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26 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
cf96d55027 Clarify Notesnook encryption (#2332)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gray <dngray@privacyguides.org>
Signed-off-by: Freddy <freddy@privacyguides.org>
2023-11-19 18:36:05 +10:30
a896a1a306 AdGuard supports DoQ (#2336)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gray <dngray@privacyguides.org>
2023-11-19 18:32:30 +10:30
b7f0b672a2 AdGuard DNS supports ECS as of v0.3.1 (#2334)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gray <dngray@privacyguides.org>
2023-11-19 17:35:09 +10:30
7004d344ac CoC updated grammar and punctuation (#2324)
Co-authored-by: Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
Signed-off-by: Freddy <freddy@privacyguides.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gray <dngray@privacyguides.org>
2023-11-19 14:00:42 +10:30
461ac8f224 MAT2 Nautilus extension deprecated (#2333)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gray <dngray@privacyguides.org>
2023-11-18 23:14:18 +10:30
c8dc59c134 Bump crowdin/github-action from 1.14.1 to 1.15.2
Bumps [crowdin/github-action](https://github.com/crowdin/github-action) from 1.14.1 to 1.15.2.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/crowdin/github-action/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/crowdin/github-action/compare/v1.14.1...v1.15.2)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: crowdin/github-action
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
2023-11-17 04:47:42 +00:00
f8570a4c6a Clarify data breach risk with OAuth (#2326)
Signed-off-by: Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
Signed-off-by: Freddy <freddy@privacyguides.org>
2023-11-14 02:03:22 +10:30
9d285e3094 Clarify Google Play Services permissions (#2328) 2023-11-13 11:59:53 +00:00
abc22993cb Tuta now supports subfolders (#2329) 2023-11-13 11:51:55 +00:00
e56081202d Add Photo Management Recommendations (#2102)
Co-authored-by: Daniel Gray <dngray@privacyguides.org>
Signed-off-by: Freddy <freddy@privacyguides.org>
2023-11-12 18:22:54 -06:00
6da9b15464 Clarify and modernize VPN and Tor advice (#2322)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gray <dngray@privacyguides.org>
Signed-off-by: Freddy <freddy@privacyguides.org>
2023-11-12 21:33:42 +10:30
d5a31c88bb Add device integrity/verification tools (#2315)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gray <dngray@privacyguides.org>
Signed-off-by: Freddy <freddy@privacyguides.org>
2023-11-12 21:30:56 +10:30
d9ff08381f Replace "Tutanota" with "Tuta" (#2325) 2023-11-08 10:11:05 +00:00
e6149a97d9 Bump crowdin/github-action from 1.14.0 to 1.14.1
Bumps [crowdin/github-action](https://github.com/crowdin/github-action) from 1.14.0 to 1.14.1.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/crowdin/github-action/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/crowdin/github-action/compare/v1.14.0...v1.14.1)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: crowdin/github-action
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
2023-11-03 04:25:30 +00:00
b69edfefd6 Recommend F-Droid Basic over Neo Store (#2293)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gray <dngray@privacyguides.org>
Signed-off-by: blacklight447 <github.ef27z@simplelogin.com>
2023-11-01 13:39:32 -05:00
d419ac9432 Remove i18n link from README.md (#2319)
Signed-off-by: Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gray <dngray@privacyguides.org>
Signed-off-by: Freddy <freddy@privacyguides.org>
2023-11-01 19:23:24 +10:30
708b1917a7 Bump crowdin/github-action from 1.13.1 to 1.14.0
Bumps [crowdin/github-action](https://github.com/crowdin/github-action) from 1.13.1 to 1.14.0.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/crowdin/github-action/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/crowdin/github-action/compare/v1.13.1...v1.14.0)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: crowdin/github-action
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
2023-10-31 07:51:54 +00:00
741fb9d904 Update and Add URLs (#2321)
Signed-off-by: Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gray <dngray@privacyguides.org>
2023-10-31 18:18:51 +10:30
05228b4db3 Link to code.privacyguides.dev archive (#2316) 2023-10-26 11:19:16 +01:00
aa9fed4eac Add warning about Brave's "referral code" system (#2271)
Co-authored-by: Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gray <dngray@privacyguides.org>
Signed-off-by: blacklight447 <github.ef27z@simplelogin.com>
2023-10-24 19:58:42 +10:30
3db638b937 Update pixel updates to 7 years (#2314)
Signed-off-by: Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gray <dngray@privacyguides.org>
2023-10-24 19:57:16 +10:30
43b346a5ff Add "share" section (#2300)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gray <dngray@privacyguides.org>
Signed-off-by: blacklight447 <github.ef27z@simplelogin.com>
2023-10-24 19:57:15 +10:30
de216b9cde Open-source hyphens fix (#2295)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gray <dngray@privacyguides.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
2023-10-24 19:57:15 +10:30
add980a655 Add "ente Auth" TOTP app (#2310)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gray <dngray@privacyguides.org>
Signed-off-by: Freddy <freddy@privacyguides.org>
2023-10-24 19:57:15 +10:30
MMR
58d6e4e044 Recommend Max Protection DoH in Firefox (#2292)
Signed-off-by: Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gray <dngray@privacyguides.org>
2023-10-24 19:57:15 +10:30
366e44a940 Add Proton Calendar App Store link (#2312)
Signed-off-by: Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
Signed-off-by: Freddy <freddy@privacyguides.org>
2023-10-24 19:56:40 +10:30
76 changed files with 3495 additions and 409 deletions

View File

@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ jobs:
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: crowdin action
uses: crowdin/github-action@v1.13.1
uses: crowdin/github-action@v1.15.2
with:
upload_sources: true
upload_sources_args: '--auto-update --delete-obsolete'

1
.gitignore vendored
View File

@ -20,3 +20,4 @@ site
# Local Netlify folder
.netlify
node_modules

350
Pipfile.lock generated
View File

@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
"sha256:492bbc69dca35d12daac71c4db1bfff0c876c00ef4a2ffacce226d4638eb72da",
"sha256:bd2520ca0d9d7d12694a53d44ac482d181b4ec1888909b035a3dbf40d0f57d4a"
],
"markers": "python_full_version >= '3.6.0'",
"markers": "python_version >= '3.6'",
"version": "==4.12.2"
},
"cairocffi": {
@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
"sha256:539cc1d13202e33ca466e88b2807e29f4c13049d6d87031a3c110744495cb082",
"sha256:92d6037539857d8206b8f6ae472e8b77db8058fec5937a1ef3f54304089edbb9"
],
"markers": "python_full_version >= '3.6.0'",
"markers": "python_version >= '3.6'",
"version": "==2023.7.22"
},
"cffi": {
@ -116,99 +116,99 @@
},
"charset-normalizer": {
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"sha256:6932a7652464746fcb484f7fc3618e6503d2066d853f68a4bd97193a3996e273",
"sha256:7a7e3daa202beb61821c06d2517428e8e7c1aab08943e92ec9e5755c2fc9ba5e",
"sha256:7dbaa3c7de82ef37e7708521be41db5565004258ca76945ad74a8e998c30af8d",
"sha256:7df5608bc38bd37ef585ae9c38c9cd46d7c81498f086915b0f97255ea60c2818",
"sha256:806abdd8249ba3953c33742506fe414880bad78ac25cc9a9b1c6ae97bedd573f",
"sha256:883f216eac8712b83a63f41b76ddfb7b2afab1b74abbb413c5df6680f071a6b9",
"sha256:912e3812a1dbbc834da2b32299b124b5ddcb664ed354916fd1ed6f193f0e2d01",
"sha256:937bdc5a7f5343d1c97dc98149a0be7eb9704e937fe3dc7140e229ae4fc572a7",
"sha256:9882a7451c680c12f232a422730f986a1fcd808da0fd428f08b671237237d651",
"sha256:9a92109192b360634a4489c0c756364c0c3a2992906752165ecb50544c251312",
"sha256:9d7bc666bd8c5a4225e7ac71f2f9d12466ec555e89092728ea0f5c0c2422ea80",
"sha256:a5f63b5a68daedc54c7c3464508d8c12075e56dcfbd42f8c1bf40169061ae666",
"sha256:a646e48de237d860c36e0db37ecaecaa3619e6f3e9d5319e527ccbc8151df061",
"sha256:a89b8312d51715b510a4fe9fc13686283f376cfd5abca8cd1c65e4c76e21081b",
"sha256:a92386125e9ee90381c3369f57a2a50fa9e6aa8b1cf1d9c4b200d41a7dd8e992",
"sha256:ae88931f93214777c7a3aa0a8f92a683f83ecde27f65a45f95f22d289a69e593",
"sha256:afc8eef765d948543a4775f00b7b8c079b3321d6b675dde0d02afa2ee23000b4",
"sha256:b0eb01ca85b2361b09480784a7931fc648ed8b7836f01fb9241141b968feb1db",
"sha256:b1c25762197144e211efb5f4e8ad656f36c8d214d390585d1d21281f46d556ba",
"sha256:b4005fee46ed9be0b8fb42be0c20e79411533d1fd58edabebc0dd24626882cfd",
"sha256:b920e4d028f6442bea9a75b7491c063f0b9a3972520731ed26c83e254302eb1e",
"sha256:baada14941c83079bf84c037e2d8b7506ce201e92e3d2fa0d1303507a8538212",
"sha256:bb40c011447712d2e19cc261c82655f75f32cb724788df315ed992a4d65696bb",
"sha256:c0949b55eb607898e28eaccb525ab104b2d86542a85c74baf3a6dc24002edec2",
"sha256:c9aeea7b63edb7884b031a35305629a7593272b54f429a9869a4f63a1bf04c34",
"sha256:cfe96560c6ce2f4c07d6647af2d0f3c54cc33289894ebd88cfbb3bcd5391e256",
"sha256:d27b5997bdd2eb9fb199982bb7eb6164db0426904020dc38c10203187ae2ff2f",
"sha256:d921bc90b1defa55c9917ca6b6b71430e4286fc9e44c55ead78ca1a9f9eba5f2",
"sha256:e6bf8de6c36ed96c86ea3b6e1d5273c53f46ef518a062464cd7ef5dd2cf92e38",
"sha256:eaed6977fa73408b7b8a24e8b14e59e1668cfc0f4c40193ea7ced8e210adf996",
"sha256:fa1d323703cfdac2036af05191b969b910d8f115cf53093125e4058f62012c9a",
"sha256:fe1e26e1ffc38be097f0ba1d0d07fcade2bcfd1d023cda5b29935ae8052bd793"
],
"index": "pypi",
"version": "==10.0.1"
"version": "==10.1.0"
},
"platformdirs": {
"hashes": [
@ -620,11 +620,11 @@
},
"pymdown-extensions": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:77a82c621c58a83efc49a389159181d570e370fff9f810d3a4766a75fc678b66",
"sha256:94a0d8a03246712b64698af223848fd80aaf1ae4c4be29c8c61939b0467b5722"
"sha256:8cba67beb2a1318cdaf742d09dff7c0fc4cafcc290147ade0f8fb7b71522711a",
"sha256:f6c79941498a458852853872e379e7bab63888361ba20992fc8b4f8a9b61735e"
],
"markers": "python_version >= '3.8'",
"version": "==10.3"
"version": "==10.3.1"
},
"python-dateutil": {
"hashes": [
@ -695,7 +695,7 @@
"sha256:fd1592b3fdf65fff2ad0004b5e363300ef59ced41c2e6b3a99d4089fa8c5435d",
"sha256:fd66fc5d0da6d9815ba2cebeb4205f95818ff4b79c3ebe268e75d961704af52f"
],
"markers": "python_full_version >= '3.6.0'",
"markers": "python_version >= '3.6'",
"version": "==6.0.1"
},
"pyyaml-env-tag": {
@ -703,7 +703,7 @@
"sha256:70092675bda14fdec33b31ba77e7543de9ddc88f2e5b99160396572d11525bdb",
"sha256:af31106dec8a4d68c60207c1886031cbf839b68aa7abccdb19868200532c2069"
],
"markers": "python_full_version >= '3.6.0'",
"markers": "python_version >= '3.6'",
"version": "==0.1"
},
"regex": {
@ -850,11 +850,11 @@
},
"urllib3": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:7a7c7003b000adf9e7ca2a377c9688bbc54ed41b985789ed576570342a375cd2",
"sha256:b19e1a85d206b56d7df1d5e683df4a7725252a964e3993648dd0fb5a1c157564"
"sha256:c97dfde1f7bd43a71c8d2a58e369e9b2bf692d1334ea9f9cae55add7d0dd0f84",
"sha256:fdb6d215c776278489906c2f8916e6e7d4f5a9b602ccbcfdf7f016fc8da0596e"
],
"markers": "python_version >= '3.7'",
"version": "==2.0.6"
"version": "==2.0.7"
},
"watchdog": {
"hashes": [

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@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ Copyright &copy; 2019 - 2023 [Privacy Guides contributors](https://github.com/pr
Privacy Guides content is licensed under the [Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License](/LICENSE), and the underlying source code used to format and display that content on [www.privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org) is licensed under the [MIT License](/LICENSE-CODE).
Generally speaking, **content** can be found in the [`/docs`](/docs), [`/theme/assets/img`](/theme/assets/img), [`/includes`](/includes), and [`/i18n`](/i18n) folders; and **source code** and configuration files can be found in the [`/config`](/config) and [`/theme`](/theme) folders, and in the root of this repository. Any source code snippets contained within documentation files are [MIT Licensed](/LICENSE-CODE). Please contact us if you require clarification on any of these terms.
Generally speaking, **content** can be found in the [`/docs`](/docs), [`/theme/assets/img`](/theme/assets/img) and [`/includes`](/includes) folders; and **source code** and configuration files can be found in the [`/config`](/config) and [`/theme`](/theme) folders, and in the root of this repository. Any source code snippets contained within documentation files are [MIT Licensed](/LICENSE-CODE). Please contact us if you require clarification on any of these terms.
These licenses do not apply to any work where another license is otherwise noted.

