update: PeekYou Opt Out links

Signed-off-by: redoomed1 <redoomed1@privacyguides.org>

.vscode/ltex.dictionary.en-US.txt

@@ -562,3 +562,10 @@ unlinkability
 Kagi
 Secureblue
 pseudonymity
+TrueNAS
+Arti
+Tailscale
+allowlisted
+MyMonero
+Monero-LWS
+OkCupid

blog/.authors.yml

@@ -56,6 +56,13 @@ authors:
       instance: neat.computer
     twitter: jonaharagon
     bluesky: jonaharagon.com
+  justin:
+    name: Justin Ehrenhofer
+    description: Guest Contributor
+    avatar: https://github.com/SamsungGalaxyPlayer.png
+    mastodon:
+      username: sgp
+      instance: neat.computer
   kaitebay:
     name: Kai Tebay
     description: Former Team Member

blog/posts/mastodon-privacy-and-security.md

@@ -0,0 +1,914 @@
+---
+date:
+    created: 2025-07-15T17:00:00Z
+categories:
+    - Tutorials
+authors:
+    - em
+description: While most social media rely on commercial models harvesting users' data, Mastodon offers an alternative that doesn't seek profits from your data and attention.
+schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle
+preview:
+  cover: blog/assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-cover.webp
+---
+
+# Privacy and Security on Mastodon
+
+![The Mastodon name and logo over a dark purple background with a large purple padlock icon under it.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-cover.webp)
+
+<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Em / Privacy Guides | Logo: Mastodon gGmbH</small>
+
+Mastodon is an open-source and decentralized social network that has been growing in popularity for the past few years.
+
+While most social media rely on commercial models harvesting users' data to sell to advertisers, Mastodon offers a human-centric alternative that doesn't seek profits from your data and attention. This means better social connections, better controls, and better privacy.<!-- more -->
+
+Mastodon doesn't use your data to make money. This fact alone comes with incredible benefits for data privacy and security. Because the goal isn't to collect as much information as possible on its users, Mastodon embraces data minimization and only requires providing what is truly needed to run the service for you.
+
+If you do not have a Mastodon account yet, but would like to learn more about its privacy and security practices and features before creating one, the first part of this article will give you an overview of what they are.
+
+If you already have a Mastodon account, the second part of this article will guide you to use and understand better the controls it offers. If you are already informed about Mastodon's privacy and security, you may want to [**jump directly to the tutorial**](#tutorial-how-to-adjust-and-improve-privacy-and-security-on-mastodon) part.
+
+This article isn't an onboarding guide to start using Mastodon, but if that's what you seek, take a look at this [short guide](https://docpop.org/2025/02/how-to-get-started-with-mastodon/) from Doc Pop. If you're still unsure about using Mastodon, [this excellent video](https://news.elenarossini.com/fediverse-video/) from Elena Rossini might convince you.
+
+<div class="admonition info" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Mastodon the software vs the network vs the instance</p>
+
+Unless otherwise specified, the word *Mastodon* in this article will refer to the Mastodon *software,* in its default version. The Mastodon *software* is different from the Mastodon.Social original *instance* (server), and is different from the Mastodon *network*.
+
+**Mastodon software**: The software used by people on the Mastodon network, and installed by administrators to run an instance (what you see).
+
+**Mastodon network**: The network of interconnected instances using the Mastodon software (all the different Mastodon instances you interact with). The Mastodon network also connects to the larger Fediverse network.
+
+**Mastodon.Social, the instance**: The largest Mastodon server, managed and moderated by the Mastodon nonprofit organization.
+
+</div>
+
+One of the wonderful possibility Mastodon offers is to [self-host your own Mastodon instance](https://docs.joinmastodon.org/user/run-your-own/). While this is the pinnacle of control, security, and privacy for a skilled administrator, self-hosting also means more responsibilities, where more expertise and resources are required. This isn't realistically accessible to everyone.
+
+For this reason, this article-tutorial will focus on the experience from the **user side**, and not from the administrator side.
+
+## :octicons-home-16: Choosing a Mastodon instance
+
+Another particularity of Mastodon compared to commercial social media is its true decentralization.
+
+The Mastodon network is composed of a [multiplicity of instances](https://joinmastodon.org/servers) that connect with each other, through a protocol called [ActivityPub](https://docs.joinmastodon.org/#fediverse). This collection of connected instances, along with other connected software using the same protocol, is called [the Fediverse](https://jointhefediverse.net/).
+
+![Screenshot of the official Mastodon website from the page presenting various Mastodon instances.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-choosing-instance.webp)
+
+This article will not go deep into this topic, but it's important to mention that different instances will offer different degrees of privacy and security. Choosing an instance can have an important impact on this.
+
+This is because the administration team of each instance has the responsibility to configure the software properly, to keep it updated, and to safeguard the server hosting the data. This in itself implies many security duties. It's important to consider the capabilities of the administration team to secure the instance you choose to join.
+
+Moreover, even when the security part of hosting is well managed, the administration team is also responsible for enforcing policies and moderation. The quality of moderation can have a significant impact on the safety and privacy of a community.
+
+Choosing an instance where you trust the administration and moderation team is essential to have a good and secure experience on the network. This is true for any other social media as well, even the ones that sadly don't offer any option to move your account if you aren't happy with management.
+
+To facilitate choosing an instance, the Mastodon official website keeps a list of instances that have all agreed to follow the [Mastodon Server Covenant](https://joinmastodon.org/covenant), committing to the following:
+
+- Enforcing active moderation against racism, sexism, homophobia, and transphobia
+
+- Conducting daily backup to avoid accidental data loss
+
+- Having at least one other person with emergency access to the server
+
+- Giving at least 3 months of advance notice if the server shuts down and users have to move (this isn't frequent)
+
+### Changing instance
+
+Despite these considerations, Mastodon newcomers **shouldn't feel [analysis paralysis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analysis_paralysis) over choosing an instance**. This decision isn't permanent, and can be changed later on, once one has acquired a better sense of the platform.
+
+Indeed, as shown later in the tutorial part, Mastodon makes it possible to easily [move an account](#moving-to-another-instance) from one instance to another!
+
+If trust is broken by an instance administration or moderation team, users can easily decide to migrate to another one with better practices. This account portability is quite unique to the Fediverse.
+
+While account content (posts) will unfortunately not get transferred through this process on Mastodon (yet), account followers *and* follows will be moved unharmed during a Mastodon account migration.
+
+Furthermore, this process might get improved soon! There is work currently being done to implement data portability between two ActivityPub servers (even for account content) with the [LOLA protocol](https://swicg.github.io/activitypub-data-portability/lola). This could eventually allow Mastodon's account migration process to include posts migration as well.
+
+<div class="admonition success" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">You can always keep a copy of your content!</p>
+
+Even if the Mastodon migration process doesn't allow for automatic posts transfer (yet), you are still able to keep a local copy of all your content, before moving to another instance or for backup purposes. More on this in the tutorial part.
+
+</div>
+
+## :octicons-shield-check-16: How secure is Mastodon
+
+As explained previously, choosing an instance with a competent and trustworthy administration team is fundamental on Mastodon. Due to a plurality of instances, levels of security expertise can greatly vary from one server to another.
+
+### Server security
+
+As for any platform we use online (including commercial social media), it's important to evaluate properly the level of trust we are willing to give before subscribing to a service handling our data.
+
+In this case, it means trusting the administration team of the instance you choose to safeguard the instance's server and data properly.
+
+Additionally, like any other social media, Mastodon isn't immune to software vulnerability. When a problem arises, your server's security will depend on the responsiveness of your administrator(s).
+
+Mastodon's development team has a good track record of acting promptly to fix and transparently inform the community when a critical [vulnerability is found](https://www.theregister.com/2024/02/02/critical_vulnerability_in_mastodon_is/). However, your instance's administration team must also act quickly to implement the fix.
+
+Due to the decentralization of the Mastodon network, software patches cannot be automatically pushed to all instances at once. Administrators' reaction time may vary for each instance.
+
+### Software security
+
+Because the Mastodon software is open-source, anyone can inspect [its code](https://github.com/mastodon/mastodon). This *can* offer the benefit of getting more opportunities to spot and patch potential problems.
+
+It also allows anyone to verify privacy and security claims, which greatly improves transparency and trust. This is something that cannot be done with proprietary closed-source software like most commercial social media use.
+
+But open-source code isn't magically secure either. Experts still have to take the time to actually inspect the code for this to have any significant value.
+
+In 2023, the Mozilla Foundation funded a penetration test for Mastodon that was conducted by the German cybersecurity firm [Cure53](https://cure53.de/). Following the results, the Mastodon development team [promptly fixed](https://arstechnica.com/security/2023/07/mastodon-fixes-critical-tootroot-vulnerability-allowing-node-hijacking/) the critical vulnerabilities found, and informed instance administrators to be ready to patch the software quickly. Mastodon instances updated to the most recent software now benefit from greater security, thanks to the excellent work of Cure53 and the Mastodon development team.
+
+Additionally, anybody detecting a security vulnerability in Mastodon's code can [report it easily](https://github.com/mastodon/mastodon/security/policy) on the project's GitHub page. Known security vulnerabilities are also transparently reported to the public in the [security advisories](https://github.com/mastodon/mastodon/security/advisories) list.
+
+Since April 1st this year, the Nivenly Foundation started the Fediverse Security Fund, a [security bounty program](https://nivenly.org/docs/programs/fediverse-security-fund/) to encourage more people to contribute to securing Mastodon and other Fediverse-connected software.
+
+The experimental program will run **until September 30th, 2025**, and invites individual researchers and contributors to identify or patch vulnerabilities, rewarding them with a one-time sponsorship. If successful, the program could get extended, depending on member votes.
+
+Regarding the software itself, Mastodon [uses](https://docs.joinmastodon.org/spec/security/) public key cryptography to secure HTTP Signatures and Linked Data Signatures. From [version 4.4](https://blog.joinmastodon.org/2025/07/mastodon-4.4/), Mastodon implemented a number of [security improvements](https://blog.joinmastodon.org/2025/07/mastodon-4-4-for-devs/) to authentication and authorization mechanisms. Mastodon 4.4 now [supports](https://docs.joinmastodon.org/spec/security/#http-message-signatures) incoming HTTP requests to be signed with RFC9421-compatible signatures. Additionally, the older (less secure) OAuth password grant type has been removed, and the OAuth Client Auth with HTTP Basic Auth with SSO has been fixed.
+
+On the user side, Mastodon gives options to improve account security with the use of **multifactor authentication**, using an authenticator app or a physical security key. Already, this is better account security than what many (if not most) commercial social media platforms propose.
+
+In addition, Mastodon users can see within their account lists of all sessions open, the authentication history, and all third-party software authorized to access the account. Users can quickly revoke access to any unauthorized or unused sessions or app, as necessary.
+
+### Data security
+
+Finally, because Mastodon only requires **minimal information** to create an account, less personal data risks getting exposed, in the unfortunate eventuality of a data breach. For example, no phone number, legal name, or official ID is required. This is excellent for both privacy and security.
+
+Even if Mastodon has a much smaller security team than larger commercial platforms, its decentralization, transparency, and data minimization gives it significant advantages over for-profit social media.
+
+Users' private data is protected reasonably well at the software level, but again, this protection also relies on the server security for each specific instance.
+
+While security and privacy are related concepts that can enhance each other, they differ in many points. A piece of software could be very secure, yet collect and use a lot of private data, regardless of the user's consent or knowledge. Inversely, a seemingly privacy-respectful software could be collecting very little user data, yet not securing it properly.
+
+Both privacy and security are important to consider for users, and both must be examined when evaluating software.
+
+## :octicons-lock-16: How private is Mastodon
+
+When using social media, there are always two sides to data privacy: The data collected by the service, and the data exposed by the user posting content.
+
+### Data collected by the service
+
+On Mastodon, the platform collects only minimal information from the user. Besides the content you decide to share for your profile and posts, the software only requires an *email address,* a *username,* and a *password* to sign up.
+
+Starting from version 4.4, some instances might also collect a *date of birth,* if the instance implements a minimum age policy. This date of birth is only used to validate age requirements and isn't stored anywhere, but it is [checked](https://blog.joinmastodon.org/2025/07/mastodon-4-4-for-devs/) against the minimum age condition server-side.
+
+Additionally, Mastodon will collect your *IP address(es)*, *applications* used, and the *times* you logged in. This is necessary to provide the service to you. You can increase your account privacy by registering with an [alias email address](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/email-aliasing) (if allowed by your instance), and logging in through a [trustworthy VPN](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/).
+
+It's worth mentioning that Mastodon.Social, the instance administrated by the Mastodon organization, recently added to their terms of service an additional clause to [explicitly prohibit scraping](https://techcrunch.com/2025/06/17/mastodon-updates-its-terms-to-prohibit-ai-model-training/) users' data for unauthorized purposes, such as to train AI models. Many other instances might soon add similar clauses (or already have them).
+
+While this provides little technical protections, it does provide some interesting *legal* protections. These are protections most commercial social media do not offer, as many already exploit users' content to train their own AI models or sell it to third-parties for this purpose.
+
+This new Mastodon.Social policy is well aligned with the more human-centric values of the Fediverse.
+
+<div class="admonition abstract" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Summary of data collected by Mastodon</p>
+
+- Email address
+- Username
+- Password
+- IP addresses (temporary stored, may vary per instance)
+- Browser and application types (temporary stored, may vary per instance)
+- Login history (temporary stored, may vary per instance)
+- Date of birth (not stored, may vary per instance)
+- Optional: The data you decide to share with the service (profile information, posts, post timestamps, uploaded media, favorites, boosts, followers, follows, bookmarks, lists, blocks, mutes, personal notes)
+
+</div>
+
+### Data you post on the service
+
+Regarding the content of your profile and posts (including private mentions), no matter how much you restrict access to your account, you should always consider that this content *can* technically be accessed by the administration and moderation team of your instance.
+
+Concerning people outside your instance's administration team, the privacy of the data you upload yourself will greatly vary depending on how you use and configure your account.
+
+For more information on how to adjust your account's configuration for better privacy, consult the [tutorial part](#tutorial-how-to-adjust-and-improve-privacy-and-security-on-mastodon) of this article.
+
+### Who can access your private data
+
+As described above, the administration team of your instance *can* always technically access *any* data related to your account, regardless of if you make it public or private. This is true for most commercial platforms as well.
+
+That being said, administration teams are generally much smaller on the Mastodon network, so this might not represent a lot of people. It could even mean only *one* administrator.
+
+This has both benefits and downsides: The benefit is that fewer people have access to your private account data. The downsides are that, due to limited resources, this data *could* get less protection. That said, large commercial platforms aren't immune to data breaches either, despite all the resources they could use in prevention.
+
+### Account configuration
+
+Outside access from the administration team, content privacy will vary per account, depending on configuration. Similarly to any other social media platforms.
+
+Some people might prefer to share openly with everyone, even with people who do not have a Mastodon account. While others might prefer to lock their account entirely, and reduce content visibility to their approved followers only. Both types of usage are possible on Mastodon.
+
+Additionally, Mastodon offers much better controls over your data. You can set up automated post deletion with specific thresholds, adjust post visibility for each post, adjust searchability and discoverability to your preferences, and allow or restrict the upcoming [quote posts](#quote-posts) feature.
+
+All these features are fantastic for data privacy, and often absent from commercial platforms.
+
+### Users tracking and profiling
+
+Most important of all, because Mastodon has no interest in monetizing your data, there is **no tracking, no advertising, and no "Mastodon-AI" profiling you** and scanning all your posts. Mastodon doesn't collect any data from you for a reason other than providing the service *to you*.
+
+This is completely antithesis to commercial social media. And this alone makes Mastodon fundamentally **much more private than any other big tech platforms**.
+
+## :material-lock-check-outline: Privacy benefits of Mastodon
+
+Each Mastodon instance will have a different privacy policy that you should consult before creating an account, like for any other platforms. But unless the software was modified, data collection should be similar to what is described here, and remain minimal for the majority of connected instances.
+
+Here's a summary of some benefits Mastodon can offer for your data privacy:
+
+### Data minimization
+
+Mastodon only collects what's necessary. The information required to create an account is minimal. There are no "real-name" policy and no phone number required. Only the data absolutely necessary to provide the service to you is required.
+
+### Adjustable visibility
+
+While profile information will be visible publicly, post visibility can be adjusted to your preference for each post. The list of who follows you and who you follow can be visible or hidden. Account searchability, discoverability, and quote posts from unmentioned users can all be disabled.
+
+### Your data is yours
+
+On Mastodon, you have full control over accessing and deleting your data. You don't need any third-party software to get your post deleted, and you don't need to wait after a company's customer service to download your data. Those controls are accessible to any user from their own account.
+
+### No data monetization
+
+The Mastodon software is developed and maintained by a nonprofit organization, the German [Mastodon gGmbH](https://joinmastodon.org/about). This software is free and accessible to anyone. There is no incentive to generate profit from your data on Mastodon. This is an *immense* privacy advantage over *any* commercial social platforms. There is nothing tracking you around or building an advertising profile on you. Your data is not for sale.
+
+### Transparency and mobility
+
+Because the Mastodon code is open-source, anyone can inspect it. This helps quickly verifying claims, proposing new features, and allowing other developers to create their own application for Mastodon.
+
+With Mastodon, you are not stuck with only one app. If you don't like the official app, just use [another one](https://joinmastodon.org/apps)! Moreover, you can even move your account from one instance to another. This means you don't have to trust your administration team forever. **You can choose who you trust, and your trust (and consent) is revocable, as it should.**
+
+### Respects your privacy protections
+
+So many services and websites have adopted a hostile stance towards people using privacy protections such as a VPN server, a privacy-focused browser, or running their phone in [Lockdown Mode](https://support.apple.com/en-us/105120). But with Mastodon, you are free to use all the protections you love. **Mastodon isn't hostile to your privacy.**
+
+## :octicons-alert-16: What to stay careful about
+
+While the privacy benefits of Mastodon are numerous, there are also a few things to keep in mind when using the platform:
+
+### Direct messages (private mentions)
+
+Direct messages on Mastodon are better described at private mentions. Private mentions are like any other posts (and will sometimes show up in your feed! Don't panic!), but they will only be visible to the people you *mentioned* in it.
+
+That being said, do **not** type the handle of someone to talk "in private" about them with someone else, because this *mentioned* person *will* also get included in this thread!
+
+Additionally, private mentions on Mastodon, like private messages on other commercial social media, aren't end-to-end encrypted. The Mastodon interface shows this clearly:
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon interface showing a warning presented when selecting private mention visibility for a post. The message says: "Posts on Mastodon are not end-to-end encrypted. Do not share any sensitive information over Mastodon. Learn more"](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-private-mention-encryption.webp){width="400"}
+
+This means that all your private mention posts *could* be accessed by the administration and moderation team of your instance. **Never share any sensitive information using private mentions.** The same advice is applicable to any other social media.
+
+<div class="admonition info" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">End-to-end encryption could be coming soon!</p>
+
+That being said, this could change soon! The ActivityPub team is currently [working on integrating end-to-end encryption](https://socialwebfoundation.org/program-protocol-e2ee/) for the protocol. This would be nothing less than revolutionary for platforms using ActivityPub, like Mastodon.
+
+It's difficult to estimate when this feature could be available to Mastodon users however, because implementing end-to-end encryption properly isn't a simple task. Even once the integration is completed for the ActivityPub protocol, it might take some time before the Mastodon development team implements it for the software as well.
+
+Nevertheless, Fediverse users can dare to hope this feature may be available relatively soon, perhaps in the next year or two.
+
+</div>
+
+### The open web is open to all
+
+On Mastodon, you don't need an account to see people's profile page and public (or quiet-public) posts.
+
+This is an **immense benefit for organizations**, to share information with the public without restricting access like on commercial platforms. However, this can also mean more account visibility than some individual users may prefer.
+
