Update blog/posts/taking-advantage-of-android-user-profiles.md

Co-authored-by: redoomed1 <redoomed1@privacyguides.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>

.vscode/ltex.dictionary.en-US.txt

@@ -561,4 +561,3 @@ Chaum
 unlinkability
 Kagi
 Secureblue
-pseudonymity

blog/posts/age-verification-wants-your-face.md

@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
----
-date:
-    created: 2025-05-06T21:45:00Z
-categories:
-    - News
-authors:
-    - em
-description: Age verification laws and propositions forcing platforms to restrict content accessed by children and teens have been multiplying in recent years. The problem is, implementing such measure necessarily requires identifying each user accessing this content, one way or another. This is bad news for your privacy.
-schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle
-preview:
-  cover: blog/assets/images/age-verification-wants-your-face/ageverification-cover.webp
----
-
-# Age Verification Wants Your Face, and Your Privacy
-
-![A stylized photo showing a person holding a printed photo of their face in front of their actual face.](../assets/images/age-verification-wants-your-face/ageverification-cover.webp)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Photo: Kyle Glenn / Unsplash</small>
-
-Age verification laws and propositions forcing platforms to restrict content accessed by children and teens have been multiplying in recent years. The problem is, implementing such measures necessarily requires identifying each user accessing this content, one way or another. This is bad news for your privacy.<!-- more -->
-
-For a few years now, several legislators in North America, Europe, and Australia have expressed concern about children and teens accessing certain types of content online. While there is no doubt some online content can be worrisome, implementing a technological solution for this is [extremely problematic](https://www.jonaharagon.com/posts/age-verification-is-incompatible-with-the-internet/).
-
-By mandating platforms to be legally responsible to verify a user's age, regulators effectively force them to identify each user requesting access to content deemed inappropriate under a certain age threshold.
-
-If these regulations continue to proliferate, this could lead to the end of pseudonymity online.
-
-## How can age be verified online
-
-Verifying age online is [difficult](https://www.woodhullfoundation.org/fact-checked/online-age-verification-is-not-the-same-as-flashing-your-id-at-a-liquor-store/). There isn't any magical solution to it, it's either recording how a user looks or scanning official documents.
-
-Conducting verification "on-device" offers only few additional protections considering this information still has to be checked and reported with an external service, somehow.
-
-Moreover, processes used to keep this data "on-device" are often opaque. Taking into account how valuable this information is, it becomes very difficult to trust any for-profit third-party services which such a sensitive task.
-
-Users' faces and official documents are two types of very sensitive information. Who becomes responsible to collect, process, store, and safeguard this data? With whom does this data get shared, and for which other purposes? And how accurate is this data anyway?
-
-### Facial scans
-
-Some platforms and third-party providers of the rapidly growing "[identity verification industry](https://www.businessresearchinsights.com/market-reports/digital-identity-verification-market-118180)" have started to use facial recognition and face scan systems in order to determine a user's age.
-
-The problem is, the systems are [horrible for everyone's privacy](https://www.liberties.eu/en/stories/facial-recognition-privacy-concerns/44518), extremely problematic to use due to [racist and gendered biases](https://www.aclu-mn.org/en/news/biased-technology-automated-discrimination-facial-recognition), [inaccurate](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/01/face-scans-estimate-our-age-creepy-af-and-harmful) to determine the correct age, and on top of all that, [can be cheated](https://www.theregister.com/2022/05/22/ai_in_brief/).
-
-### Official documents
-
-The second solution is to require users to provide an official piece of ID. Considering an official ID often contain a photo, full legal name, date of birth, home address, and government specific codes, this is even worse.
-
-All this sensitive data then gets collected by either the platform itself or a third-party provider with little oversight or incentive to protect this data at all. Leaks and breaches for this enormous data trove are just around the corner. Unfortunately, this isn't speculative, [data leaks have already occurred](https://www.404media.co/id-verification-service-for-tiktok-uber-x-exposed-driver-licenses-au10tix/).
-
-The more copies of your official documents exist online, the greater the risk this data *will get exposed*, and the less value this document has to actually identify you when it's *truly* needed.
-
-And again, this sort of verification is easy to cheat. Any determined teenager will soon learn how to either create a fake ID, use someone else's ID, or go around this verification system in another way.
-
-Age verification laws will *without a doubt* support a flourishing criminal industry to provide fake or stolen IDs even more easily online.
-
-## Where age verification is (or will be) required
-
-In April this year, [Discord started to test age verification systems](https://www.theverge.com/news/650493/discord-age-verification-face-id-scan-experiment) using facial or ID scans, as a way to comply with [Australia](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c89vjj0lxx9o)'s and [UK](https://www.theverge.com/2023/10/26/23922397/uk-online-safety-bill-law-passed-royal-assent-moderation-regulation)'s new laws.
-
-This measure only applies to access certain protected posts for users located in Australia and the United Kingdom and at this time, but don't be surprised if it soon gets implemented at the account level for users everywhere.
-
-In the [United States](https://action.freespeechcoalition.com/age-verification-resources/state-avs-laws/), many states have already passed some types of age verification laws, and several others have proposed such laws. In [Canada](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/09/canadas-leaders-must-reject-overbroad-age-verification-bill) and [Europe](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/funding/call-tenders-development-consultancy-and-support-age-verification-solution), legislators have also been pushing for similar regulations to block content online subject to age verification.
-
-There is no doubt the more countries pass similar prohibitive laws, the more other countries will soon follow.
-
-Some hope however, this month a US federal judge ruled an age verification [law in Arkansas unconstitutional](https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/5228836-judge-blocks-social-media-age-verification-law-in-arkansas/).
-
-## Who decides what is sensitive content
-
-When talking about age verification, most assume this only applies to obvious pornographic content. However, many of these laws have [much wider reach](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/01/impact-age-verification-measures-goes-beyond-porn-sites).
-
-For example, the Australian law prohibits access to social media altogether for anyone under the age of 16. This means that, once the law comes into full effect after its transitional period, anyone who uses social media in Australia will have to prove they are older than this age. It is likely that all Australian users will have to provide some form of identifying data to continue using their social media accounts. **This is a privacy nightmare.**
-
-When laws target specific content, definition of what is appropriate and what isn't is often too broad. Moreover, this definition is subject to change from one administration to another.
-
-There are also wide differences from one country to another. For example, some countries sadly consider simple discussions of gender identity or sexual orientation to be sensitive content. What is deemed inappropriate to children in one culture might not be the same in another.
-
-Automating this sort of censorship leads to a lot of misfiring. There has already been numerous instances of [breastfeeding photos mislabelled](https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/facebook-clarifies-breastfeeding-pics-ok-updates-rules-1.2997124) for nudity. Important educational material for sex education could get censored and inaccessible to children, who critically need access to it *before* adulthood.
-
-Who will decide which content should be censored and which shouldn't? Will countries hosting the big tech platforms end up having a greater decision power in the matter? Will platforms simply decide to apply the strongest level of restriction worldwide?
-
-## Age verification isn't effective
-
-Even if we could somehow find a global consensus that is perfectly ethical and never misfires on which content children shouldn't access, it will likely fail.
-
-Children, and teenagers especially, are and have always been incredibly effective at going around such limitation to feed their curious minds.
-
-First, there are technical tools such as VPNs and proxies of all sort to go around location-based restrictions. Then, there's the classic fake ID, and its modern evolution: deepfake face. There will also be without a doubt a growing market of pre-verified "adult" accounts up for sale online.
-
-Perhaps age verification measures will work for a couple of months, until products to evade it get the word out, then they'll become useless. Only leaving the ashes of your social media legal consenting adult pseudonymity in its path.
-
-## Why it's bad news for everyone's privacy
-
-Age verification will require all platforms and/or third-party identification service providers to collect an enormous trove of sensitive data on everyone.
-
-This goes against all principles of data minimization, generally a vital part of data protection regulations.
-
-Daily occurrences of data breach incidents have taught us we cannot trust these services to safeguard our data. Data breaches for this sensitive information are only a matter of time.
-
-The concentration of such valuable data will likely be monetized and resold either by the platforms themselves, by the for-profit third-party "age assurance" providers they use, or eventually by the criminals who stole it from them.
-
-This data trove will include face scans of children with their location (trying to pass as adults), and faces and official documents from every adult in the world using social media, if this kind of regulation gets implemented at large.
-
-**The privacy and safety implications of this are absolutely disastrous**.
-
-## Age verification is not the solution
-
-Sadly, age verification legislation will not help safeguard children from harmful content online, but it will effectively remove protection for anyone needing pseudonymity online to [stay safe](privacy-means-safety.md). Moreover, it will put everyone at a much greater risk of victimization by identify theft, impersonation, stalking, and worse.
-
-Despite the perhaps well-intended legislators, technological solutions aren't always adequate to solve every problem we have. Here again, education and content moderation are likely much better ways to deal with this sort of issues.
-
-In the meantime, don't be surprised if you cross a teenager on the street suddenly pointing their phone to scan *your* adult face, or a young relative looking in your wallet. They probably won't be looking for your money, but most likely for your adult ID.

