+For resistance against traffic analysis attacks, consider enabling *Isolate Destination Address* in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Connectivity**. This will use a completely different Tor Circuit (different middle relay and exit nodes) for every domain you connect to.
+
+!!! tip "Tips for Android"
+
+ Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN killswitch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+ Orbot is often outdated on the Guardian Project's [F-Droid repository](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android), so consider downloading directly from the [GitHub repository](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases) instead.
+
+ All versions are signed using the same signature so they should be compatible with each other.
+
+## Relays and Bridges
+
+### Snowflake
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.
+
+ People who are censored can use Snowflake proxies to connect to the Tor network. Snowflake is a great way to contribute to the network even if you don't have the technical know-how to run a Tor relay or bridge.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://snowflake.torproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/wikis/Technical%20Overview){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/snowflake.git/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/torproject-snowflake/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/snowflake/mafpmfcccpbjnhfhjnllmmalhifmlcie)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://snowflake.torproject.org/embed "Leave this page open to be a Snowflake proxy")
+
+??? tip "Embedded Snowflake"
+
+ You can enable Snowflake in your browser by clicking the switch below and ==leaving this page open==. You can also install Snowflake as a browser extension to have it always run while your browser is open, however adding third-party extensions can increase your attack surface.
+
+
+ If the embed does not appear for you, ensure you are not blocking the third-party frame from `torproject.org`. Alternatively, visit [this page](https://snowflake.torproject.org/embed.html).
+
+Snowflake does not increase your privacy in any way, nor is it used to connect to the Tor network within your personal browser. However, if your internet connection is uncensored, you should consider running it to help people in censored networks achieve better privacy themselves. There is no need to worry about which websites people are accessing through your proxy—their visible browsing IP address will match their Tor exit node, not yours.
+
+Running a Snowflake proxy is low-risk, even moreso than running a Tor relay or bridge which are already not particularly risky endeavours. However, it does still proxy traffic through your network which can be impactful in some ways, especially if your network is bandwidth-limited. Make sure you understand [how Snowflake works](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/wikis/home) before deciding whether to run a proxy.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/video-streaming.md b/i18n/eo/video-streaming.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b2bcf05b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/video-streaming.md
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+---
+title: "Video Streaming"
+icon: material/video-wireless
+---
+
+The primary threat when using a video streaming platform is that your streaming habits and subscription lists could be used to profile you. You should combine these tools with a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) to make it harder to profile your usage.
+
+## LBRY
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **The LBRY network** is a decentralized video sharing network. It uses a [BitTorrent](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent)-like network to store the video content, and a [blockchain](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockchain) to store the indexes for those videos. The main benefit of this design is censorship resistance.
+
+ **The LBRY desktop client** helps you stream videos from the LBRY network and stores your subscription list in your own LBRY wallet.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://lbry.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://lbry.com/privacypolicy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://lbry.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/lbryio/lbry-desktop){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://lbry.com/windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://lbry.com/osx)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://lbry.com/linux)
+
+!!! note
+
+ Only the **LBRY desktop client** is recommended, as the [Odysee](https://odysee.com) website and the LBRY clients in F-Droid, Play Store, and the App Store have mandatory synchronization and telemetry.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ While watching and hosting videos, your IP address is visible to the LBRY network. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+We recommend **against** synchronizing your wallet with LBRY Inc., as synchronizing encrypted wallets is not supported yet. If you synchronize your wallet with LBRY Inc., you have to trust them to not look at your subscription list, [LBC](https://lbry.com/faq/earn-credits) funds, or take control of your channel.
+
+You can disable *Save hosting data to help the LBRY network* option in :gear: **Settings** → **Advanced Settings**, to avoid exposing your IP address and watched videos when using LBRY for a prolonged period of time.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must not require a centralized account to view videos.
+ - Decentralized authentication, such as via a mobile wallet's private key is acceptable.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/eo/vpn.md b/i18n/eo/vpn.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..598bef037
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/eo/vpn.md
@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+---
+title: "VPN Services"
+icon: material/vpn
+---
+
+Find a no-logging VPN operator who isn’t out to sell or read your web traffic.
+
+??? danger "VPNs do not provide anonymity"
+
+ Using a VPN will **not** keep your browsing habits anonymous, nor will it add additional security to non-secure (HTTP) traffic.
+
+ If you are looking for **anonymity**, you should use the Tor Browser **instead** of a VPN.
+
+ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connecting to websites using HTTPS. A VPN is not a replacement for good security practices.
+
+ [Download Tor](https://www.torproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Tor Myths & FAQ](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
+
+??? question "When are VPNs useful?"
+
+ If you're looking for additional **privacy** from your ISP, on a public Wi-Fi network, or while torrenting files, a VPN may be the solution for you as long as you understand the risks involved.
+
+ [More Info](basics/vpn-overview.md){ .md-button }
+
+## Recommended Providers
+
+!!! abstract "Criteria"
+
+ Our recommended providers use encryption, accept Monero, support WireGuard & OpenVPN, and have a no logging policy. Read our [full list of criteria](#our-criteria) for more information.
+
+### Proton VPN
+
+!!! recommendation annotate
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton VPN** is a strong contender in the VPN space, and they have been in operation since 2016. Proton AG is based in Switzerland and offers a limited free tier, as well as a more featured premium option.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://protonvpn.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://protonvpn.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://protonvpn.com/support/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonVPN){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonvpn.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id1437005085)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonVPN/android-app/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://protonvpn.com/download-windows)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://protonvpn.com/support/linux-vpn-setup/)
+
+??? success annotate "67 Countries"
+
+ Proton VPN has [servers in 67 countries](https://protonvpn.com/vpn-servers) (1). Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
+
+ We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if they use [dedicated servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), instead of cheaper shared solutions (with other customers) such as [virtual private servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
+
+1. Last checked: 2022-09-16
+
+??? success "Independently Audited"
+
+ As of January 2020, Proton VPN has undergone an independent audit by SEC Consult. SEC Consult found some medium and low risk vulnerabilities in Proton VPN's Windows, Android, and iOS applications, all of which were "properly fixed" by Proton VPN before the reports were published. None of the issues identified would have provided an attacker remote access to your device or traffic. You can view individual reports for each platform at [protonvpn.com](https://protonvpn.com/blog/open-source/). In April 2022 Proton VPN underwent [another audit](https://protonvpn.com/blog/no-logs-audit/) and the report was [produced by Securitum](https://protonvpn.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/securitum-protonvpn-nologs-20220330.pdf). A [letter of attestation](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps) was provided for Proton VPN's apps on 9th November 2021 by [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com).
+
+??? success "Open-Source Clients"
+
+ Proton VPN provides the source code for their desktop and mobile clients in their [GitHub organization](https://github.com/ProtonVPN).
+
+??? success "Accepts Cash"
+
+ Proton VPN, in addition to accepting credit/debit cards and PayPal, accepts Bitcoin, and **cash/local currency** as anonymous forms of payment.
+
+??? success "WireGuard Support"
+
+ Proton VPN mostly supports the WireGuard® protocol. [WireGuard](https://www.wireguard.com) is a newer protocol that uses state-of-the-art [cryptography](https://www.wireguard.com/protocol/). Additionally, WireGuard aims to be simpler and more performant.
+
+ Proton VPN [recommends](https://protonvpn.com/blog/wireguard/) the use of WireGuard with their service. On Proton VPN's Windows, macOS, iOS, Android, ChromeOS, and Android TV apps, WireGuard is the default protocol; however, [support](https://protonvpn.com/support/how-to-change-vpn-protocols/) for the protocol is not present in their Linux app.
+
+??? warning "Remote Port Forwarding"
+
+ Proton VPN currently only supports remote [port forwarding](https://protonvpn.com/support/port-forwarding/) on Windows, which may impact some applications. Especially Peer-to-peer applications like Torrent clients.
+
+??? success "Mobile Clients"
+
+ In addition to providing standard OpenVPN configuration files, Proton VPN has mobile clients for [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/protonvpn-fast-secure-vpn/id1437005085), [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonvpn.android&hl=en_US), and [GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonVPN/android-app/releases) allowing for easy connections to their servers.
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ Proton VPN clients support two factor authentication on all platforms except Linux at the moment. Proton VPN has their own servers and datacenters in Switzerland, Iceland and Sweden. They offer adblocking and known malware domains blocking with their DNS service. Additionally, Proton VPN also offers "Tor" servers allowing you to easily connect to onion sites, but we still strongly recommend using [the official Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) for this purpose.
+
+!!! danger "Killswitch feature is broken on Intel-based Macs"
+
+ System crashes [may occur](https://protonvpn.com/support/macos-t2-chip-kill-switch/) on Intel-based Macs when using the VPN killswitch. If you require this feature, and you are using a Mac with Intel chipset, you should consider using another VPN service.
+
+### IVPN
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **IVPN** is another premium VPN provider, and they have been in operation since 2009. IVPN is based in Gibraltar.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.ivpn.net/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.ivpn.net/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/general/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ivpn){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-android/)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/ivpn-serious-privacy-protection/id1193122683)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-windows/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-macos/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-linux/)
+
+??? success annotate "35 Countries"
+
+ IVPN has [servers in 35 countries](https://www.ivpn.net/server-locations) (1). Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
+
+ We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if they use [dedicated servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), instead of cheaper shared solutions (with other customers) such as [virtual private servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
+
+1. Last checked: 2022-09-16
+
+??? success "Independently Audited"
+
+ IVPN has undergone a [no-logging audit from Cure53](https://cure53.de/audit-report_ivpn.pdf) which concluded in agreement with IVPN's no-logging claim. IVPN has also completed a [comprehensive pentest report Cure53](https://cure53.de/summary-report_ivpn_2019.pdf) in January 2020. IVPN has also said they plan to have [annual reports](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/independent-security-audit-concluded) in the future. A further review was conducted [in April 2022](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/ivpn-apps-security-audit-2022-concluded/) and was produced by Cure53 [on their website](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_IVPN_2022.pdf).
+
+??? success "Open-Source Clients"
+
+ As of February 2020 [IVPN applications are now open-source](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/ivpn-applications-are-now-open-source). Source code can be obtained from their [GitHub organization](https://github.com/ivpn).
+
+??? success "Accepts Cash and Monero"
+
+ In addition to accepting credit/debit cards and PayPal, IVPN accepts Bitcoin, **Monero** and **cash/local currency** (on annual plans) as anonymous forms of payment.
+
+??? success "WireGuard Support"
+
+ IVPN supports the WireGuard® protocol. [WireGuard](https://www.wireguard.com) is a newer protocol that uses state-of-the-art [cryptography](https://www.wireguard.com/protocol/). Additionally, WireGuard aims to be simpler and more performant.
+
+ IVPN [recommends](https://www.ivpn.net/wireguard/) the use of WireGuard with their service and, as such, the protocol is the default on all of IVPN's apps. IVPN also offers a WireGuard configuration generator for use with the official WireGuard [apps](https://www.wireguard.com/install/).
+
+??? success "Remote Port Forwarding"
+
+ Remote [port forwarding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_forwarding) is possible with a Pro plan. Port forwarding [can be activated](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/81/How-do-I-activate-port-forwarding.html) via the client area. Port forwarding is only available on IVPN when using WireGuard or OpenVPN protocols and is [disabled on US servers](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/116/Port-forwarding-is-not-working-why.html).
+
+??? success "Mobile Clients"
+
+ In addition to providing standard OpenVPN configuration files, IVPN has mobile clients for [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/ivpn-serious-privacy-protection/id1193122683), [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.ivpn.client), and [GitHub](https://github.com/ivpn/android-app/releases) allowing for easy connections to their servers.
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ IVPN clients support two factor authentication (Mullvad's clients do not). IVPN also provides "[AntiTracker](https://www.ivpn.net/antitracker)" functionality, which blocks advertising networks and trackers from the network level.
+
+### Mullvad
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mullvad** is a fast and inexpensive VPN with a serious focus on transparency and security. They have been in operation since **2009**. Mullvad is based in Sweden and does not have a free trial.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mullvad.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://o54hon2e2vj6c7m3aqqu6uyece65by3vgoxxhlqlsvkmacw6a7m7kiad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/privacy-policy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mullvad){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.mullvad.mullvadvpn)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/mullvad-vpn/id1488466513)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://mullvad.net/en/download/windows/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://mullvad.net/en/download/macos/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://mullvad.net/en/download/linux/)
+
+??? success annotate "41 Countries"
+
+ Mullvad has [servers in 41 countries](https://mullvad.net/servers/) (1). Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
+
+ We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if they use [dedicated servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), instead of cheaper shared solutions (with other customers) such as [virtual private servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
+
+1. Last checked: 2023-01-19
+
+??? success "Independently Audited"
+
+ Mullvad's VPN clients have been audited by Cure53 and Assured AB in a pentest report [published at cure53.de](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_v2.pdf). The security researchers concluded:
+
+ > Cure53 and Assured AB are happy with the results of the audit and the software leaves an overall positive impression. With security dedication of the in-house team at the Mullvad VPN compound, the testers have no doubts about the project being on the right track from a security standpoint.
+
+ In 2020 a second audit [was announced](https://mullvad.net/blog/2020/6/25/results-available-audit-mullvad-app/) and the [final audit report](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_2020_v2.pdf) was made available on Cure53's website:
+
+ > The results of this May-June 2020 project targeting the Mullvad complex are quite positive. [...] The overall application ecosystem used by Mullvad leaves a sound and structured impression. The overall structure of the application makes it easy to roll out patches and fixes in a structured manner. More than anything, the findings spotted by Cure53 showcase the importance of constantly auditing and re-assessing the current leak vectors, in order to always ensure privacy of the end-users. With that being said, Mullvad does a great job protecting the end-user from common PII leaks and privacy related risks.
+
+ In 2021 an infrastructure audit [was announced](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2021/1/20/no-pii-or-privacy-leaks-found-cure53s-infrastructure-audit/) and the [final audit report](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_2021_v1.pdf) was made available on Cure53's website. Another report was commissioned [in June 2022](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2022/6/22/vpn-server-audit-found-no-information-leakage-or-logging-of-customer-data/) and is available on [Assured's website](https://www.assured.se/publications/Assured_Mullvad_relay_server_audit_report_2022.pdf).
+
+??? success "Open-Source Clients"
+
+ Mullvad provides the source code for their desktop and mobile clients in their [GitHub organization](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app).
+
+??? success "Accepts Cash and Monero"
+
+ Mullvad, in addition to accepting credit/debit cards and PayPal, accepts Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, **Monero** and **cash/local currency** as anonymous forms of payment. They also accept Swish and bank wire transfers.
+
+??? success "WireGuard Support"
+
+ Mullvad supports the WireGuard® protocol. [WireGuard](https://www.wireguard.com) is a newer protocol that uses state-of-the-art [cryptography](https://www.wireguard.com/protocol/). Additionally, WireGuard aims to be simpler and more performant.
+
+ Mullvad [recommends](https://mullvad.net/en/help/why-wireguard/) the use of WireGuard with their service. It is the default or only protocol on Mullvad's Android, iOS, macOS, and Linux apps, but on Windows you have to [manually enable](https://mullvad.net/en/help/how-turn-wireguard-mullvad-app/) WireGuard. Mullvad also offers a WireGuard configuration generator for use with the official WireGuard [apps](https://www.wireguard.com/install/).
+
+??? success "IPv6 Support"
+
+ Mullvad supports the future of networking [IPv6](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv6). Their network allows you to [access services hosted on IPv6](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2014/9/15/ipv6-support/) as opposed to other providers who block IPv6 connections.
+
+??? success "Remote Port Forwarding"
+
+ Remote [port forwarding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_forwarding) is allowed for people who make one-time payments, but not allowed for accounts with a recurring/subscription-based payment method. This is to prevent Mullvad from being able to identify you based on your port usage and stored subscription information. See [Port forwarding with Mullvad VPN](https://mullvad.net/help/port-forwarding-and-mullvad/) for more information.
+
+??? success "Mobile Clients"
+
+ Mullvad has published [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/mullvad-vpn/id1488466513) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.mullvad.mullvadvpn) clients, both supporting an easy-to-use interface as opposed to requiring you to manually configure your WireGuard connection. The Android client is also available on [GitHub](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/releases).
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ Mullvad is very transparent about which nodes they [own or rent](https://mullvad.net/en/servers/). They use [ShadowSocks](https://shadowsocks.org/) in their ShadowSocks + OpenVPN configuration, making them more resistant against firewalls with [Deep Packet Inspection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection) trying to block VPNs. Supposedly, [China has to use a different method to block ShadowSocks servers](https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/22). Mullvad's website is also accessible via Tor at [o54hon2e2vj6c7m3aqqu6uyece65by3vgoxxhlqlsvkmacw6a7m7kiad.onion](http://o54hon2e2vj6c7m3aqqu6uyece65by3vgoxxhlqlsvkmacw6a7m7kiad.onion).
+
+## Criteria
+
+!!! danger
+
+ It is important to note that using a VPN provider will not make you anonymous, but it will give you better privacy in certain situations. A VPN is not a tool for illegal activities. Don't rely on a "no log" policy.
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the providers we recommend. This allows us to provide completely objective recommendations.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements for any VPN provider wishing to be recommended, including strong encryption, independent security audits, modern technology, and more. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing a VPN provider, and conduct your own research to ensure the VPN provider you choose is as trustworthy as possible.
+
+### Technology
+
+We require all our recommended VPN providers to provide OpenVPN configuration files to be used in any client. **If** a VPN provides their own custom client, we require a killswitch to block network data leaks when disconnected.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Support for strong protocols such as WireGuard & OpenVPN.
+- Killswitch built in to clients.
+- Multihop support. Multihopping is important to keep data private in case of a single node compromise.
+- If VPN clients are provided, they should be [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_source), like the VPN software they generally have built into them. We believe that [source code](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Source_code) availability provides greater transparency about what your device is actually doing.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- WireGuard and OpenVPN support.
+- Killswitch with highly configurable options (enable/disable on certain networks, on boot, etc.)
+- Easy-to-use VPN clients
+- Supports [IPv6](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv6). We expect that servers will allow incoming connections via IPv6 and allow you to access services hosted on IPv6 addresses.
+- Capability of [remote port forwarding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_forwarding#Remote_port_forwarding) assists in creating connections when using P2P ([Peer-to-Peer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer-to-peer)) file sharing software or hosting a server (e.g., Mumble).
+
+### Privacy
+
+We prefer our recommended providers to collect as little data as possible. Not collecting personal information on registration, and accepting anonymous forms of payment are required.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Monero or cash payment option.
+- No personal information required to register: Only username, password, and email at most.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Accepts Monero, cash, and other forms of anonymous payment options (gift cards, etc.)
+- No personal information accepted (autogenerated username, no email required, etc.)
+
+### Security
+
+A VPN is pointless if it can't even provide adequate security. We require all our recommended providers to abide by current security standards for their OpenVPN connections. Ideally, they would use more future-proof encryption schemes by default. We also require an independent third-party to audit the provider's security, ideally in a very comprehensive manner and on a repeated (yearly) basis.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Strong Encryption Schemes: OpenVPN with SHA-256 authentication; RSA-2048 or better handshake; AES-256-GCM or AES-256-CBC data encryption.
+- Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).
+- Published security audits from a reputable third-party firm.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Strongest Encryption: RSA-4096.
+- Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).
+- Comprehensive published security audits from a reputable third-party firm.
+- Bug-bounty programs and/or a coordinated vulnerability-disclosure process.
+
+### Trust
+
+You wouldn't trust your finances to someone with a fake identity, so why trust them with your internet data? We require our recommended providers to be public about their ownership or leadership. We also would like to see frequent transparency reports, especially in regard to how government requests are handled.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership or ownership.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership.
+- Frequent transparency reports.
+
+### Marketing
+
+With the VPN providers we recommend we like to see responsible marketing.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Must self-host analytics (i.e., no Google Analytics). The provider's site must also comply with [DNT (Do Not Track)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Do_Not_Track) for people who want to opt-out.
+
+Must not have any marketing which is irresponsible:
+
+- Making guarantees of protecting anonymity 100%. When someone makes a claim that something is 100% it means there is no certainty for failure. We know people can quite easily deanonymize themselves in a number of ways, e.g.:
+ - Reusing personal information (e.g., email accounts, unique pseudonyms, etc) that they accessed without anonymity software (Tor, VPN, etc.)
+ - [Browser fingerprinting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint)
+- Claim that a single circuit VPN is "more anonymous" than Tor, which is a circuit of three or more hops that regularly changes.
+- Use responsible language: i.e., it is okay to say that a VPN is "disconnected" or "not connected", however claiming that someone is "exposed", "vulnerable" or "compromised" is needless use of alarming language that may be incorrect. For example, that person might simply be on another VPN provider's service or using Tor.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+Responsible marketing that is both educational and useful to the consumer could include:
+
+- An accurate comparison to when [Tor](tor.md) should be used instead.
+- Availability of the VPN provider's website over a [.onion service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.onion)
+
+### Additional Functionality
+
+While not strictly requirements, there are some factors we looked into when determining which providers to recommend. These include adblocking/tracker-blocking functionality, warrant canaries, multihop connections, excellent customer support, the number of allowed simultaneous connections, etc.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.eo.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/404.md b/i18n/es/404.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..57697cdeb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/404.md
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+---
+hide:
+ - feedback
+---
+
+# 404 - No encontrado
+
+We couldn't find the page you were looking for! Maybe you were looking for one of these?
+
+- [Introducción a la creación de un modelo de amenazas](basics/threat-modeling.md)
+- [Proveedores de DNS recomendados](dns.md)
+- [Mejores navegadores de escritorio](desktop-browsers.md)
+- [Mejores proveedores de VPN](vpn.md)
+- [Foro de Privacy Guides](https://discuss.privacyguides.net)
+- [Nuestro blog](https://blog.privacyguides.org)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md b/i18n/es/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..88a0e9100
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# Community Code of Conduct
+
+**We pledge** to make our community a harassment-free experience for everyone.
+
+**We strive** to create a positive environment, using welcoming and inclusive language, and being respectful of the viewpoints of others.
+
+**We do not allow** inappropriate or otherwise unacceptable behavior, such as sexualized language, trolling and insulting comments, or otherwise promoting intolerance or harassment.
+
+## Community Standards
+
+What we expect from members of our communities:
+
+1. **Don't spread misinformation**
+
+ We are creating an evidence-based educational community around information privacy and security, not a home for conspiracy theories. For example, when making a claim that a certain piece of software is malicious or that certain telemetry data is privacy invasive, explain in detail what is collected and how it collected. Claims of this nature must be backed by technical evidence.
+
+1. **Don't abuse our willingness to help**
+
+ Our community members are not your free tech support. We are happy to help you with specific steps on your privacy journey if you are willing to put in effort on your end. We are not willing to answer endlessly repeated questions about generic computer problems you could have answered yourself with a 30-second internet search. Don't be a [help vampire](https://slash7.com/2006/12/22/vampires/).
+
+1. **Behave in a positive and constructive manner**
+
+ Examples of behavior that contributes to a positive environment for our community include:
+
+ - Demonstrating empathy and kindness toward other people
+ - Being respectful of differing opinions, viewpoints, and experiences
+ - Giving and gracefully accepting constructive feedback
+ - Accepting responsibility and apologizing to those affected by our mistakes, and learning from the experience
+ - Focusing on what is best not just for us as individuals, but for the overall community
+
+### Unacceptable Behavior
+
+The following behaviors are considered harassment and are unacceptable within our community:
+
+- The use of sexualized language or imagery, and sexual attention or advances of any kind
+- Trolling, insulting or derogatory comments, and personal or political attacks
+- Public or private harassment
+- Publishing others' private information, such as a physical or email address, without their explicit permission
+- Other conduct which could reasonably be considered inappropriate in a professional setting
+
+## Scope
+
+Our Code of Conduct applies within all project spaces, as well as when an individual is representing the Privacy Guides project in other communities.
+
+We are responsible for clarifying the standards of our community, and have the right to remove or alter the comments of those participating within our community, as necessary and at our discretion.
+
+### Contact
+
+If you observe a problem on a platform like Matrix or Reddit, please contact our moderators on that platform in chat, via DM, or through any designated "Modmail" system.
+
+If you have a problem elsewhere, or a problem our community moderators are unable to resolve, reach out to `jonah@privacyguides.org` and/or `dngray@privacyguides.org`.
+
+All community leaders are obligated to respect the privacy and security of the reporter of any incident.
diff --git a/i18n/es/about/criteria.md b/i18n/es/about/criteria.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c5acf096c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/about/criteria.md
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+---
+title: Criterios generales
+---
+
+!!! example "Trabajo en Progreso"
+
+ La siguiente página se encuentra en construcción, y no refleja todos los criterios para nuestras recomendaciones en este momento. Discusión anterior sobre este tema: [#24](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/discussions/24)
+
+Abajo se encuentran algunos aspectos que deben cumplir todos los envíos a Privacy Guides. Cada categoría puede tener requisitos adicionales.
+
+## Información financiera
+
+No obtenemos dinero al recomendar ciertos productos, nosotros no utilizamos enlaces de afiliados, y no realizamos alguna consideración especial a los patrocinadores del proyecto.
+
+## Lineamientos generales
+
+Aplicamos estas prioridades al considerar nuevas recomendaciones:
+
+- Herramientas **seguras**: Las herramientas deben seguir las mejores prácticas de seguridad cuando sea necesario.
+- **Disponibilidad del código**: Proyectos de código abierto son preferidos sobre alternativas similares de código cerrado.
+- **Multiplataforma**: Preferimos que las recomendaciones sean multiplataforma para evitar la dependencia de un sistema.
+- **Active Development**: The tools that we recommend should be actively developed, unmaintained projects will be removed in most cases.
+- **Usability**: Tools should be accessible to most computer users, an overly technical background should not be required.
+- **Documented**: Tools should have clear and extensive documentation for use.
+
+## Developer Self-Submissions
+
+We have these requirements in regard to developers which wish to submit their project or software for consideration.
+
+- Must disclose affiliation, i.e. your position within the project being submitted.
+
+- Must have a security whitepaper if it is a project that involves handling of sensitive information like a messenger, password manager, encrypted cloud storage etc.
+ - Third party audit status. We want to know if you have one, or have one planned. If possible please mention who will be conducting the audit.
+
+- Must explain what the project brings to the table in regard to privacy.
+ - Does it solve any new problem?
+ - Why should anyone use it over the alternatives?
+
+- Must state what the exact threat model is with their project.
+ - It should be clear to potential users what the project can provide, and what it cannot.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/about/donate.md b/i18n/es/about/donate.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d56cd8f6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/about/donate.md
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+---
+title: Apoyándonos
+---
+
+
+Se necesita a un montón de [personas](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors) y [trabajo](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/pulse/monthly) para mantener Privacy Guides actualizado y difundiendo la palabra sobre la privacidad y la vigilancia masiva. Si te gusta lo que hacemos, considera formar parte [editando el sitio web](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org) o [contribuyendo a las traducciones](https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides).
+
+Si nos quieres ayudar financialmente, el método más conveniente para nosotros es que contribuyas vía Open Collective, un sitio web operado por nuestro anfitrión fiscal. Open Collective acepta pagos vía tarjeta de crédito o débito, PayPal, y transferencias bancarias.
+
+[Dona en OpenCollective.com](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/donate ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+Las donaciones hechas directamente a Open Collective son generalmente deducibles de impuestos en los Estados Unidos, porque nuestro anfitrión fiscal (la Fundación Open Collective) es una organización registrada 501(c)3. Recibirás un recibo de Open Collective Foundation después de donar. Privacy Guides no ofrece asesoramiento financiero, por lo que debe ponerse en contacto con su asesor fiscal para saber si esto es aplicable en su caso.
+
+Si ya haces uso de los patrocinios de GitHub, también puedes patrocinar a nuestra organización allí.
+
+[Patrocínanos en GitHub](https://github.com/sponsors/privacyguides ""){.md-button}
+
+## Patrocinadores
+
+¡Un agradecimiento especial a todos los que apoyan nuestra misión! :heart:
+
+*Tenga en cuenta: Esta sección carga un widget directamente desde Open Collective. Esta sección no refleja las donaciones realizadas fuera de Open Collective, y no tenemos ningún control sobre los donantes específicos que aparecen en esta sección.*
+
+
+
+## Como usamos las donaciones
+
+Privacy Guides es una organización **sin ánimos de lucro**. Utilizamos las donaciones para diversos fines, entre ellos:
+
+**Registro del dominio**
+:
+
+Tenemos algunos nombres de dominio como `privacyguides.org` los cuales nos cuestan alrededor de 10 dólares al año para mantener su registro.
+
+**Alojamiento web**
+:
+
+El tráfico de este sitio web utiliza cientos de gigabytes de datos al mes, utilizamos una variedad de proveedores de servicios para mantener este tráfico.
+
+**Servicios en línea**
+:
+
+Alojamos [servicios de internet](https://privacyguides.net) para probar y mostrar diferentes productos de privacidad que nos gustan y [recomendamos](../tools.md). Algunos de ellos están disponibles públicamente para el uso de nuestra comunidad (SearXNG, Tor, etc.), y otros se proporcionan a los miembros de nuestro equipo (correo electrónico, etc.).
+
+**Compras de productos**
+:
+
+Ocasionalmente compramos productos y servicios con el fin de probar nuestras [herramientas recomendadas](../tools.md).
+
+Seguimos trabajando con nuestro anfitrión fiscal (la Open Collective Foundation) para recibir donaciones de criptomonedas, por el momento la contabilidad es inviable para muchas transacciones más pequeñas, pero esto debería cambiar en el futuro. Mientras tanto, si desea hacer una donación considerable (> 100 dólares) en criptomoneda, por favor, póngase en contacto con [jonah@privacyguides.org](mailto:jonah@privacyguides.org).
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/about/index.md b/i18n/es/about/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..322ca826a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/about/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: "About Privacy Guides"
+---
+
+**Privacy Guides** is a socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy. We are a non-profit collective operated entirely by volunteer [team members](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/g/team) and contributors.
+
+[:material-hand-coin-outline: Support the project](donate.md ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+## Our Team
+
+??? person "@jonah"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/jonah)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/jonaharagon "@jonaharagon")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@jonah "@jonah@neat.computer"){rel=me}
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Homepage](https://www.jonaharagon.com)
+
+??? person "@niek-de-wilde"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/Niek-de-Wilde)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/blacklight447 "@blacklight447")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.social/@blacklight447 "@blacklight447@mastodon.social"){rel=me}
+
+??? person "@dngray"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/dngray)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/dngray "@dngray")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.social/@dngray "@dngray@mastodon.social"){rel=me}
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-envelope: Email](mailto:dngray@privacyguides.org)
+
+??? person "@freddy"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/freddy)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/freddy-m "@freddy-m")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://social.lol/@freddy "@freddy@social.lol"){rel=me}
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-envelope: Email](mailto:freddy@privacyguides.org)
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Homepage](https://freddy.omg.lol)
+
+??? person "@mfwmyfacewhen"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/mfwmyfacewhen)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/mfwmyfacewhen "@mfwmyfacewhen")
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Homepage](https://mfw.omg.lol)
+
+??? person "@olivia"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/olivia)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/hook9 "@hook9")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@oliviablob "@oliviablob@neat.computer"){rel=me}
+
+Additionally, [many people](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors) have made contributions to the project. You can too, we're open sourced on GitHub!
+
+Our team members review all changes made to the website and handle administrative duties such as web hosting and financials, however they do not personally profit from any contributions made to this site. Our financials are transparently hosted by the Open Collective Foundation 501(c)(3) at [opencollective.com/privacyguides](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides). Donations to Privacy Guides are generally tax deductible in the United States.
+
+## Site License
+
+*The following is a human-readable summary of (and not a substitute for) the [license](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE):*
+
+:fontawesome-brands-creative-commons: :fontawesome-brands-creative-commons-by: :fontawesome-brands-creative-commons-nd: Unless otherwise noted, the original content on this website is made available under the [Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE). This means that you are free to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format for any purpose, even commercially; as long as you give appropriate credit to `Privacy Guides (www.privacyguides.org)` and provide a link to the license. Usted **no puede** utilizar la marca de Privacy Guides en su propio proyecto sin la aprobación expresa de este proyecto. If you remix, transform, or build upon the content of this website, you may not distribute the modified material.
+
+This license is in place to prevent people from sharing our work without giving proper credit, and to prevent people from modifying our work in a way that could be used to mislead people. If you find the terms of this license too restrictive for the project you're working on, please reach out to us at `jonah@privacyguides.org`. We are happy to provide alternative licensing options for well-intentioned projects in the privacy space!
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/about/notices.md b/i18n/es/about/notices.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3c02db335
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/about/notices.md
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+---
+title: "Avisos y descargos de responsabilidad"
+hide:
+ - toc
+---
+
+## Aviso legal
+
+Privacy Guides no es un bufete de abogados. Como tal, el sitio web de Privacy Guides y sus colaboradores no están proporcionando asesoría legal. El material y las recomendaciones de nuestro sitio web y de las guías no constituyen asesoramiento jurídico. Contribuir al sitio web o comunicarse con Privacy Guides u otros colaboradores sobre nuestro sitio web no crea una relación abogado-cliente.
+
+Dirigir este sitio web, como cualquier empresa humana, implica incertidumbre y compromisos. Esperamos que este sitio web ayude, pero puede incluir errores y no puede abordar todas las situaciones. Si tiene alguna duda sobre su situación, le animamos a que investigue por su cuenta, busque a otros expertos y participe en debates con la comunidad de Privacy Guides. Si tiene alguna pregunta legal, debe consultar con su propio abogado antes de seguir adelante.
+
+Privacy Guides es un proyecto de código abierto al que se ha contribuido bajo licencias que incluyen términos que, para la protección del sitio web y sus contribuyentes, dejan claro que el proyecto Privacy Guides y el sitio web se ofrece "tal cual", sin garantía, y renunciando a la responsabilidad por los daños resultantes del uso del sitio web o de cualquier recomendación contenida en él. Privacy Guides no garantiza ni hace ninguna declaración sobre la exactitud, los resultados probables o la fiabilidad del uso de los materiales en el sitio web o de cualquier otro modo relacionado con dichos materiales en el sitio web o en cualquier sitio de terceros vinculado en este sitio.
+
+Además, Privacy Guides no garantiza que este sitio web esté disponible, de forma constante o en absoluto.
+
+## Licencias
+
+A menos que se indique lo contrario, todo el contenido de este sitio web está disponible de forma gratuita bajo los términos de la [Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE).
+
+Esto no incluye el código de terceros incrustado en este repositorio, o el código en el que se indique una licencia superior. Los siguientes son ejemplos notables, pero esta lista puede no ser exhaustiva:
+
+* [MathJax](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/docs/javascripts/mathjax.js) tiene licencia [Apache License 2.0](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/docs/javascripts/LICENSE.mathjax.txt).
+
+Algunas partes de este aviso fueron adoptadas de [opensource.guide](https://github.com/github/opensource.guide/blob/master/notices.md) en GitHub. Ese recurso y esta página están publicados bajo la licencia [CC-BY-4.0](https://github.com/github/opensource.guide/blob/master/LICENSE).
+
+Esto significa que puedes utilizar el texto de privacyguides.org para su propio proyecto, de acuerdo con los términos indicados en [esta licencia](https://github. com/privacyguides/privacyguides. org/blob/main/LICENSE). Usted **no puede** utilizar la marca de Privacy Guides en su propio proyecto sin la aprobación expresa de este proyecto. Las marcas comerciales de Privacy Guides incluyen el logotipo de "Privacy Guides" y el logotipo del escudo. Las marcas comerciales de Privacy Guides incluyen el logotipo de "Privacy Guides" y el logotipo del escudo.
+
+Creemos que los logotipos y otras imágenes en `assets` obtenidos de terceros proveedores son de dominio público o **de uso leal**. En pocas palabras, la doctrina legal de [uso justo](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uso_justo) permite el uso de imágenes con derechos de autor con el propósito de identificar el tema para fines de comentario público. Sin embargo, estos logotipos y otras imágenes pueden estar sujetos a la legislación sobre marcas en una o más jurisdicciones. Antes de utilizar este contenido, asegúrese de que se utiliza para identificar a la entidad u organización propietaria de la marca comercial y de que usted tiene derecho a utilizarla según las leyes que se aplican en las circunstancias de tu uso previsto. *Al copiar el contenido de este sitio web, usted es el único responsable de asegurarse de no infringir la marca comercial o los derechos de autor de otra persona.*
+
+Cuando usted contribuye a este repositorio lo hace bajo las licencias mencionadas.
+
+## Uso aceptable
+
+Usted no puedes utilizar este sitio web de ninguna manera que cause o pueda causar daños al sitio web o que afecte a la disponibilidad o accesibilidad de Privacy Guides, ni de ninguna manera que sea ilegal, ilícita, fraudulenta o perjudicial, o que esté relacionada con cualquier propósito o actividad ilícita, ilegal, fraudulenta o perjudicial.
+
+No debe llevar a cabo ninguna actividad de recopilación de datos sistemática o automatizada en este sitio web o en relación con él sin el consentimiento expreso por escrito de Aragon Ventures LLC, incluyendo:
+
+* Exceso de Escaneos Automáticos
+* Ataque de Denegación de Servicio
+* Scraping
+* Minería de Datos
+* 'Framing' (IFrames)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/about/privacy-policy.md b/i18n/es/about/privacy-policy.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fb78970a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/about/privacy-policy.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: "Política de Privacidad"
+---
+
+Privacy Guides es un proyecto comunitario gestionado por una serie de colaboradores voluntarios. La lista pública de los miembros del equipo [se puede encontrar en GitHub](https://github.com/orgs/privacyguides/people).
+
+## Datos que recopilamos de los visitantes
+
+La privacidad de los visitantes de nuestro sitio web es importante para nosotros, por lo que no rastreamos a ninguna persona en particular. Como visitante de nuestro sitio web:
+
+- No se recopila información personal
+- Ninguna información tal como las cookies se almacena en el navegador
+- No se comparte, envía o vende información a terceros
+- No se comparte ninguna información con empresas de publicidad
+- No se extrae información ni se recolecta para obtener tendencias personales y de comportamiento
+- No se monetiza ninguna información
+
+Puede consultar los datos que recopilamos en nuestra página [statistics](statistics.md) .
+
+Ejecutamos una instalación propia de [Plausible Analytics](https://plausible.io) para recopilar algunos datos de uso anónimos con fines estadísticos. El objetivo es hacer un seguimiento de las tendencias generales del tráfico de nuestro sitio web, no de los visitantes individuales. Todos los datos están en solo agregar. No se recopila información personal.
+
+Los datos recopilados incluyen fuentes de referencia, páginas principales, duración de la visita, información de los dispositivos (tipo de dispositivo, sistema operativo, país y navegador) utilizados durante la visita y más. Puedes aprender más acerca sobre como Plausible funciona y recopila información de una manera que respeta la privacidad [aquí](https://plausible.io/data-policy).
+
+## Datos que recopilamos de los titulares de cuentas
+
+En algunos sitios web y servicios que ofrecemos, muchas funciones pueden requerir una cuenta. Por ejemplo, puede ser necesaria una cuenta para publicar y responder a temas en una plataforma de foros.
+
+Para registrarse en la mayoría de las cuentas, recopilaremos un nombre, nombre de usuario, correo electrónico y contraseña. En el caso de que un sitio web requiera más información que esos datos, se indicará claramente y se señalará en una declaración de privacidad separada por sitio.
+
+Utilizamos los datos de su cuenta para identificarle en el sitio web y para crear páginas específicas para usted, como su página de perfil. También utilizaremos los datos de su cuenta para publicar un perfil público para usted en nuestros servicios.
+
+Utilizamos su correo electrónico para:
+
+- Notificarle sobre publicaciones y otras actividades en los sitios web o servicios.
+- Restablecer su contraseña y ayudar a mantener su cuenta segura.
+- Contactarle en circunstancias especiales relacionadas con su cuenta.
+- Contactarle en relación con solicitudes legales, como las solicitudes de eliminación de datos de la DMCA.
+
+En algunos sitios web y servicios puede proporcionar información adicional para su cuenta, como una breve biografía, un avatar, su ubicación o su cumpleaños. Ponemos esa información a disposición de todos los que pueden acceder al sitio web o al servicio en cuestión. Esta información no es necesaria para utilizar ninguno de nuestros servicios y puede borrarse en cualquier momento.
+
+Almacenaremos los datos de su cuenta mientras su cuenta permanezca abierta. Después de cerrar una cuenta, podemos conservar algunos o todos los datos de su cuenta en forma de copias de seguridad o archivos durante un máximo de 90 días.
+
+## Contacto
+
+El equipo de Privacy Guides generalmente no tiene acceso a datos personales fuera del acceso limitado otorgado a través de algunos paneles de moderación. Las consultas sobre su información personal deben enviarse directamente a:
+
+```text
+Jonah Aragon
+Administrador de servicios
+jonah@privacyguides.org
+```
+
+Para cualquier otra consulta, puede contactar a cualquier miembro de nuestro equipo.
+
+Puede presentar reclamaciones acerca del RGPD ante sus autoridades locales de supervisión de protección de datos. En Francia es la "Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés" la que se ocupa y tramita las denuncias. Ellos proporcionan una [carta de reclamaciones](https://www.cnil.fr/en/plaintes) para utilizar.
+
+## Acerca de esta política
+
+Publicaremos cualquier versión nueva de esta declaración [aquí](privacy-policy.md). Es posible que cambiemos la forma de anunciar los cambios en futuras versiones de este documento. Mientras tanto, podemos actualizar nuestra información de contacto en cualquier momento sin anunciar ningún cambio. Consulte la [Política de privacidad](privacy-policy.md) para obtener la última información de contacto.
+
+A full revision [history](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/commits/main/docs/about/privacy-policy.md) of this page can be found on GitHub.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/about/privacytools.md b/i18n/es/about/privacytools.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e5e84ecbc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/about/privacytools.md
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+---
+title: "Preguntas frecuentes de PrivacyTools"
+---
+
+# Por qué dejamos de usar PrivacyTools
+
+En septiembre de 2021, todos los colaboradores activos acordaron por unanimidad pasar de PrivacyTools a trabajar en este sitio: Privacy Guides. Esta decisión se tomó porque el fundador de PrivacyTools y controlador del nombre de dominio había desaparecido durante un largo periodo de tiempo y no se pudo contactar con él.
+
+Habiendo construido un sitio y un conjunto de servicios de buena reputación en PrivacyTools.io, esto causó graves preocupaciones por el futuro de PrivacyTools, ya que cualquier interrupción futura podría acabar con toda la organización sin ningún método de recuperación. Esta transición se comunicó a la comunidad de PrivacyTools con muchos meses de antelación a través de diversos canales, como su blog, Twitter, Reddit y Mastodon, para garantizar que todo el proceso se desarrollara con la mayor fluidez posible. Lo hicimos para asegurarnos de que nadie se quedara en la oscuridad, que ha sido nuestro modus operandi desde que se creó nuestro equipo, y para asegurarnos de que Privacy Guides fuera reconocida como la misma organización fiable que era PrivacyTools antes de la transición.
+
+Una vez finalizado el traslado organizativo, el fundador de PrivacyTools regresó y comenzó a difundir información errónea sobre el proyecto de Privacy Guides. Siguen difundiendo información errónea además de operar una granja de enlaces pagados en el dominio de PrivacyTools. Estamos creando esta página para aclarar cualquier malentendido.
+
+## ¿Qué es PrivacyTools?
+
+PrivacyTools fue creado en 2015 por "BurungHantu", que quería hacer un recurso de información de privacidad - herramientas útiles después de las revelaciones de Snowden. El sitio creció hasta convertirse en un floreciente proyecto de código abierto con [muchos colaboradores](https://github.com/privacytools/privacytools.io/graphs/contributors), algunos de los cuales acabaron asumiendo diversas responsabilidades organizativas, como el funcionamiento de servicios en línea como Matrix y Mastodon, la gestión y revisión de los cambios en el sitio en GitHub, la búsqueda de patrocinadores para el proyecto, la redacción de publicaciones en el blog y el funcionamiento de plataformas de difusión en los medios sociales como Twitter, etc.
+
+A partir de 2019, BurungHantu se alejó cada vez más del desarrollo activo del sitio web y las comunidades, y comenzó a retrasar los pagos de los que era responsable en relación con los servidores que operábamos. Para evitar que nuestro administrador del sistema pague los costos del servidor de su propio bolsillo, cambiamos los métodos de donación enumerados en el sitio de las cuentas personales de PayPal y criptomonedas de BurungHantu a una nueva página de OpenCollective el [31 de octubre de 2019](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184557/https://blog.privacytools.io/privacytools-io-joins-the-open-collective-foundation/). Esto tenía la ventaja añadida de hacer nuestras finanzas completamente transparentes, un valor en el que creemos firmemente, y deducibles de impuestos en los Estados Unidos, porque estaban en manos de la Open Collective Foundation 501(c)3. Este cambio fue acordado unánimemente por el equipo y no fue impugnado.
+
+## Por qué nos mudamos
+
+En 2020, la ausencia de BurungHantu se hizo mucho más notoria. En un momento dado, requerimos que los servidores de nombres del dominio se cambiaran a servidores de nombres controlados por nuestro administrador del sistema para evitar interrupciones futuras, y este cambio no se completó hasta más de un mes después de la solicitud inicial. Desaparecía del chat público y de las salas de chat privadas del equipo en Matrix durante meses, apareciendo de vez en cuando para dar algún pequeño comentario o prometer ser más activo antes de volver a desaparecer.
+
+En octubre de 2020, el administrador del sistema de PrivacyTools (Jonah) [dejó](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190742/https://blog.privacytools.io/blacklight447-taking-over/) el proyecto debido a estas dificultades, cediendo el control a otro colaborador de larga data. Jonah había estado operando casi todos los servicios de PrivacyTools y actuando como el líder del proyecto *de facto* para el desarrollo del sitio web en ausencia de BurungHantu, por lo que su partida fue un cambio significativo para la organización. En aquel momento, debido a estos importantes cambios organizativos, BurungHantu prometió al equipo restante que volvería para tomar el control del proyecto en adelante. ==El equipo de PrivacyTools se puso en contacto a través de varios métodos de comunicación durante los meses siguientes, pero no recibió ninguna respuesta.==
+
+## Dependencia del nombre de dominio
+
+A principios de 2021, el equipo de PrivacyTools se preocupó por el futuro del proyecto, ya que el nombre de dominio iba a expirar el 1 de marzo de 2021. El dominio fue finalmente renovado por BurungHantu sin ningún comentario.
+
+Las preocupaciones del equipo no fueron atendidas, y nos dimos cuenta de que esto sería un problema cada año: Si el dominio caducaba habría permitido que lo robaran ocupantes ilegales o spammers, arruinando así la reputación de la organización. También habríamos tenido problemas para llegar a la comunidad para informarles de lo ocurrido.
+
+Sin estar en contacto con BurungHantu, decidimos que el mejor curso de acción sería pasar a un nuevo nombre de dominio mientras tuviéramos garantizado el control sobre el antiguo nombre de dominio, en algún momento antes de marzo de 2022. De esta manera, podríamos redirigir limpiamente todos los recursos de PrivacyTools al nuevo sitio sin ninguna interrupción del servicio. Esta decisión se tomó con muchos meses de antelación y se comunicó a todo el equipo con la esperanza de que BurungHantu se pusiera en contacto y asegurara su apoyo continuo al proyecto, porque con una marca reconocible y grandes comunidades en línea, alejarse de "PrivacyTools" era el resultado menos deseable posible.
+
+A mediados de 2021, el equipo de PrivacyTools se puso en contacto con Jonah, que aceptó reincorporarse al equipo para ayudar en la transición.
+
+## Llamada a la acción comunitaria
+
+A finales de julio de 2021 [informamos](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184422/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-future-of-privacytools/) a la comunidad PrivacyTools de nuestra intención de elegir un nuevo nombre y continuar el proyecto en un nuevo dominio, para ser [elegido](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190935/https://aragon.cloud/apps/forms/cMPxG9KyopapBbcw) el 2 de agosto de 2022. Al final, se eligió "Privacy Guides", con el dominio `privacyguides.org` que ya poseía Jonah para un proyecto paralelo de 2020 que quedó sin desarrollar.
+
+## Control de r/privacytoolsIO
+
+Simultáneamente con los problemas del sitio web en privacytools.io, el equipo de moderación de r/privacytoolsIO se enfrentaba a retos en la gestión del subreddit. El subreddit siempre había sido operado en su mayor parte independientemente del desarrollo del sitio web, pero BurungHantu era el principal moderador del subreddit también, y era el único moderador al que se le habían concedido privilegios de "Control total". u/trai_dep era el único moderador activo en ese momento, y [publicó](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/comments/o9tllh/requesting_rprivacytoolsio_im_only_active_mod_top/) una solicitud a los administradores de Reddit el 28 de junio de 2021, en la que pedía que se le concediera el puesto de moderador principal y privilegios de control total, con el fin de realizar los cambios necesarios en el subreddit.
+
+Reddit requiere que los subreddits tengan moderadores activos. Si el moderador principal está inactivo durante un largo periodo de tiempo (como un año), el puesto de moderador principal puede volver a asignarse al siguiente moderador en la lista. Para que se le concediera esta petición, BurungHantu tenía que haber estado completamente ausente de toda actividad de Reddit durante un largo periodo de tiempo, lo que era coherente con sus comportamientos en otras plataformas.
+
+> Si fuiste removido como moderador de un subreddit a través de una solicitud de Reddit es porque tu falta de respuesta y tu falta de actividad calificaron al subreddit para una transferencia de r/redditrequest.
+>
+> r/redditrequest es la forma de Reddit de asegurarse de que las comunidades tengan moderadores activos y forma parte del [Código de Conducta de Moderador](https://www.redditinc.com/policies/moderator-code-of-conduct).
+
+## Inicio de la transición
+
+El 14 de septiembre de 2021, [anunciamos](https://www.privacyguides.org/blog/2021/09/14/welcome-to-privacy-guides/) el inicio de nuestra migración a este nuevo dominio:
+
+> [...] nos pareció necesario hacer este cambio más pronto que tarde para que la gente se enterara de esta transición lo antes posible. Esto nos da el tiempo adecuado para la transición del nombre de dominio, que actualmente se está redirigiendo a www.privacyguides.org, y esperamos que dé a todos el tiempo suficiente para notar el cambio, actualizar los marcadores y los sitios web, etc.
+
+Este cambio [implicó:](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pnhn4a/rprivacyguides_privacyguidesorg_what_you_need_to/)
+
+- Redirigiendo www.privacytools.io a [www.privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org).
+- Archivar el código fuente en GitHub para preservar nuestro trabajo anterior y el rastreador de problemas, que seguimos utilizando durante meses para el desarrollo futuro de este sitio.
+- Publicar anuncios en nuestro subreddit y en varias otras comunidades informando a la gente del cambio oficial.
+- Cerrar formalmente los servicios de privacytools.io, como Matrix y Mastodon, y animar a los usuarios existentes a migrar lo antes posible.
+
+Las cosas parecían ir bien, y la mayoría de nuestra comunidad activa hizo el cambio a nuestro nuevo proyecto exactamente como esperábamos.
+
+## Eventos siguientes
+
+Aproximadamente una semana después de la transición, BurungHantu volvió a estar en línea por primera vez en casi un año, sin embargo nadie de nuestro equipo estaba dispuesto a volver a PrivacyTools debido a su histórica falta de fiabilidad. En lugar de disculparse por su prolongada ausencia, pasó inmediatamente a la ofensiva y situó la transición a Privacy Guides como un ataque contra él y su proyecto. Posteriormente, [borró](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/pp9yie/comment/hd49wbn) muchos de estos mensajes cuando la comunidad le señaló que había estado ausente y abandonado el proyecto.
+
+En este punto, BurungHantu afirmó que quería seguir trabajando en privacytools.io por su cuenta y solicitó que elimináramos la redirección de www.privacytools.io a [www.privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org). Le obligamos y le pedimos que mantuviera activos los subdominios de Matrix, Mastodon y PeerTube para que funcionaran como servicio público para nuestra comunidad durante al menos unos meses, con el fin de que los usuarios de esas plataformas pudieran migrar fácilmente a otras cuentas. Debido a la naturaleza federada de los servicios que prestábamos, estaban vinculados a nombres de dominio específicos, lo que hacía muy difícil la migración (y en algunos casos imposible).
+
+Desafortunadamente, debido a que el control del subreddit r/privacytoolsIO no fue devuelto a BurungHantu a su demanda (más información abajo), esos subdominios fueron [cortados](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pymthv/comment/hexwrps/) a principios de octubre, acabando con cualquier posibilidad de migración para cualquier usuario que aún usara esos servicios.
+
+Tras esto, BurungHantu hizo falsas acusaciones sobre el robo de donaciones del proyecto por parte de Jonah. BurungHantu tenía más de un año desde que ocurrió el presunto incidente y, sin embargo, no lo puso en conocimiento de nadie hasta después de la migración de Privacy Guides. El equipo [y la comunidad](https://twitter.com/TommyTran732/status/1526153536962281474) han pedido repetidamente a BurungHantu que aporte pruebas y comente el motivo de su silencio, y no lo ha hecho.
+
+BurungHantu también hizo una [publicación en Twitter](https://twitter.com/privacytoolsIO/status/1510560676967710728) alegando que un "abogado" se había puesto en contacto con él en Twitter y le estaba dando consejos, en otro intento de intimidarnos para darle el control de nuestro subreddit, y como parte de su campaña de difamación para enturbiar las aguas que rodean el lanzamiento de Privacy Guides mientras fingía ser una víctima.
+
+## PrivacyTools.io Ahora
+
+A partir del 25 de septiembre de 2022 estamos viendo cómo los planes generales de BurungHantu se hacen realidad en privacytools.io, y esta es la razón por la que hemos decidido crear esta página explicativa hoy. El sitio web que está operando parece ser una versión altamente optimizada para SEO del sitio que recomienda herramientas a cambio de una compensación financiera. Recientemente, IVPN y Mullvad, dos proveedores de VPN [recomendados](../vpn.md) casi universalmente por la comunidad de la privacidad y notables por su postura contra los programas de afiliación, fueron eliminados de PrivacyTools. ¿En su lugar? NordVPN, Surfshark, ExpressVPN y hide.me; gigantescas corporaciones de VPN con plataformas y prácticas comerciales poco fiables, famosas por sus agresivos programas de marketing y afiliación.
+
+==**PrivacyTools se ha convertido exactamente en el tipo de sitio que [advertimos](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729205249/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-reviews/) en el blog de PrivacyTools en 2019.**== Hemos intentado mantener las distancias con PrivacyTools desde la transición, pero su continuo acoso hacia nuestro proyecto y ahora su absurdo abuso de la credibilidad que su marca ha ganado a lo largo de 6 años de contribuciones de código abierto es extremadamente preocupante para nosotros. Los que realmente luchamos por la privacidad no estamos luchando entre nosotros, y no estamos recibiendo nuestro consejo del mejor postor.
+
+## r/privacytoolsIO Ahora
+
+Después del lanzamiento de [r/PrivacyGuides](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacyguides), era poco práctico para u/trai_dep continuar moderando ambos subreddits, y con la comunidad a bordo con la transición, r/privacytoolsIO se [hizo](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/qk7qrj/a_new_era_why_rptio_is_now_a_restricted_sub/) un sub restringido en un post el 1 de noviembre de 2021:
+
+> [...] El crecimiento de este Sub fue el resultado de un gran esfuerzo, a lo largo de varios años, del equipo de PrivacyGuides.org. Y por cada uno de ustedes.
+>
+> Un Subreddit es una gran cantidad de trabajo para administrar y moderar. Al igual que un jardín, requiere una atención paciente y un cuidado diario. No es una tarea para diletantes o personas con problemas de compromiso. No puede prosperar bajo un jardinero que la abandona durante varios años y luego aparece exigiendo la cosecha de este año como su tributo. Es injusto para el equipo formado hace años. Es injusto para ti. [...]
+
+Los subreddits no pertenecen a nadie, y especialmente no pertenecen a los titulares de las marcas. Pertenecen a sus comunidades, y la comunidad y sus moderadores tomaron la decisión de apoyar el traslado a r/PrivacyGuides.
+
+En los meses posteriores, BurungHantu ha amenazado y rogado para que le devuelvan el control del subreddit a su cuenta en [violación](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/wiki/top_mod_removal/) de las normas de Reddit:
+
+> No se permiten las represalias por parte de ningún moderador con respecto a las solicitudes de eliminación.
+
+Para una comunidad con muchos miles de suscriptores restantes, creemos que sería increíblemente irrespetuoso devolver el control de esa plataforma masiva a la persona que la abandonó durante más de un año, y que ahora gestiona un sitio web que, en nuestra opinión, proporciona información de muy baja calidad. Preservar los años de discusiones pasadas en esa comunidad es más importante para nosotros, y por lo tanto u/trai_dep y el resto del equipo de moderación del subreddit ha tomado la decisión de mantener r/privacytoolsIO como está.
+
+## OpenCollective Ahora
+
+Nuestra plataforma de recaudación de fondos, OpenCollective, es otra fuente de controversia. Nuestra posición es que OpenCollective fue puesto en marcha por nuestro equipo y gestionado por nuestro equipo para financiar los servicios que actualmente operamos y que PrivacyTools ya no hace. Nosotros [nos pusimos en contacto](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/updates/transitioning-to-privacy-guides) con todos nuestros donantes con respecto a nuestro traslado a Privacy Guides y fuimos apoyados unánimemente por nuestros patrocinadores y la comunidad.
+
+Por lo tanto, los fondos de OpenCollective pertenecen a Privacy Guides, fueron entregados a nuestro proyecto, y no al propietario de un nombre de dominio muy conocido. En el anuncio hecho a los donantes el 17 de septiembre de 2021, ofrecimos reembolsos a cualquier donante que no estuviera de acuerdo con la postura que adoptamos, pero nadie ha aceptado esta oferta:
+
+> Si algún patrocinador no está de acuerdo o se siente engañado por estos recientes acontecimientos y quiere solicitar un reembolso dadas estas circunstancias tan inusuales, por favor póngase en contacto con nuestro administrador del proyecto enviando un correo electrónico a jonah@triplebit.net.
+
+## Further Reading
+
+Este tema se ha debatido ampliamente en nuestras comunidades en varios lugares, y parece probable que la mayoría de las personas que lean esta página ya estén familiarizadas con los acontecimientos que condujeron al cambio a Privacy Guides. Algunas de nuestras publicaciones anteriores sobre el tema pueden tener detalles adicionales que omitimos aquí por razones de brevedad. Se han enlazado a continuación para completarlo.
+
+- [28 de junio de 2021: solicitud de control de r/privacytoolsIO](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/comments/o9tllh/requesting_rprivacytoolsio_im_only_active_mod_top/)
+- [27 de julio de 2021: anuncio de nuestras intenciones de mudanza en el blog de PrivacyTools, escrito por el equipo](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184422/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-future-of-privacytools/)
+- [13 de septiembre de 2021: anuncio del inicio de nuestra transición a las Guías de Privacidad en r/privacytoolsIO](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/pnql46/rprivacyguides_privacyguidesorg_what_you_need_to/)
+- [17 de septiembre, 2021: anuncio en OpenCollective de Jonah](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/updates/transitioning-to-privacy-guides)
+- [30 de septiembre de 2021: Hilo de Twitter en el que se detallan la mayoría de los acontecimientos que ahora se describen en esta página](https://twitter.com/privacy_guides/status/1443633412800225280)
+- [Oct 1, 2021: post de u/dng99 observando fallo de subdominio](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pymthv/comment/hexwrps/)
+- [2 de abril de 2022: respuesta de u/dng99 a la publicación acusatoria en el blog de PrivacyTools](https://www.reddit.com/comments/tuo7mm/comment/i35kw5a/)
+- [16 de mayo de 2022: respuesta de @TommyTran732 en Twitter](https://twitter.com/TommyTran732/status/1526153497984618496)
+- [3 de septiembre de 2022: post en el foro de Techlore por @dngray](https://discuss.techlore.tech/t/has-anyone-seen-this-video-wondering-your-thoughts/792/20)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/about/services.md b/i18n/es/about/services.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bf426bf81
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/about/services.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# Servicios de Privacy Guides
+
+Ejecutamos una serie de servicios web para probar las características y promover proyectos descentralizados, federados y/o de código abierto. Muchos de estos servicios están disponibles al público y están detallados a continuación.
+
+[:material-comment-alert: Reportar un problema](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/services/2 ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+## Discourse
+
+- Enlace: [discuss.privacyguides.net](https://discuss.privacyguides.net)
+- Disponibilidad: Pública
+- Código fuente: [github.com/discourse/discourse](https://github.com/discourse/discourse)
+
+## Gitea
+
+- Enlace: [code.privacyguides.dev](https://code.privacyguides.dev)
+- Disponibilidad: Sólo por invitación
+ El acceso puede otorgarse a solicitud de cualquier equipo trabajando en el desarrollo o contenido relacionado a *Privacy Guides*.
+- Código fuente: [snapcraft.io/gitea](https://snapcraft.io/gitea)
+
+## Matrix
+
+- Enlace: [matrix.privacyguides.org](https://matrix.privacyguides.org)
+- Disponibilidad: Sólo por invitación
+ El acceso puede otorgarse a solicitud de los miembros del equipo de Privacy Guides, los moderadores de Matrix, terceras partes administradoras de la comunidad Matrix, los operatores de bots de Matrix, y otros individuos en la necesidad de una presencia confiable de Matrix.
+- Código fuente: [github.com/spantaleev/matrix-docker-ansible-deploy](https://github.com/spantaleev/matrix-docker-ansible-deploy)
+
+## SearXNG
+
+- Enlace: [search.privacyguides.net](https://search.privacyguides.net)
+- Disponibilidad: Pública
+- Código fuente: [github.com/searxng/searxng-docker](https://github.com/searxng/searxng-docker)
+
+## Invidious
+
+- Enlace: [invidious.privacyguides.net](https://invidious.privacyguides.net)
+- Disponibilidad: Semipública
+ Alojamos Indivious principalmente para servir videos de YouTube incrustados en nuestra página. Esta instancia no está destinada al público general y puede ser limitada en cualquier momento.
+- Código fuente: [github.com/iv-org/invidious](https://github.com/iv-org/invidious)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/about/statistics.md b/i18n/es/about/statistics.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d528e3338
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/about/statistics.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: Estadísticas de tráfico
+---
+
+## Estadísticas de la página
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/advanced/communication-network-types.md b/i18n/es/advanced/communication-network-types.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f5cb21a02
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/advanced/communication-network-types.md
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+---
+title: "Tipos de redes de comunicación"
+icon: 'material/transit-connection-variant'
+---
+
+Existen varias arquitecturas de red utilizadas habitualmente para transmitir mensajes entre personas. Estas redes pueden ofrecer diferentes garantías de privacidad, por lo que conviene tener en cuenta tu [modelo de amenaza](../basics/threat-modeling.md) a la hora de decidir qué aplicación utilizar.
+
+[Servicios de mensajería instantánea recomendados](../real-time-communication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Redes centralizadas
+
+{ align=left }
+
+Los mensajeros centralizados son aquellos en los que todos los participantes están en el mismo servidor o red de servidores controlados por la misma organización.
+
+Algunos servicios de mensajería autoalojados te permiten configurar tu propio servidor. El autoalojamiento puede ofrecer garantías adicionales de privacidad, como la ausencia de registros de uso o el acceso limitado a los metadatos (datos sobre quién habla con quién). Los servicios de mensajería centralizados autoalojados están aislados y todos deben estar en el mismo servidor para comunicarse.
+
+**Ventajas:**
+
+- Las nuevas funciones y cambios pueden aplicarse más rápidamente.
+- Es más fácil empezar y encontrar contactos.
+- Ecosistemas de características más maduras y estables, ya que son más fáciles de programar en un software centralizado.
+- Los problemas de privacidad pueden reducirse cuando se confía en un servidor que está autoalojando.
+
+**Desventajas:**
+
+- Puede incluir [control o acceso restringido](https://drewdevault.com/2018/08/08/Signal.html). Esto puede incluir cosas como:
+- Estar [prohibido conectar clientes de terceros](https://github.com/LibreSignal/LibreSignal/issues/37#issuecomment-217211165) a la red centralizada que podría proporcionar una mayor personalización o una mejor experiencia. A menudo se define en los Términos y condiciones de uso.
+- Documentación pobre o nula para desarrolladores de terceros.
+- La [propiedad](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729191953/https://blog.privacytools.io/delisting-wire/), la política de privacidad y las operaciones del servicio pueden cambiar fácilmente cuando una sola entidad lo controla, pudiendo comprometer el servicio más adelante.
+- El autoalojamiento requiere esfuerzo y conocimiento de cómo configurar un servicio.
+
+## Redes federadas
+
+{ align=left }
+
+Los servicios de mensajería federados utilizan varios servidores independientes y descentralizados que pueden comunicarse entre sí (el correo electrónico es un ejemplo de servicio federado). La federación permite a los administradores de sistemas controlar su propio servidor y seguir formando parte de la red de comunicaciones más amplia.
+
+Cuando se autoaloja, los miembros de un servidor federado pueden descubrir y comunicarse con los miembros de otros servidores, aunque algunos servidores pueden optar por permanecer privados al no estar federados (por ejemplo, el servidor del equipo de trabajo).
+
+**Ventajas:**
+
+- Permite un mayor control sobre tus propios datos cuando administras tu propio servidor.
+- Te permite elegir en quién confiar tus datos eligiendo entre varios servidores "públicos".
+- A menudo permite los clientes de terceros que pueden ofrecer una experiencia más nativa, personalizada o accesible.
+- Se puede verificar que el software del servidor coincide con el código fuente público, suponiendo que se tiene acceso al servidor o se confía en la persona que lo tiene (por ejemplo, un familiar).
+
+**Desventajas:**
+
+- Añadir nuevas funcionalidades es más complejo porque estas funcionalidades tienen que ser estandarizadas y probadas para asegurar que funcionan con todos los servidores de la red.
+- Debido al punto anterior, pueden faltar funciones, o estar incompletas o funcionar de forma inesperada en comparación con las plataformas centralizadas, como la retransmisión de mensajes cuando se está desconectado o la eliminación de mensajes.
+- Algunos metadatos pueden estar disponibles (por ejemplo, información como "quién habla con quién", pero no el contenido real del mensaje si se utiliza E2EE).
+- Los servidores federados generalmente requieren confiar en el administrador de tu servidor. Puede que sean aficionados o que no sean "profesionales de la seguridad", y puede que no sirvan documentos estándar como una política de privacidad o unas condiciones de servicio que detallen cómo se utilizan tus datos.
+- Los administradores de los servidores a veces deciden bloquear otros servidores que son fuente de abusos no moderados o que rompen las normas generales de comportamiento aceptadas. Esto dificultará tu capacidad de comunicación con los miembros de esos servidores.
+
+## Redes par a par (P2P)
+
+{ align=left }
+
+Los servicios de mensajería P2P se conectan a una [red distribuida](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_distribuida) de nodos para transmitir un mensaje al destinatario sin necesidad de un servidor externo.
+
+Los clientes (pares) suelen encontrarse entre sí mediante el uso de una red de [computación distribuida](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computación_distribuida). Ejemplos de esto incluyen la [Tabla de hash distribuida](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tabla_de_hash_distribuida) (DHT), usada por [torrents](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent) y [IPFS](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sistema_de_archivos_interplanetario) por ejemplo. Otro enfoque son las redes basadas en la proximidad, en las que se establece una conexión a través de WiFi o Bluetooth (por ejemplo, Briar o el protocolo de red social [Scuttlebutt](https://www.scuttlebutt.nz)).
+
+Una vez que un par ha encontrado una ruta a su contacto a través de cualquiera de estos métodos, se establece una conexión directa entre ellos. Aunque los mensajes suelen estar encriptados, un observador puede deducir la ubicación y la identidad del remitente y del destinatario.
+
+Las redes P2P no utilizan servidores, ya que los pares se comunican directamente entre sí y, por tanto, no pueden ser autoalojadas. Sin embargo, algunos servicios adicionales pueden depender de servidores centralizados, como el descubrimiento de usuarios o la retransmisión de mensajes sin conexión, que pueden beneficiarse del autoalojamiento.
+
+**Ventajas:**
+
+- La información que se expone a terceros es mínima.
+- Las plataformas P2P modernas implementan E2EE por defecto. No hay servidores que puedan interceptar y descifrar tus transmisiones, a diferencia de los modelos centralizados y federados.
+
+**Desventajas:**
+
+- Conjunto de funciones reducido:
+- Los mensajes solo pueden enviarse cuando ambos pares están en línea, sin embargo, tu cliente puede almacenar los mensajes localmente para esperar a que el contacto vuelva a estar en línea.
+- Por lo general, aumenta el uso de la batería en los dispositivos móviles, ya que el cliente debe permanecer conectado a la red distribuida para saber quién está conectado.
+- Es posible que algunas funciones comunes de mensajería no se implementen o sean incompletas, como la eliminación de mensajes.
+- Tu dirección IP y la de los contactos con los que te comunicas puede quedar expuesta si no utilizas el software junto con una [VPN](../vpn.md) o [Tor](../tor.md). Muchos países tienen alguna forma de vigilancia masiva y/o retención de metadatos.
+
+## Enrutamiento anónimo
+
+{ align=left }
+
+Un servicio de mensajería que utilice [enrutamiento anónimo](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_628) oculta la identidad del emisor, del receptor o la evidencia de que se han comunicado. Idealmente, un servicio de mensajería debería ocultar los tres.
+
+Hay [muchas](https://doi.org/10.1145/3182658) formas diferentes de implementar el enrutamiento anónimo. Una de las más famosas es el [enrutamiento cebolla](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encaminamiento_cebolla) (es decir, [Tor](tor-overview.md)), que comunica mensajes cifrados a través de una red [superpuesta virtual](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_superpuesta) que oculta la ubicación de cada nodo, así como el destinatario y el remitente de cada mensaje. El remitente y el destinatario nunca interactúan directamente y solo se reúnen a través de un nodo de encuentro secreto para que no haya filtración de direcciones IP ni de la ubicación física. Los nodos no pueden descifrar los mensajes, ni el destino final; solo el destinatario puede hacerlo. Cada nodo intermediario solo puede desencriptar una parte que indica a dónde enviar el mensaje aún encriptado a continuación, hasta que llega al destinatario que puede desencriptarlo completamente, de ahí las "capas de cebolla."
+
+El autoalojamiento de un nodo en una red de enrutamiento anónimo no proporciona al anfitrión beneficios adicionales de privacidad, sino que contribuye a la resistencia de toda la red contra los ataques de identificación en beneficio de todos.
+
+**Ventajas:**
+
+- La información que se expone a otras partes es mínima o nula.
+- Los mensajes pueden transmitirse de forma descentralizada incluso si una de las partes está desconectada.
+
+**Desventajas:**
+
+- Lenta propagación de mensajes.
+- A menudo se limita a menos tipos de medios, sobre todo de texto, ya que la red es lenta.
+- Menos fiable si los nodos se seleccionan mediante enrutamiento aleatorio, algunos nodos pueden estar muy lejos del emisor y del receptor, añadiendo latencia o incluso dejando de transmitir mensajes si uno de los nodos se desconecta.
+- Más complejo para empezar, ya que se requiere la creación y el respaldo seguro de una clave privada criptográfica.
+- Al igual que en otras plataformas descentralizadas, añadir funciones es más complejo para los desarrolladores que en una plataforma centralizada. Por lo tanto, pueden faltar funciones o estar implementadas de forma incompleta, como la retransmisión de mensajes fuera de línea o la eliminación de mensajes.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/advanced/dns-overview.md b/i18n/es/advanced/dns-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..35097c1fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/advanced/dns-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+---
+title: "Resumen DNS"
+icon: material/dns
+---
+
+El [Sistema de Nombres de Dominio](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sistema_de_nombres_de_dominio) es el 'directorio telefónico del Internet'. El DNS traduce los nombres de dominio a direcciones IP para que los navegadores y otros servicios puedan cargar los recursos de Internet, a través de una red descentralizada de servidores.
+
+## ¿Qué es el DNS?
+
+Cuando visitas un sitio web, se devuelve una dirección numérica. Por ejemplo, cuando visitas `privacyguides.org`, la dirección `192.98.54.105` es devuelta.
+
+DNS ha existido desde los [primeros días](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sistema_de_nombres_de_dominio#Historia) de Internet. Las solicitudes DNS realizadas desde y hacia servidores DNS **no** son generalmente cifradas. En un entorno residencial, el cliente recibe servidores del ISP a través de [DHCP](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protocolo_de_configuraci%C3%B3n_din%C3%A1mica_de_host).
+
+Las solicitudes de DNS sin cifrar pueden ser fácilmente **vigiladas** y **modificadas** en tránsito. En algunas partes del mundo, a los ISP se les ordena que hagan un [filtrado de DNS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) primitivo. Cuando se solicita la dirección IP de un dominio que está bloqueado, es posible que el servidor no responda o lo haga con una dirección IP diferente. Como el protocolo DNS no está encriptado, el ISP (o cualquier operador de red) puede utilizar [DPI](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inspecci%C3%B3n_profunda_de_paquete) para controlar las solicitudes. Los ISP también pueden bloquear las solicitudes en función de características comunes, independientemente del servidor DNS que se utilice. El DNS no cifrado siempre utiliza el [puerto](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Puerto_de_red) 53 y siempre utiliza UDP.
+
+A continuación, discutimos y proporcionamos un tutorial para probar lo que un observador externo puede ver usando DNS regulares sin encriptar y [DNS encriptado](#what-is-encrypted-dns).
+
+### DNS sin cifrado
+
+1. Usando [`tshark`](https://www.wireshark.org/docs/man-pages/tshark.html) (parte del proyecto [Wireshark](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wireshark)) podemos monitorear y registrar el flujo de paquetes de Internet. Este comando registra los paquetes que cumplen las reglas especificadas:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/dns.pcap udp port 53 and host 1.1.1.1 or host 8.8.8.8
+ ```
+
+2. Entonces podemos usar [`dig`](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dig_(comando)) (Linux, macOS, etc) o [`nslookup`](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nslookup) (Windows) para enviar la búsqueda DNS a ambos servidores. Software como los navegadores web hacen estas búsquedas automáticamente, a menos que estén configurados para usar DNS cifrado.
+
+ === "Linux, macOS"
+
+ ```
+ dig +noall +answer privacyguides.org @1.1.1.1
+ dig +noall +answer privacyguides.org @8.8.8.8
+ ```
+ === "Windows"
+
+ ```
+ nslookup privacyguides.org 1.1.1.1
+ nslookup privacyguides.org 8.8.8.8
+ ```
+
+3. A continuación, queremos [analizar](https://www.wireshark.org/docs/wsug_html_chunked/ChapterIntroduction.html#ChIntroWhatIs) los resultados:
+
+ === "Wireshark"
+
+ ```
+ wireshark -r /tmp/dns.pcap
+ ```
+
+ === "tshark"
+
+ ```
+ tshark -r /tmp/dns.pcap
+ ```
+
+Si ejecutas el comando Wireshark anterior, el panel superior muestra los "[frames](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethernet_frame)", y el panel inferior muestra todos los datos sobre el frame seleccionado. Las soluciones empresariales de filtrado y monitorización (como las adquiridas por los gobiernos) pueden realizar el proceso de forma automática, sin interacción humana, y pueden agregar esas tramas para producir datos estadísticos útiles para el observador de la red.
+
+| No. | Tiempo | Fuente | Destino | Protocolo | Duración | Información |
+| --- | -------- | --------- | --------- | ------------------------- | -------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| 1 | 0.000000 | 192.0.2.1 | 1.1.1.1 | Almacenamiento en la Nube | 104 | Consulta estándar 0x58ba A privacyguides.org OPT |
+| 2 | 0.293395 | 1.1.1.1 | 192.0.2.1 | Almacenamiento en la Nube | 108 | Respuesta de consulta estándar 0x58ba A privacyguides.org A 198.98.54.105 OPT |
+| 3 | 1.682109 | 192.0.2.1 | 8.8.8.8 | Almacenamiento en la Nube | 104 | Consulta estándar 0xf1a9 A privacyguides.org OPT |
+| 4 | 2.154698 | 8.8.8.8 | 192.0.2.1 | Almacenamiento en la Nube | 108 | Respuesta de consulta estándar 0xf1a9 A privacyguides.org A 198.98.54.105 OPT |
+
+Un observador podría modificar cualquiera de estos paquetes.
+
+## ¿Qué es "DNS cifrado"?
+
+DNS cifrado puede referirse a uno de un número de protocolos, siendo los más comunes:
+
+### DNSCrypt
+
+[**DNSCrypt**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNSCrypt) fue uno de los primeros métodos de encriptación de consultas DNS. DNSCrypt opera en el puerto 443 y funciona con los protocolos de transporte TCP o UDP. DNSCrypt nunca ha sido enviado al [Grupo de Trabajo de Ingeniería en Internet (IETF)](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grupo_de_Trabajo_de_Ingenier%C3%ADa_de_Internet) ni ha pasado por el proceso de ["Request for Comments" (RFC)](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Request_for_Comments) por lo que no ha sido utilizado ampliamente fuera de unas pocas [implementaciones](https://dnscrypt.info/implementations). Como resultado, ha sido sustituido en gran medida por el más popular [DNS sobre HTTPS](#dns-over-https-doh).
+
+### DNS sobre TLS (DoT)
+
+[**DNS sobre TLS**](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_mediante_TLS) es otro método para cifrar la comunicación DNS que se define en [RFC 7858](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7858). La compatibilidad se implementó por primera vez en Android 9, iOS 14 y en Linux en [systemd-resolved](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/resolved.conf.html#DNSOverTLS=) en la versión 237. La preferencia en la industria se ha estado alejando del DoT al DoH en los últimos años, ya que el DoT es un [protocolo complejo](https://dnscrypt.info/faq/) y tiene un cumplimiento variable del RFC en todas las implementaciones que existen. DoT también opera en un puerto dedicado 853 que puede ser bloqueado fácilmente por cortafuegos restrictivos.
+
+### DNS sobre HTTPS (DoH)
+
+[**DNS sobre HTTPS**](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_mediante_HTTPS) como se define en [RFC 8484](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8484) empaqueta las consultas en el protocolo [HTTP/2](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/2) y proporciona seguridad con HTTPS. La compatibilidad se añadió por primera vez en navegadores web como Firefox 60 y Chrome 83.
+
+La implementación nativa de DoH apareció en iOS 14, macOS 11, Microsoft Windows y Android 13 (sin embargo, no estará habilitada [por defecto](https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/packages/modules/DnsResolver/+/1833144)). El soporte general de los escritorios de Linux está a la espera de la [implementación](https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/8639) de systemd por lo que [la instalación de software de terceros sigue siendo necesaria](../dns.md#linux).
+
+## ¿Qué puede ver un tercero?
+
+En este ejemplo registraremos lo que sucede cuando hacemos una solicitud de DoH:
+
+1. En primer lugar, inicia `tshark`:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/dns_doh.pcap -f "tcp port https and host 1.1.1.1"
+ ```
+
+2. En segundo lugar, hace una petición con `curl`:
+
+ ```bash
+ curl -vI --doh-url https://1.1.1.1/dns-query https://privacyguides.org
+ ```
+
+3. Después de hacer la solicitud, podemos detener la captura de paquetes con CTRL + C.
+
+4. Analiza los resultados en Wireshark:
+
+ ```bash
+ wireshark -r /tmp/dns_doh.pcap
+ ```
+
+Podemos ver el [establecimiento de la conexión](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protocolo_de_control_de_transmisi%C3%B3n#Establecimiento_de_la_conexi%C3%B3n_(negociaci%C3%B3n_en_tres_pasos)) y [enlace TLS](https://www.cloudflare.com/es-es/learning/ssl/what-happens-in-a-tls-handshake/) que ocurre con cualquier conexión encriptada. Al mirar los paquetes de "datos de aplicación" que siguen, ninguno de ellos contiene el dominio que solicitamos ni la dirección IP devuelta.
+
+## ¿Por qué **no debería** utilizar un DNS cifrado?
+
+En los lugares en los que existe el filtrado de Internet (o la censura), visitar recursos prohibidos puede tener sus propias consecuencias, que deberás tener en cuenta en tu [modelo de amenazas](../basics/threat-modeling.md). Nosotros **no** sugerimos el uso de DNS encriptados para este propósito. Usa [Tor](https://torproject.org) o una [VPN](../vpn.md) en su lugar. Si estás usando una VPN, deberías usar los servidores DNS de tu VPN. Al utilizar una VPN, ya les estás confiando toda tu actividad en la red.
+
+Cuando hacemos una búsqueda en el DNS, generalmente es porque queremos acceder a un recurso. A continuación, hablaremos de algunos de los métodos que pueden revelar tus actividades de navegación incluso cuando se utiliza un DNS cifrado:
+
+### Dirección IP
+
+La forma más sencilla de determinar la actividad de navegación podría ser mirar las direcciones IP a las que acceden sus dispositivos. Por ejemplo, si el observador sabe que `privacyguides.org` está en `198.98.54.105`, y tu dispositivo solicita datos de `198.98.54.105`, es muy probable que estés visitando Privacy Guides.
+
+Este método sólo es útil cuando la dirección IP pertenece a un servidor que sólo aloja unos pocos sitios web. Tampoco es muy útil si el sitio está alojado en una plataforma compartida (por ejemplo, Github Pages, Cloudflare Pages, Netlify, WordPress, Blogger, etc). Tampoco es muy útil si el servidor está alojado detrás de un [proxy inverso](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proxy_inverso), lo cual es muy común en la Internet moderna.
+
+### Indicación del Nombre del Servidor (SNI)
+
+La Indicación del Nombre del Servidor se suele utilizar cuando una dirección IP aloja muchos sitios web. Esto podría ser un servicio como Cloudflare, o alguna otra protección de [ataque de denegación de servicio](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ataque_de_denegaci%C3%B3n_de_servicio).
+
+1. Comienza a capturar de nuevo con `tshark`. Hemos añadido un filtro con nuestra dirección IP para que no captures muchos paquetes:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/pg.pcap port 443 and host 198.98.54.105
+ ```
+
+2. Luego visitamos [https://privacyguides.org](https://privacyguides.org).
+
+3. Después de visitar el sitio web, queremos detener la captura de paquetes con CTRL + C.
+
+4. A continuación queremos analizar los resultados:
+
+ ```bash
+ wireshark -r /tmp/pg.pcap
+ ```
+
+ Veremos el establecimiento de la conexión, seguido del enlace TLS para el sitio web de Privacy Guides. Alrededor del marco 5. verás un "Client Hello".
+
+5. Expande el triángulo ▸ junto a cada campo:
+
+ ```text
+ ▸ Transport Layer Security
+ ▸ TLSv1.3 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
+ ▸ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
+ ▸ Extension: server_name (len=22)
+ ▸ Server Name Indication extension
+ ```
+
+6. Podemos ver el valor SNI que revela el sitio web que estamos visitando. El comando `tshark` puede darte el valor directamente para todos los paquetes que contienen un valor SNI:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -r /tmp/pg.pcap -Tfields -Y tls.handshake.extensions_server_name -e tls.handshake.extensions_server_name
+ ```
+
+Esto significa que incluso si estamos utilizando servidores "DNS cifrados", es probable que el dominio se divulgue a través de SNI. El protocolo [TLS v1.3](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seguridad_de_la_capa_de_transporte#TLS_1.3) trae consigo [Client Hello Encriptado](https://blog.cloudflare.com/encrypted-client-hello/), que evita este tipo de fugas.
+
+Los gobiernos, en particular de [China](https://www.zdnet.com/article/china-is-now-blocking-all-encrypted-https-traffic-using-tls-1-3-and-esni/) y [Russia](https://www.zdnet.com/article/russia-wants-to-ban-the-use-of-secure-protocols-such-as-tls-1-3-doh-dot-esni/), ya han [empezado a bloquearlo](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication#Funcionamiento_de_ESNI) o han expresado su deseo de hacerlo. Recientemente, Rusia ha [comenzado a bloquear sitios web extranjeros](https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/108) que utilizan el estándar [HTTP/3](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3). Esto se debe a que el protocolo [QUIC](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/QUIC) que forma parte de HTTP/3 requiere que `ClientHello` también esté cifrado.
+
+### Protocolo de comprobación del Estado de un Certificado En línea (OCSP)
+
+Otra forma en que tu navegador puede revelar tus actividades de navegación es con el [Protocolo de comprobación del Estado de un Certificado En línea](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_Certificate_Status_Protocol). Al visitar un sitio web HTTPS, el navegador puede comprobar si el [certificado](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificado_de_clave_p%C3%BAblica) del sitio web ha sido revocado. Esto se hace generalmente a través del protocolo HTTP, lo que significa que **no** está cifrado.
+
+La solicitud OCSP contiene el "[número de serie](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificado_de_clave_p%C3%BAblica#Campos_comunes)" del certificado, que es único. Se envía al "Respondedor OCSP" para comprobar su estado.
+
+Podemos simular lo que haría un navegador utilizando el comando [`openssl`](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenSSL).
+
+1. Obtén el certificado del servidor y usa [`sed`](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sed_(inform%C3%A1tica)) para conservar sólo la parte importante y escribirla en un archivo:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl s_client -connect privacyguides.org:443 < /dev/null 2>&1 |
+ sed -n '/^-*BEGIN/,/^-*END/p' > /tmp/pg_server.cert
+ ```
+
+2. Obtén el certificado intermedio. Las [Autoridades de Certificación (CA)](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autoridad_de_certificaci%C3%B3n) normalmente no firman un certificado directamente; utilizan lo que se conoce como un certificado "intermedio".
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl s_client -showcerts -connect privacyguides.org:443 < /dev/null 2>&1 |
+ sed -n '/^-*BEGIN/,/^-*END/p' > /tmp/pg_and_intermediate.cert
+ ```
+
+3. El primer certificado en `pg_and_intermediate.cert` es en realidad el certificado del servidor del paso 1. Podemos usar `sed` de nuevo para borrar hasta la primera instancia de END:
+
+ ```bash
+ sed -n '/^-*END CERTIFICATE-*$/!d;:a n;p;ba' \
+ /tmp/pg_and_intermediate.cert > /tmp/intermediate_chain.cert
+ ```
+
+4. Obtén el respondedor OCSP para el certificado del servidor:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl x509 -noout -ocsp_uri -in /tmp/pg_server.cert
+ ```
+
+ Nuestro certificado muestra el respondedor del certificado Lets Encrypt. Si queremos ver todos los detalles del certificado podemos utilizar:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl x509 -text -noout -in /tmp/pg_server.cert
+ ```
+
+5. Inicia la captura de paquetes:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap -f "tcp port http"
+ ```
+
+6. Realiza la solicitud OCSP:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl ocsp -issuer /tmp/intermediate_chain.cert \
+ -cert /tmp/pg_server.cert \
+ -text \
+ -url http://r3.o.lencr.org
+ ```
+
+7. Abre la captura:
+
+ ```bash
+ wireshark -r /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap
+ ```
+
+ Habrá dos paquetes con el protocolo "OCSP": una "Solicitud" y una "Respuesta". Para la "Solicitud" podemos ver el "número de serie" expandiendo el triángulo ▸ al lado de cada campo:
+
+ ```bash
+ ▸ Online Certificate Status Protocol
+ ▸ tbsRequest
+ ▸ requestList: 1 item
+ ▸ Request
+ ▸ reqCert
+ serialNumber
+ ```
+
+ Para la "Respuesta" también podemos ver el "número de serie":
+
+ ```bash
+ ▸ Online Certificate Status Protocol
+ ▸ responseBytes
+ ▸ BasicOCSPResponse
+ ▸ tbsResponseData
+ ▸ responses: 1 item
+ ▸ SingleResponse
+ ▸ certID
+ serialNumber
+ ```
+
+8. O usa `tshark` para filtrar los paquetes por el número de serie:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -r /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap -Tfields -Y ocsp.serialNumber -e ocsp.serialNumber
+ ```
+
+Si el observador de red tiene el certificado público, que está disponible públicamente, puede hacer coincidir el número de serie con ese certificado y, por lo tanto, determinar el sitio que estás visitando a partir de ese. El proceso puede automatizarse y asociar las direcciones IP con los números de serie. También es posible consultar los registros de [Certificate Transparency](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_Transparency) para conocer el número de serie.
+
+## ¿Debería utilizar un DNS cifrado?
+
+Hemos elaborado este diagrama de flujo para describir cuándo *deberías* usar el DNS cifrado:
+
+``` mermaid
+graph TB
+ Comienzo[Start] --> anonymous{¿Tratando de ser anónimo?}
+ anonymous--> | Sí | tor(Usa Tor)
+ anonymous --> | No | censorship{¿Evitando la censura?}
+ censorship --> | Sí | vpnOrTor(Usa una VPN o Tor)
+ censorship --> | No | privacy{¿Quieres privacidad del ISP?}
+ privacy --> | Sí | vpnOrTor
+ privacy --> | No | obnoxious{¿El ISP hace odiosas redirecciones?}
+ obnoxious --> | Sí | encryptedDNS(Usa DNS cifrado con terceros)
+ obnoxious --> | No | ispDNS{¿El ISP soporta DNS cifrado?}
+ ispDNS --> | Sí | useISP(Usa DNS cifrado con ISP)
+ ispDNS --> | No | nothing(No hagas nada)
+```
+
+El DNS cifrado con un tercero solo debe usarse para evitar redirecciones y el [bloqueo básico de DNS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) cuando puedas estar seguro de que no habrá consecuencias o estés interesado en un proveedor que realice un filtrado rudimentario.
+
+[Lista de servidores DNS recomendados](../dns.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## ¿Qué es DNSSEC?
+
+Las [extensiones de seguridad para el sistema de nombres de dominio](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Extensions) (DNSSEC) son una función del DNS que autentifica las respuestas a las búsquedas de nombres de dominio. No proporciona protecciones de privacidad para esas búsquedas, sino que evita que los atacantes manipulen o envenenen las respuestas a las solicitudes de DNS.
+
+En otras palabras, DNSSEC firma digitalmente los datos para ayudar a garantizar su validez. Para garantizar una búsqueda segura, la firma se produce en todos los niveles del proceso de búsqueda del DNS. Como resultado, todas las respuestas del DNS son de confianza.
+
+El proceso de firma de DNSSEC es similar al de alguien que firma un documento legal con un bolígrafo; esa persona firma con una firma única que nadie más puede crear, y un perito judicial puede mirar esa firma y verificar que el documento fue firmado por esa persona. Estas firmas digitales garantizan que los datos no han sido manipulados.
+
+DNSSEC implementa una política de firma digital jerárquica en todas las capas del DNS. Por ejemplo, en el caso de una búsqueda en `privacyguides.org`, un servidor DNS raíz firmaría una clave para el servidor de nombres `.org`, y el servidor de nombres `.org` firmaría entonces una clave para el servidor de nombres autoritativo `privacyguides.org`.
+
+Adaptado de [DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) overview](https://cloud.google.com/dns/docs/dnssec) por Google y [DNSSEC: An Introduction](https://blog.cloudflare.com/dnssec-an-introduction/) por Cloudflare, ambos licensiados bajo [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
+
+## ¿Qué es la minimización de QNAME?
+
+Un QNAME es un "nombre cualificado", por ejemplo `privacyguides.org`. La minimización de QNAME reduce la cantidad de información enviada desde el servidor DNS al [servidor de nombres autoritativo](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Servidor_de_nombres).
+
+En lugar de enviar todo el dominio `privacyguides.org`, la minimización de QNAME significa que el servidor DNS pedirá todos los registros que terminen en `.org`. Una descripción técnica más detallada se encuentra en [RFC 7816](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7816).
+
+## ¿Qué es la Subred del Cliente EDNS (ECS)?
+
+La [Subred de Cliente EDNS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EDNS_Client_Subnet) es un método para que un resolvedor DNS recursivo especifique una [subred](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subred) para el [host o cliente](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cliente_(inform%C3%A1tica)) que está realizando la consulta DNS.
+
+Su objetivo es "acelerar" la entrega de datos dando al cliente una respuesta que pertenece a un servidor que está cerca de él, como una [red de distribución de contenidos](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_de_distribuci%C3%B3n_de_contenidos), que se utilizan a menudo en la transmisión de vídeo y el servicio de aplicaciones web de JavaScript.
+
+Esta característica tiene un coste de privacidad, ya que indica al servidor DNS cierta información sobre la ubicación del cliente.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/advanced/tor-overview.md b/i18n/es/advanced/tor-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f54692182
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/advanced/tor-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+---
+title: "Resumen de Tor"
+icon: 'simple/torproject'
+---
+
+Tor es una red descentralizada y gratuita diseñada para utilizar Internet con la mayor privacidad posible. Si se utiliza correctamente, la red permite la navegación y las comunicaciones privadas y anónimas.
+
+## Construcción de ruta
+
+Tor funciona enrutando tu tráfico a través de una red compuesta por miles de servidores gestionados por voluntarios llamados nodos (o repetidores).
+
+Cada vez que te conectes a Tor, elegirá tres nodos para construir una ruta a Internet-esta ruta se llama "circuito." Cada uno de estos nodos tiene su propia función:
+
+### El nodo de entrada
+
+El nodo de entrada, a menudo llamado nodo de guardia, es el primer nodo al que se conecta tu cliente Tor. El nodo de entrada puede ver tu dirección IP, pero no puede ver a qué te estás conectando.
+
+A diferencia de los otros nodos, el cliente Tor seleccionará aleatoriamente un nodo de entrada y se quedará con él durante dos o tres meses para protegerte de ciertos ataques.[^1]
+
+### El nodo medio
+
+El nodo del medio es el segundo nodo al que se conecta tu cliente Tor. Puede ver de qué nodo procede el tráfico -el nodo de entrada- y a qué nodo se dirige a continuación. El nodo intermedio no puede, ver tu dirección IP o el dominio al que te estás conectando.
+
+Para cada nuevo circuito, el nodo central se selecciona aleatoriamente de entre todos los nodos Tor disponibles.
+
+### El nodo de salida
+
+El nodo de salida es el punto en el que tu tráfico web abandona la red Tor y es reenviado a su destino deseado. El nodo de salida no puede ver tu dirección IP, pero sí sabe a qué sitio te estás conectando.
+
+El nodo de salida será elegido al azar de entre todos los nodos Tor disponibles ejecutados con una bandera de retransmisión de salida.[^2]
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ Ruta del circuito de tor
+
+
+## Cifrado
+
+Tor encripta cada paquete (un bloque de datos transmitidos) tres veces con las claves del nodo de salida, medio y de entrada, en ese orden.
+
+Una vez que Tor ha construido un circuito, la transmisión de datos se realiza de la siguiente manera:
+
+1. En primer lugar: cuando el paquete llega al nodo de entrada, se elimina la primera capa de cifrado. En este paquete encriptado, el nodo de entrada encontrará otro paquete encriptado con la dirección del nodo intermedio. El nodo de entrada reenviará entonces el paquete al nodo intermedio.
+
+2. Segundo: cuando el nodo intermedio recibe el paquete del nodo de entrada, también elimina una capa de encriptación con su clave, y esta vez encuentra un paquete encriptado con la dirección del nodo de salida. El nodo intermedio reenviará entonces el paquete al nodo de salida.
+
+3. Por último, cuando el nodo de salida reciba su paquete, eliminará la última capa de cifrado con su clave. El nodo de salida verá la dirección de destino y reenviará el paquete a esa dirección.
+
+A continuación se presenta un diagrama alternativo que muestra el proceso. Cada nodo elimina su propia capa de encriptación, y cuando el servidor de destino devuelve los datos, el mismo proceso ocurre completamente a la inversa. Por ejemplo, el nodo de salida no sabe quién eres, pero sí sabe de qué nodo procede, por lo que añade su propia capa de encriptación y lo envía de vuelta.
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ Envío y recepción de datos a través de la red Tor
+
+
+Tor nos permite conectarnos a un servidor sin que nadie conozca la ruta completa. El nodo de entrada sabe quién eres, pero no a dónde vas; el nodo intermedio no sabe quién eres ni a dónde vas; y el nodo de salida sabe a dónde vas, pero no quién eres. Como el nodo de salida es el que realiza la conexión final, el servidor de destino nunca conocerá tu dirección IP.
+
+## Advertencias
+
+Aunque Tor proporciona fuertes garantías de privacidad, uno debe ser consciente de que Tor no es perfecto:
+
+- Los adversarios bien financiados con la capacidad de observar pasivamente la mayor parte del tráfico de la red en todo el mundo tienen la posibilidad de desanonimizar a los usuarios de Tor mediante el análisis avanzado del tráfico. Tor tampoco te protege de exponerte por error, como por ejemplo si compartes demasiada información sobre tu identidad real.
+- Los nodos de salida de Tor también pueden monitorear el tráfico que pasa a través de ellos. Esto significa que el tráfico que no está encriptado, como el tráfico HTTP simple, puede ser grabado y monitoreado. Si dicho tráfico contiene información personal identificable, entonces puede desanonimizarlo a ese nodo de salida. Por lo tanto, recomendamos utilizar HTTPS sobre Tor siempre que sea posible.
+
+Si deseas utilizar Tor para navegar por la web, sólo recomendamos el navegador Tor Browser **oficial**-está diseñado para evitar las huellas digitales.
+
+- [Tor Browser :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../tor.md#tor-browser)
+
+## Recursos Adicionales
+
+- [Manual del usuario del navegador Tor](https://tb-manual.torproject.org)
+- [¿Cómo funciona Tor? - Computerphile](https://invidious.privacyguides.net/embed/QRYzre4bf7I?local=true) (YouTube)
+- [Servicios Onion de Tor - Computerphile](https://invidious.privacyguides.net/embed/lVcbq_a5N9I?local=true) (YouTube)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
+
+[^1]: El primer repetidor en tu circuito se llama "guardia de entrada" o "guardia". Es un repetidor rápido y estable que se mantiene como el primero en tu circuito durante 2-3 meses para protegerse de un ataque conocido de ruptura del anonimato. El resto de tu circuito cambia con cada nuevo sitio web que visitas, y todos juntos estos repetidores proporcionan las protecciones de privacidad completas de Tor. Para obtener más información sobre el funcionamiento de los repetidores de protección, consulta esta [entrada del blog](https://blog.torproject.org/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters) y el [documento](https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/single_guard.pdf) sobre los guardias de entrada. ([https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2/](https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2/))
+
+[^2]: Bandera de repetidor: una (des)calificación de los repetidores para las posiciones de los circuitos (por ejemplo, "Guardia", "Salida", "MalaSalida"), las propiedades de los circuitos (por ejemplo, "Rápido", "Estable"), o los roles (por ejemplo, "Autoridad", "HSDir"), tal y como los asignan las autoridades de los directorios y se definen con más detalle en la especificación del protocolo del directorio. ([https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html](https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html))
diff --git a/i18n/es/android.md b/i18n/es/android.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..85d51ee58
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/android.md
@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+---
+title: "Android"
+icon: 'fontawesome/brands/android'
+---
+
+{ align=right }
+
+El **proyecto de código abierto de Android** es un sistema operativo móvil de código abierto liderado por Google, que está detrás de la mayor parte de los dispositivos móviles del mundo. La mayor parte de los teléfono vendidos con Android son modificados para incluir integraciones y aplicaciones invasivas como los servicios de Google Play, así que puedes mejorar la privacidad de tu dispositivo móvil de manera significativa al reemplazar la instalación predeterminada de tu teléfono con una versión de Android sin esas características invasivas.
+
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://source.android.com/){ .card-link title=Homepage }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://source.android.com/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+En particular, GrapheneOS admite [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play). Los Servicios de Google Play se pueden ejecutar completamente de manera aislada como una aplicación de usuario normal y se pueden incluir en un [perfil de trabajo o un perfil de usuario](#android-security-privacy) de su elección.
+
+- [General Android Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/android-overview.md)
+- [Por qué recomendamos GrapheneOS sobre CalyxOS :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/)
+
+## Derivados de AOSP
+
+We recommend installing one of these custom Android operating systems on your device, listed in order of preference, depending on your device's compatibility with these operating systems.
+
+!!! note
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GrapheneOS** es la mejor opción cuando se trata de privacidad y seguridad. GrapheneOS proporciona mejoras adicionales de [seguridad](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Endurecimiento_(inform%C3%A1tica)) y de privacidad.
+
+### GrapheneOS
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ Los dispositivos de "soporte extendido" de GrapheneOS no tienen correcciones de seguridad completos (actualizaciones de firmware) debido a que el fabricante de equipos originales (OEM) suspende el soporte.
+
+ Estos dispositivos no pueden considerarse completamente seguros. It has a [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), network and sensor permissions, and various other [security features](https://grapheneos.org/features). GrapheneOS also comes with full firmware updates and signed builds, so verified boot is fully supported.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://grapheneos.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://grapheneos.org/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Para complacer a los usuarios que necesitan Google Play Services, CalyxOS incluye de manera opcional [MicroG](https://microg.org/). Con MicroG, CalyxOS también se incluye en los servicios de localización de [Mozilla](https://location.services.mozilla.com/) y [DejaVu](https://github.com/n76/DejaVu).
+
+Google Pixel phones are the only devices that currently meet GrapheneOS's [hardware security requirements](https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-support).
+
+### CalyxOS
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **CalyxOS** es una alternativa aceptable a GrapheneOS.
+ Tiene algunas funciones de privacidad además de AOSP, que incluyen [Datura firewall](https://calyxos.org/docs/tech/datura-details), [Signal](https://signal.org) integración en la aplicación de marcación y un botón de pánico incorporado. CalyxOS también viene con actualizaciones de firmware y compilaciones firmadas, así que [el arranque verificado](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) es completamente compatible.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://divestos.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://divestoseb5nncsydt7zzf5hrfg44md4bxqjs5ifcv4t7gt7u6ohjyyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=privacy_policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/divested-mobile){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+DivestOS has automated kernel vulnerability ([CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures)) [patching](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/cve_checker), fewer proprietary blobs, and a custom [hosts](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=dnsbl) file. recommendation DivestOS also includes kernel patches from GrapheneOS and enables all available kernel security features via [defconfig hardening](https://github.com/Divested-Mobile/DivestOS-Build/blob/master/Scripts/Common/Functions.sh#L758). All kernels newer than version 3.4 include full page [sanitization](https://lwn.net/Articles/334747/) and all ~22 Clang-compiled kernels have [`-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero`](https://reviews.llvm.org/D54604?id=174471) enabled.
+
+DivestOS ha automatizado el [parchamiento vulnerabilidad del kernel](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/cve_checker) ([CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures)), menos blobs propietarios, un archivo personalizado de [hosts](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=dnsbl), y [F-Droid](https://www.f-droid.org) como tienda de aplicaciones. Incluye [UnifiedNlp](https://github.com/microg/UnifiedNlp) para la localización de la red. 17.1 and higher features GrapheneOS's per-network full [MAC randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address#Randomization) option, [`ptrace_scope`](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.html) control, and automatic reboot/Wi-Fi/Bluetooth [timeout options](https://grapheneos.org/features).
+
+DivestOS también incluye parches de GrapheneOS para el kernel y habilita todas las características de seguridad del kernel disponibles a través de [endurecimiento defconfig](https://github.com/Divested-Mobile/DivestOS-Build/blob/master/Scripts/Common/Functions.sh#L758). Todos los kernels más recientes que la versión 3.4 incluyen [saneamiento](https://lwn.net/Articles/334747/) página completa y todos los ~22 kernels compilados por Clang tienen [`-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero`](https://reviews.llvm.org/D54604?id=174471) habilitado. However, doing so on DivestOS isn't viable; the developers update their apps via their own F-Droid repositories ([DivestOS Official](https://divestos.org/fdroid/official/?fingerprint=E4BE8D6ABFA4D9D4FEEF03CDDA7FF62A73FD64B75566F6DD4E5E577550BE8467) and [DivestOS WebView](https://divestos.org/fdroid/webview/?fingerprint=FB426DA1750A53D7724C8A582B4D34174E64A84B38940E5D5A802E1DFF9A40D2)). We recommend disabling the official F-Droid app and using [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) with the DivestOS repositories enabled to keep those components up to date. For other apps, our recommended methods of obtaining them still apply.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ DivestOS firmware update [status](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/firmware-empty/-/blob/master/STATUS) and quality control varies across the devices it supports. We still recommend GrapheneOS depending on your device's compatibility. For other devices, DivestOS is a good alternative.
+
+ Not all of the supported devices have verified boot, and some perform it better than others.
+
+## Android Devices
+
+When purchasing a device, we recommend getting one as new as possible. The software and firmware of mobile devices are only supported for a limited time, so buying new extends that lifespan as much as possible.
+
+Avoid buying phones from mobile network operators. These often have a **locked bootloader** and do not support [OEM unlocking](https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/locking_unlocking). These phone variants will prevent you from installing any kind of alternative Android distribution.
+
+Be very **careful** about buying second hand phones from online marketplaces. Always check the reputation of the seller. If the device is stolen, there's a possibility of [IMEI blacklisting](https://www.gsma.com/security/resources/imei-blacklisting/). There is also a risk involved with you being associated with the activity of the previous owner.
+
+A few more tips regarding Android devices and operating system compatibility:
+
+- Do not buy devices that have reached or are near their end-of-life, additional firmware updates must be provided by the manufacturer.
+- Do not buy preloaded LineageOS or /e/ OS phones or any Android phones without proper [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) support and firmware updates. These devices also have no way for you to check whether they've been tampered with.
+- In short, if a device or Android distribution is not listed here, there is probably a good reason. Check out our [forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/) to find details!
+
+### DivestOS
+
+Google Pixel phones are the **only** devices we recommend for purchase. Pixel phones have stronger hardware security than any other Android devices currently on the market, due to proper AVB support for third-party operating systems and Google's custom [Titan](https://security.googleblog.com/2021/10/pixel-6-setting-new-standard-for-mobile.html) security chips acting as the Secure Element.
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **DivestOS** es un [soft-fork](https://es. wikipedia.org/wiki/Bifurcaci%C3%B3n_(desarrollo_de_software)) de [LineageOS](https://lineageos.org/).
+
+ DivestOS hereda muchos [dispositivos soportados](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=devices&base=LineageOS) de LineageOS.
+
+ Tiene builds firmados, lo que permite tener [arranque verificado](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) en algunos dispositivos que no son Pixel.
+
+Secure Elements like the Titan M2 are more limited than the processor's Trusted Execution Environment used by most other phones as they are only used for secrets storage, hardware attestation, and rate limiting, not for running "trusted" programs. Phones without a Secure Element have to use the TEE for *all* of those functions, resulting in a larger attack surface.
+
+Google Pixel phones use a TEE OS called Trusty which is [open-source](https://source.android.com/security/trusty#whyTrusty), unlike many other phones.
+
+The installation of GrapheneOS on a Pixel phone is easy with their [web installer](https://grapheneos.org/install/web). If you don't feel comfortable doing it yourself and are willing to spend a bit of extra money, check out the [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) as they come preloaded with GrapheneOS from the reputable [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/about) company.
+
+A few more tips for purchasing a Google Pixel:
+
+- If you're after a bargain on a Pixel device, we suggest buying an "**a**" model, just after the next flagship is released. Discounts are usually available because Google will be trying to clear their stock.
+- Consider price beating options and specials offered at physical stores.
+- Look at online community bargain sites in your country. These can alert you to good sales.
+- Google provides a list showing the [support cycle](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) for each one of their devices. The price per day for a device can be calculated as: $\text{Cost} \over \text {EOL Date}-\text{Current Date}$, meaning that the longer use of the device the lower cost per day.
+
+## General Apps
+
+We recommend a wide variety of Android apps throughout this site. The apps listed here are Android-exclusive and specifically enhance or replace key system functionality.
+
+### Perfiles de usuario
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Shelter** is an app that helps you leverage Android's Work Profile functionality to isolate or duplicate apps on your device.
+
+ Shelter supports blocking contact search cross profiles and sharing files across profiles via the default file manager ([DocumentsUI](https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/modular-system/documentsui)).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://gitea.angry.im/PeterCxy/Shelter#shelter){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitea.angry.im/PeterCxy/Shelter){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.patreon.com/PeterCxy){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.typeblog.shelter)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Shelter is recommended over [Insular](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/) and [Island](https://github.com/oasisfeng/island) as it supports [contact search blocking](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/faq.html).
+
+ When using Shelter, you are placing complete trust in its developer, as Shelter acts as a [Device Admin](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/admin/device-admin) to create the Work Profile, and it has extensive access to the data stored within the Work Profile.
+
+### Perfil de trabajo
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Auditor** is an app which leverages hardware security features to provide device integrity monitoring for [supported devices](https://attestation.app/about#device-support). Currently, it only works with GrapheneOS and the device's stock operating system.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://attestation.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://attestation.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://attestation.app/about){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://attestation.app/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://attestation.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.attestation.auditor.play)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases)
+ - [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+Auditor performs attestation and intrusion detection by:
+
+- Using a [Trust On First Use (TOFU)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_on_first_use) model between an *auditor* and *auditee*, the pair establish a private key in the [hardware-backed keystore](https://source.android.com/security/keystore/) of the *Auditor*.
+- The *auditor* can either be another instance of the Auditor app or the [Remote Attestation Service](https://attestation.app).
+- The *auditor* records the current state and configuration of the *auditee*.
+- Should tampering with the operating system of the *auditee* happen after the pairing is complete, the auditor will be aware of the change in the device state and configurations.
+- You will be alerted to the change.
+
+No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
+
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service. To make sure that your hardware and operating system is genuine, [perform local attestation](https://grapheneos.org/install/web#verifying-installation) immediately after the device has been installed and prior to any internet connection.
+
+### Arranque verificado
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Secure Camera** is a camera app focused on privacy and security which can capture images, videos and QR codes. CameraX vendor extensions (Portrait, HDR, Night Sight, Face Retouch, and Auto) are also supported on available devices.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://grapheneos.org/usage#camera){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.grapheneos.camera.play)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases)
+ - [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+Main privacy features include:
+
+- Auto removal of [Exif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exif) metadata (enabled by default)
+- Use of the new [Media](https://developer.android.com/training/data-storage/shared/media) API, therefore [storage permissions](https://developer.android.com/training/data-storage) are not required
+- Microphone permission not required unless you want to record sound
+
+!!! note
+
+ Metadata is not currently deleted from video files but that is planned.
+
+ The image orientation metadata is not deleted. If you enable location (in Secure Camera) that **won't** be deleted either. If you want to delete that later you will need to use an external app such as [ExifEraser](data-redaction.md#exiferaser).
+
+### Secure PDF Viewer
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Secure PDF Viewer** is a PDF viewer based on [pdf.js](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PDF.js) that doesn't require any permissions. The PDF is fed into a [sandboxed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandbox_(software_development)) [webview](https://developer.android.com/guide/webapps/webview). This means that it doesn't require permission directly to access content or files.
+
+ [Content-Security-Policy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy) is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.grapheneos.pdfviewer.play)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer/releases)
+ - [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+## Obtaining Applications
+
+### Interruptores globales
+
+GrapheneOS's app store is available on [GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases). It supports Android 12 and above and is capable of updating itself. The app store has standalone applications built by the GrapheneOS project such as the [Auditor](https://attestation.app/), [Camera](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera), and [PDF Viewer](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer). If you are looking for these applications, we highly recommend that you get them from GrapheneOS's app store instead of the Play Store, as the apps on their store are signed by the GrapheneOS's project own signature that Google does not have access to.
+
+### Orbot
+
+The Google Play Store requires a Google account to login which is not great for privacy. You can get around this by using an alternative client, such as Aurora Store.
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Aurora Store** is a Google Play Store client which does not require a Google Account, Google Play Services, or microG to download apps.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://auroraoss.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-gitlab: GitLab](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore/-/releases)
+
+Aurora Store does not allow you to download paid apps with their anonymous account feature. You can optionally log in with your Google account with Aurora Store to download apps you have purchased, which does give access to the list of apps you've installed to Google, however you still benefit from not requiring the full Google Play client and Google Play Services or microG on your device.
+
+### Shelter
+
+For apps that are released on platforms like GitHub and GitLab, you may be able to add an RSS feed to your [news aggregator](/news-aggregators) that will help you keep track of new releases.
+
+   
+
+#### GitHub
+
+On GitHub, using [Secure Camera](#secure-camera) as an example, you would navigate to its [releases page](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases) and append `.atom` to the URL:
+
+`https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases.atom`
+
+#### GitLab
+
+On GitLab, using [Aurora Store](#aurora-store) as an example, you would navigate to its [project repository](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore) and append `/-/tags?format=atom` to the URL:
+
+`https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore/-/tags?format=atom`
+
+#### Verifying APK Fingerprints
+
+If you download APK files to install manually, you can verify their signature with the [`apksigner`](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/apksigner) tool, which is a part of Android [build-tools](https://developer.android.com/studio/releases/build-tools).
+
+1. Install [Java JDK](https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/downloads/).
+
+2. Download the [Android Studio command line tools](https://developer.android.com/studio#command-tools).
+
+3. Extract the downloaded archive:
+
+ ```bash
+ unzip commandlinetools-*.zip
+ cd cmdline-tools
+ ./bin/sdkmanager --sdk_root=./ "build-tools;29.0.3"
+ ```
+
+4. Run the signature verification command:
+
+ ```bash
+ ./build-tools/29.0.3/apksigner verify --print-certs ../Camera-37.apk
+ ```
+
+5. The resulting hashes can then be compared with another source. Some developers such as Signal [show the fingerprints](https://signal.org/android/apk/) on their website.
+
+ ```bash
+ Signer #1 certificate DN: CN=GrapheneOS
+ Signer #1 certificate SHA-256 digest: 6436b155b917c2f9a9ed1d15c4993a5968ffabc94947c13f2aeee14b7b27ed59
+ Signer #1 certificate SHA-1 digest: 23e108677a2e1b1d6e6b056f3bb951df7ad5570c
+ Signer #1 certificate MD5 digest: dbbcd0cac71bd6fa2102a0297c6e0dd3
+ ```
+
+### Auditor
+
+{ align=right width=120px }
+
+==We do **not** currently recommend F-Droid as a way to obtain apps.== F-Droid is often recommended as an alternative to Google Play, particularly in the privacy community. The option to add third-party repositories and not be confined to Google's walled garden has led to its popularity. F-Droid additionally has [reproducible builds](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Reproducible_Builds/) for some applications and is dedicated to free and open-source software. However, there are [notable problems](https://privsec.dev/posts/android/f-droid-security-issues/) with the official F-Droid client, their quality control, and how they build, sign, and deliver packages.
+
+Due to their process of building apps, apps in the official F-Droid repository often fall behind on updates. F-Droid maintainers also reuse package IDs while signing apps with their own keys, which is not ideal as it gives the F-Droid team ultimate trust.
+
+Other popular third-party repositories such as [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) alleviate some of these concerns. The IzzyOnDroid repository pulls builds directly from GitHub and is the next best thing to the developers' own repositories. However, it is not something that we can recommend, as apps are typically [removed](https://github.com/vfsfitvnm/ViMusic/issues/240#issuecomment-1225564446) from that respository when they make it to the main F-Droid repository. While that makes sense (since the goal of that particular repository is to host apps before they're accepted into the main F-Droid repository), it can leave you with installed apps which no longer receive updates.
+
+That said, the [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/) and [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) repositories are home to countless apps, so they can be a useful tool to search for and discover open-source apps that you can then download through Play Store, Aurora Store, or by getting the APK directly from the developer. It is important to keep in mind that some apps in these repositories have not been updated in years and may rely on unsupported libraries, among other things, posing a potential security risk. You should use your best judgement when looking for new apps via this method.
+
+!!! note
+
+ In some rare cases, the developer of an app will only distribute it through F-Droid ([Gadgetbridge](https://gadgetbridge.org/) is one example of this). If you really need an app like that, we recommend using [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) instead of the official F-Droid app to obtain it.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Software
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must support bootloader locking with custom AVB key support.
+- Must receive major Android updates within 0-1 months of release.
+- Must receive Android feature updates (minor version) within 0-14 days of release.
+- Must receive regular security patches within 0-5 days of release.
+- Must **not** be "rooted" out of the box.
+- Must **not** enable Google Play Services by default.
+- Must **not** require system modification to support Google Play Services.
+
+### Devices
+
+- Must support at least one of our recommended custom operating systems.
+- Must be currently sold new in stores.
+- Must receive a minimum of 5 years of security updates.
+- Must have dedicated secure element hardware.
+
+### Applications
+
+- Applications on this page must not be applicable to any other software category on the site.
+- General applications should extend or replace core system functionality.
+- Applications should receive regular updates and maintenance.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png b/i18n/es/assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5295c902c
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/es/assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/es/assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png b/i18n/es/assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..974869a4e
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/es/assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/es/assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png b/i18n/es/assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..21d6ef03a
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/es/assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/es/assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png b/i18n/es/assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b46283571
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/es/assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/es/assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png b/i18n/es/assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f88f7b404
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/es/assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/es/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption-dark.svg b/i18n/es/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption-dark.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..95e681571
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption-dark.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/es/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg b/i18n/es/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f5b1e2915
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/es/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg b/i18n/es/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9002c9b16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/es/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg b/i18n/es/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cb53d8b13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/es/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png b/i18n/es/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d4b678fd5
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/es/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/es/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png b/i18n/es/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2dc08ae99
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/es/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/es/assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png b/i18n/es/assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cde3771e0
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/es/assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/es/assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png b/i18n/es/assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d71381491
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/es/assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/es/basics/account-creation.md b/i18n/es/basics/account-creation.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aa3894b33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/basics/account-creation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+---
+title: "Creación De Cuenta"
+icon: 'material/account-plus'
+---
+
+A menudo la gente se inscribe en servicios sin pensar. Tal vez sea un servicio de streaming para que puedas ver ese nuevo show del que todo el mundo habla, o una cuenta que te da un descuento para tu lugar de comida rápida favorito. Sea cual sea el caso, debes tener en cuenta las implicaciones que tednrá para tus datos ahora y más adelante.
+
+Hay riesgos asociados con cada nuevo servicio que utilices. Las filtraciones de datos, la revelación de información de clientes a terceros o el acceso a datos por parte de empleados deshonestos son posibilidades que deben tenerse en cuenta a la hora de facilitar tu información. Tienes que estar seguro de que puedes confiar en el servicio, por eso no recomendamos almacenar datos valiosos en nada, excepto en los productos más maduros y que han sido puestos profundamente a prueba. Por lo general, se trata de servicios que ofrecen E2EE y han sido sometidos a una auditoría criptográfica. Una auditoría aumenta las garantías de que el producto se diseñó sin problemas de seguridad notorios causados por un desarrollador inexperto.
+
+También puede ser difícil eliminar las cuentas en algunos servicios. En ocasiones, [sobrescribir los datos](account-deletion.md#overwriting-account-information) asociados a una cuenta puede ser posible, pero en otros casos el servicio guardará un historial completo de los cambios realizados en la cuenta.
+
+## Términos del servicio y Política de privacidad
+
+Los ToS (Términos del Servicio) son las normas que usted se compromete a respetar al utilizar el servicio. En los servicios más grandes, estas normas suelen aplicarse mediante sistemas automatizados. A veces, estos sistemas automatizados pueden cometer errores. Por ejemplo, pueden expulsarte o bloquearte la cuenta en algunos servicios por utilizar una VPN o un número VOIP. Recurrir estos bloqueos suele ser difícil, y además implica un proceso automatizado que no siempre funciona bien. Esta es una de las razones por las que no sugerimos utilizar Gmail para el correo electrónico, por ejemplo. El correo electrónico es crucial para acceder a otros servicios a los que estés inscrito.
+
+La Política de Privacidad es la forma en que el servicio dice que utilizará tus datos y vale la pena leerla para que entiendas cómo se utilizarán tus datos. Una empresa u organización puede no estar legalmente obligada a seguir todo lo que contiene la política (depende de la jurisdicción). Te recomendamos que tengas una idea de cuál es tu legislación local y qué le permite recopilar a un proveedor.
+
+Te recomendamos que busques términos concretos como "recopilación de datos", "análisis de datos", "cookies", "anuncios" o servicios de "terceros". A veces podrás optar por no participar en la recopilación de datos o no compartirlos, pero lo mejor es elegir un servicio que respete tu privacidad desde el principio.
+
+Ten en cuenta que también estás depositando tu confianza en la empresa u organización y en que cumplirán su propia política de privacidad.
+
+## Métodos de autenticación
+
+Usualmente hay varias maneras para registrarse, cada una tiene sus propias ventajas y desventajas.
+
+### Correo electrónico y contraseña
+
+La manera más común de crear una nueva cuenta es utilizando una dirección de correo electrónico y una contraseña. Cuando se utiliza este método, se debe utilizar un gestor de contraseñas y seguir las [mejores prácticas](passwords-overview.md) respecto a las contraseñas.
+
+!!! consejo
+
+ ¡También se puede usar un gestor de contraseñas para organizar otros métodos de autenticación! Solo añade la nueva entrada y completa los espacios apropiados, puedes agregar notas para cosas como las preguntas de seguridad o una clave de respaldo.
+
+Usted es responsable de gestionar sus credenciales de ingreso. Para mayor seguridad, se puede configurar la [autenticación multifactor](multi-factor-authentication.md) en las cuentas.
+
+[Gestores de contraseñas recomendados](../passwords.md ""){.md-button}
+
+#### Alias de correo electrónico
+
+Si no se quiere utilizar una dirección real de correo electrónico en un servicio, se cuenta con la opción de utilizar un alias. Estos los describimos con mayores detalles en nuestra página con recomendaciones de servicios de correo electrónico. Básicamente, los servicios de alias permiten generar nuevas direcciones de correo que reenvían todos los correos a la dirección principal. Esto puede ayudar a prevenir el rastreo a través de múltiples servicios y ayudar a gestionar los correos de mercadeo que algunas veces vienen con el proceso de registro. Estos pueden ser filtrados automáticamente basándose en el alias al que son enviados.
+
+Si un servicio es hackeado, puede que usted comience a recibir correos engañosos o basura en la dirección que utilizó para registrarse. Al utilizar un único alias para cada servicio, se puede identificar cual servicio fue hackeado.
+
+[Servicios recomendados de alias de correo electrónico](../email.md#email-aliasing-services ""){.md-button}
+
+### Single sign-on
+
+!!! note
+
+ We are discussing Single sign-on for personal use, not enterprise users.
+
+Single sign-on (SSO) is an authentication method that allows you to register for a service without sharing much information, if any. Whenever you see something along the lines of "Sign-in with *provider name*" on a registration form it's SSO.
+
+When you choose single sign-on in a website, it will prompt your SSO provider login page and after that your account will be connected. Your password won't be shared but some basic information will (you can review it during the login request). This process is needed every time you want to log in to the same account.
+
+The main advantages are:
+
+- **Security**: no risk of being involved in a [data breach](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_breach) because the website does not store your credentials.
+- **Ease of use**: multiple accounts are managed by a single login.
+
+But there are disadvantages:
+
+- **Privacy**: a SSO provider will know the services you use.
+- **Centralization**: if your SSO account gets compromised or you aren't able to login to it, all other accounts connected to it are affected.
+
+SSO can be especially useful in those situations where you could benefit from deeper integration between services. For example, one of those services may offer SSO for the others. Our recommendation is to limit SSO to only where you need it and protect the main account with [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md).
+
+All services that use SSO will be as secure as your SSO account. For example, if you want to secure an account with a hardware key but that service doesn't support hardware keys, you can secure your SSO account with a hardware key and now you essentially have hardware MFA on all your accounts. It is worth noting though that weak authentication on your SSO account means that any account tied to that login will also be weak.
+
+### Phone number
+
+We recommend avoiding services that require a phone number for sign up. A phone number can identity you across multiple services and depending on data sharing agreements this will make your usage easier to track, particularly if one of those services is breached as the phone number is often **not** encrypted.
+
+You should avoid giving out your real phone number if you can. Some services will allow the use of VOIP numbers, however these often trigger fraud detection systems, causing an account to be locked down, so we don't recommend that for important accounts.
+
+In many cases you will need to provide a number that you can receive SMS or calls from, particularly when shopping internationally, in case there is a problem with your order at border screening. It's common for services to use your number as a verification method; don't let yourself get locked out of an important account because you wanted to be clever and give a fake number!
+
+### Username and password
+
+Some services allow you to register without using an email address and only require you to set a username and password. These services may provide increased anonymity when combined with a VPN or Tor. Keep in mind that for these accounts there will most likely be **no way to recover your account** in the event you forget your username or password.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/basics/account-deletion.md b/i18n/es/basics/account-deletion.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d9d81118b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/basics/account-deletion.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: "Eliminación de cuenta"
+icon: 'material/account-remove'
+---
+
+Con el tiempo, puede ser fácil acumular varias cuentas en línea, muchas de las cuales puede que ya no utilices. Eliminar estas cuentas que no utilizas es un paso importante para recuperar tu privacidad, ya que las cuentas inactivas son vulnerables a las filtraciones de datos. Una filtración de datos se da cuando la seguridad de un servicio se ve comprometida y la información protegida es vista, transmitida o robada por actores no autorizados. Desafortunadamente, las filtraciones de datos son [demasiado comunes](https://haveibeenpwned.com/PwnedWebsites) en estos días, por lo que practicar una buena higiene digital es la mejor manera de minimizar el impacto que tienen en tu vida. El objetivo de esta guía es ayudarte a atravesar el fastidioso proceso de eliminación de cuentas para mejorar tu presencia en línea, lo que es a menudo dificultado por [un diseño engañoso](https://www.deceptive.design/).
+
+## Buscar cuentas antiguas
+
+### Administrador de contraseñas
+
+Si tienes un gestor de contraseñas que has utilizado durante toda tu vida digital, esta parte será muy fácil. A menudo, incluyen funcionalidad integrada para detectar si tus credenciales fueron expuestas en una filtración de datos, como el [Data Breach Report](https://bitwarden.com/blog/have-you-been-pwned/) (Reporte de filtración de datos) de Bitwarden.
+
+
+ 
+
+
+Incluso si no has usado explícitamente un gestor de contraseñas antes, es probable que hayas usado el de tu navegador o el de tu teléfono sin darte cuenta. Por ejemplo: [Firefox Password Manager](https://support.mozilla.org/es-es/kb/password-manager-remember-delete-edit-logins), [Google Password Manager](https://passwords.google.com/intro) y [Edge Password Manager](https://support.microsoft.com/es-es/microsoft-edge/save-or-forget-passwords-in-microsoft-edge-b4beecb0-f2a8-1ca0-f26f-9ec247a3f336).
+
+Los sistemas operativos también suelen tener un gestor de contraseñas que puede ayudarte a recuperar las que has olvidado:
+
+- Windows [Administrador de credenciales](https://support.microsoft.com/es-es/windows/accessing-credential-manager-1b5c916a-6a16-889f-8581-fc16e8165ac0)
+- macOS [Contraseñas](https://support.apple.com/es-es/HT211145)
+- iOS [Contraseñas](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211146)
+- Linux, Gnome Keyring, al que se puede acceder a través de [Seahorse](https://help.gnome.org/users/seahorse/stable/passwords-view.html.en) o [KDE Wallet Manager](https://userbase.kde.org/KDE_Wallet_Manager/es)
+
+### Proveedores de VPN
+
+Si no utilizaste un gestor de contraseñas en el pasado o crees que tienes cuentas que nunca se añadieron a tu gestor de contraseñas, otra opción es buscar en la(s) cuenta(s) de correo electrónico en las que crees que te has registrado. En tu cliente de correo electrónico, busca palabras clave como "verificar" o "bienvenida" Casi siempre que se crea una cuenta en línea, el servicio envía un enlace de verificación o un mensaje introductorio a tu correo electrónico. Esta puede ser una buena manera de encontrar cuentas antiguas y olvidadas.
+
+## Eliminar cuentas antiguas
+
+### Inicio de sesión
+
+Para eliminar tus antiguas cuentas, primero tendrás que asegurarte de que puedes acceder a ellas. De nuevo, si la cuenta estaba en tu gestor de contraseñas, este paso es fácil. Si no, puedes intentar adivinando tu contraseña. Si no es así, suele haber opciones para recuperar el acceso a tu cuenta, normalmente disponibles a través de un enlace "olvido de contraseña" en la página de inicio de sesión. También es posible que las cuentas que has abandonado ya hayan sido eliminadas: a veces los servicios eliminan todas las cuentas antiguas.
+
+Cuando intentes recuperar el acceso, si el sitio devuelve un mensaje de error diciendo que el correo electrónico no está asociado a una cuenta, o nunca recibe un enlace de restablecimiento después de múltiples intentos, entonces no tienes una cuenta con esa dirección de correo electrónico y debes probar con otra. Si no puedes averiguar qué dirección de correo electrónico utilizaste, o ya no tienes acceso a ese correo, puedes intentar ponerte en contacto con el servicio de atención al cliente del servicio. Desafortunadamente, no hay garantía de que puedas recuperar el acceso a tu cuenta.
+
+### GDPR (solamente para residentes del EEE)
+
+Los residentes del EEE tienen derechos adicionales en relación con la supresión de datos especificados en [el artículo 17](https://www.gdpr.org/regulation/article-17.html) del GDPR. Si es aplicable para ti, lee la política de privacidad del servicio para encontrar información sobre cómo ejercer tu derecho de eliminación. Leer la política de privacidad puede ser importante, ya que algunos servicios tienen una opción de "Borrar cuenta" que solamente desactiva tu cuenta y para la eliminación real tienes que realizar una acción adicional. A veces, la eliminación real puede implicar llenar formularios, enviar un correo electrónico al responsable de la protección de datos del servicio, o incluso demostrar tu residencia en el EEE. Si planeas seguir este camino, **no** sobrescribas la información de tu cuenta; es posible que se requiera tu identidad como residente del EEE. Ten en cuenta que la ubicación del servicio no importa; el GDPR se aplica a cualquiera que preste servicios a usuarios europeos. Si el servicio no respeta tu derecho de supresión de datos, puedes ponerte en contacto con tu [Autoridad de Protección de Datos](https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/rights-citizens/redress/what-should-i-do-if-i-think-my-personal-data-protection-rights-havent-been-respected_es) y puedes tener derecho a una compensación monetaria.
+
+### Sobrescribir la información de la cuenta
+
+En algunas situaciones en la que planeas abandonar una cuenta, puede tener sentido sobrescribir la información de la cuenta con datos falsos. Una vez que te hayas asegurado de que puedes iniciar sesión, cambia toda la información de tu cuenta por información falsa. El motivo es que muchos sitios conservan la información que tenías anteriormente incluso después de la eliminación de la cuenta. Lo que se desea es que sobrescriban la información anterior con los datos más recientes que hayas introducido. Sin embargo, no hay forma de saber de qué no haya copias de seguridad con la información anterior.
+
+Para el correo electrónico de la cuenta, crea una nueva cuenta de correo electrónico alternativa a través de tu proveedor de elección o crea un alias utilizando un [servicio de alias de correo electrónico](/email/#email-aliasing-services). Una vez que hayas terminado, podrás eliminar tu dirección de correo electrónico alternativa. No recomendamos utilizar proveedores de correo electrónico temporales, ya que a menudo es posible reactivar los correos electrónicos temporales.
+
+### Eliminar
+
+Puedes consultar en [JustDeleteMe](https://justdeleteme.xyz/es) las instrucciones para eliminar la cuenta de un servicio específico. Algunos sitios tendrán amablemente una opción de "Borrar cuenta", mientras que otros llegarán a obligarte a hablar con un agente de soporte. El proceso de eliminación puede variar de un sitio a otro, siendo imposible la eliminación de la cuenta en algunos.
+
+Para los servicios que no permiten la eliminación de cuentas, lo mejor que puede hacer es falsificar toda su información como se mencionó anteriormente y fortalecer la seguridad de la cuenta. Para ello, habilita [MFA](basics/multi-factor-authentication) y cualquier característica de seguridad adicional ofrecida. Además, cambia la contraseña a una generada aleatoriamente que sea el tamaño máximo permitido (un [administrador de contraseñas](/passwords/#local-password-managers) puede ser útil para esto).
+
+Si tienes la certeza de que se ha eliminado toda la información que te importa, puedes olvidarte con seguridad de esta cuenta. Si no es así, puede ser una buena idea mantener las credenciales almacenadas con tus otras contraseñas y de vez en cuando volver a iniciar sesión para restablecer la contraseña.
+
+Aunque puedas eliminar una cuenta, no hay garantía de que toda tu información sea eliminada. De hecho, algunas empresas están obligadas por ley a conservar cierta información, sobre todo cuando está relacionada con transacciones financieras. La mayoría de las veces, lo que ocurre con tus datos está fuera de tu control cuando se trata de sitios web y servicios en la nube.
+
+## Evitar cuentas nuevas
+
+Como dice el refrán, "más vale prevenir que lamentar" Siempre que sientas la tentación de crear una nueva cuenta, pregúntate "¿realmente lo necesito? ¿Puedo lograr lo que necesito sin una cuenta?" A menudo puede ser mucho más difícil eliminar una cuenta que crearla. E incluso después de borrar o cambiar la información de tu cuenta, puede haber una versión en caché de un tercero, como en el [Internet Archive](https://archive.org/). Evita la tentación cuando puedas, ¡tu futuro yo te lo agradecerá!
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/es/basics/common-misconceptions.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9ffa5cd61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/basics/common-misconceptions.md
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+---
+title: "Conceptos erróneos comunes"
+icon: 'material/robot-confused'
+---
+
+## "El software de código abierto es siempre seguro" o "El software propietario es más seguro"
+
+Estos mitos provienen de varios prejuicios, pero el hecho de que el código fuente esté disponible y la forma en que se licencie el software no afecta intrínsecamente a su seguridad de ninguna manera. ==El software de código abierto tiene el *potencial* de ser más seguro que el software propietario, pero no hay ninguna garantía de que sea así.== Cuando evalúes el software, debes examinar la reputación y la seguridad de cada herramienta de forma individual.
+
+El software de código abierto *puede* ser auditado por terceros, y a menudo es más transparente sobre las vulnerabilidades potenciales que sus contrapartes propietarias. También te permite revisar el código y desactivar cualquier funcionalidad sospechosa que encuentres. Sin embargo, *a menos que lo hagas*, no hay garantía de que el código haya sido evaluado alguna vez, especialmente en los proyectos de software más pequeños. El proceso de desarrollo abierto también ha sido explotado en ocasiones para introducir nuevas vulnerabilidades incluso en proyectos aún más grandes.[^1]
+
+Por otro lado, el software propietario es menos transparente, pero eso no implica que no sea seguro. Los grandes proyectos de software propietario pueden ser auditados internamente y por agencias de terceros, y los investigadores de seguridad independientes pueden seguir encontrando vulnerabilidades con técnicas como la ingeniería inversa.
+
+Para evitar decisiones sesgadas, es *vital* que evalúes los estándares de privacidad y seguridad del software que utilizas.
+
+## "Transferir la confianza puede aumentar la privacidad"
+
+Hablamos mucho de "transferir la confianza" cuando hablamos de soluciones como las VPN (que transfieren la confianza que depositas en tu ISP al proveedor de VPN). Aunque esto protege tus datos de navegación de tu proveedor de internet *específicamente*, el proveedor de VPN que elijas sigue teniendo acceso a tus datos de navegación: Tus datos no están completamente protegidos de todas las partes. Esto significa que:
+
+1. Hay que ser prudente a la hora de elegir un proveedor al que confiar.
