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@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
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|
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{ align=right }
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**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
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All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
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**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
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[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
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[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
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@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN a
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</div>
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Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). The server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
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Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
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1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
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2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
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3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
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4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
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5. Select **Phone Number**
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6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
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You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
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Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam.
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The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
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@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/20
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Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
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Briar supports Forward Secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
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Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
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## Additional Options
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<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
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<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
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These messengers do not have [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
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These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
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</div>
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@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
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|
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Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
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The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
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|
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The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
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@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to
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Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
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Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
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Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
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Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
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Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
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Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
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Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
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## Criteria
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@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, a
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</div>
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- Must have open-source clients.
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- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Must support E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Must have been independently audited.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
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- Supports E2EE for all messages.
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- Has been independently audited.
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|
||||
### Best-Case
|
||||
|
||||
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
|
||||
|
||||
- Should have Forward Secrecy.
|
||||
- Should have open-source servers.
|
||||
- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
|
||||
- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
|
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- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
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- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
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- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
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- Has open-source servers.
|
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- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
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- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
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- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
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|
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[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
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|
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@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
|
||||
|
||||
All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). The server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/20
|
||||
|
||||
Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
|
||||
|
||||
Briar supports Forward Secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Options
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
These messengers do not have [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
|
||||
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to
|
||||
|
||||
Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
|
||||
|
||||
Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Must have open-source clients.
|
||||
- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Must support E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Must have been independently audited.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### Best-Case
|
||||
|
||||
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
|
||||
|
||||
- Should have Forward Secrecy.
|
||||
- Should have open-source servers.
|
||||
- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
|
||||
- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
|
||||
|
||||
All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). The server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/20
|
||||
|
||||
Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
|
||||
|
||||
Briar supports Forward Secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Options
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
These messengers do not have [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
|
||||
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to
|
||||
|
||||
Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
|
||||
|
||||
Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Must have open-source clients.
|
||||
- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Must support E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Must have been independently audited.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### Best-Case
|
||||
|
||||
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
|
||||
|
||||
- Should have Forward Secrecy.
|
||||
- Should have open-source servers.
|
||||
- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
|
||||
- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
|
||||
|
||||
All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). The server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/20
|
||||
|
||||
Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
|
||||
|
||||
Briar supports Forward Secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Options
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
These messengers do not have [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
|
||||
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to
|
||||
|
||||
Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
|
||||
|
||||
Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Must have open-source clients.
|
||||
- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Must support E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Must have been independently audited.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### Best-Case
|
||||
|
||||
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
|
||||
|
||||
- Should have Forward Secrecy.
|
||||
- Should have open-source servers.
|
||||
- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
|
||||
- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
|
||||
|
||||
All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). The server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/20
|
||||
|
||||
Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
|
||||
|
||||
Briar supports Forward Secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Options
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
These messengers do not have [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
|
||||
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to
|
||||
|
||||
Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
|
||||
|
||||
Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Must have open-source clients.
|
||||
- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Must support E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Must have been independently audited.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### Best-Case
|
||||
|
||||
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
|
||||
|
||||
- Should have Forward Secrecy.
|
||||
- Should have open-source servers.
|
||||
- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
|
||||
- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
|
||||
|
||||
All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). The server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/20
|
||||
|
||||
Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
|
||||
|
||||
Briar supports Forward Secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Options
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
These messengers do not have [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
|
||||
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to
|
||||
|
||||
Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
|
||||
|
||||
Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Must have open-source clients.
|
||||
- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Must support E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Must have been independently audited.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### Best-Case
|
||||
|
||||
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
|
||||
|
||||
- Should have Forward Secrecy.
|
||||
- Should have open-source servers.
|
||||
- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
|
||||
- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
|
||||
|
||||
All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). The server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/20
|
||||
|
||||
Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
|
||||
|
||||
Briar supports Forward Secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Options
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
These messengers do not have [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
|
||||
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to
|
||||
|
||||
Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
|
||||
|
||||
Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Must have open-source clients.
|
||||
- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Must support E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Must have been independently audited.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### Best-Case
|
||||
|
||||
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
|
||||
|
||||
- Should have Forward Secrecy.
|
||||
- Should have open-source servers.
|
||||
- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
|
||||
- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,15 +20,13 @@ Estos servicios de mensajería son ideales para proteger sus comunicaciones conf
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** es una aplicación móvil desarrollada por Signal Messenger LLC. La aplicación ofrece mensajería instantánea, así como llamadas de voz y vídeo.
|
||||
**Signal** es una aplicación móvil desarrollada por Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
Todas las comunicaciones son E2EE. Las listas de contactos se encriptan con su PIN de Signal y el servidor no tiene acceso a ellas. Los perfiles personales también están encriptados y sólo se comparten con los contactos con los que chatea.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Página Principal](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Política de Privacidad" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us){ .card-link title=Documentación}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/signalapp){ .card-link title="Código Fuente" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://signal.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribuir }
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/signalapp){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://signal.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads "Descargas"</summary>
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ Todas las comunicaciones son E2EE. Las listas de contactos se encriptan con su P
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signal admite [grupos privados](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). El servidor no tiene registro de la pertenencia a un grupo, los títulos de los grupos, los avatares de los grupos o los atributos de los grupos. Signal tiene pocos metadatos cuando [Remitente Confidencial](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) está activado. La dirección del remitente se encripta junto con el cuerpo del mensaje, y sólo la dirección del destinatario es visible para el servidor. Remitente confidencial sólo está activado para las personas de su lista de contactos, pero se puede activar para todos los destinatarios con el consiguiente riesgo de recibir spam. Signal requiere su número de teléfono como identificador personal.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Los perfiles personales también están encriptados y sólo se comparten con los contactos con los que chatea. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal tiene pocos metadatos cuando [Remitente Confidencial](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) está activado. La dirección del remitente se encripta junto con el cuerpo del mensaje, y sólo la dirección del destinatario es visible para el servidor. Remitente confidencial sólo está activado para las personas de su lista de contactos, pero se puede activar para todos los destinatarios con el consiguiente riesgo de recibir spam.
|
||||
|
||||
El protocolo fue [auditado](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) de forma independiente en 2016. La especificación del protocolo Signal puede encontrarse en su [documentación](https://signal.org/docs/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ El software cliente fue [auditado](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-relea
|
||||
|
||||
Briar tiene una [especificación publicada](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec) completamente.
|
||||
|
||||
Briar soporta Secreto Hacia Adelante utilizando los protocolos Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) y [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md).
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Opciones Adicionales
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Advertencia</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Estos servicios de mensajería no tienen [Secreto Hacia Adelante](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfect_forward_secrecy), y aunque satisfacen ciertas necesidades que nuestras recomendaciones anteriores no pueden satisfacer, no los recomendamos para comunicaciones a largo plazo o sensibles. Cualquier compromiso de claves entre los destinatarios de los mensajes afectaría a la confidencialidad de **todas** las comunicaciones anteriores.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Cualquier compromiso de claves entre los destinatarios de los mensajes afectaría a la confidencialidad de **todas** las comunicaciones anteriores.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Las fotos de perfil, las reacciones y los apodos no están cifrados.
|
||||
|
||||
Las llamadas de voz y vídeo en grupo [no](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) son E2EE, y utilizan Jitsi, pero se espera que esto cambie con [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Actualmente, las llamadas grupales [no tienen autenticación](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074), lo que significa que los participantes que no son de la sala también pueden entrar a las llamadas. Le recomendamos que no utilice esta función para las reuniones privadas.
|
||||
|
||||
El propio protocolo Matrix [soporta teóricamente PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), sin embargo [no está soportado actualmente en Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) debido a que rompe algunos aspectos de la experiencia del usuario como las copias de seguridad de claves y el historial de mensajes compartidos.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
El protocolo fue [auditado](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) de forma independiente en 2016. La especificación del protocolo Matrix puede encontrarse en su [documentación](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). El [trinquete criptográfico Olm](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) utilizado por Matrix es una implementación del algoritmo [Double Ratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/) de Signal.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session utiliza la red descentralizada [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.
|
||||
|
||||
Session permite E2EE en chats individuales o grupos cerrados que admiten hasta 100 miembros. Los grupos abiertos no tienen ninguna restricción en cuanto al número de miembros, pero son abiertos por diseño.
|
||||
|
||||
Session [no](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) soporta PFS, que es cuando un sistema de cifrado cambia automáticamente y con frecuencia las claves que utiliza para cifrar y descifrar la información, de tal manera que si la última clave se ve comprometida expone una porción menor de información sensible.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen solicitó una auditoría independiente para Session en marzo de 2020. La auditoría [concluyó](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) en abril de 2021, "El nivel de seguridad general de esta aplicación es bueno y la hace utilizable para las personas preocupadas por la privacidad".
