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6
.github/workflows/crowdin-upload.yml
vendored
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2023 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2024 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
|
||||
# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
|
||||
# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
|
||||
@ -36,10 +36,10 @@ jobs:
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Checkout
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@v3
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@v4
|
||||
|
||||
- name: crowdin action
|
||||
uses: crowdin/github-action@v1.11.0
|
||||
uses: crowdin/github-action@v1.16.1
|
||||
with:
|
||||
upload_sources: true
|
||||
upload_sources_args: '--auto-update --delete-obsolete'
|
||||
|
14
.github/workflows/pages.yml
vendored
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2023 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2024 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
|
||||
# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
|
||||
# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
|
||||
@ -40,22 +40,23 @@ jobs:
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: Checkout repository
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@v3
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
fetch-depth: '0'
|
||||
ssh-key: ${{ secrets.ACTIONS_SSH_KEY }}
|
||||
submodules: 'true'
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Pages setup
|
||||
uses: actions/configure-pages@v3
|
||||
uses: actions/configure-pages@v4
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Python setup
|
||||
uses: actions/setup-python@v4
|
||||
uses: actions/setup-python@v5
|
||||
with:
|
||||
python-version: '3.8'
|
||||
cache: 'pipenv'
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Cache files
|
||||
uses: actions/cache@v3.3.1
|
||||
uses: actions/cache@v4.0.0
|
||||
with:
|
||||
key: ${{ github.ref }}
|
||||
path: .cache
|
||||
@ -64,6 +65,7 @@ jobs:
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
pip install pipenv
|
||||
pipenv install
|
||||
sudo apt install pngquant
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Build website
|
||||
env:
|
||||
@ -74,7 +76,7 @@ jobs:
|
||||
pipenv run mkdocs --version
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Package website
|
||||
uses: actions/upload-pages-artifact@v2
|
||||
uses: actions/upload-pages-artifact@v3
|
||||
with:
|
||||
path: site
|
||||
|
||||
|
29
.github/workflows/release.yml
vendored
@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
name: 📦 Releases
|
||||
|
||||
on:
|
||||
on:
|
||||
push:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- '*'
|
||||
@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ jobs:
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: Checkout repository
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@v3
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
fetch-depth: '0'
|
||||
ssh-key: ${{ secrets.ACTIONS_SSH_KEY }}
|
||||
@ -50,22 +50,20 @@ jobs:
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: Checkout repository
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@v3
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
fetch-depth: '0'
|
||||
ssh-key: ${{ secrets.ACTIONS_SSH_KEY }}
|
||||
submodules: 'true'
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Pages setup
|
||||
uses: actions/configure-pages@v3
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Python setup
|
||||
uses: actions/setup-python@v4
|
||||
uses: actions/setup-python@v5
|
||||
with:
|
||||
python-version: '3.8'
|
||||
cache: 'pipenv'
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Cache files
|
||||
uses: actions/cache@v3.3.1
|
||||
uses: actions/cache@v4.0.0
|
||||
with:
|
||||
key: ${{ github.ref }}
|
||||
path: .cache
|
||||
@ -74,11 +72,12 @@ jobs:
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
pip install pipenv
|
||||
pipenv install
|
||||
sudo apt install pngquant
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Build website
|
||||
env:
|
||||
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
|
||||
CARDS: true
|
||||
CARDS: false
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
pipenv run mkdocs build --config-file config/mkdocs-offline.yml
|
||||
pipenv run mkdocs --version
|
||||
@ -89,13 +88,13 @@ jobs:
|
||||
zip -r -q offline.zip site
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Upload tar.gz file
|
||||
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
|
||||
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
name: offline.tar.gz
|
||||
path: offline.tar.gz
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Upload zip file
|
||||
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
|
||||
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
name: offline.zip
|
||||
path: offline.zip
|
||||
@ -109,7 +108,7 @@ jobs:
|
||||
zimwriterfs -w index.html -I assets/brand/PNG/Square/pg-yellow.png -l eng -t "Privacy Guides" -d "Your central privacy and security resource to protect yourself online." -c "Privacy Guides" -p "Jonah Aragon" -n "Privacy Guides" -e "https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org" /data/site /data/privacy_guides.zim
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Upload ZIM file
|
||||
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
|
||||
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
name: privacy_guides.zim
|
||||
path: privacy_guides.zim
|
||||
@ -122,15 +121,15 @@ jobs:
|
||||
contents: write
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v3
|
||||
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
name: offline.tar.gz
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v3
|
||||
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
name: offline.zip
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v3
|
||||
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
name: privacy_guides.zim
|
||||
|
||||
|
1
.gitignore
vendored
@ -20,3 +20,4 @@ site
|
||||
|
||||
# Local Netlify folder
|
||||
.netlify
|
||||
node_modules
|
||||
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2023 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2024 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
|
||||
# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
|
||||
# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
|
||||
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
MIT License
|
||||
|
||||
Copyright (c) 2019 - 2023 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
Copyright (c) 2020 - 2023 Privacy Guides contributors
|
||||
Copyright (c) 2019 - 2024 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
Copyright (c) 2020 - 2024 Privacy Guides contributors
|
||||
|
||||
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
|
||||
of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
|
||||
|
8
Pipfile
@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2023 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2024 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
|
||||
# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
|
||||
# deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the
|
||||
# rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or
|
||||
# sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
|
||||
# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
|
||||
# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
|
||||
# IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
|
||||
# FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NON-INFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
|
||||
|
878
Pipfile.lock
generated
22
README.md
@ -9,17 +9,17 @@
|
||||
|
||||
<p><em>Your central privacy and security resource to protect yourself online.</em></p>
|
||||
|
||||
<p><a href="https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides">
|
||||
<img src="https://img.shields.io/mastodon/follow/109298532634697668?domain=https%3A%2F%2Fmastodon.neat.computer&label=Follow%20%40privacyguides%40neat.computer&style=social">
|
||||
</a>
|
||||
<a href="https://twitter.com/privacy_guides">
|
||||
<img src="https://img.shields.io/twitter/follow/privacy_guides?style=social">
|
||||
</a>
|
||||
<a href="https://discuss.privacyguides.net/">
|
||||
<p><a href="https://discuss.privacyguides.net/">
|
||||
<img src="https://img.shields.io/discourse/users?label=Join%20our%20forum&logo=discourse&server=https%3A%2F%2Fdiscuss.privacyguides.net&style=social">
|
||||
</a>
|
||||
<a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/stargazers">
|
||||
<img src="https://img.shields.io/github/stars/privacyguides?style=social">
|
||||
</a>
|
||||
<a href="https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides">
|
||||
<img src="https://img.shields.io/mastodon/follow/109298532634697668?domain=https%3A%2F%2Fmastodon.neat.computer&label=Follow%20%40privacyguides%40neat.computer&style=social">
|
||||
</a>
|
||||
<a href="https://lemmy.one/c/privacyguides">
|
||||
<img src="https://img.shields.io/lemmy/privacyguides%40lemmy.one?style=social">
|
||||
</a></p>
|
||||
|
||||
<p><a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/pulls">
|
||||
@ -59,20 +59,20 @@ All contributors to the site are listed [here](https://github.com/privacyguides/
|
||||
## Mirrors
|
||||
|
||||
[](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org)
|
||||
[](https://code.privacyguides.dev/privacyguides/privacyguides.org)
|
||||
[](https://gitlab.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org)
|
||||
[](https://codeberg.org/privacyguides/privacyguides.org)
|
||||
[](https://git.sr.ht/~jonaharagon/privacyguides.org)
|
||||
[](https://code.privacyguides.dev/privacyguides/privacyguides.org)
|
||||
[](https://git.jonaharagon.net/privacyguides/privacyguides.org)
|
||||
|
||||
**Hidden service (Tor/onion):** [xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh6wh5jc4up35bqdflu6bkdc5cas5vjqd.onion](http://www.xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh6wh5jc4up35bqdflu6bkdc5cas5vjqd.onion/)
|
||||
|
||||
## License
|
||||
|
||||
Copyright © 2019 - 2023 [Privacy Guides contributors](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors).
|
||||
Copyright © 2019 - 2024 [Privacy Guides contributors](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors).
|
||||
|
||||
Privacy Guides content is licensed under the [Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License](/LICENSE), and the underlying source code used to format and display that content on [www.privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org) is licensed under the [MIT License](/LICENSE-CODE).
|
||||
|
||||
Generally speaking, **content** can be found in the [`/docs`](/docs), [`/theme/assets/img`](/theme/assets/img), [`/includes`](/includes), and [`/i18n`](/i18n) folders; and **source code** and configuration files can be found in the [`/config`](/config) and [`/theme`](/theme) folders, and in the root of this repository. Any source code snippets contained within documentation files are [MIT Licensed](/LICENSE-CODE). Please contact us if you require clarification on any of these terms.
|
||||
Generally speaking, **content** can be found in the [`/docs`](/docs), [`/theme/assets/img`](/theme/assets/img) and [`/includes`](/includes) folders; and **source code** and configuration files can be found in the [`/config`](/config) and [`/theme`](/theme) folders, and in the root of this repository. Any source code snippets contained within documentation files are [MIT Licensed](/LICENSE-CODE). Please contact us if you require clarification on any of these terms.
|
||||
|
||||
These licenses do not apply to any work where another license is otherwise noted.
|
||||
|
||||
|
100
config/layouts/home.yml
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
|
||||
definitions:
|
||||
|
||||
- &background_color >-
|
||||
#FFD06F
|
||||
|
||||
- &color >-
|
||||
#2d2d2d
|
||||
|
||||
- &title_font_family >-
|
||||
Bagnard
|
||||
|
||||
- &font_family >-
|
||||
{%- if config.theme.language == "he" -%}
|
||||
Suez One
|
||||
{%- elif config.theme.language == ("zh-Hant" or "ru") -%}
|
||||
Noto Sans TC
|
||||
{%- else -%}
|
||||
Public Sans
|
||||
{%- endif -%}
|
||||
|
||||
- &page_title >-
|
||||
{{ config.site_name }}
|
||||
|
||||
- &page_title_with_site_name >-
|
||||
{{ page.meta.get("title", page.title) }}
|
||||
|
||||
- &page_description >-
|
||||
{{ config.extra.homepage_description or "A socially motivated website which provides information about protecting your online data privacy and security." }}
|
||||
|
||||
- &og_description >-
|
||||
{{ page.meta.get("description", config.site_description) or "" }}
|
||||
|
||||
- &logo >-
|
||||
{{ config.docs_dir }}/{{ config.theme.logo }}
|
||||
|
||||
# Meta tags
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
|
||||
# Open Graph
|
||||
og:type: website
|
||||
og:title: *page_title_with_site_name
|
||||
og:description: *og_description
|
||||
og:image: "{{ image.url }}"
|
||||
og:image:type: "{{ image.type }}"
|
||||
og:image:width: "{{ image.width }}"
|
||||
og:image:height: "{{ image.height }}"
|
||||
og:url: "{{ page.canonical_url }}"
|
||||
|
||||
# Twitter
|
||||
twitter:card: summary_large_image
|
||||
twitter.title: *page_title_with_site_name
|
||||
twitter:description: *page_description
|
||||
twitter:image: "{{ image.url }}"
|
||||
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Specification
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
# Card size and layers
|
||||
size: { width: 1200, height: 630 }
|
||||
layers:
|
||||
|
||||
# Background
|
||||
- background:
|
||||
color: *background_color
|
||||
|
||||
# Logo
|
||||
- size: { width: 64, height: 64 }
|
||||
offset: { x: 64, y: 64 }
|
||||
background:
|
||||
image: *logo
|
||||
|
||||
# Page title
|
||||
- size: { width: 864, height: 256 }
|
||||
offset: { x: 62, y: 192 }
|
||||
typography:
|
||||
content: *page_title
|
||||
align: start
|
||||
color: *color
|
||||
line:
|
||||
amount: 3
|
||||
height: 1.5
|
||||
font:
|
||||
family: *title_font_family
|
||||
style: Bold
|
||||
|
||||
# Page description
|
||||
- size: { width: 864, height: 192 }
|
||||
offset: { x: 64, y: 320 }
|
||||
typography:
|
||||
content: *page_description
|
||||
overflow: shrink
|
||||
align: start
|
||||
color: *color
|
||||
line:
|
||||
amount: 3
|
||||
height: 1.5
|
||||
font:
|
||||
family: *font_family
|
||||
style: Regular
|
145
config/layouts/page.yml
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
|
||||
definitions:
|
||||
|
||||
- &background_image >-
|
||||
{%- if page.meta.cover -%}
|
||||
theme/assets/img/cover/{{ page.meta.cover }}
|
||||
{%- else -%}
|
||||
{{ layout.background_image or "" }}
|
||||
{%- endif -%}
|
||||
|
||||
- &background_color >-
|
||||
{%- if page.meta.cover -%}
|
||||
#f7f7fcaa
|
||||
{%- else -%}
|
||||
#FFD06F
|
||||
{%- endif -%}
|
||||
|
||||
- &color >-
|
||||
{{ layout.color or "#2d2d2d" }}
|
||||
|
||||
- &title_font_family >-
|
||||
{%- if config.theme.language == "he" -%}
|
||||
Suez One
|
||||
{%- elif config.theme.language == ("zh-Hant" or "ru") -%}
|
||||
Noto Serif TC
|
||||
{%- else -%}
|
||||
Bagnard
|
||||
{%- endif -%}
|
||||
|
||||
- &font_family >-
|
||||
{%- if config.theme.language == "he" -%}
|
||||
Suez One
|
||||
{%- elif config.theme.language == ("zh-Hant" or "ru") -%}
|
||||
Noto Sans TC
|
||||
{%- else -%}
|
||||
Public Sans
|
||||
{%- endif -%}
|
||||
|
||||
- &site_name >-
|
||||
{{ config.site_name }}
|
||||
|
||||
- &page_title >-
|
||||
{{ page.meta.get("title", page.title) }}
|
||||
|
||||
- &page_title_with_site_name >-
|
||||
{%- if page.meta.meta_title -%}
|
||||
{{ page.meta.meta_title }}
|
||||
{%- else -%}
|
||||
{{ page.meta.get("title", page.title) }} - {{ config.site_name }}
|
||||
{%- endif -%}
|
||||
|
||||
- &page_description >-
|
||||
{{ page.meta.get("description", config.site_description) or "" }}
|
||||
|
||||
- &page_icon >-
|
||||
{{ page.meta.icon or "" }}
|
||||
|
||||
- &logo >-
|
||||
{%- if page.meta.cover -%}
|
||||
theme/assets/brand/SVG/Logo/privacy-guides-logo-notext.svg
|
||||
{%- elif config.theme.logo -%}
|
||||
{{ config.docs_dir }}/{{ config.theme.logo }}
|
||||
{%- endif -%}
|
||||
|
||||
# Meta tags
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
|
||||
# Open Graph
|
||||
og:type: website
|
||||
og:title: *page_title_with_site_name
|
||||
og:description: *page_description
|
||||
og:image: "{{ image.url }}"
|
||||
og:image:type: "{{ image.type }}"
|
||||
og:image:width: "{{ image.width }}"
|
||||
og:image:height: "{{ image.height }}"
|
||||
og:url: "{{ page.canonical_url }}"
|
||||
|
||||
# Twitter
|
||||
twitter:card: summary_large_image
|
||||
twitter.title: *page_title_with_site_name
|
||||
twitter:description: *page_description
|
||||
twitter:image: "{{ image.url }}"
|
||||
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Specification
|
||||
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
# Card size and layers
|
||||
size: { width: 1200, height: 630 }
|
||||
layers:
|
||||
|
||||
# Background
|
||||
- background:
|
||||
image: *background_image
|
||||
color: *background_color
|
||||
|
||||
# Page icon
|
||||
- size: { width: 630, height: 630 }
|
||||
offset: { x: 570, y: 0 }
|
||||
icon:
|
||||
value: *page_icon
|
||||
color: "#00000033"
|
||||
|
||||
# Logo
|
||||
- size: { width: 64, height: 64 }
|
||||
offset: { x: 64, y: 64 }
|
||||
background:
|
||||
image: *logo
|
||||
|
||||
# Site name
|
||||
- size: { width: 768, height: 42 }
|
||||
offset: { x: 160, y: 78 }
|
||||
typography:
|
||||
content: *site_name
|
||||
color: *color
|
||||
font:
|
||||
family: Bagnard
|
||||
style: Bold
|
||||
|
||||
# Page title
|
||||
- size: { width: 864, height: 256 }
|
||||
offset: { x: 62, y: 192 }
|
||||
typography:
|
||||
content: *page_title
|
||||
align: start
|
||||
color: *color
|
||||
line:
|
||||
amount: 3
|
||||
height: 1.5
|
||||
font:
|
||||
family: *title_font_family
|
||||
style: Bold
|
||||
|
||||
# Page description
|
||||
- size: { width: 864, height: 96 }
|
||||
offset: { x: 64, y: 480 }
|
||||
typography:
|
||||
content: *page_description
|
||||
align: start
|
||||
color: *color
|
||||
line:
|
||||
amount: 3
|
||||
height: 1.5
|
||||
font:
|
||||
family: *font_family
|
||||
style: Regular
|
@ -10,20 +10,11 @@ definitions:
|
||||
- &background_color >-
|
||||
#f7f7fcaa
|
||||
|
||||
#- &background_color >-
|
||||
# {%- if page.meta.cover -%}
|
||||
# #f7f7fcaa
|
||||
# {%- else -%}
|
||||
# #FFD06F
|
||||
# {%- endif -%}
|
||||
|
||||
- &color >-
|
||||
{{ layout.color or "#2d2d2d" }}
|
||||
|
||||
- &title_font_family >-
|
||||
{%- if page.is_homepage -%}
|
||||
Bagnard
|
||||
{%- elif config.theme.language == "he" -%}
|
||||
{%- if config.theme.language == "he" -%}
|
||||
Suez One
|
||||
{%- elif config.theme.language == ("zh-Hant" or "ru") -%}
|
||||
Noto Serif TC
|
||||
@ -41,40 +32,19 @@ definitions:
|
||||
{%- endif -%}
|
||||
|
||||
- &site_name >-
|
||||
{%- if page.is_homepage -%}
|
||||
{%- else -%}
|
||||
{{ config.site_name }}
|
||||
{%- endif -%}
|
||||
{{ config.site_name }}
|
||||
|
||||
- &page_title >-
|
||||
{%- if page.is_homepage -%}
|
||||
Privacy Guides
|
||||
{%- else -%}
|
||||
{{ page.meta.get("title", page.title) }}
|
||||
{%- endif -%}
|
||||
{{ page.meta.get("title", page.title) }}
|
||||
|
||||
- &page_title_with_site_name >-
|
||||
{%- if page.meta.meta_title -%}
|
||||
{{ page.meta.meta_title }}
|
||||
{%- elif not page.is_homepage -%}
|
||||
{{ page.meta.get("title", page.title) }} - {{ config.site_name }}
|
||||
{%- else -%}
|
||||
{{ page.meta.get("title", page.title) }}
|
||||
{%- endif -%}
|
||||
|
||||
- &page_description >-
|
||||
{%- if page.is_homepage -%}
|
||||
{%- else -%}
|
||||
{{ page.meta.get("description", config.site_description) or "" }}
|
||||
{%- endif -%}
|
||||
|
||||
- &homepage_description >-
|
||||
{%- if page.is_homepage -%}
|
||||
{{ config.extra.homepage_description or "A socially motivated website which provides information about protecting your online data privacy and security." }}
|
||||
{%- else -%}
|
||||
{%- endif -%}
|
||||
|
||||
- &og_description >-
|
||||
{{ page.meta.get("description", config.site_description) or "" }}
|
||||
|
||||
- &page_icon >-
|
||||
@ -83,19 +53,13 @@ definitions:
|
||||
- &logo >-
|
||||
theme/assets/brand/SVG/Logo/privacy-guides-logo-notext.svg
|
||||
|
||||
#{%- if page.meta.cover -%}
|
||||
# theme/assets/brand/SVG/Logo/privacy-guides-logo-notext.svg
|
||||
#{%- elif config.theme.logo -%}
|
||||
# {{ config.docs_dir }}/{{ config.theme.logo }}
|
||||
#{%- endif -%}
|
||||
|
||||
# Meta tags
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
|
||||
# Open Graph
|
||||
og:type: website
|
||||
og:title: *page_title_with_site_name
|
||||
og:description: *og_description
|
||||
og:description: *page_description
|
||||
og:image: "{{ image.url }}"
|
||||
og:image:type: "{{ image.type }}"
|
||||
og:image:width: "{{ image.width }}"
|
||||
@ -171,18 +135,3 @@ layers:
|
||||
font:
|
||||
family: *font_family
|
||||
style: Regular
|
||||
|
||||
# Homepage description
|
||||
- size: { width: 864, height: 192 }
|
||||
offset: { x: 64, y: 320 }
|
||||
typography:
|
||||
content: *homepage_description
|
||||
overflow: shrink
|
||||
align: start
|
||||
color: *color
|
||||
line:
|
||||
amount: 3
|
||||
height: 1.5
|
||||
font:
|
||||
family: *font_family
|
||||
style: Regular
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2023 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2024 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
|
||||
# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
|
||||
# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
|
||||
@ -93,10 +93,9 @@ theme:
|
||||
- search.highlight
|
||||
|
||||
extra_css:
|
||||
- assets/stylesheets/extra.css?v=3.2.0
|
||||
- assets/stylesheets/extra.css?v=3.17.0
|
||||
extra_javascript:
|
||||
- assets/javascripts/mathjax.js
|
||||
- assets/javascripts/feedback.js
|
||||
|
||||
watch:
|
||||
- ../theme
|
||||
@ -120,7 +119,6 @@ plugins:
|
||||
privacy:
|
||||
assets_exclude:
|
||||
- cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/mathjax@3/*
|
||||
- api.privacyguides.net/*
|
||||
optimize:
|
||||
enabled: !ENV [NETLIFY, false]
|
||||
typeset: {}
|
||||
@ -128,7 +126,8 @@ plugins:
|
||||
cards: !ENV [CARDS, true]
|
||||
cards_dir: assets/img/social
|
||||
cards_layout_dir: config/layouts
|
||||
cards_layout: custom
|
||||
cards_layout: page
|
||||
# cards_layout: pride
|
||||
|
||||
markdown_extensions:
|
||||
admonition: {}
|
||||
|
@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ site_description: |
|
||||
copyright: |
|
||||
<b>Privacy Guides</b> is a non-profit, socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy.<br>
|
||||
We do not make money from recommending certain products, and we do not use affiliate links.<br>
|
||||
© 2019 - 2023 Privacy Guides and contributors.
|
||||
© 2019 - 2024 Privacy Guides and contributors.
|
||||
<span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="m245.83 214.87-33.22 17.28c-9.43-19.58-25.24-19.93-27.46-19.93-22.13 0-33.22 14.61-33.22 43.84 0 23.57 9.21 43.84 33.22 43.84 14.47 0 24.65-7.09 30.57-21.26l30.55 15.5c-6.17 11.51-25.69 38.98-65.1 38.98-22.6 0-73.96-10.32-73.96-77.05 0-58.69 43-77.06 72.63-77.06 30.72-.01 52.7 11.95 65.99 35.86zm143.05 0-32.78 17.28c-9.5-19.77-25.72-19.93-27.9-19.93-22.14 0-33.22 14.61-33.22 43.84 0 23.55 9.23 43.84 33.22 43.84 14.45 0 24.65-7.09 30.54-21.26l31 15.5c-2.1 3.75-21.39 38.98-65.09 38.98-22.69 0-73.96-9.87-73.96-77.05 0-58.67 42.97-77.06 72.63-77.06 30.71-.01 52.58 11.95 65.56 35.86zM247.56 8.05C104.74 8.05 0 123.11 0 256.05c0 138.49 113.6 248 247.56 248 129.93 0 248.44-100.87 248.44-248 0-137.87-106.62-248-248.44-248zm.87 450.81c-112.54 0-203.7-93.04-203.7-202.81 0-105.42 85.43-203.27 203.72-203.27 112.53 0 202.82 89.46 202.82 203.26-.01 121.69-99.68 202.82-202.84 202.82z"></path></svg></span><span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="M314.9 194.4v101.4h-28.3v120.5h-77.1V295.9h-28.3V194.4c0-4.4 1.6-8.2 4.6-11.3 3.1-3.1 6.9-4.7 11.3-4.7H299c4.1 0 7.8 1.6 11.1 4.7 3.1 3.2 4.8 6.9 4.8 11.3zm-101.5-63.7c0-23.3 11.5-35 34.5-35s34.5 11.7 34.5 35c0 23-11.5 34.5-34.5 34.5s-34.5-11.5-34.5-34.5zM247.6 8C389.4 8 496 118.1 496 256c0 147.1-118.5 248-248.4 248C113.6 504 0 394.5 0 256 0 123.1 104.7 8 247.6 8zm.8 44.7C130.2 52.7 44.7 150.6 44.7 256c0 109.8 91.2 202.8 203.7 202.8 103.2 0 202.8-81.1 202.8-202.8.1-113.8-90.2-203.3-202.8-203.3z"></path></svg></span><span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="M247.6 8C389.4 8 496 118.1 496 256c0 147.1-118.5 248-248.4 248C113.6 504 0 394.5 0 256 0 123.1 104.7 8 247.6 8zm.8 44.7C130.2 52.7 44.7 150.6 44.7 256c0 109.8 91.2 202.8 203.7 202.8 103.2 0 202.8-81.1 202.8-202.8.1-113.8-90.2-203.3-202.8-203.3zm94 144.3v42.5H162.1V197h180.3zm0 79.8v42.5H162.1v-42.5h180.3z"></path></svg></span>
|
||||
Content licensed under <a href="https://www.privacyguides.org/license"><strong>CC BY-ND 4.0</strong></a>.
|
||||
repo_url: ""
|
||||
@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ nav:
|
||||
- 'dns.md'
|
||||
- 'email.md'
|
||||
- 'financial-services.md'
|
||||
- 'photo-management.md'
|
||||
- 'search-engines.md'
|
||||
- 'vpn.md'
|
||||
- Software:
|
||||
@ -154,6 +155,7 @@ nav:
|
||||
- Contributing:
|
||||
- Writing Guide:
|
||||
- 'meta/writing-style.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/admonitions.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/brand.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/translations.md'
|
||||
- Technical Guides:
|
||||
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2023 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2024 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
|
||||
# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
|
||||
# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
|
||||
@ -29,27 +29,13 @@ site_description: |
|
||||
copyright: |
|
||||
<b>Privacy Guides</b> is a non-profit, socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy.<br>
|
||||
We do not make money from recommending certain products, and we do not use affiliate links.<br>
|
||||
© 2019 - 2023 Privacy Guides and contributors.
|
||||
© 2019 - 2024 Privacy Guides and contributors.
|
||||
<span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="m245.83 214.87-33.22 17.28c-9.43-19.58-25.24-19.93-27.46-19.93-22.13 0-33.22 14.61-33.22 43.84 0 23.57 9.21 43.84 33.22 43.84 14.47 0 24.65-7.09 30.57-21.26l30.55 15.5c-6.17 11.51-25.69 38.98-65.1 38.98-22.6 0-73.96-10.32-73.96-77.05 0-58.69 43-77.06 72.63-77.06 30.72-.01 52.7 11.95 65.99 35.86zm143.05 0-32.78 17.28c-9.5-19.77-25.72-19.93-27.9-19.93-22.14 0-33.22 14.61-33.22 43.84 0 23.55 9.23 43.84 33.22 43.84 14.45 0 24.65-7.09 30.54-21.26l31 15.5c-2.1 3.75-21.39 38.98-65.09 38.98-22.69 0-73.96-9.87-73.96-77.05 0-58.67 42.97-77.06 72.63-77.06 30.71-.01 52.58 11.95 65.56 35.86zM247.56 8.05C104.74 8.05 0 123.11 0 256.05c0 138.49 113.6 248 247.56 248 129.93 0 248.44-100.87 248.44-248 0-137.87-106.62-248-248.44-248zm.87 450.81c-112.54 0-203.7-93.04-203.7-202.81 0-105.42 85.43-203.27 203.72-203.27 112.53 0 202.82 89.46 202.82 203.26-.01 121.69-99.68 202.82-202.84 202.82z"></path></svg></span><span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="M314.9 194.4v101.4h-28.3v120.5h-77.1V295.9h-28.3V194.4c0-4.4 1.6-8.2 4.6-11.3 3.1-3.1 6.9-4.7 11.3-4.7H299c4.1 0 7.8 1.6 11.1 4.7 3.1 3.2 4.8 6.9 4.8 11.3zm-101.5-63.7c0-23.3 11.5-35 34.5-35s34.5 11.7 34.5 35c0 23-11.5 34.5-34.5 34.5s-34.5-11.5-34.5-34.5zM247.6 8C389.4 8 496 118.1 496 256c0 147.1-118.5 248-248.4 248C113.6 504 0 394.5 0 256 0 123.1 104.7 8 247.6 8zm.8 44.7C130.2 52.7 44.7 150.6 44.7 256c0 109.8 91.2 202.8 203.7 202.8 103.2 0 202.8-81.1 202.8-202.8.1-113.8-90.2-203.3-202.8-203.3z"></path></svg></span><span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="M247.6 8C389.4 8 496 118.1 496 256c0 147.1-118.5 248-248.4 248C113.6 504 0 394.5 0 256 0 123.1 104.7 8 247.6 8zm.8 44.7C130.2 52.7 44.7 150.6 44.7 256c0 109.8 91.2 202.8 203.7 202.8 103.2 0 202.8-81.1 202.8-202.8.1-113.8-90.2-203.3-202.8-203.3zm94 144.3v42.5H162.1V197h180.3zm0 79.8v42.5H162.1v-42.5h180.3z"></path></svg></span>
|
||||
Content licensed under <a href="/license"><strong>CC BY-ND 4.0</strong></a>.
|
||||
edit_uri: edit/main/docs/
|
||||
|
||||
extra:
|
||||
generator: false
|
||||
analytics:
|
||||
provider: plausible
|
||||
property: privacyguides.org
|
||||
feedback:
|
||||
title: "Was this page helpful?"
|
||||
ratings:
|
||||
- icon: material/robot-happy-outline
|
||||
name: "This page was helpful"
|
||||
data: Helpful
|
||||
note: "Thanks for your feedback!"
|
||||
- icon: material/robot-confused
|
||||
name: "This page could be improved"
|
||||
data: Needs Improvement
|
||||
note: "Thanks for your feedback! Help us improve this page by opening a <a href='https://discuss.privacyguides.net/'>discussion on our forum</a>."
|
||||
|
||||
theme:
|
||||
language: en
|
||||
@ -104,6 +90,7 @@ nav:
|
||||
- 'advanced/communication-network-types.md'
|
||||
- Operating Systems:
|
||||
- 'os/android-overview.md'
|
||||
- 'os/ios-overview.md'
|
||||
- 'os/linux-overview.md'
|
||||
- 'os/macos-overview.md'
|
||||
- 'os/qubes-overview.md'
|
||||
@ -119,6 +106,7 @@ nav:
|
||||
- 'dns.md'
|
||||
- 'email.md'
|
||||
- 'financial-services.md'
|
||||
- 'photo-management.md'
|
||||
- 'search-engines.md'
|
||||
- 'vpn.md'
|
||||
- Software:
|
||||
@ -139,10 +127,11 @@ nav:
|
||||
- 'android.md'
|
||||
- 'desktop.md'
|
||||
- 'router.md'
|
||||
- Advanced:
|
||||
- 'device-integrity.md'
|
||||
- About:
|
||||
- 'about/index.md'
|
||||
- 'about/criteria.md'
|
||||
- 'about/statistics.md'
|
||||
- 'about/notices.md'
|
||||
- 'about/privacy-policy.md'
|
||||
- Community:
|
||||
@ -153,6 +142,7 @@ nav:
|
||||
- Contributing:
|
||||
- Writing Guide:
|
||||
- 'meta/writing-style.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/admonitions.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/brand.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/translations.md'
|
||||
- Technical Guides:
|
||||
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2023 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2024 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
|
||||
# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
|
||||
# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
|
||||
@ -29,27 +29,13 @@ site_description: |
|
||||
copyright: |
|
||||
<b>Privacy Guides</b> es un sitio web sin fines lucrativos y de motivación social que ofrece información para proteger la seguridad y privacidad de sus datos.<br>
|
||||
No ganamos dinero por recomendar determinados productos y no utilizamos enlaces de afiliados.<br>
|
||||
© 2019 - 2023 Privacy Guides y colaboradores.
|
||||
© 2019 - 2024 Privacy Guides y colaboradores.
|
||||
<span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="m245.83 214.87-33.22 17.28c-9.43-19.58-25.24-19.93-27.46-19.93-22.13 0-33.22 14.61-33.22 43.84 0 23.57 9.21 43.84 33.22 43.84 14.47 0 24.65-7.09 30.57-21.26l30.55 15.5c-6.17 11.51-25.69 38.98-65.1 38.98-22.6 0-73.96-10.32-73.96-77.05 0-58.69 43-77.06 72.63-77.06 30.72-.01 52.7 11.95 65.99 35.86zm143.05 0-32.78 17.28c-9.5-19.77-25.72-19.93-27.9-19.93-22.14 0-33.22 14.61-33.22 43.84 0 23.55 9.23 43.84 33.22 43.84 14.45 0 24.65-7.09 30.54-21.26l31 15.5c-2.1 3.75-21.39 38.98-65.09 38.98-22.69 0-73.96-9.87-73.96-77.05 0-58.67 42.97-77.06 72.63-77.06 30.71-.01 52.58 11.95 65.56 35.86zM247.56 8.05C104.74 8.05 0 123.11 0 256.05c0 138.49 113.6 248 247.56 248 129.93 0 248.44-100.87 248.44-248 0-137.87-106.62-248-248.44-248zm.87 450.81c-112.54 0-203.7-93.04-203.7-202.81 0-105.42 85.43-203.27 203.72-203.27 112.53 0 202.82 89.46 202.82 203.26-.01 121.69-99.68 202.82-202.84 202.82z"></path></svg></span><span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="M314.9 194.4v101.4h-28.3v120.5h-77.1V295.9h-28.3V194.4c0-4.4 1.6-8.2 4.6-11.3 3.1-3.1 6.9-4.7 11.3-4.7H299c4.1 0 7.8 1.6 11.1 4.7 3.1 3.2 4.8 6.9 4.8 11.3zm-101.5-63.7c0-23.3 11.5-35 34.5-35s34.5 11.7 34.5 35c0 23-11.5 34.5-34.5 34.5s-34.5-11.5-34.5-34.5zM247.6 8C389.4 8 496 118.1 496 256c0 147.1-118.5 248-248.4 248C113.6 504 0 394.5 0 256 0 123.1 104.7 8 247.6 8zm.8 44.7C130.2 52.7 44.7 150.6 44.7 256c0 109.8 91.2 202.8 203.7 202.8 103.2 0 202.8-81.1 202.8-202.8.1-113.8-90.2-203.3-202.8-203.3z"></path></svg></span><span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="M247.6 8C389.4 8 496 118.1 496 256c0 147.1-118.5 248-248.4 248C113.6 504 0 394.5 0 256 0 123.1 104.7 8 247.6 8zm.8 44.7C130.2 52.7 44.7 150.6 44.7 256c0 109.8 91.2 202.8 203.7 202.8 103.2 0 202.8-81.1 202.8-202.8.1-113.8-90.2-203.3-202.8-203.3zm94 144.3v42.5H162.1V197h180.3zm0 79.8v42.5H162.1v-42.5h180.3z"></path></svg></span>
|
||||
Contenido bajo licencia <a href="/license"><strong>CC BY-ND 4.0</strong></a>.
|
||||
edit_uri: edit/main/i18n/es/
|
||||
|
||||
extra:
|
||||
generator: false
|
||||
analytics:
|
||||
provider: plausible
|
||||
property: privacyguides.org
|
||||
feedback:
|
||||
title: "¿Le ha resultado útil esta página?"
|
||||
ratings:
|
||||
- icon: material/robot-happy-outline
|
||||
name: "Esta página fue útil"
|
||||
data: Helpful
|
||||
note: "Gracias por sus comentarios!"
|
||||
- icon: material/robot-confused
|
||||
name: "Esta página se podría mejorar"
|
||||
data: Needs Improvement
|
||||
note: "Gracias por sus comentarios. Ayúdenos a mejorar esta página abriendo un <a href='https://discuss.privacyguides.net/'>debate en nuestro foro</a>."
|
||||
|
||||
theme:
|
||||
language: es
|
||||
@ -102,6 +88,7 @@ nav:
|
||||
- 'advanced/communication-network-types.md'
|
||||
- Sistemas operativos:
|
||||
- 'os/android-overview.md'
|
||||
- 'os/ios-overview.md'
|
||||
- 'os/linux-overview.md'
|
||||
- 'os/macos-overview.md'
|
||||
- 'os/qubes-overview.md'
|
||||
@ -117,6 +104,7 @@ nav:
|
||||
- 'dns.md'
|
||||
- 'email.md'
|
||||
- 'financial-services.md'
|
||||
- 'photo-management.md'
|
||||
- 'search-engines.md'
|
||||
- 'vpn.md'
|
||||
- Software:
|
||||
@ -137,10 +125,11 @@ nav:
|
||||
- 'android.md'
|
||||
- 'desktop.md'
|
||||
- 'router.md'
|
||||
- Advanced:
|
||||
- 'device-integrity.md'
|
||||
- Acerca de:
|
||||
- 'about/index.md'
|
||||
- 'about/criteria.md'
|
||||
- 'about/statistics.md'
|
||||
- 'about/notices.md'
|
||||
- 'about/privacy-policy.md'
|
||||
- Comunidad:
|
||||
@ -151,6 +140,7 @@ nav:
|
||||
- Contribuir:
|
||||
- "Guía de redacción":
|
||||
- 'meta/writing-style.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/admonitions.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/brand.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/translations.md'
|
||||
- "Guías técnicas":
|
||||
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2023 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2024 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
|
||||
# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
|
||||
# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
|
||||
@ -29,27 +29,13 @@ site_description: |
|
||||
copyright: |
|
||||
<b>Privacy Guides</b> est un site web à but non lucratif et à vocation sociale qui fournit des informations pour protéger la sécurité de vos données et votre vie privée.<br>
|
||||
Nous ne gagnons pas d'argent en recommandant certains produits et nous n'utilisons pas de liens d'affiliation.<br>
|
||||
© 2019 - 2023 Privacy Guides et contributeurs.