+2. Aun así, deberías utilizar otras técnicas, como E2EE, para proteger tus datos por completo. Simplemente desconfiar de un proveedor para confiar en otro no es proteger tus datos.
+
+## "Las soluciones centradas en la privacidad son inherentemente fiables"
+
+Centrarse exclusivamente en las políticas de privacidad y en el marketing de una herramienta o proveedor puede impedirte ver sus debilidades. Cuando estés buscando una solución más privada, deberías determinar cuál es el problema subyacente y encontrar soluciones técnicas a ese problema. Por ejemplo, es posible que quieras evitar Google Drive, ya que da acceso a Google a todos tus datos. El problema subyacente en este caso es la falta de E2EE, por lo que deberías asegurarte de que el proveedor al que te cambias realmente implementa E2EE, o utiliza una herramienta (como [Cryptomator](../encryption.md#cryptomator-cloud)) que proporciona E2EE a cualquier proveedor de servicios en la nube. Cambiar a un proveedor "centrado en la privacidad" (que no implementa E2EE) no resuelve tu problema: esto solo cambia la confianza de Google a ese proveedor.
+
+Las políticas de privacidad y las prácticas empresariales de los proveedores que elijas son muy importantes, pero deben considerarse secundarias frente a las garantías técnicas de tu privacidad: No deberías cambiar la confianza a otro proveedor cuando la confianza en un proveedor no es un requisito en absoluto.
+
+## "Lo complicado es mejor"
+
+A menudo vemos a gente que describe modelos de amenaza a la privacidad que son excesivamente complejos. A menudo, estas soluciones incluyen problemas como muchas cuentas de correo electrónico diferentes o configuraciones complicadas con muchas partes móviles y condiciones. Las respuestas suelen responder a "¿Cuál es la mejor manera de hacer *X*?"
+
+Encontrar la "mejor" solución para uno mismo no significa necesariamente que se busque una solución infalible con docenas de condiciones: suele ser difícil trabajar con estas soluciones de forma realista. Como hemos comentado anteriormente, la seguridad a menudo viene a expensas de la comodidad. A continuación, te ofrecemos algunos consejos:
+
+1. ==Las acciones tienen que servir a un propósito concreto:== piensa en cómo hacer lo que quieres con el menor número de acciones.
+2. ==Eliminar los puntos de fallo humanos:== Fallamos, nos cansamos y olvidamos cosas. Para mantener la seguridad, evita depender de condiciones y procesos manuales que tengas que recordar.
+3. ==Utiliza el nivel adecuado de protección para lo que pretendes.== A menudo vemos recomendaciones de las llamadas soluciones de aplicación de la ley o a prueba de citaciones. Estas a menudo requieren conocimientos especializados y generalmente no es lo que la gente quiere. No tiene sentido construir un intrincado modelo de amenaza para el anonimato si puede ser fácilmente desanonimizado por un simple descuido.
+
+Así que, ¿cómo podría verse esto?
+
+Uno de los modelos de amenaza más claros es aquel en el que la gente *sabe quién eres* y otro en el que no. Siempre habrá situaciones en las que debes declarar tu nombre legal y otras en las que no es necesario.
+
+1. **Identidad conocida** - Una identidad conocida se utiliza para cosas en las que debes declarar tu nombre. Hay muchos documentos legales y contratos en los que se requiere una identidad legal. Esto puede abarcar desde la apertura de una cuenta bancaria, la firma de un contrato de arrendamiento de una propiedad, la obtención de un pasaporte, las declaraciones de aduana al importar artículos o cualquier otro trámite con tu Gobierno. Por lo general, estas cosas conducirán a credenciales como tarjetas de crédito, controles de calificación crediticia, números de cuenta y, posiblemente, direcciones físicas.
+
+ No sugerimos usar una VPN o Tor para ninguna de estas cosas, ya que tu identidad ya es conocida por otros medios.
+
+ !!! tip
+
+ Al comprar en línea, el uso de un [casillero de paquetes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parcel_locker) puede ayudar a mantener la privacidad de tu dirección física.
+
+2. **Identidad desconocida** - Una identidad desconocida podría ser un seudónimo estable que utilizas con regularidad. No es anónimo porque no cambia. Si formas parte de una comunidad en línea, es posible que desees mantener un personaje que los demás conozcan. Este seudónimo no es anónimo porque, si se vigila durante el tiempo suficiente, los detalles sobre el propietario pueden revelar más información, como su forma de escribir, sus conocimientos generales sobre temas de interés, etc.
+
+ Es posible que desees utilizar una VPN para esto, para enmascarar tu dirección IP. Las transacciones financieras son más difíciles de enmascarar: Podrías considerar el uso de criptomonedas anónimas, como [Monero](https://www.getmonero.org/). El cambio a una moneda alternativa también puede ayudar a disfrazar dónde se originó tu moneda. Por lo general, los intercambios requieren que el KYC (conoce a tu cliente) se complete antes de que te permitan cambiar moneda fiduciaria a cualquier tipo de criptomoneda. Las opciones de encuentros locales también pueden ser una solución; sin embargo, suelen ser más caras y, a veces, también requieren KYC.
+
+3. **Identidad anónima** - Incluso con experiencia, las identidades anónimas son difíciles de mantener durante largos periodos de tiempo. Deben ser identidades a corto plazo y de corta duración que roten regularmente.
+
+ Usar Tor puede ayudar con esto. También cabe destacar que es posible un mayor anonimato mediante la comunicación asíncrona: La comunicación en tiempo real es vulnerable al análisis de los patrones de escritura (es decir, más de un párrafo de texto, distribuido en un foro, por correo electrónico, etc.)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
+
+[^1]: Un ejemplo notable de esto es [el incidente de 2021 en el que investigadores de la Universidad de Minnesota introdujeron tres vulnerabilidades en el proyecto de desarrollo del kernel de Linux](https://cse.umn.edu/cs/linux-incident).
diff --git a/i18n/es/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/es/basics/common-threats.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..eef40a370
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/basics/common-threats.md
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+---
+title: "Amenazas comunes"
+icon: 'material/eye-outline'
+---
+
+En términos generales, clasificamos nuestras recomendaciones en las [amenazas](threat-modeling.md) u objetivos que se aplican a la mayoría de las personas. ==Puede que no te preocupe ninguna, una, varias o todas estas posibilidades==, y las herramientas y servicios que utilices dependerán de cuáles sean tus objetivos. Es posible que también tengas amenazas específicas fuera de estas categorías, ¡lo cual está perfectamente bien! Lo importante es desarrollar una comprensión de los beneficios y las deficiencias de las herramientas que elijas utilizar, porque prácticamente ninguna de ellas te protegerá de todas las amenazas.
+
+- :material-incognito: Anonimato - Proteger tu actividad en línea de tu identidad real, protegiendote de las personas que están tratando de descubrir *tu* identidad específicamente.
+- :material-target-account: Ataques dirigidos - Estar protegido de los hackers u otros actores maliciosos que están tratando de acceder a *tus* datos o dispositivos específicamente.
+- :material-bug-outline: Ataques pasivos - Estar protegido de cosas como el malware, las filtraciones de datos y otros ataques que se realizan contra muchas personas a la vez.
+- :material-server-network: Proveedores de servicios - Proteger tus datos de los proveedores de servicios (por ejemplo, con E2EE, que hace que tus datos sean ilegibles para el servidor).
+- :material-eye-outline: Vigilancia masiva - Protección contra las agencias gubernamentales, organizaciones, sitios web y servicios que trabajan juntos para rastrear tus actividades.
+- :material-account-cash: Capitalismo de la vigilancia - Protegerse de las grandes redes de publicidad, como Google y Facebook, así como de una miríada de otros recolectores de datos de terceros.
+- :material-account-search: Exposición pública - Limitar la información sobre ti que es accesible en línea, para los motores de búsqueda o el público en general.
+- :material-close-outline: Censura - Evitar el acceso censurado a la información o ser censurado uno mismo al hablar en línea.
+
+Algunas de estas amenazas pueden ser más importantes para ti que otras, dependiendo de tus preocupaciones específicas. Por ejemplo, un desarrollador de software con acceso a datos valiosos o críticos puede estar preocupado principalmente por :material-target-account: Ataques dirigidos, pero probablemente siga queriendo proteger sus datos personales de ser barridos por los programas de :material-eye-outline: Vigilancia masiva. Del mismo modo, muchas personas pueden estar preocupadas principalmente por la :material-account-search: Exposición pública de sus datos personales, pero aún así deben tener cuidado con los problemas centrados en la seguridad, como los :material-bug-outline: Ataques pasivos-como el malware que afecta a sus dispositivos.
+
+## Anonimato vs. Privacidad
+
+:material-incognito: Anonimato
+
+El anonimato se confunde a menudo con la privacidad, pero son conceptos distintos. Mientras que la privacidad es un conjunto de decisiones que tomas sobre cómo se utilizan y comparten tus datos, el anonimato es la completa disociación de tus actividades en línea de tu identidad real.
+
+Los denunciantes y los periodistas, por ejemplo, pueden tener un modelo de amenaza mucho más extremo que requiere el anonimato total. Eso no sólo es ocultar lo que hacen, los datos que tienen y no ser hackeados por actores maliciosos o gobiernos, sino también ocultar por completo quiénes son. A menudo sacrificarán cualquier tipo de comodidad si eso significa proteger su anonimato, privacidad o seguridad, porque sus vidas podrían depender de ello. La mayoría de la gente no necesita ir tan lejos.
+
+## Seguridad y privacidad
+
+:material-bug-outline: Ataques pasivos
+
+La seguridad y la privacidad también se confunden a menudo, porque se necesita seguridad para obtener cualquier apariencia de privacidad: El uso de herramientas -incluso si son privadas por diseño- es inútil si pueden ser fácilmente explotadas por atacantes que luego liberen tus datos. Sin embargo, lo contrario no es necesariamente cierto: el servicio más seguro del mundo *no es necesariamente* privado. El mejor ejemplo de esto es confiar los datos a Google, que, dada su escala, ha tenido pocos incidentes de seguridad al emplear a expertos en seguridad líderes en la industria para asegurar su infraestructura. Aunque Google proporciona servicios muy seguros, muy pocas personas considerarían que sus datos son privados en los productos gratuitos de consumo de Google (Gmail, YouTube, etc.)
+
+En lo que respecta a la seguridad de las aplicaciones, generalmente no sabemos (y a veces no podemos) si el software que utilizamos es malicioso, o podría llegar a serlo algún día. Incluso en el caso de los desarrolladores más fiables, generalmente no hay garantía de que su software no tenga una vulnerabilidad grave que pueda ser explotada posteriormente.
+
+Para minimizar el daño que una pieza maliciosa de software *podría hacer*, deberías emplear la seguridad por compartimentación. Por ejemplo, esto podría darse en la forma de usar diferentes ordenadores para diferentes trabajos, usar máquinas virtuales para separar diferentes grupos de aplicaciones relacionadas, o usar un sistema operativo seguro con un fuerte enfoque en el aislamiento de aplicaciones y el control de acceso obligatorio.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Los sistemas operativos móviles suelen tener un mejor aislamiento de aplicaciones que los sistemas operativos de escritorio: Las aplicaciones no pueden obtener acceso a la raíz y requieren permiso para acceder a los recursos del sistema.
+
+ Los sistemas operativos de escritorio generalmente se retrasan en el aislamiento adecuado. ChromeOS tiene capacidades de aislamiento similares a las de Android, y macOS tiene un control total de los permisos del sistema (y los desarrolladores pueden optar por el aislamiento para las aplicaciones). Sin embargo, estos sistemas operativos transmiten información de identificación a sus respectivos OEM. Linux tiende a no enviar información a los proveedores de sistemas, pero tiene poca protección contra los exploits y las aplicaciones maliciosas. Esto puede mitigarse un poco con distribuciones especializadas que hacen un uso significativo de máquinas virtuales o contenedores, como Qubes OS.
+
+:material-target-account: Ataques dirigidos
+
+Los ataques dirigidos contra una persona concreta son más problemáticos de tratar. Los ataques más comunes son el envío de documentos maliciosos por correo electrónico, la explotación de vulnerabilidades (por ejemplo, en los navegadores y sistemas operativos) y los ataques físicos. Si esto te preocupa, deberías emplear estrategias de mitigación de amenazas más avanzadas.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Por su diseño, los **navegadores web**, los **clientes de correo electrónico** y las **aplicaciones de oficina** suelen ejecutar código no fiable, enviado por terceros. Ejecutar múltiples máquinas virtuales -para separar aplicaciones como estas de su sistema anfitrión, así como entre sí- es una técnica que puedes utilizar para mitigar la posibilidad de que un exploit en estas aplicaciones comprometa el resto de tu sistema. Por ejemplo, tecnologías como Qubes OS o Microsoft Defender Application Guard en Windows proporcionan métodos convenientes para hacerlo.
+
+Si te preocupan los **ataques físicos** deberías utilizar un sistema operativo con una implementación de arranque seguro verificado, como Android, iOS, macOS o [Windows (con TPM)](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). También deberías asegurarte de que tu disco esté encriptado y de que el sistema operativo utiliza un TPM o Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) o [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) para limitar los intentos de introducir la frase de contraseña de encriptación. Deberías evitar compartir tu ordenador con personas que no sean de tu confianza, ya que la mayoría de los sistemas operativos de escritorio no cifran los datos por separado para cada usuario.
+
+## Privacidad de los proveedores de servicios
+
+:material-server-network: Proveedores de servicios
+
+Vivimos en un mundo en el que casi todo está conectado a Internet. Nuestros mensajes "privados", correos electrónicos e interacciones sociales suelen almacenarse en un servidor, en algún lugar. Generalmente, cuando envías un mensaje a alguien, este se almacena en un servidor, y cuando tu amigo quiere leer el mensaje, el servidor se lo muestra.
+
+El problema obvio de esto es que el proveedor de servicios (o un hacker que haya comprometido el servidor) puede acceder a tus conversaciones cuando y como quiera, sin que tú lo sepas. Esto se aplica a muchos servicios comunes, como la mensajería SMS, Telegram y Discord.
+
+Afortunadamente, E2EE puede aliviar este problema encriptando las comunicaciones entre tú y los destinatarios deseados antes de que se envíen al servidor. La confidencialidad de tus mensajes está garantizada, suponiendo que el proveedor de servicios no tenga acceso a las claves privadas de ninguna de las partes.
+
+!!! nota "Nota sobre el cifrado basado en la web"
+
+ En la práctica, la eficacia de las diferentes implementaciones de E2EE varía. Las aplicaciones, como [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), se ejecutan de forma nativa en tu dispositivo, y cada copia de la aplicación es la misma en diferentes instalaciones. Si el proveedor de servicios introdujera un [backdoor](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Puerta_trasera) en su aplicación -en un intento de robar tus claves privadas- podría ser detectado posteriormente con [ingeniería inversa](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ingenier%C3%Ada_inversa).
+
+ Por otro lado, las implementaciones E2EE basadas en la web, como el webmail de Proton Mail o *Web Vault* de Bitwarden, dependen de que el servidor sirva dinámicamente código JavaScript al navegador para manejar la criptografía. Un servidor malicioso puede dirigirse a ti y enviarte un código JavaScript malicioso para robar tu clave de cifrado (y sería extremadamente difícil de notar). Dado que el servidor puede elegir servir diferentes clientes de la web a diferentes personas -incluso si te diste cuenta del ataque- sería increíblemente difícil probar la culpabilidad del proveedor.
+
+ Por lo tanto, siempre que sea posible, hay que utilizar aplicaciones nativas en lugar de clientes web.
+
+Incluso con E2EE, los proveedores de servicios aún pueden hacerte un perfil basado en **metadatos**, que generalmente no están protegidos. Aunque el proveedor de servicios no puede leer tus mensajes, sí puede observar cosas importantes, como con quién hablas, la frecuencia con la que les envías mensajes y cuándo sueles estar activo. La protección de los metadatos es bastante infrecuente, y -si está dentro de tu [modelo de amenazas](basics/threat-modeling.md)- deberías prestar mucha atención a la documentación técnica del software que estás utilizando para ver si hay alguna minimización o protección de los metadatos.
+
+## Programas de vigilancia masiva
+
+:material-eye-outline: Vigilancia masiva
+
+La vigilancia masiva es el intrincado esfuerzo por controlar el "comportamiento, muchas actividades o información" de toda una población (o de una fracción sustancial de ella).[^1] Suele referirse a programas gubernamentales, como los que [reveló Edward Snowden en 2013](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revelaciones_sobre_la_red_de_vigilancia_mundial_(2013-2015)). Sin embargo, también puede ser llevada a cabo por empresas, ya sea en nombre de organismos gubernamentales o por iniciativa propia.
+
+!!! Sin embargo, al vulnerar los derechos humanos, se utiliza con mayor frecuencia para atacar desproporcionadamente a grupos minoritarios y disidentes políticos, entre otros.
+
+ Si quiere saber más sobre los métodos de vigilancia y cómo se aplican en su ciudad, también puede echar un vistazo al [Atlas of Surveillance](https://atlasofsurveillance.org/) de la [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.eff.org/).
+
+ In France you can take a look at the [Technolopolice website](https://technopolice.fr/villes/) maintained by the non-profit association La Quadrature du Net.
+
+Los gobiernos suelen justificar los programas de vigilancia masiva como medios necesarios para combatir el terrorismo y prevenir la delincuencia. cita "ACLU: [*La lección de privacidad del 11 de septiembre: La vigilancia masiva no es el camino a seguir*](https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/the-privacy-lesson-of-9-11-mass-surveillance-is-not-the-way-forward)"
+
+!!! quote "ACLU: [*The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward*](https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/the-privacy-lesson-of-9-11-mass-surveillance-is-not-the-way-forward)"
+
+ Aunque eludir la censura en sí puede ser fácil, ocultar el hecho de que lo estás haciendo puede ser muy problemático. Debrías considerar qué aspectos de la red puede observar tu adversario y si tiene una negación plausible de tus acciones.
+
+En línea, puedes ser rastreado a través de una variedad de métodos:
+
+\[Esta lista no es exhaustiva].
+
+- Tu dirección IP
+- Cookies del navegador
+- Los datos que envías a los sitios web
+- La huella digital de tu navegador o dispositivo
+- Correlación del método de pago
+
+Si te preocupan los programas de vigilancia masiva, puedes utilizar estrategias como compartimentar tus identidades en línea, mezclarte con otros usuarios o, siempre que sea posible, simplemente evitar dar información que te identifique.
+
+Si te preocupan los programas de vigilancia masiva, puedes utilizar estrategias como compartimentar tus identidades en línea, mezclarte con otros usuarios o, siempre que sea posible, simplemente evitar proporcionar información que te identifique.
+
+:material-account-cash: Capitalismo de Vigilancia
+
+> El capitalismo de vigilancia es un sistema económico centrado en la captura y mercantilización de datos personales con el propósito principal de obtener ganancias.[^3]
+
+Además, incluso empresas ajenas a la industria de *AdTech* o de seguimiento pueden compartir tu información con los [corredores de datos](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Broker_de_informaci%C3%B3n) (como Cambridge Analytica, Experian o Datalogix) u otras partes. No puedes asumir automáticamente que tus datos están seguros sólo porque el servicio que utilizas no entra dentro del típico modelo de negocio de AdTech o de seguimiento. La mayor protección contra la recopilación de datos por parte de las empresas es encriptar u ofuscar tus datos siempre que sea posible, dificultando que los diferentes proveedores puedan correlacionar los datos entre sí y construir un perfil sobre ti.
+
+La mejor manera de mantener la privacidad de tus datos es simplemente no hacerlos públicos en primer lugar. Borrar la información no deseada que encuentres sobre ti en Internet es uno de los mejores primeros pasos que puedes dar para recuperar tu privacidad. La mayor protección contra la recopilación de datos por parte de las empresas es encriptar u ofuscar tus datos siempre que sea posible, dificultando que los diferentes proveedores puedan correlacionar los datos entre sí y construir un perfil sobre ti.
+
+## Limitación de la información pública
+
+:material-account-search: Exposición pública
+
+En los sitios en los que compartes información, es muy importante comprobar la configuración de privacidad de tu cuenta para limitar la difusión de esos datos. Por ejemplo, activa el "modo privado" en tus cuentas si tienes la opción: Esto garantiza que tu cuenta no sea indexada por los motores de búsqueda y que no pueda ser vista sin tu permiso.
+
+- [Mira nuestra guía sobre la eliminación de cuentas :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](account-deletion.md)
+
+Si ya has enviado tu información real a sitios que no deberían tenerla, considera la posibilidad de utilizar tácticas de desinformación, como enviar información ficticia relacionada con esa identidad en línea. Esto hace que tu información real sea indistinguible de la falsa.
+
+La censura en línea puede ser llevada a cabo (en diversos grados) por actores que incluyen gobiernos totalitarios, administradores de redes y proveedores de servicios. Estos esfuerzos por controlar la comunicación y restringir el acceso a la información serán siempre incompatibles con el derecho humano a la Libertad de Expresión.[^5]
+
+## Evitar la censura
+
+:material-close-outline: Censura
+
+La censura en las plataformas corporativas es cada vez más común, ya que plataformas como Twitter y Facebook ceden a la demanda del público, a las presiones del mercado y a las de los organismos gubernamentales. Las presiones gubernamentales pueden ser peticiones encubiertas a las empresas, como la de la Casa Blanca [solicitando la retirada](https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/technology/on-the-web-a-fine-line-on-free-speech-across-globe.html) de un vídeo provocativo de YouTube, o abiertamente, como la del gobierno chino exigiendo a las empresas que se adhieran a un estricto régimen de censura.
+
+La censura en las plataformas corporativas es cada vez más común, ya que plataformas como Twitter y Facebook ceden a la demanda del público, a las presiones del mercado y a las de los organismos gubernamentales. Government pressures can be covert requests to businesses, such as the White House [requesting the takedown](https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/technology/on-the-web-a-fine-line-on-free-speech-across-globe.html) of a provocative YouTube video, or overt, such as the Chinese government requiring companies to adhere to a strict regime of censorship.
+
+People concerned with the threat of censorship can use technologies like [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) to circumvent it, and support censorship-resistant communication platforms like [Matrix](../real-time-communication.md#element), which doesn't have a centralized account authority that can close accounts arbitrarily.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ While evading censorship itself can be easy, hiding the fact that you are doing it can be very problematic.
+
+ You should consider which aspects of the network your adversary can observe, and whether you have plausible deniability for your actions. For example, using [encrypted DNS](../advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns) can help you bypass rudimentary, DNS-based censorship systems, but it can't truly hide what you are visiting from your ISP. A VPN or Tor can help hide what you are visiting from network administrators, but can't hide that you're using those networks in the first place. Pluggable transports (such as Obfs4proxy, Meek, or Shadowsocks) can help you evade firewalls that block common VPN protocols or Tor, but your circumvention attempts can still be detected by methods like probing or [deep packet inspection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection).
+
+You must always consider the risks of trying to bypass censorship, the potential consequences, and how sophisticated your adversary may be. You should be cautious with your software selection, and have a backup plan in case you are caught.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
+
+[^1]: Wikipedia: [*Vigilancia masiva*](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vigilancia_masiva) y [*Vigilancia*](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vigilancia).
+[^2]: Junta de Supervisión de la Privacidad y las Libertades Civiles de los Estados Unidos: [*Informe sobre el Programa de Registros Telefónicos llevado a cabo bajo la Sección 215*](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/ec542143-1079-424a-84b3-acc354698560/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf)
+[^3]: Wikipedia: [*Capitalismo de vigilancia*](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capitalismo_de_vigilancia)
+[^4]: "[Enumerar la maldad](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/)" (o, "enumerar todas las cosas malas que conocemos"), como hacen muchos bloqueadores de anuncios y programas antivirus, no protege adecuadamente de las amenazas nuevas y desconocidas porque aún no se han añadido a la lista de filtros. También deberías emplear otras técnicas de mitigación.
+[^5]: Naciones Unidas: [*La Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos*](https://www.un.org/es/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights).
diff --git a/i18n/es/basics/email-security.md b/i18n/es/basics/email-security.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6fbf613e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/basics/email-security.md
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+---
+title: Seguridad del correo electrónico
+icon: material/email
+---
+
+El correo electrónico es una forma de comunicación insegura por defecto. Puedes mejorar la seguridad de tu correo electrónico con herramientas como OpenPGP, que añaden cifrado de extremo a extremo a tus mensajes, pero OpenPGP sigue teniendo una serie de inconvenientes en comparación con el cifrado de otras aplicaciones de mensajería, y algunos datos del correo electrónico nunca pueden cifrarse de forma inherente debido a cómo está diseñado el correo electrónico.
+
+En consecuencia, el correo electrónico se utiliza mejor para recibir correos electrónicos transaccionales (como notificaciones, correos de verificación, restablecimiento de contraseñas, etc.) de los servicios en los que te registras en línea, no para comunicarte con otras personas.
+
+## Descripción de la encriptación del correo electrónico
+
+La forma estándar de añadir E2EE a los correos electrónicos entre diferentes proveedores de correo electrónico es utilizando OpenPGP. Existen diferentes implementaciones del estándar OpenPGP, siendo las más comunes [GnuPG](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard) y [OpenPGP.js](https://openpgpjs.org).
+
+Hay otro estándar que es popular entre las empresas llamada [S/MIME](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME), sin embargo, requiere un certificado emitido por una [Autoridad de certificación](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autoridad_de_certificaci%C3%B3n) (no todos emiten certificados S/MIME). Tiene soporte en [Google Workplace](https://support.google.com/a/topic/9061730?hl=es&%3Bref_topic=9061731) y [Outlook para Web o Exchange Server 2016, 2019](https://support.microsoft.com/es-es/office/cifrar-mensajes-mediante-s-mime-en-outlook-en-la-web-878c79fc-7088-4b39-966f-14512658f480?ui=en-us&rs=en-us&ad=us).
+
+Incluso si utilizas OpenPGP, no admite el [secreto perfecto hacia adelante](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfect_forward_secrecy), lo que significa que si alguna vez se roba tu clave privada o la del destinatario, todos los mensajes anteriores cifrados con ella se expondrán. Es por eso que recomendamos [servicios de mensajería instantáneos](../real-time-communication.md) que implementan el secreto perfecto hacia adelante por sobre el correo electrónico para las comunicaciones de persona a persona siempre que sea posible.
+
+### ¿Qué clientes de correo electrónico admiten E2EE?
+
+Los proveedores de correo electrónico que permiten utilizar protocolos de acceso estándar como IMAP y SMTP pueden utilizarse con cualquiera de los clientes de correo electrónico [que recomendamos](../email-clients.md). Dependiendo del método de autenticación, esto puede conducir a la disminución de la seguridad si el proveedor o el cliente de correo electrónico no soporta OATH o una aplicación puente debido a que la [autenticación multifactor](multi-factor-authentication.md) no es posible con la autenticación de contraseña simple.
+
+### ¿Cómo puedo proteger mis claves privadas?
+
+Una tarjeta inteligente (como una [Yubikey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) o una [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com)) funciona recibiendo un mensaje de correo electrónico cifrado desde un dispositivo (teléfono, tableta, ordenador, etc.) que ejecuta un cliente de correo electrónico/correo web. El mensaje es entonces descifrado por la tarjeta inteligente y el contenido descifrado es enviado de vuelta al dispositivo.
+
+Es ventajoso que el descifrado ocurra en la tarjeta inteligente para evitar la posible exposición de tu clave privada a un dispositivo comprometido.
+
+## Descripción general de los metadatos de correo electrónico
+
+Los metadatos del correo electrónico se almacenan en la [cabecera del mensaje](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Correo_electr%C3%B3nico#Escritura_del_mensaje) del correo electrónico e incluye algunas cabeceras visibles que puedes haber visto como: `Para`, `De`, `Cc`, `Fecha`, `Asunto`. También hay una serie de encabezados ocultos incluidos por muchos clientes y proveedores de correo electrónico que pueden revelar información sobre tu cuenta.
+
+El software del cliente puede usar metadatos de correo electrónico para mostrar de quién es un mensaje y a qué hora se recibió. Los servidores pueden utilizarlo para determinar dónde debe enviarse un mensaje de correo electrónico, [entre otros fines](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Correo_electr%C3%B3nico#Escritura_del_mensaje) que no siempre son transparentes.
+
+### ¿Quién puede ver los metadatos del correo electrónico?
+
+Los metadatos del correo electrónico están protegidos de observadores externos con [STARTTLS](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/STARTTLS) protegiéndolos de observadores externos, pero aún pueden ser vistos por tu software de cliente de correo electrónico (o webmail) y cualquier servidor que retransmita el mensaje de ti a cualquier destinatario, incluyendo tu proveedor de correo electrónico. A veces, los servidores de correo electrónico también utilizan servicios de terceros para protegerse del spam, que generalmente también tienen acceso a tus mensajes.
+
+### ¿Por qué los metadatos no pueden ser E2EE?
+
+Los metadatos del correo electrónico son cruciales para la funcionalidad más básica del correo electrónico (de dónde viene y a dónde tiene que ir). E2EE no estaba integrado originalmente en los protocolos de correo electrónico, sino que requería un software adicional como OpenPGP. Dado que los mensajes OpenPGP todavía tienen que funcionar con los proveedores de correo electrónico tradicionales, no puede cifrar los metadatos del correo electrónico, sino sólo el cuerpo del mensaje. Esto significa que, incluso cuando se utiliza OpenPGP, los observadores externos pueden ver mucha información sobre tus mensajes, como a quién estás enviando correos electrónicos, las líneas de asunto, cuándo estás enviando correos, etc.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md b/i18n/es/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2e3cf8e45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+---
+title: "Autenticación de múltiples factores"
+icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication'
+---
+
+**La autenticación multifactorial** (**MFA**) es un mecanismo de seguridad que requiere pasos adicionales a la introducción del nombre de usuario (o correo electrónico) y la contraseña. El método más común son los códigos de tiempo limitado que puedes recibir de un SMS o una aplicación.
+
+Normalmente, si un hacker (o adversario) es capaz de averiguar tu contraseña, entonces obtendrá acceso a la cuenta a la que pertenece esa contraseña. Una cuenta con MFA obliga al hacker a tener tanto la contraseña (algo que *conoces*) como un dispositivo de tu propiedad (algo que *tienes*), como tu teléfono.
+
+Los métodos MFA varían en seguridad, pero se basan en la premisa de que cuanto más difícil sea para un atacante acceder a tu método MFA, mejor. Algunos ejemplos de métodos MFA (de más débil a más fuerte) incluyen SMS, códigos de correo electrónico, notificaciones push de aplicaciones, TOTP, Yubico OTP y FIDO.
+
+## Comparación de métodos MFA
+
+### SMS o correo electrónico MFA
+
+Recibir códigos OTP por SMS o correo electrónico es una de las formas más débiles de asegurar tus cuentas con MFA. Obtener un código por correo electrónico o SMS se aleja de la idea de "algo que *tienes*", porque hay una gran variedad de formas en las que un hacker podría [tomar tu número de teléfono](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swapping) o acceder a tu correo electrónico sin tener acceso físico a ninguno de tus dispositivos. Si una persona no autorizada obtuviera acceso a tu correo electrónico, podría utilizar ese acceso tanto para restablecer tu contraseña como para recibir el código de autenticación, lo que le daría pleno acceso a tu cuenta.
+
+### Notificaciones push
+
+La MFA por notificación push consiste en el envío de un mensaje a una aplicación de tu teléfono en el que se te pide que confirmes el inicio de sesión de una nueva cuenta. Este método es mucho mejor que el de los SMS o el correo electrónico, ya que un atacante normalmente no podría obtener estas notificaciones push sin tener un dispositivo ya conectado, lo que significa que tendría que comprometer uno de tus otros dispositivos primero.
+
+Todos cometemos errores, y existe el riesgo de que aceptes el intento de inicio de sesión por accidente. Las autorizaciones de inicio de sesión mediante notificaciones push suelen enviarse a *todos* tus dispositivos a la vez, ampliando la disponibilidad del código MFA si tienes muchos dispositivos.
+
+La seguridad de las notificaciones push MFA depende tanto de la calidad de la aplicación como del componente del servidor y de la confianza del desarrollador que la produce. La instalación de una aplicación también puede requerir que aceptes privilegios invasivos que concedan acceso a otros datos de tu dispositivo. Una aplicación individual también requiere que tengas una aplicación específica para cada servicio que puede no requerir una contraseña para abrirse, a diferencia de una buena aplicación generadora de TOTP.
+
+### Contraseñas de un solo uso basado en tiempo (TOTP)
+
+El TOTP es una de las formas más comunes de MFA disponibles. Cuando se configura el TOTP, generalmente se requiere escanear un [código QR](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/C%C3%B3digo_QR) que establece un "[secreto compartido](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secreto_compartido)" con el servicio que se pretende utilizar. El secreto compartido está asegurado dentro de los datos de la aplicación de autenticación, y a veces está protegido por una contraseña.
+
+El código de tiempo limitado se deriva entonces del secreto compartido y de la hora actual. Como el código sólo es válido durante un corto periodo de tiempo, sin acceso al secreto compartido, un adversario no puede generar nuevos códigos.
+
+Si tienes una llave de seguridad de hardware con soporte para TOTP (como una YubiKey con [Yubico Authenticator](https://www.yubico.com/products/yubico-authenticator/)), recomendamos que almacenes tus "secretos compartidos" en el equipo. El hardware como el YubiKey se desarrolló con la intención de que el "secreto compartido" fuera difícil de extraer y copiar. Una YubiKey tampoco está conectada a Internet, a diferencia de un teléfono con una aplicación TOTP.
+
+A diferencia de [WebAuthn](#fido-fast-identity-online), TOTP no ofrece protección contra [Phishing](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing) o ataques de reutilización. Si un adversario obtiene un código válido de ti, puede utilizarlo tantas veces como quiera hasta que caduque (generalmente 60 segundos).
+
+Un adversario podría crear un sitio web para imitar un servicio oficial en un intento de engañarte para que des tu nombre de usuario, contraseña y código TOTP actual. Si el adversario utiliza esas credenciales registradas puede ser capaz de entrar en el servicio real y secuestrar la cuenta.
+
+Aunque no es perfecto, TOTP es lo suficientemente seguro para la mayoría de la gente, y cuando las [llaves de seguridad de hardware](../multi-factor-authentication.md#hardware-security-keys) no son compatibles las [aplicaciones de autenticación](../multi-factor-authentication.md#authenticator-apps) siguen siendo una buena opción.
+
+### Llaves de seguridad de hardware
+
+La YubiKey almacena los datos en un chip de estado sólido resistente a las manipulaciones, al que es [imposible acceder](https://security.stackexchange.com/a/245772) de forma no destructiva sin un costoso proceso y un laboratorio forense.
+
+Estas claves suelen ser multifuncionales y ofrecen varios métodos de autenticación. A continuación se presentan los más comunes.
+
+#### Yubico OTP
+
+Yubico OTP es un protocolo de autenticación típicamente implementado en llaves de seguridad de hardware. Cuando decidas utilizar Yubico OTP, la clave generará un ID público, un ID privado y una clave secreta que se cargará en el servidor Yubico OTP.
+
+Para entrar en un sitio web, basta con tocar físicamente la clave de seguridad. La llave de seguridad emulará un teclado e imprimirá una contraseña de un solo uso en el campo de la contraseña.
+
+El servicio enviará entonces la contraseña de un solo uso al servidor Yubico OTP para su validación. Se incrementa un contador tanto en la llave como en el servidor de validación de Yubico. La OTP sólo puede utilizarse una vez, y cuando se produce una autenticación con éxito, el contador se incrementa, lo que impide la reutilización de la OTP. Yubico proporciona un [documento detallado](https://developers.yubico.com/OTP/OTPs_Explained.html) sobre el proceso.
+
+
+ 
+
+
+El uso de Yubico OTP tiene algunas ventajas y desventajas en comparación con TOTP.
+
+El servidor de validación de Yubico es un servicio basado en la nube, y estás confiando en que Yubico almacena los datos de forma segura y no los perfila. El ID público asociado con Yubico OTP se reutiliza en todos los sitios web y podría ser otra vía para que terceros te perfilen. Al igual que TOTP, Yubico OTP no proporciona resistencia al phishing.
+
+Si tu modelo de amenaza requiere que tengas diferentes identidades en diferentes sitios web, **no** utilices Yubico OTP con la misma clave de seguridad de hardware entre esos sitios web ya que el ID público es único para cada clave de seguridad.
+
+#### FIDO (Fast IDentity Online)
+
+[FIDO](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIDO_Alliance) incluye una serie de estándares, primero fue U2F y después [FIDO2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIDO2_Project) el cual incluye el estándar web [WebAuthn](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn).
+
+U2F y FIDO2 se refieren al [Protocolo Cliente-Autenticador](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Client_to_Authenticator_Protocol), que es el protocolo entre la clave de seguridad y el ordenador, como un portátil o un teléfono. Complementa a WebAuthn, que es el componente utilizado para autenticarse con el sitio web (la "parte dependiente") en el que estás intentando de iniciar sesión.
+
+WebAuthn es la forma más segura y privada de autenticación de segundo factor. Si bien la experiencia de autenticación es similar a Yubico OTP, la clave no imprime una contraseña de una sola vez y se valida con un servidor de terceros. En su lugar, utiliza [criptografía de clave pública](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criptograf%C3%Ada_asim%C3%A9trica) para la autenticación.
+
+
+ 
+
+
+Cuando creas una cuenta, la clave pública se envía al servicio, luego cuando inicias sesión, el servicio requerirá que "firmes" algunos datos con tu clave privada. La ventaja de esto es que el servicio no almacena nunca los datos de la contraseña, por lo que no hay nada que un adversario pueda robar.
+
+Esta presentación habla de la historia de la autenticación de contraseñas, los tropiezos (como la reutilización de contraseñas) y el debate de los estándares FIDO2 y [WebAuthn](https://webauthn.guide).
+
+
+
+
+
+FIDO2 y WebAuthn tienen propiedades de seguridad y privacidad superiores en comparación con cualquier método MFA.
+
+Por lo general, para los servicios web se utiliza con WebAuthn, que es una parte de las [recomendaciones W3C](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Wide_Web_Consortium#Recomendaci%C3%B3n_de_W3C_(REC)). Utiliza la autenticación de clave pública y es más segura que los secretos compartidos utilizados en los métodos OTP y TOTP de Yubico, ya que incluye el nombre de origen (normalmente, el nombre del dominio) durante la autenticación. La certificación se proporciona para protegerte del phishing, ya que te ayuda a determinar que estás utilizando el servicio auténtico y no una copia falsa.
+
+A diferencia de Yubico OTP, WebAuthn no utiliza ningún ID público, entonces la clave **no** es identificable a través de diferentes sitios web. Tampoco utiliza ningún servidor de nube de terceros para la autenticación. Toda la comunicación se completa entre la clave y el sitio web en el que estás iniciando sesión. FIDO también utiliza un contador que se incrementa cuando se utiliza para evitar la reutilización de la sesión y llaves clonadas.
+
+Si un sitio web o servicio es compatible con WebAuthn para la autenticación, es muy recomendable que lo utilices sobre cualquier otra forma de MFA.
+
+## Recomendaciones generales
+
+Tenemos estas recomendaciones generales:
+
+### ¿Qué método debería usar?
+
+Al configurar tu método MFA, ten en cuenta que es tan seguro como el método de autenticación más débil que utilices. Esto significa que es importante que sólo utilices el mejor método de MFA disponible. Por ejemplo, si ya estás utilizando TOTP, deberías desactivar la MFA por correo electrónico y SMS. Si ya estás usando FIDO2/WebAuthn, no deberías usar Yubico OTP o TOTP en tu cuenta.
+
+### Copias de seguridad
+
+Siempre debes tener copias de seguridad de tu método MFA. Las llaves de seguridad de hardware pueden perderse, ser robadas o simplemente dejar de funcionar con el tiempo. Se recomienda tener un par de llaves de seguridad de hardware con el mismo acceso a tus cuentas en lugar de una sola.
+
+Cuando utilices TOTP con una aplicación de autenticación, asegúrate de hacer una copia de seguridad de tus claves de recuperación o de la propia aplicación, o de copiar los "secretos compartidos" a otra instancia de la aplicación en un teléfono diferente o a un contenedor cifrado (por ejemplo, [VeraCrypt](../encryption.md#veracrypt)).
+
+### Configuración inicial
+
+Cuando compres una llave de seguridad, es importante que cambies las credenciales por defecto, configures la protección por contraseña de la llave y actives la confirmación táctil si tu llave es compatible con ella. Los productos como el YubiKey tienen múltiples interfaces con credenciales separadas para cada uno de ellos, por lo que debes repasar cada interfaz y configurar la protección también.
+
+### Correo electrónico y SMS
+
+Si tienes que utilizar el correo electrónico para MFA, asegúrate de que la propia cuenta de correo electrónico está protegida con un método MFA adecuado.
+
+Si usas MFA de SMS, utiliza un operador que no cambie tu número de teléfono a una nueva tarjeta SIM sin acceso a la cuenta, o usa un número VoIP dedicado de un proveedor con seguridad similar para evitar un [ataque de duplicación de SIM](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swapping).
+
+[Herramientas de MFA que recomendamos](../multi-factor-authentication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Más lugares para configurar MFA
+
+Además de proteger tus inicios de sesión del sitio web, la autenticación de múltiples factores también se puede utilizar para proteger tus inicios de sesión locales, claves SSH o incluso bases de datos de contraseñas.
+
+### Windows
+
+Yubico tiene un [Proveedor de credenciales](https://learn.microsoft.com/es-es/windows/win32/secauthn/credential-providers-in-windows) dedicado que añade la autenticación Challenge-Response para el flujo de inicio de sesión con nombre de usuario + contraseña para las cuentas locales de Windows. Si tienes una YubiKey con soporte de autenticación Challenge-Response, echa un ojo a la [Guía de configuración de Yubico Login para Windows](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013708460-Yubico-Login-for-Windows-Configuration-Guide), que te permitirá configurar MFA en tu computadora Windows.
+
+### macOS
+
+macOS tiene [soporte nativo](https://support.apple.com/es-es/guide/deployment/depd0b888248/web) para la autenticación con tarjetas inteligentes (PIV). Si tienes una tarjeta inteligente o una llave de seguridad de hardware compatible con la interfaz PIV como la YubiKey, te recomendamos que sigas la documentación de tu tarjeta inteligente/vendedor de seguridad de hardware y configures la autenticación de segundo factor para tu ordenador macOS.
+
+Yubico tiene una guía [Uso de su YubiKey como tarjeta inteligente en macOS](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016649059) que puede ayudarte a configurar tu YubiKey en macOS.
+
+Después de configurar tu tarjeta inteligente/clave de seguridad, te recomendamos que ejecutes este comando en el Terminal:
+
+```text
+sudo defaults write /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow DisableFDEAutoLogin -bool YES
+```
+
+El comando evitará que un adversario se salte la MFA al arrancar el ordenador.
+
+### Linux
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Si el nombre de host de tu sistema cambia (por ejemplo, debido al DHCP), no podrás iniciar sesión. Es vital que configures un nombre de host adecuado para tu ordenador antes de seguir esta guía.
+
+El módulo `pam_u2f` en Linux puede proporcionar autenticación de dos factores para iniciar sesión en las distribuciones Linux más populares. Si tienes una llave de seguridad de hardware compatible con U2F, puedes configurar la autenticación MFA para tu inicio de sesión. Yubico tiene una guía [Guía de inicio de sesión en Ubuntu Linux - U2F](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016649099-Ubuntu-Linux-Login-Guide-U2F) que debería funcionar en cualquier distribución. Sin embargo, los comandos del gestor de paquetes—como `"apt-get"`—y los nombres de los paquetes pueden ser diferentes. Esta guía **no** se aplica a Qubes OS.
+
+### Qubes OS
+
+Qubes OS tiene soporte para la autenticación Challenge-Response con YubiKeys. Si tienes una YubiKey con soporte de autenticación Challenge-Response, echale un ojo a la [documentación de YubiKey](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/yubikey/) de Qubes OS si quieres configurar MFA en Qubes OS.
+
+### SSH
+
+#### Llaves de Seguridad
+
+MFA de SSH podría configurarse utilizando varios métodos de autenticación diferentes que son populares con las claves de seguridad de hardware. Te recomendamos que consultea la [documentación](https://developers.yubico.com/SSH/) de Yubico sobre cómo configurarlo.
+
+#### Contraseñas de un solo uso basado en tiempo (TOTP)
+
+MFA de SSH también se puede configurar utilizando TOTP. DigitalOcean ha proporcionado un tutorial [Cómo configurar la autenticación multifactor para SSH en Ubuntu 20.04](https://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/how-to-set-up-multi-factor-authentication-for-ssh-on-ubuntu-20-04). La mayoría de las cosas deberían ser las mismas independientemente de la distribución, sin embargo los comandos del gestor de paquetes—como `"apt-get"`—y los nombres de los paquetes pueden diferir.
+
+### KeePass (y KeePassXC)
+
+Las bases de datos de KeePass y KeePassXC pueden ser aseguradas utilizando Challenge-Response o HOTP como segundo factor de autenticación. Yubico ha proporcionado un documento para KeePass [Uso de su YubiKey con KeePass](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013779759-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-KeePass) y también hay uno en el sitio web de [KeePassXC](https://keepassxc.org/docs/#faq-yubikey-2fa).
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/basics/passwords-overview.md b/i18n/es/basics/passwords-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..51ad8fdf3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/basics/passwords-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+---
+title: "Introducción a las contraseñas"
+icon: 'material/form-textbox-password'
+---
+
+Las contraseñas son una parte esencial de nuestra vida digital cotidiana. Las utilizamos para proteger nuestras cuentas, nuestros dispositivos y nuestros secretos. A pesar de ser a menudo lo único que nos separa de un adversario que busca nuestra información privada, no se piensa mucho en ellas, lo que a menudo lleva a la gente a utilizar contraseñas que pueden ser fácilmente adivinadas o forzadas.
+
+## Buenas prácticas
+
+### Utilice contraseñas únicas para cada servicio
+
+Imagínate por un momento esta situación: te suscribes con el mismo correo y contraseña en múltiples servicios online. Si alguno de esos proveedores de servicios es malicioso, o su servicio tiene una filtración de datos que expone tu contraseña en un formato sin encriptar, todo lo que los malos actores deben hacer es probar esa combinación de correo electrónico y contraseña, a través de múltiples servicios populares hasta obtener un resultado. No importa lo fuerte que sea esa contraseña, porque ya la tienen.
+
+Esto es llamado [suplantación de identidad](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credential_stuffing), y es una de las formas comunes en que las cuentas son comprometidas por malos actores. Para evitar esto, asegúrate de que nunca reutilices tus contraseñas.
+
+### Utilizar contraseñas generadas aleatoriamente
+
+===**Nunca** debes confiar en ti mismo para inventar una buena contraseña.== Recomendamos utilizar [contraseñas generadas aleatoriamente](#passwords) o [frases de contraseña](#diceware-passphrases) con suficiente entropía para proteger tus cuentas y dispositivos.
+
+Todos nuestros [gestores recomendados de contraseñas](../passwords.md) incluyen un generador integrado de contraseñas que puedes usar.
+
+### Rotación de contraseñas
+
+Debes evitar cambiar frecuentemente las contraseñas que debes recordar (como la contraseña maestra de tu gestor de contraseñas), a menos que tengas alguna razón para creer que ha sido comprometida, porque cambiarla con mucha frecuencia te expone al riesgo de olvidarla.
+
+When it comes to passwords that you don't have to remember (such as passwords stored inside your password manager), if your [threat model](threat-modeling.md) calls for it, we recommend going through important accounts (especially accounts that don't use multi-factor authentication) and changing their password every couple of months, in case they have been compromised in a data breach that hasn't become public yet. Most password managers allow you to set an expiry date for your password to make this easier to manage.
+
+!!! tip "Checking for data breaches"
+
+ If your password manager lets you check for compromised passwords, make sure to do so and promptly change any password that may have been exposed in a data breach. Alternatively, you could follow [Have I Been Pwned's Latest Breaches feed](https://feeds.feedburner.com/HaveIBeenPwnedLatestBreaches) with the help of a [news aggregator](../news-aggregators.md).
+
+## Creating strong passwords
+
+### Passwords
+
+A lot of services impose certain criteria when it comes to passwords, including a minimum or maximum length, as well as which special characters, if any, can be used. You should use your password manager's built-in password generator to create passwords that are as long and complex as the service will allow by including capitalized and lowercase letters, numbers and special characters.
+
+If you need a password you can memorize, we recommend a [diceware passphrase](#diceware-passphrases).
+
+### Diceware Passphrases
+
+Diceware is a method for creating passphrases which are easy to remember, but hard to guess.
+
+Diceware passphrases are a great option when you need to memorize or manually input your credentials, such as for your password manager's master password or your device's encryption password.
+
+An example of a diceware passphrase is `viewable fastness reluctant squishy seventeen shown pencil`.
+
+To generate a diceware passphrase using real dice, follow these steps:
+
+!!! note
+
+ These instructions assume that you are using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate the passphrase, which requires five dice rolls per word. Other wordlists may require more or less rolls per word, and may require a different amount of words to achieve the same entropy.
+
+1. Roll a six-sided die five times, noting down the number after each roll.
+
+2. As an example, let's say you rolled `2-5-2-6-6`. Look through the [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) for the word that corresponds to `25266`.
+
+3. You will find the word `encrypt`. Write that word down.
+
+4. Repeat this process until your passphrase has as many words as you need, which you should separate with a space.
+
+!!! warning "Important"
+
+ You should **not** re-roll words until you get a combination of words that appeal to you. The process should be completely random.
+
+If you don't have access to or would prefer to not use real dice, you can use your password manager's built-in password generator, as most of them have the option to generate diceware passphrases in addition to regular passwords.
+
+We recommend using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate your diceware passphrases, as it offers the exact same security as the original list, while containing words that are easier to memorize. There are also [other wordlists in different languages](https://theworld.com/~reinhold/diceware.html#Diceware%20in%20Other%20Languages|outline), if you do not want your passphrase to be in English.
+
+??? note "Explanation of entropy and strength of diceware passphrases"
+
+ To demonstrate how strong diceware passphrases are, we'll use the aforementioned seven word passphrase (`viewable fastness reluctant squishy seventeen shown pencil`) and [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) as an example.
+
+ One metric to determine the strength of a diceware passphrase is how much entropy it has. The entropy per word in a diceware passphrase is calculated as $\text{log}_2(\text{WordsInList})$ and the overall entropy of the passphrase is calculated as $\text{log}_2(\text{WordsInList}^\text{WordsInPhrase})$.
+
+ Therefore, each word in the aforementioned list results in ~12.9 bits of entropy ($\text{log}_2(7776)$), and a seven word passphrase derived from it has ~90.47 bits of entropy ($\text{log}_2(7776^7)$).
+
+ The [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) contains 7776 unique words. To calculate the amount of possible passphrases, all we have to do is $\text{WordsInList}^\text{WordsInPhrase}$, or in our case, $7776^7$.
+
+ Let's put all of this in perspective: A seven word passphrase using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) is one of ~1,719,070,799,748,422,500,000,000,000 possible passphrases.
+
+ On average, it takes trying 50% of all the possible combinations to guess your phrase. With that in mind, even if your adversary is capable of ~1,000,000,000,000 guesses per second, it would still take them ~27,255,689 years to guess your passphrase. That is the case even if the following things are true:
+
+ - Your adversary knows that you used the diceware method.
+ - Your adversary knows the specific wordlist that you used.
+ - Your adversary knows how many words your passphrase contains.
+
+To sum it up, diceware passphrases are your best option when you need something that is both easy to remember *and* exceptionally strong.
+
+## Storing Passwords
+
+### Password Managers
+
+The best way to store your passwords is by using a password manager. They allow you to store your passwords in a file or in the cloud and protect them with a single master password. That way, you will only have to remember one strong password, which lets you access the rest of them.
+
+There are many good options to choose from, both cloud-based and local. Choose one of our recommended password managers and use it to establish strong passwords across all of your accounts. We recommend securing your password manager with a [diceware passphrase](#diceware-passphrases) comprised of at least seven words.
+
+[List of recommended password managers](../passwords.md ""){.md-button}
+
+!!! warning "Don't place your passwords and TOTP tokens inside the same password manager"
+
+ When using TOTP codes as [multi-factor authentication](../multi-factor-authentication.md), the best security practice is to keep your TOTP codes in a [separate app](../multi-factor-authentication.md#authenticator-apps).
+
+ Storing your TOTP tokens in the same place as your passwords, while convenient, reduces the accounts to a single factor in the event that an adversary gains access to your password manager.
+
+ Furthermore, we do not recommend storing single-use recovery codes in your password manager. Those should be stored separately such as in an encrypted container on an offline storage device.
+
+### Copias de seguridad
+
+You should store an [encrypted](../encryption.md) backup of your passwords on multiple storage devices or a cloud storage provider. This can help you access your passwords if something happens to your primary device or the service you are using.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/basics/threat-modeling.md b/i18n/es/basics/threat-modeling.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..51dd7ef4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/basics/threat-modeling.md
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+---
+title: "¿Qué son los modelos de amenaza?"
+icon: 'material/target-account'
+---
+
+Equilibrar la seguridad, la privacidad y la facilidad de uso es una de las primeras y más difíciles tareas a las que se enfrentará en su camino hacia la privacidad. Everything is a trade-off: The more secure something is, the more restricting or inconvenient it generally is, etc. Often, people find that the problem with the tools they see recommended is that they're just too hard to start using!
+
+Si quisiera utilizar las herramientas **más** seguras disponibles, tendría que sacrificar *mucha facilidad de uso*. And, even then, ==nothing is ever fully secure.== There's **high** security, but never **full** security. Por eso es que los modelos de amenaza son importantes.
+
+**So, what are these threat models, anyway?**
+
+==A threat model is a list of the most probable threats to your security and privacy endeavors.== Since it's impossible to protect yourself against **every** attack(er), you should focus on the **most probable** threats. In computer security, a threat is an event that could undermine your efforts to stay private and secure.
+
+Focusing on the threats that matter to you narrows down your thinking about the protection you need, so you can choose the tools that are right for the job.
+
+## Creating Your Threat Model
+
+To identify what could happen to the things you value and determine from whom you need to protect them, you should answer these five questions:
+
+1. ¿Qué quiero proteger?
+2. ¿De quién quiero protegerlo?
+3. ¿Qué probabilidad hay de que tenga que protegerlo?
+4. ¿Qué tan graves serían las consecuencias si fallo?
+5. ¿Cuánto esfuerzo estoy dispuesto a dedicar para prevenir posibles consecuencias?
+
+### ¿Qué quiero proteger?
+
+Un "activo" es algo que usted valora y quiere proteger. In the context of digital security, ==an asset is usually some kind of information.== For example, your emails, contact lists, instant messages, location, and files are all possible assets. Sus dispositivos también pueden ser activos.
+
+*Haz una lista de tus activos: datos que guardas, dónde se guardan, quién tiene acceso a ellos y qué impide que otros los accedan.*
+
+### ¿De quién quiero protegerlo?
+
+Para responder a esta pregunta, es importante identificar quién podría querer suponer una amenaza para usted o su información. ==A person or entity that poses a threat to your assets is an “adversary”.== Examples of potential adversaries are your boss, your former partner, your business competition, your government, or a hacker on a public network.
+
+*Make a list of your adversaries or those who might want to get ahold of your assets. Su lista puede incluir individuos, una agencia gubernamental o empresas.*
+
+Depending on who your adversaries are, under some circumstances, this list might be something you want to destroy after you're done security planning.
+
+### ¿Qué probabilidad hay de que tenga que protegerlo?
+
+==Risk is the likelihood that a particular threat against a particular asset will actually occur.== It goes hand-in-hand with capability. Aunque tu proveedor de telefonía móvil tiene la capacidad de acceder a todos tus datos, el riesgo de que publiquen tus datos privados en Internet para dañar tu reputación es bajo.
+
+Es importante distinguir entre lo que podría ocurrir y la probabilidad de que ocurra. Por ejemplo, existe la amenaza de que su edificio se derrumbe, pero el riesgo de que esto ocurra es mucho mayor en San Francisco (donde los terremotos son habituales) que en Estocolmo (donde no lo son).
+
+Assessing risks is both a personal and subjective process. Many people find certain threats unacceptable, no matter the likelihood they will occur, because the mere presence of the threat is not worth the cost. En otros casos, las personas ignoran algunos altos riesgos porque no ven la amenaza como un problema.
+
+*Anote qué amenazas va a tomar en serio y cuáles pueden ser demasiado raras o demasiado inofensivas (o demasiado difíciles de combatir) como para preocuparse por ellas.*
+
+### ¿Qué tan graves serían las consecuencias si fallo?
+
+Hay muchas maneras de que un adversario pueda acceder a sus datos. Por ejemplo, un adversario puede leer sus comunicaciones privadas mientras pasan por la red, o puede borrar o corromper sus datos.
+
+==The motives of adversaries differ widely, as do their tactics.== A government trying to prevent the spread of a video showing police violence may be content to simply delete or reduce the availability of that video. Por el contrario, un opositor político puede querer acceder a contenido secreto y publicarlo sin que usted lo sepa.
+
+La planificación de la seguridad implica comprender las consecuencias que podría tener el hecho de que un adversario consiga acceder a uno de sus activos. Para determinar esto, debe considerar la capacidad de su adversario. For example, your mobile phone provider has access to all of your phone records. Un hacker en una red Wi-Fi abierta puede acceder a sus comunicaciones no cifradas. Su gobierno podría tener capacidades más fuertes.
+
+*Escriba lo que su adversario podría querer hacer con sus datos privados.*
+
+### ¿Cuánto esfuerzo estoy dispuesto a dedicar para prevenir posibles consecuencias?
+
+==There is no perfect option for security.== Not everyone has the same priorities, concerns, or access to resources. Su evaluación de riesgos le permitirá planificar la estrategia adecuada para usted, equilibrando la comodidad, el coste y la privacidad.
+
+Por ejemplo, un abogado que representa a un cliente en un caso de seguridad nacional puede estar dispuesto a hacer mayores esfuerzos para proteger las comunicaciones sobre ese caso, como el uso de correo electrónico cifrado, que una madre que envía regularmente a su hija vídeos divertidos de gatos por correo electrónico.
+
+*Anote las opciones que tiene a su disposición para ayudar a mitigar sus amenazas únicas. Tenga en cuenta si tiene limitaciones financieras, técnicas o sociales.*
+
+### Try it yourself: Protecting Your Belongings
+
+These questions can apply to a wide variety of situations, online and offline. As a generic demonstration of how these questions work, let's build a plan to keep your house and possessions safe.
+
+**¿Qué quiere proteger? (O bien, *¿qué tiene que vale la pena proteger?*)**
+:
+
+Sus activos pueden incluir joyas, aparatos electrónicos, documentos importantes o fotos.
+
+**¿De quién quiere protegerlo?**
+:
+
+Sus adversarios pueden ser ladrones, compañeros de piso o invitados.
+
+**¿Qué probabilidad hay de que tenga que protegerlo?**
+:
+
+¿Su vecindario un historial de robos? How trustworthy are your roommates or guests? ¿Cuáles son las capacidades de sus adversarios? ¿Cuáles son los riesgos que debe tener en cuenta?
+
+**¿Cómo de graves son las consecuencias si falla?**
+:
+
+¿Tiene algo en tu casa que no pueda reemplazar? Do you have the time or money to replace those things? ¿Tiene un seguro que cubra los bienes robados en su casa?
+
+**¿Cuánto esfuerzo estaría dispuesto a dedicar para prevenir posibles consecuencias?**
+:
+
+¿Está dispuesto a comprar una caja fuerte para documentos confidenciales? ¿Puede permitirse comprar una cerradura de alta calidad? ¿Tiene tiempo para abrir una caja de seguridad en su banco local y mantener sus objetos de valor allí?
+
+Sólo una vez que se haya planteado estas preguntas estará en condiciones de evaluar qué medidas tomar. Si sus posesiones son valiosas, pero la probabilidad de que se produzca un robo es baja, quizás no quiera invertir demasiado dinero en una cerradura. But, if the probability of a break-in is high, you'll want to get the best lock on the market and consider adding a security system.
+
+Elaborar un plan de seguridad le ayudará a comprender las amenazas que le son propias y a evaluar sus activos, sus adversarios y las capacidades de éstos, junto con la probabilidad de los riesgos a los que se enfrenta.
+
+## Further Reading
+
+For people looking to increase their privacy and security online, we've compiled a list of common threats our visitors face or goals our visitors have, to give you some inspiration and demonstrate the basis of our recommendations.
+
+- [Common Goals and Threats :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](common-threats.md)
+
+## Fuentes
+
+- [EFF Surveillance Self Defense: Su plan de seguridad](https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/your-security-plan)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/basics/vpn-overview.md b/i18n/es/basics/vpn-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0cdbc15d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/basics/vpn-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+---
+title: Vista general del VPN
+icon: material/vpn
+---
+
+Las redes virtuales privadas (conocidas en inglés como Virtual Private Networks) son una manera de ampliar el extremo de tu red hacia algún lugar del mundo. An ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (i.e. modem).
+
+Encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, so they may not be able to see exactly what you're posting or reading but they can get an idea of the [domains you request](../advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).
+
+A VPN can help as it can shift trust to a server somewhere else in the world. As a result, the ISP then only sees that you are connected to a VPN and nothing about the activity that you're passing into it.
+
+## Should I use a VPN?
+
+**Yes**, unless you are already using Tor. A VPN does two things: shifting the risks from your Internet Service Provider to itself and hiding your IP from a third-party service.
+
+VPNs cannot encrypt data outside of the connection between your device and the VPN server. VPN providers can see and modify your traffic the same way your ISP could. And there is no way to verify a VPN provider's "no logging" policies in any way.
+
+However, they do hide your actual IP from a third-party service, provided that there are no IP leaks. They help you blend in with others and mitigate IP based tracking.
+
+## When shouldn't I use a VPN?
+
+Using a VPN in cases where you're using your [known identity](common-threats.md#common-misconceptions) is unlikely be useful.
+
+Doing so may trigger spam and fraud detection systems, such as if you were to log into your bank's website.
+
+## What about encryption?
+
+Encryption offered by VPN providers are between your devices and their servers. It guarantees that this specific link is secure. This is a step up from using unencrypted proxies where an adversary on the network can intercept the communications between your devices and said proxies and modify them. However, encryption between your apps or browsers with the service providers are not handled by this encryption.
+
+In order to keep what you actually do on the websites you visit private and secure, you must use HTTPS. This will keep your passwords, session tokens, and queries safe from the VPN provider. Consider enabling "HTTPS everywhere" in your browser to mitigate downgrade attacks like [SSL Strip](https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Marlinspike/BlackHat-DC-09-Marlinspike-Defeating-SSL.pdf).
+
+## Should I use encrypted DNS with a VPN?
+
+Unless your VPN provider hosts the encrypted DNS servers, **no**. Using DOH/DOT (or any other form of encrypted DNS) with third-party servers will simply add more entities to trust and does **absolutely nothing** to improve your privacy/security. Your VPN provider can still see which websites you visit based on the IP addresses and other methods. Instead of just trusting your VPN provider, you are now trusting both the VPN provider and the DNS provider.
+
+A common reason to recommend encrypted DNS is that it helps against DNS spoofing. However, your browser should already be checking for [TLS certificates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Digital_certificates) with **HTTPS** and warn you about it. If you are not using **HTTPS**, then an adversary can still just modify anything other than your DNS queries and the end result will be little different.
+
+Needless to say, **you shouldn't use encrypted DNS with Tor**. This would direct all of your DNS requests through a single circuit and would allow the encrypted DNS provider to deanonymize you.
+
+## Should I use Tor *and* a VPN?
+
+By using a VPN with Tor, you're creating essentially a permanent entry node, often with a money trail attached. This provides zero additional benefits to you, while increasing the attack surface of your connection dramatically. If you wish to hide your Tor usage from your ISP or your government, Tor has a built-in solution for that: Tor bridges. [Read more about Tor bridges and why using a VPN is not necessary](../advanced/tor-overview.md).
+
+## What if I need anonymity?
+
+VPNs cannot provide anonymity. Your VPN provider will still see your real IP address, and often has a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. You cannot rely on "no logging" policies to protect your data. Use [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) instead.
+
+## What about VPN providers that provide Tor nodes?
+
+Do not use that feature. The point of using Tor is that you do not trust your VPN provider. Currently Tor only supports the [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol) protocol. [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol) (used in [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC) for voice and video sharing, the new [HTTP3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) protocol, etc), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol) and other packets will be dropped. To compensate for this, VPN providers typically will route all non-TCP packets through their VPN server (your first hop). This is the case with [ProtonVPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn/). Additionally, when using this Tor over VPN setup, you do not have control over other important Tor features such as [Isolated Destination Address](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (using a different Tor circuit for every domain you visit).
+
+The feature should be viewed as a convenient way to access the Tor Network, not to stay anonymous. For proper anonymity, use the Tor Browser, TorSocks, or a Tor gateway.
+
+## When are VPNs useful?
+
+A VPN may still be useful to you in a variety of scenarios, such as:
+
+1. Hiding your traffic from **only** your Internet Service Provider.
+1. Hiding your downloads (such as torrents) from your ISP and anti-piracy organizations.
+1. Hiding your IP from third-party websites and services, preventing IP based tracking.
+
+For situations like these, or if you have another compelling reason, the VPN providers we listed above are who we think are the most trustworthy. However, using a VPN provider still means you're *trusting* the provider. In pretty much any other scenario you should be using a secure**-by-design** tool such as Tor.
+
+## Sources and Further Reading
+
+1. [VPN - a Very Precarious Narrative](https://schub.io/blog/2019/04/08/very-precarious-narrative.html) by Dennis Schubert
+1. [Tor Network Overview](../advanced/tor-overview.md)
+1. [IVPN Privacy Guides](https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides)
+1. ["Do I need a VPN?"](https://www.doineedavpn.com), a tool developed by IVPN to challenge aggressive VPN marketing by helping individuals decide if a VPN is right for them.
+
+## Related VPN Information
+
+- [The Trouble with VPN and Privacy Review Sites](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2019/11/20/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-review-sites/)
+- [Free VPN App Investigation](https://www.top10vpn.com/free-vpn-app-investigation/)
+- [Hidden VPN owners unveiled: 101 VPN products run by just 23 companies](https://vpnpro.com/blog/hidden-vpn-owners-unveiled-97-vpns-23-companies/)
+- [This Chinese company is secretly behind 24 popular apps seeking dangerous permissions](https://vpnpro.com/blog/chinese-company-secretly-behind-popular-apps-seeking-dangerous-permissions/)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/calendar.md b/i18n/es/calendar.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..23fe133d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/calendar.md
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+---
+title: "Clientes de Correo Electrónico"
+icon: material/calendar
+---
+
+Calendars contain some of your most sensitive data; use products that implement E2EE at rest to prevent a provider from reading them.
+
+## Solo software como servicio (ScuS)
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tutanota** offers a free and encrypted calendar across their supported platforms. [Visita tutanota.com](https://tutanota.com/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Política de privacidad](https://tutanota.com/privacy){ .md-button }
+
+ **Descargas**
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-apple: macOS](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-linux: Linux](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:pg-flathub: Flatpak](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.tutanota.Tutanota)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-google-play: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
+ - [:pg-f-droid: F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/de.tutao.tutanota)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-app-store-ios: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/tutanota/id922429609)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-github: Fuente](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota)
+
+ Multiple calendars and extended sharing functionality is limited to paid subscribers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tutanota.com/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tutanota.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tutanota.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tutanota.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/tutanota/id922429609)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.tutanota.Tutanota)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.tutanota.com/)
+
+## Autoalojable
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton Calendar** is an encrypted calendar service available to Proton members via web or mobile clients. Todos los datos almacenados en él se cifran de extremo a extremo cuando se almacenan en los servidores de ProtonMail. [Visita calendar.protonmail.com](https://calendar.protonmail.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Política de privacidad](https://protonmail.com/privacy-policy){ .md-button }
+
+ **Descargas**
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-google-play: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=me.proton.android.calendar)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-github: Source](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients) Extended sharing functionality is also limited to paid subscribers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/proton-calendar-guide){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=me.proton.android.calendar)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://calendar.proton.me)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Qualifications
+
+- Must sync and store information with E2EE to ensure data is not visible to the service provider.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should integrate with native OS calendar and contact management apps if applicable.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/cloud.md b/i18n/es/cloud.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0b020a27d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/cloud.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: "Correo Electrónico"
+icon: material/file-cloud
+---
+
+Muchos proveedores de almacenamiento en la nube exigen que confíes plenamente en que no mirarán tus archivos. Las alternativas que se enumeran a continuación eliminan la necesidad de confianza, ya que le ponen en control de sus datos o implementan E2EE.
+
+Confíe en su proveedor utilizando una alternativa a continuación que es compatible con [cifrado de extremo a extremo (E2EE)](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cifrado_de_extremo_a_extremo).
+
+??? recommendation
+
+ Nextcloud is [still a recommended tool](productivity.md) for self-hosting a file management suite, however we do not recommend third-party Nextcloud storage providers at the moment, because we do not recommend Nextcloud's built-in E2EE functionality for home users.
+
+## Cryptee
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton Drive** es un servicio general de almacenamiento de archivos cifrados de extremo a extremo (E2EE) hecho por el proveedor de correo electrónico cifrado [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.com).
+
+ [Visita drive.protonmail.com](https://drive.protonmail.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Política de privacidad](https://docs.tildes.net/policies/privacy-policy){ .md-button }
+
+ **Descargas**
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-github: Fuente](hhttps://https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients) [:octicons-home-16: Inicio](https://nextcloud.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://nextcloud.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Política de privacidad" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://nextcloud.com/support/){ .card-link title=Documentación}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/nextcloud){ .card-link title="Código fuente" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nextcloud.com/contribute/){ .card-link title=Contribuir }
+
+ ???
+
+Proton Drive's mobile clients were released in December 2022 and are not yet open-source. Proton has historically delayed their source code releases until after initial product releases, and [plans to](https://www.reddit.com/r/ProtonDrive/comments/zf14i8/comment/izdwmme/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web2x&context=3) release the source code by the end of 2023. Proton Drive desktop clients are still in development.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must enforce end-to-end encryption.
+- Must offer a free plan or trial period for testing.
+- Must support TOTP or FIDO2 multi-factor authentication, or Passkey logins.
+- Must offer a web interface which supports basic file management functionality.
+- Must allow for easy exports of all files/documents.
+- Must use standard, audited encryption.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Clients should be open-source.
+- Clients should be audited in their entirety by an independent third-party.
+- Should offer native clients for Linux, Android, Windows, macOS, and iOS.
+ - These clients should integrate with native OS tools for cloud storage providers, such as Files app integration on iOS, or DocumentsProvider functionality on Android.
+- Should support easy file-sharing with other users.
+- Should offer at least basic file preview and editing functionality on the web interface.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/data-redaction.md b/i18n/es/data-redaction.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f3c305d92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/data-redaction.md
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+---
+title: "Data and Metadata Redaction"
+icon: material/tag-remove
+---
+
+When sharing files, be sure to remove associated metadata. Image files commonly include [Exif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exif) data. Photos sometimes even include GPS coordinates in the file metadata.
+
+## Desktop
+
+### MAT2
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **MAT2** is free software, which allows the metadata to be removed from image, audio, torrent, and document file types. It provides both a command line tool and a graphical user interface via an [extension for Nautilus](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/tree/master/nautilus), the default file manager of [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), and [Dolphin](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/tree/master/dolphin), the default file manager of [KDE](https://kde.org).
+
+ On Linux, a third-party graphical tool [Metadata Cleaner](https://gitlab.com/rmnvgr/metadata-cleaner) powered by MAT2 exists and is [available on Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/fr.romainvigier.MetadataCleaner).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/blob/master/README.md){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://pypi.org/project/mat2)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2#requirements-setup-on-macos-os-x-using-homebrew)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://pypi.org/project/mat2)
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2#web-interface)
+
+## Firmware del Router
+
+### ExifEraser (Android)
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **ExifEraser** is a modern, permissionless image metadata erasing application for Android.
+
+ It currently supports JPEG, PNG and WebP files.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.none.tom.exiferaser)
+ - [:octicons-moon-16: Accrescent](https://accrescent.app/app/com.none.tom.exiferaser)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser/releases)
+
+The metadata that is erased depends on the image's file type:
+
+* **JPEG**: ICC Profile, Exif, Photoshop Image Resources and XMP/ExtendedXMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
+* **PNG**: ICC Profile, Exif and XMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
+* **WebP**: ICC Profile, Exif and XMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
+
+After processing the images, ExifEraser provides you with a full report about what exactly was removed from each image.
+
+The app offers multiple ways to erase metadata from images. Namely:
+
+* You can share an image from another application with ExifEraser.
+* Through the app itself, you can select a single image, multiple images at once, or even an entire directory.
+* It features a "Camera" option, which uses your operating system's camera app to take a photo, and then it removes the metadata from it.
+* It allows you to drag photos from another app into ExifEraser when they are both open in split-screen mode.
+* Lastly, it allows you to paste an image from your clipboard.
+
+### Metapho (iOS)
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Metapho** is a simple and clean viewer for photo metadata such as date, file name, size, camera model, shutter speed, and location.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://zininworks.com/metapho){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://zininworks.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/metapho/id914457352)
+
+### PrivacyBlur
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **PrivacyBlur** is a free app which can blur sensitive portions of pictures before sharing them online.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://privacyblur.app/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://privacyblur.app/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/MATHEMA-GmbH/privacyblur#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/MATHEMA-GmbH/privacyblur){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.mathema.privacyblur)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/privacyblur/id1536274106)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ You should **never** use blur to redact [text in images](https://bishopfox.com/blog/unredacter-tool-never-pixelation). If you want to redact text in an image, draw a box over the text. For this, we suggest apps like [Pocket Paint](https://github.com/Catrobat/Paintroid).
+
+## Command-line
+
+### ExifTool
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **ExifTool** is the original perl library and command-line application for reading, writing, and editing meta information (Exif, IPTC, XMP, and more) in a wide variety of file formats (JPEG, TIFF, PNG, PDF, RAW, and more).
+
+ It's often a component of other Exif removal applications and is in most Linux distribution repositories.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://exiftool.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://exiftool.org/faq.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/exiftool/exiftool){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://exiftool.org/#donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://exiftool.org)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://exiftool.org)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://exiftool.org)
+
+!!! example "Deleting data from a directory of files"
+
+ ```bash
+ exiftool -all= *.file_extension
+ ```
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Apps developed for open-source operating systems must be open-source.
+- Apps must be free and should not include ads or other limitations.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/desktop-browsers.md b/i18n/es/desktop-browsers.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cc56f6374
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/desktop-browsers.md
@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
+---
+title: "Navegadores de escritorio"
+icon: material/laptop
+---
+
+Estas son nuestras recomendaciones de navegadores web para computadoras y las configuraciones para la navegación estándar/no anónima por Internet. Si necesitas navegar por Internet de forma anónima, deberías utilizar [Tor](tor.md) . En general, recomendamos mantener una cantidad mínima de extensiones; estas tienen un acceso privilegiado dentro de tu navegador, requieren que confíes en el desarrollador, pueden hacerte [destacar](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint), y [debilitan](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/chromium-extensions/c/0ei-UCHNm34/m/lDaXwQhzBAAJ) el aislamiento del sitio.
+
+## Firefox
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Firefox** brinda una configuración fuerte de privacidad como la [Protección de Rastreo Mejorada](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/enhanced-tracking-protection-firefox-desktop), que puede ayudar con el bloqueo de varios [tipos de rastreadores](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/enhanced-tracking-protection-firefox-desktop#w_what-enhanced-tracking-protection-blocks).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://firefox.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mozilla.org/privacy/firefox/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.mozilla.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/mac)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/linux)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.mozilla.firefox)
+
+!!! recommendation The token is **not** included in releases from the [Mozilla FTP](https://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/firefox/releases/).
+
+### Firefox
+
+Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. When you use Firefox, we recommend changing the following settings to protect your privacy from certain parties, but all browsers other than [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) will be traceable by *somebody* in some regard or another.
+
+Estas opciones se encuentran en la página de configuración *Privacidad & Seguridad* ( ≡ → Ajustes → Privacidad y Seguridad).
+
+##### Enhanced Tracking Protection
+
+- Seleccione: "Estricto"
+
+This protects you by blocking social media trackers, fingerprinting scripts (note that this does not protect you from *all* fingerprinting), cryptominers, cross-site tracking cookies, and some other tracking content. ETP protects against many common threats, but it does not block all tracking avenues because it is designed to have minimal to no impact on site usability.
+
+##### Sanitize on Close
+
+If you want to stay logged in to particular sites, you can allow exceptions in **Cookies and Site Data** → **Manage Exceptions...**
+
+- [x] Check **Delete cookies and site data when Firefox is closed**
+
+This protects you from persistent cookies, but does not protect you against cookies acquired during any one browsing session. When this is enabled, it becomes possible to easily cleanse your browser cookies by simply restarting Firefox. You can set exceptions on a per-site basis, if you wish to stay logged in to a particular site you visit often.
+
+##### Search Suggestions
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Provide search suggestions**
+
+Search suggestion features may not be available in your region.
+
+Search suggestions send everything you type in the address bar to the default search engine, regardless of whether you submit an actual search. Disabling search suggestions allows you to more precisely control what data you send to your search engine provider.
+
+##### Telemetry
+
+- Seleccione: "Habilitar el modo solo HTTPS en todas las ventanas".
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Firefox to install and run studies**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Firefox to send backlogged crash reports on your behalf**
+
+> Firefox sends data about your Firefox version and language; device operating system and hardware configuration; memory, basic information about crashes and errors; outcome of automated processes like updates, safebrowsing, and activation to us. When Firefox sends data to us, your IP address is temporarily collected as part of our server logs.
+
+Additionally, the Firefox Accounts service collects [some technical data](https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/privacy/firefox/#firefox-accounts). If you use a Firefox Account you can opt-out:
+
+1. Open your [profile settings on accounts.firefox.com](https://accounts.firefox.com/settings#data-collection)
+2. Uncheck **Data Collection and Use** > **Help improve Firefox Accounts**
+
+##### HTTPS-Only Mode
+
+- [x] Select **Enable HTTPS-Only Mode in all windows**
+
+This prevents you from unintentionally connecting to a website in plain-text HTTP. Sites without HTTPS are uncommon nowadays, so this should have little to no impact on your day to day browsing.
+
+### Firefox Sync
+
+[Firefox Sync](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2018/11/firefox-sync-privacy/) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices and protects it with E2EE.
+
+### Extensiones
+
+The [Arkenfox project](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js) provides a set of carefully considered options for Firefox. If you [decide](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/1.1-To-Arkenfox-or-Not) to use Arkenfox, a [few options](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/3.2-Overrides-[Common]) are subjectively strict and/or may cause some websites to not work properly - [which you can easily change](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/3.1-Overrides) to suit your needs. We **strongly recommend** reading through their full [wiki](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki). Arkenfox also enables [container](https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/containers#w_for-advanced-users) support.
+
+## Brave
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Brave Browser** includes a built-in content blocker and [privacy features](https://brave.com/privacy-features/), many of which are enabled by default.
+
+ Brave is built upon the Chromium web browser project, so it should feel familiar and have minimal website compatibility issues.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://brave.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://brave4u7jddbv7cyviptqjc7jusxh72uik7zt6adtckl5f4nwy2v72qd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://brave.com/privacy/browser/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.brave.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads annotate
+
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://brave.com/download/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://brave.com/download/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://brave.com/linux/) (1)
+
+ 1. We advise against using the Flatpak version of Brave, as it replaces Chromium's sandbox with Flatpak's, which is less effective. Additionally, the package is not maintained by Brave Software, Inc.
+
+### Firefox
+
+Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. Cuando uses Brave, te recomendamos cambiar la siguiente configuración para proteger tu privacidad de ciertas partes, pero todos los navegadores que no sean [el navegador Tor](tor.md#tor-browser) serán rastreables por *alguien* en algún sentido u otro.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings**.
+
+##### Shields
+
+Brave includes some anti-fingerprinting measures in its [Shields](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360022973471-What-is-Shields-) feature. We suggest configuring these options [globally](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360023646212-How-do-I-configure-global-and-site-specific-Shields-settings-) across all pages that you visit.
+
+Shields' options can be downgraded on a per-site basis as needed, but by default we recommend setting the following:
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Prevent sites from fingerprinting me based on my language preferences**
+- [x] Select **Aggressive** under Trackers & ads blocking
+
+ ??? warning "Use default filter lists"
+ Brave allows you to select additional content filters within the internal `brave://adblock` page. We advise against using this feature; instead, keep the default filter lists. Using extra lists will make you stand out from other Brave users and may also increase attack surface if there is an exploit in Brave and a malicious rule is added to one of the lists you use.
+
+- [x] (Optional) Select **Block Scripts** (1)
+- [x] Select **Strict, may break sites** under Block fingerprinting
+
+
+
+1. This option provides functionality similar to uBlock Origin's advanced [blocking modes](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) or the [NoScript](https://noscript.net/) extension.
+
+##### Social media blocking
+
+- [ ] Uncheck all social media components
+
+##### Privacy and security
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Disable non-proxied UDP** under [WebRTC IP Handling Policy](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360017989132-How-do-I-change-my-Privacy-Settings-#webrtc)
+- [ ] Uncheck **Use Google services for push messaging**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow privacy-preserving product analytics (P3A)**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send daily usage ping to Brave**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send diagnostic reports**
+- [x] Select **Always use secure connections** in the **Security** menu
+- [ ] Uncheck **Private window with Tor** (1)
+
+ !!! tip "Sanitizing on Close"
+ - [x] Select **Clear cookies and site data when you close all windows** in the *Cookies and other site data* menu
+
+ If you wish to stay logged in to a particular site you visit often, you can set exceptions on a per-site basis under the *Customized behaviors* section.
+
+
+
+1. Brave is **not** as resistant to fingerprinting as the Tor Browser and far fewer people use Brave with Tor, so you will stand out. Where [strong anonymity is required](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360018121491-What-is-a-Private-Window-with-Tor-Connectivity-) use the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser).
+
+##### Extensiones
+
+Disable built-in extensions you do not use in **Extensions**
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Hangouts**
+- [ ] Uncheck **WebTorrent**
+
+##### IPFS
+
+InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is a decentralized, peer-to-peer network for storing and sharing data in a distributed filesystem. Unless you use the feature, disable it.
+
+- [x] Select **Disabled** on Method to resolve IPFS resources
+
+##### Additional settings
+
+Under the *System* menu
+
+
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Continue running apps when Brave is closed** to disable background apps (1)
+
+
+
+1. This option is not present on all platforms.
+
+### Brave Sync
+
+[Brave Sync](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360059793111-Understanding-Brave-Sync) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices without requiring an account and protects it with E2EE.
+
+## Recursos Adicionales
+
+We generally do not recommend installing any extensions as they increase your attack surface. However, uBlock Origin may prove useful if you value content blocking functionality.
+
+### uBlock Origin
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **uBlock Origin** is a popular content blocker that could help you block ads, trackers, and fingerprinting scripts.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/ublock-origin/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/ublock-origin/cjpalhdlnbpafiamejdnhcphjbkeiagm)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/ublock-origin/odfafepnkmbhccpbejgmiehpchacaeak)
+
+We suggest following the [developer's documentation](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) and picking one of the "modes". Additional filter lists can impact performance and [may increase attack surface](https://portswigger.net/research/ublock-i-exfiltrate-exploiting-ad-blockers-with-css).
+
+##### Other lists
+
+These are some other [filter lists](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Dashboard:-Filter-lists) that you may want to consider adding:
+
+- [x] Check **Privacy** > **AdGuard URL Tracking Protection**
+- Add [Actually Legitimate URL Shortener Tool](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DandelionSprout/adfilt/master/LegitimateURLShortener.txt)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Supports automatic updates.
+- Receives engine updates in 0-1 days from upstream release.
+- Available on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- Any changes required to make the browser more privacy-respecting should not negatively impact user experience.
+- Blocks third-party cookies by default.
+- Supports [state partitioning](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning) to mitigate cross-site tracking.[^1]
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Incluye la funcionalidad de bloquear contenido.
+- Supports cookie compartmentalization (à la [Multi-Account Containers](https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/containers)).
+- Supports Progressive Web Apps.
+ PWAs enable you to install certain websites as if they were native apps on your computer. This can have advantages over installing Electron-based apps, because you benefit from your browser's regular security updates.
+- Does not include add-on functionality (bloatware) that does not impact user privacy.
+- Does not collect telemetry by default.
+- Provides open-source sync server implementation.
+- Defaults to a [private search engine](search-engines.md).
+
+### Extension Criteria
+
+- Must not replicate built-in browser or OS functionality.
+- Must directly impact user privacy, i.e. must not simply provide information.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
+
+[^1]: Brave's implementation is detailed at [Brave Privacy Updates: Partitioning network-state for privacy](https://brave.com/privacy-updates/14-partitioning-network-state/).
diff --git a/i18n/es/desktop.md b/i18n/es/desktop.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a4e9b1ba4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/desktop.md
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+---
+title: "Almacenamiento en la Nube"
+icon: simple/linux
+---
+
+Linux distributions are commonly recommended for privacy protection and software freedom. If you don't already use Linux, below are some distributions we suggest trying out, as well as some general privacy and security improvement tips that are applicable to many Linux distributions.
+
+- [General Linux Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/linux-overview.md)
+
+## Distribuciones tradicionales
+
+### Fedora Workstation
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Fedora Workstation** is our recommended distribution for people new to Linux. Fedora generally adopts newer technologies before other distributions e.g., [Wayland](https://wayland.freedesktop.org/), [PipeWire](https://pipewire.org). These new technologies often come with improvements in security, privacy, and usability in general.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getfedora.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://whatcanidoforfedora.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Fedora has a semi-rolling release cycle. While some packages like [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org) are frozen until the next Fedora release, most packages (including the kernel) are updated frequently throughout the lifespan of the release. Each Fedora release is supported for one year, with a new version released every 6 months.
+
+### openSUSE Tumbleweed
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **openSUSE Tumbleweed** is a stable rolling release distribution.
+
+ openSUSE Tumbleweed has a [transactional update](https://kubic.opensuse.org/blog/2018-04-04-transactionalupdates/) system that uses [Btrfs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Btrfs) and [Snapper](https://en.opensuse.org/openSUSE:Snapper_Tutorial) to ensure that snapshots can be rolled back should there be a problem.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://get.opensuse.org/tumbleweed/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://doc.opensuse.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://shop.opensuse.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Tumbleweed follows a rolling release model where each update is released as a snapshot of the distribution. When you upgrade your system, a new snapshot is downloaded. Each snapshot is run through a series of automated tests by [openQA](https://openqa.opensuse.org) to ensure its quality.
+
+### Arch Linux
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Arch Linux** is a lightweight, do-it-yourself (DIY) distribution meaning that you only get what you install. For more information see their [FAQ](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Frequently_asked_questions).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://archlinux.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://wiki.archlinux.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://archlinux.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Arch Linux has a rolling release cycle. There is no fixed release schedule and packages are updated very frequently.
+
+Being a DIY distribution, you are [expected to set up and maintain](os/linux-overview.md#arch-based-distributions) your system on your own. Arch has an [official installer](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Archinstall) to make the installation process a little easier.
+
+A large portion of [Arch Linux’s packages](https://reproducible.archlinux.org) are [reproducible](https://reproducible-builds.org).
+
+## Distribuciones inmutables
+
+### Fedora Silverblue
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Fedora Silverblue** and **Fedora Kinoite** are immutable variants of Fedora with a strong focus on container workflows. Silverblue comes with the [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org/) desktop environment while Kinoite comes with [KDE](https://kde.org/). Silverblue and Kinoite follow the same release schedule as Fedora Workstation, benefiting from the same fast updates and staying very close to upstream.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://silverblue.fedoraproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora-silverblue/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://whatcanidoforfedora.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Silverblue (and Kinoite) differ from Fedora Workstation as they replace the [DNF](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/DNF) package manager with a much more advanced alternative called [`rpm-ostree`](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/rawhide/system-administrators-guide/package-management/rpm-ostree/). The `rpm-ostree` package manager works by downloading a base image for the system, then overlaying packages over it in a [git](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Git)-like commit tree. When the system is updated, a new base image is downloaded and the overlays will be applied to that new image.
+
+After the update is complete you will reboot the system into the new deployment. `rpm-ostree` keeps two deployments of the system so that you can easily rollback if something breaks in the new deployment. There is also the option to pin more deployments as needed.
+
+[Flatpak](https://www.flatpak.org) is the primary package installation method on these distributions, as `rpm-ostree` is only meant to overlay packages that cannot stay inside of a container on top of the base image.
+
+As an alternative to Flatpaks, there is the option of [Toolbox](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora-silverblue/toolbox/) to create [Podman](https://podman.io) containers with a shared home directory with the host operating system and mimic a traditional Fedora environment, which is a [useful feature](https://containertoolbx.org) for the discerning developer.
+
+### NixOS
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ NixOS is an independent distribution based on the Nix package manager with a focus on reproducibility and reliability.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://nixos.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://nixos.org/learn.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nixos.org/donate.html){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+NixOS’s package manager keeps every version of every package in a different folder in the **Nix store**. Due to this you can have different versions of the same package installed on your system. After the package contents have been written to the folder, the folder is made read-only.
+
+NixOS also provides atomic updates; first it downloads (or builds) the packages and files for the new system generation and then switches to it. There are different ways to switch to a new generation; you can tell NixOS to activate it after reboot or you can switch to it at runtime. You can also *test* the new generation by switching to it at runtime, but not setting it as the current system generation. If something in the update process breaks, you can just reboot and automatically and return to a working version of your system.
+
+Nix the package manager uses a purely functional language - which is also called Nix - to define packages.
+
+[Nixpkgs](https://github.com/nixos/nixpkgs) (the main source of packages) are contained in a single GitHub repository. You can also define your own packages in the same language and then easily include them in your config.
+
+Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in the binary cache, Nix will just build the package from source using its definition. It builds each package in a sandboxed *pure* environment, which is as independent of the host system as possible, thus making binaries reproducible.
+
+## Distribuciones enfocadas en el anonimato
+
+### Whonix
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Whonix is meant to run as two virtual machines: a “Workstation” and a Tor “Gateway.” All communications from the Workstation must go through the Tor gateway. This means that even if the Workstation is compromised by malware of some kind, the true IP address remains hidden.
+
+Some of its features include Tor Stream Isolation, [keystroke anonymization](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Keystroke_Deanonymization#Kloak), [encrypted swap](https://github.com/Whonix/swap-file-creator), and a hardened memory allocator.
+
+Future versions of Whonix will likely include [full system AppArmor policies](https://github.com/Whonix/apparmor-profile-everything) and a [sandbox app launcher](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Sandbox-app-launcher) to fully confine all processes on the system.
+
+Whonix is best used [in conjunction with Qubes](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Why_use_Qubes_over_other_Virtualizers), Qubes-Whonix has various [disadvantages](https://forums.whonix.org/t/qubes-whonix-security-disadvantages-help-wanted/8581) when compared to other hypervisors.
+
+### Tails
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tails** is a live operating system based on Debian that routes all communications through Tor, which can boot on on almost any computer from a DVD, USB stick, or SD card installation. It uses [Tor](tor.md) to preserve privacy and anonymity while circumventing censorship, and it leaves no trace of itself on the computer it is used on after it is powered off.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tails.boum.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tails.boum.org/doc/index.en.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tails.boum.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Tails is great for counter forensics due to amnesia (meaning nothing is written to the disk); however, it is not a hardened distribution like Whonix. It lacks many anonymity and security features that Whonix has and gets updated much less often (only once every six weeks). A Tails system that is compromised by malware may potentially bypass the transparent proxy allowing for the user to be deanonymized.
+
+Tails includes [uBlock Origin](desktop-browsers.md#ublock-origin) in Tor Browser by default, which may potentially make it easier for adversaries to fingerprint Tails users. [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) virtual machines may be more leak-proof, however they are not amnesic, meaning data may be recovered from your storage device.
+
+By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypted [persistent storage](https://tails.boum.org/doc/persistent_storage/index.en.html) can be configured to store some data between reboots.
+
+## Distribuciones centradas en la seguridad
+
+### Qubes OS
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Qubes** es un sistema operativo de código abierto diseñado para proporcionar una fuerte seguridad para el uso de escritorio. Qubes se basa en Xen, el Sistema de Ventanas X y Linux, y puede ejecutar la mayoría de las aplicaciones Linux y utilizar la mayoría de los controladores de Linux.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*.
+
+El sistema operativo Qubes OS asegura el ordenador aislando subsistemas (por ejemplo, redes, USB, etc.) y aplicaciones en máquinas virtuales separadas. Si una parte del sistema se ve comprometida, es probable que el aislamiento adicional proteja al resto del sistema. Para obtener más detalles, consulte las [Preguntas frecuentes de Qubes](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/).
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+Nuestros sistemas operativos recomendados:
+
+- Deben ser de código abierto.
+- Deben recibir actualizaciones periódicas de software y del núcleo de Linux.
+- Las distribuciones Linux deben ser compatibles con [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#Wayland).
+- Debe soportar el cifrado de disco completo durante la instalación.
+- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage.
+- Debe ser compatible con una amplia variedad de hardware.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/dns.md b/i18n/es/dns.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7d8c0aa02
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/dns.md
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+---
+title: "Introducción a DNS"
+icon: material/dns
+---
+
+!!! ¿Debería utilizar un DNS cifrado?
+
+ El DNS cifrado con un tercero solo debe usarse para evitar redirecciones y el bloqueo básico de DNS cuando puedas estar seguro de que no habrá consecuencias o estés interesado en un proveedor que realice un filtrado rudimentario. DNS encriptado no te ayudará a esconder tu actividad en línea.
+
+ [Aprende más sobre DNS](technology/dns.md){ .md-button }
+
+## Proveedores recomendados
+
+| DNS | Política de Privacidad | Protocolo | Protocolos | Registros | ECS |
+| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| [**AdGuard**](https://adguard.com/en/adguard-dns/overview.html) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html) | Comercial | Texto simple DoH DoT DNSCrypt | 2 | No Filter list being used can be found here. [**DNS mediante HTTPS**](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_mediante_HTTPS) como está definido en el [RFC 8484](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8484) empaqueta las consultas en el protocolo [HTTP/2](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/2) y proporciona seguridad con HTTPS. |
+| [**Cloudflare**](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/setting-up-1.1.1.1/) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/) | Comercial | Texto simple DoH DoT | 2 | No |
+| [**ControlID**](https://controld.com/free-dns) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://controld.com/privacy) | Comercial | Texto simple DoH DoT | 2 | No |
+| [**IVPN**](https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/) | Comercial | DoH DoT | 2 | No Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/mullvad/dns-adblock) |
+| [**NextDNS**](https://www.nextdns.io) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://www.nextdns.io/privacy) | Comercial | Texto simple DoH DoT DNSCrypt | Opcional [^5] | No |
+| [**Quad9**](https://quad9.net) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://quad9.net/privacy/policy/) | Comercial | Some[^6] | Opcional [^5] | Based on server choice, Malware blocking by default. |
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Debe soportar [DNSSEC](technology/dns.md#what-is-dnssec-and-when-is-it-used)
+- [QNAME Minimization](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-qname-minimization).
+- Allow for [ECS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-edns-client-subnet-ecs) to be disabled.
+- Prefer [anycast](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anycast#Addressing_methods) support or geo-steering support.
+
+## DNS sin cifrado
+
+### Android
+
+Las últimas versiones de iOS, iPadOS, tvOS y macOS, soportan tanto DoT como DoH. Ambos protocolos son soportados nativamente a través de [configuración de perfiles ](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/configuration-profile-enforcement-secf6fb9f053/web) o a través de la [API de configuración DNS](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/networkextension/dns_settings).
+
+### Dispositivos Apple
+
+Tras la instalación de un perfil de configuración o de una aplicación que utilice la API de configuración de DNS, se puede seleccionar la configuración de DNS. Si una VPN está activo, la resolución dentro del túnel VPN utilizará la configuración DNS de la VPN y no la configuración de todo el sistema.
+
+After installation of either a configuration profile or an app that uses the DNS Settings API, the DNS configuration can be selected. If a VPN is active, resolution within the VPN tunnel will use the VPN's DNS settings and not your system-wide settings.
+
+#### Signed Profiles
+
+Apple does not provide a native interface for creating encrypted DNS profiles. Información Signed profiles are preferred; signing validates a profile's origin and helps to ensure the integrity of the profiles. A green "Verified" label is given to signed configuration profiles. For more information on code signing, see [About Code Signing](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/CodeSigningGuide/Introduction/Introduction.html). **Signed profiles** are offered by [AdGuard](https://adguard.com/en/blog/encrypted-dns-ios-14.html), [NextDNS](https://apple.nextdns.io), and [Quad9](https://www.quad9.net/news/blog/ios-mobile-provisioning-profiles/).
+
+!!! info
+
+ `systemd-resolved`, which many Linux distributions use to do their DNS lookups, doesn't yet [support DoH](https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/8639). If you want to use DoH, you'll need to install a proxy like [dnscrypt-proxy](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy) and [configure it](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dnscrypt-proxy) to take all the DNS queries from your system resolver and forward them over HTTPS.
+
+## Encrypted DNS Proxies
+
+Encrypted DNS proxy software provides a local proxy for the [unencrypted DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md#unencrypted-dns) resolver to forward to. Typically it is used on platforms that don't natively support [encrypted DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns).
+
+### DNS
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **RethinkDNS** is an open-source Android client supporting [DNS-over-HTTPS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), [DNS-over-TLS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-tls-dot), [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt) and DNS Proxy along with caching DNS responses, locally logging DNS queries and can be used as a firewall too.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://rethinkdns.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://rethinkdns.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.rethinkdns.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/celzero/rethink-app){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.celzero.bravedns)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/celzero/rethink-app/releases)
+
+### DNSCrypt
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **dnscrypt-proxy** is a DNS proxy with support for [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt), [DNS-over-HTTPS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), and [Anonymized DNS](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Anonymized-DNS).
+
+ !!! warning "The anonymized DNS feature does [**not**](advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns) anonymize other network traffic."
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/dnscrypt/contribute){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Installation-Windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Installation-macOS)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Installation-linux)
+
+## Self-hosted Solutions
+
+A self-hosted DNS solution is useful for providing filtering on controlled platforms, such as Smart TVs and other IoT devices, as no client-side software is needed.
+
+### RethinkDNS
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **AdGuard Home** is an open-source [DNS-sinkhole](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_sinkhole) which uses [DNS filtering](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/access-management/what-is-dns-filtering/) to block unwanted web content, such as advertisements.
+
+ AdGuard Home features a polished web interface to view insights and manage blocked content.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://adguard.com/adguard-home/overview.html){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://adguard.com/privacy/home.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+### DNSCloak
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Pi-hole** is an open-source [DNS-sinkhole](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_sinkhole) which uses [DNS filtering](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/access-management/what-is-dns-filtering/) to block unwanted web content, such as advertisements.
+
+ Pi-hole is designed to be hosted on a Raspberry Pi, but it is not limited to such hardware. The software features a friendly web interface to view insights and manage blocked content.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://pi-hole.net/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://pi-hole.net/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.pi-hole.net/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/pi-hole/pi-hole){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://pi-hole.net/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
+
+[^1]: AdGuard stores aggregated performance metrics of their DNS servers, namely the number of complete requests to a particular server, the number of blocked requests, and the speed of processing requests. They also keep and store the database of domains requested in within last 24 hours. "We need this information to identify and block new trackers and threats." "We also log how many times this or that tracker has been blocked. We need this information to remove outdated rules from our filters." [https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html](https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html)
+[^2]: Cloudflare collects and stores only the limited DNS query data that is sent to the 1.1.1.1 resolver. The 1.1.1.1 resolver service does not log personal data, and the bulk of the limited non-personally identifiable query data is stored only for 25 hours. [https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/)
+[^3]: Control D only logs for Premium resolvers with custom DNS profiles. Free resolvers do not log data. [https://controld.com/privacy](https://controld.com/privacy)
+[^4]: Mullvad's DNS service is available to both subscribers and non-subscribers of Mullvad VPN. Their privacy policy explicitly claims they do not log DNS requests in any way. [https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/](https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/)
+[^5]: NextDNS can provide insights and logging features on an opt-in basis. You can choose retention times and log storage locations for any logs you choose to keep. If it's not specifically requested, no data is logged. [https://nextdns.io/privacy](https://nextdns.io/privacy)
+[^6]: Quad9 collects some data for the purposes of threat monitoring and response. That data may then be remixed and shared, such as for the purpose of security research. Quad9 does not collect or record IP addresses or other data they deem personally identifiable. [https://www.quad9.net/privacy/policy/](https://www.quad9.net/privacy/policy/)
diff --git a/i18n/es/email-clients.md b/i18n/es/email-clients.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5962ed571
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/email-clients.md
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+---
+title: "Email Clients"
+icon: material/email-open
+---
+
+Nuestra lista de recomendaciones contiene clientes de correo electrónico que soportan [OpenPGP](encryption.md#openpgp) y una autenticación fuerte como [Open Authorization (OAuth)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth). OAuth te permite utilizar la [Autenticación Multifactor](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md) y previene el robo de cuentas.
+
+??? advertencia "El correo electrónico no proporciona el secreto de reenvío"
+
+ Cuando se utiliza una tecnología de cifrado de extremo a extremo (E2EE, por sus siglas en inglés) como OpenPGP, el correo aún tendrá algunos [metadatos](email.md#email-metadata-overview) que no son encriptados en el encabezado del correo.
+
+ OpenPGP tampoco soporta '[forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy)', lo que significa que si la clave privada del receptor es robada, todos los mensajes encriptados previamente con esta se encontrarán expuestos: [¿Cómo puedo proteger mis claves privadas?](basics/email-security.md) Considere utilizar un medio que brinde 'forward secrecy':
+
+ [Comunicación en tiempo real](real-time-communication.md){ .md-button }
+
+## Multiplataforma
+
+### Thunderbird
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Thunderbird** es un cliente gratuito, de código abierto y multiplataforma, de correo electrónico, grupos de noticias y chat (XMPP, IRC, Twitter), desarrollado por la comunidad Thunderbird, y previamente por la Fundación Mozilla.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.thunderbird.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mozilla.org/privacy/thunderbird){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.mozilla.org/products/thunderbird){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://hg.mozilla.org/comm-central){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.thunderbird.net)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.thunderbird.net)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.thunderbird.net)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.mozilla.Thunderbird)
+
+#### Firefox
+
+We recommend changing some of these settings to make Thunderbird a little more private.
+
+Estas opciones se encuentran en la página de configuración *Privacidad & Seguridad* ( ≡ → Ajustes → Privacidad y Seguridad).
+
+##### Web Content
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Remember websites and links I've visited**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Accept cookies from sites**
+
+##### Telemetry
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Thunderbird to send technical and interaction data to Mozilla**
+
+#### Thunderbird-user.js (advanced)
+
+[`thunderbird-user.js`](https://github.com/HorlogeSkynet/thunderbird-user.js), is a set of configurations options that aims to disable as many of the web-browsing features within Thunderbird as possible in order to reduce surface area and maintain privacy. Some of the changes are backported from the [Arkenfox project](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js).
+
+## Platform Specific
+
+### Apple Mail (macOS)
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Apple Mail** is included in macOS and can be extended to have OpenPGP support with [GPG Suite](encryption.md#gpg-suite), which adds the ability to send PGP-encrypted email.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/welcome/mac){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/toc){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+### Canary Mail (iOS)
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Canary Mail** is a paid email client designed to make end-to-end encryption seamless with security features such as a biometric app lock.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://canarymail.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://canarymail.io/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://canarymail.zendesk.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.canarymail.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1236045954)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://canarymail.io/downloads.html)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Canary Mail only recently released a Windows and Android client, though we don't believe they are as stable as their iOS and Mac counterparts.
+
+Canary Mail is closed-source. We recommend it due to the few choices there are for email clients on iOS that support PGP E2EE.
+
+### FairEmail (Android)
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FairEmail** is a minimal, open-source email app, using open standards (IMAP, SMTP, OpenPGP) with a low data and battery usage.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://email.faircode.eu){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/blob/master/PRIVACY.md){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/blob/master/FAQ.md){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://email.faircode.eu/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=eu.faircode.email)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/releases)
+
+### GNOME Evolution (GNOME)
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Evolution** is a personal information management application that provides integrated mail, calendaring and address book functionality. Evolution has extensive [documentation](https://help.gnome.org/users/evolution/stable/) to help you get started.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Evolution){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Evolution/PrivacyPolicy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://help.gnome.org/users/evolution/stable/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.gnome.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.gnome.Evolution)
+
+### K-9 Mail (Android)
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **K-9 Mail** is an independent mail application that supports both POP3 and IMAP mailboxes, but only supports push mail for IMAP.
+
+ In the future, K-9 Mail will be the [officially branded](https://k9mail.app/2022/06/13/K-9-Mail-and-Thunderbird.html) Thunderbird client for Android.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://k9mail.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://k9mail.app/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.k9mail.app/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/k9mail/k-9){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://k9mail.app/contribute){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.fsck.k9)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/k9mail/k-9/releases)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When replying to someone on a mailing list the "reply" option may also include the mailing list. For more information see [thundernest/k-9 #3738](https://github.com/thundernest/k-9/issues/3738).
+
+### Kontact (KDE)
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Kontact** is a personal information manager (PIM) application from the [KDE](https://kde.org) project. It provides a mail client, address book, organizer and RSS client.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://kontact.kde.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://kde.org/privacypolicy-apps){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://kontact.kde.org/users/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://invent.kde.org/pim/kmail){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://kde.org/community/donations/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://kontact.kde.org/download)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.kde.kontact)
+
+### Mailvelope (Browser)
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mailvelope** is a browser extension that enables the exchange of encrypted emails following the OpenPGP encryption standard.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.mailvelope.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mailvelope.com/en/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mailvelope.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailvelope/mailvelope){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/mailvelope)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/mailvelope/kajibbejlbohfaggdiogboambcijhkke)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/mailvelope/dgcbddhdhjppfdfjpciagmmibadmoapc)
+
+### NeoMutt (CLI)
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **NeoMutt** is an open-source command line mail reader (or MUA) for Linux and BSD. It's a fork of [Mutt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutt_(email_client)) with added features.
+
+ NeoMutt is a text-based client that has a steep learning curve. It is however, very customizable.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://neomutt.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://neomutt.org/guide/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/russon/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://neomutt.org/distro)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://neomutt.org/distro)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Qualifications
+
+- Apps developed for open-source operating systems must be open-source.
+- Must not collect telemetry, or have an easy way to disable all telemetry.
+- Must support OpenPGP message encryption.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should be open-source.
+- Should be cross-platform.
+- Should not collect any telemetry by default.
+- Should support OpenPGP natively, i.e. without extensions.
+- Should support storing OpenPGP encrypted emails locally.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/email.md b/i18n/es/email.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3b4f339f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/email.md
@@ -0,0 +1,485 @@
+---
+title: "Servicios de correo electrónico"
+icon: material/email
+---
+
+El correo electrónico es prácticamente necesario para utilizar cualquier servicio en línea. Sin embargo, no lo recomendamos para las conversaciones de persona a persona. En vez de utilizar el correo electrónico para comunicarse con otras personas, considere utilizar un servicio de mensajería instantánea que soporte el secreto de reenvío.
+
+[Servicios de mensajería instantánea recomendados](real-time-communication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+Para todo lo demás, recomendamos una variedad de proveedores de correo electrónico basados en modelos sostenibles, además de características de seguridad y privacidad integradas.
+
+## Servicios compatibles con OpenPGP
+
+Estos proveedores soportan de manera nativa el cifrado/descifrado de OpenPGP, permitiendo que los correos electrónicos E2EE sean independientes del proveedor. Por ejemplo, un usuario de Proton Mail no puede enviar un mensaje E2EE a un usuario de Mailbox.org, o usted puede recibir notificaciones cifradas con OpenPGP desde servicios de internet que lo soporten.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Al utilizar una tecnología de cifrado de extremo a extremo (E2EE, por sus siglas en inglés) como OpenPGP, los correos aún tendrán algunos metadatos que no son encriptados en el encabezado del correo. Más información sobre los [metadatos de correo electrónico](basics/email-security.md#email-metadata-overview).
+
+ OpenPGP tampoco soporta el secreto de reenvío, lo que significa si la clave privada del receptos es robada, todos los mensajes cifrados previamente con ella, serán expuestos. [¿Cómo puedo proteger mis claves privadas?](basics/email-security.md#how-do-i-protect-my-private-keys)
+
+### Proton Mail
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton Mail** es un servicio de correo electrónico con un enfoque en la privacidad, el cifrado, la seguridad y la facilidad de uso. Ellos operan desde **2013**. Proton AG tiene su sede en Ginebra, Suiza. Las cuentas inician con 500 MB de almacenamiento en el plan gratuito.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Página principal](https://proton.me/mail){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://protonmailrmez3lotccipshtkleegetolb73fuirgj7r4o4vfu7ozyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/mail){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? descargas
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonmail.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id979659905)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonMail/proton-mail-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.proton.me)
+
+Las cuentas gratuitas tienen algunas limitaciones, como no poder buscar texto en el contenido, y no tener acceso a [Proton Mail Bridge](https://proton.me/mail/bridge), que es requerido para utilizar un [cliente recomendado de correo electrónico para escritorio](email-clients.md) (como Thunderbird). Las cuentas de pago incluyen características como Proton Mail Bridge, almacenamiento adicional y soporte para dominios personalizados. A [letter of attestation](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps) was provided for Proton Mail's apps on 9th November 2021 by [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com).
+
+If you have the Proton Unlimited, Business, or Visionary Plan, you also get [SimpleLogin](#simplelogin) Premium for free.
+
+Proton Mail has internal crash reports that they **do not** share with third parties. This can be disabled in: **Settings** > **Go to Settings** > **Account** > **Security and privacy** > **Send crash reports**.
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Paid Proton Mail subscribers can use their own domain with the service or a [catch-all](https://proton.me/support/catch-all) address. Proton Mail also supports [subaddressing](https://proton.me/support/creating-aliases), which is useful for people who don't want to purchase a domain.
+
+??? success "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ Proton Mail [accepts](https://proton.me/support/payment-options) Bitcoin and cash by mail in addition to standard credit/debit card and PayPal payments.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ Proton Mail supports TOTP [two factor authentication](https://proton.me/support/two-factor-authentication-2fa) only. The use of a U2F security key is not yet supported. Proton Mail is planning to implement U2F upon completion of their [Single Sign On (SSO)](https://reddit.com/comments/cheoy6/comment/feh2lw0/) code.
+
+??? success "Data Security"
+
+ Proton Mail has [zero-access encryption](https://proton.me/blog/zero-access-encryption) at rest for your emails and [calendars](https://proton.me/news/protoncalendar-security-model). Data secured with zero-access encryption is only accessible by you.
+
+ Certain information stored in [Proton Contacts](https://proton.me/support/proton-contacts), such as display names and email addresses, are not secured with zero-access encryption. Contact fields that support zero-access encryption, such as phone numbers, are indicated with a padlock icon.
+
+??? success "Email Encryption"
+
+ Proton Mail has [integrated OpenPGP encryption](https://proton.me/support/how-to-use-pgp) in their webmail. Emails to other Proton Mail accounts are encrypted automatically, and encryption to non-Proton Mail addresses with an OpenPGP key can be enabled easily in your account settings. They also allow you to [encrypt messages to non-Proton Mail addresses](https://proton.me/support/password-protected-emails) without the need for them to sign up for a Proton Mail account or use software like OpenPGP.
+
+ Proton Mail also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This allows people who don't use Proton Mail to find the OpenPGP keys of Proton Mail accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE.
+
+??? warning "Digital Legacy"
+
+ Proton Mail doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ If you have a paid account and your [bill is unpaid](https://proton.me/support/delinquency) after 14 days, you won't be able to access your data. After 30 days, your account will become delinquent and won't receive incoming mail. You will continue to be billed during this period.
+
+??? check "Aplicaciones móviles"
+
+ Proton Mail offers an "Unlimited" account for €9.99/Month, which also enables access to Proton VPN in addition to providing multiple accounts, domains, aliases, and 500GB of storage.
+
+### Mailbox.org
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mailbox.org** is an email service with a focus on being secure, ad-free, and privately powered by 100% eco-friendly energy. They have been in operation since 2014. Mailbox.org is based in Berlin, Germany. Accounts start with 2 GB of storage, which can be upgraded as needed.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailbox.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://mailbox.org/en/data-protection-privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://login.mailbox.org)
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Mailbox.org lets you use your own domain, and they support [catch-all](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Using+catch-all+alias+with+own+domain) addresses. Mailbox.org also supports [subaddressing](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/BMBOKBEN/What+is+an+alias+and+how+do+I+use+it), which is useful if you don't want to purchase a domain.
+
+??? info "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ Mailbox.org doesn't accept Bitcoin or any other cryptocurrencies as a result of their payment processor BitPay suspending operations in Germany. However, they do accept Cash by mail, cash payment to bank account, bank transfer, credit card, PayPal and couple of German-specific processors: paydirekt and Sofortüberweisung.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ Mailbox.org supports [two factor authentication](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/How+to+use+two-factor+authentication+-+2FA) for their webmail only. You can use either TOTP or a [Yubikey](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YubiKey) via the [Yubicloud](https://www.yubico.com/products/services-software/yubicloud). Web standards such as [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn) are not yet supported.
+
+??? info "Data Security"
+
+ Mailbox.org allows for encryption of incoming mail using their [encrypted mailbox](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/The+Encrypted+Mailbox). New messages that you receive will then be immediately encrypted with your public key.
+
+ However, [Open-Exchange](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-Xchange), the software platform used by Mailbox.org, [does not support](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/BMBOKBEN/Encryption+of+calendar+and+address+book) the encryption of your address book and calendar. A [standalone option](calendar.md) may be more appropriate for that information.
+
+??? success "Email Encryption"
+
+ Mailbox.org has [integrated encryption](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Send+encrypted+e-mails+with+Guard) in their webmail, which simplifies sending messages to people with public OpenPGP keys. They also allow [remote recipients to decrypt an email](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/My+recipient+does+not+use+PGP) on Mailbox.org's servers. This feature is useful when the remote recipient does not have OpenPGP and cannot decrypt a copy of the email in their own mailbox.
+
+ Mailbox.org also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This allows people outside of Mailbox.org to find the OpenPGP keys of Mailbox.org accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE.
+
+??? success "Digital Legacy"
+
+ Mailbox.org has a digital legacy feature for all plans. You can choose whether you want any of your data to be passed to heirs providing that they apply and provide your testament. Alternatively, you can nominate a person by name and address.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ Your account will be set to a restricted user account when your contract ends, after [30 days it will be irrevocably deleted](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/payment-article/what-happens-at-the-end-of-my-contract).
+
+??? check "Aplicaciones móviles"
+
+ You can access your Mailbox.org account via IMAP/SMTP using their [.onion service](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/The+Tor+exit+node+of+mailbox.org). However, their webmail interface cannot be accessed via their .onion service and you may experience TLS certificate errors.
+
+ All accounts come with limited cloud storage that [can be encrypted](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Encrypt+files+on+your+Drive). Mailbox.org also offers the alias [@secure.mailbox.org](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Ensuring+E-Mails+are+Sent+Securely), which enforces the TLS encryption on the connection between mail servers, otherwise the message will not be sent at all. Mailbox.org also supports [Exchange ActiveSync](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exchange_ActiveSync) in addition to standard access protocols like IMAP and POP3.
+
+### StartMail
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **StartMail** is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of standard OpenPGP encryption. StartMail has been in operation since 2014 and is based in Boulevard 11, Zeist Netherlands. Accounts start with 10GB. They offer a 30-day trial.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.startmail.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.startmail.com/en/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.startmail.com){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.startmail.com/login)
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Personal accounts can use [Custom or Quick](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360007297457-Aliases) aliases. [Custom domains](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/4403911432209-Setup-a-custom-domain) are also available.
+
+??? warning "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ StartMail accepts Visa, MasterCard, American Express and Paypal. StartMail also has other [payment options](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006620637-Payment-methods) such as Bitcoin (currently only for Personal accounts) and SEPA Direct Debit for accounts older than a year.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ StartMail supports TOTP two factor authentication [for webmail only](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006682158-Two-factor-authentication-2FA). They do not allow U2F security key authentication.
+
+??? info "Data Security"
+
+ StartMail has [zero access encryption at rest](https://www.startmail.com/en/whitepaper/#_Toc458527835), using their "user vault" system. When you log in, the vault is opened, and the email is then moved to the vault out of the queue where it is decrypted by the corresponding private key.
+
+ StartMail supports importing [contacts](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006495557-Import-contacts) however, they are only accessible in the webmail and not through protocols such as [CalDAV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CalDAV). Contacts are also not stored using zero knowledge encryption.
+
+??? success "Email Encryption"
+
+ StartMail has [integrated encryption](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/sections/360001889078-Encryption) in their webmail, which simplifies sending encrypted messages with public OpenPGP keys.
+
+??? warning "Digital Legacy"
+
+ StartMail does not offer a digital legacy feature.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ On account expiration, StartMail will permanently delete your account after [6 months in 3 phases](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006794398-Account-expiration).
+
+??? check "Aplicaciones móviles"
+
+ StartMail allows for proxying of images within emails. If you allow the remote image to be loaded, the sender won't know what your IP address is.
+
+## More Providers
+
+These providers store your emails with zero-knowledge encryption, making them great options for keeping your stored emails secure. However, they don't support interoperable encryption standards for E2EE communications between providers.
+
+### Solo software como servicio (ScuS)
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tutanota** is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of encryption. Tutanota has been in operation since **2011** and is based in Hanover, Germany. Accounts start with 1GB storage with their free plan.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tutanota.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tutanota.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tutanota.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tutanota.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/tutanota/id922429609)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.tutanota.com/)
+
+Tutanota doesn't support the [IMAP protocol](https://tutanota.com/faq/#imap) or the use of third-party [email clients](email-clients.md), and you also won't be able to add [external email accounts](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/544#issuecomment-670473647) to the Tutanota app. Neither [Email import](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/630) or [subfolders](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/927) are currently supported, though this is [due to be changed](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/kickoff-import). Emails can be exported [individually or by bulk selection](https://tutanota.com/howto#generalMail) per folder, which may be inconvenient if you have many folders.
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Paid Tutanota accounts can use up to 5 [aliases](https://tutanota.com/faq#alias) and [custom domains](https://tutanota.com/faq#custom-domain). Tutanota doesn't allow for [subaddressing (plus addresses)](https://tutanota.com/faq#plus), but you can use a [catch-all](https://tutanota.com/howto#settings-global) with a custom domain.
+
+??? warning "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ Tutanota only directly accepts credit cards and PayPal, however Bitcoin and Monero can be used to purchase gift cards via their [partnership](https://tutanota.com/faq/#cryptocurrency) with Proxystore.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ Tutanota supports [two factor authentication](https://tutanota.com/faq#2fa) with either TOTP or U2F.
+
+??? success "Data Security"
+
+ Tutanota has [zero access encryption at rest](https://tutanota.com/faq#what-encrypted) for your emails, [address book contacts](https://tutanota.com/faq#encrypted-address-book), and [calendars](https://tutanota.com/faq#calendar). This means the messages and other data stored in your account are only readable by you.
+
+??? warning "Email Encryption"
+
+ Tutanota [does not use OpenPGP](https://www.tutanota.com/faq/#pgp). Tutanota accounts can only receive encrypted emails from non-Tutanota email accounts when sent via a [temporary Tutanota mailbox](https://www.tutanota.com/howto/#encrypted-email-external).
+
+??? warning "Digital Legacy"
+
+ Tutanota doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ Tutanota will [delete inactive free accounts](https://tutanota.com/faq#inactive-accounts) after six months. You can reuse a deactivated free account if you pay.
+
+??? check "Aplicaciones móviles"
+
+ Tutanota offers the business version of [Tutanota to non-profit organizations](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/secure-email-for-non-profit) for free or with a heavy discount.
+
+ Tutanota also has a business feature called [Secure Connect](https://tutanota.com/secure-connect/). This ensures customer contact to the business uses E2EE. The feature costs €240/y.
+
+## Email Aliasing Services
+
+An email aliasing service allows you to easily generate a new email address for every website you register for. The email aliases you generate are then forwarded to an email address of your choosing, hiding both your "main" email address and the identity of your email provider. True email aliasing is better than plus addressing commonly used and supported by many providers, which allows you to create aliases like yourname+[anythinghere]@example.com, because websites, advertisers, and tracking networks can trivially remove anything after the + sign to know your true email address.
+
+Email aliasing can act as a safeguard in case your email provider ever ceases operation. In that scenario, you can easily re-route your aliases to a new email address. In turn, however, you are placing trust in the aliasing service to continue functioning.
+
+Using a dedicated email aliasing service also has a number of benefits over a catch-all alias on a custom domain:
+
+- Aliases can be turned on and off individually when you need them, preventing websites from emailing you randomly.
+- Replies are sent from the alias address, shielding your real email address.
+
+They also have a number of benefits over "temporary email" services:
+
+- Aliases are permanent and can be turned on again if you need to receive something like a password reset.
+- Emails are sent to your trusted mailbox rather than stored by the alias provider.
+- Temporary email services typically have public mailboxes which can be accessed by anyone who knows the address, aliases are private to you.
+
+Our email aliasing recommendations are providers that allow you to create aliases on domains they control, as well as your own custom domain(s) for a modest yearly fee. They can also be self-hosted if you want maximum control. However, using a custom domain can have privacy-related drawbacks: If you are the only person using your custom domain, your actions can be easily tracked across websites simply by looking at the domain name in the email address and ignoring everything before the at (@) sign.
+
+Using an aliasing service requires trusting both your email provider and your aliasing provider with your unencrypted messages. Some providers mitigate this slightly with automatic PGP encryption, which reduces the number of parties you need to trust from two to one by encrypting incoming emails before they are delivered to your final mailbox provider.
+
+### AnonAddy
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **AnonAddy** lets you create 20 domain aliases on a shared domain for free, or unlimited "standard" aliases which are less anonymous.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://anonaddy.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://anonaddy.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://app.anonaddy.com/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/anonaddy){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://anonaddy.com/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://anonaddy.com/faq/#is-there-an-android-app)
+ - [:material-apple-ios: iOS](https://anonaddy.com/faq/#is-there-an-ios-app)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-GB/firefox/addon/anonaddy/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/anonaddy-anonymous-email/iadbdpnoknmbdeolbapdackdcogdmjpe)
+
+The number of shared aliases (which end in a shared domain like @anonaddy.me) that you can create is limited to 20 on AnonAddy's free plan and 50 on their $12/year plan. You can create unlimited standard aliases (which end in a domain like @[username].anonaddy.com or a custom domain on paid plans), however, as previously mentioned, this can be detrimental to privacy because people can trivially tie your standard aliases together based on the domain name alone. Unlimited shared aliases are available for $36/year.
+
+Notable free features:
+
+- [x] 20 Shared Aliases
+- [x] Unlimited Standard Aliases
+- [ ] No Outgoing Replies
+- [x] 2 Recipient Mailboxes
+- [x] Automatic PGP Encryption
+
+### SimpleLogin
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **SimpleLogin** is a free service which provides email aliases on a variety of shared domain names, and optionally provides paid features like unlimited aliases and custom domains.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://simplelogin.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://simplelogin.io/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://simplelogin.io/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simple-login){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.simplelogin.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1494359858)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/simple-login/Simple-Login-Android/releases)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/simplelogin/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/dphilobhebphkdjbpfohgikllaljmgbn)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/simpleloginreceive-sen/diacfpipniklenphgljfkmhinphjlfff)
+ - [:simple-safari: Safari](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1494051017)
+
+SimpleLogin was [acquired by Proton AG](https://proton.me/news/proton-and-simplelogin-join-forces) as of April 8, 2022. If you use Proton Mail for your primary mailbox, SimpleLogin is a great choice. As both products are now owned by the same company you now only have to trust a single entity. We also expect that SimpleLogin will be more tightly integrated with Proton's offerings in the future. SimpleLogin continues to support forwarding to any email provider of your choosing. Securitum [audited](https://simplelogin.io/blog/security-audit/) SimpleLogin in early 2022 and all issues [were addressed](https://simplelogin.io/audit2022/web.pdf).
+
+You can link your SimpleLogin account in the settings with your Proton account. If you have the Proton Unlimited, Business, or Visionary Plan, you will have SimpleLogin Premium for free.
+
+Notable free features:
+
+- [x] 10 Shared Aliases
+- [x] Unlimited Replies
+- [x] 1 Recipient Mailbox
+
+## Nuestro criterio
+
+Advanced system administrators may consider setting up their own email server. Mail servers require attention and continuous maintenance in order to keep things secure and mail delivery reliable.
+
+### Combined software solutions
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mailcow** is a more advanced mail server perfect for those with a bit more Linux experience. It has everything you need in a Docker container: A mail server with DKIM support, antivirus and spam monitoring, webmail and ActiveSync with SOGo, and web-based administration with 2FA support.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailcow.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mailcow.github.io/mailcow-dockerized-docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailcow/mailcow-dockerized){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.servercow.de/mailcow?lang=en#sal){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mail-in-a-Box** is an automated setup script for deploying a mail server on Ubuntu. Its goal is to make it easier for people to set up their own mail server.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailinabox.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mailinabox.email/guide.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mail-in-a-box/mailinabox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+For a more manual approach we've picked out these two articles:
+
+- [Setting up a mail server with OpenSMTPD, Dovecot and Rspamd](https://poolp.org/posts/2019-09-14/setting-up-a-mail-server-with-opensmtpd-dovecot-and-rspamd/) (2019)
+- [How To Run Your Own Mail Server](https://www.c0ffee.net/blog/mail-server-guide/) (August 2017)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the providers we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements for any Email provider wishing to be recommended, including implementing industry best practices, modern technology and more. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing an Email provider, and conduct your own research to ensure the Email provider you choose is the right choice for you.
+
+### Tecnología
+
+We regard these features as important in order to provide a safe and optimal service. You should consider whether the provider which has the features you require.
+
+**Mejor caso:**
+
+- Encrypts email account data at rest with zero-access encryption.
+- Export capability as [Mbox](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mbox) or individual .eml with [RFC5322](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5322/) standard.
+- Allow users to use their own [domain name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name). Custom domain names are important to users because it allows them to maintain their agency from the service, should it turn bad or be acquired by another company which doesn't prioritize privacy.
+- Operates on owned infrastructure, i.e. not built upon third-party email service providers.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Encrypts all account data (Contacts, Calendars, etc) at rest with zero-access encryption.
+- Integrated webmail E2EE/PGP encryption provided as a convenience.
+- Support for [WKD](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD) to allow improved discovery of public OpenPGP keys via HTTP. GnuPG users can get a key by typing: `gpg --locate-key example_user@example.com`
+- Support for a temporary mailbox for external users. This is useful when you want to send an encrypted email, without sending an actual copy to your recipient. These emails usually have a limited lifespan and then are automatically deleted. They also don't require the recipient to configure any cryptography like OpenPGP.
+- Availability of the email provider's services via an [onion service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.onion).
+- [Subaddressing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email_address#Subaddressing) support.
+- Catch-all or alias functionality for those who own their own domains.
+- Use of standard email access protocols such as IMAP, SMTP or [JMAP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Meta_Application_Protocol). Standard access protocols ensure customers can easily download all of their email, should they want to switch to another provider.
+
+### Privacidad
+
+We prefer our recommended providers to collect as little data as possible.
+
+**Mejor caso:**
+
+- Protect sender's IP address. Filter it from showing in the `Received` header field.
+- Don't require personally identifiable information (PII) besides a username and a password.
+- Privacy policy that meets the requirements defined by the GDPR
+- Must not be hosted in the US due to [ECPA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_Communications_Privacy_Act#Criticism) which has [yet to be reformed](https://epic.org/ecpa/).
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Accepts Bitcoin, cash, and other forms of cryptocurrency and/or anonymous payment options (gift cards, etc.)
+
+### Seguridad
+
+Email servers deal with a lot of very sensitive data. We expect that providers will adopt best industry practices in order to protect their members.
+
+**Mejor caso:**
+
+- Protection of webmail with 2FA, such as TOTP.
+- Zero access encryption, builds on encryption at rest. The provider does not have the decryption keys to the data they hold. This prevents a rogue employee leaking data they have access to or remote adversary from releasing data they have stolen by gaining unauthorized access to the server.
+- [DNSSEC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Extensions) support.
+- No TLS errors or vulnerabilities when being profiled by tools such as [Hardenize](https://www.hardenize.com/), [testssl.sh](https://testssl.sh/), or [Qualys SSL Labs](https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest); this includes certificate related errors and weak DH parameters, such as those that led to [Logjam](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logjam_(computer_security)).
+- A server suite preference (optional on TLSv1.3) for strong cipher suites which support forward secrecy and authenticated encryption.
+- A valid [MTA-STS](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8461) and [TLS-RPT](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8460) policy.
+- Valid [DANE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS-based_Authentication_of_Named_Entities) records.
+- Valid [SPF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sender_Policy_Framework) and [DKIM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DomainKeys_Identified_Mail) records.
+- Have a proper [DMARC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DMARC) record and policy or use [ARC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain) for authentication. If DMARC authentication is being used, the policy must be set to `reject` or `quarantine`.
+- A server suite preference of TLS 1.2 or later and a plan for [Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate/).
+- [SMTPS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SMTPS) submission, assuming SMTP is used.
+- Website security standards such as:
+ - [HTTP Strict Transport Security](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security)
+ - [Subresource Integrity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subresource_Integrity) if loading things from external domains.
+- Must support viewing of [Message headers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header), as it is a crucial forensic feature to determine if an email is a phishing attempt.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Support for hardware authentication, i.e. U2F and [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn). U2F and WebAuthn are more secure as they use a private key stored on a client-side hardware device to authenticate people, as opposed to a shared secret that is stored on the web server and on the client side when using TOTP. Furthermore, U2F and WebAuthn are more resistant to phishing as their authentication response is based on the authenticated [domain name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name).
+- [DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844) in addition to DANE support.
+- Implementation of [Authenticated Received Chain (ARC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain), this is useful for people who post to mailing lists [RFC8617](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8617).
+- Programas de recompensa de errores y/o un proceso coordinado de divulgación de vulnerabilidades.
+- Website security standards such as:
+ - [Content Security Policy (CSP)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy)
+ - [Expect-CT](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-expect-ct)
+
+### Confianza
+
+You wouldn't trust your finances to someone with a fake identity, so why trust them with your email? We require our recommended providers to be public about their ownership or leadership. We also would like to see frequent transparency reports, especially in regard to how government requests are handled.
+
+**Mejor caso:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership or ownership.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership.
+- Informes de transparencia frecuentes.
+
+### Marketing
+
+With the email providers we recommend we like to see responsible marketing.
+
+**Mejor caso:**
+
+- Debe tener análisis propios (no Google Analytics, etc.). The provider's site must also comply with [DNT (Do Not Track)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Do_Not_Track) for those who wish to opt-out.
+
+Must not have any marketing which is irresponsible:
+
+- Claims of "unbreakable encryption." Encryption should be used with the intention that it may not be secret in the future when the technology exists to crack it.
+- Garantizar la protección del anonimato al 100%. Cuando alguien afirma que algo es 100% significa que no hay certeza de fracaso. Sabemos que la gente puede desanonimizarse fácilmente de varias maneras, por ejemplo:
+
+- Reusing personal information e.g. (email accounts, unique pseudonyms, etc) that they accessed without anonymity software (Tor, VPN, etc)
+- [Browser fingerprinting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint)
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Clear and easy to read documentation. This includes things like, setting up 2FA, email clients, OpenPGP, etc.
+
+### Funcionalidades adicionales
+
+While not strictly requirements, there are some other convenience or privacy factors we looked into when determining which providers to recommend.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/encryption.md b/i18n/es/encryption.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a781ee90e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/encryption.md
@@ -0,0 +1,358 @@
+---
+title: "Software de encriptación"
+icon: material/file-lock
+---
+
+El cifrado de los datos es la única forma de controlar quién puede acceder a ellos. Si actualmente no está utilizando software de encriptación para su disco duro, correos electrónicos o archivos, debería elegir una opción aquí.
+
+## Multi plataforma
+
+Las opciones enumeradas aquí son multiplataforma y excelentes para crear copias de seguridad cifradas de sus datos.
+
+### VeraCrypt
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **VeraCrypt** es una utilidad freeware fuente disponible que se utiliza para el cifrado transparente. Le permite crear bóvedas que se almacenan en una unidad virtual, cuyo contenido está encriptado y sincronizado con su proveedor de almacenamiento en la nube.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Inicio](https://cryptomator.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://cryptomator.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Política de privacidad" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.cryptomator.org/){ .card-link title=Documentación}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/cryptomator){ .card-link title="código fuente" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://cryptomator.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribuir }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.cryptomator)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/cryptomator-2/id1560822163)
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://cryptomator.org/android)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.cryptomator.Cryptomator)
+
+Cryptomator utiliza el cifrado AES-256 para cifrar tanto los archivos como los nombres de archivo. Cryptomator no puede cifrar metadatos como las marcas de tiempo de acceso, modificación y creación, ni el número y tamaño de los archivos y carpetas.
+
+Algunas bibliotecas criptográficas de Cryptomator han sido [auditadas](https://community.cryptomator.org/t/has-there-been-a-security-review-audit-of-cryptomator/44) por Cure53. El alcance de las bibliotecas auditadas incluye: [cryptolib](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptolib), [cryptofs](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptofs), [siv-mode](https://github.com/cryptomator/siv-mode) y [cryptomator-objc-cryptor](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptomator-objc-cryptor). La auditoría no se extendió a [cryptolib-swift](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptolib-swift), que es una biblioteca utilizada por Cryptomator para iOS.
+
+La documentación de Cryptomator detalla su intención [objetivo de seguridad](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/security-target/), [arquitectura de seguridad](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/architecture/), y [mejores prácticas](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/best-practices/) para su uso con más detalle.
+
+### Picocrypt (Archivo)
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Picocrypt** es una herramienta de cifrado pequeña y simple que proporciona un cifrado moderno. Picocrypt utiliza el cifrado seguro XChaCha20 y la función de derivación de clave Argon2id para proporcionar un alto nivel de seguridad. Utiliza los módulos x/crypto estándar de Go para sus funciones de cifrado.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repositorio](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt){ .card-link title="Código fuente" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/picocrypt){ .card-link title=Contribuir }
+
+ ??? descargas
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases)
+
+### VeraCrypt (Disco)
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **VeraCrypt** es una utilidad de software gratuito con el código fuente disponible que se utiliza para el cifrado sobre la marcha. Puede crear un disco cifrado virtual dentro de un archivo, cifrar una partición o cifrar todo el dispositivo de almacenamiento con autenticación previa al arranque.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Página principal](https://veracrypt.fr){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/en/Documentation.html){ .card-link title=Documentación}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/code/){ .card-link title="Código fuente" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/en/Donation.html){ .card-link title=Contribuir }
+
+ ??? descargas
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html)
+
+VeraCrypt es una bifurcación del proyecto TrueCrypt ya descontinuado. Según sus desarrolladores, se implementaron mejoras de seguridad y se abordaron los problemas planteados por la auditoría inicial del código TrueCrypt.