+It's important to stay aware that your account *could* be seen by anyone on the internet visiting your Mastodon account's public page. Your account's public page address is your instance's website address followed by your account's username, in the following format:
+
+```html
+https://YOUR_INSTANCE_ADDRESS/@YOUR_USERNAME
+```
+
+For example, for the Privacy Guides Mastodon account hosted on the mastodon.neat.computer Mastodon instance, this account's public page address looks like this:
+
+```html {.copy}
+https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides
+```
+
+Whether you lock your account (approve followers and use followers-only posts) or not, your display name, biography, profile and header pictures, followers and follows count, date joining the instance, and extra fields will always be visible to anyone from your account's public page.
+
+Your public posts can even be accessed via [RSS feed](https://fedi.tips/following-mastodon-and-fediverse-accounts-through-rss/) on Mastodon. To limit this, you can adjust the settings to [restrict the visibility](#selecting-post-visibility-and-access) of your posts.
+
+### Connection with commercial social media
+
+Some Mastodon instances [connect](https://www.howtogeek.com/threads-now-connects-to-mastodon-and-other-fediverse-platforms/) with larger commercial social media like Threads (from Meta), and Bluesky ([through a bridge](https://techcrunch.com/2024/06/05/bluesky-and-mastodon-users-can-now-talk-to-each-other-with-bridgy-fed/)).
+
+The Fediverse community is quite [divided](https://wedistribute.org/2024/03/block-threads-to-remain-listed/) on this topic. Some people argue that more connectivity is good, while others want to stay away from commercial platforms entirely, partly due to their questionable data privacy, ethics, and [moderation practices](https://www.wired.com/story/meta-immigration-gender-policies-change/).
+
+If this is important to you, you can check your instance's policies to see if it allows connections with these commercial social media. If it does, and you do not want this, you can [block specific instances](#blocking-an-instance) at the account level. This isn't a complete protection for your data, but it does reduce visibility from and to these platforms.
+
+If this isn't enough for you, you can migrate your account to an [instance blocking Threads](https://fedipact.veganism.social/) (or other servers) at the administrator level. This offers stronger protections.
+
+### Connection with other instances
+
+It's important to remember that on Mastodon, there isn't only one centralized entity that receives your data.
+
+For example, if you send a private mention post to someone on a different instance than yours, this person's instance administration team will now have access to your message as well, and your data *for this post* will also be stored on that instance.
+
+This is very similar to how emails work. If you are a Tuta or Proton email user, and you send a message to someone using Gmail, now Google will also have a stored copy of your message.
+
+### Decision paralysis trusting an instance
+
+Finally, probably the biggest block people hit when starting to use Mastodon is *which instance to trust*.
+
+Sadly, this simple decision has discouraged many potential users. Yet, having to choose an instance is indeed a feature and not a bug.
+
+Because yes, this choice does burden you to pick who you trust, but **it also empowers you** to be able to *revoke* this trust at any time. No commercial social media gives you the option to stop trusting Mark Zuckerberg and move to another Facebook server that matches better your values, for example.
+
+Be careful who you trust of course, but don't get paralyzed by this choice. Even if this might feel intimidating at first, this fear of choosing isn't worth staying with possibly even less trustworthy big tech administrators.
+
+***
+
+## :simple-mastodon: Tutorial: How to adjust and improve privacy and security on Mastodon
+
+The second part of this article is a tutorial on how to improve your Mastodon account's security, and how to adjust the different privacy features to your preferences.
+
+<div class="admonition question" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Who is this tutorial for?</p>
+
+- You already have an account on Mastodon
+
+- You are *not* familiar with all the Mastodon settings yet
+
+- You are *not* self-hosting your instance
+
+</div>
+
+Although many variations and versions of the Mastodon software are in use on the Fediverse, for the sake of simplification and universality, this tutorial will focus on its most recently released version (4.4).
+
+If your instance software version is different, you will likely still be able to follow this tutorial, but might notice some variations.
+
+<div class="admonition question" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">What software version is your instance running?</p>
+
+To check which version your instance is currently running, from the web interface on desktop, check the information in the lower-left corner of your instance website (e.g. [https://mastodon.social/](https://mastodon.social/)). The very last line should list something similar to `v4.4.1` This is your instance's Mastodon version number.
+
+</div>
+
+Additionally, this tutorial was created from the desktop web interface. Experiences and setting accesses may vary greatly from a mobile app. It is recommended to follow along from the desktop web interface as well.
+
+Screenshots for the tutorial were mostly taken from an account on the Mastodon.Social instance, but you will be able to follow along even if your account is on a different instance.
+
+### Improving account security
+
+Using a [unique email address](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/email-aliasing/) and a unique and [strong password](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/passwords-overview/) are the starting points for good account security, and this is no different for Mastodon accounts.
+
+Additionally, you should enable multifactor authentication for your account as soon as you can. This is one of the most important step you can take to increase your account's security, and its protections against account takeover attacks.
+
+#### Enabling two-factor authentication
+
+For this, go to "Preferences" (in the right-side menu) > "Account" > "Two-factor Auth", then click on the purple "Set up" button at the bottom.
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the Two-factor Auth page in Preferences.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-multifactor-setup.webp)
+
+#### Authenticator app
+
+Confirm your password when prompted. Then scan the QR code with your [authenticator app](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/multi-factor-authentication/), or enter manually the plain-text secret on the right of the QR code. Confirm with entering the two-factor code from your authenticator app, then click "Enable" at the bottom.
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the Two-factor Auth page in Preferences. This shows a QR code to scan or a plain-text secret to register a code for an authenticator app.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-multifactor-qrcode.webp)
+
+**Carefully note the recovery codes** provided. You will need to use them if you lose access to your authenticator, for example if you were to lose your phone.
+
+If you need to change your authenticator app later, you can go back to this menu and select "Edit" on the right of "Authenticator app". You can also return to this menu to generate new recovery codes, if you have lost your older ones or if they were compromised. Generating new recovery codes will invalidate your previous ones.
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the Two-factor Auth page in Preferences. The page displays a confirmation message that authentication is enabled, and options to "Edit", "Add", or "Disable 2FA" methods.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-multifactor-enabled.webp)
+
+#### Security key
+
+Once you have enabled two-factor authentication with an authenticator app, you will see the option to add a [security key](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/security-keys/) as well. You can add one if you want to register multiple second factors of authentication for your account.
+
+<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Browser compatibility</p>
+
+Some browsers will not support security key authentication. For example, the Mullvad Browser doesn't support it.
+
+</div>
+
+To add a security key, click on "Add" on the right of the listing. Insert your security key, choose a "Nickname" for it, then click on the "Add new security key" purple button.
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the Security keys page in Preferences.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-multifactor-securitykey.webp)
+
+On macOS, you might be prompted with an option to "Choose how to manage your passkeys". If you get this pop-up, click on "Other Options" at the bottom.
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the Security keys page with a macOS pop-up window over it. The pop-up gives options to "Choose how to manage your passkeys".](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-multifactor-mac-popup.webp)
+
+On the second pop-up, select "Security key" then "Continue". When prompted with "Set Up Security Key", activate your security key (for some keys, this means touching the metal part of it). This step may differ depending on your operating system type and version.
+
+Once completed, you should see a confirmation that "Your security key was successfully added" on the page.
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the Two-factor Auth page in Preferences. The page displays a confirmation message and options to "Edit" both two-factor methods.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-multifactor-securitykey-added.webp)
+
+From now, each time you log in your Mastodon account, you will be prompted to select one of your authentication methods after entering your email address and password:
+
+**To log in using your security key**, click on the "Use security key" purple button when prompted by your browser. Your operating system might present you with a pop-up to choose again between your authenticator app or your security key. On macOS, select "Security key", click "Continue", then insert and activate your key. There may be variations depending on your operating system, but it should be similar to this.
+
+**To log in using your authenticator app**, click on the "Enter a two-factor code from your phone or a recovery code" link at the bottom, then enter the code from your authenticator app when prompted by your browser (or recovery code if you've lost your authenticator).
+
+If you try to sign in from a browser that doesn't support security keys after enabling it (or if you lost access to your security key), you can still log in your account using your authenticator app as described above.
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the login page for the second factor of authentication. The page gives the option to "Use security key" or "Enter a two-factor code from your phone or a recovery code".](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-multifactor-securitykey-prompted.webp)
+
+Keep in mind that adding *more* methods of authentication to your account *doesn't* make it more secure, it's the opposite.
+
+If you register both an authenticator app *and* a security key, this means anyone who can access *either* your authenticator app *or* your security key could log into your account (if they already have your password). Different second factors aren't added together here, they simply provide more options to *access* your account.
+
+<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">When enabling multifactor authentication with any account</p>
+
+Be careful to choose a method you will have access to easily each time you log in. In addition, make sure to note the recovery codes provided *very carefully* and store them in a secure location (ideally offline). Keep in mind these codes will allow you to recover your account, but could also allow *anyone* to bypass your multifactor authentication.
+
+</div>
+
+#### Verifying account accesses
+
+In "Preferences" > "Account" > "Authorized apps", you can see which applications have access to your account.
+
+There, you will see every application you have granted access to. If you no longer use a mobile app or a service listed there, you should revoke access.
+
+If you do not recognize a listed service, you can ask your instance administrator to know if this is a legitimate application (some administrators might connect legitimate services to your account you may not recognize, such as Matrix).
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the "Your authorized applications" page in Preferences.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-accesses-authorized-apps.webp)
+
+Additionally, in "Preferences" > "Account" > "Account settings", in the "Sessions" section, you will find a list of authorized browser sessions. Again, you can revoke access to any sessions you no longer use, or do not recognize.
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the Account settings page in Preferences.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-accesses-sessions-list.webp)
+
+Just above this sessions list, you will see a link labeled "View authentication history of your account". Click on it to see a list of past logins, including applications used and IP addresses.
+
+If you see a login that isn't legitimate, you should *immediately* revoke accesses you aren't using, and consider changing your password.
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the Authentication history page from clicking on the "View authentication history of your account" link on the previous Account settings page.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-accesses-login-history.webp)
+
+### Adjusting privacy vs discovery
+
+When using social media, there's usually a sliding scale between privacy and discoverability.
+
+You might decide to enable the most restrictions on your account's visibility (more privacy), make it as public as possible (more reach), or anything in between.
+
+**Only you can decide what is best for your unique situation and usage.**
+
+On Mastodon, you have many options to adjust this to your preferences and needs. In "Preferences" > "Public profile", select the "Privacy and reach" tab at the top.
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the Public profile page in Preferences, from the "Privacy and reach" tab.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-account-privacy-reach.webp)
+
+In the "Reach" section:
+
+- The option "Feature profile and posts in discovery algorithms" allows more people to find your account and public posts (default is unchecked). **Leave it *unchecked* for more privacy.**
+
+- The option "Automatically accept new followers" allows anyone to be able to follow you (default is checked). Approving each follower can increase the privacy of your follower-only posts. **If you prefer to approve each new follower (locking your account), then *uncheck* this option.**
+
+In the "Search" section:
+
+- The option "Include public posts in search results" allows people to be able to find your public posts when searching for keywords in Mastodon (default is unchecked). **Leave it *unchecked* for more privacy.**
+
+- The option "Include profile page in search engines" allows your Mastodon profile to potentially appear in search engine results, like Google and Bing (default is checked). ***Uncheck* this option to increase your account's privacy.**
+
+In the "Privacy" section:
+
+- The option "Show follows and followers on profile" allows anyone to be able to see who you follow and who follows you (default is checked). If you prefer to hide this from the public, ***uncheck* this option for more privacy.**
+
+- The option "Display from which app you sent a post" will display publicly which application you are posting from for each post (default is checked). If you prefer to not show which app(s) you are using, ***uncheck* this option for more privacy.**
+
+Once you have adjusted the account options to your preferences, click on "Save changes" at the bottom to confirm your choices.
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the Public profile page in Preferences, from the "Privacy and reach" tab. The page is scrolled down to the "Save changes" button at the very bottom of the six unchecked options.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-account-privacy-options.webp)
+
+### Selecting post visibility and access
+
+In addition to your account's privacy preferences, you can also adjust visibility for each post. This is very handy to allow you to pick in a more granular way which information you wish to share more or less openly.
+
+#### Choosing post visibility
+
+On Mastodon, you can choose between 4 types of visibility for each post: Public, Quiet public, Followers, and Private mention.
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the post composition window. The image shows the drop-menu from the "Change post privacy" button, with four different post visibility options.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-posts-visibility-types.webp){width="400"}
+
+#### Public post
+
+This post is visible to anyone, whether they follow you or not. This post will also be visible from your account's public page, to people who do not necessarily have a Mastodon account.
+
+For example, if you log *out* of your account, then go to `https://YOUR_INSTANCE_ADDRESS/@YOUR_USERNAME`, you will see what someone outside of Mastodon could see from your public page.
+
+![Screenshot of a Mastodon account's public page from a browser. A yellow arrow points at the account's URL, and three red arrows point at information visible to the public such as a public post, a quiet-public post, and the fact that this account is locked.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-posts-account-page.webp)
+<small aria-hidden="true">Note: Please do not follow this account. This account is for research purposes only, and is not an official Privacy Guides account.</small>
+
+#### Quiet public post
+
+This post is visible to anyone, and is also visible from your account's public page (like a Public post). However, it will not be featured in the "Trending" or "Live feeds" timelines. Additionally, it will not be searchable. This reduces its public exposure slightly, and is sometimes recommended for replies.
+
+#### Followers post
+
+This post is only visible to your followers. If you enabled the option to approve each follower, then only people you have approved will see this post. Followers-only posts cannot be boosted (re-posted) by others, and will *not* appear on your account's public page.
+
+Your Followers-only posts will have significantly less reach, and potentially less engagement, but will be much more private.
+
+<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Followers-only post and approving followers</p>
+
+An important thing to keep in mind when selecting a post's visibility is who your followers are (or could be).
+
+If you select Followers-only, but anyone could follow you, this restriction will block boosts for this post, and remove visibility from your account's public page, but anyone who decided to follow you can see it.
+
+However, if you *also* enable restrictions on who can follow you, you will have more control over the visibility of your Followers-only posts, by pre-approving who can follow you and see these posts.
+
+</div>
+
+#### Private mention post
+
+This post is only visible to the people mentioned in it. This works like a "Direct message" feature, except that anyone mentioned will be included.
+
+Be careful not to write the handle of someone you do not want included in this conversation! Because this *will* include them.
+
+Additionally, always keep in mind that the administration and moderation team of your instance *could* see all your posts, including your Private mention posts (like it is the case for any other social media). Never share sensitive information in Private mention posts!
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the post composition window for a Private mention post. There is a warning message above saying that "Posts on Mastodon are not end-to-end encrypted. Do not share any sensitive information over Mastodon. Learn more".](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-private-mention.webp){width="400"}
+
+<div class="admonition info" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">End-to-end encryption for private mentions</p>
+
+There is currently work being done to [integrate end-to-end encryption](https://socialwebfoundation.org/program-protocol-e2ee/) to the ActivityPub protocol, potentially making end-to-end encrypted private mention on Mastodon possible one day.
+
+Implementing end-to-end encryption properly is no small task, and understandably it could take some time for this to be ready for Mastodon users.
+
+However, it would make your private mentions truly private, being accessible only to its intended sender(s) and recipient(s). This could be groundbreaking for the Fediverse, and for your privacy!
+
+</div>
+
+#### Adjusting default post visibility
+
+Even if you can adjust visibility for each post, you may also want to adjust your account's *default* post visibility.
+
+For example, this can help by preventing accidentally sharing something publicly if posting to followers only is preferred, especially if your account is locked for more privacy.
+
+To adjust the default post visibility, go to "Preferences" > "Preferences" > "Other". In the "Posting privacy" section, select your preference in the "Posting privacy" drop-menu for either "Public - Everyone can see", "Unlisted - Everyone can see, but not listed on public timelines", or "Followers-only - Only show to followers".
+
+Confirm your choice by clicking on "Save changes" on the upper-right.
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the "Preferences" page in Preferences.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-posts-default.webp)
+
+<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Hide posted media (slighly)</p>
+
+Additionally, you might want to check the "Always mark media as sensitive" option from the same section. This will label the media as "Sensitive content", and require others to click on it to view the image. This will **not stop anyone from clicking to view it**, including people without a Mastodon account from your account's public page, but it might *slightly* reduce the visibility for certain media.
+
+Depending on the content, your instance may have some rules requiring to hide certain type of content. Make sure to consult your instance's Server rules about this.
+
+</div>
+
+#### Quote posts
+
+Mastodon version 4.4 is already preparing for the implementation of a new [Quote Posts feature](https://blog.joinmastodon.org/2025/02/bringing-quote-posts-to-mastodon/) coming up in Mastodon 4.5. Quote posts have been long requested and debated on Mastodon.
+
+Mastodon didn't lack quote posts accidentally, it was a deliberate choice from the development team to [reduce potential abuse](https://techcrunch.com/2025/07/08/mastodons-latest-update-readies-the-app-for-quote-posts-revamps-design/). This is why the team has been very careful, taking the time to implement this new feature properly, and giving options for Mastodon users to opt out.
+
+Again, this shows how Mastodon differs from commercial social media, by prioritizing users' safety and control over monetizing attention.
+
+To give control to the users, important options have been planned out:
+
+1. People will be able to choose if they want their post to be quoted or not
+2. People will be notified when their post is quoted
+3. People will be able to **withdraw their post from being quoted** at any time
+
+These options greatly reduce the potential for abuse when quoting posts, a behavior we have sadly all witnessed on commercial social media with a culture of dunking on others.
+
+From Mastodon version 4.4, you can already decide which permission you want to allow for your posts to be quoted. This is only in preparation for the feature for now, the final implementation should be available in the [next software update](https://blog.joinmastodon.org/2025/07/mastodon-4-4-for-devs/).
+
+To adjust this in preparation, go to "Preferences" > "Preferences" > "Other". From the "Posting defaults" section, find the drop-menu labeled "Who can quote", and select either "Everyone", "Followers and mentioned users", or "Only mentioned users".
+
+Confirm your choice by clicking on "Save changes" on the upper-right.
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the "Preferences" page in Preferences.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-posts-quote-posts.webp)
+
+### Verifying yourself and others
+
+The account verification process on Mastodon is excellent. Not only is it free, but it doesn't require you to provide any official ID or other intrusive documentation to proof your identity. It is a privacy-respectful verification feature.
+
+The way it functions is very simple: Verification works by providing a *proof of control* over a website, or a web page.
+