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
Session tiene un [informe oficial](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) que describe los aspectos técnicos de la aplicación y el protocolo.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Criterios
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ Estamos trabajando en establecer criterios definidos para cada sección de nuest
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Debe tener clientes de código abierto.
|
||||
- Debe utilizar E2EE para los mensajes privados por defecto.
|
||||
- Debe ser compatible con E2EE para todos los mensajes.
|
||||
- Debe haber sido objeto de una auditoría independiente.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### Mejor Caso
|
||||
|
||||
Nuestro criterio del mejor caso representa lo que nos gustaría ver del proyecto perfecto en esta categoría. Es posible que nuestras recomendaciones no incluyan todas o algunas de estas funciones, pero las que sí las incluyan pueden estar mejor clasificadas que otras en esta página.
|
||||
|
||||
- Debe tener Secreto Hacia Adelante.
|
||||
- Debe tener servidores de código abierto.
|
||||
- Debe ser descentralizado, es decir, federado o P2P.
|
||||
- Debe utilizar E2EE para todos los mensajes por defecto.
|
||||
- Debe ser compatible con Linux, macOS, Windows, Android e iOS.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
|
||||
|
||||
All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). The server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/20
|
||||
|
||||
Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
|
||||
|
||||
Briar supports Forward Secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Options
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
These messengers do not have [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
|
||||
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to
|
||||
|
||||
Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
|
||||
|
||||
Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Must have open-source clients.
|
||||
- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Must support E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Must have been independently audited.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### Best-Case
|
||||
|
||||
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
|
||||
|
||||
- Should have Forward Secrecy.
|
||||
- Should have open-source servers.
|
||||
- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
|
||||
- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,15 +20,13 @@ Ces messageries sont idéales pour sécuriser vos communications sensibles.
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** est une application mobile développée par Signal Messenger LLC. L'application offre une messagerie instantanée, ainsi que des appels vocaux et vidéo.
|
||||
**Signal** est une application mobile développée par Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
Toutes les communications sont E2EE. Les listes de contacts sont chiffrées à l'aide de votre code PIN de connexion et le serveur n'y a pas accès. Les profils personnels sont également chiffrés et ne sont partagés qu'avec les contacts qui vous ajoutent.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://signal.org/fr/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.signal.org/hc/fr){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/signalapp){ .card-link title="Code source" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://signal.org/fr/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribuer }
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/signalapp){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://signal.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Téléchargements</summary>
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ Toutes les communications sont E2EE. Les listes de contacts sont chiffrées à l
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signal prend en charge les [groupes privés](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). Le serveur n'a aucune trace de votre appartenance à un groupe, de vos titres de groupe, de vos avatars de groupe ou de vos attributs de groupe. Signal expose un minimum de métadonnées lorsque l'option [Expéditeur Scellé](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) est activée. L'adresse de l'expéditeur est chiffrée avec le corps du message, et seule l'adresse du destinataire est visible par le serveur. Expéditeur Scellé est uniquement activé pour les personnes de votre liste de contacts, mais peut être activé pour tous les destinataires avec le risque accru de recevoir du spam. Signal requiert votre numéro de téléphone comme identifiant personnel.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Les profils personnels sont également chiffrés et ne sont partagés qu'avec les contacts qui vous ajoutent. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal expose un minimum de métadonnées lorsque l'option [Expéditeur Scellé](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) est activée. L'adresse de l'expéditeur est chiffrée avec le corps du message, et seule l'adresse du destinataire est visible par le serveur. Expéditeur Scellé est uniquement activé pour les personnes de votre liste de contacts, mais peut être activé pour tous les destinataires avec le risque accru de recevoir du spam.
|
||||
|
||||
Le protocole a fait l'objet d'un [audit](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) indépendant en 2016. La spécification du protocole Signal se trouve dans leur [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ Le logiciel client a été indépendamment [audité](https://briarproject.org/ne
|
||||
|
||||
Briar a un [cahier des charges](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec) entièrement publié.
|
||||
|
||||
Briar prend en charge la confidentialité persistante en utilisant le protocole de [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) et de [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) Bramble.
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Autres options
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Avertissement</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Ces messageries instantanées ne disposent pas de la [confidentialité persistante](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confidentialit%C3%A9_persistante) et, bien qu'ils répondent à certains cas d'utilisation que nos recommandations précédentes ne permettent pas, nous ne les recommandons pas pour les communications sensibles ou long terme. Toute compromission de la clé parmi les destinataires du message affecterait la confidentialité de **toutes** les communications passées.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Toute compromission de la clé parmi les destinataires du message affecterait la confidentialité de **toutes** les communications passées.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Les photos de profil, les réactions et les surnoms ne sont pas chiffrés.
|
||||
|
||||
Les appels vocaux et vidéo de groupe ne sont [pas](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, et utilisent Jitsi, mais cela devrait changer avec [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Les appels de groupe n'ont [pas d'authentification](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) actuellement, ce qui signifie que les participants ne faisant pas partie de la salle peuvent également se joindre aux appels. Nous vous recommandons de ne pas utiliser cette fonctionnalité pour les réunions privées.
|
||||
|
||||
Le protocole Matrix lui-même [prend théoriquement en charge la PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), mais ce [n'est pas actuellement pris en charge par Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) car elle rompt certains aspects de l'expérience utilisateur tels que la sauvegarde des clés et l'historique des messages partagés.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
Le protocole a fait l'objet d'un [audit](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) indépendant en 2016. La spécification du protocole Matrix se trouve dans leur [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). Le [cliquet cryptographique Olm](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) utilisé par Matrix est une implémentation de l'[algorithme à double cliquet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/) de Signal.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session utilise le réseau décentralisé [Oxen Service Node Network](https://ox
|
||||
|
||||
Session permet l'E2EE dans les chats individuels ou des groupes fermés pouvant compter jusqu'à 100 membres. Les groupes ouverts n'ont aucune restriction sur le nombre de membres, mais sont ouverts par conception.
|
||||
|
||||
Session ne prend [pas](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) en charge PFS, c'est-à-dire lorsqu'un système de chiffrement change automatiquement et fréquemment les clés qu'il utilise pour chiffrer et déchiffrer des informations, de sorte que si la dernière clé est compromise, elle expose une plus petite partie des informations sensibles.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen a demandé un audit indépendant pour Session en mars 2020. L'audit [s'est conclu](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) en Avril 2021 : "Le niveau de sécurité global de cette application est bon et la rend utilisable pour les personnes soucieuses de la protection de leur vie privée."
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
Session a un [livre blanc](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) décrivant les spécifications techniques de l'application et du protocole.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Critères
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ Nous travaillons à l'établissement de critères définis pour chaque section d
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Doit avoir des clients open-source.
|
||||
- Doit utiliser E2EE pour les messages privés par défaut.
|
||||
- Doit supporter E2EE pour tous les messages.
|
||||
- Doit avoir fait l'objet d'un audit indépendant.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### Dans le meilleur des cas
|
||||
|
||||
Nos critères de cas idéal représentent ce que nous aimerions voir d'un projet parfait dans cette catégorie. Nos recommandations peuvent ne pas inclure tout ou partie de cette fonctionnalité, mais celles qui l'inclus peuvent être mieux classées que les autres sur cette page.
|
||||
|
||||
- Devrait prendre en charge la confidentialité persistante.
|
||||
- Devrait avoir des serveurs open-source.
|
||||
- Devrait être décentralisé, c'est-à-dire fédéré ou P2P.
|
||||
- Devrait utiliser E2EE pour tous les messages par défaut.
|
||||
- Devrait prendre en charge Linux, macOS, Windows, Android et iOS.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** היא אפליקציה לנייד שפותחה על ידי סיגנל מסנג'ר LLC. האפליקציה מספקת הודעות מיידיות, כמו גם שיחות קוליות ושיחות וידאו.
|
||||
|
||||
כל התקשורת היא E2EE. רשימות אנשי קשר מוצפנות באמצעות קוד ה - PIN שלך ולשרת אין גישה אליהן. גם פרופילים אישיים מוצפנים ומשותפים רק עם אנשי קשר שאיתם אתה משוחח בצ'אט.