blog/posts/in-praise-of-tor.md

@@ -1,420 +0,0 @@
----
-date:
-    created: 2025-04-30T20:30:00Z
-    updated: 2025-05-06T18:00:00Z
-categories:
-    - Explainers
-tags:
-    - Tor
-authors:
-    - em
-description: You might have heard of Tor in the news a few times, yet never dared to try it yourself. Despite being around for decades, Tor is still a tool too few people know about. Today, Tor is easy to use for anyone. It not only helps journalists and activists, but anybody who seeks greater privacy online or access to information regardless of location. But what is Tor exactly? How can Tor help you? And why is it such an important tool?
-schema_type: OpinionNewsArticle
-preview:
-  cover: blog/assets/images/in-praise-of-tor/tor-cover.webp
----
-
-# In Praise of Tor: Why You Should Support and Use Tor
-
-![The Tor Project logo over a series of Tor icons on a purple background.](../assets/images/in-praise-of-tor/tor-cover.webp)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Em / Privacy Guides | Logo and icons: The Tor Project</small>
-
-You might have heard of Tor in the news a few times, yet never dared to try it yourself. Despite being around for decades, Tor is still a tool too few people know about.
-
-Today, Tor is easy to use for anyone. It helps not only journalists and activists, but anybody who seeks greater privacy online or access to information regardless of location. But what is Tor exactly? How can Tor help you? And why is it such an important tool?<!-- more -->
-
-## :simple-torbrowser: What is Tor
-
-Tor is an overlay network that was specifically designed to protect the privacy of its users. The Tor Network uses multiple layers of encryption and relays in order to protect a person's location and other potential identifiers, such as an IP address.
-
-Its name comes from the acronym for **The Onion Router**, a [routing system](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing) using multiple layers that can get peeled off at each step, like an onion 🧅
-
-This special network can be easily accessed by anyone, for free, through the Tor Browser. The Tor Browser is as easy to use as any other browser you are familiar with already.
-
-Both the tools for the Tor Network and the Tor Browser are maintained by a nonprofit organization called the Tor Project.
-
-### The Tor Network
-
-The [Tor Network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tor_(network)) was deployed in 2002, although its core principle was developed in the mid 1990s. It was first created at the United States Naval Research Laboratory in order to protect intelligence communication online.
-
-In 2004, the laboratory released the project's code under a free and open source license, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) began funding its development. A few years later, the onion routing project officially became the Tor Project.
-
-Today, Tor is one of the [largest](https://metrics.torproject.org/) anonymity networks, with thousands of relays and millions of users worldwide.
-
-#### How does it work
-
-The Tor Network is run by a community of volunteers who operate the relays required for the network to function.
-
-Each time someone uses the Tor Network, the communication passes through at least 3 relays: A Guard Relay, a Middle Relay, and an Exit Relay. Each relay has a different function to protect the communication.
-
-**The Guard Relay** knows where the communication is from (IP address), but doesn't know where it's going (which website is visited, for example). This relay only knows that you want to access the Tor Network. Its task is to send your encrypted communication to a Middle Relay, but it cannot read it.
-
-**The Middle Relay** doesn't really know anything. It doesn't know who you are nor where you are going. It only knows a Guard Relay wants to send encrypted data to an Exit Relay. The Middle Relay transfers this communication from one relay to another, and it cannot read it either.
-
-**The Exit Relay** has no idea who you are. It only knows someone, somewhere, wants to access this website (or other content). The Exit Relay will get the information from the website, then send it back to the Middle Relay, so that you can receive it from the Guard Relay. If you only visit pages using HTTPS, the Exit Relay can know someone is visiting this website, but cannot know what they are doing on it. Visiting *non-onion* websites using HTTPS instead of just HTTP is **[very important](https://support.torproject.org/https/https-1/)** for security and privacy.
-
-<div class="admonition info" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Onion service websites</p>
-
-Onion service websites are special websites that can only be accessed using the Tor Network.
-
-They are easy to recognize because they use the .onion domain at the end, and are often composed of a long string of seemingly random characters. Onion websites offer protections equivalent to HTTPS.
-
-You can see this represented by the [onion padlock icon](https://support.torproject.org/onionservices/onionservices-5/) in the Tor Browser.
-
-</div>
-
-#### How Tor works using a letter and envelopes analogy
-
-Tor works a bit as if you put a letter (request) into an envelope with someone's address. Then, you put this envelope in another envelope addressed to someone else, with instructions. Finally, you put this second envelope in yet another one.
-
-Each envelope protects the content of the other, and can only be opened one at the time by each recipient. In this analogy, each recipient (relay) has a key that can only open the envelope addressed to them, and not the others.
-
-![Graphic representation of a Tor Circuit composed of a Guard Relay, a Middle Relay, and an Exit Relay using a letter and envelopes analogy.](../assets/images/in-praise-of-tor/tor-diagram.webp)
-<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Em / Privacy Guides</small>
-
-#### What is a Tor Circuit
-
-The network of randomly selected relays to complete a request on the Tor Network is called a Tor Circuit. This circuit changes each time a new connection is established.
-
-From the Tor Browser, you can see each relay that was selected for a circuit, and even change it manually. To generate a new circuit, click on the "Tor Circuit" button on the upper-left of the browser, then on "New Tor circuit for this site" at the bottom.
-
-![Screenshot from the Tor Browser showing a popup window from the Tor Circuit button.](../assets/images/in-praise-of-tor/tor-torcircuit.webp)
-
-### The Tor Browser
-
-The [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/download/) was created in 2008 to facilitate access to the Tor Network. It is a modified version of Mozilla's Firefox browser, and can be installed on Linux, macOS, Windows, and Android systems.
-
-The Tor Browser start configuration is private by default. No additional extensions are required to make it more secure or more private. Actually, it's even discouraged to install any additional extensions, as this would weaken its [fingerprinting resistance](https://blog.torproject.org/browser-fingerprinting-introduction-and-challenges-ahead/).
-
-<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Highest security settings</p>
-
-Even if the Tor Browser is configured to be private by default, if you are in an especially sensitive situation, for example if you are using Tor as a whistleblower or a dissident activist, you might want to adjust the Tor Browser security level to "Safest".
-
-For this, click on the shield icon on the upper-right, then on the "Settings" button in blue, and select "Safest" instead of the default "Standard".
-
-**Important:** Each time you change the security level, you **must** make sure to restart the browser to ensure all changes have taken effect. Otherwise, [some changes](tor-security-slider-flaw.md) might not have been applied yet.
-
-</div>
-
-![Screenshot from the Tor Browser showing a warning from the SecureDrop website to adjust Tor security level to Safest.](../assets/images/in-praise-of-tor/tor-safestsetting.webp)
-
-The default search engine is the privacy-focused [DuckDuckGo](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/search-engines/#duckduckgo). You will not even find Google in the options for the default search engine. More browsers should follow this good practice.
-
-The first page opening with the Tor Browser will give the option to Connect to Tor. From there, you can click on "Connect" to start browsing through Tor, or on "Configure Connection" if you need additional settings. For example, if you need to set up a [Bridge](https://bridges.torproject.org/) because Tor is blocked from your country.
-
-<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Only connect to Tor if it is safe for you</p>
-
-Be careful when using Tor from a country where Tor might be blocked or perceived as suspicious. Similarly, be careful if you connect from a location where revealing you have been using Tor [could](#depending-on-where-you-are-using-tor-is-likely-safe) be dangerous to you.
-
-</div>
-
-![Screenshot from the Tor Browser showing the "Connect to Tor" welcome page.](../assets/images/in-praise-of-tor/tor-torbrowser.webp)
-
-Once connected to the Tor Network, you will be directed to the DuckDuckGo welcome page, and you can search or type any URLs in the address bar, like you would with any other browser.
-
-If you know an organization has an onion site (a website that is only accessible through Tor), you can type this onion address directly in the address bar.
-
-If you don't know if an organization has an onion site, you might find it from its regular URL. For example, if you visit privacyguides.org from the Tor Browser, you will notice a purple button on the right informing you that an onion version of this website is available, click on it to get redirected to it.
-
-![Screenshot from the Tor Browser showing the Privacy Guides website with an onion available purple button right to the address bar.](../assets/images/in-praise-of-tor/tor-privacyguides.webp)
-
-<div class="admonition info" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Mullvad Browser and the Tor Project</p>
-
-If you are familiar with the Mullvad Browser, know that the Mullvad Browser was developed by the Tor Project team!
-
-The Mullvad Browser was born of a [collaboration](https://blog.torproject.org/releasing-mullvad-browser/) between Mullvad VPN and the Tor Project, to build a browser that offers similar privacy features to the Tor Browser, but while using it through a VPN instead of through the Tor Network (both offering different benefits).
-
-The Mullvad Browser can also be used without a VPN, and will still provide better privacy protections than most other browsers. It cannot be used to access the Tor Network, however.
-
-</div>
-
-### The Tor Project
-
-The [Tor Project](https://www.torproject.org/) is the US-based nonprofit organization maintaining the software and community for the Tor Network, and developing and maintaining the Tor Browser. It's also a privacy advocacy organization, with a mission to advance human rights and freedoms around the world through the free technology it creates.
-
-The nonprofit was founded in 2006 and gets its funding from [various sources](https://www.torproject.org/about/supporters/) including government grants, independent contributors, and individual [donations](https://donate.torproject.org/).