|
||||
© 2019 - 2024 Privacy Guides et contributeurs.
|
||||
<span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="m245.83 214.87-33.22 17.28c-9.43-19.58-25.24-19.93-27.46-19.93-22.13 0-33.22 14.61-33.22 43.84 0 23.57 9.21 43.84 33.22 43.84 14.47 0 24.65-7.09 30.57-21.26l30.55 15.5c-6.17 11.51-25.69 38.98-65.1 38.98-22.6 0-73.96-10.32-73.96-77.05 0-58.69 43-77.06 72.63-77.06 30.72-.01 52.7 11.95 65.99 35.86zm143.05 0-32.78 17.28c-9.5-19.77-25.72-19.93-27.9-19.93-22.14 0-33.22 14.61-33.22 43.84 0 23.55 9.23 43.84 33.22 43.84 14.45 0 24.65-7.09 30.54-21.26l31 15.5c-2.1 3.75-21.39 38.98-65.09 38.98-22.69 0-73.96-9.87-73.96-77.05 0-58.67 42.97-77.06 72.63-77.06 30.71-.01 52.58 11.95 65.56 35.86zM247.56 8.05C104.74 8.05 0 123.11 0 256.05c0 138.49 113.6 248 247.56 248 129.93 0 248.44-100.87 248.44-248 0-137.87-106.62-248-248.44-248zm.87 450.81c-112.54 0-203.7-93.04-203.7-202.81 0-105.42 85.43-203.27 203.72-203.27 112.53 0 202.82 89.46 202.82 203.26-.01 121.69-99.68 202.82-202.84 202.82z"></path></svg></span><span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="M314.9 194.4v101.4h-28.3v120.5h-77.1V295.9h-28.3V194.4c0-4.4 1.6-8.2 4.6-11.3 3.1-3.1 6.9-4.7 11.3-4.7H299c4.1 0 7.8 1.6 11.1 4.7 3.1 3.2 4.8 6.9 4.8 11.3zm-101.5-63.7c0-23.3 11.5-35 34.5-35s34.5 11.7 34.5 35c0 23-11.5 34.5-34.5 34.5s-34.5-11.5-34.5-34.5zM247.6 8C389.4 8 496 118.1 496 256c0 147.1-118.5 248-248.4 248C113.6 504 0 394.5 0 256 0 123.1 104.7 8 247.6 8zm.8 44.7C130.2 52.7 44.7 150.6 44.7 256c0 109.8 91.2 202.8 203.7 202.8 103.2 0 202.8-81.1 202.8-202.8.1-113.8-90.2-203.3-202.8-203.3z"></path></svg></span><span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="M247.6 8C389.4 8 496 118.1 496 256c0 147.1-118.5 248-248.4 248C113.6 504 0 394.5 0 256 0 123.1 104.7 8 247.6 8zm.8 44.7C130.2 52.7 44.7 150.6 44.7 256c0 109.8 91.2 202.8 203.7 202.8 103.2 0 202.8-81.1 202.8-202.8.1-113.8-90.2-203.3-202.8-203.3zm94 144.3v42.5H162.1V197h180.3zm0 79.8v42.5H162.1v-42.5h180.3z"></path></svg></span>
|
||||
Contenu sous licence <a href="/license"><strong>CC BY-ND 4.0</strong></a>.
|
||||
edit_uri: edit/main/i18n/fr/
|
||||
|
||||
extra:
|
||||
generator: false
|
||||
analytics:
|
||||
provider: plausible
|
||||
property: privacyguides.org
|
||||
feedback:
|
||||
title: "Cette page vous a été utile ?"
|
||||
ratings:
|
||||
- icon: material/robot-happy-outline
|
||||
name: "Cette page a été utile"
|
||||
data: Helpful
|
||||
note: "Merci pour votre retour !"
|
||||
- icon: material/robot-confused
|
||||
name: "Cette page pourrait être améliorée"
|
||||
data: Needs Improvement
|
||||
note: "Merci pour vos commentaires ! Aidez-nous à améliorer cette page en ouvrant une <a href='https://discuss.privacyguides.net/'>discussion sur notre forum</a>."
|
||||
|
||||
theme:
|
||||
language: fr
|
||||
@ -102,6 +88,7 @@ nav:
|
||||
- 'advanced/communication-network-types.md'
|
||||
- "Systèmes d'exploitation":
|
||||
- 'os/android-overview.md'
|
||||
- 'os/ios-overview.md'
|
||||
- 'os/linux-overview.md'
|
||||
- 'os/macos-overview.md'
|
||||
- 'os/qubes-overview.md'
|
||||
@ -117,6 +104,7 @@ nav:
|
||||
- 'dns.md'
|
||||
- 'email.md'
|
||||
- 'financial-services.md'
|
||||
- 'photo-management.md'
|
||||
- 'search-engines.md'
|
||||
- 'vpn.md'
|
||||
- "Logiciels":
|
||||
@ -137,10 +125,11 @@ nav:
|
||||
- 'android.md'
|
||||
- 'desktop.md'
|
||||
- 'router.md'
|
||||
- "Advanced":
|
||||
- 'device-integrity.md'
|
||||
- "À propos":
|
||||
- 'about/index.md'
|
||||
- 'about/criteria.md'
|
||||
- 'about/statistics.md'
|
||||
- 'about/notices.md'
|
||||
- 'about/privacy-policy.md'
|
||||
- "Communauté":
|
||||
@ -151,6 +140,7 @@ nav:
|
||||
- "Contribuer":
|
||||
- "Guide de rédaction":
|
||||
- 'meta/writing-style.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/admonitions.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/brand.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/translations.md'
|
||||
- "Guides techniques":
|
||||
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2023 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2024 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
|
||||
# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
|
||||
# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
|
||||
@ -29,27 +29,13 @@ site_description: |
|
||||
copyright: |
|
||||
<b>Privacy Guides</b> is a non-profit, socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy.<br>
|
||||
We do not make money from recommending certain products, and we do not use affiliate links.<br>
|
||||
© 2019 - 2023 Privacy Guides and contributors.
|
||||
© 2019 - 2024 Privacy Guides and contributors.
|
||||
<span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="m245.83 214.87-33.22 17.28c-9.43-19.58-25.24-19.93-27.46-19.93-22.13 0-33.22 14.61-33.22 43.84 0 23.57 9.21 43.84 33.22 43.84 14.47 0 24.65-7.09 30.57-21.26l30.55 15.5c-6.17 11.51-25.69 38.98-65.1 38.98-22.6 0-73.96-10.32-73.96-77.05 0-58.69 43-77.06 72.63-77.06 30.72-.01 52.7 11.95 65.99 35.86zm143.05 0-32.78 17.28c-9.5-19.77-25.72-19.93-27.9-19.93-22.14 0-33.22 14.61-33.22 43.84 0 23.55 9.23 43.84 33.22 43.84 14.45 0 24.65-7.09 30.54-21.26l31 15.5c-2.1 3.75-21.39 38.98-65.09 38.98-22.69 0-73.96-9.87-73.96-77.05 0-58.67 42.97-77.06 72.63-77.06 30.71-.01 52.58 11.95 65.56 35.86zM247.56 8.05C104.74 8.05 0 123.11 0 256.05c0 138.49 113.6 248 247.56 248 129.93 0 248.44-100.87 248.44-248 0-137.87-106.62-248-248.44-248zm.87 450.81c-112.54 0-203.7-93.04-203.7-202.81 0-105.42 85.43-203.27 203.72-203.27 112.53 0 202.82 89.46 202.82 203.26-.01 121.69-99.68 202.82-202.84 202.82z"></path></svg></span><span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="M314.9 194.4v101.4h-28.3v120.5h-77.1V295.9h-28.3V194.4c0-4.4 1.6-8.2 4.6-11.3 3.1-3.1 6.9-4.7 11.3-4.7H299c4.1 0 7.8 1.6 11.1 4.7 3.1 3.2 4.8 6.9 4.8 11.3zm-101.5-63.7c0-23.3 11.5-35 34.5-35s34.5 11.7 34.5 35c0 23-11.5 34.5-34.5 34.5s-34.5-11.5-34.5-34.5zM247.6 8C389.4 8 496 118.1 496 256c0 147.1-118.5 248-248.4 248C113.6 504 0 394.5 0 256 0 123.1 104.7 8 247.6 8zm.8 44.7C130.2 52.7 44.7 150.6 44.7 256c0 109.8 91.2 202.8 203.7 202.8 103.2 0 202.8-81.1 202.8-202.8.1-113.8-90.2-203.3-202.8-203.3z"></path></svg></span><span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="M247.6 8C389.4 8 496 118.1 496 256c0 147.1-118.5 248-248.4 248C113.6 504 0 394.5 0 256 0 123.1 104.7 8 247.6 8zm.8 44.7C130.2 52.7 44.7 150.6 44.7 256c0 109.8 91.2 202.8 203.7 202.8 103.2 0 202.8-81.1 202.8-202.8.1-113.8-90.2-203.3-202.8-203.3zm94 144.3v42.5H162.1V197h180.3zm0 79.8v42.5H162.1v-42.5h180.3z"></path></svg></span>
|
||||
Content licensed under <a href="/license"><strong>CC BY-ND 4.0</strong></a>.
|
||||
edit_uri: edit/main/i18n/he/
|
||||
|
||||
extra:
|
||||
generator: false
|
||||
analytics:
|
||||
provider: plausible
|
||||
property: privacyguides.org
|
||||
feedback:
|
||||
title: "האם הדף הזה עזר לך?"
|
||||
ratings:
|
||||
- icon: material/robot-happy-outline
|
||||
name: "הדף הזה היה מועיל"
|
||||
data: Helpful
|
||||
note: "תודה על המשוב שלך!"
|
||||
- icon: material/robot-confused
|
||||
name: "דף זה יכול להשתפר"
|
||||
data: Needs Improvement
|
||||
note: "תודה על המשוב שלך! Help us improve this page by opening a <a href='https://discuss.privacyguides.net/'>discussion on our forum</a>."
|
||||
|
||||
extra_css:
|
||||
- assets/stylesheets/extra.css?v=3.2.0
|
||||
@ -106,6 +92,7 @@ nav:
|
||||
- 'advanced/communication-network-types.md'
|
||||
- "מערכות הפעלה":
|
||||
- 'os/android-overview.md'
|
||||
- 'os/ios-overview.md'
|
||||
- 'os/linux-overview.md'
|
||||
- 'os/macos-overview.md'
|
||||
- 'os/qubes-overview.md'
|
||||
@ -121,6 +108,7 @@ nav:
|
||||
- 'dns.md'
|
||||
- 'email.md'
|
||||
- 'financial-services.md'
|
||||
- 'photo-management.md'
|
||||
- 'search-engines.md'
|
||||
- 'vpn.md'
|
||||
- "תוכנה":
|
||||
@ -141,10 +129,11 @@ nav:
|
||||
- 'android.md'
|
||||
- 'desktop.md'
|
||||
- 'router.md'
|
||||
- "Advanced":
|
||||
- 'device-integrity.md'
|
||||
- "על אודות":
|
||||
- 'about/index.md'
|
||||
- 'about/criteria.md'
|
||||
- 'about/statistics.md'
|
||||
- 'about/notices.md'
|
||||
- 'about/privacy-policy.md'
|
||||
- Community:
|
||||
@ -155,6 +144,7 @@ nav:
|
||||
- Contributing:
|
||||
- Writing Guide:
|
||||
- 'meta/writing-style.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/admonitions.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/brand.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/translations.md'
|
||||
- Technical Guides:
|
||||
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2023 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2024 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
|
||||
# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
|
||||
# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
|
||||
@ -29,27 +29,13 @@ site_description: |
|
||||
copyright: |
|
||||
<b>Privacy Guides</b> è un sito web senza fini di lucro e a sfondo sociale che fornisce informazioni per proteggere la sicurezza e la privacy dei dati.<br>
|
||||
Non guadagniamo denaro consigliando determinati prodotti e non utilizziamo link di affiliazione.<br>
|
||||
© 2019 - 2023 Privacy Guides e collaboratori.
|
||||
© 2019 - 2024 Privacy Guides e collaboratori.
|
||||
<span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="m245.83 214.87-33.22 17.28c-9.43-19.58-25.24-19.93-27.46-19.93-22.13 0-33.22 14.61-33.22 43.84 0 23.57 9.21 43.84 33.22 43.84 14.47 0 24.65-7.09 30.57-21.26l30.55 15.5c-6.17 11.51-25.69 38.98-65.1 38.98-22.6 0-73.96-10.32-73.96-77.05 0-58.69 43-77.06 72.63-77.06 30.72-.01 52.7 11.95 65.99 35.86zm143.05 0-32.78 17.28c-9.5-19.77-25.72-19.93-27.9-19.93-22.14 0-33.22 14.61-33.22 43.84 0 23.55 9.23 43.84 33.22 43.84 14.45 0 24.65-7.09 30.54-21.26l31 15.5c-2.1 3.75-21.39 38.98-65.09 38.98-22.69 0-73.96-9.87-73.96-77.05 0-58.67 42.97-77.06 72.63-77.06 30.71-.01 52.58 11.95 65.56 35.86zM247.56 8.05C104.74 8.05 0 123.11 0 256.05c0 138.49 113.6 248 247.56 248 129.93 0 248.44-100.87 248.44-248 0-137.87-106.62-248-248.44-248zm.87 450.81c-112.54 0-203.7-93.04-203.7-202.81 0-105.42 85.43-203.27 203.72-203.27 112.53 0 202.82 89.46 202.82 203.26-.01 121.69-99.68 202.82-202.84 202.82z"></path></svg></span><span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="M314.9 194.4v101.4h-28.3v120.5h-77.1V295.9h-28.3V194.4c0-4.4 1.6-8.2 4.6-11.3 3.1-3.1 6.9-4.7 11.3-4.7H299c4.1 0 7.8 1.6 11.1 4.7 3.1 3.2 4.8 6.9 4.8 11.3zm-101.5-63.7c0-23.3 11.5-35 34.5-35s34.5 11.7 34.5 35c0 23-11.5 34.5-34.5 34.5s-34.5-11.5-34.5-34.5zM247.6 8C389.4 8 496 118.1 496 256c0 147.1-118.5 248-248.4 248C113.6 504 0 394.5 0 256 0 123.1 104.7 8 247.6 8zm.8 44.7C130.2 52.7 44.7 150.6 44.7 256c0 109.8 91.2 202.8 203.7 202.8 103.2 0 202.8-81.1 202.8-202.8.1-113.8-90.2-203.3-202.8-203.3z"></path></svg></span><span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="M247.6 8C389.4 8 496 118.1 496 256c0 147.1-118.5 248-248.4 248C113.6 504 0 394.5 0 256 0 123.1 104.7 8 247.6 8zm.8 44.7C130.2 52.7 44.7 150.6 44.7 256c0 109.8 91.2 202.8 203.7 202.8 103.2 0 202.8-81.1 202.8-202.8.1-113.8-90.2-203.3-202.8-203.3zm94 144.3v42.5H162.1V197h180.3zm0 79.8v42.5H162.1v-42.5h180.3z"></path></svg></span>
|
||||
Contenuto sotto licenza <a href="/license"><strong>CC BY-ND 4.0</strong></a>.
|
||||
edit_uri: edit/main/i18n/it/
|
||||
|
||||
extra:
|
||||
generator: false
|
||||
analytics:
|
||||
provider: plausible
|
||||
property: privacyguides.org
|
||||
feedback:
|
||||
title: "Questa pagina è stata utile?"
|
||||
ratings:
|
||||
- icon: material/robot-happy-outline
|
||||
name: "Questa pagina è stata utile"
|
||||
data: Helpful
|
||||
note: "Grazie per il tuo feedback!"
|
||||
- icon: material/robot-confused
|
||||
name: "Questa pagina può essere migliorata"
|
||||
data: Needs Improvement
|
||||
note: "Grazie per il tuo feedback! Aiutaci a migliorare questa pagina aprendo una discussione sul <a href='https://discuss.privacyguides.net/'>nostro forum</a>."
|
||||
|
||||
theme:
|
||||
language: it
|
||||
@ -102,6 +88,7 @@ nav:
|
||||
- 'advanced/communication-network-types.md'
|
||||
- Sistemi operativi:
|
||||
- 'os/android-overview.md'
|
||||
- 'os/ios-overview.md'
|
||||
- 'os/linux-overview.md'
|
||||
- 'os/macos-overview.md'
|
||||
- 'os/qubes-overview.md'
|
||||
@ -117,6 +104,7 @@ nav:
|
||||
- 'dns.md'
|
||||
- 'email.md'
|
||||
- 'financial-services.md'
|
||||
- 'photo-management.md'
|
||||
- 'search-engines.md'
|
||||
- 'vpn.md'
|
||||
- Software:
|
||||
@ -137,10 +125,11 @@ nav:
|
||||
- 'android.md'
|
||||
- 'desktop.md'
|
||||
- 'router.md'
|
||||
- "Advanced":
|
||||
- 'device-integrity.md'
|
||||
- Informazioni:
|
||||
- 'about/index.md'
|
||||
- 'about/criteria.md'
|
||||
- 'about/statistics.md'
|
||||
- 'about/notices.md'
|
||||
- 'about/privacy-policy.md'
|
||||
- Comunità:
|
||||
@ -151,6 +140,7 @@ nav:
|
||||
- Contribuisci:
|
||||
- Guida alla scrittura:
|
||||
- 'meta/writing-style.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/admonitions.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/brand.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/translations.md'
|
||||
- Guide tecniche:
|
||||
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2023 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2024 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
|
||||
# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
|
||||
# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
|
||||
@ -29,27 +29,13 @@ site_description: |
|
||||
copyright: |
|
||||
<b>Privacy Guides</b> is een non-profit, sociaal gemotiveerde website die informatie biedt voor de bescherming van jouw gegevensbeveiliging en privacy.<br>
|
||||
Wij verdienen geen geld met het aanbevelen van bepaalde producten, en wij maken geen gebruik van affiliate links.<br>
|
||||
© 2019 - 2023 Privacy Guides en medewerkers.
|
||||
© 2019 - 2024 Privacy Guides en medewerkers.
|
||||
<span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="m245.83 214.87-33.22 17.28c-9.43-19.58-25.24-19.93-27.46-19.93-22.13 0-33.22 14.61-33.22 43.84 0 23.57 9.21 43.84 33.22 43.84 14.47 0 24.65-7.09 30.57-21.26l30.55 15.5c-6.17 11.51-25.69 38.98-65.1 38.98-22.6 0-73.96-10.32-73.96-77.05 0-58.69 43-77.06 72.63-77.06 30.72-.01 52.7 11.95 65.99 35.86zm143.05 0-32.78 17.28c-9.5-19.77-25.72-19.93-27.9-19.93-22.14 0-33.22 14.61-33.22 43.84 0 23.55 9.23 43.84 33.22 43.84 14.45 0 24.65-7.09 30.54-21.26l31 15.5c-2.1 3.75-21.39 38.98-65.09 38.98-22.69 0-73.96-9.87-73.96-77.05 0-58.67 42.97-77.06 72.63-77.06 30.71-.01 52.58 11.95 65.56 35.86zM247.56 8.05C104.74 8.05 0 123.11 0 256.05c0 138.49 113.6 248 247.56 248 129.93 0 248.44-100.87 248.44-248 0-137.87-106.62-248-248.44-248zm.87 450.81c-112.54 0-203.7-93.04-203.7-202.81 0-105.42 85.43-203.27 203.72-203.27 112.53 0 202.82 89.46 202.82 203.26-.01 121.69-99.68 202.82-202.84 202.82z"></path></svg></span><span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="M314.9 194.4v101.4h-28.3v120.5h-77.1V295.9h-28.3V194.4c0-4.4 1.6-8.2 4.6-11.3 3.1-3.1 6.9-4.7 11.3-4.7H299c4.1 0 7.8 1.6 11.1 4.7 3.1 3.2 4.8 6.9 4.8 11.3zm-101.5-63.7c0-23.3 11.5-35 34.5-35s34.5 11.7 34.5 35c0 23-11.5 34.5-34.5 34.5s-34.5-11.5-34.5-34.5zM247.6 8C389.4 8 496 118.1 496 256c0 147.1-118.5 248-248.4 248C113.6 504 0 394.5 0 256 0 123.1 104.7 8 247.6 8zm.8 44.7C130.2 52.7 44.7 150.6 44.7 256c0 109.8 91.2 202.8 203.7 202.8 103.2 0 202.8-81.1 202.8-202.8.1-113.8-90.2-203.3-202.8-203.3z"></path></svg></span><span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="M247.6 8C389.4 8 496 118.1 496 256c0 147.1-118.5 248-248.4 248C113.6 504 0 394.5 0 256 0 123.1 104.7 8 247.6 8zm.8 44.7C130.2 52.7 44.7 150.6 44.7 256c0 109.8 91.2 202.8 203.7 202.8 103.2 0 202.8-81.1 202.8-202.8.1-113.8-90.2-203.3-202.8-203.3zm94 144.3v42.5H162.1V197h180.3zm0 79.8v42.5H162.1v-42.5h180.3z"></path></svg></span>
|
||||
Inhoud gelicentieerd onder <a href="/license"><strong>CC BY-ND 4.0</strong></a>.
|
||||
edit_uri: edit/main/i18n/nl/
|
||||
|
||||
extra:
|
||||
generator: false
|
||||
analytics:
|
||||
provider: plausible
|
||||
property: privacyguides.org
|
||||
feedback:
|
||||
title: "Was deze pagina nuttig?"
|
||||
ratings:
|
||||
- icon: material/robot-happy-outline
|
||||
name: "Deze pagina was nuttig"
|
||||
data: Helpful
|
||||
note: "Bedankt voor je feedback!"
|
||||
- icon: material/robot-confused
|
||||
name: "Deze pagina kan worden verbeterd"
|
||||
data: Needs Improvement
|
||||
note: "Bedankt voor jouw feedback! Help ons deze pagina te verbeteren door een <a href='https://discuss.privacyguides.net/'>discussie te openen op ons forum</a>."
|
||||
|
||||
theme:
|
||||
language: nl
|
||||
@ -102,6 +88,7 @@ nav:
|
||||
- 'advanced/communication-network-types.md'
|
||||
- Besturings systemen:
|
||||
- 'os/android-overview.md'
|
||||
- 'os/ios-overview.md'
|
||||
- 'os/linux-overview.md'
|
||||
- 'os/macos-overview.md'
|
||||
- 'os/qubes-overview.md'
|
||||
@ -117,6 +104,7 @@ nav:
|
||||
- 'dns.md'
|
||||
- 'email.md'
|
||||
- 'financial-services.md'
|
||||
- 'photo-management.md'
|
||||
- 'search-engines.md'
|
||||
- 'vpn.md'
|
||||
- Software:
|
||||
@ -137,10 +125,11 @@ nav:
|
||||
- 'android.md'
|
||||
- 'desktop.md'
|
||||
- 'router.md'
|
||||
- "Advanced":
|
||||
- 'device-integrity.md'
|
||||
- Over ons:
|
||||
- 'about/index.md'
|
||||
- 'about/criteria.md'
|
||||
- 'about/statistics.md'
|
||||
- 'about/notices.md'
|
||||
- 'about/privacy-policy.md'
|
||||
- Gemeenschap:
|
||||
@ -151,6 +140,7 @@ nav:
|
||||
- Bijdragen:
|
||||
- Schrijfgids:
|
||||
- 'meta/writing-style.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/admonitions.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/brand.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/translations.md'
|
||||
- Technische gids:
|
||||
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2023 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2024 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
|
||||
# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
|
||||
# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
|
||||
@ -36,20 +36,6 @@ edit_uri: edit/main/docs/
|
||||
|
||||
extra:
|
||||
generator: false
|
||||
analytics:
|
||||
provider: plausible
|
||||
property: privacyguides.org
|
||||
feedback:
|
||||
title: "Была ли эта страница полезной?"
|
||||
ratings:
|
||||
- icon: material/robot-happy-outline
|
||||
name: "Эта страница была полезна"
|
||||
data: Helpful
|
||||
note: "Спасибо за ваш отзыв!"
|
||||
- icon: material/robot-confused
|
||||
name: "Эта страница может быть улучшена"
|
||||
data: Needs Improvement
|
||||
note: "Спасибо за ваш отзыв! Помогите нам улучшить эту страницу, <a href='https://discuss.privacyguides.net/'>открыв обсуждение на нашем форуме.</a>"
|
||||
|
||||
extra_css:
|
||||
- assets/stylesheets/extra.css?v=3.2.0
|
||||
@ -120,6 +106,7 @@ nav:
|
||||
- 'dns.md'
|
||||
- 'email.md'
|
||||
- 'financial-services.md'
|
||||
- 'photo-management.md'
|
||||
- 'search-engines.md'
|
||||
- 'vpn.md'
|
||||
- Программное обеспечение:
|
||||
@ -140,10 +127,11 @@ nav:
|
||||
- 'android.md'
|
||||
- 'desktop.md'
|
||||
- 'router.md'
|
||||
- Advanced:
|
||||
- 'device-integrity.md'
|
||||
- О сайте:
|
||||
- 'about/index.md'
|
||||
- 'about/criteria.md'
|
||||
- 'about/statistics.md'
|
||||
- 'about/notices.md'
|
||||
- 'about/privacy-policy.md'
|
||||
- Сообщество:
|
||||
@ -154,7 +142,9 @@ nav:
|
||||
- Помощь проекту:
|
||||
- Руководство по написанию:
|
||||
- 'meta/writing-style.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/admonitions.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/brand.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/translations.md'
|
||||
- Технические руководства:
|
||||
- 'meta/uploading-images.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/git-recommendations.md'
|
||||
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2023 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2024 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
|
||||
# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
|
||||
# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
|
||||
@ -20,8 +20,8 @@
|
||||
|
||||
INHERIT: mkdocs-common.yml
|
||||
docs_dir: '../i18n/zh-Hant'
|
||||
site_url: "https://www.privacyguides.org/zh-hant/"
|
||||
site_dir: '../site/zh-hant'
|
||||
site_url: "https://www.privacyguides.org/zh-Hant/"
|
||||
site_dir: '../site/zh-Hant'
|
||||
|
||||
site_name: Privacy Guides
|
||||
site_description: |
|
||||
@ -29,27 +29,13 @@ site_description: |
|
||||
copyright: |
|
||||
<b>Privacy Guides</b> 是一個非營利、社會導向的網站,旨在提供有關資訊以確保您的資料安全和隱私。</br>
|
||||
我們不會通過推薦某些產品來賺錢,我們也不會使用推廣回贈鏈接。
|
||||
© 2019 - 2023 Privacy Guides 和貢獻者。
|
||||
© 2019 - 2024 Privacy Guides 和貢獻者。
|
||||
<span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="m245.83 214.87-33.22 17.28c-9.43-19.58-25.24-19.93-27.46-19.93-22.13 0-33.22 14.61-33.22 43.84 0 23.57 9.21 43.84 33.22 43.84 14.47 0 24.65-7.09 30.57-21.26l30.55 15.5c-6.17 11.51-25.69 38.98-65.1 38.98-22.6 0-73.96-10.32-73.96-77.05 0-58.69 43-77.06 72.63-77.06 30.72-.01 52.7 11.95 65.99 35.86zm143.05 0-32.78 17.28c-9.5-19.77-25.72-19.93-27.9-19.93-22.14 0-33.22 14.61-33.22 43.84 0 23.55 9.23 43.84 33.22 43.84 14.45 0 24.65-7.09 30.54-21.26l31 15.5c-2.1 3.75-21.39 38.98-65.09 38.98-22.69 0-73.96-9.87-73.96-77.05 0-58.67 42.97-77.06 72.63-77.06 30.71-.01 52.58 11.95 65.56 35.86zM247.56 8.05C104.74 8.05 0 123.11 0 256.05c0 138.49 113.6 248 247.56 248 129.93 0 248.44-100.87 248.44-248 0-137.87-106.62-248-248.44-248zm.87 450.81c-112.54 0-203.7-93.04-203.7-202.81 0-105.42 85.43-203.27 203.72-203.27 112.53 0 202.82 89.46 202.82 203.26-.01 121.69-99.68 202.82-202.84 202.82z"></path></svg></span><span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="M314.9 194.4v101.4h-28.3v120.5h-77.1V295.9h-28.3V194.4c0-4.4 1.6-8.2 4.6-11.3 3.1-3.1 6.9-4.7 11.3-4.7H299c4.1 0 7.8 1.6 11.1 4.7 3.1 3.2 4.8 6.9 4.8 11.3zm-101.5-63.7c0-23.3 11.5-35 34.5-35s34.5 11.7 34.5 35c0 23-11.5 34.5-34.5 34.5s-34.5-11.5-34.5-34.5zM247.6 8C389.4 8 496 118.1 496 256c0 147.1-118.5 248-248.4 248C113.6 504 0 394.5 0 256 0 123.1 104.7 8 247.6 8zm.8 44.7C130.2 52.7 44.7 150.6 44.7 256c0 109.8 91.2 202.8 203.7 202.8 103.2 0 202.8-81.1 202.8-202.8.1-113.8-90.2-203.3-202.8-203.3z"></path></svg></span><span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 496 512"><!--! Font Awesome Free 6.2.0 by @fontawesome - https://fontawesome.com License - https://fontawesome.com/license/free (Icons: CC BY 4.0, Fonts: SIL OFL 1.1, Code: MIT License) Copyright 2022 Fonticons, Inc.--><path d="M247.6 8C389.4 8 496 118.1 496 256c0 147.1-118.5 248-248.4 248C113.6 504 0 394.5 0 256 0 123.1 104.7 8 247.6 8zm.8 44.7C130.2 52.7 44.7 150.6 44.7 256c0 109.8 91.2 202.8 203.7 202.8 103.2 0 202.8-81.1 202.8-202.8.1-113.8-90.2-203.3-202.8-203.3zm94 144.3v42.5H162.1V197h180.3zm0 79.8v42.5H162.1v-42.5h180.3z"></path></svg></span>
|
||||
根據CC BY-ND 4.0授權的內容。 <a href="/license"><strong>CC BY-ND 4.0</strong></a>.
|
||||
edit_uri: edit/main/i18n/zh-Hant/
|
||||
|
||||
extra:
|
||||
generator: false
|
||||
analytics:
|
||||
provider: plausible
|
||||
property: privacyguides.org
|
||||
feedback:
|
||||
title: "這個頁面對您有幫助嗎?"
|
||||
ratings:
|
||||
- icon: material/robot-happy-outline
|
||||
name: "此頁有幫助"
|
||||
data: Helpful
|
||||
note: "感謝反饋!"
|
||||
- icon: material/robot-confused
|
||||
name: "此頁面可以改善"
|
||||
data: Needs Improvement
|
||||
note: "感謝你的意見!通過在的論壇上開啟<a href='https://discuss.privacyguides.net'>討論來協助我們改善此頁面。</a>"
|
||||
|
||||
extra_css:
|
||||
- assets/stylesheets/extra.css?v=3.2.0
|
||||
@ -120,6 +106,7 @@ nav:
|
||||
- 'dns.md'
|
||||
- 'email.md'
|
||||
- 'financial-services.md'
|
||||
- 'photo-management.md'
|
||||
- 'search-engines.md'
|
||||
- 'vpn.md'
|
||||
- 軟體:
|
||||
@ -140,10 +127,11 @@ nav:
|
||||
- 'android.md'
|
||||
- 'desktop.md'
|
||||
- 'router.md'
|
||||
- Advanced:
|
||||
- 'device-integrity.md'
|
||||
- 關於:
|
||||
- 'about/index.md'
|
||||
- 'about/criteria.md'
|
||||
- 'about/statistics.md'
|
||||
- 'about/notices.md'
|
||||
- 'about/privacy-policy.md'
|
||||
- 社群:
|
||||
@ -154,7 +142,9 @@ nav:
|
||||
- 貢獻:
|
||||
- 寫作指南:
|
||||
- 'meta/writing-style.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/admonitions.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/brand.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/translations.md'
|
||||
- 技術指導:
|
||||
- 'meta/uploading-images.md'
|
||||
- 'meta/git-recommendations.md'
|
||||
|
@ -10,44 +10,44 @@
|
||||
|
||||
What we expect from members of our communities:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Don't spread misinformation**
|
||||
1. **Do not spread misinformation**
|
||||
|
||||
We are creating an evidence-based educational community around information privacy and security, not a home for conspiracy theories. For example, when making a claim that a certain piece of software is malicious or that certain telemetry data is privacy invasive, explain in detail what is collected and how it collected. Claims of this nature must be backed by technical evidence.
|
||||
We are creating an evidence-based educational community around information privacy and security, not an information home for conspiracy theories. For example, when making a claim that a certain piece of software is malicious or that certain telemetry data is privacy invasive; explain in detail what is collected and how it collected. Claims of this nature must be backed by technical evidence.
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Don't abuse our willingness to help**
|
||||
2. **Do not abuse our willingness to help**
|
||||
|
||||
Our community members are not your free tech support. We are happy to help you with specific steps on your privacy journey if you are willing to put in effort on your end. We are not willing to answer endlessly repeated questions about generic computer problems you could have answered yourself with a 30-second internet search. Don't be a [help vampire](https://slash7.com/2006/12/22/vampires/).
|
||||
Our community members are not free tech support. We are happy to help with specific steps for individual's, privacy journey, if they are willing to put in effort. We are not obligated to answer endless, repetitive questions, about general computer problems solvable with a simple internet search. **Do not** become a [help vampire](https://slash7.com/2006/12/22/vampires/).