|
||||
**Signal** היא אפליקציה לנייד שפותחה על ידי סיגנל מסנג'ר LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signal תומך ב[קבוצות פרטיות](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). לשרת אין תיעוד של חברות בקבוצה, כותרות קבוצות, אווטרים של קבוצות או תכונות קבוצה. לSignal יש מטא נתונים מינימליים כאשר [שולח חתום](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) מופעל. כתובת השולח מוצפנת יחד עם גוף ההודעה, ורק כתובת הנמען גלויה לשרת. 'שולח אטום' זמין רק עבור אנשים ברשימת אנשי הקשר שלך, אך ניתן להפוך אותו לזמין עבור כל הנמענים עם סיכון מוגבר לקבלת דואר זבל. סיגנל דורש את מספר הטלפון שלך כמזהה אישי.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. גם פרופילים אישיים מוצפנים ומשותפים רק עם אנשי קשר שאיתם אתה משוחח בצ'אט. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. לSignal יש מטא נתונים מינימליים כאשר [שולח חתום](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) מופעל. כתובת השולח מוצפנת יחד עם גוף ההודעה, ורק כתובת הנמען גלויה לשרת. 'שולח אטום' זמין רק עבור אנשים ברשימת אנשי הקשר שלך, אך ניתן להפוך אותו לזמין עבור כל הנמענים עם סיכון מוגבר לקבלת דואר זבל.
|
||||
|
||||
הפרוטוקול היה מבוקר [באופן עצמאי](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) בשנת 2016. ניתן למצוא את המפרט של פרוטוקול סיגנל בתיעוד [](https://signal.org/docs/)שלהם.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ SimpleX Chat תומך בפונקציונליות בסיסית של צ'אט קב
|
||||
|
||||
ל Briar יש מפרט ש[פורסם במלואו](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
|
||||
|
||||
Briar תומך ב-Forward Secrecy באמצעות תומך ב-Forward Secrecy באמצעות [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) ו- [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## אפשרויות נוספות
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
למסנג'רים האלה אין [סודיות קדימה](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), ולמרות שהם ממלאים צרכים מסוימים שהמלצות קודמות שלנו אולי לא, איננו ממליצים עליהם לתקשורת ארוכת טווח או רגישה. כל פשרה מרכזית בין מקבלי ההודעות תשפיע על הסודיות של **כל** התקשורת העבר.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. כל פשרה מרכזית בין מקבלי ההודעות תשפיע על הסודיות של **כל** התקשורת העבר.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Briar תומך ב-Forward Secrecy באמצעות תומך ב-Forward Secrecy ב
|
||||
|
||||
שיחות קוליות ושיחות וידאו קבוצתיות [אינן](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, ומשתמשות ב- Jitsi, אך זה צפוי להשתנות עם[ איתות VoIP קבוצתי מקורי](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). שיחות קבוצתיות כוללות [שיחות ללא אימות](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) כרגע, כלומר, כל משתתפים יכולים גם להצטרף לשיחות. אנו ממליצים שלא להשתמש בתכונה זו לפגישות פרטיות.
|
||||
|
||||
פרוטוקול Matrix עצמו [תומך תיאורטית ב-PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), עם זאת, זה [לא נתמך כרגע ב-Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) בגלל שהוא שובר היבטים מסוימים של חוויית המשתמש, כגון גיבויי מפתח והיסטוריית הודעות משותפת.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
הפרוטוקול היה מבוקר [באופן עצמאי](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) בשנת 2016. את המפרט לפרוטוקול מטריקס ניתן למצוא [בתיעוד שלהם](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session משתמש ב-[Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) המבוזר
|
||||
|
||||
Session מאפשרת E2EE בצ'אטים אחד על אחד או קבוצות סגורות המאפשרות עד 100 חברים. לקבוצות פתוחות אין הגבלה על מספר החברים, אך הן פתוחות על פי עיצוב.
|
||||
|
||||
Session [לא](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) תומך ב-PFS, כלומר כאשר מערכת הצפנה משנה באופן אוטומטי ותדיר את המפתחות שבה היא משתמשת להצפנה ולפענח מידע, כך שאם המפתח האחרון נפגע הוא חושף חלק קטן יותר של מידע רגיש.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen ביקשה ביקורת בלתי תלויה למפגש במרץ 2020. הביקורת [הסתיימה](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) באפריל 2021, "רמת האבטחה הכללית של האפליקציה הזו טובה והופכת אותה לשמישה לפרטיות אנשים."
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
להפעלה יש [נייר לבן](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) המתאר את התכונות הטכניות של האפליקציה והפרוטוקול.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## קריטריונים
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ Oxen ביקשה ביקורת בלתי תלויה למפגש במרץ 2020. הב
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- חייבים להיות לקוחות קוד פתוח.
|
||||
- חייב להשתמש ב- E2EE עבור הודעות פרטיות כברירת מחדל.
|
||||
- חייב לתמוך ב- E2EE עבור כל ההודעות.
|
||||
- חייב להיות נבדק באופן עצמאי.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### המקרה הטוב ביותר
|
||||
|
||||
הקריטריונים הטובים ביותר שלנו מייצגים את מה שהיינו רוצים לראות מהפרויקט המושלם בקטגוריה זו. ייתכן שההמלצות שלנו לא יכללו חלק מהפונקציונליות הזו או את כולה, אך אלו שכן כן עשויות לדרג גבוה יותר מאחרות בדף זה.
|
||||
|
||||
- צריך להיות Forward Secrecy.
|
||||
- צריכים להיות שרתי קוד פתוח.
|
||||
- צריך להיות מבוזר, כלומר מאוחד או P2P.
|
||||
- אמור להשתמש ב- E2EE עבור כל ההודעות כברירת מחדל.
|
||||
- צריך לתמוך בלינוקס, macOS, ווינדוס, אנדרואיד ו-iOS.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
|
||||
|
||||
All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). The server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/20
|
||||
|
||||
Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
|
||||
|
||||
Briar supports Forward Secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Options
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
These messengers do not have [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
|
||||
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to
|
||||
|
||||
Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
|
||||
|
||||
Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Must have open-source clients.
|
||||
- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Must support E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Must have been independently audited.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### Best-Case
|
||||
|
||||
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
|
||||
|
||||
- Should have Forward Secrecy.
|
||||
- Should have open-source servers.
|
||||
- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
|
||||
- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
|
||||
|
||||
All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). The server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/20
|
||||
|
||||
Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
|
||||
|
||||
Briar supports Forward Secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Options
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
These messengers do not have [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
|
||||
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to
|
||||
|
||||
Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
|
||||
|
||||
Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Követelmények
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ Azon dolgozunk, hogy meghatározott követelményeket állapítsunk meg az oldal
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Must have open-source clients.
|
||||
- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Must support E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Must have been independently audited.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### Legjobb esetben
|
||||
|
||||
A legjobb esetben alkalmazott követelményeink azt fejezik ki, hogy mit szeretnénk látni egy kifogástalan projekttől ebben a kategóriában. Előfordulhat, hogy ajánlásaink nem tartalmazzák az összes ilyen funkciót, de azok, amelyek igen, magasabb helyen szerepelhetnek, mint mások ezen az oldalon.
|
||||
|
||||
- Should have Forward Secrecy.
|
||||
- Should have open-source servers.
|
||||
- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
|
||||
- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
|
||||
|
||||
All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). The server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/20
|
||||
|
||||
Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
|
||||
|
||||
Briar supports Forward Secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Options
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
These messengers do not have [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
|
||||
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to
|
||||
|
||||
Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
|
||||
|
||||
Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Kriteria
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ Kami sedang berupaya menetapkan kriteria yang jelas untuk setiap bagian dari sit
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Must have open-source clients.
|
||||
- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Must support E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Must have been independently audited.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### Kasus Terbaik
|
||||
|
||||
Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang sempurna dalam kategori ini. Rekomendasi kami mungkin tidak menyertakan salah satu atau semua fungsi ini, tetapi rekomendasi yang menyertakan fungsi ini mungkin memiliki peringkat yang lebih tinggi daripada yang lain di halaman ini.
|
||||
|
||||
- Should have Forward Secrecy.
|
||||
- Should have open-source servers.
|
||||
- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
|
||||
- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,15 +20,13 @@ Queste app di messaggistica sono ottime per proteggere le tue comunicazioni sens
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** è un'app per dispositivi mobili sviluppata da Signal Messenger LLC. L'app offre messaggistica istantanea, oltre che chiamate e videochiamate.
|
||||
|
||||
Tutte le comunicazioni sono E2EE. Gli elenchi di contatti sono crittografati utilizzando il tuo PIN di Signal e il server non vi ha accesso. Inoltre, i profili personali sono crittografati e condivisi esclusivamente con i contatti con cui parli.