+
+Al cifrar con VeraCrypt, tiene la opción de seleccionar entre diferentes [funciones hash](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt#Encryption_scheme). Le sugerimos **únicamente** seleccionar [SHA-512](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-512) y seleccionar el [AES](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard) como cifrado de bloque.
+
+Truecrypt ha sido [auditado un buen número de veces](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TrueCrypt#Security_audits), y VeraCrypt también ha sido [auditado de manera separada](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt#VeraCrypt_audit).
+
+## Cifrado de disco completo del sistema operativo
+
+Los sistemas operativos modernos [FDE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_encryption) y tendrán un[criptoprocesador seguro](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_cryptoprocessor).
+
+### BitLocker
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **BitLocker** es la solución de cifrado de volumen completo incluida con Microsoft Windows. La razón principal por la que lo recomendamos, es por su [uso de TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). [ElcomSoft](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ElcomSoft), una empresa forense, ha escrito sobre ello en [Understanding BitLocker TPM Protection](https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2021/01/understanding-BitLocker-tpm-protection/).
+
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/BitLocker/BitLocker-overview){ .card-link title=Documentación}
+
+BitLocker es [únicamente compatible](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/turn-on-device-encryption-0c453637-bc88-5f74-5105-741561aae838) en las versiones Pro, Enterprise y Education de Windows. Se puede habilitar en las ediciones Home siempre que cumplan con los requisitos previos.
+
+??? ejemplo "Habilitación de BitLocker en Windows Home"
+
+ Para habilitar BitLocker en las ediciones "Home" de Windows, debe tener particiones formateadas con una [tabla de partición GUID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GUID_Partition_Table) y tener un módulo TPM (v1.2, 2.0+) dedicado.
+
+ 1. Abra un símbolo del sistema y verifique el formato de la tabla de particiones de su unidad con el siguiente comando. Debería ver "**GPT**" listado bajo "Partition Style":
+
+ ```
+ powershell Get-Disk
+ ```
+
+ 2. Ejecute este comando (en un símbolo del sistema con derechos de administración) para verificar su versión de TPM. Debería ver `2.0` o `1.2` junto a `SpecVersion`:
+
+ ```
+ powershell Get-WmiObject -Namespace "root/cimv2/security/microsofttpm" -Class WIN32_tpm
+ ```
+
+ 3. Acceda a [Opciones avanzadas de inicio](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/advanced-startup-options-including-safe-mode-b90e7808-80b5-a291-d4b8-1a1af602b617). Debe reiniciar mientras pulsa la tecla F8 antes de que se inicie Windows y entrar en el símbolo del sistema ** en **Solucionar problemas** → **Opciones avanzadas** → **Símbolo del sistema**.
+
+ 4. Inicie sesión con su cuenta de administrador y escriba esto en el símbolo del sistema para iniciar el cifrado:
+
+ ```
+ manage-bde -on c: -used
+ ```
+
+ 5. Cierre el símbolo del sistema y continúe con el arranque normal de Windows.
+
+ 6. Open an admin command prompt and run the following commands:
+
+ ```
+ manage-bde c: -protectors -add -rp -tpm
+ manage-bde -protectors -enable c:
+ manage-bde -protectors -get c: > %UserProfile%\Desktop\BitLocker-Recovery-Key.txt
+ ```
+
+ !!! tip
+
+ Backup `BitLocker-Recovery-Key.txt` on your Desktop to a separate storage device. La pérdida de este código de recuperación puede resultar en la pérdida de datos.
+
+### FileVault
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FileVault** is the on-the-fly volume encryption solution built into macOS. FileVault is recommended because it [leverages](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/volume-encryption-with-filevault-sec4c6dc1b6e/web) hardware security capabilities present on an Apple silicon SoC or T2 Security Chip.
+
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/encrypt-mac-data-with-filevault-mh11785/mac){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+We recommend storing a local recovery key in a secure place as opposed to using your iCloud account for recovery.
+
+### Linux Unified Key Setup
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **LUKS** is the default FDE method for Linux. It can be used to encrypt full volumes, partitions, or create encrypted containers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/blob/main/README.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+??? example "Creating and opening encrypted containers"
+
+ ```
+ dd if=/dev/urandom of=/path-to-file bs=1M count=1024 status=progress
+ sudo cryptsetup luksFormat /path-to-file
+ ```
+
+
+ #### Opening encrypted containers
+ We recommend opening containers and volumes with `udisksctl` as this uses [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). Most file managers, such as those included with popular desktop environments, can unlock encrypted files. Tools like [udiskie](https://github.com/coldfix/udiskie) can run in the system tray and provide a helpful user interface.
+ ```
+ udisksctl loop-setup -f /path-to-file
+ udisksctl unlock -b /dev/loop0
+ ```
+
+!!! note "Remember to back up volume headers"
+
+ We recommend you always [back up your LUKS headers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Device_encryption#Backup_and_restore) in case of partial drive failure. Esto se puede hacer con:
+
+ ```
+ cryptsetup luksHeaderBackup /dev/device --header-backup-file /mnt/backup/file.img
+ ```
+
+## Browser-based
+
+Browser-based encryption can be useful when you need to encrypt a file but cannot install software or apps on your device.
+
+### hat.sh
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Hat.sh** is a web application that provides secure client-side file encryption in your browser. It can also be self-hosted and is useful if you need to encrypt a file but cannot install any software on your device due to organizational policies.
+
+ [:octicons-globe-16: Website](https://hat.sh){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://hat.sh/about/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://hat.sh/about/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/sh-dv/hat.sh){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sh-dv/hat.sh#donations){ .card-link title="Donations methods can be found at the bottom of the website" }
+
+## Command-line
+
+Tools with command-line interfaces are useful for integrating [shell scripts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shell_script).
+
+### Kryptor
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Kryptor** is a free and open-source file encryption and signing tool that makes use of modern and secure cryptographic algorithms. It aims to be a better version of [age](https://github.com/FiloSottile/age) and [Minisign](https://jedisct1.github.io/minisign/) to provide a simple, easier alternative to GPG.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kryptor.co.uk){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/features#privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/tutorial){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/samuel-lucas6/Kryptor){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/#donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.kryptor.co.uk)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.kryptor.co.uk)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.kryptor.co.uk)
+
+### Tomb
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tomb** is a command-line shell wrapper for LUKS. It supports steganography via [third-party tools](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb#how-does-it-work).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.dyne.org/software/tomb){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.dyne.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+## OpenPGP
+
+OpenPGP is sometimes needed for specific tasks such as digitally signing and encrypting email. PGP has many features and is [complex](https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html) as it has been around a long time. For tasks such as signing or encrypting files, we suggest the above options.
+
+When encrypting with PGP, you have the option to configure different options in your `gpg.conf` file. We recommend staying with the standard options specified in the [GnuPG user FAQ](https://www.gnupg.org/faq/gnupg-faq.html#new_user_gpg_conf).
+
+!!! tip "Use future defaults when generating a key"
+
+ When [generating keys](https://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual/c14.html) we suggest using the `future-default` command as this will instruct GnuPG use modern cryptography such as [Curve25519](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curve25519#History) and [Ed25519](https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/):
+
+ ```bash
+ gpg --quick-gen-key alice@example.com future-default
+ ```
+
+### GNU Privacy Guard
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GnuPG** is a GPL-licensed alternative to the PGP suite of cryptographic software. GnuPG is compliant with [RFC 4880](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880), which is the current IETF specification of OpenPGP. The GnuPG project has been working on an [updated draft](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh/) in an attempt to modernize OpenPGP. GnuPG is a part of the Free Software Foundation's GNU software project and has received major [funding](https://gnupg.org/blog/20220102-a-new-future-for-gnupg.html) from the German government.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gnupg.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gnupg.org/privacy-policy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gnupg.org/documentation/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.sufficientlysecure.keychain)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://gpg4win.org/download.html)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://gpgtools.org)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://gnupg.org/download/index.html#binary)
+
+### GPG4win
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GPG4win** is a package for Windows from [Intevation and g10 Code](https://gpg4win.org/impressum.html). It includes [various tools](https://gpg4win.org/about.html) that can assist you in using GPG on Microsoft Windows. The project was initiated and originally [funded by](https://web.archive.org/web/20190425125223/https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/news/government-used-cryptography) Germany's Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) in 2005.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gpg4win.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gpg4win.org/privacy-policy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gpg4win.org/documentation.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gpg4win.git;a=summary){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://gpg4win.org/donate.html){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://gpg4win.org/download.html)
+
+### GPG Suite
+
+!!! note
+
+ We suggest [Canary Mail](email-clients.md#canary-mail) for using PGP with email on iOS devices.
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GPG Suite** provides OpenPGP support for [Apple Mail](email-clients.md#apple-mail) and macOS.
+
+ We recommend taking a look at their [First steps](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb/how-to/first-steps-where-do-i-start-where-do-i-begin-setup-gpgtools-create-a-new-key-your-first-encrypted-email) and [Knowledge base](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb) for support.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gpgtools.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gpgtools.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GPGTools){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://gpgtools.org)
+
+### OpenKeychain
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OpenKeychain** is an Android implementation of GnuPG. It's commonly required by mail clients such as [K-9 Mail](email-clients.md#k-9-mail) and [FairEmail](email-clients.md#fairemail) and other Android apps to provide encryption support. Cure53 completed a [security audit](https://www.openkeychain.org/openkeychain-3-6) of OpenKeychain 3.6 in October 2015. Technical details about the audit and OpenKeychain's solutions can be found [here](https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain/wiki/cure53-Security-Audit-2015).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.openkeychain.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.openkeychain.org/help/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.openkeychain.org/faq/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.sufficientlysecure.keychain)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Qualifications
+
+- Cross-platform encryption apps must be open-source.
+- File encryption apps must support decryption on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- External disk encryption apps must support decryption on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- Internal (OS) disk encryption apps must be cross-platform or built in to the operating system natively.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Operating System (FDE) encryption apps should utilize hardware security such as a TPM or Secure Enclave.
+- File encryption apps should have first- or third-party support for mobile platforms.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/file-sharing.md b/i18n/es/file-sharing.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8ca0d1470
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/file-sharing.md
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+---
+title: "Compartición y sincronización de archivos"
+icon: material/share-variant
+---
+
+Descubra cómo puede compartir de manera privada sus archivos entre sus dispositivos, con sus amigos y familia, o de manera anónima en línea.
+
+## Programas para compartir archivos
+
+### Enviar
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Send** es una bifurcación del programa Firefox Send (descontinuado por Mozilla), que permite enviar archivos a otras personas mediante un enlace. Los archivos son encriptados en su dispositivo, lo que no permite que sean leídos por el servidor y, opcionalmente, también pueden protegerse por una contraseña. El responsable de mantener Send ofrece una [instancia pública](https://send.vis.ee/). Puede usitlizar otras instancias públicas o puede hospedar Send usted mismo.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Página principal](https://send.vis.ee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send-instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/timvisee){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Send puede utilizarse a través de su interfaz web o mediante la herremienta de comandos [ffsend](https://github.com/timvisee/ffsend). Si usted es familiar con la línea de comandos y envía archivos frecuentemente, recomendamos utilizar el cliente CLI para evitar la encriptación basada en JavaScript. Usted puede especificar la bandera `--host` para utilizar un servidor en específico:
+
+```bash
+ffsend upload --host https://send.vis.ee/ FILE
+```
+
+### OnionShare
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OnionShare** es una herramienta de código abierto que permite compartir de manera segura y anónima un archivo de cualquier tamaño. Funciona iniciando un servidor web accesible como un servicio onion de Tor, con un enlace indescifrable que se puede compartir con los receptores para descargar o enviar archivos.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Página principal](https://onionshare.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://lldan5gahapx5k7iafb3s4ikijc4ni7gx5iywdflkba5y2ezyg6sjgyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.onionshare.org){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/onionshare/onionshare){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? descargas
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://onionshare.org/#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://onionshare.org/#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://onionshare.org/#download)
+
+### Criterios
+
+**Por favor, tome en cuenta que no estamos afiliados con ninguno de los proyectos que recomendamos.** En adición a [nuestros criterios estándares](about/criteria.md), hemos desarrollado un claro conjunto de requisitos para permitirnos brindar recomendaciones objetivas. Sugerimos que usted se familiarice con esta lista antes de optar por utilizar un proyecto, y realizar su propia investigación para asegurarse que es la elección adecuada.
+
+!!! ejemplo "Esta sección es nueva"
+
+ Estamos trabajando en establecer criterios definidos para cada sección de nuestra página, y esto puede estar sujeto a cambios. Si tiene alguna pregunta sobre nuestros criterios, por favor [pregunte en nuestro foro](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) y no asuma que no consideramos algo al hacer nuestras recomendaciones, si no se encuentra listado aquí. Hay múltiples factores considerados y discutidos cuando recomendamos un proyecto, y documentar cada uno es un trabajo en progreso.
+
+- No debe almacenar información sin encriptar en un servidor remoto.
+- Debe ser un programa de código abierto.
+- Debe tener clientes para Linux, macOS y Winwos; o tener una interfaz web.
+
+## FreedomBox
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FreedomBox** es un sistema operativo diseñado para correr en una [computadora de placa única (SBC, por sus siglas en inglés)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-board_computer). El propósito es facilitar la configuración de aplicaciones que requieran un servidor y se puedan alojar por usted mismo.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Página principal](https://freedombox.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://wiki.debian.org/FreedomBox/Manual){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://salsa.debian.org/freedombox-team/freedombox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://freedomboxfoundation.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+## Sincronización de archivos
+
+### Nextcloud (Cliente-Servidor)
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nextcloud** es un conjunto de programas gratuitos y de código abierto, para la creación de su propio servicio de almacenamiento de archivos en un servidor privado que usted controle.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Página principal](https://nextcloud.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://nextcloud.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://nextcloud.com/support/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/nextcloud){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nextcloud.com/contribute/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? descargas
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nextcloud.client)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1125420102)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/nextcloud/android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/www/nextcloud)
+
+!!! peligro
+
+ No recomendamos utilizar la [aplicación con cifrado de extremo a extremo](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/end_to_end_encryption) para Nextcloud, porque puede causar la pérdida de datos; esta es considerada como altamente experimental y no debe utilizarse en entornos de producción.
+
+### Syncthing (P2P)
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Syncthing** es una herramienta de sincronización continua de archivos peer-to-peer de código abierto. Es utilizada para sincronizar archivos entre dos o más dispositivos sobre la red local o el Internet. Syncthing no utiliza un servidor centralizado, este utiliza el [Protocolo de Intercambio de Bloques](https://docs.syncthing.net/specs/bep-v1.html#bep-v1) para transferir los datos entre dispositivos. Todos los datos son encriptados utilizando TLS.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Página principal](https://syncthing.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.syncthing.net){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/syncthing){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://syncthing.net/donations/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? descargas
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nutomic.syncthingandroid)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-openbsd: OpenBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-netbsd: NetBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+
+### Criterios
+
+**Por favor, tome en cuenta que no estamos afiliados con ninguno de los proyectos que recomendamos.** En adición a [nuestros criterios estándares](about/criteria.md), hemos desarrollado un claro conjunto de requisitos para permitirnos brindar recomendaciones objetivas. Sugerimos que usted se familiarice con esta lista antes de optar por utilizar un proyecto, y realizar su propia investigación para asegurarse que es la elección adecuada.
+
+!!! ejemplo "Esta sección es nueva"
+
+ Estamos trabajando en establecer criterios definidos para cada sección de nuestra página, y esto puede estar sujeto a cambios. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+#### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must not require a third-party remote/cloud server.
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Debe tener clientes para Linux, macOS y Winwos; o tener una interfaz web.
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Has mobile clients for iOS and Android, which at least support document previews.
+- Supports photo backup from iOS and Android, and optionally supports file/folder sync on Android.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/frontends.md b/i18n/es/frontends.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2fe355099
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/frontends.md
@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+---
+title: "Frontends"
+icon: material/flip-to-front
+---
+
+Sometimes services will try to force you to sign up for an account by blocking access to content with annoying popups. They might also break without JavaScript enabled. These frontends can allow you to get around these restrictions.
+
+## Clientes
+
+### Librarian
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Librarian** is a free and open-source frontend for [Odysee](https://odysee.com/) (LBRY) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://librarian.codeberg.page/){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Librarian does not proxy video streams by default. Videos watched through Librarian will still make direct connections to Odysee's servers (e.g. `odycdn.com`); however, some instances may enable proxying which would be detailed in the instance's privacy policy.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Librarian is useful if you want watch LBRY content on mobile without mandatory telemetry and if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, as is the case with [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Librarian, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a Librarian instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Librarian instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect the default policy. Librarian instances feature a "privacy nutrition label" to provide an overview of their policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+## Reddit
+
+### Nitter
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nitter** is a free and open-source frontend for [Twitter](https://twitter.com) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter/wiki/Instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter#nitter){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Nitter is useful if you want to browse Twitter content without having to log in and if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, as is the case with [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level. It also allows you to [create RSS feeds for Twitter](news-aggregators.md#twitter).
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Nitter, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a Nitter instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Nitter instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect the default policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+## TikTok
+
+### ProxiTok
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **ProxiTok** is an open source frontend to the [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com) website that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok/wiki/Public-instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+!!! tip
+
+ ProxiTok is useful if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, such as [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting ProxiTok, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a ProxiTok instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. ProxiTok instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect their associated privacy policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+## Twitter
+
+### FreeTube
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FreeTube** is a free and open-source desktop application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com). When using FreeTube, your subscription list and playlists are saved locally on your device.
+
+ By default, FreeTube blocks all YouTube advertisements. In addition, FreeTube optionally integrates with [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://freetubeapp.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://freetubeapp.io/privacy.php){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.freetubeapp.io/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/FreeTubeApp/FreeTube){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/FreeTube){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/io.freetubeapp.FreeTube)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using FreeTube, your IP address may still be known to YouTube, [Invidious](https://instances.invidious.io) or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) depending on your configuration. Considere la posibilidad de utilizar un [VPN](vpn.md) o [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) si su [modelo de amenaza](basics/threat-modeling.md) requiere ocultar su dirección IP.
+
+### Yattee
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Yattee** is a free and open-source privacy oriented video player for iOS, tvOS and macOS for [YouTube](https://youtube.com). When using Yattee, your subscription list are saved locally on your device.
+
+ You will need to take a few [extra steps](https://gonzoknows.com/posts/Yattee/) before you can use Yattee to watch YouTube, due to App Store restrictions.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://github.com/yattee/yattee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://r.yattee.stream/docs/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/wiki/Donations){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-apple: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/yattee/id1595136629)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/releases)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using Yattee, your IP address may still be known to YouTube, [Invidious](https://instances.invidious.io), [Piped](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances) or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) depending on your configuration. Considere la posibilidad de utilizar un [VPN](vpn.md) o [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) si su [modelo de amenaza](basics/threat-modeling.md) requiere ocultar su dirección IP.
+
+By default, Yattee blocks all YouTube advertisements. In addition, Yattee optionally integrates with [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments.
+
+### LibreTube (Android)
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **LibreTube** is a free and open-source Android application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) which uses the [Piped](#piped) API.
+
+ LibreTube allows you to store your subscription list and playlists locally on your Android device, or to an account on your Piped instance of choice, which allows you to access them seamlessly on other devices as well.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://libre-tube.github.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube#privacy-policy-and-disclaimer){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube/releases)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using LibreTube, your IP address will be visible to the [Piped](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances) instance you choose and/or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) depending on your configuration. Considere la posibilidad de utilizar un [VPN](vpn.md) o [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) si su [modelo de amenaza](basics/threat-modeling.md) requiere ocultar su dirección IP.
+
+By default, LibreTube blocks all YouTube advertisements. Additionally, Libretube uses [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments. You are able to fully configure the types of segments that SponsorBlock will skip, or disable it completely. There is also a button on the video player itself to disable it for a specific video if desired.
+
+### NewPipe (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **NewPipe** is a free and open-source Android application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com), [SoundCloud](https://soundcloud.com), [media.ccc.de](https://media.ccc.de), [Bandcamp](https://bandcamp.com), and [PeerTube](https://joinpeertube.org/) (1).
+
+ Your subscription list and playlists are saved locally on your Android device.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://newpipe.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://newpipe.net/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://teamnewpipe.github.io/documentation/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamNewPipe/NewPipe){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://newpipe.net/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/TeamNewPipe/NewPipe/releases)
+
+1. The default instance is [FramaTube](https://framatube.org/), however more can be added via **Settings** → **Content** → **PeerTube instances**
+
+!!! Advertencia
+
+ When using NewPipe, your IP address will be visible to the video providers used. Considere la posibilidad de utilizar un [VPN](vpn.md) o [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) si su [modelo de amenaza](basics/threat-modeling.md) requiere ocultar su dirección IP.
+
+### Invidious
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Invidious** is a free and open-source frontend for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://invidious.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://instances.invidious.io){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.invidious.io/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/iv-org/invidious){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://invidious.io/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Invidious does not proxy video streams by default. Videos watched through Invidious will still make direct connections to Google's servers (e.g. `googlevideo.com`); however, some instances support video proxying—simply enable *Proxy videos* within the instances' settings or add `&local=true` to the URL.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Invidious is useful if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, such as [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level. It does not provide privacy by itself, and we don’t recommend logging into any accounts.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Invidious, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using an Invidious instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Invidious instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect their associated privacy policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+### Piped
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Piped** is a free and open-source frontend for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ Piped requires JavaScript in order to function and there are a number of public instances.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://piped.kavin.rocks/preferences#ddlInstanceSelection){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://piped-docs.kavin.rocks/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped#donations){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Piped is useful if you want to use [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) without installing an extension or to access age-restricted content without an account. It does not provide privacy by itself, and we don’t recommend logging into any accounts.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Piped, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a Piped instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Piped instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect their associated privacy policy.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+Recommended frontends...
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must be self-hostable.
+- Must provide all basic website functionality available to anonymous users.
+
+We only consider frontends for websites which are...
+
+- Not normally accessible without JavaScript.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/index.md b/i18n/es/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ac41e0eb8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+---
+template: overrides/home.es.html
+hide:
+ - navigation
+ - toc
+ - feedback
+---
+
+
+## Why should I care?
+
+##### “I have nothing to hide. Why should I care about my privacy?”
+
+Much like the right to interracial marriage, woman's suffrage, freedom of speech, and many others, our right to privacy hasn't always been upheld. In several dictatorships, it still isn't. Generations before ours fought for our right to privacy. ==Privacy is a human right, inherent to all of us,== that we are entitled to (without discrimination).
+
+You shouldn't confuse privacy with secrecy. We know what happens in the bathroom, but you still close the door. That's because you want privacy, not secrecy. **Everyone** has something to protect. Privacy is something that makes us human.
+
+[:material-target-account: Common Internet Threats](basics/common-threats.md ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+## What should I do?
+
+##### First, you need to make a plan
+
+Trying to protect all your data from everyone all the time is impractical, expensive, and exhausting. But don't worry! Security is a process, and, by thinking ahead, you can put together a plan that's right for you. Security isn't just about the tools you use or the software you download. Rather, it begins by understanding the unique threats you face, and how you can mitigate them.
+
+==This process of identifying threats and defining countermeasures is called **threat modeling**==, and it forms the basis of every good security and privacy plan.
+
+[:material-book-outline: Learn More About Threat Modeling](basics/threat-modeling.md ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+---
+
+## We need you! Here's how to get involved:
+
+[:simple-discourse:](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/){ title="Join our Forum" }
+[:simple-mastodon:](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides){ rel=me title="Follow us on Mastodon" }
+[:material-book-edit:](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org){ title="Contribute to this website" }
+[:material-translate:](https://matrix.to/#/#pg-i18n:aragon.sh){ title="Help translate this website" }
+[:simple-matrix:](https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org){ title="Chat with us on Matrix" }
+[:material-information-outline:](about/index.md){ title="Learn more about us" }
+[:material-hand-coin-outline:](about/donate.md){ title="Support the project" }
+
+It's important for a website like Privacy Guides to always stay up-to-date. We need our audience to keep an eye on software updates for the applications listed on our site and follow recent news about providers that we recommend. It's hard to keep up with the fast pace of the internet, but we try our best. If you spot an error, think a provider should not be listed, notice a qualified provider is missing, believe a browser plugin is no longer the best choice, or uncover any other issue, please let us know.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/kb-archive.md b/i18n/es/kb-archive.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5667d7aab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/kb-archive.md
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+---
+title: KB Archive
+icon: material/archive
+---
+
+# Pages Moved to Blog
+
+Some pages that used to be in our knowledge base can now be found on our blog:
+
+- [GrapheneOS vs. CalyxOS](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/)
+- [Signal Configuration Hardening](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening/)
+- [Linux - System Hardening](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/22/linux-system-hardening/)
+- [Linux - Application Sandboxing](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/22/linux-application-sandboxing/)
+- [Secure Data Erasure](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/05/25/secure-data-erasure/)
+- [Integrando Eliminación de Metadatos](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/09/integrating-metadata-removal/)
+- [iOS Configuration Guide](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/22/ios-configuration-guide/)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/meta/brand.md b/i18n/es/meta/brand.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f2792cfdc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/meta/brand.md
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+---
+title: Lineamientos de marca
+---
+
+El nombre de la página es **Privacy Guides** y **no** debe ser cambiado a:
+
+
+
+El nombre del subreddit es **r/PrivacyGuides** o **el subreddit de Privacy Guides**.
+
+Lineamientos adicionales de marca pueden encontrarse en [github.com/privacyguides/brand](https://github.com/privacyguides/brand)
+
+## Marca registrada
+
+"Privacy Guides" y el logo del escudo son marcas registradas por Jonah Aragon, el uso ilimitado es otorgado al proyecto de Privacy Guides.
+
+Sin renuncias a ninguno de sus derechos, Privacy Guides no asesora a terceros sobre el alcance de sus derechos de propiedad intelectual. Privacy Guides no permite o autoriza el uso de ninguna de sus marcas de ninguna manera, donde es probable que se cause confusión al implicar la asociació o el patrocinio de Privacy Guides. Si tiene conocimiento de algún uso de este tipo, por favor contacte a Jonah Aragon en jonah@privacyguides.org. Consulte a su asesor jurídico si tiene preguntas.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/meta/git-recommendations.md b/i18n/es/meta/git-recommendations.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b3fb0761e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/meta/git-recommendations.md
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+---
+title: Git Recommendations
+---
+
+If you make changes to this website on GitHub.com's web editor directly, you shouldn't have to worry about this. If you are developing locally and/or are a long-term website editor (who should probably be developing locally!), consider these recommendations.
+
+## Enable SSH Key Commit Signing
+
+You can use an existing SSH key for signing, or [create a new one](https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/connecting-to-github-with-ssh/generating-a-new-ssh-key-and-adding-it-to-the-ssh-agent).
+
+1. Configure your Git client to sign commits and tags by default (remove `--global` to only sign by default for this repo):
+ ```
+ git config --global commit.gpgsign true
+ git config --global gpg.format ssh
+ git config --global tag.gpgSign true
+ ```
+2. Copy your SSH public key to your clipboard, for example:
+ ```
+ pbcopy < ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+ # Copies the contents of the id_ed25519.pub file to your clipboard
+ ```
+3. Set your SSH key for signing in Git with the following command, replacing the last string in quotes with the public key in your clipboard:
+ ```
+ git config --global user.signingkey 'ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3(...) user@example.com'
+ ```
+
+Ensure you [add your SSH key to your GitHub account](https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/connecting-to-github-with-ssh/adding-a-new-ssh-key-to-your-github-account#adding-a-new-ssh-key-to-your-account) **as a Signing Key** (as opposed to or in addition to as an Authentication Key).
+
+## Rebase on Git pull
+
+Use `git pull --rebase` instead of `git pull` when pulling in changes from GitHub to your local machine. This way your local changes will always be "on top of" the latest changes on GitHub, and you avoid merge commits (which are disallowed in this repo).
+
+You can set this to be the default behavior:
+
+```
+git config --global pull.rebase true
+```
+
+## Rebase from `main` before submitting a PR
+
+If you are working on your own branch, run these commands before submitting a PR:
+
+```
+git fetch origin
+git rebase origin/main
+```
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/meta/uploading-images.md b/i18n/es/meta/uploading-images.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..85ba54771
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/meta/uploading-images.md
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+---
+title: Uploading Images
+---
+
+Here are a couple of general rules for contributing to Privacy Guides:
+
+## Images
+
+- We **prefer** SVG images, but if those do not exist we can use PNG images
+
+Company logos have canvas size of:
+
+- 128x128px
+- 384x128px
+
+## Optimization
+
+### PNG
+
+Use the [OptiPNG](https://sourceforge.net/projects/optipng/) to optimize the PNG image:
+
+```bash
+optipng -o7 file.png
+```
+
+### SVG
+
+#### Inkscape
+
+[Scour](https://github.com/scour-project/scour) all SVG images.
+
+In Inkscape:
+
+1. File Save As..
+2. Set type to Optimized SVG (*.svg)
+
+In the **Options** tab:
+
+- **Number of significant digits for coordinates** > **5**
+- [x] Turn on **Shorten color values**
+- [x] Turn on **Convert CSS attributes to XML attributes**
+- [x] Turn on **Collapse groups**
+- [x] Turn on **Create groups for similar attributes**
+- [ ] Turn off **Keep editor data**
+- [ ] Turn off **Keep unreferenced definitions**
+- [x] Turn on **Work around renderer bugs**
+
+In the **SVG Output** tab under **Document options**:
+
+- [ ] Turn off **Remove the XML declaration**
+- [x] Turn on **Remove metadata**
+- [x] Turn on **Remove comments**
+- [x] Turn on **Embeded raster images**
+- [x] Turn on **Enable viewboxing**
+
+In the **SVG Output** under **Pretty-printing**:
+
+- [ ] Turn off **Format output with line-breaks and indentation**
+- **Indentation characters** > Select **Space**
+- **Depth of indentation** > **1**
+- [ ] Turn off **Strip the "xml:space" attribute from the root SVG element**
+
+In the **IDs** tab:
+
+- [x] Turn on **Remove unused IDs**
+- [ ] Turn off **Shorten IDs**
+- **Prefix shortened IDs with** > `leave blank`
+- [x] Turn on **Preserve manually created IDs not ending with digits**
+- **Preserve the following IDs** > `leave blank`
+- **Preserve IDs starting with** > `leave blank`
+
+#### CLI
+
+The same can be achieved with the [Scour](https://github.com/scour-project/scour) command:
+
+```bash
+scour --set-precision=5 \
+ --create-groups \
+ --renderer-workaround \
+ --remove-descriptive-elements \
+ --enable-comment-stripping \
+ --enable-viewboxing \
+ --indent=space \
+ --nindent=1 \
+ --no-line-breaks \
+ --enable-id-stripping \
+ --protect-ids-noninkscape \
+ input.svg output.svg
+```
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/meta/writing-style.md b/i18n/es/meta/writing-style.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c0fe9160c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/meta/writing-style.md
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+---
+title: Writing Style
+---
+
+Privacy Guides is written in American English, and you should refer to [APA Style guidelines](https://apastyle.apa.org/style-grammar-guidelines/grammar) when in doubt.
+
+In general the [United States federal plain language guidelines](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/) provide a good overview of how to write clearly and concisely. We highlight a few important notes from these guidelines below.
+
+## Writing for our audience
+
+Privacy Guides' intended [audience](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/audience/) is primarily average, technology using adults. Don't dumb down content as if you are addressing a middle-school class, but don't overuse complicated terminology about concepts average computer users wouldn't be familiar with.
+
+### Address only what people want to know
+
+People don't need overly complex articles with little relevance to them. Figure out what you want people to accomplish when writing an article, and only include those details.
+
+> Tell your audience why the material is important to them. Say, “If you want a research grant, here’s what you have to do.” Or, “If you want to mine federal coal, here’s what you should know.” Or, “If you’re planning a trip to Rwanda, read this first.”
+
+### Address people directly
+
+We're writing *for* a wide variety of people, but we are writing *to* the person who is actually reading it. Use "you" to address the reader directly.
+
+> More than any other single technique, using “you” pulls users into the information and makes it relevant to them.
+>
+> When you use “you” to address users, they are more likely to understand what their responsibility is.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/audience/address-the-user/)
+
+### Avoid "users"
+
+Avoid calling people "users", in favor of "people", or a more specific description of the group of people you are writing for.
+
+## Organizing content
+
+Organization is key. Content should flow from most to least important information, and use headers as much as needed to logically separate different ideas.
+
+- Limit the document to around five or six sections. Long documents should probably be broken up into separate pages.
+- Mark important ideas with **bold** or *italics*.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/design/)
+
+### Begin with a topic sentence
+
+> If you tell your reader what they’re going to read about, they’re less likely to have to read your paragraph again. Headings help, but they’re not enough. Establish a context for your audience before you provide them with the details.
+>
+> We often write the way we think, putting our premises first and then our conclusion. It may be the natural way to develop thoughts, but we wind up with the topic sentence at the end of the paragraph. Move it up front and let users know where you’re going. Don’t make readers hold a lot of information in their heads before getting to the point.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/organize/have-a-topic-sentence/)
+
+## Choose your words carefully
+
+> Words matter. They are the most basic building blocks of written and spoken communication. Don’t complicate things by using jargon, technical terms, or abbreviations that people won’t understand.
+
+We should try to avoid abbreviations where possible, but technology is full of abbreviations. In general, spell out the abbreviation/acronym the first time it is used on a page, and add the abbreviation to the abbreviation glossary file when it is used repeatedly.
+
+> Kathy McGinty offers tongue-in-cheek instructions for bulking up your simple, direct sentences:
+>
+> > There is no escaping the fact that it is considered very important to note that a number of various available applicable studies ipso facto have generally identified the fact that additional appropriate nocturnal employment could usually keep juvenile adolescents off thoroughfares during the night hours, including but not limited to the time prior to midnight on weeknights and/or 2 a.m. on weekends.
+>
+> And the original, using stronger, simpler words:
+>
+> > More night jobs would keep youths off the streets.
+
+## Be concise
+
+> Unnecessary words waste your audience’s time. Great writing is like a conversation. Omit information that the audience doesn’t need to know. This can be difficult as a subject matter expert so it’s important to have someone look at the information from the audience’s perspective.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/concise/)
+
+## Keep text conversational
+
+> Verbs are the fuel of writing. They give your sentences power and direction. They enliven your writing and make it more interesting.
+>
+> Verbs tell your audience what to do. Make sure it’s clear who does what.
+
+### Use active voice
+
+> Active voice makes it clear who is supposed to do what. It eliminates ambiguity about responsibilities. Not “It must be done,” but “You must do it.”
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/conversational/use-active-voice/)
+
+### Use "must" for requirements
+
+> - “must” for an obligation
+> - “must not” for a prohibition
+> - “may” for a discretionary action
+> - “should” for a recommendation
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/mobile-browsers.md b/i18n/es/mobile-browsers.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5e8d66a41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/mobile-browsers.md
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+---
+title: "Navegadores Móviles"
+icon: material/cellphone-information
+---
+
+Estos son nuestros navegadores web para móviles y configuraciones recomendadas actualmente para la navegación estándar/no anónima por Internet. Si necesitas navegar por Internet de forma anónima, deberías utilizar [Tor](tor.md) . En general, recomendamos mantener las extensiones al mínimo; tienen acceso privilegiado dentro de su navegador, requieren que confíe en el desarrollador, pueden hacerte [destacar](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint), y [debilitar el aislamiento del sitio](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/chromium-extensions/c/0ei-UCHNm34/m/lDaXwQhzBAAJ).
+
+## Android
+
+En Android, Firefox es incluso menos seguro que las alternativas basadas en Chromium: El motor de Mozilla, [GeckoView](https://mozilla.github.io/geckoview/), aún no soporta el aislamiento de sitios [](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2021/05/introducing-firefox-new-site-isolation-security-architecture) ni habilita [ProcesoAislado](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1565196).
+
+### Brave
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Brave Browser** includes a built-in content blocker and [privacy features](https://brave.com/privacy-features/), many of which are enabled by default.
+
+ Brave is built upon the Chromium web browser project, so it should feel familiar and have minimal website compatibility issues.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://brave.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://brave4u7jddbv7cyviptqjc7jusxh72uik7zt6adtckl5f4nwy2v72qd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://brave.com/privacy/browser/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.brave.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? notas de descarga
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.brave.browser)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/releases)
+
+#### Firefox
+
+Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. Cuando uses Brave, te recomendamos cambiar la siguiente configuración para proteger tu privacidad de ciertas partes, pero todos los navegadores que no sean [el navegador Tor](tor.md#tor-browser) serán rastreables por *alguien* en algún sentido u otro.
+
+Estas opciones se pueden encontrar en :material-menu: → **Configuración** → **Protecciones y privacidad de Brave**
+
+##### Shields
+
+Brave includes some anti-fingerprinting measures in its [Shields](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360022973471-What-is-Shields-) feature. We suggest configuring these options [globally](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360023646212-How-do-I-configure-global-and-site-specific-Shields-settings-) across all pages that you visit.
+
+##### Brave shields global defaults
+
+Shields' options can be downgraded on a per-site basis as needed, but by default we recommend setting the following:
+
+
+
+- [x] Selecciona **Agresivo** en Bloquear rastreadores y anuncios
+
+??? warning "Use default filter lists"
+ Brave allows you to select additional content filters within the internal `brave://adblock` page. We advise against using this feature; instead, keep the default filter lists. Using extra lists will make you stand out from other Brave users and may also increase attack surface if there is an exploit in Brave and a malicious rule is added to one of the lists you use.
+
+- [x] (Opcional) Selecciona **Bloquear Scripts** (1)
+- [x] Selecciona **Estricto, puede dañar los sitios** en Bloquear fingerprint
+
+
+
+1. This option provides functionality similar to uBlock Origin's advanced [blocking modes](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) or the [NoScript](https://noscript.net/) extension.
+
+##### IPFS
+
+- [x] Selecciona **Borrar datos al salir**
+
+##### Bloqueo de redes sociales
+
+- [ ] Uncheck all social media components
+
+##### Otros ajustes de privacidad
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Disable non-proxied UDP** under [WebRTC IP Handling Policy](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360017989132-How-do-I-change-my-Privacy-Settings-#webrtc)
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow sites to check if you have payment methods saved**
+- [ ] Uncheck **IPFS Gateway** (1)
+- [x] Select **Close tabs on exit**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow privacy-preserving product analytics (P3A)**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send diagnostic reports**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send daily usage ping to Brave**
+
+1. InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is a decentralized, peer-to-peer network for storing and sharing data in a distributed filesystem. Unless you use the feature, disable it.
+
+
+
+#### Brave Sync
+
+[Brave Sync](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360059793111-Understanding-Brave-Sync) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices without requiring an account and protects it with E2EE.
+
+## iOS
+
+On iOS, any app that can browse the web is [restricted](https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines) to using an Apple-provided [WebKit framework](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/webkit), so there is little reason to use a third-party web browser.
+
+### Safari
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Safari** is the default browser in iOS. It includes [privacy features](https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/browse-the-web-privately-iphb01fc3c85/15.0/ios/15.0) such as Intelligent Tracking Protection, Privacy Report, isolated Private Browsing tabs, iCloud Private Relay, and automatic HTTPS upgrades.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.apple.com/safari/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/safari/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/safari/welcome/mac){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+#### Firefox
+
+These options can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Safari** → **Privacy and Security**.
+
+##### Cross-Site Tracking Prevention
+
+- [x] Enable **Prevent Cross-Site Tracking**
+
+This enables WebKit's [Intelligent Tracking Protection](https://webkit.org/tracking-prevention/#intelligent-tracking-prevention-itp). The feature helps protect against unwanted tracking by using on-device machine learning to stop trackers. ITP protects against many common threats, but it does not block all tracking avenues because it is designed to not interfere with website usability.
+
+##### Privacy Report
+
+Privacy Report provides a snapshot of cross-site trackers currently prevented from profiling you on the website you're visiting. It can also display a weekly report to show which trackers have been blocked over time.
+
+Privacy Report is accessible via the Page Settings menu.
+
+##### Privacy Preserving Ad Measurement
+
+- [ ] Disable **Privacy Preserving Ad Measurement**
+
+Ad click measurement has traditionally used tracking technology that infringes on user privacy. [Private Click Measurement](https://webkit.org/blog/11529/introducing-private-click-measurement-pcm/) is a WebKit feature and proposed web standard aimed towards allowing advertisers to measure the effectiveness of web campaigns without compromising on user privacy.
+
+The feature has little privacy concerns on its own, so while you can choose to leave it on, we consider the fact that it's automatically disabled in Private Browsing to be an indicator for disabling the feature.
+
+##### Always-on Private Browsing
+
+Open Safari and tap the Tabs button, located in the bottom right. Then, expand the Tab Groups list.
+
+- [x] Select **Private**
+
+Safari's Private Browsing mode offers additional privacy protections. Private Browsing uses a new [ephemeral](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/urlsessionconfiguration/1410529-ephemeral) session for each tab, meaning tabs are isolated from one another. There are also other smaller privacy benefits with Private Browsing, such as not sending a webpage’s address to Apple when using Safari's translation feature.
+
+Do note that Private Browsing does not save cookies and website data, so it won't be possible to remain signed into sites. This may be an inconvenience.
+
+##### iCloud Sync
+
+Synchronization of Safari History, Tab Groups, iCloud Tabs and saved passwords are E2EE. However, by default, bookmarks are [not](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303). Apple can decrypt and access them in accordance with their [privacy policy](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/).
+
+You can enable E2EE for you Safari bookmarks and downloads by enabling [Advanced Data Protection](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212520). Go to your **Apple ID name → iCloud → Advanced Data Protection**.
+
+- [x] Turn On **Advanced Data Protection**
+
+If you use iCloud with Advanced Data Protection disabled, we also recommend checking to ensure Safari's default download location is set to locally on your device. This option can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Safari** → **General** → **Downloads**.
+
+### AdGuard
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **AdGuard for iOS** is a free and open-source content-blocking extension for Safari that uses the native [Content Blocker API](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/safariservices/creating_a_content_blocker).
+
+ AdGuard for iOS has some premium features; however, standard Safari content blocking is free of charge.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://adguard.com/en/adguard-ios/overview.html){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://adguard.com/privacy/ios.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://kb.adguard.com/ios){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdguardForiOS){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id1047223162)
+
+Additional filter lists do slow things down and may increase your attack surface, so only apply what you need.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must support automatic updates.
+- Must receive engine updates in 0-1 days from upstream release.
+- Any changes required to make the browser more privacy-respecting should not negatively impact user experience.
+- Android browsers must use the Chromium engine.
+ - Unfortunately, Mozilla GeckoView is still less secure than Chromium on Android.
+ - iOS browsers are limited to WebKit.
+
+### Extension Criteria
+
+- Must not replicate built-in browser or OS functionality.
+- Must directly impact user privacy, i.e. must not simply provide information.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/multi-factor-authentication.md b/i18n/es/multi-factor-authentication.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..31173e9f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/multi-factor-authentication.md
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+---
+title: "Autenticación de múltiples factores"
+icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication'
+---
+
+## Llaves de Seguridad
+
+### YubiKey
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ 
+
+ Las **YubiKeys** están entre las llaves de seguridad más populares. Algunos modelos de YubiKey tienen un gran rango de caracteristicas como: [2ndo Factor Universal (U2F)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_2nd_Factor), [FIDO2 WebAuthn](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn), [Yubico OTP](https://developers.yubico.com/OTP/), [PIV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIPS_201), [OpenPGP](https://developers.yubico.com/PGP/) y autenticación [TOTP and HOTP](https://developers.yubico.com/OATH/).
+
+ Una de las ventajas de la YubiKey es que una llave puede hacer casi todo (YubiKey 5), se podría esperar de una llave de seguridad. We do encourage you to take the [quiz](https://www.yubico.com/quiz/) before purchasing in order to make sure you make the right choice.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.yubico.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.yubico.com/support/terms-conditions/privacy-notice){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.yubico.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+La [tabla de comparación](https://www.yubico.com/store/compare/) muestra las características y cómo se comparan las YubiKeys. Le recomendamos que seleccione las llaves de las Series YubiKey 5.
+
+YubiKeys can be programmed using the [YubiKey Manager](https://www.yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-manager/) or [YubiKey Personalization Tools](https://www.yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-personalization-tools/). For managing TOTP codes, you can use the [Yubico Authenticator](https://www.yubico.com/products/yubico-authenticator/). All of Yubico's clients are open-source.
+
+For models which support HOTP and TOTP, there are 2 slots in the OTP interface which could be used for HOTP and 32 slots to store TOTP secrets. These secrets are stored encrypted on the key and never expose them to the devices they are plugged into. Once a seed (shared secret) is given to the Yubico Authenticator, it will only give out the six-digit codes, but never the seed. This security model helps limit what an attacker can do if they compromise one of the devices running the Yubico Authenticator and make the YubiKey resistant to a physical attacker.
+
+!!! !!! warning
+ The firmware of YubiKey is not open-source and is not updatable. If you want features in newer firmware versions, or if there is a vulnerability in the firmware version you are using, you would need to purchase a new key.
+
+### Nitrokey / Librem Key
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nitrokey** has a security key capable of [FIDO2 and WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) called the **Nitrokey FIDO2**. For PGP support, you need to purchase one of their other keys such as the **Nitrokey Start**, **Nitrokey Pro 2** or the **Nitrokey Storage 2**.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.nitrokey.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.nitrokey.com/data-privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.nitrokey.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+The [comparison table](https://www.nitrokey.com/#comparison) shows the features and how the Nitrokey models compare. The **Nitrokey 3** listed will have a combined feature set.
+
+Nitrokey models can be configured using the [Nitrokey app](https://www.nitrokey.com/download).
+
+For the models which support HOTP and TOTP, there are 3 slots for HOTP and 15 for TOTP. Some Nitrokeys can act as a password manager. They can store 16 different credentials and encrypt them using the same password as the OpenPGP interface.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ While Nitrokeys do not release the HOTP/TOTP secrets to the device they are plugged into, the HOTP and TOTP storage is **not** encrypted and is vulnerable to physical attacks. If you are looking to store HOTP or TOTP these secrets, we highly recommend that you use a Yubikey instead.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Resetting the OpenPGP interface on a Nitrokey will also make the password database [inaccessible](https://docs.nitrokey.com/pro/factory-reset.html).
+
+ The Nitrokey Pro 2, Nitrokey Storage 2, and the upcoming Nitrokey 3 supports system integrity verification for laptops with the [Coreboot](https://www.coreboot.org/) + [Heads](https://osresearch.net/) firmware. Purism's [Librem Key](https://puri.sm/products/librem-key/) is a rebranded NitroKey Pro 2 with similar firmware and can also be used for the same purposes.
+
+Nitrokey's firmware is open-source, unlike the YubiKey. The firmware on modern NitroKey models (except the **NitroKey Pro 2**) is updatable.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ The Nitrokey app, while compatible with Librem Keys, requires `libnitrokey` version 3.6 or above to recognize them. Currently, the package is outdated on Windows, macOS, and most Linux distributions' repository, so you will likely have to compile the Nitrokey app yourself to get it working with the Librem Key. On Linux, you can obtain an up-to-date version from [Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.nitrokey.nitrokey-app).
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+#### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must use high quality, tamper resistant hardware security modules.
+- Must support the latest FIDO2 specification.
+- Must not allow private key extraction.
+- Devices which cost over $35 must support handling OpenPGP and S/MIME.
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should be available in USB-C form-factor.
+- Should be available with NFC.
+- Should support TOTP secret storage.
+- Should support secure firmware updates.
+
+## Aplicaciones de Autenticación
+
+Authenticator Apps implement a security standard adopted by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) called **Time-based One-time Passwords**, or **TOTP**. This is a method where websites share a secret with you which is used by your authenticator app to generate a six (usually) digit code based on the current time, which you enter while logging in for the website to check. Typically these codes are regenerated every 30 seconds, and once a new code is generated the old one becomes useless. Even if a hacker gets one six-digit code, there is no way for them to reverse that code to get the original secret or otherwise be able to predict what any future codes might be.
+
+We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternatives as Android and iOS have better security and app isolation than most desktop operating systems.
+
+### Aegis Authenticator (Android)
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Aegis Authenticator** is a free, secure and open-source app to manage your 2-step verification tokens for your online services.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getaegis.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://getaegis.app/aegis/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.buymeacoffee.com/beemdevelopment){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.beemdevelopment.aegis)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis/releases) downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.beemdevelopment.aegis)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis/releases)
+
+### Raivo OTP (iOS)
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Raivo OTP** is a native, lightweight and secure time-based (TOTP) & counter-based (HOTP) password client for iOS. Raivo OTP offers optional iCloud backup & sync. Raivo OTP is also available for macOS in the form of a status bar application, however the Mac app does not work independently of the iOS app.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://raivo-otp.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://raivo-otp.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/raivo-otp/ios-application){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://raivo-otp.com/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/raivo-otp/id1459042137) downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/raivo-otp/id1459042137)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must not require internet connectivity.
+- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
+ - **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/news-aggregators.md b/i18n/es/news-aggregators.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..99dd93c49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/news-aggregators.md
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+---
+title: "News Aggregators"
+icon: octicons/rss-24
+---
+
+Un [agregador de noticias](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agregador) es una forma de mantenerse al día con sus blogs y sitios de noticias favoritos.
+
+## Clientes agregadores
+
+### Fluent Reader
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Akregator** is a news feed reader that is a part of the [KDE](https://kde.org) project. [Visita hyliu.me](https://hyliu.me/fluent-reader){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Política de Privacidad](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader/wiki/Privacy){ .md-button }
+
+ **Descargas**
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://hyliu.me/fluent-reader)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-app-store: Mac App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1520907427)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-github: Código Fuente](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader.git)
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://apps.kde.org/akregator){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://kde.org/privacypolicy-apps){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.kde.org/?application=akregator){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://invent.kde.org/pim/akregator){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://kde.org/community/donations/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.kde.akregator)
+
+### GNOME Feeds
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Feeder** is a modern RSS client for Android that has many [features](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder#features) and works well with folders of RSS feeds. It supports [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS), [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)), [RDF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDF%2FXML) and [JSON Feed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Feed).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://ko-fi.com/spacecowboy){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nononsenseapps.feeder.play)
+
+### Akregator
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Fluent Reader** is a secure cross-platform news aggregator that has useful privacy features such as deletion of cookies on exit, strict [content security policies (CSP)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy) and proxy support, meaning you can use it over [Tor](tor.md).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://hyliu.me/fluent-reader){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader/wiki/Privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader/wiki/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/yang991178){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://hyliu.me/fluent-reader)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1520907427)
+
+### Handy News Reader
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GNOME Feeds** is an [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS) and [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)) news reader for [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org). It has a simple interface and is quite fast.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gfeeds.gabmus.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.gnome.org/World/gfeeds){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/gabmus/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://gfeeds.gabmus.org/#install)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.gabmus.gfeeds)
+
+### NetNewsWire
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Miniflux** is a web-based news aggregator that you can self-host. It supports [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS), [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)), [RDF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDF%2FXML) and [JSON Feed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Feed).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://miniflux.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://miniflux.app/docs/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/miniflux/v2){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://miniflux.app/#donations){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+### Miniflux
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **NetNewsWire** a free and open-source feed reader for macOS and iOS with a focus on a native design and feature set. It supports the typical feed formats alongside built-in support for Twitter and Reddit feeds.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://netnewswire.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://netnewswire.com/privacypolicy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://netnewswire.com/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Ranchero-Software/NetNewsWire){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/netnewswire-rss-reader/id1480640210)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://netnewswire.com)
+
+### Newsboat
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Newsboat** is an RSS/Atom feed reader for the text console. It's an actively maintained fork of [Newsbeuter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newsbeuter). It is very lightweight, and ideal for use over [Secure Shell](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Shell).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://newsboat.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://newsboat.org/releases/2.27/docs/newsboat.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/newsboat/newsboat){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must operate locally, i.e. must not be a cloud service.
+
+## Social Media RSS Support
+
+Some social media services also support RSS although it's not often advertised.
+
+### Youtube
+
+Reddit allows you to subscribe to subreddits via RSS.
+
+!!! example
+ Replace `subreddit_name` with the subreddit you wish to subscribe to.
+
+ ```text
+ https://www.reddit.com/r/{{ subreddit_name }}/new/.rss
+ ```
+
+### Reddit
+
+Using any of the Nitter [instances](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter/wiki/Instances) you can easily subscribe using RSS.
+
+!!! example
+ 1. Pick an instance and set `nitter_instance`.
+ 2. Replace `twitter_account` with the account name.
+
+ ```text
+ https://{{ nitter_instance }}/{{ twitter_account }}/rss
+ ```
+
+### Twitter
+
+You can subscribe YouTube channels without logging in and associating usage information with your Google Account.
+
+!!! example
+
+ https://www.reddit.com/r/{{ subreddit_name }}/new/.rss
+ ```text
+ https://www.youtube.com/feeds/videos.xml?channel_id=[CHANNEL ID]
+ ```
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/notebooks.md b/i18n/es/notebooks.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e7ddd2710
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/notebooks.md
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+---
+title: "Bloc de Notas"
+icon: material/notebook-edit-outline
+---
+
+Mantén el control de tus notas y diarios sin darlos a un tercero.
+
+Si actualmente utilizas una aplicación como Evernote, Google Keep o Microsoft OneNote, te sugerimos que elijas aquí una alternativa que soporte [Cifrado de extremo a extremo (E2EE)](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cifrado_de_extremo_a_extremo).
+
+## Basado en la nube
+
+### Joplin
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Joplin** es una aplicación gratuita, de código abierto y con todas las funciones para tomar notas y hacer tareas, que puede manejar un gran número de notas markdown organizadas en cuadernos y etiquetas. Ofrece encriptación de extremo a extremo y puede sincronizar a través de Nextcloud, Dropbox y más. También ofrece una fácil importación desde Evernote y notas en texto plano.
+
+ [Visita joplinapp.org](https://joplinapp.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+
+ **Descargas**
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-apple: macOS](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-linux: Linux](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-firefox-browser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/joplin-web-clipper/)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-chrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/joplin-web-clipper/alofnhikmmkdbbbgpnglcpdollgjfek)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-google-play: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.cozic.joplin)
+ - [:pg-f-droid: F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/es/packages/net.cozic.joplin)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-android: Android](https://joplinapp.org/#mobile-applications)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-github: GitHub](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin) downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.cozic.joplin)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/joplin/id1315599797)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/joplin-web-clipper/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/joplin-web-clipper/alofnhikmmkdbbbgpnglcpdollgjjfek)
+
+Joplin does not support password/PIN protection for the [application itself or individual notes and notebooks](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin/issues/289). However, your data is still encrypted in transit and at the sync location using your master key.
+
+### Standard Notes
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ Nota: A partir de diciembre de 2018, Joplin no admite la protección con contraseña/pin para la propia aplicación o las notas/cuadernos individuales. Los datos se siguen encriptando en tránsito y en la ubicación de sincronización utilizando su clave maestra. It has also been [independently audited (PDF)](https://s3.amazonaws.com/standard-notes/security/Report-SN-Audit.pdf).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://standardnotes.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://standardnotes.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://standardnotes.com/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/standardnotes){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://standardnotes.com/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.standardnotes)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1285392450)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/standardnotes/app/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://standardnotes.com)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://standardnotes.com)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://standardnotes.com)
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://app.standardnotes.com/)
+
+### Cryptee
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ Standard Notes es una aplicación de notas simple y privada que hace que tus notas sean fáciles y estén disponibles dondequiera que estés. Cuenta con cifrado de extremo a extremo en todas las plataformas y una potente experiencia de escritorio con temas y editores personalizados.
+
+ También ha sido [auditada de forma independiente (PDF)](https://s3.amazonaws.com/standard-notes/security/Report-SN-Audit.pdf). [Visita standardnotes.org](https://standardnotes.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+
+ **Descargas**
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://standardnotes.org/#get-started)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-apple: macOS](https://standardnotes.org/#get-started)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-linux: Linux](https://standardnotes.org/#get-started)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-google-play: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.standardnotes)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-app-store-ios: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1285392450)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Navegador](https://app.standardnotes.org/)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-github: GitHub](https://github.com/standardnotes)
+
+Cryptee offers 100MB of storage for free, with paid options if you need more. Sign-up doesn't require an e-mail or other personally identifiable information.
+
+## Dignos de mención
+
+### Org-mode
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Org-mode** is a [major mode](https://www.gnu.org/software/emacs/manual/html_node/elisp/Major-Modes.html) for GNU Emacs. Org-mode is for keeping notes, maintaining TODO lists, planning projects, and authoring documents with a fast and effective plain-text system. Synchronization is possible with [file synchronization](file-sharing.md#file-sync) tools.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orgmode.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://orgmode.org/manuals.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/emacs/org-mode.git){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/bzg){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Clients must be open-source.
+- Any cloud sync functionality must be E2EE.
+- Must support exporting documents into a standard format.
+
+### Best Case
+
+- Local backup/sync functionality should support encryption.
+- Cloud-based platforms should support document sharing.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/es/os/android-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ef74b455d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/os/android-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+---
+title: Visión general de Android
+icon: fontawesome/brands/android
+---
+
+Android es un sistema operativo seguro el cuál tiene [aislamiento de las aplicaciones](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [arranque verificado](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), y un robusto sistema de control de [permisos](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview).
+
+## Elegir una distribución de Android
+
+Cuando compras un celular Android, el sistema operativo por defecto suele venir con una integración invasiva con aplicaciones y servicios que no son parte del [Android Open Source Project](https://source.android.com/). Un ejemplo de ello son los servicios de Google Play, el cual tiene permisos irrevocables a tus archivos, almacenamiento de contactos, registros de llamadas, mensajes SMS, ubicación, cámara, micrófono, identificadores de hardware, etc. Estas aplicaciones y servicios aumentan la superficie de ataque de tu dispositivo y son la fuente de varios problemas de privacidad en Android.
+
+Este problema puede ser solucionado al usar una distribución modificada de Android la cual no contenga tal integración invasiva. Desafortunadamente, varias distribuciones modificadas de Android suelen violar el modelo de seguridad de Android al no soportar características críticas de seguridad como el AVB, protección de reversión, actualizaciones del firmware, etc. Algunas distribuciones también incluyen compilaciones [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) las cuales exponen root vía [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) y requieren políticas [más permisivas](https://github.com/LineageOS/android_system_sepolicy/search?q=userdebug&type=code) de SELinux para acomodar las características de depuración, lo que resulta en una superficie de ataque aún más grande y un modelo de seguridad debilitado.
+
+Idealmente, cuando escojas una distribución de Android, deberías asegurarte de que mantenga el modelo de seguridad de Android. Al menos, la distribución debería tener compilaciones de producción, soporte para AVB, protección de reversión, actualizaciones oportunas del firmware y el sistema operativo, y tener a SELinux en [modo de cumplimiento](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts#enforcement_levels). Todas nuestras distribuciones recomendadas para Android cumplen con estos criterios.
+
+[Nuestras recomendaciones del sistema Android :material-arrow-right:](../android.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Evita el Rooting
+
+Hacer [Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) en celulares Android puede debilitar la seguridad significativamente debido que debilita el [modelo completo de seguridad de Android](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android#Seguridad,_privacidad_y_vigilancia). Esto puede debilitar la privacidad en caso de que haya un exploit que sea asistido por la seguridad debilitada. Los métodos de rooteo más comunes involucran la manipulación directa de la partición de arranque, haciendo que sea imposible realizar con éxito el arranque verificado. Las aplicaciones que requieren root también modificarán la partición del sistema, lo que significa que el arranque verificado tendría que permanecer deshabilitado. Tener el root expuesto directamente en la interfaz del usuario también incrementa la [superficie de ataque](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) de tu dispositivo y puede asistir en la [escalada de privilegios](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Escalada_de_privilegios) de vulnerabilidades y omisiones de la política de SELinux.
+
+Los bloqueadores de anuncios que modifican el [archivo hosts](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archivo_hosts) (AdAway) y los cortafuegos (AFWall+) que requieren acceso root persistente son peligrosos y no deberían ser usados. Tampoco son la forma correcta de resolver sus propósitos. Para el bloqueo de anuncios sugerimos usar soluciones de bloqueo de servidor como un [DNS](../dns.md) encriptado o una [VPN](../vpn.md) en su lugar. RethinkDNS, TrackerControl y AdAway en modo no raíz ocuparán la ranura VPN (mediante el uso de una VPN de bucle local) que le impide utilizar servicios de mejora de la privacidad como Orbot o un servidor VPN real.
+
+AFWall+ funciona basado en el enfoque del [filtrado de paquetes](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortafuegos_(inform%C3%A1tica)#Primera_generaci%C3%B3n_%E2%80%93_cortafuegos_de_red:_filtrado_de_paquetes) el cual puede ser omitido en algunas situaciones.
+
+No creemos que los sacrificios de seguridad realizados al rootear un teléfono merezcan la pena por los cuestionables beneficios de privacidad de esas aplicaciones.
+
+## Arranque verificado
+
+El [arranque verificado](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) es una parte importante del modelo de seguridad de Android. Proviene de protección contra ataques [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack), persistencia del malware, y se asegura que las actualizaciones de seguridad no puedan ser desactualizadas gracias a la [protección de reversión](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection).
+
+Android 10 y superior se han alejado del cifrado de disco completo por un cifrado más flexible [basado en archivos](https://source.android.com/security/encryption/file-based). Tus datos se encriptan utilizando claves de encriptación únicas, y los archivos del sistema operativo se dejan sin encriptar.
+
+El arranque verificado garantiza la integridad de los archivos del sistema operativo, evitando así que un adversario con acceso físico pueda manipular o instalar malware en el dispositivo. En el improbable caso de que el malware pueda explotar otras partes del sistema y obtener un acceso privilegiado más alto, el arranque verificado evitará y revertirá los cambios en la partición del sistema al reiniciar el dispositivo.
+
+Desgraciadamente, los fabricantes de equipos originales (OEM) solo están obligados a dar soporte al arranque verificado en su distribución de Android de serie. Solo unos pocos fabricantes de equipos originales, como Google, admiten la inscripción de claves AVB modificadas en sus dispositivos. Además, algunos derivados de AOSP como LineageOS o /e/ OS no admiten arranque verificado, incluso en hardware con soporte de arranque verificado para sistemas operativos de terceros. Nosotros recomendamos que compruebe la compatibilidad **antes** de comprar un nuevo dispositivo. Los derivados de AOSP que no soportan el arranque verificado **no son** recomendados.
+
+Muchos OEMs también han roto la implementación del Arranque Verificado que tienes que conocer más allá de su marketing. Por ejemplo, los Fairphone 3 y 4 no son seguros por defecto, ya que el [bootloader de serie confía en la clave de firma pública AVB](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). Esto rompe el arranque verificado en un dispositivo Fairphone de fábrica, ya que el sistema arrancará sistemas operativos Android alternativos como (como /e/) [sin ninguna advertencia](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) sobre el uso del sistema operativo personalizado.
+
+## Actualizaciones de firmware
+
+Las actualizaciones de firmware son fundamentales para mantener la seguridad y, sin ellas, tu dispositivo no puede ser seguro. Los fabricantes de equipos originales tienen acuerdos de asistencia con sus socios para proporcionar los componentes de código cerrado durante un periodo de asistencia limitado. Estos se detallan en los [boletines de seguridad mensuales de Android](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin).
+
+Dado que los componentes del teléfono, como el procesador y las tecnologías de radio, dependen de componentes de código cerrado, las actualizaciones deben ser proporcionadas por los respectivos fabricantes. Por lo tanto, es importante que compres un dispositivo dentro de un ciclo de soporte activo. [Qualcomm](https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2020/12/16/qualcomm-and-google-announce-collaboration-extend-android-os-support-and) y [Samsung](https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-security-extending-updates-knox/) dan soporte a sus dispositivos por un período de 4 años, mientras que los productos más baratos suelen tener un ciclo de soporte más corto. Con la introducción del [Pixel 6](https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/4457705), Google ahora hace su propio SoC y van a ofrecer un mínimo de 5 años de soporte.
+
+Los dispositivos EOL que ya no son compatibles con el fabricante del SoC no pueden recibir actualizaciones de firmware de los proveedores OEM o de los distribuidores Android posteriores al mercado. Esto significa que los problemas de seguridad con esos dispositivos permanecerán sin solucionar.
+
+Fairphone, por ejemplo, comercializa sus dispositivos con 6 años de soporte. Sin embargo, el SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G en el Fairphone 4) tiene una fecha de caducidad considerablemente más corta. Esto significa que las actualizaciones de seguridad de firmware de Qualcomm para el Fairphone 4 terminarán en septiembre de 2023, independientemente de que Fairphone siga publicando actualizaciones de seguridad de software.
+
+## Versiones de Android
+
+Es importante no usar una versión de Android al [final de su vida útil](https://endoflife.date/android). Las versiones más recientes de Android no solo reciben actualizaciones de seguridad para el sistema operativo, sino también actualizaciones importantes para mejorar la privacidad. Por ejemplo, [antes de Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), cualquier aplicación con el permiso [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) podía acceder a números de serie únicos y sensibles como el [IMEI](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/IMEI), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), el [IMSI](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/IMSI) de tu tarjeta SIM, mientras que ahora deben ser aplicaciones del sistema para poder hacerlo. Las aplicaciones del sistema sólo las proporciona el OEM o la distribución de Android.
+
+## Permisos de Android
+
+Los [permisos en Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) te dan control sobre que pueden acceder las aplicaciones. Google regularmente hace [mejoras](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) en el sistema de permisos en cada versión sucesiva. Todas las aplicaciones que instales están estrictamente [aisladas](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), por lo que no es necesario instalar ninguna aplicación de antivirus. Un smartphone con la última versión de Android siempre será más seguro que un smartphone antiguo con un antivirus que hayas pagado. Es mejor no pagar por un antivirus y ahorrar para comprar un nuevo smartphone como un Google Pixel.
+
+Si quieres ejecutar una aplicación sobre la que no estás seguro, considera usar un perfil de usuario o de trabajo.
+
+## Acceso a medios
+
+Unas cuantas aplicaciones te permiten "compartir" un archivo con ellos para la carga de medios. Si quieres, por ejemplo, tuitear una foto a Twitter, no le des acceso a tus "medios y fotos", porque entonces tendrá acceso a todas tus fotos. En su lugar, ve a tu gestor de archivos (documentsUI), mantén la imagen y compártela en Twitter.
+
+## Perfiles de usuario
+
+Los perfiles de usuario múltiples pueden ser encontrados en **Ajustes** → **Sistema** → **Usuarios múltiples** y son la manera más simple de aislar en Android.
+
+Con los perfiles de usuario, puedes imponer restricciones a un perfil específico, como: realizar llamadas, usar SMS o instalar aplicaciones en el dispositivo. Cada perfil se cifra con su propia clave de cifrado y no puede acceder a los datos de ningún otro perfil. Incluso el propietario del dispositivo no puede ver los datos de otros perfiles sin conocer su contraseña. Los perfiles de usuario múltiples son un método más seguro de aislamiento.
+
+## Perfil de trabajo
+
+Los [perfiles de trabajo](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) son otra manera de aislar aplicaciones individuales y pueden ser más convenientes que usar perfiles de usuario separados.
+
+Se requiere una aplicación de **controlador de dispositivo** como [Shelter](#recommended-apps) para crear un perfil de trabajo sin una MDM empresarial, a menos que estés utilizando un sistema operativo Android personalizado que incluya uno.
+
+El perfil de trabajo depende de un controlador de dispositivo para funcionar. Características como el *transbordador de archivos* y el *bloqueo de búsqueda de contactos* o cualquier tipo de característica de aislamiento debe ser implementada por el controlador. También debes confiar plenamente en la aplicación del controlador del dispositivo, ya que tiene acceso completo a tus datos dentro del perfil de trabajo.
+
+Este método es generalmente menos seguro que un perfil de usuario secundario; sin embargo, le permite la comodidad de ejecutar aplicaciones tanto en el trabajo y perfiles personales simultáneamente.
+
+## "Killswitch" de un VPN
+
+Android 7 y superiores soportan un VPN killswitch y está disponible sin necesidad de instalar aplicaciones de terceros. Esta función puede evitar fugas si la VPN está desconectada. Se puede encontrar en :gear: **Ajustes** → **Red e internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Bloquear conexiones sin VPN**.
+
+## Cambios globales
+
+Los dispositivos Android modernos tienen interruptores globales para desactivar los servicios de Bluetooth y de localización. Android 12 introdujo interruptores para la cámara y el micrófono. Cuando no estén en uso, recomendamos desactivar estas funciones. Las aplicaciones no pueden usar las funciones desactivadas (incluso si se les concede un permiso individual) hasta que se reactiven.
+
+## Google
+
+Si está utilizando un dispositivo con servicios de Google, ya sea su sistema operativo de stock o un sistema operativo que utiliza Google Play Services de forma segura como GrapheneOS, hay una serie de cambios adicionales que puede realizar para mejorar su privacidad. Seguimos recomendando evitar los servicios de Google por completo, o limitar los servicios de Google Play a un perfil específico de usuario/trabajo combinando un controlador de dispositivo como *Shelter* con Google Play aislado de GrapheneOS.
+
+### Programa de Protección Avanzada
+
+Si tienes una cuenta de Google sugerimos que te inscribas en el [Programa de protección avanzada](https://landing.google.com/advancedprotection/). Está disponible sin costo a cualquiera que tenga dos o más llaves de seguridad de hardware con soporte para [FIDO](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online).
+
+El Programa de protección avanzada proporciona una supervisión de amenazas mejorada y permite:
+
+- Autenticación de dos factores más estricta; por ejemplo: que [FIDO](/security/multi-factor-authentication/#fido-fast-identity-online) **deba** ser usado y restringe el uso de [SMS OTPs](/security/multi-factor-authentication/#sms-or-email-mfa), [TOTP](/security/multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp), y [OAuth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth)
+- Solo las aplicaciones de Google y de terceros verificadas pueden acceder a los datos de la cuenta
+- Escaneo de correos electrónicos inminentes en las cuentas de Gmail contra los intentos de [phishing](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing#T%C3%A9cnicas_de_phishing)
+- Más estricto [escaneo seguro del navegador](https://www.google.com/chrome/privacy/whitepaper.html#malware) con Google Chrome
+- Proceso de recuperación más estricto para cuentas con credenciales perdidas
+
+ Si no usas los servicios de Google Play aislados (común en los sistemas operativos por defecto), el programa de protección avanzada también viene con [beneficios adicionales](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/9764949?hl=en) como:
+
+- No permitir la instalación de aplicaciones fuera de la Google Play Store, la tienda de aplicaciones del proveedor del sistema operativo, o vía [`adb`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_Debug_Bridge)
+- Escaneo automático obligatorio con [Play Protect](https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/2812853?hl=en#zippy=%2Chow-malware-protection-works%2Chow-privacy-alerts-work)
+- Advertencia sobre aplicaciones no verificadas
+
+### Actualizaciones del sistema de Google Play
+
+En el pasado, las actualizaciones de seguridad de Android tenían que ser enviadas por el proveedor del sistema operativo. Android se ha vuelto más modular a partir de Android 10, y Google puede impulsar las actualizaciones de seguridad para **algunos** componentes del sistema vía los servicios de Google Play privilegiados.
+
+Si tienes un dispositivo EOL (end-of-life) incluido con Android 10 o superior y no puedes ejecutar ninguno de nuestros sistemas operativos recomendados en tu dispositivo, es probable que te resulte mejor seguir con tu instalación de Android OEM (a diferencia de un sistema operativo que no aparece aquí, como LineageOS o /e/ OS). Esto te permitirá recibir **algunos** arreglos de seguridad de Google, mientras que no viola el modelo de seguridad de Android al usar un derivado de Android inseguro y aumentando tu superficie de ataque. Aún así, te recomendamos que actualices a un dispositivo compatible lo antes posible.
+
+### ID de publicidad
+
+Todos los dispositivos con los servicios de Google Play instalados automáticamente generan un [ID de publicidad](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/6048248?hl=en) usado para la publicidad dirigida. Deshabilite esta función para limitar los datos recopilados sobre usted.
+
+En las distribuciones de Android con los [servicios de Google Play aislados](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), ve a :gear: **Ajustes** → **Aplicaciones** → **Google Play aislado** → **Ajustes de Google** → **Anuncios**, y selecciona *Eliminar el ID de publicidad*.
+
+En las distribuciones de Android con servicios privilegiados de Google Play (como los sistemas operativos de serie), la configuración puede estar en una de varias ubicaciones. Revisa
+
+- :gear: **Ajustes** → **Google** → **Anuncios**
+- :gear: **Ajustes** → **Privacidad** → **Anuncios**
+
+Te van a dar la opción de eliminar tu ID de publicidad o *Optar por no recibir anuncios basados en intereses*, esto varía según la distribución OEM de Android. Si se presenta la opción de eliminar el ID de publicidad eso sería lo ideal. Si no es así, asegúrate de optar por no participar y restablecer tu ID de publicidad.
+
+### SafetyNet y Play Integrity API
+
+[SafetyNet](https://developer.android.com/training/safetynet/attestation) y el [Play Integrity APIs](https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity) son generalmente usados para [aplicaciones bancarias](https://grapheneos.org/usage#banking-apps). Muchas aplicaciones bancarias funcionarán bien en GrapheneOS con los servicios de Google Play aislados, sin embargo, algunas aplicaciones no financieras tienen sus propios mecanismos anti-manipulación que pueden fallar. GrapheneOS pasa con éxito el chequeo `basicIntegrity`, pero no el check de certificación `ctsProfileMatch`. Los dispositivos con Android 8 o posterior tienen soporte de certificación de hardware que no se puede omitir sin claves filtradas o vulnerabilidades graves.
+
+En cuanto a Google Wallet, no lo recomendamos debido a su [política de privacidad](https://payments.google.com/payments/apis-secure/get_legal_document?ldo=0&ldt=privacynotice&ldl=en), la cual dicta que debes optar por excluirte si no quieres que tu calificación crediticia y tu información personal sea compartido con los servicios de marketing afiliados.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/es/os/linux-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..775c0de04
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/os/linux-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+---
+title: Vista general de Linux
+icon: simple/linux
+---
+
+Es una creencia popular que los programas de [código abierto](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) son seguros porque su código fuente está disponible. Siempre hay una expectativa de que la verificación comunitaria sucede regularmente; sin embargo, [este no siempre es el caso](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). Esto depende de varios factores, como la actividad del proyecto, la experiencia del desarrollador, el nivel de rigor aplicado a las [revisiones de código](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review) y con qué frecuencia se le brinda atención a ciertas partes del [código base](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase), que pueden no ser modificados en años.
+
+De momento, Linux de escritorio tiene algunas áreas que pueden ser mejoradas al ser comparadas con sus contrapartes propietarias, por ejemplo:
+
+- Una cadena verificada de inicio, como el [Inicio Seguro](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) de Apple (con el [enclave seguro](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), el [Arranque Verificado](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) de Android, el [Arranque Verificado](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot) de ChromeOS, o el [proceso de inicio](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) de Windows con [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). Estas características y tecnologías de hardware pueden ayudar a prevenir la manipulación persistente ocasionada por algún malware o [ataque de 'evil-maid'](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack).
+- Una fuerte solución de aislamiento como la que se encuentra en [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md) y [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Las soluciones de aislamiento utilizadas comúnmente de Linux como [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) y [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/), aún tienen mucho por recorrer.
+- Fuertes [mitigaciones de vulnerabilidades](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations).
+
+A pesar de estos inconvenientes, las distribuciones Linux de escritorio son geniales si quieres:
+
+- Evitar la telemetría que, regularmente, viene con los sistemas operativos propietarios.
+- Mantener la ['libertad del software'](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms).
+- Tener sistemas enfocados en la privacidad como [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) o [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/).
+
+Nuestra página generalmente utiliza el término "Linux" para describir las distribuciones Linux de escritorio. Otros sistemas operativos que también utilizan el kernel de Linux como ChromeOS, Android y Qubes OS no se discuten aquí.
+
+[Nuestras recomendaciones de Linux: :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Elegir tu distribución
+
+No todas las distribuciones Linux son iguales. Mientras nuestra página con recomendaciones de Linux no fue creada para ser una fuente autorizada para decidir cuál distribución debes utilizar, hay algunos aspectos que debes considerar al elegir cuál distribución usar.
+
+### Ciclo de lanzamiento
+
+Recomendamos encarecidamente que elijas las distribuciones que permanecen cerca a los lanzamientos estables, comúnmente denominadas como distribuciones de lanzamiento continuo. Esto se debe a que las distribuciones de lanzamiento de ciclo congelado, normalmente no actualizan las versiones de sus paquetes y se encuentran detrás en actualizaciones de seguridad.
+
+Para las distribuciones congeladas como [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), se espera que los encargados de mantener los paquetes adapten los parches para corregir vulnerabilidades, en lugar de actualizar el software a la "siguiente versión" lanzada por el desarrollador original. Algunos arreglos de seguridad [no](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) reciben un [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (programas de menor popularidad) del todo y no llegan a la distribución con este modelo de parches. Por ello, a veces las correcciones de seguridad son pospuestas hasta la siguiente versión importante.
+
+No creemos que retener paquetes y aplicar los parches provisionales sea una buena idea, porque se aleja de la forma en que el desarrollador se pudo asegurar que el software funcione. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) tiene una presentación sobre esto:
+
+
+
+
+
+### Actualizaciones tradicionales vs. Atómicas
+
+Tradicionalmente, las distribuciones de Linux se actualizan secuencialmente, actualizando los paquetes deseados. Las actualizaciones tradicionales, como las utilizadas en las distribuciones basadas en Fedora, Arch Linux y Debian, son menos confiables, si un error se produce al actualizar.
+
+Las distribuciones de actualizaciones Atómicas, aplican las actualizaciones en su totalidad o no del todo. Normalmente, los sistemas de actualización transaccional también son atómicos.
+
+Un sistema de actualización transaccional crea una instantánea que se realiza antes y después de haber aplicado una actualización. Si una actualización falla en cualquier momento (debido a situaciones como fallas de electricidad), la actualización puede revertirse fácilmente al "último estado bueno conocido".
+
+El método de actualizaciones Atómicas es utilizado para distribuciones inmutables como Silverblue, Tumbleweed y NixOS, y puede obtener confiabilidad con este modelo. [Adam Šamalik](https://twitter.com/adsamalik) brinda una presentación sobre cómo `rpm-ostree` funciona con Silverblue:
+
+
+
+
+
+### Distribuciones "enfocadas en la seguridad"
+
+A menudo existe cierta confusión entre las distribuciones "enfocadas en la privacidad" y las distribuciones "pentesting". Una búsqueda rápida para "la distribución más segura de Linux" suele arrojar resultados como Kali Linux, Black Arch y Parrot OS. Estas distribuciones son distribuciones de pruebas de penetración ofensivas que incluyen herramientas para probar otros sistemas. Estas no incluyen ninguna "seguridad adicional" o mitigaciones defensivas destinadas a un uso regular.
+
+### Arch-based distributions
+
+Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own.
+
+For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit).
+
+Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora.
+
+If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically:
+
+- **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories.
+- **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks.
+
+### Kicksecure
+
+While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default.
+
+### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions
+
+We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons.
+
+## Recomendaciones generales
+
+### Drive Encryption
+
+Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS](../encryption.md#linux-unified-key-setup) FDE. If this option isn’t set at installation time, you will have to backup your data and re-install, as encryption is applied after [disk partitioning](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_partitioning), but before [file systems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_system) are formatted. We also suggest securely erasing your storage device:
+
+- [Secure Data Erasure :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/05/25/secure-data-erasure/)
+
+### Swap
+
+Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Swap#zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM).
+
+### Wayland
+
+We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland.
+
+Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)).
+
+We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do not have Wayland support, such as Cinnamon (default on Linux Mint), Pantheon (default on Elementary OS), MATE, Xfce, and i3.
+
+### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates)
+
+Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html).
+
+We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default.
+
+### Updates
+
+Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found.
+
+Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates.
+
+Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd).
+
+## Privacy Tweaks
+
+### MAC Address Randomization
+
+Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings.
+
+It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous.
+
+We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as suggested in the [article](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/).
+
+If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=).
+
+There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware.
+
+### Other Identifiers
+
+There are other system identifiers which you may wish to be careful about. You should give this some thought to see if it applies to your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md):
+
+- **Hostnames:** Your system's hostname is shared with the networks you connect to. You should avoid including identifying terms like your name or operating system in your hostname, instead sticking to generic terms or random strings.
+- **Usernames:** Similarly, your username is used in a variety of ways across your system. Consider using generic terms like "user" rather than your actual name.
+- **Machine ID:**: During installation a unique machine ID is generated and stored on your device. Consider [setting it to a generic ID](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#machine-id).
+
+### System Counting
+
+The Fedora Project [counts](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting) how many unique systems access its mirrors by using a [`countme`](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting#Detailed_Description) variable instead of a unique ID. Fedora does this to determine load and provision better servers for updates where necessary.
+
+This [option](https://dnf.readthedocs.io/en/latest/conf_ref.html#options-for-both-main-and-repo) is currently off by default. We recommend adding `countme=false` to `/etc/dnf/dnf.conf` just in case it is enabled in the future. On systems that use `rpm-ostree` such as Silverblue, the countme option is disabled by masking the [rpm-ostree-countme](https://fedoramagazine.org/getting-better-at-counting-rpm-ostree-based-systems/) timer.
+
+openSUSE also uses a [unique ID](https://en.opensuse.org/openSUSE:Statistics) to count systems, which can be disabled by deleting the `/var/lib/zypp/AnonymousUniqueId` file.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/es/os/qubes-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a580e9990
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/os/qubes-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+---
+title: "Qubes Overview"
+icon: pg/qubes-os
+---
+
+[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/).
+
+## How does Qubes OS work?
+
+Qubes uses [compartmentalization](https://www.qubes-os.org/intro/) to keep the system secure. Qubes are created from templates, the defaults being for Fedora, Debian and [Whonix](../desktop.md#whonix). Qubes OS also allows you to create once-use [disposable](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-use-disposables/) virtual machines.
+
+
+Qubes Architecture, Credit: What is Qubes OS Intro
+
+Each Qubes application has a [colored border](https://www.qubes-os.org/screenshots/) that can help you keep track of the virtual machine it is running in. You could, for example, use a specific color for your banking browser, while using a different color for a general untrusted browser.
+
+
+Qubes window borders, Credit: Qubes Screenshots
+
+## Why Should I use Qubes?
+
+Qubes OS is useful if your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md) requires strong compartmentalization and security, such as if you think you'll be opening untrusted files from untrusted sources. A typical reason for using Qubes OS is to open documents from unknown sources.
+
+Qubes OS utilizes [Dom0](https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Dom0) Xen VM (i.e., an "AdminVM") for controlling other guest VMs or Qubes on the host OS. Other VMs display individual application windows within Dom0's desktop environment. It allows you to color code windows based on trust levels and run apps that can interact with each other with very granular control.
+
+### Copying and Pasting Text
+
+You can [copy and paste text](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-and-paste-text/) using `qvm-copy-to-vm` or the below instructions:
+
+1. Press **Ctrl+C** to tell the VM you're in that you want to copy something.
+2. Press **Ctrl+Shift+C** to tell the VM to make this buffer available to the global clipboard.
+3. Press **Ctrl+Shift+V** in the destination VM to make the global clipboard available.
+4. Press **Ctrl+V** in the destination VM to paste the contents in the buffer.
+
+### File Exchange
+
+To copy and paste files and directories (folders) from one VM to another, you can use the option **Copy to Other AppVM...** or **Move to Other AppVM...**. The difference is that the **Move** option will delete the original file. Either option will protect your clipboard from being leaked to any other Qubes. This is more secure than air-gapped file transfer because an air-gapped computer will still be forced to parse partitions or file systems. That is not required with the inter-qube copy system.
+
+??? info "AppVMs or qubes do not have their own file systems"
+
+ You can [copy and move files](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-and-move-files/) between Qubes. When doing so the changes aren't immediately made and can be easily undone in case of an accident.
+
+### Inter-VM Interactions
+
+The [qrexec framework](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec/) is a core part of Qubes which allows virtual machine communication between domains. It is built on top of the Xen library *vchan*, which facilitates [isolation through policies](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2020/06/22/new-qrexec-policy-system/).
+
+## Recursos Adicionales
+
+For additional information we encourage you to consult the extensive Qubes OS documentation pages located on the [Qubes OS Website](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/). Offline copies can be downloaded from the Qubes OS [documentation repository](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-doc).
+
+- Open Technology Fund: [*Arguably the world's most secure operating system*](https://www.opentech.fund/news/qubes-os-arguably-the-worlds-most-secure-operating-system-motherboard/)
+- J. Rutkowska: [*Software compartmentalization vs. physical separation*](https://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/2014/Software_compartmentalization_vs_physical_separation.pdf)
+- J. Rutkowska: [*Partitioning my digital life into security domains*](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/03/13/partitioning-my-digital-life-into.html)
+- Qubes OS: [*Related Articles*](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/categories/#articles)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/passwords.md b/i18n/es/passwords.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..34937ec04
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/passwords.md
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+---
+title: "Password Managers"
+icon: material/form-textbox-password
+---
+
+Manténgase seguro y protegido en línea con un gestor de contraseñas cifrado y de código abierto.
+
+[Introduction to Passwords :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](./basics/passwords-overview.md)
+
+!!! info
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **KeePassXC** es una bifurcación mantenida por la comunidad de KeePassX, un puerto nativo multiplataforma de KeePass Password Safe, con el objetivo de extenderlo y mejorarlo con nuevas características y correcciones de errores para proporcionar un gestor de contraseñas de código abierto con varias características, totalmente multiplataforma y moderno. [Visita keepassxc.org](https://keepassxc.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Política de Privacidad](https://keepassxc.org/privacy){ .md-button }
+
+ **Descargas**
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://keepassxc.org/download/#windows)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-apple: macOS](https://keepassxc.org/download/#mac)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-linux: Linux](https://keepassxc.org/download/#linux)
+ - [:pg-flathub: Flatpak](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.keepassxc.KeePassXC)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-firefox: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/keepassxc-browser)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-chrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/keepassxc-browser/oboonakemofpalcgghocfoadofidjkkk)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-github: Código Fuente](https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc)
+
+ For example, the password manager in Microsoft Edge doesn't offer E2EE at all. Google's password manager has [optional](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/11350823) E2EE, and [Apple's](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303) offers E2EE by default.
+
+## Basado en la nube
+
+These password managers sync your passwords to a cloud server for easy accessibility from all your devices and safety against device loss.
+
+### KeepassXC
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Bitwarden** is a free and open-source password manager. It aims to solve password management problems for individuals, teams, and business organizations. Bitwarden is among the best and safest solutions to store all of your logins and passwords while conveniently keeping them synced between all of your devices.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://bitwarden.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://bitwarden.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://bitwarden.com/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/bitwarden){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.x8bit.bitwarden)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/bitwarden-password-manager/id1137397744)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/bitwarden/mobile/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://bitwarden.com/download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://bitwarden.com/download)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.bitwarden.desktop)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/bitwarden-password-manager)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/bitwarden-free-password-m/nngceckbapebfimnlniiiahkandclblb)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/jbkfoedolllekgbhcbcoahefnbanhhlh)
+
+Bitwarden also features [Bitwarden Send](https://bitwarden.com/products/send/), which allows you to share text and files securely with [end-to-end encryption](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-encryption). A [password](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-privacy/#send-passwords) can be required along with the send link. Bitwarden Send also features [automatic deletion](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-lifespan).
+
+You need the [Premium Plan](https://bitwarden.com/help/about-bitwarden-plans/#compare-personal-plans) to be able to share files. The free plan only allows text sharing.
+
+Bitwarden's server-side code is [open-source](https://github.com/bitwarden/server), so if you don't want to use the Bitwarden cloud, you can easily host your own Bitwarden sync server.
+
+**Vaultwarden** is an alternative implementation of Bitwarden's sync server written in Rust and compatible with official Bitwarden clients, perfect for self-hosted deployment where running the official resource-heavy service might not be ideal. If you are looking to self-host Bitwarden on your own server, you almost certainly want to use Vaultwarden over Bitwarden's official server code.
+
+[:octicons-repo-16: Vaultwarden Repository](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden ""){.md-button} [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/dani-garcia){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+### KeepassDX
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **1Password** is a password manager with a strong focus on security and ease-of-use, which allows you to store passwords, credit cards, software licenses, and any other sensitive information in a secure digital vault. Your vault is hosted on 1Password's servers for a [monthly fee](https://1password.com/sign-up/). 1Password is [audited](https://support.1password.com/security-assessments/) on a regular basis and provides exceptional customer support. 1Password is closed source; however, the security of the product is thoroughly documented in their [security white paper](https://1passwordstatic.com/files/security/1password-white-paper.pdf).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://1password.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://support.1password.com/1password-privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.1password.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.onepassword.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1511601750?mt=8)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://1password.com/downloads/windows/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://1password.com/downloads/mac/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://1password.com/downloads/linux/)
+
+Traditionally, **1Password** has offered the best password manager user experience for people using macOS and iOS; however, it has now achieved feature-parity across all platforms. It boasts many features geared towards families and less technical people, as well as advanced functionality.
+
+Your 1Password vault is secured with both your master password and a randomized 34-character security key to encrypt your data on their servers. This security key adds a layer of protection to your data because your data is secured with high entropy regardless of your master password. Many other password manager solutions are entirely reliant on the strength of your master password to secure your data.
+
+One advantage 1Password has over Bitwarden is its first-class support for native clients. While Bitwarden relegates many duties, especially account management features, to their web vault interface, 1Password makes nearly every feature available within its native mobile or desktop clients. 1Password's clients also have a more intuitive UI, which makes them easier to use and navigate.
+
+### Bitwarden
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Bitwarden** es un gestor de contraseñas gratuito y de código abierto. Su objetivo es resolver los problemas de gestión de contraseñas para individuos, equipos y organizaciones empresariales. Bitwarden es una de las soluciones más fáciles y seguras para almacenar todas sus contraseñas e inicios de sesión manteniéndolos convenientemente sincronizados entre todos sus dispositivos.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://psono.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://psono.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://doc.psono.com){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/psono){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.psono.psono)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/psono-password-manager/id1545581224)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/psono-pw-password-manager)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/psonopw-password-manager/eljmjmgjkbmpmfljlmklcfineebidmlo)
+ - [:simple-docker: Docker Hub](https://hub.docker.com/r/psono/psono-client)
+
+Psono provides extensive documentation for their product. The web-client for Psono can be self-hosted; alternatively, you can choose the full Community Edition or the Enterprise Edition with additional features.
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+#### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must utilize strong, standards-based/modern E2EE.
+- Must have thoroughly documented encryption and security practices.
+- Must have a published audit from a reputable, independent third-party.
+- All non-essential telemetry must be optional.
+- Must not collect more PII than is necessary for billing purposes.
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Telemetry should be opt-in (disabled by default) or not collected at all.
+- Should be open-source and reasonably self-hostable.
+
+## Gestores de Contraseñas Locales
+
+These options allow you to manage an encrypted password database locally.
+
+### Vaultwarden
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **KeePassXC** is a community fork of KeePassX, a native cross-platform port of KeePass Password Safe, with the goal to extend and improve it with new features and bugfixes to provide a feature-rich, cross-platform and modern open-source password manager.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://keepassxc.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://keepassxc.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://keepassxc.org/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://keepassxc.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://keepassxc.org/download/#windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://keepassxc.org/download/#mac)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://keepassxc.org/download/#linux)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flatpak](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.keepassxc.KeePassXC)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/keepassxc-browser)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/keepassxc-browser/oboonakemofpalcgghocfoadofidjkkk)
+
+KeePassXC stores its export data as [CSV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comma-separated_values) files. This may mean data loss if you import this file into another password manager. We advise you check each record manually.
+
+### KeePassDX (Android)
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **KeePassDX** is a lightweight password manager for Android, allows editing encrypted data in a single file in KeePass format and can fill in the forms in a secure way. [Contributor Pro](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kunzisoft.keepass.pro) allows unlocking cosmetic content and non-standard protocol features, but more importantly, it helps and encourages development.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.keepassdx.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.keepassdx.com/#donation){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kunzisoft.keepass.free)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX/releases)
+
+### Strongbox (iOS & macOS)
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Strongbox** is a native, open-source password manager for iOS and macOS. Supporting both KeePass and Password Safe formats, Strongbox can be used in tandem with other password managers, like KeePassXC, on non-Apple platforms. By employing a [freemium model](https://strongboxsafe.com/pricing/), Strongbox offers most features under its free tier with more convenience-oriented [features](https://strongboxsafe.com/comparison/)—such as biometric authentication—locked behind a subscription or perpetual license.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://strongboxsafe.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://strongboxsafe.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://strongboxsafe.com/getting-started/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/strongbox-password-safe/Strongbox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/strongbox-password-safe/Strongbox#supporting-development){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/strongbox-keepass-pwsafe/id897283731)
+
+Additionally, there is an offline-only version offered: [Strongbox Zero](https://apps.apple.com/app/strongbox-keepass-pwsafe/id1581589638). This version is stripped down in an attempt to reduce attack surface.
+
+### Command-line
+
+These products are minimal password managers that can be used within scripting applications.
+
+#### gopass
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **gopass** is a password manager for the command line written in Go. It works on all major desktop and server operating systems (Linux, macOS, BSD, Windows).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.gopass.pw){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/gopasspw/gopass/tree/master/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/gopasspw/gopass){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/dominikschulz){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-macos)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-linux)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-bsd)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be cross-platform.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/productivity.md b/i18n/es/productivity.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4192af631
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/productivity.md
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+---
+title: "Productivity Tools"
+icon: material/file-sign
+---
+
+Most online office suites do not support E2EE, meaning the cloud provider has access to everything you do. The privacy policy may legally protect your rights, but it does not provide technical access constraints.
+
+## Collaboration Platforms
+
+### Nextcloud
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nextcloud** es un conjunto de programas gratuitos y de código abierto, para la creación de su propio servicio de almacenamiento de archivos en un servidor privado que usted controle.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Página principal](https://nextcloud.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://nextcloud.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://nextcloud.com/support/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/nextcloud){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nextcloud.com/contribute/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? descargas
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nextcloud.client)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1125420102)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/nextcloud/android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/www/nextcloud)
+
+!!! peligro
+
+ No recomendamos utilizar la [aplicación con cifrado de extremo a extremo](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/end_to_end_encryption) para Nextcloud, porque puede causar la pérdida de datos; esta es considerada como altamente experimental y no debe utilizarse en entornos de producción. For this reason, we don't recommend third-party Nextcloud providers.
+
+### CryptPad
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **CryptPad** is a private-by-design alternative to popular office tools. All content on this web service is end-to-end encrypted and can be shared with other users easily.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://cryptpad.fr){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://cryptpad.fr/pad/#/2/pad/view/GcNjAWmK6YDB3EO2IipRZ0fUe89j43Ryqeb4fjkjehE/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.cryptpad.fr/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/xwiki-labs/cryptpad){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/cryptpad){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+In general, we define collaboration platforms as full-fledged suites which could reasonably act as a replacement to collaboration platforms like Google Drive.
+
+- Open-source.
+- Makes files accessible via WebDAV unless it is impossible due to E2EE.
+- Has sync clients for Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- Supports document and spreadsheet editing.
+- Supports real-time document collaboration.
+- Supports exporting documents to standard document formats (e.g. ODF).
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should store files in a conventional filesystem.
+- Should support TOTP or FIDO2 multi-factor authentication support, or Passkey logins.
+
+## Office Suites
+
+### LibreOffice
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **LibreOffice** is a free and open-source office suite with extensive functionality.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.libreoffice.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.libreoffice.org/about-us/privacy/privacy-policy-en/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://documentation.libreoffice.org/en/english-documentation/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://www.libreoffice.org/about-us/source-code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.libreoffice.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/android-and-ios/)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/android-and-ios/)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/download/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/download/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/download/)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.libreoffice.LibreOffice)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/editors/libreoffice/)
+
+### OnlyOffice
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OnlyOffice** is a cloud-based free and open-source office suite with extensive functionality, including integration with Nextcloud.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.onlyoffice.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://help.onlyoffice.com/products/files/doceditor.aspx?fileid=5048502&doc=SXhWMEVzSEYxNlVVaXJJeUVtS0kyYk14YWdXTEFUQmRWL250NllHNUFGbz0_IjUwNDg1MDIi0){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://helpcenter.onlyoffice.com/userguides.aspx){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ONLYOFFICE){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.onlyoffice.documents)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id944896972)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.onlyoffice.com/download-desktop.aspx)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.onlyoffice.com/download-desktop.aspx)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.onlyoffice.com/download-desktop.aspx)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.onlyoffice.desktopeditors)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/www/onlyoffice-documentserver/)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+In general, we define office suites as applications which could reasonably act as a replacement for Microsoft Word for most needs.
+
+- Must be cross-platform.
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must function offline.
+- Must support editing documents, spreadsheets, and slideshows.
+- Must export files to standard document formats.
+
+## Paste services
+
+### PrivateBin
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **PrivateBin** is a minimalist, open-source online pastebin where the server has zero knowledge of pasted data. Data is encrypted/decrypted in the browser using 256-bit AES. It is the improved version of ZeroBin. There is a [list of instances](https://privatebin.info/directory/).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://privatebin.info){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://privatebin.info/directory/){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/wiki/FAQ){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/es/real-time-communication.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cc0eb8793
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/real-time-communication.md
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+---
+title: "Comunicación en tiempo real"
+icon: material/chat-processing
+---
+
+Estas son nuestras recomendaciones para la comunicación cifrada en tiempo real.
+
+[Tipos de redes de comunicación :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](./advanced/communication-network-types.md)
+
+## Mensajeros multiplataforma
+
+These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
+
+### Signal
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Signal** es una aplicación móvil desarrollada por Signal Messenger LLC. La aplicación ofrece mensajería instantánea, así como llamadas de voz y vídeo.
+
+ Todas las comunicaciones son E2EE. Las listas de contactos se encriptan con tu PIN de Signal y el servidor no tiene acceso a ellas. Los perfiles personales también están encriptados y sólo se comparten con los contactos con los que chateas.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/signalapp){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://signal.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.thoughtcrime.securesms)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id874139669)
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://signal.org/android/apk/)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://signal.org/download/windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://signal.org/download/macos)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://signal.org/download/linux)
+
+El protocolo fue [auditado](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) de forma independiente en 2016. La especificación del protocolo Signal puede encontrarse en su [documentación](https://signal.org/docs/). Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
+
+The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
+
+We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation:
+
+[Signal Configuration and Hardening :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening/)
+
+### SimpleX Chat
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Element** es el cliente de referencia para el protocolo [Matrix](https://matrix.org/docs/guides/introduction), un [estándar abierto](https://matrix.org/docs/spec) para la comunicación segura descentralizada en tiempo real. Los mensajes y los archivos compartidos en las salas privadas (las que requieren una invitación) son por defecto E2EE, al igual que las llamadas de voz y vídeo uno a uno.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://element.io/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://element.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://element.io/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/vector-im){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=im.vector.app)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/vector/id1083446067)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/vector-im/element-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://element.io/get-started)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://element.io/get-started)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://element.io/get-started)
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://app.element.io)
+
+SimpleX Chat [was audited](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website.html) by Trail of Bits in October 2022.
+
+Currently SimpleX Chat only provides a client for Android and iOS. La especificación del protocolo Matrix puede encontrarse en su [documentación](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). El trinquete criptográfico [Olm](https://matrix.org/docs/projects/other/olm) utilizado por Matrix es una implementación del
+
+algoritmo de doble trinquete de Signal.
+
+Your data can be exported, and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up.
+
+
+
+### Briar
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Session** es un mensajero descentralizado con un foco en las comunicaciones privadas, seguras y anónimas. Session soporta los mensajes directos, chats de grupo y llamadas de voz. Session utiliza la red descentralizada [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) para almacenar y enrutar los mensajes.
+
+ Cada mensaje encriptado pasa por tres nodos de una red llamada "Red de Nodos de Servicio Oxen", lo que hace prácticamente imposible que los nodos recopilen información significativa sobre quienes utilizan la red. downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.briarproject.briar.android)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://briarproject.org/download-briar-desktop/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://briarproject.org/download-briar-desktop/)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.briarproject.Briar)
+
+
+To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby.
+
+The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit/), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited.
+
+Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
+
+Briar supports perfect forward secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
+
+
+
+## Otros mensajeros
+
+!!! warning
+
+ These messengers do not have Perfect [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) (PFS), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Briar también puede conectarse a través de Wi-Fi o Bluetooth cuando está cerca.
+
+
+
+
+### Element
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Element** is the reference client for the [Matrix](https://matrix.org/docs/guides/introduction) protocol, an [open standard](https://matrix.org/docs/spec) for secure decentralized real-time communication.
+
+ Messages and files shared in private rooms (those which require an invite) are by default E2EE as are one to one voice and video calls.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://element.io/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://element.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://element.io/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/vector-im){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=im.vector.app)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/vector/id1083446067)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/vector-im/element-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://element.io/get-started)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://element.io/get-started)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://element.io/get-started)
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://app.element.io)
+
+
+Briar tiene una [especificación publicada](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec) completamente.
+
+Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
+
+The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
+
+The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm](https://matrix.org/docs/projects/other/olm) cryptographic ratchet used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
+
+
+
+### Session
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Session** is a decentralized messenger with a focus on private, secure, and anonymous communications. Session offers support for direct messages, group chats, and voice calls.
+
+ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to store and route messages. Every encrypted message is routed through three nodes in the Oxen Service Node Network, making it virtually impossible for the nodes to compile meaningful information on those using the network.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getsession.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://getsession.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://getsession.org/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/oxen-io){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=network.loki.messenger)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1470168868)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/oxen-io/session-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://getsession.org/download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://getsession.org/download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://getsession.org/download)
+
+
+Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
+
+Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
+
+Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
+
+Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
+
+
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+
+- Must have open-source clients.
+- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
+- Must support E2EE for all messages.
+- Must have been independently audited.
+
+
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should have Perfect Forward Secrecy.
+- Should have open-source servers.
+- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
+- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
+- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/router.md b/i18n/es/router.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..57288b8dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/router.md
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+---
+title: "Firmware del Router"
+icon: material/router-wireless
+---
+
+A continuación se presentan algunos sistemas operativos alternativos, que pueden utilizarse en routers, puntos de acceso Wi-Fi, etc.
+
+## OpenWrt
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OpenWrt** es un sistema operativo basado en Linux; se utiliza principalmente en dispositivos integrados para enrutar el tráfico de red. Incluye util-linux, uClibc, y BusyBox. Todos los componentes han sido optimizados para routers domésticos.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Inicio](https://openwrt.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://openwrt.org/docs/start){ .card-link title=Documentación}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt){ .card-link title="Código Fuente }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://openwrt.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribuir }
+
+Puedes consultar [ la tabla de hardware](https://openwrt.org/toh/start) de OpenWrt para comprobar si tu dispositivo es compatible.
+
+## OPNsense
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OPNsense** es una plataforma de enrutamiento y cortafuegos de código abierto basada en FreeBSD que incorpora muchas características avanzadas, como la conformación del tráfico, el equilibrio de carga y las capacidades de VPN, con muchas más características disponibles en forma de plugins. OPNsense se implementa habitualmente como cortafuegos perimetral, router, punto de acceso inalámbrico, servidor DHCP, servidor DNS y punto final VPN.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Inicio](https://opnsense.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.opnsense.org/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentación}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/opnsense){ .card-link title="Código Fuente" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opnsense.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribuir }
+
+OPNsense se desarrolló originalmente como una bifurcación de [pfSense](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PfSense), y ambos proyectos destacan por ser distribuciones de cortafuegos libres y fiables que ofrecen características que a menudo sólo se encuentran en los costosos cortafuegos comerciales. Lanzado en 2015, los desarrolladores de OPNsense [citaron a](https://docs.opnsense.org/history/thefork.html) una serie de problemas de seguridad y de calidad del código de pfSense que consideraban que necesitaba una bifurcación del proyecto, así como preocupaciones por la adquisición mayoritaria de pfSense por parte de Netgate y la futura dirección del proyecto pfSense.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Debe ser de código abierto.
+- Debe recibir actualizaciones de manera periódica.
+- Debe ser compatible con una amplia variedad de hardware.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/search-engines.md b/i18n/es/search-engines.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2091e801e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/search-engines.md
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+---
+title: "Motores de Búsqueda"
+icon: material/search-web
+---
+
+Utilice un motor de búsqueda que no construya un perfil publicitario basado en sus búsquedas.
+
+Las recomendaciones aquí se basan en los méritos de la política de privacidad de cada servicio. No hay **garantías** de que estas políticas de privacidad se respetan.
+
+Considera usar un [VPN](/vpn) o [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) si tu modelo de amenaza requiere ocultar tu dirección IP al proveedor de búsquedas.
+
+## Brave Search
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **DuckDuckGo** es un popular motor de búsqueda y es el predeterminado para el Navegador Tor. DuckDuckGo utiliza una API comercial de Bing y [otras fuentes](https://help.duckduckgo.com/results/sources) para proporcionar sus datos de búsqueda.
+
+ [Visita duckduckgo.com](https://duckduckgo.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:pg-tor:](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion){ .md-button } [Política de privacidad](https://duckduckgo.com/privacy){ .md-button }
+
+ We recommend you disable [Anonymous usage metrics](https://search.brave.com/help/usage-metrics) as it is enabled by default and can be disabled within settings.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://search.brave.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://search.brave4u7jddbv7cyviptqjc7jusxh72uik7zt6adtckl5f4nwy2v72qd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://search.brave.com/help/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://search.brave.com/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+Brave Search is based in the United States. note IP addresses are temporarily processed, but are not retained.
+
+## DuckDuckGo
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ DuckDuckGo está basado en 🇺🇸 USA. Su [Política de Privacidad](https://duckduckgo.com/privacy) indica que sí registran tus consultas de búsqueda, pero no tu IP o cualquier otra identificable. The search engine relies on a commercial Bing API to serve most results, but it does use numerous [other sources](https://help.duckduckgo.com/results/sources/) for instant answers and other non-primary results.
+
+ DuckDuckGo is the default search engine for the Tor Browser and is one of the few available options on Apple’s Safari browser.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://duckduckgo.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://duckduckgo.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://help.duckduckgo.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+DuckDuckGo is based in the United States. recommendation
+
+DuckDuckGo offers two [other versions](https://help.duckduckgo.com/features/non-javascript/) of their search engine, both of which do not require JavaScript. note These versions can also be used in conjunction with their [Tor onion address](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/) by appending [/lite](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/lite) or [/html](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/html) for the respective version.
+
+## SearXNG
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Startpage** es un motor de búsqueda que ofrece resultados de búsqueda de Google. Es una forma muy cómoda de obtener resultados de búsqueda en Google sin experimentar patrones oscuros como los difíciles captchas o que te denieguen el acceso porque has utilizado un [VPN](/vpn) o [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/download/).
+
+ [Visita startpage.com](https://www.startpage.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Política de privacidad](https://www.startpage.com/en/privacy-policy){ .md-button }
+
+SearXNG is a proxy between you and the search engines it aggregates from. recommendation
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance so that the queries would blend in. note
+
+When you are using a SearXNG instance, be sure to go read their privacy policy. recommendation Some instances run as a Tor hidden service, which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries does not contain PII.
+
+## Startpage
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Startpage** is a private search engine known for serving Google search results. One of Startpage's unique features is the [Anonymous View](https://www.startpage.com/en/anonymous-view/), which puts forth efforts to standardize user activity to make it more difficult to be uniquely identified. The feature can be useful for hiding [some](https://support.startpage.com/hc/en-us/articles/4455540212116-The-Anonymous-View-Proxy-technical-details) network and browser properties. Unlike the name suggests, the feature should not be relied upon for anonymity. If you are looking for anonymity, use the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) instead.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.startpage.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.startpage.com/en/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.startpage.com/hc/en-us/categories/4481917470356-Startpage-Search-Engine){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Startpage regularly limits service access to certain IP addresses, such as IPs reserved for VPNs or Tor. [DuckDuckGo](#duckduckgo) and [Brave Search](#brave-search) are friendlier options if your threat model requires hiding your IP address from the search provider.
+
+Startpage is based in the Netherlands. According to their [privacy policy](https://www.startpage.com/en/privacy-policy/), they log details such as: operating system, type of browser, and language. They do not log your IP address, search queries, or other personally identifying information.
+
+Startpage's majority shareholder is System1 who is an adtech company. We don't believe that to be an issue as they have a distinctly separate [privacy policy](https://system1.com/terms/privacy-policy). The Privacy Guides team reached out to Startpage [back in 2020](https://web.archive.org/web/20210118031008/https://blog.privacytools.io/relisting-startpage/) to clear up any concerns with System1's sizeable investment into the service. We were satisfied with the answers we received.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must not collect personally identifiable information per their privacy policy.
+- Must not allow users to create an account with them.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should be based on open-source software.
+- Should not block Tor exit node IP addresses.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/tools.md b/i18n/es/tools.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fee0caf5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/tools.md
@@ -0,0 +1,458 @@
+---
+title: "Herramientas de Privacidad"
+icon: material/tools
+hide:
+ - toc
+---
+
+Si está buscando una solución específica para algo, estas son las herramientas de hardware y software que recomendamos en una variedad de categorías. Nuestras herramientas de privacidad recomendadas se eligen principalmente en función de sus características de seguridad, con un énfasis adicional en las herramientas descentralizadas y de código abierto. They are applicable to a variety of threat models ranging from protection against global mass surveillance programs and avoiding big tech companies to mitigating attacks, but only you can determine what will work best for your needs.
+
+If you want assistance figuring out the best privacy tools and alternative programs for your needs, start a discussion on our [forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/) or our [Matrix](https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org) community!
+
+For more details about each project, why they were chosen, and additional tips or tricks we recommend, click the "Learn more" link in each section, or click on the recommendation itself to be taken to that specific section of the page.
+
+## Navegadores Web
+
+
+
+- { .twemoji } [Navegador Tor](https://www.torproject.org/)
+- { .twemoji } [Firefox (Escritorio)](https://firefox.com/)
+- { .twemoji } [Bromite (Android)](https://www.bromite.org/)
+- { .twemoji } [Safari (iOS)](https://www.apple.com/safari/)
+
+
+
+1. Snowflake no aumenta la privacidad, sin embargo, te permite contribuir fácilmente a la red Tor y ayudar a que la gente en redes censuradas consiga una mejor privacidad.
+
+[Aprender más :material-arrow-right:](tor.md)
+
+## Sistemas Operativos
+
+
+
+- { .twemoji } [uBlock Origin](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock)
+- { .twemoji } [AdGuard para Safari](https://adguard.com/es/adguard-safari/overview.html)
+- { .twemoji } [Terms of Service; Didn't Read](https://tosdr.org/) (1)
+
+
+
+[Aprender más :material-arrow-right:](desktop-browsers.md)
+
+### Recursos Adicionales
+
+
+
+- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [GrapheneOS](https://grapheneos.org/)
+- { .twemoji } [CalyxOS](https://calyxos.org/)
+- { .twemoji } [DivestOS](https://divestos.org/)
+
+
+
+[Aprender más :material-arrow-right:](desktop-browsers.md#additional-resources)
+
+## Proveedores de Servicios
+
+
+
+- { .twemoji } [Droid-ify (Cliente de F-Droid)](https://github.com/Iamlooker/Droid-ify)
+- { .twemoji } [Orbot (Proxy de Tor)](https://orbot.app/)
+- { .twemoji } [Shelter (Perfiles de Trabajo)](https://gitea.angry.im/PeterCxy/Shelter)
+- { .twemoji }!¡[Logotipo de GrapheneOS](assets/img/android/auditor-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji } [Auditor (Dispositivos Compatibles)](https://attestation.app/)
+- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Secure Camera](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera)
+- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Secure PDF Viewer](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer)
+- { .twemoji } [PrivacyBlur](https://privacyblur.app/)
+
+
+
+[Aprender más :material-arrow-right:](mobile-browsers.md)
+
+### Recursos Adicionales
+
+
+
+- { .twemoji } [Fedora Workstation](https://getfedora.org/)
+- { .twemoji } [OpenSUSE Tumbleweed](https://get.opensuse.org/tumbleweed/)
+- { .twemoji } [Arch Linux](https://archlinux.org/)
+- { .twemoji } [Fedora Silverblue & Kinoite](https://silverblue.fedoraproject.org/)
+- { .twemoji } [NixOS](https://nixos.org/)
+- { .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](https://www.whonix.org/)
+- { .twemoji } [Tails (Arranque en vivo (Live boot))](https://tails.boum.org/)
+- { .twemoji } [Qubes OS (Xen VM Distribution)](https://www.qubes-os.org/) (1)
+
+
+
+[Aprender más :material-arrow-right:](mobile-browsers.md#adguard)
+
+## Software
+
+### Firmware del Router
+
+
+
+- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [OpenWrt](https://openwrt.org/)
+- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [pfSense](https://www.pfsense.org/)
+
+
+
+[Aprender más :material-arrow-right:](android.md)
+
+#### Proveedores DNS
+
+
+
+- { .twemoji } [Nextcloud (Autoalojable)](https://nextcloud.com/)
+- { .twemoji } [Proton Drive](https://drive.protonmail.com/)
+- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Cryptee](https://crypt.ee/)
+- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Tahoe-LAFS (Avanzado)](https://www.tahoe-lafs.org/)
+
+
+
+[Aprender más :material-arrow-right:](android.md#general-apps)
+
+### Almacenamiento en la Nube
+
+
+
+- { .twemoji } [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.com/)
+- { .twemoji } [Mailbox.org](https://mailbox.org/)
+- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Disroot](https://disroot.org/)
+- { .twemoji } [Tutanota](https://tutanota.com/)
+- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [StartMail](https://startmail.com/)
+- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [CTemplar](https://ctemplar.com/)
+
+
+
+[Aprender más :material-arrow-right:](desktop.md)
+
+### Firmware del Router
+
+
+
+- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [AnonAddy](https://anonaddy.com/)
+- { .twemoji } [SimpleLogin](https://simplelogin.io/)
+
+
+
+[Aprender más :material-arrow-right:](router.md)
+
+## Proveedores de Servicios
+
+### Correo Electrónico
+
+
+
+- { .twemoji } [Mail-in-a-Box](https://mailinabox.email/)
+- { .twemoji } [mailcow](https://mailcow.email/)
+
+
+
+[Aprender más :material-arrow-right:](cloud.md)
+
+### Almacenamiento en la Nube
+
+#### DNS Providers
+
+[Recomendamos](dns.md#recommended-providers) una serie de servidores DNS cifrados, como [Mullvad](https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls) y [Quad9](https://quad9.net/) entre otros, según varios criterios. Recomendamos que leas nuestras páginas sobre DNS antes de elegir un proveedor. En muchos casos no se recomienda utilizar un proveedor de DNS alternativo.
+
+[Aprender más :material-arrow-right:](dns.md)
+
+#### Encrypted DNS Proxies
+
+
+
+- { .twemoji } [DuckDuckGo](https://duckduckgo.com/)
+- { .twemoji } [Startpage](https://www.startpage.com/)
+- { .twemoji } [Mojeek](https://www.mojeek.com/)
+- { .twemoji } [Searx](https://searx.me/)
+
+
+
+[Aprender más :material-arrow-right:](dns.md#encrypted-dns-proxies)
+
+#### Self-hosted Solutions
+
+
+
+[Aprender más :material-arrow-right:](search-engines.md)
+
+### VPN Providers
+
+??? danger "Las VPN no proporcionan anonimato"
+
+ El uso de una VPN **no** mantendrá tus hábitos de navegación en el anonimato, ni añadirá seguridad adicional al tráfico no seguro (HTTP).
+
+ Si estás buscando **anonimato**, deberías usar el navegador Tor **en lugar** de una VPN.
+
+ Si buscas mayor **seguridad**, deberías asegurarte siempre de que te conectas a sitios web que utilicen HTTPS. Una VPN no sustituye las buenas prácticas de seguridad.
+
+ [Aprende más :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](vpn.md)
+
+
+
+[Aprender más :material-arrow-right:](data-redaction.md)
+
+### Email Clients
+
+
+
+- { .twemoji } [Thunderbird](email-clients.md#thunderbird)
+- { .twemoji } [Apple Mail (macOS)](email-clients.md#apple-mail-macos)
+- { .twemoji } [Canary Mail (iOS)](email-clients.md#canary-mail-ios)
+- { .twemoji } [FairEmail (Android)](email-clients.md#fairemail-android)
+- { .twemoji } [GNOME Evolution (Linux)](email-clients.md#gnome-evolution-gnome)
+- { .twemoji } [K-9 Mail (Android)](email-clients.md#k-9-mail-android)
+- { .twemoji } [Kontact (Linux)](email-clients.md#kontact-kde)
+- { .twemoji } [Mailvelope (PGP in standard webmail)](email-clients.md#mailvelope-browser)
+- { .twemoji } [NeoMutt (CLI)](email-clients.md#neomutt-cli)
+
+
+
+[Aprender más :material-arrow-right:](email-clients.md)
+
+### Software de encriptación
+
+??? info "Operating System Disk Encryption"
+
+ Para cifrar la unidad de tu sistema operativo, normalmente recomendamos utilizar cualquier herramienta de cifrado que proporcione tu sistema operativo, ya sea **BitLocker** en Windows, **FileVault** en macOS, o **LUKS** en Linux. Estas herramientas están incluidas en el sistema operativo y suelen utilizar elementos de cifrado por hardware, como un TPM, que otros programas de cifrado de disco completo, como VeraCrypt, no utilizan. VeraCrypt sigue siendo adecuado para los discos que no son del sistema operativo, como las unidades externas, especialmente las unidades a las que se puede acceder desde varios sistemas operativos.
+
+ [Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](encryption.md##operating-system-included-full-disk-encryption-fde)
+
+
+
+[Aprender más :material-arrow-right:](video-streaming.md)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/tor.md b/i18n/es/tor.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bd1a45986
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/tor.md
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+---
+title: "Navegadores Web"
+icon: simple/torproject
+---
+
+{ align=right }
+
+La red **Tor** es un grupo de servidores operados por voluntarios que te permite conectarte gratuitamente y mejorar tu privacidad y seguridad en Internet. Los individuos y las organizaciones también pueden compartir información a través de la red Tor con los "servicios ocultos.onion" sin comprometer su privacidad. Debido a que el tráfico de Tor es difícil de bloquear y rastrear, Tor es una herramienta eficaz para eludir la censura.
+
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://www.torproject.org){ .card-link title=Inicio}
+[:simple-torbrowser:](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion){ .card-link title="Servicio Onion" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Documentación}
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git){ .card-link title="Código Fuente" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribuir }
+
+Tor funciona enrutando tu tráfico de Internet a través de esos servidores operados por voluntarios, en lugar de hacer una conexión directa con el sitio que estás tratando de visitar. This obfuscates where the traffic is coming from, and no server in the connection path is able to see the full path of where the traffic is coming from and going to, meaning even the servers you are using to connect cannot break your anonymity.
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ Ruta del circuito Tor - Los nodos en la ruta solo pueden ver los servidores a los que están directamente conectados, por ejemplo el nodo "Entry" que se muestra puede ver tu dirección IP y la dirección del nodo "Middle", pero no tiene forma de ver qué sitio web estás visitando.
+
+
+- [Más información sobre cómo funciona Tor :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md)
+
+## Conectarse a Tor
+
+Hay varias maneras de conectarse a la red Tor desde tu dispositivo, el más utilizado es **Tor Browser**, un fork de Firefox diseñado para la navegación anónima para ordenadores de sobremesa y Android. Además de las aplicaciones enumeradas a continuación, también hay sistemas operativos diseñados específicamente para conectarse a la red Tor, como [Whonix](linux-desktop.md/#whonix) en [Qubes OS](qubes.md), que proporcionan incluso mayor seguridad y protección que el Navegador Tor estándar.
+
+### Tor Browser
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tor Browser** is the choice if you need anonymity, as it provides you with access to the Tor network and bridges, and it includes default settings and extensions that are automatically configured by the default security levels: *Standard*, *Safer* and *Safest*.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Inicio](https://www.torproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion){ .card-link title="Servicio Onion" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Documentación }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/){ .card-link title="Código Fuente" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribuir }
+
+ ??? descargas
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.torbrowser)
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://www.torproject.org/download/#android)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.torproject.org/download/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.torproject.org/download/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.torproject.org/download/)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/security/tor)
+ - [:simple-openbsd: OpenBSD](https://openports.se/net/tor)
+ - [:simple-netbsd: NetBSD](https://pkgsrc.se/net/tor)
+
+!!! peligro
+
+ **Nunca** deberías instalar ninguna extensión adicional en el Navegador Tor, ni siquiera las que sugerimos para Firefox. Las extensiones del navegador y las configuraciones no estándar te hacen destacar de los demás en la red Tor, haciendo así que tu navegador sea más fácil de [fingerprint](https://support.torproject.org/glossary/browser-fingerprinting).
+
+El navegador Tor está diseñado para evitar la toma de huellas dactilares o tu identificación debido a la configuración de tu navegador. Por lo tanto, es imperativo que **no** modifiques el navegador más allá de los [niveles de seguridad](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/) predeterminados.
+
+### Perfiles de usuario
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Orbot** es una VPN de Tor gratuita para smartphones que enruta el tráfico desde cualquier aplicación en tu dispositivo a través de la red Tor.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Inicio](https://orbot.app/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Política de Privacidad" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentación}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Código Fuente" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribuir }
+
+ ??? descargas
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/orbot/id1609461599)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+
+For resistance against traffic analysis attacks, consider enabling *Isolate Destination Address* in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Connectivity**. This will use a completely different Tor Circuit (different middle relay and exit nodes) for every domain you connect to.
+
+!!! consejo "Consejos para Android"
+
+ Orbot puede hacer de proxy de aplicaciones individuales si soportan SOCKS o proxy HTTP. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN killswitch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+ Orbot suele estar desactualizado en el [repositorio F-Droid](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) de Guardian Project y en [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android), así que considera descargarlo directamente desde el [repositorio GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases).
+
+ Todas las versiones están firmadas con la misma firma, por lo que deberían ser compatibles entre sí.
+
+## Relays and Bridges
+
+### Snowflake
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Snowflake** te permite donar ancho de banda al Proyecto Tor operando un "proxy Snowflake" dentro de tu navegador.
+
+ People who are censored can use Snowflake proxies to connect to the Tor network. Snowflake is a great way to contribute to the network even if you don't have the technical know-how to run a Tor relay or bridge.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Inicio](https://snowflake.torproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/wikis/Technical%20Overview){ .card-link title=Documentación}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/snowflake.git/){ .card-link title="Código Fuente" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribuir }
+
+ ??? descargas
+
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/torproject-snowflake/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/snowflake/mafpmfcccpbjnhfhjnllmmalhifmlcie)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://snowflake.torproject.org/embed "Leave this page open to be a Snowflake proxy")
+
+??? tip "Embedded Snowflake"
+
+ You can enable Snowflake in your browser by clicking the switch below and ==leaving this page open==. You can also install Snowflake as a browser extension to have it always run while your browser is open, however adding third-party extensions can increase your attack surface.
+
+
+ If the embed does not appear for you, ensure you are not blocking the third-party frame from `torproject.org`. Alternatively, visit [this page](https://snowflake.torproject.org/embed.html).
+
+Snowflake does not increase your privacy in any way, nor is it used to connect to the Tor network within your personal browser. However, if your internet connection is uncensored, you should consider running it to help people in censored networks achieve better privacy themselves. There is no need to worry about which websites people are accessing through your proxy—their visible browsing IP address will match their Tor exit node, not yours.
+
+Running a Snowflake proxy is low-risk, even moreso than running a Tor relay or bridge which are already not particularly risky endeavours. However, it does still proxy traffic through your network which can be impactful in some ways, especially if your network is bandwidth-limited. Make sure you understand [how Snowflake works](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/wikis/home) before deciding whether to run a proxy.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/video-streaming.md b/i18n/es/video-streaming.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..598ef26c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/video-streaming.md
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+---
+title: "Transmisiones en Vivo"
+icon: material/video-wireless
+---
+
+La principal amenaza al utilizar una plataforma de streaming es que sus hábitos de streaming y sus suscripciones podrían utilizarse para elaborar un perfil. Debería combinar estas herramientas con un [VPN](/vpn) o [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) para hacer más difícil perfilar su perfil.
+
+## Clientes
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FreeTube** es una aplicación gratuita y de código abierto para [YouTube](https://youtube.com). Al usar FreeTube, su lista de suscripción y listas de reproducción se guardan localmente en su dispositivo. Por defecto, FreeTube bloquea todos los anuncios de YouTube.
+
+ Además, FreeTube se integra opcionalmente con [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) para ayudarle a saltar segmentos de vídeo patrocinados.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://freetubeapp.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://freetubeapp.io/privacy.php){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.freetubeapp.io/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/FreeTubeApp/FreeTube){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/FreeTube){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-apple: macOS](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:fontawesome-brands-linux: Linux](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:pg-flathub: Flatpak](https://flathub.org/apps/details/io.freetubeapp.FreeTube)
+
+!!! note
+
+ Solo se recomienda el **cliente de escritorio LBRY**, ya que el sitio web [Odysee](https://odysee.com) y los clientes LBRY en F-Droid, Play Store y App Store tienen sincronización y telemetría obligatorias.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **La red LBRY** es una red descentralizada para compartir vídeos. Considere la posibilidad de utilizar un [VPN](vpn.md) o [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) si su [modelo de amenaza](basics/threat-modeling.md) requiere ocultar su dirección IP.
+
+We recommend **against** synchronizing your wallet with LBRY Inc., as synchronizing encrypted wallets is not supported yet. Si sincroniza su wallet con LBRY Inc. tendrá que confiar que ellos no mirarán su lista de suscripciones, sus fondos [LBC](https://lbry.com/faq/earn-credits) o tomen el control de su canal.
+
+Puede desactivar la opción *Guardar datos de alojamiento para ayudar a la red LBRY* en :gear: **Ajustes** → **Ajustes avanzados**, para evitar exponer su dirección IP y los vídeos vistos cuando utilice LBRY durante un periodo de tiempo prolongado.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must not require a centralized account to view videos.
+ - Decentralized authentication, such as via a mobile wallet's private key is acceptable.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/es/vpn.md b/i18n/es/vpn.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..884f1aa9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/es/vpn.md
@@ -0,0 +1,314 @@
+---
+title: "Servicios VPN"
+icon: material/vpn
+---
+
+Encuentre una VPN sin registro que no esté dispuesto a vender o leer su tráfico web.
+
+??? danger "Las VPN no proporcionan anonimato"
+
+ El uso de una VPN **no** mantendrá tus hábitos de navegación en el anonimato, ni añadirá seguridad adicional al tráfico no seguro (HTTP).
+
+ Si estás buscando **anonimato**, deberías usar el navegador Tor **en lugar** de una VPN.
+
+ Si buscas mayor **seguridad**, deberías asegurarte siempre de que te conectas a sitios web que utilicen HTTPS. Una VPN no sustituye las buenas prácticas de seguridad.
+
+ [Descargar Tor](https://www.torproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Mitos de Tor & FAQ](https://medium.com/privacyguides/slicing-onions-part-1-myth-busting-tor-9ec188ae1904){ .md-button }
+
+??? question "¿Cuándo son útiles las VPN?"
+
+ Si buscas una mayor **privacidad** de tu ISP, de una red wifi pública o mientras hace o descargar archivos Torrent, una VPN puede ser la solución para usted, siempre y cuando entienda los riesgos que conlleva.
+
+ [Más información](basics/vpn-overview.md){ .md-button }
+
+## Proveedores recomendados
+
+!!! summary "Criterios"
+
+ Nuestros proveedores recomendados usan encriptación, aceptan Monero, soportan WireGuard & OpenVPN, y tienen una política de no registro. Lea nuestra [lista de criterios completa](#our-criteria) para mayor información.
+
+### Mullvad
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mullvad** es una VPN rápida y cómoda con un enfoque serio en la transparencia y la seguridad. Llevan en funcionamiento desde **2009**.
+
+ Mullvad tiene su sede en Suecia y no tiene prueba gratuita. descargas
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonvpn.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id1437005085)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonVPN/android-app/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://protonvpn.com/download-windows)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://protonvpn.com/support/linux-vpn-setup/)
+
+??? check annotate "38 Países"
+
+ Mullvad tiene [servidores en 38 países](https://mullvad.net/servers/) (1). Elegir un proveedor de VPN con un servidor cercano a usted reducirá la latencia del tráfico de red que envíe. Esto se debe a que es una ruta más corta (menos saltos) hasta el destino.
+
+ También pensamos que es mejor para la seguridad de las claves privadas del proveedor de VPN si utilizan [servidores dedicados](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), en lugar de soluciones compartidas más baratas (con otros clientes) como los [servidores privados virtuales](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
+
+1. En 2022/05/17
+
+??? check "Auditoria independiente"
+
+ Los clientes VPN de Mullvad han sido auditados por Cure53 y Assured AB en un reporte de pentest [publicado en cure53.de](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_v2.pdf). Los investigadores de seguridad concluyeron:
+
+ > Cure53 y Assured AB están satisfechos con los resultados de la auditoría y el software deja una impresión positiva en general. Con la dedicación a la seguridad del equipo interno de Mullvad VPN, los testers no tienen dudas de que el proyecto va por buen camino desde el punto de vista de la seguridad. You can view individual reports for each platform at [protonvpn.com](https://protonvpn.com/blog/open-source/). In April 2022 Proton VPN underwent [another audit](https://protonvpn.com/blog/no-logs-audit/) and the report was [produced by Securitum](https://protonvpn.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/securitum-protonvpn-nologs-20220330.pdf). A [letter of attestation](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps) was provided for Proton VPN's apps on 9th November 2021 by [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com).
+
+??? check "Clientes Open Source"
+
+ Proton VPN proporciona el código fuente para su aplicación de escritorio and móvil en su [GitHub organization](https://github.com/ProtonVPN).
+
+??? check "Acepta dinero y Monero"
+
+ Proton VPN, además de aceptar tarjetas de crédito/débito y Paypal, acepta Bitcoin, y **cash/local currency** como formas anónimas de pago.
+
+??? check "Soporte de WireGuard"
+
+ Mullvad soporta el protocolo WireGuard®. [WireGuard](https://www.wireguard.com) es un protocolo más reciente que utiliza [criptografía](https://www.wireguard.com/protocol/) de última generación. Además, WireGuard pretende ser más simple y veloz.
+
+ Mullvad [recomienda](https://mullvad.net/en/help/why-wireguard/) el uso de WireGuard con su servicio. Es el protocolo por defecto o único en las aplicaciones de Mullvad para Android, iOS, macOS y Linux, pero en Windows hay que [activar manualmente](https://mullvad.net/en/help/how-turn-wireguard-mullvad-app/) WireGuard.
+
+??? check "Soporte de IPv6"
+
+ Mullvad soporta el futuro de la red [IPv6](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv6). Su red permite [acceder a servicios alojados en IPv6](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2014/9/15/ipv6-support/) a diferencia de otros proveedores que bloquean las conexiones IPv6.
+
+??? check "Redirección remota de puertos"
+
+ Además de proporcionar los archivos de configuración estándar de OpenVPN, Proton VPN tiene clientes móviles para [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/protonvpn-fast-secure-vpn/id1437005085) y [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonvpn.android&hl=en_US) que permiten conectarse fácilmente a sus servidores.
+
+??? check "Aplicaciones móviles"
+
+ Mullvad ha publicado su cliente en la [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/mullvad-vpn/id1488466513) y en [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.mullvad.mullvadvpn), ambos con una interfaz fácil de usar en lugar de requerir la configuración manual de la conexión de WireGuard. El cliente móvil en Android también está disponible en [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/packages/net.mullvad.mullvadvpn), lo que garantiza que se compila con [builds reproducibles](https://www.f-droid.org/en/2019/05/05/trust-privacy-and-free-software.html). They offer adblocking and known malware domains blocking with their DNS service. Additionally, Proton VPN also offers "Tor" servers allowing you to easily connect to onion sites, but we still strongly recommend using [the official Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) for this purpose.
+
+!!! info "Funcionalidades adicionales"
+
+ Mullvad es muy transparente en cuanto a los nodos que posee o alquila (https://mullvad.net/es/servers/). Utilizan [ShadowSocks](https://shadowsocks.org/en/index.html) en su configuración de ShadowSocks + OpenVPN, lo que les hace más resistentes contra los cortafuegos con [Inspección profunda de paquete](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_Packet_Inspection) que intentan bloquear las VPN.
+
+### Proton VPN
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton VPN** es un fuerte contendiente en el espacio de las VPN, y ha estado en funcionamiento desde 2016. Proton AG tiene su sede en Suiza y ofrece un nivel gratuito limitado, así como una opción premium con más funciones.
+
+ **Free** — **Plus Plan USD $71.88/anual** (1)
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://protonvpn.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://protonvpn.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://protonvpn.com/support/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonVPN){ .card-link title="Source Code" } También pensamos que es mejor para la seguridad de las claves privadas del proveedor de VPN si utilizan [servidores dedicados](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), en lugar de soluciones compartidas más baratas (con otros clientes) como los [servidores privados virtuales](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
+
+??? check annotate "63 países"
+
+ Proton VPN tiene [servidores en 63 países](https://protonvpn.com/vpn-servers) (1). Elegir un proveedor de VPN con un servidor cercano a usted reducirá la latencia del tráfico de red que envíe. Esto se debe a que es una ruta más corta (menos saltos) hasta el destino.
+
+ También pensamos que es mejor para la seguridad de las claves privadas del proveedor de VPN si utilizan [servidores dedicados](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), en lugar de soluciones compartidas más baratas (con otros clientes) como los [servidores privados virtuales](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
+
+1. En 2022/05/17
+
+??? check "Auditoria independiente"
+
+ IVPN se ha sometido a una [auditoría de no-logging de Cure53](https://cure53.de/audit-report_ivpn.pdf) que concluyó de acuerdo con la afirmación de no-logging de IVPN. IVPN también ha completado un [informe completo de pentest Cure53](https://cure53.de/summary-report_ivpn_2019.pdf) en enero de 2020. IVPN has also said they plan to have [annual reports](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/independent-security-audit-concluded) in the future. A further review was conducted [in April 2022](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/ivpn-apps-security-audit-2022-concluded/) and was produced by Cure53 [on their website](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_IVPN_2022.pdf).
+
+??? check "Clientes Open Source"
+
+ A partir de febrero de 2020 [las aplicaciones de IVPN son ahora de código abierto](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/ivpn-applications-are-now-open-source). Source code can be obtained from their [GitHub organization](https://github.com/ivpn).
+
+??? check "Acepta efectivo"
+
+ Además de aceptar tarjetas de crédito/débito y PayPal, IVPN acepta Bitcoin, **Monero** y **efectivo/moneda local** (en planes anuales) como formas de pago anónimas.
+
+??? check "Soporte de WireGuard"
+
+ Proton VPN soporta principalmente el protocolo WireGuard®. [WireGuard](https://www.wireguard.com) es un protocolo más reciente que utiliza [criptografía](https://www.wireguard.com/protocol/) de última generación. Además, WireGuard pretende ser más simple y veloz.
+
+ IVPN [recomienda](https://www.ivpn.net/wireguard/) el uso de WireGuard con su servicio y, como tal, es el protocolo predeterminado en todas las aplicaciones de IVPN. IVPN also offers a WireGuard configuration generator for use with the official WireGuard [apps](https://www.wireguard.com/install/).