-
-## :octicons-lock-16: What Tor can do
-
-### Improve Privacy
-
-Tor is not magical, but it's by far one of the best privacy tool we have. Using Tor will not make you perfectly anonymous online, but it will greatly reduce the traces your leave online.
-
-Here are a few benefits Tor can provide for your privacy:
-
-- Tor can prevent the websites you are visiting from collecting your IP address (and your IP address can indeed lead to identifying *you*).
-
-- Tor can prevent your Internet Service Provider (ISP), Virtual Private Network (VPN) provider, or authorities requesting information from them to collect a list of the websites you have visited. They will know however that you have been using Tor.
-
-- The Tor Browser isolates each website you visit. This prevents ads and trackers from following you around, potentially popping up later in your [Facebook ads and accidentally outing you](https://www.intomore.com/culture/you/facebook-ads-outed-me/).
-
-- The Tor Browser is fingerprinting resistant. This reduces the ways you can be tracked and identified online, even without your IP address.
-
-- When keeping the default settings, the Tor Browser only uses private windows and will not keep any traces of your browsing history. It will also delete all cookies and site data when closing.
-
-### Circumvent censorship
-
-Because of how the Tor Network redirects traffic, it's a perfect tool to resist censorship. Using Tor can give access to websites or services that aren't accessible from a country blocking them.
-
-Even from a region where Tor itself is actively blocked, the network can still be accessed using [pluggable transports](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/circumvention/).
-
-Using this type of measures to circumvent government censorship will make Tor accessible even from countries with heavily censored internet, such as [China](https://support.torproject.org/censorship/connecting-from-china/), [Russia](https://blog.torproject.org/call-for-webtunnel-bridges/), [Iran](https://forum.torproject.org/t/iran-circumventing-censorship-with-tor/4590), and many others.
-
-<div class="admonition question" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">If you can't download the Tor Browser from your country</p>
-
-If you cannot download the Tor Browser because of your country's censorship, and **if it is safe for you to do**, you can try downloading the browser from a proxy website such as the [EFF website](https://tor.eff.org/), the [Calyx Institute website](https://tor.calyxinstitute.org/).
-
-You can even directly email **<gettor@torproject.org>** and send the name of your operating system (Linux, macOS, Windows) to get a direct link to download the Tor Browser.
-
-</div>
-
-If you want to help people around the world access the internet freely, you can volunteer to run a [Tor Snowflake](https://snowflake.torproject.org/) proxy. For more tech-savvy volunteers, you can also help by running a [Tor Bridge](https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/bridge/), or even a [WebTunnel Bridge](https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/webtunnel/).
-
-## :octicons-heart-16: Why Tor is so important
-
-### Tor is vital for human rights and democracy
-
-Tor is an essential tool for journalists, activists, whistleblowers, dissidents, and people in vulnerable situations everywhere. It is one of the best tool we have to increase privacy online, and to resist censorship from oppressive regimes.
-
-Thanks to Tor, activists have a safe way to continue fighting for human rights.
-
-Some of the most respected human rights organizations use Tor to offer safe access to their services and information. This includes organizations such as [Amnesty International](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/12/global-amnesty-international-website-launches-on-tor-network-to-help-universal-access/), [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/04/eff-now-has-tor-onions), Freedom of The Press Foundation, and of course the Tor Project.
-
-Without Tor, journalists would lose invaluable sources of information provided by courageous whistleblowers reporting in the public interest.
-
-Without Tor, brave citizens fighting against authoritarian governments would be at much greater risk when organizing and bringing vital information to the public's attention.
-
-Without Tor, victims of domestic violence and LGBTQ+ people living in hostile environments could be in much greater danger when researching life-saving information online.
-
-Without Tor, people living in oppressive regimes would not have access to the crucial information they need to fight for freedom, democracy, and peace.
-
-<div class="admonition success" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Add an onion service for your organization's website</p>
-
-If you would like to add this service for your website to help more people access it safely, you can [read more](https://blog.torproject.org/more-onions-porfavor/) about onion services on the Tor Project Blog. As of 2021, you can even [get](https://blog.torproject.org/tls-certificate-for-onion-site/) domain-validated certificates for your onion site using HARICA, an operator founded by a nonprofit civil society from Greece.
-
-</div>
-
-### Tor is for everyone to use
-
-Tor is a tool that can help so many people. But Tor isn't *only* for people in highly sensitive situations like whistleblowers and journalists, Tor is for everyone!
-
-Of course, people in more dangerous situations will *need* Tor to stay safe, but everyone can benefit from Tor's privacy protections in their daily lives. I personally use Tor when I am forced to visit Google Map. Not because it's dangerous to me, but just because I greatly dislike the idea of Google tracking my location activities.
-
-Tor can also help fighting surveillance capitalism!
-
-Moreover, you can considerably help people in dangerous situations by using Tor for trivial reasons like I do.
-
-By using Tor for banal activities, when you aren't in any danger worse than a nasty ad-attack, you help to normalize the use of Tor and add more noise to the traffic. The more people do this, the more using Tor becomes just something people do when they care about privacy online, and nothing more.
-
-### Who uses Tor?
-
-- Anyone who cares about privacy!
-- Journalists who need to conduct research and protect their sources.
-- Whistleblowers using special websites to communication information to newspapers anonymously.
-- Democracy activists fighting against authoritarian governments who require anonymity online to stay safe from persecution.
-- People living under oppressive regimes who need to circumvent their country's censorship to access information freely.
-- Victims of domestic violence who need to research safe shelters and supportive resources without raising suspicion from their aggressor.
-- LGBTQ+ people living in hostile environments who need to access information online and stay connected with their community.
-- Generous people who want to [help and support](https://blog.torproject.org/support-tor-project-share-your-story/) all the above 💜
-
-The Tor community has gathered this [wonderful collection of anonymous user stories](https://community.torproject.org/outreach/stories/) from people describing why they use Tor.
-
-### Tor is critical public infrastructure
-
-To keep Tor strong for everyone, it's essential to support and grow the network of volunteer-operated relays forming the Tor Network.
-
-Thousands of journalists and activists rely on the Tor Network every day to stay safe and to continue their important work.
-
-Furthermore, **countless privacy-oriented projects depend on the Tor Network**.
-
-To name only a few, the messaging applications [Briar](https://briarproject.org/), [Cwtch](https://docs.cwtch.im/), and [SimpleX](https://simplex.chat/) all use Tor to harden some of their privacy-preserving features.
-
-For whistleblowers to stay safe, both [SecureDrop](https://securedrop.org/) and [Hush Line](https://hushline.app/) use the Tor Network. Many [newsrooms around the world](https://securedrop.org/directory/) host onion services to protect sources, such as The Guardian in the UK, CBC in Canada, ProPublica in the US, and many more.
-
-There's also all the applications protecting people with the highest needs such as [Tails](https://tails.net/), [OnionShare](https://onionshare.org/), and [more](https://github.com/Polycarbohydrate/awesome-tor).
-
-**Losing the Tor Network would mean losing all the applications and features relying on it.**
-
-This would be disastrous for the privacy community, journalists, activists, dissidents, victims of domestic violence, LGBTQ+ population, and so many worldwide.
-
-From a human rights perspective, **we simply cannot afford to lose Tor**.
-
-## :octicons-question-16: Things to consider when using Tor
-
-### Tor compared to VPN protections
-
-When using a VPN, your ISP will not know which websites you visit online (or other activities). Your ISP will see that you are connecting to a VPN, but will not know what you do from there. Your VPN however *could* know which websites you visit. Using a VPN is a transfer of trust from your ISP. When using a VPN, you should always trust your VPN provider more than your ISP.
-
-The websites you visit will see the IP address of your VPN provider instead of yours. This can help protect your identity and location, but they will know this connection uses a VPN.
-
-VPNs can offer great benefits for your privacy. However, if your VPN provider was compelled by law to provide the logs of the websites you visited (or will visit), it is *technically* possible to do for them.
-
-When using the Tor Network correctly, no one knows which websites *you visited*, or other services you accessed. Your ISP or VPN provider will only know you have accessed Tor, but will not know which websites you have visited from there. Even if compelled by law, they could only share that you have accessed Tor, at this specific time.
-
-The websites you have visited also won't know who you are (unless you tell them). They will only know someone accessed their websites through Tor, at this specific time.
-
-The relays used for a Tor Circuit cannot alone re-recreate the link between your IP address and the websites you visit either. This offers much stronger protection for your privacy than a VPN does.
-
-### Who knows you are using Tor
-
-When using the Tor Network, your ISP and the Guard Relay will both know you (the IP address you are using) are using Tor.
-
-To prevent this, you [could](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/advanced/tor-overview/#safely-connecting-to-tor) use Tor from a [trustworthy VPN](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/).
-
-If you do so, your VPN provider will know you are using Tor, but your ISP will not. Your ISP will only see you are accessing your VPN, and the Tor Guard Relay will see your VPN's IP address instead of yours.
-
-### HTTPS for non-onion websites
-
-The Exit Relay from the Tor Circuit will see someone is accessing this website (or other service).
-
-If you were to use Tor to visit a non-onion website that isn't protected with HTTPS, and log in with your credentials, this Exit Relay *could* technically read this information. Using HTTPS with non-onion websites is *very* important when using Tor. Onion sites offer protections that are equivalent to HTTPS.
