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privacyguides.org/docs/basics/vpn-overview.md

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How Do VPNs Protect Your Privacy? Our VPN Overview - Privacy Guides VPN Overview material/vpn Virtual Private Networks shift risk away from your ISP to a third-party you trust. You should keep these things in mind.

Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit somewhere else in the world. Originally, they were designed so that you could securely connect to a network even if you weren't physically there; you're virtually on a private network.

How do VPNs work?

VPNs encrypt your traffic between your device and a server owned by your VPN provider. From the perspective of anyone between you and the VPN server, it looks like you're connecting to the VPN server. From the perspective of anyone between the VPN server and your destination site, all they can see is the VPN server connecting to the website.

flowchart TD
    server== VPN encryption ===infra(Outside Infrastructure)== VPN encryption ===local[Local Network]== VPN encryption ===device[Your Device]
    server{VPN Server}-. No VPN encryption .--infr(Outside Infrastructure)-. No VPN encryption .--site[Destination Website]

When should I use a VPN?

Hiding browsing habits from your ISP

An ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (i.e. modem).

They usually can't see the content of your traffic since encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, but they can see the domains you request. A VPN will prevent your ISP from seeing what domains you connect to, although the VPN provider is still able to see all your traffic.

==VPNs can't encrypt data outside of the connection between your device and the VPN server.== VPN providers can see and modify your traffic the same way your ISP could. And there is no way to verify a VPN provider's "no logging" policies in any way.

Hiding your IP address from third parties

Any website you connect to will see the VPN provider's IP address instead of yours. This can be useful if you want to avoid leaking your IP address to outside parties if you are worried about a DDoS or other attack against your network.

For example, a VPN can also protect you from your ISP or anti-piracy organizations while torrenting.

Preventing tracking

A VPN can't prevent tracking all on its own, but it can offer a few benefits.

You can connect to a server in a different city or country than you live in, making it appear like you're somwhere you're not. This is easily circumvented using things like your browser's language and timezone settings, so this shouldn't be relied on.

Because you share a pool of IP addresses with many other users, it becomes more difficult to track you. Do note that most people do not have static IP addresses, so even without a VPN your IP address will change even without a VPN.

When shouldn't I use a VPN?

Using a VPN in cases where you're using your known identity is unlikely be useful.

Doing so may trigger spam and fraud detection systems, such as if you were to log into your bank's website.

For anonymity

VPNs can't provide anonymity. Your VPN provider will still see your real IP address, and often has a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. You can't rely on "no logging" policies to protect your data. Use Tor instead.

For E2EE

Encryption offered by VPN providers is between your devices and their servers. It guarantees that this specific link is secure. This is a step up from using unencrypted proxies where an adversary on the network can intercept the communications between your devices and said proxies and modify them. However, encryption between your apps or browsers with the service providers are not handled by this encryption.

In order to keep what you actually do on the websites you visit private and secure, you must use HTTPS. This will keep your passwords, session tokens, and queries safe from the VPN provider. You can enable HTTPS-only mode in your browser (if it's supported) to mitigate downgrade attacks like SSL Strip.

Should I use encrypted DNS with a VPN?

Unless your VPN provider hosts the encrypted DNS servers, no. Using DOH/DOT (or any other form of encrypted DNS) with third-party servers will simply add more entities to trust and does absolutely nothing to improve your privacy/security. Your VPN provider can still see which websites you visit based on the IP addresses and other methods. Instead of trusting only your VPN provider, you are now trusting both the VPN provider and the DNS provider.

A common reason to recommend encrypted DNS is that it helps against DNS spoofing. However, your browser should already be checking for TLS certificates with HTTPS and warn you about it. If you are not using HTTPS, then an adversary can still just modify anything other than your DNS queries and the end result will be little different.

You shouldn't use encrypted DNS with Tor. This will direct all of your DNS requests through a single circuit and allow the encrypted DNS provider to deanonymize you.

Should I use Tor and a VPN?

By using a VPN with Tor, you're essentially creating a permanent entry node, often with a money trail attached. This provides zero additional benefits to you, while increasing the attack surface of your connection dramatically. If you wish to hide your Tor usage from your ISP or your government, Tor has a built-in solution for that: Tor bridges. Read more about Tor bridges and why using a VPN is not necessary.

What about VPN providers that provide Tor nodes?

Do not use that feature. The point of using Tor is that you ==don't have to trust it==, unlike VPNs which require you to trust your provider. Currently Tor only supports the TCP protocol. UDP (used in WebRTC for voice and video sharing, the new HTTP3/QUIC protocol, etc.), ICMP and other packets will be dropped. To compensate for this, VPN providers typically will route all non-TCP packets through their VPN server (your first hop). This is the case with ProtonVPN. Additionally, when using this Tor over VPN setup, you do not have control over other important Tor features such as Isolated Destination Address (using a different Tor circuit for every domain you visit).

The feature should be viewed as a convenient way to access the Tor Network, not to stay anonymous. For proper anonymity, use the Tor Browser, TorSocks, or a Tor gateway.

VPN Ownership

Most VPN services are owned by the same few companies. These shady companies run lots of smaller VPN services to create the illusion that you have more choice than you actually do and to maximize profit. Typically, these providers that feed into their shell company have terrible privacy policies and shouldn't be trusted with your internet traffic. You should be very strict about which provider you decide to use.

You should also be wary that many VPN review sites are merely advertising vehicles open to the highest bidder; a paid review can't possibly be impartial. ==Privacy Guides never accepts payment or affiliate programs for our content.==

Our VPN Recommendations{ .md-button }

Multi-Party Relays

Multi-Party Relays use multiple nodes owned by different parties, such that no individual party knows both who you are and what you're connecting to. This is the idea behind Tor, but now there are some paid services that try to emulate this model.

MPRs seek to solve a problem inherent to VPNs: the fact that you must trust them completely.

MPRs typically have ways of protecting your DNS traffic. Apple's Private Relay uses ODoH, INVISV uses Obvlivious DNS, and Tor lets the exit node do the DNS lookup for you.

Speeds are comparable to non-proxied speeds using these services due to the MASQUE protocol, which is not present on Tor or VPNs.

Decentralized VPNs

Another attempt at solving the issues with centralized VPN services are dVPNs. These are based on blockchain technology and claim to eliminiate trust in a single party by distributing the nodes across lots of different people. However, many times a dVPN will default to a single node, meaning you need to trust that node completely, just like a traditional VPN. Unlike a traditional VPN, this one node that can see all your traffic is a random person instead of your VPN provider that can be audited and has legal responsiblities to uphold their privacy policy. Multi-hop is needed to solve this, but that comes with a stability and performance cost.

Another consideration is legal liability; the exit node will need to deal with legal problems from misuse of the network, an issue that the Tor network has contended with for its entire existence. This disincentivizes regular people from running nodes and makes it more attractive for a malicious actor with lots of resources to host one. This is a big problem is the service is single-node, as the potentially malicious exit node can see who you are and what you're connecting to.

dVPNs are closed networks many times. They might not be able to access the regular web.

Many are used to push a cryptocurrency rather than to make the best service.

They tend to be smaller networks with fewer nodes, making them more vulnerable to sybil attacks.

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