+For example, if you are the official Mastodon account for the privacyguides.org website, you can easily add a simple invisible link to this website to confirm that this Mastodon account is official. Once the verification process is completed, the Mastodon account profile page will display a **verified link in green with a checkmark**, confirming this account is authorized by the owner of this website (or web page).
+
+From a profile page, it looks like this:
+
+![Screenshot of the Privacy Guides Mastodon account's public page. The profile page shows multiple verified links in green with a checkmark on the left, including the official Privacy Guides website, forum, articles, videos, and donation pages.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-verification-links.webp)
+
+All the links displayed in green with a checkmark have been verified from the listed website.
+
+This is **a feature very important to use for organizations**. It confirms to readers and followers this Mastodon account is authorized and truly belongs to the organization. It's also important for any individuals, writers, and journalists who want to confirm their identity to the public.
+
+Looking for these verified links, other Mastodon users can validate if an account is legitimate, increasing trust and security.
+
+#### Verification for journalists and writers
+
+In addition to the verification process available to anyone, Mastodon recently [added](https://blog.joinmastodon.org/2024/07/highlighting-journalism-on-mastodon/) a feature specifically for writers and journalists!
+
+Since last year, journalists and bloggers alike can link their articles to their Mastodon account. This validates their identity, while also increasing their Mastodon account's discoverability from article links. This is fantastic feature!
+
+Popular websites like TechCrunch, ProPublica, and of course Privacy Guides have already adopted it! You might have noticed this feature previously, for example if you found this article from a Mastodon post.
+
+#### Verifying yourself
+
+If you would like to verify your own account, here's how you can do it yourself.
+
+It's easy, and it's free!
+
+Go to "Preferences" > "Public profile", then select the "Verification" tab at the top. From there, follow the instructions to copy the link to the web page you want to use to verify your account.
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the Public profile page in Preferences, from the "Verification" tab. The page shows a link to copy containing the account's address, and a confirmation of links already verified.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-verification-link-setup.webp)
+
+If you prefer not to add a Mastodon link to your web page, you can simply add this HTML line in the web page's head section (replacing `https://YOUR_INSTANCE_ADDRESS/@YOUR_USERNAME` with the link to your own Mastodon account):
+
+```html
+<link href="https://YOUR_INSTANCE_ADDRESS/@YOUR_USERNAME" rel="me">
+```
+
+To add author attributions to your articles, scroll down the same page and simply add the provided link to each of your article's HTML page, then lists the website(s) allowed to credit you below:
+
+```html
+<meta property="fediverse:creator" content="@YOUR_USERNAME@YOUR_INSTANCE_ADDRESS">
+```
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the Public profile page in Preferences, from the "Verification" tab. The page is scrolled down to the very bottom, showing the option and instructions to add Author attribution to articles.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-verification-author-setup.webp)
+
+### Deleting and accessing your data
+
+Data deletion is a fundamental part of data privacy, and a protected right under many privacy laws.
+
+Mastodon makes data deletion effortless. You will never have to battle the insufferable BigTech™️ customer service to request your data to be deleted on Mastodon. You can control most of it just by yourself.
+
+#### Automated post deletion
+
+First, you can easily set up automatic post deletion and adjust it to your precise preferences. This is a rare feature on social media, and demonstrates once again how Mastodon prioritizes users' benefits over data monetization.
+
+To enable it, go to "Preferences" > "Automated post deletion", then check the option "Automatically delete old posts" on the upper-left. Adjust the "Age threshold" on the upper-right to anything between 1 week and 2 years.
+
+In the "Exceptions" section below, you can select a number of variables to customize post deletion. Keeping your pinned posts from being deleted is likely a good idea, for example.
+
+You can also keep the option checked to protect from deletion your own posts that you have favorited. This is very convenient to get a more granular control over automated deletion, purposefully keeping some posts while letting others getting automatically deleted.
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the Automated post deletion page in Preferences.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-deletion.webp)
+
+In the "Exceptions based on interactions" section, you can select a threshold of favorites and/or boosts to protect posts from automatic deletion.
+
+Once you have adjusted automated deletion to your preferences, click on "Save changes" on the upper-right to confirm your choices.
+
+#### Data access and backups
+
+Another important side of digital rights is access to your own data. Here again, Mastodon makes it easy. You can download a copy of your account data any time you want.
+
+For this, go to "Preferences" > "Import and export" > "Export". From there, you can request a compressed archive of all your posts and uploaded media once every 7 days. This archive will be readable by any ActivityPub-compatible software, or you can open it with any simple text software.
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the Export page in Preferences.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-export.webp)
+
+Additionally, you can download lists of your Follows, Followers, Lists, Mutes, Blocks, Domain Blocks, and Bookmarks in CSV format any time (also readable with any simple text software).
+
+Keeping a local copy of your data for regular backup purposes is a good idea in general, and also recommended before an account migration.
+
+#### Account deletion
+
+Finally, if you decide to delete your *whole* account, this is again incredibly easy. Simply go to "Preferences" > "Account" > "Account settings", and scroll down to the bottom of this page.
+
+Once you are ready to delete your data (and have downloaded the data you wish to keep), click on the "proceed here" link. Read the information from the "Account deletion" page, and enter your password when you are ready to confirm.
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the Account deletion page, from the "proceed here" link on the previous "Account" page.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-deletion-account.webp)
+
+### Blocking users and instances
+
+You have a lot of control on which information you show and see on Mastodon. Like for other social media, you can block users individually on Mastodon. But additionally, you can also block a whole instance if you aren't happy interacting with it. This, like an individual block, can benefit your privacy by restricting further who can access your posts.
+
+<div class="admonition info" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Filtering content and muting users</p>
+
+This tutorial will not discuss in details all the Mastodon features, as it focuses on privacy and security. However, it's worth mentioning briefly that there are softer options than blocking, if you simply wish not to see some content on Mastodon.
+
+First, you can use [Filters](https://docs.joinmastodon.org/user/moderating/#filters) to hide specific content or hashtags from your timelines. Second, you can [Mute](https://docs.joinmastodon.org/user/moderating/#mute) a user, temporarily or permanently. However, remember that muting a user will still allow them to see your posts. Since Mastodon 4.4, you can also now use "Remove follower" to simply remove someone from following you, without having to block them.
+
+</div>
+
+If you block a user, this person will not be able to interact with you, and will not see your posts from their account anymore. They could however still see your public and quiet-public posts from your account's public page.
+
+<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Adding a Personal Note</p>
+
+If you want to remember why you blocked (or muted) someone, you can [add a Personal Note](https://fedi.tips/what-are-notes-on-mastodon-what-does-click-to-add-note-mean-on-mastodon-profiles/) on their profile page. They will not be able to see this note, but your notes could be read by your instance's administration or moderation team. Be careful what you write there. Notes cannot be transferred during account migration at this time.
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing a user's profile page viewed from within a logged-in user interface. A yellow arrow points at the section to add a Personal Note on a user's profile page.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-personal-note.webp)
+
+</div>
+
+To block a single user, find their profile and click on the 3-dot "Menu" button on the upper-right. From the drop-menu, select "Block `USER_NAME`".
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing a user's profile page viewed from within a logged-in user interface. A yellow arrow points at the drop-menu from the profile page's "Menu" button, with the selection to Block that user.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-block-user.webp)
+
+<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Blocked users can still visit your account's public page</p>
+
+Remember that blocked accounts (and instances) might still be able to see your public and quiet-public posts outside Mastodon, by visiting your account's public page. Although, they will not be able to interact with your posts anymore.
+
+</div>
+
+#### Blocking an instance
+
+If you block an entire instance, *everyone* from this instance will stop seeing your posts, you will stop seeing theirs, and they will be removed from your followers and follows. Nobody from this instance will be able to follow you anymore, and you will not be able to follow them either.
+
+There are two ways to block a whole instance. The simplest way is to find a user from that instance and click on the 3-dot "Menu" button on their profile. From the drop-menu, select "Block domain `DOMAIN_NAME`".
+
+<div class="admonition danger" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">This blocks everyone from that instance</p>
+
+Remember this will block *everyone* using this instance at once, and you will lose *all* followers and follows you may have from this instance as well. You might not be able to recover those followers if you change your mind later.
+
+</div>
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing a user's profile page viewed from within a logged-in user interface. A yellow arrow points at the drop-menu from the profile page's "Menu" button, with the selection to Block domain the whole instance this user is from.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-block-instance.webp)
+
+Alternatively, you can even "pre-block" an instance on Mastodon. For example, many people used this method when Meta's Threads announced they would connect to the Fediverse, but didn't have any connected accounts yet.
+
+To do this, go to "Preferences" > "Import and export" > "Export", then download the "CSV" file for your "Domain blocks".
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the Export page in Preferences.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-block-domains-csv.webp)
+
+Open the `blocked_domains.csv` file as a text file, then type each domain(s) you wish to block. Use one line for each domain (if you want to block more than one). Save this file using the same filename.
+
+![Screenshot of the "blocked domains" CSV file opened with TextEdit. The file contains two different domains written on each a separate line.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-block-domains-file.webp)
+
+Back to your account, move to the "Import" section from the left-side menu. From the "Import type", select "Domain blocking list".
+
+Keep the "Merge" option on if you want to *add* new domains to block, or select "Overwrite" to replace your old list with this new list. Browse to upload the file you just modified, then click "Upload".
+
+<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Carefully verify the correct type!</p>
+
+Make sure to select "Domain blocking list" in the "Import type" or you could accidentally overwrite other important data! For safety, always save a backup of your existing data before doing any modifications like this.
+
+</div>
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the Import page in Preferences.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-block-domains-import.webp)
+
+You will be prompted to confirm. Verify the information is correct, then click "Confirm". You should see a confirmation message with "Your data was successfully uploaded and will be processed in due time". You can now leave this page.
+
+#### Reporting users
+
+Reporting users isn't necessarily directly linked to privacy and security (although it can be), but it's still an important mechanism to address the overall safety of the network.
+
+Because moderators have less resources on the Fediverse, they rely on users reporting problematic posts in order to enforce moderation policies.
+
+As a member of your instance's community, it's important to report posts violating your instance's Server rules, but it's also important not to misuse report mechanisms when there are no violations.
+
+To report a post, click on the 3-dot "More" button on the lower-right of the problematic post, then select "Report `USERNAME`".
+
+Answer the form to the best of your knowledge, and **try to be as helpful to your instance's moderation team as you can, without overwhelming them**.
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing a user's profile page viewed from within a logged-in user interface. A red arrow points at the "More" button of a post, and another red arrow points at the "Report" selection from the drop-menu.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-report.webp)
+
+<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Do not report if there are no policy violations</p>
+
+People who volunteer to moderate an instance are doing it for the community. It's important to respect their time, to stay kind, and to not abuse reporting mechanisms.
+
+Only report content that violates the policies of your instance, or theirs. Do not report users simply because you dislike their posts. There are better mechanisms to hide the content you simply dislike, such as Filters, Mutes, or Blocks.
+
+</div>
+
+### Opting out with hashtags
+
+Data privacy and user consent are principles strongly valued by the Fediverse community. Sometimes, developers trying to create tools for the Fediverse or utilizing its user data without prior explicit consent have come into conflict with these values.
+
+Unfortunately, despite how illegal it may be, there aren't many technical barriers to stop malicious actors from violating users' consent.
+
+However, many developers creating tools for the Fediverse actually *do care* about respecting these values, and want to build tools the right way.
+
+Some have implemented methods to opt in or opt out the data they collect or the tools they build. This is why you will sometimes see people adding specific hashtags in their profile biography, such as `#noindex`, `#nosearch`, `#nobot`, `#noai`, `#nobridge`, etc.
+
+Ideally, all data collection should be prohibited until users' consent is obtained, and data subjects notified (opt in default). This is obligatory by law for many jurisdictions. Sadly, many developers do not follow sound legal practices in reality, and will not seek users' consent, despite their legal and moral obligations.
+
+Adding these hashtags (and maybe others in the future) to your profile biography *might* help to opt out certain data collection and certain tools built by developers who do respect users' consent. This can effectively *reduce* data scraping, in some situations. If anything, it is at least a public statement against disrespectful (and sometimes illegal) practices.
+
+### Moving to another instance
+
+The freedom to move from one instance to another can greatly contribute to keeping Mastodon a place that puts its users first.
+
+If suddenly your instance were to implement a data scraper for its AI model to train on all your content (like so many commercial social media do now), or drastically drop moderation, you could simply move your account to another instance, one that is more respectful of your values and privacy rights.
+
+This is a feature completely absent from centralized social media. Allowing them to unleash unchecked user exploitation, knowing fully users feel trapped and somehow forced to endure the abuse on their platforms.
+
+Mastodon is protected again such abuse, by design.
+
+When investing your precious time and energy participating in a Fediverse community, you will retain your data and your agency to choose which type of administration you prefer.
+
+If you are unhappy with your Mastodon instance's management, here's how to leave for greener pastures:
+
+#### Planning your move
+
+First, plan your move properly. While moving your account is easy enough to do, there is a 30 days cooldown period in which you will not be able to move your account again. Make sure to choose your new home (instance) carefully, you will be there for *at least* 30 days.
+
+Then, you might want to inform your followers. While moving followers is done automatically, it may take a few hours before completion, and your followers might be wondering what is going on. It can be a good idea to post about it from the account you are moving away from before moving.
+
+<div class="admonition success" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Summary of the steps to follow</p>
+
+1. Save an archive of your posts (if you want)
+2. Save a copy of the six CSV files in "Export" (to import later)
+3. Choose a new instance
+4. Create a new account on your new instance (you can use the same username if available)
+5. Alias your two accounts
+6. Move your old account to the new one
+7. From your new account: Wait that your followers are all transferred
+8. From your new account: Import data and verify that everything is transferred properly
+9. From your old account: Delete your older account (if you want)
+
+</div>
+
+#### Backing up your data
+
+The first step is to back up your data. This is important both for security and to allow you to import it later to your new account (some data isn't transferred automatically).
+
+Go to "Preferences" > "Import and export" > "Export", then click the "Request your archive" purple button at the bottom.
+
+Wait for the archive to be ready (you should receive an email notification within a few minutes), then download your precious archive somewhere secure.
+
+Do not stop there!
+
+You also need to download the CSV files above to import them manually to your new account. For each line with a CSV option on the table below ("Follows", "Lists", "You mute", "You block", "Domain blocks", and "Bookmarks"), download the CSV file in a secure location. Be careful not to forget anything.
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the Export page in Preferences. The downloadable CSV files are highlighted.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-move-export.webp)
+
+<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Your posts will not be moved!</p>
+
+Unfortunately, you will not be able to import your posts to your new Mastodon account (yet).
+
+But this might change soon! The ActivityPub team is currently working on a [live online account portability protocol (LOLA)](https://swicg.github.io/activitypub-data-portability/lola) that could get added to Mastodon relatively soon. This will be a wonderful improvement to this process, and allow even more freedom and agency to Mastodon users!
+
+</div>
+
+#### Moving your account
+
+Once you have backed up your data, informed your followers, and created a new account on your instance of choice, you can start the migration process.
+
+**From your new account:** Go to "Preferences" > "Account" > "Account settings", scroll down to "Moving **from** a different account", and click on "create an account alias".
+
+In the field labeled "Handle of the old account", enter the complete handle (`@YOUR_USERNAME@YOUR_INSTANCE_ADDRESS`) of the *old* account you want to move *from*. Then click on "Create alias" at the bottom to confirm.
+
+This will not initiate the migration yet. It will only create an alias, and it is reversible.
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the Account aliases page in Preferences, from the "Moving from a different account" link on the Account settings page.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-move-account-alias.webp)
+
+**From your old account:** Go to "Preferences" > "Account" > "Account settings", scroll down to "Move **to** a different account", and click on "configure it here".
+
+Carefully read the information on this page. Enter the *complete handle* (`@YOUR_NEW_USERNAME@YOUR_NEW_INSTANCE_ADDRESS`) of the new account you want to move *to* in "Handle of the new account". Confirm with your current (old) account password on the right, then click on the "Move followers" purple button at the bottom.
+
+**This will initiate the migration process.**
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the Account aliases page in Preferences, from the "Move to a different account" link on the Account settings page.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-move-account-migration.webp)
+
+Moving all your followers to your new account might take some time, but normally should be fully completed within 24 hours.
+
+Besides waiting for your followers to migrate, you will also need to manually import your "Following list", "Bookmarks", "Lists", "Muting list", "Blocking list", and "Domain blocking list". For this, go to "Preferences" > "Import and export" > "Import".
+
+For **each** of these 6 types of data, select a type in the "Import type" drop-menu, then click on "Browse" to upload the corresponding file you have exported earlier in the [Backing up your data](#backing-up-your-data) step.
+
+Choose "Merge" on the right if you want to *add* this old data to data your already have on your new account, or "Overwrite" if you want to only keep data from your old account. Then click "Upload" below.
+
+![Screenshot of the Mastodon web interface showing the Import page in Preferences.](../assets/images/mastodon-privacy-and-security/mastodon-move-import.webp)
+
+There you go! Your Mastodon account was successfully moved from one Mastodon instance to another!
+
+## :octicons-star-16: Mastodon keeps getting better
+
+This article only presents an overview of Mastodon's features, and focuses on the features related to privacy and security. But Mastodon is so much more. It's a social platform that truly respects its community.
+
+Mastodon is genuinely mindful of its users' experiences. In comparison, commercial social media are far behind in terms of customization and respect for their users.
+
+**On Mastodon, you are not a product, you are a *person*.**
+
+Moreover, the software and community keeps growing and getting even better every year. For the next Mastodon update planned later this year, we can expect Quote Posts to be fully implemented, while respecting users' consent to have their posts quoted or not.
+
+Perhaps next year we can hope for improvement of the migration process, allowing users to also transfer their content to a new instance, thanks to the LOLA protocol. Then, we can dream of fully private direct messaging down the road, with the integration of end-to-end encryption.
+
+Once again, all these features will put Mastodon and other Fediverse software well above any commercial platforms. Keep an eye on the [Mastodon roadmap for more](https://joinmastodon.org/roadmap)!
+
+Mastodon isn't there to exploit your data and sell it to advertisers. There is no incentive to monetize you. On Mastodon, **you are a person who is part of a community**. This makes all the difference to respect your privacy rights 💛
+
+## :material-hand-heart-outline: Consider supporting Mastodon
+
+Mastodon doesn't sell your data, but it still needs money to survive and thrive. Mastodon is supported by its community!
+
+If you enjoy the platform and can contribute, consider supporting the project by:
+
+- [Donating to support Mastodon's development and operations](https://joinmastodon.org/sponsors)
+
+- Donating to your Mastodon instance (ask your administrator)
+
+- [Buying cute merch from the Mastodon organization](https://shop.joinmastodon.org/)
+
+- [Contributing to the Mastodon project on GitHub](https://github.com/mastodon/.github/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md)
+
+- [Starting your own Mastodon instance](https://docs.joinmastodon.org/user/run-your-own/)
+
+- [Talking to your friends and family about joining the Fediverse!](https://jointhefediverse.net/join)
+
+<div class="admonition info" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">More information</p>
+
+For more information on Mastodon and the Fediverse, you can visit the excellent website [Fedi.Tips](https://fedi.tips/).
+
+</div>
+
+<small aria-hidden="true">Unless credited otherwise, all screenshots from: Privacy Guides</small>