-
-### Be careful with files when using Tor
-
-While it's safe to visit secured websites through Tor, be careful when downloading files or opening documents.
-
-Depending on what kind of files it is, there are a number of problems that could arise. For example, it's a [bad idea](https://blog.torproject.org/blog/bittorrent-over-tor-isnt-good-idea) to download torrent files over Tor. Additionally, Tor will not protect you from downloading malware or exposing metadata with shared files.
-
-If you need to share files through Tor with a *trusted* contact, [OnionShare](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/file-sharing/#onionshare) is a good option.
-
-## :octicons-stop-16: Addressing misconceptions
-
-There has been misconceptions floating around about Tor. Most of them repeat similar misinformation attributed to many other privacy tools: Why using this if you have nothing to hide? But this argument is incredibly flawed and comes from a naive understanding of privacy rights and needs.
-
-Most people use privacy tools for protection, and everyone needs protection. Moreover, [privacy is a fundamental right](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/04/17/is-privacy-dead/) intrinsically connected to democracy and civil liberties.
-
-### The dark web, the deep web, and the surface web
-
-Some misconceptions have spread from confusion on what the *deep* web and the *dark* web are. Because yes, Tor is part of the dark web.
-
-While using the term "dark web" might make for great sensationalist news title, the dark web isn't anything to fear.
-
-It's not "dark" as in "dark intent" or the "dark side of the Force". It's really just dark as in "it's so dark on this road, I can't read the addresses around".
-
-This dark web needs special software, configuration, or authorization to access it. For example, **the Tor Browser is the streetlight you need to navigate on the Onion roads**.
-
-If you use Tor to visit the Privacy Guides onion site, you will be using the dark web. It's a website (or website version) that can only be accessed using a specialized tool. That's it!
-
-The dark web is part of the deep web, which is simply all the online information that isn't indexed by any standard web search engines. Aren't you happy your bank account is on the deep web?
-
-![Illustration of an iceberg where the tip above water represents the surface web, the part underwater represents the deep web, and the part under the iceberg represents the dark web.](../assets/images/in-praise-of-tor/tor-darkweb.webp)
-<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Em / Privacy Guides | Inspired by: [Ranjithsiji](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Iceberg_of_Webs.svg)</small>
-
-### Criminals use envelopes, doors, and clothing too
-
-Some fear that Tor is used by criminals. While that might be true some criminals use Tor, a lot of people who aren't criminals at all also use Tor.
-
-This kind of argument really leads nowhere. Criminals also use Google, Facebook, and Twitter (a lot actually). Criminals use envelopes to hide their ransom letters, closed doors to hide their crimes, and clothing to conceal weapons! Are we going to forbid clothing because some (all?) criminals use clothing to hide their weapons?
-
-**We shouldn't ban clothing, and we shouldn't ban Tor either.** There are other better ways to catch criminals than removing a tool millions use to stay safe online.
-
-### Tor receives government funding
-
-Yes, Tor does receive government funding, and that's a good thing. A lot of nonprofit organizations receive government funding as a stable ([usually](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/02/03/the-future-of-privacy/#the-tools-you-use-might-depend-on-government-funding)) source of income. Our governments *should* be contributing financially to the tools we all use to improve our security and privacy for free, moreover if they are using it themselves.
-
-While any organization should thrive to diversify its sources of income to reduce its dependency on large contributors, it's not always easy to do.
-
-If you feel uneasy about a privacy tool you use receiving government funding, the best thing you can do to fight this is to [donate](https://donate.torproject.org/) directly to reduce its dependence to it.
-
-### Depending on where you are, using Tor is likely safe
-
-If you are not living under an oppressive regime with heavy censorship, it's likely that using Tor is safe for you, and will not put you on "a list". Even if it was putting you on "a list", it likely is a list full of great people working to defend human rights and privacy rights online.
-
-That being said, **if you are living in a region where using Tor is dangerous**, and could put you on a list of anti-regime dissidents, you *should absolutely* be careful and take special measures to hide your usage of Tor.
-
-Additionally, **if you are in a vulnerable situation** where an aggressor has access to your device or ISP information, and could hurt you if they knew you have used Tor, you should use a Tor Bridge and only [access Tor through Tails](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/01/29/installing-and-using-tails/).
-
-### Tor is fantastic for your privacy, but is not magical
-
-Tor is a great tool to improve your privacy online and make it much harder to identify you, your location, and the content you access online. However, it will not make you magically anonymous.
-
-If you use Tor with files containing metadata about you, this metadata can still identify you.
-
-If you use Tor to log in your Facebook account, then of course Facebook still knows it's you, and now also knows you are using Tor.
-
-If you use Tor to create a new account, but use an email address, phone number, username, or profile picture you used elsewhere when not connected through Tor, then your Tor activity can get linked to your previous activity.
-
-If you use Tor to reveal information so specific that only you, or only someone at your company, or only someone in this small government department could know, then of course authorities can identify you this way.
-
-You should also consider correlation in time when using Tor. If your activity is so specific that it can be narrowed down to only a few people, and your ISP or VPN knows you have accessed Tor at this specific time (and shares this information with authorities), a correlation in time could be enough to de-anonymize you.
-
-### Misconceptions are very detrimental to Tor, and other privacy tools
-
-We need to be extremely careful when spreading information that could be inaccurate or hasn't been verified when talking about Tor (or any other privacy tools).
-
-Misinformation can create mistaken fears and stop people from using a tool they would greatly benefit from.
-
-If someone is so scared of Tor because of some rumor they heard, that they continue their activism from the surface web instead, they could needlessly put themselves at risk.
-
-Furthermore, unjustified bad reputations can severely hurt funding for tools like Tor. This leads to less resources to continue developing the browser, the network, and to advocate for privacy everywhere.
-
-We all have a responsibility to verify which information we share with others, make sure we stop misinformation at its root, and correct harmful misconceptions everywhere we hear them.
-
-## :material-hand-heart-outline: Tor needs our support
-
-**Tor is at risk, and needs our help.** Despite its strength and history, Tor isn't safe from the same attacks oppressive regimes and misinformed legislators direct at encryption and many other privacy-enhancing technologies.
-
-Moreover, due to its US government funding, Tor has already been on the destruction path of the recent hectic government cuts. Thankfully, the US Agency for Global Media finally [rescinded the grant termination](https://www.theregister.com/2025/03/25/otf_tor_lets_encrypt_funding_lawsuit/?td=rt-3a) it had announced on March 15th to the Open Technology Fund, which the Tor Project benefits from. Sadly, considering the unpredictability of the current US administration, this doesn't mean the Tor Project is safe from cuts later on.
-
-As much as the Tor Network relies on generous volunteers to run it, the nonprofit Tor Project relies on grants and donations to survive.
-
-The good news is, we can help with both!
-
-The more individuals donate to the Tor Project, the less it depends on government funding, and the more stable its donation income becomes.
-
-Similarly, the more people volunteer to run a Tor relay, the more stable and reliable the Tor Network becomes.
-
-Tor is a privacy tool so many people, organizations, and applications need to stay safe and secure. It is **our collective responsibility to contribute what we can** to keep Tor strong and thriving for all of us.
-
-### How to support Tor
-
-There are many ways to help Tor survive and thrive! You can help by:
-
-- [Donating to the Tor Project (includes really neat merch!)](https://donate.torproject.org/)
-
-- [Spreading the word about Tor](https://community.torproject.org/outreach/)
-
-- [Joining the Tor community](https://community.torproject.org/)
-
-- [Making your website accessible as an onion service](https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/setup/)
-
-- [Asking your university to run a Tor relay](https://toruniversity.eff.org/)
-
-- [Running a Tor relay yourself](https://community.torproject.org/relay/)
-
-- [Running a Snowflake proxy to help fight censorship](https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/snowflake/)
-
-- Using Tor for anything from important to trivial
-
-- Sharing this article 💜
-
-## :octicons-bookmark-16: Onion sites you can visit using the Tor Browser
-
-- [Privacy Guides website](http://www.xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh6wh5jc4up35bqdflu6bkdc5cas5vjqd.onion/en/) 💛
-- [Privacy Guides forum](http://discuss.6xotdxvg7pexnean3xu6b7ivs7g52zcwsdbnz4mdm4byivc3yfv65aid.onion/)
-- [Amnesty International](https://www.amnestyl337aduwuvpf57irfl54ggtnuera45ygcxzuftwxjvvmpuzqd.onion)
-- [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.iykpqm7jiradoeezzkhj7c4b33g4hbgfwelht2evxxeicbpjy44c7ead.onion/)
-- [Freedom of the Press Foundation](http://fpfjxcrmw437h6z2xl3w4czl55kvkmxpapg37bbopsafdu7q454byxid.onion/)
-- [Secure Drop directory (for whistleblowers)](http://sdolvtfhatvsysc6l34d65ymdwxcujausv7k5jk4cy5ttzhjoi6fzvyd.onion/directory/)
-- [ProPublica](http://p53lf57qovyuvwsc6xnrppyply3vtqm7l6pcobkmyqsiofyeznfu5uqd.onion/)
-- [Internet Archive](https://archivep75mbjunhxc6x4j5mwjmomyxb573v42baldlqu56ruil2oiad.onion/)
-- [OnionShare (file sharing)](http://lldan5gahapx5k7iafb3s4ikijc4ni7gx5iywdflkba5y2ezyg6sjgyd.onion/)
-- [Proton Mail](https://protonmailrmez3lotccipshtkleegetolb73fuirgj7r4o4vfu7ozyd.onion/)
-- [Tor Project](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion)
-
-***
-
-For more in-depth information about Tor, you can consult our [Tor Overview](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/advanced/tor-overview/).
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Unless credited otherwise, all screenshots from: Privacy Guides</small>
-
----
-
-**Update (5/6):** This article was updated to note [the importance of restarting Tor Browser](tor-security-slider-flaw.md) when changing security level settings.