|
||||
**Signal** è un'app per dispositivi mobili sviluppata da Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Informativa sulla Privacy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us){ .card-link title=Documentazione}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/signalapp){ .card-link title="Codice sorgente" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://signal.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribuisci }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/signalapp){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://signal.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Scarica</summary>
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ Tutte le comunicazioni sono E2EE. Gli elenchi di contatti sono crittografati uti
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signal supporta i [gruppi privati](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). Il server non registra le appartenenze ai gruppi, i titoli, gli avatar o gli attributi dei gruppi. Signal ha metadati minimi quando [Mittente sigillato](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) è abilitato. L'indirizzo del mittente è crittografato insieme al corpo del messaggio e soltanto l'indirizzo del destinatario è visibile al server. Mittente Sigillato è abilitato esclusivamente per i tuoi contatti, ma è attivabile per tutti i destinatari con il rischio incrementato di ricevere spam. Signal richiede il numero di telefono come identificativo personale.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Inoltre, i profili personali sono crittografati e condivisi esclusivamente con i contatti con cui parli. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal ha metadati minimi quando [Mittente sigillato](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) è abilitato. L'indirizzo del mittente è crittografato insieme al corpo del messaggio e soltanto l'indirizzo del destinatario è visibile al server. Mittente Sigillato è abilitato esclusivamente per i tuoi contatti, ma è attivabile per tutti i destinatari con il rischio incrementato di ricevere spam.
|
||||
|
||||
Il protocollo è stato [controllato](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) indipendentemente nel 2016. Le specifiche per il protocollo di Signal si possono trovare nella sua [documentazione](https://signal.org/docs/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ Il software per il client è stato [controllato](https://briarproject.org/news/2
|
||||
|
||||
Briar ha [pubblicato le specifiche](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec) complete.
|
||||
|
||||
Briar supporta la Segretezza in Avanti utilizzando l'[Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) di Bramble e il protocollo di [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md).
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Opzioni Aggiuntive
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Avviso</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Queste app di messaggistica non dispongono della [Segretezza in Avanti](https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) e, sebbene soddisfino certe esigenze non soddisfatte dai nostri consigli precedenti, le sconsigliamo per le comunicazioni a lungo termine o sensibili. Qualsiasi compromissione di chiavi tra i destinatari del messaggio, influenzerebbe la confidenzialità di **tutte** le comunicazioni precedenti.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Qualsiasi compromissione di chiavi tra i destinatari del messaggio, influenzerebbe la confidenzialità di **tutte** le comunicazioni precedenti.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Le immagini del profilo, le reazioni e i nomi utente non sono crittografati.
|
||||
|
||||
Le chiamate e le videochiamate [non](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) sono in E2EE e utilizzano Jitsi, ma ciò cambierà con la [Segnalazione Nativa VoIP del Gruppo](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Le chiamate di gruppo, correntemente, non dispongono di [autenticazione](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074), a significare che i non partecipanti alla stanza, possono anche unirsi alle chiamate. Consigliamo di non utilizzare questa funzionalità per le riunioni private.
|
||||
|
||||
Lo stesso protocollo Matrix [supporta teoricamente il PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), tuttavia [non è correntemente supportato su Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101), poiché rovina alcuni aspetti dell'esperienza utente, come il backup delle chiavi e la cronologia dei messaggi condivisi.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
Il protocollo è stato [controllato](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) indipendentemente nel 2016. Le specifiche per il protocollo di Matrix possono essere trovate nella sua [documentazione](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). Il [ratchet di crittografia Olm](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) utilizzato da Matrix è un'implementazione dell'[algoritmo Double Ratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/) di Signal.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session utilizza la [Rete Oxen Service Node](https://oxen.io/) decentralizzata p
|
||||
|
||||
Session consente l'E2EE per le chat individuali o i gruppi chiusi, che consentono fino a 100 membri. I gruppi aperti non hanno limitazioni sul numero di membri, ma sono aperti per scelta.
|
||||
|
||||
Session [non](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) supporta PFD, ossia quando un sistema crittografico modifica automaticamente e frequentemente le chiavi utilizzate per crittografare e decrittografare le informazioni, così che se l'ultima chiave è compromessa, espone una porzione minore di informazioni sensibili.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen ha richiesto un controllo indipendente per Session a marzo 2020. Il controllo [è stato concluso](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) ad aprile 2021, "Il livello di sicurezza complessivo di questa applicazione è buono e la rende utilizzabile per gli individui interessati alla propria privacy."
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
Session ha un [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) che descrive le caratteristiche tecniche dell'app e del protocollo.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Criteri
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ Stiamo lavorando per stabilire i criteri definiti per ogni sezione del nostro si
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Deve avere dei client open source.
|
||||
- Deve utilizzare l'E2EE per i messaggi privati di default.
|
||||
- Deve supportare l'E2EE per tutti i messaggi.
|
||||
- Deve essere stato controllato indipendentemente.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### Miglior Caso
|
||||
|
||||
I nostri criteri ottimali rappresentano ciò che vorremmo vedere dal progetto perfetto in questa categoria. I nostri consigli potrebbero non includere tutte o alcune di queste funzionalità, ma quelli che le includono potrebbero essere preferiti ad altri su questa pagina.
|
||||
|
||||
- Dovrebbe disporre della Segretezza in Avanti.
|
||||
- Dovrebbe disporre di server open source.
|
||||
- Dovrebbe essere decentralizzato, cioè federato o P2P.
|
||||
- Dovrebbe utilizzare l'E2EE per tutti i messaggi di default.
|
||||
- Dovrebbe supportare Linux, macOS, Windows, Android e iOS.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
|
||||
|
||||
全ての通信はE2EEで行われます。 Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). The server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/20
|
||||
|
||||
Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
|
||||
|
||||
Briar supports Forward Secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## 追加のオプション
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
These messengers do not have [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
|
||||
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to
|
||||
|
||||
Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
|
||||
|
||||
Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## 規準
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Must have open-source clients.
|
||||
- プライベートメッセージにデフォルトでE2EEを使用していること。
|
||||
- Must support E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Must have been independently audited.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### 満たされることが望ましい基準
|
||||
|
||||
満たされることが望ましい基準には、このカテゴリーの完璧なプロジェクトに私たちが望むものを示しています。 私たちが推薦するプロジェクトは、この機能の一部または全部を含んでいないかもしれませんが、もし含んでいれば、このページで他のプロジェクトよりも上位にランクされるかもしれません。
|
||||
|
||||
- Should have Forward Secrecy.
|
||||
- Should have open-source servers.
|
||||
- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
|
||||
- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal**은 Signal Messenger LLC에서 개발한 모바일 앱입니다. 인스턴트 메시지, 음성 및 영상 통화 기능을 제공합니다.
|
||||
|
||||
모든 통신은 E2EE가 적용됩니다. 연락처 목록은 Signal PIN으로 암호화되며, 서버에서는 연락처 목록에 접근할 수 없습니다. 개인 프로필 또한 암호화되어 여러분이 대화하는 상대에게만 공유됩니다.
|
||||
**Signal**은 Signal Messenger LLC에서 개발한 모바일 앱입니다. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Singal은 [비공개 그룹](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/)을 지원합니다. 그룹 구성원, 그룹 이름, 아바타, 속성 등은 서버에 기록되지 않습니다. 메타데이터를 최소화하는 [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) 기능도 존재합니다. 해당 기능을 사용할 경우, 발신자 주소는 메시지 본문과 함께 암호화되어 서버에서는 수신자 주소만 볼 수 있습니다. Sealed Sender는 연락처 목록에 있는 사람들에게만 활성화되지만, 스팸 수신 위험성이 높아짐에 따라 모든 수신자에게 활성화하는 것도 가능합니다. Signal을 사용하려면 반드시 자신의 전화번호를 개인 식별 정보로 입력해야만 합니다.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. 개인 프로필 또한 암호화되어 여러분이 대화하는 상대에게만 공유됩니다. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. 메타데이터를 최소화하는 [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) 기능도 존재합니다. 해당 기능을 사용할 경우, 발신자 주소는 메시지 본문과 함께 암호화되어 서버에서는 수신자 주소만 볼 수 있습니다. Sealed Sender는 연락처 목록에 있는 사람들에게만 활성화되지만, 스팸 수신 위험성이 높아짐에 따라 모든 수신자에게 활성화하는 것도 가능합니다.