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Behave in a positive and constructive manner**
|
||||
3. **Behave in a positive and constructive manner**
|
||||
|
||||
Examples of behavior that contributes to a positive environment for our community include:
|
||||
|
||||
- Demonstrating empathy and kindness toward other people
|
||||
- Being respectful of differing opinions, viewpoints, and experiences
|
||||
- Giving and gracefully accepting constructive feedback
|
||||
- Accepting responsibility and apologizing to those affected by our mistakes, and learning from the experience
|
||||
- Focusing on what is best not just for us as individuals, but for the overall community
|
||||
- Being respectful of differing opinions, viewpoints, and experiences.
|
||||
- Demonstrating empathy and kindness toward others.
|
||||
- Focusing on what is best not just for us as overseers, but for the overall community.
|
||||
- Giving and gracefully accepting constructive feedback within' our community while growing and improving.
|
||||
- Operating with a communal mindset at all times.
|
||||
|
||||
### Unacceptable Behavior
|
||||
## Unacceptable Behavior
|
||||
|
||||
The following behaviors are considered harassment and are unacceptable within our community:
|
||||
|
||||
- The use of sexualized language or imagery, and sexual attention or advances of any kind
|
||||
- Trolling, insulting or derogatory comments, and personal or political attacks
|
||||
- Public or private harassment
|
||||
- Publishing others' private information, such as a physical or email address, without their explicit permission
|
||||
- Other conduct which could reasonably be considered inappropriate in a professional setting
|
||||
- Any other conduct which would reasonably be considered inappropriate in a professional setting.
|
||||
- Public and/or private harassment of any kind.
|
||||
- Publishing others' private information, such as a physical address and/or email address, without a persons explicit permission.
|
||||
- The use of sexualized language or imagery, and sexual attention or advances of any kind.
|
||||
- Trolling, insulting and/or derogatory comments, including personal or political attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
## Scope
|
||||
|
||||
Our Code of Conduct applies within all project spaces, as well as when an individual is representing the Privacy Guides project in other communities.
|
||||
|
||||
We are responsible for clarifying the standards of our community, and have the right to remove or alter the comments of those participating within our community, as necessary and at our discretion.
|
||||
We are responsible for clarifying the standards of our community and have the right to remove or alter the comments of those participating within our community, as necessary and at our discretion.
|
||||
|
||||
### Contact
|
||||
## Contact
|
||||
|
||||
If you observe a problem on a platform like Matrix or Reddit, please contact our moderators on that platform in chat, via DM, or through any designated "Modmail" system.
|
||||
If you observe a problem on a platform like Matrix or Reddit, please contact our moderators on that platform via chat, direct message, or any designated "Modmail" system.
|
||||
|
||||
If you have a problem elsewhere, or a problem our community moderators are unable to resolve, reach out to `jonah@privacyguides.org` and/or `dngray@privacyguides.org`.
|
||||
If you have a problem elsewhere, or a problem that our community moderators are unable to resolve, reach out to `jonah@privacyguides.org` and/or `dngray@privacyguides.org`.
|
||||
|
||||
All community leaders are obligated to respect the privacy and security of the reporter of any incident.
|
||||
All community leaders are obligated to respect the privacy and security of reporters for all incidents.
|
||||
|
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ We do not make money from recommending certain products, we do not use affiliate
|
||||
We apply these priorities when considering new recommendations:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Secure**: Tools should follow security best-practices wherever applicable.
|
||||
- **Source Availability**: Open source projects are generally preferred over equivalent proprietary alternatives.
|
||||
- **Source Availability**: Open-source projects are generally preferred over equivalent proprietary alternatives.
|
||||
- **Cross-Platform**: We typically prefer recommendations to be cross-platform, to avoid vendor lock-in.
|
||||
- **Active Development**: The tools that we recommend should be actively developed, unmaintained projects will be removed in most cases.
|
||||
- **Usability**: Tools should be accessible to most computer users, an overly technical background should not be required.
|
||||
|
@ -72,14 +72,7 @@ So far in 2023 we've launched international translations of our website in [Fren
|
||||
- [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/freddy)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/freddy-m "@freddy-m")
|
||||
- [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://social.lol/@freddy "@freddy@social.lol"){rel=me}
|
||||
- [:fontawesome-solid-envelope: Email](mailto:freddy@privacyguides.org)
|
||||
- [:fontawesome-solid-house: Homepage](https://freddy.omg.lol)
|
||||
|
||||
??? person "@mfwmyfacewhen"
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-discourse: Discourse](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/mfwmyfacewhen)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/mfwmyfacewhen "@mfwmyfacewhen")
|
||||
- [:fontawesome-solid-house: Homepage](https://mfw.omg.lol)
|
||||
- [:fontawesome-solid-house: Homepage](https://freddy.lol)
|
||||
|
||||
??? person "@olivia"
|
||||
|
||||
@ -87,7 +80,7 @@ So far in 2023 we've launched international translations of our website in [Fren
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/hook9 "@hook9")
|
||||
- [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@oliviablob "@oliviablob@neat.computer"){rel=me}
|
||||
|
||||
Additionally, [many people](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors) have made contributions to the project. You can too, we're open sourced on GitHub, and accepting translation suggestions on [Crowdin](https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides).
|
||||
Additionally, [many people](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors) have made contributions to the project. You can too, we're open source on GitHub, and accepting translation suggestions on [Crowdin](https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides).
|
||||
|
||||
Our team members review all changes made to the website and handle administrative duties such as web hosting and financials, however they do not personally profit from any contributions made to this site. Our financials are transparently hosted by the Open Collective Foundation 501(c)(3) at [opencollective.com/privacyguides](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides). Donations to Privacy Guides are generally tax-deductible in the United States.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Privacy Guides is not a law firm. As such, the Privacy Guides website and contri
|
||||
|
||||
Running this website, like any human endeavor, involves uncertainty and trade-offs. We hope this website helps, but it may include mistakes and can’t address every situation. If you have any questions about your situation, we encourage you to do your own research, seek out other experts, and engage in discussions with the Privacy Guides community. If you have any legal questions, you should consult with your own legal counsel before moving forward.
|
||||
|
||||
Privacy Guides is an open source project contributed to under licenses that include terms that, for the protection of the website and its contributors, make clear that the Privacy Guides project and website is offered "as-is", without warranty, and disclaiming liability for damages resulting from using the website or any recommendations contained within. Privacy Guides does not warrant or make any representations concerning the accuracy, likely results, or reliability of the use of the materials on the website or otherwise relating to such materials on the website or on any third-party sites linked on this site.
|
||||
Privacy Guides is an open-source project contributed to under licenses that include terms that, for the protection of the website and its contributors, make clear that the Privacy Guides project and website is offered "as-is", without warranty, and disclaiming liability for damages resulting from using the website or any recommendations contained within. Privacy Guides does not warrant or make any representations concerning the accuracy, likely results, or reliability of the use of the materials on the website or otherwise relating to such materials on the website or on any third-party sites linked on this site.
|
||||
|
||||
Privacy Guides additionally does not warrant that this website will be constantly available, or available at all.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -14,34 +14,17 @@ The privacy of our website visitors is important to us, so we do not track any i
|
||||
- No information is mined and harvested for personal and behavioral trends
|
||||
- No information is monetized
|
||||
|
||||
You can view the data we collect on our [statistics](statistics.md) page.
|
||||
|
||||
We run a self-hosted installation of [Plausible Analytics](https://plausible.io) to collect some anonymous usage data for statistical purposes. The goal is to track overall trends in our website traffic, it is not to track individual visitors. All the data is in aggregate only. No personal data is collected.
|
||||
|
||||
Data collected includes referral sources, top pages, visit duration, information from the devices (device type, operating system, country and browser) used during the visit and more. You can learn more about how Plausible works and collects information in a privacy-respecting manner [here](https://plausible.io/data-policy).
|
||||
|
||||
## Data We Collect From Account Holders
|
||||
|
||||
On some websites and services we provide, many features may require an account. For example, an account may be required to post and reply to topics on a forum platform.
|
||||
If you register for an account on one of our services, we may collect any information you provide us (such as your email, password, profile information, etc.) and use that information to provide you with the service. We never share or sell this data.
|
||||
|
||||
To sign up for most accounts, we will collect a name, username, email, and password. In the event a website requires more information than just that data, that will be clearly marked and noted in a separate privacy statement per-site.
|
||||
|
||||
We use your account data to identify you on the website and to create pages specific to you, such as your profile page. We will also use your account data to publish a public profile for you on our services.
|
||||
|
||||
We use your email to:
|
||||
|
||||
- Notify you about posts and other activity on the websites or services.
|
||||
- Reset your password and help keep your account secure.
|
||||
- Contact you in special circumstances related to your account.
|
||||
- Contact you about legal requests, such as DMCA takedown requests.
|
||||
|
||||
On some websites and services you may provide additional information for your account, such as a short biography, avatar, your location, or your birthday. We make that information available to everyone who can access the website or service in question. This information is not required to use any of our services and can be erased at any time.
|
||||
|
||||
We will store your account data as long as your account remains open. After closing an account, we may retain some or all of your account data in the form of backups or archives for up to 90 days.
|
||||
Some services we host have separate privacy policies which supersede this document. For example, the privacy policy of our forum can be found at [discuss.privacyguides.net/privacy](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/privacy).
|
||||
|
||||
## Contacting Us
|
||||
|
||||
The Privacy Guides team generally does not have access to personal data outside of limited access granted via some moderation panels. Inquiries regarding your personal information should be sent directly to:
|
||||
Even in the limited cases where your data is collected, our volunteers and most members of the Privacy Guides team have no access to that information. Some information (such as your email address) may be accessible to moderators via limited control panels for the purposes of moderating our communities.
|
||||
|
||||
Thus, inquiries regarding your personal information should be sent directly to:
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
Jonah Aragon
|
||||
@ -51,8 +34,7 @@ jonah@privacyguides.org
|
||||
|
||||
For all other inquiries, you can contact any member of our team.
|
||||
|
||||
For complaints under GDPR more generally, you may lodge complaints with your local data protection supervisory authorities.
|
||||
In France it's the Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés which take care and handle the complaints. They provide a [template of complaint letter](https://www.cnil.fr/en/plaintes) to use.
|
||||
For complaints under GDPR more generally, you always have the option to lodge complaints with your local data protection supervisory authorities.
|
||||
|
||||
## About This Policy
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ BurungHantu also made a [twitter post](https://twitter.com/privacytoolsIO/status
|
||||
|
||||
As of September 25th 2022 we are seeing BurungHantu's overall plans come to fruition on privacytools.io, and this is the very reason we decided to create this explainer page today. The website he is operating appears to be a heavily SEO-optimized version of the site which recommends tools in exchange for financial compensation. Very recently, IVPN and Mullvad, two VPN providers near-universally [recommended](../vpn.md) by the privacy community and notable for their stance against affiliate programs were removed from PrivacyTools. In their place? NordVPN, Surfshark, ExpressVPN, and hide.me; Giant VPN corporations with untrustworthy platforms and business practices, notorious for their aggressive marketing and affiliate programs.
|
||||
|
||||
==**PrivacyTools has become exactly the type of site we [warned against](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729205249/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-reviews/) on the PrivacyTools blog in 2019.**== We've tried to keep our distance from PrivacyTools since the transition, but their continued harassment towards our project and now their absurd abuse of the credibility their brand gained over 6 years of open source contributions is extremely troubling to us. Those of us actually fighting for privacy are not fighting against each other, and are not getting our advice from the highest bidder.
|
||||
==**PrivacyTools has become exactly the type of site we [warned against](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729205249/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-reviews/) on the PrivacyTools blog in 2019.**== We've tried to keep our distance from PrivacyTools since the transition, but their continued harassment towards our project and now their absurd abuse of the credibility their brand gained over 6 years of open-source contributions is extremely troubling to us. Those of us actually fighting for privacy are not fighting against each other, and are not getting our advice from the highest bidder.
|
||||
|
||||
## r/privacytoolsIO Now
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: Traffic Statistics
|
||||
---
|
||||
## Website Statistics
|
||||
|
||||
<iframe plausible-embed src="https://stats.privacyguides.net/share/privacyguides.org?auth=IxTl2wRhi3uxF09rd1NSn&embed=true&theme=system&background=transparent" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" loading="lazy" style="width: 1px; min-width: 100%; height: 1600px;" id="plausibleFrame"></iframe>
|
||||
<div style="font-size: 14px; padding-bottom: 14px;">Stats powered by <a target="_blank" style="color: #4F46E5; text-decoration: underline;" href="https://plausible.io">Plausible Analytics</a></div>
|
||||
<script async src="https://stats.privacyguides.net/js/embed.host.js"></script>
|
||||
|
||||
<script>
|
||||
|
||||
/* Set palette on initial load */
|
||||
var palette = __md_get("__palette")
|
||||
if (palette && typeof palette.color === "object") {
|
||||
var theme = palette.color.scheme === "slate" ? "dark" : "light"
|
||||
document.getElementById('plausibleFrame').src = 'https://stats.privacyguides.net/share/privacyguides.org?auth=IxTl2wRhi3uxF09rd1NSn&embed=true&theme=' + theme + '&background=transparent';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Register event handlers after documented loaded */
|
||||
document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function() {
|
||||
var ref = document.querySelector("[data-md-component=palette]")
|
||||
ref.addEventListener("change", function() {
|
||||
var palette = __md_get("__palette")
|
||||
if (palette && typeof palette.color === "object") {
|
||||
var theme = palette.color.scheme === "slate" ? "dark" : "light"
|
||||
|
||||
document.getElementById('plausibleFrame').src = 'https://stats.privacyguides.net/share/privacyguides.org?auth=IxTl2wRhi3uxF09rd1NSn&embed=true&theme=' + theme + '&background=transparent';
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
</script>
|
||||
|
||||
## Blog Statistics
|
||||
|
||||
<iframe plausible-embed src="https://stats.privacyguides.net/share/blog.privacyguides.org?auth=onWV76WWcsDifUqlaHEAg&embed=true&theme=system&background=transparent" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" loading="lazy" style="width: 1px; min-width: 100%; height: 1600px;" id="blogFrame"></iframe>
|
||||
<div style="font-size: 14px; padding-bottom: 14px;">Stats powered by <a target="_blank" style="color: #4F46E5; text-decoration: underline;" href="https://plausible.io">Plausible Analytics</a></div>
|
||||
<script async src="https://stats.privacyguides.net/js/embed.host.js"></script>
|
||||
|
||||
<script>
|
||||
|
||||
/* Set palette on initial load */
|
||||
var palette = __md_get("__palette")
|
||||
if (palette && typeof palette.color === "object") {
|
||||
var theme = palette.color.scheme === "slate" ? "dark" : "light"
|
||||
document.getElementById('blogFrame').src = 'https://stats.privacyguides.net/share/blog.privacyguides.org?auth=onWV76WWcsDifUqlaHEAg&embed=true&theme=' + theme + '&background=transparent';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Register event handlers after documented loaded */
|
||||
document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function() {
|
||||
var ref = document.querySelector("[data-md-component=palette]")
|
||||
ref.addEventListener("change", function() {
|
||||
var palette = __md_get("__palette")
|
||||
if (palette && typeof palette.color === "object") {
|
||||
var theme = palette.color.scheme === "slate" ? "dark" : "light"
|
||||
|
||||
document.getElementById('blogFrame').src = 'https://stats.privacyguides.net/share/blog.privacyguides.org?auth=onWV76WWcsDifUqlaHEAg&embed=true&theme=' + theme + '&background=transparent';
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
</script>
|
@ -294,9 +294,24 @@ DNSSEC implements a hierarchical digital signing policy across all layers of DNS
|
||||
|
||||
## What is QNAME minimization?
|
||||
|
||||
A QNAME is a "qualified name", for example `privacyguides.org`. QNAME minimisation reduces the amount of information sent from the DNS server to the [authoritative name server](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Name_server#Authoritative_name_server).
|
||||
A QNAME is a "qualified name", for example `discuss.privacyguides.net`. In the past, when resolving a domain name your DNS resolver would ask every server in the chain to provide any information it has about your full query. In this example below, your request to find the IP address for `discuss.privacyguides.net` gets asked of every DNS server provider:
|
||||
|
||||
Instead of sending the whole domain `privacyguides.org`, QNAME minimization means the DNS server will ask for all the records that end in `.org`. Further technical description is defined in [RFC 7816](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7816).
|
||||
| Server | Question Asked | Response |
|
||||
|------------------------|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
|
||||
| Root server | What's the IP of discuss.privacyguides.net? | I don't know, ask .net's server... |
|
||||
| .net's server | What's the IP of discuss.privacyguides.net? | I don't know, ask Privacy Guides' server... |
|
||||
| Privacy Guides' server | What's the IP of discuss.privacyguides.net? | 5.161.195.190! |
|
||||
|
||||
With "QNAME minimization," your DNS resolver now only asks for just enough information to find the next server in the chain. In this example, the root server is only asked for enough information to find the appropriate nameserver for the .net TLD, and so on, without ever knowing the full domain you're trying to visit:
|
||||
|
||||
| Server | Question Asked | Response |
|
||||
|------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
|
||||
| Root server | What's the nameserver for .net? | *Provides .net's server* |
|
||||
| .net's server | What's the nameserver for privacyguides.net? | *Provides Privacy Guides' server* |
|
||||
| Privacy Guides' server | What's the nameserver for discuss.privacyguides.net? | This server! |
|
||||
| Privacy Guides' server | What's the IP of discuss.privacyguides.net? | 5.161.195.190 |
|
||||
|
||||
While this process can be slightly more inefficient, in this example neither the central root nameservers nor the TLD's nameservers ever receive information about your *full* query, thus reducing the amount of information being transmitted about your browsing habits. Further technical description is defined in [RFC 7816](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7816).
|
||||
|
||||
## What is EDNS Client Subnet (ECS)?
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -6,11 +6,91 @@ description: Tor is a free to use, decentralized network designed for using the
|
||||
|
||||
Tor is a free to use, decentralized network designed for using the internet with as much privacy as possible. If used properly, the network enables private and anonymous browsing and communications.
|
||||
|
||||
## Safely Connecting to Tor
|
||||
|
||||
Before connecting to [Tor](../tor.md), you should carefully consider what you're looking to accomplish by using Tor in the first place, and who you're trying to hide your network activity from.
|
||||
|
||||
If you live in a free country, are accessing mundane content via Tor, aren't worried about your ISP or local network administrators having the knowledge that you're using Tor, and want to help [de-stigmatize](https://2019.www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en) Tor usage, you can likely connect to Tor directly via standard means like [Tor Browser](../tor.md) without worry.
|
||||
|
||||
If you have the ability to access a trusted VPN provider and **any** of the following are true, you almost certainly should connect to Tor through a VPN:
|
||||
|
||||
- You already use a [trusted VPN provider](../vpn.md)
|
||||
- Your threat model includes an adversary which is capable of extracting information from your ISP
|
||||
- Your threat model includes your ISP itself as an adversary
|
||||
- Your threat model includes local network administrators before your ISP as an adversary
|
||||
|
||||
Because we already [generally recommend](../basics/vpn-overview.md) that the vast majority of people use a trusted VPN provider for a variety of reasons, the following recommendation about connecting to Tor via a VPN likely applies to you. <mark>There is no need to disable your VPN before connecting to Tor</mark>, as some online resources would lead you to believe.
|
||||
|
||||
Connecting directly to Tor will make your connection stand out to any local network administrators or your ISP. Detecting and correlating this traffic [has been done](https://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/17/justice/massachusetts-harvard-hoax/) in the past by network administrators to identify and deanonymize specific Tor users on their network. On the other hand, connecting to a VPN is almost always less suspicious, because commercial VPN providers are used by everyday consumers for a variety of mundane tasks like bypassing geo-restrictions, even in countries with heavy internet restrictions.
|
||||
|
||||
Therefore, you should make an effort to hide your IP address **before** connecting to the Tor network. You can do this by simply connecting to a VPN (through a client installed on your computer) and then accessing [Tor](../tor.md) as normal, through Tor Browser for example. This creates a connection chain like:
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] You → VPN → Tor → Internet
|
||||
|
||||
From your ISP's perspective, it looks like you're accessing a VPN normally (with the associated cover that provides you). From your VPN's perspective, they can see that you are connecting to the Tor network, but nothing about what websites you're accessing. From Tor's perspective, you're connecting normally, but in the unlikely event of some sort of Tor network compromise, only your VPN's IP would be exposed, and your VPN would *additionally* have to be compromised to deanonymize you.
|
||||
|
||||
This is **not** censorship circumvention advice, because if Tor is blocked entirely by your ISP, your VPN likely is as well. Rather, this recommendation aims to make your traffic blend in better with commonplace VPN user traffic, and provide you with some level of plausible deniability by obscuring the fact that you're connecting to Tor from your ISP.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
We **very strongly discourage** combining Tor with a VPN in any other manner. Do not configure your connection in a way which resembles any of the following:
|
||||
|
||||
- You → Tor → VPN → Internet
|
||||
- You → VPN → Tor → VPN → Internet
|
||||
- Any other configuration
|
||||
|
||||
Some VPN providers and other publications will occasionally recommend these **bad** configurations to evade Tor bans (exit nodes being blocked by websites) in some places. [Normally](https://support.torproject.org/#about_change-paths), Tor frequently changes your circuit path through the network. When you choose a permanent *destination* VPN (connecting to a VPN server *after* Tor), you're eliminating this advantage and drastically harming your anonymity.
|
||||
|
||||
Setting up bad configurations like these is difficult to do accidentally, because it usually involves either setting up custom proxy settings inside Tor Browser, or setting up custom proxy settings inside your VPN client which routes your VPN traffic through the Tor Browser. As long as you avoid these non-default configurations, you're probably fine.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
!!! info "VPN/SSH Fingerprinting"
|
||||
|
||||
The Tor Project [notes](https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/wikis/doc/TorPlusVPN#vpnssh-fingerprinting) that *theoretically* using a VPN to hide Tor activities from your ISP may not be foolproof. VPNs have been found to be vulnerable to website traffic fingerprinting, where an adversary can still guess what website is being visited, because all websites have specific traffic patterns.
|
||||
|
||||
Therefore, it's not unreasonable to believe that encrypted Tor traffic hidden by a VPN could also be detected via similar methods. There are no research papers on this subject, and we still consider the benefits of using a VPN to far outweigh these risks, but it is something to keep in mind.
|
||||
|
||||
If you still believe that pluggable transports (bridges) provide additional protection against website traffic fingerprinting that a VPN does not, you always have the option to use a bridge **and** a VPN in conjunction.
|
||||
|
||||
Determining whether you should first use a VPN to connect to the Tor network will require some common sense and knowledge of your own government's and ISP's policies relating to what you're connecting to. However, again in most cases you will be better off being seen as connecting to a commercial VPN network than directly to the Tor network. If VPN providers are censored in your area, then you can also consider using Tor pluggable transports (e.g. Snowflake or meek bridges) as an alternative, but using these bridges may arouse more suspicion than standard WireGuard/OpenVPN tunnels.
|
||||
|
||||
## What Tor is Not
|
||||
|
||||
The Tor network is not the perfect privacy protection tool in all cases, and has a number of drawbacks which should be carefully considered. These things should not discourage you from using Tor if it is appropriate for your needs, but they are still things to think about when deciding which solution is most appropriate for you.
|
||||
|
||||
### Tor is not a free VPN
|
||||
|
||||
The release of the *Orbot* mobile app has lead many people to describe Tor as a "free VPN" for all of your device traffic. However, treating Tor like this poses some dangers compared to a typical VPN.
|
||||
|
||||
Unlike Tor exit nodes, VPN providers are usually not *actively* [malicious](#caveats). Because Tor exit nodes can be created by anybody, they are hotspots for network logging and modification. In 2020, many Tor exit nodes were documented to be downgrading HTTPS traffic to HTTP in order to [hijack cryptocurrency transactions](https://therecord.media/thousands-of-tor-exit-nodes-attacked-cryptocurrency-users-over-the-past-year). Other exit node attacks such as replacing downloads via unencrypted channels with malware have also been observed. HTTPS does mitigate these threats to an extent.
|
||||
|
||||
As we've alluded to already, Tor is also easily identifiable on the network. Unlike an actual VPN provider, using Tor will make you stick out as a person likely attempting to evade authorities. In a perfect world, Tor would be seen by network administrators and authorities as a tool with many uses (like how VPNs are viewed), but in reality the perception of Tor is still far less legitimate than the perception of commercial VPNs, so using a real VPN provides you with plausible deniability, e.g. "I was just using it to watch Netflix," etc.
|
||||
|
||||
### Tor usage is not undetectable
|
||||
|
||||
**Even if you use bridges and pluggable transports,** the Tor Project provides no tools to hide the fact that you are using Tor from your ISP. Even using obfuscated "pluggable transports" or non-public bridges do not hide the fact that you are using a private communications channel. The most popular pluggable transports like obfs4 (which obfuscates your traffic to "look like nothing") and meek (which uses domain fronting to camouflage your traffic) can be [detected](https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/889-Tor-0day-Burning-Bridges.html) with fairly standard traffic analysis techniques. Snowflake has similar issues, and can be [easily detected](https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/944-Tor-0day-Snowflake.html) *before* a Tor connection is even established.
|
||||
|
||||
Pluggable transports other than these three do exist, but typically rely on security through obscurity to evade detection. They aren't impossible to detect, they are just used by so few people that it's not worth the effort building detectors for them. They shouldn't be relied upon if you specifically are being monitored.
|
||||
|
||||
It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and evading detection. It is easier to accomplish the former because of the many real-world limitations on what network censors can realistically do en masse, but these techniques do not hide the fact that you—*specifically* you—are using Tor from an interested party monitoring your network.
|
||||
|
||||
### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser
|
||||
|
||||
Anonymity can often be at odds with security: Tor's anonymity requires every user to be identical, which creates a monoculture (the same bugs are present across all Tor Browser users). As a cybersecurity rule of thumb, monocultures are generally regarded as bad: Security through diversity (which Tor lacks) provides natural segmentation by limiting vulnerabilities to smaller groups, and is therefore usually desirable, but this diversity is also less good for anonymity.
|
||||
|
||||
Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):
|
||||
|
||||
1. Look for new Critical/High vulnerabilities in Firefox nightly or beta builds, then check if they are exploitable in Tor Browser (this vulnerability period can last weeks).
|
||||
2. Chain *multiple* Medium/Low vulnerabilities together until they get the level of access they're looking for (this vulnerability period can last months or longer).
|
||||
|
||||
Those at risk of browser vulnerabilities should consider additional protections to defend against Tor Browser exploits, such as using Whonix in [Qubes](../os/qubes-overview.md) to contain your Tor browsing in a secure VM and protect against leaks.
|
||||
|
||||
## Path Building to Clearnet Services
|
||||
|
||||
"Clearnet services" are websites which you can access with any browser, like [privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org). Tor lets you connect to these websites anonymously by routing your traffic through a network comprised of thousands of volunteer-run servers called nodes (or relays).
|
||||
|
||||
Every time you [connect to Tor](../tor.md), it will choose three nodes to build a path to the internet—this path is called a "circuit."
|
||||
Every time you [connect to Tor](../tor.md), it will choose three nodes to build a path to the internet—this path is called a "circuit."
|
||||
|
||||
<figure markdown>
|
||||

|
||||
@ -80,13 +160,34 @@ Tor allows us to connect to a server without any single party knowing the entire
|
||||
|
||||
Though Tor does provide strong privacy guarantees, one must be aware that Tor is not perfect:
|
||||
|
||||
- Well-funded adversaries with the capability to passively watch most network traffic over the globe have a chance of deanonymizing Tor users by means of advanced traffic analysis. Nor does Tor protect you from exposing yourself by mistake, such as if you share too much information about your real identity.
|
||||
- Tor exit nodes can also monitor traffic that passes through them. This means traffic which is not encrypted, such as plain HTTP traffic, can be recorded and monitored. If such traffic contains personally identifiable information, then it can deanonymize you to that exit node. Thus, we recommend using HTTPS over Tor where possible.
|
||||
- Tor never protects you from exposing yourself by mistake, such as if you share too much information about your real identity.
|
||||
- Tor exit nodes can **modify** unencrypted traffic which passes through them. This means traffic which is not encrypted, such as plain HTTP traffic, can be changed by a malicious exit node. **Never** download files from an unencrypted `http://` website over Tor, and ensure your browser is set to always upgrade HTTP traffic to HTTPS.
|
||||
- Tor exit nodes can also monitor traffic that passes through them. Unencrypted traffic which contains personally identifiable information can deanonymize you to that exit node. Again, we recommend only using HTTPS over Tor.
|
||||
- Powerful adversaries with the capability to passively watch *all* network traffic around the globe ("Global Passive Adversaries") are **not** something that Tor protects you against (and using Tor [with a VPN](#safely-connecting-to-tor) doesn't change this fact).
|
||||
- Well-funded adversaries with the capability to passively watch *most* network traffic around the globe still have a *chance* of deanonymizing Tor users by means of advanced traffic analysis.
|
||||
|
||||
If you wish to use Tor for browsing the web, we only recommend the **official** Tor Browser—it is designed to prevent fingerprinting.
|
||||
|
||||
- [Tor Browser :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../tor.md#tor-browser)
|
||||
|
||||
### Protections provided by bridges
|
||||
|
||||
Tor bridges are commonly touted as an alternative method to hiding Tor usage from an ISP, instead of a VPN (as we suggest using if possible). Something to consider is that while bridges may provide adequate censorship circumvention, this is only a *transient* benefit. They do not adequately protect you from your ISP discovering you connected to Tor in the *past* with historical traffic log analysis.
|
||||
|
||||
To illustrate this point, consider the following scenario: You connect to Tor via a bridge, and your ISP doesn’t detect it because they are not doing sophisticated analysis of your traffic, so things are working as intended. Now, 4 months go by, and the IP of your bridge has been made public. This is a very common occurrence with bridges, they are discovered and blocked relatively frequently, just not immediately.
|
||||
|
||||
Your ISP wants to identify Tor users 4 months ago, and with their limited metadata logging they can see that you connected to an IP address which was later revealed to be a Tor bridge. You have virtually no other excuse to be making such a connection, so the ISP can say with very high confidence that you were a Tor user at that time.
|
||||
|
||||
Contrast this with our recommended scenario, where you connect to Tor via a VPN. Say that 4 months later your ISP again wants to identify anybody who used Tor 4 months ago. Their logs almost certainly can identify your traffic 4 months ago, but all they would likely be able to see is that you connected to a VPN’s IP address. This is because most ISPs only retain metadata over long periods of time, not the full contents of the traffic you request. Storing the entirety of your traffic data would require a massive quantity of storage which nearly all threat actors wouldn't possess.
|
||||
|
||||
Because your ISP almost certainly is not capturing all packet-level data and storing it forever, they have no way of determining what you connected to with that VPN *after* the fact with an advanced technique like deep packet inspection, and therefore you have plausible deniability.
|
||||
|
||||
Therefore, bridges provide the most benefit when circumventing internet censorship *in the moment*, but they are not an adequate substitute for **all** the benefits that using a VPN alongside Tor can provide. Again, this is not advice *against* using Tor bridges, you should just be aware of these limitations while making your decision. In some cases bridges may be the *only* option (if all VPN providers are blocked, for instance), so you can still use them in those circumstances with this limitation in mind.
|
||||
|
||||
If you think that a bridge can aid in defending against fingerprinting or other advanced network analysis more than a VPN's encrypted tunnel already can, you always have the option to use a bridge in conjunction with a VPN as well. That way you are still protected by the pluggable transport's obfuscation techniques even if an adversary gains some level of visibility into your VPN tunnel. If you decide to go this route, we recommend connecting to an obfs4 bridge behind your VPN for optimal fingerprinting protection, rather than meek or Snowflake.
|
||||
|
||||
It is [possible](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/clarify-tors-weaknesses-with-respect-to-observability/3676/16) that the [WebTunnel](https://forum.torproject.org/t/tor-relays-announcement-webtunnel-a-new-pluggable-transport-for-bridges-now-available-for-deployment/8180) pluggable transport currently being trialed may mitigate some of these concerns. We will continue to keep an eye on that technology as it develops.
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Resources
|
||||
|
||||
- [Tor Browser User Manual](https://tb-manual.torproject.org)
|
||||
|
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ meta_title: "Android Recommendations: GrapheneOS and DivestOS - Privacy Guides"
|
||||
title: "Android"
|
||||
icon: 'simple/android'
|
||||
description: You can replace the operating system on your Android phone with these secure and privacy-respecting alternatives.
|
||||
cover: android.png
|
||||
cover: android.webp
|
||||
schema:
|
||||
-
|
||||
"@context": http://schema.org
|
||||
@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ DivestOS also includes kernel patches from GrapheneOS and enables all available
|
||||
|
||||
DivestOS implements some system hardening patches originally developed for GrapheneOS. DivestOS 16.0 and higher implements GrapheneOS's [`INTERNET`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) and SENSORS permission toggle, [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), [exec-spawning](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/#additional-hardening), [JNI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_Native_Interface) [constification](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Const_(computer_programming)), and partial [bionic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bionic_(software)) hardening patchsets. 17.1 and higher features GrapheneOS's per-network full [MAC randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address#Randomization) option, [`ptrace_scope`](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.html) control, and automatic reboot/Wi-Fi/Bluetooth [timeout options](https://grapheneos.org/features).
|
||||
|
||||
DivestOS uses F-Droid as its default app store. Normally, we would recommend avoiding F-Droid due to its numerous [security issues](#f-droid). However, doing so on DivestOS isn't viable; the developers update their apps via their own F-Droid repositories ([DivestOS Official](https://divestos.org/fdroid/official/?fingerprint=E4BE8D6ABFA4D9D4FEEF03CDDA7FF62A73FD64B75566F6DD4E5E577550BE8467) and [DivestOS WebView](https://divestos.org/fdroid/webview/?fingerprint=FB426DA1750A53D7724C8A582B4D34174E64A84B38940E5D5A802E1DFF9A40D2)). We recommend disabling the official F-Droid app and using [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) with the DivestOS repositories enabled to keep those components up to date. For other apps, our recommended methods of obtaining them still apply.
|
||||
DivestOS uses F-Droid as its default app store. We normally [recommend avoiding F-Droid](#f-droid), but doing so on DivestOS isn't viable; the developers update their apps via their own F-Droid repositories ([DivestOS Official](https://divestos.org/fdroid/official/?fingerprint=E4BE8D6ABFA4D9D4FEEF03CDDA7FF62A73FD64B75566F6DD4E5E577550BE8467) and [DivestOS WebView](https://divestos.org/fdroid/webview/?fingerprint=FB426DA1750A53D7724C8A582B4D34174E64A84B38940E5D5A802E1DFF9A40D2)). We recommend disabling the official F-Droid app and using [F-Droid Basic](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.basic/) **with the DivestOS repositories enabled** to keep those components up to date. For other apps, our recommended methods of obtaining them still apply.
|
||||
|
||||
!!! warning
|
||||
|
||||
@ -175,13 +175,13 @@ Google Pixel phones are the **only** devices we recommend for purchase. Pixel ph
|
||||
|
||||
**Google Pixel** devices are known to have good security and properly support [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), even when installing custom operating systems.
|
||||
|
||||
Beginning with the **Pixel 6** and **6 Pro**, Pixel devices receive a minimum of 5 years of guaranteed security updates, ensuring a much longer lifespan compared to the 2-4 years competing OEMs typically offer.
|
||||
Beginning with the **Pixel 8** and **8 Pro**, Pixel devices receive a minimum of 7 years of guaranteed security updates, ensuring a much longer lifespan compared to the 2-5 years competing OEMs typically offer.
|
||||
|
||||
[:material-shopping: Store](https://store.google.com/category/phones){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
|
||||
Secure Elements like the Titan M2 are more limited than the processor's Trusted Execution Environment used by most other phones as they are only used for secrets storage, hardware attestation, and rate limiting, not for running "trusted" programs. Phones without a Secure Element have to use the TEE for *all* of those functions, resulting in a larger attack surface.
|
||||
|
||||
Google Pixel phones use a TEE OS called Trusty which is [open-source](https://source.android.com/security/trusty#whyTrusty), unlike many other phones.
|
||||
Google Pixel phones use a TEE OS called Trusty which is [open source](https://source.android.com/security/trusty#whyTrusty), unlike many other phones.
|
||||
|
||||
The installation of GrapheneOS on a Pixel phone is easy with their [web installer](https://grapheneos.org/install/web). If you don't feel comfortable doing it yourself and are willing to spend a bit of extra money, check out the [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) as they come preloaded with GrapheneOS from the reputable [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/about) company.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ A few more tips for purchasing a Google Pixel:
|
||||
- Consider price beating options and specials offered at physical stores.
|
||||
- Look at online community bargain sites in your country. These can alert you to good sales.
|
||||
- Google provides a list showing the [support cycle](https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705) for each one of their devices. The price per day for a device can be calculated as: $\text{Cost} \over \text {EOL Date}-\text{Current Date}$, meaning that the longer use of the device the lower cost per day.
|
||||
- If the Pixel is unavailable in your region, the [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) can be shipped globally.
|
||||
|
||||
## General Apps
|
||||
|
||||
@ -216,40 +217,6 @@ We recommend a wide variety of Android apps throughout this site. The apps liste
|
||||
|
||||
When using Shelter, you are placing complete trust in its developer, as Shelter acts as a [Device Admin](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/admin/device-admin) to create the Work Profile, and it has extensive access to the data stored within the Work Profile.
|
||||
|
||||
### Auditor
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Auditor** is an app which leverages hardware security features to provide device integrity monitoring by actively validating the identity of a device and the integrity of its operating system. Currently, it only works with GrapheneOS or the stock operating system for [supported devices](https://attestation.app/about#device-support).
