update(blog)!: The Importance of Privacy For The Queer Community (#3044)

Signed-off-by: Jonah Aragon <jonah@privacyguides.org>

blog/assets/images/digital-provenance/manifest.svg

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+    </g>
+</svg>

blog/posts/digital-provenance.md

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+---
+date:
+    created: 2025-05-19T20:15:00Z
+categories:
+    - Opinion
+authors:
+    - fria
+tags:
+    - AI
+    - Content Credentials
+---
+# The Power of Digital Provenance in the Age of AI
+
+![Article cover showing a painterly background with cool colors and the Content Credentials logo](../assets/images/digital-provenance/cover.jpg)
+
+<small aria-hidden="true">Photo: Kseniya Lapteva / Pexels | Logo: Content Credentials</small>
+
+With the popularity of generative AI, it's becoming more and more difficult to [distinguish](https://uwaterloo.ca/news/media/can-you-tell-ai-generated-people-real-ones) reality from fiction. Can this problem be solved using cryptography? What are the privacy implications of the currently proposed systems?<!-- more -->
+
+## The Problem
+
+Can you tell which of these images are AI generated?
+
+<div class="grid" markdown>
+
+![Group of geese by some water](../assets/images/digital-provenance/geese1.jpeg)
+
+![Group of geese by some water](../assets/images/digital-provenance/geese2.jpeg)
+
+![Group of geese by some water](../assets/images/digital-provenance/geese3.jpeg)
+
+![Group of geese by some water](../assets/images/digital-provenance/geese4.jpeg)
+
+</div>
+
+...Have a guess?
+
+---
+
+Actually, they're all real. But the fact that you may have believed some of them were AI generated poses a problem: How can we tell where an image came from, if it was AI generated, and whether it was edited?
+
+## Provenance
+
+[Provenance](https://youtu.be/K56EhgfCDjs) is the history of ownership of an object, typically used when referring to antiques or art. Knowing the history of a piece of art can affect the value a lot, but you need a way to prove it's an original piece by the artist instead of a reproduction, or was owned by a famous person.
+
+Provenance can take many [forms](https://artbusiness.com/provwarn.html), from an original receipt or documentation from the artist themselves to stickers from a gallery attached to it. Typically, you want a signed [certificate](https://www.artcertificate.co.uk/?id_article=2267) from an expert on the artist in order to verify its authenticity.
+
+## Hoaxes
+
+It's important for historical preservation as well to know that an object is really from a certain time period. There's no shortage of [historical hoaxes](https://www.history.com/articles/7-historical-hoaxes). These can distort our view of history and make us all a bit dumber.
+
+### Cardiff Giant
+
+One of the most famous hoaxes was that of the [Cardiff Giant](https://www.history.com/articles/the-cardiff-giant-fools-the-nation-145-years-ago).
+
+An atheist named George Hull got into an argument with a preacher. Hull was frustrated with the preacher's literal interpretation of the bible, particularly his belief that giants were real.
+
+Hull devised a plan to trick the religious and make some money at the same time. He would have a statue of a giant man constructed and pass it off as a petrified human.
+
+After securing the materials needed, specifically a soft material called gypsum, he convinced a marble dealer to help him with his scheme. A pair of sculptors carved out the visage of a giant 10-foot man, with Hull posing as a model. They even poured sulfuric acid over it to give it an aged look.
+
+He settled on burying the giant in Cardiff, New York, where he cut a deal with a distant relative and farmer named William "Stub" Newell.
+
+On October 16, 1869, Newell hired an unsuspecting pair of workers to dig a well on his property. After they inevitably uncovered the giant, it wasn't long before the whole town was in a frenzy.
+
+![men surrounding a stone sculpture of a man in a hole in the ground doffing their hats](../assets/images/digital-provenance/cardiff-giant.jpg)
+
+<small aria-hidden="true">Photo: Wikimedia Commons (Public Domain)</small>
+
+Speculation that the sculpture was an ancient, petrified man quickly began to spread. Eventually, a syndicate of businessmen offered Newell $30,000 (worth $[705,438.97](https://www.in2013dollars.com/us/inflation/1869?amount=30000) in today's money) for a three-fourths stake, and he took them up on that offer.
+
+P.T. Barnum even tried to buy the sculpture, and after being turned down, he had a replica built and displayed it in a Manhattan museum. Several other copies were made afterward, and soon, there were petrified giants being exhibited all over the country.
+
+In a way that seems familiar to us now, you couldn't even be sure you were looking at the *real* hoax. Misinformation can so easily mutate and spread when left unchecked.
+
+A famed Yale paleontologist named Othniel Charles Marsh declared it "of very recent origin, and a most decided humbug." Unfortunately, as is so often the case, Hull had already cashed in on the fervor by the time experts had properly debunked his hoax.
+
+### AI Hoaxes
+
+Many modern hoaxes tend to make use of social media and focus on getting views and clicks over selling a physical object.
+
+[Miniminuteman](https://youtu.be/Pc2psN0PFTk) is a great YouTube channel covering misinformation on the internet, specifically about archaeology. Misinformation can spread quickly, especially now with the rise of generative AI that can make convincing fake images and videos.
+
+[Here](https://www.mediamatters.org/media/4016186/embed/embed) you can see an example of AI being used to make a fake Joe Rogan podcast clip. Now, whether or not you view Joe Rogan as a reliable source of information is another topic, but as one of the [most popular podcasts](https://podcastcharts.byspotify.com), his reach could be leveraged to spread dangerous misinformation like that a meteor is going to hit earth and kill everyone.
+
+The effort required is low, and the return is high. With TikTok's [Creator Rewards Program](https://www.tiktok.com/creator-academy/en/article/creator-rewards-program), content that's at least 60 seconds long and has high engagement will be rewarded. That means longer videos with alarming content like conspiracy theory videos will do very well since they will have lots of comments from people either fooled by the content posting about how scared they are or people debunking the claims. The insidious thing is the creators get rewarded either way.
+
+[Several](https://youtu.be/E4I6K8OEyho?si=wbWAUcLsjOA7yDnO) [history](https://youtu.be/cqrHmjGD1ds?si=k60RTO9MH177ASTS) [channels](https://youtu.be/HG1324unhcA?si=MuwglKd52FQ7iKU3) on YouTube have expressed their concerns about misinformation being spread about history through AI generated images and videos and how they can distort our view of the past. There's even the possibility that these AI generated images could end up polluting the historical record.
+
+## Content Authenticity Initiative
+
+In 2019, [Adobe announced](https://contentauthenticity.org/blog/test) that it was partnering with the New York Times and Twitter on a project to develop an industry standard for digital content attribution called the Content Authenticity Initiative.
+
+Twitter has since dropped out of the partnership.
+
+## Project Origin
+
+At the same time, [Project Origin](https://www.originproject.info) was designing their system for content transparency. This started as a partnership between Microsoft and the BBC.
+
+## C2PA
+
+The Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity, or [C2PA](https://c2pa.org), combines the efforts of Project Origin and the Content Authenticity Initiative. Together, they created the [C2PA standard](https://c2pa.org/specifications/specifications/2.1/specs/C2PA_Specification.html) used to add verifiable provenance data to files, which they dub "Content Credentials."
+
+## Content Credentials
+
+[Content Credentials](https://contentcredentials.org) are the implementation of digital provenance by the C2PA, the culmination of years of research and development by major tech companies, from camera manufacturers to photo editing software and AI companies to social media sites.
+
+The way Content Credentials work draws on concepts both familiar and alien. The standard is designed to be flexible and cover the myriad ways media is used online.
+
+It's important to note that Content Credentials aren't attempting to determine "truth"; that's a much more complex and philosophical topic. Rather, they're trying to show where an image came from, edits made to it, its constituent parts, etc. so that you can decide for yourself if you trust the source. It's trying to show you that an image came from the BBC, rather than whether you should trust the BBC.
+
+### Manifest
+
+Content Credentials are contained in what's called the **manifest**. The manifest consists of the claim, claim signature, and assertions.
+
+![Example of a Manifest, with the Claim, Claim Signature, and Assertions inside](../assets/images/digital-provenance/manifest.svg)
+
+<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: [C2PA](https://c2pa.org/specifications/specifications/2.1/specs/C2PA_Specification.html)</small>
+
+The manifest is created by hardware or software called a "claim generator."
+
+Files can have multiple manifests, and the set of manifests comprise its provenance data.
+
+#### Assertions
+
+An assertion is labelled data such as the type of camera used, actions performed on the image such as color corrections, a thumbnail image, or other types of data.
+
+#### Claim
+
+The claim gathers together all the assertions and then hashes and cryptographically signs them. The claim is the part that backs up the assertions with cryptography; without it, there wouldn't be a way to verify the authenticity of the data.
+
+### Signatures
+
+The foundation is based around cryptographic signatures, similar to how you'd cryptographically sign software or text with a PGP signature.
+
+The parts of a file that are cryptographically verified are called "hard bindings." This allows programs to detect tampering.
+
+#### Certificate Authorities
+
+There are certificate authorities similar to how HTTPS works, which allow only signatures from trusted sources. Non-trusted signatures will give a warning in whatever C2PA-enabled software you're using.
+
+Content Credentials allow for each application to provide its own *trust lists*: lists of certificate authorities trusted by the application.
+
+The C2PA gives a few examples to illustrate. A news organization might rely on a non-profit organization that verifies the authenticity of sources through real-world due diligence. An insurance company might operate its own internal CA to verify only its own employees handled the images.
+
+### Ingredients
+
+However, what's interesting is Content Credentials can cover multiple assets being [combined](https://contentcredentials.org/verify?source=https%3A%2F%2Fcontentcredentials.org%2F_app%2Fimmutable%2Fassets%2Fhome2.91ab8f2d.jpg) and still be able to verify each element of the image. Each element is called an "ingredient." When the ingredients come together, the result is called a "composed asset," with "asset" referring to a digital media file or data stream.
+
+### Chain of Provenance
+
+It also supports a chain of provenance, showing all steps in the life cycle of the file that change its contents such as edits. These are referred to as "actions."
+
+The specification supports a list of pre-defined actions such as edits, changing the color, translating to a different language, etc. It's really quite flexible, but the flexibility of information that can be provided allows for more opportunities for errors and means you need to trust the entity providing the information more.
+
+An issue I noticed is when making edits using software that doesn't support Content Credentials, they will be corrupted and can't be read by verification programs. This poses a problem for the "unbroken chain of provenance" that the standard promises.
+
+These verification programs tend to offer a way to check against a database of images with Content Credentials, so you can find an image with unbroken provenance data. They use "soft bindings" or a type of fingerprinting of the image in order to find similar images in the database.
+
+I think this problem will be less and less of an issue when more software supports the standard. It will need to be so ubiquitous that image viewing programs don't trust images without provenance data, similar to how browsers don't trust websites without HTTPS. But for now with its very limited availability, that's not the case.
+
+### Privacy
+
+Since Content Credentials are all about attaching extra data to images, concerns about privacy are reasonable.
+
+However, it's important to remember that metadata has always existed in relation to digital files. Just like the metadata we've always had, Content Credentials are optional.
+
+Of course, it'll be up to programs we use to mediate what data is included. In order for the system to work as intended, certain things like "this photo was edited in Adobe Photoshop" will need to be automatically applied. Clear lines between personal data such as names, location, etc. need to be kept up to the user to add.
+
+Privacy was one of the stated goals when the C2PA was designing Content Credentials, and I think they've done a good job giving users control over their information.
+
+## Support
+
+There are several online verification tools you can use to try out Content Credentials. [ContentCredentials.org](https://contentcredentials.org) offers a [verification tool](https://contentcredentials.org/verify) that lets you upload a media file and check its Content Credentials. They have some example images on their site you can try, or you can upload images from elsewhere and see where Content Credentials are supported, for example you can upload any image generated in ChatGPT.
+
+Content Credentials also offers an official [command line tool](https://github.com/contentauth/c2pa-rs/releases?q=c2patool), so you can view exactly what data is being stored in the image. They provide some samples as well that you can play around with. To view the content credentials, just run
+
+```sh
+c2patool sample/C.jpg
+```
+
+for any image you want to inspect, replacing sample/C.jpg with a path to your image.
+
+### BBC
+
+The BBC is doing a limited trial run of Content Credentials with [BBC Verify](https://www.bbc.com/news/bbcverify). Not all media in these articles have Content Credentials attached. [This article](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-68462851) has Content Credentials for the video at the bottom. They also ask for feedback, so feel free to provide some. I'd like to see more Content Credentials show up in news reporting, so please add your voice.
+
+### OpenAI
+
+OpenAI has embraced Content Credentials, with images generated using ChatGPT identifying themselves using Content Credentials. Try [generating an image](https://chatgpt.com) and upload it to the verification tool. You should see it identify the origin as OpenAI.
+
+### TikTok
+
+[TikTok](https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/partnering-with-our-industry-to-advance-ai-transparency-and-literacy) became the first video sharing platform to support Content Credentials. For now, it's limited to being able to read Content Credentials from certain AI platforms. They say in the future they'll start labeling all content from TikTok with Content Credentials, but it seems they haven't enabled that yet, as if you download a video from TikTok, the C2PA verify tool will say it doesn't have any Content Credentials.
+
+### Leica
+
+Leica's [M11-P camera](https://leica-camera.com/en-US/photography/cameras/m/m11-p-black) is the first camera in the world to support Content Credentials. That's a huge step toward adoption; camera manufacturers need to support Content Credentials if they're going to be included from the creation of the image.
+
+### Nikon
+
+Nikon is planning to release a firmware update for their [Z6III](https://www.nikon.co.uk/en_GB/learn-and-explore/magazine/gear/nikon-z6iii-firmware-update-to-feature-content-verification) camera that will support Content Credentials.
+
+### Adobe
+
+Much of Adobe's [software](https://helpx.adobe.com/creative-cloud/help/content-credentials.html) supports Content Credentials, including Photoshop, Lightroom, and Adobe Camera Raw as well as Adobe's Firefly AI.
+
+### Qualcomm
+
+With the Snapdragon 8 Gen 3 chipset, Qualcomm is embedding Content Credential capabilities into the Trusted Execution Environment, allowing for Content Credentials to be added right as the photo is produced.
+
+## Limitations
+
+### Lack of Support
+
+Content Credentials will need widespread support at every level, from hardware OEMs to photo editing software vendors and AI generators to sites that host and display images. The rollout of Content Credentials will be slow, although more and more companies are starting to support them.
+
+There are still major players missing support like Apple and Android, which is a big problem considering how many images are taken, edited, and shared on smartphones. Once photos taken from your phone can be imbued with Content Credentials in the default camera app, we'll see much wider adoption I think.
+
+### Easy to Remove
+
+In my testing, any edits from a program that doesn't support Content Credentials will render them unreadable after that point. This problem won't be as bad if and when support for Content Credentials becomes widespread, since you can just decide not to trust images without them, sort of like not trusting a website without HTTPS. Platforms could even display a warning.
+
+But for now, removing Content Credentials won't be noticed.
+
+### Reliant on Certificate Authorities
+
+The system shares a flaw with HTTPS in that you need to rely on trusted Certificate Authorities to verify the validity of the information, except that Content Credentials are trying to verify a lot more information than just who originally made the image.
+
+Since anyone can add their own Content Credentials to an image, a warning is displayed similar to a certificate warning in your browser that the Content Credentials come from an untrusted entity.
+
+### Complexity
+
+One of the issues I ran into while researching was just how complex the standard is, since it needs to cover so many use cases and situations. This is pure speculation, but I can imagine the sheer complexity makes it unattractive for platforms to implement and maintain, which could be contributing to the very slow and partial rollout we're seeing on the platforms of even founding members of the project like the BBC.
+
+I think this will be less of an issue as it rolls out however, as platforms will likely be able to use each other's implementations, or at least reference them when implementing it on their platform.
+
+The standard is still in early stages and there's plenty of room to shape it and improve it in the future, so make your voice heard about how you want to see it implemented. I think with more awareness about Content Credentials, platforms will feel more pressure to support them, so if you want to see this feature on your favorite platform, speak up and gather support.