+
+??? warning "Redirección remota de puertos"
+
+ El [port forwarding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_forwarding) es posible con un plan de pago (Pro). Port forwarding [can be activated](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/81/How-do-I-activate-port-forwarding.html) via the client area. Port forwarding is only available on IVPN when using WireGuard or OpenVPN protocols and is [disabled on US servers](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/116/Port-forwarding-is-not-working-why.html).
+
+??? check "Redirección remota de puertos"
+
+ Además de proporcionar los archivos de configuración estándar de OpenVPN, Proton VPN tiene clientes móviles para [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/ivpn-serious-privacy-protection/id1193122683) y [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.ivpn.client) que permiten conectarse fácilmente a sus servidores.
+
+??? check "Aplicaciones móviles"
+
+ Proton VPN tiene sus propios servidores y centros de datos en Suiza, Islandia y Suecia. Ofrecen bloqueo de anuncios y de dominios con malware conocido con su servicio de DNS.
+
+### IVPN
+
+!!! recomendación
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **IVPN** es otro proveedor de VPN premium, y llevan en funcionamiento desde 2009. IVPN tiene su sede en Gibraltar. **Standard USD $60/año** — **Pro USD $100/año**
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.ivpn.net/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.ivpn.net/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/general/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ivpn){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ También pensamos que es mejor para la seguridad de las claves privadas del proveedor de VPN si utilizan [servidores dedicados](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), en lugar de soluciones compartidas más baratas (con otros clientes) como los [servidores privados virtuales](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server). downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.mullvad.mullvadvpn)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/mullvad-vpn/id1488466513)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://mullvad.net/en/download/windows/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://mullvad.net/en/download/macos/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://mullvad.net/en/download/linux/)
+
+??? check annotate "32 Países"
+
+ IVPN tiene [servidores en 32 países](https://www.ivpn.net/server-locations) (1). Elegir un proveedor de VPN con un servidor cercano a usted reducirá la latencia del tráfico de red que envíe. Esto se debe a que es una ruta más corta (menos saltos) hasta el destino.
+
+ También pensamos que es mejor para la seguridad de las claves privadas del proveedor de VPN si utilizan [servidores dedicados](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), en lugar de soluciones compartidas más baratas (con otros clientes) como los [servidores privados virtuales](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
+
+1. En 2022/05/17
+
+??? check "Auditoria independiente"
+
+ Los clientes VPN de Mullvad han sido auditados por Cure53 y Assured AB en un reporte de pentest [publicado en cure53.de](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_v2.pdf). Los investigadores de seguridad concluyeron:
+
+ > Cure53 y Assured AB están satisfechos con los resultados de la auditoría y el software deja una impresión positiva en general. Con la dedicación a la seguridad del equipo interno de Mullvad VPN, los testers no tienen dudas de que el proyecto va por buen camino desde el punto de vista de la seguridad.
+
+ En 2020 se anunció una segunda auditoría (https://mullvad.net/blog/2020/6/25/results-available-audit-mullvad-app/) y el [informe final de la auditoría] (https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_2020_v2.pdf) se publicó en el sitio web de Cure53:
+
+ > Los resultados de este proyecto de mayo-junio de 2020 dirigido al complejo Mullvad, son bastante positivos. [...] El ecosistema general de aplicaciones utilizado por Mullvad deja una impresión sólida y estructurada. La estructura general de la aplicación facilita el despliegue de parches y correcciones de forma estructurada. Más que nada, los hallazgos detectados por Cure53 muestran la importancia de auditar y reevaluar constantemente los vectores de filtración actuales, para garantizar siempre la privacidad de los usuarios finales. With that being said, Mullvad does a great job protecting the end-user from common PII leaks and privacy related risks.
+
+ In 2021 an infrastructure audit [was announced](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2021/1/20/no-pii-or-privacy-leaks-found-cure53s-infrastructure-audit/) and the [final audit report](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_2021_v1.pdf) was made available on Cure53's website. Another report was commissioned [in June 2022](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2022/6/22/vpn-server-audit-found-no-information-leakage-or-logging-of-customer-data/) and is available on [Assured's website](https://www.assured.se/publications/Assured_Mullvad_relay_server_audit_report_2022.pdf).
+
+??? check "Clientes Open Source"
+
+ Mullvad provides the source code for their desktop and mobile clients in their [GitHub organization](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app).
+
+??? check "Acepta efectivo"
+
+ Mullvad, in addition to accepting credit/debit cards and PayPal, accepts Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, **Monero** and **cash/local currency** as anonymous forms of payment. [WireGuard](https://www.wireguard.com) es un protocolo más reciente que utiliza [criptografía](https://www.wireguard.com/protocol/) de última generación.
+
+??? check "Soporte de WireGuard"
+
+ IVPN soporta el protocolo WireGuard®. [WireGuard](https://www.wireguard.com) es un protocolo más reciente que utiliza [criptografía](https://www.wireguard.com/protocol/) de última generación. Además, WireGuard pretende ser más simple y veloz.
+
+ Mullvad [recommends](https://mullvad.net/en/help/why-wireguard/) the use of WireGuard with their service. It is the default or only protocol on Mullvad's Android, iOS, macOS, and Linux apps, but on Windows you have to [manually enable](https://mullvad.net/en/help/how-turn-wireguard-mullvad-app/) WireGuard. Mullvad also offers a WireGuard configuration generator for use with the official WireGuard [apps](https://www.wireguard.com/install/).
+
+??? check "Redirección remota de puertos"
+
+ El [redirección de puertos] (https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_Forwarding) es posible con un plan Pro. La redirección de puertos [puede ser activada](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/81/How-do-I-activate-port-forwarding.html) a través del Client Area.
+
+??? warning "Redirección remota de puertos"
+
+ Además de proporcionar archivos de configuración estándar de OpenVPN, IVPN tiene aplicaciones móviles para [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/ivpn-serious-privacy-protection/id1193122683) y [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.ivpn.client) que permiten conectarse fácilmente a sus servidores. La aplicación móvil en Android también está disponible en [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/net.ivpn.client), lo que garantiza que se compila con [builds reproducibles](https://www.f-droid.org/en/2019/05/05/trust-privacy-and-free-software.html). See [Port forwarding with Mullvad VPN](https://mullvad.net/help/port-forwarding-and-mullvad/) for more information.
+
+??? check "Redirección remota de puertos"
+
+ Los clientes IVPN soportan la autenticación de dos factores (los clientes Mullvad y Proton VPN no). IVPN también proporciona la funcionalidad "[AntiTracker](https://www.ivpn.net/antitracker)", que bloquea las redes publicitarias y los rastreadores de la red.
+
+??? check "Aplicaciones móviles"
+
+ Es importante tener en cuenta que el uso de un proveedor de VPN no le hará anónimo, pero le dará mayor privacidad en ciertas situaciones. Una VPN no es una herramienta para actividades ilegales. No confíes en una política de "no registro". Mullvad's website is also accessible via Tor at [o54hon2e2vj6c7m3aqqu6uyece65by3vgoxxhlqlsvkmacw6a7m7kiad.onion](http://o54hon2e2vj6c7m3aqqu6uyece65by3vgoxxhlqlsvkmacw6a7m7kiad.onion).
+
+## Criteria
+
+!!! peligro
+
+ It is important to note that using a VPN provider will not make you anonymous, but it will give you better privacy in certain situations. A VPN is not a tool for illegal activities. Don't rely on a "no log" policy.
+
+Exigimos que todos nuestros proveedores de VPN recomendados, proporcionen archivos de configuración de OpenVPN para ser utilizados en cualquier cliente. **Si** una VPN proporciona su propio cliente personalizado, requerimos un killswitch para bloquear las fugas de datos de la red cuando se desconecta. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing a VPN provider, and conduct your own research to ensure the VPN provider you choose is as trustworthy as possible.
+
+### Tecnología
+
+We require all our recommended VPN providers to provide OpenVPN configuration files to be used in any client. **If** a VPN provides their own custom client, we require a killswitch to block network data leaks when disconnected.
+
+**Mejor caso:**
+
+- Soporte para protocolos fuertes como WireGuard & OpenVPN.
+- Killswitch integrado en los clientes.
+- Soporte de multisaltos. El multihopping es importante para mantener la privacidad de los datos en caso de que un solo nodo se vea comprometido.
+- Si se proporciona clientes VPN, deben ser [de código abierto](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_source), como el software VPN que generalmente llevan incorporado. Creemos que la disponibilidad de [código fuente](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Source_code) proporciona una mayor transparencia sobre lo que su dispositivo está haciendo realmente.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Soporte de WireGuard y OpenVPN.
+- Killswitch con opciones altamente configurables (activar/desactivar en determinadas redes, en el arranque, etc.)
+- Clientes VPN fáciles de usar
+- Admite [IPv6](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv6). Esperamos que los servidores permitan las conexiones entrantes a través de IPv6 y le permitan acceder a los servicios alojados en direcciones IPv6.
+- La capacidad de [redirección de puertos](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_forwarding#Remote_port_forwarding) ayuda a crear conexiones cuando se utiliza software de intercambio de archivos P2P ([Peer-to-Peer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer-to-peer)), Freenet, o se aloja un servidor (por ejemplo, Mumble).
+
+### Privacidad
+
+We prefer our recommended providers to collect as little data as possible. Not collecting personal information on registration, and accepting anonymous forms of payment are required.
+
+**Mejor caso:**
+
+- Opción de pago en Monero o en efectivo.
+- No se requiere información personal para registrarse: Sólo nombre de usuario, contraseña y correo electrónico como máximo.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Acepta Monero, dinero en efectivo y otras formas de pago anónimo (tarjetas de regalo, etc.)
+- No se aceptan datos personales (nombre de usuario autogenerado, no se requiere correo electrónico, etc.)
+
+### Seguridad
+
+A VPN is pointless if it can't even provide adequate security. We require all our recommended providers to abide by current security standards for their OpenVPN connections. Ideally, they would use more future-proof encryption schemes by default. We also require an independent third-party to audit the provider's security, ideally in a very comprehensive manner and on a repeated (yearly) basis.
+
+**Mejor caso:**
+
+- Esquemas de cifrado fuertes: OpenVPN con autenticación SHA-256; RSA-2048 o mejor handshake; AES-256-CBC o cifrado de datos AES-256-GCM.
+- Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).
+- Auditorías de seguridad publicadas por una empresa externa de prestigio.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Cifrado más fuerte: RSA-4096.
+- Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).
+- Auditorías de seguridad exhaustivas publicadas por una empresa externa de prestigio.
+- Programas de recompensa de errores y/o un proceso coordinado de divulgación de vulnerabilidades.
+
+### Confianza
+
+You wouldn't trust your finances to someone with a fake identity, so why trust them with your internet data? We require our recommended providers to be public about their ownership or leadership. We also would like to see frequent transparency reports, especially in regard to how government requests are handled.
+
+**Mejor caso:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership or ownership.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership.
+- Informes de transparencia frecuentes.
+
+### Marketing
+
+With the VPN providers we recommend we like to see responsible marketing.
+
+**Mejor caso:**
+
+- Debe tener análisis propios (no Google Analytics, etc.). El sitio del proveedor también debe cumplir con [DNT (Do Not Track)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Do_Not_Track) para las personas que quieran excluirse.
+
+Must not have any marketing which is irresponsible:
+
+- Garantizar la protección del anonimato al 100%. Cuando alguien afirma que algo es 100% significa que no hay certeza de fracaso. Sabemos que la gente puede desanonimizarse fácilmente de varias maneras, por ejemplo:
+ - Reusing personal information (e.g., email accounts, unique pseudonyms, etc) that they accessed without anonymity software (Tor, VPN, etc.)
+ - [Browser fingerprinting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint)
+- Afirmar que una VPN de un solo circuito es "más anónima" que Tor, el cual es un circuito de 3 o más saltos que cambia regularmente.
+- Utilice un lenguaje responsable, por ejemplo, está bien decir que una VPN está "desconectada" o "no conectada", pero afirmar que alguien está "expuesto", "vulnerable" o "comprometido" es un uso innecesario de un lenguaje alarmante que puede ser incorrecto. Por ejemplo, esa persona podría simplemente estar en el servicio de otro proveedor de VPN o usar Tor.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+Responsible marketing that is both educational and useful to the consumer could include:
+
+- Una comparación precisa para cuando se debe utilizar Tor u otras [redes autónomas](self-contained-networks.md).
+- Disponibilidad del sitio web del proveedor de VPN a través de un .onion [Hidden Service](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/.onion)
+
+### Funcionalidades adicionales
+
+While not strictly requirements, there are some factors we looked into when determining which providers to recommend. These include adblocking/tracker-blocking functionality, warrant canaries, multihop connections, excellent customer support, the number of allowed simultaneous connections, etc.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.es.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/404.md b/i18n/fa/404.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..49886058c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/404.md
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+---
+hide:
+ - feedback
+---
+
+# 404 - Not Found
+
+We couldn't find the page you were looking for! Maybe you were looking for one of these?
+
+- [Introduction to Threat Modeling](basics/threat-modeling.md)
+- [Recommended DNS Providers](dns.md)
+- [Best Desktop Web Browsers](desktop-browsers.md)
+- [Best VPN Providers](vpn.md)
+- [Privacy Guides Forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net)
+- [Our Blog](https://blog.privacyguides.org)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md b/i18n/fa/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..88a0e9100
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# Community Code of Conduct
+
+**We pledge** to make our community a harassment-free experience for everyone.
+
+**We strive** to create a positive environment, using welcoming and inclusive language, and being respectful of the viewpoints of others.
+
+**We do not allow** inappropriate or otherwise unacceptable behavior, such as sexualized language, trolling and insulting comments, or otherwise promoting intolerance or harassment.
+
+## Community Standards
+
+What we expect from members of our communities:
+
+1. **Don't spread misinformation**
+
+ We are creating an evidence-based educational community around information privacy and security, not a home for conspiracy theories. For example, when making a claim that a certain piece of software is malicious or that certain telemetry data is privacy invasive, explain in detail what is collected and how it collected. Claims of this nature must be backed by technical evidence.
+
+1. **Don't abuse our willingness to help**
+
+ Our community members are not your free tech support. We are happy to help you with specific steps on your privacy journey if you are willing to put in effort on your end. We are not willing to answer endlessly repeated questions about generic computer problems you could have answered yourself with a 30-second internet search. Don't be a [help vampire](https://slash7.com/2006/12/22/vampires/).
+
+1. **Behave in a positive and constructive manner**
+
+ Examples of behavior that contributes to a positive environment for our community include:
+
+ - Demonstrating empathy and kindness toward other people
+ - Being respectful of differing opinions, viewpoints, and experiences
+ - Giving and gracefully accepting constructive feedback
+ - Accepting responsibility and apologizing to those affected by our mistakes, and learning from the experience
+ - Focusing on what is best not just for us as individuals, but for the overall community
+
+### Unacceptable Behavior
+
+The following behaviors are considered harassment and are unacceptable within our community:
+
+- The use of sexualized language or imagery, and sexual attention or advances of any kind
+- Trolling, insulting or derogatory comments, and personal or political attacks
+- Public or private harassment
+- Publishing others' private information, such as a physical or email address, without their explicit permission
+- Other conduct which could reasonably be considered inappropriate in a professional setting
+
+## Scope
+
+Our Code of Conduct applies within all project spaces, as well as when an individual is representing the Privacy Guides project in other communities.
+
+We are responsible for clarifying the standards of our community, and have the right to remove or alter the comments of those participating within our community, as necessary and at our discretion.
+
+### Contact
+
+If you observe a problem on a platform like Matrix or Reddit, please contact our moderators on that platform in chat, via DM, or through any designated "Modmail" system.
+
+If you have a problem elsewhere, or a problem our community moderators are unable to resolve, reach out to `jonah@privacyguides.org` and/or `dngray@privacyguides.org`.
+
+All community leaders are obligated to respect the privacy and security of the reporter of any incident.
diff --git a/i18n/fa/about/criteria.md b/i18n/fa/about/criteria.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..562a5d4a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/about/criteria.md
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+---
+title: General Criteria
+---
+
+!!! example "Work in Progress"
+
+ The following page is a work in progress, and does not reflect the full criteria for our recommendations at this time. Past discussion on this topic: [#24](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/discussions/24)
+
+Below are some things that must apply to all submissions to Privacy Guides. Each category will have additional requirements for inclusion.
+
+## Financial Disclosure
+
+We do not make money from recommending certain products, we do not use affiliate links, and we do not provide special consideration to project donors.
+
+## General Guidelines
+
+We apply these priorities when considering new recommendations:
+
+- **Secure**: Tools should follow security best-practices wherever applicable.
+- **Source Availability**: Open source projects are generally preferred over equivalent proprietary alternatives.
+- **Cross-Platform**: We typically prefer recommendations to be cross-platform, to avoid vendor lock-in.
+- **Active Development**: The tools that we recommend should be actively developed, unmaintained projects will be removed in most cases.
+- **Usability**: Tools should be accessible to most computer users, an overly technical background should not be required.
+- **Documented**: Tools should have clear and extensive documentation for use.
+
+## Developer Self-Submissions
+
+We have these requirements in regard to developers which wish to submit their project or software for consideration.
+
+- Must disclose affiliation, i.e. your position within the project being submitted.
+
+- Must have a security whitepaper if it is a project that involves handling of sensitive information like a messenger, password manager, encrypted cloud storage etc.
+ - Third party audit status. We want to know if you have one, or have one planned. If possible please mention who will be conducting the audit.
+
+- Must explain what the project brings to the table in regard to privacy.
+ - Does it solve any new problem?
+ - Why should anyone use it over the alternatives?
+
+- Must state what the exact threat model is with their project.
+ - It should be clear to potential users what the project can provide, and what it cannot.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/about/donate.md b/i18n/fa/about/donate.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5e700e2ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/about/donate.md
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+---
+title: Supporting Us
+---
+
+
+It takes a lot of [people](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors) and [work](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/pulse/monthly) to keep Privacy Guides up to date and spreading the word about privacy and mass surveillance. If you like what we do, consider getting involved by [editing the site](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org) or [contributing translations](https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides).
+
+If you want to support us financially, the most convenient method for us is contributing via Open Collective, a website operated by our fiscal host. Open Collective accepts payments via credit/debit card, PayPal, and bank transfers.
+
+[Donate on OpenCollective.com](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/donate ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+Donations made directly to us on Open Collective are generally tax-deductible in the US, because our fiscal host (the Open Collective Foundation) is a registered 501(c)3 organization. You will receive a receipt from the Open Collective Foundation after donating. Privacy Guides does not provide financial advice, and you should contact your tax advisor to find out whether this is applicable to you.
+
+If you already make use of GitHub sponsorships, you can also sponsor our organization there.
+
+[Sponsor us on GitHub](https://github.com/sponsors/privacyguides ""){.md-button}
+
+## Backers
+
+A special thanks to all those who support our mission! :heart:
+
+*Please note: This section loads a widget directly from Open Collective. This section does not reflect donations made outside of Open Collective, and we have no control over the specific donors featured in this section.*
+
+
+
+## How We Use Donations
+
+Privacy Guides is a **non-profit** organization. We use donations for a variety of purposes, including:
+
+**Domain Registrations**
+:
+
+We have a few domain names like `privacyguides.org` which cost us around $10 yearly to maintain their registration.
+
+**Web Hosting**
+:
+
+Traffic to this website uses hundreds of gigabytes of data per month, we use a variety of service providers to keep up with this traffic.
+
+**Online Services**
+:
+
+We host [internet services](https://privacyguides.net) for testing and showcasing different privacy-products we like and [recommend](../tools.md). Some of which are made publicly available for our community's use (SearXNG, Tor, etc.), and some are provided for our team members (email, etc.).
+
+**Product Purchases**
+:
+
+We occasionally purchase products and services for the purposes of testing our [recommended tools](../tools.md).
+
+We are still working with our fiscal host (the Open Collective Foundation) to receive cryptocurrency donations, at the moment the accounting is unfeasible for many smaller transactions, but this should change in the future. In the meantime, if you wish to make a sizable (> $100) cryptocurrency donation, please reach out to [jonah@privacyguides.org](mailto:jonah@privacyguides.org).
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/about/index.md b/i18n/fa/about/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..917b49103
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/about/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: "About Privacy Guides"
+---
+
+**Privacy Guides** is a socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy. We are a non-profit collective operated entirely by volunteer [team members](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/g/team) and contributors.
+
+[:material-hand-coin-outline: Support the project](donate.md ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+## Our Team
+
+??? person "@jonah"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/jonah)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/jonaharagon "@jonaharagon")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@jonah "@jonah@neat.computer"){rel=me}
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Homepage](https://www.jonaharagon.com)
+
+??? person "@niek-de-wilde"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/Niek-de-Wilde)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/blacklight447 "@blacklight447")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.social/@blacklight447 "@blacklight447@mastodon.social"){rel=me}
+
+??? person "@dngray"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/dngray)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/dngray "@dngray")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.social/@dngray "@dngray@mastodon.social"){rel=me}
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-envelope: Email](mailto:dngray@privacyguides.org)
+
+??? person "@freddy"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/freddy)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/freddy-m "@freddy-m")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://social.lol/@freddy "@freddy@social.lol"){rel=me}
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-envelope: Email](mailto:freddy@privacyguides.org)
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Homepage](https://freddy.omg.lol)
+
+??? person "@mfwmyfacewhen"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/mfwmyfacewhen)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/mfwmyfacewhen "@mfwmyfacewhen")
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Homepage](https://mfw.omg.lol)
+
+??? person "@olivia"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/olivia)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/hook9 "@hook9")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@oliviablob "@oliviablob@neat.computer"){rel=me}
+
+Additionally, [many people](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors) have made contributions to the project. You can too, we're open sourced on GitHub!
+
+Our team members review all changes made to the website and handle administrative duties such as web hosting and financials, however they do not personally profit from any contributions made to this site. Our financials are transparently hosted by the Open Collective Foundation 501(c)(3) at [opencollective.com/privacyguides](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides). Donations to Privacy Guides are generally tax deductible in the United States.
+
+## Site License
+
+*The following is a human-readable summary of (and not a substitute for) the [license](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE):*
+
+:fontawesome-brands-creative-commons: :fontawesome-brands-creative-commons-by: :fontawesome-brands-creative-commons-nd: Unless otherwise noted, the original content on this website is made available under the [Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE). This means that you are free to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format for any purpose, even commercially; as long as you give appropriate credit to `Privacy Guides (www.privacyguides.org)` and provide a link to the license. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests Privacy Guides endorses you or your use. If you remix, transform, or build upon the content of this website, you may not distribute the modified material.
+
+This license is in place to prevent people from sharing our work without giving proper credit, and to prevent people from modifying our work in a way that could be used to mislead people. If you find the terms of this license too restrictive for the project you're working on, please reach out to us at `jonah@privacyguides.org`. We are happy to provide alternative licensing options for well-intentioned projects in the privacy space!
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/about/notices.md b/i18n/fa/about/notices.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2ded68dfc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/about/notices.md
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+---
+title: "اطلاعیه ها و سلب مسئولیت"
+hide:
+ - toc
+---
+
+## سلب مسئولیت حقوقی
+
+Privacy Guides(راهنمای حفظ حریم خصوصی) یک شرکت حقوقی نیست. به این ترتیب، که وب سایت راهنمای حریم خصوصی و مشارکت کنندگان . مشاوره حقوقی ارائه نمی دهند. مطالب و توصیههای موجود در وبسایت و راهنماهای ما به منزله مشاوره حقوقی نیست و مشارکت در وبسایت یا برقراری ارتباط با راهنمای حریم خصوصی یا سایر مشارکتکنندگان در مورد وبسایت ما باعث ایجاد رابطه وکیل و مشتری نمیشود.
+
+راه اندازی این وب سایت، مانند هر تلاش انسانی، مستلزم عدم اطمینان و مبادله است. امیدواریم این وب سایت به شما کمک کند، اما ممکن است شامل اشتباهاتی باشد و نتواند به هر موقعیتی رسیدگی کند. اگر در مورد وضعیت خود سؤالی دارید، ما شما را تشویق میکنیم که تحقیقات خود را انجام دهید، کارشناسان دیگر را جستجو کنید و با انجمن راهنماهای حریم خصوصی وارد بحث شوید. If you have any legal questions, you should consult with your own legal counsel before moving forward.
+
+Privacy Guides is an open source project contributed to under licenses that include terms that, for the protection of the website and its contributors, make clear that the Privacy Guides project and website is offered "as-is", without warranty, and disclaiming liability for damages resulting from using the website or any recommendations contained within. Privacy Guides does not warrant or make any representations concerning the accuracy, likely results, or reliability of the use of the materials on the website or otherwise relating to such materials on the website or on any third-party sites linked on this site.
+
+Privacy Guides additionally does not warrant that this website will be constantly available, or available at all.
+
+## Licenses
+
+Unless otherwise noted, all content on this website is made available under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE).
+
+This does not include third-party code embedded in this repository, or code where a superseding license is otherwise noted. The following are notable examples, but this list may not be all-inclusive:
+
+* [MathJax](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/docs/assets/javascripts/mathjax.js) is licensed under the [Apache License 2.0](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/docs/assets/javascripts/LICENSE.mathjax.txt).
+
+Portions of this notice itself were adopted from [opensource.guide](https://github.com/github/opensource.guide/blob/master/notices.md) on GitHub. That resource and this page itself are released under [CC-BY-4.0](https://github.com/github/opensource.guide/blob/master/LICENSE).
+
+This means that you can use the human-readable content in this repository for your own project, per the terms outlined in the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License text. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests Privacy Guides endorses you or your use. You **may not** use the Privacy Guides branding in your own project without express approval from this project. Privacy Guides's brand trademarks include the "Privacy Guides" wordmark and shield logo.
+
+We believe that the logos and other images in `assets` obtained from third-party providers are either in the public domain or **fair use**. In a nutshell, legal [fair use doctrine](https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/more-info.html) allows the use of copyrighted images in order to identify the subject matter for purposes of public comment. However, these logos and other images may still be subject to trademark laws in one or more jurisdictions. Before using this content, please ensure that it is used to identify the entity or organization that owns the trademark and that you have the right to use it under the laws which apply in the circumstances of your intended use. *When copying content from this website, you are solely responsible for ensuring that you do not infringe someone else's trademark or copyright.*
+
+When you contribute to this repository you are doing so under the above licenses, and you are granting Privacy Guides a perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive, transferable, royalty-free, irrevocable license with the right to sublicense such rights through multiple tiers of sublicensees, to reproduce, modify, display, perform and distribute your contribution as part of our project.
+
+## Acceptable Use
+
+You may not use this website in any way that causes or may cause damage to the website or impairment of the availability or accessibility of Privacy Guides, or in any way which is unlawful, illegal, fraudulent, harmful, or in connection with any unlawful, illegal, fraudulent, or harmful purpose or activity.
+
+You must not conduct any systematic or automated data collection activities on or in relation to this website without express written consent, including:
+
+* Excessive Automated Scans
+* Denial of Service Attacks
+* Scraping
+* Data Mining
+* 'Framing' (IFrames)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/about/privacy-policy.md b/i18n/fa/about/privacy-policy.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..70ab9d9be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/about/privacy-policy.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: "Privacy Policy"
+---
+
+Privacy Guides is a community project operated by a number of active volunteer contributors. The public list of team members [can be found on GitHub](https://github.com/orgs/privacyguides/people).
+
+## Data We Collect From Visitors
+
+The privacy of our website visitors is important to us, so we do not track any individual people. As a visitor to our website:
+
+- No personal information is collected
+- No information such as cookies are stored in the browser
+- No information is shared with, sent to or sold to third-parties
+- No information is shared with advertising companies
+- No information is mined and harvested for personal and behavioral trends
+- No information is monetized
+
+You can view the data we collect on our [statistics](statistics.md) page.
+
+We run a self-hosted installation of [Plausible Analytics](https://plausible.io) to collect some anonymous usage data for statistical purposes. The goal is to track overall trends in our website traffic, it is not to track individual visitors. All the data is in aggregate only. No personal data is collected.
+
+Data collected includes referral sources, top pages, visit duration, information from the devices (device type, operating system, country and browser) used during the visit and more. You can learn more about how Plausible works and collects information in a privacy-respecting manner [here](https://plausible.io/data-policy).
+
+## Data We Collect From Account Holders
+
+On some websites and services we provide, many features may require an account. For example, an account may be required to post and reply to topics on a forum platform.
+
+To sign up for most accounts, we will collect a name, username, email, and password. In the event a website requires more information than just that data, that will be clearly marked and noted in a separate privacy statement per-site.
+
+We use your account data to identify you on the website and to create pages specific to you, such as your profile page. We will also use your account data to publish a public profile for you on our services.
+
+We use your email to:
+
+- Notify you about posts and other activity on the websites or services.
+- Reset your password and help keep your account secure.
+- Contact you in special circumstances related to your account.
+- Contact you about legal requests, such as DMCA takedown requests.
+
+On some websites and services you may provide additional information for your account, such as a short biography, avatar, your location, or your birthday. We make that information available to everyone who can access the website or service in question. This information is not required to use any of our services and can be erased at any time.
+
+We will store your account data as long as your account remains open. After closing an account, we may retain some or all of your account data in the form of backups or archives for up to 90 days.
+
+## Contacting Us
+
+The Privacy Guides team generally does not have access to personal data outside of limited access granted via some moderation panels. Inquiries regarding your personal information should be sent directly to:
+
+```text
+Jonah Aragon
+Services Administrator
+jonah@privacyguides.org
+```
+
+For all other inquiries, you can contact any member of our team.
+
+For complaints under GDPR more generally, you may lodge complaints with your local data protection supervisory authorities. In France it's the Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés which take care and handle the complaints. They provide a [template of complaint letter](https://www.cnil.fr/en/plaintes) to use.
+
+## About This Policy
+
+We will post any new versions of this statement [here](privacy-policy.md). We may change how we announce changes in future versions of this document. In the meantime we may update our contact information at any time without announcing a change. Please refer to the [Privacy Policy](privacy-policy.md) for the latest contact information at any time.
+
+A full revision [history](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/commits/main/docs/about/privacy-policy.md) of this page can be found on GitHub.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/about/privacytools.md b/i18n/fa/about/privacytools.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..319fac36e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/about/privacytools.md
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+---
+title: "PrivacyTools FAQ"
+---
+
+# Why we moved on from PrivacyTools
+
+In September 2021, every active contributor unanimously agreed to move from PrivacyTools to work on this site: Privacy Guides. This decision was made because PrivacyTools’ founder and controller of the domain name had disappeared for an extended period of time and could not be contacted.
+
+Having built a reputable site and set of services on PrivacyTools.io, this caused grave concerns for the future of PrivacyTools, as any future disruption could wipe out the entire organization with no recovery method. This transition was communicated to the PrivacyTools community many months in advance via a variety of channels including its blog, Twitter, Reddit, and Mastodon to ensure the entire process went as smoothly as possible. We did this to ensure nobody was kept in the dark, which has been our modus operandi since our team was created, and to make sure Privacy Guides was recognized as the same reliable organization that PrivacyTools was before the transition.
+
+After the organizational move was completed, the founder of PrivacyTools returned and began to spread misinformation about the Privacy Guides project. They continue to spread misinformation in addition to operating a paid link farm on the PrivacyTools domain. We are creating this page to clear up any misconceptions.
+
+## What is PrivacyTools?
+
+PrivacyTools was created in 2015 by "BurungHantu," who wanted to make a privacy information resource - helpful tools following the Snowden revelations. The site grew into a flourishing open-source project with [many contributors](https://github.com/privacytools/privacytools.io/graphs/contributors), some eventually given various organizational responsibilities, such as operating online services like Matrix and Mastodon, managing and reviewing changes to the site on GitHub, finding sponsors for the project, writing blog posts and operating social media outreach platforms like Twitter, etc.
+
+Beginning in 2019, BurungHantu grew more and more distant from the active development of the website and communities, and began delaying payments he was responsible for related to the servers we operated. To avoid having our system administrator pay server costs out of their own pocket, we changed the donation methods listed on the site from BurungHantu's personal PayPal and crypto accounts to a new OpenCollective page on [October 31, 2019](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184557/https://blog.privacytools.io/privacytools-io-joins-the-open-collective-foundation/). This had the added benefits of making our finances completely transparent, a value we strongly believe in, and tax-deductible in the United States, because they were being held by the Open Collective Foundation 501(c)3. This change was unanimously agreed upon by the team and went uncontested.
+
+## Why We Moved On
+
+In 2020, BurungHantu's absence grew much more noticeable. At one point, we required the domain's nameservers to be changed to nameservers controlled by our system administrator to avoid future disruption, and this change was not completed for over a month after the initial request. He would disappear from the public chat and private team chat rooms on Matrix for months at a time, occasionally popping in to give some small feedback or promise to be more active before disappearing once again.
+
+In October 2020, the PrivacyTools system administrator (Jonah) [left](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190742/https://blog.privacytools.io/blacklight447-taking-over/) the project because of these difficulties, handing control to another long-time contributor. Jonah had been operating nearly every PrivacyTools service and acting as the *de facto* project lead for website development in BurungHantu's absence, thus his departure was a significant change to the organization. At the time, because of these significant organizational changes, BurungHantu promised the remaining team he would return to take control of the project going forward. ==The PrivacyTools team reached out via several communication methods over the following months, but did not receive any response.==
+
+## Domain Name Reliance
+
+At the beginning of 2021, the PrivacyTools team grew worried about the future of the project, because the domain name was set to expire on 1st March 2021. The domain was ultimately renewed by BurungHantu with no comment.
+
+The team’s concerns were not addressed, and we realized this would be a problem every year: If the domain expired it would have allowed it to be stolen by squatters or spammers, thus ruining the organization's reputation. We also would have had trouble reaching the community to inform them of what took place.
+
+Without being in any contact with BurungHantu, we decided the best course of action would be to move to a new domain name while we still had guaranteed control over the old domain name, sometime before March 2022. This way, we would be able to cleanly redirect all PrivacyTools resources to the new site without any interruption in service. This decision was made many months in advance and communicated to the entire team in the hopes that BurungHantu would reach out and assure his continued support for the project, because with a recognizable brand name and large communities online, moving away from "PrivacyTools" was the least desirable possible outcome.
+
+In mid-2021 the PrivacyTools team reached out to Jonah, who agreed to rejoin the team to help with the transition.
+
+## Community Call to Action
+
+At the end of July 2021, we [informed](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184422/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-future-of-privacytools/) the PrivacyTools community of our intention to choose a new name and continue the project on a new domain, to be [chosen](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190935/https://aragon.cloud/apps/forms/cMPxG9KyopapBbcw) on 2nd August 2022. In the end, "Privacy Guides" was selected, with the `privacyguides.org` domain already owned by Jonah for a side-project from 2020 that went undeveloped.
+
+## Control of r/privacytoolsIO
+
+Simultaneously with the ongoing website issues at privacytools.io, the r/privacytoolsIO moderation team was facing challenges with managing the subreddit. The subreddit had always been operated mostly independently of the website's development, but BurungHantu was the primary moderator of the subreddit as well, and he was the only moderator granted "Full Control" privileges. u/trai_dep was the only active moderator at the time, and [posted](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/comments/o9tllh/requesting_rprivacytoolsio_im_only_active_mod_top/) a request to Reddit's administrators on June 28, 2021, asking to be granted the primary moderator position and full control privileges, in order to make necessary changes to the Subreddit.
+
+Reddit requires that subreddits have active moderators. If the primary moderator is inactive for a lengthy period of time (such as a year) the primary moderation position can be re-appointed to the next moderator in line. For this request to have been granted, BurungHantu had to have been completely absent from all Reddit activity for a long period of time, which was consistent with his behaviors on other platforms.
+
+> If you were removed as moderator from a subreddit through Reddit request it is because your lack of response and lack of activity qualified the subreddit for an r/redditrequest transfer.
+>
+> r/redditrequest is Reddit's way of making sure communities have active moderators and is part of the [Moderator Code of Conduct](https://www.redditinc.com/policies/moderator-code-of-conduct).
+
+## Beginning the Transition
+
+On September 14th, 2021, we [announced](https://www.privacyguides.org/blog/2021/09/14/welcome-to-privacy-guides/) the beginning of our migration to this new domain:
+
+> [...] we found it necessary to make this switch sooner rather than later to ensure people would find out about this transition as soon as possible. This gives us adequate time to transition the domain name, which is currently redirecting to www.privacyguides.org, and it hopefully gives everyone enough time to notice the change, update bookmarks and websites, etc.
+
+This change [entailed:](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pnhn4a/rprivacyguides_privacyguidesorg_what_you_need_to/)
+
+- Redirecting www.privacytools.io to [www.privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org).
+- Archiving the source code on GitHub to preserve our past work and issue tracker, which we continued to use for months of future development of this site.
+- Posting announcements to our subreddit and various other communities informing people of the official change.
+- Formally closing privacytools.io services, like Matrix and Mastodon, and encouraging existing users to migrate as soon as possible.
+
+Things appeared to be going smoothly, and most of our active community made the switch to our new project exactly as we hoped.
+
+## Following Events
+
+Roughly a week following the transition, BurungHantu returned online for the first time in nearly a year, however nobody on our team was willing to return to PrivacyTools because of his historic unreliability. Rather than apologize for his prolonged absence, he immediately went on the offensive and positioned the transition to Privacy Guides as an attack against him and his project. He subsequently [deleted](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/pp9yie/comment/hd49wbn) many of these posts when it was pointed out by the community that he had been absent and abandoned the project.
+
+At this point, BurungHantu claimed he wanted to continue working on privacytools.io on his own and requested that we remove the redirect from www.privacytools.io to [www.privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org). We obliged and requested that he keep the subdomains for Matrix, Mastodon, and PeerTube active for us to run as a public service to our community for at least a few months, in order to allow users on those platforms to easily migrate to other accounts. Due to the federated nature of the services we provided, they were tied to specific domain names making it very difficult to migrate (and in some cases impossible).
+
+Unfortunately, because control of the r/privacytoolsIO subreddit was not returned to BurungHantu at his demand (further information below), those subdomains were [cut off](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pymthv/comment/hexwrps/) at the beginning of October, ending any migration possibilities to any users still using those services.
+
+Following this, BurungHantu made false accusations about Jonah stealing donations from the project. BurungHantu had over a year since the alleged incident occurred, and yet he never made anyone aware of it until after the Privacy Guides migration. BurungHantu has been repeatedly asked for proof and to comment on the reason for his silence by the team [and the community](https://twitter.com/TommyTran732/status/1526153536962281474), and has not done so.
+
+BurungHantu also made a [twitter post](https://twitter.com/privacytoolsIO/status/1510560676967710728) alleging that an "attorney" had reached out to him on Twitter and was providing advice, in another attempt to bully us into giving him control of our subreddit, and as part of his smear campaign to muddy the waters surrounding the launch of Privacy Guides while pretending to be a victim.
+
+## PrivacyTools.io Now
+
+As of September 25th 2022 we are seeing BurungHantu's overall plans come to fruition on privacytools.io, and this is the very reason we decided to create this explainer page today. The website he is operating appears to be a heavily SEO-optimized version of the site which recommends tools in exchange for financial compensation. Very recently, IVPN and Mullvad, two VPN providers near-universally [recommended](../vpn.md) by the privacy community and notable for their stance against affiliate programs were removed from PrivacyTools. In their place? NordVPN, Surfshark, ExpressVPN, and hide.me; Giant VPN corporations with untrustworthy platforms and business practices, notorious for their aggressive marketing and affiliate programs.
+
+==**PrivacyTools has become exactly the type of site we [warned against](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729205249/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-reviews/) on the PrivacyTools blog in 2019.**== We've tried to keep our distance from PrivacyTools since the transition, but their continued harassment towards our project and now their absurd abuse of the credibility their brand gained over 6 years of open source contributions is extremely troubling to us. Those of us actually fighting for privacy are not fighting against each other, and are not getting our advice from the highest bidder.
+
+## r/privacytoolsIO Now
+
+After the launch of [r/PrivacyGuides](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacyguides), it was impractical for u/trai_dep to continue moderating both subreddits, and with the community on-board with the transition, r/privacytoolsIO was [made](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/qk7qrj/a_new_era_why_rptio_is_now_a_restricted_sub/) a restricted sub in a post on November 1st, 2021:
+
+> [...] The growth of this Sub was the result of great effort, across several years, by the PrivacyGuides.org team. And by every one of you.
+>
+> A Subreddit is a great deal of work to administer and moderate. Like a garden, it requires patient tending and daily care. It’s not a task for dilettantes or commitment-challenged people. It can’t thrive under a gardener who abandons it for several years, then shows up demanding this year’s harvest as their tribute. It’s unfair to the team formed years ago. It’s unfair to you. [...]
+
+Subreddits do not belong to anybody, and they especially do not belong to brand-holders. They belong to their communities, and the community and its moderators made the decision to support the move to r/PrivacyGuides.
+
+In the months since, BurungHantu has threatened and begged for returning subreddit control to his account in [violation](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/wiki/top_mod_removal/) of Reddit rules:
+
+> Retaliation from any moderator with regards to removal requests is disallowed.
+
+For a community with many thousands of remaining subscribers, we feel that it would be incredibly disrespectful to return control of that massive platform to the person who abandoned it for over a year, and who now operates a website that we feel provides very low-quality information. Preserving the years of past discussions in that community is more important to us, and thus u/trai_dep and the rest of the subreddit moderation team has made the decision to keep r/privacytoolsIO as-is.
+
+## OpenCollective Now
+
+Our fundraising platform, OpenCollective, is another source of contention. Our position is that OpenCollective was put in place by our team and managed by our team to fund services we currently operate and which PrivacyTools no longer does. We [reached out](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/updates/transitioning-to-privacy-guides) to all of our donors regarding our move to Privacy Guides, and we were unanimously supported by our sponsors and community.
+
+Thus, the funds in OpenCollective belong to Privacy Guides, they were given to our project, and not the owner of a well known domain name. In the announcement made to donors on September 17th, 2021, we offered refunds to any donor who disagrees with the stance we took, but nobody has taken us up on this offer:
+
+> If any sponsors or backers disagree with or feel misled by these recent events and would like to request a refund given these highly unusual circumstances, please get in touch with our project admin by emailing jonah@triplebit.net.
+
+## Further Reading
+
+This topic has been discussed extensively within our communities in various locations, and it seems likely that most people reading this page will already be familiar with the events leading up to the move to Privacy Guides. Some of our previous posts on the matter may have extra detail we omitted here for brevity. They have been linked below for the sake of completion.
+
+- [June 28, 2021 request for control of r/privacytoolsIO](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/comments/o9tllh/requesting_rprivacytoolsio_im_only_active_mod_top/)
+- [July 27, 2021 announcement of our intentions to move on the PrivacyTools blog, written by the team](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184422/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-future-of-privacytools/)
+- [Sept 13, 2021 announcement of the beginning of our transition to Privacy Guides on r/privacytoolsIO](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/pnql46/rprivacyguides_privacyguidesorg_what_you_need_to/)
+- [Sept 17, 2021 announcement on OpenCollective from Jonah](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/updates/transitioning-to-privacy-guides)
+- [Sept 30, 2021 Twitter thread detailing most of the events now described on this page](https://twitter.com/privacy_guides/status/1443633412800225280)
+- [Oct 1, 2021 post by u/dng99 noting subdomain failure](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pymthv/comment/hexwrps/)
+- [Apr 2, 2022 response by u/dng99 to PrivacyTools' accusatory blog post](https://www.reddit.com/comments/tuo7mm/comment/i35kw5a/)
+- [May 16, 2022 response by @TommyTran732 on Twitter](https://twitter.com/TommyTran732/status/1526153497984618496)
+- [Sep 3, 2022 post on Techlore's forum by @dngray](https://discuss.techlore.tech/t/has-anyone-seen-this-video-wondering-your-thoughts/792/20)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/about/services.md b/i18n/fa/about/services.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..45a5f1765
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/about/services.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# Privacy Guides Services
+
+We run a number of web services to test out features and promote cool decentralized, federated, and/or open-source projects. Many of these services are available to the public and are detailed below.
+
+[:material-comment-alert: Report an issue](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/services/2 ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+## Discourse
+
+- Domain: [discuss.privacyguides.net](https://discuss.privacyguides.net)
+- Availability: Public
+- Source: [github.com/discourse/discourse](https://github.com/discourse/discourse)
+
+## Gitea
+
+- Domain: [code.privacyguides.dev](https://code.privacyguides.dev)
+- Availability: Invite-Only
+ Access may be granted upon request to any team working on *Privacy Guides*-related development or content.
+- Source: [snapcraft.io/gitea](https://snapcraft.io/gitea)
+
+## Matrix
+
+- Domain: [matrix.privacyguides.org](https://matrix.privacyguides.org)
+- Availability: Invite-Only
+ Access may be granted upon request to Privacy Guides team members, Matrix moderators, third-party Matrix community administrators, Matrix bot operators, and other individuals in need of a reliable Matrix presence.
+- Source: [github.com/spantaleev/matrix-docker-ansible-deploy](https://github.com/spantaleev/matrix-docker-ansible-deploy)
+
+## SearXNG
+
+- Domain: [search.privacyguides.net](https://search.privacyguides.net)
+- Availability: Public
+- Source: [github.com/searxng/searxng-docker](https://github.com/searxng/searxng-docker)
+
+## Invidious
+
+- Domain: [invidious.privacyguides.net](https://invidious.privacyguides.net)
+- Availability: Semi-Public
+ We host Invidious primarily to serve embedded YouTube videos on our website, this instance is not intended for general-purpose use and may be limited at any time.
+- Source: [github.com/iv-org/invidious](https://github.com/iv-org/invidious)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/about/statistics.md b/i18n/fa/about/statistics.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6e2334d43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/about/statistics.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: Traffic Statistics
+---
+
+## Website Statistics
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/advanced/communication-network-types.md b/i18n/fa/advanced/communication-network-types.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fcbc0465b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/advanced/communication-network-types.md
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+---
+title: "Types of Communication Networks"
+icon: 'material/transit-connection-variant'
+---
+
+There are several network architectures commonly used to relay messages between people. These networks can provide different privacy guarantees, which is why it's worth considering your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md) when deciding which app to use.
+
+[Recommended Instant Messengers](../real-time-communication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Centralized Networks
+
+{ align=left }
+
+Centralized messengers are those where all participants are on the same server or network of servers controlled by the same organization.
+
+Some self-hosted messengers allow you to set up your own server. Self-hosting can provide additional privacy guarantees, such as no usage logs or limited access to metadata (data about who is talking to whom). Self-hosted centralized messengers are isolated and everyone must be on the same server to communicate.
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- New features and changes can be implemented more quickly.
+- Easier to get started with and to find contacts.
+- Most mature and stable features ecosystems, as they are easier to program in a centralized software.
+- Privacy issues may be reduced when you trust a server that you're self-hosting.
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Can include [restricted control or access](https://drewdevault.com/2018/08/08/Signal.html). This can include things like:
+- Being [forbidden from connecting third-party clients](https://github.com/LibreSignal/LibreSignal/issues/37#issuecomment-217211165) to the centralized network that might provide for greater customization or a better experience. Often defined in Terms and Conditions of usage.
+- Poor or no documentation for third-party developers.
+- The [ownership](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729191953/https://blog.privacytools.io/delisting-wire/), privacy policy, and operations of the service can change easily when a single entity controls it, potentially compromising the service later on.
+- Self-hosting requires effort and knowledge of how to set up a service.
+
+## Federated Networks
+
+{ align=left }
+
+Federated messengers use multiple, independent, decentralized servers that are able to talk to each other (email is one example of a federated service). Federation allows system administrators to control their own server and still be a part of the larger communications network.
+
+When self-hosted, members of a federated server can discover and communicate with members of other servers, although some servers may choose to remain private by being non-federated (e.g., work team server).
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- Allows for greater control over your own data when running your own server.
+- Allows you to choose whom to trust your data with by choosing between multiple "public" servers.
+- Often allows for third-party clients which can provide a more native, customized, or accessible experience.
+- Server software can be verified that it matches public source code, assuming you have access to the server or you trust the person who does (e.g., a family member).
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Adding new features is more complex because these features need to be standardized and tested to ensure they work with all servers on the network.
+- Due to the previous point, features can be lacking, or incomplete or working in unexpected ways compared to centralized platforms, such as message relay when offline or message deletion.
+- Some metadata may be available (e.g., information like "who is talking to whom," but not actual message content if E2EE is used).
+- Federated servers generally require trusting your server's administrator. They may be a hobbyist or otherwise not a "security professional," and may not serve standard documents like a privacy policy or terms of service detailing how your data is used.
+- Server administrators sometimes choose to block other servers, which are a source of unmoderated abuse or break general rules of accepted behavior. This will hinder your ability to communicate with members of those servers.
+
+## Peer-to-Peer Networks
+
+{ align=left }
+
+P2P messengers connect to a [distributed network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_networking) of nodes to relay a message to the recipient without a third-party server.
+
+Clients (peers) usually find each other through the use of a [distributed computing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_computing) network. Examples of this include [Distributed Hash Tables](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_hash_table) (DHT), used by [torrents](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent_(protocol)) and [IPFS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/InterPlanetary_File_System) for example. Another approach is proximity based networks, where a connection is established over WiFi or Bluetooth (for example, Briar or the [Scuttlebutt](https://www.scuttlebutt.nz) social network protocol).
+
+Once a peer has found a route to its contact via any of these methods, a direct connection between them is made. Although messages are usually encrypted, an observer can still deduce the location and identity of the sender and recipient.
+
+P2P networks do not use servers, as peers communicate directly between each other and hence cannot be self-hosted. However, some additional services may rely on centralized servers, such as user discovery or relaying offline messages, which can benefit from self-hosting.
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- Minimal information is exposed to third-parties.
+- Modern P2P platforms implement E2EE by default. There are no servers that could potentially intercept and decrypt your transmissions, unlike centralized and federated models.
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Reduced feature set:
+- Messages can only be sent when both peers are online, however, your client may store messages locally to wait for the contact to return online.
+- Generally increases battery usage on mobile devices, because the client must stay connected to the distributed network to learn about who is online.
+- Some common messenger features may not be implemented or incompletely, such as message deletion.
+- Your IP address and that of the contacts you're communicating with may be exposed if you do not use the software in conjunction with a [VPN](../vpn.md) or [Tor](../tor.md). Many countries have some form of mass surveillance and/or metadata retention.
+
+## Anonymous Routing
+
+{ align=left }
+
+A messenger using [anonymous routing](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_628) hides either the identity of the sender, the receiver, or evidence that they have been communicating. Ideally, a messenger should hide all three.
+
+There are [many](https://doi.org/10.1145/3182658) different ways to implement anonymous routing. One of the most famous is [onion routing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing) (i.e. [Tor](tor-overview.md)), which communicates encrypted messages through a virtual [overlay network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overlay_network) that hides the location of each node as well as the recipient and sender of each message. The sender and recipient never interact directly and only meet through a secret rendezvous node so that there is no leak of IP addresses nor physical location. Nodes cannot decrypt messages, nor the final destination; only the recipient can. Each intermediary node can only decrypt a part that indicates where to send the still encrypted message next, until it arrives at the recipient who can fully decrypt it, hence the "onion layers."
+
+Self-hosting a node in an anonymous routing network does not provide the hoster with additional privacy benefits, but rather contributes to the whole network's resilience against identification attacks for everyone's benefit.
+
+**Advantages:**
+
+- Minimal to no information is exposed to other parties.
+- Messages can be relayed in a decentralized manner even if one of the parties is offline.
+
+**Disadvantages:**
+
+- Slow message propagation.
+- Often limited to fewer media types, mostly text, since the network is slow.
+- Less reliable if nodes are selected by randomized routing, some nodes may be very far from the sender and receiver, adding latency or even failing to transmit messages if one of the nodes goes offline.
+- More complex to get started, as the creation and secured backup of a cryptographic private key is required.
+- Just like other decentralized platforms, adding features is more complex for developers than on a centralized platform. Hence, features may be lacking or incompletely implemented, such as offline message relaying or message deletion.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/advanced/dns-overview.md b/i18n/fa/advanced/dns-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1e872d2d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/advanced/dns-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+---
+title: "DNS Overview"
+icon: material/dns
+---
+
+[سیستم نام دامنه (DNS)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System) 'دفترچه تلفن اینترنت' است. DNS translates domain names to IP addresses so browsers and other services can load Internet resources, through a decentralized network of servers.
+
+## دی ان اس DNS چیست؟
+
+When you visit a website, a numerical address is returned. For example, when you visit `privacyguides.org`, the address `192.98.54.105` is returned.
+
+DNS has existed since the [early days](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System#History) of the Internet. DNS requests made to and from DNS servers are **not** generally encrypted. In a residential setting, a customer is given servers by the ISP via [DHCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dynamic_Host_Configuration_Protocol).
+
+Unencrypted DNS requests are able to be easily **surveilled** and **modified** in transit. In some parts of the world, ISPs are ordered to do primitive [DNS filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking). When you request the IP address of a domain that is blocked, the server may not respond or may respond with a different IP address. As the DNS protocol is not encrypted, the ISP (or any network operator) can use [DPI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection) to monitor requests. ISPs can also block requests based on common characteristics, regardless of which DNS server is used. Unencrypted DNS always uses [port](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_(computer_networking)) 53 and always uses UDP.
+
+Below, we discuss and provide a tutorial to prove what an outside observer may see using regular unencrypted DNS and [encrypted DNS](#what-is-encrypted-dns).
+
+### Unencrypted DNS
+
+1. Using [`tshark`](https://www.wireshark.org/docs/man-pages/tshark.html) (part of the [Wireshark](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wireshark) project) we can monitor and record internet packet flow. This command records packets that meet the rules specified:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/dns.pcap udp port 53 and host 1.1.1.1 or host 8.8.8.8
+ ```
+
+2. We can then use [`dig`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dig_(command)) (Linux, MacOS etc) or [`nslookup`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nslookup) (Windows) to send the DNS lookup to both servers. Software such as web browsers do these lookups automatically, unless they are configured to use encrypted DNS.
+
+ === "Linux, macOS"
+
+ ```
+ dig +noall +answer privacyguides.org @1.1.1.1
+ dig +noall +answer privacyguides.org @8.8.8.8
+ ```
+ === "Windows"
+
+ ```
+ nslookup privacyguides.org 1.1.1.1
+ nslookup privacyguides.org 8.8.8.8
+ ```
+
+3. Next, we want to [analyse](https://www.wireshark.org/docs/wsug_html_chunked/ChapterIntroduction.html#ChIntroWhatIs) the results:
+
+ === "Wireshark"
+
+ ```
+ wireshark -r /tmp/dns.pcap
+ ```
+
+ === "tshark"
+
+ ```
+ tshark -r /tmp/dns.pcap
+ ```
+
+If you run the Wireshark command above, the top pane shows the "[frames](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethernet_frame)", and the bottom pane shows all the data about the selected frame. Enterprise filtering and monitoring solutions (such as those purchased by governments) can do the process automatically, without human interaction, and can aggregate those frames to produce statistical data useful to the network observer.
+
+| No. | Time | Source | Destination | Protocol | Length | Info |
+| --- | -------- | --------- | ----------- | -------- | ------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| 1 | 0.000000 | 192.0.2.1 | 1.1.1.1 | DNS | 104 | Standard query 0x58ba A privacyguides.org OPT |
+| 2 | 0.293395 | 1.1.1.1 | 192.0.2.1 | DNS | 108 | Standard query response 0x58ba A privacyguides.org A 198.98.54.105 OPT |
+| 3 | 1.682109 | 192.0.2.1 | 8.8.8.8 | DNS | 104 | Standard query 0xf1a9 A privacyguides.org OPT |
+| 4 | 2.154698 | 8.8.8.8 | 192.0.2.1 | DNS | 108 | Standard query response 0xf1a9 A privacyguides.org A 198.98.54.105 OPT |
+
+An observer could modify any of these packets.
+
+## What is "encrypted DNS"?
+
+Encrypted DNS can refer to one of a number of protocols, the most common ones being:
+
+### DNSCrypt
+
+[**DNSCrypt**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNSCrypt) was one of the first methods of encrypting DNS queries. DNSCrypt operates on port 443 and works with both the TCP or UDP transport protocols. DNSCrypt has never been submitted to the [Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Engineering_Task_Force) nor has it gone through the [Request for Comments (RFC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Request_for_Comments) process, so it has not been used widely outside of a few [implementations](https://dnscrypt.info/implementations). As a result, it has been largely replaced by the more popular [DNS over HTTPS](#dns-over-https-doh).
+
+### DNS over TLS (DoT)
+
+[**DNS over TLS**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_TLS) is another method for encrypting DNS communication that is defined in [RFC 7858](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7858). Support was first implemented in Android 9, iOS 14, and on Linux in [systemd-resolved](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/resolved.conf.html#DNSOverTLS=) in version 237. Preference in the industry has been moving away from DoT to DoH in recent years, as DoT is a [complex protocol](https://dnscrypt.info/faq/) and has varying compliance to the RFC across the implementations that exist. DoT also operates on a dedicated port 853 which can be blocked easily by restrictive firewalls.
+
+### DNS over HTTPS (DoH)
+
+[**DNS over HTTPS**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_HTTPS) as defined in [RFC 8484](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8484) packages queries in the [HTTP/2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/2) protocol and provides security with HTTPS. Support was first added in web browsers such as Firefox 60 and Chrome 83.
+
+Native implementation of DoH showed up in iOS 14, macOS 11, Microsoft Windows, and Android 13 (however, it won't be enabled [by default](https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/packages/modules/DnsResolver/+/1833144)). General Linux desktop support is waiting on the systemd [implementation](https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/8639) so [installing third-party software is still required](../dns.md#encrypted-dns-proxies).
+
+## What can an outside party see?
+
+In this example we will record what happens when we make a DoH request:
+
+1. First, start `tshark`:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/dns_doh.pcap -f "tcp port https and host 1.1.1.1"
+ ```
+
+2. Second, make a request with `curl`:
+
+ ```bash
+ curl -vI --doh-url https://1.1.1.1/dns-query https://privacyguides.org
+ ```
+
+3. After making the request, we can stop the packet capture with CTRL + C.
+
+4. Analyse the results in Wireshark:
+
+ ```bash
+ wireshark -r /tmp/dns_doh.pcap
+ ```
+
+We can see the [connection establishment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol#Connection_establishment) and [TLS handshake](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ssl/what-happens-in-a-tls-handshake/) that occurs with any encrypted connection. When looking at the "application data" packets that follow, none of them contain the domain we requested or the IP address returned.
+
+## Why **shouldn't** I use encrypted DNS?
+
+In locations where there is internet filtering (or censorship), visiting forbidden resources may have its own consequences which you should consider in your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md). We do **not** suggest the use of encrypted DNS for this purpose. Use [Tor](https://torproject.org) or a [VPN](../vpn.md) instead. If you're using a VPN, you should use your VPN's DNS servers. When using a VPN, you are already trusting them with all your network activity.
+
+When we do a DNS lookup, it's generally because we want to access a resource. Below, we will discuss some of the methods that may disclose your browsing activities even when using encrypted DNS:
+
+### IP Address
+
+The simplest way to determine browsing activity might be to look at the IP addresses your devices are accessing. For example, if the observer knows that `privacyguides.org` is at `198.98.54.105`, and your device is requesting data from `198.98.54.105`, there is a good chance you're visiting Privacy Guides.
+
+This method is only useful when the IP address belongs to a server that only hosts few websites. It's also not very useful if the site is hosted on a shared platform (e.g. Github Pages, Cloudflare Pages, Netlify, WordPress, Blogger, etc). It also isn't very useful if the server is hosted behind a [reverse proxy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_proxy), which is very common on the modern Internet.
+
+### Server Name Indication (SNI)
+
+Server Name Indication is typically used when a IP address hosts many websites. This could be a service like Cloudflare, or some other [Denial-of-service attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial-of-service_attack) protection.
+
+1. Start capturing again with `tshark`. We've added a filter with our IP address so you don't capture many packets:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/pg.pcap port 443 and host 198.98.54.105
+ ```
+
+2. Then we visit [https://privacyguides.org](https://privacyguides.org).
+
+3. After visiting the website, we want to stop the packet capture with CTRL + C.
+
+4. Next we want to analyze the results:
+
+ ```bash
+ wireshark -r /tmp/pg.pcap
+ ```
+
+ We will see the connection establishment, followed by the TLS handshake for the Privacy Guides website. Around frame 5. you'll see a "Client Hello".
+
+5. Expand the triangle ▸ next to each field:
+
+ ```text
+ ▸ Transport Layer Security
+ ▸ TLSv1.3 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
+ ▸ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
+ ▸ Extension: server_name (len=22)
+ ▸ Server Name Indication extension
+ ```
+
+6. We can see the SNI value which discloses the website we are visiting. The `tshark` command can give you the value directly for all packets containing a SNI value:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -r /tmp/pg.pcap -Tfields -Y tls.handshake.extensions_server_name -e tls.handshake.extensions_server_name
+ ```
+
+This means even if we are using "Encrypted DNS" servers, the domain will likely be disclosed through SNI. The [TLS v1.3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#TLS_1.3) protocol brings with it [Encrypted Client Hello](https://blog.cloudflare.com/encrypted-client-hello/), which prevents this kind of leak.
+
+Governments, in particular [China](https://www.zdnet.com/article/china-is-now-blocking-all-encrypted-https-traffic-using-tls-1-3-and-esni/) and [Russia](https://www.zdnet.com/article/russia-wants-to-ban-the-use-of-secure-protocols-such-as-tls-1-3-doh-dot-esni/), have either already [started blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication#Encrypted_Client_Hello) it or expressed a desire to do so. Recently, Russia has [started blocking foreign websites](https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/108) that use the [HTTP/3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) standard. This is because the [QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QUIC) protocol that is a part of HTTP/3 requires that `ClientHello` also be encrypted.
+
+### Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
+
+Another way your browser can disclose your browsing activities is with the [Online Certificate Status Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_Certificate_Status_Protocol). When visiting an HTTPS website, the browser might check to see if the website's [certificate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_certificate) has been revoked. This is generally done through the HTTP protocol, meaning it is **not** encrypted.
+
+The OCSP request contains the certificate "[serial number](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_certificate#Common_fields)", which is unique. It is sent to the "OCSP responder" in order to check its status.
+
+We can simulate what a browser would do using the [`openssl`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenSSL) command.
+
+1. Get the server certificate and use [`sed`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sed) to keep just the important part and write it out to a file:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl s_client -connect privacyguides.org:443 < /dev/null 2>&1 |
+ sed -n '/^-*BEGIN/,/^-*END/p' > /tmp/pg_server.cert
+ ```
+
+2. Get the intermediate certificate. [Certificate Authorities (CA)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) normally don't sign a certificate directly; they use what is known as an "intermediate" certificate.
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl s_client -showcerts -connect privacyguides.org:443 < /dev/null 2>&1 |
+ sed -n '/^-*BEGIN/,/^-*END/p' > /tmp/pg_and_intermediate.cert
+ ```
+
+3. The first certificate in `pg_and_intermediate.cert` is actually the server certificate from step 1. We can use `sed` again to delete until the first instance of END:
+
+ ```bash
+ sed -n '/^-*END CERTIFICATE-*$/!d;:a n;p;ba' \
+ /tmp/pg_and_intermediate.cert > /tmp/intermediate_chain.cert
+ ```
+
+4. Get the OCSP responder for the server certificate:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl x509 -noout -ocsp_uri -in /tmp/pg_server.cert
+ ```
+
+ Our certificate shows the Lets Encrypt certificate responder. If we want to see all the details of the certificate we can use:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl x509 -text -noout -in /tmp/pg_server.cert
+ ```
+
+5. Start the packet capture:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap -f "tcp port http"
+ ```
+
+6. Make the OCSP request:
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl ocsp -issuer /tmp/intermediate_chain.cert \
+ -cert /tmp/pg_server.cert \
+ -text \
+ -url http://r3.o.lencr.org
+ ```
+
+7. Open the capture:
+
+ ```bash
+ wireshark -r /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap
+ ```
+
+ There will be two packets with the "OCSP" protocol: a "Request" and a "Response". For the "Request" we can see the "serial number" by expanding the triangle ▸ next to each field:
+
+ ```bash
+ ▸ Online Certificate Status Protocol
+ ▸ tbsRequest
+ ▸ requestList: 1 item
+ ▸ Request
+ ▸ reqCert
+ serialNumber
+ ```
+
+ For the "Response" we can also see the "serial number":
+
+ ```bash
+ ▸ Online Certificate Status Protocol
+ ▸ responseBytes
+ ▸ BasicOCSPResponse
+ ▸ tbsResponseData
+ ▸ responses: 1 item
+ ▸ SingleResponse
+ ▸ certID
+ serialNumber
+ ```
+
+8. Or use `tshark` to filter the packets for the Serial Number:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -r /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap -Tfields -Y ocsp.serialNumber -e ocsp.serialNumber
+ ```
+
+If the network observer has the public certificate, which is publicly available, they can match the serial number with that certificate and therefore determine the site you're visiting from that. The process can be automated and can associate IP addresses with serial numbers. It is also possible to check [Certificate Transparency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_Transparency) logs for the serial number.
+
+## Should I use encrypted DNS?
+
+We made this flow chart to describe when you *should* use encrypted DNS:
+
+``` mermaid
+graph TB
+ Start[Start] --> anonymous{Trying to be anonymous?}
+ anonymous--> | Yes | tor(Use Tor)
+ anonymous --> | No | censorship{Avoiding censorship?}
+ censorship --> | Yes | vpnOrTor(Use VPN or Tor)
+ censorship --> | No | privacy{Want privacy from ISP?}
+ privacy --> | Yes | vpnOrTor
+ privacy --> | No | obnoxious{ISP makes obnoxious redirects?}
+ obnoxious --> | Yes | encryptedDNS(Use encrypted DNS with 3rd party)
+ obnoxious --> | No | ispDNS{Does ISP support encrypted DNS?}
+ ispDNS --> | Yes | useISP(Use encrypted DNS with ISP)
+ ispDNS --> | No | nothing(Do nothing)
+```
+
+Encrypted DNS with a third-party should only be used to get around redirects and basic [DNS blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) when you can be sure there won't be any consequences or you're interested in a provider that does some rudimentary filtering.
+
+[List of recommended DNS servers](../dns.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## What is DNSSEC?
+
+[Domain Name System Security Extensions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Extensions) (DNSSEC) is a feature of DNS that authenticates responses to domain name lookups. It does not provide privacy protections for those lookups, but rather prevents attackers from manipulating or poisoning the responses to DNS requests.
+
+In other words, DNSSEC digitally signs data to help ensure its validity. In order to ensure a secure lookup, the signing occurs at every level in the DNS lookup process. As a result, all answers from DNS can be trusted.
+
+The DNSSEC signing process is similar to someone signing a legal document with a pen; that person signs with a unique signature that no one else can create, and a court expert can look at that signature and verify that the document was signed by that person. These digital signatures ensure that data has not been tampered with.
+
+DNSSEC implements a hierarchical digital signing policy across all layers of DNS. For example, in the case of a `privacyguides.org` lookup, a root DNS server would sign a key for the `.org` nameserver, and the `.org` nameserver would then sign a key for `privacyguides.org`’s authoritative nameserver.
+
+Adapted from [DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) overview](https://cloud.google.com/dns/docs/dnssec) by Google and [DNSSEC: An Introduction](https://blog.cloudflare.com/dnssec-an-introduction/) by Cloudflare, both licensed under [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
+
+## What is QNAME minimization?
+
+A QNAME is a "qualified name", for example `privacyguides.org`. QNAME minimisation reduces the amount of information sent from the DNS server to the [authoritative name server](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Name_server#Authoritative_name_server).
+
+Instead of sending the whole domain `privacyguides.org`, QNAME minimization means the DNS server will ask for all the records that end in `.org`. Further technical description is defined in [RFC 7816](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7816).
+
+## What is EDNS Client Subnet (ECS)?
+
+The [EDNS Client Subnet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EDNS_Client_Subnet) is a method for a recursive DNS resolver to specify a [subnetwork](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subnetwork) for the [host or client](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Client_(computing)) which is making the DNS query.
+
+It's intended to "speed up" delivery of data by giving the client an answer that belongs to a server that is close to them such as a [content delivery network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_delivery_network), which are often used in video streaming and serving JavaScript web apps.
+
+This feature does come at a privacy cost, as it tells the DNS server some information about the client's location.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/advanced/tor-overview.md b/i18n/fa/advanced/tor-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..678ffe864
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/advanced/tor-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+---
+title: "Tor Overview"
+icon: 'simple/torproject'
+---
+
+Tor is a free to use, decentralized network designed for using the internet with as much privacy as possible. If used properly, the network enables private and anonymous browsing and communications.
+
+## Path Building
+
+Tor works by routing your traffic through a network comprised of thousands of volunteer-run servers called nodes (or relays).
+
+Every time you connect to Tor, it will choose three nodes to build a path to the internet—this path is called a "circuit." Each of these nodes has its own function:
+
+### The Entry Node
+
+The entry node, often called the guard node, is the first node to which your Tor client connects. The entry node is able to see your IP address, however it is unable to see what you are connecting to.
+
+Unlike the other nodes, the Tor client will randomly select an entry node and stick with it for two to three months to protect you from certain attacks.[^1]
+
+### The Middle Node
+
+The middle node is the second node to which your Tor client connects. It can see which node the traffic came from—the entry node—and to which node it goes to next. The middle node cannot, see your IP address or the domain you are connecting to.
+
+For each new circuit, the middle node is randomly selected out of all available Tor nodes.
+
+### The Exit Node
+
+The exit node is the point in which your web traffic leaves the Tor network and is forwarded to your desired destination. The exit node is unable to see your IP address, but it does know what site it's connecting to.
+
+The exit node will be chosen at random from all available Tor nodes ran with an exit relay flag.[^2]
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ Tor circuit pathway
+
+
+## Encryption
+
+Tor encrypts each packet (a block of transmitted data) three times with the keys from the exit, middle, and entry node—in that order.
+
+Once Tor has built a circuit, data transmission is done as follows:
+
+1. Firstly: when the packet arrives at the entry node, the first layer of encryption is removed. In this encrypted packet, the entry node will find another encrypted packet with the middle node’s address. The entry node will then forward the packet to the middle node.
+
+2. Secondly: when the middle node receives the packet from the entry node, it too will remove a layer of encryption with its key, and this time finds an encrypted packet with the exit node's address. The middle node will then forward the packet to the exit node.
+
+3. Lastly: when the exit node receives its packet, it will remove the last layer of encryption with its key. The exit node will see the destination address and forward the packet to that address.
+
+Below is an alternative diagram showing the process. Each node removes its own layer of encryption, and when the destination server returns data, the same process happens entirely in reverse. For example, the exit node does not know who you are, but it does know which node it came from, and so it adds its own layer of encryption and sends it back.
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ Sending and receiving data through the Tor Network
+
+
+Tor allows us to connect to a server without any single party knowing the entire path. The entry node knows who you are, but not where you are going; the middle node doesn’t know who you are or where you are going; and the exit node knows where you are going, but not who you are. Because the exit node is what makes the final connection, the destination server will never know your IP address.
+
+## Caveats
+
+Though Tor does provide strong privacy guarantees, one must be aware that Tor is not perfect:
+
+- Well-funded adversaries with the capability to passively watch most network traffic over the globe have a chance of deanonymizing Tor users by means of advanced traffic analysis. Nor does Tor protect you from exposing yourself by mistake, such as if you share too much information about your real identity.
+- Tor exit nodes can also monitor traffic that passes through them. This means traffic which is not encrypted, such as plain HTTP traffic, can be recorded and monitored. If such traffic contains personally identifiable information, then it can deanonymize you to that exit node. Thus, we recommend using HTTPS over Tor where possible.
+
+If you wish to use Tor for browsing the web, we only recommend the **official** Tor Browser—it is designed to prevent fingerprinting.
+
+- [Tor Browser :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../tor.md#tor-browser)
+
+## Additional Resources
+
+- [Tor Browser User Manual](https://tb-manual.torproject.org)
+- [How Tor Works - Computerphile](https://invidious.privacyguides.net/embed/QRYzre4bf7I?local=true) (YouTube)
+- [Tor Onion Services - Computerphile](https://invidious.privacyguides.net/embed/lVcbq_a5N9I?local=true) (YouTube)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
+
+[^1]: The first relay in your circuit is called an "entry guard" or "guard". It is a fast and stable relay that remains the first one in your circuit for 2-3 months in order to protect against a known anonymity-breaking attack. The rest of your circuit changes with every new website you visit, and all together these relays provide the full privacy protections of Tor. For more information on how guard relays work, see this [blog post](https://blog.torproject.org/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters) and [paper](https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/single_guard.pdf) on entry guards. ([https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2/](https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2/))
+
+[^2]: Relay flag: a special (dis-)qualification of relays for circuit positions (for example, "Guard", "Exit", "BadExit"), circuit properties (for example, "Fast", "Stable"), or roles (for example, "Authority", "HSDir"), as assigned by the directory authorities and further defined in the directory protocol specification. ([https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html](https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html))
diff --git a/i18n/fa/android.md b/i18n/fa/android.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..082a71261
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/android.md
@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+---
+title: "Android"
+icon: 'simple/android'
+---
+
+{ align=right }
+
+The **Android Open Source Project** is an open-source mobile operating system led by Google which powers the majority of the world's mobile devices. Most phones sold with Android are modified to include invasive integrations and apps such as Google Play Services, so you can significantly improve your privacy on your mobile device by replacing your phone's default installation with a version of Android without these invasive features.
+
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://source.android.com/){ .card-link title=Homepage }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://source.android.com/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+These are the Android operating systems, devices, and apps we recommend to maximize your mobile device's security and privacy. To learn more about Android:
+
+- [General Android Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/android-overview.md)
+- [Why we recommend GrapheneOS over CalyxOS :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/)
+
+## AOSP Derivatives
+
+We recommend installing one of these custom Android operating systems on your device, listed in order of preference, depending on your device's compatibility with these operating systems.
+
+!!! note
+
+ End-of-life devices (such as GrapheneOS or CalyxOS's "extended support" devices) do not have full security patches (firmware updates) due to the OEM discontinuing support. These devices cannot be considered completely secure regardless of installed software.
+
+### GrapheneOS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GrapheneOS** is the best choice when it comes to privacy and security.
+
+ GrapheneOS provides additional [security hardening](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardening_(computing)) and privacy improvements. It has a [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), network and sensor permissions, and various other [security features](https://grapheneos.org/features). GrapheneOS also comes with full firmware updates and signed builds, so verified boot is fully supported.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://grapheneos.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://grapheneos.org/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+GrapheneOS supports [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), which runs [Google Play Services](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Play_Services) fully sandboxed like any other regular app. This means you can take advantage of most Google Play Services, such as [push notifications](https://firebase.google.com/docs/cloud-messaging/), while giving you full control over their permissions and access, and while containing them to a specific [work profile](os/android-overview.md#work-profile) or [user profile](os/android-overview.md#user-profiles) of your choice.
+
+Google Pixel phones are the only devices that currently meet GrapheneOS's [hardware security requirements](https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-support).
+
+### DivestOS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **DivestOS** is a soft-fork of [LineageOS](https://lineageos.org/).
+ DivestOS inherits many [supported devices](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=devices&base=LineageOS) from LineageOS. It has signed builds, making it possible to have [verified boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) on some non-Pixel devices.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://divestos.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://divestoseb5nncsydt7zzf5hrfg44md4bxqjs5ifcv4t7gt7u6ohjyyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=privacy_policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/divested-mobile){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+DivestOS has automated kernel vulnerability ([CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures)) [patching](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/cve_checker), fewer proprietary blobs, and a custom [hosts](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=dnsbl) file. Its hardened WebView, [Mulch](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/mulch), enables [CFI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity) for all architectures and [network state partitioning](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning), and receives out-of-band updates. DivestOS also includes kernel patches from GrapheneOS and enables all available kernel security features via [defconfig hardening](https://github.com/Divested-Mobile/DivestOS-Build/blob/master/Scripts/Common/Functions.sh#L758). All kernels newer than version 3.4 include full page [sanitization](https://lwn.net/Articles/334747/) and all ~22 Clang-compiled kernels have [`-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero`](https://reviews.llvm.org/D54604?id=174471) enabled.
+
+DivestOS implements some system hardening patches originally developed for GrapheneOS. DivestOS 16.0 and higher implements GrapheneOS's [`INTERNET`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) and SENSORS permission toggle, [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), [exec-spawning](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/#additional-hardening), [JNI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_Native_Interface) [constification](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Const_(computer_programming)), and partial [bionic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bionic_(software)) hardening patchsets. 17.1 and higher features GrapheneOS's per-network full [MAC randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address#Randomization) option, [`ptrace_scope`](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.html) control, and automatic reboot/Wi-Fi/Bluetooth [timeout options](https://grapheneos.org/features).
+
+DivestOS uses F-Droid as its default app store. Normally, we would recommend avoiding F-Droid due to its numerous [security issues](#f-droid). However, doing so on DivestOS isn't viable; the developers update their apps via their own F-Droid repositories ([DivestOS Official](https://divestos.org/fdroid/official/?fingerprint=E4BE8D6ABFA4D9D4FEEF03CDDA7FF62A73FD64B75566F6DD4E5E577550BE8467) and [DivestOS WebView](https://divestos.org/fdroid/webview/?fingerprint=FB426DA1750A53D7724C8A582B4D34174E64A84B38940E5D5A802E1DFF9A40D2)). We recommend disabling the official F-Droid app and using [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) with the DivestOS repositories enabled to keep those components up to date. For other apps, our recommended methods of obtaining them still apply.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ DivestOS firmware update [status](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/firmware-empty/-/blob/master/STATUS) and quality control varies across the devices it supports. We still recommend GrapheneOS depending on your device's compatibility. For other devices, DivestOS is a good alternative.
+
+ Not all of the supported devices have verified boot, and some perform it better than others.
+
+## Android Devices
+
+When purchasing a device, we recommend getting one as new as possible. The software and firmware of mobile devices are only supported for a limited time, so buying new extends that lifespan as much as possible.
+
+Avoid buying phones from mobile network operators. These often have a **locked bootloader** and do not support [OEM unlocking](https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/locking_unlocking). These phone variants will prevent you from installing any kind of alternative Android distribution.
+
+Be very **careful** about buying second hand phones from online marketplaces. Always check the reputation of the seller. If the device is stolen, there's a possibility of [IMEI blacklisting](https://www.gsma.com/security/resources/imei-blacklisting/). There is also a risk involved with you being associated with the activity of the previous owner.
+
+A few more tips regarding Android devices and operating system compatibility:
+
+- Do not buy devices that have reached or are near their end-of-life, additional firmware updates must be provided by the manufacturer.
+- Do not buy preloaded LineageOS or /e/ OS phones or any Android phones without proper [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) support and firmware updates. These devices also have no way for you to check whether they've been tampered with.
+- In short, if a device or Android distribution is not listed here, there is probably a good reason. Check out our [forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/) to find details!
+
+### Google Pixel
+
+Google Pixel phones are the **only** devices we recommend for purchase. Pixel phones have stronger hardware security than any other Android devices currently on the market, due to proper AVB support for third-party operating systems and Google's custom [Titan](https://security.googleblog.com/2021/10/pixel-6-setting-new-standard-for-mobile.html) security chips acting as the Secure Element.
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Google Pixel** devices are known to have good security and properly support [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), even when installing custom operating systems.
+
+ Beginning with the **Pixel 6** and **6 Pro**, Pixel devices receive a minimum of 5 years of guaranteed security updates, ensuring a much longer lifespan compared to the 2-4 years competing OEMs typically offer.
+
+ [:material-shopping: Store](https://store.google.com/category/phones){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+
+Secure Elements like the Titan M2 are more limited than the processor's Trusted Execution Environment used by most other phones as they are only used for secrets storage, hardware attestation, and rate limiting, not for running "trusted" programs. Phones without a Secure Element have to use the TEE for *all* of those functions, resulting in a larger attack surface.
+
+Google Pixel phones use a TEE OS called Trusty which is [open-source](https://source.android.com/security/trusty#whyTrusty), unlike many other phones.
+
+The installation of GrapheneOS on a Pixel phone is easy with their [web installer](https://grapheneos.org/install/web). If you don't feel comfortable doing it yourself and are willing to spend a bit of extra money, check out the [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) as they come preloaded with GrapheneOS from the reputable [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/about) company.
+
+A few more tips for purchasing a Google Pixel:
+
+- If you're after a bargain on a Pixel device, we suggest buying an "**a**" model, just after the next flagship is released. Discounts are usually available because Google will be trying to clear their stock.
+- Consider price beating options and specials offered at physical stores.
+- Look at online community bargain sites in your country. These can alert you to good sales.
+- Google provides a list showing the [support cycle](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) for each one of their devices. The price per day for a device can be calculated as: $\text{Cost} \over \text {EOL Date}-\text{Current Date}$, meaning that the longer use of the device the lower cost per day.
+
+## General Apps
+
+We recommend a wide variety of Android apps throughout this site. The apps listed here are Android-exclusive and specifically enhance or replace key system functionality.
+
+### Shelter
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Shelter** is an app that helps you leverage Android's Work Profile functionality to isolate or duplicate apps on your device.
+
+ Shelter supports blocking contact search cross profiles and sharing files across profiles via the default file manager ([DocumentsUI](https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/modular-system/documentsui)).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://gitea.angry.im/PeterCxy/Shelter#shelter){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitea.angry.im/PeterCxy/Shelter){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.patreon.com/PeterCxy){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.typeblog.shelter)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Shelter is recommended over [Insular](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/) and [Island](https://github.com/oasisfeng/island) as it supports [contact search blocking](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/faq.html).
+
+ When using Shelter, you are placing complete trust in its developer, as Shelter acts as a [Device Admin](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/admin/device-admin) to create the Work Profile, and it has extensive access to the data stored within the Work Profile.
+
+### Auditor
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Auditor** is an app which leverages hardware security features to provide device integrity monitoring for [supported devices](https://attestation.app/about#device-support). Currently, it only works with GrapheneOS and the device's stock operating system.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://attestation.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://attestation.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://attestation.app/about){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://attestation.app/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://attestation.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.attestation.auditor.play)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases)
+ - [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+Auditor performs attestation and intrusion detection by:
+
+- Using a [Trust On First Use (TOFU)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_on_first_use) model between an *auditor* and *auditee*, the pair establish a private key in the [hardware-backed keystore](https://source.android.com/security/keystore/) of the *Auditor*.
+- The *auditor* can either be another instance of the Auditor app or the [Remote Attestation Service](https://attestation.app).
+- The *auditor* records the current state and configuration of the *auditee*.
+- Should tampering with the operating system of the *auditee* happen after the pairing is complete, the auditor will be aware of the change in the device state and configurations.
+- You will be alerted to the change.
+
+No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
+
+If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service. To make sure that your hardware and operating system is genuine, [perform local attestation](https://grapheneos.org/install/web#verifying-installation) immediately after the device has been installed and prior to any internet connection.
+
+### Secure Camera
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Secure Camera** is a camera app focused on privacy and security which can capture images, videos and QR codes. CameraX vendor extensions (Portrait, HDR, Night Sight, Face Retouch, and Auto) are also supported on available devices.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://grapheneos.org/usage#camera){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.grapheneos.camera.play)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases)
+ - [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+Main privacy features include:
+
+- Auto removal of [Exif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exif) metadata (enabled by default)
+- Use of the new [Media](https://developer.android.com/training/data-storage/shared/media) API, therefore [storage permissions](https://developer.android.com/training/data-storage) are not required
+- Microphone permission not required unless you want to record sound
+
+!!! note
+
+ Metadata is not currently deleted from video files but that is planned.
+
+ The image orientation metadata is not deleted. If you enable location (in Secure Camera) that **won't** be deleted either. If you want to delete that later you will need to use an external app such as [ExifEraser](data-redaction.md#exiferaser).
+
+### Secure PDF Viewer
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Secure PDF Viewer** is a PDF viewer based on [pdf.js](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PDF.js) that doesn't require any permissions. The PDF is fed into a [sandboxed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandbox_(software_development)) [webview](https://developer.android.com/guide/webapps/webview). This means that it doesn't require permission directly to access content or files.
+
+ [Content-Security-Policy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy) is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.grapheneos.pdfviewer.play)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer/releases)
+ - [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+## Obtaining Applications
+
+### GrapheneOS App Store
+
+GrapheneOS's app store is available on [GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases). It supports Android 12 and above and is capable of updating itself. The app store has standalone applications built by the GrapheneOS project such as the [Auditor](https://attestation.app/), [Camera](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera), and [PDF Viewer](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer). If you are looking for these applications, we highly recommend that you get them from GrapheneOS's app store instead of the Play Store, as the apps on their store are signed by the GrapheneOS's project own signature that Google does not have access to.
+
+### Aurora Store
+
+The Google Play Store requires a Google account to login which is not great for privacy. You can get around this by using an alternative client, such as Aurora Store.
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Aurora Store** is a Google Play Store client which does not require a Google Account, Google Play Services, or microG to download apps.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://auroraoss.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-gitlab: GitLab](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore/-/releases)
+
+Aurora Store does not allow you to download paid apps with their anonymous account feature. You can optionally log in with your Google account with Aurora Store to download apps you have purchased, which does give access to the list of apps you've installed to Google, however you still benefit from not requiring the full Google Play client and Google Play Services or microG on your device.
+
+### Manually with RSS Notifications
+
+For apps that are released on platforms like GitHub and GitLab, you may be able to add an RSS feed to your [news aggregator](/news-aggregators) that will help you keep track of new releases.
+
+   
+
+#### GitHub
+
+On GitHub, using [Secure Camera](#secure-camera) as an example, you would navigate to its [releases page](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases) and append `.atom` to the URL:
+
+`https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases.atom`
+
+#### GitLab
+
+On GitLab, using [Aurora Store](#aurora-store) as an example, you would navigate to its [project repository](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore) and append `/-/tags?format=atom` to the URL:
+
+`https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore/-/tags?format=atom`
+
+#### Verifying APK Fingerprints
+
+If you download APK files to install manually, you can verify their signature with the [`apksigner`](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/apksigner) tool, which is a part of Android [build-tools](https://developer.android.com/studio/releases/build-tools).
+
+1. Install [Java JDK](https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/downloads/).
+
+2. Download the [Android Studio command line tools](https://developer.android.com/studio#command-tools).
+
+3. Extract the downloaded archive:
+
+ ```bash
+ unzip commandlinetools-*.zip
+ cd cmdline-tools
+ ./bin/sdkmanager --sdk_root=./ "build-tools;29.0.3"
+ ```
+
+4. Run the signature verification command:
+
+ ```bash
+ ./build-tools/29.0.3/apksigner verify --print-certs ../Camera-37.apk
+ ```
+
+5. The resulting hashes can then be compared with another source. Some developers such as Signal [show the fingerprints](https://signal.org/android/apk/) on their website.
+
+ ```bash
+ Signer #1 certificate DN: CN=GrapheneOS
+ Signer #1 certificate SHA-256 digest: 6436b155b917c2f9a9ed1d15c4993a5968ffabc94947c13f2aeee14b7b27ed59
+ Signer #1 certificate SHA-1 digest: 23e108677a2e1b1d6e6b056f3bb951df7ad5570c
+ Signer #1 certificate MD5 digest: dbbcd0cac71bd6fa2102a0297c6e0dd3
+ ```
+
+### F-Droid
+
+{ align=right width=120px }
+
+==We do **not** currently recommend F-Droid as a way to obtain apps.== F-Droid is often recommended as an alternative to Google Play, particularly in the privacy community. The option to add third-party repositories and not be confined to Google's walled garden has led to its popularity. F-Droid additionally has [reproducible builds](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Reproducible_Builds/) for some applications and is dedicated to free and open-source software. However, there are [notable problems](https://privsec.dev/posts/android/f-droid-security-issues/) with the official F-Droid client, their quality control, and how they build, sign, and deliver packages.
+
+Due to their process of building apps, apps in the official F-Droid repository often fall behind on updates. F-Droid maintainers also reuse package IDs while signing apps with their own keys, which is not ideal as it gives the F-Droid team ultimate trust.
+
+Other popular third-party repositories such as [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) alleviate some of these concerns. The IzzyOnDroid repository pulls builds directly from GitHub and is the next best thing to the developers' own repositories. However, it is not something that we can recommend, as apps are typically [removed](https://github.com/vfsfitvnm/ViMusic/issues/240#issuecomment-1225564446) from that respository when they make it to the main F-Droid repository. While that makes sense (since the goal of that particular repository is to host apps before they're accepted into the main F-Droid repository), it can leave you with installed apps which no longer receive updates.
+
+That said, the [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/) and [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) repositories are home to countless apps, so they can be a useful tool to search for and discover open-source apps that you can then download through Play Store, Aurora Store, or by getting the APK directly from the developer. It is important to keep in mind that some apps in these repositories have not been updated in years and may rely on unsupported libraries, among other things, posing a potential security risk. You should use your best judgement when looking for new apps via this method.
+
+!!! note
+
+ In some rare cases, the developer of an app will only distribute it through F-Droid ([Gadgetbridge](https://gadgetbridge.org/) is one example of this). If you really need an app like that, we recommend using [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) instead of the official F-Droid app to obtain it.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Operating Systems
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must support bootloader locking with custom AVB key support.
+- Must receive major Android updates within 0-1 months of release.
+- Must receive Android feature updates (minor version) within 0-14 days of release.
+- Must receive regular security patches within 0-5 days of release.
+- Must **not** be "rooted" out of the box.
+- Must **not** enable Google Play Services by default.
+- Must **not** require system modification to support Google Play Services.
+
+### Devices
+
+- Must support at least one of our recommended custom operating systems.
+- Must be currently sold new in stores.
+- Must receive a minimum of 5 years of security updates.
+- Must have dedicated secure element hardware.
+
+### Applications
+
+- Applications on this page must not be applicable to any other software category on the site.
+- General applications should extend or replace core system functionality.
+- Applications should receive regular updates and maintenance.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png b/i18n/fa/assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5295c902c
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/fa/assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/fa/assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png b/i18n/fa/assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..974869a4e
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/fa/assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/fa/assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png b/i18n/fa/assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..21d6ef03a
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/fa/assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/fa/assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png b/i18n/fa/assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b46283571
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/fa/assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/fa/assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png b/i18n/fa/assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f88f7b404
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/fa/assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/fa/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption-dark.svg b/i18n/fa/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption-dark.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..95e681571
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption-dark.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/fa/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg b/i18n/fa/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f5b1e2915
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/fa/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg b/i18n/fa/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9002c9b16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/fa/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg b/i18n/fa/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cb53d8b13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/fa/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png b/i18n/fa/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7a4a0d170
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/fa/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/fa/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png b/i18n/fa/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f81058d88
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/fa/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/fa/assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png b/i18n/fa/assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cde3771e0
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/fa/assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/fa/assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png b/i18n/fa/assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d71381491
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/fa/assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/fa/basics/account-creation.md b/i18n/fa/basics/account-creation.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e1371a802
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/basics/account-creation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+---
+title: "Account Creation"
+icon: 'material/account-plus'
+---
+
+Often people sign up for services without thinking. Maybe it's a streaming service so you can watch that new show everyone's talking about, or an account that gives you a discount for your favorite fast food place. Whatever the case may be, you should consider the implications for your data now and later on down the line.
+
+There are risks associated with every new service that you use. Data breaches; disclosure of customer information to third parties; rogue employees accessing data; all are possibilities that must be considered when giving your information out. You need to be confident that you can trust the service, which is why we don't recommend storing valuable data on anything but the most mature and battle-tested products. That usually means services which provide E2EE and have undergone a cryptographic audit. An audit increases assurance that the product was designed without glaring security issues caused by an inexperienced developer.
+
+It can also be difficult to delete the accounts on some services. Sometimes [overwriting data](account-deletion.md#overwriting-account-information) associated with an account can be possible, but in other cases the service will keep an entire history of changes to the account.
+
+## Terms of Service & Privacy Policy
+
+The ToS are the rules that you agree to follow when using the service. With larger services these rules are often enforced by automated systems. Sometimes these automated systems can make mistakes. For example, you may be banned or locked out of your account on some services for using a VPN or VOIP number. Appealing such bans is often difficult, and involves an automated process too, which isn't always successful. This would be one of the reasons why we wouldn't suggest using Gmail for email as an example. Email is crucial for access to other services you might have signed up for.
+
+The Privacy Policy is how the service says they will use your data and it is worth reading so that you understand how your data will be used. A company or organization might not be legally obligated to follow everything contained in the policy (it depends on the jurisdiction). We would recommend having some idea what your local laws are and what they permit a provider to collect.
+
+We recommend looking for particular terms such as "data collection", "data analysis", "cookies", "ads" or "3rd-party" services. Sometimes you will be able to opt-out from data collection or from sharing your data, but it is best to choose a service that respects your privacy from the start.
+
+Keep in mind you're also placing your trust in the company or organization and that they will comply with their own privacy policy.
+
+## Authentication methods
+
+There are usually multiple ways to sign up for an account, each with their own benefits and drawbacks.
+
+### Email and password
+
+The most common way to create a new account is by an email address and password. When using this method, you should use a password manager and follow [best practices](passwords-overview.md) regarding passwords.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ You can use your password manager to organize other authentication methods too! Just add the new entry and fill the appropriate fields, you can add notes for things like security questions or a backup key.
+
+You will be responsible for managing your login credentials. For added security, you can set up [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md) on your accounts.
+
+[Recommended password managers](../passwords.md ""){.md-button}
+
+#### Email aliases
+
+If you don't want to give your real email address to a service, you have the option to use an alias. We described them in more detail on our email services recommendation page. Essentially, alias services allow you to generate new email addresses that forward all emails to your main address. This can help prevent tracking across services and help you manage the marketing emails that sometimes come with the sign up process. Those can be filtered automatically based on the alias they are sent to.
+
+Should a service get hacked, you might start receiving phishing or spam emails to the address you used to sign up. Using unique aliases for each service can assist in identifying exactly what service was hacked.
+
+[Recommended email aliasing services](../email.md#email-aliasing-services ""){.md-button}
+
+### Single sign-on
+
+!!! note
+
+ We are discussing Single sign-on for personal use, not enterprise users.
+
+Single sign-on (SSO) is an authentication method that allows you to register for a service without sharing much information, if any. Whenever you see something along the lines of "Sign-in with *provider name*" on a registration form it's SSO.
+
+When you choose single sign-on in a website, it will prompt your SSO provider login page and after that your account will be connected. Your password won't be shared but some basic information will (you can review it during the login request). This process is needed every time you want to log in to the same account.
+
+The main advantages are:
+
+- **Security**: no risk of being involved in a [data breach](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_breach) because the website does not store your credentials.
+- **Ease of use**: multiple accounts are managed by a single login.
+
+But there are disadvantages:
+
+- **Privacy**: a SSO provider will know the services you use.
+- **Centralization**: if your SSO account gets compromised or you aren't able to login to it, all other accounts connected to it are affected.
+
+SSO can be especially useful in those situations where you could benefit from deeper integration between services. For example, one of those services may offer SSO for the others. Our recommendation is to limit SSO to only where you need it and protect the main account with [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md).
+
+All services that use SSO will be as secure as your SSO account. For example, if you want to secure an account with a hardware key but that service doesn't support hardware keys, you can secure your SSO account with a hardware key and now you essentially have hardware MFA on all your accounts. It is worth noting though that weak authentication on your SSO account means that any account tied to that login will also be weak.
+
+### Phone number
+
+We recommend avoiding services that require a phone number for sign up. A phone number can identity you across multiple services and depending on data sharing agreements this will make your usage easier to track, particularly if one of those services is breached as the phone number is often **not** encrypted.
+
+You should avoid giving out your real phone number if you can. Some services will allow the use of VOIP numbers, however these often trigger fraud detection systems, causing an account to be locked down, so we don't recommend that for important accounts.
+
+In many cases you will need to provide a number that you can receive SMS or calls from, particularly when shopping internationally, in case there is a problem with your order at border screening. It's common for services to use your number as a verification method; don't let yourself get locked out of an important account because you wanted to be clever and give a fake number!
+
+### Username and password
+
+Some services allow you to register without using an email address and only require you to set a username and password. These services may provide increased anonymity when combined with a VPN or Tor. Keep in mind that for these accounts there will most likely be **no way to recover your account** in the event you forget your username or password.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/basics/account-deletion.md b/i18n/fa/basics/account-deletion.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5bc04f102
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/basics/account-deletion.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: "Account Deletion"
+icon: 'material/account-remove'
+---
+
+Over time, it can be easy to accumulate a number of online accounts, many of which you may no longer use. Deleting these unused accounts is an important step in reclaiming your privacy, as dormant accounts are vulnerable to data breaches. A data breach is when a service's security is compromised and protected information is viewed, transmitted, or stolen by unauthorized actors. Data breaches are unfortunately all [too common](https://haveibeenpwned.com/PwnedWebsites) these days, and so practicing good digital hygiene is the best way to minimize the impact they have on your life. The goal of this guide then is to help navigate you through the irksome process of account deletion, often made difficult by [deceptive design](https://www.deceptive.design/), for the betterment of your online presence.
+
+## Finding Old Accounts
+
+### Password Manager
+
+If you have a password manager that you've used for your entire digital life, this part will be very easy. Oftentimes, they include built-in functionality for detecting if your credentials were exposed in a data breach—such as Bitwarden's [Data Breach Report](https://bitwarden.com/blog/have-you-been-pwned/).
+
+
+ 
+
+
+Even if you haven't explicitly used a password manager before, there's a chance you've used the one in your browser or your phone without even realizing it. For example: [Firefox Password Manager](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/password-manager-remember-delete-edit-logins), [Google Password Manager](https://passwords.google.com/intro) and [Edge Password Manager](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-edge/save-or-forget-passwords-in-microsoft-edge-b4beecb0-f2a8-1ca0-f26f-9ec247a3f336).
+
+Desktop platforms also often have a password manager which may help you recover passwords you've forgotten about:
+
+- Windows [Credential Manager](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/accessing-credential-manager-1b5c916a-6a16-889f-8581-fc16e8165ac0)
+- macOS [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211145)
+- iOS [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211146)
+- Linux, Gnome Keyring, which can be accessed through [Seahorse](https://help.gnome.org/users/seahorse/stable/passwords-view.html.en) or [KDE Wallet Manager](https://userbase.kde.org/KDE_Wallet_Manager)
+
+### Email
+
+If you didn't use a password manager in the past or you think you have accounts that were never added to your password manager, another option is to search the email account(s) that you believe you signed up on. On your email client, search for keywords such as "verify" or "welcome." Almost every time you make an online account, the service will send a verification link or an introductory message to your email. This can be a good way to find old, forgotten accounts.
+
+## Deleting Old Accounts
+
+### Log In
+
+In order to delete your old accounts, you'll need to first make sure you can log in to them. Again, if the account was in your password manager, this step is easy. If not, you can try to guess your password. Failing that, there are typically options to regain access to your account, commonly available through a "forgot password" link on the login page. It may also be possible that accounts you've abandoned have already been deleted—sometimes services prune all old accounts.
+
+When attempting to regain access, if the site returns an error message saying that email is not associated with an account, or you never receive a reset link after multiple attempts, then you do not have an account under that email address and should try a different one. If you can't figure out which email address you used, or you no longer have access to that email, you can try contacting the service's customer support. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that you will be able to reclaim access your account.
+
+### GDPR (EEA residents only)
+
+Residents of the EEA have additional rights regarding data erasure specified in [Article 17](https://www.gdpr.org/regulation/article-17.html) of the GDPR. If it's applicable to you, read the privacy policy for any given service to find information on how to exercise your right to erasure. Reading the privacy policy can prove important, as some services have a "Delete Account" option that only disables your account and for real deletion you have to take additional action. Sometimes actual deletion may involve filling out surveys, emailing the data protection officer of the service or even proving your residence in the EEA. If you plan to go this way, do **not** overwrite account information—your identity as an EEA resident may be required. Note that the location of the service does not matter; GDPR applies to anyone serving European users. If the service does not respect your right to erasure, you can contact your national [Data Protection Authority](https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/rights-citizens/redress/what-should-i-do-if-i-think-my-personal-data-protection-rights-havent-been-respected_en) and you may be entitled to monetary compensation.
+
+### Overwriting Account information
+
+In some situations where you plan to abandon an account, it may make sense to overwrite the account information with fake data. Once you've made sure you can log in, change all the information in your account to falsified information. The reason for this is that many sites will retain information you previously had even after account deletion. The hope is that they will overwrite the previous information with the newest data you entered. However, there is no guarantee that there won't be backups with the prior information.
+
+For the account email, either create a new alternate email account via your provider of choice or create an alias using an [email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services). You can then delete your alternate email address once you are done. We recommend against using temporary email providers, as oftentimes it is possible to reactivate temporary emails.
+
+### Delete
+
+You can check [JustDeleteMe](https://justdeleteme.xyz) for instructions on deleting the account for a specific service. Some sites will graciously have a "Delete Account" option, while others will go as far as to force you to speak with a support agent. The deletion process can vary from site to site, with account deletion being impossible on some.
+
+For services that don't allow account deletion, the best thing to do is falsify all your information as previously mentioned and strengthen account security. To do so, enable [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md) and any extra security features offered. As well, change the password to a randomly-generated one that is the maximum allowed size (a [password manager](../passwords.md) can be useful for this).
+
+If you're satisfied that all information you care about is removed, you can safely forget about this account. If not, it might be a good idea to keep the credentials stored with your other passwords and occasionally re-login to reset the password.
+
+Even when you are able to delete an account, there is no guarantee that all your information will be removed. In fact, some companies are required by law to keep certain information, particularly when related to financial transactions. It's mostly out of your control what happens to your data when it comes to websites and cloud services.
+
+## Avoid New Accounts
+
+As the old saying goes, "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." Whenever you feel tempted to sign up for a new account, ask yourself, "Do I really need this? Can I accomplish what I need to without an account?" It can often be much harder to delete an account than to create one. And even after deleting or changing the info on your account, there might be a cached version from a third-party—like the [Internet Archive](https://archive.org/). Avoid the temptation when you're able to—your future self will thank you!
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/fa/basics/common-misconceptions.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9db645e06
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/basics/common-misconceptions.md
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+---
+title: "Common Misconceptions"
+icon: 'material/robot-confused'
+---
+
+## "Open-source software is always secure" or "Proprietary software is more secure"
+
+These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but whether the source code is available and how software is licensed does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you should look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis.
+
+Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent about potential vulnerabilities than proprietary counterparts. It also allows you to review the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, *unless you do so*, there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects. The open development process has also sometimes been exploited to introduce new vulnerabilities into even large projects.[^1]
+
+On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that doesn't imply that it's not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering.
+
+To avoid biased decisions, it's *vital* that you evaluate the privacy and security standards of the software you use.
+
+## "Shifting trust can increase privacy"
+
+We talk about "shifting trust" a lot when discussing solutions like VPNs (which shift the trust you place in your ISP to the VPN provider). While this protects your browsing data from your ISP *specifically*, the VPN provider you choose still has access to your browsing data: Your data isn't completely secured from all parties. This means that:
+
+1. You must exercise caution when choosing a provider to shift trust to.
+2. You should still use other techniques, like E2EE, to protect your data completely. Merely distrusting one provider to trust another is not securing your data.
+
+## "Privacy-focused solutions are inherently trustworthy"
+
+Focusing solely on the privacy policies and marketing of a tool or provider can blind you to its weaknesses. When you're looking for a more private solution, you should determine what the underlying problem is and find technical solutions to that problem. For example, you may want to avoid Google Drive, which gives Google access to all of your data. The underlying problem in this case is lack of E2EE, so you should make sure that the provider you switch to actually implements E2EE, or use a tool (like [Cryptomator](../encryption.md#cryptomator-cloud)) which provides E2EE on any cloud provider. Switching to a "privacy-focused" provider (that doesn't implement E2EE) doesn't solve your problem: it just shifts trust from Google to that provider.
+
+The privacy policies and business practices of providers you choose are very important, but should be considered secondary to technical guarantees of your privacy: You shouldn't shift trust to another provider when trusting a provider isn't a requirement at all.
+
+## "Complicated is better"
+
+We often see people describing privacy threat models that are overly complex. Often, these solutions include problems like many different email accounts or complicated setups with lots of moving parts and conditions. The replies are usually answers to "What is the best way to do *X*?"
+
+Finding the "best" solution for yourself doesn't necessarily mean you are after an infallible solution with dozens of conditions—these solutions are often difficult to work with realistically. As we discussed previously, security often comes at the cost of convenience. Below, we provide some tips:
+
+1. ==Actions need to serve a particular purpose:== think about how to do what you want with the fewest actions.
+2. ==Remove human failure points:== We fail, get tired, and forget things. To maintain security, avoid relying on manual conditions and processes that you have to remember.
+3. ==Use the right level of protection for what you intend.== We often see recommendations of so-called law-enforcement or subpoena-proof solutions. These often require specialist knowledge and generally aren't what people want. There's no point in building an intricate threat model for anonymity if you can be easily de-anonymized by a simple oversight.
+
+So, how might this look?
+
+One of the clearest threat models is one where people *know who you are* and one where they do not. There will always be situations where you must declare your legal name and there are others where you don't need to.
+
+1. **Known identity** - A known identity is used for things where you must declare your name. There are many legal documents and contracts where a legal identity is required. This could range from opening a bank account, signing a property lease, obtaining a passport, customs declarations when importing items, or otherwise dealing with your government. These things will usually lead to credentials such as credit cards, credit rating checks, account numbers, and possibly physical addresses.
+
+ We don't suggest using a VPN or Tor for any of these things, as your identity is already known through other means.
+
+ !!! tip
+
+ When shopping online, the use of a [parcel locker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parcel_locker) can help keep your physical address private.
+
+2. **Unknown identity** - An unknown identity could be a stable pseudonym that you regularly use. It is not anonymous because it doesn't change. If you're part of an online community, you may wish to retain a persona that others know. This pseudonym isn't anonymous because—if monitored for long enough—details about the owner can reveal further information, such as the way they write, their general knowledge about topics of interest, etc.
+
+ You may wish to use a VPN for this, to mask your IP address. Financial transactions are more difficult to mask: You could consider using anonymous cryptocurrencies, such as [Monero](https://www.getmonero.org/). Employing altcoin shifting may also help to disguise where your currency originated. Typically, exchanges require KYC (know your customer) to be completed before they'll allow you to exchange fiat currency into any kind of cryptocurrency. Local meet-up options may also be a solution; however, those are often more expensive and sometimes also require KYC.
+
+3. **Anonymous identity** - Even with experience, anonymous identities are difficult to maintain over long periods of time. They should be short-term and short-lived identities which are rotated regularly.
+
+ Using Tor can help with this. It is also worth noting that greater anonymity is possible through asynchronous communication: Real-time communication is vulnerable to analysis of typing patterns (i.e. more than a paragraph of text, distributed on a forum, via email, etc.)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
+
+[^1]: One notable example of this is the [2021 incident in which University of Minnesota researchers introduced three vulnerabilities into the Linux kernel development project](https://cse.umn.edu/cs/linux-incident).
diff --git a/i18n/fa/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/fa/basics/common-threats.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4b1111992
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/basics/common-threats.md
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+---
+title: "Common Threats"
+icon: 'material/eye-outline'
+---
+
+Broadly speaking, we categorize our recommendations into the [threats](threat-modeling.md) or goals that apply to most people. ==You may be concerned with none, one, a few, or all of these possibilities==, and the tools and services you use depend on what your goals are. You may have specific threats outside of these categories as well, which is perfectly fine! The important part is developing an understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of the tools you choose to use, because virtually none of them will protect you from every threat.
+
+- :material-incognito: Anonymity - Shielding your online activity from your real identity, protecting you from people who are trying to uncover *your* identity specifically.
+- :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks - Being protected from hackers or other malicious actors who are trying to gain access to *your* data or devices specifically.
+- :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks - Being protected from things like malware, data breaches, and other attacks that are made against many people at once.
+- :material-server-network: Service Providers - Protecting your data from service providers (e.g. with E2EE, which renders your data unreadable to the server).
+- :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance - Protection from government agencies, organizations, websites, and services which work together to track your activities.
+- :material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism - Protecting yourself from big advertising networks, like Google and Facebook, as well as a myriad of other third-party data collectors.
+- :material-account-search: Public Exposure - Limiting the information about you that is accessible online—to search engines or the general public.
+- :material-close-outline: Censorship - Avoiding censored access to information or being censored yourself when speaking online.
+
+Some of these threats may be more important to you than others, depending on your specific concerns. For example, a software developer with access to valuable or critical data may be primarily concerned with :material-target-account: Targeted Attacks, but they probably still want to protect their personal data from being swept up in :material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance programs. Similarly, many people may be primarily concerned with :material-account-search: Public Exposure of their personal data, but they should still be wary of security-focused issues, such as :material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks—like malware affecting their devices.
+
+## Anonymity vs. Privacy
+
+:material-incognito: Anonymity
+
+Anonymity is often confused with privacy, but they're distinct concepts. While privacy is a set of choices you make about how your data is used and shared, anonymity is the complete disassociation of your online activities from your real identity.
+
+Whistleblowers and journalists, for example, can have a much more extreme threat model which requires total anonymity. That's not only hiding what they do, what data they have, and not getting hacked by malicious actors or governments, but also hiding who they are entirely. They will often sacrifice any kind of convenience if it means protecting their anonymity, privacy, or security, because their lives could depend on it. Most people don't need to go so far.
+
+## Security and Privacy
+
+:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks
+
+Security and privacy are also often confused, because you need security to obtain any semblance of privacy: Using tools—even if they're private by design—is futile if they could be easily exploited by attackers who later release your data. However, the inverse isn't necessarily true: The most secure service in the world *isn't necessarily* private. The best example of this is trusting data to Google who, given their scale, have had few security incidents by employing industry-leading security experts to secure their infrastructure. Even though Google provides very secure services, very few people would consider their data private in Google's free consumer products (Gmail, YouTube, etc.)
+
+When it comes to application security, we generally don't (and sometimes can't) know if the software we use is malicious, or might one day become malicious. Even with the most trustworthy developers, there's generally no guarantee that their software doesn't have a serious vulnerability that could later be exploited.
+
+To minimize the damage that a malicious piece of software *could* do, you should employ security by compartmentalization. For example, this could come in the form of using different computers for different jobs, using virtual machines to separate different groups of related applications, or using a secure operating system with a strong focus on application sandboxing and mandatory access control.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Mobile operating systems generally have better application sandboxing than desktop operating systems: Apps can't obtain root access, and require permission for access to system resources.
+
+ Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS has similar sandboxing capabilities to Android, and macOS has full system permission control (and developers can opt-in to sandboxing for applications). However, these operating systems do transmit identifying information to their respective OEMs. Linux tends to not submit information to system vendors, but it has poor protection against exploits and malicious apps. This can be mitigated somewhat with specialized distributions which make significant use of virtual machines or containers, such as [Qubes OS](../../desktop/#qubes-os).
+
+:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks
+
+Targeted attacks against a specific person are more problematic to deal with. Common attacks include sending malicious documents via email, exploiting vulnerabilities (e.g. in browsers and operating systems), and physical attacks. If this is a concern for you, you should employ more advanced threat mitigation strategies.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ By design, **web browsers**, **email clients**, and **office applications** typically run untrusted code, sent to you from third parties. Running multiple virtual machines—to separate applications like these from your host system, as well as each other—is one technique you can use to mitigate the chance of an exploit in these applications compromising the rest of your system. For example, technologies like Qubes OS or Microsoft Defender Application Guard on Windows provide convenient methods to do this.
+
+If you are concerned about **physical attacks** you should use an operating system with a secure verified boot implementation, such as Android, iOS, macOS, or [Windows (with TPM)](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). You should also make sure that your drive is encrypted, and that the operating system uses a TPM or Secure [Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) or [Element](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) to rate limit attempts to enter the encryption passphrase. You should avoid sharing your computer with people you don't trust, because most desktop operating systems don't encrypt data separately per-user.
+
+## Privacy From Service Providers
+
+:material-server-network: Service Providers
+
+We live in a world where almost everything is connected to the internet. Our "private" messages, emails, and social interactions are typically stored on a server, somewhere. Generally, when you send someone a message it's stored on a server, and when your friend wants to read the message the server will show it to them.
+
+The obvious problem with this is that the service provider (or a hacker who has compromised the server) can access your conversations whenever and however they want, without you ever knowing. This applies to many common services, like SMS messaging, Telegram, and Discord.
+
+Thankfully, E2EE can alleviate this issue by encrypting communications between you and your desired recipients before they are even sent to the server. The confidentiality of your messages is guaranteed, assuming the service provider doesn't have access to the private keys of either party.
+
+!!! note "Note on Web-based Encryption"
+
+ In practice, the effectiveness of different E2EE implementations varies. Applications, such as [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal), run natively on your device, and every copy of the application is the same across different installations. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering).
+
+ On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's webmail or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt.
+
+ Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible.
+
+Even with E2EE, service providers can still profile you based on **metadata**, which typically isn't protected. While the service provider can't read your messages, they can still observe important things, such as who you're talking to, how often you message them, and when you're typically active. Protection of metadata is fairly uncommon, and—if it's within your [threat model](threat-modeling.md)—you should pay close attention to the technical documentation of the software you're using to see if there's any metadata minimization or protection at all.
+
+## Mass Surveillance Programs
+
+:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance
+
+Mass surveillance is the intricate effort to monitor the "behavior, many activities, or information" of an entire (or substantial fraction of a) population.[^1] It often refers to government programs, such as the ones [disclosed by Edward Snowden in 2013](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_surveillance_disclosures_(2013%E2%80%93present)). However, it can also be carried out by corporations, either on behalf of government agencies or by their own initiative.
+
+!!! abstract "Atlas of Surveillance"
+
+ If you want to learn more about surveillance methods and how they're implemented in your city you can also take a look at the [Atlas of Surveillance](https://atlasofsurveillance.org/) by the [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.eff.org/).
+
+ In France you can take a look at the [Technolopolice website](https://technopolice.fr/villes/) maintained by the non-profit association La Quadrature du Net.
+
+Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, breaching human rights, it's most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.
+
+!!! quote "ACLU: [*The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward*](https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/the-privacy-lesson-of-9-11-mass-surveillance-is-not-the-way-forward)"
+
+ In the face of [Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRISM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM) and [Upstream](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upstream_collection)], intelligence officials also admitted that the NSA had for years been secretly collecting records about virtually every American’s phone calls — who’s calling whom, when those calls are made, and how long they last. This kind of information, when amassed by the NSA day after day, can reveal incredibly sensitive details about people’s lives and associations, such as whether they have called a pastor, an abortion provider, an addiction counselor, or a suicide hotline.
+
+Despite growing mass surveillance in the United States, the government has found that mass surveillance programs like Section 215 have had "little unique value" with respect to stopping actual crimes or terrorist plots, with efforts largely duplicating the FBI's own targeted surveillance programs.[^2]
+
+Online, you can be tracked via a variety of methods:
+
+- Your IP address
+- Browser cookies
+- The data you submit to websites
+- Your browser or device fingerprint
+- Payment method correlation
+
+\[This list isn't exhaustive].
+
+If you're concerned about mass surveillance programs, you can use strategues like compartmentalizing your online identities, blending in with other users, or, whenever possible, simply avoiding giving out identifying information.
+
+:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism
+
+> Surveillance capitalism is an economic system centered around the capture and commodification of personal data for the core purpose of profit-making.[^3]
+
+For many people, tracking and surveillance by private corporations is a growing concern. Pervasive ad networks, such as those operated by Google and Facebook, span the internet far beyond just the sites they control, tracking your actions along the way. Using tools like content blockers to limit network requests to their servers, and reading the privacy policies of the services you use can help you avoid many basic adversaries (although it can't completely prevent tracking).[^4]
+
+Additionally, even companies outside of the *AdTech* or tracking industry can share your information with [data brokers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_broker) (such as Cambridge Analytica, Experian, or Datalogix) or other parties. You can't automatically assume your data is safe just because the service you're using doesn't fall within the typical AdTech or tracking business model. The strongest protection against corporate data collection is to encrypt or obfuscate your data whenever possible, making it difficult for different providers to correlate data with each other and build a profile on you.
+
+## Limiting Public Information
+
+:material-account-search: Public Exposure
+
+The best way to keep your data private is simply not making it public in the first place. Deleting unwanted information you find about yourself online is one of the best first steps you can take to regain your privacy.
+
+- [View our guide on account deletion :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](account-deletion.md)
+
+On sites where you do share information, checking the privacy settings of your account to limit how widely that data is spread is very important. For example, enable "private mode" on your accounts if given the option: This ensures that your account isn't being indexed by search engines, and that it can't be viewed without your permission.
+
+If you've already submitted your real information to sites which shouldn't have it, consider using disinformation tactics, like submitting fictitious information related to that online identity. This makes your real information indistinguishable from the false information.
+
+## Avoiding Censorship
+
+:material-close-outline: Censorship
+
+Censorship online can be carried out (to varying degrees) by actors including totalitarian governments, network administrators, and service providers. These efforts to control communication and restrict access to information will always be incompatible with the human right to Freedom of Expression.[^5]
+
+Censorship on corporate platforms is increasingly common, as platforms like Twitter and Facebook give in to public demand, market pressures, and pressures from government agencies. Government pressures can be covert requests to businesses, such as the White House [requesting the takedown](https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/technology/on-the-web-a-fine-line-on-free-speech-across-globe.html) of a provocative YouTube video, or overt, such as the Chinese government requiring companies to adhere to a strict regime of censorship.
+
+People concerned with the threat of censorship can use technologies like [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) to circumvent it, and support censorship-resistant communication platforms like [Matrix](../real-time-communication.md#element), which doesn't have a centralized account authority that can close accounts arbitrarily.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ While evading censorship itself can be easy, hiding the fact that you are doing it can be very problematic.
+
+ You should consider which aspects of the network your adversary can observe, and whether you have plausible deniability for your actions. For example, using [encrypted DNS](../advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns) can help you bypass rudimentary, DNS-based censorship systems, but it can't truly hide what you are visiting from your ISP. A VPN or Tor can help hide what you are visiting from network administrators, but can't hide that you're using those networks in the first place. Pluggable transports (such as Obfs4proxy, Meek, or Shadowsocks) can help you evade firewalls that block common VPN protocols or Tor, but your circumvention attempts can still be detected by methods like probing or [deep packet inspection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection).
+
+You must always consider the risks of trying to bypass censorship, the potential consequences, and how sophisticated your adversary may be. You should be cautious with your software selection, and have a backup plan in case you are caught.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
+
+[^1]: Wikipedia: [*Mass Surveillance*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass_surveillance) and [*Surveillance*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance).
+[^2]: United States Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: [*Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215*](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/ec542143-1079-424a-84b3-acc354698560/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf)
+[^3]: Wikipedia: [*Surveillance capitalism*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance_capitalism)
+[^4]: "[Enumerating badness](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/)" (or, "listing all the bad things that we know about"), as many adblockers and antivirus programs do, fails to adequately protect you from new and unknown threats because they have not yet been added to the filter list. You should also employ other mitigation techniques.
+[^5]: United Nations: [*Universal Declaration of Human Rights*](https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights).
diff --git a/i18n/fa/basics/email-security.md b/i18n/fa/basics/email-security.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..61694ede0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/basics/email-security.md
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+---
+title: Email Security
+icon: material/email
+---
+
+Email is an insecure form of communication by default. You can improve your email security with tools such as OpenPGP, which add End-to-End Encryption to your messages, but OpenPGP still has a number of drawbacks compared to encryption in other messaging applications, and some email data can never be encrypted inherently due to how email is designed.
+
+As a result, email is best used for receiving transactional emails (like notifications, verification emails, password resets, etc.) from the services you sign up for online, not for communicating with others.
+
+## Email Encryption Overview
+
+The standard way to add E2EE to emails between different email providers is by using OpenPGP. There are different implementations of the OpenPGP standard, the most common being [GnuPG](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard) and [OpenPGP.js](https://openpgpjs.org).
+
+There is another standard which is popular with business called [S/MIME](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME), however, it requires a certificate issued from a [Certificate Authority](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) (not all of them issue S/MIME certificates). It has support in [Google Workplace](https://support.google.com/a/topic/9061730?hl=en&ref_topic=9061731) and [Outlook for Web or Exchange Server 2016, 2019](https://support.office.com/en-us/article/encrypt-messages-by-using-s-mime-in-outlook-on-the-web-878c79fc-7088-4b39-966f-14512658f480).
+
+Even if you use OpenPGP, it does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. This is why we recommend [instant messengers](../real-time-communication.md) which implement forward secrecy over email for person-to-person communications whenever possible.
+
+### What Email Clients Support E2EE?
+
+Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md). Depending on the authentication method, this may lead to the decrease security if either the provider or the email client does not support OATH or a bridge application as [multi-factor authentication](multi-factor-authentication.md) is not possible with plain password authentication.
+
+### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
+
+A smartcard (such as a [Yubikey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
+
+It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard so as to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.
+
+## Email Metadata Overview
+
+Email metadata is stored in the [message header](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) of the email message and includes some visible headers that you may have seen such as: `To`, `From`, `Cc`, `Date`, `Subject`. There are also a number of hidden headers included by many email clients and providers that can reveal information about your account.
+
+Client software may use email metadata to show who a message is from and what time it was received. Servers may use it to determine where an email message must be sent, among [other purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) which are not always transparent.
+
+### Who Can View Email Metadata?
+
+Email metadata is protected from outside observers with [Opportunistic TLS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunistic_TLS) protecting it from outside observers, but it is still able to be seen by your email client software (or webmail) and any servers relaying the message from you to any recipients including your email provider. Sometimes email servers will also use third-party services to protect against spam, which generally also have access to your messages.
+
+### Why Can't Metadata be E2EE?
+
+Email metadata is crucial to the most basic functionality of email (where it came from, and where it has to go). E2EE was not built into the email protocols originally, instead requiring add-on software like OpenPGP. Because OpenPGP messages still have to work with traditional email providers, it cannot encrypt email metadata, only the message body itself. That means that even when using OpenPGP, outside observers can see lots of information about your messages, such as who you're emailing, the subject lines, when you're emailing, etc.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md b/i18n/fa/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f3f5b7043
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+---
+title: "Multi-Factor Authentication"
+icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication'
+---
+
+**Multi-Factor Authentication** (**MFA**) is a security mechanism that requires additional steps beyond entering your username (or email) and password. The most common method is time limited codes you might receive from SMS or an app.
+
+Normally, if a hacker (or adversary) is able to figure out your password then they’d gain access to the account that password belongs to. An account with MFA forces the hacker to have both the password (something you *know*) and a device that you own (something you *have*), like your phone.
+
+MFA methods vary in security, but are based on the premise that the more difficult it is for an attacker to gain access to your MFA method, the better. Examples of MFA methods (from weakest to strongest) include SMS, Email codes, app push notifications, TOTP, Yubico OTP and FIDO.
+
+## MFA Method Comparison
+
+### SMS or Email MFA
+
+Receiving OTP codes via SMS or email are one of the weaker ways to secure your accounts with MFA. Obtaining a code by email or SMS takes away from the "something you *have*" idea, because there are a variety of ways a hacker could [take over your phone number](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam) or gain access to your email without having physical access to any of your devices at all. If an unauthorized person gained access to your email, they would be able to use that access to both reset your password and receive the authentication code, giving them full access to your account.
+
+### Push Notifications
+
+Push notification MFA takes the form of a message being sent to an app on your phone asking you to confirm new account logins. This method is a lot better than SMS or email, since an attacker typically wouldn't be able to get these push notifications without having an already logged-in device, which means they would need to compromise one of your other devices first.
+
+We all make mistakes, and there is the risk that you might accept the login attempt by accident. Push notification login authorizations are typically sent to *all* your devices at once, widening the availability of the MFA code if you have many devices.
+
+The security of push notification MFA is dependent on both the quality of the app, the server component and the trust of the developer who produces it. Installing an app may also require you to accept invasive privileges that grant access to other data on your device. An individual app also requires that you have a specific app for each service which may not require a password to open, unlike a good TOTP generator app.
+
+### Time-based One-time Password (TOTP)
+
+TOTP is one of the most common forms of MFA available. When you set up TOTP, you are generally required to scan a [QR Code](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QR_code) which establishes a "[shared secret](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_secret)" with the service that you intend to use. The shared secret is secured inside of the authenticator app's data, and is sometimes protected by a password.
+
+The time-limited code is then derived from the shared secret and the current time. As the code is only valid for a short time, without access to the shared secret, an adversary cannot generate new codes.
+
+If you have a hardware security key with TOTP support (such as a YubiKey with [Yubico Authenticator](https://www.yubico.com/products/yubico-authenticator/)), we recommend that you store your "shared secrets" on the hardware. Hardware such as the YubiKey was developed with the intention of making the "shared secret" difficult to extract and copy. A YubiKey is also not connected to the Internet, unlike a phone with a TOTP app.
+
+Unlike [WebAuthn](#fido-fast-identity-online), TOTP offers no protection against [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing) or reuse attacks. If an adversary obtains a valid code from you, they may use it as many times as they like until it expires (generally 60 seconds).
+
+An adversary could set up a website to imitate an official service in an attempt to trick you into giving out your username, password and current TOTP code. If the adversary then uses those recorded credentials they may be able to log into the real service and hijack the account.
+
+Although not perfect, TOTP is secure enough for most people, and when [hardware security keys](../multi-factor-authentication.md#hardware-security-keys) are not supported [authenticator apps](../multi-factor-authentication.md#authenticator-apps) are still a good option.
+
+### Hardware security keys
+
+The YubiKey stores data on a tamper-resistant solid-state chip which is [impossible to access](https://security.stackexchange.com/a/245772) non-destructively without an expensive process and a forensics laboratory.
+
+These keys are generally multi-function and provide a number of methods to authenticate. Below are the most common ones.
+
+#### Yubico OTP
+
+Yubico OTP is an authentication protocol typically implemented in hardware security keys. When you decide to use Yubico OTP, the key will generate a public ID, private ID, and a Secret Key which is then uploaded to the Yubico OTP server.
+
+When logging into a website, all you need to do is to physically touch the security key. The security key will emulate a keyboard and print out a one-time password into the password field.
+
+The service will then forward the one-time password to the Yubico OTP server for validation. A counter is incremented both on the key and Yubico's validation server. The OTP can only be used once, and when a successful authentication occurs, the counter is increased which prevents reuse of the OTP. Yubico provides a [detailed document](https://developers.yubico.com/OTP/OTPs_Explained.html) about the process.
+
+
+ 
+
+
+There are some benefits and disadvantages to using Yubico OTP when compared to TOTP.
+
+The Yubico validation server is a cloud based service, and you're placing trust in Yubico that they are storing data securely and not profiling you. The public ID associated with Yubico OTP is reused on every website and could be another avenue for third-parties to profile you. Like TOTP, Yubico OTP does not provide phishing resistance.
+
+If your threat model requires you to have different identities on different websites, **do not** use Yubico OTP with the same hardware security key across those websites as public ID is unique to each security key.
+
+#### FIDO (Fast IDentity Online)
+
+[FIDO](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIDO_Alliance) includes a number of standards, first there was U2F and then later [FIDO2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIDO2_Project) which includes the web standard [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn).
+
+U2F and FIDO2 refer to the [Client to Authenticator Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Client_to_Authenticator_Protocol), which is the protocol between the security key and the computer, such as a laptop or phone. It complements WebAuthn which is the component used to authenticate with the website (the "Relying Party") you're trying to log in on.
+
+WebAuthn is the most secure and private form of second factor authentication. While the authentication experience is similar to Yubico OTP, the key does not print out a one-time password and validate with a third-party server. Instead, it uses [public key cryptography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography) for authentication.
+
+
+ 
+
+
+When you create an account, the public key is sent to the service, then when you log in, the service will require you to "sign" some data with your private key. The benefit of this is that no password data is ever stored by the service, so there is nothing for an adversary to steal.
+
+This presentation discusses the history of password authentication, the pitfalls (such as password reuse), and discussion of FIDO2 and [WebAuthn](https://webauthn.guide) standards.
+
+
+
+
+
+FIDO2 and WebAuthn have superior security and privacy properties when compared to any MFA methods.
+
+Typically for web services it is used with WebAuthn which is a part of the [W3C recommendations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Wide_Web_Consortium#W3C_recommendation_(REC)). It uses public key authentication and is more secure than shared secrets used in Yubico OTP and TOTP methods, as it includes the origin name (usually, the domain name) during authentication. Attestation is provided to protect you from phishing attacks, as it helps you to determine that you are using the authentic service and not a fake copy.
+
+Unlike Yubico OTP, WebAuthn does not use any public ID, so the key is **not** identifiable across different websites. It also does not use any third-party cloud server for authentication. All communication is completed between the key and the website you are logging into. FIDO also uses a counter which is incremented upon use in order to prevent session reuse and cloned keys.
+
+If a website or service supports WebAuthn for the authentication, it is highly recommended that you use it over any other form of MFA.
+
+## توصیههای عمومی
+
+We have these general recommendations:
+
+### Which Method Should I Use?
+
+When configuring your MFA method, keep in mind that it is only as secure as your weakest authentication method you use. This means it is important that you only use the best MFA method available. For instance, if you are already using TOTP, you should disable email and SMS MFA. If you are already using FIDO2/WebAuthn, you should not be using Yubico OTP or TOTP on your account.
+
+### Backups
+
+You should always have backups for your MFA method. Hardware security keys can get lost, stolen or simply stop working over time. It is recommended that you have a pair of hardware security keys with the same access to your accounts instead of just one.
+
+When using TOTP with an authenticator app, be sure to back up your recovery keys or the app itself, or copy the "shared secrets" to another instance of the app on a different phone or to an encrypted container (e.g. [VeraCrypt](../encryption.md#veracrypt)).
+
+### Initial Set Up
+
+When buying a security key, it is important that you change the default credentials, set up password protection for the key, and enable touch confirmation if your key supports it. Products such as the YubiKey have multiple interfaces with separate credentials for each one of them, so you should go over each interface and set up protection as well.
+
+### Email and SMS
+
+If you have to use email for MFA, make sure that the email account itself is secured with a proper MFA method.
+
+If you use SMS MFA, use a carrier who will not switch your phone number to a new SIM card without account access, or use a dedicated VoIP number from a provider with similar security to avoid a [SIM swap attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam).
+
+[MFA tools we recommend](../multi-factor-authentication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## More Places to Set Up MFA
+
+Beyond just securing your website logins, multi-factor authentication can be used to secure your local logins, SSH keys or even password databases as well.
+
+### Windows
+
+Yubico has a dedicated [Credential Provider](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/credential-providers-in-windows) that adds Challenge-Response authentication for the username + password login flow for local Windows accounts. If you have a YubiKey with Challenge-Response authentication support, take a look at the [Yubico Login for Windows Configuration Guide](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013708460-Yubico-Login-for-Windows-Configuration-Guide), which will allow you to set up MFA on your Windows computer.
+
+### macOS
+
+macOS has [native support](https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/intro-to-smart-card-integration-depd0b888248/web) for authentication with smart cards (PIV). If you have a smartcard or a hardware security key that supports the PIV interface such as the YubiKey, we recommend that you follow your smartcard/hardware security vendor's documentation and set up second factor authentication for your macOS computer.
+
+Yubico have a guide [Using Your YubiKey as a Smart Card in macOS](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016649059) which can help you set up your YubiKey on macOS.
+
+After your smartcard/security key is set up, we recommend running this command in the Terminal:
+
+```text
+sudo defaults write /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow DisableFDEAutoLogin -bool YES
+```
+
+The command will prevent an adversary from bypassing MFA when the computer boots.
+
+### Linux
+
+!!! warning
+
+ If the hostname of your system changes (such as due to DHCP), you would be unable to login. It is vital that you set up a proper hostname for your computer before following this guide.
+
+The `pam_u2f` module on Linux can provide two-factor authentication for logging in on most popular Linux distributions. If you have a hardware security key that supports U2F, you can set up MFA authentication for your login. Yubico has a guide [Ubuntu Linux Login Guide - U2F](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016649099-Ubuntu-Linux-Login-Guide-U2F) which should work on any distribution. The package manager commands—such as `apt-get`—and package names may however differ. This guide does **not** apply to Qubes OS.
+
+### Qubes OS
+
+Qubes OS has support for Challenge-Response authentication with YubiKeys. If you have a YubiKey with Challenge-Response authentication support, take a look at the Qubes OS [YubiKey documentation](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/yubikey/) if you want to set up MFA on Qubes OS.
+
+### SSH
+
+#### Hardware Security Keys
+
+SSH MFA could be set up using multiple different authentication methods that are popular with hardware security keys. We recommend that you check out Yubico's [documentation](https://developers.yubico.com/SSH/) on how to set this up.
+
+#### Time-based One-time Password (TOTP)
+
+SSH MFA can also be set up using TOTP. DigitalOcean has provided a tutorial [How To Set Up Multi-Factor Authentication for SSH on Ubuntu 20.04](https://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/how-to-set-up-multi-factor-authentication-for-ssh-on-ubuntu-20-04). Most things should be the same regardless of distribution, however the package manager commands—such as `apt-get`—and package names may differ.
+
+### KeePass (and KeePassXC)
+
+KeePass and KeePassXC databases can be secured using Challenge-Response or HOTP as a second-factor authentication. Yubico has provided a document for KeePass [Using Your YubiKey with KeePass](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013779759-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-KeePass) and there is also one on the [KeePassXC](https://keepassxc.org/docs/#faq-yubikey-2fa) website.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/basics/passwords-overview.md b/i18n/fa/basics/passwords-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2bb9b52a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/basics/passwords-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+---
+title: "Introduction to Passwords"
+icon: 'material/form-textbox-password'
+---
+
+Passwords are an essential part of our everyday digital lives. We use them to protect our accounts, our devices and our secrets. Despite often being the only thing between us and an adversary who's after our private information, not a lot of thought is put into them, which often leads to people using passwords that can be easily guessed or brute-forced.
+
+## Best Practices
+
+### Use unique passwords for every service
+
+Imagine this; you sign up for an account with the same e-mail and password on multiple online services. If one of those service providers is malicious, or their service has a data breach that exposes your password in an unencrypted format, all a bad actor would have to do is try that e-mail and password combination across multiple popular services until they get a hit. It doesn't matter how strong that one password is, because they already have it.
+
+This is called [credential stuffing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credential_stuffing), and it is one of the most common ways that your accounts can be compromised by bad actors. To avoid this, make sure that you never re-use your passwords.
+
+### Use randomly generated passwords
+
+==You should **never** rely on yourself to come up with a good password.== We recommend using [randomly generated passwords](#passwords) or [diceware passphrases](#diceware-passphrases) with sufficient entropy to protect your accounts and devices.
+
+All of our [recommended password managers](../passwords.md) include a built-in password generator that you can use.
+
+### Rotating Passwords
+
+You should avoid changing passwords that you have to remember (such as your password manager's master password) too often unless you have reason to believe it has been compromised, as changing it too often exposes you to the risk of forgetting it.
+
+When it comes to passwords that you don't have to remember (such as passwords stored inside your password manager), if your [threat model](threat-modeling.md) calls for it, we recommend going through important accounts (especially accounts that don't use multi-factor authentication) and changing their password every couple of months, in case they have been compromised in a data breach that hasn't become public yet. Most password managers allow you to set an expiry date for your password to make this easier to manage.