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@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ theme:
- search.highlight
extra_css:
- assets/stylesheets/extra.css?v=3.15.0
- assets/stylesheets/extra.css?v=3.17.0
extra_javascript:
- assets/javascripts/mathjax.js

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@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ nav:
- 'dns.md'
- 'email.md'
- 'financial-services.md'
- 'photo-management.md'
- 'search-engines.md'
- 'vpn.md'
- Software:

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@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ nav:
- 'dns.md'
- 'email.md'
- 'financial-services.md'
- 'photo-management.md'
- 'search-engines.md'
- 'vpn.md'
- Software:
@ -126,6 +127,8 @@ nav:
- 'android.md'
- 'desktop.md'
- 'router.md'
- Advanced:
- 'device-integrity.md'
- About:
- 'about/index.md'
- 'about/criteria.md'

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@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ nav:
- 'android.md'
- 'desktop.md'
- 'router.md'
- Advanced:
- 'device-integrity.md'
- Acerca de:
- 'about/index.md'
- 'about/criteria.md'

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@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ nav:
- 'dns.md'
- 'email.md'
- 'financial-services.md'
- 'photo-management.md'
- 'search-engines.md'
- 'vpn.md'
- "Logiciels":
@ -124,6 +125,8 @@ nav:
- 'android.md'
- 'desktop.md'
- 'router.md'
- "Advanced":
- 'device-integrity.md'
- "À propos":
- 'about/index.md'
- 'about/criteria.md'

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@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ nav:
- 'dns.md'
- 'email.md'
- 'financial-services.md'
- 'photo-management.md'
- 'search-engines.md'
- 'vpn.md'
- "תוכנה":
@ -128,6 +129,8 @@ nav:
- 'android.md'
- 'desktop.md'
- 'router.md'
- "Advanced":
- 'device-integrity.md'
- "על אודות":
- 'about/index.md'
- 'about/criteria.md'

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@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ nav:
- 'android.md'
- 'desktop.md'
- 'router.md'
- "Advanced":
- 'device-integrity.md'
- Informazioni:
- 'about/index.md'
- 'about/criteria.md'

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@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ nav:
- 'dns.md'
- 'email.md'
- 'financial-services.md'
- 'photo-management.md'
- 'search-engines.md'
- 'vpn.md'
- Software:
@ -124,6 +125,8 @@ nav:
- 'android.md'
- 'desktop.md'
- 'router.md'
- "Advanced":
- 'device-integrity.md'
- Over ons:
- 'about/index.md'
- 'about/criteria.md'

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@ -126,6 +126,8 @@ nav:
- 'android.md'
- 'desktop.md'
- 'router.md'
- Advanced:
- 'device-integrity.md'
- О сайте:
- 'about/index.md'
- 'about/criteria.md'

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@ -126,6 +126,8 @@ nav:
- 'android.md'
- 'desktop.md'
- 'router.md'
- Advanced:
- 'device-integrity.md'
- 關於:
- 'about/index.md'
- 'about/criteria.md'

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@ -10,44 +10,44 @@
What we expect from members of our communities:
1. **Don't spread misinformation**
1. **Do not spread misinformation**
We are creating an evidence-based educational community around information privacy and security, not a home for conspiracy theories. For example, when making a claim that a certain piece of software is malicious or that certain telemetry data is privacy invasive, explain in detail what is collected and how it collected. Claims of this nature must be backed by technical evidence.
We are creating an evidence-based educational community around information privacy and security, not an information home for conspiracy theories. For example, when making a claim that a certain piece of software is malicious or that certain telemetry data is privacy invasive; explain in detail what is collected and how it collected. Claims of this nature must be backed by technical evidence.
1. **Don't abuse our willingness to help**
2. **Do not abuse our willingness to help**
Our community members are not your free tech support. We are happy to help you with specific steps on your privacy journey if you are willing to put in effort on your end. We are not willing to answer endlessly repeated questions about generic computer problems you could have answered yourself with a 30-second internet search. Don't be a [help vampire](https://slash7.com/2006/12/22/vampires/).
Our community members are not free tech support. We are happy to help with specific steps for individual's, privacy journey, if they are willing to put in effort. We are not obligated to answer endless, repetitive questions, about general computer problems solvable with a simple internet search. **Do not** become a [help vampire](https://slash7.com/2006/12/22/vampires/).
1. **Behave in a positive and constructive manner**
3. **Behave in a positive and constructive manner**
Examples of behavior that contributes to a positive environment for our community include:
- Demonstrating empathy and kindness toward other people
- Being respectful of differing opinions, viewpoints, and experiences
- Giving and gracefully accepting constructive feedback
- Accepting responsibility and apologizing to those affected by our mistakes, and learning from the experience
- Focusing on what is best not just for us as individuals, but for the overall community
- Being respectful of differing opinions, viewpoints, and experiences.
- Demonstrating empathy and kindness toward others.
- Focusing on what is best not just for us as overseers, but for the overall community.
- Giving and gracefully accepting constructive feedback within' our community while growing and improving.
- Operating with a communal mindset at all times.
### Unacceptable Behavior
## Unacceptable Behavior
The following behaviors are considered harassment and are unacceptable within our community:
- The use of sexualized language or imagery, and sexual attention or advances of any kind
- Trolling, insulting or derogatory comments, and personal or political attacks
- Public or private harassment
- Publishing others' private information, such as a physical or email address, without their explicit permission
- Other conduct which could reasonably be considered inappropriate in a professional setting
- Any other conduct which would reasonably be considered inappropriate in a professional setting.
- Public and/or private harassment of any kind.
- Publishing others' private information, such as a physical address and/or email address, without a persons explicit permission.
- The use of sexualized language or imagery, and sexual attention or advances of any kind.
- Trolling, insulting and/or derogatory comments, including personal or political attacks.
## Scope
Our Code of Conduct applies within all project spaces, as well as when an individual is representing the Privacy Guides project in other communities.
We are responsible for clarifying the standards of our community, and have the right to remove or alter the comments of those participating within our community, as necessary and at our discretion.
We are responsible for clarifying the standards of our community and have the right to remove or alter the comments of those participating within our community, as necessary and at our discretion.
### Contact
## Contact
If you observe a problem on a platform like Matrix or Reddit, please contact our moderators on that platform in chat, via DM, or through any designated "Modmail" system.
If you observe a problem on a platform like Matrix or Reddit, please contact our moderators on that platform via chat, direct message, or any designated "Modmail" system.
If you have a problem elsewhere, or a problem our community moderators are unable to resolve, reach out to `jonah@privacyguides.org` and/or `dngray@privacyguides.org`.
If you have a problem elsewhere, or a problem that our community moderators are unable to resolve, reach out to `jonah@privacyguides.org` and/or `dngray@privacyguides.org`.
All community leaders are obligated to respect the privacy and security of the reporter of any incident.
All community leaders are obligated to respect the privacy and security of reporters for all incidents.

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@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ We do not make money from recommending certain products, we do not use affiliate
We apply these priorities when considering new recommendations:
- **Secure**: Tools should follow security best-practices wherever applicable.
- **Source Availability**: Open source projects are generally preferred over equivalent proprietary alternatives.
- **Source Availability**: Open-source projects are generally preferred over equivalent proprietary alternatives.
- **Cross-Platform**: We typically prefer recommendations to be cross-platform, to avoid vendor lock-in.
- **Active Development**: The tools that we recommend should be actively developed, unmaintained projects will be removed in most cases.
- **Usability**: Tools should be accessible to most computer users, an overly technical background should not be required.

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@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ So far in 2023 we've launched international translations of our website in [Fren
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/hook9 "@hook9")
- [:simple-mastodon: Mastodon](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@oliviablob "@oliviablob@neat.computer"){rel=me}
Additionally, [many people](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors) have made contributions to the project. You can too, we're open sourced on GitHub, and accepting translation suggestions on [Crowdin](https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides).
Additionally, [many people](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/graphs/contributors) have made contributions to the project. You can too, we're open source on GitHub, and accepting translation suggestions on [Crowdin](https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides).
Our team members review all changes made to the website and handle administrative duties such as web hosting and financials, however they do not personally profit from any contributions made to this site. Our financials are transparently hosted by the Open Collective Foundation 501(c)(3) at [opencollective.com/privacyguides](https://opencollective.com/privacyguides). Donations to Privacy Guides are generally tax-deductible in the United States.

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@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Privacy Guides is not a law firm. As such, the Privacy Guides website and contri
Running this website, like any human endeavor, involves uncertainty and trade-offs. We hope this website helps, but it may include mistakes and cant address every situation. If you have any questions about your situation, we encourage you to do your own research, seek out other experts, and engage in discussions with the Privacy Guides community. If you have any legal questions, you should consult with your own legal counsel before moving forward.
Privacy Guides is an open source project contributed to under licenses that include terms that, for the protection of the website and its contributors, make clear that the Privacy Guides project and website is offered "as-is", without warranty, and disclaiming liability for damages resulting from using the website or any recommendations contained within. Privacy Guides does not warrant or make any representations concerning the accuracy, likely results, or reliability of the use of the materials on the website or otherwise relating to such materials on the website or on any third-party sites linked on this site.
Privacy Guides is an open-source project contributed to under licenses that include terms that, for the protection of the website and its contributors, make clear that the Privacy Guides project and website is offered "as-is", without warranty, and disclaiming liability for damages resulting from using the website or any recommendations contained within. Privacy Guides does not warrant or make any representations concerning the accuracy, likely results, or reliability of the use of the materials on the website or otherwise relating to such materials on the website or on any third-party sites linked on this site.
Privacy Guides additionally does not warrant that this website will be constantly available, or available at all.

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@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ BurungHantu also made a [twitter post](https://twitter.com/privacytoolsIO/status
As of September 25th 2022 we are seeing BurungHantu's overall plans come to fruition on privacytools.io, and this is the very reason we decided to create this explainer page today. The website he is operating appears to be a heavily SEO-optimized version of the site which recommends tools in exchange for financial compensation. Very recently, IVPN and Mullvad, two VPN providers near-universally [recommended](../vpn.md) by the privacy community and notable for their stance against affiliate programs were removed from PrivacyTools. In their place? NordVPN, Surfshark, ExpressVPN, and hide.me; Giant VPN corporations with untrustworthy platforms and business practices, notorious for their aggressive marketing and affiliate programs.
==**PrivacyTools has become exactly the type of site we [warned against](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729205249/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-reviews/) on the PrivacyTools blog in 2019.**== We've tried to keep our distance from PrivacyTools since the transition, but their continued harassment towards our project and now their absurd abuse of the credibility their brand gained over 6 years of open source contributions is extremely troubling to us. Those of us actually fighting for privacy are not fighting against each other, and are not getting our advice from the highest bidder.
==**PrivacyTools has become exactly the type of site we [warned against](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729205249/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-reviews/) on the PrivacyTools blog in 2019.**== We've tried to keep our distance from PrivacyTools since the transition, but their continued harassment towards our project and now their absurd abuse of the credibility their brand gained over 6 years of open-source contributions is extremely troubling to us. Those of us actually fighting for privacy are not fighting against each other, and are not getting our advice from the highest bidder.
## r/privacytoolsIO Now

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@ -6,11 +6,91 @@ description: Tor is a free to use, decentralized network designed for using the
Tor is a free to use, decentralized network designed for using the internet with as much privacy as possible. If used properly, the network enables private and anonymous browsing and communications.
## Safely Connecting to Tor
Before connecting to [Tor](../tor.md), you should carefully consider what you're looking to accomplish by using Tor in the first place, and who you're trying to hide your network activity from.
If you live in a free country, are accessing mundane content via Tor, aren't worried about your ISP or local network administrators having the knowledge that you're using Tor, and want to help [de-stigmatize](https://2019.www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en) Tor usage, you can likely connect to Tor directly via standard means like [Tor Browser](../tor.md) without worry.
If you have the ability to access a trusted VPN provider and **any** of the following are true, you almost certainly should connect to Tor through a VPN:
- You already use a [trusted VPN provider](../vpn.md)
- Your threat model includes an adversary which is capable of extracting information from your ISP
- Your threat model includes your ISP itself as an adversary
- Your threat model includes local network administrators before your ISP as an adversary
Because we already [generally recommend](../basics/vpn-overview.md) that the vast majority of people use a trusted VPN provider for a variety of reasons, the following recommendation about connecting to Tor via a VPN likely applies to you. <mark>There is no need to disable your VPN before connecting to Tor</mark>, as some online resources would lead you to believe.
Connecting directly to Tor will make your connection stand out to any local network administrators or your ISP. Detecting and correlating this traffic [has been done](https://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/17/justice/massachusetts-harvard-hoax/) in the past by network administrators to identify and deanonymize specific Tor users on their network. On the other hand, connecting to a VPN is almost always less suspicious, because commercial VPN providers are used by everyday consumers for a variety of mundane tasks like bypassing geo-restrictions, even in countries with heavy internet restrictions.
Therefore, you should make an effort to hide your IP address **before** connecting to the Tor network. You can do this by simply connecting to a VPN (through a client installed on your computer) and then accessing [Tor](../tor.md) as normal, through Tor Browser for example. This creates a connection chain like:
- [x] You → VPN → Tor → Internet
From your ISP's perspective, it looks like you're accessing a VPN normally (with the associated cover that provides you). From your VPN's perspective, they can see that you are connecting to the Tor network, but nothing about what websites you're accessing. From Tor's perspective, you're connecting normally, but in the unlikely event of some sort of Tor network compromise, only your VPN's IP would be exposed, and your VPN would *additionally* have to be compromised to deanonymize you.
This is **not** censorship circumvention advice, because if Tor is blocked entirely by your ISP, your VPN likely is as well. Rather, this recommendation aims to make your traffic blend in better with commonplace VPN user traffic, and provide you with some level of plausible deniability by obscuring the fact that you're connecting to Tor from your ISP.
---
We **very strongly discourage** combining Tor with a VPN in any other manner. Do not configure your connection in a way which resembles any of the following:
- You → Tor → VPN → Internet
- You → VPN → Tor → VPN → Internet
- Any other configuration
Some VPN providers and other publications will occasionally recommend these **bad** configurations to evade Tor bans (exit nodes being blocked by websites) in some places. [Normally](https://support.torproject.org/#about_change-paths), Tor frequently changes your circuit path through the network. When you choose a permanent *destination* VPN (connecting to a VPN server *after* Tor), you're eliminating this advantage and drastically harming your anonymity.
Setting up bad configurations like these is difficult to do accidentally, because it usually involves either setting up custom proxy settings inside Tor Browser, or setting up custom proxy settings inside your VPN client which routes your VPN traffic through the Tor Browser. As long as you avoid these non-default configurations, you're probably fine.
---
!!! info "VPN/SSH Fingerprinting"
The Tor Project [notes](https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/wikis/doc/TorPlusVPN#vpnssh-fingerprinting) that *theoretically* using a VPN to hide Tor activities from your ISP may not be foolproof. VPNs have been found to be vulnerable to website traffic fingerprinting, where an adversary can still guess what website is being visited, because all websites have specific traffic patterns.
Therefore, it's not unreasonable to believe that encrypted Tor traffic hidden by a VPN could also be detected via similar methods. There are no research papers on this subject, and we still consider the benefits of using a VPN to far outweigh these risks, but it is something to keep in mind.
If you still believe that pluggable transports (bridges) provide additional protection against website traffic fingerprinting that a VPN does not, you always have the option to use a bridge **and** a VPN in conjunction.
Determining whether you should first use a VPN to connect to the Tor network will require some common sense and knowledge of your own government's and ISP's policies relating to what you're connecting to. However, again in most cases you will be better off being seen as connecting to a commercial VPN network than directly to the Tor network. If VPN providers are censored in your area, then you can also consider using Tor pluggable transports (e.g. Snowflake or meek bridges) as an alternative, but using these bridges may arouse more suspicion than standard WireGuard/OpenVPN tunnels.
## What Tor is Not
The Tor network is not the perfect privacy protection tool in all cases, and has a number of drawbacks which should be carefully considered. These things should not discourage you from using Tor if it is appropriate for your needs, but they are still things to think about when deciding which solution is most appropriate for you.
### Tor is not a free VPN
The release of the *Orbot* mobile app has lead many people to describe Tor as a "free VPN" for all of your device traffic. However, treating Tor like this poses some dangers compared to a typical VPN.
Unlike Tor exit nodes, VPN providers are usually not *actively* [malicious](#caveats). Because Tor exit nodes can be created by anybody, they are hotspots for network logging and modification. In 2020, many Tor exit nodes were documented to be downgrading HTTPS traffic to HTTP in order to [hijack cryptocurrency transactions](https://therecord.media/thousands-of-tor-exit-nodes-attacked-cryptocurrency-users-over-the-past-year). Other exit node attacks such as replacing downloads via unencrypted channels with malware have also been observed. HTTPS does mitigate these threats to an extent.
As we've alluded to already, Tor is also easily identifiable on the network. Unlike an actual VPN provider, using Tor will make you stick out as a person likely attempting to evade authorities. In a perfect world, Tor would be seen by network administrators and authorities as a tool with many uses (like how VPNs are viewed), but in reality the perception of Tor is still far less legitimate than the perception of commercial VPNs, so using a real VPN provides you with plausible deniability, e.g. "I was just using it to watch Netflix," etc.
### Tor usage is not undetectable
**Even if you use bridges and pluggable transports,** the Tor Project provides no tools to hide the fact that you are using Tor from your ISP. Even using obfuscated "pluggable transports" or non-public bridges do not hide the fact that you are using a private communications channel. The most popular pluggable transports like obfs4 (which obfuscates your traffic to "look like nothing") and meek (which uses domain fronting to camouflage your traffic) can be [detected](https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/889-Tor-0day-Burning-Bridges.html) with fairly standard traffic analysis techniques. Snowflake has similar issues, and can be [easily detected](https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/944-Tor-0day-Snowflake.html) *before* a Tor connection is even established.
Pluggable transports other than these three do exist, but typically rely on security through obscurity to evade detection. They aren't impossible to detect, they are just used by so few people that it's not worth the effort building detectors for them. They shouldn't be relied upon if you specifically are being monitored.
It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and evading detection. It is easier to accomplish the former because of the many real-world limitations on what network censors can realistically do en masse, but these techniques do not hide the fact that you—*specifically* you—are using Tor from an interested party monitoring your network.
### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser
Anonymity can often be at odds with security: Tor's anonymity requires every user to be identical, which creates a monoculture (the same bugs are present across all Tor Browser users). As a cybersecurity rule of thumb, monocultures are generally regarded as bad: Security through diversity (which Tor lacks) provides natural segmentation by limiting vulnerabilities to smaller groups, and is therefore usually desirable, but this diversity is also less good for anonymity.
Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):
1. Look for new Critical/High vulnerabilities in Firefox nightly or beta builds, then check if they are exploitable in Tor Browser (this vulnerability period can last weeks).
2. Chain *multiple* Medium/Low vulnerabilities together until they get the level of access they're looking for (this vulnerability period can last months or longer).
Those at risk of browser vulnerabilities should consider additional protections to defend against Tor Browser exploits, such as using Whonix in [Qubes](../os/qubes-overview.md) to contain your Tor browsing in a secure VM and protect against leaks.
## Path Building to Clearnet Services
"Clearnet services" are websites which you can access with any browser, like [privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org). Tor lets you connect to these websites anonymously by routing your traffic through a network comprised of thousands of volunteer-run servers called nodes (or relays).
Every time you [connect to Tor](../tor.md), it will choose three nodes to build a path to the internet—this path is called a "circuit."
Every time you [connect to Tor](../tor.md), it will choose three nodes to build a path to the internet—this path is called a "circuit."
<figure markdown>
![Tor path showing your device connecting to an entry node, middle node, and exit node before reaching the destination website](../assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path.svg#only-light)
@ -80,13 +160,34 @@ Tor allows us to connect to a server without any single party knowing the entire
Though Tor does provide strong privacy guarantees, one must be aware that Tor is not perfect:
- Well-funded adversaries with the capability to passively watch most network traffic over the globe have a chance of deanonymizing Tor users by means of advanced traffic analysis. Nor does Tor protect you from exposing yourself by mistake, such as if you share too much information about your real identity.
- Tor exit nodes can also monitor traffic that passes through them. This means traffic which is not encrypted, such as plain HTTP traffic, can be recorded and monitored. If such traffic contains personally identifiable information, then it can deanonymize you to that exit node. Thus, we recommend using HTTPS over Tor where possible.
- Tor never protects you from exposing yourself by mistake, such as if you share too much information about your real identity.
- Tor exit nodes can **modify** unencrypted traffic which passes through them. This means traffic which is not encrypted, such as plain HTTP traffic, can be changed by a malicious exit node. **Never** download files from an unencrypted `http://` website over Tor, and ensure your browser is set to always upgrade HTTP traffic to HTTPS.
- Tor exit nodes can also monitor traffic that passes through them. Unencrypted traffic which contains personally identifiable information can deanonymize you to that exit node. Again, we recommend only using HTTPS over Tor.
- Powerful adversaries with the capability to passively watch *all* network traffic around the globe ("Global Passive Adversaries") are **not** something that Tor protects you against (and using Tor [with a VPN](#safely-connecting-to-tor) doesn't change this fact).
- Well-funded adversaries with the capability to passively watch *most* network traffic around the globe still have a *chance* of deanonymizing Tor users by means of advanced traffic analysis.
If you wish to use Tor for browsing the web, we only recommend the **official** Tor Browser—it is designed to prevent fingerprinting.
- [Tor Browser :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../tor.md#tor-browser)
### Protections provided by bridges
Tor bridges are commonly touted as an alternative method to hiding Tor usage from an ISP, instead of a VPN (as we suggest using if possible). Something to consider is that while bridges may provide adequate censorship circumvention, this is only a *transient* benefit. They do not adequately protect you from your ISP discovering you connected to Tor in the *past* with historical traffic log analysis.
To illustrate this point, consider the following scenario: You connect to Tor via a bridge, and your ISP doesnt detect it because they are not doing sophisticated analysis of your traffic, so things are working as intended. Now, 4 months go by, and the IP of your bridge has been made public. This is a very common occurrence with bridges, they are discovered and blocked relatively frequently, just not immediately.
Your ISP wants to identify Tor users 4 months ago, and with their limited metadata logging they can see that you connected to an IP address which was later revealed to be a Tor bridge. You have virtually no other excuse to be making such a connection, so the ISP can say with very high confidence that you were a Tor user at that time.
Contrast this with our recommended scenario, where you connect to Tor via a VPN. Say that 4 months later your ISP again wants to identify anybody who used Tor 4 months ago. Their logs almost certainly can identify your traffic 4 months ago, but all they would likely be able to see is that you connected to a VPNs IP address. This is because most ISPs only retain metadata over long periods of time, not the full contents of the traffic you request. Storing the entirety of your traffic data would require a massive quantity of storage which nearly all threat actors wouldn't possess.
Because your ISP almost certainly is not capturing all packet-level data and storing it forever, they have no way of determining what you connected to with that VPN *after* the fact with an advanced technique like deep packet inspection, and therefore you have plausible deniability.
Therefore, bridges provide the most benefit when circumventing internet censorship *in the moment*, but they are not an adequate substitute for **all** the benefits that using a VPN alongside Tor can provide. Again, this is not advice *against* using Tor bridges, you should just be aware of these limitations while making your decision. In some cases bridges may be the *only* option (if all VPN providers are blocked, for instance), so you can still use them in those circumstances with this limitation in mind.
If you think that a bridge can aid in defending against fingerprinting or other advanced network analysis more than a VPN's encrypted tunnel already can, you always have the option to use a bridge in conjunction with a VPN as well. That way you are still protected by the pluggable transport's obfuscation techniques even if an adversary gains some level of visibility into your VPN tunnel. If you decide to go this route, we recommend connecting to an obfs4 bridge behind your VPN for optimal fingerprinting protection, rather than meek or Snowflake.
It is [possible](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/clarify-tors-weaknesses-with-respect-to-observability/3676/16) that the [WebTunnel](https://forum.torproject.org/t/tor-relays-announcement-webtunnel-a-new-pluggable-transport-for-bridges-now-available-for-deployment/8180) pluggable transport currently being trialed may mitigate some of these concerns. We will continue to keep an eye on that technology as it develops.
## Additional Resources
- [Tor Browser User Manual](https://tb-manual.torproject.org)