blog/posts/importance-of-privacy-for-the-queer-community.md

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+---
+date:
+    created: 2025-06-03T17:00:00Z
+categories:
+    - News
+tags:
+    - Pride Month
+authors:
+    - em
+description: Data privacy is important for everyone. But for some marginalized populations, data privacy is indispensable for social connection, access to information, and physical safety. For Pride month this year, we will discuss topics at the intersection of data privacy and experiences specific to the LGBTQ+ community.
+schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle
+preview:
+  cover: blog/assets/images/importance-of-privacy-for-the-queer-community/pride-cover.webp
+---
+# The Importance of Data Privacy For The Queer Community
+
+![Photo of a Progress Pride Flag with a semi-transparent padlock icon over it.](../assets/images/importance-of-privacy-for-the-queer-community/pride-cover.webp)
+
+<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Em / Privacy Guides | Photo: Chris Robert / Unsplash</small>
+
+Data privacy is important for everyone. But for some marginalized populations, data privacy is indispensable for social connection, access to information, and physical safety. For [Pride month](../tags.md#tag:pride-month) this year, we will discuss topics at the intersection of data privacy and experiences specific to the LGBTQ+ community.<!-- more -->
+
+While it's difficult to get a complete estimate on this, due to fear of discrimination and other factors, a 2021 [survey](https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2021-06/LGBT%20Pride%202021%20Global%20Survey%20Report_3.pdf) conducted by Ipsos in 27 countries revealed that only 80% of the population surveyed identified as heterosexual. Additionally, about 1% of adults identified as a gender different from the one they were assigned at birth. This percentage is even higher for Gen Z and Millennials.
+
+In the United States alone, it's [estimated](https://www.lgbttech.org/_files/ugd/d77b01_0e1e02c938e94ae3aad4ce21312bdde4.pdf) there are 20 million adults who are part of the LGBTQ+ community. That's a lot of people!
+
+Despite the progress of the past decades, the queer population still faces many challenges to being free and safe from discrimination.
+
+Discrimination online, at work, at school, at the national or even the familial level, can put LGBTQ+ individuals in dangerous situations, where data privacy may be the only shield available for protection.
+
+In this context, it's essential for the queer community to be well-informed on the tools and practices that can help mitigate the risks, so that information, services, and support can still be accessed safely.
+
+## Higher risk when data gets exposed
+
+Unfortunately, LGBTQ+ people are still at a higher risk when their personal data gets exposed.
+
+First, for people living in environments hostile to their sexual orientation or gender identity, keeping personal information private can literally mean life or death. Tragically, even today many countries still criminalize homosexuality and gender identities different from cisgender. When this personal information gets exposed, people might lose support from their family, lose their job, get arrested, or even be [executed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capital_punishment_for_homosexuality) in some countries.
+
+People in these very vulnerable situations have to be *extremely* careful about protecting their data in order to stay safe, online and offline.
+
+Moreover, organizations collecting data that could put anyone at risk of getting accidentally or maliciously outed should feel a *strong responsibility* to protect this data fiercely, and be held legally accountable when they fail.
+
+### Being outed against one's will
+
+For a queer person, deciding when, how, and to whom to reveal their sexuality or gender identity is a very important and intimate moment. It *must* be a personal choice, and only on the person's own terms.
+
+Even in countries where queer identities and sexualities are legal and accepted, [being outed against one's will can have devastating consequences](https://www.pridecorner.org/post/how-to-support-someone-who-has-been-outed-against-their-will).
+
+If someone lives with family members who do not accept who they are, getting outed against their will could mean losing their home and familial support. In other situations, perhaps their family is supportive, but their employer isn't, or maybe some of their friends or co-workers are hostile. They might want to keep this information from them in order to avoid conflicts at work, or avoid losing friendships. Further, there is of course the risk for discrimination, online harassment, and worse.
+
+No matter the situation, coming out as queer should always be an individual and intentional choice.
+
+It is an act of violence to out someone against their consent, even when performed by the intermediary of an algorithm or a neglectful data leak.
+
+Each time there is a data breach that includes information about gender identity, sexuality, browsing history, location history, installed applications, or legal names, this data leak risks outing people against their will.
+
+For all these reasons, it is vital that information be safeguarded so that a queer person is empowered to choose when, how, and to whom to come out on their own terms.
+
+In today's political climate, this is unfortunately even truer for trans people, who are at a greater risk of getting outed against their will when data about their gender, sex, or legal name leaks. Sadly, there are still too many online forms and software that needlessly collect gender data when it's completely unnecessary. Similarly, requiring full *legal* name is completely irrelevant in many situations where it is currently asked.
+
+Developers must take responsibility and design software and forms considering these risks. As data scientist and civic technologist Soren Spicknall explains brilliantly, gender data [should never be collected](https://medium.com/@SorenSpicknall/protecting-queer-communities-through-data-4707ae0cb562) unless *absolutely* necessary and *absolutely* protected, which in most instances it really isn't:
+
+> "Is the danger to your LGBT+ users worth the ability to roughly guess whether somebody is buying a purse for themselves or as a gift, or to assume you know what kind of movie they want to watch?"
+
+Algorithms shouldn't be able to target sexuality and gender identity as markers for advertising purposes. Unfortunately, there have already been reported incidents where [people were outed against their will by Facebook](https://www.dailydot.com/irl/facebook-ads-lgbtq/) spitting around rainbow ads everywhere, because of Facebook secretly tying someone's browsing activity back to their profile.
+
+Facebook (and most other commercial platforms) uses cookies and other tracking technologies to follow users online and [build an advertising profile](https://www.makeuseof.com/tag/facebook-tracking-stop/) based on their online activity, even outside of Facebook. Then, it shows ads on Facebook related to that activity, no matter if this information was shared or not on the platform.
+
+This kind of non-consensual outing can have devastating consequences, and should be forbidden by law. Everyone should be able to come out when and how they see fit, and not be aggressively outed by some Facebook or Google ad algorithm, or by some negligent data leak.
+
+### Online harassment and extortion
+
+The risk of having data about one's sexuality or gender identity revealed against one's will can be very dangerous for some people.
+
+With online harassment on the rise, this intimate information can be weaponized by bigots and extortionists to cause severe harm. Unfortunately, this isn't a rare occurrence, even in countries where the LGBTQ+ community is well accepted. Regrettably, some platforms have even started to [roll back previous protections against hate speech](https://apnews.com/article/social-media-lgbtq-tiktok-x-facebook-instagram-glaad-f790bda1bc3f169ef28ca3f441ea8447) and harassment. This will have a severely detrimental impact on the safety of the queer community online.
+
+This year, the LGBTQ advocacy organization GLAAD produced a [Social Media Safety Index](https://glaad.org/smsi/2025/platform-scorecard/) rating six major platforms: TikTok, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, Threads, and X. X (formerly Twitter) received the worst safety score of them all.
+
+### Seeking health information
+
+People questioning their gender identity or sexuality might seek information online about the health procedures or treatments they need.
+
+This sensitive search history can reveal a lot of personal details that should never be exposed against one's will. Sadly, browsing the internet without any tracking is a task that becomes harder every year, and many people aren't aware of the protections they can use against this tracking.
+
+People can suffer from severe harm when sensitive data related to their gender-affirming care or sexual health is exposed, ranging from non-consensual outing to imprisonment. Discrimination related to this type of health information is still rampant in every country in the world.
+
+### Seeking community online
+
+Seeking the support of online communities is common for queer people who can more easily feel isolated. This is especially true for youth living in hostile or rural environments, where smaller population density often means less supportive local resources and venues.
+
+For people in these situations, finding community online can be essential to survival.
+
+Despite all its flaws, the internet still offers a wonderful way to connect with others regardless of physical distances, and this is doubly true for the queer community.
+
+The need for social connection and support from peers is a fundamental human need. No matter how dangerous this can be, not sharing information online is simply not a viable option for many queer people.
+
+## Privacy-invasive practices that are exponentially worse for queer people
+
+### Real-name policies
+
+Many privacy-invasive practices and policies are significantly more dangerous for LGBTQ+ people. For example, [the "real-name" policies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Real-name_system) on Facebook and other platforms are absolutely horrendous for transgender people.
+
+If a trans person uses an older account, or has not changed their name on official documentation, a real-name policy could either out them against their will, force them to keep their [deadname](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deadnaming) online, or even lock them out of their account if official ID is requested for account recovery and doesn't match the name they used for the account.
+
+For many people around the world, the use of pseudonyms or chosen names online means safety, and this is even truer for trans people and other queer people.
+
+### Single-account policies
+
+Thankfully, most platforms aren't using such policies yet. But unfortunately, it does seem there could be a push to implement single-account policies in the near future.
+
+With the multiplication of age verification laws and the proliferation of unregulated AI systems, there has been some talk of using unique identifiers to prevent the creation of multiple accounts. This is **a horrible idea for everyone**, and should never be allowed, but it's even worse for LGBTQ+ people.
+
+Creating multiple accounts for different purposes, for example to separate work life from personal life, is a great privacy practice for anyone.
+
+Multiple accounts on a same platform, or "alt accounts", are regularly used by queer people in order to be their full selves online, when they aren't fully out in their public or personal life, or just because they prefer to keep their queer identity and activities separated.
+
+Sadly, if single-account policies begin to be implemented on platforms, this great privacy protection could soon disappear.
+
+### Facial recognition
+
+Facial recognition is an especially problematic technology for transgender people. Many times, these algorithms will not only create a faceprint from the data, but will also try to infer gender from it.
+
+These systems are deeply flawed and have discrimination biases built-in. They can't even reliably identify the correct gender of cisgender people. Because of the way these algorithms were developed, the use of this technology is [worse for transgender people](https://www.theswaddle.com/how-facial-recognition-ai-reinforces-discrimination-against-trans-people), and [exponentially worse](https://sciencepolicy.hsites.harvard.edu/blog/racial-discrimination-face-recognition-technology) for transgender people of color.
+
+Tragically, privacy legislation is lagging behind at protecting us by regulating this biased, invasive, and inaccurate technology that is spreading faster and further every year.
+
+### Public photos during events
+
+These days, it's pretty much impossible to attend many events without having our photo intrusively taken by a stranger and posted on Instagram without our consent.
+
+This is a generally bad behavior that we should all work on improving culturally. Posting photos of strangers online without their consent can be much more harmful for queer people.
+
+For example, taking photos at a Pride event and posting it online can out people against their will. While it's perhaps fair to assume most people *performing* in a Pride parade or on a stage might implicitly be comfortable with it, this isn't necessarily the case for people in the *audience*.
+
+This non-consensual practice, coupled with the corporate social media tendency to use facial recognition to tag everyone's faces, can cause harm in all sorts of ways.
+
+We should all [develop more respectful practices](the-privacy-of-others.md) when taking photos at events, and be mindful not to post anything online which could identify anyone in the audience who did not give their explicit consent.
+
+### Background checks and algorithmic biases
+
+Even for people who are publicly out and live in regions that are supportive, discrimination and biases are still there. Despite new legislations and a more progressive culture, data remnants of previous oppressive times can still have a severe negative impact on someone's life. Too few efforts are made by institutions to correct records properly after legislation has passed.
+
+This is especially problematic with opaque systems where embedded discrimination might not be obvious. Algorithmic decision-making is a growing danger for this, considering there is often no way to trace back the reasons a decision was made, and no accountability for whomever fed biased data to the black-box algorithm, whether negligently or maliciously.
+
+There are also older systems of decision-making, such as background checks. Last year, a 78-year-old woman from West Sussex [learned](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c3v5pwnpnvko) that she had a criminal record for 56 years for being a lesbian in the military (at a time when it was illegal). Completely unaware of this outdated data trail, this woman spent her whole life with this discriminatory tag attached to her records. This likely cost her countless opportunities throughout the decades, without her ever knowing the cause.
+
+Unfortunately, this kind of incident is likely to multiply by millions with the increased use of algorithmic decision-making using closed systems, often impossible to audit.
+
+### Dating apps data
+
+Last but not least, data collected by dating apps is an especially sensitive issue for the queer population.
+
+Regrettably, there have already been numerous data breaches showing this risk is very real. Intimate photos have been leaked, location data has been leaked, health data has been leaked, and even private messages have been [leaked](https://www.pride.com/think-your-privacy-is-safe-on-the-gay-dating-apps-this-data-leak-could-change-your-mind).
+
+The harm caused by these leaks and breaches have consequences ranging from accidental outing, to loss of employment, extortion by criminals, imprisonment, and even *death*.
+
+In countries where homosexuality is criminalized, cruel state authorities and homophobic bigots are [weaponizing dating apps to entrap](https://www.article19.org/resources/apps-traps-dating-apps-must-protect-communities-middle-east-north-africa/) LGBTQ+ people to attack or arrest them. Weighing the need for support, love, and affection, with the very real risk of physical aggression is a dreadful challenge many queer people face.
+
+## Things to keep in mind to stay safe
+
+Despite the increased risks the queer community is exposed to, staying offline and disconnected from the world isn't a viable option.
+
+Indeed, disconnection and isolation can be a *worse* risk for many LGBTQ+ people, especially younger people. Tragically, queer youth are more than four times as likely to attempt suicide. Disconnecting from the internet communities that accept them isn't an option, and would pose dangers of its own.
+
+Thankfully, there are many tools and practices that can be adopted to improve privacy online, and reduce the risk of sensitive data getting exposed. Here are a few ideas that might help yourself or your loved ones to stay safer online:
+
+### Using better social media
+
+Social media usage leaves *a lot* of digital footprints online, and some platforms are worse than others for this. Staying mindful about which platform to choose, and how to use it, can greatly improve one's experience and security.
+
+Favoring alternative social media platforms that do not have a commercial incentive to monetize data can really help.