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://attestation.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://attestation.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://attestation.app/about){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://attestation.app/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://attestation.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.attestation.auditor.play)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases)
|
||||
- [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
|
||||
|
||||
Auditor performs attestation and intrusion detection by:
|
||||
|
||||
- Using a [Trust On First Use (TOFU)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_on_first_use) model between an *auditor* and *auditee*, the pair establish a private key in the [hardware-backed keystore](https://source.android.com/security/keystore/) of the *Auditor*.
|
||||
- The *auditor* can either be another instance of the Auditor app or the [Remote Attestation Service](https://attestation.app).
|
||||
- The *auditor* records the current state and configuration of the *auditee*.
|
||||
- Should tampering with the operating system of the *auditee* happen after the pairing is complete, the auditor will be aware of the change in the device state and configurations.
|
||||
- You will be alerted to the change.
|
||||
|
||||
No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
|
||||
|
||||
If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service.
|
||||
To make sure that your hardware and operating system is genuine, [perform local attestation](https://grapheneos.org/install/web#verifying-installation) immediately after the device has been installed and prior to any internet connection.
|
||||
|
||||
### Secure Camera
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
@ -305,6 +272,24 @@ Main privacy features include:
|
||||
|
||||
## Obtaining Applications
|
||||
|
||||
### Obtainium
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Obtainium** is an app manager which allows you to install and update apps directly from the developer's own releases page (i.e. GitHub, GitLab, the developer's website, etc.), rather than a centralized app store/repository. It supports automatic background updates on Android 12 and higher.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/ImranR98/Obtainium#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ImranR98/Obtainium){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/ImranR98){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ImranR98/Obtainium/releases)
|
||||
|
||||
Obtainium allows you to download APK installer files from a wide variety of sources, and it is up to you to ensure those sources and apps are legitimate. For example, using Obtainium to install Signal from [Signal's APK landing page](https://signal.org/android/apk/) should be fine, but installing from third-party APK repositories like Aptoide or APKPure may pose additional risks. The risk of installing a malicious *update* is lower, because Android itself verifies that all app updates are signed by the same developer as the existing app on your phone before installing them.
|
||||
|
||||
### GrapheneOS App Store
|
||||
|
||||
GrapheneOS's app store is available on [GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases). It supports Android 12 and above and is capable of updating itself. The app store has standalone applications built by the GrapheneOS project such as the [Auditor](https://attestation.app/), [Camera](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera), and [PDF Viewer](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer). If you are looking for these applications, we highly recommend that you get them from GrapheneOS's app store instead of the Play Store, as the apps on their store are signed by the GrapheneOS's project own signature that Google does not have access to.
|
||||
@ -320,6 +305,7 @@ The Google Play Store requires a Google account to login which is not great for
|
||||
**Aurora Store** is a Google Play Store client which does not require a Google Account, Google Play Services, or microG to download apps.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://auroraoss.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore/-/blob/master/POLICY.md){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
@ -330,7 +316,7 @@ Aurora Store does not allow you to download paid apps with their anonymous accou
|
||||
|
||||
### Manually with RSS Notifications
|
||||
|
||||
For apps that are released on platforms like GitHub and GitLab, you may be able to add an RSS feed to your [news aggregator](/news-aggregators) that will help you keep track of new releases.
|
||||
For apps that are released on platforms like GitHub and GitLab, you may be able to add an RSS feed to your [news aggregator](news-aggregators.md) that will help you keep track of new releases.
|
||||
|
||||
   
|
||||
|
||||
@ -381,17 +367,17 @@ If you download APK files to install manually, you can verify their signature wi
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right width=120px }
|
||||
|
||||
==We do **not** currently recommend F-Droid as a way to obtain apps.== F-Droid is often recommended as an alternative to Google Play, particularly in the privacy community. The option to add third-party repositories and not be confined to Google's walled garden has led to its popularity. F-Droid additionally has [reproducible builds](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Reproducible_Builds/) for some applications and is dedicated to free and open-source software. However, there are [notable problems](https://privsec.dev/posts/android/f-droid-security-issues/) with the official F-Droid client, their quality control, and how they build, sign, and deliver packages.
|
||||
==We only recommend F-Droid as a way to obtain apps which cannot be obtained via the means above.== F-Droid is often recommended as an alternative to Google Play, particularly in the privacy community. The option to add third-party repositories and not be confined to Google's walled garden has led to its popularity. F-Droid additionally has [reproducible builds](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Reproducible_Builds/) for some applications and is dedicated to free and open-source software. However, there are some security-related downsides to how F-Droid builds, signs, and delivers packages:
|
||||
|
||||
Due to their process of building apps, apps in the official F-Droid repository often fall behind on updates. F-Droid maintainers also reuse package IDs while signing apps with their own keys, which is not ideal as it gives the F-Droid team ultimate trust.
|
||||
Due to their process of building apps, apps in the official F-Droid repository often fall behind on updates. F-Droid maintainers also reuse package IDs while signing apps with their own keys, which is not ideal as it gives the F-Droid team ultimate trust. Additionally, the requirements for an app to be included in the official F-Droid repo are less strict than other app stores like Google Play, meaning that F-Droid tends to host a lot more apps which are older, unmaintained, or otherwise no longer meet [modern security standards](https://developer.android.com/google/play/requirements/target-sdk).
|
||||
|
||||
Other popular third-party repositories such as [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) alleviate some of these concerns. The IzzyOnDroid repository pulls builds directly from GitHub and is the next best thing to the developers' own repositories. However, it is not something that we can recommend, as apps are typically [removed](https://github.com/vfsfitvnm/ViMusic/issues/240#issuecomment-1225564446) from that respository when they make it to the main F-Droid repository. While that makes sense (since the goal of that particular repository is to host apps before they're accepted into the main F-Droid repository), it can leave you with installed apps which no longer receive updates.
|
||||
Other popular third-party repositories for F-Droid such as [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) alleviate some of these concerns. The IzzyOnDroid repository pulls builds directly from GitHub and is the next best thing to the developers' own repositories. However, it is not something that we can fully recommend, as apps are typically [removed](https://github.com/vfsfitvnm/ViMusic/issues/240#issuecomment-1225564446) from that repository if they are later added to the main F-Droid repository. While that makes sense (since the goal of that particular repository is to host apps before they're accepted into the main F-Droid repository), it can leave you with installed apps which no longer receive updates.
|
||||
|
||||
That said, the [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/) and [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) repositories are home to countless apps, so they can be a useful tool to search for and discover open-source apps that you can then download through Play Store, Aurora Store, or by getting the APK directly from the developer. It is important to keep in mind that some apps in these repositories have not been updated in years and may rely on unsupported libraries, among other things, posing a potential security risk. You should use your best judgement when looking for new apps via this method.
|
||||
That said, the [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/) and [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) repositories are home to countless apps, so they can be a useful tool to search for and discover open-source apps that you can then download through other means such as the Play Store, Aurora Store, or by getting the APK directly from the developer. You should use your best judgement when looking for new apps via this method, and keep an eye on how frequently the app is updated. Outdated apps may rely on unsupported libraries, among other things, posing a potential security risk.
|
||||
|
||||
!!! note
|
||||
!!! note "F-Droid Basic"
|
||||
|
||||
In some rare cases, the developer of an app will only distribute it through F-Droid ([Gadgetbridge](https://gadgetbridge.org/) is one example of this). If you really need an app like that, we recommend using [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) instead of the official F-Droid app to obtain it.
|
||||
In some rare cases, the developer of an app will only distribute it through F-Droid ([Gadgetbridge](https://gadgetbridge.org/) is one example of this). If you really need an app like that, we recommend using the newer [F-Droid Basic](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.basic/) client instead of the original F-Droid app to obtain it. F-Droid Basic can do unattended updates without privileged extension or root, and has a reduced feature set (limiting attack surface).
|
||||
|
||||
## Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -53,17 +53,21 @@ When you sign in with OAuth, it will open a login page with the provider you cho
|
||||
|
||||
The main advantages are:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Security**: no risk of being involved in a [data breach](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_breach) because the website does not store your credentials.
|
||||
- **Security**: you don't have to trust the security practices of the service you're logging into when it comes to storing your login credentials, because they are stored with the external OAuth provider, which when it comes to services like Apple and Google typically follow the best security practices, continuously audit their authentication systems, and don't store credentials inappropriately (such as in plain text).
|
||||
- **Ease of use**: multiple accounts are managed by a single login.
|
||||
|
||||
But there are disadvantages:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Privacy**: the OAuth provider you log in with will know the services you use.
|
||||
- **Centralization**: if the account you use for OAuth is compromised or you aren't able to login to it, all other accounts connected to it are affected.
|
||||
- **Centralization**: if the account you use for OAuth is compromised, or you aren't able to log in to it, all other accounts connected to it are affected.
|
||||
|
||||
OAuth authentication can be especially useful in those situations where you could benefit from deeper integration between services. Our recommendation is to limit using OAuth to only where you need it, and always protect the main account with [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md).
|
||||
OAuth can be especially useful in those situations where you could benefit from deeper integration between services. Our recommendation is to limit using OAuth to only where you need it, and always protect the main account with [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md).
|
||||
|
||||
All the services that use OAuth will be as secure as your underlying provider's account. For example, if you want to secure an account with a hardware key, but that service doesn't support hardware keys, you can secure the account you use with OAuth with a hardware key instead, and now you essentially have hardware MFA on all your accounts. It is worth noting though that weak authentication on your OAuth provider account means that any account tied to that login will also be weak.
|
||||
All the services that use OAuth will be as secure as your underlying OAuth provider's account. For example, if you want to secure an account with a hardware key, but that service doesn't support hardware keys, you can secure the account you use with OAuth with a hardware key instead, and now you essentially have hardware MFA on all your accounts. It is worth noting though that weak authentication on your OAuth provider account means that any account tied to that login will also be weak.
|
||||
|
||||
There is an additional danger when using *Sign in with Google*, *Facebook*, or another service, which is that typically the OAuth process allows for *bidirectional* data sharing. For example, logging in to a forum with your Twitter account could grant that forum access to do things on your Twitter account such as post, read your messages, or access other personal data. OAuth providers will typically present you with a list of things you are granting the external service access to, and you should always ensure that you read through that list and don't inadvertently grant the external service access to anything it doesn't require.
|
||||
|
||||
Malicious applications, particularly on mobile devices where the application has access to the WebView session used for logging in to the OAuth provider, can also abuse this process by hijacking your session with the OAuth provider and gaining access to your OAuth account through those means. Using the *Sign in with* option with any provider should usually be considered a matter of convenience that you only use with services you trust to not be actively malicious.
|
||||
|
||||
### Phone number
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ schema:
|
||||
mainEntity:
|
||||
-
|
||||
"@type": Question
|
||||
name: Is open source software inherently secure?
|
||||
name: Is open-source software inherently secure?
|
||||
acceptedAnswer:
|
||||
"@type": Answer
|
||||
text: |
|
||||
|
@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ To minimize the damage that a malicious piece of software *could* do, you should
|
||||
|
||||
Mobile operating systems generally have better application sandboxing than desktop operating systems: Apps can't obtain root access, and require permission for access to system resources.
|
||||
|
||||
Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS has similar sandboxing capabilities to Android, and macOS has full system permission control (and developers can opt-in to sandboxing for applications). However, these operating systems do transmit identifying information to their respective OEMs. Linux tends to not submit information to system vendors, but it has poor protection against exploits and malicious apps. This can be mitigated somewhat with specialized distributions which make significant use of virtual machines or containers, such as [Qubes OS](../../desktop/#qubes-os).
|
||||
Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS has similar sandboxing capabilities to Android, and macOS has full system permission control (and developers can opt-in to sandboxing for applications). However, these operating systems do transmit identifying information to their respective OEMs. Linux tends to not submit information to system vendors, but it has poor protection against exploits and malicious apps. This can be mitigated somewhat with specialized distributions which make significant use of virtual machines or containers, such as [Qubes OS](../desktop.md#qubes-os).
|
||||
|
||||
<span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks</span>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -144,5 +144,5 @@ You must always consider the risks of trying to bypass censorship, the potential
|
||||
[^1]: Wikipedia: [*Mass Surveillance*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass_surveillance) and [*Surveillance*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance).
|
||||
[^2]: United States Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: [*Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215*](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/ec542143-1079-424a-84b3-acc354698560/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf)
|
||||
[^3]: Wikipedia: [*Surveillance capitalism*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance_capitalism)
|
||||
[^4]: "[Enumerating badness](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/)" (or, "listing all the bad things that we know about"), as many adblockers and antivirus programs do, fails to adequately protect you from new and unknown threats because they have not yet been added to the filter list. You should also employ other mitigation techniques.
|
||||
[^4]: "[Enumerating badness](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/)" (or, "listing all the bad things that we know about"), as many content blockers and antivirus programs do, fails to adequately protect you from new and unknown threats because they have not yet been added to the filter list. You should also employ other mitigation techniques.
|
||||
[^5]: United Nations: [*Universal Declaration of Human Rights*](https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights).
|
||||
|
@ -17,6 +17,16 @@ There is another standard which is popular with business called [S/MIME](https:/
|
||||
|
||||
Even if you use OpenPGP, it does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. This is why we recommend [instant messengers](../real-time-communication.md) which implement forward secrecy over email for person-to-person communications whenever possible.
|
||||
|
||||
## What is the Web Key Directory standard?
|
||||
|
||||
The Web Key Directory (WKD) standard allows email clients to discover the OpenPGP key for other mailboxes, even those hosted on a different provider. Email clients which support WKD will ask the recipient's server for a key based on the email address' domain name. For example, if you emailed `jonah@privacyguides.org`, your email client would ask `privacyguides.org` for Jonah's OpenPGP key, and if `privacyguides.org` has a key for that account, your message would be automatically encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
In addition to the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md) which support WKD, some webmail providers also support WKD. Whether *your own* key is published to WKD for others to use depends on your domain configuration. If you use an [email provider](../email.md#openpgp-compatible-services) which supports WKD, such as Proton Mail or Mailbox.org, they can publish your OpenPGP key on their domain for you.
|
||||
|
||||
If you use your own custom domain, you will need to configure WKD separately. If you control your domain name, you can set up WKD regardless of your email provider. One easy way to do this is to use the "[WKD as a Service](https://keys.openpgp.org/about/usage#wkd-as-a-service)" feature from keys.openpgp.org, by setting a CNAME record on the `openpgpkey` subdomain of your domain pointed to `wkd.keys.openpgp.org`, then uploading your key to [keys.openpgp.org](https://keys.openpgp.org/). Alternatively, you can [self-host WKD on your own web server](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKDHosting).
|
||||
|
||||
If you use a shared domain from a provider which doesn't support WKD, like @gmail.com, you won't be able to share your OpenPGP key with others via this method.
|
||||
|
||||
### What Email Clients Support E2EE?
|
||||
|
||||
Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and SMTP can be used with any of the [email clients we recommend](../email-clients.md). Depending on the authentication method, this may lead to the decrease security if either the provider or the email client does not support OATH or a bridge application as [multi-factor authentication](multi-factor-authentication.md) is not possible with plain password authentication.
|
||||
@ -25,7 +35,7 @@ Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and S
|
||||
|
||||
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
|
||||
|
||||
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard so as to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.
|
||||
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.
|
||||
|
||||
## Email Metadata Overview
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ To answer this question, it's important to identify who might want to target you
|
||||
|
||||
*Make a list of your adversaries or those who might want to get ahold of your assets. Your list may include individuals, a government agency, or corporations.*
|
||||
|
||||
Depending on who your adversaries are, under some circumstances, this list might be something you want to destroy after you're done security planning.
|
||||
Depending on who your adversaries are, this list might be something you want to destroy after you've finished developing your threat model.
|
||||
|
||||
### How likely is it that I will need to protect it?
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -5,70 +5,106 @@ icon: material/vpn
|
||||
description: Virtual Private Networks shift risk away from your ISP to a third-party you trust. You should keep these things in mind.
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit somewhere else in the world. An ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (i.e. modem).
|
||||
Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit somewhere else in the world.
|
||||
|
||||
Encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, so they may not be able to see exactly what you're posting or reading, but they can get an idea of the [domains you request](../advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).
|
||||
Normally, an ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (i.e. modem). Encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, so they may not be able to see exactly what you're posting or reading, but they can get an idea of the [domains you request](../advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).
|
||||
|
||||
A VPN can help as it can shift trust to a server somewhere else in the world. As a result, the ISP then only sees that you are connected to a VPN and nothing about the activity that you're passing into it.
|
||||
Using a VPN hides even this information from your ISP, by shifting the trust you place in your network to a server somewhere else in the world. As a result, the ISP then only sees that you are connected to a VPN and nothing about the activity that you're passing through it.
|
||||
|
||||
!!! note
|
||||
|
||||
When we refer to "Virtual Private Networks" on this website, we are usually referring to **commercial** [VPN providers](../vpn.md), who you pay a monthly fee to in exchange for routing your internet traffic securely through their public servers. There are many other forms of VPN, such as ones you host yourself or ones operated by workplaces which allow you to securely connect to internal/employee network resources, however, these VPNs are usually designed for accessing remote networks securely, rather than protecting the privacy of your internet connection.
|
||||
|
||||
## How does a VPN work?
|
||||
|
||||
VPNs encrypt your traffic between your device and a server owned by your VPN provider. From the perspective of anyone between you and the VPN server, it looks like you're connecting to the VPN server. From the perspective of anyone between the VPN server and your destination site, all they can see is the VPN server connecting to the website.
|
||||
|
||||
``` mermaid
|
||||
flowchart LR
|
||||
763931["Your Device<div>(with VPN Client)</div>"] ===|"VPN Encryption"| 404512{"VPN Server"}
|
||||
404512 -.-|"No VPN Encryption"| 593753((("The Internet\n(Your Destination)")))
|
||||
subgraph 763931["Your Device<div>(with VPN Client)</div>"]
|
||||
end
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Note that a VPN does not add any security or encryption to your traffic between the VPN server and your destination on the internet. To access a website securely you **must** still ensure HTTPS is in use regardless of whether you use a VPN.
|
||||
|
||||
## Should I use a VPN?
|
||||
|
||||
**Yes**, unless you are already using Tor. A VPN does two things: shifting the risks from your Internet Service Provider to itself and hiding your IP from a third-party service.
|
||||
|
||||
VPNs cannot encrypt data outside of the connection between your device and the VPN server. VPN providers can see and modify your traffic the same way your ISP could. And there is no way to verify a VPN provider's "no logging" policies in any way.
|
||||
|
||||
However, they do hide your actual IP from a third-party service, provided that there are no IP leaks. They help you blend in with others and mitigate IP based tracking.
|
||||
|
||||
## When shouldn't I use a VPN?
|
||||
|
||||
Using a VPN in cases where you're using your [known identity](common-threats.md#common-misconceptions) is unlikely be useful.
|
||||
|
||||
Doing so may trigger spam and fraud detection systems, such as if you were to log into your bank's website.
|
||||
|
||||
## What about encryption?
|
||||
|
||||
Encryption offered by VPN providers are between your devices and their servers. It guarantees that this specific link is secure. This is a step up from using unencrypted proxies where an adversary on the network can intercept the communications between your devices and said proxies and modify them. However, encryption between your apps or browsers with the service providers are not handled by this encryption.
|
||||
|
||||
In order to keep what you actually do on the websites you visit private and secure, you must use HTTPS. This will keep your passwords, session tokens, and queries safe from the VPN provider. Consider enabling "HTTPS everywhere" in your browser to mitigate downgrade attacks like [SSL Strip](https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Marlinspike/BlackHat-DC-09-Marlinspike-Defeating-SSL.pdf).
|
||||
|
||||
## Should I use encrypted DNS with a VPN?
|
||||
|
||||
Unless your VPN provider hosts the encrypted DNS servers, **no**. Using DOH/DOT (or any other form of encrypted DNS) with third-party servers will simply add more entities to trust and does **absolutely nothing** to improve your privacy/security. Your VPN provider can still see which websites you visit based on the IP addresses and other methods. Instead of just trusting your VPN provider, you are now trusting both the VPN provider and the DNS provider.
|
||||
|
||||
A common reason to recommend encrypted DNS is that it helps against DNS spoofing. However, your browser should already be checking for [TLS certificates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Digital_certificates) with **HTTPS** and warn you about it. If you are not using **HTTPS**, then an adversary can still just modify anything other than your DNS queries and the end result will be little different.
|
||||
|
||||
Needless to say, **you shouldn't use encrypted DNS with Tor**. This would direct all of your DNS requests through a single circuit and would allow the encrypted DNS provider to deanonymize you.
|
||||
|
||||
## Should I use Tor *and* a VPN?
|
||||
|
||||
By using a VPN with Tor, you're creating essentially a permanent entry node, often with a money trail attached. This provides zero additional benefits to you, while increasing the attack surface of your connection dramatically. If you wish to hide your Tor usage from your ISP or your government, Tor has a built-in solution for that: Tor bridges. [Read more about Tor bridges and why using a VPN is not necessary](../advanced/tor-overview.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## What if I need anonymity?
|
||||
|
||||
VPNs cannot provide anonymity. Your VPN provider will still see your real IP address, and often has a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. You cannot rely on "no logging" policies to protect your data. Use [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) instead.
|
||||
|
||||
## What about VPN providers that provide Tor nodes?
|
||||
|
||||
Do not use that feature. The point of using Tor is that you do not trust your VPN provider. Currently Tor only supports the [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol) protocol. [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol) (used in [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC) for voice and video sharing, the new [HTTP3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) protocol, etc.), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol) and other packets will be dropped. To compensate for this, VPN providers typically will route all non-TCP packets through their VPN server (your first hop). This is the case with [ProtonVPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn/). Additionally, when using this Tor over VPN setup, you do not have control over other important Tor features such as [Isolated Destination Address](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (using a different Tor circuit for every domain you visit).
|
||||
|
||||
The feature should be viewed as a convenient way to access the Tor Network, not to stay anonymous. For proper anonymity, use the Tor Browser, TorSocks, or a Tor gateway.
|
||||
|
||||
## When are VPNs useful?
|
||||
|
||||
A VPN may still be useful to you in a variety of scenarios, such as:
|
||||
**Yes**, almost certainly. A VPN has many advantages, including:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Hiding your traffic from **only** your Internet Service Provider.
|
||||
1. Hiding your downloads (such as torrents) from your ISP and anti-piracy organizations.
|
||||
1. Hiding your IP from third-party websites and services, preventing IP based tracking.
|
||||
1. Hiding your IP from third-party websites and services, helping you blend in and preventing IP based tracking.
|
||||
1. Allowing you to bypass geo-restrictions on certain content.
|
||||
|
||||
For situations like these, or if you have another compelling reason, the VPN providers we listed above are who we think are the most trustworthy. However, using a VPN provider still means you're *trusting* the provider. In pretty much any other scenario you should be using a secure**-by-design** tool such as Tor.
|
||||
VPNs can provide *some* of the same benefits Tor provides, such as hiding your IP from the websites you visit and geographically shifting your network traffic, and good VPN providers will not cooperate with e.g. legal authorities from oppressive regimes, especially if you choose a VPN provider outside your own jurisdiction.
|
||||
|
||||
## Sources and Further Reading
|
||||
VPNs cannot encrypt data outside the connection between your device and the VPN server. VPN providers can also see and modify your traffic the same way your ISP could, so there is still a level of trust you are placing in them. And there is no way to verify a VPN provider's "no logging" policies in any way.
|
||||
|
||||
1. [VPN - a Very Precarious Narrative](https://schub.io/blog/2019/04/08/very-precarious-narrative.html) by Dennis Schubert
|
||||
1. [Tor Network Overview](../advanced/tor-overview.md)
|
||||
1. [IVPN Privacy Guides](https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides)
|
||||
1. ["Do I need a VPN?"](https://www.doineedavpn.com), a tool developed by IVPN to challenge aggressive VPN marketing by helping individuals decide if a VPN is right for them.
|
||||
## When isn't a VPN suitable?
|
||||
|
||||
Using a VPN in cases where you're using your [real-life or well-known identity](common-misconceptions.md#complicated-is-better) online is unlikely be useful. Doing so may trigger spam and fraud detection systems, such as if you were to log into your bank's website.
|
||||
|
||||
It's important to remember that a VPN will not provide you with absolute anonymity, because the VPN provider itself will still see your real IP address, destination website information, and often has a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. You can't rely on "no logging" policies to protect your data from anyone who is able to protect. If you need complete safety from the network itself, consider using [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) in addition to or instead of a VPN.
|
||||
|
||||
You also should not trust a VPN to secure your connection to an unencrypted, HTTP destination. In order to keep what you actually do on the websites you visit private and secure, you must use HTTPS. This will keep your passwords, session tokens, and queries safe from the VPN provider and other potential adversaries in between the VPN server and your destination. You should enable HTTPS-only mode in your browser (if it's supported) to mitigate attacks which try to downgrade your connection from HTTPS to HTTP.
|
||||
|
||||
## Should I use encrypted DNS with a VPN?
|
||||
|
||||
Unless your VPN provider hosts the encrypted DNS servers themselves, **probably not**. Using DOH/DOT (or any other form of encrypted DNS) with third-party servers will simply add more entities to trust. Your VPN provider can still see which websites you visit based on the IP addresses and other methods. All this being said, there may be some advantages to enabling encrypted DNS in order to enable other security features in your browser, such as ECH. Browser technologies which are reliant on in-browser encrypted DNS are relatively new and not yet widespread, so whether they are relevant to you in particular is an exercise we will leave to you to research independently.
|
||||
|
||||
Another common reason encrypted DNS is recommended is that it prevents DNS spoofing. However, your browser should already be checking for [TLS certificates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Digital_certificates) with **HTTPS** and warn you about it. If you are not using **HTTPS**, then an adversary can still just modify anything other than your DNS queries and the end result will be little different.
|
||||
|
||||
## Should I use Tor *and* a VPN?
|
||||
|
||||
Maybe, Tor is not necessarily suitable for everybody in the first place. Consider your [threat model](threat-modeling.md), because if your adversary is not capable of extracting information from your VPN provider, using a VPN alone may provide enough protection.
|
||||
|
||||
If you do use Tor then you are *probably* best off connecting to the Tor network via a commercial VPN provider. However, this is a complex subject which we've written more about on our [Tor overview](../advanced/tor-overview.md) page.
|
||||
|
||||
## Should I access Tor through VPN providers that provide "Tor nodes"?
|
||||
|
||||
You should not use that feature: The primary advantage of using Tor is that you do not trust your VPN provider, which is negated when you use Tor nodes hosted by your VPN instead of connecting directly to Tor from your computer.
|
||||
|
||||
Currently, Tor only supports the TCP protocol. UDP (used by [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC), [HTTP3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3), and other protocols), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol), and other packets will be dropped. To compensate for this, VPN providers typically will route all non-TCP packets through their VPN server (your first hop). This is the case with [ProtonVPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn/). Additionally, when using this Tor over VPN setup, you do not have control over other important Tor features such as [Isolated Destination Address](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (using a different Tor circuit for every domain you visit).
|
||||
|
||||
The feature should be viewed as a *convenient* way to access hidden services on Tor, not to stay anonymous. For proper anonymity, use the actual [Tor Browser](../tor.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## Commercial VPN Ownership
|
||||
|
||||
Most VPN services are owned by the same [few companies](https://vpnpro.com/blog/hidden-vpn-owners-unveiled-97-vpns-23-companies/). These shady companies run lots of smaller VPN services to create the illusion that you have more choice than you actually do and to maximize profit. Typically, these providers that feed into their shell company have terrible privacy policies and shouldn't be trusted with your internet traffic. You should be very strict about which provider you decide to use.
|
||||
|
||||
You should also be wary that many VPN review sites are merely advertising vehicles open to the highest bidder. ==Privacy Guides does not make money from recommending external products, and never uses affiliate programs.==
|
||||
|
||||
[Our VPN Recommendations](../vpn.md){ .md-button }
|
||||
|
||||
## Modern VPN Alternatives
|
||||
|
||||
Recently, some attempts have been made by various organizations to address some issues which centralized VPNs have. These technologies are relatively new, but worth keeping an eye on as the field develops.
|
||||
|
||||
### Multi-Party Relays
|
||||
|
||||
Multi-Party Relays (MPRs) use multiple nodes owned by different parties, such that no individual party knows both who you are and what you're connecting to. This is the basic idea behind Tor, but now there are some paid services that try to emulate this model.
|
||||
|
||||
MPRs seek to solve a problem inherent to VPNs: the fact that you must trust them completely. They accomplish this goal by segmenting the responsibilities between two or more different companies. For example, Apple's iCloud+ Private Relay routes your traffic through two servers:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Firstly, a server operated by Apple.
|
||||
|
||||
This server is able to see your device's IP when you connect to it, and has knowledge of your payment information and Apple ID tied to your iCloud subscription. However, it is unable to see what website you are connecting to.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Secondly, a server operated by a partner CDN, such as Cloudflare or Fastly.
|
||||
|
||||
This server actually makes the connection to your destination website, but has no knowledge of your device. The only IP address it knows about is Apple's server's.
|
||||
|
||||
Other MPRs run by different companies like Google or INVISV operate in a very similar manner. This protection by segmentation only exists if you trust the two companies to not collude with each other to deanonymize you.
|
||||
|
||||
### Decentralized VPNs
|
||||
|
||||
Another attempt at solving the issues with centralized VPN services are dVPNs. These are based on blockchain technology and claim to eliminate trust in a single party by distributing the nodes across lots of different people. However, many times a dVPN will default to a single node, meaning you need to trust that node completely, just like a traditional VPN. Unlike a traditional VPN, this one node that can see all your traffic is a random person instead of your VPN provider that can be audited and has legal responsibilities to uphold their privacy policy. Multi-hop is needed to solve this, but that comes with a stability and performance cost.
|
||||
|
||||
Another consideration is legal liability. The exit node will need to deal with legal problems from misuse of the network, an issue that the Tor network has contended with for its entire existence. This discourages regular people from running nodes and makes it more attractive for a malicious actor with lots of resources to host one. This is a big problem if the service is single-node, as the potentially malicious exit node can see who you are and what you're connecting to.
|
||||
|
||||
Many dVPNs are used to push a cryptocurrency rather than to make the best service. They also tend to be smaller networks with fewer nodes, making them more vulnerable to [Sybil attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sybil_attack).
|
||||
|
||||
## Related VPN Information
|
||||
|
||||
@ -76,3 +112,4 @@ For situations like these, or if you have another compelling reason, the VPN pro
|
||||
- [Free VPN App Investigation](https://www.top10vpn.com/free-vpn-app-investigation/)
|
||||
- [Hidden VPN owners unveiled: 101 VPN products run by just 23 companies](https://vpnpro.com/blog/hidden-vpn-owners-unveiled-97-vpns-23-companies/)
|
||||
- [This Chinese company is secretly behind 24 popular apps seeking dangerous permissions](https://vpnpro.com/blog/chinese-company-secretly-behind-popular-apps-seeking-dangerous-permissions/)
|
||||
- [VPN - a Very Precarious Narrative](https://schub.io/blog/2019/04/08/very-precarious-narrative.html) by Dennis Schubert
|
||||
|
@ -50,4 +50,4 @@ Privacy is something we need to have baked into the [software and services](../t
|
||||
|
||||
- [Why Privacy Matters](https://www.amazon.com/Why-Privacy-Matters-Neil-Richards/dp/0190939044) (2021) by Neil Richards
|
||||
- [The New Oil: Why Privacy & Security Matter](https://thenewoil.org/en/guides/prologue/why/)
|
||||
- [@Thorin-Oakenpants on GitHub](https://github.com/privacytools/privacytools.io/issues/1760#issuecomment-597497298)
|
||||
- [@Thorin-Oakenpants on Anonymity vs Privacy vs Security](https://code.privacyguides.dev/privacyguides/privacytools.io/issues/1760#issuecomment-10452)
|
||||
|
@ -2,36 +2,35 @@
|
||||
title: "Calendar Sync"
|
||||
icon: material/calendar
|
||||
description: Calendars contain some of your most sensitive data; use products that implement encryption at rest.
|
||||
cover: calendar.png
|
||||
cover: calendar.webp
|
||||
---
|
||||
Calendars contain some of your most sensitive data; use products that implement E2EE at rest to prevent a provider from reading them.
|
||||
|
||||
## Tutanota
|
||||
## Tuta
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Tutanota** offers a free and encrypted calendar across their supported platforms. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, multi-factor authentication, and [more](https://tutanota.com/calendar-app-comparison/).
|
||||
**Tuta** offers a free and encrypted calendar across their supported platforms. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, multi-factor authentication, and [more](https://tuta.com/calendar-app-comparison/).
|
||||
|
||||
Multiple calendars and extended sharing functionality is limited to paid subscribers.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tutanota.com/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://tutanota.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://tutanota.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tuta.com/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://tuta.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://tuta.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://tutanota.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://tuta.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/tutanota/id922429609)
|
||||
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
|
||||
- [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.tutanota.Tutanota)
|
||||
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.tutanota.com/)
|
||||
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tuta.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tuta.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tuta.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
|
||||
- [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/com.tutanota.Tutanota)
|
||||
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://app.tuta.com/)
|
||||
|
||||
## Proton Calendar
|
||||
|
||||
@ -39,7 +38,7 @@ Calendars contain some of your most sensitive data; use products that implement
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Proton Calendar** is an encrypted calendar service available to Proton members via web or mobile clients. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, and [more](https://proton.me/support/proton-calendar-guide). Those on the free tier get access to a single calendar, whereas paid subscribers can create up to 20 calendars. Extended sharing functionality is also limited to paid subscribers.
|
||||
**Proton Calendar** is an encrypted calendar service available to Proton members via web or mobile clients. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, and [more](https://proton.me/support/proton-calendar-guide). Those on the free tier get access to 3 calendars, whereas paid subscribers can create up to 25 calendars. Extended sharing functionality is also limited to paid subscribers.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -49,8 +48,11 @@ Calendars contain some of your most sensitive data; use products that implement
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=me.proton.android.calendar)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id1514709943)
|
||||
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://calendar.proton.me)
|
||||
|
||||
Unfortunately, as of January 2024 Proton has [still](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/proton-calendar-is-not-open-source-mobile/14656/8) not released the source code for their mobile Calendar app on Android or iOS. Proton Calendar's web client is open source.
|
||||
|
||||
## Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
|
||||
|
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ meta_title: "The Best Private and Secure Cloud Storage Providers - Privacy Guide
|
||||
title: "Cloud Storage"
|
||||
icon: material/file-cloud
|
||||
description: Many cloud storage providers require your trust that they will not look at your files. These are private alternatives!
|
||||
cover: cloud.png
|
||||
cover: cloud.webp
|
||||
---
|
||||
Many cloud storage providers require your full trust that they will not look at your files. The alternatives listed below eliminate the need for trust by implementing secure E2EE.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ If these alternatives do not fit your needs, we suggest you look into using encr
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=me.proton.android.drive)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1509667851)
|
||||
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://proton.me/drive/download)
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://proton.me/drive/download)
|
||||
|
||||
The Proton Drive web application has been independently audited by Securitum in [2021](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps), full details were not made available, but Securitum's letter of attestation states:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -92,7 +94,7 @@ They have also received the Digital Trust Label, a certification from the [Swiss
|
||||
|
||||
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
|
||||
|
||||
- Clients should be open-source.
|
||||
- Clients should be open source.
|
||||
- Clients should be audited in their entirety by an independent third-party.
|
||||
- Should offer native clients for Linux, Android, Windows, macOS, and iOS.
|
||||
- These clients should integrate with native OS tools for cloud storage providers, such as Files app integration on iOS, or DocumentsProvider functionality on Android.
|
||||
|
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
meta_title: "Private Cryptocurrency Blockchains - Privacy Guides"
|
||||
title: Cryptocurrency
|
||||
icon: material/bank-circle
|
||||
cover: cryptocurrency.png
|
||||
cover: cryptocurrency.webp
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Making payments online is one of the biggest challenges to privacy. These cryptocurrencies provide transaction privacy by default (something which is **not** guaranteed by the majority of cryptocurrencies), provided you have a strong understanding of how to make private payments effectively. We strongly encourage you first read our payments overview article before making any purchases:
|
||||
|
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ meta_title: "Remove PII with Metadata Scrubbers and Data Redaction Tools - Priva
|
||||
title: "Data and Metadata Redaction"
|
||||
icon: material/tag-remove
|
||||
description: Use these tools to remove metadata like GPS location and other identifying information from photos and files you share.
|
||||
cover: data-redaction.png
|
||||
cover: data-redaction.webp
|
||||
---
|
||||
When sharing files, be sure to remove associated metadata. Image files commonly include [Exif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exif) data. Photos sometimes even include GPS coordinates in the file metadata.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ When sharing files, be sure to remove associated metadata. Image files commonly
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**MAT2** is free software, which allows the metadata to be removed from image, audio, torrent, and document file types. It provides both a command line tool and a graphical user interface via an [extension for Nautilus](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/tree/master/nautilus), the default file manager of [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), and [Dolphin](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/tree/master/dolphin), the default file manager of [KDE](https://kde.org).
|
||||
**MAT2** is free software, which allows the metadata to be removed from image, audio, torrent, and document file types. It provides both a command line tool and a graphical user interface via an extension for [Dolphin](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/tree/master/dolphin), the default file manager of [KDE](https://kde.org).
|
||||
|
||||
On Linux, a third-party graphical tool [Metadata Cleaner](https://gitlab.com/rmnvgr/metadata-cleaner) powered by MAT2 exists and is [available on Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/fr.romainvigier.MetadataCleaner).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -54,19 +54,19 @@ When sharing files, be sure to remove associated metadata. Image files commonly
|
||||
|
||||
The metadata that is erased depends on the image's file type:
|
||||
|
||||
* **JPEG**: ICC Profile, Exif, Photoshop Image Resources and XMP/ExtendedXMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
|
||||
* **PNG**: ICC Profile, Exif and XMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
|
||||
* **WebP**: ICC Profile, Exif and XMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
|
||||
- **JPEG**: ICC Profile, Exif, Photoshop Image Resources and XMP/ExtendedXMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
|
||||
- **PNG**: ICC Profile, Exif and XMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
|
||||
- **WebP**: ICC Profile, Exif and XMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
|
||||
|
||||
After processing the images, ExifEraser provides you with a full report about what exactly was removed from each image.
|
||||
|
||||
The app offers multiple ways to erase metadata from images. Namely:
|
||||
|
||||
* You can share an image from another application with ExifEraser.
|
||||
* Through the app itself, you can select a single image, multiple images at once, or even an entire directory.
|
||||
* It features a "Camera" option, which uses your operating system's camera app to take a photo, and then it removes the metadata from it.
|
||||
* It allows you to drag photos from another app into ExifEraser when they are both open in split-screen mode.
|
||||
* Lastly, it allows you to paste an image from your clipboard.
|
||||
- You can share an image from another application with ExifEraser.
|
||||
- Through the app itself, you can select a single image, multiple images at once, or even an entire directory.
|
||||
- It features a "Camera" option, which uses your operating system's camera app to take a photo, and then it removes the metadata from it.
|
||||
- It allows you to drag photos from another app into ExifEraser when they are both open in split-screen mode.
|
||||
- Lastly, it allows you to paste an image from your clipboard.
|
||||
|
||||
### Metapho (iOS)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -142,5 +142,5 @@ The app offers multiple ways to erase metadata from images. Namely:
|
||||
|
||||
We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
|
||||
|
||||
- Apps developed for open-source operating systems must be open-source.
|
||||
- Apps developed for open-source operating systems must be open source.
|
||||
- Apps must be free and should not include ads or other limitations.
|
||||
|
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ meta_title: "Privacy Respecting Web Browsers for PC and Mac - Privacy Guides"
|
||||
title: "Desktop Browsers"
|
||||
icon: material/laptop
|
||||
description: These web browsers provide stronger privacy protections than Google Chrome.
|
||||
cover: desktop-browsers.png
|
||||
cover: desktop-browsers.webp
|
||||
schema:
|
||||
-
|
||||
"@context": http://schema.org
|
||||
@ -179,6 +179,14 @@ Additionally, the Firefox Accounts service collects [some technical data](https:
|
||||
|
||||
This prevents you from unintentionally connecting to a website in plain-text HTTP. Sites without HTTPS are uncommon nowadays, so this should have little to no impact on your day to day browsing.
|
||||
|
||||
##### DNS over HTTPS
|
||||
|
||||
If you use a [DNS over HTTPS provider](dns.md):
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] Select **Max Protection** and choose a suitable provider
|
||||
|
||||
Max Protection enforces the use of DNS over HTTPS, and a security warning will show if Firefox can’t connect to your secure DNS resolver, or if your secure DNS resolver says that records for the domain you are trying to access do not exist. This stops the network you're connected to from secretly downgrading your DNS security.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Sync
|
||||
|
||||
[Firefox Sync](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2018/11/firefox-sync-privacy/) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices and protects it with E2EE.
|
||||
@ -218,6 +226,12 @@ Arkenfox only aims to thwart basic or naive tracking scripts through canvas rand
|
||||
|
||||
1. We advise against using the Flatpak version of Brave, as it replaces Chromium's sandbox with Flatpak's, which is less effective. Additionally, the package is not maintained by Brave Software, Inc.
|
||||
|
||||
**macOS users:** The download for Brave Browser from their official website is a `.pkg` installer which requires admin privileges to run (and may run other unnecessary scripts on your machine). As an alternative, you can download the latest `Brave-Browser-universal.dmg` file from their [GitHub releases](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/releases/latest) page, which provides a traditional "drag to Applications folder" install.
|
||||
|
||||
!!! warning
|
||||
|
||||
Brave adds a "[referral code](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/wiki/Brave%E2%80%99s-Use-of-Referral-Codes)" to the file name in downloads from the Brave website, which is used to track which source the browser was downloaded from, for example `BRV002` in a download named `Brave-Browser-BRV002.pkg`. The installer will then ping Brave's server with the referral code at the end of the installation process. If you're concerned about this, you can rename the installer file before opening it.
|
||||
|
||||
### Recommended Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings**.
|
||||
@ -238,12 +252,15 @@ Shields' options can be downgraded on a per-site basis as needed, but by default
|
||||
??? warning "Use default filter lists"
|
||||
Brave allows you to select additional content filters within the internal `brave://adblock` page. We advise against using this feature; instead, keep the default filter lists. Using extra lists will make you stand out from other Brave users and may also increase attack surface if there is an exploit in Brave and a malicious rule is added to one of the lists you use.