|
||||
|
||||
Signal 프로토콜은 2016년에 독립적으로 [감사를 받았습니다](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf). Signal 프로토콜 사양은 [문서](https://signal.org/docs/)에서 확인할 수 있습니다.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ Briar 연락처에 누군가를 등록하려면 서로가 모두 서로를 연
|
||||
|
||||
Briar [사양 문서](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec)는 전체 공개되어 있습니다.
|
||||
|
||||
Briar supports Forward Secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## 추가 선택지
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
These messengers do not have [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. 대화 참여자 중 한 명만 키가 유출되더라도 이전에 주고받은 **모든** 메시지의 기밀성이 손상됩니다.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. 대화 참여자 중 한 명만 키가 유출되더라도 이전에 주고받은 **모든** 메시지의 기밀성이 손상됩니다.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ These messengers do not have [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/For
|
||||
|
||||
그룹 음성 및 영상 통화에는 E2EE가 [아닌](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878), Jitsi를 사용합니다. 단, 이는 추후 [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401)으로 변경될 예정입니다. 현재 그룹 통화는 인증 과정을 거치지 [않습니다](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074). 즉, 룸 참가자가 아닌 사람도 통화에 난입하는 것이 가능합니다. 사적인 모임에서는 해당 기능을 사용하지 않는 것이 좋습니다.
|
||||
|
||||
Matrix 프로토콜 자체는 [이론적으로 PFS를 지원하지만](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), 키 백업 및 사용자 간 메시지 기록 공유 등의 사용자 경험을 해치기 때문에 [현시점에서 Element는 PFS를 지원하지 않습니다](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101).
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
Matrix 프로토콜은 2016년에 독립적으로 [감사를 받았습니다](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last). Matirx 프로토콜 사양은 [문서](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/)에서 확인할 수 있습니다. The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session은 탈중앙화된 [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/)를 이
|
||||
|
||||
Session은 일대일 채팅 및 최대 100명까지 참여 가능한 비공개 그룹에서 E2EE를 지원합니다. 공개 그룹은 구성원 수에 제한이 없지만, 설계상 개방되어 있습니다.
|
||||
|
||||
Session은 완전 순방향 비밀성을 지원하지 [않습니다](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information). 즉, '암호화 시스템이 자동으로 빈번하게 암호화 및 복호화에 사용되는 키를 변경하여, 최신 키가 손상되더라도 민감한 정보는 일부만 노출되게 하는 시스템'이 존재하지 않습니다.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen은 2020년 3월에 Session의 제3자 감사를 요청했습니다. 감사는 2021년 4월에 [완료되었으며](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit), "이 애플리케이션의 전반적인 보안 수준은 양호하며, 프라이버시를 중시하는 사람들이 사용하기에 적합합니다"라는 결론이 내려졌습니다.
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
Session은 애플리케이션 및 프로토콜의 기술적인 설명을 담은 [백서](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf)를 제공하고 있습니다.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## 평가 기준
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ Privacy Guides 팀은 사이트의 모든 항목마다 명확한 평가 기준
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- 오픈 소스 클라이언트가 있어야 합니다.
|
||||
- 비공개 메시지에는 E2EE가 기본 적용이어야 합니다.
|
||||
- 모든 메시지에 E2EE가 지원되어야 합니다.
|
||||
- 독립적인 감사를 받았어야 합니다.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### 우대 사항
|
||||
|
||||
평가 기준에서 '우대 사항'은 해당 부문에서 완벽한 프로젝트에 기대하는 바를 나타냅니다. 다음의 우대 사항에 해당하지 않더라도 권장 목록에 포함될 수 있습니다. 단, 우대 사항에 해당할수록 이 페이지의 다른 항목보다 높은 순위를 갖습니다.
|
||||
|
||||
- Should have Forward Secrecy.
|
||||
- 오픈 소스 서버가 있어야 합니다.
|
||||
- 탈중앙 방식(연합 방식/P2P 방식)이어야 합니다.
|
||||
- 모든 메시지에 E2EE가 기본 적용이어야 합니다.
|
||||
- Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, iOS를 지원해야 합니다.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
|
||||
|
||||
All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). The server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/20
|
||||
|
||||
Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
|
||||
|
||||
Briar supports Forward Secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Options
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
These messengers do not have [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
|
||||
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to
|
||||
|
||||
Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
|
||||
|
||||
Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Must have open-source clients.
|
||||
- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Must support E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Must have been independently audited.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### Best-Case
|
||||
|
||||
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
|
||||
|
||||
- Should have Forward Secrecy.
|
||||
- Should have open-source servers.
|
||||
- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
|
||||
- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ Deze boodschappers zijn geweldig voor het beveiligen van jouw gevoelige communic
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** is een mobiele app ontwikkeld door Signal Messenger LLC. De app biedt instant messaging en spraak- en videobellen.
|
||||
|
||||
Alle communicatie is E2EE. Contactlijsten worden versleuteld met uw Signal PIN en de server heeft er geen toegang toe. Persoonlijke profielen worden ook versleuteld en alleen gedeeld met contacten waarmee je chat.
|
||||
**Signal** is een mobiele app ontwikkeld door Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ Alle communicatie is E2EE. Contactlijsten worden versleuteld met uw Signal PIN e
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signaal ondersteunt [privégroepen](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). De server heeft geen gegevens van je groepslidmaatschappen, groepstitels, groepsafbeeldingen of groepsattributen. Signaal heeft minimale metadata wanneer [Verzegelde Afzender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is ingeschakeld. Het afzenderadres is versleuteld samen met de inhoud van het bericht, en alleen het adres van de ontvanger is zichtbaar voor de server. Verzegelde afzender is alleen ingeschakeld voor mensen in uw contactenlijst, maar kan ingeschakeld zijn voor alle ontvangers met een verhoogd risico om spam te ontvangen. Signaal vereist jouw telefoonnummer als persoonlijk identificatiemiddel.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Persoonlijke profielen worden ook versleuteld en alleen gedeeld met contacten waarmee je chat. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signaal heeft minimale metadata wanneer [Verzegelde Afzender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is ingeschakeld. Het afzenderadres is versleuteld samen met de inhoud van het bericht, en alleen het adres van de ontvanger is zichtbaar voor de server. Verzegelde afzender is alleen ingeschakeld voor mensen in uw contactenlijst, maar kan ingeschakeld zijn voor alle ontvangers met een verhoogd risico om spam te ontvangen.
|
||||
|
||||
Het protocol was onafhankelijk [gecontroleerd](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. De specificatie van het Signaal-protocol kan worden gevonden in hun [documentatie](https://signal.org/docs/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ De clientsoftware was onafhankelijk [gecontroleerd](https://briarproject.org/new
|
||||
|
||||
Briar heeft een volledig [gepubliceerde specificatie](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
|
||||
|
||||
Briar ondersteunt perfecte forward secrecy door gebruik te maken van het Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) en [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Aanvullende opties
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Deze messengers hebben geen Perfect [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) (Pfs), en hoewel zij in bepaalde behoeften voorzien die onze vorige aanbevelingen niet hebben, bevelen wij ze niet aan voor langdurige of gevoelige communicatie. Elke compromittering van sleutels tussen ontvangers van berichten zou de vertrouwelijkheid van **alle** eerdere communicaties aantasten.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Elke compromittering van sleutels tussen ontvangers van berichten zou de vertrouwelijkheid van **alle** eerdere communicaties aantasten.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Profielfoto's, reacties en bijnamen zijn niet versleuteld.
|
||||
|
||||
Groepsgesprekken voor spraak en video zijn [niet](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, en gebruiken Jitsi, maar dit zal naar verwachting veranderen met [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Groepsgesprekken hebben [momenteel geen authenticatie](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074), wat betekent dat ook deelnemers van buiten de zaal aan de gesprekken kunnen deelnemen. Wij raden je aan deze functie niet te gebruiken voor privévergaderingen.
|
||||
|
||||
Het Matrix-protocol zelf [ondersteunt in theorie PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), maar dit wordt [momenteel niet ondersteund in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) omdat het sommige aspecten van de gebruikerservaring, zoals sleutelback-ups en gedeelde berichtgeschiedenis, hierdoor niet naar behoren functioneerd.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
Het protocol is in 2016 onafhankelijk [gecontroleerd](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last). De specificatie van het Matrix-protocol is te vinden in hun [documentatie](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session maakt gebruik van het gedecentraliseerde [Oxen Service Node Network](htt
|
||||
|
||||
Session maakt E2EE mogelijk in één-op-één chats of gesloten groepen met maximaal 100 leden. Open groepen hebben geen beperking wat het aantal leden betreft, maar zijn open van opzet.
|
||||
|
||||
Session ondersteunt [geen](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) perfect forward secrecy, waarbij een encryptiesysteem de sleutels die het gebruikt om informatie te versleutelen en te ontsleutelen, automatisch en frequent wijzigt, zodat, indien de laatste sleutel wordt gecompromitteerd, een kleiner deel van de gevoelige informatie wordt blootgelegd.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen heeft een onafhankelijke audit aangevraagd voor Session in maart 2020. De audit [concludeerde](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in april van 2021: "Het algemene beveiligingsniveau van deze applicatie is goed en maakt het bruikbaar voor mensen die zich zorgen maken over privacy."