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@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ DivestOS also includes kernel patches from GrapheneOS and enables all available
DivestOS implements some system hardening patches originally developed for GrapheneOS. DivestOS 16.0 and higher implements GrapheneOS's [`INTERNET`](https://developer.android.com/training/basics/network-ops/connecting) and SENSORS permission toggle, [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), [exec-spawning](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/21/grapheneos-or-calyxos/#additional-hardening), [JNI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_Native_Interface) [constification](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Const_(computer_programming)), and partial [bionic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bionic_(software)) hardening patchsets. 17.1 and higher features GrapheneOS's per-network full [MAC randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address#Randomization) option, [`ptrace_scope`](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.html) control, and automatic reboot/Wi-Fi/Bluetooth [timeout options](https://grapheneos.org/features).
DivestOS uses F-Droid as its default app store. Normally, we would recommend avoiding F-Droid due to its numerous [security issues](#f-droid). However, doing so on DivestOS isn't viable; the developers update their apps via their own F-Droid repositories ([DivestOS Official](https://divestos.org/fdroid/official/?fingerprint=E4BE8D6ABFA4D9D4FEEF03CDDA7FF62A73FD64B75566F6DD4E5E577550BE8467) and [DivestOS WebView](https://divestos.org/fdroid/webview/?fingerprint=FB426DA1750A53D7724C8A582B4D34174E64A84B38940E5D5A802E1DFF9A40D2)). We recommend disabling the official F-Droid app and using [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) with the DivestOS repositories enabled to keep those components up to date. For other apps, our recommended methods of obtaining them still apply.
DivestOS uses F-Droid as its default app store. We normally [recommend avoiding F-Droid](#f-droid), but doing so on DivestOS isn't viable; the developers update their apps via their own F-Droid repositories ([DivestOS Official](https://divestos.org/fdroid/official/?fingerprint=E4BE8D6ABFA4D9D4FEEF03CDDA7FF62A73FD64B75566F6DD4E5E577550BE8467) and [DivestOS WebView](https://divestos.org/fdroid/webview/?fingerprint=FB426DA1750A53D7724C8A582B4D34174E64A84B38940E5D5A802E1DFF9A40D2)). We recommend disabling the official F-Droid app and using [F-Droid Basic](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.basic/) **with the DivestOS repositories enabled** to keep those components up to date. For other apps, our recommended methods of obtaining them still apply.
!!! warning
@ -175,13 +175,13 @@ Google Pixel phones are the **only** devices we recommend for purchase. Pixel ph
**Google Pixel** devices are known to have good security and properly support [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), even when installing custom operating systems.
Beginning with the **Pixel 6** and **6 Pro**, Pixel devices receive a minimum of 5 years of guaranteed security updates, ensuring a much longer lifespan compared to the 2-4 years competing OEMs typically offer.
Beginning with the **Pixel 8** and **8 Pro**, Pixel devices receive a minimum of 7 years of guaranteed security updates, ensuring a much longer lifespan compared to the 2-5 years competing OEMs typically offer.
[:material-shopping: Store](https://store.google.com/category/phones){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
Secure Elements like the Titan M2 are more limited than the processor's Trusted Execution Environment used by most other phones as they are only used for secrets storage, hardware attestation, and rate limiting, not for running "trusted" programs. Phones without a Secure Element have to use the TEE for *all* of those functions, resulting in a larger attack surface.
Google Pixel phones use a TEE OS called Trusty which is [open-source](https://source.android.com/security/trusty#whyTrusty), unlike many other phones.
Google Pixel phones use a TEE OS called Trusty which is [open source](https://source.android.com/security/trusty#whyTrusty), unlike many other phones.
The installation of GrapheneOS on a Pixel phone is easy with their [web installer](https://grapheneos.org/install/web). If you don't feel comfortable doing it yourself and are willing to spend a bit of extra money, check out the [NitroPhone](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop) as they come preloaded with GrapheneOS from the reputable [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/about) company.
@ -216,40 +216,6 @@ We recommend a wide variety of Android apps throughout this site. The apps liste
When using Shelter, you are placing complete trust in its developer, as Shelter acts as a [Device Admin](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/admin/device-admin) to create the Work Profile, and it has extensive access to the data stored within the Work Profile.
### Auditor
!!! recommendation
![Auditor logo](assets/img/android/auditor.svg#only-light){ align=right }
![Auditor logo](assets/img/android/auditor-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
**Auditor** is an app which leverages hardware security features to provide device integrity monitoring by actively validating the identity of a device and the integrity of its operating system. Currently, it only works with GrapheneOS or the stock operating system for [supported devices](https://attestation.app/about#device-support).
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://attestation.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://attestation.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://attestation.app/about){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-code-16:](https://attestation.app/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://attestation.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
??? downloads
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.attestation.auditor.play)
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases)
- [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
Auditor performs attestation and intrusion detection by:
- Using a [Trust On First Use (TOFU)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_on_first_use) model between an *auditor* and *auditee*, the pair establish a private key in the [hardware-backed keystore](https://source.android.com/security/keystore/) of the *Auditor*.
- The *auditor* can either be another instance of the Auditor app or the [Remote Attestation Service](https://attestation.app).
- The *auditor* records the current state and configuration of the *auditee*.
- Should tampering with the operating system of the *auditee* happen after the pairing is complete, the auditor will be aware of the change in the device state and configurations.
- You will be alerted to the change.
No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service.
To make sure that your hardware and operating system is genuine, [perform local attestation](https://grapheneos.org/install/web#verifying-installation) immediately after the device has been installed and prior to any internet connection.
### Secure Camera
!!! recommendation
@ -321,9 +287,7 @@ Main privacy features include:
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ImranR98/Obtainium/releases)
Obtainium allows you to download APK installer files from a wide variety of sources, and it is up to you to ensure those sources and apps are legitimate. For example, using Obtainium to install Signal from [Signal's APK landing page](https://signal.org/android/apk/) should be fine, but installing from third-party APK repositories like Aptoide or APKPure may pose additional risks.
Obtainium can also be used to download apps from F-Droid repositories, and may serve as a useful alternative to the official F-Droid clients. However, we generally recommend against apps built by F-Droid or from unofficial F-Droid repositories: Read [our notes on F-Droid](#f-droid) below for more information.
Obtainium allows you to download APK installer files from a wide variety of sources, and it is up to you to ensure those sources and apps are legitimate. For example, using Obtainium to install Signal from [Signal's APK landing page](https://signal.org/android/apk/) should be fine, but installing from third-party APK repositories like Aptoide or APKPure may pose additional risks. The risk of installing a malicious *update* is lower, because Android itself verifies that all app updates are signed by the same developer as the existing app on your phone before installing them.
### GrapheneOS App Store
@ -340,6 +304,7 @@ The Google Play Store requires a Google account to login which is not great for
**Aurora Store** is a Google Play Store client which does not require a Google Account, Google Play Services, or microG to download apps.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://auroraoss.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore/-/blob/master/POLICY.md){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/AuroraOSS/AuroraStore){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
??? downloads
@ -350,7 +315,7 @@ Aurora Store does not allow you to download paid apps with their anonymous accou
### Manually with RSS Notifications
For apps that are released on platforms like GitHub and GitLab, you may be able to add an RSS feed to your [news aggregator](/news-aggregators) that will help you keep track of new releases.
For apps that are released on platforms like GitHub and GitLab, you may be able to add an RSS feed to your [news aggregator](news-aggregators.md) that will help you keep track of new releases.
![RSS APK](./assets/img/android/rss-apk-light.png#only-light) ![RSS APK](./assets/img/android/rss-apk-dark.png#only-dark) ![APK Changes](./assets/img/android/rss-changes-light.png#only-light) ![APK Changes](./assets/img/android/rss-changes-dark.png#only-dark)
@ -401,17 +366,17 @@ If you download APK files to install manually, you can verify their signature wi
![F-Droid logo](assets/img/android/f-droid.svg){ align=right width=120px }
==We do **not** currently recommend F-Droid as a way to obtain apps.== F-Droid is often recommended as an alternative to Google Play, particularly in the privacy community. The option to add third-party repositories and not be confined to Google's walled garden has led to its popularity. F-Droid additionally has [reproducible builds](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Reproducible_Builds/) for some applications and is dedicated to free and open-source software. However, there are [notable problems](https://privsec.dev/posts/android/f-droid-security-issues/) with the official F-Droid client, their quality control, and how they build, sign, and deliver packages.
==We only recommend F-Droid as a way to obtain apps which cannot be obtained via the means above.== F-Droid is often recommended as an alternative to Google Play, particularly in the privacy community. The option to add third-party repositories and not be confined to Google's walled garden has led to its popularity. F-Droid additionally has [reproducible builds](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Reproducible_Builds/) for some applications and is dedicated to free and open-source software. However, there are some security-related downsides to how F-Droid builds, signs, and delivers packages:
Due to their process of building apps, apps in the official F-Droid repository often fall behind on updates. F-Droid maintainers also reuse package IDs while signing apps with their own keys, which is not ideal as it gives the F-Droid team ultimate trust.
Due to their process of building apps, apps in the official F-Droid repository often fall behind on updates. F-Droid maintainers also reuse package IDs while signing apps with their own keys, which is not ideal as it gives the F-Droid team ultimate trust. Additionally, the requirements for an app to be included in the official F-Droid repo are less strict than other app stores like Google Play, meaning that F-Droid tends to host a lot more apps which are older, unmaintained, or otherwise no longer meet [modern security standards](https://developer.android.com/google/play/requirements/target-sdk).
Other popular third-party repositories such as [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) alleviate some of these concerns. The IzzyOnDroid repository pulls builds directly from GitHub and is the next best thing to the developers' own repositories. However, it is not something that we can recommend, as apps are typically [removed](https://github.com/vfsfitvnm/ViMusic/issues/240#issuecomment-1225564446) from that respository when they make it to the main F-Droid repository. While that makes sense (since the goal of that particular repository is to host apps before they're accepted into the main F-Droid repository), it can leave you with installed apps which no longer receive updates.
Other popular third-party repositories for F-Droid such as [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) alleviate some of these concerns. The IzzyOnDroid repository pulls builds directly from GitHub and is the next best thing to the developers' own repositories. However, it is not something that we can fully recommend, as apps are typically [removed](https://github.com/vfsfitvnm/ViMusic/issues/240#issuecomment-1225564446) from that repository if they are later added to the main F-Droid repository. While that makes sense (since the goal of that particular repository is to host apps before they're accepted into the main F-Droid repository), it can leave you with installed apps which no longer receive updates.
That said, the [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/) and [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) repositories are home to countless apps, so they can be a useful tool to search for and discover open-source apps that you can then download through Play Store, Aurora Store, or by getting the APK directly from the developer. It is important to keep in mind that some apps in these repositories have not been updated in years and may rely on unsupported libraries, among other things, posing a potential security risk. You should use your best judgement when looking for new apps via this method.
That said, the [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/) and [IzzyOnDroid](https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/) repositories are home to countless apps, so they can be a useful tool to search for and discover open-source apps that you can then download through other means such as the Play Store, Aurora Store, or by getting the APK directly from the developer. You should use your best judgement when looking for new apps via this method, and keep an eye on how frequently the app is updated. Outdated apps may rely on unsupported libraries, among other things, posing a potential security risk.
!!! note
!!! note "F-Droid Basic"
In some rare cases, the developer of an app will only distribute it through F-Droid ([Gadgetbridge](https://gadgetbridge.org/) is one example of this). If you really need an app like that, we recommend using [Neo Store](https://github.com/NeoApplications/Neo-Store/) instead of the official F-Droid app to obtain it.
In some rare cases, the developer of an app will only distribute it through F-Droid ([Gadgetbridge](https://gadgetbridge.org/) is one example of this). If you really need an app like that, we recommend using the newer [F-Droid Basic](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.basic/) client instead of the original F-Droid app to obtain it. F-Droid Basic can do unattended updates without privileged extension or root, and has a reduced feature set (limiting attack surface).
## Criteria