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] Select **Strict** under **Upgrade connections to HTTPS**
|
||||
- [x] (Optional) Select **Block Scripts** (1)
|
||||
- [x] Select **Strict, may break sites** under Block fingerprinting
|
||||
- [x] Check **Forget me when I close this site** (2)
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
1. This option provides functionality similar to uBlock Origin's advanced [blocking modes](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) or the [NoScript](https://noscript.net/) extension.
|
||||
2. If you wish to stay logged in to a particular site you visit often, you can set exceptions on a per-site basis by clicking on the Shield icon in the address bar.
|
||||
|
||||
##### Social media blocking
|
||||
|
||||
@ -258,7 +275,6 @@ Shields' options can be downgraded on a per-site basis as needed, but by default
|
||||
- [ ] Uncheck **Allow privacy-preserving product analytics (P3A)**
|
||||
- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send daily usage ping to Brave**
|
||||
- [ ] Uncheck **Automatically send diagnostic reports**
|
||||
- [x] Select **Always use secure connections** in the **Security** menu
|
||||
- [ ] Uncheck **Private window with Tor** (1)
|
||||
|
||||
!!! tip "Sanitizing on Close"
|
||||
@ -282,9 +298,8 @@ Disable built-in extensions you do not use in **Extensions**
|
||||
|
||||
Brave's Web3 features can potentially add to your browser fingerprint and attack surface. Unless you use any of features, they should be disabled.
|
||||
|
||||
Set **Default Ethereum wallet** to **Extensions (no fallback)**
|
||||
Set **Default Solana wallet** to **Extensions (no fallback)**
|
||||
Set **Method to resolve IPFS resources** to **Disabled**
|
||||
- Select **Extensions (no fallback)** under Default Ethereum wallet and Default Solana wallet
|
||||
- Set **Method to resolve IPFS resources** to **Disabled**
|
||||
|
||||
##### System
|
||||
|
||||
@ -331,13 +346,43 @@ In general, we recommend keeping your browser extensions to a minimum to decreas
|
||||
|
||||
We suggest following the [developer's documentation](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Blocking-mode) and picking one of the "modes". Additional filter lists can impact performance and [may increase attack surface](https://portswigger.net/research/ublock-i-exfiltrate-exploiting-ad-blockers-with-css).
|
||||
|
||||
##### Other lists
|
||||
|
||||
These are some other [filter lists](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Dashboard:-Filter-lists) that you may want to consider adding:
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] Check **Privacy** > **AdGuard URL Tracking Protection**
|
||||
- Add [Actually Legitimate URL Shortener Tool](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DandelionSprout/adfilt/master/LegitimateURLShortener.txt)
|
||||
|
||||
### uBlock Origin Lite
|
||||
|
||||
uBlock Origin also has a "Lite" version of their extension, which offers a very limited feature-set compared to the original extension. However, it has a few distinct advantages over its full-fledged sibling, so you may want to consider it if...
|
||||
|
||||
- ...you don't want to grant full "read/modify website data" permissions to any extensions (even a trusted one like uBlock Origin)
|
||||
- ...you want a more resource (memory/CPU) efficient content blocker[^1]
|
||||
- ...your browser only supports Manifest V3 extensions
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**uBlock Origin Lite** is a Manifest V3 compatible content blocker. Compared to the original *uBlock Origin*, this extension does not require broad "read/modify data" permissions to function.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/uBlockOrigin/uBOL-home#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/uBlockOrigin/uBOL-home/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/tree/master/platform/mv3){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/addon/ublock-origin-lite/)
|
||||
- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/ublock-origin-lite/ddkjiahejlhfcafbddmgiahcphecmpfh)
|
||||
|
||||
We only recommend this version of uBlock Origin if you never want to make any changes to your filter lists, because it only supports a few pre-selected lists and offers no additional customization options, including the ability to select elements to block manually. These restrictions are due to limitations in Manifest V3's design.
|
||||
|
||||
This version offers three levels of blocking: "Basic" works without requiring any special privileges to view and modify site content, while the "Optimal" and "Complete" levels do require that broad permission, but offer a better filtering experience with additional cosmetic rules and scriptlet injections.
|
||||
|
||||
If you set the default filtering mode to "Optimal" or "Complete" the extension will request read/modify access to **all** websites you visit. However, you also have the option to change the setting to "Optimal" or "Complete" on a **per-site** basis by adjusting the slider in the extension's pop-up panel on any given site. When you do so, the extension will request read/modify access to that site only. Therefore, if you want to take advantage of uBlock Origin Lite's "permission-less" configuration, you should probably leave the default setting as "Basic" and only adjust it higher on sites where that level is not adequate.
|
||||
|
||||
uBlock Origin Lite only receives block list updates whenever the extension is updated from your browser's extension marketplace, as opposed to on demand. This means that you may miss out on new threats being blocked for weeks until a full extension release is published.
|
||||
|
||||
## Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
|
||||
@ -354,9 +399,8 @@ These are some other [filter lists](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Dashb
|
||||
- Available on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
|
||||
- Any changes required to make the browser more privacy-respecting should not negatively impact user experience.
|
||||
- Blocks third-party cookies by default.
|
||||
- Supports [state partitioning](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning) to mitigate cross-site tracking.[^1]
|
||||
- Supports [state partitioning](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Privacy/State_Partitioning) to mitigate cross-site tracking.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Brave's implementation is detailed at [Brave Privacy Updates: Partitioning network-state for privacy](https://brave.com/privacy-updates/14-partitioning-network-state/).
|
||||
|
||||
### Best-Case
|
||||
|
||||
@ -375,3 +419,6 @@ Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect pro
|
||||
|
||||
- Must not replicate built-in browser or OS functionality.
|
||||
- Must directly impact user privacy, i.e. must not simply provide information.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: uBlock Origin Lite *itself* will consume no resources, because it uses newer APIs which make the browser process the filter lists natively, instead of running JavaScript code within the extension to handle the filtering. However, this resource advantage is only [theoretical](https://github.com/uBlockOrigin/uBOL-home/wiki/Frequently-asked-questions-(FAQ)#is-ubol-more-efficient-cpu--and-memory-wise-than-ubo), because it's possible that standard uBlock Origin's filtering code is more efficient than your browser's native filtering code. This has not yet been benchmarked.
|
||||
[^2]: Brave's implementation is detailed at [Brave Privacy Updates: Partitioning network-state for privacy](https://brave.com/privacy-updates/14-partitioning-network-state/).
|
||||
|
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
title: "Desktop/PC"
|
||||
icon: simple/linux
|
||||
description: Linux distributions are commonly recommended for privacy protection and software freedom.
|
||||
cover: desktop.png
|
||||
cover: desktop.webp
|
||||
---
|
||||
Linux distributions are commonly recommended for privacy protection and software freedom. If you don't already use Linux, below are some distributions we suggest trying out, as well as some general privacy and security improvement tips that are applicable to many Linux distributions.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Linux distributions are commonly recommended for privacy protection and software
|
||||
|
||||
**Fedora Workstation** is our recommended distribution for people new to Linux. Fedora generally adopts newer technologies before other distributions e.g., [Wayland](https://wayland.freedesktop.org/), [PipeWire](https://pipewire.org). These new technologies often come with improvements in security, privacy, and usability in general.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getfedora.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://fedoraproject.org/workstation/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://whatcanidoforfedora.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
@ -66,13 +66,13 @@ A large portion of [Arch Linux’s packages](https://reproducible.archlinux.org)
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Fedora Silverblue** and **Fedora Kinoite** are immutable variants of Fedora with a strong focus on container workflows. Silverblue comes with the [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org/) desktop environment while Kinoite comes with [KDE](https://kde.org/). Silverblue and Kinoite follow the same release schedule as Fedora Workstation, benefiting from the same fast updates and staying very close to upstream.
|
||||
**Fedora Silverblue** is an immutable variant of Fedora with a strong focus on container workflows and the [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org/) desktop environment. If you prefer an environment other than GNOME, there are also other variants including [Kinoite](https://fedoraproject.org/kinoite/) (which comes with [KDE](https://kde.org/)) and [Sericea](https://fedoraproject.org/sericea/) (which comes with [Sway](https://swaywm.org/), a [Wayland](https://wayland.freedesktop.org)-only tiling window manager). We don't recommend [Onyx](https://fedoraproject.org/onyx/) at this time as it still [requires X11](https://buddiesofbudgie.org/blog/wayland). All of these variants follow the same release schedule as Fedora Workstation, benefiting from the same fast updates and staying very close to upstream.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://silverblue.fedoraproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://fedoraproject.org/silverblue/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora-silverblue/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://whatcanidoforfedora.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
Silverblue (and Kinoite) differ from Fedora Workstation as they replace the [DNF](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/DNF) package manager with a much more advanced alternative called [`rpm-ostree`](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/rawhide/system-administrators-guide/package-management/rpm-ostree/). The `rpm-ostree` package manager works by downloading a base image for the system, then overlaying packages over it in a [git](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Git)-like commit tree. When the system is updated, a new base image is downloaded and the overlays will be applied to that new image.
|
||||
Silverblue and its variants differ from Fedora Workstation as they replace the [DNF](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/quick-docs/dnf/) package manager with a much more advanced alternative called [`rpm-ostree`](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/latest/system-administrators-guide/package-management/rpm-ostree/). The `rpm-ostree` package manager works by downloading a base image for the system, then overlaying packages over it in a [git](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Git)-like commit tree. When the system is updated, a new base image is downloaded and the overlays will be applied to that new image.
|
||||
|
||||
After the update is complete you will reboot the system into the new deployment. `rpm-ostree` keeps two deployments of the system so that you can easily rollback if something breaks in the new deployment. There is also the option to pin more deployments as needed.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os).
|
||||
**Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os).
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
|
||||
@ -119,11 +119,9 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th
|
||||
|
||||
Whonix is meant to run as two virtual machines: a “Workstation” and a Tor “Gateway.” All communications from the Workstation must go through the Tor gateway. This means that even if the Workstation is compromised by malware of some kind, the true IP address remains hidden.
|
||||
|
||||
Some of its features include Tor Stream Isolation, [keystroke anonymization](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Keystroke_Deanonymization#Kloak), [encrypted swap](https://github.com/Whonix/swap-file-creator), and a hardened memory allocator.
|
||||
Some of its features include Tor Stream Isolation, [keystroke anonymization](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Keystroke_Deanonymization#Kloak), [encrypted swap](https://github.com/Whonix/swap-file-creator), and a hardened memory allocator. Future versions of Whonix will likely include [full system AppArmor policies](https://github.com/Whonix/apparmor-profile-everything) and a [sandbox app launcher](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Sandbox-app-launcher) to fully confine all processes on the system.
|
||||
|
||||
Future versions of Whonix will likely include [full system AppArmor policies](https://github.com/Whonix/apparmor-profile-everything) and a [sandbox app launcher](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Sandbox-app-launcher) to fully confine all processes on the system.
|
||||
|
||||
Whonix is best used [in conjunction with Qubes](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Why_use_Qubes_over_other_Virtualizers), Qubes-Whonix has various [disadvantages](https://forums.whonix.org/t/qubes-whonix-security-disadvantages-help-wanted/8581) when compared to other hypervisors.
|
||||
Whonix is best used [in conjunction with Qubes](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Why_use_Qubes_over_other_Virtualizers). We have a [recommended guide](os/qubes-overview.md#connecting-to-tor-via-a-vpn) on configuring Whonix in conjunction with a VPN ProxyVM in Qubes to hide your Tor activities from your ISP.
|
||||
|
||||
### Tails
|
||||
|
||||
@ -151,33 +149,48 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers.
|
||||
**Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (or "qubes"). Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux. It can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*.
|
||||
Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate *qubes*. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the *qubes* and the core system.
|
||||
|
||||
The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/).
|
||||
For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page.
|
||||
|
||||
### Kicksecure
|
||||
|
||||
While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install.
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix).
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
## Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
|
||||
Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards:
|
||||
|
||||
!!! example "This section is new"
|
||||
- Free and open source.
|
||||
- Receives regular software and kernel updates.
|
||||
- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland).
|
||||
- The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other.
|
||||
- Supports full-disk encryption during installation.
|
||||
- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year.
|
||||
- We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage.
|
||||
- Supports a wide variety of hardware.
|
||||
- Preference towards larger projects.
|
||||
- Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers.
|
||||
|
||||
We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
|
||||
|
||||
Our recommended operating systems:
|
||||
|
||||
- Must be open-source.
|
||||
- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates.
|
||||
- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland).
|
||||
- Must support full-disk encryption during installation.
|
||||
- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage.
|
||||
- Must support a wide variety of hardware.
|
||||
In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.**
|
||||
|
242
docs/device-integrity.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "Device Integrity"
|
||||
icon: material/security
|
||||
description: These tools can be used to check your devices for compromise.
|
||||
cover: device-integrity.webp
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
These tools can be used to validate the integrity of your mobile devices and check them for indicators of compromise by spyware and malware such as Pegasus, Predator, or KingsPawn. This page focuses on **mobile security**, because mobile devices typically have read-only systems with well-known configurations, so detecting malicious modifications is easier than on traditional desktop systems. We may expand the focus of this page in the future.
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition note" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">This is an advanced topic</p>
|
||||
|
||||
These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functionality which most people do not need to worry about, and often require more in-depth technical knowledge to use effectively.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
It is **critical** to understand that scanning your device for public indicators of compromise is **not sufficient** to determine that a device is "clean", and not targeted with a particular spyware tool. Reliance on these publicly-available scanning tools can miss recent security developments and give you a false sense of security.
|
||||
|
||||
## General Advice
|
||||
|
||||
The majority of system-level exploits on modern mobile devices—especially zero-click compromises—are non-persistent, meaning they will not remain or run automatically after a reboot. For this reason, we highly recommend rebooting your device regularly. We recommend everybody reboot their devices once a week at minimum, but if non-persistent malware is of particular concern for you, we and many security experts recommend a daily reboot schedule.
|
||||
|
||||
This means an attacker would have to regularly re-infect your device to retain access, although we'll note this is not impossible. Rebooting your device also will not protect you against *persistent* malware, but this is less common on mobile devices due to modern security features like secure/verified boot.
|
||||
|
||||
## Post-Compromise Information & Disclaimer
|
||||
|
||||
If any of the following tools indicate a potential compromise by spyware such as Pegasus, Predator, or KingsPawn, we advise that you contact:
|
||||
|
||||
- If you are a human rights defender, journalist, or from a civil society organization: [Amnesty International's Security Lab](https://securitylab.amnesty.org/contact-us/)
|
||||
- If a business or government device is compromised: Contact the appropriate security liason at your enterprise, department, or agency
|
||||
- Local law enforcement
|
||||
|
||||
**We are unable to help you directly beyond this.** We are happy to discuss your specific situation or circumstances and review your results in our [community](https://discuss.privacyguides.net) spaces, but it is unlikely we can assist you beyond what is written on this page.
|
||||
|
||||
The tools on this page are only capable of detecting indicators of compromise, not removing them. If you are concerned about having been compromised, we advise that you:
|
||||
|
||||
- Consider replacing the device completely
|
||||
- Consider changing your SIM/eSIM number
|
||||
- Not restore from a backup, because that backup may be compromised
|
||||
|
||||
These tools provide analysis based on the information they have the ability to access from your device, and publicly-accessible indicators of compromise. It is important to keep in mind two things:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Indicators of compromise are just that: *indicators*. They are not a definitive finding, and may occasionally be **false positives**. If an indicator of compromise is detected, it means you should do additional research into the *potential* threat.
|
||||
2. The indicators of compromise these tools look for are published by threat research organizations, but not all indicators are made available to the public! This means that these tools can present a **false negative**, if your device is infected with spyware which is not detected by any of the public indicators. Reliable and comprehensive digital forensic support and triage requires access to non-public indicators, research and threat intelligence.
|
||||
|
||||
## External Verification Tools
|
||||
|
||||
External verification tools run on your computer and scan your mobile device for forensic traces which are helpful to identify potential compromise.
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition danger" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Danger</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Public indicators of compromise are insufficient to determine that a device is "clean", and not targeted with a particular spyware tool. Reliance on public indicators alone can miss recent forensic traces and give a false sense of security.
|
||||
|
||||
Reliable and comprehensive digital forensic support and triage requires access to non-public indicators, research and threat intelligence.
|
||||
|
||||
Such support is available to civil society through [Amnesty International's Security Lab](https://www.amnesty.org/en/tech/) or [Access Now’s Digital Security Helpline](https://www.accessnow.org/help/).
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
These tools can trigger false-positives. If any of these tools finds indicators of compromise, you need to dig deeper to determine your actual risk. Some reports may be false positives based on websites you've visited in the past, and findings which are many years old are likely either false-positives or indicate previous (and no longer active) compromise.
|
||||
|
||||
### Mobile Verification Toolkit
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Mobile Verification Toolkit** (**MVT**) is a collection of utilities which simplifies and automates the process of scanning mobile devices for potential traces of targeting or infection by known spyware campaigns. MVT was developed by Amnesty International and released in 2021 in the context of the [Pegasus Project](https://forbiddenstories.org/about-the-pegasus-project/).
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mvt.re/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mvt-project/mvt){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://docs.mvt.re/en/latest/install/)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://docs.mvt.re/en/latest/install/)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Using MVT is insufficient to determine that a device is "clean", and not targeted with a particular spyware tool.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
MVT is *most* useful for scanning iOS devices. Android stores very little diagnostic information useful to triage potential compromises, and because of this `mvt-android` capabilities are limited as well. On the other hand, encrypted iOS iTunes backups provide a large enough subset of files stored on the device to detect suspicious artifacts in many cases. This being said, MVT does still provide fairly useful tools for both iOS and Android analysis.
|
||||
|
||||
If you use iOS and are at high-risk, we have three additional suggestions for you:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Create and keep regular (monthly) iTunes backups. This allows you to find and diagnose past infections later with MVT, if new threats are discovered in the future.
|
||||
2. Trigger *sysdiagnose* logs often and back them up externally. These logs can provide invaluable data to future forensic investigators if need be.
|
||||
|
||||
The process to do so varies by model, but you can trigger it on newer phones by holding down *Power* + *Volume Up* + *Volume Down* until you feel a brief vibration. After a few minutes, the timestamped *sysdiagnose* log will appear in **Settings** > **Privacy & Security** > **Analytics & Improvements** > **Analytics Data**.
|
||||
|
||||
3. Enable [Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode).
|
||||
|
||||
MVT allows you to perform deeper scans/analysis if your device is jailbroken. Unless you know what you are doing, **do not jailbreak or root your device.** Jailbreaking your device exposes it to considerable security risks.
|
||||
|
||||
### iMazing (iOS)
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**iMazing** provides a free spyware analyzer tool for iOS devices which acts as a GUI-wrapper for [MVT](#mobile-verification-toolkit). This can be much easier to run compared to MVT itself, which is a command-line tool designed for technologists and forensic investigators.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://imazing.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://imazing.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://imazing.com/spyware-analyzer){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://imazing.com/download)
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://imazing.com/download)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
iMazing automates and interactively guides you through the process of using [MVT](#mobile-verification-toolkit) to scan your device for publicly-accessible indicators of compromise published by various threat researchers. All of the information and warnings which apply to MVT apply to this tool as well, so we suggest you also familiarize yourself with the notes on MVT in the sections above.
|
||||
|
||||
## On-Device Verification
|
||||
|
||||
These are apps you can install which check your device and operating system for signs of tampering, and validate the identity of your device.
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Using these apps is insufficient to determine that a device is "clean", and not targeted with a particular spyware tool.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
### Auditor (Android)
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Auditor** is an app which leverages hardware security features to provide device integrity monitoring by actively validating the identity of a device and the integrity of its operating system. Currently, it only works with GrapheneOS or the stock operating system for [supported devices](https://attestation.app/about#device-support).
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://attestation.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://attestation.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://attestation.app/about){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://attestation.app/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://attestation.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.attestation.auditor.play)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases)
|
||||
- [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Auditor is not a scanning/analysis tool like some other tools on this page, rather it uses your device's hardware-backed keystore to allow you to verify the identity of your device and gain assurance that the operating system itself hasn't been tampered with or downgraded via verified boot. This provides a very robust integrity check of your device itself, but doesn't necessarily check whether the user-level apps running on your device are malicious.
|
||||
|
||||
Auditor performs attestation and intrusion detection with **two** devices, an *auditee* (the device being verified) and an *auditor* (the device performing the verification). The auditor can be any Android 10+ device (or a remote web service operated by [GrapheneOS](android.md#grapheneos)), while the auditee must be a specifically [supported device](https://attestation.app/about#device-support). Auditor works by:
|
||||
|
||||
- Using a [Trust On First Use (TOFU)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_on_first_use) model between an *auditor* and *auditee*, the pair establish a private key in the [hardware-backed keystore](https://source.android.com/security/keystore/) of the *Auditor*.
|
||||
- The *auditor* can either be another instance of the Auditor app or the [Remote Attestation Service](https://attestation.app).
|
||||
- The *auditor* records the current state and configuration of the *auditee*.
|
||||
- Should tampering with the operating system of the *auditee* happen after the pairing is complete, the auditor will be aware of the change in the device state and configurations.
|
||||
- You will be alerted to the change.
|
||||
|
||||
It is important to note that Auditor can only effectively detect changes **after** the initial pairing, not necessarily during or before due to its TOFU model. To make sure that your hardware and operating system is genuine, [perform local attestation](https://grapheneos.org/install/web#verifying-installation) immediately after the device has been installed and prior to any internet connection.
|
||||
|
||||
No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
|
||||
|
||||
If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service.
|
||||
|
||||
## On-Device Scanners
|
||||
|
||||
These are apps you can install on your device which scan your device for signs of compromise.
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Using these apps is insufficient to determine that a device is "clean", and not targeted with a particular spyware tool.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
### Hypatia (Android)
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Hypatia** is an open source real-time malware scanner for Android, from the developer of [DivestOS](android.md#divestos). It accesses the internet to download signature database updates, but does not upload your files or any metadata to the cloud (scans are performed entirely locally).
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://divestos.org/pages/our_apps#hypatia){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://divestos.org/pages/privacy_policy#hypatia){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/divested-mobile/hypatia){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://divested.dev/pages/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-android: F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/packages/us.spotco.malwarescanner/)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Hypatia is particularly good at detecting common stalkerware: If you suspect you are a victim of stalkerware, you should [visit this page](https://stopstalkerware.org/information-for-survivors/) for advice.
|
||||
|
||||
### iVerify (iOS)
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**iVerify** is an iOS app which automatically scans your device to check configuration settings, patch level, and other areas of security. It also checks your device for indicators of compromise by jailbreak tools or spyware such as Pegasus.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.iverify.io/consumer){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.iverify.io/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://www.iverify.io/frequently-asked-questions#iVerify-General){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/iverify/id1466120520)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Like all iOS apps, iVerify is restricted to what it can observe about your device from within the iOS App Sandbox. It will not provide nearly as robust analysis as a full-system analysis tool like [MVT](#mobile-verification-toolkit). Its primary function is to detect whether your device is jailbroken, which it is effective at, however a hypothetical threat which is *specifically* designed to bypass iVerify's checks would likely succeed at doing so.
|
||||
|
||||
iVerify is **not** an "antivirus" tool, and will not detect non-system-level malware such as malicious custom keyboards or malicious Wi-Fi Sync configurations, for example.
|
||||
|
||||
In addition to device scanning, iVerify also includes a number of additional security utilities which you may find useful, including device reboot reminders, iOS update notifications (which are often faster than Apple's staggered update notification rollout), some basic privacy and security guides, and a DNS over HTTPS tool which can connect your device's [DNS](dns.md) queries securely to Quad9, Cloudflare, or Google.
|
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
title: "DNS Resolvers"
|
||||
icon: material/dns
|
||||
description: These are some encrypted DNS providers we recommend switching to, to replace your ISP's default configuration.
|
||||
cover: dns.png
|
||||
cover: dns.webp
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Encrypted DNS with third-party servers should only be used to get around basic [DNS blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) when you can be sure there won't be any consequences. Encrypted DNS will not help you hide any of your browsing activity.
|
||||
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Encrypted DNS with third-party servers should only be used to get around basic [
|
||||
|
||||
| DNS Provider | Privacy Policy | Protocols | Logging | ECS | Filtering |
|
||||
| ------------ | -------------- | --------- | ------- | --- | --------- |
|
||||
| [**AdGuard**](https://adguard.com/en/adguard-dns/overview.html) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html) | Cleartext <br> DoH/3 <br> DoT <br> DNSCrypt | Some[^1] | No | Based on personal configuration. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardDNS)
|
||||
| [**AdGuard**](https://adguard.com/en/adguard-dns/overview.html) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html) | Cleartext <br> DoH/3 <br> DoT <br> DoQ <br> DNSCrypt | Some[^1] | Yes | Based on personal configuration. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardDNS)
|
||||
| [**Cloudflare**](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/setting-up-1.1.1.1/) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/) | Cleartext <br> DoH/3 <br> DoT | Some[^2] | No | Based on personal configuration.|
|
||||
| [**Control D**](https://controld.com/free-dns) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://controld.com/privacy) | Cleartext <br> DoH/3 <br> DoT <br> DoQ| Optional[^3] | No | Based on personal configuration. |
|
||||
| [**Mullvad**](https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/) | DoH <br> DoT | No[^4] | No | Based on personal configuration. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/mullvad/dns-adblock)
|
||||
|
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
title: "Email Clients"
|
||||
icon: material/email-open
|
||||
description: These email clients are privacy-respecting and support OpenPGP email encryption.
|
||||
cover: email-clients.png
|
||||
cover: email-clients.webp
|
||||
---
|
||||
Our recommendation list contains email clients that support both [OpenPGP](encryption.md#openpgp) and strong authentication such as [Open Authorization (OAuth)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth). OAuth allows you to use [Multi-Factor Authentication](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md) and prevent account theft.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -145,13 +145,13 @@ Canary Mail is closed-source. We recommend it due to the few choices there are f
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://k9mail.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://k9mail.app/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.k9mail.app/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/k9mail/k-9){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/thundernest/k-9){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://k9mail.app/contribute){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.fsck.k9)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/k9mail/k-9/releases)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/thundernest/k-9/releases)
|
||||
|
||||
!!! warning
|
||||
|
||||
@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ Canary Mail is closed-source. We recommend it due to the few choices there are f
|
||||
|
||||
### Minimum Qualifications
|
||||
|
||||
- Apps developed for open-source operating systems must be open-source.
|
||||
- Apps developed for open-source operating systems must be open source.
|
||||
- Must not collect telemetry, or have an easy way to disable all telemetry.
|
||||
- Must support OpenPGP message encryption.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ Canary Mail is closed-source. We recommend it due to the few choices there are f
|
||||
|
||||
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
|
||||
|
||||
- Should be open-source.
|
||||
- Should be open source.
|
||||
- Should be cross-platform.
|
||||
- Should not collect any telemetry by default.
|
||||
- Should support OpenPGP natively, i.e. without extensions.
|
||||
|
365
docs/email.md
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ meta_title: "Encrypted Private Email Recommendations - Privacy Guides"
|
||||
title: "Email Services"
|
||||
icon: material/email
|
||||
description: These email providers offer a great place to store your emails securely, and many offer interoperable OpenPGP encryption with other providers.
|
||||
cover: email.png
|
||||
cover: email.webp
|
||||
---
|
||||
Email is practically a necessity for using any online service, however we do not recommend it for person-to-person conversations. Rather than using email to contact other people, consider using an instant messaging medium that supports forward secrecy.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -18,44 +18,53 @@ For everything else, we recommend a variety of email providers based on sustaina
|
||||
|
||||
## OpenPGP Compatible Services
|
||||
|
||||
These providers natively support OpenPGP encryption/decryption and the Web Key Directory (WKD) standard, allowing for provider-agnostic E2EE emails. For example, a Proton Mail user could send an E2EE message to a Mailbox.org user, or you could receive OpenPGP-encrypted notifications from internet services which support it.
|
||||
These providers natively support OpenPGP encryption/decryption and the [Web Key Directory standard](basics/email-security.md#what-is-the-web-key-directory-standard), allowing for provider-agnostic E2EE emails. For example, a Proton Mail user could send an E2EE message to a Mailbox.org user, or you could receive OpenPGP-encrypted notifications from internet services which support it.
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Proton Mail](email.md#proton-mail)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Skiff Mail](email.md#skiff-mail)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Mailbox.org](email.md#mailboxorg)
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
!!! warning
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
When using E2EE technology like OpenPGP, email will still have some metadata that is not encrypted in the header of the email. Read more about [email metadata](basics/email-security.md#email-metadata-overview).
|
||||
When using E2EE technology like OpenPGP your email will still have some metadata that is not encrypted in the header of the email, generally including the subject line! Read more about [email metadata](basics/email-security.md#email-metadata-overview).
|
||||
|
||||
OpenPGP also does not support Forward secrecy, which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. [How do I protect my private keys?](basics/email-security.md#how-do-i-protect-my-private-keys)
|
||||
OpenPGP also does not support Forward secrecy, which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed. [How do I protect my private keys?](basics/email-security.md#how-do-i-protect-my-private-keys)
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
### Proton Mail
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Proton Mail** is an email service with a focus on privacy, encryption, security, and ease of use. They have been in operation since **2013**. Proton AG is based in Genève, Switzerland. Accounts start with 500 MB storage with their free plan.
|
||||
**Proton Mail** is an email service with a focus on privacy, encryption, security, and ease of use. They have been in operation since **2013**. Proton AG is based in Genève, Switzerland. Accounts start with 500 MB storage with their free plan.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/mail){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:simple-torbrowser:](https://protonmailrmez3lotccipshtkleegetolb73fuirgj7r4o4vfu7ozyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/mail){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://proton.me/mail){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:simple-torbrowser:](https://protonmailrmez3lotccipshtkleegetolb73fuirgj7r4o4vfu7ozyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://proton.me/legal/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://proton.me/support/mail){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ProtonMail){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonmail.android)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id979659905)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonMail/proton-mail-android/releases)
|
||||
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
|
||||
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.proton.me)
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonmail.android)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id979659905)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonMail/proton-mail-android/releases)
|
||||
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
|
||||
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.proton.me)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Free accounts have some limitations, such as not being able to search body text and not having access to [Proton Mail Bridge](https://proton.me/mail/bridge), which is required to use a [recommended desktop email client](email-clients.md) (e.g. Thunderbird). Paid accounts include features like Proton Mail Bridge, additional storage, and custom domain support. A [letter of attestation](https://proton.me/blog/security-audit-all-proton-apps) was provided for Proton Mail's apps on 9th November 2021 by [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -83,9 +92,9 @@ Certain information stored in [Proton Contacts](https://proton.me/support/proton
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Email Encryption
|
||||
|
||||
Proton Mail has [integrated OpenPGP encryption](https://proton.me/support/how-to-use-pgp) in their webmail. Emails to other Proton Mail accounts are encrypted automatically, and encryption to non-Proton Mail addresses with an OpenPGP key can be enabled easily in your account settings. They also allow you to [encrypt messages to non-Proton Mail addresses](https://proton.me/support/password-protected-emails) without the need for them to sign up for a Proton Mail account or use software like OpenPGP.
|
||||
Proton Mail has [integrated OpenPGP encryption](https://proton.me/support/how-to-use-pgp) in their webmail. Emails to other Proton Mail accounts are encrypted automatically, and encryption to non-Proton Mail addresses with an OpenPGP key can be enabled easily in your account settings. Proton also supports automatic external key discovery with [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This means that emails sent to other providers which use WKD, such as Skiff Mail, will be automatically encrypted with OpenPGP as well, without the need to manually exchange public PGP keys with your contacts. They also allow you to [encrypt messages to non-Proton Mail addresses without OpenPGP](https://proton.me/support/password-protected-emails), without the need for them to sign up for a Proton Mail account.
|
||||
|
||||
Proton Mail also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This allows people who don't use Proton Mail to find the OpenPGP keys of Proton Mail accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE.
|
||||
Proton Mail also publishes the public keys of Proton accounts via HTTP from their WKD. This allows people who don't use Proton Mail to find the OpenPGP keys of Proton Mail accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE. This only applies to email addresses ending in one of Proton's own domains, like @proton.me. If you use a custom domain, you must [configure WKD](./basics/email-security.md#what-is-the-web-key-directory-standard) separately.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Account Termination
|
||||
|
||||
@ -97,21 +106,86 @@ Proton Mail offers an "Unlimited" account for €9.99/Month, which also enables
|
||||
|
||||
Proton Mail doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
|
||||
|
||||
### Skiff Mail
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Skiff Mail** is a web based email service with E2EE that began in 2020 that is based in San Francisco with developers worldwide. Accounts start with 10GB of free storage.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://skiff.com/mail){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://app.skiff.com/docs/db93c237-84c2-4b2b-9588-19a7cd2cd45a#tyGksN9rkqbo2uGYASxsA6HVLjUoly/wTYK8tncTto8=){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://skiff.com/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/skiff-org/skiff-apps){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-android: Android](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.skemailmobileapp&pli=1)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: iOS](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/skiff-mail/id1619168801)
|
||||
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://app.skiff.com/mail)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Skiff has undergone a few [audits](https://skiff.com/transparency) during its development.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Custom Domains and Aliases
|
||||
|
||||
You can create up to 3 additional @skiff.com email aliases in addition to your primary account address on their free plan. Free accounts can add 1 [custom domain](https://skiff.com/blog/custom-domain-setup), and up to 15 custom domains on a paid plan. You can create unlimited aliases or a [catch-all](https://skiff.com/blog/catch-all-email-alias) alias on your custom domain.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } Private Payment Methods
|
||||
|
||||
Skiff Mail accepts cryptocurrency payments via Coinbase Commerce, including Bitcoin and Ethereum, but they do not accept our recommended [cryptocurrency](cryptocurrency.md), Monero. They also accept credit card payments via Stripe.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Account Security
|
||||
|
||||
Skiff Mail supports TOTP two-factor authentication and hardware security keys using FIDO2 or U2F standards. The use of a hardware security key requires setting up TOTP two-factor authentication first.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Data Security
|
||||
|
||||
Skiff Mail has zero access encryption at rest for all of your data. This means the messages and other data stored in your account are only readable by you.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Email Encryption
|
||||
|
||||
Skiff Mail encrypts messages to other Skiff mailboxes automatically with E2EE. On December 18th, 2023, Skiff added support for PGP and automatic public key discovery via Web Key Directory (WKD). This means that emails sent to other providers which use WKD, such as Proton Mail, will be automatically encrypted with OpenPGP as well without the need to exchange public PGP keys with your contacts. New Skiff Mail accounts should have a PGP key automatically generated, while accounts from before this feature was introduced need to generate a new PGP key for their address (or upload an existing private key) in the account's address settings. Skiff Mail only has support for reading messages encrypted with PGP/MIME, not the older PGP/Inline standard. Sending messages with PGP/MIME is the [recommended approach](https://www.gnupg.org/faq/gnupg-faq.html#use_pgpmime), but may pose compatibility issues in some edge cases.
|
||||
|
||||
Skiff Mail also publishes the public keys of Skiff Mail accounts via HTTP from their [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This allows people who don't use Skiff Mail to find the OpenPGP keys of Skiff Mail accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE. This only applies to email addresses ending in one of Skiff's own domains, like @skiff.com. If you use a custom domain, you must [configure WKD](./basics/email-security.md#what-is-the-web-key-directory-standard) separately.
|
||||
|
||||
Skiff does not have a "temporary inbox" or "passworded email" feature like some other providers have, so that external users without OpenPGP cannot receive or reply to messages with E2EE.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Account Termination
|
||||
|
||||
Skiff Mail accounts do not expire, but unpaid accounts will be prompted to remove any enabled paid features (such as additional aliases) or renew their plan before the account can be used.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Additional Functionality
|
||||
|
||||
Skiff additionally offers [workspace productivity features](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/skiff-pages-drive-productivity-tools/11758/13), but we still prefer [alternative](productivity.md) options for collaborating and file sharing at this time.
|
||||
|
||||
Skiff Mail does not offer a digital legacy feature.
|
||||
|
||||
### Mailbox.org
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Mailbox.org** is an email service with a focus on being secure, ad-free, and privately powered by 100% eco-friendly energy. They have been in operation since 2014. Mailbox.org is based in Berlin, Germany. Accounts start with 2 GB of storage, which can be upgraded as needed.
|
||||
**Mailbox.org** is an email service with a focus on being secure, ad-free, and privately powered by 100% eco-friendly energy. They have been in operation since 2014. Mailbox.org is based in Berlin, Germany. Accounts start with 2 GB of storage, which can be upgraded as needed.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailbox.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://mailbox.org/en/data-protection-privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailbox.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://mailbox.org/en/data-protection-privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://login.mailbox.org)
|
||||
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://login.mailbox.org)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Custom Domains and Aliases
|
||||
|
||||
@ -135,7 +209,7 @@ However, [Open-Exchange](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-Xchange), the softwa
|
||||
|
||||
Mailbox.org has [integrated encryption](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Send+encrypted+e-mails+with+Guard) in their webmail, which simplifies sending messages to people with public OpenPGP keys. They also allow [remote recipients to decrypt an email](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/My+recipient+does+not+use+PGP) on Mailbox.org's servers. This feature is useful when the remote recipient does not have OpenPGP and cannot decrypt a copy of the email in their own mailbox.
|
||||
|
||||
Mailbox.org also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This allows people outside of Mailbox.org to find the OpenPGP keys of Mailbox.org accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE.
|
||||
Mailbox.org also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This allows people outside of Mailbox.org to find the OpenPGP keys of Mailbox.org accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE. This only applies to email addresses ending in one of Mailbox.org's own domains, like @mailbox.org. If you use a custom domain, you must [configure WKD](./basics/email-security.md#what-is-the-web-key-directory-standard) separately.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Account Termination
|
||||
|
||||
@ -155,119 +229,72 @@ These providers store your emails with zero-knowledge encryption, making them gr
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Skiff Mail](email.md#skiff-mail)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Tutanota](email.md#tutanota)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Tuta](email.md#tuta)
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
### Skiff Mail
|
||||
### Tuta
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Skiff Mail** is a web based email service with E2EE that began in 2020 that is based in San Francisco with developers worldwide. Accounts start with 10GB of free storage.
|
||||
**Tuta** is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of encryption. Tuta has been in operation since **2011** and is based in Hanover, Germany. Accounts start with 1GB storage with their free plan.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://skiff.com/mail){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://app.skiff.com/docs/db93c237-84c2-4b2b-9588-19a7cd2cd45a#tyGksN9rkqbo2uGYASxsA6HVLjUoly/wTYK8tncTto8=){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://skiff.com/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/skiff-org/skiff-apps){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tuta.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://tuta.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://tuta.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://tuta.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-android: Android](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.skemailmobileapp&pli=1)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: iOS](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/skiff-mail/id1619168801)
|
||||
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://app.skiff.com/mail)
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/tutanota/id922429609)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/releases)
|
||||
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tuta.com/#download)
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tuta.com/#download)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tuta.com/#download)
|
||||
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://app.tuta.com/)
|
||||
|
||||
Skiff has undergone a few [audits](https://skiff.com/transparency) during its development.