blog/posts/monero-server-using-truenas.md

@@ -0,0 +1,362 @@
+---
+date:
+    created: 2025-06-12T18:15:00Z
+categories:
+    - Tutorials
+tags:
+    - Self-Hosting
+    - Cryptocurrency
+    - TrueNAS
+authors:
+    - justin
+description: In this guide, we will walk you through setting up a very powerful Monero server on TrueNAS.
+schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle
+preview:
+  cover: blog/assets/images/monero-server-using-truenas/cover.webp
+---
+# Creating a Tricked-Out Monero Server with TrueNAS
+
+![A cover image for this post showing an illustration of a NAS and stacks of coins imprinted with the Monero logo](../assets/images/monero-server-using-truenas/cover.webp)
+
+<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Jonah Aragon / Privacy Guides</small>
+
+In this guide, we will walk you through setting up a very powerful [Monero](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/cryptocurrency/#monero) server on TrueNAS. By completing these steps, you will be able to connect to your own self-hosted Monero node with the official Monero wallet and Cake Wallet, and you will be able to connect to your own self-hosted Monero LWS server with Edge Wallet and MyMonero.<!-- more -->
+
+<div class="admonition note" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Guest Contributor</p>
+
+Please welcome Justin Ehrenhofer as a first-time guest contributor! Justin is the president of MAGIC Grants, a nonprofit which supports public cryptocurrency infrastructure and promotes privacy, and operates as Privacy Guides' [fiscal host](privacy-guides-partners-with-magic-grants-501-c-3.md). Privacy Guides does not publish guest posts in exchange for compensation, and this tutorial was independently reviewed by our editorial team prior to publication.
+
+</div>
+
+This guide assumes that you are using TrueNAS for the first time. TrueNAS is an open-source operating system that is meant to function primarily as a NAS, and it supports running arbitrary Docker apps. [MAGIC Grants](https://magicgrants.org) spent the last few months making dedicated apps on the TrueNAS store to make this setup process simpler than starting from scratch.
+
+## Advantages of Running Your Own Node
+
+Monero is a cryptocurrency with strong privacy properties by default, and it is the only cryptocurrency currently [recommended](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/cryptocurrency/) by Privacy Guides.
+
+Despite Monero's privacy protections, your wallet needs to communicate with the rest of the Monero network. There are two main options:
+
+1. Connecting to someone else's node; or
+2. Connecting to your own node.
+
+By connecting to your own node, you do not need to reveal when you are using your wallet and what transactions you send to the node operator.
+
+By following this guide, your transaction broadcasts will be protected with the Tor and/or I2P [networks](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/alternative-networks/).
+
+In short, if you *can* run your own node, you *should* run your own node.
+
+## Hardware/Software Recommendations
+
+* A spare machine (e.g., an old desktop computer) with:
+    * One or more SSDs with >100 GB of free space
+    * 4+ CPU cores
+    * 4GB+ of RAM
+    * TrueNAS already installed
+* A domain name (optional, for encrypted clearnet connections)
+
+It's possible to undercut these recommendations, but please don't do that to yourself.
+
+## What We Will Set Up
+
+All of these applications are optional. You can set up nearly any combination of these. For example, you can skip just the I2P app if you don't plan to use I2P.
+
+| Software | Description | Purpose |
+| -------- | -------- | -------- |
+| Arti | A [Tor](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/advanced/tor-overview) client written in Rust. | Connect to Tor nodes, broadcast transactions over Tor, and connect to TrueNAS apps over Tor. |
+| Java I2P | The officially distributed app to connect to the [I2P network](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/alternative-networks/#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project). | Connect to I2P nodes, broadcast transactions over I2P, and connect to TrueNAS apps over I2P. |
+| Monero Node | The officially distributed app for communicating with the Monero network. | The app provides the necessary information to send and receive Monero transactions. Most wallets (including the official Monero wallets and Cake Wallet) connect to Monero nodes. |
+| Monero-LWS | A "**L**ight**w**eight **S**erver" that allows "lightweight" wallets to send and receive Monero transactions. | Lightweight Monero wallet apps (including Edge Wallet and MyMonero) can connect to this server so that the wallet itself does not need to scan/sync Monero history; the server handles this scanning/syncing. |
+
+## Configure TrueNAS Storage
+
+We will configure storage for the Monero blockchain, and we will use default storage settings for other purposes. If you are an advanced user, you can configure the storage yourself.
+
+### Create a Monero Pool
+
+In TrueNAS, a pool is a collection of hard drives for a specific use-case. For simplicity, we will configure the entirety of a single SSD for Monero's use.
+
+1. Click **Storage**.
+2. Click **Create Pool**.
+3. Type `monero-pool` for the name. Leave encryption disabled (this will only store public blockchain data). Click **Next**.
+4. Choose the layout that you will be using. We will pick **Stripe** in this guide.
+5. Select the entire storage space for the SSD. Click **Next**.
+6. Skip all the remaining options for metadata, log, cache, spare, and dedup. Keep clicking **Next**.
+7. Finish creating the pool by clicking **Create Pool**.
+
+### Create a Monero Dataset
+
+A dataset is effectively a folder inside a pool. We will make one folder for the Monero blockchain data:
+
+1. Click **Datasets**.
+2. Click on the `monero-pool` pool.
+3. Click **Add Dataset**.
+4. Set the name to `monero-blockchain`
+5. Set the dataset preset to **Apps**.
+6. Click **Save**.
+
+![Screenshot showing the Datasets list in TrueNAS](../assets/images/monero-server-using-truenas/01-datasets.webp)
+
+Next, we will assign the ownership of that folder to the `apps` user:
+
+1. While the `monero-blockchain` dataset is selected, click **Edit** under Permissions.
+2. At the top, change the **Owner** and **Owner Group** from `root` to `apps`.
+3. Check the boxes for **Apply Owner** and **Apply Group**.
+4. Check **Apply permissions recursively**.
+5. Click **Save Access Control List**.
+
+![Screenshot showing the ACL settings for monero-blockchain](../assets/images/monero-server-using-truenas/02-edit-acl.webp)
+
+## Configure Arti (Tor)
+
+<div class="admonition example" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Experimental software</p>
+
+Arti is experimental software. At the time of writing, Arti should not be used for privacy-critical applications. Connecting to your own Monero node is "low risk" in most circumstances. However, if you have very sensitive requirements you should not use Arti until it has been tested further by the community. By using Arti today, you are helping to make Arti better!
+
+</div>
+
+1. Click **Apps**.
+2. Click **Discover Apps**.
+3. Search for `Arti`. Click on the **Arti** app.
+4. Click **Install**. This will pull up a form.
+5. Under **Hidden Services**, click **Add**. For each of the functions below that you want to support, create a new hidden service:
+    1. Monero Node (for incoming P2P connections)
+        1. Name: `monerodp2p`
+        2. App Port: `18084`
+        3. Hidden Service Port: `18084`
+    2. Monero Node (for incoming RPC (wallet) connections)
+        1. Name: `monerodrpc`
+        2. App Port: `18089`
+        3. Hidden Service Port: `18089`
+    3. Monero LWS
+        1. Name: `monerolws`
+        2. App Port: `18090`
+        3. Hidden Service Port: `18090`
+6. Leave the other settings as default. Click **Install**.
+
+You will see the Applications screen after it installs. After the Arti app shows the status as **Running**, click on the shell icon under Workloads and to the right of `arti – Running` (not `config` or `perms`).
+
+![Screenshot showing how to click the Arti shell icon](../assets/images/monero-server-using-truenas/03-arti-shell.webp)
+
+In the shell, type the command `arti hss --nickname monerodp2p onion-address`. This will return a string that ends in `.onion`. In notepad, Excel, or another app, save the `.onion` address and the service it is associated with (`monerodp2p`). You might need to copy from the shell with ++ctrl+ins++.
+
+![Screenshot showing the command and response to get the onion address](../assets/images/monero-server-using-truenas/04-arti-shell.webp)
+
+Do this again for the following two commands as well:
+
+```console
+arti hss --nickname monerodrpc onion-address
+arti hss --nickname monerolws onion-address
+```
+
+You should have three saved and unique `.onion` addresses.
+
+## Configure I2P
+
+1. Click **Apps**.
+2. Click **Discover Apps**.
+3. Search for `I2P`. Click on the **I2P** app.
+4. Click **Install**. This will pull up a form.
+5. Change the **Port Bind Mode** for **I2P HTTP Proxy Port** to `None`.
+6. Change the **Port Bind Mode** for **I2P HTTPS Proxy Port** to `None`.
+7. To the right of **Additional Ports**, click **Add**.
+8. In the newly exposed fields, set the Port Number as `4447`.
+9. In the same newly exposed fields, set the Container Port as `4447`.
+10. Leave the other settings as default. Click **Install**.
+
+![Screenshot showing the I2P installation settings](../assets/images/monero-server-using-truenas/05-i2p-install.webp)
+
+You will see the Applications screen after it installs. After the Arti app shows the status as **Running**, open a browser and direct it to the I2P configuration wizard. This is available at `<hostname>:7657`, for example `192.168.1.100:7657`.
+
+Complete the initial I2P wizard using the default settings.
+
+### Create I2P SOCKS Proxy
+
+1. Click **Local Tunnels**.
+2. Click on the I2P HTTP Proxy.
+3. Uncheck **Automatically start tunnel when router starts**.
+4. Click **Save**.
+5. To the right of the I2P HTTP Proxy, click **Stop**.
+6. Click on the I2P HTTPS Proxy.
+7. Uncheck **Automatically start tunnel when router starts**.
+8. Click **Save**.
+9. To the right of the I2P HTTP Proxy, click **Stop**.
+10. At the bottom and to the right of **New client tunnel:**, change the type in the dropdown from `Standard` to `SOCKS 4/4a/5` and click **Create**.
+    1. Set the name as `monerod`.
+    2. Check **Automatically start tunnel when router starts**.
+    3. Set the Access Point **Port** to `4447`.
+    4. Set **Reachable by** to `0.0.0.0`.
+    5. Click **Save**.
+
+### Create I2P Hidden Services
+
+There is an optional step below to reduce the hidden service tunnel length from the default of 3 to 1. This will substantially increase the reliability of the server at the cost of anonymity.
+
+However, the server's connection to the I2P network for connecting to Monero wallets and the rest of the Monero network is typically not sensitive, unless you want to completely conceal that you are running a Monero node. Thus, most users will prefer the higher performance of the shorter tunnel length.
+
+We do not recommend shortening the tunnel lengths for the I2P SOCKS Proxy (in the previous section above) on the other hand, since transaction broadcasts tend to be sensitive.
+
+1. Under **I2P Hidden Services** and to the right of **New hidden service:**, change the type in the dropdown from `HTTP` to `Standard` and click **Create**.
+    1. Set the name as `monerodp2p`.
+    2. Check **Automatically start tunnel when router starts**.
+    3. Set the target host as the server's hostname, for example `192.168.1.100`.
+    4. Set the target port as `18085`.
+    5. *Optional:* Set the Tunnel Length Option to **1 hop tunnel (low anonymity)** for better performance.
+    6. Click **Save**.
+2. Create another `Standard` hidden service.
+    1. Set the name as `monerodrpc`.
+    2. Check **Automatically start tunnel when router starts**.
+    3. Set the target host as the server's hostname, for example `192.168.1.100`.
+    4. Set the target port as `18089`.
+    5. *Optional:* Set the Tunnel Length Option to **1 hop tunnel (low anonymity)** for better performance.
+    6. Click **Save**.
+3. Create another `Standard` hidden service.
+    1. Set the name as `monerolws`.
+    2. Check **Automatically start tunnel when router starts**.
+    3. Set the target host as the server's hostname, for example `192.168.1.100`.
+    4. Set the target port as `18090`.
+    5. *Optional:* Set the Tunnel Length Option to **1 hop tunnel (low anonymity)** for better performance.
+    6. Click **Save**.
+
+You will see the three I2P Hidden Services that you configured. Under each, you will see a `.b32.i2p` address after **Destination:**. You will need to use the destination `.b32.i2p` addresses in later steps (just like the `.onion` addresses), so keep them handy.
+
+![Screenshot showing I2P Hidden Services settings](../assets/images/monero-server-using-truenas/06-i2p-settings.webp)
+
+## Configure Monero Node
+
+### Initial Setup
+
+1. Click **Apps**.
+2. Click **Discover Apps**.
+3. Search for `Monero Node`. Click on the **Monero Node** app.
+4. Click **Install**. This will pull up a form.
+5. *Optional:* Uncheck **Prune the blockchain**. This will use significantly more storage.
+6. Under **Storage Configuration** and **Blockchain storage location**, change the **Type** from `ixVolume` to `Host Path`.
+7. Under **Host Path**, use the folder picker to select the `monero-blockchain` dataset. This should usually be `/mnt/monero-pool/monero-blockchain`.
+8. *Optional:* Under **Resources Configuration**, increase the CPU resource limits to as high of a value as possible for your system. This will help the node sync faster.
+9. Leave the other settings as default. Click **Install**.
+
+#### Why not configure Tor and I2P settings to begin with?
+
+Some users may be sensitive to a privacy risk where your Tor and I2P addresses could be matched with your public IPV4 address while it is syncing. By waiting to configure these settings until after your node is already fully synced, we minimize this risk.
+
+### Check on the Sync Status
+
+It will take a day or more for most systems to fully sync the Monero blockchain from scratch.
+
+To check the status, go to the app page and click on the `monerod` app. Under Workloads and to the right of `monerod – Running`, click on the shell icon.
+
+![Screenshot showing how to click the Monero Node shell icon](../assets/images/monero-server-using-truenas/07-monero-shell.webp)
+
+Type `monerod status` and press enter.
+
+If the status reports `Height: ####/#### (100.0%) on mainnet`, then your node is fully synced. You can proceed to the next step.
+
+![Screenshot showing the Monero Node sync status command](../assets/images/monero-server-using-truenas/08-monero-shell.webp)
+
+### Add Tor and I2P
+
+After your Monero node is fully synced, click on the `monerod` app and then click **Edit**. This will bring up the same form that you configured when installing the app.
+
+1. Check **Enable Tor connections**.
+2. Set the **Tor IP** as your hostname, for example `192.168.1.100`.
+3. Set the **Tor port** as `9150`.
+4. Check **Enable inbound Tor connections**.
+5. Set the **Inbound onion address** as the `.onion` address for `monerodp2p` that you observed earlier.
+6. Check **Enable inbound I2P connections**.
+7. Set the **I2P IP** as your hostname, for example `192.168.1.100`.
+8. Set the **I2P Port** as `4447`.
+9. Check **Enable inbound I2P connections**.
+10. Set the **Inbound I2P base32 address** as the `.b32.i2p` address for `monerodp2p` that you observed earlier.
+11. If you wish to enable Monero LWS, under **ZMQ RPC Port**, change the **Port Bind Mode** from `None` to `Publish port on the host for external access`.
+12. If you wish to enable Monero LWS, under **ZMQ Pub Port**, change the **Port Bind Mode** from `None` to `Publish port on the host for external access`.
+13. Under **Tor inbound port**, change the **Port Bind Mode** from `None` to `Publish port on the host for external access`.
+14. Under **I2P inbound port**, change the **Port Bind Mode** from `None` to `Publish port on the host for external access`.
+15. Click **Update**.
+
+![Screenshot showing the Monero Node install settings](../assets/images/monero-server-using-truenas/09-monero-install.webp)
+
+## Configure Monero LWS
+
+For security reasons, the Monero LWS app only accepts requests from allowlisted Monero addresses. Requests from other users will be rejected.
+
+1. Click **Apps**.
+2. Click **Discover Apps**.
+3. Search for `Monero LWS`. Click on the **Monero LWS** app.
+4. Click **Install**. This will pull up a form.
+5. Under **Accounts**, you can add sets of allowlisted Monero wallets that will be supported by this server. Click **Add** to add a wallet. For each wallet, include the `Address`, `View Key`, and `Restore Height`. If a restore height is not provided, it will scan the entire blockchain (which is thorough but inefficient).
+6. *Optional:* Under **Resources Configuration**, increase the CPU resource limits to as high of a value as possible for your system. This will help the server scan multiple wallets faster.
+7. After you have added all the wallets, click **Install**.
+
+You can add new Monero wallets in the future by adding them to the list of accounts.
+
+## Configure Secure Clearnet Connections
+
+It is insecure to connect your wallet to your server over an unencrypted connection.
+
+If you only configure your wallet to connect to your server over its I2P or Tor addresses, then you're all set. The connection is already encrypted.
+
+There are different ways to connect to your node over an encrypted clearnet connection, each with their pros and cons:
+
+| Method | Pros | Cons |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Tor | No additional configuration necessary. Private. Secure. Reliable. | Slow for non-LWS wallets. |
+| I2P | No additional configuration necessary. Private. Secure. | Slow. Unreliable. |
+| Nginx Proxy Manager | High degree of user control. Secure. Reliable. Fast. | Requires a domain. Requires configuration. |
+| Cloudflare Tunnels | Secure. Reliable. Fast. Easy to set up. Extra security settings. | Requires a domain. Decrypted traffic is shared with Cloudflare. |
+
+### Nginx Proxy Manager (Recommended)
+
+1. Click **Apps**.
+2. Click **Discover Apps**.
+3. Search for `Nginx Proxy Manager`. Click on the **Nginx Proxy Manager** app.
+4. Click **Install**. This will pull up a form.
+5. Leave the settings as default. Click **Install**.
+
+You will see the Applications screen after it installs. After the Nginx Proxy Manager app shows the status as **Running**, open a browser to `<hostname>:30020`, for example `192.168.1.100:30020`.
+
+#### Configure Your Domain and Router
+
+You will need to create A and (optionally) AAAA records with your DNS provider that point to your public IPV4 and IPV6 IP addresses, respectively. You will then need to forward the ports in your router to your TrueNAS hostname. These steps are out of scope for this guide.
+
+#### Add Proxy Hosts to Nginx Proxy Manager
+
+From the Nginx Proxy Manager browser interface, click **Hosts**, **Proxy Hosts**, then **Add Proxy Host**. We recommend creating proxy hosts as follows:
+
+| Domain Name | Scheme | Forward Hostname / IP | Forward Port |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| `monerod-rpc.<domain>` | `http` | `<hostname>` | `18089` |
+| `monero-lws.<domain>` | `http` | `<hostname>` | `18090` |
+
+For each entry, enable **Block common exploits**.  Configure the SSL settings with **Request a new SSL Certificate**, **Force SSL** enabled, and **HTTP/2 Support** enabled.
+
+Optionally assign an access list.
+
+You should now be able to access these services using your domain!
+
+## A Note About Clearnet Networking
+
+Making clearnet connections without encryption (without SSL/TLS) is insecure. This guide uses the Nginx Proxy Manager app to configure these secure connections, but you can alternatively use another approach such as Cloudflare Tunnels, Tailscale, or WireGuard.
+
+## What About Bitcoin?
+
+Bitcoin is not recommended by Privacy Guides due to its very weak privacy properties by default. Nevertheless, MAGIC Grants has made several Bitcoin oriented applications in the TrueNAS store that you may benefit from if you need to use Bitcoin.
+
+## Test Connections
+
+We will test connections to our node over Tor using [Cake Wallet](https://cakewallet.com), [Edge Wallet](https://edge.app), and [Orbot](https://orbot.app). Make sure you have these apps installed and already have Monero wallets set up.
+
+Use **Full Device VPN** mode with Orbot for this guide.
+
+### Test with Cake Wallet
+
+Cake Wallet will connect to your Monero node. Follow [these steps](https://docs.cakewallet.com/features/advanced/tor-with-orbot/#switch-back-to-cake-wallet) to change the Monero node that Cake Wallet uses. Provide your `monerodrpc` onion address for the Monero Node app as the node address, `18089` as the port, no username, no password, and **Use SSL** unchecked.
+
+You should see a green dot next to this newly added node, and you should notice that your wallet is able to sync. Syncing performance to a Monero node over Tor is slow.
+
+### Test with Edge Wallet
+
+Edge Wallet will connect to your Monero-LWS server. In Edge Wallet, click on the upper right hamburger menu, then **Settings**, then **Asset Settings**, then **Monero**. Select **Custom Light Wallet Server** and provide your `monerolws` onion address with the port. For example, `http://monerolws.onion:18090`, replacing `monerolws.onion` with your correct onion address.
+
+Back in the main wallet overview, you should see that your Monero wallet is fully synced.