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@ -53,17 +53,21 @@ When you sign in with OAuth, it will open a login page with the provider you cho
The main advantages are:
- **Security**: no risk of being involved in a [data breach](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_breach) because the website does not store your credentials.
- **Security**: you don't have to trust the security practices of the service you're logging into when it comes to storing your login credentials, because they are stored with the external OAuth provider, which when it comes to services like Apple and Google typically follow the best security practices, continuously audit their authentication systems, and don't store credentials inappropriately (such as in plain text).
- **Ease of use**: multiple accounts are managed by a single login.
But there are disadvantages:
- **Privacy**: the OAuth provider you log in with will know the services you use.
- **Centralization**: if the account you use for OAuth is compromised or you aren't able to login to it, all other accounts connected to it are affected.
- **Centralization**: if the account you use for OAuth is compromised, or you aren't able to log in to it, all other accounts connected to it are affected.
OAuth authentication can be especially useful in those situations where you could benefit from deeper integration between services. Our recommendation is to limit using OAuth to only where you need it, and always protect the main account with [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md).
OAuth can be especially useful in those situations where you could benefit from deeper integration between services. Our recommendation is to limit using OAuth to only where you need it, and always protect the main account with [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md).
All the services that use OAuth will be as secure as your underlying provider's account. For example, if you want to secure an account with a hardware key, but that service doesn't support hardware keys, you can secure the account you use with OAuth with a hardware key instead, and now you essentially have hardware MFA on all your accounts. It is worth noting though that weak authentication on your OAuth provider account means that any account tied to that login will also be weak.
All the services that use OAuth will be as secure as your underlying OAuth provider's account. For example, if you want to secure an account with a hardware key, but that service doesn't support hardware keys, you can secure the account you use with OAuth with a hardware key instead, and now you essentially have hardware MFA on all your accounts. It is worth noting though that weak authentication on your OAuth provider account means that any account tied to that login will also be weak.
There is an additional danger when using *Sign in with Google*, *Facebook*, or another service, which is that typically the OAuth process allows for *bidirectional* data sharing. For example, logging in to a forum with your Twitter account could grant that forum access to do things on your Twitter account such as post, read your messages, or access other personal data. OAuth providers will typically present you with a list of things you are granting the external service access to, and you should always ensure that you read through that list and don't inadvertently grant the external service access to anything it doesn't require.
Malicious applications, particularly on mobile devices where the application has access to the WebView session used for logging in to the OAuth provider, can also abuse this process by hijacking your session with the OAuth provider and gaining access to your OAuth account through those means. Using the *Sign in with* option with any provider should usually be considered a matter of convenience that you only use with services you trust to not be actively malicious.
### Phone number

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@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ schema:
mainEntity:
-
"@type": Question
name: Is open source software inherently secure?
name: Is open-source software inherently secure?
acceptedAnswer:
"@type": Answer
text: |

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@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ To minimize the damage that a malicious piece of software *could* do, you should
Mobile operating systems generally have better application sandboxing than desktop operating systems: Apps can't obtain root access, and require permission for access to system resources.
Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS has similar sandboxing capabilities to Android, and macOS has full system permission control (and developers can opt-in to sandboxing for applications). However, these operating systems do transmit identifying information to their respective OEMs. Linux tends to not submit information to system vendors, but it has poor protection against exploits and malicious apps. This can be mitigated somewhat with specialized distributions which make significant use of virtual machines or containers, such as [Qubes OS](../../desktop/#qubes-os).
Desktop operating systems generally lag behind on proper sandboxing. ChromeOS has similar sandboxing capabilities to Android, and macOS has full system permission control (and developers can opt-in to sandboxing for applications). However, these operating systems do transmit identifying information to their respective OEMs. Linux tends to not submit information to system vendors, but it has poor protection against exploits and malicious apps. This can be mitigated somewhat with specialized distributions which make significant use of virtual machines or containers, such as [Qubes OS](../desktop.md#qubes-os).
<span class="pg-red">:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks</span>

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@ -5,70 +5,106 @@ icon: material/vpn
description: Virtual Private Networks shift risk away from your ISP to a third-party you trust. You should keep these things in mind.
---
Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit somewhere else in the world. An ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (i.e. modem).
Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit somewhere else in the world.
Encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, so they may not be able to see exactly what you're posting or reading, but they can get an idea of the [domains you request](../advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).
Normally, an ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (i.e. modem). Encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, so they may not be able to see exactly what you're posting or reading, but they can get an idea of the [domains you request](../advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).
A VPN can help as it can shift trust to a server somewhere else in the world. As a result, the ISP then only sees that you are connected to a VPN and nothing about the activity that you're passing into it.
Using a VPN hides even this information from your ISP, by shifting the trust you place in your network to a server somewhere else in the world. As a result, the ISP then only sees that you are connected to a VPN and nothing about the activity that you're passing through it.
!!! note
When we refer to "Virtual Private Networks" on this website, we are usually referring to **commercial** [VPN providers](../vpn.md), who you pay a monthly fee to in exchange for routing your internet traffic securely through their public servers. There are many other forms of VPN, such as ones you host yourself or ones operated by workplaces which allow you to securely connect to internal/employee network resources, however, these VPNs are usually designed for accessing remote networks securely, rather than protecting the privacy of your internet connection.
## How does a VPN work?
VPNs encrypt your traffic between your device and a server owned by your VPN provider. From the perspective of anyone between you and the VPN server, it looks like you're connecting to the VPN server. From the perspective of anyone between the VPN server and your destination site, all they can see is the VPN server connecting to the website.
``` mermaid
flowchart LR
763931["Your Device<div>(with VPN Client)</div>"] ===|"VPN Encryption"| 404512{"VPN Server"}
404512 -.-|"No VPN Encryption"| 593753((("The Internet\n(Your Destination)")))
subgraph 763931["Your Device<div>(with VPN Client)</div>"]
end
```
Note that a VPN does not add any security or encryption to your traffic between the VPN server and your destination on the internet. To access a website securely you **must** still ensure HTTPS is in use regardless of whether you use a VPN.
## Should I use a VPN?
**Yes**, unless you are already using Tor. A VPN does two things: shifting the risks from your Internet Service Provider to itself and hiding your IP from a third-party service.
VPNs cannot encrypt data outside of the connection between your device and the VPN server. VPN providers can see and modify your traffic the same way your ISP could. And there is no way to verify a VPN provider's "no logging" policies in any way.
However, they do hide your actual IP from a third-party service, provided that there are no IP leaks. They help you blend in with others and mitigate IP based tracking.
## When shouldn't I use a VPN?
Using a VPN in cases where you're using your [known identity](common-misconceptions.md#complicated-is-better) is unlikely be useful.
Doing so may trigger spam and fraud detection systems, such as if you were to log into your bank's website.
## What about encryption?
Encryption offered by VPN providers are between your devices and their servers. It guarantees that this specific link is secure. This is a step up from using unencrypted proxies where an adversary on the network can intercept the communications between your devices and said proxies and modify them. However, encryption between your apps or browsers with the service providers are not handled by this encryption.
In order to keep what you actually do on the websites you visit private and secure, you must use HTTPS. This will keep your passwords, session tokens, and queries safe from the VPN provider. Consider enabling "HTTPS everywhere" in your browser to mitigate downgrade attacks like [SSL Strip](https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Marlinspike/BlackHat-DC-09-Marlinspike-Defeating-SSL.pdf).
## Should I use encrypted DNS with a VPN?
Unless your VPN provider hosts the encrypted DNS servers, **no**. Using DOH/DOT (or any other form of encrypted DNS) with third-party servers will simply add more entities to trust and does **absolutely nothing** to improve your privacy/security. Your VPN provider can still see which websites you visit based on the IP addresses and other methods. Instead of just trusting your VPN provider, you are now trusting both the VPN provider and the DNS provider.
A common reason to recommend encrypted DNS is that it helps against DNS spoofing. However, your browser should already be checking for [TLS certificates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Digital_certificates) with **HTTPS** and warn you about it. If you are not using **HTTPS**, then an adversary can still just modify anything other than your DNS queries and the end result will be little different.
Needless to say, **you shouldn't use encrypted DNS with Tor**. This would direct all of your DNS requests through a single circuit and would allow the encrypted DNS provider to deanonymize you.
## Should I use Tor *and* a VPN?
By using a VPN with Tor, you're creating essentially a permanent entry node, often with a money trail attached. This provides zero additional benefits to you, while increasing the attack surface of your connection dramatically. If you wish to hide your Tor usage from your ISP or your government, Tor has a built-in solution for that: Tor bridges. [Read more about Tor bridges and why using a VPN is not necessary](../advanced/tor-overview.md).
## What if I need anonymity?
VPNs cannot provide anonymity. Your VPN provider will still see your real IP address, and often has a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. You cannot rely on "no logging" policies to protect your data. Use [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) instead.
## What about VPN providers that provide Tor nodes?
Do not use that feature. The point of using Tor is that you do not trust your VPN provider. Currently Tor only supports the [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol) protocol. [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol) (used in [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC) for voice and video sharing, the new [HTTP3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) protocol, etc.), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol) and other packets will be dropped. To compensate for this, VPN providers typically will route all non-TCP packets through their VPN server (your first hop). This is the case with [ProtonVPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn/). Additionally, when using this Tor over VPN setup, you do not have control over other important Tor features such as [Isolated Destination Address](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (using a different Tor circuit for every domain you visit).
The feature should be viewed as a convenient way to access the Tor Network, not to stay anonymous. For proper anonymity, use the Tor Browser, TorSocks, or a Tor gateway.
## When are VPNs useful?
A VPN may still be useful to you in a variety of scenarios, such as:
**Yes**, almost certainly. A VPN has many advantages, including:
1. Hiding your traffic from **only** your Internet Service Provider.
1. Hiding your downloads (such as torrents) from your ISP and anti-piracy organizations.
1. Hiding your IP from third-party websites and services, preventing IP based tracking.
1. Hiding your IP from third-party websites and services, helping you blend in and preventing IP based tracking.
1. Allowing you to bypass geo-restrictions on certain content.
For situations like these, or if you have another compelling reason, the VPN providers we listed above are who we think are the most trustworthy. However, using a VPN provider still means you're *trusting* the provider. In pretty much any other scenario you should be using a secure**-by-design** tool such as Tor.
VPNs can provide *some* of the same benefits Tor provides, such as hiding your IP from the websites you visit and geographically shifting your network traffic, and good VPN providers will not cooperate with e.g. legal authorities from oppressive regimes, especially if you choose a VPN provider outside your own jurisdiction.
## Sources and Further Reading
VPNs cannot encrypt data outside the connection between your device and the VPN server. VPN providers can also see and modify your traffic the same way your ISP could, so there is still a level of trust you are placing in them. And there is no way to verify a VPN provider's "no logging" policies in any way.
1. [VPN - a Very Precarious Narrative](https://schub.io/blog/2019/04/08/very-precarious-narrative.html) by Dennis Schubert
1. [Tor Network Overview](../advanced/tor-overview.md)
1. [IVPN Privacy Guides](https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides)
1. ["Do I need a VPN?"](https://www.doineedavpn.com), a tool developed by IVPN to challenge aggressive VPN marketing by helping individuals decide if a VPN is right for them.
## When isn't a VPN suitable?
Using a VPN in cases where you're using your [real-life or well-known identity](common-misconceptions.md#complicated-is-better) online is unlikely be useful. Doing so may trigger spam and fraud detection systems, such as if you were to log into your bank's website.
It's important to remember that a VPN will not provide you with absolute anonymity, because the VPN provider itself will still see your real IP address, destination website information, and often has a money trail that can be linked directly back to you. You can't rely on "no logging" policies to protect your data from anyone who is able to protect. If you need complete safety from the network itself, consider using [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) in addition to or instead of a VPN.
You also should not trust a VPN to secure your connection to an unencrypted, HTTP destination. In order to keep what you actually do on the websites you visit private and secure, you must use HTTPS. This will keep your passwords, session tokens, and queries safe from the VPN provider and other potential adversaries in between the VPN server and your destination. You should enable HTTPS-only mode in your browser (if it's supported) to mitigate attacks which try to downgrade your connection from HTTPS to HTTP.
## Should I use encrypted DNS with a VPN?
Unless your VPN provider hosts the encrypted DNS servers themselves, **probably not**. Using DOH/DOT (or any other form of encrypted DNS) with third-party servers will simply add more entities to trust. Your VPN provider can still see which websites you visit based on the IP addresses and other methods. All this being said, there may be some advantages to enabling encrypted DNS in order to enable other security features in your browser, such as ECH. Browser technologies which are reliant on in-browser encrypted DNS are relatively new and not yet widespread, so whether they are relevant to you in particular is an exercise we will leave to you to research independently.
Another common reason encrypted DNS is recommended is that it prevents DNS spoofing. However, your browser should already be checking for [TLS certificates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Digital_certificates) with **HTTPS** and warn you about it. If you are not using **HTTPS**, then an adversary can still just modify anything other than your DNS queries and the end result will be little different.
## Should I use Tor *and* a VPN?
Maybe, Tor is not necessarily suitable for everybody in the first place. Consider your [threat model](threat-modeling.md), because if your adversary is not capable of extracting information from your VPN provider, using a VPN alone may provide enough protection.
If you do use Tor then you are *probably* best off connecting to the Tor network via a commercial VPN provider. However, this is a complex subject which we've written more about on our [Tor overview](../advanced/tor-overview.md) page.
## Should I access Tor through VPN providers that provide "Tor nodes"?
You should not use that feature: The primary advantage of using Tor is that you do not trust your VPN provider, which is negated when you use Tor nodes hosted by your VPN instead of connecting directly to Tor from your computer.
Currently, Tor only supports the TCP protocol. UDP (used by [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC), [HTTP3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3), and other protocols), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol), and other packets will be dropped. To compensate for this, VPN providers typically will route all non-TCP packets through their VPN server (your first hop). This is the case with [ProtonVPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn/). Additionally, when using this Tor over VPN setup, you do not have control over other important Tor features such as [Isolated Destination Address](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (using a different Tor circuit for every domain you visit).
The feature should be viewed as a *convenient* way to access hidden services on Tor, not to stay anonymous. For proper anonymity, use the actual [Tor Browser](../tor.md).
## Commercial VPN Ownership
Most VPN services are owned by the same [few companies](https://vpnpro.com/blog/hidden-vpn-owners-unveiled-97-vpns-23-companies/). These shady companies run lots of smaller VPN services to create the illusion that you have more choice than you actually do and to maximize profit. Typically, these providers that feed into their shell company have terrible privacy policies and shouldn't be trusted with your internet traffic. You should be very strict about which provider you decide to use.
You should also be wary that many VPN review sites are merely advertising vehicles open to the highest bidder. ==Privacy Guides does not make money from recommending external products, and never uses affiliate programs.==
[Our VPN Recommendations](../vpn.md){ .md-button }
## Modern VPN Alternatives
Recently, some attempts have been made by various organizations to address some issues which centralized VPNs have. These technologies are relatively new, but worth keeping an eye on as the field develops.
### Multi-Party Relays
Multi-Party Relays (MPRs) use multiple nodes owned by different parties, such that no individual party knows both who you are and what you're connecting to. This is the basic idea behind Tor, but now there are some paid services that try to emulate this model.
MPRs seek to solve a problem inherent to VPNs: the fact that you must trust them completely. They accomplish this goal by segmenting the responsibilities between two or more different companies. For example, Apple's iCloud+ Private Relay routes your traffic through two servers:
1. Firstly, a server operated by Apple.
This server is able to see your device's IP when you connect to it, and has knowledge of your payment information and Apple ID tied to your iCloud subscription. However, it is unable to see what website you are connecting to.
2. Secondly, a server operated by a partner CDN, such as Cloudflare or Fastly.
This server actually makes the connection to your destination website, but has no knowledge of your device. The only IP address it knows about is Apple's server's.
Other MPRs run by different companies like Google or INVISV operate in a very similar manner. This protection by segmentation only exists if you trust the two companies to not collude with each other to deanonymize you.
### Decentralized VPNs
Another attempt at solving the issues with centralized VPN services are dVPNs. These are based on blockchain technology and claim to eliminate trust in a single party by distributing the nodes across lots of different people. However, many times a dVPN will default to a single node, meaning you need to trust that node completely, just like a traditional VPN. Unlike a traditional VPN, this one node that can see all your traffic is a random person instead of your VPN provider that can be audited and has legal responsibilities to uphold their privacy policy. Multi-hop is needed to solve this, but that comes with a stability and performance cost.
Another consideration is legal liability. The exit node will need to deal with legal problems from misuse of the network, an issue that the Tor network has contended with for its entire existence. This discourages regular people from running nodes and makes it more attractive for a malicious actor with lots of resources to host one. This is a big problem if the service is single-node, as the potentially malicious exit node can see who you are and what you're connecting to.
Many dVPNs are used to push a cryptocurrency rather than to make the best service. They also tend to be smaller networks with fewer nodes, making them more vulnerable to [Sybil attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sybil_attack).
## Related VPN Information
@ -76,3 +112,4 @@ For situations like these, or if you have another compelling reason, the VPN pro
- [Free VPN App Investigation](https://www.top10vpn.com/free-vpn-app-investigation/)
- [Hidden VPN owners unveiled: 101 VPN products run by just 23 companies](https://vpnpro.com/blog/hidden-vpn-owners-unveiled-97-vpns-23-companies/)
- [This Chinese company is secretly behind 24 popular apps seeking dangerous permissions](https://vpnpro.com/blog/chinese-company-secretly-behind-popular-apps-seeking-dangerous-permissions/)
- [VPN - a Very Precarious Narrative](https://schub.io/blog/2019/04/08/very-precarious-narrative.html) by Dennis Schubert