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Tuta doesn't support the [IMAP protocol](https://tuta.com/faq/#imap) or the use of third-party [email clients](email-clients.md), and you also won't be able to add [external email accounts](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/544#issuecomment-670473647) to the Tuta app. [Email import](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/630) is not currently supported either, though this is [due to be changed](https://tuta.com/blog/posts/kickoff-import). Emails can be exported [individually or by bulk selection](https://tuta.com/howto#generalMail) per folder, which may be inconvenient if you have many folders.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Custom Domains and Aliases
|
||||
|
||||
You can create up to 3 additional @skiff.com email aliases in addition to your primary account address on their free plan. [Custom domains](https://skiff.com/blog/custom-domain-setup) are available on their Pro or Business plan, and allow you to create unlimited aliases.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } Private Payment Methods
|
||||
|
||||
Skiff Mail accepts cryptocurrency payments via Coinbase Commerce, including Bitcoin and Ethereum, but they do not accept our recommended [cryptocurrency](cryptocurrency.md), Monero. They also accept credit card payments via Stripe.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Account Security
|
||||
|
||||
Skiff Mail supports TOTP two-factor authentication and hardware security keys using FIDO2 or U2F standards. The use of a hardware security key requires setting up TOTP two-factor authentication first.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Data Security
|
||||
|
||||
Skiff Mail has zero access encryption at rest for all of your data. This means the messages and other data stored in your account are only readable by you.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Email Encryption
|
||||
|
||||
Skiff Mail does not use OpenPGP. Emails are only encrypted with E2EE to other Skiff Mail users. Skiff does not have a "temporary inbox" or "passworded email" feature like some other providers have, so that external users cannot receive or reply to messages with E2EE.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Account Termination
|
||||
|
||||
Skiff Mail accounts do not expire, but unpaid accounts will be prompted to remove any enabled paid features (such as additional aliases) or renew their plan before the account can be used.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Additional Functionality
|
||||
|
||||
Skiff additionally offers [workspace productivity features](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/skiff-pages-drive-productivity-tools/11758/13), but we still prefer [alternative](productivity.md) options for collaborating and file sharing at this time.
|
||||
|
||||
Skiff Mail does not offer a digital legacy feature.
|
||||
|
||||
### Tutanota
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Tutanota** is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of encryption. Tutanota has been in operation since **2011** and is based in Hanover, Germany. Accounts start with 1GB storage with their free plan.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tutanota.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://tutanota.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://tutanota.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://tutanota.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/tutanota/id922429609)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/releases)
|
||||
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tutanota.com/#download)
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tutanota.com/#download)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tutanota.com/#download)
|
||||
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.tutanota.com/)
|
||||
|
||||
Tutanota doesn't support the [IMAP protocol](https://tutanota.com/faq/#imap) or the use of third-party [email clients](email-clients.md), and you also won't be able to add [external email accounts](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/544#issuecomment-670473647) to the Tutanota app. Neither [Email import](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/630) or [subfolders](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/927) are currently supported, though this is [due to be changed](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/kickoff-import). Emails can be exported [individually or by bulk selection](https://tutanota.com/howto#generalMail) per folder, which may be inconvenient if you have many folders.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Custom Domains and Aliases
|
||||
|
||||
Paid Tutanota accounts can use up to 5 [aliases](https://tutanota.com/faq#alias) and [custom domains](https://tutanota.com/faq#custom-domain). Tutanota doesn't allow for [subaddressing (plus addresses)](https://tutanota.com/faq#plus), but you can use a [catch-all](https://tutanota.com/howto#settings-global) with a custom domain.
|
||||
Paid Tuta accounts can use either 15 or 30 aliases depending on their plan and unlimited aliases on [custom domains](https://tuta.com/faq#custom-domain). Tuta doesn't allow for [subaddressing (plus addresses)](https://tuta.com/faq#plus), but you can use a [catch-all](https://tuta.com/howto#settings-global) with a custom domain.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Private Payment Methods
|
||||
|
||||
Tutanota only directly accepts credit cards and PayPal, however [cryptocurrency](cryptocurrency.md) can be used to purchase gift cards via their [partnership](https://tutanota.com/faq/#cryptocurrency) with Proxystore.
|
||||
Tuta only directly accepts credit cards and PayPal, however [cryptocurrency](cryptocurrency.md) can be used to purchase gift cards via their [partnership](https://tuta.com/faq/#cryptocurrency) with Proxystore.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Account Security
|
||||
|
||||
Tutanota supports [two factor authentication](https://tutanota.com/faq#2fa) with either TOTP or U2F.
|
||||
Tuta supports [two factor authentication](https://tuta.com/faq#2fa) with either TOTP or U2F.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Data Security
|
||||
|
||||
Tutanota has [zero access encryption at rest](https://tutanota.com/faq#what-encrypted) for your emails, [address book contacts](https://tutanota.com/faq#encrypted-address-book), and [calendars](https://tutanota.com/faq#calendar). This means the messages and other data stored in your account are only readable by you.
|
||||
Tuta has [zero access encryption at rest](https://tuta.com/faq#what-encrypted) for your emails, [address book contacts](https://tuta.com/faq#encrypted-address-book), and [calendars](https://tuta.com/faq#calendar). This means the messages and other data stored in your account are only readable by you.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Email Encryption
|
||||
|
||||
Tutanota [does not use OpenPGP](https://www.tutanota.com/faq/#pgp). Tutanota accounts can only receive encrypted emails from non-Tutanota email accounts when sent via a [temporary Tutanota mailbox](https://www.tutanota.com/howto/#encrypted-email-external).
|
||||
Tuta [does not use OpenPGP](https://tuta.com/support/#pgp). Tuta accounts can only receive encrypted emails from non-Tuta email accounts when sent via a [temporary Tuta mailbox](https://tuta.com/support/#encrypted-email-external).
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Account Termination
|
||||
|
||||
Tutanota will [delete inactive free accounts](https://tutanota.com/faq#inactive-accounts) after six months. You can reuse a deactivated free account if you pay.
|
||||
Tuta will [delete inactive free accounts](https://tuta.com/faq#inactive-accounts) after six months. You can reuse a deactivated free account if you pay.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Additional Functionality
|
||||
|
||||
Tutanota offers the business version of [Tutanota to non-profit organizations](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/secure-email-for-non-profit) for free or with a heavy discount.
|
||||
Tuta offers the business version of [Tuta to non-profit organizations](https://tuta.com/blog/posts/secure-email-for-non-profit) for free or with a heavy discount.
|
||||
|
||||
Tutanota also has a business feature called [Secure Connect](https://tutanota.com/secure-connect/). This ensures customer contact to the business uses E2EE. The feature costs €240/y.
|
||||
Tuta also has a business feature called [Secure Connect](https://tuta.com/secure-connect/). This ensures customer contact to the business uses E2EE. The feature costs €240/y.
|
||||
|
||||
Tutanota doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
|
||||
Tuta doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
|
||||
|
||||
## Email Aliasing Services
|
||||
|
||||
@ -275,7 +302,7 @@ An email aliasing service allows you to easily generate a new email address for
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [AnonAddy](email.md#anonaddy)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [addy.io](email.md#addyio)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [SimpleLogin](email.md#simplelogin)
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
@ -297,60 +324,70 @@ Our email aliasing recommendations are providers that allow you to create aliase
|
||||
|
||||
Using an aliasing service requires trusting both your email provider and your aliasing provider with your unencrypted messages. Some providers mitigate this slightly with automatic PGP encryption, which reduces the number of parties you need to trust from two to one by encrypting incoming emails before they are delivered to your final mailbox provider.
|
||||
|
||||
### AnonAddy
|
||||
### addy.io
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**AnonAddy** lets you create 20 domain aliases on a shared domain for free, or unlimited "standard" aliases which are less anonymous.
|
||||
**addy.io** lets you create 10 domain aliases on a shared domain for free, or unlimited "standard" aliases which are less anonymous.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://anonaddy.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://anonaddy.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://app.anonaddy.com/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/anonaddy){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://anonaddy.com/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://addy.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://addy.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://app.addy.io/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/anonaddy){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://addy.io/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-android: Android](https://anonaddy.com/faq/#is-there-an-android-app)
|
||||
- [:material-apple-ios: iOS](https://anonaddy.com/faq/#is-there-an-ios-app)
|
||||
- [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-GB/firefox/addon/anonaddy/)
|
||||
- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/anonaddy-anonymous-email/iadbdpnoknmbdeolbapdackdcogdmjpe)
|
||||
- [:simple-android: Android](https://addy.io/faq/#is-there-an-android-app)
|
||||
- [:material-apple-ios: iOS](https://addy.io/faq/#is-there-an-ios-app)
|
||||
- [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/addy_io/)
|
||||
- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/addyio-anonymous-email-fo/iadbdpnoknmbdeolbapdackdcogdmjpe)
|
||||
|
||||
The number of shared aliases (which end in a shared domain like @anonaddy.me) that you can create is limited to 20 on AnonAddy's free plan and 50 on their $12/year plan. You can create unlimited standard aliases (which end in a domain like @[username].anonaddy.com or a custom domain on paid plans), however, as previously mentioned, this can be detrimental to privacy because people can trivially tie your standard aliases together based on the domain name alone. Unlimited shared aliases are available for $36/year.
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
The number of shared aliases (which end in a shared domain like @addy.io) that you can create is limited to 10 on addy.io's free plan, 50 on their $1/month plan and unlimited on the $4/month plan (billed $3 for a year). You can create unlimited standard aliases (which end in a domain like @[username].addy.io or a custom domain on paid plans), however, as previously mentioned, this can be detrimental to privacy because people can trivially tie your standard aliases together based on the domain name alone. They are useful where a shared domain might be blocked by a service. Securitum [audited](https://addy.io/blog/addy-io-passes-independent-security-audit/) addy.io in September 2023 and no significant vulnerabilities [were identified](https://addy.io/addy-io-security-audit.pdf).
|
||||
|
||||
Notable free features:
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] 20 Shared Aliases
|
||||
- [x] 10 Shared Aliases
|
||||
- [x] Unlimited Standard Aliases
|
||||
- [ ] No Outgoing Replies
|
||||
- [x] 2 Recipient Mailboxes
|
||||
- [x] 1 Recipient Mailboxes
|
||||
- [x] Automatic PGP Encryption
|
||||
|
||||
### SimpleLogin
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**SimpleLogin** is a free service which provides email aliases on a variety of shared domain names, and optionally provides paid features like unlimited aliases and custom domains.
|
||||
**SimpleLogin** is a free service which provides email aliases on a variety of shared domain names, and optionally provides paid features like unlimited aliases and custom domains.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://simplelogin.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://simplelogin.io/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://simplelogin.io/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simple-login){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://simplelogin.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://simplelogin.io/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://simplelogin.io/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simple-login){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.simplelogin.android)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1494359858)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/simple-login/Simple-Login-Android/releases)
|
||||
- [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/simplelogin/)
|
||||
- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/dphilobhebphkdjbpfohgikllaljmgbn)
|
||||
- [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/simpleloginreceive-sen/diacfpipniklenphgljfkmhinphjlfff)
|
||||
- [:simple-safari: Safari](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1494051017)
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.simplelogin.android)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1494359858)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/simple-login/Simple-Login-Android/releases)
|
||||
- [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/simplelogin/)
|
||||
- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/dphilobhebphkdjbpfohgikllaljmgbn)
|
||||
- [:simple-microsoftedge: Edge](https://microsoftedge.microsoft.com/addons/detail/simpleloginreceive-sen/diacfpipniklenphgljfkmhinphjlfff)
|
||||
- [:simple-safari: Safari](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1494051017)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
SimpleLogin was [acquired by Proton AG](https://proton.me/news/proton-and-simplelogin-join-forces) as of April 8, 2022. If you use Proton Mail for your primary mailbox, SimpleLogin is a great choice. As both products are now owned by the same company you now only have to trust a single entity. We also expect that SimpleLogin will be more tightly integrated with Proton's offerings in the future. SimpleLogin continues to support forwarding to any email provider of your choosing. Securitum [audited](https://simplelogin.io/blog/security-audit/) SimpleLogin in early 2022 and all issues [were addressed](https://simplelogin.io/audit2022/web.pdf).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -370,26 +407,30 @@ Advanced system administrators may consider setting up their own email server. M
|
||||
|
||||
### Combined software solutions
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Mailcow** is a more advanced mail server perfect for those with a bit more Linux experience. It has everything you need in a Docker container: A mail server with DKIM support, antivirus and spam monitoring, webmail and ActiveSync with SOGo, and web-based administration with 2FA support.
|
||||
**Mailcow** is a more advanced mail server perfect for those with a bit more Linux experience. It has everything you need in a Docker container: A mail server with DKIM support, antivirus and spam monitoring, webmail and ActiveSync with SOGo, and web-based administration with 2FA support.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailcow.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://mailcow.github.io/mailcow-dockerized-docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailcow/mailcow-dockerized){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.servercow.de/mailcow?lang=en#sal){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailcow.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://mailcow.github.io/mailcow-dockerized-docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailcow/mailcow-dockerized){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.servercow.de/mailcow?lang=en#sal){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
**Mail-in-a-Box** is an automated setup script for deploying a mail server on Ubuntu. Its goal is to make it easier for people to set up their own mail server.
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailinabox.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://mailinabox.email/guide.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mail-in-a-box/mailinabox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
**Mail-in-a-Box** is an automated setup script for deploying a mail server on Ubuntu. Its goal is to make it easier for people to set up their own mail server.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailinabox.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://mailinabox.email/guide.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mail-in-a-box/mailinabox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
For a more manual approach we've picked out these two articles:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -496,8 +537,8 @@ Must not have any marketing which is irresponsible:
|
||||
- Claims of "unbreakable encryption." Encryption should be used with the intention that it may not be secret in the future when the technology exists to crack it.
|
||||
- Making guarantees of protecting anonymity 100%. When someone makes a claim that something is 100% it means there is no certainty for failure. We know people can quite easily deanonymize themselves in a number of ways, e.g.:
|
||||
|
||||
- Reusing personal information e.g. (email accounts, unique pseudonyms, etc.) that they accessed without anonymity software (Tor, VPN, etc.)
|
||||
- [Browser fingerprinting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint)
|
||||
- Reusing personal information e.g. (email accounts, unique pseudonyms, etc.) that they accessed without anonymity software (Tor, VPN, etc.)
|
||||
- [Browser fingerprinting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint)
|
||||
|
||||
**Best Case:**
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ meta_title: "Recommended Encryption Software: VeraCrypt, Cryptomator, PicoCrypt,
|
||||
title: "Encryption Software"
|
||||
icon: material/file-lock
|
||||
description: Encryption of data is the only way to control who can access it. These tools allow you to encrypt your emails and any other files.
|
||||
cover: encryption.png
|
||||
cover: encryption.webp
|
||||
---
|
||||
Encryption of data is the only way to control who can access it. If you are currently not using encryption software for your hard disk, emails or files, you should pick an option here.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ Truecrypt has been [audited a number of times](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tru
|
||||
|
||||
## OS Full Disk Encryption
|
||||
|
||||
Modern operating systems include [FDE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_encryption) and will have a [secure cryptoprocessor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_cryptoprocessor).
|
||||
For encrypting the drive your operating system boots from, we generally recommend enabling the encryption software that comes with your operating system rather than using a third-party tool. This is because your operating system's native encryption tools often make use of OS and hardware-specific features like the [secure cryptoprocessor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_cryptoprocessor) in your device to protect your computer against more advanced physical attacks. For secondary drives and external drives which you *don't* boot from, we still recommend using open-source tools like [VeraCrypt](#veracrypt-disk) over the tools below, because they offer additional flexibility and let you avoid vendor lock-in.
|
||||
|
||||
### BitLocker
|
||||
|
||||
@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ Modern operating systems include [FDE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_encryp
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**BitLocker** is the full volume encryption solution bundled with Microsoft Windows. The main reason we recommend it is because of its [use of TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). [ElcomSoft](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ElcomSoft), a forensics company, has written about it in [Understanding BitLocker TPM Protection](https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2021/01/understanding-BitLocker-tpm-protection/).
|
||||
**BitLocker** is the full volume encryption solution bundled with Microsoft Windows. The main reason we recommend it for encrypting your boot drive is because of its [use of TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). ElcomSoft, a forensics company, has written about this feature in [Understanding BitLocker TPM Protection](https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2021/01/understanding-BitLocker-tpm-protection/).
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/BitLocker/BitLocker-overview){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ BitLocker is [only supported](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/turn-o
|
||||
|
||||
??? example "Enabling BitLocker on Windows Home"
|
||||
|
||||
To enable BitLocker on "Home" editions of Windows, you must have partitions formatted with a [GUID Partition Table](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GUID_Partition_Table) and have a dedicated TPM (v1.2, 2.0+) module.
|
||||
To enable BitLocker on "Home" editions of Windows, you must have partitions formatted with a [GUID Partition Table](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GUID_Partition_Table) and have a dedicated TPM (v1.2, 2.0+) module. You may need to [disable the non-Bitlocker "Device encryption" functionality](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/enabling-bitlocker-on-the-windows-11-home-edition/13303/5) (which is inferior because it sends your recovery key to Microsoft's servers) if it is enabled on your device already before following this guide.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Open a command prompt and check your drive's partition table format with the following command. You should see "**GPT**" listed under "Partition Style":
|
||||
|
||||
@ -185,25 +185,6 @@ We recommend storing a local recovery key in a secure place as opposed to using
|
||||
cryptsetup luksHeaderBackup /dev/device --header-backup-file /mnt/backup/file.img
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Browser-based
|
||||
|
||||
Browser-based encryption can be useful when you need to encrypt a file but cannot install software or apps on your device.
|
||||
|
||||
### hat.sh
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Hat.sh** is a web application that provides secure client-side file encryption in your browser. It can also be self-hosted and is useful if you need to encrypt a file but cannot install any software on your device due to organizational policies.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-globe-16: Website](https://hat.sh){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://hat.sh/about/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://hat.sh/about/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/sh-dv/hat.sh){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sh-dv/hat.sh#donations){ .card-link title="Donations methods can be found at the bottom of the website" }
|
||||
|
||||
## Command-line
|
||||
|
||||
Tools with command-line interfaces are useful for integrating [shell scripts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shell_script).
|
||||
@ -343,7 +324,7 @@ When encrypting with PGP, you have the option to configure different options in
|
||||
|
||||
### Minimum Qualifications
|
||||
|
||||
- Cross-platform encryption apps must be open-source.
|
||||
- Cross-platform encryption apps must be open source.
|
||||
- File encryption apps must support decryption on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
|
||||
- External disk encryption apps must support decryption on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
|
||||
- Internal (OS) disk encryption apps must be cross-platform or built in to the operating system natively.
|
||||
|
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
title: "File Sharing and Sync"
|
||||
icon: material/share-variant
|
||||
description: Discover how to privately share your files between your devices, with your friends and family, or anonymously online.
|
||||
cover: file-sharing.png
|
||||
cover: file-sharing.webp
|
||||
---
|
||||
Discover how to privately share your files between your devices, with your friends and family, or anonymously online.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: Financial Services
|
||||
icon: material/bank
|
||||
cover: financial-services.png
|
||||
cover: financial-services.webp
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Making payments online is one of the biggest challenges to privacy. These services can assist you in protecting your privacy from merchants and other trackers, provided you have a strong understanding of how to make private payments effectively. We strongly encourage you first read our payments overview article before making any purchases:
|
||||
@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ Privacy.com gives information about the merchants you purchase from to your bank
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://anonyome.com/privacy-policy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.mysudo.com/hc/en-us){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
|
||||
MySudo's virtual cards are currently only available via their iOS app.
|
||||
|
||||
### Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
|
||||
|
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
title: "Frontends"
|
||||
icon: material/flip-to-front
|
||||
description: These open-source frontends for various internet services allow you to access content without JavaScript or other annoyances.
|
||||
cover: frontends.png
|
||||
cover: frontends.webp
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Sometimes services will try to force you to sign up for an account by blocking access to content with annoying popups. They might also break without JavaScript enabled. These frontends can allow you to get around these restrictions.
|
||||
@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ When you are using an instance run by someone else, make sure to read the privac
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**ProxiTok** is an open source frontend to the [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com) website that is also self-hostable.
|
||||
**ProxiTok** is an open-source frontend to the [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com) website that is also self-hostable.
|
||||
|
||||
There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -223,4 +223,4 @@ Recommended frontends...
|
||||
|
||||
We only consider frontends for websites which are...
|
||||
|
||||
- Not normally accessible without JavaScript.
|
||||
- Normally accessible without JavaScript.
|
||||
|
@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
meta_title: "Privacy Guides: Your Independent Privacy and Security Resource"
|
||||
template: overrides/home.en.html
|
||||
social:
|
||||
cards_layout: home
|
||||
hide:
|
||||
- navigation
|
||||
- toc
|
||||
|
293
docs/meta/admonitions.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: Admonitions
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
**Admonitions** (or "call-outs") are a choice writers can use to include side content in an article without interrupting the document flow.
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition example" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Example Admonition</p>
|
||||
|
||||
This is an example of an admonition. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nulla et euismod nulla. Curabitur feugiat, tortor non consequat finibus, justo purus auctor massa, nec semper lorem quam in massa.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="example" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Example Collapsible Admonition</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
This is an example of a collapsible admonition. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nulla et euismod nulla. Curabitur feugiat, tortor non consequat finibus, justo purus auctor massa, nec semper lorem quam in massa.
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
## Formatting
|
||||
|
||||
To add an admonition to a page, you can use the following code:
|
||||
|
||||
```markdown title="Admonition"
|
||||
<div class="admonition TYPE" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">TITLE</p>
|
||||
|
||||
ENCLOSED TEXT
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
```markdown title="Collapsible Admonition"
|
||||
<details class="TYPE" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>TITLE</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
ENCLOSED TEXT
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The `TITLE` must be specified, if you don't want a specific title you can set it to the same text as the `TYPE` (see below) in title case, e.g. `Note`. The `ENCLOSED TEXT` should be Markdown formatted.
|
||||
|
||||
### Regular types
|
||||
|
||||
Replace `TYPE` in the examples above with one of the following:
|
||||
|
||||
#### `note`
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition note" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Note</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
#### `abstract`
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition abstract" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Abstract</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
#### `info`
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition info" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Info</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
#### `tip`
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Tip</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
#### `success`
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition success" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Success</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
#### `question`
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition question" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Question</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
#### `warning`
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
#### `failure`
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition failure" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Failure</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
#### `danger`
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition danger" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Danger</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
#### `bug`
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition bug" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Bug</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
#### `example`
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition example" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Example</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
#### `quote`
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition quote" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Quote</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
### Special Types
|
||||
|
||||
#### `recommendation`
|
||||
|
||||
This format is used to generate recommendation cards. Notably it is missing the `<p class="admonition-title">` element.
|
||||
|
||||
``` markdown title="Recommendation Card"
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**PhotoPrism** is a self-hostable platform for managing photos. It supports album syncing and sharing as well as a variety of other [features](https://www.photoprism.app/features). It does not include E2EE, so it's best hosted on a server that you trust and is under your control.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.photoprism.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.photoprism.app/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://www.photoprism.app/kb){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/photoprism){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/photoprism)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="result" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**PhotoPrism** is a self-hostable platform for managing photos. It supports album syncing and sharing as well as a variety of other [features](https://www.photoprism.app/features). It does not include E2EE, so it's best hosted on a server that you trust and is under your control.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.photoprism.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.photoprism.app/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://www.photoprism.app/kb){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/photoprism){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/photoprism)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
#### `downloads`
|
||||
|
||||
This is a special type of collapsible admonition, used to generate the download links section. It is only used within recommendation cards, as shown in the example above.
|
||||
|
||||
```markdown title="Downloads Section"
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonmail.android)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id979659905)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonMail/proton-mail-android/releases)
|
||||
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
|
||||
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.proton.me)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="result" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonmail.android)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id979659905)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonMail/proton-mail-android/releases)
|
||||
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://proton.me/mail/bridge#download)
|
||||
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.proton.me)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
## Old Format
|
||||
|
||||
Throughout the site, you may see some admonitions formatted similarly to these examples:
|
||||
|
||||
``` markdown title="Admonition"
|
||||
!!! note
|
||||
|
||||
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nulla et euismod
|
||||
nulla. Curabitur feugiat, tortor non consequat finibus, justo purus auctor
|
||||
massa, nec semper lorem quam in massa.
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="result" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition note" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Note</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nulla et euismod
|
||||
nulla. Curabitur feugiat, tortor non consequat finibus, justo purus auctor
|
||||
massa, nec semper lorem quam in massa.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
``` markdown title="Collapsible Admonition"
|
||||
??? example "Custom Title"
|
||||
|
||||
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nulla et euismod
|
||||
nulla. Curabitur feugiat, tortor non consequat finibus, justo purus auctor
|
||||
massa, nec semper lorem quam in massa.
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="result" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="example" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Custom Title</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nulla et euismod
|
||||
nulla. Curabitur feugiat, tortor non consequat finibus, justo purus auctor
|
||||
massa, nec semper lorem quam in massa.
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
**This format is no longer used going forward,** because it is incompatible with newer versions of our translation software at Crowdin. When adding a new page to the site, only the newer HTML-based format should be used.
|
||||
|
||||
There is no rush to convert admonitions with the old format to the new format. Pages currently using this formatting should continue to work, but we will be updating them to use the newer HTML-based format above over time as we continue to update the site.
|
@ -13,14 +13,9 @@ You can use an existing SSH key for signing, or [create a new one](https://docs.
|
||||
git config --global gpg.format ssh
|
||||
git config --global tag.gpgSign true
|
||||
```
|
||||
2. Copy your SSH public key to your clipboard, for example:
|
||||
2. Set your SSH key for signing in Git with the following command, substituting `/PATH/TO/.SSH/KEY.PUB` with the path to the public key you'd like to use, e.g. `/home/user/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub`:
|
||||
```
|
||||
pbcopy < ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
|
||||
# Copies the contents of the id_ed25519.pub file to your clipboard
|
||||
```
|
||||
3. Set your SSH key for signing in Git with the following command, replacing the last string in quotes with the public key in your clipboard:
|
||||
```
|
||||
git config --global user.signingkey 'ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3(...) user@example.com'
|
||||
git config --global user.signingkey /PATH/TO/.SSH/KEY.PUB
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Ensure you [add your SSH key to your GitHub account](https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/connecting-to-github-with-ssh/adding-a-new-ssh-key-to-your-github-account#adding-a-new-ssh-key-to-your-account) **as a Signing Key** (as opposed to or in addition to as an Authentication Key).
|
||||
|
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ meta_title: "Privacy Respecting Mobile Web Browsers for Android and iOS - Privac
|
||||
title: "Mobile Browsers"
|
||||
icon: material/cellphone-information
|
||||
description: These browsers are what we currently recommend for standard/non-anonymous internet browsing on your phone.
|
||||
cover: mobile-browsers.png
|
||||
cover: mobile-browsers.webp
|
||||
schema:
|
||||
-
|
||||
"@context": http://schema.org
|
||||
@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ Shields' options can be downgraded on a per-site basis as needed, but by default
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="annotate" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] Select **Aggressive** under Block trackers & ads
|
||||
- [x] Select **Aggressive** under **Block trackers & ads**
|
||||
|
||||
??? warning "Use default filter lists"
|
||||
Brave allows you to select additional content filters within the internal `brave://adblock` page. We advise against using this feature; instead, keep the default filter lists. Using extra lists will make you stand out from other Brave users and may also increase attack surface if there is an exploit in Brave and a malicious rule is added to one of the lists you use.
|
||||
@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ Shields' options can be downgraded on a per-site basis as needed, but by default
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="annotate" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] Select **Disable non-proxied UDP** under [WebRTC IP Handling Policy](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360017989132-How-do-I-change-my-Privacy-Settings-#webrtc)
|
||||
- [x] Select **Disable non-proxied UDP** under [WebRTC IP handling policy](https://support.brave.com/hc/en-us/articles/360017989132-How-do-I-change-my-Privacy-Settings-#webrtc)
|
||||
- [ ] Uncheck **Allow sites to check if you have payment methods saved**
|
||||
- [ ] Uncheck **IPFS Gateway** (1)
|
||||
- [x] Select **Close tabs on exit**
|
||||
|
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
title: "Multi-Factor Authenticators"
|
||||
icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication'
|
||||
description: These tools assist you with securing your internet accounts with Multi-Factor Authentication without sending your secrets to a third-party.
|
||||
cover: multi-factor-authentication.png
|
||||
cover: multi-factor-authentication.webp
|
||||
---
|
||||
## Hardware Security Keys
|
||||
|
||||
@ -22,12 +22,12 @@ cover: multi-factor-authentication.png
|
||||
|
||||
The [comparison table](https://www.yubico.com/store/compare/) shows the features and how the YubiKeys compare. We highly recommend that you select keys from the YubiKey 5 Series.
|
||||
|
||||
YubiKeys can be programmed using the [YubiKey Manager](https://www.yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-manager/) or [YubiKey Personalization Tools](https://www.yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-personalization-tools/). For managing TOTP codes, you can use the [Yubico Authenticator](https://www.yubico.com/products/yubico-authenticator/). All of Yubico's clients are open-source.
|
||||
YubiKeys can be programmed using the [YubiKey Manager](https://www.yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-manager/) or [YubiKey Personalization Tools](https://www.yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-personalization-tools/). For managing TOTP codes, you can use the [Yubico Authenticator](https://www.yubico.com/products/yubico-authenticator/). All of Yubico's clients are open source.
|
||||
|
||||
For models which support HOTP and TOTP, there are 2 slots in the OTP interface which could be used for HOTP and 32 slots to store TOTP secrets. These secrets are stored encrypted on the key and never expose them to the devices they are plugged into. Once a seed (shared secret) is given to the Yubico Authenticator, it will only give out the six-digit codes, but never the seed. This security model helps limit what an attacker can do if they compromise one of the devices running the Yubico Authenticator and make the YubiKey resistant to a physical attacker.
|
||||
|
||||
!!! warning
|
||||
The firmware of YubiKey is not open-source and is not updatable. If you want features in newer firmware versions, or if there is a vulnerability in the firmware version you are using, you would need to purchase a new key.
|
||||
The firmware of YubiKey is not open source and is not updatable. If you want features in newer firmware versions, or if there is a vulnerability in the firmware version you are using, you would need to purchase a new key.
|
||||
|
||||
### Nitrokey
|
||||
|
||||
@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ For the models which support HOTP and TOTP, there are 3 slots for HOTP and 15 fo
|
||||
|
||||
The Nitrokey Pro 2, Nitrokey Storage 2, and the upcoming Nitrokey 3 supports system integrity verification for laptops with the [Coreboot](https://www.coreboot.org/) + [Heads](https://osresearch.net/) firmware.
|
||||
|
||||
Nitrokey's firmware is open-source, unlike the YubiKey. The firmware on modern NitroKey models (except the **NitroKey Pro 2**) is updatable.
|
||||
Nitrokey's firmware is open source, unlike the YubiKey. The firmware on modern NitroKey models (except the **NitroKey Pro 2**) is updatable.
|
||||
|
||||
### Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
@ -89,13 +89,32 @@ Authenticator Apps implement a security standard adopted by the Internet Enginee
|
||||
|
||||
We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternatives as Android and iOS have better security and app isolation than most desktop operating systems.
|
||||
|
||||
### ente Auth
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**ente Auth** is a free and open-source app which stores and generates TOTP tokens on your mobile device. It can be used with an online account to backup and sync your tokens across your devices (and access them via a web interface) in a secure, end-to-end encrypted fashion. It can also be used offline on a single device with no account necessary.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://ente.io/auth){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://ente.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ente-io/auth){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.ente.auth)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/ente-authenticator/id6444121398)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ente-io/auth/releases)
|
||||
- [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://auth.ente.io)
|
||||
|
||||
### Aegis Authenticator (Android)
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Aegis Authenticator** is a free, secure and open-source app to manage your 2-step verification tokens for your online services.
|
||||
**Aegis Authenticator** is a free and open-source app for Android to manage your 2-step verification tokens for your online services. Aegis Authenticator operates completely offline/locally, but includes the option to export your tokens for backup unlike many alternatives.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getaegis.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://getaegis.app/aegis/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
@ -108,23 +127,6 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.beemdevelopment.aegis)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/beemdevelopment/Aegis/releases)
|
||||
|
||||
### Raivo OTP (iOS)
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Raivo OTP** is a native, lightweight and secure time-based (TOTP) & counter-based (HOTP) password client for iOS. Raivo OTP offers optional iCloud backup & sync. Raivo OTP is also available for macOS in the form of a status bar application, however the Mac app does not work independently of the iOS app.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://raivo-otp.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://raivo-otp.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/raivo-otp/ios-application){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://raivo-otp.com/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/raivo-otp/id1459042137)
|
||||
|
||||
### Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
|
||||
|
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
title: "News Aggregators"
|
||||
icon: material/rss
|
||||
description: These news aggregator clients let you keep up with your favorite blogs and news sites using internet standards like RSS.
|
||||
cover: news-aggregators.png
|
||||
cover: news-aggregators.webp
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
A [news aggregator](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/News_aggregator) is a way to keep up with your favorite blogs and news sites.
|
||||
@ -27,6 +27,21 @@ A [news aggregator](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/News_aggregator) is a way to k
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.kde.akregator)
|
||||
|
||||
### NewsFlash
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**NewsFlash** is an open-source, modern, simple and easy to use GTK4 news feed reader for Linux. It can be used offline or used with services like [NextCloud News](https://apps.nextcloud.com/apps/news) or [Inoreader](https://inoreader.com). It has a search feature and even a pre-defined list of sources like [TechCrunch](https://techcrunch.com) that you can add directly. It is only available as a Flatpak (on the Flathub repository).
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://gitlab.com/news-flash/news_flash_gtk){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/news-flash/news_flash_gtk){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/io.gitlab.news_flash.NewsFlash)
|
||||
|
||||
### Feeder
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
@ -35,8 +50,8 @@ A [news aggregator](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/News_aggregator) is a way to k
|
||||
|
||||
**Feeder** is a modern RSS client for Android that has many [features](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder#features) and works well with folders of RSS feeds. It supports [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS), [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)), [RDF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDF%2FXML) and [JSON Feed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Feed).
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/spacecowboy/Feeder){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/spacecowboy/Feeder){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://ko-fi.com/spacecowboy){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
@ -62,23 +77,6 @@ A [news aggregator](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/News_aggregator) is a way to k
|
||||
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://hyliu.me/fluent-reader)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1520907427)
|
||||
|
||||
### GNOME Feeds
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**GNOME Feeds** is an [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS) and [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)) news reader for [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org). It has a simple interface and is quite fast.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://gfeeds.gabmus.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.gnome.org/World/gfeeds){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://liberapay.com/gabmus/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://gfeeds.gabmus.org/#install)
|
||||
- [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.gabmus.gfeeds)
|
||||
|
||||
### Miniflux
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
@ -143,10 +141,10 @@ Some social media services also support RSS although it's not often advertised.
|
||||
Reddit allows you to subscribe to subreddits via RSS.
|
||||
|
||||
!!! example
|
||||
Replace `subreddit_name` with the subreddit you wish to subscribe to.
|
||||
Replace `[SUBREDDIT]` with the subreddit you wish to subscribe to.
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
https://www.reddit.com/r/{{ subreddit_name }}/new/.rss
|
||||
https://www.reddit.com/r/[SUBREDDIT]/new/.rss
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Twitter
|
||||
|
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
title: "Notebooks"
|
||||
icon: material/notebook-edit-outline
|
||||
description: These encrypted note-taking apps let you keep track of your notes without giving them to a third-party.
|
||||
cover: notebooks.png
|
||||
cover: notebooks.webp
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Keep track of your notes and journalings without giving them to a third-party.
|
||||
@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ If you are currently using an application like Evernote, Google Keep, or Microso
|
||||
- [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://notesnook.com/notesnook-web-clipper/)
|
||||
- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/notesnook-web-clipper/kljhpemdlcnjohmfmkogahelkcidieaj)
|
||||
|
||||
Notesnook does not support password/PIN protection on the web & desktop apps. However, you can still lock individual notes, and your data is always encrypted in transit and on your device using your master key.
|
||||
Notesnook only allows local note encryption with the [private vault](https://help.notesnook.com/lock-notes-with-private-vault) feature on their pro plan, otherwise your notes are not stored encrypted on your device. Your notes are always encrypted before being synced to their servers with keys which only you have access to.
|
||||
|
||||
### Joplin
|
||||
|
||||
@ -87,8 +87,8 @@ Notesnook does not support password/PIN protection on the web & desktop apps. Ho
|
||||
- [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/joplin-web-clipper/)
|
||||
- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/joplin-web-clipper/alofnhikmmkdbbbgpnglcpdollgjjfek)
|
||||
|
||||
Joplin does not support password/PIN protection for the [application itself or individual notes and notebooks](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin/issues/289). However, your data is still encrypted in transit and at the sync location using your master key.
|
||||
Since January 2023, Joplin supports biometrics app lock for [Android](https://joplinapp.org/changelog_android/#android-v2-10-3-https-github-com-laurent22-joplin-releases-tag-android-v2-10-3-pre-release-2023-01-05t11-29-06z) and [iOS](https://joplinapp.org/changelog_ios/#ios-v12-10-2-https-github-com-laurent22-joplin-releases-tag-ios-v12-10-2-2023-01-20t17-41-13z).
|
||||
Joplin does not [support](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin/issues/289) password/PIN protection for the application itself or individual notes and notebooks. However, your data is still encrypted in transit and at the sync location using your master key.
|
||||
Since January 2023, Joplin [supports biometrics](https://github.com/laurent22/joplin/commit/f10d9f75b055d84416053fab7e35438f598753e9) app lock for Android and iOS.
|
||||
|
||||
### Cryptee
|
||||
|
||||
@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ Cryptee offers 100MB of storage for free, with paid options if you need more. Si
|
||||
|
||||
We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
|
||||
|
||||
- Clients must be open-source.
|
||||
- Clients must be open source.
|
||||
- Any cloud sync functionality must be E2EE.
|
||||
- Must support exporting documents into a standard format.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -3,11 +3,15 @@ title: Android Overview
|
||||
icon: simple/android
|
||||
description: Android is an open-source operating system with strong security protections, which makes it our top choice for phones.
|
||||
---
|
||||
Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system.