blog/posts/queer-dating-apps-beware-who-you-trust.md

@@ -0,0 +1,572 @@
+---
+date:
+    created: 2025-06-24T21:00:00Z
+categories:
+    - News
+tags:
+    - Pride Month
+authors:
+    - em
+description: At the intersection of data privacy and LGBTQ+ experiences, it's inevitable to talk about queer dating apps. Unfortunately, most are horrible for data privacy.
+schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle
+preview:
+  cover: blog/assets/images/queer-dating-apps-beware-who-you-trust/dating-cover.webp
+---
+
+# Queer Dating Apps: Beware Who You Trust With Your Intimate Data
+
+![Photo of a hand holding a phone with a rainbow gradient and a white heart on it. The hand holds the phone in front of a vertical rainbow background with an open eye displayed transparently over it, symbolizing surveillance.](../assets/images/queer-dating-apps-beware-who-you-trust/dating-cover.webp)
+
+<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Em / Privacy Guides | Photo: Surasak Ch / Unsplash</small>
+
+When discussing the intersection of data privacy and LGBTQ+ experiences, it's inevitable to also talk about queer dating apps. Due to a smaller percentage of the population and a number of factors complicating in-person dating, people part of the queer community are more likely to seek online platforms to meet lovers and friends. Unfortunately, using queer dating apps can be very dangerous for privacy, and even for safety.<!-- more -->
+
+Dating apps are generally horrible for everyone's privacy, but the queer population is at an even higher risk of harm due to discrimination, and even [criminalization in certain regions](https://www.humandignitytrust.org/lgbt-the-law/map-of-criminalisation/).
+
+Despite the risks, LGBTQ+ people still need to fulfill their social and romantic needs like anyone else.
+
+This isn't an easy task outside the online realm either. Discrimination can be much worse in physical environments that aren't specifically catering to the queer community. In some regions, this can even mean a greater risk of physical aggression.
+
+LGBTQ+ people aren't necessarily safe to date in the same ways cisgender heterosexual people are, increasing the need for safe spaces.
+
+Another important factor is that a smaller percentage of the population necessarily creates a smaller dating pool. Even if someone were to avoid entirely online services, if they aren't located in a town large enough to host LGBTQ+ venues and events, or if they live in an environment where revealing their queer identity could be unsafe to them, online spaces might be their only viable option to [find connections](stay-safe-but-stay-connected.md).
+
+Sadly, this isn't ideal. In today's world, it seems very few services (if any) are considering the importance of data privacy for dating apps seriously enough.
+
+For this reason, it is crucial to acknowledge the dangers, and learn about ways to minimize the risks, and to stay safe while looking for romantic or sexual partners online.
+
+## Dating apps are horrible for data privacy
+
+Unfortunately, whether it's dating apps catering to everyone or to a narrower segment of the population, they are pretty much *all horrible for data privacy*.
+
+Some apps might be worse than others, but at this time, there are no good, largely used, *and* privacy-respectful dating apps.
+
+Due to the nature of dating apps, a major problem is that any dating app will unavoidably collect at least some of very sensitive personal data. This can include photos, intimate photos, sexual preferences, intimate conversations, detailed physical descriptions, and likely much more.
+
+Because of this, a good privacy-respectful dating app would need to implement considerably stronger protections for this data, and obviously not share it with any third party. Regrettably, this isn't what is happening *at all*.
+
+### They collect very sensitive information, legally and illegally
+
+Necessarily, most dating apps will collect *at minimum* a nickname, email, photo, and descriptions of your personality and physical appearance. But, the majority of apps do not stop there.
+
+Most dating apps also collect your location, IP address, and phone number (a strong quasi-static identifier that can be linked to your other accounts and legal identity).
+
+Then, you might upload additional sensitive information, such as a detailed physical description, detailed personality description, health condition, religion, political views, sexual preferences, and even intimate photos in private chats. All this information is collected and stored by the dating app, and maybe even shared with third parties.
+
+According to a [report from Mozilla](https://www.mozillafoundation.org/en/privacynotincluded/articles/data-hungry-dating-apps-are-worse-than-ever-for-your-privacy/), about 25% of apps also collect metadata on uploaded content. This means that if you do not [remove metadata](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/data-redaction/) from your photos and videos (or other file types) before uploading them, the dating app could collect it. This can include very precise information on where and when a photo or video was taken, for example.
+
+Additionally, dating apps can collect a scandalous amount of information from your social media accounts if you use them to sign up with the app. Already in 2017 (this is likely much worse 8 years later into surveillance capitalism), The Guardian journalist Judith Duportail [reported](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/26/tinder-personal-data-dating-app-messages-hacked-sold) on her experience with Tinder after requesting a copy of her account data. Tinder had kept 800 pages of information on her, including Facebook likes, number of Facebook friends, Instagram photo links, ages of men she was interested in, and so on. From her experience she wrote:
+
+> What will happen if this treasure trove of data gets hacked, is made public or simply bought by another company? I can almost feel the shame I would experience.
+
+She is not alone in this. Every dating-app user is at risk of having their intimate data exposed if their account or the app's servers gets hacked, or if the company otherwise leaks or shares their data.
+
+Tragically, data breaches and companies acquisitions aren't rare occurrences. It's more a matter of "when" than "if".
+
+#### Identity verification
+
+Moreover, many apps now require to "verify identity" by requesting users to submit a video selfie, official ID, or other means of verification.
+
+This practice is intrusive at best, and straight out *dangerous* at worst. Any verification practice requiring a piece of official ID or a facial scan has the potential of endangering this data, and increases the risk of a data leak exposing your intimate dating information while being strongly linked to your legal identity.
+
+No dating app should be requiring such sensitive information. Fighting bots and fake accounts isn't worth the risk this represents to users.
+
+#### Biometric data
+
+Even for users who might be careful to choose more privacy-respectful apps, or feel protected by stronger local legislation, trust can be broken.
+
+In 2024, Bumble and Badoo settled a [class action lawsuit](https://www.the-sun.com/money/12327292/bumble-settlement-badoo-payment/) for allegedly infringing the privacy rights of users residing in Illinois US, by violating the [Biometric Information Privacy Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biometric_Information_Privacy_Act) (BIPA). The complainants alleged the apps, both owned by Bumble Inc, were capturing and storing users' facial scan biometrics it extracted from profile's content without the users' consent.
+
+While users located in Illinois were entitled to financial compensation from the [settlement](https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/closed-settlements/40m-bumble-badoo-bipa-class-action-settlement/), others located in regions with weaker local regulation didn't receive any compensation for this violation of their consent.
+
+#### Artificial intelligence features
+
+Finally, most dating services have now [integrated AI features in their platforms](https://www.platformer.news/grindr-ai-boyfriend-wingman-monetization-paid-taps/). This is dreadful for privacy.
+
+The problem with current AI features is that most will not just generate data but will also *collect* data. Once data is integrated into a model, it's incredibly difficult (if not impossible) to delete it later.
+
+Grindr's terms of service include a section specifying that, when using the platform, [you grant an irrevocable right to Grindr](https://www.grindr.com/terms-of-service) to "exploit Your User Content" to train "AI Technologies". **Your content is up for AI-grabs on Grindr.**
+
+Horrifyingly, most other dating apps aren't better.
+
+While other apps might be careful not to directly name "AI" or "training" in their terms of service, risking scaring users away, OkCupid, Hinge, and Plenty of Fish (all part of the Texas-based dating service conglomerate Match Group), describe a similar clause in their terms of service that could potentially include AI technologies training on users' content (if not already).
+
+For example, OkCupid specifies in clause 7 of their [Terms & Conditions](https://okcupid-app.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/23941864418203-Terms-Conditions) (emphasis added for clarity):
+
+> By creating an account, **you grant to OkCupid a worldwide, perpetual, transferable**, sub-licensable, royalty-free **right and license to** host, store, use, copy, display, reproduce, adapt, edit, publish, translate, modify, reformat, **incorporate into other works, advertise, distribute and otherwise make available to the general public Your Content**, including any information you authorize us to access from Facebook or other third- party sources (if applicable), in whole or in part, and **in any way and in any format or medium currently known or developed in the future.** OkCupid's license to Your Content shall be non-exclusive, except that OkCupid's license shall be exclusive with respect to derivative works created through use of our Services. For example, **OkCupid would have an exclusive license to screenshots of our Services that include Your Content.**
+
+Of course "any medium developed in the future" could include AI technologies, and/or anything else.
+
+OkCupid has already integrated AI features in users' dating experience using OpenAI's ChatGPT for its services. Michael Kaye, OkCupid's head of communications, excitedly [told Mashable](https://mashable.com/article/okcupid-chatgpt-questions) that "daters who think ChatGPT is a lifesaver get almost 40 percent more Matches on OkCupid than those who think it's too big brother".
+
+Well, perhaps users who accurately think "it's too big brother" have simply already left the app...
+
+### They can expose legal identities
+
+Besides the data privacy dangers created by integrating AI features in dating apps, [identity and age verification is another growing problem](age-verification-wants-your-face.md).
+
+Unfortunately, it seems dating apps are more concerned with fighting fake accounts than protecting users' data, and are willing to sacrifice the latter for the former.
+
+Of course, this security measure is only theatrical. Criminals will easily go around identity verification systems, while the inevitable data breaches will endanger and harm all trustworthy users at once.
+
+#### Identity verification endangers the most vulnerable
+
+Each time a dating application asks for a video selfie or an official piece of ID to prove identity or age, this data risks getting leaked and stolen later.
+
+Moreover, requiring official IDs and face scans severely harm the most vulnerable users who need [protective practices to stay safe online](stay-safe-but-stay-connected.md/#practices-and-tools-that-help-in-various-contexts), for example by using a pseudonym. This is true for victims of domestic violence, victims of online stalking, as well as for the LGBTQ+ community.
+
+Exposed legal identities, particularly in conjunction with dating data, can lead to identity theft, online harassment, doxxing, non-consensual outing, extortion, loss of employment, arrest, and even sexual and physical violence.
+
+Pseudonymity can save lives online. Fighting pseudonymity isn't fighting crime, it's [fighting against the safety](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/17416590221111827) of the most vulnerable in our society.
+
+#### Biometric data and dystopian third party
+
+Continuing this horrifying trend, Match Group has announced this spring they are partnering with the [dystopian World App](sam-altman-wants-your-eyeball.md) to start testing age verification for Tinder in Japan. The World App generates unique identifiers based on biometric iris scan.
+
+If having to scan your official ID to continue using Tinder is *bad*, having to scan your eyeball from a questionable third party app is even *worse*.
+
+This practice will start for Tinder in Japan, but it's likely the verification process could be expanded to all users of Match Group apps in the near future.  Soon, the only way to avoid having to share biometric data with the World App to continue using your favorite dating app could be to leave the app entirely.
+
+#### Payment information
+
+Finally, payment information can also create a link between your dating account and your legal identity.
+
+If you provide a credit card under your legal name to use a dating app, then this profile is inevitably linked to your legal identity.
+
+It's possible that some application *might* use third-party software to manage payments, and that this data *might* not leak associated with your dating profile. However, this depends on which payment services the dating app works with, and what the company's security practices are.
+
+### They sell users' data to data brokers
+
+Sadly, not only most dating apps collect *way too much data* they don't secure properly, but they also willingly share this data with data brokers.
+
+If you are not familiar with the [data broker industry](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/07/data-brokers-are-problem), data brokers are usually private for-profit companies that specialize in collecting personal information on everyone, using and scraping public records, social media accounts, various websites, other online sources, and any applications willing to work with them.
+
+They then make this information [available to anyone](https://gizmodo.com/alleged-minnesota-shooter-used-data-brokers-to-find-lawmakers-addresses-2000616975) for sale. They do not care about your consent nor your safety, at all.
+
+**Data brokers are the archenemy of privacy rights.**
+
+And yes, dating apps share your dating data with them. California's Privacy Protection Agency even uses dating apps in its [example](https://cppa.ca.gov/data_broker_registry/) for the Data Broker Registry it keeps:
+
+> For example, if a person signs up for a dating app, a data broker may buy all recent sign ups of that dating app from the app developer and sell the information to a gym that is looking to target potential new customers.
+
+The chosen example of a data broker selling dating app data to a gym is quite mild. As explained in the next section, [what actually happens](#hateful-groups-tracking-users) with this data if often much more grim.
+
+One type of data often [bought by data brokers](https://www.eff.org/issues/location-data-brokers) is location data. Location data can easily be used to precisely identify a user, a user's home address, a user's work address, a user's favorite venues, and a user's connections with others. **Many dating apps share location data.**
+
+In 2022, The Markup [published](https://themarkup.org/privacy/2022/01/27/gay-bi-dating-app-muslim-prayer-apps-sold-data-on-peoples-location-to-a-controversial-data-broker) the results of an investigation from a 2018-2019 sample dataset they obtained from the data broker X-Mode. The dataset compiled location data collected from 107 different apps, including the dating app Bro "for bi, gay, and open-minded men".
+
+While conducting research on apps from the Google app store in 2020, the Yale Privacy Lab uncovered several other queer dating apps selling data to X-Mode. At that time, the dating apps Wapo, Wapa, MEET MARKET, and FEM were all sharing users' location data with the same data broker.
+
+Replying to journalists, Bro App's founder confirmed that the company no longer shares users' location with X-Mode.
+
+But what other data and which other data brokers dating apps might be working with? How many other dating apps similarly share location data?
+
+Seven years after this dataset was examined, and in a world where data is being collected from users exponentially more, how many dating apps have simply normalized this practice entirely?
+
+This isn't a new problem, and this [isn't just about location data](https://www.vice.com/en/article/shady-data-brokers-are-selling-online-dating-profiles-by-the-millions/). But this problem is getting increasingly worse, and users must be properly informed on how their intimate data is used and shared.
+
+With the advancements in computer performance over the years, collecting and storing data is cheaper than ever. Corporations and governments alike are eager to access this data for advertising and surveillance purposes. The same is true for special interest and criminal groups of all kinds.
+
+**The data broker industry is thriving on exploiting our data without consent**, even in our most intimate activities.
+
+### They monetize data for advertising
+
+Data brokers and ad-tech companies are working together in similar ways to extract values from every data point they can find about you online. They feed each other in some sort of twisted exploitative synergy.
+
+Dating apps are working with them as well.
+
+In 2021, [Grindr was fined](https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-59651703) €6.5m by the Norwegian Data Protection Authority for sharing users' data without prior explicit consent. The data shared with advertisers included age, gender, advertising ID, IP address, GPS location, and the fact that someone used Grindr. This makes the data even more sensitive, potentially revealing a user's sexual orientation (which is a special category under the [GDPR Article 9](https://gdpr-info.eu/art-9-gdpr/)).