+
+For example, platforms that are developed and managed by a community of volunteers, rather than a for-profit corporation, tend to keep their users' benefits and safety in mind much more.
+
+If you are ready to make a change, [Mastodon](https://joinmastodon.org/) is a non-profit platform that [we recommend](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/social-networks/#mastodon).
+
+Mastodon is a social media platform that somewhat resembles Twitter prior to its rebranding. It is composed of multiple servers you can choose from, which makes it easier to move your account if you aren't satisfied with the moderation on one particular server.
+
+To get started, you can choose the server administrated by the team who develops the Mastodon software ([mastodon.social](https://mastodon.social/about)), or you can choose a smaller server run by volunteers (you can also self-host, but that's a longer story).
+
+Don't let this choice intimidate you too much though, these servers connect with each other, and you can always move later on. Just pick one you like. Some servers will have a focus on a region, a topic, a hobby, and there are even servers focused on LGBTQ+ communities, such as [tech.lgbt](https://tech.lgbt/about), [lgbtqia.space](https://lgbtqia.space/about), and [more](https://joinmastodon.org/servers).
+
+All the servers listed on the Mastodon website have [committed](https://joinmastodon.org/covenant) to hold active moderation against racism, sexism, homophobia, and transphobia.
+
+Additionally, Mastodon connects with other social media platforms that are also part of the larger [Fediverse](https://fediverse.info/) network.
+
+If you prefer something similar to Instagram, you can replace it with [Pixelfed](https://pixelfed.org/). For something similar to Facebook, look for [Friendica](https://friendi.ca/). For something more like TikTok, try [Loops](https://loops.video/). For a replacement to YouTube, check videos on [PeerTube](https://joinpeertube.org/), and [more](https://fediverse.info/explore/projects)!
+
+These alternative platforms often benefit from stronger moderation and better respect for their users' data. Because they aren't for-profit corporations, they have no interest in collecting your data, tracking you, or imposing invasive "real-name" policies. Additionally, they run **no ads**!
+
+#### Secure any social media you use
+
+No matter what social media platform(s) you choose to use, the first step should always be to make sure you go through all the settings to secure your account ([enable multifactor authentication](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/multi-factor-authentication/)!), and adjust the available privacy options to your needs and preferences (consider [locking](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/social-networks/#public-profile) your account if you wish to restrict visibility to your followers).
+
+This is true for Mastodon as well, but you should make adjusting all the privacy and security options an *absolute priority* for *any* corporate social media, especially [if you stay on Facebook](https://www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/how-to-opt-out-of-targeted-ads-on-facebook/).
+
+Additionally, keep in mind that many platforms, including X, Facebook, and Reddit, will now use all your posted content to train their AI systems, making this information and embedded biases likely impossible to delete in the future.
+
+Developing an awareness of what data is shared, who can access it, how it is secured, and how it is used is very important for staying safe online.
+
+### Securing data when communicating
+
+Outside of social media platforms, many tools are available to help you secure your intimate and private communications.
+
+While chatting on dating apps may be the first step to meeting new people, moving early to end-to-end encrypted channels is likely a good idea for data security and privacy.
+
+That being said, also take into account that because your communications there will be fully end-to-end encrypted (only visible by its intended sender and recipient), there will be no moderation with it. Make sure you trust a person enough before moving the discussion to an end-to-end encrypted, more personal channel.
+
+#### Instant messaging communication
+
+[Signal](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/#signal) is a wonderful end-to-end encrypted and free-to-use instant messaging app. Signal will collect your phone number to create the account, but nothing else.
+
+When using Signal, you should [enable the username feature](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/6712070553754-Phone-Number-Privacy-and-Usernames). That way, you can (and should) share your *username* only, instead of sharing your phone number to connect with others.
+
+Additionally, you should [enable the disappearing messages](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360007320771-Set-and-manage-disappearing-messages) feature from Signal, to help clean up the data you no longer need as time goes, and reduce the risk of leaks.
+
+<div class="admonition danger" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Only send sensitive information to people you genuinely trust!</p>
+
+Keep in mind that even when using end-to-end encrypted apps and a disappearing message features, this will not prevent a malicious person from downloading this data on their device or taking a screenshot of it.
+
+Be especially careful when sending very sensitive information, such as intimate photos for example. No matter how secure the application is, you should only send sensitive information and pictures to people you know and sincerely trust.
+
+</div>
+
+#### Email communication
+
+For email communication, migrating to an end-to-end encrypted alternative can make a big difference for your privacy.
+
+For example, services like Gmail (Google) and Hotmail (Microsoft) could access the content of all your communications, and often use this information in various ways to build advertising profiles. Because email content isn't end-to-end encrypted, this data could get requested by authorities as well, and handed to them in plain text (unencrypted).
+
+For secure and more private end-to-end encrypted email services, we recommend [Proton Mail](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/email/#proton-mail) or [Tuta](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/email/#tuta). These services will not make you anonymous when you email someone (email address, IP address, and subject line, could still identify you), but the content of your communication will be encrypted end-to-end (if used with a compatible service), and only visible to its intended recipient(s).
+
+<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Encrypted email service limitations</p>
+
+Stay aware that if you email someone who is not using the same end-to-end encrypted email service as you, and you aren't using any additional measures to encrypt the message, this email will likely be accessible to the service you sent it to.
+
+For example, if you send an email from a Proton Mail address, to someone using a Gmail address, without asking the recipient to use your encryption key or use any additional services, then the email you sent will be stored on Google's servers, and could get accessed by Google.
+
+If you send a Proton Mail email to another Proton Mail user, the *content* of the message will be fully end-to-end encrypted and Proton could not access it.
+
+The same is true for any other email providers. Make sure to verify compatibility fully before sending any sensitive information that way.
+
+</div>
+
+### Securing data when traveling
+
+When traveling, keep in mind that different countries or regions might have different laws related to LGBTQ+ people.
+
+Your marriage might not be recognized in the location you are visiting. Your new legal name might also not get the same recognition, sadly. The first step to take when planning a trip should always be to gather information on the legal and cultural differences between your own region and the one you are visiting.
+
+If you are visiting a country hostile to your sexuality or gender identity, make sure to take the proper precautions to secure your data *before* you cross the border.
+
+This could mean leaving your phone at home and only bringing a burner phone with you. It could also mean bringing additional (or different) types of official ID that are less likely to get you in trouble, and more likely to get accepted by the authorities of your visiting country.
+
+Be extremely careful when connecting to Wi-Fi services from a foreign country. If you were to connect to a service or website that is illegal there, and could accidentally out yourself as queer, you could get in trouble with few recourses. Using a [trustworthy VPN](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/) can help mitigate some of this risk.
+
+### Securing data when protesting
+
+For this month of Pride, you might feel the need to join a protest more than a parade.
+
+If you decide to join the action, make sure to secure your data properly to stay safe. Prepare your devices adequately to be ready and resist surveillance targeted at protesters. Consult our [Protesters' Guide to Smartphone Security](activists-guide-securing-your-smartphone.md), and make sure you understand well the level of risk of this particular protest. **Different protests in different regions require different levels of data protection.**
+
+If you are organizing actions, try to stay away from corporate platforms who will willingly and quickly share your data with authorities (even private messages). If you must use corporate platforms, then make sure to limit the personal data you share there, and ensure attendees have alternative ways to contact you that do not require them to create an account, to register, or to use their legal name.
+
+Having an independent website, or using a Fediverse-connected platform that will be accessible to everyone even without an account, are better ways to organize.
+
+For example, if you create a Mastodon account for your organization, people will not need to create a Mastodon account to read your posts and event announcements. All your posts will be accessible just like any independent website would be (if you leave your posts' visibility public).
+
+Setting up an end-to-end encrypted email address and using an [alias email address](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/email-aliasing/) are also good ways to stay accessible without requiring attendees to use a Facebook account.
+
+Additionally, there are federated platforms, such as [Mobilizon](https://mobilizon.org/), that can be a great non-commercial way to organize in a safer and more accessible space.
+
+Data shared on federated platforms isn't necessarily end-to-end encrypted, and could also get shared with authorities if requested. But by using non-commercial platforms, this data will not be compiled and attached to an account the same way this would happen on a for-profit corporate platform such as Facebook. Using alternative not-for-profit platforms isn't perfect nor anonymous, but it's still a great improvement from the corporate default.
+
+### Protections for extreme situations
+
+Finally, if you are living in an extreme situation where being yourself is dangerous to your physical safety, caution must be a priority.
+
+There isn't a single solution that can protect all your data at once, and anyone telling you there is one is lying to sell you something. Remain skeptical of such claims.
+
+However, there are a *multitude* of practices and tools that can help *reduce* your data trails, and improve your privacy greatly. The tools and practices you need to adopt will depend on the [threat model](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/threat-modeling/) specific to your situation.
+
+Take the time to evaluate well which data could put you in danger, and focus on protecting this first.
+
+If you are in a situation where someone hostile to you has access to your device, for example because you are living with an unsupportive family and need to browse the internet on a family device, Tails may be a tool that can help you. If you can use this computer unobserved, by [using the live system Tails](installing-and-using-tails.md) installed on a USB stick, you can keep your browsing activity hidden from this device. Your Internet Service Provider (ISP) could still know you have been visiting a special network, however. Make sure to read our tutorial thoroughly if you decide to use Tails.
+
+If the information stored on your computer isn't a risk to you, but visiting LGBTQ+ websites from your country could be dangerous, perhaps [using Tor](in-praise-of-tor.md) with a Bridge or through a [trustworthy VPN](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/) could be another solution to allow you to access this information in a safer way.
+
+It's impossible to cover every specific situation, but know that there are [many solutions](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tools/) to reduce the risks greatly, and improve data protection to allow you to **stay connected, stay yourself, and stay safe** 💛
+
+<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Caution: This isn't an exhaustive list!</p>
+
+This is only a short introduction to some practices and tools that *can* improve your privacy online. Not one solution will be enough to be anonymous online.
+
+It's important to stay aware of what data will still be shared and which will be better protected, but nothing will make you 100% anonymous.
+
+For more information on how to improve further your data protection online, you can consult our various guides. If you are just starting in your privacy-improving journey, be patient. Adopt one small improvement at the time, then add another one. Each additional step you take will slowly but surely reduce your data trails, and improve your privacy overtime.
+
+</div>
+
+## Improving data privacy is vital for everyone, but critical for the queer community
+
+Every situation is different and requires different protections. While data privacy is important for everyone, it's also essential to acknowledge that marginalized populations are often at a heightened risk when their data gets exposed.
+
+Protection *cannot* be only an individual responsibility. **Protecting vulnerable and marginalized populations is a societal responsibility that concerns everyone.**
+
+We *all* have a **duty of care** to protect the data of others. Whether it's from the photos we take at public events, or the discussions we have about others on Facebook or X-Twitter's direct messages, *everyone* must improve their practices on this.
+
+Moreover, anyone in a position to improve how data is collected from users *must* be held accountable, and must feel morally liable on the decisions taken that could endanger anyone, but especially marginalized groups like the queer community.
+
+In an ideal world, laws and cultures would protect everyone and particularly the most vulnerable *by default*.
+
+But until we get there, we have to empowered ourselves to bring change and stop predatory data collection, prevent negligent data security, and educate everyone on the tools we can use to help ourselves and the most vulnerable to stay safe.
+
+## Additional resources
+
+### Helplines
+
+- [Mindline Trans+ (UK)](https://www.mindinsomerset.org.uk/our-services/adult-one-to-one-support/mindline-trans/): A confidential emotional, mental health support helpline for people who identify as Trans, Agender, Gender Fluid or Non-Binary.
+
+- [Trans Lifeline Hotline (US and Canada)](https://translifeline.org/hotline/): Trans peer support over the phone.
+
+- [Suicide & Crisis Helpline (US and Canada)](https://988lifeline.org/): General support 24/7 phone number 988.
+
+- [Suicide & Crisis Helpline (International)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_suicide_crisis_lines): List of suicide crisis lines around the world.
+
+### Supportive organizations
+
+- [Egale (Canada, International)](https://egale.ca/asylum/): Resources for LGBTQ+ asylum and immigration requests from outside and inside Canada.
+
+- [SOS Homophobie (France)](https://www.sos-homophobie.org/international-content): Non-profit, volunteer-run organization committed to combatting hate-motivated violence and discrimination against LGBTI people.
+
+- [The Trevor Project (US)](https://www.thetrevorproject.org/): Suicide prevention and crisis intervention non-profit organization for LGBTQ+ young people.
+
+- [Trans Rescue (International)](https://transrescue.org/): Organization assisting trans and queer individuals in relocating from dangerous areas to safer places.
+
+- [Twenty10 (Australia)](https://twenty10.org.au/): Sydney-based organization providing a broad range of free support programs to the LGBTIQA+ community.
+
+### International advocacy
+
+- [Amnesty International](https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/discrimination/lgbti-rights/): Human rights organization running campaigns to protect and uphold the rights of LGBTI people globally.
+
+- [Human Rights Watch](https://www.hrw.org/topic/lgbt-rights): Human rights non-profit who documents and exposes abuses based on sexual orientation and gender identity worldwide, and advocate for better protective laws and policies.
+
+<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Stay aware of your data trail</p>
+
+If the traces of this article in your browsing history could put you at risk, visit [our guide](clearing-browsing-data.md) to properly delete this data from your device.
+
+</div>