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
## Choosing an Android Distribution
|
||||
The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system.
|
||||
|
||||
When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has irrevocable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android.
|
||||
## Our Advice
|
||||
|
||||
### Choosing an Android Distribution
|
||||
|
||||
When you buy an Android phone, the default operating system comes bundled with apps and functionality that are not part of the Android Open Source Project. Many of these apps—even apps like the dialer which provide basic system functionality—require invasive integrations with Google Play Services, which in turn asks for privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, and numerous other things on your device in order for those basic system apps and many other apps to function in the first place. Frameworks like Google Play Services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android.
|
||||
|
||||
This problem could be solved by using a custom Android distribution that does not come with such invasive integration. Unfortunately, many custom Android distributions often violate the Android security model by not supporting critical security features such as AVB, rollback protection, firmware updates, and so on. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require [more permissive](https://github.com/LineageOS/android_system_sepolicy/search?q=userdebug&type=code) SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -15,17 +19,31 @@ Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that
|
||||
|
||||
[Our Android System Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md){ .md-button }
|
||||
|
||||
## Avoid Rooting
|
||||
### Avoid Rooting
|
||||
|
||||
[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
|
||||
|
||||
Adblockers, which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For Adblocking we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or [VPN](../vpn.md) server blocking solutions instead. RethinkDNS, TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN) preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as Orbot or a real VPN server.
|
||||
Content blockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For content blocking we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or [VPN](../vpn.md) server blocking solutions instead. RethinkDNS, TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN) preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as Orbot or a real VPN server.
|
||||
|
||||
AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
|
||||
|
||||
We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps.
|
||||
|
||||
## Verified Boot
|
||||
### Install Updates
|
||||
|
||||
It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too.
|
||||
|
||||
For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution.
|
||||
|
||||
### Sharing Media
|
||||
|
||||
You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload.
|
||||
|
||||
For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos.
|
||||
|
||||
## Security Protections
|
||||
|
||||
### Verified Boot
|
||||
|
||||
[Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -37,21 +55,17 @@ Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock And
|
||||
|
||||
Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be aware of beyond their marketing. For example, the Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage.
|
||||
|
||||
## Firmware Updates
|
||||
### Firmware Updates
|
||||
|
||||
Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin).
|
||||
|
||||
As the components of the phone, such as the processor and radio technologies rely on closed-source components, the updates must be provided by the respective manufacturers. Therefore, it is important that you purchase a device within an active support cycle. [Qualcomm](https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2020/12/16/qualcomm-and-google-announce-collaboration-extend-android-os-support-and) and [Samsung](https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-security-extending-updates-knox/) support their devices for 4 years, while cheaper products often have shorter support cycles. With the introduction of the [Pixel 6](https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/4457705), Google now makes their own SoC and they will provide a minimum of 5 years of support.
|
||||
As the components of the phone, such as the processor and radio technologies rely on closed-source components, the updates must be provided by the respective manufacturers. Therefore, it is important that you purchase a device within an active support cycle. [Qualcomm](https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2020/12/16/qualcomm-and-google-announce-collaboration-extend-android-os-support-and) and [Samsung](https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-security-extending-updates-knox/) support their devices for 4 years, while cheaper products often have shorter support cycles. With the introduction of the [Pixel 6](https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/4457705), Google now makes their own SoC, and they will provide a minimum of 5 years of support. With the introduction of the Pixel 8 series, Google increased that support window to 7 years.
|
||||
|
||||
EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive firmware updates from OEM vendors or after market Android distributors. This means that security issues with those devices will remain unfixed.
|
||||
|
||||
Fairphone, for example, markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates.
|
||||
Fairphone, for example, markets their Fairphone 4 device as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates.
|
||||
|
||||
## Android Versions
|
||||
|
||||
It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution.
|
||||
|
||||
## Android Permissions
|
||||
### Android Permissions
|
||||
|
||||
[Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -76,7 +90,7 @@ Android 12:
|
||||
|
||||
Android 13:
|
||||
|
||||
- A permission for [nearby wifi access](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/13/behavior-changes-13#nearby-wifi-devices-permission). The MAC addresses of nearby WiFi access points was a popular way for apps to track a user's location.
|
||||
- A permission for [nearby Wi-Fi access](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/13/behavior-changes-13#nearby-wifi-devices-permission). The MAC addresses of nearby Wi-Fi access points was a popular way for apps to track a user's location.
|
||||
- More [granular media permissions](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/13/behavior-changes-13#granular-media-permissions), meaning you can grant access to images, videos or audio files only.
|
||||
- Background use of sensors now requires the [`BODY_SENSORS`](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/13/behavior-changes-13#body-sensors-background-permission) permission.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -92,35 +106,33 @@ An app may request a permission for a specific feature it has. For example, any
|
||||
|
||||
Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) may show some trackers such as [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). This library includes [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) which can provide [push notifications](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps. This [is the case](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) with Bitwarden. That doesn't mean that Bitwarden is using all of the analytics features that are provided by Google Firebase Analytics.
|
||||
|
||||
## Media Access
|
||||
## Privacy Features
|
||||
|
||||
Quite a few applications allows you to "share" a file with them for media upload. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter.
|
||||
|
||||
## User Profiles
|
||||
### User Profiles
|
||||
|
||||
Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android.
|
||||
|
||||
With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation.
|
||||
|
||||
## Work Profile
|
||||
### Work Profile
|
||||
|
||||
[Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles.
|
||||
|
||||
A **device controller** app such as [Shelter](../android.md#shelter) is required to create a Work Profile without an enterprise MDM, unless you're using a custom Android OS which includes one.
|
||||
|
||||
The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such as *File Shuttle* and *contact search blocking* or any kind of isolation features must be implemented by the controller. You must also fully trust the device controller app, as it has full access to your data inside of the work profile.
|
||||
The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such as *File Shuttle* and *contact search blocking* or any kind of isolation features must be implemented by the controller. You must also fully trust the device controller app, as it has full access to your data inside the work profile.
|
||||
|
||||
This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously.
|
||||
|
||||
## VPN Killswitch
|
||||
### VPN Killswitch
|
||||
|
||||
Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
|
||||
Android 7 and above supports a VPN kill switch, and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
|
||||
|
||||
## Global Toggles
|
||||
### Global Toggles
|
||||
|
||||
Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled.
|
||||
|
||||
## Google
|
||||
## Google Services
|
||||
|
||||
If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -130,7 +142,7 @@ If you have a Google account we suggest enrolling in the [Advanced Protection Pr
|
||||
|
||||
The Advanced Protection Program provides enhanced threat monitoring and enables:
|
||||
|
||||
- Stricter two factor authentication; e.g. that [FIDO](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) **must** be used and disallows the use of [SMS OTPs](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#sms-or-email-mfa), [TOTP](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp) and [OAuth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth)
|
||||
- Stricter two-factor authentication; e.g. that [FIDO](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) **must** be used and disallows the use of [SMS OTPs](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#sms-or-email-mfa), [TOTP](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp) and [OAuth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth)
|
||||
- Only Google and verified third-party apps can access account data
|
||||
- Scanning of incoming emails on Gmail accounts for [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing#Email_phishing) attempts
|
||||
- Stricter [safe browser scanning](https://www.google.com/chrome/privacy/whitepaper.html#malware) with Google Chrome
|
||||
@ -138,7 +150,7 @@ The Advanced Protection Program provides enhanced threat monitoring and enables:
|
||||
|
||||
If you use non-sandboxed Google Play Services (common on stock operating systems), the Advanced Protection Program also comes with [additional benefits](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/9764949?hl=en) such as:
|
||||
|
||||
- Not allowing app installation outside of the Google Play Store, the OS vendor's app store, or via [`adb`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_Debug_Bridge)
|
||||
- Not allowing app installation outside the Google Play Store, the OS vendor's app store, or via [`adb`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_Debug_Bridge)
|
||||
- Mandatory automatic device scanning with [Play Protect](https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/2812853?hl=en#zippy=%2Chow-malware-protection-works%2Chow-privacy-alerts-work)
|
||||
- Warning you about unverified applications
|
||||
|
||||
@ -165,4 +177,4 @@ You will either be given the option to delete your advertising ID or to *Opt out
|
||||
|
||||
[SafetyNet](https://developer.android.com/training/safetynet/attestation) and the [Play Integrity APIs](https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity) are generally used for [banking apps](https://grapheneos.org/usage#banking-apps). Many banking apps will work fine in GrapheneOS with sandboxed Play services, however some non-financial apps have their own crude anti-tampering mechanisms which might fail. GrapheneOS passes the `basicIntegrity` check, but not the certification check `ctsProfileMatch`. Devices with Android 8 or later have hardware attestation support which cannot be bypassed without leaked keys or serious vulnerabilities.
|
||||
|
||||
As for Google Wallet, we don't recommend this due to their [privacy policy](https://payments.google.com/payments/apis-secure/get_legal_document?ldo=0&ldt=privacynotice&ldl=en), which states you must opt-out if you don't want your credit rating and personal information shared with affiliate marketing services.
|
||||
As for Google Wallet, we don't recommend this due to their [privacy policy](https://payments.google.com/payments/apis-secure/get_legal_document?ldo=0&ldt=privacynotice&ldl=en), which states you must opt out if you don't want your credit rating and personal information shared with affiliate marketing services.
|
||||
|
218
docs/os/ios-overview.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: iOS Overview
|
||||
icon: simple/apple
|
||||
description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone.
|
||||
---
|
||||
**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system.
|
||||
|
||||
## Privacy Notes
|
||||
|
||||
iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways.
|
||||
|
||||
We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services.
|
||||
|
||||
### Activation Lock
|
||||
|
||||
All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device.
|
||||
|
||||
### Mandatory App Store
|
||||
|
||||
The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method.
|
||||
|
||||
### Invasive Telemetry
|
||||
|
||||
Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance).
|
||||
|
||||
More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous.
|
||||
|
||||
## Recommended Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
### iCloud
|
||||
|
||||
The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company.
|
||||
|
||||
Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple.
|
||||
|
||||
The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks.
|
||||
|
||||
You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here.
|
||||
|
||||
#### iCloud+
|
||||
|
||||
A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone.
|
||||
|
||||
**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari.
|
||||
|
||||
**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Media & Purchases
|
||||
|
||||
At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**.
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations**
|
||||
|
||||
#### Find My
|
||||
|
||||
**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when:
|
||||
|
||||
- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater.
|
||||
- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network.
|
||||
|
||||
Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock.
|
||||
|
||||
At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features.
|
||||
|
||||
### Settings
|
||||
|
||||
Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Airplane Mode
|
||||
|
||||
Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Wi-Fi
|
||||
|
||||
You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button:
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address**
|
||||
|
||||
You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Bluetooth
|
||||
|
||||
**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective.
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth**
|
||||
|
||||
#### General
|
||||
|
||||
Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer.
|
||||
|
||||
It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**:
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates**
|
||||
- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates**
|
||||
- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files**
|
||||
|
||||
**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want.
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off**
|
||||
|
||||
**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**:
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask**
|
||||
|
||||
**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps.
|
||||
|
||||
Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Siri & Search
|
||||
|
||||
If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here.
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked**
|
||||
|
||||
#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode
|
||||
|
||||
Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security.
|
||||
|
||||
Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/).
|
||||
|
||||
If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode.
|
||||
|
||||
If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts.
|
||||
|
||||
On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device.
|
||||
|
||||
**Stolen Data Protection** is a new feature in iOS 17.3 which adds additional security intended to protect your personal data if your device is stolen while unlocked. If you use biometrics and the Find My Device feature in your Apple ID settings, we recommend enabling this new protection:
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] Select **Turn On Protection**
|
||||
|
||||
After enabling stolen data protection, [certain actions](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212510) will require biometric authentication without a password fallback (in the event that a shoulder surfer has obtained your PIN), such as using password autofill, accessing payment information, and disabling lost mode. It also adds a security delay to certain actions performed away from your home or other "familiar location," such as requiring a 1-hour timer to reset your Apple ID password or sign out of your Apple ID. This delay is intended to give you time to enable Lost Mode and secure your account before a thief can reset your device.
|
||||
|
||||
**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone.
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Control Center**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Siri**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Home Control**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Wallet**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories**
|
||||
|
||||
iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts.
|
||||
|
||||
!!! warning
|
||||
|
||||
With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it.
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] Turn on **Erase Data**
|
||||
|
||||
#### Privacy
|
||||
|
||||
**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**:
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Location Services**
|
||||
|
||||
You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**:
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track**
|
||||
|
||||
You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**:
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection**
|
||||
|
||||
**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources.
|
||||
|
||||
You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**:
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety**
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation**
|
||||
|
||||
Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising**
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads**
|
||||
|
||||
**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**:
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report**
|
||||
|
||||
[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally.
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode**
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Advice
|
||||
|
||||
### E2EE Calls
|
||||
|
||||
Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal.
|
||||
|
||||
### Avoid Jailbreaking
|
||||
|
||||
Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware.
|
||||
|
||||
### Encrypted iMessage
|
||||
|
||||
The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices.
|
||||
|
||||
If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications.
|
||||
|
||||
### Blacking Out Faces/Information
|
||||
|
||||
If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%.
|
||||
|
||||
### iOS Betas
|
||||
|
||||
Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities.
|
||||
|
||||
## Security Highlights
|
||||
|
||||
### Before First Unlock
|
||||
|
||||
If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation.
|
@ -3,33 +3,45 @@ title: Linux Overview
|
||||
icon: simple/linux
|
||||
description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative, but not all distribitions are created equal.
|
||||
---
|
||||
It is often believed that [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigor applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years.
|
||||
**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up.
|
||||
|
||||
At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.:
|
||||
|
||||
- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack)
|
||||
- A strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go
|
||||
- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations)
|
||||
|
||||
Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are great if you want to:
|
||||
|
||||
- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems
|
||||
- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms)
|
||||
- Have privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/)
|
||||
|
||||
Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed here.
|
||||
Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page.
|
||||
|
||||
[Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md){ .md-button }
|
||||
|
||||
## Privacy Notes
|
||||
|
||||
There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to:
|
||||
|
||||
- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems
|
||||
- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms)
|
||||
- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/)
|
||||
|
||||
### Open-Source Security
|
||||
|
||||
It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/).
|
||||
|
||||
In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years.
|
||||
|
||||
### Missing Security Features
|
||||
|
||||
At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3).
|
||||
|
||||
- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox.
|
||||
|
||||
Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust.
|
||||
|
||||
## Choosing your distribution
|
||||
|
||||
Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use.
|
||||
Not all Linux distributions are created equal. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution:
|
||||
|
||||
### Release cycle
|
||||
|
||||
We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates.
|
||||
|
||||
For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release.
|
||||
For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release.
|
||||
|
||||
We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -53,28 +65,28 @@ The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tu
|
||||
|
||||
### “Security-focused” distributions
|
||||
|
||||
There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use.
|
||||
There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use.
|
||||
|
||||
### Arch-based distributions
|
||||
|
||||
Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own.
|
||||
Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own.
|
||||
|
||||
For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit).
|
||||
|
||||
Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora.
|
||||
Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/).
|
||||
|
||||
If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically:
|
||||
The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora.
|
||||
|
||||
If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives.
|
||||
|
||||
Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories.
|
||||
- **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
### Kicksecure
|
||||
|
||||
While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default.
|
||||
|
||||
### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions
|
||||
|
||||
We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons.
|
||||
We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode.
|
||||
|
||||
## General Recommendations
|
||||
|
||||
@ -86,27 +98,29 @@ Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS]
|
||||
|
||||
### Swap
|
||||
|
||||
Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM).
|
||||
Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM).
|
||||
|
||||
If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats.
|
||||
|
||||
### Wayland
|
||||
|
||||
We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland.
|
||||
We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland.
|
||||
|
||||
Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)).
|
||||
Fortunately, [wayland compositors](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(protocol)#Wayland_compositors) such as those included with [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org) and [KDE Plasma](https://kde.org) now have good support for Wayland along with some other compositors that use [wlroots](https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/wlroots/wlroots/-/wikis/Projects-which-use-wlroots), (e.g. [Sway](https://swaywm.org)). Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)).
|
||||
|
||||
We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do not have Wayland support, such as Cinnamon (default on Linux Mint), Pantheon (default on Elementary OS), MATE, Xfce, and i3.
|
||||
|
||||
### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates)
|
||||
|
||||
Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html).
|
||||
Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html).
|
||||
|
||||
We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default.
|
||||
We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default.
|
||||
|
||||
### Updates
|
||||
|
||||
Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found.
|
||||
|
||||
Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates.
|
||||
Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates.
|
||||
|
||||
Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -114,7 +128,7 @@ Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automaticall
|
||||
|
||||
### MAC Address Randomization
|
||||
|
||||
Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings.
|
||||
Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings.
|
||||
|
||||
It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -122,7 +136,7 @@ We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as sugges
|
||||
|
||||
If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=).
|
||||
|
||||
There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware.
|
||||
MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware.
|
||||
|
||||
### Other Identifiers
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -117,12 +117,6 @@ Decide whether you want personalized ads based on your usage.
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Uncheck **Personalized Ads**
|
||||
|
||||
##### Security
|
||||
|
||||
Apps from the App Store are subject to stricter security guidelines, such as stricter sandboxing. If the only apps you need are available from the App Store, change the **Allow applications downloaded from** setting to **App Store** to prevent accidentally running other apps. This is a good option particularly if you are configuring a machine for other, less technical users such as children.
|
||||
|
||||
If you choose to also allow applications from identified developers, be careful about the apps you run and where you obtain them.
|
||||
|
||||
##### FileVault
|
||||
|
||||
On modern devices with a Secure Enclave (Apple T2 Security Chip, Apple silicon), your data is always encrypted, but is decrypted automatically by a hardware key if your device doesn't detect it's been tampered with. Enabling FileVault additionally requires your password to decrypt your data, greatly improving security, especially when powered off or before the first login after powering on.
|
||||
@ -139,17 +133,21 @@ On older Intel-based Mac computers, FileVault is the only form of disk encryptio
|
||||
|
||||
### MAC Address Randomization
|
||||
|
||||
Unlike iOS, macOS doesn't give you an option to randomize your MAC address in the settings, so you'll need to do it with a command or a script.
|
||||
macOS uses a randomized MAC address when performing Wi-Fi scans while disconnected from a network. However, when you connect to a preferred Wi-Fi network, the MAC address used is never randomized. Full MAC address randomization is an advanced topic, and most people don't need to worry about performing the following steps.
|
||||
|
||||
You open up your Terminal and enter this command to randomize your MAC address:
|
||||
Unlike iOS, macOS doesn't give you an option to randomize your MAC address in the settings, so if you wish to change this identifier, you'll need to do it with a command or a script. To set a random MAC address, first disconnect from the network if you're already connected, then open **Terminal** and enter this command to randomize your MAC address:
|
||||
|
||||
``` zsh
|
||||
openssl rand -hex 6 | sed 's/\(..\)/\1:/g; s/.$//' | xargs sudo ifconfig en1 ether
|
||||
openssl rand -hex 6 | sed 's/^\(.\{1\}\)./\12/; s/\(..\)/\1:/g; s/.$//' | xargs sudo ifconfig en0 ether
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
en1 is the name of the interface you're changing the MAC address for. This might not be the right one on every Mac, so to check you can hold the option key and click the Wi-Fi symbol at the top right of your screen.
|
||||
`en0` is the name of the interface you're changing the MAC address for. This might not be the right one on every Mac, so to check you can hold the option key and click the Wi-Fi symbol at the top right of your screen. "Interface name" should be displayed at the top of the dropdown menu.
|
||||
|
||||
This will be reset on reboot.
|
||||
This command sets your MAC address to a randomized, "locally administered" address, matching the behavior of iOS, Windows, and Android's MAC address randomization features. This means that every character in the MAC address is fully randomized except the second character, which denotes the MAC address as *locally administered* and not in conflict with any actual hardware. This method is most compatible with modern networks. An alternative method is to set the first six characters of the MAC address to one of Apple's existing *Organizational Unique Identifiers*, which we'll leave as an exercise to the reader. That method is more likely to conflict with some networks, but may be less noticeable. Given the prevalence of randomized, locally administered MAC addresses in other modern operating systems, we don't think either method has significant privacy advantages over the other.
|
||||
|
||||
When you connect to the network again, you'll connect with a random MAC address. This will be reset on reboot.
|
||||
|
||||
Your MAC address is not the only unique information about your device which is broadcast on the network, your hostname is another piece of information which could uniquely identify you. You may wish to set your hostname to something generic like "MacBook Air", "Laptop", "John's MacBook Pro", or "iPhone" in **System Settings** > **General** > **Sharing**. Some [privacy scripts](https://github.com/sunknudsen/privacy-guides/tree/master/how-to-spoof-mac-address-and-hostname-automatically-at-boot-on-macos#guide) allow you to easily generate hostnames with random names.
|
||||
|
||||
## Security Protections
|
||||
|
||||
@ -200,7 +198,7 @@ macOS comes with automatic backup software called [Time Machine](https://support
|
||||
|
||||
Many modern security features in macOS—such as modern Secure Boot, hardware-level exploit mitigation, OS integrity checks, and file-based encryption—rely on Apple silicon, and Apple's newer hardware always has the [best security](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/apple-soc-security-sec87716a080/1/web/1). We only encourage the use of Apple silicon, and not older Intel-based Mac computers or Hackintoshes.
|
||||
|
||||
Some of these modern security features are available on older Intel-based Mac computers with the Apple T2 Security Chip, but that chip is susceptible to the *checkm8* exploit which could compromise its security,
|
||||
Some of these modern security features are available on older Intel-based Mac computers with the Apple T2 Security Chip, but that chip is susceptible to the *checkm8* exploit which could compromise its security.
|
||||
|
||||
If you use Bluetooth accessories such as a keyboard, we recommend that you use official Apple ones as their firmware will automatically be updated for you by macOS. Using third party accessories is fine, but you should remember to install firmware updates for them regularly.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -1,54 +1,74 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "Qubes Overview"
|
||||
icon: simple/qubesos
|
||||
description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within virtual machines for heightened security.
|
||||
description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within *qubes* (formerly "VMs") for heightened security.
|
||||
---
|
||||
[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/).
|
||||
[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated *qubes*, (which are Virtual Machines). You can assign each *qube* a level of trust based on its purpose. Qubes OS provides security by using isolation. It only permits actions on a per-case basis and therefore is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/).
|
||||
|
||||
## How does Qubes OS work?
|
||||
|
||||
Qubes uses [compartmentalization](https://www.qubes-os.org/intro/) to keep the system secure. Qubes are created from templates, the defaults being for Fedora, Debian and [Whonix](../desktop.md#whonix). Qubes OS also allows you to create once-use [disposable](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-use-disposables/) virtual machines.
|
||||
Qubes uses [compartmentalization](https://www.qubes-os.org/intro/) to keep the system secure. Qubes are created from templates, the defaults being for Fedora, Debian and [Whonix](../desktop.md#whonix). Qubes OS also allows you to create once-use [disposable](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-use-disposables/) *qubes*.
|
||||
|
||||
??? "The term *qubes* is gradually being updated to avoid referring to them as "virtual machines"."
|
||||
|
||||
Some of the information here and on the Qubes OS documentation may contain conflicting language as the "appVM" term is gradually being changed to "qube". Qubes are not entire virtual machines, but maintain similar functionalities to VMs.
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
<figcaption>Qubes Architecture, Credit: What is Qubes OS Intro</figcaption>
|
||||
|
||||
Each Qubes application has a [colored border](https://www.qubes-os.org/screenshots/) that can help you keep track of the virtual machine it is running in. You could, for example, use a specific color for your banking browser, while using a different color for a general untrusted browser.
|
||||
Each qube has a [colored border](https://www.qubes-os.org/screenshots/) that can help you keep track of the domain in which it runs. You could, for example, use a specific color for your banking browser, while using a different color for a general untrusted browser.
|
||||
|
||||

|
||||
<figcaption>Qubes window borders, Credit: Qubes Screenshots</figcaption>
|
||||
|
||||
## Why Should I use Qubes?
|
||||
|
||||
Qubes OS is useful if your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md) requires strong compartmentalization and security, such as if you think you'll be opening untrusted files from untrusted sources. A typical reason for using Qubes OS is to open documents from unknown sources.
|
||||
Qubes OS is useful if your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md) requires strong security and isolation, such as if you think you'll be opening untrusted files from untrusted sources. A typical reason for using Qubes OS is to open documents from unknown sources, but the idea is that if a single qube is compromised it won't affect the rest of the system.
|
||||
|
||||
Qubes OS utilizes [Dom0](https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Dom0) Xen VM (i.e., an "AdminVM") for controlling other guest VMs or Qubes on the host OS. Other VMs display individual application windows within Dom0's desktop environment. It allows you to color code windows based on trust levels and run apps that can interact with each other with very granular control.
|
||||
Qubes OS utilizes [dom0](https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Dom0) Xen VM for controlling other *qubes* on the host OS, all of which display individual application windows within dom0's desktop environment. There are many uses for this type of architecture. Here are some tasks you can perform. You can see just how much more secure these processes are made by incorporating multiple steps.
|
||||
|
||||
### Copying and Pasting Text
|
||||
|
||||
You can [copy and paste text](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-and-paste-text/) using `qvm-copy-to-vm` or the below instructions:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Press **Ctrl+C** to tell the VM you're in that you want to copy something.
|
||||
2. Press **Ctrl+Shift+C** to tell the VM to make this buffer available to the global clipboard.
|
||||
3. Press **Ctrl+Shift+V** in the destination VM to make the global clipboard available.
|
||||
4. Press **Ctrl+V** in the destination VM to paste the contents in the buffer.
|
||||
1. Press **Ctrl+C** to tell the *qube* you're in that you want to copy something.
|
||||
2. Press **Ctrl+Shift+C** to tell the *qube* to make this buffer available to the global clipboard.
|
||||
3. Press **Ctrl+Shift+V** in the destination *qube* to make the global clipboard available.
|
||||
4. Press **Ctrl+V** in the destination *qube* to paste the contents in the buffer.
|
||||
|
||||
### File Exchange
|
||||
|
||||
To copy and paste files and directories (folders) from one VM to another, you can use the option **Copy to Other AppVM...** or **Move to Other AppVM...**. The difference is that the **Move** option will delete the original file. Either option will protect your clipboard from being leaked to any other Qubes. This is more secure than air-gapped file transfer because an air-gapped computer will still be forced to parse partitions or file systems. That is not required with the inter-qube copy system.
|
||||
To copy and paste files and directories (folders) from one *qube* to another, you can use the option **Copy to Other AppVM...** or **Move to Other AppVM...**. The difference is that the **Move** option will delete the original file. Either option will protect your clipboard from being leaked to any other *qubes*. This is more secure than air-gapped file transfer. An air-gapped computer will still be forced to parse partitions or file systems. That is not required with the inter-qube copy system.
|
||||
|
||||
??? info "AppVMs or qubes do not have their own file systems"
|
||||
??? "Qubes do not have their own filesystems."
|
||||
|
||||
You can [copy and move files](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-and-move-files/) between Qubes. When doing so the changes aren't immediately made and can be easily undone in case of an accident.
|
||||
You can [copy and move files](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-and-move-files/) between *qubes*. When doing so the changes aren't immediately made and can be easily undone in case of an accident. When you run a *qube*, it does not have a persistent filesystem. You can create and delete files, but these changes are ephemeral.
|
||||
|
||||
### Inter-VM Interactions
|
||||
|
||||
The [qrexec framework](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec/) is a core part of Qubes which allows virtual machine communication between domains. It is built on top of the Xen library *vchan*, which facilitates [isolation through policies](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2020/06/22/new-qrexec-policy-system/).
|
||||
The [qrexec framework](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec/) is a core part of Qubes which allows communication between domains. It is built on top of the Xen library *vchan*, which facilitates [isolation through policies](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2020/06/22/new-qrexec-policy-system/).
|
||||
|
||||
## Connecting to Tor via a VPN
|
||||
|
||||
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
|
||||
|
||||
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
|
||||
|
||||
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
|
||||
|
||||
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
|
||||
|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|
|
||||
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
|
||||
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
|
||||
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
|
||||
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
|
||||
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Resources
|
||||
|
||||
For additional information we encourage you to consult the extensive Qubes OS documentation pages located on the [Qubes OS Website](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/). Offline copies can be downloaded from the Qubes OS [documentation repository](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-doc).
|
||||
|
||||
- Open Technology Fund: [*Arguably the world's most secure operating system*](https://www.opentech.fund/news/qubes-os-arguably-the-worlds-most-secure-operating-system-motherboard/)
|
||||
- J. Rutkowska: [*Software compartmentalization vs. physical separation*](https://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/2014/Software_compartmentalization_vs_physical_separation.pdf)
|
||||
- J. Rutkowska: [*Partitioning my digital life into security domains*](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/03/13/partitioning-my-digital-life-into.html)
|
||||
- Qubes OS: [*Related Articles*](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/categories/#articles)
|
||||
- [Arguably the world's most secure operating system](https://www.opentech.fund/news/qubes-os-arguably-the-worlds-most-secure-operating-system-motherboard/) (Open Technology Fund)
|
||||
- [Software compartmentalization vs. physical separation](https://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/2014/Software_compartmentalization_vs_physical_separation.pdf) (J. Rutkowska)
|
||||
- [Partitioning my digital life into security domains](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/03/13/partitioning-my-digital-life-into.html) (J. Rutkowska)
|
||||
- [Related Articles](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/categories/#articles) (Qubes OS)
|
||||
|
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ meta_title: "The Best Password Managers to Protect Your Privacy and Security - P
|
||||
title: "Password Managers"
|
||||
icon: material/form-textbox-password
|
||||
description: Password managers allow you to securely store and manage passwords and other credentials.
|
||||
cover: passwords.png
|
||||
cover: passwords.webp
|
||||
schema:
|
||||
-
|
||||
"@context": http://schema.org
|
||||
@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ Bitwarden also features [Bitwarden Send](https://bitwarden.com/products/send/),
|
||||
|
||||
You need the [Premium Plan](https://bitwarden.com/help/about-bitwarden-plans/#compare-personal-plans) to be able to share files. The free plan only allows text sharing.
|
||||
|
||||
Bitwarden's server-side code is [open-source](https://github.com/bitwarden/server), so if you don't want to use the Bitwarden cloud, you can easily host your own Bitwarden sync server.
|
||||
Bitwarden's server-side code is [open source](https://github.com/bitwarden/server), so if you don't want to use the Bitwarden cloud, you can easily host your own Bitwarden sync server.
|
||||
|
||||
**Vaultwarden** is an alternative implementation of Bitwarden's sync server written in Rust and compatible with official Bitwarden clients, perfect for self-hosted deployment where running the official resource-heavy service might not be ideal. If you are looking to self-host Bitwarden on your own server, you almost certainly want to use Vaultwarden over Bitwarden's official server code.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ Psono provides extensive documentation for their product. The web-client for Pso
|
||||
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
|
||||
|
||||
- Telemetry should be opt-in (disabled by default) or not collected at all.
|
||||
- Should be open-source and reasonably self-hostable.
|
||||
- Should be open source and reasonably self-hostable.
|
||||
|
||||
## Local Storage
|
||||
|
||||
|
110
docs/photo-management.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "Photo Management"
|
||||
icon: material/image
|
||||
description: Photo management tools to keep your personal photos safe from the prying eyes of cloud storage providers and other unauthorized access.
|
||||
cover: photo-management.webp
|
||||
---
|
||||
Most cloud photo management solutions like Google Photos, Flickr, and Amazon Photos don't secure your photos against being accessed by the cloud storage provider themselves. These options keep your personal photos private, while allowing you to share them only with family and trusted people.
|
||||
|
||||
## ente
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**ente** is an end-to-end encrypted photo backup service which supports automatic backups on iOS and Android. It underwent an [audit by Cure53](https://ente.io/blog/cryptography-audit/) in March 2023.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://ente.io/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://ente.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://ente.io/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ente-io){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.ente.photos)
|
||||
- [:simple-android: Android](https://ente.io/download)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1542026904)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ente-io/photos-app/releases)
|
||||
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://ente.io/download)
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://ente.io/download)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://ente.io/download)
|
||||
- [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://web.ente.io)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
## Stingle
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Stingle** is a gallery and camera application with built-in, end-to-end encrypted backup and sync functionality for your photos and videos. Storage starts at 1GB for free accounts on their cloud, or you can host your own Stingle API server for total independence.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://stingle.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://stingle.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://stingle.org/faq/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/stingle){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.stingle.photos)
|
||||
- [:simple-android: Android](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.stingle.photos/)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/in/app/stingle-photos/id1582535448)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/stingle)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
## PhotoPrism
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**PhotoPrism** is a self-hostable platform for managing photos. It supports album syncing and sharing as well as a variety of other [features](https://www.photoprism.app/features). It does not include E2EE, so it's best hosted on a server that you trust and is under your control.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.photoprism.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.photoprism.app/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://www.photoprism.app/kb){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/photoprism){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/photoprism)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
## Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="admonition example" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">This section is new</p>
|
||||
|
||||
We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
### Minimum Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
- Cloud-hosted providers must enforce end-to-end encryption.
|
||||
- Must offer a free plan or trial period for testing.
|
||||
- Must support TOTP or FIDO2 multi-factor authentication, or Passkey logins.
|
||||
- Must offer a web interface which supports basic file management functionality.
|
||||
- Must allow for easy exports of all files/documents.
|
||||
- Must use standard, audited encryption.
|
||||
- Must be open source.
|
||||
|
||||
### Best Case
|
||||
|
||||
- Should have a published audit from a reputable, independent third-party.
|
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
title: "Productivity Tools"
|
||||
icon: material/file-sign
|
||||
description: Most online office suites do not support E2EE, meaning the cloud provider has access to everything you do.
|
||||
cover: productivity.png
|
||||
cover: productivity.webp
|
||||
---
|
||||
Most online office suites do not support E2EE, meaning the cloud provider has access to everything you do. The privacy policy may legally protect your rights, but it does not provide technical access constraints.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ Most online office suites do not support E2EE, meaning the cloud provider has ac
|
||||
|
||||
In general, we define collaboration platforms as full-fledged suites which could reasonably act as a replacement to collaboration platforms like Google Drive.
|
||||
|
||||
- Open-source.
|
||||
- Open source.
|
||||
- Makes files accessible via WebDAV unless it is impossible due to E2EE.
|
||||
- Has sync clients for Linux, macOS, and Windows.
|
||||
- Supports document and spreadsheet editing.
|
||||
@ -161,11 +161,10 @@ In general, we define office suites as applications which could reasonably act a
|
||||
|
||||
#### Minimum Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
- Must be open-source.
|
||||
- Must be open source.
|
||||
- Must implement "zero-trust" end-to-end encryption.
|
||||
- Must support password-protected files.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#### Best-Case
|
||||
|
||||
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
|
||||
|
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ meta_title: "The Best Private Instant Messengers - Privacy Guides"
|
||||
title: "Real-Time Communication"
|
||||
icon: material/chat-processing
|
||||
description: Other instant messengers make all of your private conversations available to the company that runs them.
|
||||
cover: real-time-communication.png
|
||||
cover: real-time-communication.webp
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
These are our recommendations for encrypted real-time communication.
|
||||
@ -16,28 +16,33 @@ These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
|
||||
|
||||
### Signal
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
|
||||
**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging, as well as voice and video calling.
|
||||
|
||||
All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
|
||||
All communications are E2EE. Contact lists are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/signalapp){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://signal.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/signalapp){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://signal.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.thoughtcrime.securesms)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id874139669)
|
||||
- [:simple-android: Android](https://signal.org/android/apk/)
|
||||
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://signal.org/download/windows)
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://signal.org/download/macos)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://signal.org/download/linux)
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.thoughtcrime.securesms)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id874139669)
|
||||
- [:simple-android: Android](https://signal.org/android/apk/)
|
||||
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://signal.org/download/windows)
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://signal.org/download/macos)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://signal.org/download/linux)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/). The server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam. Signal requires your phone number as a personal identifier.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -49,49 +54,60 @@ We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installati
|
||||
|
||||
### SimpleX Chat
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**SimpleX** Chat is an instant messenger that is decentralized and doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Users of SimpleX Chat can scan a QR code or click an invite link to participate in group conversations.
|
||||
**SimpleX** Chat is an instant messenger that is decentralized and doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Users of SimpleX Chat can scan a QR code or click an invite link to participate in group conversations.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://simplex.chat){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/blob/stable/PRIVACY.md){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/tree/stable/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://simplex.chat){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/blob/stable/PRIVACY.md){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/tree/stable/docs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=chat.simplex.app)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/simplex-chat/id1605771084)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/releases)
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=chat.simplex.app)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/simplex-chat/id1605771084)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat/releases)
|
||||
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://simplex.chat/downloads/#desktop-app)
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://simplex.chat/downloads/#desktop-app)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://simplex.chat/downloads/#desktop-app)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
SimpleX Chat [was audited](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website.html) by Trail of Bits in October 2022.
|
||||
|
||||
Currently SimpleX Chat only provides a client for Android and iOS. Basic group chatting functionality, direct messaging, editing of messages and markdown are supported. E2EE Audio and Video calls are also supported.
|
||||
|
||||
Your data can be exported, and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up.
|
||||
SimpleX Chat supports basic group chatting functionality, direct messaging, and editing of messages and markdown. E2EE Audio and Video calls are also supported. Your data can be exported, and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up.
|
||||
|
||||
### Briar
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works/) to other clients using the Tor Network. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem.
|
||||
**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works/) to other clients using the Tor Network. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org/){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" }
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org/){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.briarproject.briar.android)
|
||||
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://briarproject.org/download-briar-desktop/)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://briarproject.org/download-briar-desktop/)
|
||||
- [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.briarproject.Briar)
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.briarproject.briar.android)
|
||||
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://briarproject.org/download-briar-desktop/)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://briarproject.org/download-briar-desktop/)
|
||||
- [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.briarproject.Briar)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -103,34 +119,42 @@ Briar supports Forward Secrecy by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.bri
|
||||
|
||||
## Additional Options
|
||||
|
||||
!!! warning
|
||||
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
|
||||
|
||||
These messengers do not have [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
These messengers do not have [Forward Secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
### Element
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Element** is the reference client for the [Matrix](https://matrix.org/docs/guides/introduction) protocol, an [open standard](https://matrix.org/docs/spec) for secure decentralized real-time communication.
|
||||
**Element** is the reference [client](https://matrix.org/ecosystem/clients/) for the [Matrix](https://matrix.org/docs/guides/introduction) protocol, an [open standard](https://matrix.org/docs/spec) for secure decentralized real-time communication.
|
||||
|
||||
Messages and files shared in private rooms (those which require an invite) are by default E2EE as are one to one voice and video calls.
|
||||
Messages and files shared in private rooms (those which require an invite) are by default E2EE as are one to one voice and video calls.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://element.io/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://element.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://element.io/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/vector-im){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://element.io/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://element.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://element.io/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/vector-im){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=im.vector.app)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/vector/id1083446067)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/vector-im/element-android/releases)
|
||||
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://element.io/get-started)
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://element.io/get-started)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://element.io/get-started)
|
||||
- [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://app.element.io)
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=im.vector.app)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/vector/id1083446067)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/vector-im/element-android/releases)
|
||||
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://element.io/get-started)
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://element.io/get-started)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://element.io/get-started)
|
||||
- [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://app.element.io)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -138,31 +162,36 @@ Group voice and video calls are [not](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/i
|
||||
|
||||
The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports PFS](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy), however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
|
||||
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm](https://matrix.org/docs/projects/other/olm) cryptographic ratchet used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest/). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
|
||||
|
||||
### Session
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Session** is a decentralized messenger with a focus on private, secure, and anonymous communications. Session offers support for direct messages, group chats, and voice calls.
|
||||
**Session** is a decentralized messenger with a focus on private, secure, and anonymous communications. Session offers support for direct messages, group chats, and voice calls.
|
||||
|
||||
Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to store and route messages. Every encrypted message is routed through three nodes in the Oxen Service Node Network, making it virtually impossible for the nodes to compile meaningful information on those using the network.
|
||||
Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) to store and route messages. Every encrypted message is routed through three nodes in the Oxen Service Node Network, making it virtually impossible for the nodes to compile meaningful information on those using the network.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getsession.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://getsession.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://getsession.org/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/oxen-io){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getsession.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://getsession.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://getsession.org/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/oxen-io){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
<details class="downloads" markdown>
|
||||
<summary>Downloads</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=network.loki.messenger)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1470168868)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/oxen-io/session-android/releases)
|
||||
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://getsession.org/download)
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://getsession.org/download)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://getsession.org/download)
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=network.loki.messenger)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1470168868)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/oxen-io/session-android/releases)
|
||||
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://getsession.org/download)
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://getsession.org/download)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://getsession.org/download)
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. Open groups have no restriction on the number of members, but are open by design.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -176,9 +205,12 @@ Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the
|
||||
|
||||
**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
|
||||
|
||||
!!! example "This section is new"
|
||||
<div class="admonition example" markdown>
|
||||
<p class="admonition-title">This section is new</p>
|
||||
|
||||
We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
|
||||
We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
- Must have open-source clients.
|
||||
- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
|
||||
|
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
title: "Router Firmware"
|
||||
icon: material/router-wireless
|
||||
description: These alternative operating systems can be used to secure your router or Wi-Fi access point.
|
||||
cover: router.png
|
||||
cover: router.webp
|
||||
---
|
||||
Below are a few alternative operating systems, that can be used on routers, Wi-Fi access points, etc.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ You can consult OpenWrt's [table of hardware](https://openwrt.org/toh/start) to
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**OPNsense** is an open source, FreeBSD-based firewall and routing platform which incorporates many advanced features such as traffic shaping, load balancing, and VPN capabilities, with many more features available in the form of plugins. OPNsense is commonly deployed as a perimeter firewall, router, wireless access point, DHCP server, DNS server, and VPN endpoint.
|
||||
**OPNsense** is an open-source, FreeBSD-based firewall and routing platform which incorporates many advanced features such as traffic shaping, load balancing, and VPN capabilities, with many more features available in the form of plugins. OPNsense is commonly deployed as a perimeter firewall, router, wireless access point, DHCP server, DNS server, and VPN endpoint.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://opnsense.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.opnsense.org/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
|
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ meta_title: "Recommended Search Engines: Anonymous Google Alternatives - Privacy
|
||||
title: "Search Engines"
|
||||
icon: material/search-web
|
||||
description: These privacy-respecting search engines don't build an advertising profile based on your searches.
|
||||
cover: search-engines.png
|
||||
cover: search-engines.webp
|
||||
---
|
||||
Use a search engine that doesn't build an advertising profile based on your searches.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ When you are using a SearXNG instance, be sure to go read their privacy policy.