+
+Last year, Grindr was sued for allegations of [sharing users' HIV status](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj7mxnvz42no) with advertisers, in violation of UK's data privacy laws. Two years before, Grindr was [reprimanded](https://ico.org.uk/media2/migrated/4023128/grindr-reprimand.pdf) by the UK's Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) for its data protection (mal)practices.
+
+In 2020, the CPO Magazine [reported](https://www.cpomagazine.com/data-privacy/many-of-the-major-dating-apps-are-leaking-personal-data-to-advertisers/) about tests conducted by the Norwegian Consumer Council that found some of the most popular dating apps sharing sensitive personal information with advertisers. Tinder, Grindr (again), and OkCupid were all found to share age, gender, device information, IP address, and GPS location with advertising and analytics platforms owned by Google, Facebook, Twitter (X), Amazon, and more.
+
+Worse, it was also found that some of these apps sometime shared users' data related to their sexual orientation and dating interests. OkCupid even shared users data related to drug use and political views.
+
+The same year, Tinder announced a partnership with the app Noonlight to implement a "panic button" feature to connect users with help in case of emergency. This seems great at first, but the problem is, it is yet another app that hasn't done its privacy homework properly to protect users. Gizmodo [found](https://gizmodo.com/tinders-new-panic-button-is-sharing-your-data-with-ad-t-1841184919) the partnering app was sharing users' data with major ad-tech businesses *every minute*, including with Facebook and Google.
+
+Even your safety is being monetized and shared with Facebook.
+
+### They don't safeguard data properly
+
+In addition to collecting and monetizing a *large* amount of very sensitive data on every user, many dating apps have the unfortunate tendency to not take securing this data seriously enough.
+
+Data breaches and leaks of all sorts are rampant with dating apps. Assume all data you upload there might become public, sooner than later. If you are not out publicly, be aware **a dating app data breach could out you against your will**.
+
+Here are a few examples of past incidents:
+
+- 2025: [Grindr, Tinder data breach](https://techcrunch.com/2025/01/13/gravy-analytics-data-broker-breach-trove-of-location-data-threatens-privacy-millions/?guccounter=1)
+
+- 2025: [Translove, Pink, Brish data leak](https://cybernews.com/security/ios-dating-apps-leak-private-photos/)
+
+- 2025: [Gay Daddy data leak](https://cybernews.com/security/gay-daddy-ios-app-exposes-users/)
+
+- 2025: [Raw data leak](https://techcrunch.com/2025/05/02/dating-app-raw-exposed-users-location-data-personal-information/)
+
+- 2025: [Headero data leak](https://beyondmachines.net/event_details/headero-dating-app-leaks-data-exposing-4-million-user-records-5-n-4-z-a/gD2P6Ple2L)
+
+- 2023: [Coffee Meets Bagel data breach](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coffee-meets-bagel-says-recent-outage-caused-by-destructive-cyberattack/)
+
+- 2023: [419 Dating, Meet You, Speed Dating App For American data leak](https://ciso.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/data-breaches/dating-app-that-claims-50-million-users-suffer-data-breach/101910331)
+
+- 2021: [MeetMindful data breach](https://www.zdnet.com/article/hacker-leaks-data-of-2-28-million-dating-site-users/)
+
+- 2019: [Coffee Meets Bagel data breach](https://www.independent.co.uk/tech/coffee-meets-bagel-dating-app-hack-a8781176.html)
+
+- 2019: [Heyyo data leak](https://www.zdnet.com/article/heyyo-dating-app-leaked-users-personal-data-photos-location-data-more/)
+
+- 2019: [MobiFriends data breach](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/data-breach-exposes-four-million/)
+
+These are only a few examples, and from all the examples of data exposure out there, it's important to remember these are likely only *a fraction* of the data breaches truly happening. The small fraction that actually gets detected and reported.
+
+While nothing is ever 100% secure, **application developers must do much more** to protect users data adequately.
+
+The constant news about data breaches and leaks is demonstrating how better security and better privacy is urgently needed, especially for such sensitive information.
+
+### They can make deleting data difficult
+
+One excellent practice every dating app should adopt is data minimization. Applications should only require users to *provide the absolute minimum* information necessary to run the service.
+
+Then, as soon as this data is no longer required, data should be *thoroughly and permanently deleted*. For example, data should be *thoroughly deleted* when a user deletes it on their end, officially requests to have their data or their account deleted, or when an account becomes inactive after a certain period of time.
+
+This practices greatly reduces the risk of data breaches and leaks, and releases the company from this legal responsibility. **You cannot endanger the data you do not have.**
+
+Every organization and software developer *should* follow the [wise advice](https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/03/data_is_a_toxic.html) from renown cryptographer Bruce Schneier, and treat data like it's a toxic asset.
+
+#### Data retention practices
+
+It's difficult to know for sure for how long certain dating apps retain data behind the scene. Many lack transparency about their data retention practices.
+
+Data retention periods should always be the shortest possible to provide the service. Sadly, many businesses might be tempted to retain it for much longer, especially in the age of AI-training datasets.
+
+#### Data deletion practices
+
+Additionally, not all dating apps have adopted proper data deletion practices.
+
+The ideal practice is to empower users to be able to delete the data they wish to delete from within their account (e.g. being able to delete one message or one conversation). But also, companies should provide an option to request a *complete* and *permanent* account and data deletion from within the account, *without requiring additional information* from a user, and without requiring to email the company.
+
+Many applications have implemented data deletion processes similar to the model described above to manage user's requests, but not all of them (yet).
+
+Of course, organizations *must* also follow through, and *properly* delete this data in the *backend* as well as in the frontend.
+
+This has important legal implications, because even for organizations lacking transparency and honesty, users could soon find out the truth in the next data breach. If the data was not fully deleted after a deletion request was made, this could have *severe* legal and financial consequences.
+
+#### Investigating an app's data deletion process *before* creating an account
+
+Unfortunately, some dating apps seem to have neglected this important process in their relationship with users.
+
+Some applications and services are requiring *more* data to submit a data deletion request than what was even required to create the account in the first place. **This is bad.**
+
+Despite being rated the best (or perhaps the "least bad") on [Mozilla's Privacy Not Included chart](https://www.mozillafoundation.org/en/privacynotincluded/categories/dating-apps/), the queer dating app Lex seems to require users to fill a *Google Form* that mandates providing first and last name, date of birth, email, phone number, and even a *home address*. One of the form seems to imply an official piece of ID might also be required. This is *extremely* intrusive.
+
+Moreover, this practice would be directly sharing this personal information *with Google,* outing that this person (with this legal name, and at this home address) is queer and uses or used Lex.
+
+Google Forms aren't a private way to share sensitive data. This isn't a great data privacy practice, to say the least.
+
+It's also [unclear](https://help.lex.lgbt/article/69-how-can-i-delete-my-data) if Lex respond to data deletion requests from users located outside the protection of the GDPR (Europe) or the CCPA (California US) at all. Despite a number of regions worldwide benefiting from privacy laws granting rights similar to the [GDPR's Article 17](https://gdpr-info.eu/art-17-gdpr/).
+
+Even if you have been careful to provide only minimal information when creating your account, it seems a simple data deletion request once you are done using the app would require you to share all this *extremely sensitive and identifying information* with Lex (and Google!).
+
+At the time of this article's publication, Lex's current [privacy policy](https://help.lex.lgbt/article/51-privacy-policy) links to these two forms required from users to fill for [GDPR's Right to Erasure requests](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdhK2fkBounO1PeN75s7OU0Ey1tmMpGEQYd9lD8EQWAH8DPKA/viewform) and [CCPA's Right to Delete requests](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScz7bDrVbjvB4uSiWjJky0JeePyv4Q-g3Cejz6pCCHiXlUEVw/viewform).
+
+It goes without saying that you shouldn't email a copy of your passport to anyone, and you should never have to provide *more* information than the app already has on you to get your data deleted. This is especially true if all the data mentioned above gets shared with a third-party advertising company like Google, through the use of Google Forms.
+
+Privacy Guides has reached out to Lex for clarification on its data deletion practices, but has not received any response at the time of this publication. This article will be updated with new information once we receive an answer.
+
+Before creating an account with a dating app (or any other app for that matter), it's important to find information on what will be the process to delete your data and account once you are done with the app.
+
+That way, you can choose to only use applications that will thoroughly respect your privacy rights, and your rights to delete your own data.
+
+## Queer dating apps can be targeted
+
+At this time, almost all popular dating apps are *horrible* for data privacy. But queer dating apps (or queer people using any dating app) are especially vulnerable targets for malicious actors.
+
+Unfortunately, hateful groups, criminals, and even governments have been weaponizing dating apps to harass, exploit, arrest, or even attack queer people.
+
+Dating app companies are partly responsible for facilitating this harm by selling users' data to data brokers and advertisers, and by repeatedly missing opportunities for improvements to secure their users' data.
+
+Additionally, each time there is a new dating app data leak, whether from negligence, incompetence, greed, or malice, this leak risks [outing people against their will](importance-of-privacy-for-the-queer-community.md/#being-outed-against-ones-will). This alone can have devastating consequences, from feeling violated to getting arrested, or even killed.
+
+In Morocco, where being gay is still illegal, a social media influencer [asked](https://www.levantx.com/series-source/violence-in-lockdown-sofia-talouni-and-gay-male-outings-in-morocco-under-covid) people in 2020 to join dating apps to out gay men around them. This resulted in a violent online harassment campaign with many gay men being outed against their will, chased from their homes, shunned by their family, and horrifyingly even led to some suicides.
+
+Regrettably, even in countries where being queer is legal and generally accepted, [targeted harassment](privacy-means-safety.md/#trans-and-queer-activists) and attacks can happen.
+
+For people who aren't out publicly, data revealed about their dating life could potentially out them immediately. But even for people who are out publicly, making details about their dating life public could trigger online hate, targeted harassment, and endanger them in many ways.
+
+Queer dating apps have an even greater responsibility to protect their users' data.
+
+Data related to one's sexual orientation is categorized as especially sensitive information by many privacy laws, generally requiring additional protections. For example, GDPR's [Article 9](https://gdpr-info.eu/art-9-gdpr/) specifies special conditions for handling data related to a "person's sex life or sexual orientation".
+
+Companies and software developers must take this responsibility much more seriously.
+
+### Hateful groups tracking users
+
+In 2023, the Washington Post [revealed](https://www.pcmag.com/news/a-catholic-group-spent-millions-on-dating-app-data-to-out-gay-priests) that an American Catholic group based in Colorado had bought data brokers datasets from queer dating apps.
+
+The religious group spent millions of dollars to access data from Grindr, Scruff, Growlr, Jack'd, and OkCupid in an attempt to out gay and bisexual priests. The group used these datasets to cross-reference locations with church residences. This level of hate and insidious spying seems quite ungodly.
+
+Tragically, dating apps selling users' data to brokers and advertisers makes this type of targeting by hateful groups easily accessible to anyone willing to pay.
+
+### Governments and authorities prosecuting users
+
+In countries where homosexuality and transgender people are criminalized, even governments are guilty of these cruel practices.
+
+In 2017, Human Rights Watch [reported](https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/01/south-koreas-military-sodomy-law-should-go) allegations of the South Korean army cracking down on gay service members using published screenshots from dating app chats. Although homosexuality isn't illegal for civilians in South Korea, same-sex intercourse is illegal in the military. This oppressive rule is aggravated by the fact that South Korean men are [obligated to enroll](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGBTQ_rights_in_South_Korea) for a mandatory period of service under the conscript system.
+
+In 2018, organization Article 19 [completed](https://www.article19.org/resources/apps-arrests-abuse-egypt-lebanon-iran/) an investigation on the risk of dating apps usage by the LGBTQ+ community in Egypt, Lebanon, and Iran. The report demonstrates how authorities in Egypt used the geolocation feature of dating apps to entrap and arrest gay and transgender users.
+
+In 2022, Article 19 supported another report [focusing](https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Digital-Crime-Scenes-Report-3.pdf) on the persecution of queer people in Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia. The report explains how authorities in these regions used dating apps to set up trap meetings with users, and to collect digital "evidences" to charge queer users.
+
+In 2025, Human Rights Watch [published](https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/26/uganda-anti-lgbt-law-unleashed-abuse-0) a report documenting the actions of authorities in Uganda following the 2023 enactment of the Anti-Homosexuality Act. In addition to spreading misinformation and hatred against LGBTQ+ people, leading to harassment and attacks, authorities have started to use dating apps to extort, entrap, and arrest queer people.
+
+Sadly, if LGBTQ+ rights continue to regress like we have observed in the past months, this sort of government-sanctioned persecution might even become normalized in the UK and the US as well.
+
+### Criminals blackmailing and attacking users
+
+Along with hateful groups and authoritarian regimes, criminals are also targeting the queer community on dating apps. This type of crime is exponentially worse for users located in regions where being queer is criminalized, but it is still a danger for anyone worldwide.
+
+Criminals have been [targeting](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/lgbtq-plus-community-warned-of-extortionists-abusing-dating-apps/) users on queer dating apps for extortion scams. According to a report from the US Federal Trade Commission, criminals pose as potential dates sending explicit photos, then request users to reciprocate. If they get a reply, they blackmail the victim under threat of revealing this information. This type of extortion can have devastating consequences.
+
+Dating apps are worsening this problem when requesting users to provide legal identification such as facial scans, official IDs, or home addresses. If this information leaks in the future, criminals will have an even easier time to extort and attack their victims, regardless of if they're still on the app or not.
+
+## Reducing the risks when using dating apps
+
+Despite how bad dating apps are for your privacy (and maybe also your safety), your social, sexual, and romantic needs are important to consider as well.
+
+The best alternative for your data privacy is probably to favor in-person meetups and venues, whenever possible.
+
+However, if this isn't accessible to you, and you decide using a dating app is worth the risks, here are a few things to keep in mind that can help to improve your privacy and to reduce the dangers when using a dating app.
+
+### Investigating before creating an account
+
+Before creating an account on a dating app (or any other apps), it's a good idea to take a look at its privacy policy (or privacy notice) and terms of service.
+
+#### Researching privacy policy and terms of service
+
+Most people *hate* doing this, but it can really help to discern which apps are better than others.
+
+You don't have to read it all, but make sure to at least check the sections on what data they collect, with whom they share it, and how they use it.
+
+Important pro-tip: Using your browser, search the page for an "@" sign to verify if the privacy policy includes a contact email address. It *should* have one. Sometimes, it will be a link to a contact page instead. If you cannot find any way to contact anyone at this organization by email, be suspicious.
+
+If you decide to use this dating app, keep a local copy of its privacy policy and terms of service using the "Save to PDF" function from your browser. This *can* help legally by keeping a proof in time of what were the terms when you signed up (of course, they might change later, but that's a start).