blog/posts/privacy-means-safety.md

@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ The 26-year-old American who incorrectly identified the Australian girl and shar
 
 ### Targeted research, attack, and spyware
 
-For targeted attacks, aggressors will often use simple techniques to find a victim's data from what is already leaked online, or openly shared on social media. For more sophisticated attacks, perpetrators might use criminal methods such as impersonation for [SIM swap attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam). When attackers have more resources, such as a state-backed attackers, more sophisticated processes might be used, like device infection with [NSO Group's spyware](https://citizenlab.ca/tag/nso-group/).
+For targeted attacks, aggressors will often use simple techniques to find a victim's data from what is already leaked online or openly shared on social media. For more sophisticated attacks, perpetrators might use criminal methods such as impersonation for [SIM swap attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam). When attackers have more resources, such as state-backed attackers, more sophisticated processes might be used, like device infection with [NSO Group's spyware](https://citizenlab.ca/tag/nso-group).
 
 ### Maliciously stolen or negligently leaked
 

blog/posts/sam-altman-wants-your-eyeball.md

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ The World App is an everything app, providing users with a *World ID*, that can
 
 The scan is then filtered and hashed to create a unique identifier that is stored as a so-called "proof of personhood" on the *World Network*, a blockchain-based protocol.
 
-The World App itself contains a collection of "Mini Apps", where users can manage their cryptocurrencies, chat together, play games, receive their pay check even, and ultimately live their whole life within the closed "verified" ecosystem of the app.
+The World App itself contains a collection of "Mini Apps", where users can manage their cryptocurrencies, chat together, play games, receive their paychecks even, and ultimately live their whole life within the closed "verified" ecosystem of the app.
 
 For a company constantly praising decentralization, it sure looks like they want to make sure they are the center of it all.
 
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ If they succeed in convincing enough people, many of us could soon have little c
 
 ## World(coin) isn't new, you might have heard of its unethical practices already
 
-The project [claims](https://techcrunch.com/2025/04/30/sam-altmans-world-unveils-a-mobile-verification-device/) to have onboarded 26 million people already, including 12 millions "users" who are verified (had their biometric data collected).
+The project [claims](https://techcrunch.com/2025/04/30/sam-altmans-world-unveils-a-mobile-verification-device/) to have onboarded 26 million people already, including 12 million "users" who are verified (had their biometric data collected).
 
 These "users" are largely located in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. This is because the company started testing for its project there a few years ago, in regions where people often have fewer legal protections.
 
@@ -68,15 +68,15 @@ So much so that [Kenya suspended the company's operations](https://techcrunch.co
 
 Some people who signed up never received the promised money. Some officials were bribed to give the impression to participants these operations were official and supported by the government.
 
-As Ruswandi, one of the person targeted by this early campaign [remarked](https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/04/06/1048981/worldcoin-cryptocurrency-biometrics-web3/): "why did Worldcoin target lower-income communities in the first place, instead of crypto enthusiasts or communities?"
+As Ruswandi, one of the persons targeted by this early campaign [remarked](https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/04/06/1048981/worldcoin-cryptocurrency-biometrics-web3/): "why did Worldcoin target lower-income communities in the first place, instead of crypto enthusiasts or communities?"
 
-Exploiting people in situation of poverty in order to test a biometric identification technology isn't a great way to start a project developed by a company called "Tools for Humanity".
+Exploiting people in situations of poverty in order to test a biometric identification technology isn't a great way to start a project developed by a company called "Tools for Humanity".
 
 ## Creating the problem, selling the solution
 
-Why developing such a technology in the first place?
+Why develop such a technology in the first place?
 
-Sam Altman himself have [expressed concern](https://www.wired.com/story/sam-altman-orb-eyeball-scan-launch-us/) about the problem this alleged solution solves: the avalanche of fake accounts and pretend persons online caused by the new AI tools unleashed everywhere.
+Sam Altman himself has [expressed concern](https://www.wired.com/story/sam-altman-orb-eyeball-scan-launch-us/) about the problem this alleged solution solves: the avalanche of fake accounts and pretend persons online caused by the new AI tools unleashed everywhere.
 
 The proposed use of a "proof of personhood" claims to solve this problem by allocating a unique identifier to each human, a personal code supposedly impossible to duplicate or cheat. Of course, this has [already been proven wrong](https://gizmodo.com/worldcoin-black-market-iris-data-identity-orb-1850454037).
 
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ If every social media account becomes tied to a unique biometric-based identifie
 
 Further, if only one account is allowed by "verified human", then no one can create separate accounts for their work life and personal life anymore. Creating separate accounts for separate purposes is an excellent privacy-preserving practice.
 
-Even if the identifier isn't tied to a legal name directly, accounts on different platforms using the same identifier could potentially get liked together. To be fair, it does seem Tools for Humanity worked to prevent different platforms from having access to the same code, but how well will this hold the test of time? Will platforms increasingly escalate privacy-invasive requests from this point, like they often do?
+Even if the identifier isn't tied to a legal name directly, accounts on different platforms using the same identifier could potentially get linked together. To be fair, it does seem Tools for Humanity worked to prevent different platforms from having access to the same code, but how well will this hold the test of time? Will platforms increasingly escalate privacy-invasive requests from this point, like they often do?
 
 **Pseudonymity saves lives.** It is an essential tool for the safety of the most vulnerable online. Killing pseudonymity by requiring unique biometric identification could endanger millions.
 
@@ -156,13 +156,13 @@ As whistleblower [Edward Snowden rightfully pointed out](https://x.com/Snowden/s
 
 ### Questionable reassurance about local data
 
-One of the biggest reassurance relates to the claim that sensitive biometric data (Image Data) is only stored locally. But this isn't completely accurate either, and there seems to be conflicting information about it from the company's own documentation.
+One of the biggest reassurances relates to the claim that sensitive biometric data (Image Data) is only stored locally. But this isn't completely accurate either, and there seems to be conflicting information about it from the company's own documentation.
 
 The World [white paper](https://whitepaper.world.org/#enrollment-process) specifies that:
 
 "The Orb verifies that it sees a human, runs local fraud prevention checks, and takes pictures of both irises. The iris images are converted on the Orb hardware into the iris code. Raw biometric data does not leave the device (unless explicitly approved by the user for training purposes)."
 
-However, according to the [Biometric Data Consent Form](https://world.org/legal/biometric-data-consent-form) users have to sign prior to data collection, if a user needs a fully verified World ID, inevitably this sensitive biometric data will be sent to their phone, therefore leaving the Orb.
+However, according to the [Biometric Data Consent Form](https://world.org/legal/biometric-data-consent-form) users have to sign prior to data collection, if a user needs a fully verified World ID. Inevitably this sensitive biometric data will be sent to their phone, therefore leaving the Orb.
 
 After a user agrees to the form, they can keep the option for *Data Custody* disabled to have their biometric data deleted from the Orb "later", and have it uploaded to their phone (with all the risk that this entails).
 
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ The other option users have is to enable Data Custody (if allowed in the user's
 
 This means the Orb inevitably sends this sensitive data to a mobile device. Then, this data is only as secure as the mobile device is. Which isn't so reassuring.
 
-The documentation does maintain this biometric data is sent as an "end-to-end encrypted data bundle", but this doesn't mean the data never leaves the Orb, it just means it leaves it while encrypted (which is really just the basics), and copies it to the user's device.
+The documentation does maintain this biometric data is sent as an "end-to-end encrypted data bundle", but this doesn't mean the data never leaves the Orb. It just means it leaves it while encrypted (which is really just the basics), and copies it to the user's device.
 
 Furthermore, future users are *strongly* incentivized to share their Image Data with Tools for Humanity, for algorithm improvement purposes. Pressure to opt in is even presented as a *convenience* option, because it would be cumbersome to have to come over for another scan after every update.
 
@@ -202,13 +202,13 @@ If this happens, many regretful users might find themselves in [the same shoes a
 
 Additionally, the Face Authentication section of the white paper [describes](https://whitepaper.world.org/#face-authentication) a process where encrypted facial biometrics collected from the Orb are used for authentication in the World App.
 
-Even if this data is stored on-device, it is still biometric data getting collected by the Orb then processed by the phone app. There is no question this is sensitive and personal biometric data, and it is indeed kept outside the orb.
+Even if this data is stored on-device, it is still biometric data getting collected by the Orb then processed by the phone app. There is no question this is sensitive and personal biometric data, and it is indeed kept outside the Orb.
 
 Tools for Humanity lacks consistency in the various claims and statements found through its documentation and promotion material. It becomes difficult to know which version to trust, and if it is to be trusted at all.
 
 ### No deletion on the blockchain
 
-Tools for Humanity's Privacy Policy declares that the company will delete all account data (when laws allow it) one month after it is closed, this is good. They also state they will delete entirely any inactive account after 2 years, and this is actually a great policy.
+Tools for Humanity's Privacy Policy declares that the company will delete all account data (when laws allow it) one month after it is closed (this is good). They also state they will delete entirely any inactive account after 2 years, and this is actually a great policy.
 
 But what happens to the World ID, transactions, and other data stored on the blockchain?
 
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ The Orb itself is also an important potential attack surface. With Tools for Hum
 
 Despite all its privacy promotion material, the World project has failed to convince privacy commissioners around the world of their supposedly good intentions. Perhaps in this case actions speak louder than words, and privacy commissioners aren't so gullible.
 
-With the expansion the project plans this year, we can expect even more experts will examine the company's claims and challenge its "privacy-preserving" assumptions
+With the expansion the project plans this year, we can expect even more experts will examine the company's claims and challenge its "privacy-preserving" assumptions.
 
 There are many reasons to remain skeptical about these promises of privacy. Indeed, numerous countries have already suspended, fined, or called for investigation on the company's (mal)practices.
 
@@ -266,17 +266,17 @@ The World project tried again to appeal the decision, in vain.
 
 ### Kenya and Indonesia suspended its operations
 
-In 2023, Kenya, one of the first country where Worldcoin was available, [suspended](https://techcrunch.com/2023/08/02/kenya-suspends-worldcoin-scans-over-security-privacy-and-financial-concerns/) Worldcoin's operations citing concerns over the "authenticity and legality" of its activities related to privacy, security, and financial services.
+In 2023, Kenya, one of the first countries where Worldcoin was available, [suspended](https://techcrunch.com/2023/08/02/kenya-suspends-worldcoin-scans-over-security-privacy-and-financial-concerns/) Worldcoin's operations citing concerns over the "authenticity and legality" of its activities related to privacy, security, and financial services.
 
-The worse part is, months before the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner (ODPC) of the country had ordered Tools for Humanity to stop collecting personal information from its citizens. The company simply [ignored the ODPC order](https://techcrunch.com/2023/08/15/worldcoin-in-kenya/) and continued to collect biometric data from Kenyans. It only stopped after Kenya's ministry of interior and administration gave the suspension order later on.
+The worse part is that months before, the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner (ODPC) of the country had ordered Tools for Humanity to stop collecting personal information from its citizens. The company simply [ignored the ODPC order](https://techcrunch.com/2023/08/15/worldcoin-in-kenya/) and continued to collect biometric data from Kenyans. It only stopped after Kenya's ministry of interior and administration gave the suspension order later on.
 