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
Session heeft een [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) die de techniek van de app en het protocol beschrijft.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ We werken aan het vaststellen van gedefinieerde criteria voor elk deel van onze
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Moet open-source clients hebben.
|
||||
- Moet standaard E2EE gebruiken voor privé-berichten.
|
||||
- Moet E2EE ondersteunen voor alle berichten.
|
||||
- Moet onafhankelijk gecontroleerd zijn.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### Beste geval
|
||||
|
||||
Onze best-case criteria geven aan wat wij zouden willen zien van het perfecte project in deze categorie. Het is mogelijk dat onze aanbevelingen geen of niet alle functies bevatten, maar degene die dat wel doen kunnen hoger gerangschikt worden dan andere op deze pagina.
|
||||
|
||||
- Zou Forward Secrecy moeten hebben.
|
||||
- Moet open-source servers hebben.
|
||||
- Moet gedecentraliseerd zijn, d.w.z. gefedereerd of P2P.
|
||||
- Moet standaard E2EE gebruiken voor privé-berichten.
|
||||
- Moet Linux, macOS, Windows, Android en iOS ondersteunen.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
|
||||
|
||||
All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). The server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/20
|
||||
|
||||
Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
|
||||
|
||||
Briar supports Forward Secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Options
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
These messengers do not have [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
|
||||
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to
|
||||
|
||||
Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
|
||||
|
||||
Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Must have open-source clients.
|
||||
- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Must support E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Must have been independently audited.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### Best-Case
|
||||
|
||||
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
|
||||
|
||||
- Should have Forward Secrecy.
|
||||
- Should have open-source servers.
|
||||
- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
|
||||
- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
|
||||
|
||||
All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). The server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/20
|
||||
|
||||
Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
|
||||
|
||||
Briar supports Forward Secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Options
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
These messengers do not have [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
|
||||
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to
|
||||
|
||||
Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
|
||||
|
||||
Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Must have open-source clients.
|
||||
- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Must support E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Must have been independently audited.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### Melhor Caso
|
||||
|
||||
Nosso critério de melhor caso representa o que gostaríamos de ver em um projeto perfeito nessa categoria. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
|
||||
|
||||
- Should have Forward Secrecy.
|
||||
- Should have open-source servers.
|
||||
- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
|
||||
- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ Estas aplicações de mensagens são ótimas para proteger as suas comunicaçõe
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** é uma aplicação para dispositivos móveis desenvolvida pela Signal Messenger LLC. A aplicação permite o envio de mensagens instantâneas, bem como chamadas de voz e vídeo.
|
||||
|
||||
Todas as comunicações são E2EE. As listas de contactos são encriptadas utilizando o PIN do Signal e o servidor não tem acesso a elas. Os perfis pessoais também são encriptados e apenas são partilhados com os contactos com quem conversa.
|
||||
**Signal** é uma aplicação para dispositivos móveis desenvolvida pela Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ Todas as comunicações são E2EE. As listas de contactos são encriptadas utili
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
O Signal suporta [grupos privados](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). O servidor não tem qualquer registo dos grupos a que pertence, títulos de grupo, avatares de grupo ou atributos de grupo. O Signal tem metadados mínimos quando se ativa o[Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/). O endereço do remetente é encriptado juntamente com o corpo da mensagem e apenas o endereço do destinatário é visível para o servidor. O Sealed Sender só está ativado para as pessoas da sua lista de contactos, mas pode ser ativado para todos os destinatários, com o risco acrescido de poder receber spam. O Signal requer o seu número de telefone como identificador pessoal.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Os perfis pessoais também são encriptados e apenas são partilhados com os contactos com quem conversa. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. O Signal tem metadados mínimos quando se ativa o[Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/). O endereço do remetente é encriptado juntamente com o corpo da mensagem e apenas o endereço do destinatário é visível para o servidor. O Sealed Sender só está ativado para as pessoas da sua lista de contactos, mas pode ser ativado para todos os destinatários, com o risco acrescido de poder receber spam.
|
||||
|
||||
O protocolo foi objeto de uma [auditoria](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) independente em 2016. A especificação do protocolo Signal pode ser encontrada na sua [documentação](https://signal.org/docs/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ O software cliente foi [auditado de forma independente](https://briarproject.org
|
||||
|
||||
O Briar publicou na íntegra a sua [especificação](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
|
||||
|
||||
O Briar suporta Forward Secrecy, através do Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) e do [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md).
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Opções adicionais
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Estas aplicações de mensagens instantâneas não têm [Forward Secrecy] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) e, embora satisfaçam certas necessidades que as nossas recomendações anteriores não podem satisfazer, não os recomendamos para comunicações de longo prazo ou sensíveis. Qualquer comprometimento da chave entre os destinatários da mensagem afetará a confidencialidade de **todas** as comunicações anteriores.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Qualquer comprometimento da chave entre os destinatários da mensagem afetará a confidencialidade de **todas** as comunicações anteriores.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ As imagens de perfil, as reações e os nicknames não são encriptados.
|
||||
|
||||
As chamadas de voz e vídeo em grupo [não são](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE e utilizam Jitsi, mas espera-se que esta situação se altere com o [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Atualmente, as chamadas de grupo [não têm autenticação](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074), o que significa que os participantes que não estão na sala também podem juntar-se às chamadas. Recomendamos que não utilize esta funcionalidade para reuniões privadas.
|
||||
|
||||
O próprio protocolo Matrix [suporta teoricamente o PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), no entanto, este [não é atualmente suportado no Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) devido aos problemas que provoca em alguns aspetos da experiência do utilizador, como as cópias de segurança de chaves e o histórico de mensagens partilhadas.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
O protocolo foi objeto de uma [auditoria independente](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) em 2016. A especificação do protocolo Matrix pode ser encontrada na sua [documentação](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ O Session utiliza a rede descentralizada [Oxen Service Node Network] (https://ox
|
||||
|
||||
O Session permite E2EE em conversas individuais ou em grupos fechados com um máximo de 100 membros. Os grupos abertos não têm restrições quanto ao número de membros, mas são abertos por definição.
|
||||
|
||||
O Session [não](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) suporta PFS, que é quando um sistema de encriptação altera automática e frequentemente as chaves que utiliza para encriptar e desencriptar informações, de modo a que, se a chave mais recente for comprometida, exponha uma parte reduzida de informações sensíveis.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
A Oxen solicitou uma auditoria independente para o Session, em março de 2020. Em abril de 2021, a auditoria [concluiu](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit): "O nível geral de segurança desta aplicação é bom e torna-a utilizável por pessoas preocupadas com a privacidade."
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
O Session tem um [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) que descreve os aspetos técnicos da aplicação e do protocolo.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Critérios
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ Estamos a trabalhar no sentido de estabelecer critérios para cada secção do n
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Deve ter clientes de código aberto.
|
||||
- Deve utilizar o E2EE para mensagens privadas por defeito.
|
||||
- Deve suportar E2EE para todas as mensagens.
|
||||
- Deve ter sido objeto de uma auditoria independente.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### Melhor caso
|
||||
|
||||
Os nossos melhores critérios representam o que gostaríamos de ver num projeto perfeito desta categoria. As nossas recomendações podem não incluir todas as funcionalidades, mas incluem as que, na nossa opinião, têm um impacto mais elevado.
|
||||
|
||||
- Deve ter o Forward Secrecy.
|
||||
- Deve ter servidores de código aberto.
|
||||
- Deve ser descentralizado, ou seja, federado ou P2P.
|
||||
- Deve utilizar o E2EE para todas as mensagens por defeito.
|
||||
- Deve ser compatível com Linux, macOS, Windows, Android e iOS.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** - мобильное приложение, разработанное Signal Messenger LLC. Приложение обеспечивает мгновенный обмен сообщениями, а также голосовые и видеозвонки.
|
||||
|
||||
Все коммуникации осуществляются в режиме E2EE. Списки контактов шифруются с помощью вашего PIN-кода входа в систему, и сервер не имеет к ним доступа. Личные профили также шифруются и предоставляются только тем контактам, с которыми вы переписываетесь.