+
+!!! tip "Checking for data breaches"
+
+ If your password manager lets you check for compromised passwords, make sure to do so and promptly change any password that may have been exposed in a data breach. Alternatively, you could follow [Have I Been Pwned's Latest Breaches feed](https://feeds.feedburner.com/HaveIBeenPwnedLatestBreaches) with the help of a [news aggregator](../news-aggregators.md).
+
+## Creating strong passwords
+
+### Passwords
+
+A lot of services impose certain criteria when it comes to passwords, including a minimum or maximum length, as well as which special characters, if any, can be used. You should use your password manager's built-in password generator to create passwords that are as long and complex as the service will allow by including capitalized and lowercase letters, numbers and special characters.
+
+If you need a password you can memorize, we recommend a [diceware passphrase](#diceware-passphrases).
+
+### Diceware Passphrases
+
+Diceware is a method for creating passphrases which are easy to remember, but hard to guess.
+
+Diceware passphrases are a great option when you need to memorize or manually input your credentials, such as for your password manager's master password or your device's encryption password.
+
+An example of a diceware passphrase is `viewable fastness reluctant squishy seventeen shown pencil`.
+
+To generate a diceware passphrase using real dice, follow these steps:
+
+!!! note
+
+ These instructions assume that you are using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate the passphrase, which requires five dice rolls per word. Other wordlists may require more or less rolls per word, and may require a different amount of words to achieve the same entropy.
+
+1. Roll a six-sided die five times, noting down the number after each roll.
+
+2. As an example, let's say you rolled `2-5-2-6-6`. Look through the [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) for the word that corresponds to `25266`.
+
+3. You will find the word `encrypt`. Write that word down.
+
+4. Repeat this process until your passphrase has as many words as you need, which you should separate with a space.
+
+!!! warning "Important"
+
+ You should **not** re-roll words until you get a combination of words that appeal to you. The process should be completely random.
+
+If you don't have access to or would prefer to not use real dice, you can use your password manager's built-in password generator, as most of them have the option to generate diceware passphrases in addition to regular passwords.
+
+We recommend using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate your diceware passphrases, as it offers the exact same security as the original list, while containing words that are easier to memorize. There are also [other wordlists in different languages](https://theworld.com/~reinhold/diceware.html#Diceware%20in%20Other%20Languages|outline), if you do not want your passphrase to be in English.
+
+??? note "Explanation of entropy and strength of diceware passphrases"
+
+ To demonstrate how strong diceware passphrases are, we'll use the aforementioned seven word passphrase (`viewable fastness reluctant squishy seventeen shown pencil`) and [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) as an example.
+
+ One metric to determine the strength of a diceware passphrase is how much entropy it has. The entropy per word in a diceware passphrase is calculated as $\text{log}_2(\text{WordsInList})$ and the overall entropy of the passphrase is calculated as $\text{log}_2(\text{WordsInList}^\text{WordsInPhrase})$.
+
+ Therefore, each word in the aforementioned list results in ~12.9 bits of entropy ($\text{log}_2(7776)$), and a seven word passphrase derived from it has ~90.47 bits of entropy ($\text{log}_2(7776^7)$).
+
+ The [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) contains 7776 unique words. To calculate the amount of possible passphrases, all we have to do is $\text{WordsInList}^\text{WordsInPhrase}$, or in our case, $7776^7$.
+
+ Let's put all of this in perspective: A seven word passphrase using [EFF's large wordlist](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) is one of ~1,719,070,799,748,422,500,000,000,000 possible passphrases.
+
+ On average, it takes trying 50% of all the possible combinations to guess your phrase. With that in mind, even if your adversary is capable of ~1,000,000,000,000 guesses per second, it would still take them ~27,255,689 years to guess your passphrase. That is the case even if the following things are true:
+
+ - Your adversary knows that you used the diceware method.
+ - Your adversary knows the specific wordlist that you used.
+ - Your adversary knows how many words your passphrase contains.
+
+To sum it up, diceware passphrases are your best option when you need something that is both easy to remember *and* exceptionally strong.
+
+## Storing Passwords
+
+### Password Managers
+
+The best way to store your passwords is by using a password manager. They allow you to store your passwords in a file or in the cloud and protect them with a single master password. That way, you will only have to remember one strong password, which lets you access the rest of them.
+
+There are many good options to choose from, both cloud-based and local. Choose one of our recommended password managers and use it to establish strong passwords across all of your accounts. We recommend securing your password manager with a [diceware passphrase](#diceware-passphrases) comprised of at least seven words.
+
+[List of recommended password managers](../passwords.md ""){.md-button}
+
+!!! warning "Don't place your passwords and TOTP tokens inside the same password manager"
+
+ When using TOTP codes as [multi-factor authentication](../multi-factor-authentication.md), the best security practice is to keep your TOTP codes in a [separate app](../multi-factor-authentication.md#authenticator-apps).
+
+ Storing your TOTP tokens in the same place as your passwords, while convenient, reduces the accounts to a single factor in the event that an adversary gains access to your password manager.
+
+ Furthermore, we do not recommend storing single-use recovery codes in your password manager. Those should be stored separately such as in an encrypted container on an offline storage device.
+
+### Backups
+
+You should store an [encrypted](../encryption.md) backup of your passwords on multiple storage devices or a cloud storage provider. This can help you access your passwords if something happens to your primary device or the service you are using.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/basics/threat-modeling.md b/i18n/fa/basics/threat-modeling.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ecb360e88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/basics/threat-modeling.md
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+---
+title: "Threat Modeling"
+icon: 'material/target-account'
+---
+
+Balancing security, privacy, and usability is one of the first and most difficult tasks you'll face on your privacy journey. Everything is a trade-off: The more secure something is, the more restricting or inconvenient it generally is, etc. Often, people find that the problem with the tools they see recommended is that they're just too hard to start using!
+
+If you wanted to use the **most** secure tools available, you'd have to sacrifice *a lot* of usability. And, even then, ==nothing is ever fully secure.== There's **high** security, but never **full** security. That's why threat models are important.
+
+**So, what are these threat models, anyway?**
+
+==A threat model is a list of the most probable threats to your security and privacy endeavors.== Since it's impossible to protect yourself against **every** attack(er), you should focus on the **most probable** threats. In computer security, a threat is an event that could undermine your efforts to stay private and secure.
+
+Focusing on the threats that matter to you narrows down your thinking about the protection you need, so you can choose the tools that are right for the job.
+
+## Creating Your Threat Model
+
+To identify what could happen to the things you value and determine from whom you need to protect them, you should answer these five questions:
+
+1. What do I want to protect?
+2. Who do I want to protect it from?
+3. How likely is it that I will need to protect it?
+4. How bad are the consequences if I fail?
+5. How much trouble am I willing to go through to try to prevent potential consequences?
+
+### What do I want to protect?
+
+An “asset” is something you value and want to protect. In the context of digital security, ==an asset is usually some kind of information.== For example, your emails, contact lists, instant messages, location, and files are all possible assets. Your devices themselves may also be assets.
+
+*Make a list of your assets: data that you keep, where it's kept, who has access to it, and what stops others from accessing it.*
+
+### Who do I want to protect it from?
+
+To answer this question, it's important to identify who might want to target you or your information. ==A person or entity that poses a threat to your assets is an “adversary”.== Examples of potential adversaries are your boss, your former partner, your business competition, your government, or a hacker on a public network.
+
+*Make a list of your adversaries or those who might want to get ahold of your assets. Your list may include individuals, a government agency, or corporations.*
+
+Depending on who your adversaries are, under some circumstances, this list might be something you want to destroy after you're done security planning.
+
+### How likely is it that I will need to protect it?
+
+==Risk is the likelihood that a particular threat against a particular asset will actually occur.== It goes hand-in-hand with capability. While your mobile phone provider has the capability to access all of your data, the risk of them posting your private data online to harm your reputation is low.
+
+It is important to distinguish between what might happen and the probability it may happen. For instance, there is a threat that your building might collapse, but the risk of this happening is far greater in San Francisco (where earthquakes are common) than in Stockholm (where they are not).
+
+Assessing risks is both a personal and subjective process. Many people find certain threats unacceptable, no matter the likelihood they will occur, because the mere presence of the threat is not worth the cost. In other cases, people disregard high risks because they don't view the threat as a problem.
+
+*Write down which threats you are going to take seriously, and which may be too rare or too harmless (or too difficult to combat) to worry about.*
+
+### How bad are the consequences if I fail?
+
+There are many ways that an adversary could gain access to your data. For example, an adversary can read your private communications as they pass through the network, or they can delete or corrupt your data.
+
+==The motives of adversaries differ widely, as do their tactics.== A government trying to prevent the spread of a video showing police violence may be content to simply delete or reduce the availability of that video. In contrast, a political opponent may wish to gain access to secret content and publish that content without you knowing.
+
+Security planning involves understanding how bad the consequences could be if an adversary successfully gains access to one of your assets. To determine this, you should consider the capability of your adversary. For example, your mobile phone provider has access to all of your phone records. A hacker on an open Wi-Fi network can access your unencrypted communications. Your government might have stronger capabilities.
+
+*Write down what your adversary might want to do with your private data.*
+
+### How much trouble am I willing to go through to try to prevent potential consequences?
+
+==There is no perfect option for security.== Not everyone has the same priorities, concerns, or access to resources. Your risk assessment will allow you to plan the right strategy for you, balancing convenience, cost, and privacy.
+
+For example, an attorney representing a client in a national security case may be willing to go to greater lengths to protect communications about that case, such as using encrypted email, than a mother who regularly emails her daughter funny cat videos.
+
+*Write down what options you have available to you to help mitigate your unique threats. Note if you have any financial constraints, technical constraints, or social constraints.*
+
+### Try it yourself: Protecting Your Belongings
+
+These questions can apply to a wide variety of situations, online and offline. As a generic demonstration of how these questions work, let's build a plan to keep your house and possessions safe.
+
+**What do you want to protect? (Or, *what do you have that is worth protecting?*)**
+:
+
+Your assets might include jewelry, electronics, important documents, or photos.
+
+**Who do you want to protect it from?**
+:
+
+Your adversaries might include burglars, roommates, or guests.
+
+**How likely is it that you will need to protect it?**
+:
+
+Does your neighborhood have a history of burglaries? How trustworthy are your roommates or guests? What are the capabilities of your adversaries? What are the risks you should consider?
+
+**How bad are the consequences if you fail?**
+:
+
+Do you have anything in your house that you cannot replace? Do you have the time or money to replace those things? Do you have insurance that covers goods stolen from your home?
+
+**How much trouble are you willing to go through to prevent these consequences?**
+:
+
+Are you willing to buy a safe for sensitive documents? Can you afford to buy a high-quality lock? Do you have time to open a security box at your local bank and keep your valuables there?
+
+Only once you have asked yourself these questions will you be in a position to assess what measures to take. If your possessions are valuable, but the probability of a break-in is low, then you may not want to invest too much money in a lock. But, if the probability of a break-in is high, you'll want to get the best lock on the market and consider adding a security system.
+
+Making a security plan will help you to understand the threats that are unique to you and to evaluate your assets, your adversaries, and your adversaries' capabilities, along with the likelihood of risks you face.
+
+## Further Reading
+
+For people looking to increase their privacy and security online, we've compiled a list of common threats our visitors face or goals our visitors have, to give you some inspiration and demonstrate the basis of our recommendations.
+
+- [Common Goals and Threats :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](common-threats.md)
+
+## Sources
+
+- [EFF Surveillance Self Defense: Your Security Plan](https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/your-security-plan)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/basics/vpn-overview.md b/i18n/fa/basics/vpn-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..906b31f09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/basics/vpn-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+---
+title: VPN Overview
+icon: material/vpn
+---
+
+Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit somewhere else in the world. An ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (i.e. modem).
+
+Encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, so they may not be able to see exactly what you're posting or reading but they can get an idea of the [domains you request](../advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).
+
+A VPN can help as it can shift trust to a server somewhere else in the world. As a result, the ISP then only sees that you are connected to a VPN and nothing about the activity that you're passing into it.
+
+## Should I use a VPN?
+
+**Yes**, unless you are already using Tor. A VPN does two things: shifting the risks from your Internet Service Provider to itself and hiding your IP from a third-party service.
+
+VPNs cannot encrypt data outside of the connection between your device and the VPN server. VPN providers can see and modify your traffic the same way your ISP could. And there is no way to verify a VPN provider's "no logging" policies in any way.
+
+However, they do hide your actual IP from a third-party service, provided that there are no IP leaks. They help you blend in with others and mitigate IP based tracking.
+
+## When shouldn't I use a VPN?
+
+Using a VPN in cases where you're using your [known identity](common-threats.md#common-misconceptions) is unlikely be useful.
+
+Doing so may trigger spam and fraud detection systems, such as if you were to log into your bank's website.
+
+## What about encryption?
+
+Encryption offered by VPN providers are between your devices and their servers. It guarantees that this specific link is secure. This is a step up from using unencrypted proxies where an adversary on the network can intercept the communications between your devices and said proxies and modify them. However, encryption between your apps or browsers with the service providers are not handled by this encryption.
+
+In order to keep what you actually do on the websites you visit private and secure, you must use HTTPS. This will keep your passwords, session tokens, and queries safe from the VPN provider. Consider enabling "HTTPS everywhere" in your browser to mitigate downgrade attacks like [SSL Strip](https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Marlinspike/BlackHat-DC-09-Marlinspike-Defeating-SSL.pdf).
+
+## Should I use encrypted DNS with a VPN?
+
+Unless your VPN provider hosts the encrypted DNS servers, **no**. Using DOH/DOT (or any other form of encrypted DNS) with third-party servers will simply add more entities to trust and does **absolutely nothing** to improve your privacy/security. Your VPN provider can still see which websites you visit based on the IP addresses and other methods. Instead of just trusting your VPN provider, you are now trusting both the VPN provider and the DNS provider.
+
+A common reason to recommend encrypted DNS is that it helps against DNS spoofing. However, your browser should already be checking for [TLS certificates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Digital_certificates) with **HTTPS** and warn you about it. If you are not using **HTTPS**, then an adversary can still just modify anything other than your DNS queries and the end result will be little different.
+
+Needless to say, **you shouldn't use encrypted DNS with Tor**. This would direct all of your DNS requests through a single circuit and would allow the encrypted DNS provider to deanonymize you.
+
+## Should I use Tor *and* a VPN?
+
+By using a VPN with Tor, you're creating essentially a permanent entry node, often with a money trail attached. This provides zero additional benefits to you, while increasing the attack surface of your connection dramatically. If you wish to hide your Tor usage from your ISP or your government, Tor has a built-in solution for that: Tor bridges. [Read more about Tor bridges and why using a VPN is not necessary](../advanced/tor-overview.md).
+
+## What if I need anonymity?
+
+VPNs cannot provide anonymity. Your VPN provider will still see your real IP address, and often has a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. You cannot rely on "no logging" policies to protect your data. Use [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) instead.
+
+## What about VPN providers that provide Tor nodes?
+
+Do not use that feature. The point of using Tor is that you do not trust your VPN provider. Currently Tor only supports the [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol) protocol. [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol) (used in [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC) for voice and video sharing, the new [HTTP3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) protocol, etc), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol) and other packets will be dropped. To compensate for this, VPN providers typically will route all non-TCP packets through their VPN server (your first hop). This is the case with [ProtonVPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn/). Additionally, when using this Tor over VPN setup, you do not have control over other important Tor features such as [Isolated Destination Address](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (using a different Tor circuit for every domain you visit).
+
+The feature should be viewed as a convenient way to access the Tor Network, not to stay anonymous. For proper anonymity, use the Tor Browser, TorSocks, or a Tor gateway.
+
+## When are VPNs useful?
+
+A VPN may still be useful to you in a variety of scenarios, such as:
+
+1. Hiding your traffic from **only** your Internet Service Provider.
+1. Hiding your downloads (such as torrents) from your ISP and anti-piracy organizations.
+1. Hiding your IP from third-party websites and services, preventing IP based tracking.
+
+For situations like these, or if you have another compelling reason, the VPN providers we listed above are who we think are the most trustworthy. However, using a VPN provider still means you're *trusting* the provider. In pretty much any other scenario you should be using a secure**-by-design** tool such as Tor.
+
+## Sources and Further Reading
+
+1. [VPN - a Very Precarious Narrative](https://schub.io/blog/2019/04/08/very-precarious-narrative.html) by Dennis Schubert
+1. [Tor Network Overview](../advanced/tor-overview.md)
+1. [IVPN Privacy Guides](https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides)
+1. ["Do I need a VPN?"](https://www.doineedavpn.com), a tool developed by IVPN to challenge aggressive VPN marketing by helping individuals decide if a VPN is right for them.
+
+## Related VPN Information
+
+- [The Trouble with VPN and Privacy Review Sites](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2019/11/20/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-review-sites/)
+- [Free VPN App Investigation](https://www.top10vpn.com/free-vpn-app-investigation/)
+- [Hidden VPN owners unveiled: 101 VPN products run by just 23 companies](https://vpnpro.com/blog/hidden-vpn-owners-unveiled-97-vpns-23-companies/)
+- [This Chinese company is secretly behind 24 popular apps seeking dangerous permissions](https://vpnpro.com/blog/chinese-company-secretly-behind-popular-apps-seeking-dangerous-permissions/)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/calendar.md b/i18n/fa/calendar.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ced209812
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/calendar.md
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+---
+title: "Calendar Sync"
+icon: material/calendar
+---
+
+Calendars contain some of your most sensitive data; use products that implement E2EE at rest to prevent a provider from reading them.
+
+## Tutanota
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tutanota** offers a free and encrypted calendar across their supported platforms. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, multi-factor authentication, and [more](https://tutanota.com/calendar-app-comparison/).
+
+ Multiple calendars and extended sharing functionality is limited to paid subscribers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tutanota.com/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tutanota.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tutanota.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tutanota.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/tutanota/id922429609)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.tutanota.Tutanota)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.tutanota.com/)
+
+## Proton Calendar
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton Calendar** is an encrypted calendar service available to Proton members via web or mobile clients. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, and [more](https://proton.me/support/proton-calendar-guide). Those on the free tier get access to a single calendar, whereas paid subscribers can create up to 20 calendars. Extended sharing functionality is also limited to paid subscribers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/proton-calendar-guide){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=me.proton.android.calendar)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://calendar.proton.me)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Qualifications
+
+- Must sync and store information with E2EE to ensure data is not visible to the service provider.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should integrate with native OS calendar and contact management apps if applicable.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/cloud.md b/i18n/fa/cloud.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3e05b2d65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/cloud.md
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+---
+title: "Cloud Storage"
+icon: material/file-cloud
+---
+
+Many cloud storage providers require your full trust that they will not look at your files. The alternatives listed below eliminate the need for trust by either putting you in control of your data or by implementing E2EE.
+
+If these alternatives do not fit your needs, we suggest you look into [Encryption Software](encryption.md).
+
+??? توصیه شده
+
+ Nextcloud is [still a recommended tool](productivity.md) for self-hosting a file management suite, however we do not recommend third-party Nextcloud storage providers at the moment, because we do not recommend Nextcloud's built-in E2EE functionality for home users.
+
+## Proton Drive
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton Drive** is an E2EE general file storage service by the popular encrypted email provider [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/mail).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/drive){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/drive){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=me.proton.android.drive)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1509667851)
+
+Proton Drive's mobile clients were released in December 2022 and are not yet open-source. Proton has historically delayed their source code releases until after initial product releases, and [plans to](https://www.reddit.com/r/ProtonDrive/comments/zf14i8/comment/izdwmme/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web2x&context=3) release the source code by the end of 2023. Proton Drive desktop clients are still in development.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must enforce end-to-end encryption.
+- Must offer a free plan or trial period for testing.
+- Must support TOTP or FIDO2 multi-factor authentication, or Passkey logins.
+- Must offer a web interface which supports basic file management functionality.
+- Must allow for easy exports of all files/documents.
+- Must use standard, audited encryption.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Clients should be open-source.
+- Clients should be audited in their entirety by an independent third-party.
+- Should offer native clients for Linux, Android, Windows, macOS, and iOS.
+ - These clients should integrate with native OS tools for cloud storage providers, such as Files app integration on iOS, or DocumentsProvider functionality on Android.
+- Should support easy file-sharing with other users.
+- Should offer at least basic file preview and editing functionality on the web interface.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/data-redaction.md b/i18n/fa/data-redaction.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b3879c416
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/data-redaction.md
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+---
+title: "Data and Metadata Redaction"
+icon: material/tag-remove
+---
+
+When sharing files, be sure to remove associated metadata. Image files commonly include [Exif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exif) data. Photos sometimes even include GPS coordinates in the file metadata.
+
+## Desktop
+
+### MAT2
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **MAT2** is free software, which allows the metadata to be removed from image, audio, torrent, and document file types. It provides both a command line tool and a graphical user interface via an [extension for Nautilus](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/tree/master/nautilus), the default file manager of [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), and [Dolphin](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/tree/master/dolphin), the default file manager of [KDE](https://kde.org).
+
+ On Linux, a third-party graphical tool [Metadata Cleaner](https://gitlab.com/rmnvgr/metadata-cleaner) powered by MAT2 exists and is [available on Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/fr.romainvigier.MetadataCleaner).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/blob/master/README.md){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://pypi.org/project/mat2)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2#requirements-setup-on-macos-os-x-using-homebrew)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://pypi.org/project/mat2)
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2#web-interface)
+
+## Mobile
+
+### ExifEraser (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **ExifEraser** is a modern, permissionless image metadata erasing application for Android.
+
+ It currently supports JPEG, PNG and WebP files.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.none.tom.exiferaser)
+ - [:octicons-moon-16: Accrescent](https://accrescent.app/app/com.none.tom.exiferaser)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser/releases)
+
+The metadata that is erased depends on the image's file type:
+
+* **JPEG**: ICC Profile, Exif, Photoshop Image Resources and XMP/ExtendedXMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
+* **PNG**: ICC Profile, Exif and XMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
+* **WebP**: ICC Profile, Exif and XMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
+
+After processing the images, ExifEraser provides you with a full report about what exactly was removed from each image.
+
+The app offers multiple ways to erase metadata from images. Namely:
+
+* You can share an image from another application with ExifEraser.
+* Through the app itself, you can select a single image, multiple images at once, or even an entire directory.
+* It features a "Camera" option, which uses your operating system's camera app to take a photo, and then it removes the metadata from it.
+* It allows you to drag photos from another app into ExifEraser when they are both open in split-screen mode.
+* Lastly, it allows you to paste an image from your clipboard.
+
+### Metapho (iOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Metapho** is a simple and clean viewer for photo metadata such as date, file name, size, camera model, shutter speed, and location.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://zininworks.com/metapho){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://zininworks.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/metapho/id914457352)
+
+### PrivacyBlur
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **PrivacyBlur** is a free app which can blur sensitive portions of pictures before sharing them online.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://privacyblur.app/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://privacyblur.app/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/MATHEMA-GmbH/privacyblur#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/MATHEMA-GmbH/privacyblur){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.mathema.privacyblur)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/privacyblur/id1536274106)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ You should **never** use blur to redact [text in images](https://bishopfox.com/blog/unredacter-tool-never-pixelation). If you want to redact text in an image, draw a box over the text. For this, we suggest apps like [Pocket Paint](https://github.com/Catrobat/Paintroid).
+
+## Command-line
+
+### ExifTool
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **ExifTool** is the original perl library and command-line application for reading, writing, and editing meta information (Exif, IPTC, XMP, and more) in a wide variety of file formats (JPEG, TIFF, PNG, PDF, RAW, and more).
+
+ It's often a component of other Exif removal applications and is in most Linux distribution repositories.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://exiftool.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://exiftool.org/faq.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/exiftool/exiftool){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://exiftool.org/#donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://exiftool.org)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://exiftool.org)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://exiftool.org)
+
+!!! example "Deleting data from a directory of files"
+
+ ```bash
+ exiftool -all= *.file_extension
+ ```
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Apps developed for open-source operating systems must be open-source.
+- Apps must be free and should not include ads or other limitations.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/desktop-browsers.md b/i18n/fa/desktop-browsers.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f903cef9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/desktop-browsers.md
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+---
+title: "Desktop Browsers"
+icon: material/laptop
+---
+
+These are our currently recommended desktop web browsers and configurations for standard/non-anonymous browsing. If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) instead. In general, we recommend keeping your browser extensions to a minimum; they have privileged access within your browser, require you to trust the developer, can make you [stand out](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint), and [weaken](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/chromium-extensions/c/0ei-UCHNm34/m/lDaXwQhzBAAJ) site isolation.
+
+## Firefox
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Firefox** provides strong privacy settings such as [Enhanced Tracking Protection](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/enhanced-tracking-protection-firefox-desktop), which can help block various [types of tracking](https://support.mozilla.org/kb/enhanced-tracking-protection-firefox-desktop#w_what-enhanced-tracking-protection-blocks).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://firefox.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mozilla.org/privacy/firefox/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.mozilla.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/mac)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/linux)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.mozilla.firefox)
+
+!!! warning
+ Firefox includes a unique [download token](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1677497#c0) in downloads from Mozilla's website and uses telemetry in Firefox to send the token. The token is **not** included in releases from the [Mozilla FTP](https://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/firefox/releases/).
+
+### فایرفاکس Firefox
+
+Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. When you use Firefox, we recommend changing the following settings to protect your privacy from certain parties, but all browsers other than [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) will be traceable by *somebody* in some regard or another.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Privacy & Security**.
+
+##### Enhanced Tracking Protection
+
+- [x] Select **Strict** Enhanced Tracking Protection
+
+This protects you by blocking social media trackers, fingerprinting scripts (note that this does not protect you from *all* fingerprinting), cryptominers, cross-site tracking cookies, and some other tracking content. ETP protects against many common threats, but it does not block all tracking avenues because it is designed to have minimal to no impact on site usability.
+
+##### Sanitize on Close
+
+If you want to stay logged in to particular sites, you can allow exceptions in **Cookies and Site Data** → **Manage Exceptions...**
+
+- [x] Check **Delete cookies and site data when Firefox is closed**
+
+This protects you from persistent cookies, but does not protect you against cookies acquired during any one browsing session. When this is enabled, it becomes possible to easily cleanse your browser cookies by simply restarting Firefox. You can set exceptions on a per-site basis, if you wish to stay logged in to a particular site you visit often.
+
+##### Search Suggestions
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Provide search suggestions**
+
+Search suggestion features may not be available in your region.
+
+Search suggestions send everything you type in the address bar to the default search engine, regardless of whether you submit an actual search. Disabling search suggestions allows you to more precisely control what data you send to your search engine provider.
+
+##### Telemetry
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Firefox to send technical and interaction data to Mozilla**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Firefox to install and run studies**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Firefox to send backlogged crash reports on your behalf**
+
+> Firefox sends data about your Firefox version and language; device operating system and hardware configuration; memory, basic information about crashes and errors; outcome of automated processes like updates, safebrowsing, and activation to us. When Firefox sends data to us, your IP address is temporarily collected as part of our server logs.
+
+Additionally, the Firefox Accounts service collects [some technical data](https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/privacy/firefox/#firefox-accounts). If you use a Firefox Account you can opt-out:
+
+1. Open your [profile settings on accounts.firefox.com](https://accounts.firefox.com/settings#data-collection)
+2. Uncheck **Data Collection and Use** > **Help improve Firefox Accounts**
+
+##### HTTPS-Only Mode
+
+- [x] Select **Enable HTTPS-Only Mode in all windows**
+
+This prevents you from unintentionally connecting to a website in plain-text HTTP. Sites without HTTPS are uncommon nowadays, so this should have little to no impact on your day to day browsing.
+
+### Firefox Sync
+
+[Firefox Sync](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2018/11/firefox-sync-privacy/) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices and protects it with E2EE.
+
+### افزونهها
+
+The [Arkenfox project](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js) provides a set of carefully considered options for Firefox. If you [decide](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/1.1-To-Arkenfox-or-Not) to use Arkenfox, a [few options](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/3.2-Overrides-[Common]) are subjectively strict and/or may cause some websites to not work properly - [which you can easily change](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/3.1-Overrides) to suit your needs. We **strongly recommend** reading through their full [wiki](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki). Arkenfox also enables [container](https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/containers#w_for-advanced-users) support.
+
+## Brave
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Brave Browser** includes a built-in content blocker and [privacy features](https://brave.com/privacy-features/), many of which are enabled by default.
+
+ Brave is built upon the Chromium web browser project, so it should feel familiar and have minimal website compatibility issues.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://brave.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://brave4u7jddbv7cyviptqjc7jusxh72uik7zt6adtckl5f4nwy2v72qd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://brave.com/privacy/browser/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.brave.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads annotate
+
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://brave.com/download/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://brave.com/download/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://brave.com/linux/) (1)
+
+ 1. We advise against using the Flatpak version of Brave, as it replaces Chromium's sandbox with Flatpak's, which is less effective. Additionally, the package is not maintained by Brave Software, Inc.
+
+### فایرفاکس Firefox
+
+Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. When you use Brave, we recommend changing the following settings to protect your privacy from certain parties, but all browsers other than the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) will be traceable by *somebody* in some regard or another.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings**.
+
+##### Shields
+
+Brave includes some anti-fingerprinting measures in its [Shields](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360022973471-What-is-Shields-) feature. We suggest configuring these options [globally](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360023646212-How-do-I-configure-global-and-site-specific-Shields-settings-) across all pages that you visit.
+
+Shields' options can be downgraded on a per-site basis as needed, but by default we recommend setting the following:
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Prevent sites from fingerprinting me based on my language preferences**
+- [x] Select **Aggressive** under Trackers & ads blocking
+
+ ??? warning "Use default filter lists"
+ Brave allows you to select additional content filters within the internal `brave://adblock` page. We advise against using this feature; instead, keep the default filter lists. Using extra lists will make you stand out from other Brave users and may also increase attack surface if there is an exploit in Brave and a malicious rule is added to one of the lists you use.
+
+- [x] (Optional) Select **Block Scripts** (1)
+- [x] Select **Strict, may break sites** under Block fingerprinting
+
+
+
+1. This option provides functionality similar to uBlock Origin's advanced [blocking modes](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) or the [NoScript](https://noscript.net/) extension.
+
+##### Social media blocking
+
+- [ ] Uncheck all social media components
+
+##### Privacy and security
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Disable non-proxied UDP** under [WebRTC IP Handling Policy](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360017989132-How-do-I-change-my-Privacy-Settings-#webrtc)
+- [ ] Uncheck **Use Google services for push messaging**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow privacy-preserving product analytics (P3A)**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send daily usage ping to Brave**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send diagnostic reports**
+- [x] Select **Always use secure connections** in the **Security** menu
+- [ ] Uncheck **Private window with Tor** (1)
+
+ !!! tip "Sanitizing on Close"
+ - [x] Select **Clear cookies and site data when you close all windows** in the *Cookies and other site data* menu
+
+ If you wish to stay logged in to a particular site you visit often, you can set exceptions on a per-site basis under the *Customized behaviors* section.
+
+
+
+1. Brave is **not** as resistant to fingerprinting as the Tor Browser and far fewer people use Brave with Tor, so you will stand out. Where [strong anonymity is required](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360018121491-What-is-a-Private-Window-with-Tor-Connectivity-) use the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser).
+
+##### افزونهها
+
+Disable built-in extensions you do not use in **Extensions**
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Hangouts**
+- [ ] Uncheck **WebTorrent**
+
+##### IPFS
+
+InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is a decentralized, peer-to-peer network for storing and sharing data in a distributed filesystem. Unless you use the feature, disable it.
+
+- [x] Select **Disabled** on Method to resolve IPFS resources
+
+##### Additional settings
+
+Under the *System* menu
+
+
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Continue running apps when Brave is closed** to disable background apps (1)
+
+
+
+1. This option is not present on all platforms.
+
+### Brave Sync
+
+[Brave Sync](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360059793111-Understanding-Brave-Sync) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices without requiring an account and protects it with E2EE.
+
+## Additional Resources
+
+We generally do not recommend installing any extensions as they increase your attack surface. However, uBlock Origin may prove useful if you value content blocking functionality.
+
+### uBlock Origin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **uBlock Origin** is a popular content blocker that could help you block ads, trackers, and fingerprinting scripts.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/ublock-origin/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/ublock-origin/cjpalhdlnbpafiamejdnhcphjbkeiagm)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/ublock-origin/odfafepnkmbhccpbejgmiehpchacaeak)
+
+We suggest following the [developer's documentation](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) and picking one of the "modes". Additional filter lists can impact performance and [may increase attack surface](https://portswigger.net/research/ublock-i-exfiltrate-exploiting-ad-blockers-with-css).
+
+##### Other lists
+
+These are some other [filter lists](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Dashboard:-Filter-lists) that you may want to consider adding:
+
+- [x] Check **Privacy** > **AdGuard URL Tracking Protection**
+- Add [Actually Legitimate URL Shortener Tool](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DandelionSprout/adfilt/master/LegitimateURLShortener.txt)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Supports automatic updates.
+- Receives engine updates in 0-1 days from upstream release.
+- Available on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- Any changes required to make the browser more privacy-respecting should not negatively impact user experience.
+- Blocks third-party cookies by default.
+- Supports [state partitioning](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning) to mitigate cross-site tracking.[^1]
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Includes built-in content blocking functionality.
+- Supports cookie compartmentalization (à la [Multi-Account Containers](https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/containers)).
+- Supports Progressive Web Apps.
+ PWAs enable you to install certain websites as if they were native apps on your computer. This can have advantages over installing Electron-based apps, because you benefit from your browser's regular security updates.
+- Does not include add-on functionality (bloatware) that does not impact user privacy.
+- Does not collect telemetry by default.
+- Provides open-source sync server implementation.
+- Defaults to a [private search engine](search-engines.md).
+
+### Extension Criteria
+
+- Must not replicate built-in browser or OS functionality.
+- Must directly impact user privacy, i.e. must not simply provide information.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
+
+[^1]: Brave's implementation is detailed at [Brave Privacy Updates: Partitioning network-state for privacy](https://brave.com/privacy-updates/14-partitioning-network-state/).
diff --git a/i18n/fa/desktop.md b/i18n/fa/desktop.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0d4f97cfe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/desktop.md
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+---
+title: "Desktop/PC"
+icon: simple/linux
+---
+
+Linux distributions are commonly recommended for privacy protection and software freedom. If you don't already use Linux, below are some distributions we suggest trying out, as well as some general privacy and security improvement tips that are applicable to many Linux distributions.
+
+- [General Linux Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/linux-overview.md)
+
+## Traditional Distributions
+
+### Fedora Workstation
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Fedora Workstation** is our recommended distribution for people new to Linux. Fedora generally adopts newer technologies before other distributions e.g., [Wayland](https://wayland.freedesktop.org/), [PipeWire](https://pipewire.org). These new technologies often come with improvements in security, privacy, and usability in general.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getfedora.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://whatcanidoforfedora.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Fedora has a semi-rolling release cycle. While some packages like [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org) are frozen until the next Fedora release, most packages (including the kernel) are updated frequently throughout the lifespan of the release. Each Fedora release is supported for one year, with a new version released every 6 months.
+
+### openSUSE Tumbleweed
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **openSUSE Tumbleweed** is a stable rolling release distribution.
+
+ openSUSE Tumbleweed has a [transactional update](https://kubic.opensuse.org/blog/2018-04-04-transactionalupdates/) system that uses [Btrfs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Btrfs) and [Snapper](https://en.opensuse.org/openSUSE:Snapper_Tutorial) to ensure that snapshots can be rolled back should there be a problem.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://get.opensuse.org/tumbleweed/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://doc.opensuse.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://shop.opensuse.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Tumbleweed follows a rolling release model where each update is released as a snapshot of the distribution. When you upgrade your system, a new snapshot is downloaded. Each snapshot is run through a series of automated tests by [openQA](https://openqa.opensuse.org) to ensure its quality.
+
+### Arch Linux
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Arch Linux** is a lightweight, do-it-yourself (DIY) distribution meaning that you only get what you install. For more information see their [FAQ](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Frequently_asked_questions).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://archlinux.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://wiki.archlinux.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://archlinux.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Arch Linux has a rolling release cycle. There is no fixed release schedule and packages are updated very frequently.
+
+Being a DIY distribution, you are [expected to set up and maintain](os/linux-overview.md#arch-based-distributions) your system on your own. Arch has an [official installer](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Archinstall) to make the installation process a little easier.
+
+A large portion of [Arch Linux’s packages](https://reproducible.archlinux.org) are [reproducible](https://reproducible-builds.org).
+
+## Immutable Distributions
+
+### Fedora Silverblue
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Fedora Silverblue** and **Fedora Kinoite** are immutable variants of Fedora with a strong focus on container workflows. Silverblue comes with the [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org/) desktop environment while Kinoite comes with [KDE](https://kde.org/). Silverblue and Kinoite follow the same release schedule as Fedora Workstation, benefiting from the same fast updates and staying very close to upstream.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://silverblue.fedoraproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora-silverblue/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://whatcanidoforfedora.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Silverblue (and Kinoite) differ from Fedora Workstation as they replace the [DNF](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/DNF) package manager with a much more advanced alternative called [`rpm-ostree`](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/rawhide/system-administrators-guide/package-management/rpm-ostree/). The `rpm-ostree` package manager works by downloading a base image for the system, then overlaying packages over it in a [git](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Git)-like commit tree. When the system is updated, a new base image is downloaded and the overlays will be applied to that new image.
+
+After the update is complete you will reboot the system into the new deployment. `rpm-ostree` keeps two deployments of the system so that you can easily rollback if something breaks in the new deployment. There is also the option to pin more deployments as needed.
+
+[Flatpak](https://www.flatpak.org) is the primary package installation method on these distributions, as `rpm-ostree` is only meant to overlay packages that cannot stay inside of a container on top of the base image.
+
+As an alternative to Flatpaks, there is the option of [Toolbox](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora-silverblue/toolbox/) to create [Podman](https://podman.io) containers with a shared home directory with the host operating system and mimic a traditional Fedora environment, which is a [useful feature](https://containertoolbx.org) for the discerning developer.
+
+### NixOS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ NixOS is an independent distribution based on the Nix package manager with a focus on reproducibility and reliability.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://nixos.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://nixos.org/learn.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nixos.org/donate.html){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+NixOS’s package manager keeps every version of every package in a different folder in the **Nix store**. Due to this you can have different versions of the same package installed on your system. After the package contents have been written to the folder, the folder is made read-only.
+
+NixOS also provides atomic updates; first it downloads (or builds) the packages and files for the new system generation and then switches to it. There are different ways to switch to a new generation; you can tell NixOS to activate it after reboot or you can switch to it at runtime. You can also *test* the new generation by switching to it at runtime, but not setting it as the current system generation. If something in the update process breaks, you can just reboot and automatically and return to a working version of your system.
+
+Nix the package manager uses a purely functional language - which is also called Nix - to define packages.
+
+[Nixpkgs](https://github.com/nixos/nixpkgs) (the main source of packages) are contained in a single GitHub repository. You can also define your own packages in the same language and then easily include them in your config.
+
+Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in the binary cache, Nix will just build the package from source using its definition. It builds each package in a sandboxed *pure* environment, which is as independent of the host system as possible, thus making binaries reproducible.
+
+## Anonymity-Focused Distributions
+
+### Whonix
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Whonix is meant to run as two virtual machines: a “Workstation” and a Tor “Gateway.” All communications from the Workstation must go through the Tor gateway. This means that even if the Workstation is compromised by malware of some kind, the true IP address remains hidden.
+
+Some of its features include Tor Stream Isolation, [keystroke anonymization](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Keystroke_Deanonymization#Kloak), [encrypted swap](https://github.com/Whonix/swap-file-creator), and a hardened memory allocator.
+
+Future versions of Whonix will likely include [full system AppArmor policies](https://github.com/Whonix/apparmor-profile-everything) and a [sandbox app launcher](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Sandbox-app-launcher) to fully confine all processes on the system.
+
+Whonix is best used [in conjunction with Qubes](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Why_use_Qubes_over_other_Virtualizers), Qubes-Whonix has various [disadvantages](https://forums.whonix.org/t/qubes-whonix-security-disadvantages-help-wanted/8581) when compared to other hypervisors.
+
+### Tails
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tails** is a live operating system based on Debian that routes all communications through Tor, which can boot on on almost any computer from a DVD, USB stick, or SD card installation. It uses [Tor](tor.md) to preserve privacy and anonymity while circumventing censorship, and it leaves no trace of itself on the computer it is used on after it is powered off.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tails.boum.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tails.boum.org/doc/index.en.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tails.boum.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Tails is great for counter forensics due to amnesia (meaning nothing is written to the disk); however, it is not a hardened distribution like Whonix. It lacks many anonymity and security features that Whonix has and gets updated much less often (only once every six weeks). A Tails system that is compromised by malware may potentially bypass the transparent proxy allowing for the user to be deanonymized.
+
+Tails includes [uBlock Origin](desktop-browsers.md#ublock-origin) in Tor Browser by default, which may potentially make it easier for adversaries to fingerprint Tails users. [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) virtual machines may be more leak-proof, however they are not amnesic, meaning data may be recovered from your storage device.
+
+By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypted [persistent storage](https://tails.boum.org/doc/persistent_storage/index.en.html) can be configured to store some data between reboots.
+
+## Security-focused Distributions
+
+### Qubes OS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*.
+
+The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/).
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+Our recommended operating systems:
+
+- Must be open-source.
+- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates.
+- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#Wayland).
+- Must support full-disk encryption during installation.
+- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage.
+- Must support a wide variety of hardware.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/dns.md b/i18n/fa/dns.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..48581c704
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/dns.md
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+---
+title: "DNS Resolvers"
+icon: material/dns
+---
+
+!!! question "Should I use encrypted DNS?"
+
+ Encrypted DNS with third-party servers should only be used to get around basic [DNS blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) when you can be sure there won't be any consequences. Encrypted DNS will not help you hide any of your browsing activity.
+
+ [Learn more about DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md){ .md-button }
+
+## Recommended Providers
+
+| DNS Provider | Privacy Policy | Protocols | Logging | ECS | Filtering |
+| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------ | -------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| [**AdGuard**](https://adguard.com/en/adguard-dns/overview.html) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT DNSCrypt | Some[^1] | No | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardDNS) |
+| [**Cloudflare**](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/setting-up-1.1.1.1/) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT | Some[^2] | No | Based on server choice. |
+| [**Control D**](https://controld.com/free-dns) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://controld.com/privacy) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT DoQ | Optional[^3] | No | Based on server choice. |
+| [**Mullvad**](https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/) | DoH DoT | No[^4] | No | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/mullvad/dns-adblock) |
+| [**NextDNS**](https://www.nextdns.io) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://www.nextdns.io/privacy) | Cleartext DoH/3 DoT | Optional[^5] | Optional | Based on server choice. |
+| [**Quad9**](https://quad9.net) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://quad9.net/privacy/policy/) | Cleartext DoH DoT DNSCrypt | Some[^6] | Optional | Based on server choice, Malware blocking by default. |
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must support [DNSSEC](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-dnssec).
+- [QNAME Minimization](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-qname-minimization).
+- Allow for [ECS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-edns-client-subnet-ecs) to be disabled.
+- Prefer [anycast](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anycast#Addressing_methods) support or geo-steering support.
+
+## Native Operating System Support
+
+### Android
+
+Android 9 and above support DNS over TLS. The settings can be found in: **Settings** → **Network & Internet** → **Private DNS**.
+
+### Apple Devices
+
+The latest versions of iOS, iPadOS, tvOS, and macOS, support both DoT and DoH. Both protocols are supported natively via [configuration profiles](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/configuration-profile-enforcement-secf6fb9f053/web) or through the [DNS Settings API](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/networkextension/dns_settings).
+
+After installation of either a configuration profile or an app that uses the DNS Settings API, the DNS configuration can be selected. If a VPN is active, resolution within the VPN tunnel will use the VPN's DNS settings and not your system-wide settings.
+
+#### Signed Profiles
+
+Apple does not provide a native interface for creating encrypted DNS profiles. [Secure DNS profile creator](https://dns.notjakob.com/tool.html) is an unofficial tool for creating your own encrypted DNS profiles, however they will not be signed. Signed profiles are preferred; signing validates a profile's origin and helps to ensure the integrity of the profiles. A green "Verified" label is given to signed configuration profiles. For more information on code signing, see [About Code Signing](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/CodeSigningGuide/Introduction/Introduction.html). **Signed profiles** are offered by [AdGuard](https://adguard.com/en/blog/encrypted-dns-ios-14.html), [NextDNS](https://apple.nextdns.io), and [Quad9](https://www.quad9.net/news/blog/ios-mobile-provisioning-profiles/).
+
+!!! info
+
+ `systemd-resolved`, which many Linux distributions use to do their DNS lookups, doesn't yet [support DoH](https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/8639). If you want to use DoH, you'll need to install a proxy like [dnscrypt-proxy](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy) and [configure it](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dnscrypt-proxy) to take all the DNS queries from your system resolver and forward them over HTTPS.
+
+## Encrypted DNS Proxies
+
+Encrypted DNS proxy software provides a local proxy for the [unencrypted DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md#unencrypted-dns) resolver to forward to. Typically it is used on platforms that don't natively support [encrypted DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns).
+
+### RethinkDNS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **RethinkDNS** is an open-source Android client supporting [DNS-over-HTTPS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), [DNS-over-TLS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-tls-dot), [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt) and DNS Proxy along with caching DNS responses, locally logging DNS queries and can be used as a firewall too.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://rethinkdns.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://rethinkdns.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.rethinkdns.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/celzero/rethink-app){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.celzero.bravedns)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/celzero/rethink-app/releases)
+
+### dnscrypt-proxy
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **dnscrypt-proxy** is a DNS proxy with support for [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt), [DNS-over-HTTPS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), and [Anonymized DNS](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Anonymized-DNS).
+
+ !!! warning "The anonymized DNS feature does [**not**](advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns) anonymize other network traffic."
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/dnscrypt/contribute){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Installation-Windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Installation-macOS)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Installation-linux)
+
+## Self-hosted Solutions
+
+A self-hosted DNS solution is useful for providing filtering on controlled platforms, such as Smart TVs and other IoT devices, as no client-side software is needed.
+
+### AdGuard Home
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **AdGuard Home** is an open-source [DNS-sinkhole](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_sinkhole) which uses [DNS filtering](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/access-management/what-is-dns-filtering/) to block unwanted web content, such as advertisements.
+
+ AdGuard Home features a polished web interface to view insights and manage blocked content.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://adguard.com/adguard-home/overview.html){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://adguard.com/privacy/home.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+### Pi-hole
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Pi-hole** is an open-source [DNS-sinkhole](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_sinkhole) which uses [DNS filtering](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/access-management/what-is-dns-filtering/) to block unwanted web content, such as advertisements.
+
+ Pi-hole is designed to be hosted on a Raspberry Pi, but it is not limited to such hardware. The software features a friendly web interface to view insights and manage blocked content.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://pi-hole.net/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://pi-hole.net/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.pi-hole.net/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/pi-hole/pi-hole){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://pi-hole.net/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
+
+[^1]: AdGuard stores aggregated performance metrics of their DNS servers, namely the number of complete requests to a particular server, the number of blocked requests, and the speed of processing requests. They also keep and store the database of domains requested in within last 24 hours. "We need this information to identify and block new trackers and threats." "We also log how many times this or that tracker has been blocked. We need this information to remove outdated rules from our filters." [https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html](https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html)
+[^2]: Cloudflare collects and stores only the limited DNS query data that is sent to the 1.1.1.1 resolver. The 1.1.1.1 resolver service does not log personal data, and the bulk of the limited non-personally identifiable query data is stored only for 25 hours. [https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/)
+[^3]: Control D only logs for Premium resolvers with custom DNS profiles. Free resolvers do not log data. [https://controld.com/privacy](https://controld.com/privacy)
+[^4]: Mullvad's DNS service is available to both subscribers and non-subscribers of Mullvad VPN. Their privacy policy explicitly claims they do not log DNS requests in any way. [https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/](https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/)
+[^5]: NextDNS can provide insights and logging features on an opt-in basis. You can choose retention times and log storage locations for any logs you choose to keep. If it's not specifically requested, no data is logged. [https://nextdns.io/privacy](https://nextdns.io/privacy)
+[^6]: Quad9 collects some data for the purposes of threat monitoring and response. That data may then be remixed and shared, such as for the purpose of security research. Quad9 does not collect or record IP addresses or other data they deem personally identifiable. [https://www.quad9.net/privacy/policy/](https://www.quad9.net/privacy/policy/)
diff --git a/i18n/fa/email-clients.md b/i18n/fa/email-clients.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f14610d38
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/email-clients.md
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+---
+title: "Email Clients"
+icon: material/email-open
+---
+
+Our recommendation list contains email clients that support both [OpenPGP](encryption.md#openpgp) and strong authentication such as [Open Authorization (OAuth)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth). OAuth allows you to use [Multi-Factor Authentication](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md) and prevent account theft.
+
+??? warning "Email does not provide forward secrecy"
+
+ When using end-to-end encryption (E2EE) technology like OpenPGP, email will still have [some metadata](email.md#email-metadata-overview) that is not encrypted in the header of the email.
+
+ OpenPGP also does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed: [How do I protect my private keys?](basics/email-security.md) Consider using a medium that provides forward secrecy:
+
+ [Real-time Communication](real-time-communication.md){ .md-button }
+
+## Cross-Platform
+
+### Thunderbird
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Thunderbird** is a free, open-source, cross-platform email, newsgroup, news feed, and chat (XMPP, IRC, Twitter) client developed by the Thunderbird community, and previously by the Mozilla Foundation.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.thunderbird.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mozilla.org/privacy/thunderbird){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.mozilla.org/products/thunderbird){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://hg.mozilla.org/comm-central){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.thunderbird.net)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.thunderbird.net)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.thunderbird.net)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.mozilla.Thunderbird)
+
+#### فایرفاکس Firefox
+
+We recommend changing some of these settings to make Thunderbird a little more private.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Privacy & Security**.
+
+##### Web Content
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Remember websites and links I've visited**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Accept cookies from sites**
+
+##### Telemetry
+
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Thunderbird to send technical and interaction data to Mozilla**
+
+#### Thunderbird-user.js (advanced)
+
+[`thunderbird-user.js`](https://github.com/HorlogeSkynet/thunderbird-user.js), is a set of configurations options that aims to disable as many of the web-browsing features within Thunderbird as possible in order to reduce surface area and maintain privacy. Some of the changes are backported from the [Arkenfox project](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js).
+
+## Platform Specific
+
+### Apple Mail (macOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Apple Mail** is included in macOS and can be extended to have OpenPGP support with [GPG Suite](encryption.md#gpg-suite), which adds the ability to send PGP-encrypted email.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/welcome/mac){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/toc){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+### Canary Mail (iOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Canary Mail** is a paid email client designed to make end-to-end encryption seamless with security features such as a biometric app lock.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://canarymail.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://canarymail.io/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://canarymail.zendesk.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.canarymail.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1236045954)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://canarymail.io/downloads.html)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Canary Mail only recently released a Windows and Android client, though we don't believe they are as stable as their iOS and Mac counterparts.
+
+Canary Mail is closed-source. We recommend it due to the few choices there are for email clients on iOS that support PGP E2EE.
+
+### FairEmail (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FairEmail** is a minimal, open-source email app, using open standards (IMAP, SMTP, OpenPGP) with a low data and battery usage.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://email.faircode.eu){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/blob/master/PRIVACY.md){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/blob/master/FAQ.md){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://email.faircode.eu/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=eu.faircode.email)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/releases)
+
+### GNOME Evolution (GNOME)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Evolution** is a personal information management application that provides integrated mail, calendaring and address book functionality. Evolution has extensive [documentation](https://help.gnome.org/users/evolution/stable/) to help you get started.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Evolution){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Evolution/PrivacyPolicy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://help.gnome.org/users/evolution/stable/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.gnome.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.gnome.Evolution)
+
+### K-9 Mail (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **K-9 Mail** is an independent mail application that supports both POP3 and IMAP mailboxes, but only supports push mail for IMAP.
+
+ In the future, K-9 Mail will be the [officially branded](https://k9mail.app/2022/06/13/K-9-Mail-and-Thunderbird.html) Thunderbird client for Android.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://k9mail.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://k9mail.app/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.k9mail.app/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/k9mail/k-9){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://k9mail.app/contribute){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.fsck.k9)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/k9mail/k-9/releases)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When replying to someone on a mailing list the "reply" option may also include the mailing list. For more information see [thundernest/k-9 #3738](https://github.com/thundernest/k-9/issues/3738).
+
+### Kontact (KDE)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Kontact** is a personal information manager (PIM) application from the [KDE](https://kde.org) project. It provides a mail client, address book, organizer and RSS client.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://kontact.kde.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://kde.org/privacypolicy-apps){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://kontact.kde.org/users/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://invent.kde.org/pim/kmail){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://kde.org/community/donations/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://kontact.kde.org/download)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.kde.kontact)
+
+### Mailvelope (Browser)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mailvelope** is a browser extension that enables the exchange of encrypted emails following the OpenPGP encryption standard.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.mailvelope.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mailvelope.com/en/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mailvelope.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailvelope/mailvelope){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/mailvelope)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/mailvelope/kajibbejlbohfaggdiogboambcijhkke)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/mailvelope/dgcbddhdhjppfdfjpciagmmibadmoapc)
+
+### NeoMutt (CLI)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **NeoMutt** is an open-source command line mail reader (or MUA) for Linux and BSD. It's a fork of [Mutt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutt_(email_client)) with added features.
+
+ NeoMutt is a text-based client that has a steep learning curve. It is however, very customizable.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://neomutt.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://neomutt.org/guide/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/russon/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://neomutt.org/distro)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://neomutt.org/distro)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Qualifications
+
+- Apps developed for open-source operating systems must be open-source.
+- Must not collect telemetry, or have an easy way to disable all telemetry.
+- Must support OpenPGP message encryption.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should be open-source.
+- Should be cross-platform.
+- Should not collect any telemetry by default.
+- Should support OpenPGP natively, i.e. without extensions.
+- Should support storing OpenPGP encrypted emails locally.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/email.md b/i18n/fa/email.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..018713f5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/email.md
@@ -0,0 +1,485 @@
+---
+title: "Email Services"
+icon: material/email
+---
+
+Email is practically a necessity for using any online service, however we do not recommend it for person-to-person conversations. Rather than using email to contact other people, consider using an instant messaging medium that supports forward secrecy.
+
+[Recommended Instant Messengers](real-time-communication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+For everything else, we recommend a variety of email providers based on sustainable business models and built-in security and privacy features.
+
+## OpenPGP Compatible Services
+
+These providers natively support OpenPGP encryption/decryption, allowing for provider-agnostic E2EE emails. For example, a Proton Mail user could send an E2EE message to a Mailbox.org user, or you could receive OpenPGP-encrypted notifications from internet services which support it.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using E2EE technology like OpenPGP, email will still have some metadata that is not encrypted in the header of the email. Read more about [email metadata](basics/email-security.md#email-metadata-overview).
+
+ OpenPGP also does not support Forward secrecy, which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. [How do I protect my private keys?](basics/email-security.md#how-do-i-protect-my-private-keys)
+
+### Proton Mail
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton Mail** is an email service with a focus on privacy, encryption, security, and ease of use. They have been in operation since **2013**. Proton AG is based in Genève, Switzerland. Accounts start with 500 MB storage with their free plan.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/mail){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://protonmailrmez3lotccipshtkleegetolb73fuirgj7r4o4vfu7ozyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/mail){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonmail.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id979659905)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonMail/proton-mail-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.proton.me)
+
+Free accounts have some limitations, such as not being able to search body text and not having access to [Proton Mail Bridge](https://proton.me/mail/bridge), which is required to use a [recommended desktop email client](email-clients.md) (e.g. Thunderbird). Paid accounts include features like Proton Mail Bridge, additional storage, and custom domain support. A [letter of attestation](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps) was provided for Proton Mail's apps on 9th November 2021 by [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com).
+
+If you have the Proton Unlimited, Business, or Visionary Plan, you also get [SimpleLogin](#simplelogin) Premium for free.
+
+Proton Mail has internal crash reports that they **do not** share with third parties. This can be disabled in: **Settings** > **Go to Settings** > **Account** > **Security and privacy** > **Send crash reports**.
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Paid Proton Mail subscribers can use their own domain with the service or a [catch-all](https://proton.me/support/catch-all) address. Proton Mail also supports [subaddressing](https://proton.me/support/creating-aliases), which is useful for people who don't want to purchase a domain.
+
+??? success "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ Proton Mail [accepts](https://proton.me/support/payment-options) Bitcoin and cash by mail in addition to standard credit/debit card and PayPal payments.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ Proton Mail supports TOTP [two factor authentication](https://proton.me/support/two-factor-authentication-2fa) only. The use of a U2F security key is not yet supported. Proton Mail is planning to implement U2F upon completion of their [Single Sign On (SSO)](https://reddit.com/comments/cheoy6/comment/feh2lw0/) code.
+
+??? success "Data Security"
+
+ Proton Mail has [zero-access encryption](https://proton.me/blog/zero-access-encryption) at rest for your emails and [calendars](https://proton.me/news/protoncalendar-security-model). Data secured with zero-access encryption is only accessible by you.
+
+ Certain information stored in [Proton Contacts](https://proton.me/support/proton-contacts), such as display names and email addresses, are not secured with zero-access encryption. Contact fields that support zero-access encryption, such as phone numbers, are indicated with a padlock icon.
+
+??? success "Email Encryption"
+
+ Proton Mail has [integrated OpenPGP encryption](https://proton.me/support/how-to-use-pgp) in their webmail. Emails to other Proton Mail accounts are encrypted automatically, and encryption to non-Proton Mail addresses with an OpenPGP key can be enabled easily in your account settings. They also allow you to [encrypt messages to non-Proton Mail addresses](https://proton.me/support/password-protected-emails) without the need for them to sign up for a Proton Mail account or use software like OpenPGP.
+
+ Proton Mail also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This allows people who don't use Proton Mail to find the OpenPGP keys of Proton Mail accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE.
+
+??? warning "Digital Legacy"
+
+ Proton Mail doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ If you have a paid account and your [bill is unpaid](https://proton.me/support/delinquency) after 14 days, you won't be able to access your data. After 30 days, your account will become delinquent and won't receive incoming mail. You will continue to be billed during this period.
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ Proton Mail offers an "Unlimited" account for €9.99/Month, which also enables access to Proton VPN in addition to providing multiple accounts, domains, aliases, and 500GB of storage.
+
+### Mailbox.org
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mailbox.org** is an email service with a focus on being secure, ad-free, and privately powered by 100% eco-friendly energy. They have been in operation since 2014. Mailbox.org is based in Berlin, Germany. Accounts start with 2 GB of storage, which can be upgraded as needed.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailbox.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://mailbox.org/en/data-protection-privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://login.mailbox.org)
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Mailbox.org lets you use your own domain, and they support [catch-all](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Using+catch-all+alias+with+own+domain) addresses. Mailbox.org also supports [subaddressing](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/BMBOKBEN/What+is+an+alias+and+how+do+I+use+it), which is useful if you don't want to purchase a domain.
+
+??? info "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ Mailbox.org doesn't accept Bitcoin or any other cryptocurrencies as a result of their payment processor BitPay suspending operations in Germany. However, they do accept Cash by mail, cash payment to bank account, bank transfer, credit card, PayPal and couple of German-specific processors: paydirekt and Sofortüberweisung.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ Mailbox.org supports [two factor authentication](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/How+to+use+two-factor+authentication+-+2FA) for their webmail only. You can use either TOTP or a [Yubikey](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YubiKey) via the [Yubicloud](https://www.yubico.com/products/services-software/yubicloud). Web standards such as [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn) are not yet supported.
+
+??? info "Data Security"
+
+ Mailbox.org allows for encryption of incoming mail using their [encrypted mailbox](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/The+Encrypted+Mailbox). New messages that you receive will then be immediately encrypted with your public key.
+
+ However, [Open-Exchange](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-Xchange), the software platform used by Mailbox.org, [does not support](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/BMBOKBEN/Encryption+of+calendar+and+address+book) the encryption of your address book and calendar. A [standalone option](calendar.md) may be more appropriate for that information.
+
+??? success "Email Encryption"
+
+ Mailbox.org has [integrated encryption](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Send+encrypted+e-mails+with+Guard) in their webmail, which simplifies sending messages to people with public OpenPGP keys. They also allow [remote recipients to decrypt an email](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/My+recipient+does+not+use+PGP) on Mailbox.org's servers. This feature is useful when the remote recipient does not have OpenPGP and cannot decrypt a copy of the email in their own mailbox.
+
+ Mailbox.org also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This allows people outside of Mailbox.org to find the OpenPGP keys of Mailbox.org accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE.
+
+??? success "Digital Legacy"
+
+ Mailbox.org has a digital legacy feature for all plans. You can choose whether you want any of your data to be passed to heirs providing that they apply and provide your testament. Alternatively, you can nominate a person by name and address.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ Your account will be set to a restricted user account when your contract ends, after [30 days it will be irrevocably deleted](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/payment-article/what-happens-at-the-end-of-my-contract).
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ You can access your Mailbox.org account via IMAP/SMTP using their [.onion service](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/The+Tor+exit+node+of+mailbox.org). However, their webmail interface cannot be accessed via their .onion service and you may experience TLS certificate errors.
+
+ All accounts come with limited cloud storage that [can be encrypted](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Encrypt+files+on+your+Drive). Mailbox.org also offers the alias [@secure.mailbox.org](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Ensuring+E-Mails+are+Sent+Securely), which enforces the TLS encryption on the connection between mail servers, otherwise the message will not be sent at all. Mailbox.org also supports [Exchange ActiveSync](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exchange_ActiveSync) in addition to standard access protocols like IMAP and POP3.
+
+### StartMail
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **StartMail** is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of standard OpenPGP encryption. StartMail has been in operation since 2014 and is based in Boulevard 11, Zeist Netherlands. Accounts start with 10GB. They offer a 30-day trial.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.startmail.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.startmail.com/en/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.startmail.com){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.startmail.com/login)
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Personal accounts can use [Custom or Quick](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360007297457-Aliases) aliases. [Custom domains](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/4403911432209-Setup-a-custom-domain) are also available.
+
+??? warning "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ StartMail accepts Visa, MasterCard, American Express and Paypal. StartMail also has other [payment options](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006620637-Payment-methods) such as Bitcoin (currently only for Personal accounts) and SEPA Direct Debit for accounts older than a year.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ StartMail supports TOTP two factor authentication [for webmail only](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006682158-Two-factor-authentication-2FA). They do not allow U2F security key authentication.
+
+??? info "Data Security"
+
+ StartMail has [zero access encryption at rest](https://www.startmail.com/en/whitepaper/#_Toc458527835), using their "user vault" system. When you log in, the vault is opened, and the email is then moved to the vault out of the queue where it is decrypted by the corresponding private key.
+
+ StartMail supports importing [contacts](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006495557-Import-contacts) however, they are only accessible in the webmail and not through protocols such as [CalDAV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CalDAV). Contacts are also not stored using zero knowledge encryption.
+
+??? success "Email Encryption"
+
+ StartMail has [integrated encryption](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/sections/360001889078-Encryption) in their webmail, which simplifies sending encrypted messages with public OpenPGP keys.
+
+??? warning "Digital Legacy"
+
+ StartMail does not offer a digital legacy feature.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ On account expiration, StartMail will permanently delete your account after [6 months in 3 phases](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006794398-Account-expiration).
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ StartMail allows for proxying of images within emails. If you allow the remote image to be loaded, the sender won't know what your IP address is.
+
+## More Providers
+
+These providers store your emails with zero-knowledge encryption, making them great options for keeping your stored emails secure. However, they don't support interoperable encryption standards for E2EE communications between providers.
+
+### Tutanota
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tutanota** is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of encryption. Tutanota has been in operation since **2011** and is based in Hanover, Germany. Accounts start with 1GB storage with their free plan.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tutanota.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tutanota.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tutanota.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tutanota.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/tutanota/id922429609)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.tutanota.com/)
+
+Tutanota doesn't support the [IMAP protocol](https://tutanota.com/faq/#imap) or the use of third-party [email clients](email-clients.md), and you also won't be able to add [external email accounts](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/544#issuecomment-670473647) to the Tutanota app. Neither [Email import](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/630) or [subfolders](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/927) are currently supported, though this is [due to be changed](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/kickoff-import). Emails can be exported [individually or by bulk selection](https://tutanota.com/howto#generalMail) per folder, which may be inconvenient if you have many folders.
+
+??? success "Custom Domains and Aliases"
+
+ Paid Tutanota accounts can use up to 5 [aliases](https://tutanota.com/faq#alias) and [custom domains](https://tutanota.com/faq#custom-domain). Tutanota doesn't allow for [subaddressing (plus addresses)](https://tutanota.com/faq#plus), but you can use a [catch-all](https://tutanota.com/howto#settings-global) with a custom domain.
+
+??? warning "Private Payment Methods"
+
+ Tutanota only directly accepts credit cards and PayPal, however Bitcoin and Monero can be used to purchase gift cards via their [partnership](https://tutanota.com/faq/#cryptocurrency) with Proxystore.
+
+??? success "Account Security"
+
+ Tutanota supports [two factor authentication](https://tutanota.com/faq#2fa) with either TOTP or U2F.
+
+??? success "Data Security"
+
+ Tutanota has [zero access encryption at rest](https://tutanota.com/faq#what-encrypted) for your emails, [address book contacts](https://tutanota.com/faq#encrypted-address-book), and [calendars](https://tutanota.com/faq#calendar). This means the messages and other data stored in your account are only readable by you.
+
+??? warning "Email Encryption"
+
+ Tutanota [does not use OpenPGP](https://www.tutanota.com/faq/#pgp). Tutanota accounts can only receive encrypted emails from non-Tutanota email accounts when sent via a [temporary Tutanota mailbox](https://www.tutanota.com/howto/#encrypted-email-external).
+
+??? warning "Digital Legacy"
+
+ Tutanota doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
+
+??? info "Account Termination"
+
+ Tutanota will [delete inactive free accounts](https://tutanota.com/faq#inactive-accounts) after six months. You can reuse a deactivated free account if you pay.
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ Tutanota offers the business version of [Tutanota to non-profit organizations](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/secure-email-for-non-profit) for free or with a heavy discount.
+
+ Tutanota also has a business feature called [Secure Connect](https://tutanota.com/secure-connect/). This ensures customer contact to the business uses E2EE. The feature costs €240/y.
+
+## Email Aliasing Services
+
+An email aliasing service allows you to easily generate a new email address for every website you register for. The email aliases you generate are then forwarded to an email address of your choosing, hiding both your "main" email address and the identity of your email provider. True email aliasing is better than plus addressing commonly used and supported by many providers, which allows you to create aliases like yourname+[anythinghere]@example.com, because websites, advertisers, and tracking networks can trivially remove anything after the + sign to know your true email address.
+
+Email aliasing can act as a safeguard in case your email provider ever ceases operation. In that scenario, you can easily re-route your aliases to a new email address. In turn, however, you are placing trust in the aliasing service to continue functioning.
+
+Using a dedicated email aliasing service also has a number of benefits over a catch-all alias on a custom domain:
+
+- Aliases can be turned on and off individually when you need them, preventing websites from emailing you randomly.
+- Replies are sent from the alias address, shielding your real email address.
+
+They also have a number of benefits over "temporary email" services:
+
+- Aliases are permanent and can be turned on again if you need to receive something like a password reset.
+- Emails are sent to your trusted mailbox rather than stored by the alias provider.
+- Temporary email services typically have public mailboxes which can be accessed by anyone who knows the address, aliases are private to you.
+
+Our email aliasing recommendations are providers that allow you to create aliases on domains they control, as well as your own custom domain(s) for a modest yearly fee. They can also be self-hosted if you want maximum control. However, using a custom domain can have privacy-related drawbacks: If you are the only person using your custom domain, your actions can be easily tracked across websites simply by looking at the domain name in the email address and ignoring everything before the at (@) sign.
+
+Using an aliasing service requires trusting both your email provider and your aliasing provider with your unencrypted messages. Some providers mitigate this slightly with automatic PGP encryption, which reduces the number of parties you need to trust from two to one by encrypting incoming emails before they are delivered to your final mailbox provider.
+
+### AnonAddy
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **AnonAddy** lets you create 20 domain aliases on a shared domain for free, or unlimited "standard" aliases which are less anonymous.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://anonaddy.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://anonaddy.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://app.anonaddy.com/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/anonaddy){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://anonaddy.com/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://anonaddy.com/faq/#is-there-an-android-app)
+ - [:material-apple-ios: iOS](https://anonaddy.com/faq/#is-there-an-ios-app)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-GB/firefox/addon/anonaddy/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/anonaddy-anonymous-email/iadbdpnoknmbdeolbapdackdcogdmjpe)
+
+The number of shared aliases (which end in a shared domain like @anonaddy.me) that you can create is limited to 20 on AnonAddy's free plan and 50 on their $12/year plan. You can create unlimited standard aliases (which end in a domain like @[username].anonaddy.com or a custom domain on paid plans), however, as previously mentioned, this can be detrimental to privacy because people can trivially tie your standard aliases together based on the domain name alone. Unlimited shared aliases are available for $36/year.
+
+Notable free features:
+
+- [x] 20 Shared Aliases
+- [x] Unlimited Standard Aliases
+- [ ] No Outgoing Replies
+- [x] 2 Recipient Mailboxes
+- [x] Automatic PGP Encryption
+
+### SimpleLogin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **SimpleLogin** is a free service which provides email aliases on a variety of shared domain names, and optionally provides paid features like unlimited aliases and custom domains.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://simplelogin.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://simplelogin.io/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://simplelogin.io/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simple-login){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.simplelogin.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1494359858)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/simple-login/Simple-Login-Android/releases)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/simplelogin/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/dphilobhebphkdjbpfohgikllaljmgbn)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/simpleloginreceive-sen/diacfpipniklenphgljfkmhinphjlfff)
+ - [:simple-safari: Safari](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1494051017)
+
+SimpleLogin was [acquired by Proton AG](https://proton.me/news/proton-and-simplelogin-join-forces) as of April 8, 2022. If you use Proton Mail for your primary mailbox, SimpleLogin is a great choice. As both products are now owned by the same company you now only have to trust a single entity. We also expect that SimpleLogin will be more tightly integrated with Proton's offerings in the future. SimpleLogin continues to support forwarding to any email provider of your choosing. Securitum [audited](https://simplelogin.io/blog/security-audit/) SimpleLogin in early 2022 and all issues [were addressed](https://simplelogin.io/audit2022/web.pdf).
+
+You can link your SimpleLogin account in the settings with your Proton account. If you have the Proton Unlimited, Business, or Visionary Plan, you will have SimpleLogin Premium for free.
+
+Notable free features:
+
+- [x] 10 Shared Aliases
+- [x] Unlimited Replies
+- [x] 1 Recipient Mailbox
+
+## Self-Hosting Email
+
+Advanced system administrators may consider setting up their own email server. Mail servers require attention and continuous maintenance in order to keep things secure and mail delivery reliable.
+
+### Combined software solutions
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mailcow** is a more advanced mail server perfect for those with a bit more Linux experience. It has everything you need in a Docker container: A mail server with DKIM support, antivirus and spam monitoring, webmail and ActiveSync with SOGo, and web-based administration with 2FA support.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailcow.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mailcow.github.io/mailcow-dockerized-docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailcow/mailcow-dockerized){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.servercow.de/mailcow?lang=en#sal){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mail-in-a-Box** is an automated setup script for deploying a mail server on Ubuntu. Its goal is to make it easier for people to set up their own mail server.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailinabox.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mailinabox.email/guide.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mail-in-a-box/mailinabox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+For a more manual approach we've picked out these two articles:
+
+- [Setting up a mail server with OpenSMTPD, Dovecot and Rspamd](https://poolp.org/posts/2019-09-14/setting-up-a-mail-server-with-opensmtpd-dovecot-and-rspamd/) (2019)
+- [How To Run Your Own Mail Server](https://www.c0ffee.net/blog/mail-server-guide/) (August 2017)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the providers we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements for any Email provider wishing to be recommended, including implementing industry best practices, modern technology and more. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing an Email provider, and conduct your own research to ensure the Email provider you choose is the right choice for you.
+
+### Technology
+
+We regard these features as important in order to provide a safe and optimal service. You should consider whether the provider which has the features you require.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Encrypts email account data at rest with zero-access encryption.
+- Export capability as [Mbox](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mbox) or individual .eml with [RFC5322](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5322/) standard.
+- Allow users to use their own [domain name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name). Custom domain names are important to users because it allows them to maintain their agency from the service, should it turn bad or be acquired by another company which doesn't prioritize privacy.
+- Operates on owned infrastructure, i.e. not built upon third-party email service providers.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Encrypts all account data (Contacts, Calendars, etc) at rest with zero-access encryption.
+- Integrated webmail E2EE/PGP encryption provided as a convenience.
+- Support for [WKD](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD) to allow improved discovery of public OpenPGP keys via HTTP. GnuPG users can get a key by typing: `gpg --locate-key example_user@example.com`
+- Support for a temporary mailbox for external users. This is useful when you want to send an encrypted email, without sending an actual copy to your recipient. These emails usually have a limited lifespan and then are automatically deleted. They also don't require the recipient to configure any cryptography like OpenPGP.
+- Availability of the email provider's services via an [onion service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.onion).
+- [Subaddressing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email_address#Subaddressing) support.
+- Catch-all or alias functionality for those who own their own domains.
+- Use of standard email access protocols such as IMAP, SMTP or [JMAP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Meta_Application_Protocol). Standard access protocols ensure customers can easily download all of their email, should they want to switch to another provider.
+
+### Privacy
+
+We prefer our recommended providers to collect as little data as possible.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Protect sender's IP address. Filter it from showing in the `Received` header field.
+- Don't require personally identifiable information (PII) besides a username and a password.
+- Privacy policy that meets the requirements defined by the GDPR
+- Must not be hosted in the US due to [ECPA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_Communications_Privacy_Act#Criticism) which has [yet to be reformed](https://epic.org/ecpa/).
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Accepts Bitcoin, cash, and other forms of cryptocurrency and/or anonymous payment options (gift cards, etc.)
+
+### Security
+
+Email servers deal with a lot of very sensitive data. We expect that providers will adopt best industry practices in order to protect their members.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Protection of webmail with 2FA, such as TOTP.
+- Zero access encryption, builds on encryption at rest. The provider does not have the decryption keys to the data they hold. This prevents a rogue employee leaking data they have access to or remote adversary from releasing data they have stolen by gaining unauthorized access to the server.
+- [DNSSEC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Extensions) support.
+- No TLS errors or vulnerabilities when being profiled by tools such as [Hardenize](https://www.hardenize.com/), [testssl.sh](https://testssl.sh/), or [Qualys SSL Labs](https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest); this includes certificate related errors and weak DH parameters, such as those that led to [Logjam](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logjam_(computer_security)).
+- A server suite preference (optional on TLSv1.3) for strong cipher suites which support forward secrecy and authenticated encryption.
+- A valid [MTA-STS](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8461) and [TLS-RPT](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8460) policy.
+- Valid [DANE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS-based_Authentication_of_Named_Entities) records.
+- Valid [SPF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sender_Policy_Framework) and [DKIM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DomainKeys_Identified_Mail) records.
+- Have a proper [DMARC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DMARC) record and policy or use [ARC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain) for authentication. If DMARC authentication is being used, the policy must be set to `reject` or `quarantine`.
+- A server suite preference of TLS 1.2 or later and a plan for [Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate/).
+- [SMTPS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SMTPS) submission, assuming SMTP is used.
+- Website security standards such as:
+ - [HTTP Strict Transport Security](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security)
+ - [Subresource Integrity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subresource_Integrity) if loading things from external domains.
+- Must support viewing of [Message headers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header), as it is a crucial forensic feature to determine if an email is a phishing attempt.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Support for hardware authentication, i.e. U2F and [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn). U2F and WebAuthn are more secure as they use a private key stored on a client-side hardware device to authenticate people, as opposed to a shared secret that is stored on the web server and on the client side when using TOTP. Furthermore, U2F and WebAuthn are more resistant to phishing as their authentication response is based on the authenticated [domain name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_name).
+- [DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844) in addition to DANE support.
+- Implementation of [Authenticated Received Chain (ARC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain), this is useful for people who post to mailing lists [RFC8617](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8617).
+- Bug-bounty programs and/or a coordinated vulnerability-disclosure process.
+- Website security standards such as:
+ - [Content Security Policy (CSP)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy)
+ - [Expect-CT](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-expect-ct)
+
+### Trust
+
+You wouldn't trust your finances to someone with a fake identity, so why trust them with your email? We require our recommended providers to be public about their ownership or leadership. We also would like to see frequent transparency reports, especially in regard to how government requests are handled.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership or ownership.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership.
+- Frequent transparency reports.
+
+### Marketing
+
+With the email providers we recommend we like to see responsible marketing.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Must self-host analytics (no Google Analytics, Adobe Analytics, etc). The provider's site must also comply with [DNT (Do Not Track)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Do_Not_Track) for those who wish to opt-out.
+
+Must not have any marketing which is irresponsible:
+
+- Claims of "unbreakable encryption." Encryption should be used with the intention that it may not be secret in the future when the technology exists to crack it.
+- Making guarantees of protecting anonymity 100%. When someone makes a claim that something is 100% it means there is no certainty for failure. We know people can quite easily deanonymize themselves in a number of ways, e.g.:
+
+- Reusing personal information e.g. (email accounts, unique pseudonyms, etc) that they accessed without anonymity software (Tor, VPN, etc)
+- [Browser fingerprinting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint)
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Clear and easy to read documentation. This includes things like, setting up 2FA, email clients, OpenPGP, etc.
+
+### Additional Functionality
+
+While not strictly requirements, there are some other convenience or privacy factors we looked into when determining which providers to recommend.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/encryption.md b/i18n/fa/encryption.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d254167c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/encryption.md
@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
+---
+title: "Encryption Software"
+icon: material/file-lock
+---
+
+Encryption of data is the only way to control who can access it. If you are currently not using encryption software for your hard disk, emails or files, you should pick an option here.
+
+## Multi-platform
+
+The options listed here are multi-platform and great for creating encrypted backups of your data.
+
+### Cryptomator (Cloud)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Cryptomator** is an encryption solution designed for privately saving files to any cloud provider. It allows you to create vaults that are stored on a virtual drive, the contents of which are encrypted and synced with your cloud storage provider.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://cryptomator.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://cryptomator.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.cryptomator.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/cryptomator){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://cryptomator.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.cryptomator)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/cryptomator-2/id1560822163)
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://cryptomator.org/android)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.cryptomator.Cryptomator)
+
+Cryptomator uses AES-256 encryption to encrypt both files and filenames. Cryptomator cannot encrypt metadata such as access, modification, and creation timestamps, nor the number and size of files and folders.
+
+Some Cryptomator cryptographic libraries have been [audited](https://community.cryptomator.org/t/has-there-been-a-security-review-audit-of-cryptomator/44) by Cure53. The scope of the audited libraries includes: [cryptolib](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptolib), [cryptofs](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptofs), [siv-mode](https://github.com/cryptomator/siv-mode) and [cryptomator-objc-cryptor](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptomator-objc-cryptor). The audit did not extend to [cryptolib-swift](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptolib-swift), which is a library used by Cryptomator for iOS.
+
+Cryptomator's documentation details its intended [security target](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/security-target/), [security architecture](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/architecture/), and [best practices](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/best-practices/) for use in further detail.
+
+### Picocrypt (File)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Picocrypt** is a small and simple encryption tool that provides modern encryption. Picocrypt uses the secure XChaCha20 cipher and the Argon2id key derivation function to provide a high level of security. It uses Go's standard x/crypto modules for its encryption features.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/picocrypt){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases)
+
+### VeraCrypt (Disk)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **VeraCrypt** is a source-available freeware utility used for on-the-fly encryption. It can create a virtual encrypted disk within a file, encrypt a partition, or encrypt the entire storage device with pre-boot authentication.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://veracrypt.fr){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/en/Documentation.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/code/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/en/Donation.html){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html)
+
+VeraCrypt is a fork of the discontinued TrueCrypt project. According to its developers, security improvements have been implemented and issues raised by the initial TrueCrypt code audit have been addressed.
+
+When encrypting with VeraCrypt, you have the option to select from different [hash functions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt#Encryption_scheme). We suggest you **only** select [SHA-512](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-512) and stick to the [AES](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard) block cipher.
+
+Truecrypt has been [audited a number of times](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TrueCrypt#Security_audits), and VeraCrypt has also been [audited separately](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt#VeraCrypt_audit).
+
+## OS Full Disk Encryption
+
+Modern operating systems include [FDE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_encryption) and will have a [secure cryptoprocessor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_cryptoprocessor).
+
+### BitLocker
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **BitLocker** is the full volume encryption solution bundled with Microsoft Windows. The main reason we recommend it is because of its [use of TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). [ElcomSoft](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ElcomSoft), a forensics company, has written about it in [Understanding BitLocker TPM Protection](https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2021/01/understanding-BitLocker-tpm-protection/).
+
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/BitLocker/BitLocker-overview){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+BitLocker is [only supported](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/turn-on-device-encryption-0c453637-bc88-5f74-5105-741561aae838) on Pro, Enterprise and Education editions of Windows. It can be enabled on Home editions provided that they meet the prerequisites.
+
+??? example "Enabling BitLocker on Windows Home"
+
+ To enable BitLocker on "Home" editions of Windows, you must have partitions formatted with a [GUID Partition Table](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GUID_Partition_Table) and have a dedicated TPM (v1.2, 2.0+) module.
+
+ 1. Open a command prompt and check your drive's partition table format with the following command. You should see "**GPT**" listed under "Partition Style":
+
+ ```
+ powershell Get-Disk
+ ```
+
+ 2. Run this command (in an admin command prompt) to check your TPM version. You should see `2.0` or `1.2` listed next to `SpecVersion`:
+
+ ```
+ powershell Get-WmiObject -Namespace "root/cimv2/security/microsofttpm" -Class WIN32_tpm
+ ```
+
+ 3. Access [Advanced Startup Options](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/advanced-startup-options-including-safe-mode-b90e7808-80b5-a291-d4b8-1a1af602b617). You need to reboot while pressing the F8 key before Windows starts and go into the *command prompt* in **Troubleshoot** → **Advanced Options** → **Command Prompt**.
+
+ 4. Login with your admin account and type this in the command prompt to start encryption:
+
+ ```
+ manage-bde -on c: -used
+ ```
+
+ 5. Close the command prompt and continue booting to regular Windows.
+
+ 6. Open an admin command prompt and run the following commands:
+
+ ```
+ manage-bde c: -protectors -add -rp -tpm
+ manage-bde -protectors -enable c:
+ manage-bde -protectors -get c: > %UserProfile%\Desktop\BitLocker-Recovery-Key.txt
+ ```
+
+ !!! tip
+
+ Backup `BitLocker-Recovery-Key.txt` on your Desktop to a separate storage device. Loss of this recovery code may result in loss of data.
+
+### FileVault
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FileVault** is the on-the-fly volume encryption solution built into macOS. FileVault is recommended because it [leverages](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/volume-encryption-with-filevault-sec4c6dc1b6e/web) hardware security capabilities present on an Apple silicon SoC or T2 Security Chip.
+
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/encrypt-mac-data-with-filevault-mh11785/mac){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+We recommend storing a local recovery key in a secure place as opposed to using your iCloud account for recovery.
+
+### Linux Unified Key Setup
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **LUKS** is the default FDE method for Linux. It can be used to encrypt full volumes, partitions, or create encrypted containers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/blob/main/README.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+??? example "Creating and opening encrypted containers"
+
+ ```
+ dd if=/dev/urandom of=/path-to-file bs=1M count=1024 status=progress
+ sudo cryptsetup luksFormat /path-to-file
+ ```
+
+
+ #### Opening encrypted containers
+ We recommend opening containers and volumes with `udisksctl` as this uses [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). Most file managers, such as those included with popular desktop environments, can unlock encrypted files. Tools like [udiskie](https://github.com/coldfix/udiskie) can run in the system tray and provide a helpful user interface.
+ ```
+ udisksctl loop-setup -f /path-to-file
+ udisksctl unlock -b /dev/loop0
+ ```
+
+!!! note "Remember to back up volume headers"
+
+ We recommend you always [back up your LUKS headers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Device_encryption#Backup_and_restore) in case of partial drive failure. This can be done with:
+
+ ```
+ cryptsetup luksHeaderBackup /dev/device --header-backup-file /mnt/backup/file.img
+ ```
+
+## Browser-based
+
+Browser-based encryption can be useful when you need to encrypt a file but cannot install software or apps on your device.
+
+### hat.sh
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Hat.sh** is a web application that provides secure client-side file encryption in your browser. It can also be self-hosted and is useful if you need to encrypt a file but cannot install any software on your device due to organizational policies.
+
+ [:octicons-globe-16: Website](https://hat.sh){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://hat.sh/about/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://hat.sh/about/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/sh-dv/hat.sh){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sh-dv/hat.sh#donations){ .card-link title="Donations methods can be found at the bottom of the website" }
+
+## Command-line
+
+Tools with command-line interfaces are useful for integrating [shell scripts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shell_script).
+
+### Kryptor
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Kryptor** is a free and open-source file encryption and signing tool that makes use of modern and secure cryptographic algorithms. It aims to be a better version of [age](https://github.com/FiloSottile/age) and [Minisign](https://jedisct1.github.io/minisign/) to provide a simple, easier alternative to GPG.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kryptor.co.uk){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/features#privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/tutorial){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/samuel-lucas6/Kryptor){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/#donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.kryptor.co.uk)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.kryptor.co.uk)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.kryptor.co.uk)
+
+### Tomb
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tomb** is a command-line shell wrapper for LUKS. It supports steganography via [third-party tools](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb#how-does-it-work).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.dyne.org/software/tomb){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.dyne.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+## OpenPGP
+
+OpenPGP is sometimes needed for specific tasks such as digitally signing and encrypting email. PGP has many features and is [complex](https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html) as it has been around a long time. For tasks such as signing or encrypting files, we suggest the above options.
+
+When encrypting with PGP, you have the option to configure different options in your `gpg.conf` file. We recommend staying with the standard options specified in the [GnuPG user FAQ](https://www.gnupg.org/faq/gnupg-faq.html#new_user_gpg_conf).
+
+!!! tip "Use future defaults when generating a key"
+
+ When [generating keys](https://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual/c14.html) we suggest using the `future-default` command as this will instruct GnuPG use modern cryptography such as [Curve25519](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curve25519#History) and [Ed25519](https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/):
+
+ ```bash
+ gpg --quick-gen-key alice@example.com future-default
+ ```
+
+### GNU Privacy Guard
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GnuPG** is a GPL-licensed alternative to the PGP suite of cryptographic software. GnuPG is compliant with [RFC 4880](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880), which is the current IETF specification of OpenPGP. The GnuPG project has been working on an [updated draft](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh/) in an attempt to modernize OpenPGP. GnuPG is a part of the Free Software Foundation's GNU software project and has received major [funding](https://gnupg.org/blog/20220102-a-new-future-for-gnupg.html) from the German government.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gnupg.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gnupg.org/privacy-policy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gnupg.org/documentation/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.sufficientlysecure.keychain)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://gpg4win.org/download.html)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://gpgtools.org)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://gnupg.org/download/index.html#binary)
+
+### GPG4win
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GPG4win** is a package for Windows from [Intevation and g10 Code](https://gpg4win.org/impressum.html). It includes [various tools](https://gpg4win.org/about.html) that can assist you in using GPG on Microsoft Windows. The project was initiated and originally [funded by](https://web.archive.org/web/20190425125223/https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/news/government-used-cryptography) Germany's Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) in 2005.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gpg4win.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gpg4win.org/privacy-policy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gpg4win.org/documentation.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gpg4win.git;a=summary){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://gpg4win.org/donate.html){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://gpg4win.org/download.html)
+
+### GPG Suite
+
+!!! note
+
+ We suggest [Canary Mail](email-clients.md#canary-mail) for using PGP with email on iOS devices.
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GPG Suite** provides OpenPGP support for [Apple Mail](email-clients.md#apple-mail) and macOS.
+
+ We recommend taking a look at their [First steps](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb/how-to/first-steps-where-do-i-start-where-do-i-begin-setup-gpgtools-create-a-new-key-your-first-encrypted-email) and [Knowledge base](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb) for support.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gpgtools.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gpgtools.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GPGTools){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://gpgtools.org)
+
+### OpenKeychain
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OpenKeychain** is an Android implementation of GnuPG. It's commonly required by mail clients such as [K-9 Mail](email-clients.md#k-9-mail) and [FairEmail](email-clients.md#fairemail) and other Android apps to provide encryption support. Cure53 completed a [security audit](https://www.openkeychain.org/openkeychain-3-6) of OpenKeychain 3.6 in October 2015. Technical details about the audit and OpenKeychain's solutions can be found [here](https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain/wiki/cure53-Security-Audit-2015).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.openkeychain.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.openkeychain.org/help/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.openkeychain.org/faq/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.sufficientlysecure.keychain)
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Qualifications
+
+- Cross-platform encryption apps must be open-source.
+- File encryption apps must support decryption on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- External disk encryption apps must support decryption on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- Internal (OS) disk encryption apps must be cross-platform or built in to the operating system natively.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Operating System (FDE) encryption apps should utilize hardware security such as a TPM or Secure Enclave.
+- File encryption apps should have first- or third-party support for mobile platforms.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/file-sharing.md b/i18n/fa/file-sharing.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2d22ffc66
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/file-sharing.md
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+---
+title: "File Sharing and Sync"
+icon: material/share-variant
+---
+
+Discover how to privately share your files between your devices, with your friends and family, or anonymously online.
+
+## File Sharing
+
+### Send
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Send** is a fork of Mozilla’s discontinued Firefox Send service which allows you to send files to others with a link. Files are encrypted on your device so that they cannot be read by the server, and they can be optionally password-protected as well. The maintainer of Send hosts a [public instance](https://send.vis.ee/). You can use other public instances, or you can host Send yourself.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://send.vis.ee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send-instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/timvisee){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Send can be used via its web interface or via the [ffsend](https://github.com/timvisee/ffsend) CLI. If you are familiar with the command-line and send files frequently, we recommend using the CLI client to avoid JavaScript-based encryption. You can specify the `--host` flag to use a specific server:
+
+```bash
+ffsend upload --host https://send.vis.ee/ FILE
+```
+
+### OnionShare
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OnionShare** is an open-source tool that lets you securely and anonymously share a file of any size. It works by starting a web server accessible as a Tor onion service, with an unguessable URL that you can share with the recipients to download or send files.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://onionshare.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://lldan5gahapx5k7iafb3s4ikijc4ni7gx5iywdflkba5y2ezyg6sjgyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.onionshare.org){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/onionshare/onionshare){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://onionshare.org/#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://onionshare.org/#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://onionshare.org/#download)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must not store decrypted data on a remote server.
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must either have clients for Linux, macOS, and Windows; or have a web interface.
+
+## FreedomBox
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FreedomBox** is an operating system designed to be run on a [single-board computer (SBC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-board_computer). The purpose is to make it easy to set up server applications that you might want to self-host.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://freedombox.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://wiki.debian.org/FreedomBox/Manual){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://salsa.debian.org/freedombox-team/freedombox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://freedomboxfoundation.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+## File Sync
+
+### Nextcloud (Client-Server)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nextcloud** is a suite of free and open-source client-server software for creating your own file hosting services on a private server you control.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://nextcloud.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://nextcloud.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://nextcloud.com/support/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/nextcloud){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nextcloud.com/contribute/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nextcloud.client)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1125420102)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/nextcloud/android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/www/nextcloud)
+
+!!! danger
+
+ We don't recommend using the [E2EE App](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/end_to_end_encryption) for Nextcloud as it may lead to data loss; it is highly experimental and not production quality.
+
+### Syncthing (P2P)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Syncthing** is an open-source peer-to-peer continuous file synchronization utility. It is used to synchronize files between two or more devices over the local network or the internet. Syncthing does not use a centralized server; it uses the [Block Exchange Protocol](https://docs.syncthing.net/specs/bep-v1.html#bep-v1) to transfer data between devices. All data is encrypted using TLS.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://syncthing.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.syncthing.net){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/syncthing){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://syncthing.net/donations/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nutomic.syncthingandroid)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-openbsd: OpenBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-netbsd: NetBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+#### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must not require a third-party remote/cloud server.
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must either have clients for Linux, macOS, and Windows; or have a web interface.
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Has mobile clients for iOS and Android, which at least support document previews.
+- Supports photo backup from iOS and Android, and optionally supports file/folder sync on Android.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/frontends.md b/i18n/fa/frontends.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e2a458beb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/frontends.md
@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+---
+title: "Frontends"
+icon: material/flip-to-front
+---
+
+Sometimes services will try to force you to sign up for an account by blocking access to content with annoying popups. They might also break without JavaScript enabled. These frontends can allow you to get around these restrictions.
+
+## LBRY
+
+### Librarian
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Librarian** is a free and open-source frontend for [Odysee](https://odysee.com/) (LBRY) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://librarian.codeberg.page/){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Librarian does not proxy video streams by default. Videos watched through Librarian will still make direct connections to Odysee's servers (e.g. `odycdn.com`); however, some instances may enable proxying which would be detailed in the instance's privacy policy.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Librarian is useful if you want watch LBRY content on mobile without mandatory telemetry and if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, as is the case with [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Librarian, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a Librarian instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Librarian instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect the default policy. Librarian instances feature a "privacy nutrition label" to provide an overview of their policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+## Twitter
+
+### Nitter
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nitter** is a free and open-source frontend for [Twitter](https://twitter.com) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter/wiki/Instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter#nitter){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Nitter is useful if you want to browse Twitter content without having to log in and if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, as is the case with [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level. It also allows you to [create RSS feeds for Twitter](news-aggregators.md#twitter).
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Nitter, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a Nitter instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Nitter instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect the default policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+## TikTok
+
+### ProxiTok
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **ProxiTok** is an open source frontend to the [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com) website that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok/wiki/Public-instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+!!! tip
+
+ ProxiTok is useful if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, such as [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting ProxiTok, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a ProxiTok instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. ProxiTok instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect their associated privacy policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+## YouTube
+
+### FreeTube
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FreeTube** is a free and open-source desktop application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com). When using FreeTube, your subscription list and playlists are saved locally on your device.
+
+ By default, FreeTube blocks all YouTube advertisements. In addition, FreeTube optionally integrates with [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://freetubeapp.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://freetubeapp.io/privacy.php){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.freetubeapp.io/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/FreeTubeApp/FreeTube){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/FreeTube){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/io.freetubeapp.FreeTube)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using FreeTube, your IP address may still be known to YouTube, [Invidious](https://instances.invidious.io) or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+### Yattee
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Yattee** is a free and open-source privacy oriented video player for iOS, tvOS and macOS for [YouTube](https://youtube.com). When using Yattee, your subscription list are saved locally on your device.
+
+ You will need to take a few [extra steps](https://gonzoknows.com/posts/Yattee/) before you can use Yattee to watch YouTube, due to App Store restrictions.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://github.com/yattee/yattee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://r.yattee.stream/docs/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/wiki/Donations){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-apple: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/yattee/id1595136629)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/releases)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using Yattee, your IP address may still be known to YouTube, [Invidious](https://instances.invidious.io), [Piped](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances) or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+By default, Yattee blocks all YouTube advertisements. In addition, Yattee optionally integrates with [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments.
+
+### LibreTube (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **LibreTube** is a free and open-source Android application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) which uses the [Piped](#piped) API.
+
+ LibreTube allows you to store your subscription list and playlists locally on your Android device, or to an account on your Piped instance of choice, which allows you to access them seamlessly on other devices as well.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://libre-tube.github.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube#privacy-policy-and-disclaimer){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube/releases)
+
+!!! warning
+
+ When using LibreTube, your IP address will be visible to the [Piped](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances) instance you choose and/or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+By default, LibreTube blocks all YouTube advertisements. Additionally, Libretube uses [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) to help you skip sponsored video segments. You are able to fully configure the types of segments that SponsorBlock will skip, or disable it completely. There is also a button on the video player itself to disable it for a specific video if desired.
+
+### NewPipe (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation annotate
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **NewPipe** is a free and open-source Android application for [YouTube](https://youtube.com), [SoundCloud](https://soundcloud.com), [media.ccc.de](https://media.ccc.de), [Bandcamp](https://bandcamp.com), and [PeerTube](https://joinpeertube.org/) (1).
+
+ Your subscription list and playlists are saved locally on your Android device.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://newpipe.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://newpipe.net/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://teamnewpipe.github.io/documentation/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamNewPipe/NewPipe){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://newpipe.net/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/TeamNewPipe/NewPipe/releases)
+
+1. The default instance is [FramaTube](https://framatube.org/), however more can be added via **Settings** → **Content** → **PeerTube instances**
+
+!!! Warning
+
+ When using NewPipe, your IP address will be visible to the video providers used. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+### Invidious
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Invidious** is a free and open-source frontend for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://invidious.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://instances.invidious.io){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.invidious.io/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/iv-org/invidious){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://invidious.io/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Invidious does not proxy video streams by default. Videos watched through Invidious will still make direct connections to Google's servers (e.g. `googlevideo.com`); however, some instances support video proxying—simply enable *Proxy videos* within the instances' settings or add `&local=true` to the URL.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Invidious is useful if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, such as [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) on the Safest security level. It does not provide privacy by itself, and we don’t recommend logging into any accounts.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Invidious, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using an Invidious instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Invidious instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect their associated privacy policy. Some instances have Tor .onion addresses which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries don't contain PII.
+
+### Piped
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Piped** is a free and open-source frontend for [YouTube](https://youtube.com) that is also self-hostable.
+
+ Piped requires JavaScript in order to function and there are a number of public instances.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://piped.kavin.rocks/preferences#ddlInstanceSelection){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://piped-docs.kavin.rocks/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped#donations){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+!!! tip
+
+ Piped is useful if you want to use [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) without installing an extension or to access age-restricted content without an account. It does not provide privacy by itself, and we don’t recommend logging into any accounts.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting Piped, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+When you are using a Piped instance, make sure to read the privacy policy of that specific instance. Piped instances can be modified by their owners and therefore may not reflect their associated privacy policy.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+Recommended frontends...
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must be self-hostable.
+- Must provide all basic website functionality available to anonymous users.
+
+We only consider frontends for websites which are...
+
+- Not normally accessible without JavaScript.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/index.md b/i18n/fa/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..07466b4ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+---
+template: overrides/home.fa.html
+hide:
+ - navigation
+ - toc
+ - feedback
+---
+
+
+## Why should I care?
+
+##### “I have nothing to hide. Why should I care about my privacy?”
+
+Much like the right to interracial marriage, woman's suffrage, freedom of speech, and many others, our right to privacy hasn't always been upheld. In several dictatorships, it still isn't. Generations before ours fought for our right to privacy. ==Privacy is a human right, inherent to all of us,== that we are entitled to (without discrimination).
+
+You shouldn't confuse privacy with secrecy. We know what happens in the bathroom, but you still close the door. That's because you want privacy, not secrecy. **Everyone** has something to protect. Privacy is something that makes us human.
+
+[:material-target-account: Common Internet Threats](basics/common-threats.md ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+## What should I do?
+
+##### First, you need to make a plan
+
+Trying to protect all your data from everyone all the time is impractical, expensive, and exhausting. But don't worry! Security is a process, and, by thinking ahead, you can put together a plan that's right for you. Security isn't just about the tools you use or the software you download. Rather, it begins by understanding the unique threats you face, and how you can mitigate them.
+
+==This process of identifying threats and defining countermeasures is called **threat modeling**==, and it forms the basis of every good security and privacy plan.
+
+[:material-book-outline: Learn More About Threat Modeling](basics/threat-modeling.md ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+---
+
+## We need you! Here's how to get involved:
+
+[:simple-discourse:](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/){ title="Join our Forum" }
+[:simple-mastodon:](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides){ rel=me title="Follow us on Mastodon" }
+[:material-book-edit:](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org){ title="Contribute to this website" }
+[:material-translate:](https://matrix.to/#/#pg-i18n:aragon.sh){ title="Help translate this website" }
+[:simple-matrix:](https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org){ title="Chat with us on Matrix" }
+[:material-information-outline:](about/index.md){ title="Learn more about us" }
+[:material-hand-coin-outline:](about/donate.md){ title="Support the project" }
+
+It's important for a website like Privacy Guides to always stay up-to-date. We need our audience to keep an eye on software updates for the applications listed on our site and follow recent news about providers that we recommend. It's hard to keep up with the fast pace of the internet, but we try our best. If you spot an error, think a provider should not be listed, notice a qualified provider is missing, believe a browser plugin is no longer the best choice, or uncover any other issue, please let us know.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/kb-archive.md b/i18n/fa/kb-archive.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ef94741f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/kb-archive.md
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+---
+title: KB Archive
+icon: material/archive
+---
+
+# Pages Moved to Blog
+
+Some pages that used to be in our knowledge base can now be found on our blog:
+
+- [GrapheneOS vs. CalyxOS](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/)
+- [Signal Configuration Hardening](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening/)
+- [Linux - System Hardening](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/22/linux-system-hardening/)
+- [Linux - Application Sandboxing](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/22/linux-application-sandboxing/)
+- [Secure Data Erasure](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/05/25/secure-data-erasure/)
+- [Integrating Metadata Removal](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/09/integrating-metadata-removal/)
+- [iOS Configuration Guide](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/22/ios-configuration-guide/)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/meta/brand.md b/i18n/fa/meta/brand.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..07e4bb192
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/meta/brand.md
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+---
+title: Branding Guidelines
+---
+
+The name of the website is **Privacy Guides** and should **not** be changed to:
+
+
+
+The name of the subreddit is **r/PrivacyGuides** or **the Privacy Guides Subreddit**.
+
+Additional branding guidelines can be found at [github.com/privacyguides/brand](https://github.com/privacyguides/brand)
+
+## Trademark
+
+"Privacy Guides" and the shield logo are trademarks owned by Jonah Aragon, unlimited usage is granted to the Privacy Guides project.
+
+Without waiving any of its rights, Privacy Guides does not advise others on the scope of its intellectual property rights. Privacy Guides does not permit or consent to any use of its trademarks in any manner that is likely to cause confusion by implying association with or sponsorship by Privacy Guides. If you are aware of any such use, please contact Jonah Aragon at jonah@privacyguides.org. Consult your legal counsel if you have questions.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/meta/git-recommendations.md b/i18n/fa/meta/git-recommendations.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fa2e11428
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/meta/git-recommendations.md
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+---
+title: Git Recommendations
+---
+
+If you make changes to this website on GitHub.com's web editor directly, you shouldn't have to worry about this. If you are developing locally and/or are a long-term website editor (who should probably be developing locally!), consider these recommendations.
+
+## Enable SSH Key Commit Signing
+
+You can use an existing SSH key for signing, or [create a new one](https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/connecting-to-github-with-ssh/generating-a-new-ssh-key-and-adding-it-to-the-ssh-agent).
+
+1. Configure your Git client to sign commits and tags by default (remove `--global` to only sign by default for this repo):
+ ```
+ git config --global commit.gpgsign true
+ git config --global gpg.format ssh
+ git config --global tag.gpgSign true
+ ```
+2. Copy your SSH public key to your clipboard, for example:
+ ```
+ pbcopy < ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+ # Copies the contents of the id_ed25519.pub file to your clipboard
+ ```
+3. Set your SSH key for signing in Git with the following command, replacing the last string in quotes with the public key in your clipboard:
+ ```
+ git config --global user.signingkey 'ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3(...) user@example.com'
+ ```
+
+Ensure you [add your SSH key to your GitHub account](https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/connecting-to-github-with-ssh/adding-a-new-ssh-key-to-your-github-account#adding-a-new-ssh-key-to-your-account) **as a Signing Key** (as opposed to or in addition to as an Authentication Key).
+
+## Rebase on Git pull
+
+Use `git pull --rebase` instead of `git pull` when pulling in changes from GitHub to your local machine. This way your local changes will always be "on top of" the latest changes on GitHub, and you avoid merge commits (which are disallowed in this repo).
+
+You can set this to be the default behavior:
+
+```
+git config --global pull.rebase true
+```
+
+## Rebase from `main` before submitting a PR
+
+If you are working on your own branch, run these commands before submitting a PR:
+
+```
+git fetch origin
+git rebase origin/main
+```
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/meta/uploading-images.md b/i18n/fa/meta/uploading-images.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..61949c17f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/meta/uploading-images.md
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+---
+title: Uploading Images
+---
+
+Here are a couple of general rules for contributing to Privacy Guides:
+
+## Images
+
+- We **prefer** SVG images, but if those do not exist we can use PNG images
+
+Company logos have canvas size of:
+
+- 128x128px
+- 384x128px
+
+## Optimization
+
+### PNG
+
+Use the [OptiPNG](https://sourceforge.net/projects/optipng/) to optimize the PNG image:
+
+```bash
+optipng -o7 file.png
+```
+
+### SVG
+
+#### Inkscape
+
+[Scour](https://github.com/scour-project/scour) all SVG images.
+
+In Inkscape:
+
+1. File Save As..
+2. Set type to Optimized SVG (*.svg)
+
+In the **Options** tab:
+
+- **Number of significant digits for coordinates** > **5**
+- [x] Turn on **Shorten color values**
+- [x] Turn on **Convert CSS attributes to XML attributes**
+- [x] Turn on **Collapse groups**
+- [x] Turn on **Create groups for similar attributes**
+- [ ] Turn off **Keep editor data**
+- [ ] Turn off **Keep unreferenced definitions**
+- [x] Turn on **Work around renderer bugs**
+
+In the **SVG Output** tab under **Document options**:
+
+- [ ] Turn off **Remove the XML declaration**
+- [x] Turn on **Remove metadata**
+- [x] Turn on **Remove comments**
+- [x] Turn on **Embeded raster images**
+- [x] Turn on **Enable viewboxing**
+
+In the **SVG Output** under **Pretty-printing**:
+
+- [ ] Turn off **Format output with line-breaks and indentation**
+- **Indentation characters** > Select **Space**
+- **Depth of indentation** > **1**
+- [ ] Turn off **Strip the "xml:space" attribute from the root SVG element**
+
+In the **IDs** tab:
+
+- [x] Turn on **Remove unused IDs**
+- [ ] Turn off **Shorten IDs**
+- **Prefix shortened IDs with** > `leave blank`
+- [x] Turn on **Preserve manually created IDs not ending with digits**
+- **Preserve the following IDs** > `leave blank`
+- **Preserve IDs starting with** > `leave blank`
+
+#### CLI
+
+The same can be achieved with the [Scour](https://github.com/scour-project/scour) command:
+
+```bash
+scour --set-precision=5 \
+ --create-groups \
+ --renderer-workaround \
+ --remove-descriptive-elements \
+ --enable-comment-stripping \
+ --enable-viewboxing \
+ --indent=space \
+ --nindent=1 \
+ --no-line-breaks \
+ --enable-id-stripping \
+ --protect-ids-noninkscape \
+ input.svg output.svg
+```
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/meta/writing-style.md b/i18n/fa/meta/writing-style.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6915a7ffc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/meta/writing-style.md
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+---
+title: Writing Style
+---
+
+Privacy Guides is written in American English, and you should refer to [APA Style guidelines](https://apastyle.apa.org/style-grammar-guidelines/grammar) when in doubt.
+
+In general the [United States federal plain language guidelines](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/) provide a good overview of how to write clearly and concisely. We highlight a few important notes from these guidelines below.
+
+## Writing for our audience
+
+Privacy Guides' intended [audience](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/audience/) is primarily average, technology using adults. Don't dumb down content as if you are addressing a middle-school class, but don't overuse complicated terminology about concepts average computer users wouldn't be familiar with.
+
+### Address only what people want to know
+
+People don't need overly complex articles with little relevance to them. Figure out what you want people to accomplish when writing an article, and only include those details.
+
+> Tell your audience why the material is important to them. Say, “If you want a research grant, here’s what you have to do.” Or, “If you want to mine federal coal, here’s what you should know.” Or, “If you’re planning a trip to Rwanda, read this first.”
+
+### Address people directly
+
+We're writing *for* a wide variety of people, but we are writing *to* the person who is actually reading it. Use "you" to address the reader directly.
+
+> More than any other single technique, using “you” pulls users into the information and makes it relevant to them.
+>
+> When you use “you” to address users, they are more likely to understand what their responsibility is.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/audience/address-the-user/)
+
+### Avoid "users"
+
+Avoid calling people "users", in favor of "people", or a more specific description of the group of people you are writing for.
+
+## Organizing content
+
+Organization is key. Content should flow from most to least important information, and use headers as much as needed to logically separate different ideas.
+
+- Limit the document to around five or six sections. Long documents should probably be broken up into separate pages.
+- Mark important ideas with **bold** or *italics*.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/design/)
+
+### Begin with a topic sentence
+
+> If you tell your reader what they’re going to read about, they’re less likely to have to read your paragraph again. Headings help, but they’re not enough. Establish a context for your audience before you provide them with the details.
+>
+> We often write the way we think, putting our premises first and then our conclusion. It may be the natural way to develop thoughts, but we wind up with the topic sentence at the end of the paragraph. Move it up front and let users know where you’re going. Don’t make readers hold a lot of information in their heads before getting to the point.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/organize/have-a-topic-sentence/)
+
+## Choose your words carefully
+
+> Words matter. They are the most basic building blocks of written and spoken communication. Don’t complicate things by using jargon, technical terms, or abbreviations that people won’t understand.
+
+We should try to avoid abbreviations where possible, but technology is full of abbreviations. In general, spell out the abbreviation/acronym the first time it is used on a page, and add the abbreviation to the abbreviation glossary file when it is used repeatedly.
+
+> Kathy McGinty offers tongue-in-cheek instructions for bulking up your simple, direct sentences:
+>
+> > There is no escaping the fact that it is considered very important to note that a number of various available applicable studies ipso facto have generally identified the fact that additional appropriate nocturnal employment could usually keep juvenile adolescents off thoroughfares during the night hours, including but not limited to the time prior to midnight on weeknights and/or 2 a.m. on weekends.
+>
+> And the original, using stronger, simpler words:
+>
+> > More night jobs would keep youths off the streets.
+
+## Be concise
+
+> Unnecessary words waste your audience’s time. Great writing is like a conversation. Omit information that the audience doesn’t need to know. This can be difficult as a subject matter expert so it’s important to have someone look at the information from the audience’s perspective.
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/concise/)
+
+## Keep text conversational
+
+> Verbs are the fuel of writing. They give your sentences power and direction. They enliven your writing and make it more interesting.
+>
+> Verbs tell your audience what to do. Make sure it’s clear who does what.
+
+### Use active voice
+
+> Active voice makes it clear who is supposed to do what. It eliminates ambiguity about responsibilities. Not “It must be done,” but “You must do it.”
+
+Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/conversational/use-active-voice/)
+
+### Use "must" for requirements
+
+> - “must” for an obligation
+> - “must not” for a prohibition
+> - “may” for a discretionary action
+> - “should” for a recommendation
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/mobile-browsers.md b/i18n/fa/mobile-browsers.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1d8dfb6b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/mobile-browsers.md
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+---
+title: "Mobile Browsers"
+icon: material/cellphone-information
+---
+
+These are our currently recommended mobile web browsers and configurations for standard/non-anonymous internet browsing. If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) instead. In general, we recommend keeping extensions to a minimum; they have privileged access within your browser, require you to trust the developer, can make you [stand out](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint), and [weaken](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/chromium-extensions/c/0ei-UCHNm34/m/lDaXwQhzBAAJ) site isolation.
+
+## Android
+
+On Android, Firefox is still less secure than Chromium-based alternatives: Mozilla's engine, [GeckoView](https://mozilla.github.io/geckoview/), has yet to support [site isolation](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2021/05/introducing-firefox-new-site-isolation-security-architecture) or enable [isolatedProcess](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1565196).
+
+### Brave
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Brave Browser** includes a built-in content blocker and [privacy features](https://brave.com/privacy-features/), many of which are enabled by default.
+
+ Brave is built upon the Chromium web browser project, so it should feel familiar and have minimal website compatibility issues.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://brave.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://brave4u7jddbv7cyviptqjc7jusxh72uik7zt6adtckl5f4nwy2v72qd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://brave.com/privacy/browser/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.brave.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads annotate
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.brave.browser)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/releases)
+
+#### فایرفاکس Firefox
+
+Tor Browser is the only way to truly browse the internet anonymously. When you use Brave, we recommend changing the following settings to protect your privacy from certain parties, but all browsers other than the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) will be traceable by *somebody* in some regard or another.
+
+These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Brave Shields & privacy**
+
+##### Shields
+
+Brave includes some anti-fingerprinting measures in its [Shields](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360022973471-What-is-Shields-) feature. We suggest configuring these options [globally](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360023646212-How-do-I-configure-global-and-site-specific-Shields-settings-) across all pages that you visit.
+
+##### Brave shields global defaults
+
+Shields' options can be downgraded on a per-site basis as needed, but by default we recommend setting the following:
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Aggressive** under Block trackers & ads
+
+ ??? warning "Use default filter lists"
+ Brave allows you to select additional content filters within the internal `brave://adblock` page. We advise against using this feature; instead, keep the default filter lists. Using extra lists will make you stand out from other Brave users and may also increase attack surface if there is an exploit in Brave and a malicious rule is added to one of the lists you use.
+
+- [x] Select **Upgrade connections to HTTPS**
+- [x] (Optional) Select **Block Scripts** (1)
+- [x] Select **Strict, may break sites** under **Block fingerprinting**
+
+
+
+1. This option provides functionality similar to uBlock Origin's advanced [blocking modes](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) or the [NoScript](https://noscript.net/) extension.
+
+##### Clear browsing data
+
+- [x] Select **Clear data on exit**
+
+##### Social Media Blocking
+
+- [ ] Uncheck all social media components
+
+##### Other privacy settings
+
+
+
+- [x] Select **Disable non-proxied UDP** under [WebRTC IP Handling Policy](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360017989132-How-do-I-change-my-Privacy-Settings-#webrtc)
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow sites to check if you have payment methods saved**
+- [ ] Uncheck **IPFS Gateway** (1)
+- [x] Select **Close tabs on exit**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Allow privacy-preserving product analytics (P3A)**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send diagnostic reports**
+- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send daily usage ping to Brave**
+
+1. InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is a decentralized, peer-to-peer network for storing and sharing data in a distributed filesystem. Unless you use the feature, disable it.
+
+
+
+#### Brave Sync
+
+[Brave Sync](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360059793111-Understanding-Brave-Sync) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices without requiring an account and protects it with E2EE.
+
+## iOS
+
+On iOS, any app that can browse the web is [restricted](https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines) to using an Apple-provided [WebKit framework](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/webkit), so there is little reason to use a third-party web browser.
+
+### Safari
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Safari** is the default browser in iOS. It includes [privacy features](https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/browse-the-web-privately-iphb01fc3c85/15.0/ios/15.0) such as Intelligent Tracking Protection, Privacy Report, isolated Private Browsing tabs, iCloud Private Relay, and automatic HTTPS upgrades.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.apple.com/safari/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/safari/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/safari/welcome/mac){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+#### فایرفاکس Firefox
+
+These options can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Safari** → **Privacy and Security**.
+
+##### Cross-Site Tracking Prevention
+
+- [x] Enable **Prevent Cross-Site Tracking**
+
+This enables WebKit's [Intelligent Tracking Protection](https://webkit.org/tracking-prevention/#intelligent-tracking-prevention-itp). The feature helps protect against unwanted tracking by using on-device machine learning to stop trackers. ITP protects against many common threats, but it does not block all tracking avenues because it is designed to not interfere with website usability.
+
+##### Privacy Report
+
+Privacy Report provides a snapshot of cross-site trackers currently prevented from profiling you on the website you're visiting. It can also display a weekly report to show which trackers have been blocked over time.
+
+Privacy Report is accessible via the Page Settings menu.
+
+##### Privacy Preserving Ad Measurement
+
+- [ ] Disable **Privacy Preserving Ad Measurement**
+
+Ad click measurement has traditionally used tracking technology that infringes on user privacy. [Private Click Measurement](https://webkit.org/blog/11529/introducing-private-click-measurement-pcm/) is a WebKit feature and proposed web standard aimed towards allowing advertisers to measure the effectiveness of web campaigns without compromising on user privacy.
+
+The feature has little privacy concerns on its own, so while you can choose to leave it on, we consider the fact that it's automatically disabled in Private Browsing to be an indicator for disabling the feature.
+
+##### Always-on Private Browsing
+
+Open Safari and tap the Tabs button, located in the bottom right. Then, expand the Tab Groups list.
+
+- [x] Select **Private**
+
+Safari's Private Browsing mode offers additional privacy protections. Private Browsing uses a new [ephemeral](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/urlsessionconfiguration/1410529-ephemeral) session for each tab, meaning tabs are isolated from one another. There are also other smaller privacy benefits with Private Browsing, such as not sending a webpage’s address to Apple when using Safari's translation feature.
+
+Do note that Private Browsing does not save cookies and website data, so it won't be possible to remain signed into sites. This may be an inconvenience.
+
+##### iCloud Sync
+
+Synchronization of Safari History, Tab Groups, iCloud Tabs and saved passwords are E2EE. However, by default, bookmarks are [not](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303). Apple can decrypt and access them in accordance with their [privacy policy](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/).
+
+You can enable E2EE for you Safari bookmarks and downloads by enabling [Advanced Data Protection](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212520). Go to your **Apple ID name → iCloud → Advanced Data Protection**.
+
+- [x] Turn On **Advanced Data Protection**
+
+If you use iCloud with Advanced Data Protection disabled, we also recommend checking to ensure Safari's default download location is set to locally on your device. This option can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Safari** → **General** → **Downloads**.
+
+### AdGuard
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **AdGuard for iOS** is a free and open-source content-blocking extension for Safari that uses the native [Content Blocker API](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/safariservices/creating_a_content_blocker).
+
+ AdGuard for iOS has some premium features; however, standard Safari content blocking is free of charge.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://adguard.com/en/adguard-ios/overview.html){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://adguard.com/privacy/ios.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://kb.adguard.com/ios){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdguardForiOS){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id1047223162)
+
+Additional filter lists do slow things down and may increase your attack surface, so only apply what you need.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must support automatic updates.
+- Must receive engine updates in 0-1 days from upstream release.
+- Any changes required to make the browser more privacy-respecting should not negatively impact user experience.
+- Android browsers must use the Chromium engine.
+ - Unfortunately, Mozilla GeckoView is still less secure than Chromium on Android.
+ - iOS browsers are limited to WebKit.
+
+### Extension Criteria
+
+- Must not replicate built-in browser or OS functionality.
+- Must directly impact user privacy, i.e. must not simply provide information.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/multi-factor-authentication.md b/i18n/fa/multi-factor-authentication.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3bd4e5d31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/multi-factor-authentication.md
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+---
+title: "Multi-Factor Authenticators"
+icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication'
+---
+
+## Hardware Security Keys
+
+### YubiKey
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ 
+
+ The **YubiKeys** are among the most popular security keys. Some YubiKey models have a wide range of features such as: [Universal 2nd Factor (U2F)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_2nd_Factor), [FIDO2 and WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online), [Yubico OTP](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#yubico-otp), [Personal Identity Verification (PIV)](https://developers.yubico.com/PIV), [OpenPGP](https://developers.yubico.com/PGP/), [TOTP and HOTP](https://developers.yubico.com/OATH) authentication.
+
+ One of the benefits of the YubiKey is that one key can do almost everything (YubiKey 5), you could expect from a hardware security key. We do encourage you to take the [quiz](https://www.yubico.com/quiz/) before purchasing in order to make sure you make the right choice.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.yubico.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.yubico.com/support/terms-conditions/privacy-notice){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.yubico.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+The [comparison table](https://www.yubico.com/store/compare/) shows the features and how the YubiKeys compare. We highly recommend that you select keys from the YubiKey 5 Series.
+
+YubiKeys can be programmed using the [YubiKey Manager](https://www.yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-manager/) or [YubiKey Personalization Tools](https://www.yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-personalization-tools/). For managing TOTP codes, you can use the [Yubico Authenticator](https://www.yubico.com/products/yubico-authenticator/). All of Yubico's clients are open-source.
+
+For models which support HOTP and TOTP, there are 2 slots in the OTP interface which could be used for HOTP and 32 slots to store TOTP secrets. These secrets are stored encrypted on the key and never expose them to the devices they are plugged into. Once a seed (shared secret) is given to the Yubico Authenticator, it will only give out the six-digit codes, but never the seed. This security model helps limit what an attacker can do if they compromise one of the devices running the Yubico Authenticator and make the YubiKey resistant to a physical attacker.
+
+!!! warning
+ The firmware of YubiKey is not open-source and is not updatable. If you want features in newer firmware versions, or if there is a vulnerability in the firmware version you are using, you would need to purchase a new key.
+
+### Nitrokey / Librem Key
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nitrokey** has a security key capable of [FIDO2 and WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) called the **Nitrokey FIDO2**. For PGP support, you need to purchase one of their other keys such as the **Nitrokey Start**, **Nitrokey Pro 2** or the **Nitrokey Storage 2**.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.nitrokey.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.nitrokey.com/data-privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.nitrokey.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+The [comparison table](https://www.nitrokey.com/#comparison) shows the features and how the Nitrokey models compare. The **Nitrokey 3** listed will have a combined feature set.
+
+Nitrokey models can be configured using the [Nitrokey app](https://www.nitrokey.com/download).
+
+For the models which support HOTP and TOTP, there are 3 slots for HOTP and 15 for TOTP. Some Nitrokeys can act as a password manager. They can store 16 different credentials and encrypt them using the same password as the OpenPGP interface.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ While Nitrokeys do not release the HOTP/TOTP secrets to the device they are plugged into, the HOTP and TOTP storage is **not** encrypted and is vulnerable to physical attacks. If you are looking to store HOTP or TOTP these secrets, we highly recommend that you use a Yubikey instead.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Resetting the OpenPGP interface on a Nitrokey will also make the password database [inaccessible](https://docs.nitrokey.com/pro/linux/factory-reset).
+
+ The Nitrokey Pro 2, Nitrokey Storage 2, and the upcoming Nitrokey 3 supports system integrity verification for laptops with the [Coreboot](https://www.coreboot.org/) + [Heads](https://osresearch.net/) firmware. Purism's [Librem Key](https://puri.sm/products/librem-key/) is a rebranded NitroKey Pro 2 with similar firmware and can also be used for the same purposes.
+
+Nitrokey's firmware is open-source, unlike the YubiKey. The firmware on modern NitroKey models (except the **NitroKey Pro 2**) is updatable.
+
+!!! tip
+
+ The Nitrokey app, while compatible with Librem Keys, requires `libnitrokey` version 3.6 or above to recognize them. Currently, the package is outdated on Windows, macOS, and most Linux distributions' repository, so you will likely have to compile the Nitrokey app yourself to get it working with the Librem Key. On Linux, you can obtain an up-to-date version from [Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.nitrokey.nitrokey-app).
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+#### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must use high quality, tamper resistant hardware security modules.
+- Must support the latest FIDO2 specification.
+- Must not allow private key extraction.
+- Devices which cost over $35 must support handling OpenPGP and S/MIME.
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should be available in USB-C form-factor.
+- Should be available with NFC.
+- Should support TOTP secret storage.
+- Should support secure firmware updates.
+
+## Authenticator Apps
+
+Authenticator Apps implement a security standard adopted by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) called **Time-based One-time Passwords**, or **TOTP**. This is a method where websites share a secret with you which is used by your authenticator app to generate a six (usually) digit code based on the current time, which you enter while logging in for the website to check. Typically these codes are regenerated every 30 seconds, and once a new code is generated the old one becomes useless. Even if a hacker gets one six-digit code, there is no way for them to reverse that code to get the original secret or otherwise be able to predict what any future codes might be.
+
+We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternatives as Android and iOS have better security and app isolation than most desktop operating systems.
+
+### Aegis Authenticator (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Aegis Authenticator** is a free, secure and open-source app to manage your 2-step verification tokens for your online services.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getaegis.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://getaegis.app/aegis/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.buymeacoffee.com/beemdevelopment){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.beemdevelopment.aegis)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis/releases)
+
+### Raivo OTP (iOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Raivo OTP** is a native, lightweight and secure time-based (TOTP) & counter-based (HOTP) password client for iOS. Raivo OTP offers optional iCloud backup & sync. Raivo OTP is also available for macOS in the form of a status bar application, however the Mac app does not work independently of the iOS app.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://raivo-otp.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://raivo-otp.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/raivo-otp/ios-application){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://raivo-otp.com/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/raivo-otp/id1459042137)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must not require internet connectivity.
+- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
+ - **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/news-aggregators.md b/i18n/fa/news-aggregators.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c0de18bcf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/news-aggregators.md
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+---
+title: "News Aggregators"
+icon: material/rss
+---
+
+A [news aggregator](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/News_aggregator) is a way to keep up with your favourite blogs and news sites.
+
+## Aggregator clients
+
+### Akregator
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Akregator** is a news feed reader that is a part of the [KDE](https://kde.org) project. It comes with a fast search, advanced archiving functionality and an internal browser for easy news reading.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://apps.kde.org/akregator){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://kde.org/privacypolicy-apps){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.kde.org/?application=akregator){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://invent.kde.org/pim/akregator){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://kde.org/community/donations/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.kde.akregator)
+
+### Feeder
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Feeder** is a modern RSS client for Android that has many [features](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder#features) and works well with folders of RSS feeds. It supports [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS), [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)), [RDF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDF%2FXML) and [JSON Feed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Feed).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://ko-fi.com/spacecowboy){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nononsenseapps.feeder.play)
+
+### Fluent Reader
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Fluent Reader** is a secure cross-platform news aggregator that has useful privacy features such as deletion of cookies on exit, strict [content security policies (CSP)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy) and proxy support, meaning you can use it over [Tor](tor.md).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://hyliu.me/fluent-reader){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader/wiki/Privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader/wiki/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/yang991178/fluent-reader){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/yang991178){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://hyliu.me/fluent-reader)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1520907427)
+
+### GNOME Feeds
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GNOME Feeds** is an [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS) and [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)) news reader for [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org). It has a simple interface and is quite fast.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gfeeds.gabmus.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.gnome.org/World/gfeeds){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/gabmus/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://gfeeds.gabmus.org/#install)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.gabmus.gfeeds)
+
+### Miniflux
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Miniflux** is a web-based news aggregator that you can self-host. It supports [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS), [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)), [RDF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDF%2FXML) and [JSON Feed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Feed).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://miniflux.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://miniflux.app/docs/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/miniflux/v2){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://miniflux.app/#donations){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+### NetNewsWire
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **NetNewsWire** a free and open-source feed reader for macOS and iOS with a focus on a native design and feature set. It supports the typical feed formats alongside built-in support for Twitter and Reddit feeds.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://netnewswire.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://netnewswire.com/privacypolicy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://netnewswire.com/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Ranchero-Software/NetNewsWire){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/netnewswire-rss-reader/id1480640210)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://netnewswire.com)
+
+### Newsboat
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Newsboat** is an RSS/Atom feed reader for the text console. It's an actively maintained fork of [Newsbeuter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newsbeuter). It is very lightweight, and ideal for use over [Secure Shell](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Shell).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://newsboat.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://newsboat.org/releases/2.27/docs/newsboat.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/newsboat/newsboat){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must operate locally, i.e. must not be a cloud service.
+
+## Social Media RSS Support
+
+Some social media services also support RSS although it's not often advertised.
+
+### Reddit
+
+Reddit allows you to subscribe to subreddits via RSS.
+
+!!! example
+ Replace `subreddit_name` with the subreddit you wish to subscribe to.
+
+ ```text
+ https://www.reddit.com/r/{{ subreddit_name }}/new/.rss
+ ```
+
+### Twitter
+
+Using any of the Nitter [instances](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter/wiki/Instances) you can easily subscribe using RSS.
+
+!!! example
+ 1. Pick an instance and set `nitter_instance`.
+ 2. Replace `twitter_account` with the account name.
+
+ ```text
+ https://{{ nitter_instance }}/{{ twitter_account }}/rss
+ ```
+
+### YouTube
+
+You can subscribe YouTube channels without logging in and associating usage information with your Google Account.
+
+!!! example
+
+ To subscribe to a YouTube channel with an RSS client, first look for your [channel code](https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6180214), replace `[CHANNEL ID]` below:
+ ```text
+ https://www.youtube.com/feeds/videos.xml?channel_id=[CHANNEL ID]
+ ```
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/notebooks.md b/i18n/fa/notebooks.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8c47f01d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/notebooks.md
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+---
+title: "Notebooks"
+icon: material/notebook-edit-outline
+---
+
+Keep track of your notes and journalings without giving them to a third-party.
+
+If you are currently using an application like Evernote, Google Keep, or Microsoft OneNote, we suggest you pick an alternative here that supports E2EE.
+
+## Cloud-based
+
+### Joplin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Joplin** is a free, open-source, and fully-featured note-taking and to-do application which can handle a large number of markdown notes organized into notebooks and tags. It offers E2EE and can sync through Nextcloud, Dropbox, and more. It also offers easy import from Evernote and plain-text notes.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://joplinapp.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://joplinapp.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://joplinapp.org/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://joplinapp.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.cozic.joplin)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/joplin/id1315599797)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://joplinapp.org/#desktop-applications)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/joplin-web-clipper/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/joplin-web-clipper/alofnhikmmkdbbbgpnglcpdollgjjfek)
+
+Joplin does not support password/PIN protection for the [application itself or individual notes and notebooks](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin/issues/289). However, your data is still encrypted in transit and at the sync location using your master key.
+
+### Standard Notes
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Standard Notes** is a simple and private notes app that makes your notes easy and available everywhere you are. It features E2EE on every platform, and a powerful desktop experience with themes and custom editors. It has also been [independently audited (PDF)](https://s3.amazonaws.com/standard-notes/security/Report-SN-Audit.pdf).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://standardnotes.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://standardnotes.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://standardnotes.com/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/standardnotes){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://standardnotes.com/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.standardnotes)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1285392450)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/standardnotes/app/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://standardnotes.com)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://standardnotes.com)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://standardnotes.com)
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://app.standardnotes.com/)
+
+### Cryptee
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Cryptee** is an open-source, web-based E2EE document editor and photo storage application. Cryptee is a PWA, which means that it works seamlessly across all modern devices without requiring native apps for each respective platform.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://crypt.ee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://crypt.ee/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://crypt.ee/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/cryptee){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: PWA](https://crypt.ee/download)
+
+Cryptee offers 100MB of storage for free, with paid options if you need more. Sign-up doesn't require an e-mail or other personally identifiable information.
+
+## Local notebooks
+
+### Org-mode
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Org-mode** is a [major mode](https://www.gnu.org/software/emacs/manual/html_node/elisp/Major-Modes.html) for GNU Emacs. Org-mode is for keeping notes, maintaining TODO lists, planning projects, and authoring documents with a fast and effective plain-text system. Synchronization is possible with [file synchronization](file-sharing.md#file-sync) tools.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orgmode.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://orgmode.org/manuals.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/emacs/org-mode.git){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/bzg){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Clients must be open-source.
+- Any cloud sync functionality must be E2EE.
+- Must support exporting documents into a standard format.
+
+### Best Case
+
+- Local backup/sync functionality should support encryption.
+- Cloud-based platforms should support document sharing.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/fa/os/android-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bb93e22fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/os/android-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+---
+title: Android Overview
+icon: simple/android
+---
+
+Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system.
+
+## Choosing an Android Distribution
+
+When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has irrevocable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android.
+
+This problem could be solved by using a custom Android distribution that does not come with such invasive integration. Unfortunately, many custom Android distributions often violate the Android security model by not supporting critical security features such as AVB, rollback protection, firmware updates, and so on. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require [more permissive](https://github.com/LineageOS/android_system_sepolicy/search?q=userdebug&type=code) SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
+
+Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that it upholds the Android security model. At the very least, the distribution should have production builds, support for AVB, rollback protection, timely firmware and operating system updates, and SELinux in [enforcing mode](https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts#enforcement_levels). All of our recommended Android distributions satisfy these criteria.
+
+[Our Android System Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Avoid Rooting
+
+[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
+
+Adblockers, which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For Adblocking we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or [VPN](../vpn.md) server blocking solutions instead. RethinkDNS, TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN) preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as Orbot or a real VPN server.
+
+AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
+
+We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps.
+
+## Verified Boot
+
+[Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection).
+
+Android 10 and above has moved away from full-disk encryption to more flexible [file-based encryption](https://source.android.com/security/encryption/file-based). Your data is encrypted using unique encryption keys, and the operating system files are left unencrypted.
+
+Verified Boot ensures the integrity of the operating system files, thereby preventing an adversary with physical access from tampering or installing malware on the device. In the unlikely case that malware is able to exploit other parts of the system and gain higher privileged access, Verified Boot will prevent and revert changes to the system partition upon rebooting the device.
+
+Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock Android distribution. Only a few OEMs such as Google support custom AVB key enrollment on their devices. Additionally, some AOSP derivatives such as LineageOS or /e/ OS do not support Verified Boot even on hardware with Verified Boot support for third-party operating systems. We recommend that you check for support **before** purchasing a new device. AOSP derivatives which do not support Verified Boot are **not** recommended.
+
+Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be aware of beyond their marketing. For example, the Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage.
+
+## Firmware Updates
+
+Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin).
+
+As the components of the phone, such as the processor and radio technologies rely on closed-source components, the updates must be provided by the respective manufacturers. Therefore, it is important that you purchase a device within an active support cycle. [Qualcomm](https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2020/12/16/qualcomm-and-google-announce-collaboration-extend-android-os-support-and) and [Samsung](https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-security-extending-updates-knox/) support their devices for 4 years, while cheaper products often have shorter support cycles. With the introduction of the [Pixel 6](https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/4457705), Google now makes their own SoC and they will provide a minimum of 5 years of support.
+
+EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive firmware updates from OEM vendors or after market Android distributors. This means that security issues with those devices will remain unfixed.
+
+Fairphone, for example, markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates.
+
+## Android Versions
+
+It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution.
+
+## Android Permissions
+
+[Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps. A smartphone with the latest version of Android will always be more secure than an old smartphone with an antivirus that you have paid for. It's better not to pay for antivirus software and to save money to buy a new smartphone such as a Google Pixel.
+
+Should you want to run an app that you're unsure about, consider using a user or work profile.
+
+## Media Access
+
+Quite a few applications allows you to "share" a file with them for media upload. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter.
+
+## User Profiles
+
+Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android.
+
+With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation.
+
+## Work Profile
+
+[Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles.
+
+A **device controller** app such as [Shelter](#recommended-apps) is required to create a Work Profile without an enterprise MDM, unless you're using a custom Android OS which includes one.
+
+The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such as *File Shuttle* and *contact search blocking* or any kind of isolation features must be implemented by the controller. You must also fully trust the device controller app, as it has full access to your data inside of the work profile.
+
+This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously.
+
+## VPN Killswitch
+
+Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+## Global Toggles
+
+Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled.
+
+## Google
+
+If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play.