 This again is quite far from the behavior of a company who genuinely values privacy.
 
-More recently on May 4th 2025, Indonesia also [suspended](https://en.antaranews.com/news/353861/indonesia-suspends-worldcoin-world-id-operations-over-public-concerns) the World project's operation in the country over concerns related to user privacy and security. The Ministry of Communication and Digital will be summoning the project's local operators to clarify the operations and determine potential violation of the Indonesia's electronic system regulation.
+More recently on May 4th, 2025, Indonesia also [suspended](https://en.antaranews.com/news/353861/indonesia-suspends-worldcoin-world-id-operations-over-public-concerns) the World project's operation in the country over concerns related to user privacy and security. The Ministry of Communication and Digital will be summoning the project's local operators to clarify the operations and determine potential violation of the Indonesia's electronic system regulation.
 
 ### German regulator ordered GDPR compliance following investigation
 
-In December 2024, the German regulator, the Bavarian State Office for Data Protection Supervision (BayLDA), [issued an order](https://decrypt.co/298090/german-watchdog-cracks-down-on-worldcoin-over-biometric-data) to obligate proving deletion procedures that comply with the GDPR within one month. Additionally, the BayLDA ordered the complete deletion of certain data records that were previously collected without sufficient legal basis.
+In December 2024, the German regulator, the Bavarian State Office for Data Protection Supervision (BayLDA), [issued an order](https://decrypt.co/298090/german-watchdog-cracks-down-on-worldcoin-over-biometric-data) to obligate providing deletion procedures that comply with the GDPR within one month. Additionally, the BayLDA ordered the complete deletion of certain data records that were previously collected without sufficient legal basis.
 
 Again, the World Foundation is fighting the order and will [appeal](https://cointelegraph.com/news/german-watchdog-order-worldcoin-delete-data) the decision. The company tries to argue the data collected was "anonymized", a common strategy to try evading GDPR compliance, which does not regulate anonymized data.
 
@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ There is no doubt more countries and regions will follow with similar investigat
 
 ### In the United States, the app is restricted in some states
 
-Even in the US where the company is headquartered, the app is [restricted](https://www.wired.com/story/sam-altman-orb-eyeball-scan-launch-us/) in some states. The announcement for its event this month carried a warning the World is “not available for distribution via World App to people, companies or organizations who are residents of, or are located or incorporated in the State of New York or other restricted territories.”
+Even in the US where the company is headquartered, the app is [restricted](https://www.wired.com/story/sam-altman-orb-eyeball-scan-launch-us/) in some states. The announcement for its event this month carried a warning that the World is “not available for distribution via World App to people, companies or organizations who are residents of, or are located or incorporated in the State of New York or other restricted territories.”
 
 We can also expect the project will encounter roadblocks in states that have passed [regulations specific to the collection of biometric data](https://www.huschblackwell.com/2024-state-biometric-privacy-law-tracker). This includes states like Illinois, Texas, Washington, and Colorado.
 
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ The amount of money invested in the project means there will be an incredible pr
 
 The well-known dating app Tinder has already partnered with World ID to verify the age of users in Japan. If this experiment works well, and if users comply without objection, this could be soon mandatory for *all* dating apps.
 
-Let's not stop at dating apps, the World project has already announced last week they will also be working with Razer to verify humanity of online gamers. How far can this go in the age of age verification? Will every online games with mature content soon require a World ID to play?
+Let's not stop at dating apps. The World project has already announced last week they will also be working with Razer to verify humanity of online gamers. How far can this go in the age of age verification? Will every online games with mature content soon require a World ID to play?
 
 What about social media? Tools for Humanity's team have insisted the age of AI made us incapable of detecting if we are interacting with bots online. Therefore, they must valiantly come to our rescue to verify our humanity scanning our eyeballs (which bots tragically lack). What if this human verification is expanded to all our social media accounts? Certainly, regulators pushing for authoritarian age verification online would be delighted by such a product.
 
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ Then, it comes for our money. The everything app of course offers payment and mo
 
 Imagine a single app, owned by a single for-profit corporation, that collects and processes all the data from all your transactions online, all your communications online, that you absolutely have to continue using for your other social media accounts, your gaming life, and your dating life.
 
-There could soon be no way to escape the grasp of World's everything app. Actually, [some governments](https://www.theregister.com/2025/05/04/sam_altman_startup_world/) (Taiwan and Malesia) have already started using it for official services, because why not.
+There could soon be no way to escape the grasp of World's everything app. Actually, [some governments](https://www.theregister.com/2025/05/04/sam_altman_startup_world/) (Taiwan and Malaysia) have already started using it for official services, because why not.
 
 **The ways this could degenerate fast into full dystopia are infinite**, and very real.
 
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ Even if this process was perfectly secure and perfectly private (which it is def
 
 This isn't limited to Tools for Humanity, although the way the company tries to advertise itself as a privacy-first organization makes it even more important to scrutinize.
 
-But anyone else with a similar approach to biometric data collection for verifying humanity or age or legal names should be on our radar. Moreover, if it's a for-profit corporation with the power to impose this technology on us everywhere in the world.
+But anyone else with a similar approach to biometric data collection for verifying humanity or age or legal names should be on our radar. Moreover if it's a for-profit corporation with the power to impose this technology on us everywhere in the world.
 
 One company should never have such power.
 
@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ Further, biometric data should never be used for trivial purposes like "proof of
 
 The premise itself is flawed from the start to respect privacy rights.
 
-While the problem of proving identify can still be an important one to solve in *some* context, the solution to this can never be monopolized by for-profit corporations.
+While the problem of proving identity can still be an important one to solve in *some* context, the solution to this can never be monopolized by for-profit corporations.
 
 Regardless of Tools for Humanity's intentions and efforts to convince us to trust them, any similar technology is just another step towards a global system of mass surveillance, where ultimately privacy rights and human rights are lost.
 

blog/posts/signal-configuration-and-hardening.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 date:
     created: 2022-07-07T19:00:00Z
-    updated: 2025-04-15T04:00:00Z
+    updated: 2025-05-24T14:00:00Z
 authors:
     - contributors
     - matchboxbananasynergy
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle
 ---
 # Signal Configuration and Hardening Guide
 
-[Signal](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication#signal) is a widely regarded instant messaging service that is not only easy to use but is also private and secure. Signal's strong E2EE implementation and metadata protections provide a level of assurance that only you and your intended recipients are able to read communications.<!-- more -->
+[Signal](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication#signal) is a widely regarded instant messaging service that is not only easy to use but is also private and secure. Signal's strong end-to-end encryption implementation and metadata protections provide a level of assurance that only you and your intended recipients are able to read communications.<!-- more -->
 
 This guide details actions you can take to configure and harden Signal in accordance with your [threat model](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/threat-modeling/).
 
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This guide details actions you can take to configure and harden Signal in accord
 
 ### Signal PIN
 
-When you register for Signal with your phone number, you will be asked to set up a Signal PIN. This PIN can be used to recover your profile, settings, contacts and who you've blocked in case you ever lose or switch devices.
+When you register for Signal with your phone number, you will be asked to set up a Signal PIN. This PIN can be used to recover your profile, settings, contacts, and blocked users in case you ever lose or switch devices.
 
 Additionally, your Signal PIN can also double as a registration lock that prevents others from registering with your number.
 
@@ -34,18 +34,18 @@ Additionally, your Signal PIN can also double as a registration lock that preven
 
     The server will not enforce the registration lock after 7 days of inactivity. After that, someone will be able to reset the PIN at registration and register with your phone number. This will wipe the data stored in your Signal account, as it is encrypted by the PIN, but it won't prevent someone from registering with your number provided that they can receive a text on it.
 
-**Important update**: since this blog post was published, there have been changes to the registration flow for Signal. You should read about this [here](signal-number-registration-update.md).
+**Important update**: Since this blog post was published, there have been changes to the registration flow for Signal. You should read about this [here](signal-number-registration-update.md).
 
 If you haven't set up a Signal PIN, or have previously opted out of setting one up, follow these steps on Android/iOS:
 
-- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Account** > **Signal PIN**
+- Select :material-dots-vertical: → **Settings** → **Account** → **Signal PIN**
 - Select **Create new PIN**
 
-Signal will prompt you to enter a PIN. We suggest using a strong alphanumeric PIN that can be stored in a [password manager](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/passwords/).
+Signal will prompt you to enter a PIN. We suggest using a strong, alphanumeric PIN that can be stored in a [password manager](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/passwords/).
 
 Once you have done that, or if you already have set up a PIN, make sure that **Registration Lock** is also enabled.
 
-- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Account** > **Signal PIN**
+- Select :material-dots-vertical: → **Settings** → **Account** → **Signal PIN**
 - [x] Turn on **Registration Lock**
 
 !!! Important
@@ -65,12 +65,12 @@ It is best practice to always compare safety numbers with your contacts. This ca
 
 !!! Important
 
-    In order for safety numbers to also verify that the intended recipient has access to the device you're verifying, you need a secondary communication channel where you can authenticate the person that is holding the device. For example, an in-person meeting or during a video call.
+    In order for safety numbers to also verify that the intended recipient has access to the device you're verifying, you need a secondary communication channel where you can authenticate the person that is holding the device. For example, an in-person meeting or a video call.
 
 To view the safety number for a particular contact, you need to follow these steps within Signal:
 
 - Go to a chat with a contact.
-- Select the chat header or :material-dots-vertical: > **View Safety Number**
+- Select the chat header or :material-dots-vertical: → **View Safety Number**
 
 Once you've compared the safety numbers on both devices, you can mark that contact as **Verified**.
 
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ A checkmark will appear in the chat header by your contact's name when the safet
 
 After doing that, any time the safety number changes, you'll be notified.
 
-If the safety number with one of your contacts changes, we recommend asking the contact what happened (if they switched to a new device or re-installed Signal, for example) and verify the safety numbers again.
+If the safety number with one of your contacts changes, we recommend asking the contact what happened (if they switched to a new device or re-installed Signal, for example) and verifying the safety numbers again.
 
 For more demanding threat models, you should agree on a protocol with your contacts in advance on what to do in case the safety number ever changes.
 
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ It is good practice to set up disappearing messages in Signal's settings so that
 
 On Android/iOS:
 
-- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Privacy**
+- Select :material-dots-vertical: → **Settings** → **Privacy**
 - Under **Disappearing messages**, select **Default timer for new chats**
 - Select the desired amount of time and select **Save**
 
@@ -119,22 +119,20 @@ Your recipient doesn't make any requests unless they open the link on their end.
 
 On Android/iOS:
 
-- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Chats**
+- Select :material-dots-vertical: → **Settings** → **Chats**
 - [ ] Turn off **Generate link previews**
 
 ### Screen Security
 
-Signal allows you to prevent a preview of the app being shown (i.e., in the app switcher) unless you explicitly open it.
+Signal allows you to prevent a preview of the app being shown (i.e., in the app switcher) unless you explicitly open it. This option can be found in :material-dots-vertical: → **Settings** → **Privacy**.
 
-On Android:
+=== "Android"
 
-- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Privacy**
-- [x] Turn on **Screen Security**
+    - [x] Turn on **Screen Security**
 
-On iOS:
+=== "iOS"
 
-- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Privacy**
-- [x] Turn on **Hide Screen in App Switcher**
+    - [x] Turn on **Hide Screen in App Switcher**
 
 ### Screen Lock
 
@@ -144,26 +142,22 @@ To mitigate this, you can leverage the Screen Lock option to require additional
 
 On Android/iOS:
 
-- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Privacy**
+- Select :material-dots-vertical: → **Settings** → **Privacy**
 - [x] Turn on **Screen Lock**
 
 ### Notification Privacy
 
 Even when your phone is locked, anyone who can lay eyes on the device can read messages and sender names from your lock screen.
 
-On Signal, you have the ability to hide message content and sender name, or just the message content itself.
+On Signal, you have the ability to hide message content and sender name, or just the message content itself. This option can be found in :material-dots-vertical: → **Settings** → **Notifications** → **Show**.
 
-On Android:
+=== "Android"
 
-- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Notifications**
-- Select **Show**
-- Select **No name or message** or **Name only** respectively.
+    - Select **No name or message** or **Name only**, respectively.
 
-On iOS:
+=== "iOS"
 
-- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Notifications**
-- Select **Show**
-- Select **No name or Content** or **Name Only** respectively.
+    - Select **No name or Content** or **Name Only**, respectively.
 
 ### Call Relaying
 
@@ -171,7 +165,7 @@ Signal allows you to relay all calls (including video calls) through the Signal
 
 On Android/iOS:
 
-- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Privacy** > **Advanced**
+- Select :material-dots-vertical: → **Settings** → **Privacy** → **Advanced**
 - [x] Turn on **Always Relay Calls**
 
 For incoming calls from people who are not in your Contacts app, the call will be relayed through the Signal server regardless of how you've set it up.
@@ -193,13 +187,13 @@ Additionally, Signal allows you to set up a proxy to bypass censorship.
 
 You can learn more about Signal's proxy support on their [website](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360056052052-Proxy-Support).
 
-### Disable Signal Call History (iOS)
+### Disable Signal Call History (iOS only)
 
 Signal allows you to see your call history from your regular phone app. This allows your iOS device to sync your call history with iCloud, including whom you spoke to, when, and for how long.
 