|
||||
**Signal** - мобильное приложение, разработанное Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Сигнал поддерживает [приватные группы](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). На сервере нет записей о вашем членстве в группах, названиях групп, аватарах групп или атрибутах групп. Сигнал имеет минимальные метаданные, если включена функция [запечатанного отправителя](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/). Адрес отправителя шифруется вместе с текстом сообщения, серверу виден только адрес получателя. Функция запечатанного отправителя включена только для людей из вашего списка контактов, но может быть включена для всех получателей с повышенным риском получения спама. Signal требует ваш номер телефона в качестве персонального идентификатора.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Личные профили также шифруются и предоставляются только тем контактам, с которыми вы переписываетесь. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Сигнал имеет минимальные метаданные, если включена функция [запечатанного отправителя](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/). Адрес отправителя шифруется вместе с текстом сообщения, серверу виден только адрес получателя. Функция запечатанного отправителя включена только для людей из вашего списка контактов, но может быть включена для всех получателей с повышенным риском получения спама.
|
||||
|
||||
Протокол прошел независимый [аудит](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) в 2016 году. Спецификацию протокола Signal можно найти в их [документации](https://signal.org/docs/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ SimpleX Chat supports basic group chatting functionality, direct messaging, and
|
||||
|
||||
Briar имеет полностью [опубликованную документацию](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
|
||||
|
||||
Briar поддерживает прямую секретность пересылки, используя протоколы Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) и [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md).
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Дополнительные варианты
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Предупреждение</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Хотя эти мессенджеры и проходят по определённым критериям, они не поддерживают [прямую секретность](https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfect_forward_secrecy), поэтому мы не рекомендуем их для длительных или конфиденциальных коммуникаций. Любая компрометация ключа среди получателей сообщений повлияет на конфиденциальность **всех** прошлых сообщений.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Любая компрометация ключа среди получателей сообщений повлияет на конфиденциальность **всех** прошлых сообщений.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Briar поддерживает прямую секретность пересы
|
||||
|
||||
Групповые голосовые и видео звонки [не](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) зашифрованы E2EE, а используют Jitsi. Ожидается, что это изменится с [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Групповые звонки в настоящее время [не имеют аутентификации](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074), что означает, что к звонкам могут присоединяться и не входящие в комнату участники. Мы рекомендуем вам не использовать эту функцию для приватных созвонов.
|
||||
|
||||
Сам протокол Matrix [теоретически поддерживает PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), однако он [в настоящее время не поддерживается в Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) из-за того, что это нарушает некоторые аспекты работы пользователей, такие как резервное копирование ключей и общая история сообщений.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
Протокол прошел независимый [аудит](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) в 2016 году. Спецификацию протокола Matrix можно найти в их [документации](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session использует децентрализованную [Oxen Service
|
||||
|
||||
Сессия использует E2EE в чатах один на один или в закрытых группах, в которых могут участвовать до 100 человек. Открытые группы не имеют ограничений по количеству участников, но являются открытыми по своей сути.
|
||||
|
||||
Session [не](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) поддерживает прямую секретность. При прямой секретности система шифрования автоматически и часто меняет ключи шифрования, так что в случае взлома последнего ключа обнажается меньшая часть конфиденциальной информации.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Оксен запросил независимый аудит для Session в марте 2020 года. Аудит [заключил](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) в апреле 2021 года: "Общий уровень безопасности этого приложения хороший и делает его пригодным для использования людьми, заботящимися о конфиденциальности."
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
У Session есть [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf), описывающий технические особенности приложения и протокола.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Критерии
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ Session [не](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-informatio
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Должны иметь приложения с открытым исходным кодом.
|
||||
- Должны по умолчанию использовать E2EE для личных сообщений.
|
||||
- Должны поддерживать E2EE для всех сообщений.
|
||||
- Должен быть проведен независимый аудит.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### В лучшем случае
|
||||
|
||||
Эти критерии представляют собой то, что мы хотели бы видеть от идеального проекта в этой категории. Наши рекомендации могут не соответствовать всем или нескольким из этих критериев, но проекты, которые им соответствуют, расположены выше остальных.
|
||||
|
||||
- Должны поддерживать прямую секретность.
|
||||
- Должны иметь серверы с открытым исходным кодом.
|
||||
- Должны быть децентрализованными, т.е. федеративными или P2P.
|
||||
- Должны по умолчанию использовать E2EE для всех сообщений.
|
||||
- Должны поддерживать Linux, macOS, Windows, Android и iOS.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
|
||||
|
||||
All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). The server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/20
|
||||
|
||||
Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
|
||||
|
||||
Briar supports Forward Secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Options
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
These messengers do not have [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
|
||||
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to
|
||||
|
||||
Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
|
||||
|
||||
Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Kriterier
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ Vi arbetar med att fastställa kriterier för varje del av vår webbplats, och d
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Must have open-source clients.
|
||||
- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Must support E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Must have been independently audited.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### Bästa fall
|
||||
|
||||
Våra kriterier för bästa fall representerar vad vi skulle vilja se av det perfekta projektet i denna kategori. Våra rekommendationer kanske inte innehåller alla eller några av dessa funktioner, men de som gör det kan vara högre rankade än andra på den här sidan.
|
||||
|
||||
- Should have Forward Secrecy.
|
||||
- Should have open-source servers.
|
||||
- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
|
||||
- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ Bu mesajlaşma uygulamaları hassas iletişimlerinizi güvence altına almak iç
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal**, Signal Messenger LLC tarafından geliştirilen bir mobil uygulamadır. Uygulama anlık mesajlaşmanın yanı sıra sesli ve görüntülü arama da sağlıyor.
|
||||
|
||||
Tüm iletişimler uçtan uca şifrelemeye sahiptir. Kişileriniz Signal PIN'iniz kullanılarak şifrelenir ve sunucunun bunlara erişimi yoktur. Profiller de şifrelenir ve yalnızca sohbet ettiğiniz kişilerle paylaşılır.
|
||||
**Signal**, Signal Messenger LLC tarafından geliştirilen bir mobil uygulamadır. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ Tüm iletişimler uçtan uca şifrelemeye sahiptir. Kişileriniz Signal PIN'iniz
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signal [özel grupları](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/) destekler. Sunucuda grup üyeliklerinizin, grup adlarınızın, grup fotoğraflarınızın veya grup özelliklerinizin kaydı yoktur. [Gizli Gönderici](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) etkinleştirildiğinde Signal, en aza indirgenmiş metadata'ya sahiptir. Gönderenin adresi mesajla birlikte şifrelenir ve sunucu tarafından yalnızca alıcı adresi görülebilir. Gizli Gönderici varsayılan olarak yalnızca kişileriniz için etkindir ancak spam alma riskini arttırmakla beraber tüm alıcılar için etkinleştirilebilir. Signal, kişisel tanımlayıcı olarak telefon numaranızı gerektirir.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Profiller de şifrelenir ve yalnızca sohbet ettiğiniz kişilerle paylaşılır. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. [Gizli Gönderici](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) etkinleştirildiğinde Signal, en aza indirgenmiş metadata'ya sahiptir. Gönderenin adresi mesajla birlikte şifrelenir ve sunucu tarafından yalnızca alıcı adresi görülebilir. Gizli Gönderici varsayılan olarak yalnızca kişileriniz için etkindir ancak spam alma riskini arttırmakla beraber tüm alıcılar için etkinleştirilebilir.
|
||||
|
||||
Protokol 2016 yılında bağımsız olarak [denetlenmiştir](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf). Signal protokolünün özellikleri [dokümantasyonunda](https://signal.org/docs/) bulunabilir.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/20
|
||||
|
||||
Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
|
||||
|
||||
Briar supports Forward Secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Options
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
These messengers do not have [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
|
||||
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to
|
||||
|
||||
Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
|
||||
|
||||
Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Must have open-source clients.
|
||||
- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Must support E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Must have been independently audited.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### Best-Case
|
||||
|
||||
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
|
||||
|
||||
- Should have Forward Secrecy.
|
||||
- Should have open-source servers.
|
||||
- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
|
||||
- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
|
||||
|
||||
All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). The server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/20
|
||||
|
||||
Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
|
||||
|
||||
Briar supports Forward Secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Options
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
These messengers do not have [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
|
||||
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to
|
||||
|
||||
Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
|
||||
|
||||
Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Must have open-source clients.
|
||||
- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Must support E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Must have been independently audited.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### Best-Case
|
||||
|
||||
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
|
||||
|
||||
- Should have Forward Secrecy.