+
+#### Investigating usage of AI systems
+
+Look in the privacy policy and terms of service for any mention of AI systems. Sometimes, it's not named directly and might be called something else like "automated system" or other expressions.
+
+Be especially vigilant to check if the company **might use your content data to train these systems**. Make sure you have a way to at least opt out, or deactivate of any such training. AI systems training on your data is *atrocious* for your privacy.
+
+#### Confirming data deletion processes and retention periods
+
+Again usually through the app's policies, look at what the process will be when you'll want to get your data and account with this app fully deleted.
+
+This is important because deleting your data once you are done using the app will greatly improve your data privacy and security, by protecting it from potential data breaches and undisclosed usage in the future (if the deletion is done thoroughly).
+
+Additionally, deleting your data and account once you no longer need it minimizes the risk of an abandoned-account takeover by a criminal.
+
+When you abandon an account without closing it and deleting its data properly, criminals might break in and start using your account and data without your knowledge. The longer the account sits there, the greater the risk.
+
+Make sure the app describes a clear process you can manage yourself *from within* the account to fully delete your data and account, and that **it doesn't require more information** to delete your account than you had to provide to create it in the first place.
+
+#### Evaluating reputation from history of data breaches
+
+Finally, conduct a short research on the history of security practices for this dating app.
+
+Look for trustworthy third-party reviews and information about the app. Always assume information and promises from the company itself are biased.
+
+Check the news for reports of data breaches and leaks. Checks what security researchers and privacy professionals have to say about this app. Make sure to find trustworthy sources, and remain vigilant about AI-generated articles and review articles that are advertising in disguise.
+
+### Choosing a dating app
+
+As stated at length in this article, there aren't any *good* dating apps for your privacy, sadly. There are only "slightly less horrible" dating apps.
+
+For more details on each, you can take a look at Mozilla's [Privacy Not Included chart](https://www.mozillafoundation.org/en/privacynotincluded/categories/dating-apps/) for dating apps. Check the details for each app you are interested in, not just the rating. However, keep in mind that even Lex, the first app listed there, doesn't seem to have great practices in regard to [data deletion](#investigating-an-apps-data-deletion-process-before-creating-an-account), and you might be unable to delete your account data fully if you decide to use this app. This might also be the case for some other apps listed there.
+
+Alternatively, there are a few free dating apps that might offer a different approach with open source code. Applications that are open-source have the benefit of full transparency to examine its code, and potentially detecting any undisclosed data collection.
+
+That being said, open-source applications aren't magically secure, and don't necessarily grant better privacy either. But code transparency helps to audit the application, and to detect any false claim related to privacy and security. The German dating app Alovoa is an example of this. You can take a look at its [code](https://github.com/Alovoa/Alovoa/) on GitHub.
+
+However, the downside of any dating app that isn't massively popular is it will have fewer users, possibly making finding matches more difficult.
+
+Nevertheless, using a niche dating app that fits better your values *could* potentially increase the chances of finding a match that also fit better your values.
+
+Specifically to data privacy however, privacy-conscious people looking for a date online might have to wait for a truly privacy-respectful app to be developed, and to get more popular in the future.
+
+### Minimizing the data shared
+
+When using any dating app, you should always be careful with the information you share, not just for data privacy, but also for your physical safety.
+
+Using a dating app still means talking with a lot of strangers online, and these strangers might have different intentions and goals than yours.
+
+Of course, to find genuine matches, you also do need to share at least some information about yourself, and you shouldn't lie to potential partners.
+
+The idea isn't to use fake information, the idea is simply to *minimize* the information you share, to increase your data privacy with the app, and your safety when interacting with strangers.
+
+Once you have developed a certain level of trust with a dating app match, then you can [move to safer channels](stay-safe-but-stay-connected.md/#private-messaging-one-on-one-and-group-chats) to share more with them (if you wish) in a more secure and more private environment. You could share your Signal username with them to chat in an end-to-end encrypted environment, for example.
+
+<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">Warning: Only share when you fully trust!</p>
+
+Remember that there will be no content moderation in this end-to-end encrypted environment, because it is *truly private*. You should **never share any intimate details with someone you do not trust fully**, even on Signal (or any other end-to-end encrypted apps).
+
+</div>
+
+#### Sign up credentials
+
+When signing up for a dating app, **never use a social media account**. Many applications now gives the option to sign up or sign in using your Google, Facebook, or Instagram account.
+
+While this might seem convenient at first, it allows the applications to exchange data, and this is *incredibly bad for your privacy*.
+
+Instead, always sign up for a dating service using new credential information that you have not used anywhere else before (new username, new email, new password). This will reduce the risk of your other accounts being linked with your dating app data, and vice versa.
+
+#### Email address
+
+To use a unique email address, you might want to create a proxy address known as an alias.
+
+Email aliasing is a great technique to improve your privacy online. It allows you to register for services using a unique email address for each. You can also use these unique email addresses to give to your dating prospects to communicate with them. For email aliasing, SimpleLogin is a great service that we [recommend](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/email-aliasing/).
+
+#### Phone number
+
+Using a unique phone number is much more complicated, unfortunately.
+
+From some countries, you might be able to find a trustworthy phone number proxy service, but those aren't always accepted to sign up for new accounts.
+
+Generally, it's much harder to use proxy for a phone number, and account requiring phone numbers to sign up aren't the best for privacy.
+
+A phone number is an identifier that most people rarely change, and that is strongly attached to your legal identity. If this data leaks in the future, your dating data could be linked to your legal identity, and to your other accounts in all sorts of ways.
+
+Additionally, using a phone number or a verification code sent to your phone through SMS to log in makes your account vulnerable to [SIM swap attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam). Avoid apps that are requiring a phone number to sign up if you can.
+
+If you absolutely cannot avoid it, then consider getting a secondary phone number on a spare phone that you only use for dating.
+
+#### IP address
+
+Your IP address is an identifier attached to the internet service you use, and can reveal your location (more or less accurately). Additionally, an IP address can potentially reveal your legal identity, and be linked to your other internet activities.
+
+Any online services and websites you use and visit will know your IP address, including dating apps.
+
+To protect from this, you would need to use a [trustworthy Virtual Private Network (VPN)](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/) provider. However, know that using a VPN is only a transfer of trust, from your Internet Service Provider (ISP) to your VPN provider.
+
+If using a queer dating app could be dangerous in your country, keep in mind that your VPN provider would know you have visited one. You would need additional protections to go around this, such as using a service like [Tor](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/advanced/tor-overview/) (which might not be possible with some services).
+
+Moreover, some dating services might not allow connection from a VPN server at all, or could trigger additional security checks and requirements to log in.
+
+#### Mobile app permissions
+
+After installing a dating app on a mobile device, make sure to go through your phone's settings to disable all the permissions you can.
+
+Keep it at the absolute *minimum* required for you to use the app. **Don't give permissions for the app to access your contacts or photos.**
+
+If enabled by default, disable accesses. Also disable accesses to your location, if you do not use this feature with the app. Ideally, enter your broad location instead (e.g. city only), and never allow precise geolocation from your phone.
+
+#### Privacy settings and opting out
+
+Before adding any information to your dating profile, go through the app's settings to select the strongest options available to protect your privacy.
+
+Sometimes, apps make it hard to find where to opt out data sharing and AI training, but *be persistent* and look everywhere you can. This is worth the effort!
+
+#### Account security
+
+Securing your account is also important to protect your privacy. If you do not use a [strong and unique password](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/passwords-overview/), a criminal could easily snoop in or even takeover your account.
+
+In addition to choosing a long, complex, and unique password, make sure to enable multifactor authentication. Ideally, use an [authenticator app](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/multi-factor-authentication/) or [security key](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/security-keys/) for this.
+
+If the only option you have is to enable multifactor authentication with a phone number, *and you have already signed up for the app using a phone number*, then this is better than nothing. If you have *not* signed up with the app using a phone number, then it might be better to not use this at all. It's preferable to not give your phone number to the app, if you can avoid it.
+
+#### Name, nickname, and full name
+
+Be careful with the name you choose to publish. Avoid sharing your last name with anyone until you have met them, trust them, and are discussing on safer channels with them.
+
+Perhaps only use a nickname on the app, your fist name only, or a shortened version of your name if you can. **Do not lie, but avoid providing your complete legal identity from the app.**
+
+#### Photos and videos
+
+For photos, try to keep an awareness of whom will be able to see them. Some apps make your main profile picture visible to the entire internet!
+
+If this is true for the app you use, perhaps choose a photo hiding your features a little as your main photo. Then, add more detailed photos inside your profile, if photos have more restricted visibility there.
+
+No matter which photos you upload in a dating app, **do not ever use the same photos you have used on social media!**
+
+This could allow *anyone* to cross-reference your dating profile with your social media accounts using this photo (or other accounts and websites where you used the same photo). Depending on your situation, this can be incredibly dangerous.
+
+Ideally, only upload photos on the dating app that are new, or that you have only used with dating services.
+
+Additionally, be extremely careful about which *other* information is visible in the photos you share.
+
+Remain mindful of anything that could identify your home or work location, such as street signs, bus stops, street addresses, city landscapes, etc. Pay special attention to reflections in glasses, windows, mirrors, and other reflective surfaces.
+
+#### Photo metadata
+
+Furthermore, make sure to **[remove the metadata](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/data-redaction/)** from the photos and videos you want to upload, *before* you uploaded them in the dating app.
+
+Photo metadata can reveal a lot about you. This includes device models as well as the precise date, time, and geolocation where a photo was taken, or a video was filmed. Any metadata attached to images and videos uploaded to the app, is likely to be collected by the app.
+
+#### Intimate photos
+
+Finally, if you trust a match enough to start sharing more intimate pictures, consider the dating app might not be the safest space for this.
+
+Dating apps do not use end-to-end encryption, and *all* the data you upload there can be accessed by the company, and could be stolen in a data breach. Some dating apps were already [called out](https://www.techradar.com/pro/security/major-dating-app-data-breach-may-have-exposed-1-5-million-private-user-images-online) for this earlier this year.
+
+Moreover, keep in mind that criminals are regularly hunting for victims on dating apps, requesting intimate pictures for [nefarious purposes](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cyvjy0871dqo). Students and younger people are a growing target for extortion, [sextortion](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01639625.2024.2317904), and even [sex trafficking](https://www.investigatewest.org/investigatewest-reports/a-washington-teen-was-trafficked-by-a-man-she-met-on-tinder-she-says-two-years-later-shes-still-waiting-for-justice-17706687) on dating apps.
+
+*Always* keep in mind this risk when sharing intimate photos and videos with someone, *even on end-to-end encrypted platforms*.
+
+#### Private conversations
+
+When chatting in private with matches, remember that this conversation might not be as private as it feels.
+
+As explained above, the company can technically still **read and collect all of your private conversations**, and this data could also leak in a data breach.
+
+Additionally, nothing prevents anyone you are talking with from taking screenshots and publishing this information online. Unfortunately, this despicable practice isn't that uncommon.
+
+Make sure you trust the person you are chatting with enough before sharing any details that strongly identifies you, your location, or your work location. Consider moving to safer encrypted channels when the conversation becomes more personal.
+
+<div class="admonition info" markdown>
+<p class="admonition-title">A note on anonymity</p>
+
+Keep in mind that all these measures will *not* make you completely anonymous on a dating app.
+
+It will only *reduce* the data you expose to the company and its advertisers, to potential data breaches and leaks, as well as to criminal and governmental non-consensual accesses.
+
+Achieving total anonymity online is very difficult. But following these privacy-enhancing practices will effectively help to reduce the risks, and keep you safer online.
+
+</div>
+
+## Let's hope for better dating apps in the future
+
+It's disheartening to discuss a topic such as dating apps when the reality is there **aren't any good alternatives** to propose.
+
+Dating *offline* is the best data privacy-preserving solution so far, but dating apps, moreover queer dating apps, exist for a reason: It's hard to find occasions to meet people to date in-person these days.
+
+Many opportunities for this have slowly disappeared from our society in the past years. Online dating does provide a solution to meet people looking to date as well.
+
+The even sadder truth is, technically, we *could* have great privacy-respectful dating apps.
+
+However, the for-profit business model of most applications (not just dating apps) has incentive everyone to share and monetize users' data in horribly intrusive and abusive ways. This isn't a problem limited to dating apps.
+
+Nonetheless, dating apps should be built with much greater protections for users' privacy. The unavoidable sensitive data they collect warrants exemplary security and privacy measures.
+
+Let's hope that one day we will see a trustworthy dating-app developer come with a *truly* privacy-respectful dating app. One that uses serious security measures, data minimization practices, proper data deletion processes, code transparency, honest and complete policies, fully end-to-end encrypted private chat, and that doesn't sell nor share users' data with anyone.
+
+Until then, stay safe out there. And keep in mind your privacy and safety when using queer dating apps.
+
+## Additional resources
+
+### Helplines
+
+If you are feeling isolated, depressed, or suicidal, do not hesitate to reach out for help. These helplines are here to listen:
+
+- [Mindline Trans+ (UK)](https://www.mindinsomerset.org.uk/our-services/adult-one-to-one-support/mindline-trans/): Confidential support helpline for people who identify as trans, agender, gender-fluid or non-binary.
+
+- [Trans Lifeline Hotline (US and Canada)](https://translifeline.org/hotline/): Trans peer support (Phone number US: 877-565-8860 / Canada: 877-330-6366)
+
+- [Suicide & Crisis Helpline (US and Canada)](https://988lifeline.org/): General support 24/7 (Phone number: 988)
+
+- [Suicide & Crisis Helpline (International)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_suicide_crisis_lines): List of suicide crisis lines around the world.
+
+### International advocacy
+
+- [Amnesty International](https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/discrimination/lgbti-rights/): Human rights organization running campaigns to protect and uphold the rights of LGBTI people globally.
+
+- [Human Rights Watch](https://www.hrw.org/topic/lgbt-rights): Human rights non-profit who documents and exposes abuses based on sexual orientation and gender identity worldwide, and advocate for better protective laws and policies.