 If you use iCloud and you don’t want to share call history on Signal, confirm it’s turned off:
 
-- Select :material-dots-vertical: > **Settings** > **Privacy**
+- Select :material-dots-vertical: → **Settings** → **Privacy**
 - [ ] Turn off **Show Calls in Recents**
 
 ## Signal Hardening
@@ -208,13 +202,13 @@ If you use iCloud and you don’t want to share call history on Signal, confirm
 
 While it may be tempting to link your Signal account to your desktop device for convenience, keep in mind that this extends your trust to an additional and potentially less secure operating system.
 
-Avoid linking your Signal account to a desktop device to reduce your attack surface, if your threat model calls for protecting against [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/common-threats/#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }.
+Avoid linking your Signal account to a desktop device to reduce your attack surface if your threat model calls for protecting against [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/common-threats/#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }.
 
 ### Molly (Android)
 
-If you use [Molly](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/#molly-android) on Android to access the Signal network, there are many privacy and security-enhancing features that you may want to explore.
+If you use [Molly](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/#molly-android) on Android to access the Signal network, below is an overview of the many privacy- and security-enhancing features that you may want to explore. You can find a full list of Molly's [features](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#features) on the project's repository.
 
-#### Privacy and Security Features
+#### Data Encryption at Rest
 
 Molly has implemented database encryption at rest, which means that you can encrypt the app's database with a passphrase to ensure that none of its data is accessible without it.
 
@@ -231,14 +225,16 @@ For the database encryption feature to be useful, two conditions must be met:
 
 If both of the above conditions are met, the data within Molly is safe as long as the passphrase is not accessible to the attacker.
 
+#### RAM Wiper
+
 To supplement the database encryption feature, Molly securely wipes your device's RAM once the database is locked to defend against forensic analysis.
 
 While Molly is running, your data is kept in RAM. When any app closes, its data remains in RAM until another app takes the same physical memory pages. That can take seconds or days, depending on many factors. To prevent anyone from dumping the RAM to disk and extracting your data after Molly is locked, the app overrides all free RAM memory with random data when you lock the database.
 
-There is also the ability to configure a SOCKS proxy in Molly to route its traffic through the proxy or [Tor via Orbot](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tor#orbot). When enabled, all traffic is routed through the proxy and there are no known IP or DNS leaks. When using this feature, [call relaying](#call-relaying) will always be enabled, regardless of the setting.
+#### Calls and Contacts
+
+There is also the ability to configure a SOCKS proxy in Molly to route its traffic through the proxy or [Tor via Orbot](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/alternative-networks/#orbot). When enabled, all traffic is routed through the proxy and there are no known IP or DNS leaks. When using this feature, [call relaying](#call-relaying) will always be enabled, regardless of the setting.
 
 Signal adds everyone who you have communicated with to its database. Molly allows you to delete those contacts and stop sharing your profile with them.
 
-To supplement the feature above, as well as for additional security and to fight spam, Molly offers the ability to block unknown contacts that you've never been in contact with or those that are not in your contact list without you having to manually block them.
-
-You can find a full list of Molly's [features](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#features) on the project's repository.
+To supplement the feature above, as well as for additional security and to fight spam, Molly offers the ability to block unknown contacts whom you've never been in contact with or those who are not in your contact list without you having to manually block them.

blog/posts/your-online-life-is-irl.md

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+---
+date:
+    created: 2025-05-16T16:00:00Z
+categories:
+    - Opinion
+authors:
+    - em
+description: If you, like myself, have been inhabiting the internet for a few decades, you're probably familiar with the old adage IRL (In Real Life). The acronym was used a lot when the distinction between online life and offline life was much greater than it is now. In today's world, can we really keep referring to our digital life as being somehow disconnected from our real life?
+schema_type: OpinionNewsArticle
+preview:
+  cover: blog/assets/images/your-online-life-is-irl/irl-cover.webp
+---
+
+# Your Online Life Is IRL
+
+![Photo of an illuminated red street sign with the word Internet on it.](../assets/images/your-online-life-is-irl/irl-cover.webp)
+<small aria-hidden="true">Leon Seibert / Unsplash</small>
+
+If you, like myself, have been inhabiting the internet for a few decades, you're probably familiar with the old adage IRL: In Real Life.
+
+The acronym was used a lot when the distinction between online life and offline life was much greater than it is now. In today's world, can we really keep referring to our digital life as being somehow disconnected from our "real life"?<!-- more -->
+
+While it's true that pseudo-anonymity online is still alive and well, most people don't hide their real identity online because it's much different from their personality offline, but generally simply as a protection.
+
+Even when using pseudonyms, online life is still part of *real life*.
+
+The proportion of time we spend on the connected world today is also far greater than it was before. We often chat with friends online, work online, communicate with our family online, play games online, assist to events online, go to school online, watch recipe videos online, and so on and so forth.
+
+## Our offline life is happening (and tracked) online too
+
+Another thing that has changed is how much data about what we do offline ends up getting collected and stored *online*.
+
+Maybe it's the places we visit during the day getting [tracked by our phones](https://www.pcmag.com/how-to/how-to-get-google-to-quit-tracking-you) and then stored by Google in our profile.
+
+Maybe it's our [smart speaker recording](https://www.lifewire.com/can-alexa-record-conversations-5205324) an intimate conversation and sending it to Amazon.
+
+Completely outside our control, maybe it's the street cameras, cellular towers, car license readers [tracking our movement](https://www.aclum.org/en/publications/what-you-need-know-about-automatic-license-plate-readers) outside as we go about our day.
+
+Or even more dystopian, maybe it's our [doctor using an AI note-taking app](https://theconversation.com/some-clinicians-are-using-ai-to-write-health-records-what-do-you-need-to-know-237762), sending a copy of our very personal in-person medical consultation to who knows which for-profit company.
+
+## Our digital lives and IRL lives are intertwined
+
+All this data collected on what we do *offline*, can sometimes [get aggregated](https://epic.org/issues/consumer-privacy/data-brokers/) together with the data collected on us *online*, even while using pseudo-anonymity.
+
+The social media account where we use a pseudonym and cat profile picture to stay anonymous can get aggregated from the same IP address we used to log in another account using our legal name.
+
+Our offline data and our online data often get connected and bundled up together. This is especially concerning with the growing practice of [social media monitoring](https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/5337/social-media-monitoring-uk-invisible-surveillance-tool-increasingly-deployed) used by governments and companies.
+
+## What we do online have offline consequences
+
+Taking this into account, there isn't a separation between our *online* life and *offline* life anymore.
+
+What we do online affects what we do offline, and vice versa. All of our life, online and offline, is *In Real Life* now.
+
+Our digital life and communications can affect our employment, our dating life, our family life, our housing situation, and even the capacity we have to visit a country [or not](https://globalnews.ca/news/11090232/french-scientist-denied-us-entry-critical-trump-text-messages/).
+
+## The data collected on us online should be cared for even more
+
+Because there isn't much separation anymore, we should treat all data collected about us online as sensitive data intrinsically attached to our person.
+
+An invasion of online privacy, of our online life, becomes the same as an invasion of our home, our body, our IRL life. Not only because this data can be used to find our IRL location, identify our person, and have important repercussions offline, but also because all data about us is an essential part of who we are.
+
+It's not just data points, it's a part of us.
+
+Considering how the world has evolved in the past decades, and shows no sign of slowing down its greedy appropriation of every single piece of information about us, **we should defend our online lives as fiercely as we would our offline lives**.
+
+We need to fight for a future anchored in human rights, and for this, we need to firmly enforce the principle that **digital rights are fundamental human rights**.

docs/basics/passwords-overview.md

@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
 ---
-title: "Introduction to Passwords"
-icon: 'material/form-textbox-password'
+title: Introduction to Passwords
+icon: material/form-textbox-password
 description: These are some tips and tricks on how to create the strongest passwords and keep your accounts secure.
 ---
 
-Passwords are an essential part of our everyday digital lives. We use them to protect our accounts, our devices and our secrets. Despite often being the only thing between us and an adversary who's after our private information, not a lot of thought is put into them, which often leads to people using passwords that can be easily guessed or brute-forced.
+Passwords are an essential part of our everyday digital lives. We use them to protect our accounts, our devices, and our secrets. Despite often being the only thing between us and an adversary who's after our private information, not a lot of thought is put into them, which often leads to people using passwords that can be easily guessed or brute-forced.
 
 ## Best Practices
 
 ### Use unique passwords for every service
 
-Imagine this; you sign up for an account with the same e-mail and password on multiple online services. If one of those service providers is malicious, or their service has a data breach that exposes your password in an unencrypted format, all a bad actor would have to do is try that e-mail and password combination across multiple popular services until they get a hit. It doesn't matter how strong that one password is, because they already have it.
+Imagine this: You sign up for an account with the same e-mail and password on multiple online services. If one of those service providers is malicious, or their service has a data breach that exposes your password in an unencrypted format, all a bad actor would have to do is try that e-mail and password combination across multiple popular services until they get a hit. It doesn't matter how strong that one password is, because they already have it.
 
 This is called [credential stuffing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credential_stuffing), and it is one of the most common ways that your accounts can be compromised by bad actors. To avoid this, make sure that you never re-use your passwords.
 
@@ -73,9 +73,9 @@ You should **not** re-roll words until you get a combination of words that appea
 
 </div>
 
-If you don't have access to or would prefer to not use real dice, you can use your password manager's built-in password generator, as most of them have the option to generate diceware passphrases in addition to regular passwords.
+If you don't have access to or would prefer to not use real dice, you can use your password manager's built-in password generator, as most of them have the option to generate diceware passphrases in addition to regular passwords. We recommend setting the generated passphrase length to at least 6 words.
 
-We recommend using [EFF's large word list](https://eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate your diceware passphrases, as it offers the exact same security as the original list, while containing words that are easier to memorize. There are also [word lists in different languages](https://theworld.com/~reinhold/diceware.html#Diceware%20in%20Other%20Languages|outline), if you do not want your passphrase to be in English.
+We also recommend using [EFF's large word list](https://eff.org/files/2016/07/18/eff_large_wordlist.txt) to generate your diceware passphrases, as it offers the exact same security as the original list, while containing words that are easier to memorize. There are also [word lists in different languages](https://theworld.com/~reinhold/diceware.html#Diceware%20in%20Other%20Languages|outline), if you do not want your passphrase to be in English.
 
 <details class="note" markdown>
 <summary>Explanation of entropy and strength of diceware passphrases</summary>

docs/email.md

@@ -251,61 +251,6 @@ Tuta will [delete inactive free accounts](https://tuta.com/support#inactive-acco
 
 Tuta offers the business version of [Tuta to non-profit organizations](https://tuta.com/blog/secure-email-for-non-profit) for free or with a heavy discount.
 
-## Self-Hosting Email
-
-Advanced system administrators may consider setting up their own email server. Mail servers require attention and continuous maintenance in order to keep things secure and mail delivery reliable. In addition to the "all-in-one" solutions below, we've picked out a few articles that cover a more manual approach:
-
-- [Setting up a mail server with OpenSMTPD, Dovecot and Rspamd](https://poolp.org/posts/2019-09-14/setting-up-a-mail-server-with-opensmtpd-dovecot-and-rspamd) (2019)
-- [How To Run Your Own Mail Server](https://www.c0ffee.net/blog/mail-server-guide) (August 2017)
-
-### Stalwart
-
-<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
-
-![Stalwart logo](assets/img/email/stalwart.svg){ align=right }
-
-**Stalwart** is a newer mail server written in Rust which supports JMAP in addition to the standard IMAP, POP3, and SMTP. It has a wide variety of configuration options, but it also defaults to very reasonable settings (in terms of both security and features) making it easy to use immediately. It has web-based administration with TOTP 2FA support, and it allows you to enter your public PGP key to encrypt **all** incoming messages.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://stalw.art){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://stalw.art/docs/get-started){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/stalwartlabs){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/stalwartlabs){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
-
-</div>
-
-Stalwart's [PGP implementation](https://stalw.art/docs/encryption/overview) is unique among our self-hosted recommendations, and allows you to operate your own mail server with zero-knowledge message storage. If you additionally configure Web Key Directory on your domain, and if you use an email client which supports PGP and Web Key Directory for outgoing mail (like Thunderbird), then this is the easiest way to get self-hosted E2EE compatibility with all [Proton Mail](#proton-mail) users.
-
-Stalwart does **not** have an integrated webmail, so you will need to use it with a [dedicated email client](email-clients.md) (or find an open-source webmail to self-host, like Nextcloud's Mail app). We use Stalwart for our own internal email at *Privacy Guides*.
-
-### Mailcow
-
-<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
-
-![Mailcow logo](assets/img/email/mailcow.svg){ align=right }
-
-**Mailcow** is a more advanced mail server perfect for those with a bit more Linux experience. It has everything you need in a Docker container: a mail server with DKIM support, antivirus and spam monitoring, webmail and ActiveSync with SOGo, and web-based administration with 2FA support.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailcow.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.mailcow.email){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailcow/mailcow-dockerized){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://servercow.de/mailcow?lang=en#sal){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
-
-</div>
-
-### Mail-in-a-Box
-
-<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
-
-![Mail-in-a-Box logo](assets/img/email/mail-in-a-box.svg){ align=right }
-
-**Mail-in-a-Box** is an automated setup script for deploying a mail server on Ubuntu. Its goal is to make it easier for people to set up their own mail server.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailinabox.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://mailinabox.email/guide.html){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mail-in-a-box/mailinabox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-
-</div>
-
 ## Criteria
 