+
+### Advanced Protection Program
+
+If you have a Google account we suggest enrolling in the [Advanced Protection Program](https://landing.google.com/advancedprotection/). It is available at no cost to anyone with two or more hardware security keys with [FIDO](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) support.
+
+The Advanced Protection Program provides enhanced threat monitoring and enables:
+
+- Stricter two factor authentication; e.g. that [FIDO](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) **must** be used and disallows the use of [SMS OTPs](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#sms-or-email-mfa), [TOTP](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp) and [OAuth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth)
+- Only Google and verified third-party apps can access account data
+- Scanning of incoming emails on Gmail accounts for [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing#Email_phishing) attempts
+- Stricter [safe browser scanning](https://www.google.com/chrome/privacy/whitepaper.html#malware) with Google Chrome
+- Stricter recovery process for accounts with lost credentials
+
+ If you use non-sandboxed Google Play Services (common on stock operating systems), the Advanced Protection Program also comes with [additional benefits](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/9764949?hl=en) such as:
+
+- Not allowing app installation outside of the Google Play Store, the OS vendor's app store, or via [`adb`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_Debug_Bridge)
+- Mandatory automatic device scanning with [Play Protect](https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/2812853?hl=en#zippy=%2Chow-malware-protection-works%2Chow-privacy-alerts-work)
+- Warning you about unverified applications
+
+### Google Play System Updates
+
+In the past, Android security updates had to be shipped by the operating system vendor. Android has become more modular beginning with Android 10, and Google can push security updates for **some** system components via the privileged Play Services.
+
+If you have an EOL device shipped with Android 10 or above and are unable to run any of our recommended operating systems on your device, you are likely going to be better off sticking with your OEM Android installation (as opposed to an operating system not listed here such as LineageOS or /e/ OS). This will allow you to receive **some** security fixes from Google, while not violating the Android security model by using an insecure Android derivative and increasing your attack surface. We would still recommend upgrading to a supported device as soon as possible.
+
+### Advertising ID
+
+All devices with Google Play Services installed automatically generate an [advertising ID](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/6048248?hl=en) used for targeted advertising. Disable this feature to limit the data collected about you.
+
+On Android distributions with [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), go to :gear: **Settings** → **Apps** → **Sandboxed Google Play** → **Google Settings** → **Ads**, and select *Delete advertising ID*.
+
+On Android distributions with privileged Google Play Services (such as stock OSes), the setting may be in one of several locations. Check
+
+- :gear: **Settings** → **Google** → **Ads**
+- :gear: **Settings** → **Privacy** → **Ads**
+
+You will either be given the option to delete your advertising ID or to *Opt out of interest-based ads*, this varies between OEM distributions of Android. If presented with the option to delete the advertising ID that is preferred. If not, then make sure to opt out and reset your advertising ID.
+
+### SafetyNet and Play Integrity API
+
+[SafetyNet](https://developer.android.com/training/safetynet/attestation) and the [Play Integrity APIs](https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity) are generally used for [banking apps](https://grapheneos.org/usage#banking-apps). Many banking apps will work fine in GrapheneOS with sandboxed Play services, however some non-financial apps have their own crude anti-tampering mechanisms which might fail. GrapheneOS passes the `basicIntegrity` check, but not the certification check `ctsProfileMatch`. Devices with Android 8 or later have hardware attestation support which cannot be bypassed without leaked keys or serious vulnerabilities.
+
+As for Google Wallet, we don't recommend this due to their [privacy policy](https://payments.google.com/payments/apis-secure/get_legal_document?ldo=0&ldt=privacynotice&ldl=en), which states you must opt-out if you don't want your credit rating and personal information shared with affiliate marketing services.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/fa/os/linux-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..731dfba8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/os/linux-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+---
+title: Linux Overview
+icon: simple/linux
+---
+
+It is often believed that [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigour applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years.
+
+At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.:
+
+- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack)
+- A strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go
+- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations)
+
+Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are great if you want to:
+
+- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems
+- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms)
+- Have privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/)
+
+Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed here.
+
+[Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Choosing your distribution
+
+Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use.
+
+### Release cycle
+
+We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates.
+
+For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release.
+
+We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this:
+
+
+
+
+
+### Traditional vs Atomic updates
+
+Traditionally, Linux distributions update by sequentially updating the desired packages. Traditional updates such as those used in Fedora, Arch Linux, and Debian based distributions can be less reliable if an error occurs while updating.
+
+Atomic updating distributions apply updates in full or not at all. Typically, transactional update systems are also atomic.
+
+A transactional update system creates a snapshot that is made before and after an update is applied. If an update fails at any time (perhaps due to a power failure), the update can be easily rolled back to a “last known good state."
+
+The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tumbleweed, and NixOS and can achieve reliability with this model. [Adam Šamalík](https://twitter.com/adsamalik) provided a presentation on how `rpm-ostree` works with Silverblue:
+
+
+
+
+
+### “Security-focused” distributions
+
+There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use.
+
+### Arch-based distributions
+
+Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own.
+
+For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit).
+
+Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora.
+
+If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically:
+
+- **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories.
+- **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks.
+
+### Kicksecure
+
+While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default.
+
+### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions
+
+We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons.
+
+## توصیههای عمومی
+
+### Drive Encryption
+
+Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS](../encryption.md#linux-unified-key-setup) FDE. If this option isn’t set at installation time, you will have to backup your data and re-install, as encryption is applied after [disk partitioning](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_partitioning), but before [file systems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_system) are formatted. We also suggest securely erasing your storage device:
+
+- [Secure Data Erasure :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/05/25/secure-data-erasure/)
+
+### Swap
+
+Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Swap#zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM).
+
+### Wayland
+
+We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland.
+
+Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)).
+
+We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do not have Wayland support, such as Cinnamon (default on Linux Mint), Pantheon (default on Elementary OS), MATE, Xfce, and i3.
+
+### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates)
+
+Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html).
+
+We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default.
+
+### Updates
+
+Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found.
+
+Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates.
+
+Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd).
+
+## Privacy Tweaks
+
+### MAC Address Randomization
+
+Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings.
+
+It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous.
+
+We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as suggested in the [article](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/).
+
+If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=).
+
+There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware.
+
+### Other Identifiers
+
+There are other system identifiers which you may wish to be careful about. You should give this some thought to see if it applies to your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md):
+
+- **Hostnames:** Your system's hostname is shared with the networks you connect to. You should avoid including identifying terms like your name or operating system in your hostname, instead sticking to generic terms or random strings.
+- **Usernames:** Similarly, your username is used in a variety of ways across your system. Consider using generic terms like "user" rather than your actual name.
+- **Machine ID:**: During installation a unique machine ID is generated and stored on your device. Consider [setting it to a generic ID](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#machine-id).
+
+### System Counting
+
+The Fedora Project [counts](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting) how many unique systems access its mirrors by using a [`countme`](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting#Detailed_Description) variable instead of a unique ID. Fedora does this to determine load and provision better servers for updates where necessary.
+
+This [option](https://dnf.readthedocs.io/en/latest/conf_ref.html#options-for-both-main-and-repo) is currently off by default. We recommend adding `countme=false` to `/etc/dnf/dnf.conf` just in case it is enabled in the future. On systems that use `rpm-ostree` such as Silverblue, the countme option is disabled by masking the [rpm-ostree-countme](https://fedoramagazine.org/getting-better-at-counting-rpm-ostree-based-systems/) timer.
+
+openSUSE also uses a [unique ID](https://en.opensuse.org/openSUSE:Statistics) to count systems, which can be disabled by deleting the `/var/lib/zypp/AnonymousUniqueId` file.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/fa/os/qubes-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..557c32569
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/os/qubes-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+---
+title: "Qubes Overview"
+icon: simple/qubesos
+---
+
+[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/).
+
+## How does Qubes OS work?
+
+Qubes uses [compartmentalization](https://www.qubes-os.org/intro/) to keep the system secure. Qubes are created from templates, the defaults being for Fedora, Debian and [Whonix](../desktop.md#whonix). Qubes OS also allows you to create once-use [disposable](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-use-disposables/) virtual machines.
+
+
+Qubes Architecture, Credit: What is Qubes OS Intro
+
+Each Qubes application has a [colored border](https://www.qubes-os.org/screenshots/) that can help you keep track of the virtual machine it is running in. You could, for example, use a specific color for your banking browser, while using a different color for a general untrusted browser.
+
+
+Qubes window borders, Credit: Qubes Screenshots
+
+## Why Should I use Qubes?
+
+Qubes OS is useful if your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md) requires strong compartmentalization and security, such as if you think you'll be opening untrusted files from untrusted sources. A typical reason for using Qubes OS is to open documents from unknown sources.
+
+Qubes OS utilizes [Dom0](https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Dom0) Xen VM (i.e., an "AdminVM") for controlling other guest VMs or Qubes on the host OS. Other VMs display individual application windows within Dom0's desktop environment. It allows you to color code windows based on trust levels and run apps that can interact with each other with very granular control.
+
+### Copying and Pasting Text
+
+You can [copy and paste text](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-and-paste-text/) using `qvm-copy-to-vm` or the below instructions:
+
+1. Press **Ctrl+C** to tell the VM you're in that you want to copy something.
+2. Press **Ctrl+Shift+C** to tell the VM to make this buffer available to the global clipboard.
+3. Press **Ctrl+Shift+V** in the destination VM to make the global clipboard available.
+4. Press **Ctrl+V** in the destination VM to paste the contents in the buffer.
+
+### File Exchange
+
+To copy and paste files and directories (folders) from one VM to another, you can use the option **Copy to Other AppVM...** or **Move to Other AppVM...**. The difference is that the **Move** option will delete the original file. Either option will protect your clipboard from being leaked to any other Qubes. This is more secure than air-gapped file transfer because an air-gapped computer will still be forced to parse partitions or file systems. That is not required with the inter-qube copy system.
+
+??? info "AppVMs or qubes do not have their own file systems"
+
+ You can [copy and move files](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-and-move-files/) between Qubes. When doing so the changes aren't immediately made and can be easily undone in case of an accident.
+
+### Inter-VM Interactions
+
+The [qrexec framework](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec/) is a core part of Qubes which allows virtual machine communication between domains. It is built on top of the Xen library *vchan*, which facilitates [isolation through policies](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2020/06/22/new-qrexec-policy-system/).
+
+## Additional Resources
+
+For additional information we encourage you to consult the extensive Qubes OS documentation pages located on the [Qubes OS Website](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/). Offline copies can be downloaded from the Qubes OS [documentation repository](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-doc).
+
+- Open Technology Fund: [*Arguably the world's most secure operating system*](https://www.opentech.fund/news/qubes-os-arguably-the-worlds-most-secure-operating-system-motherboard/)
+- J. Rutkowska: [*Software compartmentalization vs. physical separation*](https://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/2014/Software_compartmentalization_vs_physical_separation.pdf)
+- J. Rutkowska: [*Partitioning my digital life into security domains*](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/03/13/partitioning-my-digital-life-into.html)
+- Qubes OS: [*Related Articles*](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/categories/#articles)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/passwords.md b/i18n/fa/passwords.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dbe30a966
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/passwords.md
@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+---
+title: "Password Managers"
+icon: material/form-textbox-password
+---
+
+Password managers allow you to securely store and manage passwords and other credentials with the use of a master password.
+
+[Introduction to Passwords :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](./basics/passwords-overview.md)
+
+!!! info
+
+ Built-in password managers in software like browsers and operating systems are sometimes not as good as dedicated password manager software. The advantage of a built-in password manager is good integration with the software, but it can often be very simple and lack privacy and security features standalone offerings have.
+
+ For example, the password manager in Microsoft Edge doesn't offer E2EE at all. Google's password manager has [optional](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/11350823) E2EE, and [Apple's](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303) offers E2EE by default.
+
+## Cloud-based
+
+These password managers sync your passwords to a cloud server for easy accessibility from all your devices and safety against device loss.
+
+### Bitwarden
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Bitwarden** is a free and open-source password manager. It aims to solve password management problems for individuals, teams, and business organizations. Bitwarden is among the best and safest solutions to store all of your logins and passwords while conveniently keeping them synced between all of your devices.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://bitwarden.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://bitwarden.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://bitwarden.com/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/bitwarden){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.x8bit.bitwarden)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/bitwarden-password-manager/id1137397744)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/bitwarden/mobile/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://bitwarden.com/download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://bitwarden.com/download)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.bitwarden.desktop)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/bitwarden-password-manager)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/bitwarden-free-password-m/nngceckbapebfimnlniiiahkandclblb)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/jbkfoedolllekgbhcbcoahefnbanhhlh)
+
+Bitwarden also features [Bitwarden Send](https://bitwarden.com/products/send/), which allows you to share text and files securely with [end-to-end encryption](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-encryption). A [password](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-privacy/#send-passwords) can be required along with the send link. Bitwarden Send also features [automatic deletion](https://bitwarden.com/help/send-lifespan).
+
+You need the [Premium Plan](https://bitwarden.com/help/about-bitwarden-plans/#compare-personal-plans) to be able to share files. The free plan only allows text sharing.
+
+Bitwarden's server-side code is [open-source](https://github.com/bitwarden/server), so if you don't want to use the Bitwarden cloud, you can easily host your own Bitwarden sync server.
+
+**Vaultwarden** is an alternative implementation of Bitwarden's sync server written in Rust and compatible with official Bitwarden clients, perfect for self-hosted deployment where running the official resource-heavy service might not be ideal. If you are looking to self-host Bitwarden on your own server, you almost certainly want to use Vaultwarden over Bitwarden's official server code.
+
+[:octicons-repo-16: Vaultwarden Repository](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden ""){.md-button} [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/dani-garcia){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+### 1Password
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **1Password** is a password manager with a strong focus on security and ease-of-use, which allows you to store passwords, credit cards, software licenses, and any other sensitive information in a secure digital vault. Your vault is hosted on 1Password's servers for a [monthly fee](https://1password.com/sign-up/). 1Password is [audited](https://support.1password.com/security-assessments/) on a regular basis and provides exceptional customer support. 1Password is closed source; however, the security of the product is thoroughly documented in their [security white paper](https://1passwordstatic.com/files/security/1password-white-paper.pdf).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://1password.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://support.1password.com/1password-privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.1password.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.onepassword.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1511601750?mt=8)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://1password.com/downloads/windows/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://1password.com/downloads/mac/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://1password.com/downloads/linux/)
+
+Traditionally, **1Password** has offered the best password manager user experience for people using macOS and iOS; however, it has now achieved feature-parity across all platforms. It boasts many features geared towards families and less technical people, as well as advanced functionality.
+
+Your 1Password vault is secured with both your master password and a randomized 34-character security key to encrypt your data on their servers. This security key adds a layer of protection to your data because your data is secured with high entropy regardless of your master password. Many other password manager solutions are entirely reliant on the strength of your master password to secure your data.
+
+One advantage 1Password has over Bitwarden is its first-class support for native clients. While Bitwarden relegates many duties, especially account management features, to their web vault interface, 1Password makes nearly every feature available within its native mobile or desktop clients. 1Password's clients also have a more intuitive UI, which makes them easier to use and navigate.
+
+### Psono
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Psono** is a free and open-source password manager from Germany, with a focus on password management for teams. Psono supports secure sharing of passwords, files, bookmarks, and emails. All secrets are protected by a master password.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://psono.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://psono.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://doc.psono.com){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/psono){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.psono.psono)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/psono-password-manager/id1545581224)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/psono-pw-password-manager)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/psonopw-password-manager/eljmjmgjkbmpmfljlmklcfineebidmlo)
+ - [:simple-docker: Docker Hub](https://hub.docker.com/r/psono/psono-client)
+
+Psono provides extensive documentation for their product. The web-client for Psono can be self-hosted; alternatively, you can choose the full Community Edition or the Enterprise Edition with additional features.
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+#### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must utilize strong, standards-based/modern E2EE.
+- Must have thoroughly documented encryption and security practices.
+- Must have a published audit from a reputable, independent third-party.
+- All non-essential telemetry must be optional.
+- Must not collect more PII than is necessary for billing purposes.
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Telemetry should be opt-in (disabled by default) or not collected at all.
+- Should be open-source and reasonably self-hostable.
+
+## Local Storage
+
+These options allow you to manage an encrypted password database locally.
+
+### KeePassXC
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **KeePassXC** is a community fork of KeePassX, a native cross-platform port of KeePass Password Safe, with the goal to extend and improve it with new features and bugfixes to provide a feature-rich, cross-platform and modern open-source password manager.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://keepassxc.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://keepassxc.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://keepassxc.org/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://keepassxc.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://keepassxc.org/download/#windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://keepassxc.org/download/#mac)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://keepassxc.org/download/#linux)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flatpak](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.keepassxc.KeePassXC)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/keepassxc-browser)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/keepassxc-browser/oboonakemofpalcgghocfoadofidjkkk)
+
+KeePassXC stores its export data as [CSV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comma-separated_values) files. This may mean data loss if you import this file into another password manager. We advise you check each record manually.
+
+### KeePassDX (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **KeePassDX** is a lightweight password manager for Android, allows editing encrypted data in a single file in KeePass format and can fill in the forms in a secure way. [Contributor Pro](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kunzisoft.keepass.pro) allows unlocking cosmetic content and non-standard protocol features, but more importantly, it helps and encourages development.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.keepassdx.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.keepassdx.com/#donation){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kunzisoft.keepass.free)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX/releases)
+
+### Strongbox (iOS & macOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Strongbox** is a native, open-source password manager for iOS and macOS. Supporting both KeePass and Password Safe formats, Strongbox can be used in tandem with other password managers, like KeePassXC, on non-Apple platforms. By employing a [freemium model](https://strongboxsafe.com/pricing/), Strongbox offers most features under its free tier with more convenience-oriented [features](https://strongboxsafe.com/comparison/)—such as biometric authentication—locked behind a subscription or perpetual license.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://strongboxsafe.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://strongboxsafe.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://strongboxsafe.com/getting-started/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/strongbox-password-safe/Strongbox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/strongbox-password-safe/Strongbox#supporting-development){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/strongbox-keepass-pwsafe/id897283731)
+
+Additionally, there is an offline-only version offered: [Strongbox Zero](https://apps.apple.com/app/strongbox-keepass-pwsafe/id1581589638). This version is stripped down in an attempt to reduce attack surface.
+
+### Command-line
+
+These products are minimal password managers that can be used within scripting applications.
+
+#### gopass
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **gopass** is a password manager for the command line written in Go. It works on all major desktop and server operating systems (Linux, macOS, BSD, Windows).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.gopass.pw){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/gopasspw/gopass/tree/master/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/gopasspw/gopass){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/dominikschulz){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-macos)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-linux)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.gopass.pw/#install-bsd)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be cross-platform.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/productivity.md b/i18n/fa/productivity.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..63832903c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/productivity.md
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+---
+title: "Productivity Tools"
+icon: material/file-sign
+---
+
+Most online office suites do not support E2EE, meaning the cloud provider has access to everything you do. The privacy policy may legally protect your rights, but it does not provide technical access constraints.
+
+## Collaboration Platforms
+
+### Nextcloud
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nextcloud** is a suite of free and open-source client-server software for creating your own file hosting services on a private server you control.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://nextcloud.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://nextcloud.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://nextcloud.com/support/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/nextcloud){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nextcloud.com/contribute/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nextcloud.client)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1125420102)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/nextcloud/android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/www/nextcloud)
+
+!!! danger
+
+ We don't recommend using the [E2EE App](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/end_to_end_encryption) for Nextcloud as it may lead to data loss; it is highly experimental and not production quality. For this reason, we don't recommend third-party Nextcloud providers.
+
+### CryptPad
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **CryptPad** is a private-by-design alternative to popular office tools. All content on this web service is end-to-end encrypted and can be shared with other users easily.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://cryptpad.fr){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://cryptpad.fr/pad/#/2/pad/view/GcNjAWmK6YDB3EO2IipRZ0fUe89j43Ryqeb4fjkjehE/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.cryptpad.fr/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/xwiki-labs/cryptpad){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/cryptpad){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+In general, we define collaboration platforms as full-fledged suites which could reasonably act as a replacement to collaboration platforms like Google Drive.
+
+- Open-source.
+- Makes files accessible via WebDAV unless it is impossible due to E2EE.
+- Has sync clients for Linux, macOS, and Windows.
+- Supports document and spreadsheet editing.
+- Supports real-time document collaboration.
+- Supports exporting documents to standard document formats (e.g. ODF).
+
+#### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should store files in a conventional filesystem.
+- Should support TOTP or FIDO2 multi-factor authentication support, or Passkey logins.
+
+## Office Suites
+
+### LibreOffice
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **LibreOffice** is a free and open-source office suite with extensive functionality.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.libreoffice.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.libreoffice.org/about-us/privacy/privacy-policy-en/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://documentation.libreoffice.org/en/english-documentation/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://www.libreoffice.org/about-us/source-code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.libreoffice.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/android-and-ios/)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/android-and-ios/)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/download/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/download/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.libreoffice.org/download/download/)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.libreoffice.LibreOffice)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/editors/libreoffice/)
+
+### OnlyOffice
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OnlyOffice** is a cloud-based free and open-source office suite with extensive functionality, including integration with Nextcloud.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.onlyoffice.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://help.onlyoffice.com/products/files/doceditor.aspx?fileid=5048502&doc=SXhWMEVzSEYxNlVVaXJJeUVtS0kyYk14YWdXTEFUQmRWL250NllHNUFGbz0_IjUwNDg1MDIi0){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://helpcenter.onlyoffice.com/userguides.aspx){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ONLYOFFICE){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.onlyoffice.documents)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id944896972)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.onlyoffice.com/download-desktop.aspx)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.onlyoffice.com/download-desktop.aspx)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.onlyoffice.com/download-desktop.aspx)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.onlyoffice.desktopeditors)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/www/onlyoffice-documentserver/)
+
+### Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+In general, we define office suites as applications which could reasonably act as a replacement for Microsoft Word for most needs.
+
+- Must be cross-platform.
+- Must be open-source software.
+- Must function offline.
+- Must support editing documents, spreadsheets, and slideshows.
+- Must export files to standard document formats.
+
+## Paste services
+
+### PrivateBin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **PrivateBin** is a minimalist, open-source online pastebin where the server has zero knowledge of pasted data. Data is encrypted/decrypted in the browser using 256-bit AES. It is the improved version of ZeroBin. There is a [list of instances](https://privatebin.info/directory/).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://privatebin.info){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://privatebin.info/directory/){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/wiki/FAQ){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/fa/real-time-communication.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9a51acf49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/real-time-communication.md
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+---
+title: "Real-Time Communication"
+icon: material/chat-processing
+---
+
+These are our recommendations for encrypted real-time communication.
+
+[Types of Communication Networks :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](./advanced/communication-network-types.md)
+
+## Encrypted Messengers
+
+These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
+
+### Signal
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
+
+ All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/signalapp){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://signal.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.thoughtcrime.securesms)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id874139669)
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://signal.org/android/apk/)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://signal.org/download/windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://signal.org/download/macos)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://signal.org/download/linux)
+
+Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). The server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
+
+The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
+
+We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation:
+
+[Signal Configuration and Hardening :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening/)
+
+### SimpleX Chat
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **SimpleX** Chat is an instant messenger that is decentralized and doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Users of SimpleX Chat can scan a QR code or click an invite link to participate in group conversations.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://simplex.chat){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/blob/stable/PRIVACY.md){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/tree/stable/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=chat.simplex.app)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/simplex-chat/id1605771084)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/releases)
+
+SimpleX Chat [was audited](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website.html) by Trail of Bits in October 2022.
+
+Currently SimpleX Chat only provides a client for Android and iOS. Basic group chatting functionality, direct messaging, editing of messages and markdown are supported. E2EE Audio and Video calls are also supported.
+
+Your data can be exported, and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up.
+
+### Briar
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works/) to other clients using the Tor Network. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org/){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.briarproject.briar.android)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://briarproject.org/download-briar-desktop/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://briarproject.org/download-briar-desktop/)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.briarproject.Briar)
+
+To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby.
+
+The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit/), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited.
+
+Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
+
+Briar supports perfect forward secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
+
+## Additional Options
+
+!!! warning
+
+ These messengers do not have Perfect [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) (PFS), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
+
+### Element
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Element** is the reference client for the [Matrix](https://matrix.org/docs/guides/introduction) protocol, an [open standard](https://matrix.org/docs/spec) for secure decentralized real-time communication.
+
+ Messages and files shared in private rooms (those which require an invite) are by default E2EE as are one to one voice and video calls.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://element.io/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://element.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://element.io/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/vector-im){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=im.vector.app)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/vector/id1083446067)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/vector-im/element-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://element.io/get-started)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://element.io/get-started)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://element.io/get-started)
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://app.element.io)
+
+Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
+
+Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
+
+The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
+
+The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm](https://matrix.org/docs/projects/other/olm) cryptographic ratchet used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
+
+### Session
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Session** is a decentralized messenger with a focus on private, secure, and anonymous communications. Session offers support for direct messages, group chats, and voice calls.
+
+ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to store and route messages. Every encrypted message is routed through three nodes in the Oxen Service Node Network, making it virtually impossible for the nodes to compile meaningful information on those using the network.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getsession.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://getsession.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://getsession.org/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/oxen-io){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=network.loki.messenger)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1470168868)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/oxen-io/session-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://getsession.org/download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://getsession.org/download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://getsession.org/download)
+
+Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
+
+Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
+
+Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
+
+Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must have open-source clients.
+- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
+- Must support E2EE for all messages.
+- Must have been independently audited.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should have Perfect Forward Secrecy.
+- Should have open-source servers.
+- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
+- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
+- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/router.md b/i18n/fa/router.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4677d1a61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/router.md
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+---
+title: "Router Firmware"
+icon: material/router-wireless
+---
+
+Below are a few alternative operating systems, that can be used on routers, Wi-Fi access points, etc.
+
+## OpenWrt
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OpenWrt** is a Linux-based operating system; it's primarily used on embedded devices to route network traffic. It includes util-linux, uClibc, and BusyBox. All of the components have been optimized for home routers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://openwrt.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://openwrt.org/docs/start){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://openwrt.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+You can consult OpenWrt's [table of hardware](https://openwrt.org/toh/start) to check if your device is supported.
+
+## OPNsense
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OPNsense** is an open source, FreeBSD-based firewall and routing platform which incorporates many advanced features such as traffic shaping, load balancing, and VPN capabilities, with many more features available in the form of plugins. OPNsense is commonly deployed as a perimeter firewall, router, wireless access point, DHCP server, DNS server, and VPN endpoint.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://opnsense.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.opnsense.org/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/opnsense){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opnsense.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+OPNsense was originally developed as a fork of [pfSense](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PfSense), and both projects are noted for being free and reliable firewall distributions which offer features often only found in expensive commercial firewalls. Launched in 2015, the developers of OPNsense [cited](https://docs.opnsense.org/history/thefork.html) a number of security and code-quality issues with pfSense which they felt necessitated a fork of the project, as well as concerns about Netgate's majority acquisition of pfSense and the future direction of the pfSense project.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must be open source.
+- Must receive regular updates.
+- Must support a wide variety of hardware.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/search-engines.md b/i18n/fa/search-engines.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1b19c469e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/search-engines.md
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+---
+title: "Search Engines"
+icon: material/search-web
+---
+
+Use a search engine that doesn't build an advertising profile based on your searches.
+
+The recommendations here are based on the merits of each service's privacy policy. There is **no guarantee** that these privacy policies are honored.
+
+Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) if your threat model requires hiding your IP address from the search provider.
+
+## Brave Search
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Brave Search** is developed by Brave and serves results primarily from its own, independent index. The index is optimized against Google Search and therefore may provide more contextually accurate results compared to other alternatives.
+
+ Brave Search includes unique features such as Discussions, which highlights conversation-focused results—such as forum posts.
+
+ We recommend you disable [Anonymous usage metrics](https://search.brave.com/help/usage-metrics) as it is enabled by default and can be disabled within settings.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://search.brave.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://search.brave4u7jddbv7cyviptqjc7jusxh72uik7zt6adtckl5f4nwy2v72qd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://search.brave.com/help/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://search.brave.com/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+Brave Search is based in the United States. Their [privacy policy](https://search.brave.com/help/privacy-policy) states they collect aggregated usage metrics, which includes the operating system and browser in use, however no personally identifiable information is collected. IP addresses are temporarily processed, but are not retained.
+
+## DuckDuckGo
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **DuckDuckGo** is one of the more mainstream private search engine options. Notable DuckDuckGo search features include [bangs](https://duckduckgo.com/bang) and many [instant answers](https://help.duckduckgo.com/duckduckgo-help-pages/features/instant-answers-and-other-features/). The search engine relies on a commercial Bing API to serve most results, but it does use numerous [other sources](https://help.duckduckgo.com/results/sources/) for instant answers and other non-primary results.
+
+ DuckDuckGo is the default search engine for the Tor Browser and is one of the few available options on Apple’s Safari browser.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://duckduckgo.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://duckduckgo.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://help.duckduckgo.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+DuckDuckGo is based in the United States. Their [privacy policy](https://duckduckgo.com/privacy) states they **do** log your searches for product improvement purposes, but not your IP address or any other personally identifying information.
+
+DuckDuckGo offers two [other versions](https://help.duckduckgo.com/features/non-javascript/) of their search engine, both of which do not require JavaScript. These versions do lack features, however. These versions can also be used in conjunction with their [Tor onion address](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/) by appending [/lite](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/lite) or [/html](https://duckduckgogg42xjoc72x3sjasowoarfbgcmvfimaftt6twagswzczad.onion/html) for the respective version.
+
+## SearXNG
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **SearXNG** is an open-source, self-hostable, metasearch engine, aggregating the results of other search engines while not storing any information itself. It is an actively maintained fork of [SearX](https://github.com/searx/searx).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://searxng.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://searx.space/){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/searxng/searxng){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+SearXNG is a proxy between you and the search engines it aggregates from. Your search queries will still be sent to the search engines that SearXNG gets its results from.
+
+When self-hosting, it is important that you have other people using your instance so that the queries would blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting SearXNG, as people looking up illegal content on your instance could draw unwanted attention from authorities.
+
+When you are using a SearXNG instance, be sure to go read their privacy policy. Since SearXNG instances may be modified by their owners, they do not necessarily reflect their privacy policy. Some instances run as a Tor hidden service, which may grant some privacy as long as your search queries does not contain PII.
+
+## Startpage
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Startpage** is a private search engine known for serving Google search results. One of Startpage's unique features is the [Anonymous View](https://www.startpage.com/en/anonymous-view/), which puts forth efforts to standardize user activity to make it more difficult to be uniquely identified. The feature can be useful for hiding [some](https://support.startpage.com/hc/en-us/articles/4455540212116-The-Anonymous-View-Proxy-technical-details) network and browser properties. Unlike the name suggests, the feature should not be relied upon for anonymity. If you are looking for anonymity, use the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) instead.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.startpage.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.startpage.com/en/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.startpage.com/hc/en-us/categories/4481917470356-Startpage-Search-Engine){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+!!! warning
+
+ Startpage regularly limits service access to certain IP addresses, such as IPs reserved for VPNs or Tor. [DuckDuckGo](#duckduckgo) and [Brave Search](#brave-search) are friendlier options if your threat model requires hiding your IP address from the search provider.
+
+Startpage is based in the Netherlands. According to their [privacy policy](https://www.startpage.com/en/privacy-policy/), they log details such as: operating system, type of browser, and language. They do not log your IP address, search queries, or other personally identifying information.
+
+Startpage's majority shareholder is System1 who is an adtech company. We don't believe that to be an issue as they have a distinctly separate [privacy policy](https://system1.com/terms/privacy-policy). The Privacy Guides team reached out to Startpage [back in 2020](https://web.archive.org/web/20210118031008/https://blog.privacytools.io/relisting-startpage/) to clear up any concerns with System1's sizeable investment into the service. We were satisfied with the answers we received.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+### Minimum Requirements
+
+- Must not collect personally identifiable information per their privacy policy.
+- Must not allow users to create an account with them.
+
+### Best-Case
+
+Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
+
+- Should be based on open-source software.
+- Should not block Tor exit node IP addresses.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/tools.md b/i18n/fa/tools.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1c4e0a778
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/tools.md
@@ -0,0 +1,443 @@
+---
+title: "Privacy Tools"
+icon: material/tools
+hide:
+ - toc
+---
+
+If you're looking for a specific solution to something, these are the hardware and software tools we recommend in a variety of categories. Our recommended privacy tools are primarily chosen based on security features, with additional emphasis on decentralized and open-source tools. They are applicable to a variety of threat models ranging from protection against global mass surveillance programs and avoiding big tech companies to mitigating attacks, but only you can determine what will work best for your needs.
+
+If you want assistance figuring out the best privacy tools and alternative programs for your needs, start a discussion on our [forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/) or our [Matrix](https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org) community!
+
+For more details about each project, why they were chosen, and additional tips or tricks we recommend, click the "Learn more" link in each section, or click on the recommendation itself to be taken to that specific section of the page.
+
+## Tor Network
+
+
+
+1. Snowflake does not increase privacy, however it allows you to easily contribute to the Tor network and help people in censored networks achieve better privacy.
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md)
+
+## Desktop Web Browsers
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](cloud.md)
+
+### DNS
+
+#### DNS Providers
+
+We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers based on a variety of criteria, such as [Mullvad](https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls) and [Quad9](https://quad9.net/) amongst others. We recommend for you to read our pages on DNS before choosing a provider. In many cases, using an alternative DNS provider is not recommended.
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](dns.md)
+
+#### Encrypted DNS Proxies
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](search-engines.md)
+
+### VPN Providers
+
+??? danger "VPNs do not provide anonymity"
+
+ Using a VPN will **not** keep your browsing habits anonymous, nor will it add additional security to non-secure (HTTP) traffic.
+
+ If you are looking for **anonymity**, you should use the Tor Browser **instead** of a VPN.
+
+ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connecting to websites using HTTPS. A VPN is not a replacement for good security practices.
+
+ [Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](vpn.md)
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](data-redaction.md)
+
+### Email Clients
+
+
+
+- { .twemoji } [Thunderbird](email-clients.md#thunderbird)
+- { .twemoji } [Apple Mail (macOS)](email-clients.md#apple-mail-macos)
+- { .twemoji } [Canary Mail (iOS)](email-clients.md#canary-mail-ios)
+- { .twemoji } [FairEmail (Android)](email-clients.md#fairemail-android)
+- { .twemoji } [GNOME Evolution (Linux)](email-clients.md#gnome-evolution-gnome)
+- { .twemoji } [K-9 Mail (Android)](email-clients.md#k-9-mail-android)
+- { .twemoji } [Kontact (Linux)](email-clients.md#kontact-kde)
+- { .twemoji } [Mailvelope (PGP in standard webmail)](email-clients.md#mailvelope-browser)
+- { .twemoji } [NeoMutt (CLI)](email-clients.md#neomutt-cli)
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](email-clients.md)
+
+### Encryption Software
+
+??? info "Operating System Disk Encryption"
+
+ For encrypting your operating system drive, we typically recommend using whichever encryption tool your operating system provides, whether that is **BitLocker** on Windows, **FileVault** on macOS, or **LUKS** on Linux. These tools are included with the operating system and typically use hardware encryption elements such as a TPM that other full-disk encryption software like VeraCrypt do not. VeraCrypt is still suitable for non-operating system disks such as external drives, especially drives that may be accessed from multiple operating systems.
+
+ [Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](encryption.md##operating-system-included-full-disk-encryption-fde)
+
+
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](video-streaming.md)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/tor.md b/i18n/fa/tor.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0c8cf09d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/tor.md
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+---
+title: "Tor Network"
+icon: simple/torproject
+---
+
+{ align=right }
+
+The **Tor** network is a group of volunteer-operated servers that allows you to connect for free and improve your privacy and security on the Internet. Individuals and organizations can also share information over the Tor network with ".onion hidden services" without compromising their privacy. Because Tor traffic is difficult to block and trace, Tor is an effective censorship circumvention tool.
+
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://www.torproject.org){ .card-link title=Homepage }
+[:simple-torbrowser:](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+Tor works by routing your internet traffic through those volunteer-operated servers, instead of making a direct connection to the site you're trying to visit. This obfuscates where the traffic is coming from, and no server in the connection path is able to see the full path of where the traffic is coming from and going to, meaning even the servers you are using to connect cannot break your anonymity.
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ Tor circuit pathway - Nodes in the path can only see the servers they are directly connected to, for example the "Entry" node shown can see your IP address, and the address of the "Middle" node, but has no way to see which website you are visiting.
+
+
+- [More information about how Tor works :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md)
+
+## Connecting to Tor
+
+There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for anonymous browsing for desktop computers and Android. In addition to the apps listed below, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser.
+
+### Tor Browser
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tor Browser** is the choice if you need anonymity, as it provides you with access to the Tor network and bridges, and it includes default settings and extensions that are automatically configured by the default security levels: *Standard*, *Safer* and *Safest*.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.torproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.torbrowser)
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://www.torproject.org/download/#android)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.torproject.org/download/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.torproject.org/download/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.torproject.org/download/)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/security/tor)
+
+!!! danger
+
+ You should **never** install any additional extensions on Tor Browser or edit `about:config` settings, including the ones we suggest for Firefox. Browser extensions and non-standard settings make you stand out from others on the Tor network, thus making your browser easier to [fingerprint](https://support.torproject.org/glossary/browser-fingerprinting).
+
+The Tor Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting, or identifying you based on your browser configuration. Therefore, it is imperative that you do **not** modify the browser beyond the default [security levels](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/).
+
+### Orbot
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Orbot** is a free Tor VPN for smartphones which routes traffic from any app on your device through the Tor network.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://orbot.app/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://orbot.app/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://orbot.app/code){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://orbot.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/orbot/id1609461599)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases)
+
+For resistance against traffic analysis attacks, consider enabling *Isolate Destination Address* in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Connectivity**. This will use a completely different Tor Circuit (different middle relay and exit nodes) for every domain you connect to.
+
+!!! tip "Tips for Android"
+
+ Orbot can proxy individual apps if they support SOCKS or HTTP proxying. It can also proxy all your network connections using [VpnService](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService) and can be used with the VPN killswitch in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
+
+ Orbot is often outdated on the Guardian Project's [F-Droid repository](https://guardianproject.info/fdroid) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.torproject.android), so consider downloading directly from the [GitHub repository](https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/releases) instead.
+
+ All versions are signed using the same signature so they should be compatible with each other.
+
+## Relays and Bridges
+
+### Snowflake
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Snowflake** allows you to donate bandwidth to the Tor Project by operating a "Snowflake proxy" within your browser.
+
+ People who are censored can use Snowflake proxies to connect to the Tor network. Snowflake is a great way to contribute to the network even if you don't have the technical know-how to run a Tor relay or bridge.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://snowflake.torproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/wikis/Technical%20Overview){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/snowflake.git/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/torproject-snowflake/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/snowflake/mafpmfcccpbjnhfhjnllmmalhifmlcie)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://snowflake.torproject.org/embed "Leave this page open to be a Snowflake proxy")
+
+??? tip "Embedded Snowflake"
+
+ You can enable Snowflake in your browser by clicking the switch below and ==leaving this page open==. You can also install Snowflake as a browser extension to have it always run while your browser is open, however adding third-party extensions can increase your attack surface.
+
+
+ If the embed does not appear for you, ensure you are not blocking the third-party frame from `torproject.org`. Alternatively, visit [this page](https://snowflake.torproject.org/embed.html).
+
+Snowflake does not increase your privacy in any way, nor is it used to connect to the Tor network within your personal browser. However, if your internet connection is uncensored, you should consider running it to help people in censored networks achieve better privacy themselves. There is no need to worry about which websites people are accessing through your proxy—their visible browsing IP address will match their Tor exit node, not yours.
+
+Running a Snowflake proxy is low-risk, even moreso than running a Tor relay or bridge which are already not particularly risky endeavours. However, it does still proxy traffic through your network which can be impactful in some ways, especially if your network is bandwidth-limited. Make sure you understand [how Snowflake works](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/wikis/home) before deciding whether to run a proxy.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/video-streaming.md b/i18n/fa/video-streaming.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8cc0135f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/video-streaming.md
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+---
+title: "Video Streaming"
+icon: material/video-wireless
+---
+
+The primary threat when using a video streaming platform is that your streaming habits and subscription lists could be used to profile you. You should combine these tools with a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) to make it harder to profile your usage.
+
+## LBRY
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **The LBRY network** is a decentralized video sharing network. It uses a [BitTorrent](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent)-like network to store the video content, and a [blockchain](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockchain) to store the indexes for those videos. The main benefit of this design is censorship resistance.
+
+ **The LBRY desktop client** helps you stream videos from the LBRY network and stores your subscription list in your own LBRY wallet.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://lbry.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://lbry.com/privacypolicy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://lbry.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/lbryio/lbry-desktop){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://lbry.com/windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://lbry.com/osx)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://lbry.com/linux)
+
+!!! note
+
+ Only the **LBRY desktop client** is recommended, as the [Odysee](https://odysee.com) website and the LBRY clients in F-Droid, Play Store, and the App Store have mandatory synchronization and telemetry.
+
+!!! warning
+
+ While watching and hosting videos, your IP address is visible to the LBRY network. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+
+We recommend **against** synchronizing your wallet with LBRY Inc., as synchronizing encrypted wallets is not supported yet. If you synchronize your wallet with LBRY Inc., you have to trust them to not look at your subscription list, [LBC](https://lbry.com/faq/earn-credits) funds, or take control of your channel.
+
+You can disable *Save hosting data to help the LBRY network* option in :gear: **Settings** → **Advanced Settings**, to avoid exposing your IP address and watched videos when using LBRY for a prolonged period of time.
+
+## Criteria
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+
+!!! example "This section is new"
+
+ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
+
+- Must not require a centralized account to view videos.
+ - Decentralized authentication, such as via a mobile wallet's private key is acceptable.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fa/vpn.md b/i18n/fa/vpn.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2d06ffdd2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fa/vpn.md
@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+---
+title: "VPN Services"
+icon: material/vpn
+---
+
+Find a no-logging VPN operator who isn’t out to sell or read your web traffic.
+
+??? danger "VPNs do not provide anonymity"
+
+ Using a VPN will **not** keep your browsing habits anonymous, nor will it add additional security to non-secure (HTTP) traffic.
+
+ If you are looking for **anonymity**, you should use the Tor Browser **instead** of a VPN.
+
+ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connecting to websites using HTTPS. A VPN is not a replacement for good security practices.
+
+ [Download Tor](https://www.torproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Tor Myths & FAQ](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
+
+??? question "When are VPNs useful?"
+
+ If you're looking for additional **privacy** from your ISP, on a public Wi-Fi network, or while torrenting files, a VPN may be the solution for you as long as you understand the risks involved.
+
+ [More Info](basics/vpn-overview.md){ .md-button }
+
+## Recommended Providers
+
+!!! abstract "Criteria"
+
+ Our recommended providers use encryption, accept Monero, support WireGuard & OpenVPN, and have a no logging policy. Read our [full list of criteria](#our-criteria) for more information.
+
+### Proton VPN
+
+!!! recommendation annotate
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton VPN** is a strong contender in the VPN space, and they have been in operation since 2016. Proton AG is based in Switzerland and offers a limited free tier, as well as a more featured premium option.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://protonvpn.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://protonvpn.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://protonvpn.com/support/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonVPN){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonvpn.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id1437005085)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonVPN/android-app/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://protonvpn.com/download-windows)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://protonvpn.com/support/linux-vpn-setup/)
+
+??? success annotate "67 Countries"
+
+ Proton VPN has [servers in 67 countries](https://protonvpn.com/vpn-servers) (1). Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
+
+ We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if they use [dedicated servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), instead of cheaper shared solutions (with other customers) such as [virtual private servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
+
+1. Last checked: 2022-09-16
+
+??? success "Independently Audited"
+
+ As of January 2020, Proton VPN has undergone an independent audit by SEC Consult. SEC Consult found some medium and low risk vulnerabilities in Proton VPN's Windows, Android, and iOS applications, all of which were "properly fixed" by Proton VPN before the reports were published. None of the issues identified would have provided an attacker remote access to your device or traffic. You can view individual reports for each platform at [protonvpn.com](https://protonvpn.com/blog/open-source/). In April 2022 Proton VPN underwent [another audit](https://protonvpn.com/blog/no-logs-audit/) and the report was [produced by Securitum](https://protonvpn.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/securitum-protonvpn-nologs-20220330.pdf). A [letter of attestation](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps) was provided for Proton VPN's apps on 9th November 2021 by [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com).
+
+??? success "Open-Source Clients"
+
+ Proton VPN provides the source code for their desktop and mobile clients in their [GitHub organization](https://github.com/ProtonVPN).
+
+??? success "Accepts Cash"
+
+ Proton VPN, in addition to accepting credit/debit cards and PayPal, accepts Bitcoin, and **cash/local currency** as anonymous forms of payment.
+
+??? success "WireGuard Support"
+
+ Proton VPN mostly supports the WireGuard® protocol. [WireGuard](https://www.wireguard.com) is a newer protocol that uses state-of-the-art [cryptography](https://www.wireguard.com/protocol/). Additionally, WireGuard aims to be simpler and more performant.
+
+ Proton VPN [recommends](https://protonvpn.com/blog/wireguard/) the use of WireGuard with their service. On Proton VPN's Windows, macOS, iOS, Android, ChromeOS, and Android TV apps, WireGuard is the default protocol; however, [support](https://protonvpn.com/support/how-to-change-vpn-protocols/) for the protocol is not present in their Linux app.
+
+??? warning "Remote Port Forwarding"
+
+ Proton VPN currently only supports remote [port forwarding](https://protonvpn.com/support/port-forwarding/) on Windows, which may impact some applications. Especially Peer-to-peer applications like Torrent clients.
+
+??? success "Mobile Clients"
+
+ In addition to providing standard OpenVPN configuration files, Proton VPN has mobile clients for [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/protonvpn-fast-secure-vpn/id1437005085), [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonvpn.android&hl=en_US), and [GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonVPN/android-app/releases) allowing for easy connections to their servers.
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ Proton VPN clients support two factor authentication on all platforms except Linux at the moment. Proton VPN has their own servers and datacenters in Switzerland, Iceland and Sweden. They offer adblocking and known malware domains blocking with their DNS service. Additionally, Proton VPN also offers "Tor" servers allowing you to easily connect to onion sites, but we still strongly recommend using [the official Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) for this purpose.
+
+!!! danger "Killswitch feature is broken on Intel-based Macs"
+
+ System crashes [may occur](https://protonvpn.com/support/macos-t2-chip-kill-switch/) on Intel-based Macs when using the VPN killswitch. If you require this feature, and you are using a Mac with Intel chipset, you should consider using another VPN service.
+
+### IVPN
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **IVPN** is another premium VPN provider, and they have been in operation since 2009. IVPN is based in Gibraltar.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.ivpn.net/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.ivpn.net/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/general/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ivpn){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-android/)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/ivpn-serious-privacy-protection/id1193122683)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-windows/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-macos/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-linux/)
+
+??? success annotate "35 Countries"
+
+ IVPN has [servers in 35 countries](https://www.ivpn.net/server-locations) (1). Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
+
+ We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if they use [dedicated servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), instead of cheaper shared solutions (with other customers) such as [virtual private servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
+
+1. Last checked: 2022-09-16
+
+??? success "Independently Audited"
+
+ IVPN has undergone a [no-logging audit from Cure53](https://cure53.de/audit-report_ivpn.pdf) which concluded in agreement with IVPN's no-logging claim. IVPN has also completed a [comprehensive pentest report Cure53](https://cure53.de/summary-report_ivpn_2019.pdf) in January 2020. IVPN has also said they plan to have [annual reports](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/independent-security-audit-concluded) in the future. A further review was conducted [in April 2022](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/ivpn-apps-security-audit-2022-concluded/) and was produced by Cure53 [on their website](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_IVPN_2022.pdf).
+
+??? success "Open-Source Clients"
+
+ As of February 2020 [IVPN applications are now open-source](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/ivpn-applications-are-now-open-source). Source code can be obtained from their [GitHub organization](https://github.com/ivpn).
+
+??? success "Accepts Cash and Monero"
+
+ In addition to accepting credit/debit cards and PayPal, IVPN accepts Bitcoin, **Monero** and **cash/local currency** (on annual plans) as anonymous forms of payment.
+
+??? success "WireGuard Support"
+
+ IVPN supports the WireGuard® protocol. [WireGuard](https://www.wireguard.com) is a newer protocol that uses state-of-the-art [cryptography](https://www.wireguard.com/protocol/). Additionally, WireGuard aims to be simpler and more performant.
+
+ IVPN [recommends](https://www.ivpn.net/wireguard/) the use of WireGuard with their service and, as such, the protocol is the default on all of IVPN's apps. IVPN also offers a WireGuard configuration generator for use with the official WireGuard [apps](https://www.wireguard.com/install/).
+
+??? success "Remote Port Forwarding"
+
+ Remote [port forwarding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_forwarding) is possible with a Pro plan. Port forwarding [can be activated](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/81/How-do-I-activate-port-forwarding.html) via the client area. Port forwarding is only available on IVPN when using WireGuard or OpenVPN protocols and is [disabled on US servers](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/116/Port-forwarding-is-not-working-why.html).
+
+??? success "Mobile Clients"
+
+ In addition to providing standard OpenVPN configuration files, IVPN has mobile clients for [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/ivpn-serious-privacy-protection/id1193122683), [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.ivpn.client), and [GitHub](https://github.com/ivpn/android-app/releases) allowing for easy connections to their servers.
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ IVPN clients support two factor authentication (Mullvad's clients do not). IVPN also provides "[AntiTracker](https://www.ivpn.net/antitracker)" functionality, which blocks advertising networks and trackers from the network level.
+
+### Mullvad
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mullvad** is a fast and inexpensive VPN with a serious focus on transparency and security. They have been in operation since **2009**. Mullvad is based in Sweden and does not have a free trial.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mullvad.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://o54hon2e2vj6c7m3aqqu6uyece65by3vgoxxhlqlsvkmacw6a7m7kiad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/privacy-policy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mullvad){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.mullvad.mullvadvpn)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/mullvad-vpn/id1488466513)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://mullvad.net/en/download/windows/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://mullvad.net/en/download/macos/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://mullvad.net/en/download/linux/)
+
+??? success annotate "41 Countries"
+
+ Mullvad has [servers in 41 countries](https://mullvad.net/servers/) (1). Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
+
+ We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if they use [dedicated servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), instead of cheaper shared solutions (with other customers) such as [virtual private servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
+
+1. Last checked: 2023-01-19
+
+??? success "Independently Audited"
+
+ Mullvad's VPN clients have been audited by Cure53 and Assured AB in a pentest report [published at cure53.de](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_v2.pdf). The security researchers concluded:
+
+ > Cure53 and Assured AB are happy with the results of the audit and the software leaves an overall positive impression. With security dedication of the in-house team at the Mullvad VPN compound, the testers have no doubts about the project being on the right track from a security standpoint.
+
+ In 2020 a second audit [was announced](https://mullvad.net/blog/2020/6/25/results-available-audit-mullvad-app/) and the [final audit report](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_2020_v2.pdf) was made available on Cure53's website:
+
+ > The results of this May-June 2020 project targeting the Mullvad complex are quite positive. [...] The overall application ecosystem used by Mullvad leaves a sound and structured impression. The overall structure of the application makes it easy to roll out patches and fixes in a structured manner. More than anything, the findings spotted by Cure53 showcase the importance of constantly auditing and re-assessing the current leak vectors, in order to always ensure privacy of the end-users. With that being said, Mullvad does a great job protecting the end-user from common PII leaks and privacy related risks.
+
+ In 2021 an infrastructure audit [was announced](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2021/1/20/no-pii-or-privacy-leaks-found-cure53s-infrastructure-audit/) and the [final audit report](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_2021_v1.pdf) was made available on Cure53's website. Another report was commissioned [in June 2022](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2022/6/22/vpn-server-audit-found-no-information-leakage-or-logging-of-customer-data/) and is available on [Assured's website](https://www.assured.se/publications/Assured_Mullvad_relay_server_audit_report_2022.pdf).
+
+??? success "Open-Source Clients"
+
+ Mullvad provides the source code for their desktop and mobile clients in their [GitHub organization](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app).
+
+??? success "Accepts Cash and Monero"
+
+ Mullvad, in addition to accepting credit/debit cards and PayPal, accepts Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, **Monero** and **cash/local currency** as anonymous forms of payment. They also accept Swish and bank wire transfers.
+
+??? success "WireGuard Support"
+
+ Mullvad supports the WireGuard® protocol. [WireGuard](https://www.wireguard.com) is a newer protocol that uses state-of-the-art [cryptography](https://www.wireguard.com/protocol/). Additionally, WireGuard aims to be simpler and more performant.
+
+ Mullvad [recommends](https://mullvad.net/en/help/why-wireguard/) the use of WireGuard with their service. It is the default or only protocol on Mullvad's Android, iOS, macOS, and Linux apps, but on Windows you have to [manually enable](https://mullvad.net/en/help/how-turn-wireguard-mullvad-app/) WireGuard. Mullvad also offers a WireGuard configuration generator for use with the official WireGuard [apps](https://www.wireguard.com/install/).
+
+??? success "IPv6 Support"
+
+ Mullvad supports the future of networking [IPv6](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv6). Their network allows you to [access services hosted on IPv6](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2014/9/15/ipv6-support/) as opposed to other providers who block IPv6 connections.
+
+??? success "Remote Port Forwarding"
+
+ Remote [port forwarding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_forwarding) is allowed for people who make one-time payments, but not allowed for accounts with a recurring/subscription-based payment method. This is to prevent Mullvad from being able to identify you based on your port usage and stored subscription information. See [Port forwarding with Mullvad VPN](https://mullvad.net/help/port-forwarding-and-mullvad/) for more information.
+
+??? success "Mobile Clients"
+
+ Mullvad has published [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/mullvad-vpn/id1488466513) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.mullvad.mullvadvpn) clients, both supporting an easy-to-use interface as opposed to requiring you to manually configure your WireGuard connection. The Android client is also available on [GitHub](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/releases).
+
+??? info "Additional Functionality"
+
+ Mullvad is very transparent about which nodes they [own or rent](https://mullvad.net/en/servers/). They use [ShadowSocks](https://shadowsocks.org/) in their ShadowSocks + OpenVPN configuration, making them more resistant against firewalls with [Deep Packet Inspection](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection) trying to block VPNs. Supposedly, [China has to use a different method to block ShadowSocks servers](https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/22). Mullvad's website is also accessible via Tor at [o54hon2e2vj6c7m3aqqu6uyece65by3vgoxxhlqlsvkmacw6a7m7kiad.onion](http://o54hon2e2vj6c7m3aqqu6uyece65by3vgoxxhlqlsvkmacw6a7m7kiad.onion).
+
+## Criteria
+
+!!! danger
+
+ It is important to note that using a VPN provider will not make you anonymous, but it will give you better privacy in certain situations. A VPN is not a tool for illegal activities. Don't rely on a "no log" policy.
+
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the providers we recommend. This allows us to provide completely objective recommendations.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements for any VPN provider wishing to be recommended, including strong encryption, independent security audits, modern technology, and more. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing a VPN provider, and conduct your own research to ensure the VPN provider you choose is as trustworthy as possible.
+
+### Technology
+
+We require all our recommended VPN providers to provide OpenVPN configuration files to be used in any client. **If** a VPN provides their own custom client, we require a killswitch to block network data leaks when disconnected.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Support for strong protocols such as WireGuard & OpenVPN.
+- Killswitch built in to clients.
+- Multihop support. Multihopping is important to keep data private in case of a single node compromise.
+- If VPN clients are provided, they should be [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_source), like the VPN software they generally have built into them. We believe that [source code](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Source_code) availability provides greater transparency about what your device is actually doing.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- WireGuard and OpenVPN support.
+- Killswitch with highly configurable options (enable/disable on certain networks, on boot, etc.)
+- Easy-to-use VPN clients
+- Supports [IPv6](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv6). We expect that servers will allow incoming connections via IPv6 and allow you to access services hosted on IPv6 addresses.
+- Capability of [remote port forwarding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_forwarding#Remote_port_forwarding) assists in creating connections when using P2P ([Peer-to-Peer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer-to-peer)) file sharing software or hosting a server (e.g., Mumble).
+
+### Privacy
+
+We prefer our recommended providers to collect as little data as possible. Not collecting personal information on registration, and accepting anonymous forms of payment are required.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Monero or cash payment option.
+- No personal information required to register: Only username, password, and email at most.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Accepts Monero, cash, and other forms of anonymous payment options (gift cards, etc.)
+- No personal information accepted (autogenerated username, no email required, etc.)
+
+### Security
+
+A VPN is pointless if it can't even provide adequate security. We require all our recommended providers to abide by current security standards for their OpenVPN connections. Ideally, they would use more future-proof encryption schemes by default. We also require an independent third-party to audit the provider's security, ideally in a very comprehensive manner and on a repeated (yearly) basis.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Strong Encryption Schemes: OpenVPN with SHA-256 authentication; RSA-2048 or better handshake; AES-256-GCM or AES-256-CBC data encryption.
+- Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).
+- Published security audits from a reputable third-party firm.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Strongest Encryption: RSA-4096.
+- Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).
+- Comprehensive published security audits from a reputable third-party firm.
+- Bug-bounty programs and/or a coordinated vulnerability-disclosure process.
+
+### Trust
+
+You wouldn't trust your finances to someone with a fake identity, so why trust them with your internet data? We require our recommended providers to be public about their ownership or leadership. We also would like to see frequent transparency reports, especially in regard to how government requests are handled.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership or ownership.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+- Public-facing leadership.
+- Frequent transparency reports.
+
+### Marketing
+
+With the VPN providers we recommend we like to see responsible marketing.
+
+**Minimum to Qualify:**
+
+- Must self-host analytics (i.e., no Google Analytics). The provider's site must also comply with [DNT (Do Not Track)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Do_Not_Track) for people who want to opt-out.
+
+Must not have any marketing which is irresponsible:
+
+- Making guarantees of protecting anonymity 100%. When someone makes a claim that something is 100% it means there is no certainty for failure. We know people can quite easily deanonymize themselves in a number of ways, e.g.:
+ - Reusing personal information (e.g., email accounts, unique pseudonyms, etc) that they accessed without anonymity software (Tor, VPN, etc.)
+ - [Browser fingerprinting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint)
+- Claim that a single circuit VPN is "more anonymous" than Tor, which is a circuit of three or more hops that regularly changes.
+- Use responsible language: i.e., it is okay to say that a VPN is "disconnected" or "not connected", however claiming that someone is "exposed", "vulnerable" or "compromised" is needless use of alarming language that may be incorrect. For example, that person might simply be on another VPN provider's service or using Tor.
+
+**Best Case:**
+
+Responsible marketing that is both educational and useful to the consumer could include:
+
+- An accurate comparison to when [Tor](tor.md) should be used instead.
+- Availability of the VPN provider's website over a [.onion service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.onion)
+
+### Additional Functionality
+
+While not strictly requirements, there are some factors we looked into when determining which providers to recommend. These include adblocking/tracker-blocking functionality, warrant canaries, multihop connections, excellent customer support, the number of allowed simultaneous connections, etc.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fa.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/404.md b/i18n/fr/404.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0907d1e3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/404.md
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+---
+hide:
+ - feedback
+---
+
+# 404 - Page introuvable
+
+Nous n'avons pas pu trouver la page que vous recherchiez ! Peut-être recherchiez-vous l'une d'entre elles ?
+
+- [Introduction à la modélisation des menaces](basics/threat-modeling.md)
+- [Fournisseurs DNS recommandés](dns.md)
+- [Les meilleurs navigateurs web pour ordinateurs de bureau](desktop-browsers.md)
+- [Les meilleurs fournisseurs de VPN](vpn.md)
+- [Le forum de Privacy Guides](https://discuss.privacyguides.net)
+- [Notre blog](https://blog.privacyguides.org)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md b/i18n/fr/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..88a0e9100
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# Community Code of Conduct
+
+**We pledge** to make our community a harassment-free experience for everyone.
+
+**We strive** to create a positive environment, using welcoming and inclusive language, and being respectful of the viewpoints of others.
+
+**We do not allow** inappropriate or otherwise unacceptable behavior, such as sexualized language, trolling and insulting comments, or otherwise promoting intolerance or harassment.
+
+## Community Standards
+
+What we expect from members of our communities:
+
+1. **Don't spread misinformation**
+
+ We are creating an evidence-based educational community around information privacy and security, not a home for conspiracy theories. For example, when making a claim that a certain piece of software is malicious or that certain telemetry data is privacy invasive, explain in detail what is collected and how it collected. Claims of this nature must be backed by technical evidence.
+
+1. **Don't abuse our willingness to help**
+
+ Our community members are not your free tech support. We are happy to help you with specific steps on your privacy journey if you are willing to put in effort on your end. We are not willing to answer endlessly repeated questions about generic computer problems you could have answered yourself with a 30-second internet search. Don't be a [help vampire](https://slash7.com/2006/12/22/vampires/).
+
+1. **Behave in a positive and constructive manner**
+
+ Examples of behavior that contributes to a positive environment for our community include:
+
+ - Demonstrating empathy and kindness toward other people
+ - Being respectful of differing opinions, viewpoints, and experiences
+ - Giving and gracefully accepting constructive feedback
+ - Accepting responsibility and apologizing to those affected by our mistakes, and learning from the experience
+ - Focusing on what is best not just for us as individuals, but for the overall community
+
+### Unacceptable Behavior
+
+The following behaviors are considered harassment and are unacceptable within our community:
+
+- The use of sexualized language or imagery, and sexual attention or advances of any kind
+- Trolling, insulting or derogatory comments, and personal or political attacks
+- Public or private harassment
+- Publishing others' private information, such as a physical or email address, without their explicit permission
+- Other conduct which could reasonably be considered inappropriate in a professional setting
+
+## Scope
+
+Our Code of Conduct applies within all project spaces, as well as when an individual is representing the Privacy Guides project in other communities.
+
+We are responsible for clarifying the standards of our community, and have the right to remove or alter the comments of those participating within our community, as necessary and at our discretion.
+
+### Contact
+
+If you observe a problem on a platform like Matrix or Reddit, please contact our moderators on that platform in chat, via DM, or through any designated "Modmail" system.
+
+If you have a problem elsewhere, or a problem our community moderators are unable to resolve, reach out to `jonah@privacyguides.org` and/or `dngray@privacyguides.org`.
+
+All community leaders are obligated to respect the privacy and security of the reporter of any incident.
diff --git a/i18n/fr/about/criteria.md b/i18n/fr/about/criteria.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..78c645dcd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/about/criteria.md
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+---
+title: Critères généraux
+---
+
+!!! example "Travail inachevé"
+
+ La page suivante est inachevée et ne reflète pas l'ensemble des critères de nos recommandations à l'heure actuelle. Discussion antérieure sur ce sujet : [#24](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/discussions/24)
+
+Vous trouverez ci-dessous certains éléments qui doivent s'appliquer à toutes les soumissions à Privacy Guides. Chaque catégorie aura des exigences supplémentaires pour être incluse.
+
+## Divulgation financière
+
+Nous ne gagnons pas d'argent en recommandant certains produits, nous n'utilisons pas de liens affiliés et nous n'accordons pas de considération particulière aux donateurs du projet.
+
+## Directives générales
+
+Nous appliquons ces priorités lorsque nous envisageons de nouvelles recommandations :
+
+- **Sécurisé** : les outils doivent respecter les bonnes pratiques en matière de sécurité, le cas échéant.
+- **Disponibilité des sources** : les projets à source ouverte sont généralement préférés aux solutions propriétaires équivalentes.
+- **Multiplateforme** : nous préférons généralement que les recommandations soient multiplateformes, afin d'éviter d'être coincé chez un fournisseur.
+- **Développement actif** : les outils que nous recommandons doivent être activement maintenus. Les projets non maintenus seront, dans la plupart des cas, supprimés.
+- **Facilité d'utilisation** : les outils doivent être accessibles à la plupart des utilisateurs d'ordinateurs, sans qu'un bagage trop technique soit nécessaire.
+- **Documenté** : ses outils doivent disposer d'une documentation claire et complète pour leur utilisation.
+
+## Soumissions par les développeurs
+
+Nous avons ces exigences à l'égard des développeurs qui souhaitent soumettre leur projet ou logiciel pour examen.
+
+- Vous devez indiquer votre affiliation, c'est-à-dire votre position au sein du projet soumis.
+
+- Vous devez avoir un livre blanc sur la sécurité s'il s'agit d'un projet qui implique la manipulation d'informations sensibles comme une messagerie, un gestionnaire de mots de passe, un stockage cloud chiffré, etc.
+ - Statut d'audit par une tierce partie. Nous voulons savoir si vous en avez un, ou si vous en prévoyez un. Si possible, veuillez mentionner qui mènera l'audit.
+
+- Vous devez expliquer ce que le projet apporte en matière de respect de la vie privée.
+ - Cela résout-il un nouveau problème ?
+ - Pourquoi devrait-on l'utiliser plutôt que d'autres solutions ?
+
+- Vous devez indiquer quel est le modèle de menace exact avec votre projet.
+ - Il doit être clair pour les utilisateurs potentiels ce que le projet peut fournir et ce qu'il ne peut pas fournir.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/about/donate.md b/i18n/fr/about/donate.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6fc4c7a81
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/about/donate.md
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+---
+title: Nous soutenir
+---
+
+
+De nombreuses [personnes](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors) ainsi qu'un [travail](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/pulse/monthly) conséquent sont nécessaires afin de maintenir Privacy Guides à jour et de transmettre nos connaissances concernant la vie privée et la surveillance de masse. Si vous aimez ce que nous faisons, envisagez de vous impliquer en [éditant le site](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org) ou en [contribuant aux traductions](https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides).
+
+Si vous souhaitez nous soutenir financièrement, la méthode la plus simple est de contribuer via le site web Open Collective, qui est géré par notre hébergeur fiscal. Open Collective accepte les paiements par carte de crédit/débit, PayPal et virements bancaires.
+
+[Faire un don sur OpenCollective.com](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/donate ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+Les dons qui nous sont faits via Open Collective sont généralement déductibles des impôts aux États-Unis, car notre hôte fiscal (la Fondation Open Collective) est une organisation enregistrée 501(c)3. Vous recevrez un reçu de la Fondation Open Collective après avoir fait votre don. Privacy Guides ne fournit pas de conseils financiers, et vous devez contacter votre conseiller fiscal pour savoir si cela s'applique à vous.
+
+Vous pouvez également nous soutenir via les sponsors GitHub.
+
+[Soutenez-nous sur GitHub](https://github.com/sponsors/privacyguides ""){.md-button}
+
+## Donateurs
+
+Un grand merci à tous ceux qui soutiennent notre mission ! :heart:
+
+*Remarque : Cette section charge un widget directement depuis Open Collective. Cette section ne reflète pas les dons effectués en dehors de l'Open Collective, et nous n'avons aucun contrôle sur l'ordre des donateurs présentés dans cette section.*
+
+
+
+## A Quoi Servent Vos Dons ?
+
+Privacy Guides est une **organisation à but non lucratif** . Nous utilisons les dons à des fins diverses, notamment :
+
+**Noms de Domaine**
+:
+
+Nous avons quelques noms de domaine comme `privacyguides.org` qui nous coûtent environ 10 $ par an pour maintenir leur enregistrement.
+
+**Hébergement Web**
+:
+
+Plusieurs centaines de gigaoctets de trafic sont générés sur ce site chaque mois. Nous faisons appel à différents fournisseurs de services pour gérer ce trafic.
+
+**Services En Ligne**
+:
+
+Nous hébergeons [des services internet](https://privacyguides.net) pour tester et présenter différents produits qui respectent votre vie privée, que nous apprécions et que nous [recommandons](../tools.md). Certains sont mis à la disposition du public pour l'usage de notre communauté (SearXNG, Tor, etc.), et d'autres sont fournis aux membres de notre équipe (courriel, etc.).
+
+**Achats de Produits**
+:
+
+Nous achetons occasionnellement des produits et des services dans le but de tester nos [outils recommandés](../tools.md).
+
+Nous travaillons toujours avec notre hôte fiscal (la Fondation Open Collective) pour recevoir des dons en crypto-monnaies. Pour l'instant, la comptabilité est irréalisable pour de nombreuses petites transactions, mais cela devrait changer à l'avenir. En attendant, si vous souhaitez faire un don important en crypto-monnaies (> 100 $), veuillez contacter [jonah@privacyguides.org](mailto:jonah@privacyguides.org).
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/about/index.md b/i18n/fr/about/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f9ef34697
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/about/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: "À propos de Privacy Guides"
+---
+
+**Privacy Guides** est un site web à vocation sociale qui fournit des informations pour protéger la sécurité de vos données et votre vie privée. Nous sommes un collectif à but non lucratif entièrement géré par des [membres bénévoles de l'équipe](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/g/team) et des contributeurs.
+
+[:material-hand-coin-outline: Soutenir le projet](donate.md ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+## Notre équipe
+
+??? person "@jonah"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/jonah)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/jonaharagon "@jonaharagon")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@jonah "@jonah@neat.computer"){rel=me}
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Page d'accueil](https://www.jonaharagon.com)
+
+??? person "@niek-de-wilde"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/Niek-de-Wilde)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/blacklight447 "@blacklight447")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.social/@blacklight447 "@blacklight447@mastodon.social"){rel=me}
+
+??? person "@dngray"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/dngray)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/dngray "@dngray")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.social/@dngray "@dngray@mastodon.social"){rel=me}
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-envelope: Email](mailto:dngray@privacyguides.org)
+
+??? person "@freddy"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/freddy)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/freddy-m "@freddy-m")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://social.lol/@freddy "@freddy@social.lol"){rel=me}
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-envelope: Email](mailto:freddy@privacyguides.org)
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Page d'accueil](https://freddy.omg.lol)
+
+??? person "@mfwmyfacewhen"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/mfwmyfacewhen)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/mfwmyfacewhen "@mfwmyfacewhen")
+ - [:fontawesome-solid-house: Page d'accueil](https://mfw.omg.lol)
+
+??? person "@olivia"
+
+ - [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/olivia)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/hook9 "@hook9")
+ - [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@oliviablob "@oliviablob@neat.computer"){rel=me}
+
+De plus, [de nombreuses personnes](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors) ont apporté des contributions au projet. Vous pouvez aussi, nous sommes open source sur GitHub !
+
+Les membres de notre équipe examinent toutes les modifications apportées au site et s'occupent des tâches administratives telles que l'hébergement et les finances, mais ils ne profitent pas personnellement des contributions apportées à ce site. Nos finances sont hébergées de manière transparente par la Fondation Open Collective 501(c)(3) sur [opencollective.com/privacyguides](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides). Les dons à Privacy Guides sont généralement déductibles des impôts aux États-Unis.
+
+## Licence de site
+
+*Ce qui suit est un résumé lisible par l'homme de la [licence](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE) (et ne se substitue pas à celle-ci) :*
+
+:fontawesome-brands-creative-commons: :fontawesome-brands-creative-commons-by: :fontawesome-brands-creative-commons-nd: Sauf indication contraire, le contenu original de ce site web est mis à disposition sous la [licence publique internationale Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE). Cela signifie que vous êtes libre de copier et de redistribuer le matériel sur n'importe quel support ou dans n'importe quel format, à n'importe quelle fin, même commerciale, pour autant que vous accordiez le crédit approprié à `Privacy Guides (www.privacyguides.org)` et que vous fournissiez un lien vers la licence. Vous **ne pouvez pas** utiliser la marque Privacy Guides dans votre propre projet sans l'approbation expresse de ce projet. Si vous remixez, transformez ou construisez sur le contenu de ce site web, vous n'êtes pas autorisé à distribuer le matériel modifié.
+
+Cette licence a été mise en place pour empêcher les gens de partager notre travail sans en donner le crédit approprié, et pour empêcher les gens de modifier notre travail d'une manière qui pourrait être utilisée pour induire les gens en erreur. Si vous trouvez les termes de cette licence trop restrictifs pour le projet sur lequel vous travaillez, veuillez nous contacter à l'adresse `jonah@privacyguides.org`. Nous serons heureux de fournir des options de licence alternatives pour les projets bien intentionnés dans le domaine de la vie privée !
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/about/notices.md b/i18n/fr/about/notices.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0f33d67cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/about/notices.md
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+---
+title: "Avis de non-responsabilité"
+hide:
+ - toc
+---
+
+## Avertissement légal
+
+Privacy Guides n'est pas un cabinet d'avocats. À ce titre, le site web Privacy Guides et les contributeurs ne fournissent pas de conseils juridiques. Le contenu et les recommandations de notre site web et de nos guides ne constituent pas des conseils juridiques. Et le fait de contribuer au site web ou de communiquer avec Privacy Guides ou d'autres contributeurs au sujet de notre site web ne crée pas une relation avocat-client.
+
+La gestion de ce site web, comme toute entreprise humaine, comporte des incertitudes et des compromis. Nous espérons que ce site web vous aidera, mais il peut comporter des erreurs et ne peut pas répondre à toutes les situations. Si vous avez des questions sur votre situation, nous vous encourageons à faire vos propres recherches, à consulter d'autres experts et à participer à des discussions avec la communauté Privacy Guides. Si vous avez des questions d'ordre juridique, vous devez consulter votre propre conseiller juridique avant de poursuivre.
+
+Privacy Guides est un projet open-source dont la contribution est soumise à des licences comprenant des conditions qui, pour la protection du site web et de ses contributeurs, précisent que le projet et le site Privacy Guides sont proposés "en l'état", sans garantie, et déclinent toute responsabilité pour les dommages résultant de l'utilisation du site web ou des recommandations qu'il contient. Privacy Guides ne garantit en aucun cas et ne fait aucune déclaration concernant l'exactitude, les résultats probables ou la fiabilité de l'utilisation des éléments sur le site web ou autrement liés sur le site web ou sur tout autre site tiers lié à ce site.
+
+En outre, Privacy Guides ne garantit pas que ce site web sera constamment disponible, ou disponible tout court.
+
+## Licences
+
+Sauf indication contraire, tout le contenu de ce site web est mis à disposition gratuitement selon les termes de la [Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/LICENSE).
+
+Cela n'inclut pas le code tiers intégré dans ce dépôt, ou le code pour lequel une licence de remplacement est indiquée. Les exemples suivants sont notables, mais cette liste n'est pas exhaustive :
+
+* [MathJax](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/docs/javascripts/mathjax.js) est sous licence [Apache License 2.0](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/blob/main/docs/javascripts/LICENSE.mathjax.txt).
+
+Certaines parties de cet avis ont été reprises du projet [opensource.guide](https://github.com/github/opensource.guide/blob/master/notices.md) sur GitHub. Cette ressource et cette page elle-même sont publiées sous [CC-BY-4.0](https://github.com/github/opensource.guide/blob/master/LICENSE).
+
+Cela signifie que vous pouvez utiliser le contenu lisible par l'homme de ce dépôt pour votre propre projet, conformément aux conditions décrites dans le texte universel CC0 1.0. Vous **ne pouvez pas** utiliser la marque Privacy Guides dans votre propre projet sans l'approbation expresse de ce projet. Les marques de commerce de Privacy Guides comprennent le mot-clé et le logo "Privacy Guides". Les marques déposées de Privacy Guides comprennent l'appellation « Privacy Guides » ainsi que le logo Shield.
+
+Nous estimons que les logos et autres images des `actifs` obtenus auprès de fournisseurs tiers sont soit du domaine public, soit **d'un usage raisonnable**. En résumé, la [doctrine d'usage raisonnable](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fair_use) permet l'utilisation d'images protégées par le droit d'auteur afin d'identifier le sujet à des fins de commentaire public. Toutefois, ces logos et autres images peuvent encore être soumis aux lois sur les marques commerciales dans une ou plusieurs juridictions. Avant d'utiliser ce contenu, veuillez vous assurer qu'il permet d'identifier l'entité ou l'organisation propriétaire de la marque et que vous avez le droit de l'utiliser en vertu des lois applicables dans les circonstances de votre utilisation prévue. *Lorsque vous copiez le contenu de ce site web, vous êtes seul responsable de vous assurer que vous ne violez pas la marque ou le droit d'auteur de quelqu'un d'autre.*
+
+Lorsque vous contribuez à ce dépôt, vous le faites sous les licences mentionnées ci-dessus.
+
+## Utilisation acceptable
+
+Il est interdit d'utiliser ce site web d'une manière qui cause ou pourrait causer des dommages au site web ou compromettre la disponibilité ou l'accessibilité des guides de confidentialité, ou d'une manière qui serait illégale, frauduleuse ou nuisible, ou en relation avec un objectif ou une activité illégale, frauduleuse ou nuisible.
+
+Vous ne devez pas mener d'activités de collecte de données systématiques ou automatisées sur ou en relation avec ce site web sans le consentement écrit exprès d'Aragon Ventures LLC, y compris :
+
+* Analyses automatisées excessives
+* Attaques par déni de service
+* [Web scrapping](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_scraping)
+* Extraction de données
+* 'Framing' (IFrames)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/about/privacy-policy.md b/i18n/fr/about/privacy-policy.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..38de9feb8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/about/privacy-policy.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: "Politique de confidentialité"
+---
+
+Privacy Guides est un projet communautaire géré par un certain nombre de bénévoles actifs. La liste actuelle des membres de notre équipe se trouve [ici sur GitHub](https://github.com/orgs/privacyguides/people).
+
+## Collecte et utilisation des données
+
+Le respect de la vie privée étant importante pour nous, nous ne traquons pas les personnes individuellement. En tant que visisteur sur notre site web :
+
+- Aucune information personnelle n'est collectée
+- Aucune information telle que les cookies n'est stockée dans le navigateur
+- Aucune information n'est partagée, envoyée ou vendue à des tiers
+- Aucune information n'est partagée avec des sociétés de publicité
+- Aucune information n'est exploitée et récoltée pour établir des tendances personnelles et comportementales
+- Aucune information n'est monétisée
+
+Vous pouvez consulter les données que nous collectons sur notre page [statistiques](statistics.md).
+
+Nous avons mis en place une installation auto-hébergée de [Plausible Analytics](https://plausible.io) pour collecter certaines données d'utilisation anonymes à des fins statistiques. L'objectif est de suivre les tendances générales du trafic de notre site web, et non de suivre les visiteurs individuellement. Toutes les données sont regroupées uniquement. Aucune information personnelle n'est collectée.
+
+Les données collectées comprennent les sources de référence, les pages les plus consultées, la durée de la visite, les informations sur les appareils (type d'appareil, système d'exploitation, pays et navigateur) utilisés pendant la visite, etc. Vous pouvez en savoir plus sur la manière dont Plausible fonctionne et collecte les informations dans le respect de la vie privée [ici](https://plausible.io/data-policy).
+
+## Données que nous recueillons auprès des détenteurs d'un compte
+
+Sur certains sites web et services que nous fournissons, de nombreuses fonctionnalités peuvent nécessiter un compte. Par exemple, un compte peut être nécessaire pour publier et répondre à des sujets sur une plateforme de forum.
+
+Pour s'inscrire à la plupart des comptes, nous recueillons un nom, un nom d'utilisateur, une adresse électronique et un mot de passe. Si un site web requiert plus d'informations que ces seules données, cela sera clairement indiqué et noté dans une politique de confidentialité distincte pour chaque site.
+
+Nous utilisons les données de votre compte pour vous identifier sur le site web et pour créer des pages qui vous sont spécifiques, telles que votre page de profil. Nous utiliserons également les données de votre compte pour publier un profil public vous concernant sur nos services.
+
+Nous utilisons votre e-mail pour :
+
+- Vous informer de la publication de messages et d'autres activités sur les sites web ou les services.
+- Réinitialisez votre mot de passe et contribuez à la sécurité de votre compte.
+- Vous contacter dans des circonstances particulières liées à votre compte.
+- Vous contacter au sujet de demandes légales, telles que les demandes de retrait DMCA.
+
+Sur certains sites web et services, vous pouvez fournir des informations supplémentaires pour votre compte, telles qu'une courte biographie, un avatar, votre localisation ou votre date d'anniversaire. Nous mettons ces informations à la disposition de tous ceux qui peuvent accéder au site web ou au service en question. Ces informations ne sont pas nécessaires pour utiliser l'un de nos services et peuvent être effacées à tout moment.
+
+Nous conserverons les données de votre compte tant que celui-ci restera ouvert. Après la fermeture d'un compte, nous pouvons conserver une partie ou la totalité des données de votre compte sous forme de sauvegardes ou d'archives pendant 90 jours au maximum.
+
+## Nous contacter
+
+L'équipe de Privacy Guides n'a généralement pas accès aux données personnelles en dehors d'un accès limité accordé via certains panneaux de modération. Pour toute question concernant vos données personnelles, vous pouvez nous contacter à cette adresse :
+
+```text
+Jonah Aragon
+Administrateur de services
+jonah@privacyguides.org
+```
+
+Pour toute autre demande, vous pouvez contacter n'importe quel autre membre de notre équipe.
+
+De manière plus générale, pour les plaintes en vertu du RGPD. Vous pouvez les déposer auprès de vos autorités locales de surveillance de la protection des données. En France, c'est la Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés qui s'occupent notamment de gérer ces plaintes. Ils fournissent un [modèle de lettre de plainte](https://www.cnil.fr/en/plaintes) à utiliser.
+
+## À propos de cette politique de confidentialité
+
+Nous publierons toute nouvelle version de cette déclaration [ici](privacy-policy.md). Il se peut que nous modifiions la manière dont nous annonçons les changements dans les futures versions de ce document. Nous pouvons également mettre à jour nos coordonnées à tout moment sans annoncer de changement. Veuillez vous référer à la [politique de confidentialité](privacy-policy.md) pour obtenir les dernières informations de contact à tout moment.
+
+Un [historique](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/commits/main/docs/about/privacy-policy.md) de révision complet de cette page peut être trouvé sur GitHub.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/about/privacytools.md b/i18n/fr/about/privacytools.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fda4fd598
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/about/privacytools.md
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+---
+title: "FAQ PrivacyTools"
+---
+
+# Pourquoi nous avons abandonné PrivacyTools
+
+En septembre 2021, tous les contributeurs actifs ont accepté à l'unanimité de quitter PrivacyTools pour travailler sur ce site : Privacy Guides. Cette décision a été prise parce que le fondateur et contrôleur du nom de domaine de PrivacyTools avait disparu pendant une longue période et n'a pas pu être contacté.
+
+Ayant construit un site et un ensemble de services réputés sur PrivacyTools.io, cela a suscité de graves inquiétudes pour l'avenir de PrivacyTools, car toute perturbation future pourrait anéantir l'ensemble de l'organisation sans méthode de récupération. Cette transition a été communiquée à la communauté PrivacyTools de nombreux mois à l'avance par le biais de divers canaux, notamment son blog, Twitter, Reddit et Mastodon, afin de garantir que l'ensemble du processus se déroule aussi bien que possible. Nous avons fait cela pour nous assurer que personne n'était tenu dans l'ignorance, ce qui a été notre modus operandi depuis la création de notre équipe, et pour nous assurer que Privacy Guides était reconnu comme la même organisation fiable que PrivacyTools était avant la transition.
+
+Une fois le déménagement terminé, le fondateur de PrivacyTools est revenu et a commencé à diffuser des informations erronées sur le projet Privacy Guides. Ils continuent à diffuser des informations erronées en plus d'exploiter un parc de liens payants sur le domaine PrivacyTools. Nous avons créé cette page pour dissiper tout malentendu.
+
+## Qu'est-ce que PrivacyTools ?
+
+PrivacyTools a été créé en 2015 par "BurungHantu", qui voulait faire une ressource d'information sur la vie privée - des outils utiles suite aux révélations de Snowden. Le site est devenu un projet open-source florissant avec [de nombreux contributeurs](https://github.com/privacytools/privacytools.io/graphs/contributors), dont certains se sont vus confier diverses responsabilités organisationnelles, telles que l'exploitation de services en ligne comme Matrix et Mastodon, la gestion et l'examen des modifications apportées au site sur GitHub, la recherche de sponsors pour le projet, la rédaction d'articles de blog et l'exploitation de plateformes de sensibilisation aux médias sociaux comme Twitter, etc.
+
+À partir de 2019, BurungHantu s'est éloigné de plus en plus du développement actif du site web et des communautés, et a commencé à retarder les paiements dont il était responsable liés aux serveurs que nous exploitions. Pour éviter que notre administrateur système ne paie les coûts du serveur de sa propre poche, nous avons changé les méthodes de don indiquées sur le site, passant des comptes PayPal et crypto personnels de BurungHantu à une nouvelle page OpenCollective sur [31 octobre 2019](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184557/https://blog.privacytools.io/privacytools-io-joins-the-open-collective-foundation/). Cela avait pour avantage de rendre nos finances totalement transparentes, une valeur à laquelle nous croyons fermement, et déductibles des impôts aux États-Unis, car elles étaient détenues par l'Open Collective Foundation 501(c)3. Ce changement a été accepté à l'unanimité par l'équipe et n'a pas été contesté.
+
+## Pourquoi nous sommes passés à autre chose
+
+En 2020, l'absence de BurungHantu s'est considérablement accentuée. À un moment, nous avons demandé que les serveurs de noms du domaine soient remplacés par des serveurs de noms contrôlés par notre administrateur système afin d'éviter toute perturbation future, et ce changement n'a été effectué que plus d'un mois après la demande initiale. Il disparaissait du chat public et des salles de chat privées de l'équipe sur Matrix pendant des mois, faisant occasionnellement une apparition pour donner un petit feedback ou promettre d'être plus actif avant de disparaître à nouveau.
+
+En octobre 2020, l'administrateur système de PrivacyTools (Jonah) [a quitté](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190742/https://blog.privacytools.io/blacklight447-taking-over/) le projet en raison de ces difficultés, cédant le contrôle à un autre contributeur de longue date. Jonah a opéré presque tous les services de PrivacyTools et a agi comme le chef de projet *de facto* pour le développement du site web en l'absence de BurungHantu, donc son départ a été un changement significatif pour l'organisation. À l'époque, en raison de ces changements organisationnels importants, BurungHantu a promis à l'équipe restante qu'il reviendrait prendre le contrôle du projet à l'avenir. ==L'équipe PrivacyTools l'a contacté via plusieurs méthodes de communication au cours des mois suivants, mais n'a reçu aucune réponse.==
+
+## Dépendance des noms de domaine
+
+Au début de l'année 2021, l'équipe de PrivacyTools s'est inquiétée de l'avenir du projet, car le nom de domaine devait expirer le 1er mars 2021. Le domaine a finalement été renouvelé par BurungHantu sans commentaire.
+
+Les préoccupations de l'équipe n'ont pas été prises en compte, et nous avons réalisé que ce problème se poserait chaque année : si le domaine avait expiré, il aurait pu être volé par des squatteurs ou des spammeurs, ce qui aurait ruiné la réputation de l'organisation. Nous aurions également eu du mal à joindre la communauté pour l'informer de ce qui s'est passé.
+
+Sans contact avec BurungHantu, nous avons décidé que le meilleur plan d'action serait de passer à un nouveau nom de domaine pendant que nous avions encore le contrôle garanti de l'ancien nom de domaine, quelque temps avant mars 2022. De cette façon, nous serions en mesure de rediriger proprement toutes les ressources PrivacyTools vers le nouveau site sans interruption de service. Cette décision a été prise plusieurs mois à l'avance et communiquée à l'ensemble de l'équipe dans l'espoir que BurungHantu prenne contact et assure son soutien continu au projet, car avec un nom de marque reconnaissable et de grandes communautés en ligne, s'éloigner de "PrivacyTools" était le résultat le moins souhaitable possible.
+
+À la mi-2021, l'équipe de PrivacyTools a contacté Jonah, qui a accepté de rejoindre l'équipe pour aider à la transition.
+
+## Appel à l'action de la communauté
+
+Fin juillet 2021, nous avons informé [ la communauté](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184422/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-future-of-privacytools/) PrivacyTools de notre intention de choisir un nouveau nom et de poursuivre le projet sur un nouveau domaine, qui sera [choisi](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729190935/https://aragon.cloud/apps/forms/cMPxG9KyopapBbcw) le 2 août 2022. En fin de compte, "Privacy Guides" a été choisi, avec le domaine `privacyguides.org` déjà détenu par Jonah pour un projet secondaire de 2020 qui n'a pas été développé.
+
+## Contrôle de r/privacytoolsIO
+
+En même temps que les problèmes du site privacytools.io, l'équipe de modération de r/privacytoolsIO était confrontée à des difficultés pour gérer le subreddit. Le subreddit a toujours été géré de manière indépendante du développement du site Web, mais BurungHantu en était également le principal modérateur, et il était le seul modérateur à bénéficier des privilèges de "contrôle total". u/trai_dep était le seul modérateur actif à l'époque, et [a posté](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/comments/o9tllh/requesting_rprivacytoolsio_im_only_active_mod_top/) une demande aux administrateurs de Reddit le 28 juin 2021, demandant qu'on lui accorde le poste de modérateur principal et tous les privilèges de contrôle, afin d'apporter les changements nécessaires au Subreddit.
+
+Reddit exige que les subreddits aient des modérateurs actifs. Si le modérateur principal est inactif pendant une longue période (par exemple un an), le poste de modérateur principal peut être réattribué au modérateur suivant. Pour que cette demande ait été accordée, BurungHantu devait avoir été complètement absent de toute activité Reddit pendant une longue période, ce qui était cohérent avec ses comportements sur d'autres plateformes.
+
+> Si vous avez été retiré en tant que modérateur d'un sous-rédit via la demande Reddit, c'est parce que votre manque de réponse et votre manque d'activité ont qualifié le sous-rédit pour un transfert de r/redditrequest.
+>
+> r/redditrequest est le moyen utilisé par Reddit pour s'assurer que les communautés ont des modérateurs actifs et fait partie du [code de conduite des modérateurs](https://www.redditinc.com/policies/moderator-code-of-conduct).
+
+## Début de la transition
+
+Le 14 septembre 2021, nous [avons annoncé](https://www.privacyguides.org/blog/2021/09/14/welcome-to-privacy-guides/) le début de notre migration vers ce nouveau domaine :
+
+> [...] nous avons jugé nécessaire d'effectuer ce changement plus tôt que prévu afin que les gens soient informés de cette transition le plus tôt possible. Cela nous laisse suffisamment de temps pour effectuer la transition du nom de domaine, qui est actuellement redirigé vers www.privacyguides.org, et nous espérons que tout le monde aura le temps de remarquer le changement, de mettre à jour les signets et les sites web, etc.
+
+Ce changement [a entraîné :](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pnhn4a/rprivacyguides_privacyguidesorg_what_you_need_to/)
+
+- Redirection de www.privacytools.io vers [www.privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org).
+- Archiver le code source sur GitHub pour préserver notre travail passé et le suivi de tickets, que nous avons continué à utiliser pendant des mois de développement futur de ce site.
+- Publier des annonces dans notre sous-reddit et dans diverses autres communautés pour informer les gens du changement officiel.
+- Fermer formellement les services privacytools.io, comme Matrix et Mastodon, et encourager les utilisateurs existants à migrer dès que possible.
+
+Les choses semblaient se dérouler sans problème, et la plupart de notre communauté active a fait le passage à notre nouveau projet exactement comme nous l'espérions.
+
+## Événements suivants
+
+Environ une semaine après la transition, BurungHantu est revenu en ligne pour la première fois depuis près d'un an, mais personne dans notre équipe n'était prêt à revenir à PrivacyTools en raison de son manque de fiabilité historique. Au lieu de s'excuser de son absence prolongée, il est immédiatement passé à l'offensive et a présenté le passage à Privacy Guides comme une attaque contre lui et son projet. Il a ensuite [supprimé](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/pp9yie/comment/hd49wbn) nombre de ces messages lorsque la communauté lui a fait remarquer qu'il avait été absent et avait abandonné le projet.
+
+À ce stade, BurungHantu a déclaré qu'il voulait continuer à travailler sur privacytools.io par lui-même et a demandé que nous supprimions la redirection de www.privacytools.io vers [www.privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org). Nous avons accepté et lui avons demandé de garder les sous-domaines de Matrix, Mastodon et PeerTube actifs pour que nous les gérions comme un service public pour notre communauté pendant au moins quelques mois, afin de permettre aux utilisateurs de ces plateformes de migrer facilement vers d'autres comptes. En raison de la nature fédérée des services que nous fournissions, ils étaient liés à des noms de domaine spécifiques, ce qui rendait la migration très difficile (et dans certains cas impossible).
+
+Malheureusement, parce que le contrôle du sous-breddit r/privacytoolsIO n'a pas été retourné à BurungHantu à sa demande (plus d'informations ci-dessous), ces sous-domaines ont été [coupés](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pymthv/comment/hexwrps/) au début d'octobre, mettant fin à toute possibilité de migration vers les utilisateurs utilisant toujours ces services.
+
+Suite à cela, BurungHantu a lancé de fausses accusations selon lesquelles Jonah aurait volé les dons du projet. BurungHantu avait plus d'un an depuis l'incident présumé pour informer la communauté, et pourtant, il n'en a informé personne avant la migration vers Privacy Guides. L'équipe [et la communauté](https://twitter.com/TommyTran732/status/1526153536962281474)ont demandé à plusieurs reprises à BurungHantu de fournir des preuves et de s'expliquer sur la raison de son silence, mais il ne l'a pas fait.
+
+BurungHantu a également publié [un message sur Twitter](https://twitter.com/privacytoolsIO/status/1510560676967710728) prétendant qu'un "avocat" l'avait contacté sur Twitter et lui donnait des conseils, dans une autre tentative de nous intimider pour que nous lui donnions le contrôle de notre subreddit, et dans le cadre de sa campagne de diffamation visant à brouiller les pistes concernant le lancement de Privacy Guides tout en prétendant être une victime.
+
+## PrivacyTools.io maintenant
+
+Depuis le 25 septembre 2022, nous voyons les plans de BurungHantu se dessiner sur privacytools.io, et c'est la raison pour laquelle nous avons décidé de créer cette page explicative aujourd'hui. Le site qu'il exploite semble être une version fortement optimisée pour le référencement du site qui recommande des outils en échange d'une compensation financière. Très récemment, IVPN et Mullvad, deux fournisseurs de VPN presque universellement [recommandés](../vpn.md) par la communauté de la protection de la vie privée et remarquables pour leur position contre les programmes d'affiliation ont été retirés de PrivacyTools. A leur place ? NordVPN, Surfshark, ExpressVPN, et hide.me; Des géantes sociétés de VPN avec des plateformes et des pratiques commerciales peu fiables, connues pour leur marketing agressif et leurs programmes d'affiliation.
+
+==**PrivacyTools est devenu exactement le type de site contre lequel nous [avons mis en garde](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729205249/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-reviews/) sur le blog PrivacyTools en 2019.**== Nous avons essayé de garder notre distance avec PrivacyTools depuis la transition, mais leur harcèlement continu à l'égard de notre projet et maintenant leur abus absurde de la crédibilité que leur marque a gagné depuis plus de 6 ans de contributions open source est extrêmement troublant à nos yeux. Ceux d'entre nous qui luttent vraiment pour la protection de la vie privée ne se battent pas les uns contre les autres et ne reçoivent pas leurs conseils des plus offrant.
+
+## r/privacytoolsIO maintenant
+
+Après le lancement de [r/PrivacyGuides](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacyguides), il n'était pas pratique pour u/trai_dep de continuer à modérer les deux subreddits, et avec l'adhésion de la communauté à la transition, r/privacytoolsIO a été [transformé en](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/qk7qrj/a_new_era_why_rptio_is_now_a_restricted_sub/) en un subreddit restreint dans un post du 1er novembre 2021 :
+
+> [...] La croissance de ce sous-reddit a été le résultat de grands efforts, sur plusieurs années, par l'équipe PrivacyGuides.org. Et par chacun d'entre vous.
+>
+> Un sous-reddit représente beaucoup de travail à administrer et à modérer. Comme un jardin, il nécessite un entretien patient et des soins quotidiens. Ce n'est pas une tâche pour les dilettantes ou les personnes qui ont du mal à s'engager. Il ne peut pas prospérer sous la houlette d'un jardinier qui l'abandonne pendant plusieurs années, puis se présente en exigeant la récolte de cette année en guise de tribut. C'est injuste pour l'équipe formée il y a des années. C'est injuste pour vous. [...]
+
+Les sous-reddits n'appartiennent à personne, et ils n'appartiennent surtout pas aux détenteurs de marques. Ils appartiennent à leurs communautés, et la communauté et ses modérateurs ont pris la décision de soutenir le déplacement vers r/PrivacyGuides.
+
+Dans les mois qui ont suivi, BurungHantu a menacé et supplié de rendre le contrôle du subreddit à son compte, en violation des [règles](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/wiki/top_mod_removal/) de Reddit :
+
+> Les représailles d'un modérateur à l'égard des demandes de suppression sont interdites.
+
+Pour une communauté qui compte encore plusieurs milliers d'abonnés, nous estimons qu'il serait incroyablement irrespectueux de rendre le contrôle de cette énorme plateforme à la personne qui l'a abandonnée pendant plus d'un an et qui gère désormais un site web qui, selon nous, fournit des informations de très mauvaise qualité. Préserver les années de discussions passées dans cette communauté est plus important pour nous, et donc u/trai_dep et le reste de l'équipe de modération du subreddit a pris la décision de garder r/privacytoolsIO tel quel.
+
+## OpenCollective maintenant
+
+Notre plateforme de collecte de fonds, OpenCollective, est une autre source de discorde. Notre position est qu'OpenCollective a été mis en place par notre équipe et géré par notre équipe pour financer les services que nous exploitons actuellement et que PrivacyTools ne fait plus. Nous avons [contacté](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/updates/transitioning-to-privacy-guides) tous nos donateurs au sujet de notre passage à Privacy Guides, et nous avons reçu le soutien unanime de nos sponsors et de notre communauté.
+
+Ainsi, les fonds dans OpenCollective appartiennent à Privacy Guides, ils ont été donnés à notre projet, et non au propriétaire d'un nom de domaine bien connu. Dans l'annonce faite aux donateurs le 17 septembre 2021, nous avons proposé un remboursement à tout donateur qui ne serait pas d'accord avec la position que nous avons adoptée, mais personne n'a accepté cette offre :
+
+> Si des sponsors ou des bailleurs de fonds sont en désaccord ou se sentent induits en erreur par ces événements récents et souhaitent demander un remboursement compte tenu de ces circonstances très inhabituelles, veuillez contacter notre administrateur de projet en envoyant un e-mail à jonah@triplebit.net.
+
+## Pour en savoir plus
+
+Ce sujet a fait l'objet de nombreuses discussions au sein de nos communautés à divers endroits, et il est probable que la plupart des personnes qui lisent cette page connaissent déjà les événements qui ont conduit au passage aux guides de confidentialité. Certains de nos précédents billets sur le sujet peuvent contenir des détails supplémentaires que nous avons omis ici par souci de brièveté. Ils ont été mis en lien ci-dessous dans un souci d'exhaustivité.
+
+- [28 juin 2021 demande de contrôle de r/privacytoolsIO](https://www.reddit.com/r/redditrequest/comments/o9tllh/requesting_rprivacytoolsio_im_only_active_mod_top/)
+- [27 juillet 2021 : annonce de nos intentions de déménager sur le blog PrivacyTools, écrite par l'équipe](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184422/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-future-of-privacytools/)
+- [13 septembre 2021 : annonce du début de notre transition vers Privacy Guides sur r/privacytoolsIO](https://www.reddit.com/r/privacytoolsIO/comments/pnql46/rprivacyguides_privacyguidesorg_what_you_need_to/)
+- [Annonce du 17 septembre 2021 sur OpenCollective par Jonah](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides/updates/transitioning-to-privacy-guides)
+- [30 septembre 2021 Fil Twitter détaillant la plupart des événements décrits sur cette page](https://twitter.com/privacy_guides/status/1443633412800225280)
+- [1er octobre 2021, publication de u/dng99 constatant un échec du sous-domaine](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/comments/pymthv/comment/hexwrps/)
+- [2 avr 2022 réponse de u/dng99 à l'article de blog accusatoire de PrivacyTools](https://www.reddit.com/comments/tuo7mm/comment/i35kw5a/)
+- [16 mai 2022 réponse de @TommyTran732 sur Twitter](https://twitter.com/TommyTran732/status/1526153497984618496)
+- [Sep 3, 2022 post sur le forum de Techlore par @dngray](https://discuss.techlore.tech/t/has-anyone-seen-this-video-wondering-your-thoughts/792/20)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/about/services.md b/i18n/fr/about/services.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6f1fc168b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/about/services.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# Services de Privacy Guides
+
+Nous utilisons un certain nombre de services web pour tester des fonctionnalités et promouvoir des projets décentralisés, fédérés et/ou open-source. Bon nombre de ces services sont accessibles au public et sont détaillés ci-dessous.
+
+[:material-comment-alert: Signaler un problème](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/services/2 ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+## Discourse
+
+- Domaine : [discuss.privacyguides.net](https://discuss.privacyguides.net)
+- Disponibilité : public
+- Source : [github.com/discourse/discourse](https://github.com/discourse/discourse)
+
+## Gitea
+
+- Domaine : [code.privacyguides.dev](https://code.privacyguides.dev)
+- Disponibilité : sur invitation seulement
+ L'accès peut être accordé sur demande à toute équipe travaillant sur un développement ou du contenu lié à *Privacy Guides*.
+- Source : [snapcraft.io/gitea](https://snapcraft.io/gitea)
+
+## Matrix
+
+- Domaine : [matrix.privacyguides.org](https://matrix.privacyguides.org)
+- Disponibilité : sur invitation uniquement
+ L'accès peut être accordé sur demande aux membres de l'équipe de Privacy Guides, aux modérateurs de Matrix, aux administrateurs tiers de la communauté Matrix, aux opérateurs de robots Matrix et à d'autres personnes ayant besoin d'une présence fiable dans Matrix.
+- Source : [github.com/spantaleev/matrix-docker-ansible-deploy](https://github.com/spantaleev/matrix-docker-ansible-deploy)
+
+## SearXNG
+
+- Domaine : [search.privacyguides.net](https://search.privacyguides.net)
+- Disponibilité : public
+- Source : [github.com/searxng/searxng-docker](https://github.com/searxng/searxng-docker)
+
+## Invidious
+
+- Domaine : [invidious.privacyguides.net](https://invidious.privacyguides.net)
+- Disponibilité : semi-public
+ Nous hébergeons Invidious principalement pour servir les vidéos YouTube intégrées à notre site web. Cette instance n'est pas destinée à un usage général et peut être limitée à tout moment.
+- Source : [github.com/iv-org/invidious](https://github.com/iv-org/invidious)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/about/statistics.md b/i18n/fr/about/statistics.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ddedefe51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/about/statistics.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: Statistiques de trafic
+---
+
+## Statistiques du site web
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/advanced/communication-network-types.md b/i18n/fr/advanced/communication-network-types.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..01cd10ba8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/advanced/communication-network-types.md
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+---
+title: "Types de réseaux de communication"
+icon: 'material/transit-connection-variant'
+---
+
+Il existe plusieurs architectures réseau couramment utilisées pour relayer des messages entre des personnes. Ces réseaux peuvent offrir des garanties différentes en matière de protection de la vie privée. C'est pourquoi il est utile de tenir compte de votre [modèle de menace](../basics/threat-modeling.md) lorsque vous décidez quelle application à utiliser.
+
+[Messageries instantanées recommandées](../real-time-communication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Réseaux Centralisés
+
+{ align=left }
+
+Les messageries centralisées sont celles où tous les participants se trouvent sur le même serveur ou réseau de serveurs, contrôlés par la même organisation.
+
+Certaines messageries auto-hébergées vous permettent de configurer votre propre serveur. L'auto-hébergement peut offrir des garanties de confidentialité supplémentaires, tel que l'absence de journaux d'utilisation ou un accès limité aux métadonnées (les données sur qui parle à qui). Les messageries centralisées auto-hébergées sont isolées et tout le monde doit être sur le même serveur pour communiquer.
+
+**Avantages :**
+
+- Les nouvelles fonctionnalités et les changements peuvent être mis en place plus rapidement.
+- Il est plus facile de démarrer et de trouver des contacts.
+- L'écosystème de fonctionnalités est plus mature et plus stable, car plus facile à programmer dans un logiciel centralisé.
+- Les problèmes de confidentialité peuvent être réduits lorsque vous faites confiance à un serveur que vous hébergez vous-même.
+
+**Inconvénients :**
+
+- Peut inclure des [restrictions de contrôle ou d'accès](https://drewdevault.com/2018/08/08/Signal.html). Cela peut inclure des choses telles que :
+- Être [interdit de connecter des clients tiers](https://github.com/LibreSignal/LibreSignal/issues/37#issuecomment-217211165) au réseau centralisé, ce qui pourrait permettre une plus grande personnalisation ou une meilleure expérience. Ces modalités sont souvent définies dans les conditions d'utilisation.
+- Documentation insuffisante ou inexistante pour les développeurs tiers.
+- La [propriété](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729191953/https://blog.privacytools.io/delisting-wire/), la politique de confidentialité et les opérations du service peuvent changer facilement lorsqu'une seule entité le contrôle, ce qui peut compromettre le service par la suite.
+- L'auto-hébergement demande des efforts et des connaissances sur la manière de mettre en place un service.
+
+## Réseaux Fédérés
+
+{ align=left }
+
+Les messageries fédérées utilisent plusieurs serveurs indépendants et décentralisés capables de communiquer entre eux (le courrier électronique est un exemple de service fédéré). La fédération permet aux administrateurs système de contrôler leur propre serveur tout en faisant partie d'un réseau de communication plus vaste.
+
+Lorsqu'ils sont auto-hébergés, les membres d'un serveur fédéré peuvent découvrir et communiquer avec les membres d'autres serveurs, bien que certains serveurs puissent choisir de rester privés en étant non fédérés (par exemple, un serveur d'équipe de travail).
+
+**Avantages :**
+
+- Permet un meilleur contrôle de vos propres données lorsque vous utilisez votre propre serveur.
+- Vous permet de choisir à qui confier vos données en choisissant entre plusieurs serveurs "publics".
+- Permet souvent l'utilisation de clients tiers qui peuvent fournir une expérience plus naturelle, personnalisée ou accessible.
+- Il est possible de vérifier que le logiciel du serveur correspond au code source public, en supposant que vous avez accès au serveur ou que vous faites confiance à la personne qui y a accès (par exemple, un membre de la famille).
+
+**Inconvénients :**
+
+- L'ajout de nouvelles fonctionnalités est plus complexe, car ces dernières doivent être normalisées et testées pour s'assurer qu'elles fonctionnent avec tous les serveurs du réseau.
+- En raison du point précédent, les fonctionnalités peuvent manquer, être incomplètes ou fonctionner de manière inattendue par rapport aux plateformes centralisées, comme le relais des messages hors ligne ou la suppression des messages.
+- Certaines métadonnées peuvent être disponibles (par exemple, des informations comme "qui parle à qui", mais pas le contenu réel du message si le chiffrement de bout en bout est utilisé).
+- Les serveurs fédérés nécessitent généralement de faire confiance à l'administrateur de votre serveur. Il peut s'agir d'un amateur ou d'une personne qui n'est pas un "professionnel de la sécurité", et il se peut qu'il ne fournisse pas de documents aux normes comme une politique de confidentialité ou des conditions de service détaillant l'utilisation de vos données.
+- Les administrateurs de serveurs choisissent parfois de bloquer d'autres serveurs, qui sont une source d'abus non modérés ou qui enfreignent les règles générales de comportement accepté. Cela entravera votre capacité à communiquer avec les membres de ces serveurs.
+
+## Réseaux Pair-à-Pair
+
+{ align=left }
+
+Les messageries P2P se connectent à un [réseau distribué](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Réseau_distribué) de nœuds pour relayer un message au destinataire sans serveur tiers.
+
+Les clients (les pairs) se trouvent généralement les uns les autres grâce à l'utilisation d'un réseau de [calcul distribué](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calcul_distribué). Citons par exemple les [Tables de Hachages Distribuées](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Table_de_hachage_distribuée) (THD), utilisées par les [Torrents](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent) et [l'IPFS](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/InterPlanetary_File_System). Une autre approche est celle des réseaux basés sur la proximité, où une connexion est établie par Wi-Fi ou Bluetooth (par exemple Briar ou le protocole de réseau social [Scuttlebutt](https://www.scuttlebutt.nz)).
+
+Lorsqu'un pair a trouvé une route vers son contact par l'une de ces méthodes, une connexion directe est établie entre eux. Bien que les messages soient généralement cryptés, un observateur peut toujours déduire l'emplacement et l'identité de l'expéditeur et du destinataire.
+
+Les réseaux P2P n'utilisent pas de serveurs, car les pairs communiquent directement entre eux, et ne peuvent donc pas être auto-hébergés. Cependant, certains services supplémentaires peuvent dépendre de serveurs centralisés, comme la découverte d'autres utilisateurs ou le relais des messages hors ligne, qui peuvent bénéficier de l'auto-hébergement.
+
+**Avantages :**
+
+- Minimum d'informations exposées à des tiers.
+- Les plateformes P2P modernes implémentent l'E2EE par défaut. Il n'y a pas de serveurs qui pourraient potentiellement intercepter et déchiffrer vos transmissions, contrairement aux modèles centralisés et fédérés.
+
+**Inconvénients :**
+
+- Ensemble de fonctionnalités réduit :
+- Les messages ne peuvent être envoyés que lorsque les deux pairs sont en ligne. Toutefois, votre client peut stocker les messages localement pour attendre le retour en ligne du contact.
+- Augmente généralement l'utilisation de la batterie sur les appareils mobiles, car le client doit rester connecté au réseau distribué pour savoir qui est en ligne.
+- Certaines fonctionnalités courantes de messageries peuvent ne pas être mises en œuvre ou de manière incomplète, comme la suppression des messages.
+- Votre adresse IP et celle des contacts avec lesquels vous communiquez peuvent être exposées si vous n'utilisez pas le logiciel avec un VPN [](../vpn.md) ou [Tor](../tor.md). De nombreux pays disposent d'une forme de surveillance de masse et/ou de conservation des métadonnées.
+
+## Routage Anonyme
+
+{ align=left }
+
+Une messagerie utilisant le [routage anonyme](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_628) cache soit l'identité de l'expéditeur, celle du destinataire, ou la preuve qu'ils aient communiqué. Idéalement, une messagerie devrait cacher les trois.
+
+Il existe de [nombreuses](https://doi.org/10.1145/3182658) façons différentes de mettre en œuvre le routage anonyme. L'une des plus célèbres est le [routage en oignon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing) comme [Tor](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tor_(réseau)), qui communique des messages chiffrés par le biais d'un [réseau superposé](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Réseau_superposé) qui masque l'emplacement de chaque nœud ainsi que le destinataire et l'expéditeur de chaque message. L'expéditeur et le destinataire n'interagissent jamais directement et ne se rencontrent que par l'intermédiaire d'un nœud de rendez-vous secret, de sorte qu'il n'y ait aucune fuite d'adresses IP ni de localisation physique. Les nœuds ne peuvent pas déchiffrer les messages ni la destination finale, seul le destinataire le peut. Chaque nœud intermédiaire ne peut déchiffrer qu'une partie qui indique où envoyer ensuite le message encore chiffré, jusqu'à ce qu'il arrive au destinataire qui peut le déchiffrer entièrement, d'où les "couches d'oignon."
+
+L'auto-hébergement d'un nœud dans un réseau de routage anonyme ne procure pas à l'hébergeur des avantages supplémentaires en matière de confidentialité, mais contribue plutôt à la résilience de l'ensemble du réseau contre les attaques d'identification pour le bénéfice de tous.
+
+**Avantages :**
+
+- Minimum d'informations exposées à des tiers.
+- Les messages peuvent être relayés de manière décentralisée même si l'une des parties est hors ligne.
+
+**Inconvénients :**
+
+- Propagation des messages lente.
+- Souvent limité à un nombre restreint de types de médias, principalement du texte, car le réseau est lent.
+- Moins fiable si les nœuds sont sélectionnés par un routage aléatoire, certains nœuds peuvent être très éloignés de l'expéditeur et du récepteur, ce qui ajoute une latence ou même l'impossibilité de transmettre les messages si l'un des nœuds se déconnecte.
+- Plus complexe à mettre en œuvre car la création et la sauvegarde sécurisée d'une clé cryptographique privé sont nécessaires.
+- Comme pour les autres plateformes décentralisées, l'ajout de fonctionnalités est plus complexe pour les développeurs que sur une plateforme centralisée. Par conséquent, des fonctionnalités peuvent manquer ou être incomplètement mises en œuvre, comme le relais des messages hors ligne ou la suppression des messages.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/advanced/dns-overview.md b/i18n/fr/advanced/dns-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..53064da22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/advanced/dns-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+---
+title: "Présentation de DNS"
+icon: material/dns
+---
+
+Le [système de nom de domaine](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System) est "l'annuaire de l'internet". Le DNS traduit les noms de domaine en adresses IP afin que les navigateurs et autres services puissent charger les ressources de l'internet, grâce à un réseau décentralisé de serveurs.
+
+## Qu'est-ce que le DNS ?
+
+Lorsque vous visitez un site web, une adresse numérique est renvoyée. Par exemple, lorsque vous visitez `privacyguides.org`, l'adresse `192.98.54.105` est renvoyée.
+
+Le DNS existe depuis [les premiers jours](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System#Histoire) de l'Internet. Les demandes DNS faites à destination et en provenance des serveurs DNS sont généralement **non** chiffrées. Dans un environnement résidentiel, un client se voit attribuer des serveurs par le FAI via [DHCP](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dynamic_Host_Configuration_Protocol).
+
+Les demandes DNS non chiffrées peuvent être facilement **surveillées** et **modifiées** en transit. Dans certaines régions du monde, les fournisseurs d'accès à Internet reçoivent l'ordre de procéder à un [ filtrage DNS primitif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking). Lorsque vous demandez l'adresse IP d'un domaine bloqué, le serveur peut ne pas répondre ou répondre avec une adresse IP différente. Le protocole DNS n'étant pas crypté, le FAI (ou tout opérateur de réseau) peut utiliser [DPI](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection) pour surveiller les demandes. Les FAI peuvent également bloquer des requêtes sur la base de caractéristiques communes, quel que soit le serveur DNS utilisé. Un DNS non crypté utilise toujours le [port](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_(logiciel)) 53 et utilise toujours UDP.
+
+Ci-dessous, nous discutons et fournissons un tutoriel pour prouver ce qu'un observateur extérieur peut voir en utilisant le DNS normal non crypté et le [DNS crypté](#what-is-encrypted-dns).
+
+### DNS non chiffré
+
+1. En utilisant [`tshark`](https://www.wireshark.org/docs/man-pages/tshark.html) (qui fait partie du projet [Wireshark](https://fr. wikipedia. org/wiki/Wireshark)), nous pouvons surveiller et enregistrer le flux de paquets Internet. Cette commande enregistre les paquets qui répondent aux règles spécifiées :
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/dns.pcap udp port 53 and host 1.1.1.1 or host 8.8.8.8
+ ```
+
+2. Nous pouvons ensuite utiliser [`dig`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dig_(command)) (Linux, MacOS etc) ou [`nslookup`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nslookup) (Windows) pour envoyer la recherche DNS aux deux serveurs. Les logiciels tels que les navigateurs web effectuent ces recherches automatiquement, à moins qu'ils ne soient configurés pour utiliser un DNS crypté.
+
+ === "Linux, macOS"
+
+ ```
+ dig +noall +answer privacyguides.org @1.1.1.1
+ dig +noall +answer privacyguides.org @8.8.8.8
+ ```
+ === "Windows"
+
+ ```
+ nslookup privacyguides.org 1.1.1.1
+ nslookup privacyguides.org 8.8.8.8
+ ```
+
+3. Ensuite, nous voulons [ analyser](https://www.wireshark.org/docs/wsug_html_chunked/ChapterIntroduction.html#ChIntroWhatIs) les résultats :
+
+ === "Wireshark"
+
+ ```
+ wireshark -r /tmp/dns.pcap
+ ```
+
+ === "tshark"
+
+ ```
+ tshark -r /tmp/dns.pcap
+ ```
+
+Si vous exécutez la commande Wireshark ci-dessus, le volet supérieur affiche les "[trames](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethernet_frame)", et le volet inférieur affiche toutes les données relatives à la trame sélectionnée. Les solutions de filtrage et de surveillance d'entreprise (telles que celles achetées par les gouvernements) peuvent effectuer ce processus automatiquement, sans interaction humaine, et peuvent agréger ces trames pour produire des données statistiques utiles à l'observateur du réseau.
+
+| No. | Heure | Source | Destination | Protocole | Longueur | Info |
+| --- | -------- | --------- | ----------- | --------- | -------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| 1 | 0.000000 | 192.0.2.1 | 1.1.1.1 | DNS | 104 | Standard query 0x58ba A privacyguides.org OPT |
+| 2 | 0.293395 | 1.1.1.1 | 192.0.2.1 | DNS | 108 | Standard query response 0x58ba A privacyguides.org A 198.98.54.105 OPT |
+| 3 | 1.682109 | 192.0.2.1 | 8.8.8.8 | DNS | 104 | Standard query 0xf1a9 A privacyguides.org OPT |
+| 4 | 2.154698 | 8.8.8.8 | 192.0.2.1 | DNS | 108 | Standard query response 0xf1a9 A privacyguides.org A 198.98.54.105 OPT |
+
+Un observateur pourrait modifier n'importe lequel de ces paquets.
+
+## Qu'est-ce que le "DNS crypté" ?
+
+Le DNS crypté peut faire référence à un certain nombre de protocoles, les plus courants étant :
+
+### DNSCrypt
+
+[**DNSCrypt**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNSCrypt) était l'une des premières méthodes de cryptage des requêtes DNS. DNSCrypt opère sur le port 443 et fonctionne avec les protocoles de transport TCP ou UDP. DNSCrypt n'a jamais été soumis à l'IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) [](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Engineering_Task_Force) et n'est pas passé par le processus de demande de commentaires (RFC) [](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Request_for_Comments) . Il n'a donc pas été largement utilisé en dehors de quelques implémentations [](https://dnscrypt.info/implementations). En conséquence, il a été largement remplacé par le plus populaire [DNS over HTTPS](#dns-over-https-doh).
+
+### DNS sur TLS (DoT)
+
+[**DNS over TLS**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_TLS) est une autre méthode de cryptage des communications DNS qui est définie dans [RFC 7858](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7858). La prise en charge a été implémentée pour la première fois dans Android 9, iOS 14, et sur Linux dans [systemd-resolved](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/resolved.conf.html#DNSOverTLS=) dans la version 237. Ces dernières années, la préférence du secteur s'est déplacée de DoT vers DoH, car DoT est un protocole complexe [](https://dnscrypt.info/faq/) et sa conformité au RFC varie selon les implémentations existantes. Le DoT fonctionne également sur un port dédié 853 qui peut être facilement bloqué par des pare-feu restrictifs.
+
+### DNS sur HTTPS (DoH)
+
+[**DNS sur HTTPS**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_HTTPS) tel que défini dans [RFC 8484](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8484) regroupe les requêtes dans le protocole [HTTP/2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/2) et assure la sécurité avec HTTPS. La prise en charge a d'abord été ajoutée dans les navigateurs web tels que Firefox 60 et Chrome 83.
+
+L'implémentation native de DoH est apparue dans iOS 14, macOS 11, Microsoft Windows et Android 13 (cependant, elle ne sera pas activée [par défaut](https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/packages/modules/DnsResolver/+/1833144)). Sous Linux le support sera assuré par [ l'implémentation dans systemd](https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/8639) donc [l'installation de logiciels tiers est encore nécessaire](../dns.md#linux).
+
+## Que peut voir un tiers ?
+
+Dans cet exemple, nous allons enregistrer ce qui se passe lorsque nous faisons une requête DoH :
+
+1. Tout d'abord, lancez `tshark`:
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/dns_doh.pcap -f "tcp port https and host 1.1.1.1
+ ```
+
+2. Deuxièmement, faites une requête avec `curl`:
+
+ ```bash
+ curl -vI --doh-url https://1.1.1.1/dns-query https://privacyguides.org
+ ```
+
+3. Après avoir fait la demande, nous pouvons arrêter la capture de paquets avec CTRL + C.
+
+4. Analysez les résultats dans Wireshark :
+
+ ```bash
+ wireshark -r /tmp/dns_doh.pcap
+ ```
+
+Nous pouvons voir [l'établissement de la connexion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol#Connection_establishment) et [TLS handshake](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ssl/what-happens-in-a-tls-handshake/) qui se produit avec toute connexion chiffrée. Lorsque l'on regarde les paquets de "données d'application" qui suivent, aucun d'entre eux ne contient le domaine que nous avons demandé ou l'adresse IP renvoyée.
+
+## Pourquoi **ne devrais-je pas** utiliser un DNS chiffré ?
+
+Dans les endroits où il existe un filtrage (ou une censure) de l'Internet, la visite de ressources interdites peut avoir ses propres conséquences que vous devez prendre en compte dans votre [modèle de menace](../basics/threat-modeling.md). Nous ne suggérons **pas** l'utilisation de DNS chiffrés à cette fin. Utilisez plutôt [Tor](https://torproject.org) ou un [VPN](../vpn.md). Si vous utilisez un VPN, vous devez utiliser les serveurs DNS de votre VPN. En utilisant un VPN, vous lui confiez déjà toute votre activité réseau.
+
+Lorsque nous effectuons une recherche DNS, c'est généralement parce que nous voulons accéder à une ressource. Nous examinerons ci-dessous certaines des méthodes susceptibles de divulguer vos activités de navigation, même lorsque vous utilisez un DNS chiffré :
+
+### Adresse IP
+
+Le moyen le plus simple de déterminer l'activité de navigation est de regarder les adresses IP auxquelles vos appareils accèdent. Par exemple, si l'observateur sait que `privacyguides.org` est à `198.98.54.105`, et que votre appareil demande des données à `198.98.54.105`, il y a de fortes chances que vous visitiez Privacy Guides.
+
+Cette méthode n'est utile que lorsque l'adresse IP appartient à un serveur qui n'héberge que quelques sites web. Elle n'est pas non plus très utile si le site est hébergé sur une plateforme partagée (par exemple, Github Pages, Cloudflare Pages, Netlify, WordPress, Blogger, etc). Il n'est pas non plus très utile si le serveur est hébergé derrière un [proxy inverse](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proxy_inverse), ce qui est très courant actuellement sur Internet.
+
+### Server Name Indication (SNI)
+
+La Server Name Indication (indication du nom du serveur) est généralement utilisée lorsqu'une adresse IP héberge de nombreux sites web. Il peut s'agir d'un service comme Cloudflare, ou d'une autre protection contre les [attaques par déni de service](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attaque_par_déni_de_service).
+
+1. Recommencez à capturer avec `tshark`. Nous avons ajouté un filtre avec notre adresse IP pour que vous ne capturiez pas beaucoup de paquets :
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/pg.pcap port 443 et hôte 198.98.54.105
+ ```
+
+2. Ensuite, nous visitons [https://privacyguides.org](https://privacyguides.org).
+
+3. Après avoir visité le site web, nous voulons arrêter la capture de paquets avec CTRL + C.
+
+4. Ensuite, nous voulons analyser les résultats :
+
+ ```bash
+ wireshark -r /tmp/pg.pcap
+ ```
+
+ Nous verrons l'établissement de la connexion, suivi du TLS handshake pour le site web Privacy Guides. Au niveau de l'image 5, vous verrez un "Client Hello".
+
+5. Développez le triangle ▸ à côté de chaque champ :
+
+ ```text
+ ▸ Transport Layer Security
+ ▸ TLSv1.3 Record Layer : Handshake Protocol : Client Hello
+ ▸ Handshake Protocol : Client Hello
+ ▸ Extension : server_name (len=22)
+ ▸ Server Name Indication extension
+ ```
+
+6. Nous pouvons voir la valeur SNI qui révèle le site web que nous visitons. La commande `tshark` peut vous donner directement la valeur pour tous les paquets contenant une valeur SNI :
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -r /tmp/pg.pcap -Tfields -Y tls.handshake.extensions_server_name -e tls.handshake.extensions_server_name
+ ```
+
+Cela signifie que même si nous utilisons des serveurs "DNS Chiffré", le domaine sera probablement divulgué par le SNI. Le protocole [TLS v1.3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#TLS_1.3) apporte avec lui [Encrypted Client Hello](https://blog.cloudflare.com/encrypted-client-hello/), qui empêche ce type de fuite.
+
+Des gouvernements, en particulier [la Chine](https://www.zdnet.com/article/china-is-now-blocking-all-encrypted-https-traffic-using-tls-1-3-and-esni/) et [la Russie](https://www.zdnet.com/article/russia-wants-to-ban-the-use-of-secure-protocols-such-as-tls-1-3-doh-dot-esni/), ont déjà commencé à [bloquer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication#Encrypted_Client_Hello) le protocole ou ont exprimé le souhait de le faire. Récemment, la Russie [a commencé à bloquer les sites web étrangers](https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/108) qui utilisent le standard [HTTP/3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3). En effet, le protocole [QUIC](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/QUIC) qui fait partie de HTTP/3 exige que `ClientHello` soit également chiffré.
+
+### Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
+
+Une autre façon dont votre navigateur peut divulguer vos activités de navigation est avec [l'Online Certificate Status Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_Certificate_Status_Protocol) (protocole de vérification de certificat en ligne). Lors de la visite d'un site Web HTTPS, le navigateur peut vérifier si le [certificat](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificat_%C3%A9lectronique) du site Web a été révoqué. Cela se fait généralement via le protocole HTTP, ce qui signifie qu'il **n'est pas** chiffré.
+
+La requête OCSP contient le certificat "[serial number](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_certificate#Common_fields)", qui est unique. Il est envoyé au "OCSP responder" afin de vérifier son statut.
+
+Nous pouvons simuler ce que ferait un navigateur en utilisant la commande [`openssl`](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenSSL).
+
+1. Obtenez le certificat du serveur et utilisez [`sed`](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stream_Editor) pour ne garder que la partie importante et l'écrire dans un fichier :
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl s_client -connect privacyguides.org:443 < /dev/null 2>&1 |
+ sed -n '/^-*BEGIN/,/^-*END/p' > /tmp/pg_server.cert
+ ```
+
+2. Obtenez le certificat intermédiaire. Les [Autorités de certification](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autorité_de_certification) (CA) ne signent normalement pas directement un certificat ; elles utilisent ce que l'on appelle un certificat "intermédiaire".
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl s_client -showcerts -connect privacyguides.org:443 < /dev/null 2>&1 |
+ sed -n '/^-*BEGIN/,/^-*END/p' > /tmp/pg_and_intermediate.cert
+ ```
+
+3. Le premier certificat dans `pg_and_intermediate.cert` est en fait le certificat du serveur de l'étape 1. Nous pouvons utiliser à nouveau `sed` pour tout supprimer jusqu'à la première instance de END :
+
+ ```bash
+ sed -n '/^-*END CERTIFICATE-*$/!d;:a n;p;ba' \
+ /tmp/pg_and_intermediate.cert > /tmp/intermediate_chain.cert
+ ```
+
+4. Obtenir le répondeur OCSP pour le certificat du serveur :
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl x509 -noout -ocsp_uri -in /tmp/pg_server.cert
+ ```
+
+ Notre certificat montre le répondeur du certificat Lets Encrypt. Si nous voulons voir tous les détails du certificat, nous pouvons utiliser :
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl x509 -text -noout -in /tmp/pg_server.cert
+ ```
+
+5. Démarrer la capture de paquets :
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -w /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap -f "tcp port http"
+ ```
+
+6. Faites la demande OCSP :
+
+ ```bash
+ openssl ocsp -issuer /tmp/intermediate_chain.cert \
+ -cert /tmp/pg_server.cert \
+ -text \
+ -url http://r3.o.lencr.org
+ ```
+
+7. Ouvrez la capture :
+
+ ```bash
+ wireshark -r /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap
+ ```
+
+ Il y aura deux paquets avec le protocole "OCSP" : un "Demande" et un "Réponse". Pour la "Demande", nous pouvons voir le "numéro de série" en développant le triangle ▸ à côté de chaque champ :
+
+ ```bash
+ ▸ Online Certificate Status Protocol
+ ▸ tbsRequest
+ ▸ requestList: 1 item
+ ▸ Request
+ ▸ reqCert
+ serialNumber
+ ```
+
+ Pour la "Réponse", nous pouvons également voir le "numéro de série" :
+
+ ```bash
+ ▸ Online Certificate Status Protocol
+ ▸ responseBytes
+ ▸ BasicOCSPResponse
+ ▸ tbsResponseData
+ ▸ responses: 1 item
+ ▸ SingleResponse
+ ▸ certID
+ serialNumber
+ ```
+
+8. Ou utilisez `tshark` pour filtrer les paquets du numéro de série :
+
+ ```bash
+ tshark -r /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap -Tfields -Y ocsp.serialNumber -e ocsp.serialNumber
+ ```
+
+Si l'observateur du réseau dispose du certificat public, qui est accessible au public, il peut faire correspondre le numéro de série à ce certificat et donc déterminer le site que vous visitez à partir de celui-ci. Le processus peut être automatisé et permet d'associer des adresses IP à des numéros de série. Il est également possible de vérifier les journaux de [Certificate Transparency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_Transparency) (en anlais) pour le numéro de série.
+
+## Devrais-je utiliser un DNS chiffré ?
+
+Nous avons créé cet organigramme pour décrire quand vous *devriez* utiliser des DNS cryptés:
+
+``` mermaid
+graph TB
+ Démarrage[Start] --> anonyme{Essayez-vous d'être anonyme ?}
+ anonyme --> | Oui | tor(Utilisez Tor)
+ anonyme --> | Non | censure{Eviter la censure ?}
+ censure --> | Oui | vpnOuTor(Utilisez VPN ou Tor)
+ censure --> | Non | viePrivée{Protéger votre vie privée du FAI ?}
+ p(vie privée) --> | Oui | vpnOuTor
+ p(vie privée) --> | Non | nuisible{FAI fait des redirections nuisibles ?}
+ nuisible --> | Oui | DNScryptés(Utilisez DNS cryptés avec application tierce)
+ nuisible --> | Non | DNSfai{FAI supporte les DNS cryptés ?}
+ DNSfai --> | Oui | utilisezFAI(Utilisez DNS cryptés avec FAI)
+ DNSfai --> | Non | rien(Ne rien faire)
+```
+
+Le DNS chiffré avec des serveurs tiers ne doit être utilisé que pour contourner le [blocage DNS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) de base lorsque vous êtes certain qu'il n'y aura pas de conséquences ou que vous êtes intéressés par un fournisseur qui effectue un filtrage rudimentaire.
+
+[Liste des serveurs DNS recommandés](../dns.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Qu'est-ce que le DNSSEC ?
+
+[Domain Name System Security Extensions](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Extensions) (extension de SECurité du Système de Nom de Domaine) est une fonctionnalité du DNS qui authentifie les réponses aux recherches de noms de domaine. Il ne fournit pas de protection de la vie privée pour ces recherches, mais empêche les attaquants de manipuler ou d'empoisonner les réponses aux requêtes DNS.
+
+En d'autres termes, le DNSSEC signe numériquement les données afin de garantir leur validité. Afin de garantir une recherche sécurisée, la signature a lieu à chaque niveau du processus de consultation du DNS. Par conséquent, toutes les réponses du DNS sont fiables.
+
+Le processus de signature DNSSEC est similaire à celui d'une personne qui signe un document juridique avec un stylo ; cette personne signe avec une signature unique que personne d'autre ne peut créer, et un expert judiciaire peut examiner cette signature et vérifier que le document a été signé par cette personne. Ces signatures numériques garantissent que les données n'ont pas été altérées.
+
+DNSSEC met en œuvre une politique de signature numérique hiérarchique à travers toutes les couches du DNS. Par exemple, dans le cas d'une consultation de `privacyguides.org`, un serveur DNS racine signe une clé pour le serveur de noms `.org`, et le serveur de noms `.org` signe ensuite une clé pour le serveur de noms faisant autorité `privacyguides.org`.
+
+Adapté de [DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) overview](https://cloud.google.com/dns/docs/dnssec) par Google et [DNSSEC : An Introduction](https://blog.cloudflare.com/dnssec-an-introduction/) par Cloudflare, tous deux sous licence [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
+
+## Qu'est-ce que la minimization QNAME ?
+
+Un QNAME est un "nom qualifié", par exemple `privacyguides.org`. La QNAME minimization réduit la quantité d'informations envoyées par le serveur DNS au [serveur de noms](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Name_server#Authoritative_name_server) faisant autorité.
+
+Au lieu d'envoyer le domaine entier `privacyguides.org`, la QNAME minimization signifie que le serveur DNS demandera tous les enregistrements qui se terminent par `.org`. Une description technique plus détaillée est définie dans [RFC 7816](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7816).
+
+## Qu'est-ce que le sous-réseau client EDNS (ECS) ?
+
+Le [EDNS Client Subnet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EDNS_Client_Subnet) est une méthode permettant à un résolveur DNS récursif de spécifier un [sous-réseau](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sous-réseau) pour l'hôte ou le [client](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Client_(informatique)) qui effectue la requête DNS.
+
+Il est destiné à "accélérer" la transmission des données en donnant au client une réponse qui appartient à un serveur proche de lui, comme un [réseau de diffusion de contenu](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Réseau_de_diffusion_de_contenu), souvent utilisé pour la diffusion de vidéos en continu et pour servir des applications Web JavaScript.
+
+Cette fonction a un coût en termes de confidentialité, car elle fournit au serveur DNS des informations sur la localisation du client.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/advanced/tor-overview.md b/i18n/fr/advanced/tor-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bdca1681c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/advanced/tor-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+---
+title: "Présentation de Tor"
+icon: 'simple/torproject'
+---
+
+Tor est un réseau décentralisé, gratuit, conçu pour utiliser Internet avec le plus de confidentialité possible. S'il est utilisé correctement, le réseau permet une navigation et des communications privées et anonymes.
+
+## Construction d'un chemin
+
+Tor fonctionne en acheminant votre trafic à travers un réseau composé de milliers de serveurs gérés par des volontaires, appelés nœuds (ou relais).
+
+Chaque fois que vous vous connectez à Tor, il choisira trois nœuds pour construire un chemin vers Internet - ce chemin est appelé un "circuit". Chacun de ces nœuds a sa propre fonction:
+
+### Le nœud d'entrée
+
+Le noeud d'entrée, souvent appelé le noeud de garde, est le premier noeud auquel votre client Tor se connecte. Le nœud d'entrée est capable de voir votre adresse IP, mais il est incapable de voir à quoi vous vous connectez.
+
+Contrairement aux autres nœuds, le client Tor choisira aléatoirement un nœud d'entrée et restera avec lui pendant deux à trois mois pour vous protéger de certaines attaques.[^1]
+
+### Le nœud central
+
+Le noeud central est le second noeud auquel votre client Tor se connecte. Il peut voir de quel nœud provient le trafic - le nœud d'entrée - et vers quel nœud il se dirige ensuite. Le nœud central ne peut pas voir votre adresse IP ou le domaine auquel vous vous connectez.
+
+Pour chaque nouveau circuit, le nœud central est choisi au hasard parmi tous les nœuds Tor disponibles.
+
+### Le nœud de sortie
+
+Le nœud de sortie est le point où votre trafic web quitte le réseau Tor et est transféré vers la destination souhaitée. Le nœud de sortie ne peut pas voir votre adresse IP, mais il sait à quel site il se connecte.