blog/posts/privacy-guides-hires-three-staff-members.md

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ At Privacy Guides, we are always looking for ways to be more effective at our mi
 
 ## Em – Journalist
 
-![](https://forum-cdn.privacyguides.net/user_avatar/discuss.privacyguides.net/em/288/8211_2.png){ align=right }
+![](https://forum-cdn.privacyguides.net/user_avatar/discuss.privacyguides.net/ematprivacyguides/288/8211_2.png){ align=right }
 
 We’re excited to welcome Em (she/her), our new journalist, who will play an important role in taking our [articles](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/) to the next level. She will be focusing on creating in-depth, interesting posts that explore the most important topics in the world of online privacy, security, and digital rights. Em will also conduct interviews with experts in the industry, analyze reports and studies, and produce investigative news stories to keep our readers informed.
 

blog/posts/private-european-alternatives.md

@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ Element is based in the United Kingdom, which is of course no longer in the Euro
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
-![Element logo](../assets/img/social-networks/element.svg){ align=right }
+![Element logo](../assets/img/messengers/element.svg){ align=right }
 
 **Element** is the flagship client for the [Matrix](https://matrix.org/docs/chat_basics/matrix-for-im) protocol, an [open standard](https://spec.matrix.org/latest) for secure decentralized real-time communication.
 