 **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the providers we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements for any email provider wishing to be recommended, including implementing industry best practices, modern technology and more. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing an email provider, and conduct your own research to ensure the email provider you choose is the right choice for you.

docs/real-time-communication.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 meta_title: "The Best Private Instant Messengers - Privacy Guides"
-title: "Real-Time Communication"
+title: Real-Time Communication
 icon: material/chat-processing
 description: Encrypted messengers like Signal and SimpleX keep your sensitive communications secure from prying eyes.
 cover: real-time-communication.webp
@@ -12,21 +12,17 @@ cover: real-time-communication.webp
 - [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs){ .pg-blue }
 - [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
 
-These are our recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication**. These come in the form of many [types of communication networks](./advanced/communication-network-types.md).
+These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
 
 [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why){ .md-button }
 
-## Encrypted Messengers
-
-These messengers are great for securing your sensitive communications.
-
-### Signal
+## Signal
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
 ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ align=right }
 
-**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal Protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
+**Signal** is a mobile app developed by Signal Messenger LLC. The app provides instant messaging and calls secured with the Signal protocol, an extremely secure encryption protocol which supports forward secrecy[^1] and post-compromise security.[^2]
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://signal.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@@ -53,22 +49,23 @@ Signal requires your phone number for registration, however you should create a
 
 1. In Signal, open the app's settings and tap your account profile at the top.
 2. Tap **Username** and choose **Continue** on the "Set up your Signal username" screen.
-3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it, for example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters).
+3. Enter a username. Your username will always be paired with a unique set of digits to keep your username unique and prevent people from guessing it. For example if you enter "John" your username might end up being `@john.35`. By default, only 2 digits are paired with your username when you create it, but you can add more digits until you reach the username length limit (32 characters).
 4. Go back to the main app settings page and select **Privacy**.
-5. Select **Phone Number**
-6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to: **Nobody**
-
-You can optionally change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username.
-
-Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with. Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam.
-
-The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs).
+5. Select **Phone Number**.
+6. Change the **Who Can See My Number** setting to **Nobody**.
+7. (Optional) Change the **Who Can Find Me By Number** setting to **Nobody** as well, if you want to prevent people who already have your phone number from discovering your Signal account/username
 
 We have some additional tips on configuring and hardening your Signal installation:
 
 [Signal Configuration and Hardening :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening)
 
-#### Molly (Android)
+Contact lists on Signal are encrypted using your Signal PIN and the server does not have access to them. Personal profiles are also encrypted and only shared with contacts you chat with.
+
+Signal supports [private groups](https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system), where the server has no record of your group memberships, group titles, group avatars, or group attributes. Signal has minimal metadata when [Sealed Sender](https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender) is enabled. The sender address is encrypted along with the message body, and only the recipient address is visible to the server. Sealed Sender is only enabled for people in your contacts list, but can be enabled for all recipients with the increased risk of receiving spam.
+
+The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf) in 2016. The specification for the Signal protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://signal.org/docs).
+
+### Molly (Android)
 
 If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red  } you may consider using this alternative app, which features a number of security and usability improvements, to access the Signal network.
 
@@ -76,7 +73,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material-
 
 ![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right }
 
-**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account.
+**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@@ -99,17 +96,15 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr
 
 Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates.
 
-There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)).
+**Molly-FOSS** is a version of Molly which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly at the expense of some features (like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services). You can set up push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org). Using this notification delivery method requires access to a [MollySocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) server, but you can choose a public MollySocket instance for this.[^3]
 
-All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements.
+Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code.
 
-Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code.
-
-### SimpleX Chat
+## SimpleX Chat
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
-![Simplex logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right }
+![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right }
 
 **SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }.
 
@@ -132,27 +127,27 @@ Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mo
 
 </div>
 
-SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages.
+SimpleX Chat provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages.
 
 To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up.
 
-You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository.
+You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat in the app's repository.
 
 SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/20241014-simplex-network-v6-1-security-review-better-calls-user-experience.html#simplex-cryptographic-design-review-by-trail-of-bits) and in [October 2022](https://simplex.chat/blog/20221108-simplex-chat-v4.2-security-audit-new-website).
 
-### Briar
+## Briar
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
 ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right }
 
-**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the Tor Network, making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem.
+**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
 [:octicons-info-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
 [:octicons-code-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-[:octicons-heart-16:](https://briarproject.org){ .card-link title="Donation options are listed on the bottom of the homepage" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar#donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
 
 <details class="downloads" markdown>
 <summary>Downloads</summary>
@@ -168,82 +163,33 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/
 
 To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby.
 
+Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec). Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
+
 The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited.
 
-Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
-
-Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
-
-## Additional Options
-
-<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
-
-These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain needs that our previous recommendations may not, we do not recommend them for long-term or sensitive communications. Any key compromise among message recipients would affect the confidentiality of **all** past communications.
-
-</div>
-
-### Session
-
-<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
-
-![Session logo](assets/img/messengers/session.svg){ align=right }
-
-**Session** is a decentralized messenger with a focus on private, secure, and anonymous communications. Session offers support for direct messages, group chats, and voice calls.
-
-Session uses the decentralized [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io) to store and route messages. Every encrypted message is routed through three nodes in the Oxen Service Node Network, making it virtually impossible for the nodes to compile meaningful information on those using the network.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getsession.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://getsession.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://getsession.org/faq){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/oxen-io){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-
-<details class="downloads" markdown>
-<summary>Downloads</summary>
-
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=network.loki.messenger)
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1470168868)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/oxen-io/session-android/releases)
-- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://getsession.org/download)
-- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://getsession.org/download)
-- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://getsession.org/download)
-
-</details>
-
-</div>
-
-Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants.
-
-Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
-
-Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021:
-
-> The overall security level of this application is good and makes it usable for privacy-concerned people.
-
-Session has a [white paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
-
 ## Criteria
 
 **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
 
 ### Minimum Requirements
 
-- Has open-source clients.
-- Does not require sharing personal identifiers (phone numbers or emails in particular) with contacts.
-- Uses E2EE for private messages by default.
-- Supports E2EE for all messages.
-- Has been independently audited.
+- Must have open-source clients.
+- Must not require sharing personal identifiers (particularly phone numbers or emails) with contacts.
+- Must use E2EE for private messages by default.
+- Must support E2EE for all messages.
+- Must support forward secrecy[^1]
+- Must have a published audit from a reputable, independent third party.
 
 ### Best-Case
 
 Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
 
-- Supports forward secrecy[^1]
-- Supports Future Secrecy (Post-Compromise Security)[^2]
-- Has open-source servers.
-- Decentralized, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
-- Uses E2EE for all messages by default.
-- Supports Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
+- Should support future secrecy (post-compromise security)[^2]
+- Should have open-source servers.
+- Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
+- Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
+- Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.
 
 [^1]: [Forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy) is where keys are rotated very frequently, so that if the current encryption key is compromised, it does not expose **past** messages as well.
-[^2]: Future Secrecy (or Post-Compromise Security) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties, since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
+[^2]: Future secrecy (or [post-compromise security](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/221.pdf)) is a feature where an attacker is prevented from decrypting **future** messages after compromising a private key, unless they compromise more session keys in the future as well. This effectively forces the attacker to intercept all communication between parties since they lose access as soon as a key exchange occurs that is not intercepted.
+[^3]: You may refer to this step-by-step tutorial in German on how to set up UnifiedPush as the notification provider for Molly: [https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy).

docs/self-hosting/email-servers.md

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+---
+title: Email Servers
+meta_title: "Self-Hosted Email - Privacy Guides"
+icon: material/email
+description: For our more technical readers, self-hosting your own email can provide additional privacy assurances by having maximum control over your data.
+cover: email.webp
+---
+<small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>
+
+- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](../basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
+
+Advanced system administrators may consider setting up their own email server. Mail servers require attention and continuous maintenance in order to keep things secure and mail delivery reliable. In addition to the "all-in-one" solutions below, we've picked out a few articles that cover a more manual approach:
+
+- [Setting up a mail server with OpenSMTPD, Dovecot and Rspamd](https://poolp.org/posts/2019-09-14/setting-up-a-mail-server-with-opensmtpd-dovecot-and-rspamd) (2019)
+- [How To Run Your Own Mail Server](https://www.c0ffee.net/blog/mail-server-guide) (August 2017)
+
+## Stalwart
+
+<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
+
+![Stalwart logo](../assets/img/self-hosting/stalwart.svg){ align=right }
+
+**Stalwart** is a newer mail server written in Rust which supports JMAP in addition to the standard IMAP, POP3, and SMTP. It has a wide variety of configuration options, but also defaults to very reasonable settings in terms of both security and features, making it easy to use immediately. It has web-based administration with TOTP 2FA support and allows you to enter your public PGP key to encrypt **all** incoming messages.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://stalw.art){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://stalw.art/docs/get-started){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/stalwartlabs){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sponsors/stalwartlabs){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
+
+</div>
+
+Stalwart's [PGP implementation](https://stalw.art/docs/encryption/overview) is unique among our self-hosted recommendations and allows you to operate your own mail server with zero-knowledge message storage. If you additionally configure Web Key Directory (WKD) on your domain, and if you use an email client which supports PGP and WKD for outgoing mail (like Thunderbird), then this is the easiest way to get self-hosted E2EE compatibility with all [Proton Mail](../email.md#proton-mail) users.
+
+Stalwart does **not** have an integrated webmail, so you will need to use it with a [dedicated email client](../email-clients.md) or find an open-source webmail to self-host, like Nextcloud's Mail app.
+
+We use Stalwart for our own internal email at *Privacy Guides*.
+
+## Mailcow
+
+<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
+
+![Mailcow logo](../assets/img/self-hosting/mailcow.svg){ align=right }
+
+**Mailcow** is an advanced mail server perfect for those with Linux experience. It has everything you need in a Docker container: a mail server with DKIM support, antivirus and spam monitoring, webmail and ActiveSync with SOGo, and web-based administration with 2FA support.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailcow.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.mailcow.email){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailcow/mailcow-dockerized){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+[:octicons-heart-16:](https://servercow.de/mailcow?lang=en#sal){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
+
+</div>
+
+## Mail-in-a-Box
+
+<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
+
+![Mail-in-a-Box logo](../assets/img/self-hosting/mail-in-a-box.svg){ align=right }
+
+**Mail-in-a-Box** is an automated setup script for deploying a mail server on Ubuntu. Its goal is to make it easier for people to set up their own mail server.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mailinabox.email){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://mailinabox.email/guide.html){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mail-in-a-box/mailinabox){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+</div>