+
+Le noeud de sortie sera choisi au hasard parmi tous les noeuds Tor disponibles et exécutés avec une balise "relais de sortie".[^2]
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ Chemin du circuit Tor
+
+
+## Chiffrement
+
+Tor chiffre chaque paquet (un bloc de données transmises) trois fois avec les clés du nœud de sortie, du nœud central, et du nœud d'entrée, dans cet ordre.
+
+Une fois que Tor a construit un circuit, la transmission des données se fait comme suit:
+
+1. Premièrement: lorsque le paquet arrive au nœud d'entrée, la première couche de chiffrement est supprimée. Dans ce paquet chiffré, le nœud d'entrée trouvera un autre paquet chiffré avec l'adresse du nœud central. Le nœud d'entrée transmet ensuite le paquet au nœud central.
+
+2. Deuxièmement : lorsque le nœud central reçoit le paquet du nœud d'entrée, il supprime lui aussi une couche de chiffrement avec sa clé, et trouve cette fois un paquet chiffré avec l'adresse du nœud de sortie. Le nœud central transmet ensuite le paquet au nœud de sortie.
+
+3. Enfin, lorsque le nœud de sortie reçoit son paquet, il supprime la dernière couche de chiffrement avec sa clé. Le nœud de sortie verra l'adresse de destination et transmettra le paquet à cette adresse.
+
+Vous trouverez ci-dessous un autre schéma illustrant le processus. Chaque nœud supprime sa propre couche de chiffrement, et lorsque le serveur de destination renvoie les données, le même processus se déroule entièrement en sens inverse. Par exemple, le nœud de sortie ne sait pas qui vous êtes, mais il sait de quel nœud il provient. Il ajoute donc sa propre couche de chiffrement et renvoie le message.
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ Envoyer et recevoir des données à travers le réseau Tor
+
+
+Tor nous permet de nous connecter à un serveur sans que personne ne connaisse le chemin entier. Le nœud d'entrée sait qui vous êtes, mais pas où vous allez; le nœud central ne sait pas qui vous êtes ni où vous allez; et le nœud de sortie sait où vous allez, mais pas qui vous êtes. Comme le nœud de sortie est celui qui établit la connexion finale, le serveur de destination ne connaîtra jamais votre adresse IP.
+
+## Mises en garde
+
+Bien que Tor offre de solides garanties de confidentialité, il faut être conscient que Tor n'est pas parfait:
+
+- Des adversaires bien financés ayant la capacité d'observer passivement la plupart du trafic réseau mondial ont une chance de désanonymiser les utilisateurs de Tor au moyen d'une analyse avancée du trafic. Tor ne vous protège pas non plus contre le risque de vous exposer par erreur, par exemple si vous partagez trop d'informations sur votre véritable identité.
+- Les nœuds de sortie de Tor peuvent également surveiller le trafic qui passe par eux. Cela signifie que le trafic qui n'est pas chiffré, comme le trafic HTTP ordinaire, peut être enregistré et surveillé. Si ce trafic contient des informations permettant de vous identifier, il peut vous désanonymiser aux yeux de ce nœud de sortie. Par conséquent, nous recommandons d'utiliser HTTPS via Tor dans la mesure du possible.
+
+Si vous souhaitez utiliser Tor pour naviguer sur le web, nous ne recommandons que le navigateur Tor **officiel** - il est conçu pour empêcher la prise d'empreintes numériques.
+
+- [Navigateur Tor :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../tor.md#tor-browser)
+
+## Ressources Supplémentaires
+
+- [Manuel d'utilisation du navigateur Tor](https://tb-manual.torproject.org)
+- [Comment Tor fonctionne - Computerphile](https://invidious.privacyguides.net/embed/QRYzre4bf7I?local=true) (YouTube)
+- [Services onion Tor - Computerphile](https://invidious.privacyguides.net/embed/lVcbq_a5N9I?local=true) (YouTube)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
+
+[^1]: Le premier relais de votre circuit est appelé "garde d'entrée" ou "garde". Il s'agit d'un relais rapide et stable qui reste le premier de votre circuit pendant 2 à 3 mois afin de vous protéger contre une attaque connue de rupture d'anonymat. Le reste de votre circuit change avec chaque nouveau site web que vous visitez, et tous ensemble ces relais fournissent les protections complètes de Tor en matière de vie privée. Pour en savoir plus sur le fonctionnement des relais de garde, consultez cet [article de blog](https://blog.torproject.org/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters) et ce [document](https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/single_guard.pdf) sur les gardes d'entrée. ([https://support.torproject.org/fr/tbb/tbb-2/](https://support.torproject.org/fr/tbb/tbb-2/))
+
+[^2]: Balise de relai: une (dis-)qualification spéciale des relais pour les positions de circuit (par exemple, "Guard", "Exit", "BadExit"), les propriétés de circuit (par exemple, "Fast", "Stable") ou les rôles (par exemple, "Authority", "HSDir"), tels qu'attribués par les autorités de l'annuaire et définis plus précisément dans la spécification du protocole de l'annuaire. ([https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html](https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html))
diff --git a/i18n/fr/android.md b/i18n/fr/android.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0fc683a62
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/android.md
@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+---
+title: "Android"
+icon: 'simple/android'
+---
+
+{ align=right }
+
+**Android Open Source Project** est un système d'exploitation mobile à code source ouvert dirigé par Google qui équipe la majorité des appareils mobiles dans le monde. La plupart des téléphones vendus avec Android sont modifiés pour inclure des intégrations et des applications invasives telles que Google Play Services. Vous pouvez donc améliorer considérablement votre vie privée sur votre appareil mobile en remplaçant l'installation par défaut de votre téléphone par une version d'Android dépourvue de ces fonctionnalités invasives.
+
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://source.android.com/){ .card-link title=Page d'accueil }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://source.android.com/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/){ .card-link title="Code Source" }
+
+Voici les systèmes d'exploitation, les appareils et les applications Android que nous recommandons pour optimiser la sécurité et la confidentialité de votre appareil mobile. Pour en savoir plus sur Android :
+
+- [Présentation générale d'Android :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/android-overview.md)
+- [Pourquoi nous recommandons GrapheneOS plutôt que CalyxOS :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/)
+
+## Dérivés de AOSP
+
+Nous vous recommandons d'installer l'un de ces systèmes d'exploitation Android personnalisés sur votre appareil, classés par ordre de préférence, en fonction de la compatibilité de votre appareil avec ces systèmes d'exploitation.
+
+!!! note "À noter"
+
+ Les appareils en fin de vie (tels que les appareils à "support étendu" de GrapheneOS ou de CalyxOS) ne disposent pas de correctifs de sécurité complets (mises à jour de micrologiciel) en raison de l'arrêt du support par le constructeur. Ces appareils ne peuvent pas être considérés comme totalement sûrs, quel que soit le logiciel installé.
+
+### GrapheneOS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GrapheneOS** est le meilleur choix en matière de confidentialité et de sécurité.
+
+ GrapheneOS apporte des améliorations supplémentaires en matière de [renforcement de la sécurité](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Durcissement_%28informatique%29) et de confidentialité. Il dispose d'un [allocateur de mémoire renforcé](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), d'autorisations pour le réseau et les capteurs, et de diverses autres [fonctions de sécurité](https://grapheneos.org/features). GrapheneOS est également livré avec des mises à jour complètes du micrologiciel et des versions signées, de sorte que le démarrage vérifié est entièrement pris en charge.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil ](https://grapheneos.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://grapheneos.org/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://grapheneos.org/source){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+GrapheneOS prend en charge [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), qui exécute les [Google Play Services](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Play_Services) entièrement sandboxed comme toute autre application normale. Cela signifie que vous pouvez profiter de la plupart des services Google Play, tels que [les notifications push](https://firebase.google.com/docs/cloud-messaging/), tout en vous donnant un contrôle total sur leurs autorisations et leur accès, et tout en les contenant à un [profil de travail](os/android-overview.md#work-profile) ou un [profil d'utilisateur](os/android-overview.md#user-profiles) spécifique de votre choix.
+
+Les téléphones Google Pixel sont les seuls appareils qui répondent actuellement aux [exigences de sécurité matérielle](https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-support) de GrapheneOS.
+
+### DivestOS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **DivestOS** est un léger dérivé de [LineageOS](https://lineageos.org/).
+ DivestOS hérite de nombreux [appareils pris en charge](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=devices&base=LineageOS) de LineageOS. Il a des versions signées, ce qui permet d'avoir un [démarrage vérifié](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) sur certains appareils non-Pixel.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://divestos.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://divestoseb5nncsydt7zzf5hrfg44md4bxqjs5ifcv4t7gt7u6ohjyyd.onion){ .card-link title="Service oignon" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=privacy_policy){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://divestos.org/index.php?page=faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/divested-mobile){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=donate){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+DivestOS dispose d'un système de [correction](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/cve_checker) automatique des vulnérabilités du noyau ([CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures)), de moins de morceaux propriétaires et d'un fichier [hosts](https://divested.dev/index.php?page=dnsbl) personnalisé. Son WebView renforcé, [Mulch](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/mulch), permet [CFI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control-flow_integrity) pour toutes les architectures et [un partitionnement de l'état du réseau](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning), et reçoit des mises à jour hors bande. DivestOS inclut également les correctifs de noyau de GrapheneOS et active toutes les fonctions de sécurité de noyau disponibles via [defconfig hardening](https://github.com/Divested-Mobile/DivestOS-Build/blob/master/Scripts/Common/Functions.sh#L758). Tous les noyaux plus récents que la version 3.4 incluent une [désinfection](https://lwn.net/Articles/334747/) complète de la page et tous les ~22 noyaux compilés par Clang ont [`-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero`](https://reviews.llvm.org/D54604?id=174471) activé.
+
+DivestOS met en œuvre certains correctifs de renforcement du système développés à l'origine pour GrapheneOS. DivestOS 16.0 et plus implémente les autorisations [`INTERNET`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) et SENSORS de GrapheneOS, l'[allocateur de mémoire renforcé](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), [exec-spawning](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/#additional-hardening), la [constification](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_Native_Interface) [JNI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Const_(computer_programming)), et des patchs de renforcement [bioniques](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bionic_(software)) partiels. Les versions 17.1 et supérieures offrent l'option de GrapheneOS pour [rendre aléatoire les adresses MAC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address#Randomization) entre réseaux, le contrôle [`ptrace_scope`](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.html) et les options de redémarrage/coupure Wi-Fi/coupure Bluetooth automatique [sur délai](https://grapheneos.org/features).
+
+DivestOS utilise F-Droid comme magasin d'applications par défaut. Normalement, nous recommandons d'éviter F-Droid en raison de ses nombreux [problèmes de sécurité](#f-droid). Cependant, le faire sur DivestOS n'est pas viable ; les développeurs mettent à jour leurs applications via leurs propres dépôts F-Droid ([Official DivestOS](https://divestos.org/fdroid/official/?fingerprint=E4BE8D6ABFA4D9D4FEEF03CDDA7FF62A73FD64B75566F6DD4E5E577550BE8467) et [WebView DivestOS](https://divestos.org/fdroid/webview/?fingerprint=FB426DA1750A53D7724C8A582B4D34174E64A84B38940E5D5A802E1DFF9A40D2)). Nous recommandons de désactiver l'application officielle F-Droid et d'utiliser [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) avec les dépôts DivestOS activés pour maintenir ces composants à jour. Pour les autres applications, nos méthodes recommandées pour les obtenir restent applicables.
+
+!!! warning "Avertissement"
+
+ L'[état](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/firmware-empty/-/blob/master/STATUS) des mises à jour du micrologiciel DivestOS et le contrôle de la qualité varient selon les appareils qu'il prend en charge. Nous recommandons toujours GrapheneOS en fonction de la compatibilité de votre appareil. Pour les autres appareils, DivestOS est une bonne alternative.
+
+ Tous les appareils pris en charge ne disposent pas d'un démarrage vérifié, et certains le font mieux que d'autres.
+
+## Appareils Android
+
+Lorsque vous achetez un appareil, nous vous recommandons d'en prendre un aussi neuf que possible. Les logiciels et les micrologiciels des appareils mobiles ne sont pris en charge que pour une durée limitée. L'achat de nouveaux appareils permet donc de prolonger cette durée de vie autant que possible.
+
+Évitez d'acheter des téléphones auprès des opérateurs de réseaux mobiles. Ces derniers ont souvent un **chargeur d'amorçage verrouillé** et ne supportent pas le [déverrouillage constructeur](https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/locking_unlocking). Ces variantes de téléphone vous empêcheront d'installer tout type de distribution Android alternative.
+
+Soyez très **prudent** lorsque vous achetez des téléphones d'occasion sur des marchés en ligne. Vérifiez toujours la réputation du vendeur. Si l'appareil est volé, il est possible que l'[IMEI soit mis sur liste noire](https://www.gsma.com/security/resources/imei-blacklisting/). Il y a également un risque d'être associé à l'activité de l'ancien propriétaire.
+
+Quelques conseils supplémentaires concernant les appareils Android et la compatibilité du système d'exploitation :
+
+- N'achetez pas d'appareils qui ont atteint ou sont sur le point d'atteindre leur fin de vie, des mises à jour supplémentaires du micrologiciel doivent être fournies par le fabricant.
+- N'achetez pas de téléphones LineageOS ou /e/ OS préchargés ou tout autre téléphone Android sans prise en charge adéquate de [Démarrage Vérifié](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) et sans mises à jour du micrologiciel. En outre, ces appareils ne vous permettent pas de vérifier s'ils ont été manipulés.
+- En bref, si un appareil ou une distribution Android ne figure pas dans cette liste, il y a probablement une bonne raison. Consultez notre [forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/) pour en savoir plus !
+
+### Google Pixel
+
+Les téléphones Google Pixel sont les **seuls** appareils dont nous recommandons l'achat. Les téléphones Pixel ont une sécurité matérielle plus forte que tous les autres appareils Android actuellement sur le marché, grâce à une prise en charge AVB adéquate pour les systèmes d'exploitation tiers et aux puces de sécurité personnalisées [Titan](https://security.googleblog.com/2021/10/pixel-6-setting-new-standard-for-mobile.html) de Google faisant office d'Elément Sécurisé.
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ Les appareils **Google Pixel** sont connus pour avoir une bonne sécurité et prendre correctement en charge le [Démarrage Vérifié](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), même lors de l'installation de systèmes d'exploitation personnalisés.
+
+ À partir des **Pixel 6** et **6 Pro**, les appareils Pixel bénéficient d'un minimum de 5 ans de mises à jour de sécurité garanties, ce qui leur assure une durée de vie bien plus longue que les 2 à 4 ans généralement proposés par les constructeurs concurrents.
+
+ [:material-shopping: Boutique](https://store.google.com/category/phones){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+
+Les Eléments Sécurisés comme le Titan M2 sont plus limités que le Trusted Execution Environment du processeur utilisé par la plupart des autres téléphones, car ils ne sont utilisés que pour le stockage des secrets, l'attestation matérielle et la limitation du débit, et non pour exécuter des programmes "de confiance". Les téléphones dépourvus d'un Elément Sécurisé doivent utiliser le TEE pour *toutes* ces fonctions, ce qui élargit la surface d'attaque.
+
+Les téléphones Google Pixel utilisent un OS TEE appelé Trusty qui est [open-source](https://source.android.com/security/trusty#whyTrusty), contrairement à de nombreux autres téléphones.
+
+L'installation de GrapheneOS sur un téléphone Pixel est facile avec leur [installateur web](https://grapheneos.org/install/web). Si vous ne vous sentez pas à l'aise pour le faire vous-même et que vous êtes prêt à dépenser un peu plus d'argent, consultez le site [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) car ils sont préchargés avec GrapheneOS et viennent de la société réputée [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/about).
+
+Quelques conseils supplémentaires pour l'achat d'un Google Pixel :
+
+- Si vous cherchez une bonne affaire pour un appareil Pixel, nous vous suggérons d'acheter un modèle "**a**", juste après la sortie du prochain produit phare de la marque. Les remises sont généralement disponibles parce que Google essaie d'écouler son stock.
+- Tenez compte des offres spéciales et réductions proposées par les magasins physiques.
+- Consultez les sites communautaires de bonnes affaires en ligne dans votre pays. Ils peuvent vous signaler les bonnes ventes.
+- Google fournit une liste indiquant le [cycle de support](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) pour chacun de ses appareils. Le prix par jour d'un appareil peut être calculé comme suit :\text{Coût} - \text {Date fin de vie}-\text{Date du jour}$, ce qui signifie que plus l'utilisation de l'appareil est longue, plus le coût par jour est faible.
+
+## Applications générales
+
+Nous recommandons une grande variété d'applications Android sur ce site. Les applications répertoriées ici sont exclusives à Android et améliorent ou remplacent les principales fonctionnalités du système.
+
+### Shelter
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Shelter** est une application qui vous aide à tirer parti de la fonctionnalité Profil de Travail d'Android pour isoler ou dupliquer des applications sur votre appareil.
+
+ Shelter prend en charge le blocage de la recherche de contacts entre profils et le partage de fichiers entre profils via le gestionnaire de fichiers par défaut ([DocumentsUI](https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/modular-system/documentsui)).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Dépôt](https://gitea.angry.im/PeterCxy/Shelter#shelter){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitea.angry.im/PeterCxy/Shelter){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.patreon.com/PeterCxy){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.typeblog.shelter)
+
+!!! warning "Avertissement"
+
+ Shelter est recommandé par rapport à [Insular](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/) et [Island](https://github.com/oasisfeng/island) car il prend en charge le [blocage de la recherche de contact](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular/faq.html).
+
+ En utilisant Shelter, vous accordez une confiance totale à son développeur, car Shelter agit en tant qu'[Administrateur de l'appareil](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/admin/device-admin) pour créer le Profil de Travail, et il a un accès étendu aux données stockées dans ce dernier.
+
+### Auditor
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Auditor** est une application qui exploite les fonctions de sécurité matérielle pour assurer le contrôle de l'intégrité des [appareils pris en charge](https://attestation.app/about#device-support). Actuellement, il ne fonctionne qu'avec GrapheneOS et le système d'exploitation d'origine de l'appareil.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://attestation.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://attestation.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://attestation.app/about){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://attestation.app/source){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://attestation.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.attestation.auditor.play)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases)
+ - [:material-cube-outline: Magasin d'application de GrapheneOS](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+Auditor effectue l'attestation et la détection d'intrusion :
+
+- A l'aide d'un modèle de [Confiance lors de la première utilisation (TOFU - Trust On First Use)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_on_first_use) entre un *auditeur* et un *audité*, la paire établit une clé privée dans le trousseau [matériel](https://source.android.com/security/keystore/) d'*Auditor*.
+- L'*auditeur* peut être une autre instance de l'application Auditor ou le [Service d'Attestation à Distance](https://attestation.app).
+- L'*auditeur* enregistre l'état et la configuration actuels de l'*audité*.
+- En cas d'altération du système d'exploitation de l'*audité* après l'appairage, l'auditeur sera informé de la modification de l'état et des configurations de l'appareil.
+- Vous serez alerté de ce changement.
+
+Aucune information personnelle identifiable n'est soumise au service d'attestation. Nous vous recommandons de vous inscrire avec un compte anonyme et d'activer l'attestation à distance pour un contrôle continu.
+
+Si votre [modèle de menace](basics/threat-modeling.md) nécessite une certaine confidentialité, vous pouvez envisager d'utiliser [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) ou un VPN pour cacher votre adresse IP au service d'attestation. Pour s'assurer de l'authenticité de votre matériel et de votre système d'exploitation, [effectuez une attestation locale](https://grapheneos.org/install/web#verifying-installation) immédiatement après l'installation de l'appareil et avant toute connexion à Internet.
+
+### Secure Camera
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Secure Camera** est une application de caméra axée sur la confidentialité et la sécurité qui peut capturer des images, des vidéos et des QR codes. Les extensions du vendeur CameraX (Portrait, HDR, Night Sight, Face Retouch et Auto) sont également prises en charge sur les appareils disponibles.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Dépôt](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://grapheneos.org/usage#camera){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.grapheneos.camera.play)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases)
+ - [:material-cube-outline: Magasin d'application de GrapheneOS](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+Les principales caractéristiques de confidentialité comprennent :
+
+- Suppression automatique des métadonnées [Exif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exif) (activée par défaut)
+- Utilisation de la nouvelle API [Media](https://developer.android.com/training/data-storage/shared/media), donc les [autorisations de stockage](https://developer.android.com/training/data-storage) ne sont pas nécessaires
+- L'autorisation microphone n'est pas nécessaire, sauf si vous souhaitez enregistrer des sons
+
+!!! note "À noter"
+
+ Les métadonnées ne sont pour le moment pas supprimées des fichiers vidéo, mais cela est prévu.
+
+ Les métadonnées d'orientation de l'image ne sont pas supprimées. Si vous activez la fonction de localisation (dans Secure Camera), elle ne **sera pas** non plus supprimée. Si vous voulez la supprimer ultérieurement, vous devrez utiliser une application externe telle que [ExifEraser](data-redaction.md#exiferaser).
+
+### Secure PDF Viewer
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Secure PDF Viewer** est un visualiseur de PDF basé sur [pdf.js](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PDF.js) qui ne nécessite aucune autorisation. Le PDF est introduit dans une [webview](https://developer.android.com/guide/webapps/webview) [sandboxed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandbox_(software_development)). Cela signifie qu'il n'a pas besoin d'autorisation directe pour accéder au contenu ou aux fichiers.
+
+ [Content-Security-Policy](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy) est utilisé pour faire en sorte que les propriétés JavaScript et de style dans la WebView soient entièrement statiques.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Dépôt](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://grapheneos.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.grapheneos.pdfviewer.play)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer/releases)
+ - [:material-cube-outline: Magasin d'application de GrapheneOS](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
+
+## Obtenir des applications
+
+### Magasin d'applications GrapheneOS
+
+Le magasin d'applications de GrapheneOS est disponible sur [GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases). Il prend en charge Android 12 et plus et est capable de se mettre à jour. Le magasin d'applications contient des applications autonomes construites par le projet GrapheneOS, telles que [Auditor](https://attestation.app/), [Camera](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera), et [PDF Viewer](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer). Si vous recherchez ces applications, nous vous recommandons vivement de les obtenir à partir du magasin d'applications de GrapheneOS plutôt que du Play Store, car les applications de leur magasin sont signées par la signature du projet GrapheneOS à laquelle Google n'a pas accès.
+
+### Aurora Store
+
+Le Google Play Store nécessite un compte Google pour se connecter, ce qui n'est pas idéal pour la confidentialité. Vous pouvez contourner ce problème en utilisant un client alternatif, tel que Aurora Store.
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Aurora Store** est un client Google Play Store qui ne nécessite pas de compte Google, de services Google Play ou microG pour télécharger des applications.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://auroraoss.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-gitlab: GitLab](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore/-/releases)
+
+Aurora Store ne vous permet pas de télécharger des applications payantes grâce à sa fonction de compte anonyme. Vous pouvez éventuellement vous connecter avec votre compte Google sur Aurora Store pour télécharger les applications que vous avez achetées, ce qui donne accès à la liste des applications que vous avez installées à Google, mais vous bénéficiez toujours de l'avantage de ne pas avoir besoin du client Google Play complet et des services Google Play ou microG sur votre appareil.
+
+### Manuellement avec les notifications RSS
+
+Pour les applications publiées sur des plateformes telles que GitHub et GitLab, vous pouvez ajouter un flux RSS à votre [agrégateur d'actualités](/news-aggregators) qui vous aidera à suivre les nouvelles versions.
+
+   
+
+#### GitHub
+
+Sur GitHub, en prenant l'exemple de [Secure Camera](#secure-camera), vous naviguez vers sa [page de publications](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases) et ajoutez `.atom` à l'URL :
+
+`https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases.atom`
+
+#### GitLab
+
+Sur GitLab, en prenant l'exemple de [Aurora Store](#aurora-store) , vous naviguez vers son [dépôt de projet](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore) et ajoutez `/-/tags?format=atom` à l'URL :
+
+`https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore/-/tags?format=atom`
+
+#### Vérifier les empreintes numériques des APK
+
+Si vous téléchargez des fichiers APK à installer manuellement, vous pouvez vérifier leur signature à l'aide de l'outil [`apksigner`](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/apksigner), qui fait partie des [build-tools](https://developer.android.com/studio/releases/build-tools) d'Android.
+
+1. Installez [Java JDK](https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/downloads/).
+
+2. Téléchargez les [outils de ligne de commande d'Android Studio](https://developer.android.com/studio#command-tools).
+
+3. Extrayez l'archive téléchargée :
+
+ ```bash
+ unzip commandlinetools-*.zip
+ cd cmdline-tools
+ ./bin/sdkmanager --sdk_root=./ "build-tools;29.0.3"
+ ```
+
+4. Exécutez la commande de vérification de la signature :
+
+ ```bash
+ ./build-tools/29.0.3/apksigner verify --print-certs ../Camera-37.apk
+ ```
+
+5. Les hachés obtenus peuvent ensuite être comparés avec une autre source. Certains développeurs, comme Signal, [montrent les empreintes numériques](https://signal.org/android/apk/) sur leur site web.
+
+ ```bash
+ Signer #1 certificate DN: CN=GrapheneOS
+ Signer #1 certificate SHA-256 digest: 6436b155b917c2f9a9ed1d15c4993a5968ffabc94947c13f2aeee14b7b27ed59
+ Signer #1 certificate SHA-1 digest: 23e108677a2e1b1d6e6b056f3bb951df7ad5570c
+ Signer #1 certificate MD5 digest: dbbcd0cac71bd6fa2102a0297c6e0dd3
+ ```
+
+### F-Droid
+
+{ align=right width=120px }
+
+==Nous ne recommandons **pas** actuellement F-Droid comme moyen d'obtenir des applications.== F-Droid est souvent recommandé comme une alternative à Google Play, en particulier dans la communauté de la vie privée. La possibilité d'ajouter des dépôts tiers et de ne pas être confiné au jardin clos de Google a conduit à sa popularité. F-Droid dispose en outre de [versions reproductibles](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Reproducible_Builds/) pour certaines applications et est dédié aux logiciels libres et open-source. Cependant, il y a des [problèmes notables](https://privsec.dev/posts/android/f-droid-security-issues/) avec le client officiel F-Droid, leur contrôle de qualité, et la façon dont ils construisent, signent, et livrent les paquets.
+
+En raison de leur processus de construction d'applications, les applications du dépôt officiel de F-Droid sont souvent en retard sur les mises à jour. Les mainteneurs de F-Droid réutilisent également les identifiants des paquets tout en signant les applications avec leurs propres clés, ce qui n'est pas idéal car cela donne à l'équipe F-Droid une confiance ultime.
+
+D'autres dépôts tiers populaires tels que [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) atténuent certains de ces problèmes. Le dépôt IzzyOnDroid récupère les versions directement depuis GitHub et constitue la meilleure alternative aux dépôts des développeurs. Cependant, ce n'est pas quelque chose que nous pouvons recommander, car les applications sont généralement [retirées](https://github.com/vfsfitvnm/ViMusic/issues/240#issuecomment-1225564446) de ce dépôt lorsqu'elles arrivent dans le dépôt principal de F-Droid. Bien que cela soit logique (puisque le but de ce dépôt particulier est d'héberger des applications avant qu'elles ne soient acceptées dans le dépôt principal de F-Droid), cela peut vous laisser avec des applications installées qui ne reçoivent plus de mises à jour.
+
+Cela dit, les dépôts [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/) et [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) abritent d'innombrables applications. Ils peuvent donc être un outil utile pour rechercher et découvrir des applications open-source que vous pouvez ensuite télécharger via le Play Store, Aurora Store ou en obtenant l'APK directement auprès du développeur. Il est important de garder à l'esprit que certaines applications de ces dépôts n'ont pas été mises à jour depuis des années et peuvent s'appuyer sur des bibliothèques non prises en charge, entre autres, ce qui constitue un risque potentiel pour la sécurité. Vous devez faire preuve de discernement lorsque vous recherchez de nouvelles applications par cette méthode.
+
+!!! note "À noter"
+
+ Dans certains cas rares, le développeur d'une application ne la distribue que par le biais de F-Droid ([Gadgetbridge](https://gadgetbridge.org/) en est un exemple). Si vous avez vraiment besoin d'une telle application, nous vous recommandons d'utiliser [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) au lieu de l'application officielle F-Droid pour l'obtenir.
+
+## Critères
+
+**Veuillez noter que nous ne sommes affiliés à aucun des projets que nous recommandons.** En plus de [nos critères de base](about/criteria.md), nous avons développé un ensemble d'exigences claires pour nous permettre de fournir des recommandations objectives. Nous vous suggérons de vous familiariser avec cette liste avant de choisir d'utiliser un projet, et de mener vos propres recherches pour vous assurer que c'est le bon choix pour vous.
+
+!!! example "Cette section est récente"
+
+ Nous travaillons à l'établissement de critères définis pour chaque section de notre site, et celles-ci peuvent être sujet à changement. Si vous avez des questions sur nos critères, veuillez [poser la question sur notre forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) et ne supposez pas que nous n'avons pas pris en compte un élément dans nos recommandations s'il ne figure pas dans la liste. De nombreux facteurs sont pris en compte et discutés lorsque nous recommandons un projet, et la documentation de chacun d'entre eux est en cours.
+
+### Systèmes d'exploitation
+
+- Doit être un logiciel open source.
+- Doit prendre en charge le verrouillage du chargeur d'amorçage avec prise en charge d'une clé AVB personnalisée.
+- Doit recevoir les mises à jour majeures d'Android dans le mois suivant leur publication.
+- Doit recevoir les mises à jour des fonctionnalités d'Android (version mineure) dans les 14 jours suivant leur publication.
+- Doit recevoir les correctifs de sécurité réguliers dans les 5 jours suivant leur publication.
+- Ne doit **pas** être fourni "rooté".
+- Ne doit **pas** activer Google Play Services par défaut.
+- Ne doit **pas** nécessiter une modification du système pour prendre en charge les Google Play Services.
+
+### Appareils
+
+- Doit prendre en charge au moins l'un des systèmes d'exploitation personnalisés que nous recommandons.
+- Doit être actuellement vendu neuf en magasin.
+- Doit recevoir un minimum de 5 ans de mises à jour de sécurité.
+- Doit disposer d'un matériel dédié aux éléments sécurisés.
+
+### Applications
+
+- Les applications de cette page ne doivent pas être applicables à une autre catégorie de logiciels sur le site.
+- Les applications générales doivent étendre ou remplacer les fonctionnalités de base du système.
+- Les applications doivent être régulièrement mises à jour et entretenues.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png b/i18n/fr/assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5295c902c
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/fr/assets/img/account-deletion/exposed_passwords.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/fr/assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png b/i18n/fr/assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..974869a4e
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/fr/assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/fr/assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png b/i18n/fr/assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..21d6ef03a
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/fr/assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/fr/assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png b/i18n/fr/assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b46283571
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/fr/assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/fr/assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png b/i18n/fr/assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f88f7b404
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/fr/assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/fr/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption-dark.svg b/i18n/fr/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption-dark.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dfc36b34b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption-dark.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/fr/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg b/i18n/fr/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ab96c4bbb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/fr/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg b/i18n/fr/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..858b0b368
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-dark.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/fr/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg b/i18n/fr/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..561288036
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+
+
diff --git a/i18n/fr/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png b/i18n/fr/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3b4057bc6
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/fr/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/fido.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/fr/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png b/i18n/fr/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..37487048b
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/fr/assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/yubico-otp.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/fr/assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png b/i18n/fr/assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d71381491
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/fr/assets/img/qubes/qubes-trust-level-architecture.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/fr/assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png b/i18n/fr/assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d71381491
Binary files /dev/null and b/i18n/fr/assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png differ
diff --git a/i18n/fr/basics/account-creation.md b/i18n/fr/basics/account-creation.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cef533bc4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/basics/account-creation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+---
+title: "Création de Compte"
+icon: 'material/account-plus'
+---
+
+Souvent, les gens s'inscrivent à des services sans réfléchir. Il s'agit peut-être d'un service de streaming qui vous permet de regarder la nouvelle émission dont tout le monde parle, ou d'un compte qui vous permet de bénéficier d'une réduction dans votre fast-food préféré. Quoi qu'il en soit, vous devez tenir compte des implications pour vos données, maintenant et plus tard.
+
+Chaque nouveau service que vous utilisez comporte des risques. Les fuites de données, la divulgation d'informations sur les clients à des tiers, l'accès à des données par des employés véreux sont autant de possibilités qui doivent être envisagées avant de founir vos informations. Vous devez être sûr que vous pouvez faire confiance au service, c'est pourquoi nous ne recommandons pas de stocker des données précieuses sur autre chose que les produits les plus matures et les plus éprouvés. Il s'agit généralement de services qui fournissent E2EE et qui ont fait l'objet d'un audit cryptographique. Un audit renforce l'assurance que le produit a été conçu sans problèmes de sécurité flagrants causés par un développeur inexpérimenté.
+
+Il peut également être difficile de supprimer les comptes sur certains services. Il est parfois possible [d'écraser les données](account-deletion.md#overwriting-account-information) associées à un compte, mais dans d'autres cas, le service conservera un historique complet des modifications apportées au compte.
+
+## Conditions Générales d'Utilisation & Politique de Confidentialité
+
+Les CGU sont les règles que vous acceptez de suivre lorsque vous utilisez le service. Dans les grands services, ces règles sont souvent appliquées par des systèmes automatisés. Parfois, ces systèmes automatisés peuvent faire des erreurs. Par exemple, vous pouvez être banni ou bloqué de votre compte sur certains services pour avoir utilisé un VPN ou numéro VOIP. Il est souvent difficile de faire appel de ces interdictions, et cela implique également une procédure automatisée, qui n'aboutit pas toujours. C'est l'une des raisons pour lesquelles nous ne suggérons pas d'utiliser Gmail pour la messagerie électronique, par exemple. L'e-mail est essentiel pour accéder à d'autres services auxquels vous avez peut-être souscrit.
+
+La Politique de Confidentialité est la manière dont le service indique qu'il utilisera vos données. Elle mérite d'être lue pour que vous compreniez comment vos données seront utilisées. Une entreprise ou une organisation peut ne pas être légalement obligée de suivre tout ce qui est contenu dans la politique (cela dépend de la juridiction). Nous vous recommandons d'avoir une idée de la législation locale et de ce qu'elle autorise un prestataire à collecter.
+
+Nous vous recommandons de rechercher des termes particuliers tels que "collecte de données", "analyse de données", "cookies", "annonces", "publicité" ou services "tiers". Parfois, vous aurez la possibilité de refuser la collecte ou le partage de vos données, mais il est préférable de choisir un service qui respecte votre vie privée dès le départ.
+
+Vous faites également confiance à l'entreprise ou à l'organisation pour se conformer à sa propre politique de confidentialité.
+
+## Méthodes d'authentification
+
+Il existe généralement plusieurs façons de créer un compte, chacune ayant ses propres avantages et inconvénients.
+
+### E-mail et mot de passe
+
+Le moyen le plus courant de créer un nouveau compte est d'utiliser une adresse e-mail et un mot de passe. Lorsque vous utilisez cette méthode, vous devriez utiliser un gestionnaire de mots de passe et suivre les [bonnes pratiques](passwords-overview.md) concernant les mots de passe.
+
+!!! tip "Conseil"
+
+ Vous pouvez également utiliser votre gestionnaire de mots de passe pour gérer d'autres méthodes d'authentification ! Il suffit d'ajouter la nouvelle entrée et de remplir les champs appropriés. Vous pouvez ajouter des notes pour des choses comme des questions de sécurité ou une clé de secours.
+
+Vous serez responsable de la gestion de vos identifiants de connexion. Pour plus de sécurité, vous pouvez configurer [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md) sur vos comptes.
+
+[Gestionnaires de mots de passe recommandés](../passwords.md ""){.md-button}
+
+#### Alias d'e-mail
+
+Si vous ne voulez pas donner votre véritable adresse e-mail à un service, vous avez la possibilité d'utiliser un alias. Nous les avons décrits plus en détail sur notre page de recommandation des services d'e-mail. Essentiellement, les services d'alias vous permettent de créer de nouvelles adresses e-mail qui transmettent tous les courriers à votre adresse principale. Cela peut permettre d'éviter le pistage entre les services et vous aider à gérer les e-mail de marketing qui accompagnent parfois le processus d'inscription. Ceux-ci peuvent être filtrés automatiquement en fonction de l'alias auquel ils sont envoyés.
+
+Si un service est piraté, vous pouvez commencer à recevoir des e-mails d'hameçonnage ou de spam à l'adresse que vous avez utilisée pour vous inscrire. L'utilisation d'alias uniques pour chaque service peut aider à identifier exactement quel service a été piraté.
+
+[Services d'alias d'e-mail recommandés](../email.md#email-aliasing-services ""){.md-button}
+
+### Authentification unique
+
+!!! note "À noter"
+
+ Nous parlons de l'authentification unique pour l'usage personnel, pas pour les entreprises.
+
+L'authentification unique (SSO) est une méthode d'authentification qui vous permet de vous inscrire à un service sans partager beaucoup d'informations, voire aucune. Chaque fois que vous voyez quelque chose du type "Continuer avec *nom du fournisseur*" sur un formulaire d'inscription, il s'agit de SSO.
+
+Lorsque vous choisissez l'authentification unique sur un site web, la page de connexion de votre fournisseur d'authentification unique s'affiche et votre compte est ensuite connecté. Votre mot de passe ne sera pas communiqué, mais certaines informations de base le seront (vous pouvez les consulter lors de la demande de connexion). Ce processus est nécessaire chaque fois que vous voulez vous connecter au même compte.
+
+Les principaux avantages sont les suivants :
+
+- **Sécurité**: aucun risque d'être impliqué dans une [fuite de données](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Violation_de_donn%C3%A9es) car le site ne stocke pas vos informations d'identification.
+- **Facilité d'utilisation**: plusieurs comptes sont gérés par un seul login.
+
+Mais il y a des inconvénients :
+
+- **Vie privée**: un fournisseur de SSO connaîtra les services que vous utilisez.
+- **Centralisation**: si votre compte SSO est compromis ou si vous n'êtes pas en mesure de vous y connecter, tous les autres comptes qui y sont connectés sont affectés.
+
+Le SSO peut être particulièrement utile dans les situations où vous pouvez bénéficier d'une intégration plus poussée entre les services. Par exemple, l'un de ces services peut offrir le SSO pour les autres. Notre recommandation est de limiter le SSO aux seuls endroits où vous en avez besoin et de protéger le compte principal avec [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md).
+
+Tous les services qui utilisent le SSO seront aussi sécurisé que votre compte SSO. Par exemple, si vous souhaitez sécuriser un compte à l'aide d'une clé matérielle mais que ce service ne prend pas en charge les clés matérielles, vous pouvez sécuriser votre compte SSO à l'aide d'une clé matérielle et disposer ainsi d'un MFA matériel sur tous vos comptes. Il convient toutefois de noter qu'une authentification faible sur votre compte SSO signifie que tout compte lié à cette connexion sera également faiblement sécurisé.
+
+### Numéro de téléphone
+
+Nous vous recommandons d'éviter les services qui exigent un numéro de téléphone pour l'inscription. Un numéro de téléphone peut vous identifier auprès de plusieurs services et, en fonction des accords de partage des données, cela rendra votre navigation plus facile à suivre, en particulier si l'un de ces services a une fuite, car le numéro de téléphone est souvent **non** chiffré.
+
+Vous devriez éviter de donner votre vrai numéro de téléphone si vous le pouvez. Certains services autorisent l'utilisation de numéros VOIP, mais ceux-ci déclenchent souvent des systèmes de détection des fraudes, entraînant le blocage du compte, ce que nous ne recommandons pas pour les comptes importants.
+
+Dans de nombreux cas, vous devrez fournir un numéro à partir duquel vous pourrez recevoir des SMS ou des appels, en particulier lorsque vous effectuez des achats à l'étranger, au cas où votre commande rencontrerait un problème lors du contrôle aux frontières. Il est courant que les services utilisent votre numéro comme méthode de vérification ; ne vous faites pas bloquer un compte important parce que vous avez voulu être malin et donner un faux numéro !
+
+### Nom d'utilisateur et mot de passe
+
+Certains services vous permettent de vous inscrire sans utiliser d'adresse électronique et vous demandent seulement de définir un nom d'utilisateur et un mot de passe. Ces services peuvent offrir un anonymat accru lorsqu'ils sont associés à un VPN ou à Tor. Gardez à l'esprit que pour ces comptes, il n'y aura très probablement **aucun moyen de récupérer votre compte** au cas où vous oublieriez votre nom d'utilisateur ou votre mot de passe.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/basics/account-deletion.md b/i18n/fr/basics/account-deletion.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e248e6167
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/basics/account-deletion.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+title: "Suppression de compte"
+icon: 'material/account-remove'
+---
+
+Au fil du temps, il est facile d'accumuler un certain nombre de comptes en ligne, dont beaucoup ne sont peut-être plus utilisés. La suppression de ces comptes inutilisés est une étape importante dans la récupération de votre vie privée, car les comptes inactifs sont vulnérables aux fuites de données. Il y a une fuite des données lorsque la sécurité d'un service est compromise et que des informations protégées sont consultées, transmises ou volées par des acteurs non autorisés. Les fuites de données sont malheureusement [très fréquentes](https://haveibeenpwned.com/PwnedWebsites) de nos jours, et donc le meilleur moyen de minimiser l'impact qu'elles ont sur votre vie et de pratiquer une bonne hygiène numérique. L'objectif de ce guide est donc de vous aider à traverser le processus fastidieux de la suppression d'un compte, souvent rendu difficile à cause du [dark pattern](https://www.deceptive.design/), une pratique que certains services utilisent afin que vous abandonniez l'idée de supprimer votre compte.
+
+## Recherche d'anciens comptes
+
+### Gestionnaire de mots de passe
+
+Si vous disposez d'un gestionnaire de mots de passe que vous avez utilisé pendant toute votre vie numérique, cette partie sera très facile. Souvent, ils incluent une fonctionnalité intégrée pour détecter si vos informations d'identification ont été exposées dans une fuite de données - comme le [Data Breach Report](https://bitwarden.com/blog/have-you-been-pwned/) de Bitwarden.
+
+
+ 
+
+
+Même si vous n'avez pas explicitement utilisé un gestionnaire de mots de passe auparavant, il y a de fortes chances que vous ayez utilisé celui de votre navigateur ou de votre téléphone sans même vous en rendre compte. Par exemple : [Firefox Password Manager](https://support.mozilla.org/fr/kb/gestionnaire-mots-passe), [Google Password Manager](https://passwords.google.com/intro) et [Edge Password Manager](https://support.microsoft.com/fr-fr/microsoft-edge/enregistrer-ou-oublier-des-mots-de-passe-dans-microsoft-edge-b4beecb0-f2a8-1ca0-f26f-9ec247a3f336).
+
+Les systèmes d'exploitation aussi, disposent souvent d'un gestionnaire de mots de passe qui peut vous aider à récupérer les mots de passe que vous avez oubliés :
+
+- Windows [Credential Manager](https://support.microsoft.com/fr-fr/windows/acc%C3%A8s-au-gestionnaire-d-informations-d-identification-1b5c916a-6a16-889f-8581-fc16e8165ac0)
+- macOS [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/fr-fr/HT211145)
+- iOS [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/fr-fr/HT211146)
+- Linux, Gnome Keyring, accessible par [Seahorse](https://help.gnome.org/users/seahorse/stable/passwords-view.html.fr) ou [KDE Wallet Manager](https://userbase.kde.org/KDE_Wallet_Manager).
+
+### Email
+
+Si vous n'avez pas utilisé de gestionnaire de mots de passe dans le passé ou si vous pensez avoir des comptes qui n'ont jamais été ajoutés à votre gestionnaire de mots de passe, une autre option consiste à rechercher le ou les comptes de messagerie sur lesquels vous pensez vous être inscrit. Sur votre client de messagerie, recherchez des mots-clés tels que "vérifier" ou "bienvenue". Presque à chaque fois que vous créez un compte en ligne, le service envoie un lien de vérification ou un message d'introduction à votre adresse électronique. Cela peut être un bon moyen de retrouver d'anciens comptes oubliés.
+
+## Suppression des anciens comptes
+
+### Se connecter
+
+Pour supprimer vos anciens comptes, vous devez d'abord vous assurer que vous pouvez vous y connecter. Une fois encore, si le compte est enregistré dans votre gestionnaire de mots de passe, cette étape est facile. Si ce n'est pas le cas, vous pouvez essayer de deviner votre mot de passe. Dans le cas contraire, il existe généralement des options permettant de récupérer l'accès à votre compte, souvent disponibles par le biais d'un lien "mot de passe oublié" sur la page de connexion. Il est également possible que les comptes que vous avez abandonnés aient déjà été supprimés - il arrive que certains services suppriment tous les anciens comptes.
+
+Lorsque vous tentez de vous reconnecter, si le site renvoie un message d'erreur indiquant que cette adresse électronique n'est pas associée à un compte, ou si vous ne recevez pas de lien de réinitialisation après plusieurs tentatives, c'est que vous n'avez probablement pas de compte sous cette adresse électronique et devez en essayer une autre. Si vous n'arrivez pas à trouver l'adresse électronique que vous avez utilisée ou si vous n'avez plus accès à cette adresse, vous pouvez essayer de contacter l'assistance clientèle du service. Malheureusement, il n'y a aucune garantie que vous puissiez récupérer l'accès à votre compte.
+
+### RGPD (résidents de l'Espace Économique Européen uniquement)
+
+Les résidents de l'EEE disposent de droits supplémentaires concernant l'effacement des données spécifiés dans l'article [Article 17](https://www.gdpr.org/regulation/article-17.html) du RGPD. Si vous êtes concerné, lisez la politique de confidentialité de chaque service pour trouver des informations sur la manière d'exercer votre droit à l'effacement. La lecture de la politique de confidentialité peut s'avérer importante, car certains services proposent une option "Supprimer le compte" qui ne fait que le désactiver, vous devez dans ce cas prendre des mesures supplémentaires pour réellement supprimer votre compte. Parfois, la suppression effective peut impliquer de remplir des questionnaires, d'envoyer un courriel au responsable de la protection des données du service ou même de prouver que vous résidez dans l'EEE. Si vous envisagez de procéder de cette manière, n'écrasez **pas** les informations du compte - votre identité en tant que résident de l'EEE peut être requise. Notez que l'emplacement du service n'a pas d'importance ; le RGPD s'applique à toute personne desservant des utilisateurs européens. Si le service ne respecte pas votre droit à l'effacement, vous pouvez contacter votre [autorité nationale de protection des données](https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/rights-citizens/redress/what-should-i-do-if-i-think-my-personal-data-protection-rights-havent-been-respected_en) et vous pouvez avoir droit à une compensation monétaire. L'autorité nationale de protection des données en France est la [Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL)](https://www.cnil.fr/). Des modèles de courrier pour des clôtures de compte ou de suppression de données sont accessibles sur leur [site](https://www.cnil.fr/fr/modeles/courrier). Pour en savoir plus sur votre droit à l'effacement, voici un [article](https://www.cnil.fr/fr/le-droit-leffacement-supprimer-vos-donnees-en-ligne) de la CNIL.
+
+### Remplacer les informations de compte
+
+Dans certaines situations où vous prévoyez d'abandonner un compte, il peut être judicieux de modifier les informations du compte avec de fausses données. Une fois que vous vous êtes assuré que vous pouvez vous connecter, remplacez toutes les informations de votre compte par des informations falsifiées. La raison en est que de nombreux sites conservent les informations que vous aviez auparavant, même après la suppression du compte. L'idée est qu'ils écrasent les informations précédentes avec les données les plus récentes que vous avez saisies. Cependant, il n'y a aucune garantie qu'il n'y aura pas de sauvegardes avec les informations précédentes.
+
+Pour l'email du compte, créez un nouveau compte email alternatif via le fournisseur de votre choix ou créez un alias en utilisant un [service d'alias d'emails](/email/#email-aliasing-services). Vous pouvez ensuite supprimer cette adresse électronique une fois que vous avez terminé. Nous vous déconseillons d'utiliser des fournisseurs d'emails temporaires, car il est souvent possible de réactiver des emails temporaires.
+
+### Suppression
+
+Vous pouvez consulter [JustDeleteMe](https://justdeleteme.xyz/fr) pour obtenir des instructions sur la suppression du compte d'un service en particulier. Certains sites proposent gracieusement une option "Supprimer le compte", tandis que d'autres vont jusqu'à vous obliger à parler au service assistant. Le processus de suppression peut varier d'un site à l'autre, la suppression du compte peut être impossible sur certains.
+
+Pour les services qui ne permettent pas la suppression du compte, la meilleure chose à faire est de falsifier toutes vos informations comme indiqué précédemment et de renforcer la sécurité du compte. Pour ce faire, activez le [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md) et toutes les fonctions de sécurité supplémentaires proposées par le site web. De même, changez le mot de passe avec un mot de passe généré de manière aléatoire qui correspond à la taille maximale autorisée par le site web (un [gestionnaire de mots de passe](/passwords/#local-password-managers) peut être utile pour cela).
+
+Si vous êtes convaincu que toutes les informations auxquelles vous tenez ont été supprimées, vous pouvez oublier ce compte en toute sécurité. Si ce n'est pas le cas, il peut être judicieux de conserver les informations d'identification avec vos autres mots de passe et de vous reconnecter occasionnellement pour réinitialiser le mot de passe.
+
+Même lorsque vous êtes en mesure de supprimer un compte, il n'y a aucune garantie que toutes vos informations seront supprimées. Certaines entreprises sont tenues par la loi de conserver certaines informations, notamment lorsqu'elles sont liées à des transactions financières. Vous n'avez pratiquement aucun contrôle sur ce qui arrive à vos données lorsqu'il s'agit des sites web et des services cloud.
+
+## Éviter la création de nouveaux comptes
+
+Comme le dit le vieil adage, "Mieux vaut prévenir que guérir". Chaque fois que vous êtes tenté de vous inscrire à un nouveau service ou site web, demandez-vous : "En ai-je vraiment besoin ? Puis-je accomplir ce dont j'ai besoin sans compte ?" Il est souvent beaucoup plus difficile de supprimer un compte que d'en créer un. Et même après avoir supprimé ou modifié les informations sur votre compte, il se peut qu'il existe une version en cache provenant d'un tiers, comme [Internet Archive](https://archive.org/). Évitez la tentation quand vous le pouvez - votre futur vous en remerciera !
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/basics/common-misconceptions.md b/i18n/fr/basics/common-misconceptions.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f14eb5381
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/basics/common-misconceptions.md
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+---
+title: "Idées Reçues"
+icon: 'material/robot-confused'
+---
+
+## "Les logiciels libres et open-source sont toujours sécurisés" ou "Les logiciels propriétaires sont plus sécurisé"
+
+Ces mythes découlent d'un certain nombre de préjugés, mais le fait que le code source soit disponible ou non et la manière dont les logiciels sont concédés sous licence n'affectent en rien leur sécurité. ==Les logiciels open-source ont le *potentiel* d'être plus sécurisé que les logiciels propriétaires, mais il n'y a absolument aucune garantie que ce soit le cas.== Lorsque vous évaluez un logiciel, vous devez examiner la réputation et la sécurité de chaque outil individuellement.
+
+Les logiciels libres *peuvent* être audités par des tiers et sont souvent plus transparents sur les vulnérabilités potentielles que leurs homologues propriétaires. Ils vous permettent également d'examiner le code et de désactiver vous-même toute fonctionnalité suspecte. Cependant, *à moins que vous ne le fassiez*, il n'y a aucune garantie que le code ait jamais été évalué, en particulier pour les petits projets. Le processus de développement ouvert a aussi parfois été exploité pour introduire de nouvelles vulnérabilités même dans des projets importants.[^1]
+
+Par ailleurs, les logiciels propriétaires sont moins transparents, mais cela ne signifie pas qu'ils ne sont pas sécurisés. Des projets logiciels propriétaires majeurs peuvent être audités en interne et par des agences tierces, et des chercheurs indépendants en sécurité peuvent toujours trouver des vulnérabilités avec des techniques telles que la rétro-ingénierie.
+
+Pour éviter les décisions biaisées, il est *essentiel* que vous évaluiez les normes de confidentialité et de sécurité des logiciels que vous utilisez.
+
+## "Déplacer la confiance peut améliorer la vie privée"
+
+Nous parlons souvent de "déplacement de confiance" lorsque nous abordons des solutions telles que les VPN (qui déplacent la confiance que vous accordez à votre Fournisseur d'Accès Internet vers le fournisseur de VPN). Bien que cela protège vos données de navigation de votre FAI *spécifiquement*, le fournisseur de VPN que vous choisissez a toujours accès à vos données de navigation : Vos données ne sont pas complètement protégées de toutes les parties. Cela signifie que :
+
+1. Vous devez faire preuve de prudence lorsque vous choisissez un fournisseur auquel accorder votre confiance.
+2. Vous devez toujours utiliser d'autres techniques, comme E2EE, pour protéger complètement vos données. Le simple fait de se méfier d'un fournisseur pour faire confiance à un autre ne sécurise pas vos données.
+
+## "Les solutions axées sur la protection de la vie privée sont intrinsèquement dignes de confiance"
+
+Se concentrer uniquement sur les politiques de confidentialité et le marketing d'un outil ou d'un fournisseur peut vous aveugler face à ses faiblesses. Lorsque vous recherchez une solution plus privée, vous devez déterminer quel est le problème sous-jacent et trouver des solutions techniques à ce problème. Par exemple, vous voudrez peut-être éviter Google Drive, qui donne à Google l'accès à toutes vos données. Le problème sous-jacent dans ce cas est l'absence d'E2EE, vous devez donc vous assurer que le fournisseur vers lequel vous passez met effectivement en œuvre E2EE, ou utiliser un outil (comme [Cryptomator](../encryption.md#cryptomator-cloud)) qui fournit E2EE sur n'importe quel fournisseur de cloud. Le passage à un fournisseur "soucieux de la protection de la vie privée" (qui ne met pas en œuvre E2EE) ne résout pas votre problème : il ne fait que déplacer la confiance de Google vers ce fournisseur.
+
+Les politiques de confidentialité et les pratiques commerciales des fournisseurs que vous choisissez sont très importantes, mais doivent être considérées comme secondaires par rapport aux garanties techniques de votre vie privée : Vous ne devriez pas faire confiance à un autre fournisseur lorsque la confiance en un fournisseur n'est pas du tout requise.
+
+## "Plus c'est complexe mieux c'est"
+
+Nous voyons souvent des personnes décrire des modèles de menace pour protéger leurs vies privées qui sont trop complexes. Souvent, ces solutions incluent des problèmes tels que de nombreux comptes de messagerie différents ou des configurations compliquées avec de nombreuses pièces mobiles et conditions. Les réponses sont généralement des réponses à la question "Quelle est la meilleure façon de faire *X*?"
+
+Trouver la "meilleure" solution pour soi ne signifie pas nécessairement que l'on recherche une solution infaillible avec des dizaines de conditions - ces solutions sont souvent difficiles à utiliser de manière réaliste. Comme nous l'avons vu précédemment, la sécurité se fait souvent au détriment de la commodité. Nous vous donnons ci-dessous quelques conseils :
+
+1. ==Les actions doivent servir un objectif particulier:== réfléchissez à la manière de faire ce que vous voulez avec le moins d'actions possible.
+2. ==Supprimer les points d'échec humains:== nous échouons, nous nous fatiguons et nous oublions des choses. Pour maintenir la sécurité, évitez de vous appuyer sur des conditions et des processus manuels dont vous devez vous souvenir.
+3. ==Utilisez le bon niveau de protection pour ce que vous voulez faire.== Nous voyons souvent des recommandations de solutions soi-disant à l'épreuve des forces de l'ordre et des assignations/mandats. Celles-ci nécessitent souvent des connaissances spécialisées et ne sont généralement pas ce que les gens recherchent. Il ne sert à rien de construire un modèle de menace complexe pour l'anonymat si vous pouvez être facilement désanonymisé par un simple oubli.
+
+Alors, à quoi ça pourrait ressembler ?
+
+Les modèles de menace les plus clairs sont ceux où les gens *savent qui vous êtes* et ceux où ils ne le savent pas. Il y aura toujours des situations où vous devrez déclarer votre nom légal et d'autres où vous n'aurez pas à le faire.
+
+1. **Identité connue** - Une identité connue est utilisée pour les endroits où vous devez déclarer votre nom. Il existe de nombreux documents juridiques et contrats de ce type pour lesquels une identité légale est requise. Il peut s'agir de l'ouverture d'un compte bancaire, de la signature d'un bail immobilier, de l'obtention d'un passeport, de déclarations douanières lors de l'importation d'articles ou de toute autre démarche auprès de votre gouvernement. Ces éléments conduisent généralement à des informations d'identification telles que des cartes de crédit, des vérifications de la solvabilité, des numéros de compte et éventuellement des adresses physiques.
+
+ Nous ne suggérons pas l'utilisation d'un VPN ou de Tor pour toutes ces choses, car votre identité est déjà connue par d'autres moyens.
+
+ !!! tip "Conseil"
+
+ Lorsque vous effectuez des achats en ligne, l'utilisation d'une [consigne à colis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parcel_locker) peut contribuer à préserver la confidentialité de votre adresse physique.
+
+2. **Identité inconnue** - Une identité inconnue pourrait être un pseudonyme stable que vous utilisez régulièrement. Il n'est pas anonyme car il ne change pas. Si vous faites partie d'une communauté en ligne, vous souhaiterez peut-être conserver un personnage que les autres connaissent. Ce pseudonyme n'est pas anonyme car, s'il est surveillé suffisamment longtemps, les détails concernant le propriétaire peuvent révéler d'autres informations, telles que sa façon d'écrire, ses connaissances générales sur des sujets d'intérêt, etc.
+
+ Vous pouvez utiliser un VPN pour masquer votre adresse IP. Les transactions financières sont plus difficiles à masquer : Vous pouvez envisager d'utiliser des crypto-monnaies anonymes, comme [Monero](https://www.getmonero.org/). L'utilisation de monnaies alternatives peut également contribuer à masquer l'origine de votre monnaie. En règle générale, les centres d'échange exigent que le processus [KYC](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Know_your_customer) (connaissance du client) soit complété avant de vous autoriser à échanger de la monnaie fiduciaire contre tout type de cryptomonnaie. Les options de rencontres locales peuvent également être une solution, mais elles sont souvent plus coûteuses et nécessitent parfois un processus KYC.
+
+3. **Identité anonyme** - Même avec de l'expérience, les identités anonymes sont difficiles à maintenir sur de longues périodes. Il doit s'agir d'identités à court terme et de courte durée qui font l'objet d'une rotation régulière.
+
+ L'utilisation de Tor peut y contribuer. Il convient également de noter qu'un plus grand anonymat est possible grâce à la communication asynchrone : La communication en temps réel est vulnérable à l'analyse des habitudes de frappe (c'est-à-dire plus d'un paragraphe de texte, diffusé sur un forum, par e-mail, etc.)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
+
+[^1]: Un exemple notable est l'[incident de 2021 dans lequel des chercheurs de l'Université du Minnesota ont introduit trois vulnérabilités dans le projet de développement du noyau Linux](https://cse.umn.edu/cs/linux-incident).
diff --git a/i18n/fr/basics/common-threats.md b/i18n/fr/basics/common-threats.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a6e3a11c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/basics/common-threats.md
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+---
+title: "Menaces courantes"
+icon: 'material/eye-outline'
+---
+
+Pour faire simple, nous classons nos recommandations dans ces catégories générales de [menaces](threat-modeling.md) ou d'objectifs qui s'appliquent à la plupart des gens. ==Vous pouvez vous sentir concerné par une, plusieurs, toutes, ou bien aucune de ces possibilités==. Les outils et les services que vous utilisez dépendent également de vos objectifs. Il est possible que vous ayez des menaces spécifiques ne rentrant dans aucune de ces catégories, ce qui est tout à fait normal ! L'important est de bien comprendre les avantages et les inconvénients des outils que vous choisissez d'utiliser, car pratiquement aucun d'entre eux ne vous protégera contre toutes les menaces possibles.
+
+- :material-incognito: Anonymat - Séparer votre activité en ligne de votre identité réelle, vous vous protégez des personnes qui tentent de découvrir explicitement *votre* identité
+- :material-target-account: Attaques Ciblées - Se protéger contre les pirates informatiques dévoués ou d'autres agents malintentionnés essayant d'accéder spécifiquement à *vos* données ou appareils
+- :material-bug-outline: Attaques Passives - Se protéger des logiciels malveillants, des fuites de données, et autres attaques qui sont faites contre des groupes de personnes
+- :material-server-network: Fournisseurs de Services - Protéger vos données des fournisseurs de services, en utilisant par exemple un chiffrement de bout en bout rendant vos données illisibles par le serveur
+- :material-eye-outline: Surveillance de Masse - Protection contre les agences gouvernementales, organisations, sites web et services qui collaborent pour suivre vos activités en ligne
+- :material-account-cash: Capitalisme de Surveillance - Se protéger des grands réseaux publicitaires comme Google et Facebook, ainsi que d'une myriade d'autres collecteurs de données tiers
+- :material-account-search: Exposition Publique - Limiter les informations en ligne vous concernant, accessibles par les moteurs de recherche ou par le grand public
+- :material-close-outline: Censure - Éviter les accès censurés à l'information et d'être soi-même censuré lorsqu'on discute en ligne
+
+Certaines de ces menaces peuvent peser plus que d'autres en fonction de vos préoccupations. Par exemple, un développeur de logiciels ayant accès à des données précieuses ou critiques peut être principalement concerné par les :material-target-account: Attaques Ciblées. Mais de plus, il veut probablement empêcher ses données personnelles d'être récupérées par des programmes de :material-eye-outline: Surveillance de Masse. De même, une « personne lambda » peut être principalement concernée par l':material-account-search: Exposition Publique de ses données personnelles, mais devrait tout de même se méfier des problèmes de sécurité tels que les :material-bug-outline: Attaques Passives comme les logiciels malveillants affectant ses appareils.
+
+## Anonymat et vie privée
+
+:material-incognito: Anonymat
+
+L'anonymat et le concept de vie privée sont deux concepts radicalement différents. Avoir une vie privée en ligne est un ensemble de choix que vous faites sur la façon dont vos données sont utilisées et partagées, alors que l'anonymat est la dissociation complète de vos activités en ligne de votre identité réelle.
+
+Les lanceurs d'alerte et les journalistes, par exemple, peuvent avoir un modèle de menace beaucoup plus extrême nécessitant un anonymat total. Il ne s'agit pas seulement de cacher ce qu'ils font, les données dont ils disposent ou de ne pas se faire pirater par des hackers ou des gouvernements, mais aussi de cacher entièrement qui ils sont. Ils sont prêts à sacrifier tout type de commodité s'il s'agit de protéger leur anonymat, leur vie privée ou leur sécurité, car leur vie pourrait en dépendre. La plupart des gens n'ont pas besoin d'aller si loin.
+
+## Sécurité et vie privée
+
+:material-bug-outline: Attaques passives
+
+La sécurité et la vie privée sont souvent confondues, car vous avez besoin de sécurité pour obtenir tout semblant de vie privée. Utiliser des outils qui semblent respecter votre vie privée est futile s'ils peuvent facilement être exploités par des attaquants pour publier vos données plus tard. Cependant, l'inverse n'est pas nécessairement vrai ; le service le plus sécurisé au monde *ne respecte pas nécessairement* votre vie privée. Le meilleur exemple est de confier des données à Google qui, compte tenu de leur envergure, ont connu un minimum d'incidents de sécurité grâce à l'emploi d'experts en sécurité de premier plan pour sécuriser leur infrastructure. Même si Google fournit un service très sécurisé, rares sont ceux qui considèrent que leurs données restent privées en utilisant leurs outils gratuits (Gmail, YouTube, etc).
+
+En matière de sécurité des applications, nous ne savons généralement pas (et parfois ne pouvons pas) savoir si le logiciel que nous utilisons est malveillant, ou pourrait un jour le devenir. Même avec les développeurs les plus dignes de confiance, il n'y a généralement aucune garantie que leur logiciel ne présente pas une vulnérabilité grave qui pourrait être exploitée ultérieurement.
+
+Pour minimiser les dommages potentiels qu'un logiciel malveillant peut causer, vous devez employer la sécurité par compartimentation. Il peut s'agir d'utiliser des ordinateurs différents pour des tâches différentes, d'utiliser des machines virtuelles pour séparer différents groupes d'applications connexes ou d'utiliser un système d'exploitation sécurisé mettant l'accent sur le principe de [sandboxing](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandbox_(s%C3%A9curit%C3%A9_informatique)) (ou « bac à sable » en français) des applications et du [mandatory access control](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contr%C3%B4le_d'acc%C3%A8s_obligatoire) (ou « Contrôle d'accès obligatoire » en français).
+
+!!! tip "Conseil"
+
+ Les systèmes d'exploitation mobiles sont généralement plus sûrs que les systèmes d'exploitation de bureau en ce qui concerne le sandboxing des applications.
+
+ Les systèmes d'exploitation de bureau sont généralement à la traîne en ce qui concerne le sandboxing. ChromeOS possède des capacités de sandboxing similaires à celles d'Android, et macOS dispose d'un contrôle complet des autorisations système (et les développeurs peuvent opter pour le sandboxing pour les applications). Cependant, ces systèmes d'exploitation transmettent des informations d'identification à leurs constructeurs respectifs. Linux a tendance à ne pas soumettre d'informations aux fournisseurs de systèmes, mais il a une mauvaise protection contre les exploits et les applications malveillantes. Ce problème peut être quelque peu atténué avec des distributions spécialisées qui font un usage intensif des machines virtuelles ou des conteneurs, comme Qubes OS.
+
+:material-target-account: Attaques ciblées
+
+Les attaques ciblées contre une personne spécifique sont plus difficiles à gérer. Les voies d'attaque les plus courantes sont l'envoi de documents malveillants par courrier électronique, l'exploitation de vulnérabilités dans le navigateur et les systèmes d'exploitation, et les attaques physiques. Si cela vous préoccupe, il vous sera nécessaire de recourir à des stratégies plus avancées d'atténuation des menaces.
+
+!!! tip "Conseil"
+
+ **Les navigateurs web**, **les clients de messagerie électronique** et **les applications de bureautique** exécutent généralement volontairement, et par conception, du code non fiable qui vous est envoyé par des tiers. L'exécution de plusieurs machines virtuelles pour séparer les applications de ce type de votre système hôte ainsi que les unes des autres est une technique que vous pouvez utiliser pour éviter qu'un code d'exploitation dans ces applications ne compromette le reste de votre système. Les technologies comme Qubes OS ou Microsoft Defender Application Guard sur Windows fournissent des méthodes pratiques pour le faire de manière transparente, par exemple.
+
+Si vous êtes préoccupé par les **attaques physiques** vous devriez utiliser un système d'exploitation avec une implémentation de démarrage vérifié sécurisé, à la manière d'Android, d'iOS, de macOS ou de [Windows (avec TPM)](https://docs.microsoft.com/fr-fr/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process). Vous devriez également vous assurer que votre disque est chiffré et que le système d'exploitation utilise un TPM, une [Enclave sécurisée](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1) ou un [Element sécurisé](https://developers.google.com/android/security/android-ready-se) pour limiter le taux de tentatives de saisie de la phrase de passe. Vous devriez éviter de partager votre ordinateur avec des personnes en qui vous n'avez pas confiance, car la plupart des systèmes d'exploitation de bureau ne chiffrent pas les données séparément par utilisateur.
+
+## Protection de ses données des fournisseurs de services
+
+:material-server-network: Fournisseurs de service
+
+Nous vivons dans un monde où presque tout est connecté à Internet. Nos messages « privés », e-mails et nos interactions sociales sont généralement stockés sur un serveur quelque part. Généralement, lorsque vous envoyez un message à quelqu'un, ce message est alors stocké en clair sur un serveur, et lorsque votre ami souhaite lire le message, le serveur le lui montre.
+
+Le problème évident avec cela est que le fournisseur de services (ou un pirate informatique qui a compromis le serveur) peut consulter vos conversations "privées" quand et comme il le souhaite, sans jamais que vous ne le sachiez. Cela s'applique à de nombreux services courants tels que la messagerie SMS, Telegram, Discord, etc.
+
+Heureusement, le chiffrement de bout en bout peut atténuer ce problème en rendant illisibles les communications entre vous et vos destinataires avant même qu'elles ne soient envoyées au serveur. La confidentialité de vos messages est garantie, tant que le prestataire de services n'a pas accès aux clés privées d'une des deux personnes.
+
+!!! note "Note sur le chiffrement basé sur le web"
+
+ Dans la pratique, l'efficacité des différentes mises en œuvre du chiffrement de bout en bout varie. Des applications telles que [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal) s'exécutent nativement sur votre appareil, et chaque copie de l'application est la même sur différentes installations. Si le fournisseur de services venait à ouvrir une porte dérobée dans son application pour tenter de voler vos clés privées, cela pourrait être détecté ultérieurement par rétro-ingénierie.
+
+ D'autre part, les implémentations de chiffrement de bout en bout basées sur le web, telles que l'application web de Proton Mail ou le coffre-fort web de Bitwarden, reposent sur le serveur qui sert dynamiquement du code JavaScript au navigateur pour gérer les opérations cryptographiques. Un serveur malveillant pourrait cibler une personne spécifique et lui envoyer un code JavaScript malveillant pour voler sa clé de chiffrement, et il serait extrêmement difficile pour l'utilisateur de s'en rendre compte. Même si cette personne s'aperçoit de la tentative de vol de sa clé, il serait incroyablement difficile de prouver que c'est le fournisseur qui tente de le faire, car le serveur peut choisir de servir différents clients web à différentes personnes.
+
+ Par conséquent, lorsque vous comptez sur le chiffrement de bout en bout, vous devriez choisir d'utiliser des applications natives plutôt que des clients web, dans la mesure du possible.
+
+Même avec le chiffrement de bout en bout, les fournisseurs de services peuvent toujours vous profiler sur la base des **métadonnées**, qui ne sont généralement pas protégées. Si le fournisseur de services ne peut pas lire vos messages pour savoir ce que vous dites, il peut néanmoins observer des choses comme les personnes avec lesquelles vous parlez, la fréquence de vos messages et les heures où vous êtes généralement actif. La protection des métadonnées est assez rare, et vous devriez prêter une attention particulière à la documentation technique du logiciel que vous utilisez pour voir s'il y a une minimisation ou une protection des métadonnées, si cela vous préoccupe.
+
+## Programmes de surveillance de masse
+
+:material-eye-outline: Surveillance de masse
+
+La surveillance de masse est un effort visant à surveiller le "comportement, de nombreuses activités ou les informations" d'une population entière (ou d'une fraction substantielle d'une population).[^1] Elle fait souvent référence à des programmes gouvernementaux, tels que ceux [divulgués par Edward Snowden en 2013](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_surveillance_disclosures_(2013%E2%80%93present)). Cependant, elle peut également être réalisée par des entreprises, soit pour le compte d'agences gouvernementales, soit de leur propre initiative.
+
+!!! abstract "Atlas de la surveillance"
+
+ Si vous souhaitez en savoir plus sur les méthodes de surveillance et la manière dont elles sont mises en œuvre dans les villes aux États-Unis, vous pouvez également consulter l'[Atlas de la Surveillance](https://atlasofsurveillance.org/) de l'[Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.eff.org/).
+
+ En France, vous pouvez consulter le site [Technolopolice](https://technopolice.fr/villes/) géré par l'association à but non lucratif La Quadrature du Net.
+
+Les gouvernements justifient souvent les programmes de surveillance de masse comme des moyens nécessaires pour combattre le terrorisme et prévenir la criminalité. Cependant, en violation des droits de l'homme, ces programmes de surveillance sont, entre autres, le plus souvent utilisés pour cibler de manière disproportionnée les minorités et les dissidents politiques.
+
+!!! quote "ACLU : [*La leçon du 11 septembre en matière de vie privée : La surveillance de masse n'est pas la voie à suivre*](https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/the-privacy-lesson-of-9-11-mass-surveillance-is-not-the-way-forward)"
+
+ Face aux [révélations d'Edward Snowden sur des programmes gouvernementaux tels que [PRISM](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM_%28programme_de_surveillance%29) et [Upstream](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upstream_collection)], les responsables des services de renseignement ont également admis que la NSA collectait secrètement depuis des années des enregistrements sur pratiquement tous les appels téléphoniques des Américains - qui appelle qui, quand ces appels sont passés et la durée de ces appels. Ce type d'informations, lorsqu'il est amassé par la NSA quotidiennement, peut révéler des détails terriblement sensibles sur la vie des gens en associant ces données : s'ils ont appelé un pasteur, une clinique d'avortement, un centre d'addiction ou une ligne d'assistance contre le suicide par exemple.
+
+Malgré la surveillance de masse croissante aux États-Unis, le gouvernement a constaté que les programmes de surveillance de masse comme la section 215 ont eu "peu de valeur unique" en ce qui concerne l'arrêt de crimes réels ou de complots terroristes, les efforts faisant largement double emploi avec les programmes de surveillance ciblée du FBI.[^2]
+
+Vous pouvez être pisté de plusieurs manières en ligne :
+
+- Votre adresse IP
+- Les cookies de votre navigateur
+- Les données que vous soumettez aux sites web
+- L'empreinte numérique de votre navigateur ou de votre appareil
+- La corrélation des modes de paiement
+
+\[Cette liste n'est pas exhaustive].
+
+Si vous êtes préoccupé par les programmes de surveillance de masse, vous pouvez utiliser des stratégies comme cloisonner vos identités virtuelles, vous fondre dans la masse des utilisateurs, ou, dans la mesure du possible, simplement éviter de renseigner des informations qui pourraient permettre de vous identifier.
+
+:material-account-cash: Capitalisme de surveillance
+
+> Le capitalisme de surveillance est un système économique centré sur la collecte et la marchandisation des données personnelles dont le principal but est de faire du profit.[^3]
+
+Pour de nombreuses personnes, le pistage et la surveillance par des sociétés privées constituent une préoccupation croissante. Les réseaux publicitaires omniprésents, tels que ceux exploités par Google et Facebook, s'étendent sur internet bien au-delà des sites qu'ils contrôlent et suivent vos actions tout le long de votre navigation. L'utilisation d'outils tels que des bloqueurs de contenu pour limiter les requêtes du réseau vers leurs serveurs, et la lecture des politiques de confidentialité des services que vous utilisez peuvent vous aider à éviter de nombreux adversaires de base (bien que cela ne puisse pas empêcher complètement le pistage).[^4]
+
+En outre, même les entreprises n'appartenant pas au secteur de l'*Industrie Publicitaire (AdTech)* ou du pistage peuvent partager vos informations avec des [data brokers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_broker) (ou « courtiers en données » en français) (tels que Cambridge Analytica, Experian ou Datalogix) ou d'autres parties. Vous ne pouvez pas automatiquement supposer que vos données sont en sécurité simplement parce que le service que vous utilisez n'a pas un modèle économique typique de l'AdTech ou du pistage. La meilleure protection contre la collecte de données par les entreprises est de chiffrer ou d'obscurcir vos données dans la mesure du possible, afin qu'il soit plus difficile pour les différents fournisseurs de corréler les données entre elles et d'établir un profil sur vous.
+
+## Limiter l'information publique
+
+:material-account-search: Exposition publique
+
+La meilleure façon de préserver la confidentialité de vos données est tout simplement de ne pas les mettre en ligne. La suppression des informations indésirables que vous trouvez sur vous en ligne est l'une des meilleures premières mesures que vous pouvez prendre pour retrouver votre vie privée.
+
+- [Consultez notre guide sur la suppression de compte :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](account-deletion.md)
+
+Il est très important de vérifier les paramètres de confidentialité de votre compte pour limiter la diffusion de ces données sur les sites dans lesquels vous partagez des informations. Par exemple, activez le "mode privé" sur vos comptes si vous en avez la possibilité : cela garantit que votre compte n'est pas indexé par les moteurs de recherche et qu'il ne peut pas être consulté sans votre permission.
+
+Si vous avez déjà soumis vos véritables informations à des sites qui ne devraient pas les avoir, envisagez d'utiliser des tactiques de désinformation, comme la soumission d'informations fictives liées à cette identité en ligne. Vos vraies informations seront alors indiscernables des fausses informations.
+
+## Éviter la censure
+
+:material-close-outline: Censure
+
+La censure en ligne peut être exercée (à des degrés divers) par des acteurs tels que des gouvernements totalitaires, des administrateurs de réseaux et des fournisseurs de services. Ces efforts pour contrôler la communication et restreindre l'accès à l'information seront toujours incompatibles avec le droit humain à la liberté d'expression.[^5]
+
+La censure sur les plateformes privées est de plus en plus courante, car des plateformes comme Twitter et Facebook cèdent à la demande du public, aux pressions du marché et à celles des agences gouvernementales. Les pressions gouvernementales peuvent prendre la forme de demandes secrètes adressées aux entreprises, comme la Maison Blanche [demandant le retrait](https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/technology/on-the-web-a-fine-line-on-free-speech-across-globe.html) d'une vidéo provocante sur YouTube, ou de demandes manifestes, comme le gouvernement chinois exigeant des entreprises qu'elles adhèrent à un régime de censure strict.
+
+Les personnes concernées par la menace de la censure peuvent utiliser des technologies comme [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) pour la contourner, et soutenir des plateformes de communication résistantes à la censure comme [Matrix](../real-time-communication.md#element), qui ne dispose pas d'une autorité centralisée pouvant fermer des comptes de manière arbitraire.
+
+!!! tip "Conseil"
+
+ S'il peut être facile d'échapper à la censure en soi, cacher le fait que vous le faites peut être très problématique.
+
+ Vous devez prendre en compte quels aspects du réseau votre adversaire peut observer, et si vous avez une possibilité de déni plausible pour vos actions. Par exemple, l'utilisation de [DNS chiffrés](../advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns) peut vous aider à contourner les systèmes de censure rudimentaires basés sur les DNS, mais elle ne peut pas vraiment cacher ce que vous visitez à votre FAI. Un VPN ou Tor peut aider à cacher ce que vous visitez aux administrateurs du réseaux, mais ne peut pas cacher que vous utilisez ces réseaux. Les transports enfichables (tels que Obfs4proxy, Meek ou Shadowsocks) peuvent vous aider à contourner les pare-feu qui bloquent les protocoles VPN courants ou Tor, mais vos tentatives de contournement peuvent toujours être détectées par des méthodes telles que le sondage ou [l'inspection approfondie des paquets](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection).
+
+Vous devez toujours tenir compte des risques encourus en essayant de contourner la censure, des conséquences potentielles et du degré de sophistication de votre adversaire. Soyez très prudent dans le choix de vos logiciels et prévoyez un plan de secours au cas où vous seriez pris.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
+
+[^1]: Commission de surveillance de la vie privée et des libertés civiles des États-Unis : [Rapport sur le programme d'enregistrements téléphoniques mené en vertu de la section 215](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/ec542143-1079-424a-84b3-acc354698560/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf)
+[^2]: Conseil de surveillance de la vie privée et des libertés civiles des États-Unis : [*Rapport sur le programme d'enregistrements téléphoniques mené en vertu de la section 215*](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/ec542143-1079-424a-84b3-acc354698560/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf)
+[^3]: Wikipédia : [*Capitalisme de surveillance*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance_capitalism)
+[^4]: "[Énumérer la méchanceté](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/)" (ou "énumérer toutes les mauvaises choses que nous connaissons") comme le font de nombreux bloqueurs de publicités et programmes antivirus, ne permet pas de vous protéger correctement contre les menaces nouvelles et inconnues, car elles n'ont pas encore été ajoutées à la liste des filtres. Vous devriez également utiliser d'autres techniques d'atténuation.
+[^5]: Nations Unies : [*Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme*](https://www.un.org/fr/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights).
diff --git a/i18n/fr/basics/email-security.md b/i18n/fr/basics/email-security.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..512ee5b06
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/basics/email-security.md
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+---
+title: Sécurité des Emails
+icon: material/email
+---
+
+Le courrier électronique est une forme de communication non sécurisée par défaut. Vous pouvez améliorer la sécurité de votre courrier électronique avec des outils tels que OpenPGP, qui ajoute un chiffrement de bout en bout à vos messages, mais OpenPGP présente toujours un certain nombre d'inconvénients par rapport au chiffrement dans d'autres applications de messagerie, et certaines données de courrier électronique ne peuvent jamais être chiffrées de manière inhérente en raison de la manière dont le courrier électronique est conçu.
+
+Par conséquent, il est préférable d'utiliser le courrier électronique pour recevoir des courriels transactionnels (notifications, courriels de vérification, réinitialisation de mot de passe, etc.) provenant des services auxquels vous vous inscrivez en ligne, et non pour communiquer avec d'autres personnes.
+
+## Aperçu du chiffrement des e-mails
+
+La méthode standard pour ajouter du E2EE aux emails entre différents fournisseurs mails est d'utiliser OpenPGP. Il existe différentes implémentations de la norme OpenPGP, les plus courantes étant [GnuPG](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard) et [OpenPGP.js](https://openpgpjs.org).
+
+Il existe une autre norme populaire auprès des entreprises, appelée [S/MIME](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME), mais elle nécessite un certificat émis par une [Autorité de Certification](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) (toutes ne délivrent pas de certificats S/MIME). Elle est prise en charge par [Google Workplace](https://support.google.com/a/topic/9061730?hl=en&ref_topic=9061731) et [Outlook sur le Web ou Exchange Server 2016, 2019](https://support.office.com/en-us/article/encrypt-messages-by-using-s-mime-in-outlook-on-the-web-878c79fc-7088-4b39-966f-14512658f480).
+
+Même si vous utilisez OpenPGP, il ne prend pas en charge la [confidentialité persistante](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), ce qui signifie que si votre clé privée ou celle du destinataire est volée, tous les messages précédents chiffrés avec cette clé seront exposés. C'est pourquoi nous recommandons, dans la mesure du possible, les [messageries instantanées](../real-time-communication.md) qui mettent en œuvre la confidentialité persistante par rapport aux emails pour les communications de personne à personne.
+
+### Quels clients mails supportent le E2EE ?
+
+Les fournisseurs d'emails qui vous permettent d'utiliser les protocoles d'accès standard comme IMAP et SMTP peuvent être utilisés avec n'importe lequel des [clients mail que nous recommandons](../email-clients.md). En fonction de la méthode d'authentification, cela peut entraîner une diminution de la sécurité si le fournisseur ou le client mail ne prend pas en charge OATH ou une application passerelle, car [l'authentification multi-facteurs](/basics/multi-factor-authentication/) n'est pas possible avec l'authentification par mot de passe simple.
+
+### Comment Puis-Je Protéger Mes Clés Privées?
+
+Une carte à puce (telle qu'une [Yubikey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) ou [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com)) fonctionne en recevant un email chiffré d'un appareil (téléphone, tablette, ordinateur, etc.) exécutant un client mail/webmail. Le message est ensuite déchiffré par la carte à puce et le contenu déchiffré est renvoyé à l'appareil.
+
+Il est avantageux que le déchiffrement se fasse sur la carte à puce afin d'éviter d'exposer votre clé privée à un dispositif compromis.
+
+## Aperçu des Métadonnées des Emails
+
+Les métadonnées des emails sont stockées dans [l'en-tête de message](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) de l'email et comprennent certains en-têtes visibles que vous avez peut-être vus, tels que : `À`, `De`, `Cc`, `Date`, `Sujet`. Il existe également un certain nombre d'en-têtes cachés inclus par de nombreux clients et fournisseurs de messagerie qui peuvent révéler des informations sur votre compte.
+
+Le logiciel client peut utiliser les métadonnées de l'email pour montrer de qui provient un message et à quelle heure il a été reçu. Les serveurs peuvent l'utiliser pour déterminer où un email doit être envoyé, parmi [d'autres objectifs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) qui ne sont pas toujours transparents.
+
+### Qui Peut Voir Les Métadonnées Des Emails?
+
+Les métadonnées des emails sont protégées des observateurs extérieurs par le protocole [TLS Opportuniste](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunistic_TLS). Elles peuvent néanmoins être vues par votre logiciel client mail (ou webmail) et par tout serveur relayant le message de votre part à ses destinataires, y compris votre fournisseur mails. Parfois, les serveurs mails font également appel à des services tiers pour se protéger des spams, qui ont généralement aussi accès à vos messages.
+
+### Pourquoi les métadonnées ne peuvent-elles pas être E2EE?
+
+Les métadonnées des emails sont essentielles à la fonctionnalité la plus élémentaire d'un email (d'où il vient et où il doit aller). À l'origine, l'E2EE n'était pas intégré dans les protocoles d'emails, mais nécessitait un logiciel complémentaire comme OpenPGP. Comme les messages OpenPGP doivent toujours fonctionner avec les fournisseurs d'emails traditionnels, il ne peut pas chiffrer les métadonnées du mail, mais seulement le corps du message lui-même. Cela signifie que, même en utilisant OpenPGP, des observateurs extérieurs peuvent voir de nombreuses informations sur vos messages, comme l'identité de l'expéditeur, l'objet du message, le moment de l'envoi, etc.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md b/i18n/fr/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..75df6d712
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+---
+title: "Authentification multi-facteurs"
+icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication'
+---
+
+L'**Authentification Multi-Facteurs** (**MFA**) est un mécanisme de sécurité qui exige des étapes supplémentaires au-delà de la saisie du nom d'utilisateur (ou de l'email) et du mot de passe. La méthode la plus courante est celle des codes à durée limitée que vous pouvez recevoir par SMS ou par une application.
+
+Normalement, si un pirate informatique (ou un adversaire) est capable de trouver votre mot de passe, il aura alors accès au compte auquel ce mot de passe appartient. Un compte avec MFA oblige le pirate informatique à avoir à la fois le mot de passe (quelque chose que vous *connaissez*) et un appareil que vous possédez (quelque chose que vous *avez*), comme votre téléphone.
+
+Les méthodes MFA varient en termes de sécurité, mais elles reposent sur le principe suivant : plus il est difficile pour un hacker d'accéder à votre méthode MFA, mieux c'est. Parmi les méthodes MFA (de la plus faible à la plus forte), citons les SMS, les codes par e-mail, les notifications push des applications, TOTP, Yubico OTP et FIDO.
+
+## Comparaison des méthodes de MFA
+
+### MFA SMS ou Email
+
+La réception de codes OTP par SMS ou e-mail est l'un des moyens les plus faibles pour sécuriser vos comptes avec MFA. L'obtention d'un code par e-mail ou SMS retire de l'idée "quelque chose que vous *avez*", parce qu'il existe une variété de façons dont un pirate informatique pourrait [prendre le contrôle de votre numéro de téléphone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam) ou accéder à votre e-mail sans avoir physiquement accès à aucun de vos appareils. Si une personne non autorisée a accès à votre e-mail, ils seraient en mesure d'utiliser cet accès à la fois pour réinitialiser votre mot de passe et pour recevoir le code d'authentification, en leur donnant un accès complet à votre compte.
+
+### Notifications push
+
+La MFA par notification push prend la forme d'un message envoyé à une application sur votre téléphone vous demandant de confirmer les nouvelles connexions de compte. Cette méthode est bien meilleure que le SMS ou l'e-mail, car un attaquant ne pourrait généralement pas obtenir ces notifications push sans avoir un appareil déjà connecté, ce qui signifie qu'il devrait d'abord compromettre l'un de vos autres appareils.
+
+Nous faisons tous des erreurs, et il y a le risque que vous acceptiez la tentative de connexion par accident. Les autorisations de connexion par notification push sont généralement envoyées à *tous* vos appareils en même temps, ce qui élargit la disponibilité du code MFA si vous avez de nombreux appareils.
+
+La sécurité de la MFA par notification push dépend à la fois de la qualité de l'application, du composant serveur et de la confiance du développeur qui la produit. L'installation d'une application peut également vous obliger à accepter des privilèges envahissants qui donnent accès à d'autres données sur votre appareil. Une application individuelle nécessite également que vous ayez une application spécifique pour chaque service qui peut ne pas nécessiter l'ouverture d'un mot de passe. contrairement à une bonne application de générateur TOTP.
+
+### Mot de passe unique basé sur le temps (TOTP)
+
+TOTP est l'une des formes les plus courantes de MFA. Lorsque vous configurez un TOTP, vous devez généralement scanner un code QR [](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_QR) qui établit un "[secret partagé](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret_partag%C3%A9)" avec le service que vous avez l'intention d'utiliser. Le secret partagé est sécurisé à l'intérieur des données de l'application d'authentification, et est parfois protégé par un mot de passe.
+
+Le code limité dans le temps est alors dérivé du secret partagé et de l'heure courante. Comme le code n'est valable que pour une courte période, sans accès au secret partagé, un adversaire ne peut pas générer de nouveaux codes.
+
+Si vous disposez d'une clé de sécurité matérielle avec support TOTP (comme une YubiKey avec [Yubico Authenticator](https://www.yubico.com/products/yubico-authenticator/)), nous vous recommandons de stocker vos "secrets partagés" sur le matériel. Un matériel tel que la YubiKey a été développé dans l'intention de rendre le "secret partagé" difficile à extraire et à copier. Une clé YubiKey n'est pas non plus connectée à Internet, contrairement à un téléphone équipé d'une application TOTP.
+
+Contrairement à [WebAuthn](#fido-fast-identity-online), TOTP n'offre aucune protection contre les attaques d'[hammeçonnage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing) ou de réutilisation. Si un adversaire obtient de vous un code valide, il peut l'utiliser autant de fois qu'il le souhaite jusqu'à son expiration (généralement 60 secondes).
+
+Un adversaire pourrait créer un site web imitant un service officiel afin de vous inciter à donner votre nom d'utilisateur, votre mot de passe et votre code TOTP actuel. Si l'adversaire utilise ensuite ces informations d'identification enregistrées, il peut être en mesure de se connecter au service réel et de détourner le compte.
+
+Bien qu'imparfait, TOTP est suffisamment sûr pour la plupart des gens, et lorsque [les clés de sécurité matérielles](../multi-factor-authentication.md#hardware-security-keys) ne sont pas prises en charge [les applications d'authentification](../multi-factor-authentication.md#authenticator-apps) restent une bonne option.
+
+### Clés de Sécurité Matérielles
+
+La clé YubiKey stocke les données sur une puce à semi-conducteurs inviolable à laquelle il est [impossible d'accéder](https://security.stackexchange.com/a/245772) de manière non destructive sans un processus coûteux et un laboratoire d'expertise.
+
+Ces clés sont généralement multifonctionnelles et fournissent un certain nombre de méthodes d'authentification. Vous trouverez ci-dessous les plus courantes.
+
+#### Yubico OTP
+
+Le protocole OTP de Yubico est un protocole d'authentification généralement mis en œuvre dans les clés de sécurité matérielles. Lorsque vous décidez d'utiliser l'OTP de Yubico, la clé génère un identifiant public, un identifiant privé et une clé secrète qui sont ensuite téléchargés sur le serveur OTP de Yubico.
+
+Lorsque vous vous connectez à un site web, il vous suffit de toucher physiquement la clé de sécurité. La clé de sécurité émule un clavier et imprime un mot de passe unique dans le champ mot de passe.
+
+Le service transmettra ensuite le mot de passe unique au serveur Yubico OTP pour validation. Un compteur est incrémenté à la fois sur la clé et sur le serveur de validation de Yubico. L'OTP ne peut être utilisé qu'une seule fois, et lorsqu'une authentification réussie se produit, le compteur est augmenté, ce qui empêche la réutilisation de l'OTP. Yubico fournit un [document détaillé](https://developers.yubico.com/OTP/OTPs_Explained.html) sur le processus.
+
+
+ 
+
+
+L'utilisation de l'OTP de Yubico présente certains avantages et inconvénients par rapport à TOTP.
+
+Le serveur de validation Yubico est un service basé sur le cloud, et vous placez la confiance dans Yubico pour stocker les données en toute sécurité et ne pas vous profiler. L'identifiant public associé à l'OTP de Yubico est réutilisé sur tous les sites web et pourrait constituer un autre moyen pour des tiers de vous profiler. Comme TOTP, Yubico OTP ne fournit pas de résistance au phishing.
+
+Si votre modèle de menace exige que vous ayez des identités différentes sur différents sites Web, **ne pas** utiliser Yubico OTP avec la même clé de sécurité matérielle entre ces sites Web car l'identifiant public est unique à chaque clé de sécurité.
+
+#### FIDO (Fast IDentity Online)
+
+[FIDO](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIDO_Alliance) comprend un certain nombre de normes, d'abord l'U2F puis, plus tard, la [FIDO2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIDO2_Project) qui comprend la norme Web [WebAuthn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn).
+
+U2F et FIDO2 font référence au [Protocole client à authentificateur](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Client_to_Authenticator_Protocol), qui est le protocole entre la clé de sécurité et l'ordinateur, comme un ordinateur portable ou un téléphone. Il complète WebAuthn qui est le composant utilisé pour s'authentifier avec le site Web (la « partie utilisatrice ») sur lequel vous essayez de vous connecter.
+
+WebAuthn est la forme la plus sûre et la plus privée d'authentification par second facteur. Bien que l'expérience d'authentification soit similaire à celle de Yubico OTP, la clé n'imprime pas un mot de passe à usage unique et ne le valide pas auprès d'un serveur tiers. Il utilise plutôt la [cryptographie asymétrique](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography) pour l'authentification.
+
+
+ 
+
+
+Lorsque vous créez un compte, la clé publique est envoyée au service, puis lorsque vous vous connectez, le service vous demande de "signer" certaines données avec votre clé privée. L'avantage de cette méthode est qu'aucune donnée de mot de passe n'est jamais stockée par le service, et qu'il n'y a donc rien qu'un adversaire puisse voler.
+
+Cette présentation aborde l'histoire de l'authentification par mot de passe, les pièges (tels que la réutilisation du mot de passe), et discute des normes FIDO2 et [WebAuthn](https://webauthn.guide) .
+
+
+
+
+
+FIDO2 et WebAuthn présentent des propriétés de sécurité et de confidentialité supérieures à celles de toute autre méthode MFA.
+
+Généralement pour les services web, il est utilisé avec WebAuthn qui fait partie des [recommandations W3C](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Wide_Web_Consortium#W3C_recommendation_(REC)). Il utilise l'authentification asymétrique et est plus sécurisé que les secrets partagés utilisés dans les méthodes OTP de Yubico et TOTP, car il inclut le nom d'origine (habituellement le nom de domaine) lors de l'authentification. L'attestation est fournie pour vous protéger des attaques de phishing, car elle vous aide à déterminer que vous utilisez le service authentique et non une fausse copie.
+
+Contrairement à Yubico OTP, WebAuthn n'utilise pas d'identifiant public, de sorte que la clé est **non** identifiable sur différents sites web. Il n'utilise pas non plus de serveur cloud tiers pour l'authentification. Toute la communication se fait entre la clé et le site web auquel vous vous connectez. FIDO utilise également un compteur qui est incrémenté lors de l'utilisation afin d'empêcher la réutilisation de session et les clés clonées.
+
+Si un site Web ou un service prend en charge WebAuthn pour l'authentification, il est fortement recommandé de l'utiliser plutôt que toute autre forme de MFA.
+
+## Recommandations générales
+
+Nous avons les recommandations générales suivantes :
+
+### Quelle méthode choisir ?
+
+Lors de la configuration de votre méthode MFA, gardez à l'esprit qu'elle est aussi sécurisée que votre méthode d'authentification la plus faible que vous utilisez. Cela signifie qu'il est important que vous n'utilisiez que la meilleure méthode d'MFA disponible. Par exemple, si vous utilisez déjà TOTP, vous devez désactiver les MFA par e-mail et les SMS. Si vous utilisez déjà FIDO2/WebAuthn, vous ne devez pas utiliser Yubico OTP ou TOTP sur votre compte.
+
+### Sauvegardes
+
+Vous devriez toujours avoir des sauvegardes pour votre méthode MFA. Les clés de sécurité matérielle peuvent être perdues, volées ou simplement cesser de fonctionner au fil du temps. Il est recommandé d'avoir une paire de clés de sécurité matérielle avec le même accès à vos comptes au lieu d'une seule.
+
+Lorsque vous utilisez TOTP avec une application d'authentification, assurez-vous de sauvegarder vos clés de récupération ou l'application elle-même, ou copiez les « secrets partagés » vers une autre instance de l'application sur un autre téléphone ou vers un conteneur chiffré (par exemple [VeraCrypt](../encryption.md#veracrypt)).
+
+### Configuration Initiale
+
+Lors de l'achat d'une clé de sécurité, il est important de modifier les informations d'identification par défaut, de configurer la protection par mot de passe de la clé et d'activer la confirmation tactile si votre clé la prend en charge. Les produits tels que la clé YubiKey ont plusieurs interfaces avec des informations d'identification distinctes pour chacune d'entre elles, vous devez donc passer en revue chaque interface et mettre en place une protection.
+
+### E-mail et SMS
+
+Si vous devez utiliser le courrier électronique pour MFA, assurez-vous que le compte de courrier électronique est lui-même sécurisé avec une méthode MFA appropriée.
+
+Si vous utilisez la MFA par SMS, utilisez un opérateur qui ne changera pas votre numéro de téléphone pour une nouvelle carte SIM sans accès au compte, ou utilisez un numéro VoIP dédié d'un fournisseur offrant une sécurité similaire pour éviter une attaque par [échange de carte SIM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam).
+
+[Outils de MFA que nous recommandons](../multi-factor-authentication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+## Plus d'endroits pour configurer MFA
+
+Au-delà de la simple sécurisation des connexions à votre site web, l'authentification multifactorielle peut être utilisée pour sécuriser vos connexions locales, vos clés SSH ou même vos bases de données de mots de passe.
+
+### Windows
+
+Yubico dispose d'un [fournisseur d'identifiants](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/credential-providers-in-windows) dédié qui ajoute l'authentification à épreuve-réponse pour le flux de connexion nom d'utilisateur + mot de passe pour les comptes Windows locaux. Si vous avez une YubiKey avec le support d'authentification de Challenge-Response, jetez un œil au [Guide de configuration de Yubico pour Windows](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013708460-Yubico-Login-for-Windows-Configuration-Guide), qui vous permettra de configurer la MFA sur votre ordinateur Windows.
+
+### macOS
+
+macOS dispose d'un [support natif](https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/intro-to-smart-card-integration-depd0b888248/web) pour l'authentification par carte à puce (PIV). Si vous avez une carte à puce ou une clé de sécurité matérielle qui prend en charge l'interface PIV telle que la YubiKey, nous vous recommandons de suivre la documentation de votre fournisseur de sécurité de carte à puce/matérielle et de configurer l'authentification à second facteur pour votre ordinateur macOS.
+
+Yubico a un guide [Utiliser votre YubiKey comme une Smart Card dans macOS](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016649059) qui peut vous aider à configurer votre YubiKey sur macOS.
+
+Une fois votre carte à puce/clé de sécurité configurée, nous vous recommandons d'exécuter cette commande dans le terminal :
+
+```text
+sudo defaults write /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow DisableFDEAutoLogin -bool YES
+```
+
+Cette commande empêchera un adversaire de contourner le MFA au démarrage de l'ordinateur.
+
+### Linux
+
+!!! warning "Avertissement"
+
+ Si le nom d'hôte de votre système change (par exemple à cause du DHCP), vous ne pourrez pas vous connecter. Il est essentiel que vous configuriez un nom d'hôte approprié pour votre ordinateur avant de suivre ce guide.
+
+Le module `pam_u2f` sous Linux peut fournir une authentification à deux facteurs pour se connecter sur la plupart des distributions Linux populaires. Si vous avez une clé de sécurité matérielle qui prend en charge U2F, vous pouvez configurer l'authentification MFA pour votre connexion. Yubico a un guide [Ubuntu Linux Login Guide - U2F](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016649099-Ubuntu-Linux-Login-Guide-U2F) qui devrait fonctionner sur n'importe quelle distribution. Les commandes du gestionnaire de paquets - telles que `apt-get`- et les noms de paquets peuvent toutefois différer. Ce guide ne s'applique **pas** à Qubes OS.
+
+### Qubes OS
+
+Qubes OS prend en charge l'authentification Challenge-Response avec YubiKeys. Si vous avez une YubiKey avec un support d'authentification Challenge-Response, jetez un coup d'oeil à la documentation de Qubes OS [YubiKey](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/yubikey/) si vous voulez configurer la MFA sur Qubes OS.
+
+### SSH
+
+#### Clés de sécurité matérielles
+
+La MFA par SSH peut être configuré en utilisant plusieurs méthodes d'authentification différentes qui sont populaires avec les clés de sécurité matérielle. Nous vous recommandons de consulter la [documentation](https://developers.yubico.com/SSH/) de Yubico sur la manière de la configurer.
+
+#### Mot de passe unique basé sur le temps (TOTP)
+
+La MFA par SSH peut également être configurée en utilisant TOTP. DigitalOcean fourni un tutoriel [Comment configurer l'authentification multifacteurs pour SSH sur Ubuntu 20.04](https://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/how-to-set-up-multi-factor-authentication-for-ssh-on-ubuntu-20-04). La plupart des éléments devraient être les mêmes quelle que soit la distribution, mais les commandes du gestionnaire de paquets - telles que `apt-get`- et les noms des paquets peuvent différer.
+
+### KeePass (et KeePassXC)
+
+Les bases de données KeePass et KeePassXC peuvent être sécurisées en utilisant Challenge-Response ou HOTP comme second facteur d'authentification. Yubico a fourni un tutoriel pour KeePass [Using Your YubiKey with KeePass](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013779759-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-KeePass) et il y en a également un autre sur le site [KeePassXC](https://keepassxc.org/docs/#faq-yubikey-2fa) .
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/basics/passwords-overview.md b/i18n/fr/basics/passwords-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4f6fc80fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/basics/passwords-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+---
+title: "Introduction aux mots de passe"
+icon: 'material/form-textbox-password'
+---
+
+Les mots de passe sont un élément essentiel de notre vie numérique quotidienne. Nous les utilisons pour protéger nos comptes, nos appareils et nos secrets. Bien qu'ils soient souvent la seule chose qui nous sépare d'un adversaire qui en veut à nos informations privées, ils ne font pas l'objet d'une réflexion approfondie, ce qui conduit souvent les gens à utiliser des mots de passe faciles à deviner ou à forcer.
+
+## Bonnes pratiques
+
+### Utiliser des mots de passe uniques pour chaque service
+
+Imaginez ceci : vous vous inscrivez à un compte avec le même e-mail et le même mot de passe sur plusieurs services en ligne. Si l'un de ces fournisseurs de services est malveillant ou si son service subit une fuite de données qui expose votre mot de passe dans un format non chiffré, il suffit à un acteur malveillant d'essayer cette combinaison d'e-mail et de mot de passe sur plusieurs services populaires jusqu'à ce qu'il obtienne un résultat. La force de ce mot de passe n'a pas d'importance, car ils l'ont déjà.
+
+C'est ce qu'on appelle le [bourrage d'identifiants](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credential_stuffing), et c'est l'une des façons les plus courantes dont vos comptes peuvent être compromis par des cybercriminels. Pour éviter cela, assurez-vous de ne jamais réutiliser vos mots de passe.
+
+### Utilisez des mots de passe générés de manière aléatoire
+
+==Vous ne devez **jamais** compter sur vous-même pour trouver un bon mot de passe.== Nous vous recommandons d'utiliser [des mots de passe générés de manière aléatoire](#passwords) ou [des phrases secrètes de type "diceware"](#diceware-passphrases) avec une entropie suffisante pour protéger vos comptes et vos appareils.
+
+Tous nos [gestionnaires de mots de passe recommandés](../passwords.md) comprennent un générateur de mots de passe intégré que vous pouvez utiliser.
+
+### Rotation des mots de passe
+
+Vous devez éviter de changer trop souvent les mots de passe que vous devez retenir (comme le mot de passe principal de votre gestionnaire de mots de passe), sauf si vous avez des raisons de penser qu'ils ont été compromis, car le fait de les changer trop souvent vous expose au risque de les oublier.
+
+En ce qui concerne les mots de passe que vous n'avez pas à retenir (comme les mots de passe stockés dans votre gestionnaire de mots de passe), si votre [modèle de menace](threat-modeling.md) le demande, nous vous recommandons de passer en revue les comptes importants (en particulier les comptes qui n'utilisent pas l'authentification multi-facteurs) et de changer leur mot de passe tous les deux mois, au cas où ils auraient été compromis dans le cadre d'une fuite de données qui n'a pas encore été rendue publique. La plupart des gestionnaires de mots de passe vous permettent de fixer une date d'expiration pour votre mot de passe afin d'en faciliter la gestion.
+
+!!! tip "Vérifier les fuites de données"
+
+ Si votre gestionnaire de mots de passe vous permet de vérifier les mots de passe compromis, assurez-vous de le faire et changez rapidement tout mot de passe qui pourrait avoir été exposé dans une fuite de données. Vous pouvez également suivre le flux [Dernières Brèches de Have I Been Pwned](https://feeds.feedburner.com/HaveIBeenPwnedLatestBreaches) à l'aide d'un [agrégateur d'actualités](../news-aggregators.md).
+
+## Créer des mots de passe forts
+
+### Mots de passe
+
+De nombreux services imposent certains critères en ce qui concerne les mots de passe, notamment une longueur minimale ou maximale, ainsi que les caractères spéciaux qui peuvent être utilisés le cas échéant. Vous devez utiliser le générateur de mots de passe intégré à votre gestionnaire de mots de passe pour créer des mots de passe aussi longs et complexes que le service le permet en incluant des lettres majuscules et minuscules, des chiffres et des caractères spéciaux.
+
+Si vous avez besoin d'un mot de passe que vous pouvez mémoriser, nous vous recommandons la [phrase secrète diceware](#diceware-passphrases).
+
+### Phrases secrètes Diceware
+
+Diceware est une méthode permettant de créer des phrases secrètes faciles à retenir, mais difficiles à deviner.
+
+Les phrases secrètes Diceware sont une excellente option lorsque vous devez mémoriser ou saisir manuellement vos informations d'identification, par exemple pour le mot de passe principal de votre gestionnaire de mots de passe ou le mot de passe de chiffrement de votre appareil.
+
+Un exemple de phrase secrète diceware est `viewable fastness reluctant squishy seventeen shown pencil`.
+
+Pour générer une phrase secrète diceware à l'aide de vrais dés, suivez ces étapes :
+
+!!! note "À noter"
+
+ Ces instructions supposent que vous utilisez la [grande liste de mots de l'EFF](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) pour générer la phrase secrète, ce qui nécessite cinq lancers de dés par mot. D'autres listes de mots peuvent nécessiter plus ou moins de lancers par mot, et peuvent nécessiter un nombre différent de mots pour obtenir la même entropie.
+
+1. Lancez cinq fois un dé à six faces, en notant le nombre après chaque lancer.
+
+2. Par exemple, disons que vous avez obtenu `2-5-2-6-6`. Cherchez dans la [grande liste de mots de l'EFF](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) le mot qui correspond à `25266`.
+
+3. Vous trouverez le mot `encrypt`. Notez ce mot.
+
+4. Répétez ce processus jusqu'à ce que votre phrase secrète comporte autant de mots que nécessaire, que vous devez séparer par un espace.
+
+!!! warning "Avertissement"
+
+ Vous ne devez **pas** relancer les mots jusqu'à ce que vous obteniez une combinaison de mots qui vous plaît. Le processus doit être complètement aléatoire.
+
+Si vous n'avez pas accès à de vrais dés ou si vous préférez ne pas en utiliser, vous pouvez utiliser le générateur de mots de passe intégré à votre gestionnaire de mots de passe, car la plupart d'entre eux ont la possibilité de générer des phrases secrètes diceware en plus des mots de passe ordinaires.
+
+Nous vous recommandons d'utiliser la [grande liste de mots de l'EFF](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) pour générer vos phrases secrètes diceware, car elle offre exactement la même sécurité que la liste originale, tout en contenant des mots plus faciles à mémoriser. Il existe également [d'autres listes de mots dans différentes langues](https://theworld.com/~reinhold/diceware.html#Diceware%20in%20Other%20Languages|outline), si vous ne souhaitez pas que votre phrase secrète soit en anglais.
+
+??? note "Explication de l'entropie et de la force des phrases secrètes diceware"
+
+ Pour démontrer la force des phrases secrètes diceware, nous utiliserons la phrase secrète de sept mots mentionnée plus haut (`viewable fastness reluctant squishy seventeen shown pencil`) et la [grande liste de mots de l'EFF](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) comme exemple.
+
+ L'une des mesures permettant de déterminer la force d'une phrase secrète est son degré d'entropie. L'entropie par mot dans une phrase secrète est calculée comme suit : $\text{log}_2(\text{WordsInList})$ et l'entropie globale de la phrase secrète est calculée comme suit : $\text{log}_2(\text{WordsInList}^\text{WordsInPhrase})$.
+
+ Par conséquent, chaque mot de la liste susmentionnée génère ~12,9 bits d'entropie ($\text{log}_2(7776)$), et une phrase secrète de sept mots dérivée de cette liste a ~90,47 bits d'entropie ($\text{log}_2(7776^7)$).
+
+ La [grande liste de mots de l'EFF](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) contient 7776 mots uniques. Pour calculer le nombre de phrases secrètes possibles, il suffit de faire $\text{WordsInList}^\text{WordsInPhrase}$, ou dans notre cas, $7776^7$.
+
+ Mettons tout cela en perspective : Une phrase secrète de sept mots utilisant la [grande liste de mots de l'EFF](https://www.eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) est l'une des ~1 719 070 799 748 422 500 000 000 000 phrases secrètes possibles.
+
+ En moyenne, il faut essayer 50 % de toutes les combinaisons possibles pour deviner votre phrase. En gardant cela à l'esprit, même si votre adversaire est capable de faire ~1 000 000 000 000 de suppositions par seconde, il lui faudrait toujours ~27 255 689 ans pour deviner votre phrase secrète. C'est le cas même si les choses suivantes sont vraies :
+
+ - Votre adversaire sait que vous avez utilisé la méthode du diceware.
+ - Votre adversaire connaît la liste de mots spécifique que vous avez utilisée.
+ - Votre adversaire sait combien de mots contient votre phrase secrète.
+
+Pour résumer, les phrases secrètes diceware sont votre meilleure option lorsque vous avez besoin d'une phrase à la fois facile à retenir *et* exceptionnellement forte.
+
+## Stockage des mots de passe
+
+### Gestionnaires de mots de passe
+
+La meilleure façon de stocker vos mots de passe est d'utiliser un gestionnaire de mots de passe. Ils vous permettent de stocker vos mots de passe dans un fichier ou dans le cloud et de les protéger avec un seul mot de passe principal. Ainsi, vous n'aurez à retenir qu'un seul mot de passe fort, qui vous permettra d'accéder aux autres.
+
+Il existe de nombreuses options intéressantes, qu'elles soient basées sur le cloud ou locales. Choisissez l'un de nos gestionnaires de mots de passe recommandés et utilisez-le pour établir des mots de passe forts pour tous vos comptes. Nous vous recommandons de sécuriser votre gestionnaire de mots de passe avec une [phrase secrète diceware](#diceware-passphrases) composée d'au moins sept mots.
+
+[Liste des gestionnaires de mots de passe recommandés](../passwords.md ""){.md-button}
+
+!!! warning "Ne placez pas vos mots de passe et vos codes TOTP dans le même gestionnaire de mots de passe"
+
+ Lorsque vous utilisez des codes TOTP comme [authentification à multi-facteurs](../multi-factor-authentication.md), la meilleure pratique de sécurité consiste à conserver vos codes TOTP dans une [application séparée](../multi-factor-authentication.md#authenticator-apps).
+
+ Le stockage de vos codes TOTP au même endroit que vos mots de passe, bien que pratique, réduit les comptes à un seul facteur dans le cas où un adversaire aurait accès à votre gestionnaire de mots de passe.
+
+ En outre, nous ne recommandons pas de stocker des codes de récupération à usage unique dans votre gestionnaire de mots de passe. Ils doivent être stockés séparément, par exemple dans un conteneur chiffré sur un dispositif de stockage hors ligne.
+
+### Sauvegardes
+
+Vous devriez conserver une sauvegarde [chiffrée](../encryption.md) de vos mots de passe sur plusieurs dispositifs de stockage ou sur un fournisseur de stockage cloud. Cela peut vous aider à accéder à vos mots de passe si quelque chose arrive à votre appareil principal ou au service que vous utilisez.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/basics/threat-modeling.md b/i18n/fr/basics/threat-modeling.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..68ac24a6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/basics/threat-modeling.md
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+---
+title: "Modélisation des menaces"
+icon: 'material/target-account'
+---
+
+Trouver le bon équilibre entre la sécurité, la confidentialité et la commodité est l'une des premières et plus difficiles tâches que vous aurez à accomplir dans votre parcours pour regagner votre vie privée en ligne. Tout est une histoire de compromis : plus quelque chose est sécurisé, plus il est limité ou peu pratique, etc. Souvent, les gens trouvent que le problème avec les outils qui leurs sont recommandés est qu'ils sont trop difficiles à utiliser !
+
+Si vous vouliez utiliser les outils les **plus** sécurisés actuellement disponibles, vous devriez sacrifier *beaucoup* de commodité. Et même dans ce cas, ==rien n'est jamais totalement sécurisé.== On parle de sécurité **élevée**, mais jamais de sécurité **totale**. C'est pourquoi les modèles de menace sont importants.
+
+**Alors, quels sont ces modèles de menace ?**
+
+==Un modèle de menace est une liste des menaces les plus probables pour votre sécurité/vie privée.== Puisqu'il est impossible de se protéger contre **toutes** les attaques(ants), vous devriez vous concentrer sur les menaces **les plus probables**. En matière de sécurité informatique, une menace est un événement potentiel qui pourrait saper vos efforts pour protéger votre vie privée et votre sécurité.
+
+En vous concentrant sur les menaces qui comptent pour vous, vous affinez votre réflexion sur la protection dont vous avez besoin, ce qui vous permet de choisir les outils qui conviennent le mieux.
+
+## Création de votre modèle de menace
+
+Pour identifier ce qui pourrait arriver aux choses auxquelles vous tenez et déterminer de qui vous devez les protéger, vous devez répondre à ces cinq questions :
+
+1. Qu'est-ce que je veux protéger ?
+2. De qui je veux le protéger ?
+3. Quelle est la probabilité que je doive le protéger ?
+4. Quelles sont les conséquences si j'échoue ?
+5. Jusqu'à quel point suis-je prêt à me donner du mal pour essayer de prévenir les conséquences potentielles ?
+
+### Qu'est-ce que je veux protéger ?
+
+Un "actif" est quelque chose que vous valorisez et que vous voulez protéger. Dans le contexte de la sécurité numérique, ==un actif est généralement un type d'information.== Par exemple, vos e-mails, vos listes de contacts, vos messages instantanés, votre emplacement et vos fichiers sont tous des actifs possibles. Vos appareils eux-mêmes peuvent également constituer des actifs.
+
+*Dressez la liste de vos actifs : les données que vous conservez, où elles sont conservées, qui y a accès et ce qui empêche les autres d'y accéder.*
+
+### De qui je veux le protéger ?
+
+Pour répondre à cette question, il est important d'identifier qui pourrait vouloir vous cibler, vous ou vos informations. ==Une personne ou une entité qui représente une menace pour vos actifs est un “adversaire.”== Des exemples d'adversaires potentiels sont votre patron, votre ancien partenaire, une entreprise concurrentielle, votre gouvernement ou un pirate informatique sur un réseau public.
+
+*Dressez une liste de vos adversaires, ou de ceux qui pourraient vouloir s'emparer de vos actifs. Votre liste peut comprendre des particuliers, une agence gouvernementale ou des sociétés.*
+
+Selon l'identité de vos adversaires, dans certaines circonstances, cette liste peut être quelque chose que vous souhaitez détruire après avoir terminé ce plan de sécurité.
+
+### Quelle est la probabilité que je doive le protéger ?
+
+==Le risque est la probabilité qu'une menace particulière contre un actif particulier se produise réellement. Il va de pair avec la capacité. Si votre opérateur de téléphonie mobile a la capacité d'accéder à toutes vos données, le risque qu'il publie vos données privées en ligne pour nuire à votre réputation est faible.
+
+Il est important de faire la distinction entre ce qui pourrait se produire et la probabilité que cela se produise. Par exemple, votre bâtiment risque de s'effondrer, mais le risque que cela se produise est bien plus grand à San Francisco (où les tremblements de terre sont fréquents) qu'à Stockholm (où ils ne le sont pas).
+
+L'évaluation des risques est un processus à la fois personnel et subjectif. De nombreuses personnes jugent certaines menaces inacceptables, quelle que soit la probabilité qu'elles se produisent, car la simple présence de la menace, quelle que soit la probabilité, n'en vaut pas la peine. Dans d'autres cas, les gens ignorent les risques élevés parce qu'ils ne considèrent pas la menace comme un problème.
+
+*Notez les menaces que vous allez prendre au sérieux et celles qui sont peut-être trop rares ou trop inoffensives (ou trop difficiles à combattre) pour que vous vous en préoccupiez.*
+
+### Quelles sont les conséquences si j'échoue ?
+
+Il existe de nombreuses façons pour un adversaire d'accéder à vos données. Par exemple, un adversaire peut lire vos communications privées lorsqu'elles passent par le réseau, ou il peut supprimer ou corrompre vos données.
+
+==Les motifs des adversaires diffèrent considérablement, tout comme leurs tactiques.== Un gouvernement qui tente d'empêcher la diffusion d'une vidéo montrant des violences policières peut se contenter de supprimer ou de réduire la disponibilité de cette vidéo. En revanche, un adversaire politique pourrait vouloir accéder à un contenu secret et le publier à votre insu.
+
+Préparer un plan de sécurité implique de comprendre à quelle point les conséquences pourraient être mauvaises si un adversaire réussissait à accéder à l'un de vos actifs. Pour le déterminer, vous devez tenir compte du potentiel de votre adversaire. Par exemple, votre opérateur de téléphonie mobile a accès à tous vos relevés téléphoniques. Un pirate sur un réseau Wi-Fi ouvert peut accéder à vos communications non chiffrées. Votre gouvernement a peut-être des capacités plus importantes.
+
+*Écrivez ce que votre adversaire pourrait vouloir faire avec vos données privées.*
+
+### Jusqu'à quel point suis-je prêt à me donner du mal pour essayer de prévenir les conséquences potentielles ?
+
+==Il n'y a pas d'option parfaite pour la sécurité.== Tout le monde n'a pas les mêmes priorités, préoccupations, ou accès aux ressources. Votre évaluation des risques vous permettra de planifier la stratégie qui vous convient le mieux, en conciliant commodité, coût et respect de la vie privée.
+
+Par exemple, un avocat représentant un client dans une affaire de sécurité nationale peut être prêt à faire plus d'efforts pour protéger les communications relatives à cette affaire, par exemple en utilisant un e-mail chiffré, qu'une mère qui envoie régulièrement à sa fille des vidéos de chats amusants.
+
+*Notez les options dont vous disposez pour atténuer les menaces qui vous sont propres. Notez si vous avez des contraintes financières, techniques ou sociales.*
+
+### Essayez vous-même : protéger vos biens
+
+Ces questions peuvent s'appliquer à une grande variété de situations, en ligne et hors ligne. Pour illustrer de manière générique le fonctionnement de ces questions, établissons un plan pour assurer la sécurité de votre maison et de vos biens.
+
+**Que voulez-vous protéger ? (ou, *que possédez-vous qui mérite d'être protégé ?*)**
+:
+
+Vos actifs peuvent comprendre des bijoux, des appareils électroniques, des documents importants ou des photos.
+
+**De qui voulez-vous les protéger ?**
+:
+
+Vos adversaires peuvent être des cambrioleurs, des colocataires ou des invités.
+
+**Quelle est la probabilité que je doive les protéger ?**
+:
+
+Votre quartier a-t-il des antécédents de cambriolages ? Vos colocataires/invités sont-ils dignes de confiance ? Quelles sont les capacités de vos adversaires ? Quels sont les risques à prendre en compte ?
+
+**Quelles sont les conséquences si j'échoue ?**
+:
+
+Avez-vous quelque chose dans votre maison que vous ne pouvez pas remplacer ? Avez-vous le temps ou l'argent pour remplacer ces choses ? Avez-vous une assurance qui couvre les biens volés à votre domicile ?
+
+**Jusqu'à quel point suis-je prêt à me donner du mal pour essayer de prévenir ces conséquences ?**
+:
+
+Êtes-vous prêt à acheter un coffre-fort pour les documents sensibles ? Pouvez-vous vous permettre d'acheter une serrure de haute qualité ? Avez-vous le temps d'ouvrir un coffre-fort à votre banque locale et d'y conserver vos objets de valeur ?
+
+Ce n'est qu'après vous être posé ces questions que vous serez en mesure d'évaluer les mesures à prendre. Si vos biens ont de la valeur, mais que la probabilité d'une effraction est faible, alors vous ne voudrez peut-être pas investir trop d'argent dans un verrou. Mais si la probabilité d'une effraction est élevée, vous voudrez vous procurer la meilleure serrure du marché et envisager d'ajouter un système de sécurité.
+
+L'élaboration d'un plan de sécurité vous aidera à comprendre les menaces qui vous sont propres et à évaluer vos actifs, vos adversaires et les capacités de ces derniers, ainsi que la probabilité des risques auxquels vous êtes confrontés.
+
+## Pour en savoir plus
+
+Pour les personnes qui cherchent à améliorer leur vie privée et leur sécurité en ligne, nous avons dressé une liste des menaces courantes auxquelles nos visiteurs sont confrontés ou des objectifs qu'ils poursuivent, afin de vous donner de l'inspiration et de démontrer la base de nos recommandations.
+
+- [Objectifs et menaces courants :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](common-threats.md)
+
+## Sources
+
+- [EFF Surveillance Self Defense: votre plan de sécurité](https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/your-security-plan)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/basics/vpn-overview.md b/i18n/fr/basics/vpn-overview.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f1e17ec95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/basics/vpn-overview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+---
+title: Vue d'Ensemble VPN
+icon: material/vpn
+---
+
+Les Réseaux Privés Virtuels sont un moyen d'étendre l'extrémité de votre réseau à une sortie située ailleurs dans le monde. Un Fournisseur d'Accès Internet (FAI) peut voir le flux du trafic internet qui entre et sort de votre dispositif de terminaison de réseau (c'est-à-dire la box/modem).
+
+Les protocoles de chiffrement tels que HTTPS sont couramment utilisés sur internet, ils peuvent donc ne pas être en mesure de voir exactement ce que vous publiez ou lisez, mais ils peuvent avoir une idée [des domaines que vous visitez](../advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).
+
+Un VPN peut vous aider car il peut déplacer la confiance offerte à votre FAI vers un serveur situé ailleurs dans le monde. Par conséquent, le FAI ne voit que le fait que vous êtes connecté à un VPN et rien sur l'activité que vous lui transmettez.
+
+## Devrais-je utiliser un VPN ?
+
+**Oui**, sauf si vous utilisez déjà Tor. Un VPN fait deux choses: déplacer les risques de votre Fournisseur d'Accès à Internet vers lui-même et cacher votre adresse IP d'un service tiers.
+
+Les VPN ne peuvent pas chiffrer les données en dehors de la connexion entre votre appareil et le serveur VPN. Les fournisseurs de VPN peuvent voir et modifier votre trafic de la même manière que votre FAI pourrait le faire. Et il n'existe aucun moyen de vérifier de quelque manière que ce soit la politique de "non journalisation" d'un fournisseur de VPN.
+
+Cependant, ils cachent votre IP réelle d'un service tiers, à condition qu'il n'y ait pas de fuites d'IP. Ils vous aident à vous fondre dans la masse et à atténuer le suivi par IP.
+
+## Quand ne devrais-je pas utiliser un VPN ?
+
+L'utilisation d'un VPN dans les cas où vous utilisez votre [identité connue](common-threats.md#common-misconceptions) ne sera probablement pas utile.
+
+Cela peut déclencher des systèmes de détection de spam et de fraude, par exemple si vous vous connectez au site web de votre banque.
+
+## Qu'en est-il du chiffrement ?
+
+Le chiffrement offert par les fournisseurs VPN se situe entre vos appareils et leurs serveurs. Il garantit que ce lien spécifique est sécurisé. Il s'agit d'une avancée par rapport à l'utilisation de proxys non chiffrés où un adversaire sur le réseau peut intercepter les communications entre vos appareils et lesdits proxys et les modifier. Cependant, le chiffrement entre vos applications ou navigateurs et les fournisseurs de services n'est pas géré par ce chiffrement.
+
+Pour que ce que vous faites sur les sites web que vous visitez reste privé et sécurisé, vous devez utiliser le protocole HTTPS. Cela protégera vos mots de passe, jetons de session et requêtes du fournisseur VPN. Envisagez d'activer "HTTPS partout" dans votre navigateur pour atténuer les attaques de rétrogradation comme [SSL Strip](https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Marlinspike/BlackHat-DC-09-Marlinspike-Defeating-SSL.pdf).
+
+## Devrais-je utiliser un DNS chiffré avec un VPN ?
+
+À moins que votre fournisseur VPN n'héberge les serveurs DNS chiffrés, **non**. L'utilisation de DOH/DOT (ou de toute autre forme de DNS chiffré) avec des serveurs tiers ne fera qu'ajouter des entités supplémentaires auxquelles il faudra faire confiance, et ne fait **absolument rien** pour améliorer votre confidentialité/sécurité. Votre fournisseur de VPN peut toujours voir quels sites web vous visitez en se basant sur les adresses IP et d'autres méthodes. Au lieu de faire uniquement confiance à votre fournisseur de VPN, vous faites maintenant confiance à la fois au fournisseur de VPN et au fournisseur de DNS.
+
+Une raison courante de recommander le DNS chiffré est qu'il permet de lutter contre l'usurpation DNS. Cependant, votre navigateur devrait déjà vérifier la présence de [certificats TLS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Digital_certificates) avec **HTTPS** et vous en avertir. Si vous n'utilisez pas **HTTPS**, alors un adversaire peut toujours modifier n'importe quoi d'autre que vos requêtes DNS et le résultat final sera peu différent.
+
+Inutile de dire que **vous ne devriez pas utiliser de DNS chiffré avec Tor**. Toutes vos requêtes DNS seraient ainsi dirigées vers un seul circuit, ce qui permettrait au fournisseur de DNS chiffré de vous désanonymiser.
+
+## Devrais-je utiliser Tor *et* un VPN?
+
+En utilisant un VPN avec Tor, vous créez essentiellement un nœud d'entrée permanent, souvent avec une trace financière attachée. Cela ne vous apporte aucun avantages supplémentaires, tout en augmentant considérablement la surface d'attaque de votre connexion. Si vous souhaitez cacher votre utilisation de Tor à votre FAI ou à votre gouvernement, Tor a une solution intégrée pour cela : les passerelles Tor. [En savoir plus sur les passerelles Tor et pourquoi l'utilisation d'un VPN n'est pas nécessaire](../advanced/tor-overview.md).
+
+## Et si j'ai besoin d'anonymat ?
+
+Les VPNs ne peuvent pas fournir d'anonymat. Votre fournisseur de VPN verra toujours votre adresse IP réelle, et dispose souvent d'une trace financière qui peut être liée directement à vous. Vous ne pouvez pas compter sur des politiques de "non journalisation" pour protéger vos données. Utilisez plutôt [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/fr/).
+
+## Qu'en est-il des fournisseurs de VPN qui proposent des nœuds Tor ?
+
+N'utilisez pas cette fonctionnalité. L'intérêt d'utiliser Tor est que vous ne faites pas confiance à votre fournisseur de VPN. Actuellement Tor ne supporte que le protocole [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol). [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol) (utilisé dans [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC) pour le partage de la voix et de la vidéo, le nouveau protocole [HTTP3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3), etc...), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol) et les autres paquets seront abandonnés. Pour compenser cela, les fournisseurs de VPN acheminent généralement tous les paquets non TCP par leur serveur VPN (votre premier saut). C'est le cas de [Proton VPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn/). De plus, lorsque vous utilisez cette configuration Tor par VPN, vous n'avez pas le contrôle sur d'autres fonctionnalités importantes de Tor telles que [Adresse de Destination Isolée](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (utilisation d'un circuit Tor différent pour chaque domaine que vous visitez).
+
+Cette fonctionnalité doit être considérée comme un moyen pratique d'accéder au réseau Tor, et non comme un moyen de rester anonyme. Pour un véritable anonymat, utilisez le navigateur Tor, TorSocks, ou une passerelle Tor.
+
+## Quand les VPNs sont-ils utiles ?
+
+Un VPN peut toujours vous être utile dans divers scénarios, tels que :
+
+1. Cacher votre trafic de **seulement** votre Fournisseur d'Accès Internet.
+1. Cacher vos téléchargements (tels que les torrents) à votre FAI et aux organisations anti-piratage.
+1. Cacher votre adresse IP des sites web et services tiers, empêchant le suivi basé sur l'adresse IP.
+
+Pour des situations comme celles-ci, ou si vous avez une autre raison impérieuse, les fournisseurs de VPN que nous avons listés ci-dessus sont ceux que nous pensons être les plus dignes de confiance. Cependant, l'utilisation d'un fournisseur de VPN signifie toujours que vous *faites confiance* à ce fournisseur. Dans presque tous les autres cas, vous devriez utiliser un outil sécurisé **par conception** tel que Tor.
+
+## Sources et Lectures Complémentaires
+
+1. [VPN - un Récit Très Précaire](https://schub.io/blog/2019/04/08/very-precarious-narrative.html) par Dennis Schubert
+1. [Présentation du Réseau Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md)
+1. [IVPN Privacy Guides](https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides)
+1. ["Ai-je besoin d'un VPN ?"](https://www.doineedavpn.com), un outil développé par IVPN pour défier le marketing agressif des autres VPNs en aidant les individus à décider si un VPN leur convient.
+
+## Informations VPN Liées
+
+- [Le Problème avec les sites d'évaluation des VPNs et de la Vie Privée](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2019/11/20/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-review-sites/)
+- [Enquête sur les Applications VPN Gratuites](https://www.top10vpn.com/free-vpn-app-investigation/)
+- [Les propriétaires inconnus des VPNs dévoilés : 101 produits VPN gérés par seulement 23 sociétés](https://vpnpro.com/blog/hidden-vpn-owners-unveiled-97-vpns-23-companies/)
+- [Cette société chinoise est secrètement à l'origine de 24 applications populaires qui cherchent à obtenir des autorisations dangereuses](https://vpnpro.com/blog/chinese-company-secretly-behind-popular-apps-seeking-dangerous-permissions/)
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/calendar.md b/i18n/fr/calendar.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..de9deaeaa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/calendar.md
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+---
+title: "Synchronisation de calendrier"
+icon: material/calendar
+---
+
+Les calendriers contiennent certaines de vos données les plus sensibles ; utilisez des produits qui mettent en œuvre l'E2EE au repos pour empêcher un fournisseur de les lire.
+
+## Tutanota
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tutanota** propose un calendrier gratuit et chiffré sur l'ensemble de ses plateformes prises en charge. Les fonctionnalités incluent: E2EE automatique de toutes les données, fonctionnalités de partage, fonctionnalité d'import/export, authentification multifacteur, et [plus](https://tutanota.com/calendar-app-comparison/).
+
+ Les calendriers multiples et la fonctionnalité de partage étendue sont réservés aux abonnés payants.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://tutanota.com/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tutanota.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tutanota.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tutanota.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchagements"
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/tutanota/id922429609)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.tutanota.Tutanota)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.tutanota.com/)
+
+## Proton Calendar
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton Calendar** est un service de calendrier chiffré disponible pour les membres de Proton via des clients web ou mobiles. Les fonctionnalités incluent: E2EE automatique de toutes les données, des fonctions de partage, la fonctionnalité d'import/export, et [plus](https://proton.me/fr/support/proton-calendar-guide). Les abonnés au service gratuit n'ont accès qu'à un seul calendrier, tandis que les abonnés payants peuvent créer jusqu'à 20 calendriers. Les fonctionnalités de partage avancées sont également limitées aux abonnés payants.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://proton.me/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/proton-calendar-guide){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchagements"
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=me.proton.android.calendar)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://calendar.proton.me)
+
+## Critères
+
+**Veuillez noter que nous ne sommes affiliés à aucun des projets que nous recommandons.** En plus de [nos critères de base](about/criteria.md), nous avons développé un ensemble d'exigences claires pour nous permettre de fournir des recommandations objectives. Nous vous suggérons de vous familiariser avec cette liste avant de choisir d'utiliser un projet, et de mener vos propres recherches pour vous assurer que c'est le bon choix pour vous.
+
+!!! example "Cette section est récente"
+
+ Nous travaillons à l'établissement de critères définis pour chaque section de notre site, et celles-ci peuvent être sujet à changement. Si vous avez des questions sur nos critères, veuillez [poser la question sur notre forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) et ne supposez pas que nous n'avons pas pris en compte un élément dans nos recommandations s'il ne figure pas dans la liste. De nombreux facteurs sont pris en compte et discutés lorsque nous recommandons un projet, et la documentation de chacun d'entre eux est en cours.
+
+### Qualifications minimales
+
+- Doit synchroniser et stocker les informations avec E2EE pour s'assurer que les données ne sont pas visibles par le fournisseur de services.
+
+### Dans le meilleur des cas
+
+Nos critères de cas idéal représentent ce que nous aimerions voir d'un projet parfait dans cette catégorie. Nos recommandations peuvent ne pas inclure tout ou partie de cette fonctionnalité, mais celles qui l'inclus peuvent être mieux classées que les autres sur cette page.
+
+- Doit s'intégrer aux applications natives de gestion des contacts et de calendrier du système d'exploitation, le cas échéant.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/cloud.md b/i18n/fr/cloud.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dbebe3f7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/cloud.md
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+---
+title: "Stockage cloud"
+icon: material/file-cloud
+---
+
+De nombreux fournisseurs de stockage cloud nécessitent que vous leur fassiez entièrement confiance pour ne pas consulter vos fichiers. Les alternatives énumérées ci-dessous éliminent le besoin de confiance en vous mettant en position de contrôle de vos données ou en implémentant le chiffrement de bout en bout (E2EE).
+
+Si ces alternatives ne répondent pas à vos besoins, nous vous suggérons de vous tourner vers un [Logiciel de Chiffrement](encryption.md).
+
+??? question "Vous cherchez Nextcloud ?"
+
+ Nextcloud est [toujours un outil recommandé](productivity.md) pour l'auto-hébergement d'une suite de gestion de fichiers, mais nous ne recommandons pas de fournisseurs de stockage Nextcloud tiers pour le moment, car nous ne recommandons pas la fonctionnalité E2EE intégrée de Nextcloud pour les utilisateurs moyens.
+
+## Proton Drive
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton Drive** est un service de stockage de fichiers E2EE proposé par le célèbre fournisseur de courriers électroniques chiffrés [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/mail).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://proton.me/drive){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/drive){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchagements"
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=me.proton.android.drive)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1509667851)
+
+Les clients mobiles de Proton Drive ont été publiés en décembre 2022 et ne sont pas encore open-source. Proton a toujours retardé la publication de son code source jusqu'à la sortie initiale du produit, et [prévoit de](https://www.reddit.com/r/ProtonDrive/comments/zf14i8/comment/izdwmme/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web2x&context=3) publier le code source d'ici la fin 2023. Les clients de bureau de Proton Drive sont toujours en cours de développement.