blog/posts/sam-altman-wants-your-eyeball.md

@@ -1,382 +0,0 @@
----
-date:
-    created: 2025-05-10T14:30:00Z
-categories:
-    - News
-authors:
-    - em
-description: Last week, OpenAI's CEO Sam Altman announced in San Francisco that the World project he co-founded, formerly known as Worldcoin, is opening six stores across the United States, allowing users of the project's app to scan their eyeballs.
-schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle
-preview:
-  color: "#c0322f"
-  text_color: "#ffffff"
-  site_logo: privacy-guides-logo-notext-colorbg-white.svg
-  icon: material/eye-circle
----
-
-
-# Sam Altman Wants Your Eyeball
-
-![Image of a red circle of light that resembles a human iris over a black background.](../assets/images/sam-altman-wants-your-eyeball/orb-cover.webp)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Photo: Flyd / Unsplash</small>
-
-Last week, OpenAI's CEO Sam Altman announced in San Francisco that the World project he co-founded, formerly known as Worldcoin, is opening six stores across the United States, allowing users of the project's app to scan their eyeballs.
-
-Simply put, the premise is this: scan your eyeball, get a biometric tag, verify yourself, buy our apps (and cryptocurrency). The scary part is the for-profit company developing the project has now gathered millions in venture capital investment, powerful partners, and is ready to expand and impose its [Minority Report](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minority_Report_(film)) style technology everywhere. **Welcome to Dystopialand.**<!-- more -->
-
-The World(coin) project is an initiative from the startup Tools for Humanity, co-founded by its CEO Alex Blania. Despite its friendly name, the for-profit corporation has been on the radar of many critics through the years already. From experts to journalists to privacy commissioners around the world, not everyone shares Blania's enthusiasm for his biometric-based technology.
-
-## What is the World App?
-
-The World project, recently rebranded from the Worldcoin project (possibly to convey better its expansionist ambitions) presented its plan for the World App to Americans this week. The project is now expanding well beyond the cryptocurrency it started from.
-
-The World App is an everything app, providing users with a *World ID*, that can be verified through the collection of biometric data in the form of an iris scan.
-
-The scan is then filtered and hashed to create a unique identifier that is stored as a so-called "proof of personhood" on the *World Network*, a blockchain-based protocol.
-
-The World App itself contains a collection of "Mini Apps", where users can manage their cryptocurrencies, chat together, play games, receive their pay check even, and ultimately live their whole life within the closed "verified" ecosystem of the app.
-
-For a company constantly praising decentralization, it sure looks like they want to make sure they are the center of it all.
-
-To obtain this coveted verification code, users *must* be ready to share their precious eyeball data with the Orb.
-
-The Orb is a piece of hardware designed by Tools for Humanity to perform iris scans. It is available to access in the United States at one of the currently six locations in Austin, Atlanta, Los Angeles, Miami, Nashville and San Francisco (more to come soon), like some sort of biometrics collection ATM.
-
-The World project has for ambition to expand its reach across the United States to install 7,500 Orbs by the end of this year, so be prepared to see this dystopian technology everywhere soon.
-
-The San Francisco [presentation last week](https://www.theregister.com/2025/05/04/sam_altman_startup_world/) was clearly prepared to impress investors with its Apple announcement vibe. The promise of a quickly growing startup that everyone will soon want to work with, was repeated over and over in different flavors.
-
-Tools for Humanity bragged about many large partnerships that should make any privacy advocates shiver in dread: the Match Group dating apps conglomerate (Tinder, OkCupid, Hinge, Plenty of Fish), Stripe, and Visa are some of them.
-
-If they succeed in convincing enough people, many of us could soon have little choice but to unwillingly have to enroll.
-
-## World(coin) isn't new, you might have heard of its unethical practices already
-
-The project [claims](https://techcrunch.com/2025/04/30/sam-altmans-world-unveils-a-mobile-verification-device/) to have onboarded 26 million people already, including 12 millions "users" who are verified (had their biometric data collected).
-
-These "users" are largely located in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. This is because the company started testing for its project there a few years ago, in regions where people often have fewer legal protections.
-
-In 2022, MIT Technology Review produced [an extensive investigation](https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/04/06/1048981/worldcoin-cryptocurrency-biometrics-web3/) on the startup's debut in an article titled: *Deception, exploited workers, and cash handouts: How Worldcoin recruited its first half a million test users.*
-
-The investigation revealed a collection of unethical practices to pressure the most vulnerable populations in signing up for Worldcoin, and **have their eyeball scanned in exchange for money** they desperately needed.
-
-Some participants had to provide much more personal information than the company says is required, such as emails, phone numbers, and even photos of official ID. Many people who gave their biometric data to Worldcoin were rushed and misinformed. Some who signed up didn't even have an email and had to create one. The "Orb operators" hired to perform the scans locally were often poorly trained, poorly informed, and unable to answer the questions asked by participants.
-
-So much so that [Kenya suspended the company's operations](https://techcrunch.com/2023/08/02/kenya-suspends-worldcoin-scans-over-security-privacy-and-financial-concerns/) in 2023 over concerns for privacy, security, and financial service practices.
-
-Some people who signed up never received the promised money. Some officials were bribed to give the impression to participants these operations were official and supported by the government.
-
-As Ruswandi, one of the person targeted by this early campaign [remarked](https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/04/06/1048981/worldcoin-cryptocurrency-biometrics-web3/): "why did Worldcoin target lower-income communities in the first place, instead of crypto enthusiasts or communities?"
-
-Exploiting people in situation of poverty in order to test a biometric identification technology isn't a great way to start a project developed by a company called "Tools for Humanity".
-
-## Creating the problem, selling the solution
-
-Why developing such a technology in the first place?
-
-Sam Altman himself have [expressed concern](https://www.wired.com/story/sam-altman-orb-eyeball-scan-launch-us/) about the problem this alleged solution solves: the avalanche of fake accounts and pretend persons online caused by the new AI tools unleashed everywhere.
-
-The proposed use of a "proof of personhood" claims to solve this problem by allocating a unique identifier to each human, a personal code supposedly impossible to duplicate or cheat. Of course, this has [already been proven wrong](https://gizmodo.com/worldcoin-black-market-iris-data-identity-orb-1850454037).
-
-No one will miss the irony of the CEO of OpenAI, responsible for creating the largest share of this problem, expressing such concern **while continuing to feed the fire**.
-
-This is a classic case of creating a problem and selling the solution. Well, in this case it is more like ***selling* the problem and selling the solution**. As researcher and cryptocurrency critic [Molly White pointed out](https://www.citationneeded.news/worldcoin-a-solution-in-search-of/) in 2023:
-
-"That's right, the guy who's going to sell us all the solution to a worsening AI-powered bot infestation of the Internet and to AI-induced mass unemployment is the same guy who's making the AI in question."
-
-Sadly, this proposed solution also isn't really a solution, or at least it isn't a *good* solution. Indeed, this will **create a whole collection of new problems**, many much worse than a bot infestation.
-
-## The risks of sharing biometric data
-
-Biometric data is incredibly sensitive data, because it's irrevocably attached to a person. Whether it's from a face scan, palm scan, fingerprint, keystroke pattern, or iris scan, this data is part of our bodies and **cannot be changed like a password** if it gets compromised.
-
-For this reason, a growing number of legislations around the world now include special categories for such data collection, and require extra protections and supervision for it.
-
-There are many dangers in collecting and potentially endangering biometric data. First, if this data gets stolen, criminals can impersonate a victim much more convincingly, because they will have the "proof" to "verify" this is really you.
-
-While straight-up stealing your eyeball or face might still belong to science-fiction, the risk of getting the data produced *from* the scan stolen is very real.
-
-When the World project claims it is secure because biometric data isn't stored anywhere, even if that was true, the iris *code* derivative of this data is indeed stored and processed somewhere, and this can potentially be stolen.
-
-How hard will it be for a victim to recover an account from a biometric thief when everything is reinforcing the false narrative shared with investors that this technology can't be cheated?
-
-Then, there is the loss of pseudonymity protections online.