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Startpage** is a private search engine known for serving Google search results. One of Startpage's unique features is the [Anonymous View](https://www.startpage.com/en/anonymous-view/), which puts forth efforts to standardize user activity to make it more difficult to be uniquely identified. The feature can be useful for hiding [some](https://support.startpage.com/hc/en-us/articles/4455540212116-The-Anonymous-View-Proxy-technical-details) network and browser properties. Unlike the name suggests, the feature should not be relied upon for anonymity. If you are looking for anonymity, use the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) instead.
|
||||
**Startpage** is a private search engine known for serving [Google and Bing](https://support.startpage.com/hc/en-us/articles/4522435533844-What-is-the-relationship-between-Startpage-and-your-search-partners-like-Google-and-Microsoft-Bing-) search results. One of Startpage's unique features is the [Anonymous View](https://www.startpage.com/en/anonymous-view/), which puts forth efforts to standardize user activity to make it more difficult to be uniquely identified. The feature can be useful for hiding [some](https://support.startpage.com/hc/en-us/articles/4455540212116-The-Anonymous-View-Proxy-technical-details) network and browser properties. Unlike the name suggests, the feature should not be relied upon for anonymity. If you are looking for anonymity, use the [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) instead.
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.startpage.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.startpage.com/en/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
|
@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ For more details about each project, why they were chosen, and additional tips o
|
||||
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Orbot (Smartphone Tor Proxy)](tor.md#orbot)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Onion Browser (Tor for iOS)](tor.md#onion-browser)
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Snowflake](tor.md#snowflake) (1)
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
@ -44,6 +45,7 @@ For more details about each project, why they were chosen, and additional tips o
|
||||
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [uBlock Origin](desktop-browsers.md#ublock-origin)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [uBlock Origin Lite](desktop-browsers.md#ublock-origin-lite)
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -120,7 +122,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Proton Mail](email.md#proton-mail)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Mailbox.org](email.md#mailboxorg)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Skiff Mail](email.md#skiff-mail)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Tutanota](email.md#tutanota)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Tuta](email.md#tuta)
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -130,7 +132,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [AnonAddy](email.md#anonaddy)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [addy.io](email.md#addyio)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [SimpleLogin](email.md#simplelogin)
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
@ -154,8 +156,9 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Privacy.com](financial-services.md#privacycom-us-free)
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Privacy.com](financial-services.md#privacycom-us)
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [MySudo](financial-services.md#mysudo-us-paid)
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](financial-services.md#payment-masking-services)
|
||||
@ -170,6 +173,18 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
|
||||
|
||||
[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](financial-services.md#gift-card-marketplaces)
|
||||
|
||||
### Photo Management
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Ente](photo-management.md#ente)
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Stingle](photo-management.md#stingle)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [PhotoPrism](photo-management.md#photoprism)
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](photo-management.md)
|
||||
|
||||
### Search Engines
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
|
||||
@ -211,7 +226,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Tutanota](calendar.md#tutanota)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Tuta](calendar.md#tuta)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Proton Calendar](calendar.md#proton-calendar)
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
@ -273,7 +288,6 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Cryptomator](encryption.md#cryptomator-cloud)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Picocrypt](encryption.md#picocrypt-file)
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [VeraCrypt (FDE)](encryption.md#veracrypt-disk)
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Hat.sh (Browser-based)](encryption.md#hatsh)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Kryptor](encryption.md#kryptor)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Tomb](encryption.md#tomb)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -330,8 +344,8 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
|
||||
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [YubiKey](multi-factor-authentication.md#yubikey)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Nitrokey](multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Aegis Authenticator](multi-factor-authentication.md#aegis-authenticator)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Raivo OTP](multi-factor-authentication.md#raivo-otp)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [ente Auth](multi-factor-authentication.md#ente-auth)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Aegis Authenticator (Android)](multi-factor-authentication.md#aegis-authenticator-android)
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -342,9 +356,9 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
|
||||
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Akregator](news-aggregators.md#akregator)
|
||||
- { .twemoji} [Feeder](news-aggregators.md#feeder)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [NewsFlash](news-aggregators.md#newsflash)
|
||||
- { .twemoji} [Feeder (Android)](news-aggregators.md#feeder)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Fluent Reader](news-aggregators.md#fluent-reader)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [GNOME Feeds](news-aggregators.md#gnome-feeds)
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Miniflux](news-aggregators.md#miniflux)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [NetNewsWire](news-aggregators.md#netnewswire)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Newsboat](news-aggregators.md#newsboat)
|
||||
@ -428,11 +442,11 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Obtainium (App Manager)](android.md#obtainium)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Aurora Store (Google Play Client)](android.md#aurora-store)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Shelter (Work Profiles)](android.md#shelter)
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Auditor (Supported Devices)](android.md#auditor)
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Secure Camera](android.md#secure-camera)
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Secure PDF Viewer](android.md#secure-pdf-viewer)
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Secure PDF Viewer](android.md#secure-pdf-viewer)
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -450,6 +464,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure)
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -465,3 +480,21 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](router.md)
|
||||
|
||||
## Advanced Tools
|
||||
|
||||
These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functionality which most people do not need to worry about, and often require more in-depth technical knowledge to utilize effectively.
|
||||
|
||||
### Device Integrity Verification
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [Mobile Verification Toolkit](device-integrity.md#mobile-verification-toolkit)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [iMazing (iOS)](device-integrity.md#imazing-ios)
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Auditor (Android)](device-integrity.md#auditor-android)
|
||||
- { .twemoji }{ .twemoji } [Hypatia (Android)](device-integrity.md#hypatia-android)
|
||||
- { .twemoji } [iVerify (iOS)](device-integrity.md#iverify-ios)
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](device-integrity.md)
|
||||
|
38
docs/tor.md
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ meta_title: "Tor Browser and Network: Anonymous Web Browsing - Privacy Guides"
|
||||
title: "Tor Network"
|
||||
icon: simple/torproject
|
||||
description: Protect your internet browsing from prying eyes by using the Tor network, a secure network which circumvents censorship.
|
||||
cover: tor.png
|
||||
cover: tor.webp
|
||||
schema:
|
||||
-
|
||||
"@context": http://schema.org
|
||||
@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ The **Tor** network is a group of volunteer-operated servers that allows you to
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16:](https://www.torproject.org){ .card-link title=Homepage }
|
||||
[:simple-torbrowser:](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
Tor works by routing your internet traffic through those volunteer-operated servers, instead of making a direct connection to the site you're trying to visit. This obfuscates where the traffic is coming from, and no server in the connection path is able to see the full path of where the traffic is coming from and going to, meaning even the servers you are using to connect cannot break your anonymity.
|
||||
@ -39,7 +39,15 @@ Tor works by routing your internet traffic through those volunteer-operated serv
|
||||
|
||||
## Connecting to Tor
|
||||
|
||||
There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for anonymous browsing for desktop computers and Android. In addition to the apps listed below, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser.
|
||||
!!! tip
|
||||
|
||||
Before connecting to Tor, please ensure you've read our [overview](advanced/tor-overview.md) on what Tor is and how to connect to it safely. We often recommend connecting to Tor through a trusted [VPN provider](vpn.md), but you have to do so **properly** to avoid decreasing your anonymity.
|
||||
|
||||
There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for anonymous browsing for desktop computers and Android.
|
||||
|
||||
Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
|
||||
|
||||
If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** be using the desktop Tor Browser client, ideally in a [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) configuration. Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against deanonymization.
|
||||
|
||||
### Tor Browser
|
||||
|
||||
@ -52,7 +60,7 @@ There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.torproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:simple-torbrowser:](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
@ -69,6 +77,8 @@ There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the
|
||||
|
||||
The Tor Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting, or identifying you based on your browser configuration. Therefore, it is imperative that you do **not** modify the browser beyond the default [security levels](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/).
|
||||
|
||||
In addition to installing Tor Browser on your computer directly, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser alone.
|
||||
|
||||
### Orbot
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
@ -99,6 +109,24 @@ We previously recommended enabling the *Isolate Destination Address* preference
|
||||
|
||||
All versions are signed using the same signature so they should be compatible with each other.
|
||||
|
||||
### Onion Browser
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Onion Browser** is an open-source browser that lets you browse the web anonymously over the Tor network on iOS devices and is endorsed by the [Tor Project](https://support.torproject.org/glossary/onion-browser/).
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://onionbrowser.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://onionbrowser.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/OnionBrowser/OnionBrowser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://onionbrowser.com/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id519296448)
|
||||
|
||||
## Relays and Bridges
|
||||
|
||||
### Snowflake
|
||||
@ -114,7 +142,7 @@ We previously recommended enabling the *Isolate Destination Address* preference
|
||||
|
||||
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://snowflake.torproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
|
||||
[:octicons-info-16:](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/wikis/Technical%20Overview){ .card-link title=Documentation}
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/snowflake.git/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
|
||||
|
||||
You can enable Snowflake in your browser by opening it in another tab and turning the switch on. You can leave it running in the background while you browse to contribute your connection. We don't recommend installing Snowflake as a browser extension; adding third-party extensions can increase your attack surface.
|
||||
|
49
docs/vpn.md
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ meta_title: "Private VPN Service Recommendations and Comparison, No Sponsors or
|
||||
title: "VPN Services"
|
||||
icon: material/vpn
|
||||
description: These are the best VPN services for protecting your privacy and security online. Find a provider here that isn’t out to spy on you.
|
||||
cover: vpn.png
|
||||
cover: vpn.webp
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
If you're looking for additional **privacy** from your ISP, on a public Wi-Fi network, or while torrenting files, a VPN may be the solution for you as long as you understand the risks involved. We think these providers are a cut above the rest:
|
||||
@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ If you're looking for additional **privacy** from your ISP, on a public Wi-Fi ne
|
||||
|
||||
Using a VPN will **not** keep your browsing habits anonymous, nor will it add additional security to non-secure (HTTP) traffic.
|
||||
|
||||
If you are looking for **anonymity**, you should use the Tor Browser **instead** of a VPN.
|
||||
If you are looking for **anonymity**, you should use the Tor Browser.
|
||||
|
||||
If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connecting to websites using HTTPS. A VPN is not a replacement for good security practices.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -53,12 +53,12 @@ Our recommended providers use encryption, accept Monero, support WireGuard & Ope
|
||||
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://protonvpn.com/download-windows)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://protonvpn.com/support/linux-vpn-setup/)
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } 67 Countries
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } 71 Countries
|
||||
|
||||
Proton VPN has [servers in 67 countries](https://protonvpn.com/vpn-servers).(1) Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
|
||||
Proton VPN has [servers in 71 countries](https://protonvpn.com/vpn-servers) [or 3 if you use their free plan](https://protonvpn.com/free-vpn).(1) Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
|
||||
{ .annotate }
|
||||
|
||||
1. Last checked: 2022-09-16
|
||||
1. Last checked: 2023-12-21
|
||||
|
||||
We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if they use [dedicated servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), instead of cheaper shared solutions (with other customers) such as [virtual private servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -84,13 +84,19 @@ Proton VPN [recommends](https://protonvpn.com/blog/wireguard/) the use of WireGu
|
||||
|
||||
Proton VPN currently only supports ephemeral remote [port forwarding](https://protonvpn.com/support/port-forwarding/) via NAT-PMP, with 60 second lease times. The Windows app provides an easy to access option for it, while on other operating systems you'll need to run your own [NAT-PMP client](https://protonvpn.com/support/port-forwarding-manual-setup/). Torrent applications often support NAT-PMP natively.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-orange } Censorship Circumvention
|
||||
|
||||
Proton VPN has their [Stealth](https://protonvpn.com/blog/stealth-vpn-protocol/) protocol which *may* help in situations where VPN protocols like OpenVPN or Wireguard are blocked with various rudimentary techniques. Stealth encapsulates the VPN tunnel in TLS session in order to look like more generic internet traffic.
|
||||
|
||||
Unfortunately it does not work very well in countries where sophisticated filters are deployed that analyze all outgoing traffic in an attempt to discover encrypted tunnels. Stealth is also not yet available on [Windows](https://github.com/ProtonVPN/win-app/issues/64) or Linux.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Mobile Clients
|
||||
|
||||
In addition to providing standard OpenVPN configuration files, Proton VPN has mobile clients for [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/protonvpn-fast-secure-vpn/id1437005085), [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.protonvpn.android&hl=en_US), and [GitHub](https://github.com/ProtonVPN/android-app/releases) allowing for easy connections to their servers.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Additional Functionality
|
||||
|
||||
Proton VPN clients support two factor authentication on all platforms except Linux at the moment. Proton VPN has their own servers and datacenters in Switzerland, Iceland and Sweden. They offer adblocking and known malware domains blocking with their DNS service. Additionally, Proton VPN also offers "Tor" servers allowing you to easily connect to onion sites, but we still strongly recommend using [the official Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) for this purpose.
|
||||
Proton VPN clients support two factor authentication on all platforms except Linux at the moment. Proton VPN has their own servers and datacenters in Switzerland, Iceland and Sweden. They offer content blocking and known-malware blocking with their DNS service. Additionally, Proton VPN also offers "Tor" servers allowing you to easily connect to onion sites, but we still strongly recommend using [the official Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) for this purpose.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } Killswitch feature is broken on Intel-based Macs
|
||||
|
||||
@ -110,7 +116,7 @@ System crashes [may occur](https://protonvpn.com/support/macos-t2-chip-kill-swit
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ivpn){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.ivpn.client)
|
||||
- [:octicons-moon-16: Accrescent](https://accrescent.app/app/net.ivpn.client)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/ivpn-serious-privacy-protection/id1193122683)
|
||||
@ -118,12 +124,12 @@ System crashes [may occur](https://protonvpn.com/support/macos-t2-chip-kill-swit
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-macos/)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.ivpn.net/apps-linux/)
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } 35 Countries
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } 37 Countries
|
||||
|
||||
IVPN has [servers in 35 countries](https://www.ivpn.net/server-locations).(1) Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
|
||||
IVPN has [servers in 37 countries](https://www.ivpn.net/server-locations).(1) Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
|
||||
{ .annotate }
|
||||
|
||||
1. Last checked: 2022-09-16
|
||||
1. Last checked: 2023-12-21
|
||||
|
||||
We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if they use [dedicated servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), instead of cheaper shared solutions (with other customers) such as [virtual private servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -133,7 +139,7 @@ IVPN has undergone a [no-logging audit from Cure53](https://cure53.de/audit-repo
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Open-Source Clients
|
||||
|
||||
As of February 2020 [IVPN applications are now open-source](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/ivpn-applications-are-now-open-source). Source code can be obtained from their [GitHub organization](https://github.com/ivpn).
|
||||
As of February 2020 [IVPN applications are now open source](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/ivpn-applications-are-now-open-source). Source code can be obtained from their [GitHub organization](https://github.com/ivpn).
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Accepts Cash and Monero
|
||||
|
||||
@ -149,6 +155,10 @@ IVPN [recommends](https://www.ivpn.net/wireguard/) the use of WireGuard with the
|
||||
|
||||
IVPN previously supported port forwarding, but removed the option in [June 2023](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/gradual-removal-of-port-forwarding). Missing this feature could negatively impact certain applications, especially peer-to-peer applications like torrent clients.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Censorship Circumvention
|
||||
|
||||
IVPN has obfuscation modes using the [v2ray](https://www.v2ray.com/en/index.html) project which helps in situations where VPN protocols like OpenVPN or Wireguard are blocked. Currently this feature is only available on Desktop and [iOS](https://www.ivpn.net/knowledgebase/ios/v2ray/). It has two modes where it can use [VMess](https://guide.v2fly.org/en_US/basics/vmess.html) over QUIC or TCP connections. QUIC is a modern protocol with better congestion control and therefore may be faster with reduced latency. The TCP mode makes your data appear as regular HTTP traffic.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Mobile Clients
|
||||
|
||||
In addition to providing standard OpenVPN configuration files, IVPN has mobile clients for [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/ivpn-serious-privacy-protection/id1193122683), [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.ivpn.client), and [GitHub](https://github.com/ivpn/android-app/releases) allowing for easy connections to their servers.
|
||||
@ -172,7 +182,7 @@ IVPN clients support two factor authentication (Mullvad's clients do not). IVPN
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mullvad){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
|
||||
??? downloads
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.mullvad.mullvadvpn)
|
||||
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/mullvad-vpn/id1488466513)
|
||||
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/releases)
|
||||
@ -180,12 +190,12 @@ IVPN clients support two factor authentication (Mullvad's clients do not). IVPN
|
||||
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://mullvad.net/en/download/macos/)
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://mullvad.net/en/download/linux/)
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } 41 Countries
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } 40 Countries
|
||||
|
||||
Mullvad has [servers in 41 countries](https://mullvad.net/servers/).(1) Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
|
||||
Mullvad has [servers in 40 countries](https://mullvad.net/servers/).(1) Picking a VPN provider with a server nearest to you will reduce latency of the network traffic you send. This is because of a shorter route (fewer hops) to the destination.
|
||||
{ .annotate }
|
||||
|
||||
1. Last checked: 2023-01-19
|
||||
1. Last checked: 2023-12-21
|
||||
|
||||
We also think it's better for the security of the VPN provider's private keys if they use [dedicated servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service), instead of cheaper shared solutions (with other customers) such as [virtual private servers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_server).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -223,6 +233,10 @@ Mullvad allows you to [access services hosted on IPv6](https://mullvad.net/en/bl
|
||||
|
||||
Mullvad previously supported port forwarding, but removed the option in [May 2023](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2023/5/29/removing-the-support-for-forwarded-ports/). Missing this feature could negatively impact certain applications, especially peer-to-peer applications like torrent clients.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Censorship Circumvention
|
||||
|
||||
Mullvad has obfuscation an mode using [Shadowsocks with v2ray](https://mullvad.net/en/help/shadowsocks-with-v2ray) which may be useful in situations where VPN protocols like OpenVPN or Wireguard are blocked.
|
||||
|
||||
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Mobile Clients
|
||||
|
||||
Mullvad has published [App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/mullvad-vpn/id1488466513) and [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.mullvad.mullvadvpn) clients, both supporting an easy-to-use interface as opposed to requiring you to manually configure your WireGuard connection. The Android client is also available on [GitHub](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/releases).
|
||||
@ -248,7 +262,7 @@ We require all our recommended VPN providers to provide OpenVPN configuration fi
|
||||
- Support for strong protocols such as WireGuard & OpenVPN.
|
||||
- Killswitch built in to clients.
|
||||
- Multihop support. Multihopping is important to keep data private in case of a single node compromise.
|
||||
- If VPN clients are provided, they should be [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_source), like the VPN software they generally have built into them. We believe that [source code](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Source_code) availability provides greater transparency about what your device is actually doing.
|
||||
- If VPN clients are provided, they should be [open source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_source), like the VPN software they generally have built into them. We believe that [source code](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Source_code) availability provides greater transparency about what your device is actually doing.
|
||||
|
||||
**Best Case:**
|
||||
|
||||
@ -257,6 +271,7 @@ We require all our recommended VPN providers to provide OpenVPN configuration fi
|
||||
- Easy-to-use VPN clients
|
||||
- Supports [IPv6](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv6). We expect that servers will allow incoming connections via IPv6 and allow you to access services hosted on IPv6 addresses.
|
||||
- Capability of [remote port forwarding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_forwarding#Remote_port_forwarding) assists in creating connections when using P2P ([Peer-to-Peer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer-to-peer)) file sharing software or hosting a server (e.g., Mumble).
|
||||
- Obfuscation technology which pads data packets with random data to circumvent internet censorship.
|
||||
|
||||
### Privacy
|
||||
|
||||
@ -327,4 +342,4 @@ Responsible marketing that is both educational and useful to the consumer could
|
||||
|
||||
### Additional Functionality
|
||||
|
||||
While not strictly requirements, there are some factors we looked into when determining which providers to recommend. These include adblocking/tracker-blocking functionality, warrant canaries, multihop connections, excellent customer support, the number of allowed simultaneous connections, etc.
|
||||
While not strictly requirements, there are some factors we looked into when determining which providers to recommend. These include content blocking functionality, warrant canaries, multihop connections, excellent customer support, the number of allowed simultaneous connections, etc.
|
||||
|
@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ nav:
|
||||
Internet Browsing: Internet Browsing
|
||||
Providers: Providers
|
||||
Software: Software
|
||||
Advanced: Advanced
|
||||
About: About
|
||||
Community: Community
|
||||
Online Services: Online Services
|
||||
|
23
netlify.toml
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2023 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2022-2024 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
|
||||
|
||||
# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
|
||||
# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
|
||||
@ -35,17 +35,17 @@
|
||||
X-XSS-Protection = "0"
|
||||
X-Content-Type-Options = "nosniff"
|
||||
Strict-Transport-Security = "max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload"
|
||||
Content-Security-Policy = "default-src 'none'; script-src https://www.privacyguides.org https://api.privacyguides.net 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' data:; img-src data: 'self'; connect-src https://api.github.com https://*.privacyguides.net 'self'; frame-src https://*.privacyguides.net; frame-ancestors 'none'"
|
||||
Content-Security-Policy = "default-src 'none'; script-src https://www.privacyguides.org 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' data:; img-src data: 'self'; connect-src https://api.github.com https://*.privacyguides.net 'self'; frame-src https://*.privacyguides.net; frame-ancestors 'none'"
|
||||
|
||||
[[headers]]
|
||||
for = "/:lang/about/donate/"
|
||||
[headers.values]
|
||||
Content-Security-Policy = "default-src 'none'; script-src https://opencollective.com https://www.privacyguides.org https://api.privacyguides.net 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' data:; img-src https://opencollective.com data: 'self'; connect-src https://api.github.com https://*.privacyguides.net 'self'; frame-src https://opencollective.com; frame-ancestors 'none'"
|
||||
Content-Security-Policy = "default-src 'none'; script-src https://opencollective.com https://www.privacyguides.org 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' data:; img-src https://opencollective.com data: 'self'; connect-src https://api.github.com https://*.privacyguides.net 'self'; frame-src https://opencollective.com; frame-ancestors 'none'"
|
||||
|
||||
[[headers]]
|
||||
for = "/:lang/tor/"
|
||||
[headers.values]
|
||||
Content-Security-Policy = "default-src 'none'; script-src https://www.privacyguides.org https://api.privacyguides.net 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' data:; img-src data: 'self'; connect-src https://api.github.com https://*.privacyguides.net 'self'; frame-src https://snowflake.torproject.org; frame-ancestors 'none'"
|
||||
Content-Security-Policy = "default-src 'none'; script-src https://www.privacyguides.org 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' data:; img-src data: 'self'; connect-src https://api.github.com https://*.privacyguides.net 'self'; frame-src https://snowflake.torproject.org; frame-ancestors 'none'"
|
||||
|
||||
[[redirects]]
|
||||
from = "/es/*"
|
||||
@ -86,3 +86,18 @@
|
||||
from = "/*"
|
||||
to = "/i18n/404.en.html"
|
||||
status = 404
|
||||
|
||||
[[plugins]]
|
||||
package = "@netlify/plugin-lighthouse"
|
||||
|
||||
[[plugins.inputs.audits]]
|
||||
path = "en/index.html"
|
||||
|
||||
[[plugins.inputs.audits]]
|
||||
path = "en/tools/index.html"
|
||||
|
||||
[[plugins.inputs.audits]]
|
||||
path = "en/basics/why-privacy-matters/index.html"
|
||||
|
||||
[[plugins.inputs.audits]]
|
||||
path = "en/vpn/index.html"
|
||||
|
2499
package-lock.json
generated
Normal file
8
package.json
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"devDependencies": {
|
||||
"@netlify/plugin-lighthouse": "^5.0.0"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"engines": {
|
||||
"node" : ">=18.0.0 <19.0.0"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
11
theme/assets/img/android/obtainium.svg
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
|
||||
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
|
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<!DOCTYPE svg PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD SVG 1.1//EN" "http://www.w3.org/Graphics/SVG/1.1/DTD/svg11.dtd">
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<svg width="100%" height="100%" viewBox="0 0 128 128" version="1.1" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xml:space="preserve" xmlns:serif="http://www.serif.com/" style="fill-rule:evenodd;clip-rule:evenodd;">
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<g id="path239" transform="matrix(0.780176,0,0,0.780176,-155.567,-216.875)">
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<path d="M311.473,434.341C309.4,433.242 297.281,426.527 240.515,395.021C224.718,386.253 209.509,377.822 206.717,376.285C200.375,372.794 199.4,371.935 199.4,369.835C199.4,368.736 201.931,361.693 207.864,346.288C212.518,334.2 216.635,323.607 217.011,322.748C217.868,320.792 219.25,319.131 220.599,318.433C221.862,317.78 253.426,306.253 255.035,305.857C256.774,305.429 258.274,306.253 259.159,308.122C259.583,309.019 261.347,313.648 263.079,318.408C264.811,323.169 267.389,330.208 268.808,334.051C272.06,342.856 272.181,344.103 269.917,345.44C269.317,345.794 265.413,347.326 261.243,348.844C257.072,350.361 253.092,351.933 252.399,352.336C250.799,353.267 250.559,354.704 251.809,355.859C252.305,356.318 260.325,360.893 269.63,366.025C295.638,380.369 294.194,379.72 295.929,377.848C296.779,376.931 312.317,337.409 313.209,333.896C313.59,332.395 313.548,332.186 312.735,331.529C311.625,330.63 311.786,330.591 301.573,334.202C291.455,337.779 290.491,337.855 289.136,335.18C288.424,333.775 277.526,303.843 276.849,301.435C276.411,299.877 276.947,298.397 278.258,297.538C278.803,297.181 286.734,294.138 295.882,290.776C309.458,285.788 312.913,284.658 314.679,284.63C316.957,284.594 317.256,284.75 359.027,307.863C361.922,309.464 363.466,311.15 363.466,312.708C363.466,313.326 353.109,340.799 340.45,373.76C322.597,420.244 317.208,433.886 316.428,434.572C315.102,435.74 314.015,435.689 311.473,434.341L311.473,434.341Z" style="fill:url(#_Linear1);fill-rule:nonzero;stroke:url(#_Linear2);stroke-width:0.39px;"/>
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</g>
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<defs>
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<linearGradient id="_Linear1" x1="0" y1="0" x2="1" y2="0" gradientUnits="userSpaceOnUse" gradientTransform="matrix(96.0874,110.767,-110.767,96.0874,217.55,321.519)"><stop offset="0" style="stop-color:rgb(155,88,220);stop-opacity:1"/><stop offset="1" style="stop-color:rgb(50,28,146);stop-opacity:1"/></linearGradient>
|
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<linearGradient id="_Linear2" x1="0" y1="0" x2="1" y2="0" gradientUnits="userSpaceOnUse" gradientTransform="matrix(96.0874,110.767,-110.767,96.0874,217.55,321.519)"><stop offset="0" style="stop-color:rgb(155,88,220);stop-opacity:1"/><stop offset="1" style="stop-color:rgb(50,28,146);stop-opacity:1"/></linearGradient>
|
||||
</defs>
|
||||
</svg>
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 2.6 KiB |
69
theme/assets/img/browsers/ublock_origin_lite.svg
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
|
||||
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
|
||||
<svg
|
||||
version="1.1"
|
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viewBox="0 0 128 128"
|
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height="128"
|
||||
width="128"
|
||||
id="svg86"
|
||||
sodipodi:docname="ublock.svg"
|
||||
inkscape:export-filename="../../platform/mv3/extension/img/icon_16.png"
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inkscape:export-xdpi="12"
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inkscape:export-ydpi="12"
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inkscape:version="1.2.1 (9c6d41e410, 2022-07-14)"
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xmlns:inkscape="http://www.inkscape.org/namespaces/inkscape"
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xmlns:sodipodi="http://sodipodi.sourceforge.net/DTD/sodipodi-0.dtd"
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xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
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xmlns:svg="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
|
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<defs
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||||
id="defs90" />
|
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<sodipodi:namedview
|
||||
id="namedview88"
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pagecolor="#ffffff"
|
||||
bordercolor="#000000"
|
||||
borderopacity="0.25"
|
||||
inkscape:showpageshadow="2"
|
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inkscape:pageopacity="0.0"
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inkscape:pagecheckerboard="0"
|
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inkscape:deskcolor="#d1d1d1"
|
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showgrid="true"
|
||||
inkscape:zoom="5.6734271"
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inkscape:cx="-1.6744729"
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inkscape:cy="76.232583"
|
||||
inkscape:window-width="2560"
|
||||
inkscape:window-height="1377"
|
||||
inkscape:window-x="0"
|
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inkscape:window-y="40"
|
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inkscape:window-maximized="1"
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inkscape:current-layer="svg86">
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<inkscape:grid
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type="xygrid"
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id="grid250"
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spacingx="1"
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spacingy="1"
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empspacing="8" />
|
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</sodipodi:namedview>
|
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<g
|
||||
style="display:inline;opacity:1"
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id="g76">
|
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<g
|
||||
style="fill:#800000;fill-opacity:1;stroke:#ffffff;stroke-width:1.62100744;stroke-linecap:round;stroke-miterlimit:4;stroke-opacity:1;stroke-dasharray:none;display:inline"
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transform="matrix(0.6778654,0,0,0.56141828,-241.07537,-247.27712)"
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id="g70" />
|
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<g
|
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transform="matrix(-0.6945203,0,0,0.56109687,375.02964,-247.42947)"
|
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style="fill:#800000;fill-opacity:1;stroke:#ffffff;stroke-width:1.60191178000000001;stroke-linecap:round;stroke-miterlimit:4;stroke-opacity:1;stroke-dasharray:none;display:inline;stroke-linejoin:round"
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||||
id="g74">
|
||||
<path
|
||||
d="m 447.83376,669.09921 c -80.63119,-57.03115 -80.63119,-57.03115 -80.63119,-199.60903 34.55623,0 46.07497,0 80.63119,-28.51558 m 0,228.12461 c 80.6312,-57.03115 80.6312,-57.03115 80.6312,-199.60903 -34.55623,0 -46.07497,0 -80.6312,-28.51558"
|
||||
style="fill:#800000;fill-opacity:1;fill-rule:nonzero;stroke:#ffffff;stroke-width:1.60191178;stroke-linecap:round;stroke-linejoin:round;stroke-miterlimit:4;stroke-opacity:1;stroke-dasharray:none"
|
||||
id="path72" />
|
||||
</g>
|
||||
</g>
|
||||
<rect
|
||||
style="fill:#fefefe;fill-opacity:1;stroke-width:0.550132"
|
||||
id="rect304"
|
||||
width="63.999996"
|
||||
height="12"
|
||||
x="32"
|
||||
y="58" />
|
||||
</svg>
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 2.6 KiB |
Before Width: | Height: | Size: 1.2 KiB After Width: | Height: | Size: 1.2 KiB |
@ -1 +0,0 @@
|
||||
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" version="1.1" viewBox="0 0 128 128"><defs><clipPath id="b"><use width="1280" height="800" overflow="visible" xlink:href="#a"/></clipPath><path id="a" d="m155.5 222.8c-12.64 0-22.875 10.246-22.875 22.872v211.23c0 0.801 0.046 1.608 0.123 2.388 8.5-3.167 17.524-6.629 27.054-10.436 66.336-26.48 120.57-48.994 120.62-74.415 0-0.814-0.056-1.636-0.172-2.458-3.43-25.098-63.407-32.879-63.324-44.381 7e-3 -0.611 0.18-1.25 0.548-1.889 7.205-12.619 35.743-12.015 46.253-12.907 10.519-0.913 35.206-0.724 36.399-8.244 0.035-0.232 0.057-0.463 0.057-0.695 0.028-6.987-16.977-9.726-16.977-9.726s20.635 3.083 20.579 11.11c0 0.393-0.048 0.8-0.158 1.214-2.222 8.624-20.379 10.246-32.386 10.835-11.356 0.569-28.648 1.861-28.707 7.408-7e-3 0.323 0.049 0.66 0.165 1.004 2.71 8.11 66.09 12.015 106.64 33.061 23.335 12.099 34.94 32.422 40.263 53.418v-166.52c0-12.626-10.243-22.872-22.869-22.872h-211.23z"/></defs><path d="m132.63 222.8h256.98v236.49h-256.98z" clip-path="url(#b)" transform="matrix(.49811 0 0 .49811 -66.064 -105.88)" style="fill:#a01e20"/></svg>
|
Before Width: | Height: | Size: 1.1 KiB |
Before Width: | Height: | Size: 556 KiB |
BIN
theme/assets/img/cover/android.webp
Normal file
After Width: | Height: | Size: 40 KiB |
Before Width: | Height: | Size: 417 KiB |
BIN
theme/assets/img/cover/calendar.webp
Normal file
After Width: | Height: | Size: 26 KiB |
Before Width: | Height: | Size: 717 KiB |
BIN
theme/assets/img/cover/cloud.webp
Normal file
After Width: | Height: | Size: 92 KiB |
Before Width: | Height: | Size: 639 KiB |
BIN
theme/assets/img/cover/cryptocurrency.webp
Normal file
After Width: | Height: | Size: 92 KiB |
Before Width: | Height: | Size: 918 KiB |
BIN
theme/assets/img/cover/data-redaction.webp
Normal file
After Width: | Height: | Size: 84 KiB |
Before Width: | Height: | Size: 945 KiB |
BIN
theme/assets/img/cover/desktop-browsers.webp
Normal file
After Width: | Height: | Size: 305 KiB |
Before Width: | Height: | Size: 526 KiB |
BIN
theme/assets/img/cover/desktop.webp
Normal file
After Width: | Height: | Size: 39 KiB |
BIN
theme/assets/img/cover/device-integrity.webp
Normal file
After Width: | Height: | Size: 47 KiB |