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@ -50,4 +50,4 @@ Privacy is something we need to have baked into the [software and services](../t
- [Why Privacy Matters](https://www.amazon.com/Why-Privacy-Matters-Neil-Richards/dp/0190939044) (2021) by Neil Richards
- [The New Oil: Why Privacy & Security Matter](https://thenewoil.org/en/guides/prologue/why/)
- [@Thorin-Oakenpants on GitHub](https://github.com/privacytools/privacytools.io/issues/1760#issuecomment-597497298)
- [@Thorin-Oakenpants on Anonymity vs Privacy vs Security](https://code.privacyguides.dev/privacyguides/privacytools.io/issues/1760#issuecomment-10452)

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@ -6,32 +6,31 @@ cover: calendar.webp
---
Calendars contain some of your most sensitive data; use products that implement E2EE at rest to prevent a provider from reading them.
## Tutanota
## Tuta
!!! recommendation
![Tutanota logo](assets/img/calendar/tutanota.svg#only-light){ align=right }
![Tutanota logo](assets/img/calendar/tutanota-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
![Tuta logo](assets/img/calendar/tuta.svg){ align=right }
**Tutanota** offers a free and encrypted calendar across their supported platforms. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, multi-factor authentication, and [more](https://tutanota.com/calendar-app-comparison/).
**Tuta** offers a free and encrypted calendar across their supported platforms. Features include: automatic E2EE of all data, sharing features, import/export functionality, multi-factor authentication, and [more](https://tuta.com/calendar-app-comparison/).
Multiple calendars and extended sharing functionality is limited to paid subscribers.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tutanota.com/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://tutanota.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://tutanota.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tuta.com/calendar){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://tuta.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://tuta.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://tutanota.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://tuta.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
??? downloads
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/tutanota/id922429609)
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
- [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/com.tutanota.Tutanota)
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.tutanota.com/)
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tuta.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tuta.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tuta.com/blog/posts/desktop-clients/)
- [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/com.tutanota.Tutanota)
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://app.tuta.com/)
## Proton Calendar
@ -49,6 +48,7 @@ Calendars contain some of your most sensitive data; use products that implement
??? downloads
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=me.proton.android.calendar)
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id1514709943)
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://calendar.proton.me)
## Criteria

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@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ They have also received the Digital Trust Label, a certification from the [Swiss
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
- Clients should be open-source.
- Clients should be open source.
- Clients should be audited in their entirety by an independent third-party.
- Should offer native clients for Linux, Android, Windows, macOS, and iOS.
- These clients should integrate with native OS tools for cloud storage providers, such as Files app integration on iOS, or DocumentsProvider functionality on Android.

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@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ When sharing files, be sure to remove associated metadata. Image files commonly
![MAT2 logo](assets/img/data-redaction/mat2.svg){ align=right }
**MAT2** is free software, which allows the metadata to be removed from image, audio, torrent, and document file types. It provides both a command line tool and a graphical user interface via an [extension for Nautilus](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/tree/master/nautilus), the default file manager of [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), and [Dolphin](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/tree/master/dolphin), the default file manager of [KDE](https://kde.org).
**MAT2** is free software, which allows the metadata to be removed from image, audio, torrent, and document file types. It provides both a command line tool and a graphical user interface via an extension for [Dolphin](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2/-/tree/master/dolphin), the default file manager of [KDE](https://kde.org).
On Linux, a third-party graphical tool [Metadata Cleaner](https://gitlab.com/rmnvgr/metadata-cleaner) powered by MAT2 exists and is [available on Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/fr.romainvigier.MetadataCleaner).
@ -54,19 +54,19 @@ When sharing files, be sure to remove associated metadata. Image files commonly
The metadata that is erased depends on the image's file type:
* **JPEG**: ICC Profile, Exif, Photoshop Image Resources and XMP/ExtendedXMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
* **PNG**: ICC Profile, Exif and XMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
* **WebP**: ICC Profile, Exif and XMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
- **JPEG**: ICC Profile, Exif, Photoshop Image Resources and XMP/ExtendedXMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
- **PNG**: ICC Profile, Exif and XMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
- **WebP**: ICC Profile, Exif and XMP metadata will be erased if it exists.
After processing the images, ExifEraser provides you with a full report about what exactly was removed from each image.
The app offers multiple ways to erase metadata from images. Namely:
* You can share an image from another application with ExifEraser.
* Through the app itself, you can select a single image, multiple images at once, or even an entire directory.
* It features a "Camera" option, which uses your operating system's camera app to take a photo, and then it removes the metadata from it.
* It allows you to drag photos from another app into ExifEraser when they are both open in split-screen mode.
* Lastly, it allows you to paste an image from your clipboard.
- You can share an image from another application with ExifEraser.
- Through the app itself, you can select a single image, multiple images at once, or even an entire directory.
- It features a "Camera" option, which uses your operating system's camera app to take a photo, and then it removes the metadata from it.
- It allows you to drag photos from another app into ExifEraser when they are both open in split-screen mode.
- Lastly, it allows you to paste an image from your clipboard.
### Metapho (iOS)
@ -142,5 +142,5 @@ The app offers multiple ways to erase metadata from images. Namely:
We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
- Apps developed for open-source operating systems must be open-source.
- Apps developed for open-source operating systems must be open source.
- Apps must be free and should not include ads or other limitations.

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@ -179,6 +179,14 @@ Additionally, the Firefox Accounts service collects [some technical data](https:
This prevents you from unintentionally connecting to a website in plain-text HTTP. Sites without HTTPS are uncommon nowadays, so this should have little to no impact on your day to day browsing.
##### DNS over HTTPS
If you use a [DNS over HTTPS provider](dns.md):
- [x] Select **Max Protection** and choose a suitable provider
Max Protection enforces the use of DNS over HTTPS, and a security warning will show if Firefox cant connect to your secure DNS resolver, or if your secure DNS resolver says that records for the domain you are trying to access do not exist. This stops the network you're connected to from secretly downgrading your DNS security.
#### Sync
[Firefox Sync](https://hacks.mozilla.org/2018/11/firefox-sync-privacy/) allows your browsing data (history, bookmarks, etc.) to be accessible on all your devices and protects it with E2EE.
@ -218,6 +226,12 @@ Arkenfox only aims to thwart basic or naive tracking scripts through canvas rand
1. We advise against using the Flatpak version of Brave, as it replaces Chromium's sandbox with Flatpak's, which is less effective. Additionally, the package is not maintained by Brave Software, Inc.
**macOS users:** The download for Brave Browser from their official website is a `.pkg` installer which requires admin privileges to run (and may run other unnecessary scripts on your machine). As an alternative, you can download the latest `Brave-Browser-universal.dmg` file from their [GitHub releases](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/releases/latest) page, which provides a traditional "drag to Applications folder" install.
!!! warning
Brave adds a "[referral code](https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/wiki/Brave%E2%80%99s-Use-of-Referral-Codes)" to the file name in downloads from the Brave website, which is used to track which source the browser was downloaded from, for example `BRV002` in a download named `Brave-Browser-BRV002.pkg`. The installer will then ping Brave's server with the referral code at the end of the installation process. If you're concerned about this, you can rename the installer file before opening it.
### Recommended Configuration
These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings**.

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@ -119,11 +119,9 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if theres no pre-built available in th
Whonix is meant to run as two virtual machines: a “Workstation” and a Tor “Gateway.” All communications from the Workstation must go through the Tor gateway. This means that even if the Workstation is compromised by malware of some kind, the true IP address remains hidden.
Some of its features include Tor Stream Isolation, [keystroke anonymization](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Keystroke_Deanonymization#Kloak), [encrypted swap](https://github.com/Whonix/swap-file-creator), and a hardened memory allocator.
Some of its features include Tor Stream Isolation, [keystroke anonymization](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Keystroke_Deanonymization#Kloak), [encrypted swap](https://github.com/Whonix/swap-file-creator), and a hardened memory allocator. Future versions of Whonix will likely include [full system AppArmor policies](https://github.com/Whonix/apparmor-profile-everything) and a [sandbox app launcher](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Sandbox-app-launcher) to fully confine all processes on the system.
Future versions of Whonix will likely include [full system AppArmor policies](https://github.com/Whonix/apparmor-profile-everything) and a [sandbox app launcher](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Sandbox-app-launcher) to fully confine all processes on the system.
Whonix is best used [in conjunction with Qubes](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Why_use_Qubes_over_other_Virtualizers), Qubes-Whonix has various [disadvantages](https://forums.whonix.org/t/qubes-whonix-security-disadvantages-help-wanted/8581) when compared to other hypervisors.
Whonix is best used [in conjunction with Qubes](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Why_use_Qubes_over_other_Virtualizers). We have a [recommended guide](os/qubes-overview.md#connecting-to-tor-via-a-vpn) on configuring Whonix in conjunction with a VPN ProxyVM in Qubes to hide your Tor activities from your ISP.
### Tails
@ -184,7 +182,7 @@ While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually ou
Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards:
- Free and open-source.
- Free and open source.
- Receives regular software and kernel updates.
- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland).
- The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other.