-
-If every social media account becomes tied to a unique biometric-based identifier, whether directly or indirectly, there is no pseudonymity anymore.
-
-Further, if only one account is allowed by "verified human", then no one can create separate accounts for their work life and personal life anymore. Creating separate accounts for separate purposes is an excellent privacy-preserving practice.
-
-Even if the identifier isn't tied to a legal name directly, accounts on different platforms using the same identifier could potentially get liked together. To be fair, it does seem Tools for Humanity worked to prevent different platforms from having access to the same code, but how well will this hold the test of time? Will platforms increasingly escalate privacy-invasive requests from this point, like they often do?
-
-**Pseudonymity saves lives.** It is an essential tool for the safety of the most vulnerable online. Killing pseudonymity by requiring unique biometric identification could endanger millions.
-
-This is a serious problem coming up with [age verification](age-verification-wants-your-face.md) processes as well, which World ID will soon also be a part of when [testing](https://www.engadget.com/cybersecurity/sam-altmans-eyeball-scanning-id-technology-debuts-in-the-us-130032856.html) its implementation for Tinder in Japan.
-
-Biometric data should never be used lightly. It should be reserved for the most extreme cases only.
-
-The regions who have adopted stronger regulations for biometric data collection are moving in the right direction. But will protective legislation be enough to resist the pressure from a for-profit VC-backed corporation with a valuation at billions?
-
-## Flipping the coin
-
-Tools for Humanity seems to be well aware of its creepiness factor, and of the criticisms brought by privacy commissioners around the world.
-
-Its recent Orb redesign from the previous cold (Black)mirror finish clearly tries hard to replace creepiness with cuteness.
-
-The company has also evidently invested a lot in presenting a pro-privacy image, likely in an attempt to reassure users (and investors).
-
-Unfortunately, many of these privacy-preserving claims are inaccurate. Some claims promoting "features" that might sound impressive to a neophyte's ear are actually just the baseline, and others sadly are misleading *at best*.
-
-While a few privacy-preserving efforts are indeed positive, most of the focus on privacy relates to marketing much more than any serious protections.
-
-## How privacy-preserving is it?
-
-Most people are still put off by the idea of having their eyeball scanned, and the company has evidently invested a lot in promoting a "privacy-preserving" image, possibly as an attempt to reassure unconvinced humans and [privacy commissioners](#privacy-legislators-arent-on-board) alike.
-
-But how much can we trust those claims?
-
-### Flawed assumption about what constitutes personal data
-
-The largest assumption about why this technology is "privacy-preserving" seems to come from the fact that the World App doesn't collect names, official IDs ([unless it does](https://www.toolsforhumanity.com/legal/privacy-notice#6-2-credentials-)), emails ([unless it does](https://www.toolsforhumanity.com/legal/privacy-notice#annex-i-%E2%80%93-legal-grounds/purposes-for-tools-for-humanity-data-processing-activities-)), phone numbers ([unless it does](https://www.toolsforhumanity.com/legal/privacy-notice#5-1-data-you-provide-to-us)), date of birth ([unless it does](https://world.org/blog/announcements/worldcoin-new-world-id-unverify-option-increases-personal-control-over-data)), or other identifiers.
-
-This assumption however neglects the fact that 1) even data that isn't attached to a legal name can be personal data, and 2) the iris code it produces from the iris scan *is* indeed personal data.
-
-While there are variations, most privacy regulations have similar definitions of what constitute personal data. The European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [defines](https://gdpr-info.eu/art-4-gdpr/) it as "any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person". An iris code derived from an iris scan of course fits this definition.
-
-Moreover, to create a World ID, the company also collects a face image. Together, the original iris scan and face photo are referred to as *Image Data*. For "privacy-preserving" purposes, Image Data of course never leaves the Orb device ([unless it does](https://world.org/legal/biometric-data-consent-form)).
-
-While it seems some effort has been made to protect the Image Data in some ways, the idea that derivative data from the scans isn't still sensitive personal information anymore is wrong.
-
-If there is a way for a person to scan their iris again and generate the same code, then this data relates to their identifiable person. This also means that *someone else* could scan their iris and generate the same code.
-
-As whistleblower [Edward Snowden rightfully pointed out](https://x.com/Snowden/status/1451990496537088000) in a 2021 tweet:
-
-“This looks like it produces a global (hash) database of people's iris scans (for 'fairness'), and waves away the implications by saying 'we deleted the scans!' Yeah, but you save the *hashes* produced by the scans. Hashes that match *future* scans. Don't catalogue eyeballs.”
-
-### Questionable reassurance about local data
-
-One of the biggest reassurance relates to the claim that sensitive biometric data (Image Data) is only stored locally. But this isn't completely accurate either, and there seems to be conflicting information about it from the company's own documentation.
-
-The World [white paper](https://whitepaper.world.org/#enrollment-process) specifies that:
-
-"The Orb verifies that it sees a human, runs local fraud prevention checks, and takes pictures of both irises. The iris images are converted on the Orb hardware into the iris code. Raw biometric data does not leave the device (unless explicitly approved by the user for training purposes)."
-
-However, according to the [Biometric Data Consent Form](https://world.org/legal/biometric-data-consent-form) users have to sign prior to data collection, if a user needs a fully verified World ID, inevitably this sensitive biometric data will be sent to their phone, therefore leaving the Orb.
-
-After a user agrees to the form, they can keep the option for *Data Custody* disabled to have their biometric data deleted from the Orb "later", and have it uploaded to their phone (with all the risk that this entails).
-
-The other option users have is to enable Data Custody (if allowed in the user's country) and have this sensitive data sent to both their phone *and* to Tools for Humanity.
-
-This means the Orb inevitably sends this sensitive data to a mobile device. Then, this data is only as secure as the mobile device is. Which isn't so reassuring.
-
-The documentation does maintain this biometric data is sent as an "end-to-end encrypted data bundle", but this doesn't mean the data never leaves the Orb, it just means it leaves it while encrypted (which is really just the basics), and copies it to the user's device.
-
-Furthermore, future users are *strongly* incentivized to share their Image Data with Tools for Humanity, for algorithm improvement purposes. Pressure to opt in is even presented as a *convenience* option, because it would be cumbersome to have to come over for another scan after every update.
-
-As [stated](https://world.org/legal/biometric-data-consent-form) in the Biometric Data Consent Form:
-
-"This will likely help you avoid some inconvenience because, if we have your Image Data, then you will not need to return to an Orb to re-verify your digital identity when we update the software."
-
-The company continues to repeat they have a "privacy by default and by design approach". But **you can't keep your privacy-preserving cake and eat it, too**.
-
-### What does the white paper say
-
-In tech, a white paper is usually a research-based document produced by the developers that presents more technical details on an application, product, or process. It is especially valuable for products like the Orb and the World App, where security and privacy *should* be paramount, and therefore examined closer.
-
-Because it isn't an independent review, a white paper can also not be worth much more than a marketing pamphlet.
-
-To its credit, Tools for Humanity does [warn](https://whitepaper.world.org/#nature-of-the-whitepaper) in its white paper that this information is "intended for general informational purposes and community discussion only and do not constitute a prospectus, an offer document, an offer of securities, a solicitation for investment, or any offer to sell any product, item or asset (whether digital or otherwise)."
-
-Furthermore, the company makes sure to specify that "circumstances may change and that the Whitepaper or the Website may become outdated as a result; and the [World] Foundation is not under any obligation to update or correct this document in connection therewith."
-
-The document is also described as a "crypto-asset white paper".
-
-We have been warned.
-
-In its Privacy section, the white paper [states](https://whitepaper.world.org/#image-custody-opt-in) that "no data collected, including images taken by the Orb has or will ever be sold. Nor will it be used for any other intent than to improve World ID."
-
-However, its [Privacy Notice also states](https://world.org/legal/privacy-notice#8--when-we-share-your-data) that they may "share your personal information in connection with, or during negotiations concerning, any merger, sale of company assets, financing, or acquisition of all or a portion of our business by another company."
-