docs/self-hosting/index.md

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+---
+title: Self-Hosting
+meta_title: "Self-Hosted Software and Services - Privacy Guides"
+description: For our more technical readers, self-hosted software and services can provide additional privacy assurances since you have maximum control over your data.
+cover: router.webp
+---
+<small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>
+
+- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](../basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
+
+Using **self-hosted software and services** can be a way to achieve a higher level of privacy through digital sovereignty, particularly independence from cloud servers controlled by product developers or vendors. By self-hosting, we mean hosting applications and data on your own hardware.
+
+Self-hosting your own solutions requires advanced technical knowledge and a deep understanding of the associated risks. By becoming the host for yourself and possibly others, you take on responsibilities you might not otherwise have. Self-hosting privacy software improperly can leave you worse off than using e.g. an end-to-end encrypted service provider, so it is best avoided if you are not already comfortable doing so.
+
+## :material-email: Email Servers
+
+<div class="grid cards" markdown>
+
+- ![Stalwart logo](../assets/img/self-hosting/stalwart.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Stalwart](email-servers.md#stalwart)
+- ![Mailcow logo](../assets/img/self-hosting/mailcow.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Mailcow](email-servers.md#mailcow)
+- ![Mail-in-a-Box logo](../assets/img/self-hosting/mail-in-a-box.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Mail-in-a-Box](email-servers.md#mail-in-a-box)
+
+</div>
+
+[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](email-servers.md)
+
+## :material-account-supervisor-circle-outline: Social Networks
+
+Self-hosting your own instance of a social network software can help circumvent potential [censorship on a server level](../social-networks.md#censorship-resistance) by a public server's administrator or admin team.
+
+### Mastodon
+
+<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
+
+![Mastodon logo](../assets/img/social-networks/mastodon.svg){ align=right }
+
+**Mastodon** is a social network based on open web protocols and free, open-source software. It uses the decentralized **:simple-activitypub: ActivityPub** protocol.
+
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://joinmastodon.org){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.joinmastodon.org/admin/prerequisites){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
+
+</div>
+
+Mastodon [integrates with the Tor network](https://docs.joinmastodon.org/admin/optional/tor) for more extreme scenarios where even your underlying hosting provider is subject to censorship, but this may limit who can access your content to only other servers which integrate with Tor (like most other hidden services).
+
+Mastodon benefits greatly from a large and active self-hosting community, and its administration is comprehensively documented. While many other ActivityPub platforms can require extensive technical knowledge to run and troubleshoot, Mastodon has very stable and tested releases, and it can generally be run securely without issue by anyone who can use the Linux command line and follow step-by-step instructions.
+
+### Element
+
+<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
+
+![Element logo](../assets/img/social-networks/element.svg){ align=right }
+
+**Element** is the flagship client for the **:simple-matrix: Matrix** protocol, an open standard that enables decentralized communication by way of federated chat rooms.
+
+[:octicons-home-16:](https://element.io){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://element-hq.github.io/synapse/latest){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/element-hq){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+</div>
+
+## :material-flip-to-front: Frontends
+
+Self-hosting your own instance of a web-based frontend can help you circumvent rate limits that you may encounter on high-traffic, public instances. It is important that you have other people using your instance as well in order for you to blend in. You should be careful with where and how you are hosting, as other peoples' usage will be linked to your hosting.
+
+<div class="grid cards" markdown>
+
+- ![Redlib logo](../assets/img/frontends/redlib.svg){ .lg .middle .twemoji } [**Redlib (Reddit)**](../frontends.md#redlib)
+
+    ---
+
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/redlib-org/redlib#deployment){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/redlib-org/redlib){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+- ![ProxiTok logo](../assets/img/frontends/proxitok.svg){ .lg .middle .twemoji } [**ProxiTok (TikTok)**](../frontends.md#proxitok)
+
+    ---
+
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok/wiki/Self-hosting){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+- ![Invidious logo](../assets/img/frontends/invidious.svg#only-light){ .twemoji }![Invidious logo](../assets/img/frontends/invidious-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji } [**Invidious (YouTube)**](../frontends.md#invidious)
+
+    ---
+
+    [:octicons-home-16:](https://invidious.io){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.invidious.io/installation){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/iv-org/invidious){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+- ![Piped logo](../assets/img/frontends/piped.svg){ .twemoji } [**Piped (YouTube)**](../frontends.md#piped)
+
+    ---
+
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.piped.video/docs/self-hosting){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+</div>
+
+## More Tools...
+
+Tool recommendations in other categories of the website also provide a self-hosted option, so you could consider this if you are confident in your ability to host the software after reading their documentation.
+
+<div class="grid cards" markdown>
+
+- ![Addy.io logo](../assets/img/email-aliasing/addy.svg){ .twemoji } [**Addy.io**](../email-aliasing.md#addyio)
+
+    ---
+
+    [:octicons-home-16:](https://addy.io){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://addy.io/self-hosting){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/anonaddy){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+- ![SimpleLogin logo](../assets/img/email-aliasing/simplelogin.svg){ .twemoji } [**SimpleLogin**](../email-aliasing.md#simplelogin)
+
+    ---
+
+    [:octicons-home-16:](https://addy.io){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/simple-login/app#prerequisites){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simple-login){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+- ![CryptPad logo](../assets/img/document-collaboration/cryptpad.svg){ .twemoji } [**CryptPad**](../document-collaboration.md#cryptpad)
+
+    ---
+
+    [:octicons-home-16:](https://cryptpad.fr){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.cryptpad.org/en/admin_guide/index.html){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/xwiki-labs/cryptpad){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+- ![Miniflux logo](../assets/img/news-aggregators/miniflux.svg#only-light){ .twemoji }![Miniflux logo](../assets/img/news-aggregators/miniflux-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji } [**Miniflux**](../news-aggregators.md#miniflux)
+
+    ---
+
+    [:octicons-home-16:](https://miniflux.app){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://miniflux.app/docs/index.html#administration-guide){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/miniflux/v2){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+- ![Standard Notes logo](../assets/img/notebooks/standard-notes.svg){ .twemoji } [**Standard Notes**](../notebooks.md#standard-notes)
+
+    ---
+
+    [:octicons-home-16:](https://standardnotes.com){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://standardnotes.com/help/47/can-i-self-host-standard-notes){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/standardnotes){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+- ![PrivateBin logo](../assets/img/pastebins/privatebin.svg){ .twemoji } [**PrivateBin**](../pastebins.md#privatebin)
+
+    ---
+
+    [:octicons-home-16:](https://privatebin.info){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/blob/master/doc/Installation.md){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+- ![Paaster logo](../assets/img/pastebins/paaster.svg){ .twemoji } [**Paaster**](../pastebins.md#paaster)
+
+    ---
+
+    [:octicons-home-16:](https://paaster.io){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/WardPearce/paaster#deployment){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/WardPearce/paaster){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+- ![SimpleX Chat logo](../assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ .twemoji } [**SimpleX Chat**](../real-time-communication.md#simplex-chat)
+
+    ---
+
+    [:octicons-home-16:](https://simplex.chat){ .card-link title="Homepage" }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://simplex.chat/docs/server.html){ .card-link title="Admin Documentation" }
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/simplex-chat){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+</div>

docs/tools.md

@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ description: A complete list of the privacy tools, services, software, and hardw
 
 If you're looking for a specific solution to something, these are the hardware and software tools we recommend in a variety of categories. Our recommended privacy tools are primarily chosen based on security features, with additional emphasis on decentralized and open-source tools. They are applicable to a variety of threat models ranging from protection against global mass surveillance programs and avoiding big tech companies to mitigating attacks, but only you can determine what will work best for your needs.
 
+<div class="grid" markdown>
+
+<div markdown>
 [VPN Providers](vpn.md){ .md-button }
 [Password Managers](passwords.md){ .md-button }
 [Email Providers](email.md){ .md-button }
@@ -16,6 +19,19 @@ If you're looking for a specific solution to something, these are the hardware a
 [DNS Servers](dns.md){ .md-button }
 [Email Aliasing Services](email-aliasing.md){ .md-button }
 [Photo Organization Tools](photo-management.md){ .md-button }
+</div>
+
+</div>
+
+<div markdown>
+
+<div class="admonition info" markdown>
+
+[Self-hosting recommendations](self-hosting/index.md) have been moved to their own category.
+
+</div>
+
+</div>
 
 If you want assistance figuring out the best privacy tools and alternative programs for your needs, start a discussion on our [forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net) or our [Matrix](https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org) community!
 
@@ -217,19 +233,8 @@ If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connec
 - ![Addy.io logo](assets/img/email-aliasing/addy.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Addy.io](email-aliasing.md#addyio)
 - ![SimpleLogin logo](assets/img/email-aliasing/simplelogin.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [SimpleLogin](email-aliasing.md#simplelogin)
 
-</div>
 </div>
 
-<div markdown>
-### Self-Hosting Email
-
-<div class="grid cards" markdown>
-
-- ![Stalwart logo](assets/img/email/stalwart.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Stalwart](email.md#stalwart)
-- ![Mailcow logo](assets/img/email/mailcow.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Mailcow](email.md#mailcow)
-- ![Mail-in-a-Box logo](assets/img/email/mail-in-a-box.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Mail-in-a-Box](email.md#mail-in-a-box)
-
-</div>
 </div>
 
 </div>
@@ -422,7 +427,7 @@ For encrypting your OS drive, we typically recommend using the encryption tool y
 
 </details>
 
-#### Cross-platform Tools
+#### Cross-Platform Tools
 
 <div class="grid cards" markdown>
 
@@ -486,9 +491,9 @@ For encrypting your OS drive, we typically recommend using the encryption tool y
 
 - ![Drip logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/drip.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Drip](health-and-wellness.md#drip)
 - ![Euki logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/euki.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Euki](health-and-wellness.md#euki)
-- ![Apple Health logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy } ![Apple Health logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy }[Apple Health](health-and-wellness.md#apple-health)
+- ![Apple Health logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy } ![Apple Health logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Apple Health](health-and-wellness.md#apple-health)
 - ![Gadgetbridge logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/gadgetbridge.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy }![Gadgetbridge logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/gadgetbridge-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Gadgetbridge](health-and-wellness.md#gadgetbridge)
-- ![Apple Health logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy } ![Apple Health logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy }[Apple Health Records](health-and-wellness.md#apple-health-records)
+- ![Apple Health logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health.svg#only-light){ .twemoji loading=lazy } ![Apple Health logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/apple-health-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Apple Health Records](health-and-wellness.md#apple-health-records)
 - ![CommonHealth logo](assets/img/health-and-wellness/commonhealth.png){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [CommonHealth](health-and-wellness.md#commonhealth)
 
 </div>
@@ -603,7 +608,6 @@ For encrypting your OS drive, we typically recommend using the encryption tool y
 - ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Signal](real-time-communication.md#signal)
 - ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Briar](real-time-communication.md#briar)
 - ![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [SimpleX Chat](real-time-communication.md#simplex-chat)
-- ![Session logo](assets/img/messengers/session.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Session](real-time-communication.md#session)
 
 </div>
 

mkdocs.blog.yml

@@ -215,9 +215,13 @@ nav:
       - editorial.md
       - tags.md
   - !ENV [NAV_VIDEOS, "Videos"]: /videos/
-  - !ENV [NAV_ABOUT, "About"]: /en/about/
-  - "Donate": /en/about/donate/
   - !ENV [NAV_FORUM, "Forum"]: "https://discuss.privacyguides.net/"
+  - !ENV [NAV_WIKI, "Wiki"]:
+      !ENV [
+        NAV_WIKI_LINK,
+        "https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/community-wiki/9411/none",
+      ]
+  - !ENV [NAV_ABOUT, "About"]: /en/about/
 
 validation:
   nav:

mkdocs.videos.yml

@@ -205,9 +205,13 @@ nav:
   - !ENV [NAV_VIDEOS, "Videos"]:
       - index.md
       - playlists.md
-  - !ENV [NAV_ABOUT, "About"]: /en/about/
-  - "Donate": /en/about/donate/
   - !ENV [NAV_FORUM, "Forum"]: "https://discuss.privacyguides.net/"
+  - !ENV [NAV_WIKI, "Wiki"]:
+      !ENV [
+        NAV_WIKI_LINK,
+        "https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/community-wiki/9411/none",
+      ]
+  - !ENV [NAV_ABOUT, "About"]: /en/about/
 
 validation:
   nav:

mkdocs.yml

@@ -393,6 +393,9 @@ nav:
               - "os/windows/group-policies.md"
   - !ENV [NAV_RECOMMENDATIONS, "Recommendations"]:
       - "tools.md"
+      - !ENV [NAV_SELF_HOSTING, "Self-Hosting"]:
+          - "self-hosting/index.md"
+          - "self-hosting/email-servers.md"
       - !ENV [NAV_INTERNET_BROWSING, "Internet Browsing"]:
           - "tor.md"
           - "desktop-browsers.md"
@@ -447,6 +450,11 @@ nav:
   - !ENV [NAV_VIDEOS, "Videos"]: /videos/
   - !ENV [NAV_FORUM, "Forum"]:
       !ENV [NAV_FORUM_LINK, "https://discuss.privacyguides.net/"]
+  - !ENV [NAV_WIKI, "Wiki"]:
+      !ENV [
+        NAV_WIKI_LINK,
+        "https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/community-wiki/9411/none",
+      ]
   - !ENV [NAV_ABOUT, "About"]:
       - "about.md"
       - "about/donate.md"

theme/assets/img/messengers/session.svg

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="128" height="128" version="1.1" viewBox="0 0 33.865 33.867"><g><path fill="#00f782" stroke-width=".101" d="m172.42 117.59-6.3946-3.5448h4.3302c3.7663 0 6.8277-3.0614 6.8277-6.8277s-3.0614-6.8378-6.8277-6.8378h-15.126c-4.7231 0-8.5598 3.8367-8.5598 8.5598 0 3.3636 1.8328 6.4652 4.7734 8.0965l6.3946 3.5448h-4.3302c-3.7764 0-6.8378 3.0715-6.8378 6.8378s3.0614 6.8277 6.8277 6.8277h15.126c4.7231 0 8.5598-3.8367 8.5598-8.5598 0.01-3.3636-1.8227-6.4652-4.7633-8.0965zm-19.949-2.3967c-2.2256-1.2386-3.6253-3.5549-3.6856-6.0824-0.0805-3.6353 2.9707-6.6163 6.606-6.6163h14.833c2.5377 0 4.7231 1.9436 4.8438 4.4813 0.13092 2.709-2.0342 4.9546-4.7128 4.9546h-8.5397c-0.52368 0-0.94661 0.42297-0.94661 0.94661v6.9688zm16.002 16.938h-14.833c-2.5377 0-4.7231-1.9436-4.8438-4.4813-0.13092-2.709 2.0342-4.9546 4.7128-4.9546h8.5397c0.52364 0 0.94661-0.42295 0.94661-0.9466v-6.9688l8.3987 4.6525c2.2255 1.2286 3.6152 3.5549 3.6755 6.0824 0.0906 3.6353-2.9606 6.6163-6.5959 6.6163z" class="st0" transform="translate(-144.99 -100.38)"/></g></svg>

videos/posts/recall-is-back.md

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+---
+title: |
+  Recall Is Back, But You Still Shouldn’t Use It
+date:
+  created: 2025-05-22T22:00:00Z
+authors:
+  - jordan
+description: |
+  Microsoft is rolling out its controversial Recall feature to Windows users with Copilot+ PCs. However, there are still many privacy and security concerns that remain, even after its reworking.
+readtime: 6
+thumbnail: https://neat.tube/lazy-static/previews/54ba6b19-122f-47b6-8f48-8ed651748fd6.jpg
+embed: https://neat.tube/videos/embed/pAAK8bzb6saZfQSqZLW7eU
+peertube: https://neat.tube/w/pAAK8bzb6saZfQSqZLW7eU
+youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AzLsJ-4_fhU
+---
+Microsoft is rolling out its controversial Recall feature to Windows users with Copilot+ PCs. However, there are still many privacy and security concerns that remain, even after its reworking.
+
+## Sources
+
+- Introducing Copilot+ PC's Full Keynote - Microsoft: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aZbHd4suAnQ>
+- Introducing Windows 11 - Microsoft: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uh9643c2P6k>
+- Introducing Copilot - Microsoft: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5rEZGSFgZVY>
+- Introducing a new Copilot key for Windows 11 PCs - Microsoft: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S1R08Qx6Fvs>