202
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@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
---
title: "Device Integrity"
icon: material/security
description: These tools can be used to check your devices for compromise.
cover: device-integrity.webp
---
These tools can be used to validate the integrity of your mobile devices and check them for indicators of compromise by spyware and malware such as Pegasus, Predator, or KingsPawn. This page focuses on **mobile security**, because mobile devices typically have read-only systems with well-known configurations, so detecting malicious modifications is easier than on traditional desktop systems. We may expand the focus of this page in the future.
!!! note "This is an advanced topic"
These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functionality which most people do not need to worry about, and often require more in-depth technical knowledge to use effectively.
It is **critical** to understand that scanning your device for public indicators of compromise is **not sufficient** to determine that a device is "clean", and not targeted with a particular spyware tool. Reliance on these publicly-available scanning tools can miss recent security developments and give you a false sense of security.
## General Advice
The majority of system-level exploits on modern mobile devices—especially zero-click compromises—are non-persistent, meaning they will not remain or run automatically after a reboot. For this reason, we highly recommend rebooting your device regularly. We recommend everybody reboot their devices once a week at minimum, but if non-persistent malware is of particular concern for you, we and many security experts recommend a daily reboot schedule.
This means an attacker would have to regularly re-infect your device to retain access, although we'll note this is not impossible. Rebooting your device also will not protect you against *persistent* malware, but this is less common on mobile devices due to modern security features like secure/verified boot.
## Post-Compromise Information & Disclaimer
If any of the following tools indicate a potential compromise by spyware such as Pegasus, Predator, or KingsPawn, we advise that you contact:
- If you are a human rights defender, journalist, or from a civil society organization: [Amnesty International's Security Lab](https://securitylab.amnesty.org/contact-us/)
- If a business or government device is compromised: Contact the appropriate security liason at your enterprise, department, or agency
- Local law enforcement
**We are unable to help you directly beyond this.** We are happy to discuss your specific situation or circumstances and review your results in our [community](https://discuss.privacyguides.net) spaces, but it is unlikely we can assist you beyond what is written on this page.
The tools on this page are only capable of detecting indicators of compromise, not removing them. If you are concerned about having been compromised, we advise that you:
- Consider replacing the device completely
- Consider changing your SIM/eSIM number
- Not restore from a backup, because that backup may be compromised
These tools provide analysis based on the information they have the ability to access from your device, and publicly-accessible indicators of compromise. It is important to keep in mind two things:
1. Indicators of compromise are just that: *indicators*. They are not a definitive finding, and may occasionally be **false positives**. If an indicator of compromise is detected, it means you should do additional research into the *potential* threat.
2. The indicators of compromise these tools look for are published by threat research organizations, but not all indicators are made available to the public! This means that these tools can present a **false negative**, if your device is infected with spyware which is not detected by any of the public indicators. Reliable and comprehensive digital forensic support and triage requires access to non-public indicators, research and threat intelligence.
## External Verification Tools
External verification tools run on your computer and scan your mobile device for forensic traces which are helpful to identify potential compromise.
!!! danger
Public indicators of compromise are insufficient to determine that a device is "clean", and not targeted with a particular spyware tool. Reliance on public indicators alone can miss recent forensic traces and give a false sense of security.
Reliable and comprehensive digital forensic support and triage requires access to non-public indicators, research and threat intelligence.
Such support is available to civil society through [Amnesty International's Security Lab](https://www.amnesty.org/en/tech/) or [Access Nows Digital Security Helpline](https://www.accessnow.org/help/).
These tools can trigger false-positives. If any of these tools finds indicators of compromise, you need to dig deeper to determine your actual risk. Some reports may be false positives based on websites you've visited in the past, and findings which are many years old are likely either false-positives or indicate previous (and no longer active) compromise.
### Mobile Verification Toolkit
!!! recommendation
![MVT logo](assets/img/device-integrity/mvt.webp){ align=right }
**Mobile Verification Toolkit** (**MVT**) is a collection of utilities which simplifies and automates the process of scanning mobile devices for potential traces of targeting or infection by known spyware campaigns. MVT was developed by Amnesty International and released in 2021 in the context of the [Pegasus Project](https://forbiddenstories.org/about-the-pegasus-project/).
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mvt.re/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mvt-project/mvt){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
??? downloads
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://docs.mvt.re/en/latest/install/)
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://docs.mvt.re/en/latest/install/)
!!! warning
Using MVT is insufficient to determine that a device is "clean", and not targeted with a particular spyware tool.
MVT is *most* useful for scanning iOS devices. Android stores very little diagnostic information useful to triage potential compromises, and because of this `mvt-android` capabilities are limited as well. On the other hand, encrypted iOS iTunes backups provide a large enough subset of files stored on the device to detect suspicious artifacts in many cases. This being said, MVT does still provide fairly useful tools for both iOS and Android analysis.
If you use iOS and are at high-risk, we have three additional suggestions for you:
1. Create and keep regular (monthly) iTunes backups. This allows you to find and diagnose past infections later with MVT, if new threats are discovered in the future.
2. Trigger *sysdiagnose* logs often and back them up externally. These logs can provide invaluable data to future forensic investigators if need be.
The process to do so varies by model, but you can trigger it on newer phones by holding down *Power* + *Volume Up* + *Volume Down* until you feel a brief vibration. After a few minutes, the timestamped *sysdiagnose* log will appear in **Settings** > **Privacy & Security** > **Analytics & Improvements** > **Analytics Data**.
3. Enable [Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode).
MVT allows you to perform deeper scans/analysis if your device is jailbroken. Unless you know what you are doing, **do not jailbreak or root your device.** Jailbreaking your device exposes it to considerable security risks.
### iMazing (iOS)
!!! recommendation
![iMazing logo](assets/img/device-integrity/imazing.png){ align=right }
**iMazing** provides a free spyware analyzer tool for iOS devices which acts as a GUI-wrapper for [MVT](#mobile-verification-toolkit). This can be much easier to run compared to MVT itself, which is a command-line tool designed for technologists and forensic investigators.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://imazing.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://imazing.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://imazing.com/spyware-analyzer){ .card-link title=Documentation}
??? downloads
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://imazing.com/download)
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://imazing.com/download)
iMazing automates and interactively guides you through the process of using [MVT](#mobile-verification-toolkit) to scan your device for publicly-accessible indicators of compromise published by various threat researchers. All of the information and warnings which apply to MVT apply to this tool as well, so we suggest you also familiarize yourself with the notes on MVT in the sections above.
## On-Device Verification
These are apps you can install which check your device and operating system for signs of tampering, and validate the identity of your device.
!!! warning
Using these apps is insufficient to determine that a device is "clean", and not targeted with a particular spyware tool.
### Auditor (Android)
!!! recommendation
![Auditor logo](assets/img/device-integrity/auditor.svg#only-light){ align=right }
![Auditor logo](assets/img/device-integrity/auditor-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
**Auditor** is an app which leverages hardware security features to provide device integrity monitoring by actively validating the identity of a device and the integrity of its operating system. Currently, it only works with GrapheneOS or the stock operating system for [supported devices](https://attestation.app/about#device-support).
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://attestation.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://attestation.app/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://attestation.app/about){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-code-16:](https://attestation.app/source){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://attestation.app/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
??? downloads
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.attestation.auditor.play)
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases)
- [:material-cube-outline: GrapheneOS App Store](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases)
Auditor is not a scanning/analysis tool like some other tools on this page, rather it uses your device's hardware-backed keystore to allow you to verify the identity of your device and gain assurance that the operating system itself hasn't been tampered with or downgraded via verified boot. This provides a very robust integrity check of your device itself, but doesn't necessarily check whether the user-level apps running on your device are malicious.
Auditor performs attestation and intrusion detection with **two** devices, an *auditee* (the device being verified) and an *auditor* (the device performing the verification). The auditor can be any Android 10+ device (or a remote web service operated by [GrapheneOS](android.md#grapheneos)), while the auditee must be a specifically [supported device](https://attestation.app/about#device-support). Auditor works by:
- Using a [Trust On First Use (TOFU)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_on_first_use) model between an *auditor* and *auditee*, the pair establish a private key in the [hardware-backed keystore](https://source.android.com/security/keystore/) of the *Auditor*.
- The *auditor* can either be another instance of the Auditor app or the [Remote Attestation Service](https://attestation.app).
- The *auditor* records the current state and configuration of the *auditee*.
- Should tampering with the operating system of the *auditee* happen after the pairing is complete, the auditor will be aware of the change in the device state and configurations.
- You will be alerted to the change.
It is important to note that Auditor can only effectively detect changes **after** the initial pairing, not necessarily during or before due to its TOFU model. To make sure that your hardware and operating system is genuine, [perform local attestation](https://grapheneos.org/install/web#verifying-installation) immediately after the device has been installed and prior to any internet connection.
No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.
If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires privacy, you could consider using [Orbot](tor.md#orbot) or a VPN to hide your IP address from the attestation service.
## On-Device Scanners
These are apps you can install on your device which scan your device for signs of compromise.
!!! warning
Using these apps is insufficient to determine that a device is "clean", and not targeted with a particular spyware tool.
### Hypatia (Android)
!!! recommendation
![Hypatia logo](assets/img/device-integrity/hypatia.svg#only-light){ align=right }
![Hypatia logo](assets/img/device-integrity/hypatia-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
**Hypatia** is an open source real-time malware scanner for Android, from the developer of [DivestOS](android.md#divestos). It accesses the internet to download signature database updates, but does not upload your files or any metadata to the cloud (scans are performed entirely locally).
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://divestos.org/pages/our_apps#hypatia){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://divestos.org/pages/privacy_policy#hypatia){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/divested-mobile/hypatia){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://divested.dev/pages/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
??? downloads
- [:simple-android: F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/packages/us.spotco.malwarescanner/)
Hypatia is particularly good at detecting common stalkerware: If you suspect you are a victim of stalkerware, you should [visit this page](https://stopstalkerware.org/information-for-survivors/) for advice.
### iVerify (iOS)
!!! recommendation
![iVerify logo](assets/img/device-integrity/iverify.webp){ align=right }
**iVerify** is an iOS app which automatically scans your device to check configuration settings, patch level, and other areas of security. It also checks your device for indicators of compromise by jailbreak tools or spyware such as Pegasus.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.iverify.io/consumer){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.iverify.io/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://www.iverify.io/frequently-asked-questions#iVerify-General){ .card-link title=Documentation}
??? downloads
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/iverify/id1466120520)
Like all iOS apps, iVerify is restricted to what it can observe about your device from within the iOS App Sandbox. It will not provide nearly as robust analysis as a full-system analysis tool like [MVT](#mobile-verification-toolkit). Its primary function is to detect whether your device is jailbroken, which it is effective at, however a hypothetical threat which is *specifically* designed to bypass iVerify's checks would likely succeed at doing so.
iVerify is **not** an "antivirus" tool, and will not detect non-system-level malware such as malicious custom keyboards or malicious Wi-Fi Sync configurations, for example.
In addition to device scanning, iVerify also includes a number of additional security utilities which you may find useful, including device reboot reminders, iOS update notifications (which are often faster than Apple's staggered update notification rollout), some basic privacy and security guides, and a DNS over HTTPS tool which can connect your device's [DNS](dns.md) queries securely to Quad9, Cloudflare, or Google.

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@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Encrypted DNS with third-party servers should only be used to get around basic [
| DNS Provider | Privacy Policy | Protocols | Logging | ECS | Filtering |
| ------------ | -------------- | --------- | ------- | --- | --------- |
| [**AdGuard**](https://adguard.com/en/adguard-dns/overview.html) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html) | Cleartext <br> DoH/3 <br> DoT <br> DNSCrypt | Some[^1] | No | Based on personal configuration. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardDNS)
| [**AdGuard**](https://adguard.com/en/adguard-dns/overview.html) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://adguard.com/en/privacy/dns.html) | Cleartext <br> DoH/3 <br> DoT <br> DoQ <br> DNSCrypt | Some[^1] | Yes | Based on personal configuration. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardDNS)
| [**Cloudflare**](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/setting-up-1.1.1.1/) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns-resolver/) | Cleartext <br> DoH/3 <br> DoT | Some[^2] | No | Based on personal configuration.|
| [**Control D**](https://controld.com/free-dns) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://controld.com/privacy) | Cleartext <br> DoH/3 <br> DoT <br> DoQ| Optional[^3] | No | Based on personal configuration. |
| [**Mullvad**](https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls) | [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy/) | DoH <br> DoT | No[^4] | No | Based on personal configuration. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/mullvad/dns-adblock)

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@ -145,13 +145,13 @@ Canary Mail is closed-source. We recommend it due to the few choices there are f
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://k9mail.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://k9mail.app/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.k9mail.app/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/k9mail/k-9){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/thundernest/k-9){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://k9mail.app/contribute){ .card-link title=Contribute }
??? downloads
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.fsck.k9)
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/k9mail/k-9/releases)
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/thundernest/k-9/releases)
!!! warning
@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ Canary Mail is closed-source. We recommend it due to the few choices there are f
### Minimum Qualifications
- Apps developed for open-source operating systems must be open-source.
- Apps developed for open-source operating systems must be open source.
- Must not collect telemetry, or have an easy way to disable all telemetry.
- Must support OpenPGP message encryption.
@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ Canary Mail is closed-source. We recommend it due to the few choices there are f
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
- Should be open-source.
- Should be open source.
- Should be cross-platform.
- Should not collect any telemetry by default.
- Should support OpenPGP natively, i.e. without extensions.

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@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ These providers store your emails with zero-knowledge encryption, making them gr
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
- ![Skiff Mail logo](assets/img/email/skiff-mail.svg){ .twemoji } [Skiff Mail](email.md#skiff-mail)
- ![Tutanota logo](assets/img/email/tutanota.svg){ .twemoji } [Tutanota](email.md#tutanota)
- ![Tuta logo](assets/img/email/tuta.svg){ .twemoji } [Tuta](email.md#tuta)
</div>
@ -211,63 +211,63 @@ Skiff additionally offers [workspace productivity features](https://discuss.priv
Skiff Mail does not offer a digital legacy feature.
### Tutanota
### Tuta
!!! recommendation
![Tutanota logo](assets/img/email/tutanota.svg){ align=right }
![Tuta logo](assets/img/email/tuta.svg){ align=right }
**Tutanota** is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of encryption. Tutanota has been in operation since **2011** and is based in Hanover, Germany. Accounts start with 1GB storage with their free plan.
**Tuta** is an email service with a focus on security and privacy through the use of encryption. Tuta has been in operation since **2011** and is based in Hanover, Germany. Accounts start with 1GB storage with their free plan.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tutanota.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://tutanota.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://tutanota.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tuta.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://tuta.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://tuta.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://tutanota.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://tuta.com/community/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
??? downloads
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.tutao.tutanota)
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/tutanota/id922429609)
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/releases)
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tutanota.com/#download)
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tutanota.com/#download)
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tutanota.com/#download)
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://mail.tutanota.com/)
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://tuta.com/#download)
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://tuta.com/#download)
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://tuta.com/#download)
- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://app.tuta.com/)
Tutanota doesn't support the [IMAP protocol](https://tutanota.com/faq/#imap) or the use of third-party [email clients](email-clients.md), and you also won't be able to add [external email accounts](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/544#issuecomment-670473647) to the Tutanota app. Neither [Email import](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/630) or [subfolders](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/927) are currently supported, though this is [due to be changed](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/kickoff-import). Emails can be exported [individually or by bulk selection](https://tutanota.com/howto#generalMail) per folder, which may be inconvenient if you have many folders.
Tuta doesn't support the [IMAP protocol](https://tuta.com/faq/#imap) or the use of third-party [email clients](email-clients.md), and you also won't be able to add [external email accounts](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/544#issuecomment-670473647) to the Tuta app. [Email import](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/630) is not currently supported either, though this is [due to be changed](https://tuta.com/blog/posts/kickoff-import). Emails can be exported [individually or by bulk selection](https://tuta.com/howto#generalMail) per folder, which may be inconvenient if you have many folders.
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Custom Domains and Aliases
Paid Tutanota accounts can use either 15 or 30 aliases depending on their plan and unlimited aliases on [custom domains](https://tutanota.com/faq#custom-domain). Tutanota doesn't allow for [subaddressing (plus addresses)](https://tutanota.com/faq#plus), but you can use a [catch-all](https://tutanota.com/howto#settings-global) with a custom domain.
Paid Tuta accounts can use either 15 or 30 aliases depending on their plan and unlimited aliases on [custom domains](https://tuta.com/faq#custom-domain). Tuta doesn't allow for [subaddressing (plus addresses)](https://tuta.com/faq#plus), but you can use a [catch-all](https://tuta.com/howto#settings-global) with a custom domain.
#### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Private Payment Methods
Tutanota only directly accepts credit cards and PayPal, however [cryptocurrency](cryptocurrency.md) can be used to purchase gift cards via their [partnership](https://tutanota.com/faq/#cryptocurrency) with Proxystore.
Tuta only directly accepts credit cards and PayPal, however [cryptocurrency](cryptocurrency.md) can be used to purchase gift cards via their [partnership](https://tuta.com/faq/#cryptocurrency) with Proxystore.
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Account Security
Tutanota supports [two factor authentication](https://tutanota.com/faq#2fa) with either TOTP or U2F.
Tuta supports [two factor authentication](https://tuta.com/faq#2fa) with either TOTP or U2F.
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Data Security
Tutanota has [zero access encryption at rest](https://tutanota.com/faq#what-encrypted) for your emails, [address book contacts](https://tutanota.com/faq#encrypted-address-book), and [calendars](https://tutanota.com/faq#calendar). This means the messages and other data stored in your account are only readable by you.
Tuta has [zero access encryption at rest](https://tuta.com/faq#what-encrypted) for your emails, [address book contacts](https://tuta.com/faq#encrypted-address-book), and [calendars](https://tuta.com/faq#calendar). This means the messages and other data stored in your account are only readable by you.
#### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Email Encryption
Tutanota [does not use OpenPGP](https://www.tutanota.com/faq/#pgp). Tutanota accounts can only receive encrypted emails from non-Tutanota email accounts when sent via a [temporary Tutanota mailbox](https://www.tutanota.com/howto/#encrypted-email-external).
Tuta [does not use OpenPGP](https://tuta.com/support/#pgp). Tuta accounts can only receive encrypted emails from non-Tuta email accounts when sent via a [temporary Tuta mailbox](https://tuta.com/support/#encrypted-email-external).
#### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Account Termination
Tutanota will [delete inactive free accounts](https://tutanota.com/faq#inactive-accounts) after six months. You can reuse a deactivated free account if you pay.
Tuta will [delete inactive free accounts](https://tuta.com/faq#inactive-accounts) after six months. You can reuse a deactivated free account if you pay.
#### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Additional Functionality
Tutanota offers the business version of [Tutanota to non-profit organizations](https://tutanota.com/blog/posts/secure-email-for-non-profit) for free or with a heavy discount.
Tuta offers the business version of [Tuta to non-profit organizations](https://tuta.com/blog/posts/secure-email-for-non-profit) for free or with a heavy discount.
Tutanota also has a business feature called [Secure Connect](https://tutanota.com/secure-connect/). This ensures customer contact to the business uses E2EE. The feature costs €240/y.
Tuta also has a business feature called [Secure Connect](https://tuta.com/secure-connect/). This ensures customer contact to the business uses E2EE. The feature costs €240/y.
Tutanota doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
Tuta doesn't offer a digital legacy feature.
## Email Aliasing Services

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@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ When encrypting with PGP, you have the option to configure different options in
### Minimum Qualifications
- Cross-platform encryption apps must be open-source.
- Cross-platform encryption apps must be open source.
- File encryption apps must support decryption on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
- External disk encryption apps must support decryption on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
- Internal (OS) disk encryption apps must be cross-platform or built in to the operating system natively.

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@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ When you are using an instance run by someone else, make sure to read the privac
![ProxiTok logo](assets/img/frontends/proxitok.svg){ align=right }
**ProxiTok** is an open source frontend to the [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com) website that is also self-hostable.
**ProxiTok** is an open-source frontend to the [TikTok](https://www.tiktok.com) website that is also self-hostable.
There are a number of public instances, with some instances having [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) onion services support.