+
+## Critères
+
+**Veuillez noter que nous ne sommes affiliés à aucun des projets que nous recommandons.** En plus de [nos critères de base](about/criteria.md), nous avons développé un ensemble d'exigences claires pour nous permettre de fournir des recommandations objectives. Nous vous suggérons de vous familiariser avec cette liste avant de choisir d'utiliser un projet, et de mener vos propres recherches pour vous assurer que c'est le bon choix pour vous.
+
+!!! example "Cette section est récente"
+
+ Nous travaillons à l'établissement de critères définis pour chaque section de notre site, et celles-ci peuvent être sujet à changement. Si vous avez des questions sur nos critères, veuillez [poser la question sur notre forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) et ne supposez pas que nous n'avons pas pris en compte un élément dans nos recommandations s'il ne figure pas dans la liste. De nombreux facteurs sont pris en compte et discutés lorsque nous recommandons un projet, et la documentation de chacun d'entre eux est en cours.
+
+### Exigences minimales
+
+- Doit imposer le chiffrement de bout en bout.
+- Doit avoir une offre gratuite ou une période d'essai pour les tests.
+- Doit prendre en charge l'authentification multifactorielle TOTP ou FIDO2, ou les connexions Passkey.
+- Doit offrir une interface web prennant en charge les fonctionnalités de base de gestion des fichiers.
+- Doit permettre d'exporter facilement tous les fichiers/documents.
+- Doit utiliser un chiffrement standard et audité.
+
+### Dans le meilleur des cas
+
+Nos critères de cas idéal représentent ce que nous aimerions voir d'un projet parfait dans cette catégorie. Nos recommandations peuvent ne pas inclure tout ou partie de cette fonctionnalité, mais celles qui l'inclus peuvent être mieux classées que les autres sur cette page.
+
+- Les clients doivent être open-source.
+- Les clients doivent être audités dans leur intégralité par un tiers indépendant.
+- Doit offrir des clients natifs pour Linux, Android, Windows, macOS et iOS.
+ - Ces clients doivent s'intégrer aux outils natifs du système d'exploitation pour les fournisseurs de stockage cloud, comme l'intégration de l'application Fichiers sur iOS, ou la fonctionnalité DocumentsProvider sur Android.
+- Doit permettre de partager facilement des fichiers avec d'autres utilisateurs.
+- Doit offrir au moins une fonctionnalité de base d'aperçu et d'édition de fichiers sur l'interface web.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/data-redaction.md b/i18n/fr/data-redaction.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9854f3598
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/data-redaction.md
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+---
+title: "Rédaction de données et de métadonnées"
+icon: material/tag-remove
+---
+
+Lorsque vous partagez des fichiers, veillez à supprimer les métadonnées associées. Les fichiers d'image comprennent généralement des données [Exif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exif) . Les photos comportent parfois même des coordonnées GPS dans les métadonnées du fichier.
+
+## Bureau
+
+### MAT2
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **MAT2** est un logiciel gratuit, qui permet de supprimer les métadonnées des types de fichiers image, audio, torrent et document. Il fournit à la fois un outil en ligne de commande et une interface utilisateur graphique via une [extension pour Nautilus](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/tree/master/nautilus), le gestionnaire de fichiers par défaut de [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), et [Dolphin](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/tree/master/dolphin), le gestionnaire de fichiers par défaut de [KDE](https://kde.org).
+
+ Sous Linux, un outil graphique tiers [Metadata Cleaner](https://gitlab.com/rmnvgr/metadata-cleaner) fonctionnant avec MAT2 existe et est [disponible sur Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/fr.romainvigier.MetadataCleaner).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Dépôt](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/blob/master/README.md){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchagements"
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://pypi.org/project/mat2)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2#requirements-setup-on-macos-os-x-using-homebrew)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://pypi.org/project/mat2)
+ - [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2#web-interface)
+
+## Mobile
+
+### ExifEraser (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **ExifEraser** est une application moderne d'effacement des métadonnées d'image sans autorisation pour Android.
+
+ Il prend actuellement en charge les fichiers JPEG, PNG et WebP.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Dépôt](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchagements"
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.none.tom.exiferaser)
+ - [:octicons-moon-16: Accrescent](https://accrescent.app/app/com.none.tom.exiferaser)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/Tommy-Geenexus/exif-eraser/releases)
+
+Les métadonnées qui sont effacées dépendent du type de fichier de l'image :
+
+* **JPEG**: Les métadonnées ICC Profile, Exif, Photoshop Image Resources et XMP/ExtendedXMP seront effacées si elles existent.
+* **PNG**: Les métadonnées ICC Profile, Exif et XMP seront effacées si elles existent.
+* **WebP**: les métadonnées ICC Profile, Exif et XMP seront effacées si elles existent.
+
+Après avoir traité les images, ExifEraser vous fournit un rapport complet sur ce qui a été exactement supprimé de chaque image.
+
+L'application offre plusieurs façons d'effacer les métadonnées des images. À savoir :
+
+* Vous pouvez partager une image depuis une autre application avec ExifEraser.
+* Par l'intermédiaire de l'application elle-même, vous pouvez sélectionner une seule image, plusieurs images à la fois, ou même un répertoire entier.
+* Elle comporte une option "Appareil photo", qui utilise l'application appareil photo de votre système d'exploitation pour prendre une photo, puis en supprime les métadonnées.
+* Elle vous permet de faire glisser des photos d'une autre application dans ExifEraser lorsque les deux sont ouvertes en mode écran partagé.
+* Enfin, elle vous permet de coller une image à partir de votre presse-papiers.
+
+### Metapho (iOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ Metapho est une visionneuse simple et propre pour les métadonnées des photos telles que la date, le nom du fichier, la taille, le modèle d'appareil photo, la vitesse d'obturation et le lieu.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://zininworks.com/metapho){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://zininworks.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchagements"
+
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/metapho/id914457352)
+
+### PrivacyBlur
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **PrivacyBlur** est une application gratuite qui permet de brouiller les parties sensibles des photos avant de les partager en ligne.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://privacyblur.app/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://privacyblur.app/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/MATHEMA-GmbH/privacyblur#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/MATHEMA-GmbH/privacyblur){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchagements"
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.mathema.privacyblur)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/privacyblur/id1536274106)
+
+!!! warning "Avertissement"
+
+ Vous ne devez **jamais** utiliser le flou pour expurger [du texte dans les images](https://bishopfox.com/blog/unredacter-tool-never-pixelation). Si vous voulez expurger du texte dans une image, dessinez une case sur le texte. Pour cela, nous vous suggérons [Pocket Paint](https://github.com/Catrobat/Paintroid) ou [Imagepipe](https://codeberg.org/Starfish/Imagepipe).
+
+## Ligne de commande
+
+### ExifTool
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **ExifTool** est la bibliothèque perl originale et l'application en ligne de commande pour lire, écrire et modifier les méta-informations (Exif, IPTC, XMP, etc.) dans une grande variété de formats de fichiers (JPEG, TIFF, PNG, PDF, RAW, etc.).
+
+ Elle est souvent un composant d'autres applications de suppression d'Exif et se trouve dans les dépôts de la plupart des distributions Linux.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://exiftool.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://exiftool.org/faq.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/exiftool/exiftool){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://exiftool.org/#donate){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchagements"
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://exiftool.org)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://exiftool.org)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://exiftool.org)
+
+!!! example "Suppression des données d'un répertoire de fichiers"
+
+ ```bash
+ exiftool -all= *.extension_de_fichier
+ ```
+
+## Critères
+
+**Veuillez noter que nous ne sommes affiliés à aucun des projets que nous recommandons.** En plus de [nos critères de base](about/criteria.md), nous avons développé un ensemble d'exigences claires pour nous permettre de fournir des recommandations objectives. Nous vous suggérons de vous familiariser avec cette liste avant de choisir d'utiliser un projet, et de mener vos propres recherches pour vous assurer que c'est le bon choix pour vous.
+
+!!! example "Cette section est récente"
+
+ Nous travaillons à l'établissement de critères définis pour chaque section de notre site, et celles-ci peuvent être sujet à changement. Si vous avez des questions sur nos critères, veuillez [poser la question sur notre forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) et ne supposez pas que nous n'avons pas pris en compte un élément dans nos recommandations s'il ne figure pas dans la liste. De nombreux facteurs sont pris en compte et discutés lorsque nous recommandons un projet, et la documentation de chacun d'entre eux est en cours.
+
+- Les applications développées pour les systèmes d'exploitation open source doivent être open source.
+- Les applications doivent être gratuites et ne doivent pas comporter de publicités ou d'autres limitations.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/desktop-browsers.md b/i18n/fr/desktop-browsers.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8eb4e4646
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/desktop-browsers.md
@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
+---
+title: "Navigateurs de Bureau"
+icon: material/laptop
+---
+
+Ce sont les navigateurs web de bureau et les configurations que nous recommandons actuellement pour une navigation classique/non anonyme. Si vous avez besoin de naviguer anonymement sur Internet, vous devriez plutôt utiliser [Tor](tor.md). D'une manière générale, nous vous recommandons de limiter au maximum les extensions de votre navigateur ; elles ont un accès privilégié dans votre navigateur, vous obligent à faire confiance au développeur, peuvent vous faire [sortir du lot](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empreinte_digitale_d%27appareil), et [affaiblir](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/chromium-extensions/c/0ei-UCHNm34/m/lDaXwQhzBAAJ) l'isolation des sites.
+
+## Firefox
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Firefox** offre de solides paramètres de confidentialité, tels que la [protection renforcée contre le suivi](https://support.mozilla.org/fr/kb/protection-renforcee-contre-pistage-firefox-ordinateur), qui peut contribuer à bloquer divers [types de suivi](https://support.mozilla.org/fr/kb/protection-renforcee-contre-pistage-firefox-ordinateur#w_what-enhanced-tracking-protection-blocks).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Accueil](https://firefox.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mozilla.org/fr/privacy/firefox/){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/){ .card-link title="Documentation"}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central){ .card-link title="Code source"}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.mozilla.org/fr/){ .card-link title=Contribuer}
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/mac)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox/linux)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.mozilla.firefox)
+
+!!! warning "Avertissement"
+ Firefox inclut un [jeton de téléchargement](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1677497#c0) unique dans les téléchargements effectués à partir du site Web de Mozilla et utilise la télémétrie dans Firefox pour envoyer le jeton. Le jeton **n'est pas** inclus dans les versions de [Mozilla FTP](https://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/firefox/releases/).
+
+### Configuration recommandée
+
+Le navigateur Tor est le seul moyen de vraiment naviguer anonymement sur Internet. Si vous utilisez Firefox, nous recommandons de modifier les paramètres suivants pour protéger votre vie privée de certains acteurs, mais tous les navigateurs autres que le [Navigateur Tor](tor.md#tor-browser) seront traçables par *quelqu'un* d'une manière ou d'une autre.
+
+Ces options se trouvent dans :material-menu: → **Paramètres** → **Confidentialité & Sécurité**.
+
+##### Protection renforcée contre le pistage
+
+- [x] Sélectionnez **Stricte** Protection renforcée contre le pistage
+
+Cela vous protège en bloquant les traceurs de réseaux sociaux, les scripts de prise d'empreinte (notez que cela ne vous protège pas de *toutes* les prises d'empreinte), les cryptomineurs, les cookies de suivi intersites et certains autres contenus de suivi. La PRT protège de nombreuses menaces courantes, mais ne bloque pas tous les moyens de suivi, car il est conçu pour avoir un impact minimal, voire nul, sur l'utilisation du site.
+
+##### Supprimer à la fermeture
+
+Si vous voulez rester connecté à des sites en particulier, vous pouvez autoriser des exceptions dans **Cookies et données de site** → **Gérer les exceptions....**
+
+- [x] Cochez **Supprimer les cookies et les données du site lorsque Firefox est fermé**
+
+Cela vous protège contre les cookies persistants, mais ne vous protège pas contre les cookies acquis au cours d'une même session de navigation. Lorsque cette option est activée, il devient possible de nettoyer facilement les cookies de votre navigateur en redémarrant simplement Firefox. Vous pouvez définir des exceptions par site, si vous souhaitez rester connecté à un site précis que vous visitez souvent.
+
+##### Suggestions de recherche
+
+- [ ] Décochez **Fournir des suggestions de recherche**
+
+Les fonctionnalités de suggestion de recherche peuvent ne pas être disponibles dans votre région.
+
+Les suggestions de recherche envoient tout ce que vous tapez dans la barre d'adresse au moteur de recherche par défaut, que vous effectuiez ou non une recherche effective. La désactivation des suggestions de recherche vous permet de contrôler plus précisément les données que vous envoyez à votre fournisseur de moteur de recherche.
+
+##### Télémétrie
+
+- [ ] Décochez **Autoriser Firefox à envoyer des données techniques et d'interaction à Mozilla**
+- [ ] Décochez **Autoriser Firefox à installer et à exécuter des études**
+- [ ] Décochez **Permettre à Firefox d'envoyer en votre nom les rapports de plantage**
+
+> Firefox nous envoie des données sur la version et la langue de votre Firefox ; le système d'exploitation de l'appareil et la configuration matérielle ; la mémoire, les informations de base sur les plantages et les erreurs; les résultats de processus automatisés tels que les mises à jour, la navigation sécurisée et l'activation de notre système. Lorsque Firefox nous envoie des données, votre adresse IP est temporairement collectée dans les journaux de notre serveur.
+
+En outre, le service Firefox Accounts collecte [certaines données techniques](https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/privacy/firefox/#firefox-accounts). Si vous utilisez un compte Firefox, vous pouvez la refuser :
+
+1. Ouvrez les [paramètres de votre profil sur accounts.firefox.com](https://accounts.firefox.com/settings#data-collection)
+2. Décochez **Collecte et utilisation de données** > **Aidez à améliorer les comptes Firefox**
+
+##### Mode HTTPS uniquement
+
+- [x] Sélectionnez **Activer le mode HTTPS uniquement dans toutes les fenêtres**
+
+Cela vous empêche de vous connecter involontairement à un site Web en "clair" HTTP. Les sites sans HTTPS sont rares de nos jours. Cela ne devrait donc avoir que peu ou pas d'impact sur votre navigation quotidienne.
+
+### Synchronisation Firefox
+
+La [Synchronisation Firefox](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2018/11/firefox-sync-privacy/) permet à vos données de navigation (historique, favoris, etc.) d'être accessibles sur tous vos appareils et les protège avec le chiffrement de bout en bout (E2EE).
+
+### Arkenfox (avancé)
+
+Le projet [Arkenfox](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js) fournit un ensemble d'options soigneusement étudiées pour Firefox. Si vous [décidez](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/1.1-To-Arkenfox-or-Not) d'utiliser Arkenfox, quelques [options](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/3.2-Overrides-[Common]) sont subjectivement strictes et/ou peuvent empêcher certains sites Web de fonctionner correctement. [Vous pouvez facilement modifier ces options](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/3.1-Overrides) pour répondre à vos besoins. Nous **recommandons vivement** de lire l'intégralité de leur [wiki](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki). Arkenfox permet également la prise en charge des [conteneurs](https://support.mozilla.org/fr/kb/conteneurs#w_for-advanced-users).
+
+## Brave
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Le navigateur Brave** comprend un bloqueur de contenu intégré et des [fonctions de confidentialité](https://brave.com/privacy-features/), dont la plupart sont activées par défaut.
+
+ Brave est basé sur le projet de navigateur Web Chromium. Il devrait donc vous être familier et présenter un minimum de problèmes de compatibilité avec les sites Web.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://brave.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://brave4u7jddbv7cyviptqjc7jusxh72uik7zt6adtckl5f4nwy2v72qd.onion){ .card-link title="Service onion" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://brave.com/privacy/browser/){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.brave.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+
+ ??? downloads annotate "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://brave.com/download/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://brave.com/download/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://brave.com/linux/) (1)
+
+ 1. Nous vous déconseillons d'utiliser la version Flatpak de Brave, car elle remplace la sandbox de Chromium par celle de Flatpak, qui est moins efficace. De plus, le paquet n'est pas maintenu par Brave Software, Inc.
+
+### Configuration recommandée
+
+Le navigateur Tor est le seul moyen de vraiment naviguer anonymement sur Internet. Lorsque vous utilisez Brave, nous vous recommandons de modifier les paramètres suivants afin de protéger votre vie privée de certains tiers, mais tous les navigateurs autres que le [Navigateur Tor](tor.md#tor-browser) seront traçables par *quelqu'un* d'une manière ou d'une autre.
+
+Ces options se trouvent dans :material-menu: → **Paramètres**.
+
+##### Shields
+
+Brave inclut certaines mesures contre la prise d'empreinte numérique dans sa fonction [Shields](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360022973471-What-is-Shields-). Nous vous suggérons de configurer ces options [de manière globale](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360023646212-How-do-I-configure-global-and-site-specific-Shields-settings-) sur toutes les pages que vous visitez.
+
+Les options Shields peuvent être réduites par site selon les besoins, mais par défaut, nous recommandons de définir les paramètres suivants:
+
+
+
+- [x] Sélectionnez **Empêchez les sites de prendre mon empreinte numérique en fonction de mes préférences linguistiques**
+- [x] Sélectionnez **Agressif** dans la rubrique Blocage des pisteurs et annonces
+
+ ??? warning "Utiliser les listes de filtres par défaut"
+ Brave vous permet de sélectionner des filtres de contenu supplémentaires dans la page interne `brave://adblock`. Nous vous déconseillons d'utiliser cette fonctionnalité ; conservez plutôt les listes de filtres par défaut. L'utilisation de listes supplémentaires vous distinguera des autres utilisateurs de Brave et peut également augmenter la surface d'attaque s'il y a une faille dans Brave et qu'une règle malveillante est ajoutée à l'une des listes que vous utilisez.
+
+- [x] (Facultatif) Sélectionnez **Bloquer les scripts** (1)
+- [x] Sélectionnez **Strict, peut casser les sites** sous Bloquer la capture d'empreinte numérique
+
+
+
+1. Cette option fournit une fonctionnalité similaire aux [modes de blocage](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) avancés de uBlock Origin ou l'extension [NoScript](https://noscript.net/).
+
+##### Blocage des médias sociaux
+
+- [ ] Décochez toutes les fonctionnalités de médias sociaux
+
+##### Confidentialité et sécurité
+
+
+
+- [x] Sélectionnez **Désactiver l'UDP pas en proxy** sous [Politique de gestion des adresses IP WebRTC](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360017989132-How-do-I-change-my-Privacy-Settings-#webrtc)
+- [ ] Décochez **Utiliser les services Google pour la messagerie push**
+- [ ] Décochez **Autoriser l'analyse de produits respectueuse de la vie privée (P3A)**
+- [ ] Décochez **Envoyer automatiquement un signal d'utilisation quotidienne à Brave**
+- [x] Sélectionnez **Toujours utiliser une connexion sécurisée** dans le menu **Sécurité**
+- [ ] Décochez **Fenêtre privée avec Tor** (1)
+
+ !!! tip "Nettoyer à la Fermeture"
+ - [x] Sélectionnez **Effacer les cookies et les données du site lorsque vous fermez toutes les fenêtres** dans le menu *Cookies et autres données du site*
+
+ Si vous souhaitez rester connecté à un site particulier que vous visitez souvent, vous pouvez définir des exceptions par site dans la section *Comportements personnalisés*.
+
+
+
+1. Brave **n'est pas** aussi résistant à la prise d'empreinte numérique que le navigateur Tor et beaucoup moins de personnes utilisent Brave avec Tor, vous sortirez donc du lot. Lorsqu'[un fort anonymat est nécessaire](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360018121491-What-is-a-Private-Window-with-Tor-Connectivity-) utilisez le [Navigateur Tor ](tor.md#tor-browser).
+
+##### Extensions
+
+Désactivez les extensions intégrées que vous n'utilisez pas dans **Extensions**
+
+- [ ] Décochez **Hangouts**
+- [ ] Décochez **WebTorrent**
+
+##### IPFS
+
+InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) est un réseau décentralisé, de pair à pair, permettant de stocker et de partager des données dans un système de fichiers distribué. À moins que vous n'utilisiez cette fonctionnalité, désactivez-la.
+
+- [x] Sélectionnez **désactivé** dans la méthode pour résoudre les ressources IPFS
+
+##### Paramètres additionnels
+
+Dans le menu *Système*
+
+
+
+- [ ] Décochez **Continuer l'exécution des applications lorsque Brave est fermé** pour désactiver les applications en arrière-plan (1)
+
+
+
+1. Cette option n'est pas présente sur toutes les plateformes.
+
+### Synchronisation Brave
+
+La [Synchronisation Brave](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360059793111-Understanding-Brave-Sync) permet à vos données de navigation (historique, signets, etc.) d'être accessibles sur tous vos appareils sans nécessiter de compte et les protège avec E2EE.
+
+## Ressources Supplémentaires
+
+Nous ne recommandons généralement pas l'installation d'extensions, car elles augmentent votre surface d'attaque. Cependant, uBlock Origin peut s'avérer utile si vous appréciez la fonctionnalité de blocage de contenu.
+
+### uBlock Origin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **uBlock Origin** est un bloqueur de contenu populaire qui peut vous aider à bloquer les publicités, les traqueurs et les scripts d'empreintes numériques.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Dépôt](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/ublock-origin/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/ublock-origin/cjpalhdlnbpafiamejdnhcphjbkeiagm)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/ublock-origin/odfafepnkmbhccpbejgmiehpchacaeak)
+
+Nous vous suggérons de suivre la [documentation du développeur](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) et de choisir l'un des "modes". Des listes de filtres supplémentaires peuvent avoir un impact sur les performances et [peuvent augmenter la surface d'attaque](https://portswigger.net/research/ublock-i-exfiltrate-exploiting-ad-blockers-with-css).
+
+##### Autres listes
+
+Voici d'autres [listes de filtres](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Dashboard:-Filter-lists) que vous pourriez envisager d'ajouter :
+
+- [x] Cochez **Confidentialité** > **AdGuard URL Tracking Protection**
+- Ajoutez [Actually Legitimate URL Shortener Tool](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DandelionSprout/adfilt/master/LegitimateURLShortener.txt)
+
+## Critères
+
+**Veuillez noter que nous ne sommes affiliés à aucun des projets que nous recommandons.** En plus de [nos critères de base](about/criteria.md), nous avons développé un ensemble d'exigences claires pour nous permettre de fournir des recommandations objectives. Nous vous suggérons de vous familiariser avec cette liste avant de choisir d'utiliser un projet, et de mener vos propres recherches pour vous assurer que c'est le bon choix pour vous.
+
+!!! example "Cette section est récente"
+
+ Nous travaillons à l'établissement de critères définis pour chaque section de notre site, et celles-ci peuvent être sujet à changement. Si vous avez des questions sur nos critères, veuillez [poser la question sur notre forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) et ne supposez pas que nous n'avons pas pris en compte un élément dans nos recommandations s'il ne figure pas dans la liste. De nombreux facteurs sont pris en compte et discutés lorsque nous recommandons un projet, et la documentation de chacun d'entre eux est en cours.
+
+### Exigences minimales
+
+- Doit être un logiciel open source.
+- Prend en charge les mises à jour automatiques.
+- Reçoit les mises à jour du moteur dans un délai de 1 jour à partir de la publication en amont.
+- Disponible sur Linux, macOS et Windows.
+- Les modifications nécessaires pour rendre le navigateur plus respectueux de la vie privée ne devraient pas avoir d'impact négatif sur l'expérience des utilisateurs.
+- Bloque les cookies tiers par défaut.
+- Prend en charge le [cloisonnement des états](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning) pour atténuer le suivi intersite.[^1]
+
+### Dans le meilleur des cas
+
+Nos critères de cas idéal représentent ce que nous aimerions voir d'un projet parfait dans cette catégorie. Nos recommandations peuvent ne pas inclure tout ou partie de cette fonctionnalité, mais celles qui l'inclus peuvent être mieux classées que les autres sur cette page.
+
+- Comprend une fonctionnalité intégrée de blocage du contenu.
+- Supporte la compartimentation des cookies (à la [Multi-Account Containers](https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/containers)).
+- Prend en charge les Progressive Web Apps.
+ Les PWAs vous permettent d'installer certains sites web comme s'il s'agissait d'applications natives sur votre ordinateur. Cela peut présenter des avantages par rapport à l'installation d'applications basées sur Electron, car vous bénéficiez des mises à jour de sécurité régulières de votre navigateur.
+- Ne comprend pas de fonctionnalités supplémentaires (bloatware) qui n'ont pas d'incidence sur la vie privée des utilisateurs.
+- Ne collecte pas de télémétrie par défaut.
+- Fournit une implémentation de serveur de synchronisation open-source.
+- Le moteur de recherche par défaut est un [moteur de recherche privé](search-engines.md).
+
+### Critères d'extension
+
+- Ne doit pas dupliquer une fonctionnalité intégrée dans le navigateur ou dans le système d'exploitation.
+- Doit avoir un impact direct sur la vie privée des utilisateurs, c'est-à-dire qu'il ne doit pas simplement fournir des informations.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
+
+[^1]: L'implémentation de Brave est détaillée dans [Mises à jour de la confidentialité de Brave : Partitionnement de l'état du réseau pour la confidentialité](https://brave.com/privacy-updates/14-partitioning-network-state/).
diff --git a/i18n/fr/desktop.md b/i18n/fr/desktop.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c72388f7c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/desktop.md
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+---
+title: "Bureau/PC"
+icon: simple/linux
+---
+
+Les distributions Linux sont généralement recommandées pour la protection de la vie privée et la liberté logicielle. Si vous n'utilisez pas encore Linux, vous trouverez ci-dessous quelques distributions que nous vous suggérons d'essayer, ainsi que des conseils généraux d'amélioration de la sécurité et de la confidentialité qui s'appliquent à de nombreuses distributions Linux.
+
+- [Vue d'ensemble de Linux :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/linux-overview.md)
+
+## Distributions Traditionnelles
+
+### Station de Travail Fedora
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Fedora Workstation** est notre distribution recommandée pour les personnes débutant sous Linux. Fedora adopte généralement les nouvelles technologies avant les autres distributions, par exemple, [Wayland](https://wayland.freedesktop.org/), [PipeWire](https://pipewire.org), et bientôt. Ces nouvelles technologies s'accompagnent souvent d'améliorations générales en matière de sécurité, de vie privée et d'ergonomie.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://getfedora.org/fr/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/fr/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://whatcanidoforfedora.org/){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+Fedora a un cycle de publication semi-continu. Si certains paquets comme [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org) sont gelés jusqu'à la prochaine version de Fedora, la plupart des paquets (y compris le noyau) sont mis à jour fréquemment tout au long de la durée de vie de la version. Chaque version de Fedora est supportée pendant un an, avec une nouvelle version publiée tous les 6 mois.
+
+### openSUSE Tumbleweed
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **openSUSE Tumbleweed** est une distribution stable à publication continue.
+
+ openSUSE Tumbleweed dispose d'un système de [mise à jour transactionnelle](https://kubic.opensuse.org/blog/2018-04-04-transactionalupdates/) qui utilise [Btrfs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Btrfs) et [Snapper](https://en.opensuse.org/openSUSE:Snapper_Tutorial) pour s'assurer que les livraisons peuvent être annulées en cas de problème.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://get.opensuse.org/fr/tumbleweed/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://doc.opensuse.org/fr/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://shop.opensuse.org/){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+Tumbleweed suit un modèle de publication continu où chaque mise à jour est publiée comme un instantané de la distribution. Lorsque vous mettez votre système à niveau, un nouvel instantané est téléchargé. Chaque livraison est soumise à une série de tests automatisés par [openQA](https://openqa.opensuse.org) afin de garantir sa qualité.
+
+### Arch Linux
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Arch Linux** est une distribution légère, de type do-it-yourself (DIY), ce qui signifie que vous n'obtenez que ce que vous installez. Pour plus d'informations, voir leur [FAQ](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Frequently_asked_questions_(Fran%C3%A7ais)).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://archlinux.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Main_page_(Fran%C3%A7ais)){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://archlinux.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+Arch Linux a un cycle de publication continue. Il n'y a pas de calendrier de publication fixe et les paquets sont mis à jour très fréquemment.
+
+S'agissant d'une distribution DIY, vous êtes [censé mettre en place et maintenir](os/linux-overview.md#arch-based-distributions) votre système par vous-même. Arch a un [installateur officiel](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Archinstall_(Fran%C3%A7ais)) pour rendre le processus d'installation un peu plus facile.
+
+Une grande partie des [paquets d'Arch Linux](https://reproducible.archlinux.org) sont [reproductibles](https://reproducible-builds.org).
+
+## Distributions Immuables
+
+### Fedora Silverblue
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Fedora Silverblue** et **Fedora Kinoite** sont des variantes immuables de Fedora qui mettent l'accent sur les flux de travail en conteneur. Silverblue est livré avec l'environnement de bureau [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org/) tandis que Kinoite est livré avec [KDE](https://kde.org/fr/). Silverblue et Kinoite suivent le même calendrier de publication que Fedora Workstation, bénéficiant des mêmes mises à jour rapides et restant très proches de l'original.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://silverblue.fedoraproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/fr/fedora-silverblue/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://whatcanidoforfedora.org/){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+Silverblue (et Kinoite) diffèrent de Fedora Workstation car ils remplacent le gestionnaire de paquets [DNF](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/fr/quick-docs/dnf/) par une alternative beaucoup plus avancée appelée [`rpm-ostree`](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/fr/fedora/rawhide/system-administrators-guide/package-management/rpm-ostree/). Le gestionnaire de paquets `rpm-ostree` fonctionne en téléchargeant une image de base pour le système, puis en superposant des paquets par-dessus dans un arbre de commit semblable à [git](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Git). Lorsque le système est mis à jour, une nouvelle image de base est téléchargée et les surcouches seront appliquées à cette nouvelle image.
+
+Une fois la mise à jour terminée, vous redémarrez le système dans le nouveau déploiement. `rpm-ostree` conserve deux déploiements du système afin que vous puissiez facilement revenir en arrière si quelque chose se casse dans le nouveau déploiement. Il est également possible d'épingler plus de déploiements selon les besoins.
+
+[Flatpak](https://www.flatpak.org) est la méthode principale d'installation des paquets sur ces distributions, car `rpm-ostree` n'est destiné qu'à superposer les paquets qui ne peuvent pas rester à l'intérieur d'un conteneur sur l'image de base.
+
+Comme alternative aux Flatpaks, il y a l'option de [Toolbox](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/fr/fedora-silverblue/toolbox/) pour créer des conteneurs [Podman](https://podman.io) avec un répertoire de base partagé avec le système d'exploitation hôte et imiter un environnement Fedora traditionnel, ce qui est une [fonctionnalité utile](https://containertoolbx.org) pour le développeur averti.
+
+### NixOS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ NixOS est une distribution indépendante basée sur le gestionnaire de paquets Nix avec un accent sur la reproductibilité et la fiabilité.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://nixos.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://nixos.org/learn.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nixos.org/donate.html){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+Le gestionnaire de paquets de NixOS conserve chaque version de chaque paquet dans un dossier différent dans le **magasin Nix**. De ce fait, vous pouvez avoir différentes versions d'un même paquet installé sur votre système. Une fois que le contenu du paquet a été écrit dans le dossier, ce dernier est mis en lecture seule.
+
+NixOS fournit également des mises à jour atomiques ; il télécharge d'abord (ou construit) les paquets et les fichiers pour la nouvelle génération de système et ensuite y bascule. Il y a différentes façons de passer à une nouvelle génération ; vous pouvez dire à NixOS de l'activer après le redémarrage ou vous pouvez basculer sur celle-ci pendant l'exécution. Vous pouvez également *tester* la nouvelle génération en basculant sur celle-ci pendant l'exécution, mais sans la définir comme la génération actuelle du système. Si quelque chose se casse pendant le processus de mise à jour, vous pouvez simplement redémarrer et revenir automatiquement à une version fonctionnelle de votre système.
+
+Nix, le gestionnaire de paquets, utilise un langage purement fonctionnel - qui s'appelle aussi Nix - pour définir les paquets.
+
+[Nixpkgs](https://github.com/nixos/nixpkgs) (la source principale des paquets) sont contenus dans un seul dépôt GitHub. Vous pouvez également définir vos propres paquets dans le même langage, puis les inclure facilement dans votre configuration.
+
+Nix est un gestionnaire de paquets basé sur les sources ; s'il n'y a pas de paquet pré-construit disponible dans le cache binaire, Nix construira simplement le paquet à partir des sources en utilisant sa définition. Il construit chaque paquet dans un environnement *pur* en bac à sable, qui est aussi indépendant que possible du système hôte, ce qui rend les binaires reproductibles.
+
+## Distributions Axées sur l'Anonymat
+
+### Whonix
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Whonix** est basé sur [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), un fork de Debian axé sur la sécurité. Il vise à assurer la vie privée, la sécurité et l'anonymat sur Internet. Whonix est utilisé de préférence en conjonction avec [Qubes OS](#qubes-os).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+Whonix est conçu pour fonctionner sous la forme de deux machines virtuelles : une "Station de Travail" et une "Passerelle" Tor. Toutes les communications de la station de travail doivent passer par la passerelle Tor, et seront acheminées par le réseau Tor. Cela signifie que même si la "Station de Travail" est compromise par un logiciel malveillant quelconque, la véritable adresse IP reste cachée.
+
+Parmi ses fonctionnalités, citons l'isolation des Flux Tor, [l'anonymisation des frappes de clavier](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Keystroke_Deanonymization#Kloak), [un swap chiffré](https://github.com/Whonix/swap-file-creator), et un allocateur de mémoire renforcé.
+
+Les futures versions de Whonix incluront probablement [des politiques AppArmor système complètes](https://github.com/Whonix/apparmor-profile-everything) et [un lanceur d'apps bac à sable](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Sandbox-app-launcher) pour confiner complètement tous les processus sur le système.
+
+Il est préférable d'utiliser Whonix [en conjonction avec Qubes](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Why_use_Qubes_over_other_Virtualizers).
+
+### Tails
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tails** est un système d'exploitation autonome basé sur Debian qui fait passer toutes les communications par Tor, et qui peut démarrer sur presque n'importe quel ordinateur à partir d'un DVD, d'une clé USB ou d'une installation sur carte SD. Il utilise [Tor](tor.md) pour préserver la vie privée et l'anonymat tout en contournant la censure, et il ne laisse aucune trace de son passage sur l'ordinateur sur lequel il est utilisé après avoir été éteint.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://tails.boum.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tails.boum.org/doc/index.en.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tails.boum.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+Tails est excellent pour contrer l'analyse scientifique en raison de son amnésie (ce qui signifie que rien n'est écrit sur le disque) ; cependant, ce n'est pas une distribution renforcée comme Whonix. Il ne dispose pas de nombreuses fonctions d'anonymat et de sécurité comme Whonix et est mis à jour beaucoup moins souvent (seulement une fois toutes les six semaines). Un système Tails compromis par un logiciel malveillant peut potentiellement contourner le proxy transparent et permettre à l'utilisateur d'être désanonymisé.
+
+Tails inclut [uBlock Origin](desktop-browsers.md#ublock-origin) dans le Navigateur Tor par défaut, ce qui peut potentiellement faciliter la tâche des adversaires pour identifier l'empreinte numérique des utilisateurs de Tails. Les machines virtuelles [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) sont peut-être plus étanches, mais elles ne sont pas amnésiques, ce qui signifie que les données peuvent être récupérées sur votre périphérique de stockage.
+
+Par conception, Tails est censé se réinitialiser complètement après chaque redémarrage. Le [stockage persistant](https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/persistence/index.fr.html) chiffré peut être configuré pour stocker certaines données entre les redémarrages.
+
+## Distributions axées sur la sécurité
+
+### Qubes OS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Qubes** est un système d'exploitation open-source conçu pour fournir une sécurité forte pour l'informatique de bureau. Qubes est basé sur Xen, le système X Window et Linux, et peut exécuter la plupart des applications Linux et utiliser la plupart des pilotes Linux.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Aperçu](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Service onion" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+Qubes OS est un système d'exploitation basé sur Xen destiné à fournir une sécurité forte pour l'informatique de bureau par le biais de machines virtuelles (VMs) sécurisées, également connues sous le nom de *Qubes*.
+
+Le système d'exploitation Qubes OS sécurise l'ordinateur en isolant les sous-systèmes (par exemple, réseau, USB, etc.) et les applications dans des VMs distinctes. Si une partie du système est compromise, l'isolation supplémentaire est susceptible de protéger le reste du système. Pour plus de détails, voir la FAQ de Qubes [](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/).
+
+## Critères
+
+**Veuillez noter que nous ne sommes affiliés à aucun des projets que nous recommandons.** En plus de [nos critères de base](about/criteria.md), nous avons développé un ensemble d'exigences claires pour nous permettre de fournir des recommandations objectives. Nous vous suggérons de vous familiariser avec cette liste avant de choisir d'utiliser un projet, et de mener vos propres recherches pour vous assurer que c'est le bon choix pour vous.
+
+!!! example "Cette section est récente"
+
+ Nous travaillons à l'établissement de critères définis pour chaque section de notre site, et celles-ci peuvent être sujet à changement. Si vous avez des questions sur nos critères, veuillez [poser la question sur notre forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) et ne supposez pas que nous n'avons pas pris en compte un élément dans nos recommandations s'il ne figure pas dans la liste. De nombreux facteurs sont pris en compte et discutés lorsque nous recommandons un projet, et la documentation de chacun d'entre eux est en cours.
+
+Nos systèmes d'exploitation recommandés :
+
+- Doivent être open-source.
+- Doivent recevoir régulièrement des mises à jour des logiciels et du noyau Linux.
+- Les distributions Linux doivent prendre en charge [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#Wayland).
+- Doitvent prendre en charge le chiffrement complet du disque pendant l'installation.
+- Ne doivent pas geler les mises à jour régulières pendant plus d'un an. Nous [ne recommandons pas](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" ou les versions "stables" de distro pour une utilisation domestique.
+- Doivent prendre en charge une grande variété de matériel.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/dns.md b/i18n/fr/dns.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5bb60e9d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/dns.md
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+---
+title: "Résolveurs DNS"
+icon: material/dns
+---
+
+!!! question "Devrais-je utiliser un DNS chiffré ?"
+
+ Le DNS chiffré avec des serveurs tiers ne doit être utilisé que pour contourner le [blocage DNS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) de base lorsque vous êtes certain qu'il n'y aura pas de conséquences. Le DNS chiffré ne vous aidera pas à dissimuler vos activités de navigation.
+
+ [En savoir plus sur le DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md){ .md-button }
+
+## Fournisseurs Recommandés
+
+| Fournisseur DNS | Politique de confidentialité | Protocoles | Journalisation | ECS | Filtrage |
+| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------- | --------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| [**AdGuard**](https://adguard.com/en/adguard-dns/overview.html) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html) | Cleartext DoH DoT DNSCrypt | Un peu[^1] | Non | En fonction du choix fait côté serveur. La liste des filtres utilisés peut être consultée ici. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardDNS) |
+| [**Cloudflare**](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/setting-up-1.1.1.1/) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/) | Cleartext DoH DoT | Un peu[^2] | Non | En fonction du choix fait côté serveur. |
+| [**Control D**](https://controld.com/free-dns) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://controld.com/privacy) | Cleartext DoH DoT DNSCrypt DoQ DoH3 | Optionnelle[^3] | Non | En fonction du choix fait côté serveur. |
+| [**Mullvad**](https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/) | DoH DoT | Aucune[^4] | Non | En fonction du choix fait côté serveur. La liste des filtres utilisés peut être consultée ici. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/mullvad/dns-adblock) |
+| [**NextDNS**](https://www.nextdns.io) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://www.nextdns.io/privacy) | Cleartext DoH DoT | Optionnelle[^5] | Optionnel | En fonction du choix fait côté serveur. |
+| [**Quad9**](https://quad9.net) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://quad9.net/privacy/policy/) | Cleartext DoH DoT DNSCrypt | Un peu[^6] | Optionnel | En fonction du choix fait côté serveur, Blocage des logiciels malveillants par défaut. |
+
+## Critères
+
+**Veuillez noter que nous ne sommes affiliés à aucun des projets que nous recommandons.** En plus de [nos critères de base](about/criteria.md), nous avons développé un ensemble d'exigences claires pour nous permettre de fournir des recommandations objectives. Nous vous suggérons de vous familiariser avec cette liste avant de choisir d'utiliser un projet, et de mener vos propres recherches pour vous assurer que c'est le bon choix pour vous.
+
+!!! example "Cette section est récente"
+
+ Nous travaillons à l'établissement de critères définis pour chaque section de notre site, et celles-ci peuvent être sujet à changement. Si vous avez des questions sur nos critères, veuillez [poser la question sur notre forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) et ne supposez pas que nous n'avons pas pris en compte un élément dans nos recommandations s'il ne figure pas dans la liste. De nombreux facteurs sont pris en compte et discutés lorsque nous recommandons un projet, et la documentation de chacun d'entre eux est en cours.
+
+- Doit supporter [DNSSEC](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-dnssec).
+- [Minimisation QNAME](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-qname-minimization).
+- Permettre la désactivation de [ECS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-edns-client-subnet-ecs)
+- Doit préférer la prise en charge [anycast](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anycast#Addressing_methods) ou geo-steering.
+
+## Prise en charge native des systèmes d'exploitation
+
+### Android
+
+Android 9 et supérieur prennent en charge DNS via TLS. Les paramètres peuvent être trouvés dans : **Paramètres** → **Réseau & Internet** → **DNS Privé**.
+
+### Appareils Apple
+
+Les dernières versions d'iOS, iPadOS, tvOS et macOS prennent en charge à la fois DoT et DoH. Les deux protocoles sont pris en charge nativement par l'intermédiaire des [profils de configuration](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/configuration-profile-enforcement-secf6fb9f053/web) ou par l'intermédiaire de [l'API de Paramètres DNS](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/networkextension/dns_settings).
+
+Après l'installation d'un profil de configuration ou d'une application qui utilise l'API des Paramètres DNS, la configuration DNS peut être sélectionnée. Si un VPN est actif, la résolution au sein du tunnel VPN utilisera les paramètres DNS du VPN et non les paramètres de votre système.
+
+#### Profils signés
+
+Apple ne fournit pas d'interface native pour la création de profils DNS chiffrés. Le [créateur de profil DNS Sécurisé](https://dns.notjakob.com/tool.html) est un outil non officiel permettant de créer vos propres profils DNS chiffrés, mais ils ne seront pas signés. Les profils signés sont préférables ; la signature valide l'origine d'un profil et contribue à garantir l'intégrité des profils. Un label vert "Vérifié" est attribué aux profils de configuration signés. Pour plus d'informations sur la signature de code, voir [A propos de la signature de code](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/CodeSigningGuide/Introduction/Introduction.html). **Les profils signés** sont fournis par [AdGuard](https://adguard.com/en/blog/encrypted-dns-ios-14.html), [NextDNS](https://apple.nextdns.io), et [Quad9](https://www.quad9.net/news/blog/ios-mobile-provisioning-profiles/).
+
+!!! info "Information"
+
+ `systemd-resolved`, que de nombreuses distributions Linux utilisent pour effectuer leurs recherches DNS, ne [supporte pas encore DoH](https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/8639). Si vous voulez utiliser DoH, vous devez installer un proxy comme [dnscrypt-proxy](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy) et [le configurer](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dnscrypt-proxy) pour prendre toutes les requêtes DNS du résolveur de votre système et les transmettre via HTTPS.
+
+## Proxys DNS chiffrés
+
+Un logiciel de proxy DNS chiffré fourni un proxy local vers lequel le résolveur [DNS non chiffré](advanced/dns-overview.md#unencrypted-dns) doit rediriger. Il est généralement utilisé sur les plates-formes qui ne supportent pas nativement les [DNS chiffrés](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns).
+
+### RethinkDNS
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **RethinkDNS** est un client Android open-source prenant en charge [DNS-over-HTTPS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), [DNS-over-TLS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-tls-dot), [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt) et DNS Proxy, ainsi que la mise en cache des réponses DNS, l'enregistrement local des requêtes DNS et peut également être utilisé comme pare-feu.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://rethinkdns.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://rethinkdns.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.rethinkdns.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/celzero/rethink-app){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.celzero.bravedns)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/celzero/rethink-app/releases)
+
+### dnscrypt-proxy
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **dnscrypt-proxy** est un proxy DNS qui prend en charge [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt), [DNS-over-HTTPS](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh) et [Anonymized DNS](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Anonymized-DNS).
+
+ !!! warning "La fonction DNS anonyme n'anonymise [**pas**](advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns) le reste du trafic réseau."
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Dépôt](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/dnscrypt/contribute){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Installation-Windows)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Installation-macOS)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Installation-linux)
+
+## Solutions auto-hébergées
+
+Une solution DNS auto-hébergée est utile pour assurer le filtrage sur les plateformes contrôlées, telles que les téléviseurs intelligents et autres appareils IoT, car aucun logiciel côté client n'est nécessaire.
+
+### AdGuard Home
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **AdGuard Home** est un logiciel libre [gouffre DNS](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_sinkhole) qui utilise le [filtrage DNS](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/access-management/what-is-dns-filtering/) pour bloquer les contenus web indésirables, tels que les publicités.
+
+ AdGuard Home est doté d'une interface web conviviale qui permet de visualiser et de gérer le contenu bloqué.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://adguard.com/adguard-home/overview.html){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://adguard.com/privacy/home.html){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+
+### Pi-hole
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Pi-hole** est un [gouffre DNS](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_sinkhole) open-source qui utilise le [filtrage DNS](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/access-management/what-is-dns-filtering/) pour bloquer les contenus web indésirables, tels que les publicités.
+
+ Pi-hole est conçu pour être hébergé sur un Raspberry Pi, mais il n'est pas limité à ce type de matériel. Le logiciel est doté d'une interface web conviviale permettant de visualiser et de gérer les contenus bloqués.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://pi-hole.net/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://pi-hole.net/privacy/){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.pi-hole.net/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/pi-hole/pi-hole){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://pi-hole.net/donate){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
+
+[^1]: AdGuard stocke des mesures de performance agrégées de ses serveurs DNS, à savoir le nombre de demandes complètes adressées à un serveur particulier, le nombre de demandes bloquées et la vitesse de traitement des demandes. Ils conservent et stockent également la base de données des domaines demandés dans les dernières 24 heures. "Nous avons besoin de ces informations pour identifier et bloquer les nouveaux traqueurs et menaces." "Nous enregistrons également le nombre de fois où tel ou tel traqueur a été bloqué. Nous avons besoin de ces informations pour supprimer les règles obsolètes de nos filtres." [https://adguard.com/fr/privacy/dns.html](https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html)
+[^2]: Cloudflare ne collecte et ne stocke que les données limitées des requêtes DNS qui sont envoyées au résolveur 1.1.1.1. Le service de résolution 1.1.1.1 n'enregistre pas de données personnelles, et la majeure partie des données de requête limitées et non personnellement identifiables n'est stockée que pendant 25 heures. [https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/)
+[^3]: Control D n'enregistre que les résolveurs Premium avec des profils DNS personnalisés. Les résolveurs libres n'enregistrent pas de données. [https://controld.com/privacy](https://controld.com/privacy)
+[^4]: Le service DNS de Mullvad est disponible à la fois pour les abonnés et les non-abonnés de Mullvad VPN. Leur politique de confidentialité affirme explicitement qu'ils n'enregistrent pas les requêtes DNS de quelque manière que ce soit. [https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/](https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/)
+[^5]: NextDNS peut fournir des informations et des fonctions de journalisation sur la base d'un accord préalable. Vous pouvez choisir les durées de conservation et les emplacements de stockage des journaux pour tous les journaux que vous choisissez de conserver. Si ce n'est pas spécifiquement demandé, aucune donnée n'est enregistrée. [https://nextdns.io/privacy](https://nextdns.io/privacy)
+[^6]: Quad9 recueille certaines données à des fins de surveillance et de réponse aux menaces. Ces données peuvent ensuite être remélangées et partagées, par exemple à des fins de recherche sur la sécurité. Quad9 ne collecte ni n'enregistre les adresses IP ou d'autres données qu'elle juge personnellement identifiables. [https://www.quad9.net/privacy/policy/](https://www.quad9.net/privacy/policy/)
diff --git a/i18n/fr/email-clients.md b/i18n/fr/email-clients.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ae04a4ef4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/email-clients.md
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+---
+title: "Logiciels de messagerie électronique"
+icon: material/email-open
+---
+
+Notre liste de recommandations contient des clients de messagerie qui prennent en charge à la fois [OpenPGP](encryption.md#openpgp) et l'authentification forte telle que [Open Authorization (OAuth)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth). OAuth vous permet d'utiliser l'[Authentification à Multi-Facteurs](multi-factor-authentication) et d'empêcher le vol de compte.
+
+??? warning "L'email ne fournit pas de secret de transmission"
+
+ Lors de l'utilisation d'une technologie de chiffrement de bout en bout (E2EE) comme OpenPGP, le courrier électronique contiendra toujours [certaines métadonnées](email.md#email-metadata-overview) qui ne sont pas chiffrées dans l'en-tête du courrier électronique.
+
+ OpenPGP ne prend pas non plus en charge la [confidentialité persistante](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confidentialit%C3%A9_persistante), ce qui signifie que si votre clé privée ou celle du destinataire est volée, tous les messages précédents chiffrés avec cette clé seront exposés: [Comment protéger mes clés privées ?](basics/email-security.md) Envisagez l'utilisation d'un support qui assure la confidentialité persistante:
+
+ [Communication en temps réel](real-time-communication.md){ .md-button }
+
+## Multi-plateformes
+
+### Thunderbird
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Thunderbird** est un client de messagerie, de groupes de discussion, de flux d'informations et de chat (XMPP, IRC, Twitter) gratuit, open-source et multiplateforme, développé par la communauté Thunderbird, et précédemment par la Fondation Mozilla.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://www.thunderbird.net/fr/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mozilla.org/privacy/thunderbird){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.mozilla.org/fr/products/thunderbird){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://hg.mozilla.org/comm-central){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.thunderbird.net/fr/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.thunderbird.net/fr/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.thunderbird.net/fr/)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.mozilla.Thunderbird)
+
+#### Configuration recommandée
+
+Nous vous recommandons de modifier certains de ces paramètres pour rendre Thunderbird un peu plus privé.
+
+Ces options se trouvent dans :material-menu: → **Paramètres** → **Confidentialité & Sécurité**.
+
+##### Contenu Web
+
+- [ ] Décochez **Se souvenir des sites web et des liens que j'ai visités**
+- [ ] Décochez **Accepter les cookies des sites**
+
+##### Télémétrie
+
+- [ ] Décochez **Autoriser Thunderbird à envoyer des données techniques et d'interaction à Mozilla**
+
+#### Thunderbird-user.js (avancé)
+
+[`thunderbird-user.js`](https://github.com/HorlogeSkynet/thunderbird-user.js), est un ensemble d'options de configuration qui vise à désactiver le plus grand nombre possible de fonctions de navigation web dans Thunderbird afin de réduire la surface d'attaque et de préserver la confidentialité. Certains changements sont rétroportés depuis le [projet Arkenfox](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js).
+
+## Spécifique à une plateforme
+
+### Apple Mail (macOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Apple Mail** est inclus dans macOS et peut être étendu pour prendre en charge OpenPGP avec [GPG Suite](/encryption/# gpg-suite), ce qui ajoute la possibilité d'envoyer des e-mails chiffrés.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://support.apple.com/fr-fr/guide/mail/welcome/mac){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.apple.com/fr/legal/privacy/fr-ww/){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/fr-fr/guide/mail/toc){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+### Canary Mail (iOS)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Canary Mail** est un client de messagerie payant conçu pour rendre le chiffrement de bout en bout transparent grâce à des fonctions de sécurité telles que le verrouillage biométrique des applications.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://canarymail.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://canarymail.io/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://canarymail.zendesk.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.canarymail.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1236045954)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://canarymail.io/downloads.html)
+
+!!! warning "Avertissement"
+
+ Canary Mail n'a publié que récemment un client Windows et Android, mais nous ne pensons pas qu'ils soient aussi stables que leurs homologues iOS et Mac.
+
+Canary Mail est à source fermée. Nous le recommandons en raison du peu de choix disponibles pour les clients de messagerie sur iOS prenant en charge PGP E2EE.
+
+### FairEmail (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FairEmail** est une application de messagerie électronique minimale et open-source, utilisant des standards ouverts (IMAP, SMTP, OpenPGP) avec une faible consommation de données et de batterie.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://email.faircode.eu){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/blob/master/PRIVACY.md){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/blob/master/FAQ.md){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://email.faircode.eu/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribuer}
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=eu.faircode.email)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/releases)
+
+### GNOME Evolution (GNOME)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Evolution** est une application de gestion des informations personnelles qui fournit des fonctionnalités intégrées de courrier, de calendrier et de carnet d'adresses. Evolution dispose d'une vaste [documentation](https://help.gnome.org/users/evolution/stable/) pour vous aider à démarrer.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Evolution){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Evolution/PrivacyPolicy){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://help.gnome.org/users/evolution/stable/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution/){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.gnome.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribuer}
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.gnome.Evolution)
+
+### K-9 Mail (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **K-9 Mail** est une application de messagerie indépendante qui prend en charge les boîtes aux lettres POP3 et IMAP, mais ne prend en charge le push mail que pour IMAP.
+
+ À l'avenir, K-9 Mail sera le client Thunderbird [officiel](https://k9mail.app/2022/06/13/K-9-Mail-and-Thunderbird.html) pour Android .
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://k9mail.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://k9mail.app/privacy){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.k9mail.app/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/k9mail/k-9){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://k9mail.app/contribute){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.fsck.k9)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/k9mail/k-9/releases)
+
+!!! warning "Avertissement"
+
+ Lorsque vous répondez à un membre d'une liste de diffusion, l'option "répondre" peut également inclure la liste de diffusion. Pour plus d'informations, voir [thundernest/k-9 #3738](https://github.com/thundernest/k-9/issues/3738).
+
+### Kontact (KDE)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Kontact** est une application de gestion des informations personnelles (PIM) issue du projet [KDE](https://kde.org). Il offre un client de messagerie, un carnet d'adresses, un organiseur et un client RSS.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://kontact.kde.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://kde.org/privacypolicy-apps){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://kontact.kde.org/users/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://invent.kde.org/pim/kmail){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://kde.org/community/donations/){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://kontact.kde.org/download)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.kde.kontact)
+
+### Mailvelope (Navigateur)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mailvelope** est une extension de navigateur qui permet l'échange de courriers électroniques cryptés selon la norme de cryptage OpenPGP.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.mailvelope.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mailvelope.com/en/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mailvelope.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailvelope/mailvelope){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/mailvelope)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/mailvelope/kajibbejlbohfaggdiogboambcijhkke)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/mailvelope/dgcbddhdhjppfdfjpciagmmibadmoapc)
+
+### NeoMutt (CLI)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **NeoMutt** est un lecteur de courrier en ligne de commande (ou MUA) open-source pour Linux et BSD. C'est un fork de [Mutt](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutt) avec des fonctionnalités supplémentaires.
+
+ NeoMutt est un client textuel qui a une courbe d'apprentissage abrupte. Il est cependant très personnalisable.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://neomutt.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://neomutt.org/guide/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/russon/){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://neomutt.org/distro)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://neomutt.org/distro)
+
+## Critères
+
+**Veuillez noter que nous ne sommes affiliés à aucun des projets que nous recommandons.** En plus de [nos critères de base](about/criteria.md), nous avons développé un ensemble d'exigences claires pour nous permettre de fournir des recommandations objectives. Nous vous suggérons de vous familiariser avec cette liste avant de choisir d'utiliser un projet, et de mener vos propres recherches pour vous assurer que c'est le bon choix pour vous.
+
+!!! example "Cette section est récente"
+
+ Nous travaillons à l'établissement de critères définis pour chaque section de notre site, et celles-ci peuvent être sujet à changement. Si vous avez des questions sur nos critères, veuillez [poser la question sur notre forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) et ne supposez pas que nous n'avons pas pris en compte un élément dans nos recommandations s'il ne figure pas dans la liste. De nombreux facteurs sont pris en compte et discutés lorsque nous recommandons un projet, et la documentation de chacun d'entre eux est en cours.
+
+### Qualifications minimales
+
+- Les applications développées pour les systèmes d'exploitation open source doivent être open source.
+- Ne doit pas collecter de télémétrie, ou disposer d'un moyen facile de désactiver toute télémétrie.
+- Doit prendre en charge le chiffrement des messages OpenPGP.
+
+### Dans le meilleur des cas
+
+Nos critères de cas idéal représentent ce que nous aimerions voir d'un projet parfait dans cette catégorie. Nos recommandations peuvent ne pas inclure tout ou partie de cette fonctionnalité, mais celles qui l'inclus peuvent être mieux classées que les autres sur cette page.
+
+- Doit être open-source.
+- Doit être multiplateforme.
+- Ne doit pas collecter de télémétrie par défaut.
+- Doit prendre en charge OpenPGP nativement, c'est-à-dire sans extensions.
+- Doit prendre en charge le stockage local de courriels chiffrés par OpenPGP.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/email.md b/i18n/fr/email.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..09b04fe2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/email.md
@@ -0,0 +1,485 @@
+---
+title: "Services de messagerie électronique"
+icon: material/email
+---
+
+Le courriel est pratiquement une nécessité pour utiliser n'importe quel service en ligne, mais nous ne le recommandons pas pour les conversations de personne à personne. Plutôt que d'utiliser le courriel pour contacter d'autres personnes, envisagez d'utiliser un support de messagerie instantanée qui prend en charge le secret de transfert.
+
+[Messageries instantanées recommandées](real-time-communication.md ""){.md-button}
+
+Pour tout le reste, nous recommandons une variété de fournisseurs de messagerie électronique en fonction de la viabilité de leur modèle économique et de leurs fonctions intégrées de sécurité et de confidentialité.
+
+## Fournisseurs recommandés
+
+Ces fournisseurs prennent en charge le chiffrement/déchiffrement OpenPGP nativement, ce qui permet d'envoyer des e-mails chiffrés de bout en bout (E2EE) indépendamment du fournisseur. Par exemple, un utilisateur de Proton Mail peut envoyer un message E2EE à un utilisateur de Mailbox.org, ou vous pouvez recevoir des notifications chiffrées par OpenPGP de la part de services internet qui le supportent.
+
+!!! warning "Avertissement"
+
+ Lors de l'utilisation d'une technologie E2EE telle que OpenPGP, le courrier électronique contiendra toujours certaines métadonnées non chiffrées dans l'en-tête du courrier. En savoir plus sur les [métadonnées de messagerie](basics/email-security.md#email-metadata-overview).
+
+ OpenPGP ne prend pas non plus en charge le secret de transfert, ce qui signifie que si votre clé privée ou celle du destinataire est volée, tous les messages précédents chiffrés avec elle seront exposés. [Comment protéger mes clés privées ?](basics/email-security.md#how-do-i-protect-my-private-keys)
+
+### Proton Mail
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Proton Mail** est un service de messagerie électronique qui met l'accent sur la confidentialité, le chiffrement, la sécurité et la facilité d'utilisation. Ils sont en activité depuis **2013**. Proton AG a son siège à Genève, en Suisse. Les comptes commencent avec 500 Mo de stockage avec leur offre gratuite.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://proton.me/mail){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](https://protonmailrmez3lotccipshtkleegetolb73fuirgj7r4o4vfu7ozyd.onion){ .card-link title="Service onion" }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/mail){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonmail.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id979659905)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonMail/proton-mail-android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.proton.me)
+
+Les comptes gratuits présentent certaines limitations, comme le fait de ne pas pouvoir effectuer de recherche dans le corps du texte et de ne pas avoir accès à [Proton Mail Bridge](https://proton.me/mail/bridge), qui est nécessaire pour utiliser un [client de messagerie de bureau recommandé](email-clients.md) (par exemple Thunderbird). check "Modes de paiement privés" check "Modes de paiement privés" Une [lettre d'attestation](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps) a été fournie pour les applications de Proton Mail le 9 novembre 2021 par [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com).
+
+Si vous avez l'offre Proton Illimité, entreprise ou Visionnaire, vous obtenez également [SimpleLogin](#simplelogin) Premium gratuitement.
+
+Proton Mail dispose de rapports de plantages internes qu'il **ne partage pas** avec des tiers. Ils peuvent être désactivés dans : **Paramètres** > **Aller à Paramètres** > **Compte** > **Sécurité et confidentialité** > **Envoyer des rapports de crash**.
+
+??? success "Domaines personnalisés et alias"
+
+ Les abonnés payants à Proton Mail peuvent utiliser leur propre domaine avec le service ou une adresse [fourre-tout](https://proton.me/support/catch-all). Proton Mail prend également en charge le [sous-adressage](https://proton.me/support/creating-aliases), ce qui est utile pour les personnes qui ne souhaitent pas acheter un domaine.
+
+??? success "Modes de paiement privés"
+
+ Proton Mail [accepte](https://proton.me/support/payment-options) le Bitcoin et l'argent liquide par courrier en plus des paiements standards par carte de crédit/débit et PayPal.
+
+??? success "Sécurité du compte"
+
+ Proton Mail ne prend en charge que l'[authentification à deux facteurs](https://proton.me/support/two-factor-authentication-2fa) TOTP. L'utilisation d'une clé de sécurité U2F n'est pas encore prise en charge. Proton Mail prévoit d'implémenter U2F dès l'achèvement de son système d'[Authentification unique (SSO - Single Sign On)](https://reddit.com/comments/cheoy6/comment/feh2lw0/).
+
+??? success "Sécurité des données"
+
+ Proton Mail dispose d'un [chiffrement à accès zéro](https://proton.me/blog/zero-access-encryption) au repos pour vos e-mails et [calendriers](https://proton.me/news/protoncalendar-security-model). Les données sécurisées par un chiffrmeent à accès zéro ne sont accessibles que par vous.
+
+ Certaines informations stockées dans [Proton Contacts](https://proton.me/support/proton-contacts), telles que les noms et les adresses e-mail, ne sont pas sécurisées par un chiffrement à accès zéro. Les champs de contact qui prennent en charge le chiffrement à accès zéro, comme les numéros de téléphone, sont indiqués par une icône de cadenas.
+
+??? success "Chiffrement des e-mails"
+
+ Proton Mail a [intégré le chiffrement OpenPGP](https://proton.me/support/how-to-use-pgp) dans son webmail. Les e-mails destinés à d'autres comptes Proton Mail sont chiffrés automatiquement, et le chiffrement vers des adresses autres que Proton Mail avec une clé OpenPGP peut être activé facilement dans les paramètres de votre compte. Ils vous permettent également de [chiffrer les messages destinés à des adresses autres que celles de Proton Mail](https://proton.me/support/password-protected-emails) sans qu'ils aient besoin de s'inscrire à un compte Proton Mail ou d'utiliser un logiciel comme OpenPGP.
+
+ Proton Mail prend également en charge la découverte de clés publiques via HTTP à partir de son [Répertoire de Clés Web (WKD - Web Key Directory)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). Cela permet aux personnes qui n'utilisent pas Proton Mail de trouver facilement les clés OpenPGP des comptes Proton Mail, pour un E2EE inter-fournisseurs.
+
+??? warning "Héritage numérique"
+
+ Proton Mail ne propose pas de fonction d'héritage numérique.
+
+??? info "Résiliation du compte"
+
+ Si vous avez un compte payant et que votre [facture est impayée](https://proton.me/support/delinquency) après 14 jours, vous ne pourrez pas accéder à vos données. Après 30 jours, votre compte sera en impayé et ne recevra plus d'e-mail entrant. Vous continuerez à être facturé pendant cette période.
+
+??? info "Fonctionnalités supplémentaires"
+
+ Proton Mail propose un compte "Illimité" pour 9,99 €/mois, qui permet également d'accéder à Proton VPN en plus de fournir plusieurs comptes, domaines, alias et 500 Go de stockage.
+
+### Mailbox.org
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mailbox.org** est un service de messagerie électronique qui se veut sécurisé, sans publicité et alimenté par une énergie 100% écologique. Ils sont en activité depuis 2014. Mailbox.org est basé à Berlin, en Allemagne. Les comptes commencent avec 2 Go de stockage, qui peuvent être mis à niveau si nécessaire.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://mailbox.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://mailbox.org/en/data-protection-privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://login.mailbox.org)
+
+??? success "Domaines personnalisés et alias"
+
+ Mailbox.org vous permet d'utiliser votre propre domaine et prend en charge les adresses [fourre-tout](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Using+catch-all+alias+avec+propre+domaine). Mailbox.org prend également en charge le [sous-adressage](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/BMBOKBEN/What+is+an+alias+and+how+do+I+use+it), ce qui est utile pour les personnes qui ne souhaitent pas acheter un domaine.
+
+??? info "Modes de paiement privés"
+
+ Mailbox.org n'accepte pas les bitcoins ni les autres crypto-monnaies en raison de la suspension des opérations de leur processeur de paiement BitPay en Allemagne. Cependant, ils acceptent les paiements par courrier, les paiements en espèces sur compte bancaire, les virements bancaires, les cartes de crédit, PayPal et quelques processeurs spécifiques à l'Allemagne : paydirekt et Sofortüberweisung.
+
+??? success "Sécurité du compte"
+
+ Mailbox.org prend en charge [l'authentification à deux facteurs](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/How+to+use+two-factor+authentication+-+2FA) pour son webmail uniquement. Vous pouvez utiliser soit TOTP soit un [Yubikey](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/YubiKey) via le [Yubicloud](https://www.yubico.com/products/services-software/yubicloud). Les normes web telles que [WebAuthn](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn) ne sont pas encore prises en charge.
+
+??? info "Sécurité des données"
+
+ Mailbox.org permet de chiffrer les e-mails entrants en utilisant leur [boîte mail chiffrée](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/The+Encrypted+Mailbox). Les nouveaux messages que vous recevrez seront alors immédiatement chiffrés avec votre clé publique.
+
+ Toutefois, [Open-Exchange](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-Xchange), la plate-forme logicielle utilisée par Mailbox.org, [ne prend pas en charge](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/BMBOKBEN/Encryption+de+calendrier+et+carnet+d'adresses) le chiffrement de votre carnet d'adresses et de votre calendrier. Une [option dissociée](calendar.md) peut être plus appropriée pour ces informations.
+
+??? success "Chiffrement des e-mails"
+
+ Mailbox.org a [intégré le chiffrement](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Send+encrypted+e-mails+with+Guard) dans son webmail, ce qui simplifie l'envoi de messages aux personnes disposant de clés OpenPGP publiques. Ils permettent également [aux destinataires distants de déchiffrer un e-mail](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/My+recipient+does+not+use+PGP) sur les serveurs de Mailbox.org. Cette fonction est utile lorsque le destinataire distant ne dispose pas d'OpenPGP et ne peut pas déchiffrer une copie de l'e-mail dans sa propre boîte mail.
+
+ Mailbox.org supporte également la découverte de clés publiques via HTTP à partir de leur [Répertoire de Clés Web (WKD - Web Key Directory)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). Cela permet aux personnes extérieures à Mailbox.org de trouver facilement les clés OpenPGP des comptes Mailbox.org, pour un E2EE inter-fournisseurs.
+
+??? sucess "Héritage numérique"
+
+ Mailbox.org dispose d'une fonction d'héritage numérique pour toutes les offres. Vous pouvez choisir de transmettre certaines de vos données à vos héritiers, à condition d'en faire la demande et de fournir votre testament. Vous pouvez également désigner une personne par son nom et son adresse.
+
+??? info "Résiliation du compte"
+
+ Votre compte sera défini comme un compte d'utilisateur restreint lorsque votre contrat prendra fin, après [30 jours, il sera irrévocablement supprimé](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/payment-article/what-happens-at-the-end-of-my-contract).
+
+??? info "Fonctionnalités supplémentaires"
+
+ Vous pouvez accéder à votre compte Mailbox.org via IMAP/SMTP en utilisant leur [service .onion](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/The+Tor+exit+node+de+mailbox.org). Cependant, leur interface webmail n'est pas accessible via leur service .onion et vous pouvez rencontrer des erreurs de certificat TLS.
+
+ Tous les comptes sont dotés d'un espace de stockage cloud limité qui [peut être chiffré](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Encrypt+files+sur+votre+Drive). Mailbox.org propose également l'alias [@secure.mailbox.org](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Ensuring+E-Mails+are+Sent+Securely) qui impose le chiffrement TLS sur la connexion entre les serveurs de messagerie, sinon le message ne sera pas envoyé du tout. Mailbox.org supporte également [Exchange ActiveSync](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exchange_ActiveSync) en plus des protocoles d'accès standard comme IMAP et POP3.
+
+### StartMail
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **StartMail** est un service de messagerie électronique qui met l'accent sur la sécurité et la confidentialité grâce à l'utilisation du standard de chiffrement OpenPGP. StartMail est en activité depuis 2014 et est basé à Boulevard 11, Zeist Pays-Bas. Les comptes commencent avec 10 Go. Ils offrent un essai de 30 jours.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://www.startmail.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.startmail.com/en/privacy/){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.startmail.com){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.startmail.com/login)
+
+??? success "Domaines personnalisés et alias"
+
+ Les comptes personnels peuvent utiliser des alias [Personnalisés ou Rapides](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360007297457-Aliases). Des [domaines personnalisés](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/4403911432209-Setup-a-custom-domain) sont également disponibles.
+
+??? warning "Modes de paiement privés"
+
+ StartMail accepte Visa, MasterCard, American Express et Paypal. StartMail propose également d'autres [options de paiement](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006620637-Payment-methods) telles que le Bitcoin (actuellement uniquement pour les comptes personnels) et le prélèvement SEPA pour les comptes de plus d'un an.
+
+??? success "Sécurité du compte"
+
+ StartMail supporte l'authentification TOTP à deux facteurs [pour le webmail uniquement](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006682158-Two-factor-authentication-2FA). Ils ne permettent pas l'authentification par clé de sécurité U2F.
+
+??? info "Sécurité des données"
+
+ StartMail dispose d'un [chiffrement à accès zéro au repos](https://www.startmail.com/en/whitepaper/#_Toc458527835), utilisant leur système de "coffre-fort utilisateur". Lorsque vous vous connectez, le coffre-fort est ouvert, et le courriel est alors déplacé dans le coffre-fort hors de la file d'attente où il est déchiffré par la clé privée correspondante.
+
+ StartMail supporte l'import de [contacts](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006495557-Import-contacts), cependant, ils ne sont accessibles que dans le webmail et non par des protocoles tels que [CalDAV](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/CalDAV). Les contacts ne sont pas non plus stockés à l'aide d'un chiffrement à connaissance zéro.
+
+??? success "Chiffrement des e-mails"
+
+ StartMail dispose d'un [chiffrement intégré](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/sections/360001889078-Encryption) dans son webmail, ce qui simplifie l'envoi de messages chiffrés avec des clés OpenPGP publiques.
+
+??? warning "Héritage numérique"
+
+ StartMail ne propose pas de fonction d'héritage numérique.
+
+??? info "Résiliation du compte"
+
+ À l'expiration du compte, StartMail supprimera définitivement votre compte après [6 mois en 3 phases](https://support.startmail.com/hc/en-us/articles/360006794398-Account-expiration).
+
+??? info "Fonctionnalités supplémentaires"
+
+ StartMail permet de faire passer les images des e-mails par leur serveur proxy. Si vous autorisez le chargement de l'image distante, l'expéditeur ne saura pas quelle est votre adresse IP.
+
+## D'autres fournisseurs
+
+Ces fournisseurs stockent vos e-mails avec un chiffrement à connaissance zéro, ce qui en fait d'excellentes options pour assurer la sécurité de vos courriels stockés. check "Sécurité du compte"
+
+### Tutanota
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tutanota** est un service de messagerie électronique qui met l'accent sur la sécurité et la confidentialité grâce à l'utilisation du chiffrement. Tutanota est en activité depuis **2011** et est basée à Hanovre, en Allemagne. Les comptes commencent avec 1 Go de stockage avec leur offre gratuite.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://tutanota.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://tutanota.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://tutanota.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://tutanota.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/tutanota/id922429609)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tutanota.com/#download)
+ - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.tutanota.com/)
+
+Tutanota ne prend pas en charge le [protocole IMAP](https://tutanota.com/faq/#imap) ni l'utilisation de [clients de messagerie](email-clients.md) tiers, et vous ne pourrez pas non plus ajouter [des comptes de messagerie externes](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/544#issuecomment-670473647) à l'application Tutanota. Ni [l'import d'e-mails](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/630) ni [les sous-dossiers](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/927) ne sont actuellement pris en charge, bien que cela soit [amené à changer](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/kickoff-import). Les e-mails peuvent être exportés [individuellement ou par sélection groupée](https://tutanota.com/howto#generalMail) par dossier, ce qui peut s'avérer peu pratique si vous avez de nombreux dossiers.
+
+??? success "Domaines personnalisés et alias"
+
+ Les comptes Tutanota payants peuvent utiliser jusqu'à 5 [aliases](https://tutanota.com/faq#alias) et [domaines personnalisés](https://tutanota.com/faq#custom-domain). Tutanota ne permet pas le [sous-adressage (adresses plus)](https://tutanota.com/faq#plus), mais vous pouvez utiliser un [fourre-tout](https://tutanota.com/howto#settings-global) avec un domaine personnalisé.
+
+??? warning "Modes de paiement privés"
+
+ Tutanota n'accepte directement que les cartes de crédit et PayPal, mais les Bitcoin et Monero peuvent être utilisés pour acheter des cartes-cadeaux via leur [partenariat](https://tutanota.com/faq/#cryptocurrency) avec Proxystore.
+
+??? success "Sécurité du compte"
+
+ Tutanota prend en charge l'[authentification à deux facteurs](https://tutanota.com/faq#2fa) avec TOTP ou U2F.
+
+??? success "Sécurité des données"
+
+ Tutanota dispose d'un [chiffrement à accès zéro au repos](https://tutanota.com/faq#what-encrypted) pour vos e-mails, [contacts du carnet d'adresses](https://tutanota.com/faq#encrypted-address-book) et [calendriers](https://tutanota.com/faq#calendar). Cela signifie que les messages et autres données stockés dans votre compte ne sont lisibles que par vous.
+
+??? warning "Chiffrement des e-mails"
+
+ Tutanota [n'utilise pas OpenPGP](https://www.tutanota.com/faq/#pgp). Les comptes Tutanota peuvent uniquement recevoir des e-mails chiffrés provenant de comptes de messagerie non Tutanota lorsqu'ils sont envoyés via une [boîte aux lettres temporaire Tutanota] (https://www.tutanota.com/howto/#encrypted-email-external).
+
+??? warning "Héritage numérique"
+
+ Tutanota ne propose pas de fonction d'héritage numérique.
+
+??? info "Résiliation du compte"
+
+ Tutanota [supprimera les comptes gratuits inactifs](https://tutanota.com/faq#inactive-accounts) après six mois. Vous pouvez réutiliser un compte gratuit désactivé si vous payez.
+
+??? info "Fonctionnalités supplémentaires"
+
+ Tutanota propose la version professionnelle de [Tutanota pour les organisations à but non lucratif](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/secure-email-for-non-profit) gratuitement ou avec une grosse réduction.
+
+ Tutanota dispose également d'une fonction commerciale appelée [Secure Connect](https://tutanota.com/secure-connect/). Cela garantit que le contact du client avec l'entreprise utilise E2EE. La fonctionnalité coûte 240 €/an.
+
+## Services d'alias d'e-mails
+
+Un service d'alias d'e-mails vous permet de générer facilement une nouvelle adresse e-mail pour chaque site web auquel vous vous inscrivez. Les alias que vous créez sont ensuite transférés vers une adresse électronique de votre choix, ce qui permet de masquer à la fois votre adresse électronique "principale" et l'identité de votre fournisseur de messagerie. Un véritable alias d'e-mail est mieux que l'adressage plus, couramment utilisé et pris en charge par de nombreux fournisseurs, qui vous permet de créer des alias tels que votrenom+[nimportequoiici]@exemple.fr, car les sites web, les annonceurs et les réseaux de pistage peuvent trivialement supprimer tout ce qui suit le signe + pour connaître votre véritable adresse e-mail.
+
+L'alias d'e-mail peut servir de protection au cas où votre fournisseur d'e-mail cesserait de fonctionner. Dans ce cas, vous pouvez facilement rediriger vos alias vers une nouvelle adresse électronique. En revanche, vous faites confiance au service d'aliasing pour qu'il continue de fonctionner.
+
+L'utilisation d'un service d'alias d'e-mail dédié présente également un certain nombre d'avantages par rapport à un alias fourre-tout sur un domaine personnalisé :
+
+- Les alias peuvent être activés et désactivés individuellement lorsque vous en avez besoin, ce qui empêche les sites web de vous envoyer des messages électroniques de façon aléatoire.
+- Les réponses sont envoyées à partir de l'adresse alias, qui masque votre véritable adresse électronique.
+
+Ils présentent également un certain nombre d'avantages par rapport aux services qui fournissent des "e-mails temporaires" :
+
+- Les alias sont permanents et peuvent être réactivés si vous devez recevoir quelque chose comme une réinitialisation de mot de passe.
+- Les courriels sont envoyés à votre boîte mails de confiance plutôt que d'être stockés par le fournisseur d'alias.
+- Les services d'e-mails temporaires proposent généralement des boîtes mail publiques auxquelles peuvent accéder tous ceux qui connaissent l'adresse, tandis que les alias sont privés.
+
+Nos recommandations en matière d'alias d'e-mail sont des fournisseurs qui vous permettent de créer des alias sur des domaines qu'ils contrôlent, ainsi que sur votre ou vos propres domaine(s) personnalisé(s), pour un coût annuel modeste. Ils peuvent également être auto-hébergés si vous souhaitez un contrôle maximal. Toutefois, l'utilisation d'un domaine personnalisé peut présenter des inconvénients en matière de confidentialité : Si vous êtes la seule personne à utiliser votre domaine personnalisé, vos actions peuvent être facilement suivies sur les sites web en regardant simplement le nom de domaine dans l'adresse électronique et en ignorant tout ce qui se trouve avant le signe arobase (@).
+
+L'utilisation d'un service d'alias nécessite de faire confiance à la fois à votre fournisseur de messagerie et à votre fournisseur d'alias pour vos messages non chiffrés. Certains fournisseurs atténuent légèrement ce problème grâce au chiffrement automatique PGP, qui réduit le nombre de services auxquels vous devez faire confiance de deux à un en chiffrant les e-mails entrants avant qu'ils ne soient remis à votre fournisseur de boîte mail final.
+
+### AnonAddy
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **AnonAddy** vous permet de créer gratuitement 20 alias de domaine sur un domaine partagé, ou un nombre illimité d'alias "standard" qui sont moins anonymes.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://anonaddy.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://anonaddy.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://app.anonaddy.com/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/anonaddy){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://anonaddy.com/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://anonaddy.com/faq/#is-there-an-android-app)
+ - [:material-apple-ios: iOS](https://anonaddy.com/faq/#is-there-an-ios-app)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/fr/firefox/addon/anonaddy/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/anonaddy-anonymous-email/iadbdpnoknmbdeolbapdackdcogdmjpe)
+
+Le nombre d'alias partagés (qui se terminent par un domaine partagé comme @anonaddy.me) que vous pouvez créer est limité à 20 sur l'offre gratuite d'AnonAddy et à 50 sur leur offre à 12 $/an. Vous pouvez créer un nombre illimité d'alias standard (qui se terminent par un domaine tel que @[nomdutilisateur].anonaddy.com ou un domaine personnalisé sur les offres payantes), mais, comme nous l'avons déjà mentionné, cela peut nuire à la confidentialité car les gens peuvent trivialement relier vos alias standard en se basant sur le seul nom de domaine. Des alias partagés illimités sont disponibles pour 36 $/an.
+
+Fonctions gratuites notables :
+
+- [x] 20 Alias partagés
+- [x] Alias standard illimités
+- [ ] Pas de réponses sortantes
+- [x] 2 Boîtes mail de réception
+- [x] Chiffrement automatique PGP
+
+### SimpleLogin
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **SimpleLogin** est un service gratuit qui fournit des alias d'e-mail sur une variété de noms de domaine partagés, et offre en option des fonctionnalités payantes comme des alias illimités et des domaines personnalisés.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://simplelogin.io/fr/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://simplelogin.io/privacy/){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://simplelogin.io/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simple-login){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.simplelogin.android)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1494359858)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/simple-login/Simple-Login-Android/releases)
+ - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/fr/firefox/addon/simplelogin/)
+ - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/dphilobhebphkdjbpfohgikllaljmgbn)
+ - [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/simpleloginreceive-sen/diacfpipniklenphgljfkmhinphjlfff)
+ - [:simple-safari: Safari](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1494051017)
+
+SimpleLogin a été [acquis par Proton AG](https://proton.me/news/proton-and-simplelogin-join-forces) à compter du 8 avril 2022. Si vous utilisez Proton Mail pour votre boîte mail principale, SimpleLogin est un excellent choix. Les deux produits étant désormais détenus par la même société, vous ne devez plus faire confiance qu'à une seule entité. Nous supposons également que SimpleLogin sera plus étroitement intégré aux offres de Proton à l'avenir. SimpleLogin continue de prendre en charge la redirection vers le fournisseur de messagerie de votre choix. Securitum [a audité](https://simplelogin.io/blog/security-audit/) SimpleLogin début 2022 et tous les problèmes [ont été résolus](https://simplelogin.io/audit2022/web.pdf).
+
+Vous pouvez lier votre compte SimpleLogin avec votre compte Proton dans les paramètres de SimpleLogin. Si vous avez l'offre Proton Illimité, Entreprise, ou Visionnaire, vous aurez SimpleLogin Premium gratuitement.
+
+Fonctions gratuites notables :
+
+- [x] 10 Alias partagés
+- [x] Réponses illimitées
+- [x] 1 Boîte mail de réception
+
+## E-mail auto-hébergé
+
+Les administrateurs système peuvent envisager de mettre en place leur propre serveur de messagerie. Les serveurs de messagerie requièrent une attention et une maintenance permanente afin de garantir la sécurité et la fiabilité de la distribution des e-mails.
+
+### Solutions logicielles combinées
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mailcow** est un serveur de messagerie plus avancé, parfait pour ceux qui ont un peu plus d'expérience de Linux. Il possède tout ce dont vous avez besoin dans un conteneur Docker : Un serveur de messagerie avec prise en charge de DKIM, une surveillance antivirus et spam, un webmail et ActiveSync avec SOGo, et une administration basée sur le web avec prise en charge de 2FA.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://mailcow.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mailcow.github.io/mailcow-dockerized-docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailcow/mailcow-dockerized){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.servercow.de/mailcow?lang=en#sal){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Mail-in-a-Box** est un script de configuration automatisé pour le déploiement d'un serveur de messagerie sur Ubuntu. Son objectif est de faciliter la mise en place d'un serveur de courrier électronique.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://mailinabox.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://mailinabox.email/guide.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mail-in-a-box/mailinabox){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+
+Nous préférons que nos prestataires recommandés collectent le moins de données possible.
+
+- [Configuration d'un serveur de messagerie avec OpenSMTPD, Dovecot et Rspamd](https://poolp.org/posts/2019-09-14/setting-up-a-mail-server-with-opensmtpd-dovecot-and-rspamd/) (2019)
+- [Comment gérer votre propre serveur de messagerie](https://www.c0ffee.net/blog/mail-server-guide/) (août 2017)
+
+## Critères
+
+**Veuillez noter que nous ne sommes affiliés à aucun des fournisseurs que nous recommandons.** En plus de [nos critères de base](about/criteria.md), nous avons développé un ensemble d'exigences claires pour tout fournisseur d'email souhaitant être recommandé, y compris la mise en place des bonnes pratiques du secteur, une technologie moderne et bien plus. Nous vous suggérons de vous familiariser avec cette liste avant de choisir un fournisseur d'e-mails, et de mener vos propres recherches pour vous assurer que le fournisseur d'e-mails que vous choisissez est le bon choix pour vous.
+
+### Technologie
+
+Nous considérons ces caractéristiques comme importantes afin de fournir un service sûr et optimal. Vous devez vous demander si le fournisseur possède les caractéristiques dont vous avez besoin.
+
+**Le Meilleur Cas:**
+
+- Chiffre les données du compte de messagerie au repos avec un chiffrement à accès zéro.
+- Capacité d'export en tant que [Mbox](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mbox) ou .eml individuel avec standard [RFC5322](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5322/).
+- Permet aux utilisateurs d'utiliser leur propre [nom de domaine](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nom_de_domaine). Les noms de domaine personnalisés sont importants pour les utilisateurs car ils leur permettent de conserver leur indépendance du service, au cas où celui-ci tournerait mal ou serait racheté par une autre société qui ne donne pas priorité à la vie privée.
+- Fonctionne sur sa propre infrastructure, c'est-à-dire qu'elle ne repose pas sur des fournisseurs de services de messagerie tiers.
+
+**Dans le meilleur des cas :**
+
+- Chiffre toutes les données du compte (contacts, calendriers, etc.) au repos avec un chiffrement à accès zéro.
+- Un webmail intégré avec chiffrement E2EE/PGP est fourni à titre de commodité.
+- Prise en charge de [WKD](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD) pour permettre une meilleure découverte des clés publiques OpenPGP via HTTP. Les utilisateurs de GnuPG peuvent obtenir une clé en tapant : `gpg --locate-key utilisateur_exemple@exemple.fr`
+- Prise en charge d'une boîte mail temporaire pour les utilisateurs externes. Cette fonction est utile lorsque vous souhaitez envoyer un e-mail chiffré, sans envoyer une copie réelle à votre destinataire. Ces e-mails ont généralement une durée de vie limitée et sont ensuite automatiquement supprimés. Ils n'obligent pas non plus le destinataire à configurer un système de chiffrement comme OpenPGP.
+- Disponibilité des services du fournisseur de courrier électronique via un [service onion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.onion).
+- Prise en charge du [sous-adressage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email_address#Subaddressing).
+- Fonctionnalité fourre-tout ou alias pour ceux qui possèdent leurs propres domaines.
+- Utilisation de protocoles standard d'accès au e-mails tels que IMAP, SMTP ou [JMAP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Meta_Application_Protocol). Les protocoles d'accès standard garantissent que les clients peuvent facilement télécharger l'ensemble de leur courrier électronique, s'ils souhaitent changer de fournisseur.
+
+### Confidentialité
+
+Nous préférons que nos prestataires recommandés collectent le moins de données possible.
+
+**Le Meilleur Cas:**
+
+- Protéger l'adresse IP de l'expéditeur. Filtrez-la pour qu'elle n'apparaisse pas dans le champ d'en-tête `Received`.
+- Ne demandez pas d'Informations Personnelles Identifiables (PII) en plus d'un nom d'utilisateur et d'un mot de passe.
+- Politique de confidentialité répondant aux exigences définies par le RGPD.
+- Ne doit pas être hébergé aux États-Unis en raison de [ECPA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_Communications_Privacy_Act#Criticism) qui doit [encore être réformé](https://epic.org/ecpa/).
+
+**Dans le meilleur des cas :**
+
+- Accepte le Bitcoin, les espèces et d'autres formes de crypto-monnaies et/ou options de paiement anonymes (cartes-cadeaux, etc.).
+
+### Sécurité
+
+Les serveurs de courrier électronique traitent un grand nombre de données très sensibles. Nous nous attendons à ce que les prestataires adoptent les meilleures pratiques du secteur afin de protéger leurs membres.
+
+**Le Meilleur Cas:**
+
+- Protection du webmail avec 2FA, tel que TOTP.
+- Le chiffrement à accès zéro, qui complète le chiffrement au repos. Le fournisseur ne dispose pas des clés de déchiffrement des données qu'il détient. Cela permet d'éviter qu'un employé malhonnête ne divulgue les données auxquelles il a accès ou qu'un adversaire distant ne divulgue les données qu'il a volées en obtenant un accès non autorisé au serveur.
+- Prise en charge de [DNSSEC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Extensions).
+- Aucune erreurs ou vulnérabilités TLS lors du profilage par des outils tels que [Hardenize](https://www.hardenize.com/), [testssl.sh](https://testssl.sh/), ou [Qualys SSL Labs](https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest); cela inclut les erreurs liées aux certificats et les paramètres DH faibles, tels que ceux qui ont conduit à [Logjam](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logjam_(computer_security)).
+- Une préférence, pour les serveurs (facultatif sur TLSv1.3), pour les suites de chiffrement fortes qui prennent en charge la confidentialité persistante et le chiffrement authentifié.
+- Une politique valide [MTA-STS](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8461) et [TLS-RPT](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8460).
+- Des enregistrements [DANE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS-based_Authentication_of_Named_Entities) valides.
+- Des enregistrements [SPF](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sender_Policy_Framework) et [DKIM](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/DomainKeys_Identified_Mail) valides.
+- Disposer d'un enregistrement et d'une politique [DMARC](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/DMARC) appropriés ou utiliser [ARC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain) pour l'authentification. Si l'authentification DMARC est utilisée, la politique doit être définie comme suit : `reject` ou `quarantine`.
+- Une préférence pour les serveurs avec TLS 1.2 ou plus et un plan pour [retirer TLSv1.0 et TLSv1.1](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate/).
+- Une soumission [SMTPS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SMTPS), en supposant que le SMTP est utilisé.
+- Des normes de sécurité des sites web telles que :
+ - [HTTP Strict Transport Security](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security)
+ - Une [Intégrité des sous-ressources](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subresource_Integrity) si des éléments sont chargés depuis des domaines externes.
+- Doit prendre en charge l'affichage des [en-têtes de message](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header), car il s'agit d'une fonction d'analyse scientifique essentielle pour déterminer si un e-mail est une tentative de hammeçonnage.
+
+**Dans le meilleur des cas :**
+
+- Prise en charge de l'authentification matérielle, à savoir Prise en charge de l'authentification matérielle, à savoir U2F et [WebAuthn](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn). U2F et WebAuthn sont plus sûrs car ils utilisent une clé privée stockée sur un dispositif matériel côté client pour authentifier les personnes, par opposition à un secret partagé qui est stocké sur le serveur web et côté client lors de l'utilisation de TOTP. De plus, U2F et WebAuthn sont plus résistants au phishing car leur réponse d'authentification est basée sur le [nom de domaine](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nom_de_domaine) authentifié.
+- Un [DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844) en plus de la prise en charge de DANE.
+- Prise en charge de [Authenticated Received Chain (ARC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain), utile pour les personnes qui publient sur des listes de diffusion [RFC8617](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8617).
+- Des programmes de primes aux bugs et/ou un processus coordonné de divulgation des vulnérabilités.
+- Des normes de sécurité des sites web telles que :
+ - [Content Security Policy (CSP)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy)
+ - [Expect-CT](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-expect-ct)
+
+### Confiance
+
+Vous ne confieriez pas vos finances à une personne ayant une fausse identité, alors pourquoi lui confier vos e-mails ? Nous exigeons de nos fournisseurs recommandés qu'ils rendent public leur propriété ou leur direction. Nous aimerions également voir des rapports de transparence fréquents, notamment en ce qui concerne la manière dont les demandes de gouvernement sont traitées.
+
+**Le Meilleur Cas:**
+
+- Une direction ou un propriétaire public.
+
+**Dans le meilleur des cas :**
+
+- Une direction publique.
+- Rapports de transparence fréquents.
+
+### Marketing
+
+Avec les fournisseurs de courrier électronique que nous recommandons, nous aimons voir un marketing responsable.
+
+**Le Meilleur Cas:**
+
+- Doit héberger lui-même ses outils d'analyse de traffic (pas de Google Analytics, Adobe Analytics, etc.). Le site du fournisseur doit également se conformer à [DNT (Do Not Track)](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Do_Not_Track) pour ceux qui souhaitent refuser.
+
+Ne doit pas avoir de marketing irresponsable :
+
+- Prétendre à un "chiffrement incassable". Le chiffrement doit être utilisé en supposant qu'il ne soit plus secret dans le futur, lorsque la technologie existera pour le décrypter.
+- Garantir la protection de l'anonymat à 100%. Lorsque quelqu'un prétend que quelque chose est à 100%, cela signifie qu'il n'y a aucune certitude d'échec. Nous savons que les gens peuvent assez facilement se désanonymiser de plusieurs façons, par exemple :
+
+- Réutiliser des informations personnelles (comptes de messagerie, pseudonymes uniques, etc.) auxquelles ils ont eu accès sans logiciel d'anonymat (Tor, VPN, etc.).
+- [Empreinte digitale des navigateurs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint)
+
+**Dans le meilleur des cas :**
+
+- Une documentation claire et facile à lire. Notamment pour la mise en place du 2FA, des clients de messagerie, d'OpenPGP, etc.
+
+### Fonctionnalités Supplémentaires
+
+Bien qu'il ne s'agisse pas d'exigences strictes, nous avons pris en compte d'autres facteurs liés à la commodité ou à la confidentialité pour déterminer les fournisseurs à recommander.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/encryption.md b/i18n/fr/encryption.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b7ca5f860
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/encryption.md
@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
+---
+title: "Logiciels de chiffrement"
+icon: material/file-lock
+---
+
+Le chiffrement des données est le seul moyen de contrôler de qui peut y accéder. Si vous n'utilisez pas actuellement de logiciel de chiffrement pour votre disque dur, vos e-mails ou vos fichiers, vous devriez choisir une option ici.
+
+## Multi-plateforme
+
+Les options répertoriées ici sont multiplateformes et parfaites pour créer des sauvegardes chiffrées de vos données.
+
+### Cryptomator (Cloud)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Cryptomator** est une solution de chiffrement conçue pour enregistrer vos fichiers de manière privée vers n'importe quel fournisseur de cloud. Il vous permet de créer des coffres-forts qui sont stockés sur un disque virtuel, dont le contenu est chiffré et synchronisé avec votre fournisseur de stockage cloud.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://cryptomator.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://cryptomator.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Politique de Confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.cryptomator.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/cryptomator){ .card-link title="Code Source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://cryptomator.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.cryptomator)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/cryptomator-2/id1560822163)
+ - [:simple-android: Android](https://cryptomator.org/android)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://cryptomator.org/downloads)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.cryptomator.Cryptomator)
+
+Cryptomator utilise le chiffrement AES-256 pour chiffrer les fichiers et les noms de fichiers. Cryptomator ne peut pas chiffrer certaines métadonnées telles que les dates et heures d'accès, de modification et de création, ni le nombre et la taille des fichiers et des dossiers.
+
+Certaines bibliothèques cryptographiques de Cryptomator ont été [auditées](https://community.cryptomator.org/t/has-there-been-a-security-review-audit-of-cryptomator/44) par Cure53. La portée des bibliothèques auditées comprend: [cryptolib](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptolib), [cryptofs](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptofs), [siv-mode](https://github.com/cryptomator/siv-mode) et [cryptomator-objc-cryptor](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptomator-objc-cryptor). L'audit ne s'est pas étendu à [cryptolib-swift](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptolib-swift), qui est une bibliothèque utilisée par Cryptomator pour iOS.
+
+La documentation de Cryptomator détaille sa [cible de sécurité](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/security-target/), son [architecture de sécurité](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/architecture/), et ses [meilleures pratiques](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/best-practices/) prévues pour une utilisation de manière plus détaillée.
+
+### Picocrypt (Fichier)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Picocrypt** est un outil de chiffrement léger et simple qui fournit un chiffrement moderne. Picocrypt utilise le chiffrement sécurisé XChaCha20 et la fonction de dérivation de clé Argon2id pour assurer un haut niveau de sécurité. Il utilise les modules x/crypto standards de Go pour ses fonctions de chiffrement.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Dépôt](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/picocrypt){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases)
+
+### VeraCrypt (Disque)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **VeraCrypt** est un utilitaire gratuit et open source pour le chiffrement de fichiers/dossiers à la volée. Il peut créer un disque virtuel chiffré dans un fichier, chiffrer une partition ou l'ensemble du périphérique de stockage avec une authentification avant le démarrage.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://veracrypt.fr){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/en/Documentation.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/code/){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/en/Donation.html){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html)
+
+VeraCrypt est un dérivé du projet TrueCrypt, qui a été abandonné. Selon ses développeurs, des améliorations de la sécurité ont été apportées et les problèmes soulevés par l'audit initial du code de TrueCrypt ont été résolus.
+
+Lors du chiffrement avec VeraCrypt, vous avez la possibilité de choisir parmi différentes [fonctions de hachage](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt#Syst%C3%A8me_de_chiffrement). Nous vous suggérons de **seulement** sélectionner [SHA-512](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-2) et de vous en tenir au [chiffrement par blocs AES](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard).
+
+Truecrypt a été [audité un certain nombre de fois](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/TrueCrypt#Audit_global_du_logiciel_en_2013) et VeraCrypt a également été [audité séparément](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt#Audit).
+
+## Chiffrement complet du disque du système d'exploitation
+
+Les systèmes d'exploitation modernes incluent le [Chiffrement de Disque](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chiffrement_de_disque) et utiliseront un [cryptoprocesseur sécurisé](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptoprocesseur_s%C3%A9curis%C3%A9).
+
+### BitLocker
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **BitLocker** est la solution de chiffrement intégral de volume fournie avec Microsoft Windows. La principale raison pour laquelle nous le recommandons est son [utilisation du TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/fr-fr/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). [ElcomSoft](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ElcomSoft), une entreprise de forensique, a écrit à ce sujet dans [Understanding BitLocker TPM Protection](https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2021/01/understanding-BitLocker-tpm-protection/).
+
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.microsoft.com/fr-fr/windows/security/information-protection/BitLocker/BitLocker-overview){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+BitLocker est [uniquement pris en charge](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/turn-on-device-encryption-0c453637-bc88-5f74-5105-741561aae838) sur les éditions Pro, Entreprise et Éducation de Windows. Il peut être activé sur les éditions Famille à condition qu'elles remplissent les pré-requis.
+
+??? example "Activer BitLocker sur Windows Famille"
+
+ Pour activer BitLocker sur les éditions "Famille" de Windows, vous devez formater vos partitions avec une [Table de Partitionnement GUID](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/GUID_Partition_Table) et disposer d'un module TPM dédié (v1.2, 2.0+).
+
+ 1. Ouvrez une invite de commande et vérifiez le format de la table de partition de votre disque à l'aide de la commande suivante. Vous devriez voir "**GPT**" listé sous "Style de partition" :
+
+ ```
+ powershell Get-Disk
+ ```
+
+ 2. Exécutez cette commande (dans une invite de commande administrateur) pour vérifier la version de votre TPM. Vous devriez voir `2.0` ou `1.2` listé à côté de `SpecVersion`:
+
+ ```
+ powershell Get-WmiObject -Namespace "root/cimv2/security/microsofttpm" -Class WIN32_tpm
+ ```
+
+ 3. Accédez à [Options de démarrage avancées](https://support.microsoft.com/fr-fr/windows/options-de-d%C3%A9marrage-avanc%C3%A9es-y-compris-le-mode-sans-%C3%A9chec-b90e7808-80b5-a291-d4b8-1a1af602b617). Vous devez redémarrer en appuyant sur la touche F8 avant que Windows ne démarre et aller dans l'*invite de commande* dans **Dépannage** → **Options avancées** → **Invite de commande**.
+
+ 4. Connectez-vous avec votre compte administrateur et tapez ceci dans l'invite de commande pour lancer le chiffrement:
+
+ ```
+ manage-bde -on c: -used
+ ```
+
+ 5. Fermez l'invite de commande et continuez le démarrage vers Windows normalement.
+
+ 6. Ouvrez une invite de commande administrateur et exécutez les commandes suivantes:
+
+ ```
+ manage-bde c: -protectors -add -rp -tpm
+ manage-bde -protectors -enable c:
+ manage-bde -protectors -get c: > %UserProfile%\Desktop\BitLocker-Recovery-Key.txt
+ ```
+
+ !!! tip "Conseil"
+
+ Sauvegardez le fichier `BitLocker-Recovery-Key.txt` de votre ordinateur de bureau sur un périphérique de stockage distinct. La perte de ce code de récupération peut entraîner la perte de données.
+
+### FileVault
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FileVault** est la solution de chiffrement de volume à la volée intégrée à macOS. FileVault est recommandé parce qu'il [tire profit](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/volume-encryption-with-filevault-sec4c6dc1b6e/web) de capacités de sécurité matérielle présentes sur un SoC de silicium Apple ou une Puce de Sécurité T2.
+
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/fr-fr/guide/mac-help/mh11785/mac){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+
+Nous recommandons de stocker une clé de récupération locale dans un endroit sûr plutôt que d'utiliser votre compte iCloud pour la récupération.
+
+### Linux Unified Key Setup
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **LUKS** est la méthode de chiffrement de disque par défaut pour Linux. Elle peut être utilisée pour chiffrer des volumes complets, des partitions ou créer des conteneurs chiffrés.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/blob/main/README.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+
+??? example "Créer et ouvrir des conteneurs chiffrés"
+
+ ```
+ dd if=/dev/urandom of=/path-to-file bs=1M count=1024 status=progress
+ sudo cryptsetup luksFormat /path-to-file
+ ```
+
+
+ #### Ouvrir des conteneurs chiffrés
+ Nous recommandons d'ouvrir les conteneurs et les volumes avec `udisksctl` car cela utilise [Polkit](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). La plupart des gestionnaires de fichiers, tels que ceux inclus dans les environnements de bureau les plus courants, peuvent déverrouiller les fichiers chiffrés. Des outils comme [udiskie](https://github.com/coldfix/udiskie) peuvent s'exécuter dans la barre d'état système et fournir une interface utilisateur utile.
+ ```
+ udisksctl loop-setup -f /path-to-file
+ udisksctl unlock -b /dev/loop0
+ ```
+
+!!! note "N'oubliez pas de sauvegarder les en-têtes de volume"
+
+ Nous vous recommandons de toujours [sauvegarder vos en-têtes LUKS](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Device_encryption#Backup_and_restore) en cas de panne partielle du lecteur. Cela peut être fait avec :
+
+ ```
+ cryptsetup luksHeaderBackup /dev/device --header-backup-file /mnt/backup/file.img
+ ```
+
+## Basé sur le navigateur
+
+Le chiffrement basé sur le navigateur peut être utile lorsque vous avez besoin de chiffrer un fichier, mais que vous ne pouvez pas installer de logiciel ou d'applications sur votre appareil.
+
+### hat.sh
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Hat.sh** est une application web qui fournit un chiffrement sécurisé des fichiers dans votre navigateur. Il peut également être auto-hébergé et est utile si vous devez chiffrer un fichier mais que vous ne pouvez pas installer de logiciel sur votre appareil en raison de politiques d'entreprises.
+
+ [:octicons-globe-16: Page d'accueil](https://hat.sh){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://hat.sh/about/){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://hat.sh/about/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/sh-dv/hat.sh){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sh-dv/hat.sh#donations){ .card-link title="Les méthodes de dons se trouvent au bas du site web" }
+
+## Ligne de commande
+
+Les outils dotés d'une interface de ligne de commande sont utiles pour intégrer des [scripts shell](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Script_shell).
+
+### Kryptor
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Kryptor** est un outil gratuit et open source de chiffrement et de signature de fichiers qui utilise des algorithmes cryptographiques modernes et sécurisés. Il vise à être une meilleure version d'[age](https://github.com/FiloSottile/age) et [Minisign](https://jedisct1.github.io/minisign/) pour fournir une alternative simple et facile à GPG.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://www.kryptor.co.uk){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/features#privacy){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/tutorial){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/samuel-lucas6/Kryptor){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/#donate){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.kryptor.co.uk)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.kryptor.co.uk)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.kryptor.co.uk)
+
+### Tomb
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Tomb** est un outil pour LUKS en ligne de commande shell. Il prend en charge la stéganographie via des [outils tiers](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb#how-does-it-work).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://www.dyne.org/software/tomb){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.dyne.org/donate){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+## OpenPGP
+
+OpenPGP est parfois nécessaire pour des tâches spécifiques telles que la signature numérique et le chiffrage des e-mails. PGP possède de nombreuses fonctionnalités et est [complexe](https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html) car il existe depuis longtemps. Pour des tâches telles que la signature ou le chiffrement des fichiers, nous suggérons les options ci-dessus.
+
+Lorsque vous chiffrez avec PGP, vous avez la possibilité de configurer différentes options dans votre fichier `gpg.conf` . Nous recommandons de suivre les options standard spécifiées dans la [FAQ de l'utilisateur de GnuPG](https://www.gnupg.org/faq/gnupg-faq.html#new_user_gpg_conf).
+
+!!! tip "Utiliser future-defaults lors de la génération d'une clé"
+
+ Lorsque vous [générez des clés](https://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual/c14.html), nous vous suggérons d'utiliser la commande `future-default` car elle demandera à GnuPG d'utiliser de la cryptographie moderne telle que [Curve25519](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curve25519) et [Ed25519](https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/) :
+
+ ```bash
+ gpg --quick-gen-key alice@exemple.com future-default
+ ```
+
+### GNU Privacy Guard
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GnuPG** est une alternative sous licence GPL de la suite de logiciels cryptographiques PGP. GnuPG est conforme [RFC 4880](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880), qui est la spécification actuelle de l'IETF pour OpenPGP. Le projet GnuPG a travaillé sur une [nouvelle ébauche](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh/) dans le but de moderniser OpenPGP. GnuPG fait partie du projet logiciel GNU de la Free Software Foundation et a reçu un [financement](https://gnupg.org/blog/20220102-a-new-future-for-gnupg.html) majeur du gouvernement allemand.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://gnupg.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gnupg.org/privacy-policy.html){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gnupg.org/documentation/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.sufficientlysecure.keychain)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://gpg4win.org/download.html)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://gpgtools.org)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://gnupg.org/download/index.html#binary)
+
+### GPG4win
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GPG4win** est un paquet pour Windows de [Intevation et g10 Code](https://gpg4win.org/impressum.html). Il comprend [divers outils](https://gpg4win.org/about.html) qui peuvent vous aider à utiliser GPG sous Microsoft Windows. Le projet a été lancé et initialement [financé par](https://web.archive.org/web/20190425125223/https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/news/government-used-cryptography) l'Office Fédéral allemand pour la Sécurité de l'Information (BSI) en 2005.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://gpg4win.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gpg4win.org/privacy-policy.html){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gpg4win.org/documentation.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gpg4win.git;a=summary){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://gpg4win.org/donate.html){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://gpg4win.org/download.html)
+
+### GPG Suite
+
+!!! note "À noter"
+
+ Nous suggérons [Canary Mail](email-clients.md#canary-mail) pour utiliser PGP avec les e-mails sur les appareils iOS.
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **GPG Suite** fournit un support OpenPGP pour [Courrier Apple](email-clients.md#apple-mail) et macOS.
+
+ Nous vous recommandons de consulter leurs [Premiers pas](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb/how-to/first-steps-where-do-i-start-where-do-i-begin-setup-gpgtools-create-a-new-key-your-first-encrypted-email) et leur [Base de connaissances](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb) pour obtenir de l'aide.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://gpgtools.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gpgtools.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GPGTools){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://gpgtools.org)
+
+### OpenKeychain
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OpenKeychain** est une implémentation Android de GnuPG. Elle est généralement requise par les clients de messagerie comme [K-9 Mail](email-clients.md#k-9-mail) et [FairEmail](email-clients.md#fairemail) et d'autres applications Android pour fournir la prise en charge du chiffrement. Cure53 a réalisé un [audit de sécurité](https://www.openkeychain.org/openkeychain-3-6) d'OpenKeychain 3.6 en octobre 2015. Les détails techniques concernant l'audit et les solutions d'OpenKeychain peuvent être trouvés [ici](https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain/wiki/cure53-Security-Audit-2015).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://www.openkeychain.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.openkeychain.org/help/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.openkeychain.org/faq/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.sufficientlysecure.keychain)
+
+## Critères
+
+**Veuillez noter que nous ne sommes affiliés à aucun des projets que nous recommandons.** En plus de [nos critères de base](about/criteria.md), nous avons développé un ensemble d'exigences claires pour nous permettre de fournir des recommandations objectives. Nous vous suggérons de vous familiariser avec cette liste avant de choisir d'utiliser un projet, et de mener vos propres recherches pour vous assurer que c'est le bon choix pour vous.
+
+!!! example "Cette section est récente"
+
+ Nous travaillons à l'établissement de critères définis pour chaque section de notre site, et celles-ci peuvent être sujet à changement. Si vous avez des questions sur nos critères, veuillez [poser la question sur notre forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) et ne supposez pas que nous n'avons pas pris en compte un élément dans nos recommandations s'il ne figure pas dans la liste. De nombreux facteurs sont pris en compte et discutés lorsque nous recommandons un projet, et la documentation de chacun d'entre eux est en cours.
+
+### Qualifications minimales
+
+- Les applications de chiffrement multiplateforme doivent être open-source.
+- Les applications de chiffrement de fichiers doivent prendre en charge le déchiffrement sur Linux, macOS et Windows.
+- Les applications de chiffrement de disques externes doivent prendre en charge le déchiffrement sur Linux, macOS et Windows.
+- Les applications de chiffrement de disques internes (OS) doivent être multiplateforme ou intégrées nativement au système d'exploitation.
+
+### Dans le meilleur des cas
+
+Nos critères de cas idéal représentent ce que nous aimerions voir d'un projet parfait dans cette catégorie. Nos recommandations peuvent ne pas inclure tout ou partie de cette fonctionnalité, mais celles qui l'inclus peuvent être mieux classées que les autres sur cette page.
+
+- Les applications de chiffrement du système d'exploitation (FDE) devraient utiliser une sécurité matérielle telle qu'un TPM ou Secure Enclave.
+- Les applications de chiffrement de fichiers doivent bénéficier d'une prise en charge native ou tierce pour les plateformes mobiles.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/file-sharing.md b/i18n/fr/file-sharing.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..73a01489a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/file-sharing.md
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+---
+title: "Partage et synchronisation de fichiers"
+icon: material/share-variant
+---
+
+Découvrez comment partager vos fichiers en toute confidentialité entre vos appareils, avec vos amis et votre famille, ou de manière anonyme en ligne.
+
+## Partage de fichiers
+
+### Envoyer
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Send** est un dérivé du service Firefox Send de Mozilla, qui a été abandonné, et qui vous permet d'envoyer des fichiers à d'autres personnes à l'aide d'un lien. Les fichiers sont cryptés sur votre appareil afin qu'ils ne puissent pas être lus par le serveur, et ils peuvent également être protégés par un mot de passe. Le responsable de Send héberge une [instance publique](https://send.vis.ee/). Vous pouvez utiliser d'autres instances publiques, ou vous pouvez héberger Send vous-même.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://send.vis.ee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send-instances){ .card-link title="Instances Publiques"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/timvisee/send){ .card-link title="Code Source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/timvisee){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+Send peut être utilisé via son interface web ou via le CLI [ffsend](https://github.com/timvisee/ffsend) . Si vous êtes familier avec la ligne de commande et que vous envoyez fréquemment des fichiers, nous vous recommandons d'utiliser le client CLI pour éviter le cryptage basé sur JavaScript. Vous pouvez spécifier le flag `--host` pour utiliser un serveur spécifique :
+
+```bash
+ffsend upload --host https://send.vis.ee/ FICHIER
+```
+
+### OnionShare
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **OnionShare** est un outil open-source qui vous permet de partager de manière sécurisée et anonyme un fichier de n'importe quelle taille. Il fonctionne en démarrant un serveur web accessible en tant que service oignon Tor, avec une URL non devinable que vous pouvez partager avec les destinataires pour télécharger ou envoyer des fichiers.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://onionshare.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:simple-torbrowser:](http://lldan5gahapx5k7iafb3s4ikijc4ni7gx5iywdflkba5y2ezyg6sjgyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.onionshare.org){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/onionshare/onionshare){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://onionshare.org/#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://onionshare.org/#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://onionshare.org/#download)
+
+### Critères
+
+**Veuillez noter que nous ne sommes affiliés à aucun des projets que nous recommandons.** En plus de [nos critères de base](about/criteria.md), nous avons développé un ensemble d'exigences claires pour nous permettre de fournir des recommandations objectives. Nous vous suggérons de vous familiariser avec cette liste avant de choisir d'utiliser un projet, et de mener vos propres recherches pour vous assurer que c'est le bon choix pour vous.
+
+!!! example "Cette section est récente"
+
+ Nous travaillons à l'établissement de critères définis pour chaque section de notre site, et celles-ci peuvent être sujet à changement. Si vous avez des questions sur nos critères, veuillez [poser la question sur notre forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) et ne supposez pas que nous n'avons pas pris en compte un élément dans nos recommandations s'il ne figure pas dans la liste. De nombreux facteurs sont pris en compte et discutés lorsque nous recommandons un projet, et la documentation de chacun d'entre eux est en cours.
+
+- Ne doit pas stocker des données déchiffrées sur un serveur distant.
+- Doit être un logiciel open source.
+- Doit avoir soit des clients pour Linux, macOS et Windows, soit une interface web.
+
+## FreedomBox
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FreedomBox** est un système d'exploitation conçu pour être exécuté sur un [single-board computer (SBC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-board_computer). L'objectif est de faciliter la mise en place d'applications serveur que vous pourriez vouloir auto-héberger.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://freedombox.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://wiki.debian.org/FreedomBox/Manual){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://salsa.debian.org/freedombox-team/freedombox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://freedomboxfoundation.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+## Synchronisation de Fichiers
+
+### Nextcloud (Client-Serveur)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nextcloud** est une suite de logiciels client-serveur gratuits et open-source permettant de créer vos propres services d'hébergement de fichiers sur un serveur privé que vous contrôlez.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://nextcloud.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://nextcloud.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://nextcloud.com/support/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/nextcloud){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://nextcloud.com/contribute/){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nextcloud.client)
+ - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1125420102)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/nextcloud/android/releases)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://nextcloud.com/install/#install-clients)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://www.freshports.org/www/nextcloud)
+
+!!! danger "Danger"
+
+ Nous ne recommandons pas l'utilisation de [l'application E2EE](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/end_to_end_encryption) pour Nextcloud car elle peut entraîner une perte de données ; elle est hautement expérimentale et n'est pas de qualité de production.
+
+### Syncthing (P2P)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Syncthing** est un utilitaire open-source de synchronisation continue de fichiers de pair à pair. Il est utilisé pour synchroniser des fichiers entre deux ou plusieurs appareils via le réseau local ou internet. Syncthing n'utilise pas de serveur centralisé ; il utilise le [Protocole d'Échange de Blocs](https://docs.syncthing.net/specs/bep-v1.html#bep-v1) pour transférer les données entre appareils. Toutes les données sont chiffrées à l'aide de TLS.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://syncthing.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.syncthing.net){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/syncthing){ .card-link title="Code Source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://syncthing.net/donations/){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nutomic.syncthingandroid)
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-freebsd: FreeBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-openbsd: OpenBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+ - [:simple-netbsd: NetBSD](https://syncthing.net/downloads/)
+
+### Critères
+
+**Veuillez noter que nous ne sommes affiliés à aucun des projets que nous recommandons.** En plus de [nos critères de base](about/criteria.md), nous avons développé un ensemble d'exigences claires pour nous permettre de fournir des recommandations objectives. Nous vous suggérons de vous familiariser avec cette liste avant de choisir d'utiliser un projet, et de mener vos propres recherches pour vous assurer que c'est le bon choix pour vous.
+
+!!! example "Cette section est récente"
+
+ Nous travaillons à l'établissement de critères définis pour chaque section de notre site, et celles-ci peuvent être sujet à changement. Si vous avez des questions sur nos critères, veuillez [poser la question sur notre forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) et ne supposez pas que nous n'avons pas pris en compte un élément dans nos recommandations s'il ne figure pas dans la liste. De nombreux facteurs sont pris en compte et discutés lorsque nous recommandons un projet, et la documentation de chacun d'entre eux est en cours.
+
+#### Exigences minimales
+
+- Ne doit pas nécessiter un serveur distant/cloud tiers.
+- Doit être un logiciel open source.
+- Doit avoir soit des clients pour Linux, macOS et Windows, soit une interface web.
+
+#### Dans le meilleur des cas
+
+Nos critères de cas idéal représentent ce que nous aimerions voir d'un projet parfait dans cette catégorie. Nos recommandations peuvent ne pas inclure tout ou partie de cette fonctionnalité, mais celles qui l'inclus peuvent être mieux classées que les autres sur cette page.
+
+- Dispose de clients mobiles pour iOS et Android, qui permettent au moins de prévisualiser les documents.
+- Prend en charge la sauvegarde des photos à partir d'iOS et d'Android et, en option, la synchronisation des fichiers/dossiers sur Android.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/frontends.md b/i18n/fr/frontends.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..98d9e33bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/frontends.md
@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+---
+title: "Clients applicatifs"
+icon: material/flip-to-front
+---
+
+Parfois, des services tentent de vous obliger à créer un compte en bloquant l'accès au contenu par des fenêtres pop-up gênantes. Ils peuvent également ne pas fonctionner sans JavaScript activé. Ces interfaces client peuvent vous permettre de contourner ces restrictions.
+
+## LBRY
+
+### Librarian
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Librarian** est une interface client web gratuite et open source pour le réseau de partage vidéo [Odysee](https://odysee.com/) (LBRY) qui est également auto-hébergeable.
+
+ Il existe un certain nombre d'instances publiques, dont certaines bénéficient de la prise en charge des services oignon [Tor](https://www.torproject.org).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Page d'accueil](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://librarian.codeberg.page/){ .card-link title="Public Instances"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://codeberg.org/librarian/librarian){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+!!! warning "Avertissement"
+
+ Par défaut Librarian n'utilise pas de proxy pour les flux vidéo. Les vidéos regardées via Librarian feront toujours l'objet de connexions directes aux serveurs d'Odysee (par exemple `odycdn.com`) ; cependant, certaines instances peuvent activer le proxy, ce qui serait détaillé dans la politique de confidentialité de l'instance.
+
+!!! tip "Conseil"
+
+ Librarian est utile si vous voulez regarder du contenu LBRY sur votre mobile sans télémétrie obligatoire et si vous voulez désactiver JavaScript dans votre navigateur, comme c'est le cas avec [le navigateur Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) au niveau de sécurité Le plus sûr.
+
+Lorsque vous auto-hébergez, il est important que d'autres personnes utilisent également votre instance pour que vous puissiez vous fondre dans la masse. Vous devez faire attention à l'endroit et à la manière dont vous hébergez Librarian, car l'utilisation par d'autres personnes sera liée à votre hébergement.
+
+Lorsque vous utilisez une instance de Librarian, veillez à lire la politique de confidentialité de cette instance spécifique. Les instances Librarian peuvent être modifiées par leurs propriétaires et peuvent donc ne pas refléter la politique de confidentialité qui leur est associée. Les instances Librarian comportent une "étiquette nutritionnelle de confidentialité" pour donner un aperçu de leur politique. Dans certains cas, les adresses Tor .onion peuvent garantir une certaine confidentialité tant que les requêtes de recherche ne contiennent pas d'informations personnelles identifiables.
+
+## Twitter
+
+### Nitter
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Nitter** est un frontal libre et open-source pour [Twitter](https://twitter.com) qui est également auto-hébergeable.
+
+ Il existe un certain nombre d'instances publiques, dont certaines bénéficient de la prise en charge des services oignon [Tor](https://www.torproject.org).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Dépôt](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://piped.kavin.rocks/preferences#ddlInstanceSelection){ .card-link title="Instances Publiques"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter/wiki/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .card-link title="Code Source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter#nitter){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+!!! tip "Conseil"
+
+ Nitter est utile si vous souhaitez naviguer sur le contenu de Twitter sans avoir à vous connecter et si vous souhaitez désactiver JavaScript dans votre navigateur, comme c'est le cas avec [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) au niveau de sécurité le plus sûr. Il vous permet également de [créer des flux RSS pour Twitter] (news-aggregators.md#twitter).
+
+Lorsque vous auto-hébergez, il est important que d'autres personnes utilisent également votre instance pour que vous puissiez vous fondre dans la masse. Vous devez faire attention à l'endroit et à la manière dont vous hébergez Nitter, car l'utilisation par d'autres personnes sera liée à votre hébergement.
+
+Lorsque vous utilisez une instance de Nitter, assurez-vous de lire la politique de confidentialité de cette instance spécifique. Les instances Nitter peuvent être modifiées par leurs propriétaires et peuvent donc ne pas refléter la politique par défaut. Dans certains cas, les adresses Tor .onion peuvent garantir une certaine confidentialité tant que les requêtes de recherche ne contiennent pas d'informations personnelles identifiables.
+
+## TikTok
+
+### ProxiTok
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **ProxiTok** est une interface client open source du site [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com) qui est également auto-hébergeable.
+
+ Il existe un certain nombre d'instances publiques, dont certaines bénéficient de la prise en charge des services oignon [Tor](https://www.torproject.org).
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Dépôt](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok/wiki/Public-instances){ .card-link title="Instances Publiques"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok){ .card-link title="Code Source" }
+
+!!! tip "Conseil"
+
+ ProxiTok est utile si vous souhaitez désactiver JavaScript dans votre navigateur, comme avec le [Navigateur Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) sur le niveau de sécurité Le plus sûr.
+
+Lorsque vous auto-hébergez, il est important que d'autres personnes utilisent également votre instance pour que vous puissiez vous fondre dans la masse. Vous devez faire attention à l'endroit et à la manière dont vous hébergez ProxiTok, car l'utilisation par d'autres personnes sera liée à votre hébergement.
+
+Lorsque vous utilisez une instance de ProxiTok, veillez à lire la politique de confidentialité de cette instance spécifique. Les instances ProxiTok peuvent être modifiées par leurs propriétaires et peuvent donc ne pas refléter la politique de confidentialité qui leur est associée. Dans certains cas, les adresses Tor .onion peuvent garantir une certaine confidentialité tant que les requêtes de recherche ne contiennent pas d'informations personnelles identifiables.
+
+## YouTube
+
+### FreeTube
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **FreeTube** est une application de bureau gratuite et open-source pour [YouTube](https://youtube.com). Lorsque vous utilisez FreeTube, votre liste d'abonnement et vos listes de lecture sont enregistrées localement sur votre appareil.
+
+ Par défaut, FreeTube bloque toutes les publicités YouTube. En outre, FreeTube intègre en option [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) pour vous aider à sauter les segments de vidéos sponsorisées.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://freetubeapp.io/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://orbot.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Politique de Confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.freetubeapp.io){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/FreeTubeApp/FreeTube){ .card-link title="Code Source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/FreeTube){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://freetubeapp.io/#download)
+ - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/io.freetubeapp.FreeTube)
+
+!!! warning "Avertissement"
+
+ Lorsque vous utilisez FreeTube, votre adresse IP peut encore être connue de YouTube, [Invidious](https://instances.invidious.io) ou [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) selon votre configuration. Il utilise un réseau de type [BitTorrent](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent) pour stocker le contenu vidéo, et une [blockchain](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockchain) pour stocker les index de ces vidéos.
+
+### Yattee
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Yattee** est un lecteur vidéo gratuit et open-source orienté vie privée pour iOS, tvOS et macOS pour [YouTube](https://youtube.com). Lorsque vous utilisez Yattee, votre liste d'abonnement est enregistrée localement sur votre appareil.
+
+ Vous devrez suivre quelques [étapes supplémentaires](https://gonzoknows.com/posts/Yattee/) avant de pouvoir utiliser Yattee pour regarder YouTube, en raison des restrictions de l'App Store.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://github.com/yattee/yattee){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://r.yattee.stream/docs/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Politique de Confidentialité" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee){ .card-link title="Code Source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/wiki/Donations){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-apple: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/yattee/id1595136629)
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/yattee/yattee/releases)
+
+!!! warning "Avertissement"
+
+ Lorsque vous utilisez Yattee, votre adresse IP peut encore être connue de YouTube, [Invidious](https://instances.invidious.io), [Piped](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances) ou [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) selon votre configuration. Il utilise un réseau de type [BitTorrent](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent) pour stocker le contenu vidéo, et une [blockchain](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockchain) pour stocker les index de ces vidéos.
+
+Par défaut, Yattee bloque toutes les publicités YouTube. En outre, Yattee s'intègre en option à [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) pour vous aider à sauter les segments vidéo sponsorisés.
+
+### LibreTube (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **LibreTube** est une application Android gratuite et open-source pour [YouTube](https://youtube.com) qui utilise l'API [Piped](#piped).
+
+ LibreTube vous permet de stocker votre liste d'abonnement et vos listes de lecture localement sur votre appareil Android, ou dans un compte sur l'instance Piped de votre choix, ce qui vous permet d'y accéder de manière transparente sur d'autres appareils également.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage ](https://libre-tube.github.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube#privacy-policy-and-disclaimer){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube#readme){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/libre-tube/LibreTube/releases)
+
+!!! warning "Avertissement"
+
+ Lorsque vous utilisez LibreTube, votre adresse IP sera visible par l'instance [Piped](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances) que vous avez choisie et/ou [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app/) en fonction de votre configuration. Il utilise un réseau de type [BitTorrent](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent) pour stocker le contenu vidéo, et une [blockchain](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockchain) pour stocker les index de ces vidéos.
+
+Par défaut, LibreTube bloque toutes les publicités YouTube. En outre, Libretube utilise [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) pour vous aider à sauter les segments vidéo sponsorisés. Vous pouvez configurer entièrement les types de segments que SponsorBlock va ignorer, ou le désactiver complètement. Il existe également un bouton sur le lecteur vidéo lui-même pour le désactiver pour une vidéo spécifique si vous le souhaitez.
+
+### NewPipe (Android)
+
+!!! recommendation annotate
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **NewPipe** est une application Android gratuite et open-source pour [YouTube](https://youtube.com), [SoundCloud](https://soundcloud.com), [media.ccc.de](https://media.ccc.de), [Bandcamp](https://bandcamp.com), et [PeerTube](https://joinpeertube.org/) (1).
+
+ Votre liste d'abonnement et vos listes de lecture sont enregistrées localement sur votre appareil Android.
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage ](https://newpipe.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-eye-16:](https://newpipe.net/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://teamnewpipe.github.io/documentation/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamNewPipe/NewPipe){ .card-link title="Code source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://newpipe.net/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+ ??? downloads "Téléchargements"
+
+ - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/TeamNewPipe/NewPipe/releases)
+
+1. L'instance par défaut est [FramaTube](https://framatube.org/), mais d'autres peuvent être ajoutées via **Paramètres** → **Contenu** → **Instances PeerTube**
+
+!!! warning "Avertissement"
+
+ Lorsque vous utilisez NewPipe, votre adresse IP sera visible par les fournisseurs vidéo utilisés. Il utilise un réseau de type [BitTorrent](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent) pour stocker le contenu vidéo, et une [blockchain](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockchain) pour stocker les index de ces vidéos.
+
+### Invidious
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Invidious** est une interface gratuite et open-source pour [YouTube](https://youtube.com) qui est également auto-hébergable.
+
+ Il existe un certain nombre d'instances publiques, dont certaines bénéficient de la prise en charge des services oignon [Tor](https://www.torproject.org).
+
+ [:octicons-home-16: Homepage ](https://invidious.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://instances.invidious.io){ .card-link title="Instances publiques"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.invidious.io/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/iv-org/invidious){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://invidious.io/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+!!! warning "Avertissement"
+
+ Invidious n'utilise pas de proxy pour les flux vidéo par défaut. Les vidéos regardées via Invidious seront toujours connectées directement aux serveurs de Google (par exemple, `googlevideo.com`) ; cependant, certaines instances prennent en charge la vidéo par proxy : il suffit d'activer *Proxy videos* dans les paramètres des instances ou d'ajouter `&local=true` à l'URL.
+
+!!! tip "Conseil"
+
+ Invidious est utile si vous souhaitez désactiver JavaScript dans votre navigateur, comme c'est le cas avec [le navigateur Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) au niveau de sécurité le plus sûr. Il ne garantit pas la vie privée en soi, et nous ne recommandons pas de vous connecter à un compte quelconque.
+
+Lorsque vous auto-hébergez, il est important que d'autres personnes utilisent également votre instance pour que vous puissiez vous fondre dans la masse. Vous devez faire attention à l'endroit et à la manière dont vous hébergez Invidious, car l'utilisation par d'autres personnes sera liée à votre hébergement.
+
+Lorsque vous utilisez une instance d'Invidious, veillez à lire la politique de confidentialité de cette instance spécifique. Les instances involontaires peuvent être modifiées par leurs propriétaires et peuvent donc ne pas refléter leur politique de confidentialité associée. Dans certains cas, les adresses Tor .onion peuvent garantir une certaine confidentialité tant que les requêtes de recherche ne contiennent pas d'informations personnelles identifiables.
+
+### Piped
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+ { align=right }
+
+ **Piped** est une interface gratuite et open-source pour [YouTube](https://youtube.com) qui est également auto-hébergeable.
+
+ Piped nécessite JavaScript pour fonctionner et il existe un certain nombre d'instances publiques.
+
+ [:octicons-repo-16: Dépôt](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+ [:octicons-server-16:](https://piped.kavin.rocks/preferences#ddlInstanceSelection){ .card-link title="Instances Publiques"}
+ [:octicons-info-16:](https://piped-docs.kavin.rocks/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
+ [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .card-link title="Code Source" }
+ [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped#donations){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
+
+!!! tip "Conseil"
+
+ Piped est utile si vous souhaitez utiliser [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) sans installer d'extension ou pour accéder à des contenus limités en âge sans compte. Il ne garantit pas la vie privée en soi, et nous ne recommandons pas de vous connecter à un compte quelconque.
+
+Lorsque vous auto-hébergez, il est important que d'autres personnes utilisent également votre instance pour que vous puissiez vous fondre dans la masse. Vous devez faire attention à l'endroit et à la manière dont vous hébergez Piped, car l'utilisation par d'autres personnes sera liée à votre hébergement.
+
+Lorsque vous utilisez une instance de Piped, veillez à lire la politique de confidentialité de cette instance spécifique. Les instances Piped peuvent être modifiées par leurs propriétaires et peuvent donc ne pas refléter la politique de confidentialité qui leur est associée.
+
+## Critères
+
+**Veuillez noter que nous ne sommes affiliés à aucun des projets que nous recommandons.** En plus de [nos critères de base](about/criteria.md), nous avons développé un ensemble d'exigences claires pour nous permettre de fournir des recommandations objectives. Nous vous suggérons de vous familiariser avec cette liste avant de choisir d'utiliser un projet, et de mener vos propres recherches pour vous assurer que c'est le bon choix pour vous.
+
+!!! example "Cette section est récente"
+
+ Nous travaillons à l'établissement de critères définis pour chaque section de notre site, et celles-ci peuvent être sujet à changement. Si vous avez des questions sur nos critères, veuillez [poser la question sur notre forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) et ne supposez pas que nous n'avons pas pris en compte un élément dans nos recommandations s'il ne figure pas dans la liste. De nombreux facteurs sont pris en compte et discutés lorsque nous recommandons un projet, et la documentation de chacun d'entre eux est en cours.
+
+Clients recommandés...
+
+- Doit être un logiciel open source.
+- Doit être auto-hébergeable.
+- Doit fournir toutes les fonctionnalités de base du site web accessibles aux utilisateurs anonymes.
+
+Nous ne prenons en compte que les clients des sites web qui sont...
+
+- Normalement non accessible sans JavaScript.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/index.md b/i18n/fr/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4da48675f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+---
+template: overrides/home.fr.html
+hide:
+ - navigation
+ - toc
+ - feedback
+---
+
+
+## En quoi ça me concerne ?
+
+##### « Je n'ai rien à cacher. Pourquoi devrais-je me soucier de ma vie privée? »
+
+Tout comme le droit au mariage mixte, le droit de vote des femmes, la liberté d'expression et bien d'autres, notre droit à la vie privée n'a pas toujours été respecté. Dans plusieurs dictatures, ce n'est toujours pas le cas. Nombreux sont nos ancêtres qui se sont battus pour notre droit à la vie privée. ==La vie privée est un droit humain inhérent à chacun d'entre nous== auquel nous avons droit sans discrimination.
+
+Il ne faut pas confondre la vie privée et le secret. Même si on sait ce qui se passe dans la salle de bain, vous fermez quand même la porte. C'est parce que vous voulez une vie privée, et non pas du secret. **Tout le monde** a quelque chose à protéger. La vie privée est quelque chose qui nous rend humains.
+
+[:material-target-account: Menaces courantes sur internet](basics/common-threats.md ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+## Que dois-je faire ?
+
+##### Tout d'abord, vous devez établir un plan
+
+Essayer de protéger toutes vos données contre tout le monde, tout le temps, est peu pratique, coûteux et épuisant. Mais ne vous en faites pas ! La sécurité est un processus et, en anticipant, vous pouvez élaborer un plan qui vous convient. La sécurité ne concerne pas seulement les outils que vous utilisez ou les logiciels que vous téléchargez. Au contraire, elle commence par une compréhension des menaces uniques auxquelles vous êtes confrontés, et comment les atténuer.
+
+==Ce processus d'identification des menaces et de définition des contre-mesures est appelé la **modélisation des menaces**==, et constitue la base de tout bon plan de sécurité et de vie privée.
+
+[:material-book-outline: En savoir plus sur la modélisation des menaces](basics/threat-modeling.md ""){.md-button.md-button--primary}
+
+---
+
+## On a besoin de vous ! Voici comment vous pouvez vous impliquer
+
+[:simple-discourse:](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/){ title="Rejoignez notre forum" }
+[:simple-mastodon:](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides){ rel=me title="Suivez-nous sur Mastodon" }
+[:material-book-edit:](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org){ title="Contribuez à ce site web" }
+[:material-translate:](https://matrix.to/#/#pg-i18n:aragon.sh){ title="Aidez à traduire ce site" }
+[:simple-matrix:](https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org){ title="Discutez avec nous sur Matrix" }
+[:material-information-outline:](about/index.md){ title="En savoir plus sur nous" }
+[:material-hand-coin-outline:](about/donate.md){ title="Soutenir le projet" }
+
+Il est important pour un site web comme Privacy Guides de toujours rester à jour. Nous avons besoin que notre public garde un œil sur les mises à jour logicielles des applications répertoriées sur notre site et suive l'actualité récente des fournisseurs que nous recommandons. Internet évolue à une vitesse telle, qu'il est difficile de suivre le rythme, mais nous faisons de notre mieux. Si vous repérez une erreur, que vous pensez qu'un fournisseur ne devrait pas figurer dans la liste, remarquez l'absence d'un fournisseur qualifié, pensez qu'un plugin de navigateur n'est plus le meilleur choix ou si vous découvrez tout autre problème, veuillez nous en informer.
+
+--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.fr.txt"
diff --git a/i18n/fr/kb-archive.md b/i18n/fr/kb-archive.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7e0712064
--- /dev/null
+++ b/i18n/fr/kb-archive.md
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+---
+title: Archives
+icon: material/archive
+---
+
+# Pages déplacées vers le blog
+
+Certaines pages qui se trouvaient auparavant dans notre base de connaissances peuvent désormais être consultées sur notre blog :
+
+- [GrapheneOS vs. CalyxOS](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/)
+- [Renforcement de la configuration de Signal](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening/)
+- [Linux - Renforcement du système](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/22/linux-system-