blog/posts/you-can-say-no.md

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+---
+date:
+    created: 2025-06-17T18:00:00Z
+categories:
+    - Opinion
+authors:
+    - em
+description: |
+    Sometimes, it can feel like our data is collected completely outside of our control or consent. But we still have a powerful weapon to fight back: The power to say no.
+schema_type: Opinion
+preview:
+  cover: blog/assets/images/you-can-say-no/no-cover.webp
+---
+
+# You Can Say NO
+
+![Black and white cutout photos of two hands over a blue background. One hand does an offering gesture and the other one a refusing gesture. The word "No!" is printed in the middle.](../assets/images/you-can-say-no/no-cover.webp)
+
+<small aria-hidden="true">Photo: Gabby K / Pexels</small>
+
+In the age of facial recognition and age verification, it might feel like our data is being harvested left and right, completely outside our control or consent. Yet, we still have a powerful weapon to fight back against surveillance: The power to say no.<!-- more -->
+
+The power to say no is one we severely underutilize. Of course, there are circumstances where it can be difficult (impossible even!) to refuse. Saying no can come at a cost, but this isn't true everywhere, and (more importantly) that cost might be worth paying.
+
+There are many occasions where we could indeed refuse to comply with privacy-invasive requests, but miss the opportunity.
+
+However, it is vital as a community and as individuals that we exercise this right every time we possibly can, if we want to stand a fighting chance against the normalization of mass surveillance.
+
+## Why people surrender
+
+Many people agree to privacy-invasive requests despite feeling uncomfortable about it. They might not necessarily agree as much as *not refuse*, but the result is the same. There are many factors responsible for this:
+
+### Time pressure
+
+Sometimes, when a new request is rushed, people do not have sufficient time to evaluate the consequences of saying yes or no.
+
+It's hard to make an informed decision when we get suddenly asked by a polite cashier "can I have your postal code?", or some airport worker instructing us to "just stand in line here to have your photo taken". We might get caught off guard and simply not process what is really happening.
+
+When we do not have enough time or energy to properly evaluate the consequences of data collection, our default response should always be no. It's much easier to add data later on if needed, than to delete it.
+
+### Default pressure
+
+Other times, we might not even know we have a right to object.
+
+There are so many instances in privacy where data collection is presented to us as just the normal way to proceed, without informing us properly about our other options. Of course, this is often by design, because people might never accept such intrusive practices otherwise.
+
+For privacy consent, like for any other types of consent, it's important to remember that lack of an explicit and informed yes should equal to a no.
+
+When we do not have sufficient information about why this data is collected and how it will be processed, our default response should always be to ask if there is an option to opt out or refuse.
+
+### Peer pressure
+
+Then, there's the peer pressure when everyone else is doing it.
+
+Everyone else is on this platform, it must be okay. Everyone else has agreed to being recorded during this meeting, it must be okay. Everyone else is sharing a photo of their face, it must be okay. Everyone else is scanning their irises, it must be okay.
+
+Do not get duped by popularity. Sometimes, the most popular things people are doing are the worst things to do. Even if it can be really hard to resist peer pressure and to swim against the tide, it's important to make informed decisions free from the influence of trends.
+
+When we know a service, platform, or product doesn't respect our privacy rights, we should feel proud to take a stand and refuse to use it ourselves, even if everyone else uses it (for now).
+
+Whether it's because we have been pressured in time, pressured by peers, or simply because we did not know we could say no, it is crucial we take the time to reflect on this preventively, in order to be prepared to say no the next time we have a chance to.
+
+## There are consequences for saying no, but worse ones for saying yes
+
+Unquestionably, saying no isn't free from consequences.
+
+When refusing to provide an official ID to recover an account, we might lose that account. When refusing to provide biometric data to register, we might lose the opportunity to use this service. When refusing to participate in a privacy-invasive social media, we might lose friends who don't want to contact us using privacy-respectful platforms instead.
+
+But what are the consequences for saying yes?
+
+If we say yes all the time, even when we clearly have an option to object, to report, or to refuse to participate, we will soon lose our right to say no.
+
+If everyone acquiesces to privacy-invasive requests and practices, companies and governments might soon think there is no point in keeping an opt-out option available at all, since most people are subserviently complying without making a fuss.
+
+At the individual level, of course this means our data will be collected, processed, compiled, shared, and monetized in ways we know little about. Each time we say yes, it's a new data point in our tracking history to observe, judge, categorize, and manipulate us.
+
+At the collective level, it's nothing less than the loss of our human rights and democracies.
+
+Collectively, we have the power to tilt the balance in favor of privacy rights when we stand firm for it by refusing to consent to intrusive requests every time we can.
+
+By refusing, we clearly express our rejection of this invasion and demand our right to privacy be respected. This sends a clear message to corporations and governments alike that the population does care about privacy rights.
+
+If we value the right to privacy, it's our collective duty to protect it.
+
+## How to say no?
+
+How can we individually and collectively work to push for privacy rights by saying no everywhere we can?
+
+Here are a few examples of practices you can adopt in your daily life that collectively will help to fight for privacy:
+
+### Stop
+
+Stop using the privacy-invasive platforms and services that you can. Move away and opt for [better social media, products, and services](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tools/) that do respect your privacy and do not monetize your data.
+
+This will take some time of course. Be patient. Pick one change at the time. Maybe this week [delete your Facebook account](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/social-networks/), and next month [migrate your emails](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/email/) away from Gmail.
+
+Each time you stop using services from software companies that build their wealth on monetizing your data, you are saying no and taking a stand for privacy rights.
+
+### Refuse
+
+Refuse all cookies! It can be a real pain to browse the web with all these cookie banners. Of course, companies are hoping for [decision fatigue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decision_fatigue) to manipulate you in clicking "yes, yes, yes, agree, continue, whatever!" But each time you comply in despair, you let them win against what you really want.
+
+Websites are not obligated to have cookie banners if they do not use any privacy-invasive cookies. This annoyance doesn't come from legislation, it comes from the greed and stubbornness of corporations to harvest your data. There would be no cookie banners at all if they simply stopped tracking you and collecting your data.
+
+Sabotage their plans by taking the time to find the "Reject All" button through their disingenuous button labyrinth.
+
+Similarly, many privacy-invasive features maliciously try to present as "ethical" because you can "opt out". But what good is this protection if no one uses it? Put a spoke in their wheel, look for the hidden *opt-out* option, and refuse to participate every single time.
+
+Beyond the digital realm, there are many in-person situations where you might have a right to refuse data collection as well.
+
+For example, you may have the right to refuse face scans in airports and demand a "traditional" human verification instead. Look into your local regulation to find out more about this. If everyone refused to scan their face at the airport every time they can, this practice would soon die.
+
+When you say yes to this, you are unfortunately contributing to the normalization of this invasive practice.
+
+Finally, refuse to be recorded. Depending on your local regulation, it's likely there is a legal requirement to inform you when a meeting or interview will be recorded. It's also likely that you have a right to refuse. Exercise this right every time you can. Additionally, depending on your local regulation, report instances where you couldn't and should have been able to refuse.
+
+### Report
+
+Each time you witness a practice that violates privacy laws, report it to the data protection authority for your location.
+
+Stay aware of which privacy law(s) are applicable in your region, and which official entity is responsible for enforcing the law. Your privacy protections are related to your *own* location, regardless of where the organization is based.
+
+In Europe, this entity is often called a Data Protection Authority (DPA), but outside of Europe it's often called something else. It might be a Privacy Commissioner or a Supervisory Authority, for example (but not always either). Read the law (or summary of) for your region, it will include a description of whom this entity is and how to report non-compliance.
+
+Report every infraction you see when you have the time. Sometimes, it's really as simple as sending a short email to the enforcing entity. One single complaint can trigger a full investigation sometimes. This can make an enormous difference.
+
+If you can, reporting can also mean reporting to the media.
+
+When you experience an invasive practice or witness a serious data protection violation, report it to the media if you are comfortable sharing. Personal accounts of such experience are important for collective awareness. The more people know, the more people talk, the more we stand a chance to keep our privacy rights alive. Make noise!
+
+### Advocate
+
+Talk to your friends, family, co-workers, and acquaintances about their options to opt out data collection, and their right to refuse and to say no.
+
+Tell them about how important this is with the social media, software, and services they use. Tell them about the importance of looking for the rejection options on cookie banners, finding information on how to object to face scans at the airport, and refusing the use of AI note-takers during their medical consultations.
+
+Talk about this topic on social media! Share news about privacy-invasive practices. Inform people on how they can opt out, refuse, and say no in your specific region.
+
+## Saying no is a collective and individual responsibility
+
+**Refusal is a powerful way to protest.** But like any protest, it must gather in numbers to have an impact at the collective level. The larger the number of people opting out and saying no, the stronger the message sent.
+
+That being said, do not minimize the impact your individual actions have. **Every single action matters, even the smallest one.** Movements always start at the individual level. If nobody starts, then nobody follows.
+
+By saying no each time, by stopping, refusing, reporting, and advocating, you are starting a movement. When advocating for the right to refuse privacy-invasive practices, you are growing a movement. Each of these contributions matters.
+
+The consequences for not saying no would be leaving the next generations without any protections for their privacy. It would be disastrous for their individual rights, but also disastrous for democracy, freedom of speech, and so many rights we currently take for granted.
+
+We cannot let our society slip into authoritarian mass surveillance. For ourselves and for the next generations, we must fight by saying no, every time we possibly can.

docs/data-broker-removals.md

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ You should search for your information on these sites first, and submit an opt-o
 - Dataveria ([Search](https://dataveria.com), [Opt-Out](https://dataveria.com/ng/control/privacy))
 - InfoTracer ([Search](https://infotracer.com), [Opt-Out](https://infotracer.com/optout))
 - Intelius ([Search](https://intelius.com), [Opt-Out](https://suppression.peopleconnect.us/login))
-- PeekYou ([Search](https://peekyou.com), [Opt-Out](https://peekyou.com/about/contact/optout))
+- PeekYou ([Search](https://peekyou.com), [Opt-Out](https://peekyou.com/about/contact/ccpa_optout/do_not_sell))
 - PublicDataUSA ([Search](https://publicdatausa.com), [Opt-Out](https://publicdatausa.com/remove.php))
 - Radaris ([Search](https://radaris.com), [Opt-Out](https://radaris.com/page/how-to-remove))
 - Spokeo ([Search](https://spokeo.com/search), [Opt-Out](https://spokeo.com/optout))
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ Our [testing](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/02/03/easyoptouts-revi
 EasyOptOuts does not cover the following sites we consider to be "high priority," so you should still manually opt-out of:
 
 - Intelius ([Search](https://intelius.com), [Opt-Out](https://suppression.peopleconnect.us/login))
-- PeekYou ([Search](https://peekyou.com), [Opt-Out](https://peekyou.com/about/contact/optout))
+- PeekYou ([Search](https://peekyou.com), [Opt-Out](https://peekyou.com/about/contact/ccpa_optout/do_not_sell))
 
 </div>
 

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