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@ -22,12 +22,12 @@ cover: multi-factor-authentication.webp
The [comparison table](https://www.yubico.com/store/compare/) shows the features and how the YubiKeys compare. We highly recommend that you select keys from the YubiKey 5 Series.
YubiKeys can be programmed using the [YubiKey Manager](https://www.yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-manager/) or [YubiKey Personalization Tools](https://www.yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-personalization-tools/). For managing TOTP codes, you can use the [Yubico Authenticator](https://www.yubico.com/products/yubico-authenticator/). All of Yubico's clients are open-source.
YubiKeys can be programmed using the [YubiKey Manager](https://www.yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-manager/) or [YubiKey Personalization Tools](https://www.yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-personalization-tools/). For managing TOTP codes, you can use the [Yubico Authenticator](https://www.yubico.com/products/yubico-authenticator/). All of Yubico's clients are open source.
For models which support HOTP and TOTP, there are 2 slots in the OTP interface which could be used for HOTP and 32 slots to store TOTP secrets. These secrets are stored encrypted on the key and never expose them to the devices they are plugged into. Once a seed (shared secret) is given to the Yubico Authenticator, it will only give out the six-digit codes, but never the seed. This security model helps limit what an attacker can do if they compromise one of the devices running the Yubico Authenticator and make the YubiKey resistant to a physical attacker.
!!! warning
The firmware of YubiKey is not open-source and is not updatable. If you want features in newer firmware versions, or if there is a vulnerability in the firmware version you are using, you would need to purchase a new key.
The firmware of YubiKey is not open source and is not updatable. If you want features in newer firmware versions, or if there is a vulnerability in the firmware version you are using, you would need to purchase a new key.
### Nitrokey
@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ For the models which support HOTP and TOTP, there are 3 slots for HOTP and 15 fo
The Nitrokey Pro 2, Nitrokey Storage 2, and the upcoming Nitrokey 3 supports system integrity verification for laptops with the [Coreboot](https://www.coreboot.org/) + [Heads](https://osresearch.net/) firmware.
Nitrokey's firmware is open-source, unlike the YubiKey. The firmware on modern NitroKey models (except the **NitroKey Pro 2**) is updatable.
Nitrokey's firmware is open source, unlike the YubiKey. The firmware on modern NitroKey models (except the **NitroKey Pro 2**) is updatable.
### Criteria
@ -89,13 +89,32 @@ Authenticator Apps implement a security standard adopted by the Internet Enginee
We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternatives as Android and iOS have better security and app isolation than most desktop operating systems.
### ente Auth
!!! recommendation
![ente Auth logo](assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/ente-auth.png){ align=right }
**ente Auth** is a free and open-source app which stores and generates TOTP tokens on your mobile device. It can be used with an online account to backup and sync your tokens across your devices (and access them via a web interface) in a secure, end-to-end encrypted fashion. It can also be used offline on a single device with no account necessary.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://ente.io/auth){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://ente.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ente-io/auth){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
??? downloads
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.ente.auth)
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/ente-authenticator/id6444121398)
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ente-io/auth/releases)
- [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://auth.ente.io)
### Aegis Authenticator (Android)
!!! recommendation
![Aegis logo](assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/aegis.png){ align=right }
**Aegis Authenticator** is a free, secure and open-source app to manage your 2-step verification tokens for your online services.
**Aegis Authenticator** is a free and open-source app for Android to manage your 2-step verification tokens for your online services. Aegis Authenticator operates completely offline/locally, but includes the option to export your tokens for backup unlike many alternatives.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getaegis.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://getaegis.app/aegis/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }

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@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ A [news aggregator](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/News_aggregator) is a way to k
**Feeder** is a modern RSS client for Android that has many [features](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder#features) and works well with folders of RSS feeds. It supports [RSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS), [Atom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom_(Web_standard)), [RDF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDF%2FXML) and [JSON Feed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON_Feed).
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://gitlab.com/spacecowboy/Feeder){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/spacecowboy/Feeder){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/spacecowboy/Feeder){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://ko-fi.com/spacecowboy){ .card-link title=Contribute }

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@ -11,6 +11,30 @@ If you are currently using an application like Evernote, Google Keep, or Microso
## Cloud-based
### Standard Notes
!!! recommendation
![Standard Notes logo](assets/img/notebooks/standard-notes.svg){ align=right }
**Standard Notes** is a simple and private notes app that makes your notes easy and available everywhere you are. It features E2EE on every platform, and a powerful desktop experience with themes and custom editors. It has also been [independently audited](https://standardnotes.com/help/2/has-standard-notes-completed-a-third-party-security-audit).
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://standardnotes.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://standardnotes.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://standardnotes.com/help){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/standardnotes){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://standardnotes.com/donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
??? downloads
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.standardnotes)
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1285392450)
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/standardnotes/app/releases)
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://standardnotes.com)
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://standardnotes.com)
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://standardnotes.com)
- [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://app.standardnotes.com/)
### Notesnook
!!! recommendation
@ -36,7 +60,7 @@ If you are currently using an application like Evernote, Google Keep, or Microso
- [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://notesnook.com/notesnook-web-clipper/)
- [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/notesnook-web-clipper/kljhpemdlcnjohmfmkogahelkcidieaj)
Notesnook does not support password/PIN protection on the web & desktop apps. However, you can still lock individual notes, and your data is always encrypted in transit and on your device using your master key.
Notesnook only allows local note encryption with the [private vault](https://help.notesnook.com/lock-notes-with-private-vault) feature on their pro plan, otherwise your notes are not stored encrypted on your device. Your notes are always encrypted before being synced to their servers with keys which only you have access to.
### Joplin
@ -109,7 +133,7 @@ Cryptee offers 100MB of storage for free, with paid options if you need more. Si
We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
- Clients must be open-source.
- Clients must be open source.
- Any cloud sync functionality must be E2EE.
- Must support exporting documents into a standard format.

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@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featurin
### Choosing an Android Distribution
When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has irrevocable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android.
When you buy an Android phone, the default operating system comes bundled with apps and functionality that are not part of the Android Open Source Project. Many of these apps—even apps like the dialer which provide basic system functionality—require invasive integrations with Google Play Services, which in turn asks for privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, and numerous other things on your device in order for those basic system apps and many other apps to function in the first place. Frameworks like Google Play Services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android.
This problem could be solved by using a custom Android distribution that does not come with such invasive integration. Unfortunately, many custom Android distributions often violate the Android security model by not supporting critical security features such as AVB, rollback protection, firmware updates, and so on. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require [more permissive](https://github.com/LineageOS/android_system_sepolicy/search?q=userdebug&type=code) SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
@ -59,11 +59,11 @@ Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be a
Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin).
As the components of the phone, such as the processor and radio technologies rely on closed-source components, the updates must be provided by the respective manufacturers. Therefore, it is important that you purchase a device within an active support cycle. [Qualcomm](https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2020/12/16/qualcomm-and-google-announce-collaboration-extend-android-os-support-and) and [Samsung](https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-security-extending-updates-knox/) support their devices for 4 years, while cheaper products often have shorter support cycles. With the introduction of the [Pixel 6](https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/4457705), Google now makes their own SoC and they will provide a minimum of 5 years of support.
As the components of the phone, such as the processor and radio technologies rely on closed-source components, the updates must be provided by the respective manufacturers. Therefore, it is important that you purchase a device within an active support cycle. [Qualcomm](https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2020/12/16/qualcomm-and-google-announce-collaboration-extend-android-os-support-and) and [Samsung](https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-security-extending-updates-knox/) support their devices for 4 years, while cheaper products often have shorter support cycles. With the introduction of the [Pixel 6](https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/4457705), Google now makes their own SoC, and they will provide a minimum of 5 years of support. With the introduction of the Pixel 8 series, Google increased that support window to 7 years.
EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive firmware updates from OEM vendors or after market Android distributors. This means that security issues with those devices will remain unfixed.
Fairphone, for example, markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates.
Fairphone, for example, markets their Fairphone 4 device as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates.
### Android Permissions
@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ Android 12:
Android 13:
- A permission for [nearby wifi access](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/13/behavior-changes-13#nearby-wifi-devices-permission). The MAC addresses of nearby WiFi access points was a popular way for apps to track a user's location.
- A permission for [nearby Wi-Fi access](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/13/behavior-changes-13#nearby-wifi-devices-permission). The MAC addresses of nearby Wi-Fi access points was a popular way for apps to track a user's location.
- More [granular media permissions](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/13/behavior-changes-13#granular-media-permissions), meaning you can grant access to images, videos or audio files only.
- Background use of sensors now requires the [`BODY_SENSORS`](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/13/behavior-changes-13#body-sensors-background-permission) permission.
@ -120,13 +120,13 @@ With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as:
A **device controller** app such as [Shelter](../android.md#shelter) is required to create a Work Profile without an enterprise MDM, unless you're using a custom Android OS which includes one.
The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such as *File Shuttle* and *contact search blocking* or any kind of isolation features must be implemented by the controller. You must also fully trust the device controller app, as it has full access to your data inside of the work profile.
The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such as *File Shuttle* and *contact search blocking* or any kind of isolation features must be implemented by the controller. You must also fully trust the device controller app, as it has full access to your data inside the work profile.
This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously.
### VPN Killswitch
Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings****Network & internet****VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
Android 7 and above supports a VPN kill switch, and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings****Network & internet****VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
### Global Toggles
@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ If you have a Google account we suggest enrolling in the [Advanced Protection Pr
The Advanced Protection Program provides enhanced threat monitoring and enables:
- Stricter two factor authentication; e.g. that [FIDO](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) **must** be used and disallows the use of [SMS OTPs](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#sms-or-email-mfa), [TOTP](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp) and [OAuth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth)
- Stricter two-factor authentication; e.g. that [FIDO](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) **must** be used and disallows the use of [SMS OTPs](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#sms-or-email-mfa), [TOTP](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp) and [OAuth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth)
- Only Google and verified third-party apps can access account data
- Scanning of incoming emails on Gmail accounts for [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing#Email_phishing) attempts
- Stricter [safe browser scanning](https://www.google.com/chrome/privacy/whitepaper.html#malware) with Google Chrome
@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ The Advanced Protection Program provides enhanced threat monitoring and enables:
If you use non-sandboxed Google Play Services (common on stock operating systems), the Advanced Protection Program also comes with [additional benefits](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/9764949?hl=en) such as:
- Not allowing app installation outside of the Google Play Store, the OS vendor's app store, or via [`adb`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_Debug_Bridge)
- Not allowing app installation outside the Google Play Store, the OS vendor's app store, or via [`adb`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_Debug_Bridge)
- Mandatory automatic device scanning with [Play Protect](https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/2812853?hl=en#zippy=%2Chow-malware-protection-works%2Chow-privacy-alerts-work)
- Warning you about unverified applications
@ -177,4 +177,4 @@ You will either be given the option to delete your advertising ID or to *Opt out
[SafetyNet](https://developer.android.com/training/safetynet/attestation) and the [Play Integrity APIs](https://developer.android.com/google/play/integrity) are generally used for [banking apps](https://grapheneos.org/usage#banking-apps). Many banking apps will work fine in GrapheneOS with sandboxed Play services, however some non-financial apps have their own crude anti-tampering mechanisms which might fail. GrapheneOS passes the `basicIntegrity` check, but not the certification check `ctsProfileMatch`. Devices with Android 8 or later have hardware attestation support which cannot be bypassed without leaked keys or serious vulnerabilities.
As for Google Wallet, we don't recommend this due to their [privacy policy](https://payments.google.com/payments/apis-secure/get_legal_document?ldo=0&ldt=privacynotice&ldl=en), which states you must opt-out if you don't want your credit rating and personal information shared with affiliate marketing services.
As for Google Wallet, we don't recommend this due to their [privacy policy](https://payments.google.com/payments/apis-secure/get_legal_document?ldo=0&ldt=privacynotice&ldl=en), which states you must opt out if you don't want your credit rating and personal information shared with affiliate marketing services.

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@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of.
- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms)
- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/)
### Open Source Security
### Open-Source Security
It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isnt always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/).

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@ -48,6 +48,22 @@ To copy and paste files and directories (folders) from one *qube* to another, yo
The [qrexec framework](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec/) is a core part of Qubes which allows communication between domains. It is built on top of the Xen library *vchan*, which facilitates [isolation through policies](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2020/06/22/new-qrexec-policy-system/).
## Connecting to Tor via a VPN
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## Additional Resources
For additional information we encourage you to consult the extensive Qubes OS documentation pages located on the [Qubes OS Website](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/). Offline copies can be downloaded from the Qubes OS [documentation repository](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-doc).

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@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ Bitwarden also features [Bitwarden Send](https://bitwarden.com/products/send/),
You need the [Premium Plan](https://bitwarden.com/help/about-bitwarden-plans/#compare-personal-plans) to be able to share files. The free plan only allows text sharing.
Bitwarden's server-side code is [open-source](https://github.com/bitwarden/server), so if you don't want to use the Bitwarden cloud, you can easily host your own Bitwarden sync server.
Bitwarden's server-side code is [open source](https://github.com/bitwarden/server), so if you don't want to use the Bitwarden cloud, you can easily host your own Bitwarden sync server.
**Vaultwarden** is an alternative implementation of Bitwarden's sync server written in Rust and compatible with official Bitwarden clients, perfect for self-hosted deployment where running the official resource-heavy service might not be ideal. If you are looking to self-host Bitwarden on your own server, you almost certainly want to use Vaultwarden over Bitwarden's official server code.
@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ Psono provides extensive documentation for their product. The web-client for Pso
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
- Telemetry should be opt-in (disabled by default) or not collected at all.
- Should be open-source and reasonably self-hostable.
- Should be open source and reasonably self-hostable.
## Local Storage

92
docs/photo-management.md Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
---
title: "Photo Management"
icon: material/image
description: Photo management tools to keep your personal photos safe from the prying eyes of cloud storage providers and other unauthorized access.
cover: photo-management.webp
---
Most cloud photo management solutions like Google Photos, Flickr, and Amazon Photos don't secure your photos against being accessed by the cloud storage provider themselves. These options keep your personal photos private, while allowing you to share them only with family and trusted people.
## ente
!!! recommendation
![ente logo](assets/img/photo-management/ente.svg#only-light){ align=right }
![ente logo](assets/img/photo-management/ente-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }
**ente** is an end-to-end encrypted photo backup service which supports automatic backups on iOS and Android. It underwent an [audit by Cure53](https://ente.io/blog/cryptography-audit/) in March 2023.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://ente.io/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://ente.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://ente.io/faq){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/ente-io){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
??? downloads
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.ente.photos)
- [:simple-android: Android](https://ente.io/download)
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1542026904)
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/ente-io/photos-app/releases)
- [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://ente.io/download)
- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://ente.io/download)
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://ente.io/download)
- [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://web.ente.io)
## Stingle
!!! recommendation
![Stingle logo](assets/img/photo-management/stingle.png#only-light){ align=right }
![Stingle logo](assets/img/photo-management/stingle-dark.png#only-dark){ align=right }
**Stingle** is a gallery and camera application with built-in, end-to-end encrypted backup and sync functionality for your photos and videos. Storage starts at 1GB for free accounts on their cloud, or you can host your own Stingle API server for total independence.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://stingle.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://stingle.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://stingle.org/faq/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/stingle){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
??? downloads
- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.ente.photos)
- [:simple-android: Android](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.stingle.photos)
- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/in/app/stingle-photos/id1582535448)
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/stingle)
## PhotoPrism
!!! recommendation
![PhotoPrism logo](assets/img/photo-management/photoprism.svg){ align=right }
**PhotoPrism** is a self-hostable platform for managing photos. It supports album syncing and sharing as well as a variety of other [features](https://www.photoprism.app/features). It does not include E2EE, so it's best hosted on a server that you trust and is under your control.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.photoprism.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.photoprism.app/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://www.photoprism.app/kb){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/photoprism){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
??? downloads
- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/photoprism)
## Criteria
**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
!!! example "This section is new"
We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
### Minimum Requirements
- Cloud-hosted providers must enforce end-to-end encryption.
- Must offer a free plan or trial period for testing.
- Must support TOTP or FIDO2 multi-factor authentication, or Passkey logins.
- Must offer a web interface which supports basic file management functionality.
- Must allow for easy exports of all files/documents.
- Must use standard, audited encryption.
- Must be open source.
### Best Case
- Should have a published audit from a reputable, independent third-party.