|
||||
- Should have open-source servers.
|
||||
- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
|
||||
- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
|
||||
|
||||
All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). The server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/20
|
||||
|
||||
Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
|
||||
|
||||
Briar supports Forward Secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Options
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
These messengers do not have [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
|
||||
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to
|
||||
|
||||
Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
|
||||
|
||||
Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Framadate
|
||||
|
||||
@ -217,17 +226,22 @@ Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Must have open-source clients.
|
||||
- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Must support E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Must have been independently audited.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### Best-Case
|
||||
|
||||
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
|
||||
|
||||
- Should have Forward Secrecy.
|
||||
- Should have open-source servers.
|
||||
- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
|
||||
- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** 是由Signal Messenger LLC開發的行動應用程式。 該應用程式提供即時消息，以及語音和視頻通話。
|
||||
|
||||
所有通信都是E2EE。 連絡人清單會使用您的 Signal PIN 加密，而伺服器無法存取。 個人帳號也會加密，並僅與您聊天的聯絡人分享。
|
||||
**Signal** 是由Signal Messenger LLC開發的行動應用程式。 The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signal支持 [私人羣組](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/)。 伺服器不會記錄羣組成員資格、羣組標題、羣組頭像或羣組屬性。 當啓用 [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) 時， Signal具有最小元數據。 發件人地址與訊息內文一起加密，伺服器只可見到收件人地址。 Sealed Sender 功能僅適用於聯絡人清單的成員，但在收訊時也可啟用以防止接收垃圾郵件增加的風險。 Signal 需要您的電話號碼作為個人識別碼。
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. 個人帳號也會加密，並僅與您聊天的聯絡人分享。 Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. 當啓用 [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) 時， Signal具有最小元數據。 發件人地址與訊息內文一起加密，伺服器只可見到收件人地址。 Sealed Sender 功能僅適用於聯絡人清單的成員，但在收訊時也可啟用以防止接收垃圾郵件增加的風險。
|
||||
|
||||
其協議在2016年獨立進行了 [審計](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) 。 Signal 協議的規範可以在他們的 [文檔](https://signal.org/docs/)中找到。
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ Briar 要新增聯絡人，必須先彼此互加。 您可以交換 `briar://`
|
||||
|
||||
Briar有一個完整 [發布的規範](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec)。
|
||||
|
||||
Briar 使用 Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) 與 [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) 協議來支援向前保密機制。
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## 額外選項
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning "警告"</p>
|
||||
|
||||
這些通訊軟體無 [向前保密](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) 雖然它們達成我們之前建議的某些需求，但不推薦將其用於長期或敏感通信。 訊息收件人之間的任何密鑰洩露都會影響* *所有* *過去通信的機密性。
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. 訊息收件人之間的任何密鑰洩露都會影響* *所有* *過去通信的機密性。
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,13 +169,10 @@ Briar 使用 Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/
|
||||
|
||||
羣組語音和視視通話 [則不是](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE ，而是使用Jitsi ，但預計將隨著 [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401)而發生變化。 群組通目前 [沒有驗證](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) ，因此其它人員也可以加入。 我們建議您不要將此功能用於私人會議。
|
||||
|
||||
Matrix 協議本身 [理論上支援 PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)，但目前Element </a> 不支援 PFS
|
||||
，因為它破壞一些使用者體驗，例如密鑰備份和共享訊息歷史記錄。</p>
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
其協議在 2016年獨立進行了 [審計](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) 。 Matrix 協議的規範可以在他們的 [文檔](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/)中找到。 Matrix 使用的 [Olm 加密棘輪](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/)是執行Signal [Double Ratchet 演算法](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/)。
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### Session
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
@ -198,13 +204,11 @@ Session使用去中心化的 [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) 來
|
||||
|
||||
會話允許E2EE在一對一聊天或封閉羣組中，最多可容納100名成員。 開放羣組對成員數量沒有限制，從設計上來說是開放的。
|
||||
|
||||
Session [不](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information)支援 PFS, PFS 加密系統會自動經常變更密鑰，假如最新密鑰被破壞也只洩漏一小部份敏感資訊。
|
||||
|
||||
2020年3月Oxen 對 Session 進行獨立審計。 審計 [在2021年4月完成](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) ， “此應用程式整體安全級別良好，可供關注隱私的人使用。
|
||||
|
||||
Session [白皮書](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) ，描述了應用程式和協議的技術。
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## 標準
|
||||
|
||||
@ -217,19 +221,22 @@ Session [白皮書](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) ，描述了應用程
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- 一定要有開源客戶端。
|
||||
- 預設情況下，私人訊息必須使用E2EE。
|
||||
- 必須支援所有訊息都可 E2EE。
|
||||
- 必須通過獨立審計。
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### 最佳案例
|
||||
|
||||
最佳案例標準代表了我們希望從這個類別的完美項目應具備的功能。 推薦產品可能沒有此功能，但若有這些功能則會讓排名更為提高。
|
||||
|
||||
- 應有向前保密功能。
|
||||
- 應該有開源伺服器。
|
||||
- 應該是分散的，即聯邦式或 P2P。
|
||||
- 預設情況下，所有訊息皆應使用 E2EE。
|
||||
- 應支持Linux、macOS、Windows、Android和iOS。
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** 是Signal Messenger LLC所研发的一款手机应用。 这款应用提供即时通讯，语音通话以及视频通话。
|
||||
|
||||
所有的聊天窗口都有端到端加密（E2EE） 联系人列表使用你的Signal PIN码来保护，且服务器无法访问。 个人资料也经过加密，并只与你联系过的人共享。
|
||||
**Signal** 是Signal Messenger LLC所研发的一款手机应用。 The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -44,7 +42,18 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signal 支持 [私密群组](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). 服务器没有你的群组成员资格，名称，头像以及其他属性的记录。 只有当 [加密发送（Sealed Sender）](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/)启用时，Signal才会保存最少的元数据。 发信人地址与消息正文一起被加密，只有收信人的地址对服务器可见。 加密发送仅对你联系人列表中的人启用，你也可以对所有收件人启用，但是这么做会增加你收到垃圾邮件的风险。 Signal需要你的电话号码作为个人识别码。
|
||||
Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a username to hide your phone number from your contacts:
|
||||
|
||||
1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
|
||||
2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
|
||||
3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`.
|
||||
4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
|
||||
5. Select **Phone Number**
|
||||
6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
|
||||
|
||||
You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
|
||||
|
||||
Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. 个人资料也经过加密，并只与你联系过的人共享。 Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. 只有当 [加密发送（Sealed Sender）](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/)启用时，Signal才会保存最少的元数据。 发信人地址与消息正文一起被加密，只有收信人的地址对服务器可见。 加密发送仅对你联系人列表中的人启用，你也可以对所有收件人启用，但是这么做会增加你收到垃圾邮件的风险。
|
||||
|
||||
Signal协议在2016年被独立[审计](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) 。 该协议的规范可以在他们的[文档](https://signal.org/docs/)查看。
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,14 +124,14 @@ The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/20
|
||||
|
||||
Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
|
||||
|
||||
Briar supports Forward Secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Options
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">警告</p>
|
||||
|
||||
These messengers do not have [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +169,7 @@ Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/12878) E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with [Native Group VoIP Signalling](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3401). Group calls have [no authentication](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/13074) currently, meaning that non-room participants can also join the calls. We recommend that you do not use this feature for private meetings.
|
||||
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,11 +204,11 @@ Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to
|
||||
|
||||
Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
|
||||
|
||||
Session does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support PFS, which is when an encryption system automatically and frequently changes the keys it uses to encrypt and decrypt information, such that if the latest key is compromised it exposes a smaller portion of sensitive information.
|
||||
Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March of 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April of 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021, “The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.”
|
||||
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technicals of the app and protocol.
|
||||
Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
|
||||
|
||||
## Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,17 +221,22 @@ We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, a
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Must have open-source clients.
|
||||
- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Must support E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Must have been independently audited.
|
||||
- Has open-source clients.
|
||||
- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports E2EE for all messages.
|
||||
- Has been independently audited.
|
||||
|
||||
### Best-Case
|
||||
|
||||
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
|
||||
|
||||
- Should have Forward Secrecy.
|
||||
- Should have open-source servers.
|
||||
- Should be decentralized, i.e. federated or P2P.
|
||||
- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
- Supports Forward Secrecy[^1]
|
||||
- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
|
||||
- Has open-source servers.
|
||||
- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
|
||||
- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
|
||||
- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
|
||||
[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user