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@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ Most online office suites do not support E2EE, meaning the cloud provider has ac
In general, we define collaboration platforms as full-fledged suites which could reasonably act as a replacement to collaboration platforms like Google Drive.
- Open-source.
- Open source.
- Makes files accessible via WebDAV unless it is impossible due to E2EE.
- Has sync clients for Linux, macOS, and Windows.
- Supports document and spreadsheet editing.
@ -161,11 +161,10 @@ In general, we define office suites as applications which could reasonably act a
#### Minimum Requirements
- Must be open-source.
- Must be open source.
- Must implement "zero-trust" end-to-end encryption.
- Must support password-protected files.
#### Best-Case
Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.

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@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ You can consult OpenWrt's [table of hardware](https://openwrt.org/toh/start) to
![OPNsense logo](assets/img/router/opnsense.svg){ align=right }
**OPNsense** is an open source, FreeBSD-based firewall and routing platform which incorporates many advanced features such as traffic shaping, load balancing, and VPN capabilities, with many more features available in the form of plugins. OPNsense is commonly deployed as a perimeter firewall, router, wireless access point, DHCP server, DNS server, and VPN endpoint.
**OPNsense** is an open-source, FreeBSD-based firewall and routing platform which incorporates many advanced features such as traffic shaping, load balancing, and VPN capabilities, with many more features available in the form of plugins. OPNsense is commonly deployed as a perimeter firewall, router, wireless access point, DHCP server, DNS server, and VPN endpoint.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://opnsense.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.opnsense.org/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentation}

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@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
- ![Proton Mail logo](assets/img/email/protonmail.svg){ .twemoji } [Proton Mail](email.md#proton-mail)
- ![Mailbox.org logo](assets/img/email/mailboxorg.svg){ .twemoji } [Mailbox.org](email.md#mailboxorg)
- ![Skiff Mail logo](assets/img/email/skiff-mail.svg){ .twemoji } [Skiff Mail](email.md#skiff-mail)
- ![Tutanota logo](assets/img/email/tutanota.svg){ .twemoji } [Tutanota](email.md#tutanota)
- ![Tuta logo](assets/img/email/tuta.svg){ .twemoji } [Tuta](email.md#tuta)
</div>
@ -172,6 +172,18 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](financial-services.md#gift-card-marketplaces)
### Photo Management
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
- ![Ente logo](assets/img/photo-management/ente.svg#only-light){ .twemoji }![Ente logo](assets/img/photo-management/ente.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji } [Ente](photo-management.md#ente)
- ![Stingle logo](assets/img/photo-management/stingle.png#only-light){ .twemoji }![Stingle logo](assets/img/photo-management/stingle-dark.png#only-dark){ .twemoji } [Stingle](photo-management.md#stingle)
- ![PhotoPrism logo](assets/img/photo-management/photoprism.svg){ .twemoji } [PhotoPrism](photo-management.md#photoprism)
</div>
[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](photo-management.md)
### Search Engines
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
@ -213,7 +225,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
- ![Tutanota logo](assets/img/calendar/tutanota.svg){ .twemoji } [Tutanota](calendar.md#tutanota)
- ![Tuta logo](assets/img/calendar/tuta.svg){ .twemoji } [Tuta](calendar.md#tuta)
- ![Proton Calendar logo](assets/img/calendar/proton-calendar.svg){ .twemoji } [Proton Calendar](calendar.md#proton-calendar)
</div>
@ -332,6 +344,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
- ![YubiKeys](assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/mini/yubico.svg){ .twemoji } [YubiKey](multi-factor-authentication.md#yubikey)
- ![Nitrokey](assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/mini/nitrokey.svg){ .twemoji } [Nitrokey](multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)
- ![ente Auth logo](assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/ente-auth.png){ .twemoji } [ente Auth](multi-factor-authentication.md#ente-auth)
- ![Aegis logo](assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/aegis.png){ .twemoji } [Aegis Authenticator (Android)](multi-factor-authentication.md#aegis-authenticator-android)
</div>
@ -358,6 +371,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
- ![Standard Notes logo](assets/img/notebooks/standard-notes.svg){ .twemoji } [Standard Notes](notebooks.md#standard-notes)
- ![Notesnook logo](assets/img/notebooks/notesnook.svg){ .twemoji } [Notesnook](notebooks.md#notesnook)
- ![Joplin logo](assets/img/notebooks/joplin.svg){ .twemoji } [Joplin](notebooks.md#joplin)
- ![Cryptee logo](assets/img/notebooks/cryptee.svg#only-light){ .twemoji }![Cryptee logo](assets/img/notebooks/cryptee-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji } [Cryptee](notebooks.md#cryptee)
@ -431,9 +445,8 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
- ![Obtainium logo](assets/img/android/obtainium.svg){ .twemoji } [Obtainium (App Manager)](android.md#obtainium)
- ![Aurora Store logo](assets/img/android/aurora-store.webp){ .twemoji } [Aurora Store (Google Play Client)](android.md#aurora-store)
- ![Shelter logo](assets/img/android/mini/shelter.svg){ .twemoji } [Shelter (Work Profiles)](android.md#shelter)
- ![Auditor logo](assets/img/android/auditor.svg#only-light){ .twemoji }![GrapheneOS logo](assets/img/android/auditor-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji } [Auditor (Supported Devices)](android.md#auditor)
- ![Secure Camera logo](assets/img/android/secure_camera.svg#only-light){ .twemoji }![Secure Camera logo](assets/img/android/secure_camera-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji } [Secure Camera](android.md#secure-camera)
- ![Secure PDF Viewer logo](assets/img/android/secure_pdf_viewer.svg#only-light){ .twemoji }![GrapheneOS logo](assets/img/android/secure_pdf_viewer-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji } [Secure PDF Viewer](android.md#secure-pdf-viewer)
- ![Secure PDF Viewer logo](assets/img/android/secure_pdf_viewer.svg#only-light){ .twemoji }![Secure PDF Viewer logo](assets/img/android/secure_pdf_viewer-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji } [Secure PDF Viewer](android.md#secure-pdf-viewer)
</div>
@ -467,3 +480,21 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
</div>
[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](router.md)
## Advanced Tools
These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functionality which most people do not need to worry about, and often require more in-depth technical knowledge to utilize effectively.
### Device Integrity Verification
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
- ![MVT logo](assets/img/device-integrity/mvt.webp){ .twemoji } [Mobile Verification Toolkit](device-integrity.md#mobile-verification-toolkit)
- ![iMazing logo](assets/img/device-integrity/imazing.png){ .twemoji } [iMazing (iOS)](device-integrity.md#imazing-ios)
- ![Auditor logo](assets/img/device-integrity/auditor.svg#only-light){ .twemoji }![Auditor logo](assets/img/device-integrity/auditor-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji } [Auditor (Android)](device-integrity.md#auditor-android)
- ![Hypatia logo](assets/img/device-integrity/hypatia.svg#only-light){ .twemoji }![Hypatia logo](assets/img/device-integrity/hypatia-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji } [Hypatia (Android)](device-integrity.md#hypatia-android)
- ![iVerify logo](assets/img/device-integrity/iverify.webp){ .twemoji } [iVerify (iOS)](device-integrity.md#iverify-ios)
</div>
[Learn more :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](device-integrity.md)

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@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ The **Tor** network is a group of volunteer-operated servers that allows you to
[:octicons-home-16:](https://www.torproject.org){ .card-link title=Homepage }
[:simple-torbrowser:](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
Tor works by routing your internet traffic through those volunteer-operated servers, instead of making a direct connection to the site you're trying to visit. This obfuscates where the traffic is coming from, and no server in the connection path is able to see the full path of where the traffic is coming from and going to, meaning even the servers you are using to connect cannot break your anonymity.
@ -39,7 +39,15 @@ Tor works by routing your internet traffic through those volunteer-operated serv
## Connecting to Tor
There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for anonymous browsing for desktop computers and Android. In addition to the apps listed below, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser.
!!! tip
Before connecting to Tor, please ensure you've read our [overview](advanced/tor-overview.md) on what Tor is and how to connect to it safely. We often recommend connecting to Tor through a trusted [VPN provider](vpn.md), but you have to do so **properly** to avoid decreasing your anonymity.
There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for anonymous browsing for desktop computers and Android.
Some of these apps are better than others, and again making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.
If more complete anonymity is paramount to your situation, you should **only** be using the desktop Tor Browser client, ideally in a [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) + [Qubes](desktop.md#qubes-os) configuration. Mobile browsers are less common on Tor (and more fingerprintable as a result), and other configurations are not as rigorously tested against deanonymization.
### Tor Browser
@ -52,7 +60,7 @@ There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.torproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:simple-torbrowser:](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Documentation }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
??? downloads
@ -69,6 +77,8 @@ There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the
The Tor Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting, or identifying you based on your browser configuration. Therefore, it is imperative that you do **not** modify the browser beyond the default [security levels](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings/).
In addition to installing Tor Browser on your computer directly, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser alone.
### Orbot
!!! recommendation
@ -132,7 +142,7 @@ We previously recommended enabling the *Isolate Destination Address* preference
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://snowflake.torproject.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/wikis/Technical%20Overview){ .card-link title=Documentation}
[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/snowflake.git/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://donate.torproject.org/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
You can enable Snowflake in your browser by opening it in another tab and turning the switch on. You can leave it running in the background while you browse to contribute your connection. We don't recommend installing Snowflake as a browser extension; adding third-party extensions can increase your attack surface.

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@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ IVPN has undergone a [no-logging audit from Cure53](https://cure53.de/audit-repo
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Open-Source Clients
As of February 2020 [IVPN applications are now open-source](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/ivpn-applications-are-now-open-source). Source code can be obtained from their [GitHub organization](https://github.com/ivpn).
As of February 2020 [IVPN applications are now open source](https://www.ivpn.net/blog/ivpn-applications-are-now-open-source). Source code can be obtained from their [GitHub organization](https://github.com/ivpn).
#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Accepts Cash and Monero
@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ We require all our recommended VPN providers to provide OpenVPN configuration fi
- Support for strong protocols such as WireGuard & OpenVPN.
- Killswitch built in to clients.
- Multihop support. Multihopping is important to keep data private in case of a single node compromise.
- If VPN clients are provided, they should be [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_source), like the VPN software they generally have built into them. We believe that [source code](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Source_code) availability provides greater transparency about what your device is actually doing.
- If VPN clients are provided, they should be [open source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_source), like the VPN software they generally have built into them. We believe that [source code](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Source_code) availability provides greater transparency about what your device is actually doing.
**Best Case:**

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@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ nav:
Internet Browsing: Internet Browsing
Providers: Providers
Software: Software
Advanced: Advanced
About: About
Community: Community
Online Services: Online Services

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@ -86,3 +86,18 @@
from = "/*"
to = "/i18n/404.en.html"
status = 404
[[plugins]]
package = "@netlify/plugin-lighthouse"
[[plugins.inputs.audits]]
path = "en/index.html"
[[plugins.inputs.audits]]
path = "en/tools/index.html"
[[plugins.inputs.audits]]
path = "en/basics/why-privacy-matters/index.html"
[[plugins.inputs.audits]]
path = "en/vpn/index.html"

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"devDependencies": {
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},
"engines": {
"node" : ">=18.0.0 <19.0.0"
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left: 50%;
transform: translate(-50%, -50%);
color: white;
z-index: 1;
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/* Social share button */
.social-share-text {
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{% endif %}
{{ page.content }}
{% include "partials/source-file.html" %}
{% include "partials/feedback.html" %}
{% include "partials/comments.html" %}
{% if config.theme.language == "es" %}
{% if config.theme.language == "en" %}
<hr>
<h2>Share this website and spread privacy knowledge</h2>
<p><input class="admonition quote social-share-text" id="share" type="text" value="Privacy Guides: https://www.privacyguides.org - Cybersecurity resources and privacy-focused tools to protect yourself online" onclick="select()" readonly=""></p>
<p><em>Copy this text to easily share Privacy Guides with your friends and family on any social network!</em></p>
<p>
<a class="card-link" href="http://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=Privacy%20Guides%3A%20https%3A%2F%2Fwww.privacyguides.org%20-%20Cybersecurity%20resources%20and%20privacy-focused%20tools%20to%20protect%20yourself%20online.%20%40privacy_guides" target="_blank" title="Share the site on X (formerly Twitter)" rel="noopener"><span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 24 24"><path d="M18.901 1.153h3.68l-8.04 9.19L24 22.846h-7.406l-5.8-7.584-6.638 7.584H.474l8.6-9.83L0 1.154h7.594l5.243 6.932ZM17.61 20.644h2.039L6.486 3.24H4.298Z"></path></svg></span></a>
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<a class="card-link" href="http://www.facebook.com/share.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.privacyguides.org" target="_blank" rel="noopener" title="Share the site on Facebook"><span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 24 24"><path d="M24 12.073c0-6.627-5.373-12-12-12s-12 5.373-12 12c0 5.99 4.388 10.954 10.125 11.854v-8.385H7.078v-3.47h3.047V9.43c0-3.007 1.792-4.669 4.533-4.669 1.312 0 2.686.235 2.686.235v2.953H15.83c-1.491 0-1.956.925-1.956 1.874v2.25h3.328l-.532 3.47h-2.796v8.385C19.612 23.027 24 18.062 24 12.073z"></path></svg></span></a>
<a class="card-link" href="http://www.linkedin.com/shareArticle?mini=true&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.privacyguides.org" target="_blank" title="Share the site on LinkedIn" rel="noopener"><span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 24 24"><path d="M20.447 20.452h-3.554v-5.569c0-1.328-.027-3.037-1.852-3.037-1.853 0-2.136 1.445-2.136 2.939v5.667H9.351V9h3.414v1.561h.046c.477-.9 1.637-1.85 3.37-1.85 3.601 0 4.267 2.37 4.267 5.455v6.286zM5.337 7.433a2.062 2.062 0 0 1-2.063-2.065 2.064 2.064 0 1 1 2.063 2.065zm1.782 13.019H3.555V9h3.564v11.452zM22.225 0H1.771C.792 0 0 .774 0 1.729v20.542C0 23.227.792 24 1.771 24h20.451C23.2 24 24 23.227 24 22.271V1.729C24 .774 23.2 0 22.222 0h.003z"></path></svg></span></a>
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<a class="card-link" href="https://blog.privacyguides.org" title="Follow our blog for updates"><span class="twemoji"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 24 24"><path d="M19.199 24C19.199 13.467 10.533 4.8 0 4.8V0c13.165 0 24 10.835 24 24h-4.801zM3.291 17.415a3.3 3.3 0 0 1 3.293 3.295A3.303 3.303 0 0 1 3.283 24C1.47 24 0 22.526 0 20.71s1.475-3.294 3.291-3.295zM15.909 24h-4.665c0-6.169-5.075-11.245-11.244-11.245V8.09c8.727 0 15.909 7.184 15.909 15.91z"></path></svg></span></a>
</p>
{% elif config.theme.language == "es" %}
<div class="admonition info">
<p>Está viendo la copia en español de Privacy Guides, traducidas por nuestro fantástico equipo lingüístico en <a href="https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides">Crowdin</a>. Si nota un error o ve alguna sección sin traducir en esta página, ¡<a href="https://matrix.to/#/#pg-i18n:aragon.sh">considere ayudar</a>! Para obtener más información y consejos, consulte nuestra <a href="/meta/translation.md">guía de traducción</a>.</p>
<p>You're viewing the Spanish copy of Privacy Guides, translated by our fantastic language team on <a href="https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides">Crowdin</a>. If you notice an error, or see any untranslated sections on this page, please consider <a href="https://matrix.to/#/#pg-i18n:aragon.sh">helping out</a>! For more information and tips see our <a href="/meta/translation.md">translation guide</a>.</p>
@ -149,4 +163,7 @@
<p>You're viewing the Russian copy of Privacy Guides, translated by our fantastic language team on <a href="https://crowdin.com/project/privacyguides">Crowdin</a>. If you notice an error, or see any untranslated sections on this page, please consider <a href="https://matrix.to/#/#pg-i18n:aragon.sh">helping out</a>! For more information and tips see our <a href="/meta/translation.md">translation guide</a>.</p>
</div>
{% endif %}
{% include "partials/feedback.html" %}
{% include "partials/comments.html" %}
{% endblock %}