-If this happens, many regretful users might find themselves in [the same shoes as 23andMe users this year](https://www.techradar.com/health-fitness/23andme-is-bankrupt-and-about-to-sell-your-dna-heres-how-to-stop-that-from-happening), where the DNA collecting company started to look for buyers of its biometric data assets after filling for bankruptcy.
-
-Additionally, the Face Authentication section of the white paper [describes](https://whitepaper.world.org/#face-authentication) a process where encrypted facial biometrics collected from the Orb are used for authentication in the World App.
-
-Even if this data is stored on-device, it is still biometric data getting collected by the Orb then processed by the phone app. There is no question this is sensitive and personal biometric data, and it is indeed kept outside the orb.
-
-Tools for Humanity lacks consistency in the various claims and statements found through its documentation and promotion material. It becomes difficult to know which version to trust, and if it is to be trusted at all.
-
-### No deletion on the blockchain
-
-Tools for Humanity's Privacy Policy declares that the company will delete all account data (when laws allow it) one month after it is closed, this is good. They also state they will delete entirely any inactive account after 2 years, and this is actually a great policy.
-
-But what happens to the World ID, transactions, and other data stored on the blockchain?
-
-While some thoughts have been put into deletion and some good mechanisms seem to have been implemented, unfortunately data stored on the blockchain might be "deletion-resistant".
-
-There's a possibility that **what happens on the blockchain stays on the blockchain, forever**.
-
-The policy [notes](https://www.toolsforhumanity.com/legal/privacy-notice#11--how-long-do-we-keep-your-data-) that:
-
-"Due to the public and immutable nature of blockchain technology, we cannot amend, erase, or control the disclosure of data that is stored on blockchains."
-
-So that is something to keep in mind if you value your right to delete.
-
-## Data security considerations
-
-Even if some thoughtful security features seem to have been implemented for the World App and its Orbs, nothing processing sensitive data at such a large scale should be left in the hands of a single for-profit, largely unregulated, organization.
-
-This would be like putting 8 billion eggs in a very fragile basket, held by someone paid to make the basket pretty and convince as many people as possible to put their precious single egg in it, with no incentive whatsoever to ensure the basket doesn't break. I would not want to put my egg in there, especially with how much it costs now.
-
-The idea of using one single *for-profit* app worldwide for "human verification", identity verification, age verification, money transactions, and storing official IDs (and so on and so forth) makes this application a *huge* target for criminals and hostile governments alike.
-
-It's good that the app had [security audits](https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/2023-08-worldcoin-orb-securityreview.pdf), made some [code available](https://github.com/worldcoin) as open source, and reportedly [plans](https://whitepaper.world.org/#why-custom-hardware-is-needed) to open a bug bounty program.
-
-However, there are still problems that remain. For example, the phone in this case becomes a single point of failure. The easiest way to steal someone's identity and money (all at once) will be to steal their phone data (whether physically or remotely). Even without criminal intent, what happens when someone just loses their phone? Or accidentally drop it in the pool? Or step on it?
-
-With **everything relying on a single app and a single device**, risk is greatly amplified.
-
-Outside the user's responsibility, Orb operators and Orb stores are susceptible to various attacks. This will increase exponentially with the number of users of course, as the target becomes bigger. In fact, Orb operators have [already been hacked](https://techcrunch.com/2023/05/12/hackers-stole-passwords-of-worldcoin-orb-operators/).
-
-Then, there is the appeal of fake identities and money fraud for criminals. Already, there is a [black market](https://gizmodo.com/worldcoin-black-market-iris-data-identity-orb-1850454037) for iris data in China, where people buy iris data (or verified World ID according to World) from people in Cambodia, Kenya, and other countries for a few dollars only. The vulnerability allowing this was reportedly fixed, but it is doubtful this is the last one we hear about.
-
-The Orb itself is also an important potential attack surface. With Tools for Humanity's ambition to fill the world with Orbs everywhere, will Orbs become the next version of the sketchy ATM? Where you might wonder if this funny-looking Orb is trustworthy enough to pay your bar tab without risking emptying your crypto wallet?
-
-## Privacy legislators aren't on board
-
-Despite all its privacy promotion material, the World project has failed to convince privacy commissioners around the world of their supposedly good intentions. Perhaps in this case actions speak louder than words, and privacy commissioners aren't so gullible.
-
-With the expansion the project plans this year, we can expect even more experts will examine the company's claims and challenge its "privacy-preserving" assumptions
-
-There are many reasons to remain skeptical about these promises of privacy. Indeed, numerous countries have already suspended, fined, or called for investigation on the company's (mal)practices.
-
-### The company was fined for personal data violation
-
-In 2024, the company was [fined](https://cointelegraph.com/news/south-korea-fines-worldcoin-personal-data-violations) 1.1 billion Korean won for violating South Korea's Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA). The Worldcoin Foundation was also imposed corrective orders and recommendations. Organizations that are truly "privacy-first" rarely reach this point.
-
-The Data Custody feature, which allows (and encourages) users to share their biometric data with Tools for Humanity is now unavailable in South Korea.
-
-### Brazil has banned Worldcoin in the country
-
-In January this year, the National Data Protection Authority (ANPD) [banned](https://decrypt.co/305639/brazilian-regulator-denies-worldcoin-appeal-ban) Worldcoin's operations in Brazil, after the company's appeal was rejected.
-
-The ban comes from regulation stating that consent to process biometric data must be "free, informed, and unequivocal", which cannot be the case with the World project paying users in cryptocurrency in exchange for their iris scans. Data deletion concerns were also raised by the regulator.
-
-The World project tried again to appeal the decision, in vain.
-
-### Kenya and Indonesia suspended its operations
-
-In 2023, Kenya, one of the first country where Worldcoin was available, [suspended](https://techcrunch.com/2023/08/02/kenya-suspends-worldcoin-scans-over-security-privacy-and-financial-concerns/) Worldcoin's operations citing concerns over the "authenticity and legality" of its activities related to privacy, security, and financial services.
-
-The worse part is, months before the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner (ODPC) of the country had ordered Tools for Humanity to stop collecting personal information from its citizens. The company simply [ignored the ODPC order](https://techcrunch.com/2023/08/15/worldcoin-in-kenya/) and continued to collect biometric data from Kenyans. It only stopped after Kenya's ministry of interior and administration gave the suspension order later on.
-
-This again is quite far from the behavior of a company who genuinely values privacy.
-
-More recently on May 4th 2025, Indonesia also [suspended](https://en.antaranews.com/news/353861/indonesia-suspends-worldcoin-world-id-operations-over-public-concerns) the World project's operation in the country over concerns related to user privacy and security. The Ministry of Communication and Digital will be summoning the project's local operators to clarify the operations and determine potential violation of the Indonesia's electronic system regulation.
-
-### German regulator ordered GDPR compliance following investigation
-
-In December 2024, the German regulator, the Bavarian State Office for Data Protection Supervision (BayLDA), [issued an order](https://decrypt.co/298090/german-watchdog-cracks-down-on-worldcoin-over-biometric-data) to obligate proving deletion procedures that comply with the GDPR within one month. Additionally, the BayLDA ordered the complete deletion of certain data records that were previously collected without sufficient legal basis.
-
-Again, the World Foundation is fighting the order and will [appeal](https://cointelegraph.com/news/german-watchdog-order-worldcoin-delete-data) the decision. The company tries to argue the data collected was "anonymized", a common strategy to try evading GDPR compliance, which does not regulate anonymized data.
-
-### Data protection authorities around the world are investigating
-
-In 2023, France's data protection authority the CNIL [investigated](https://www.reuters.com/technology/worldcoin-paris-office-checked-by-french-data-watchdog-2023-08-31/) Worldcoin's activities in the country. The same year, UK's privacy watchdog started its own [inquiry](https://www.reuters.com/technology/uk-data-watchdog-make-enquiries-worldcoin-crypto-project-2023-07-25/) into the company's operations.
-
-In 2024, Hong Kong's Office of the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data [raided](https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3250480/hong-kong-eye-scan-cryptocurrency-scheme-probed-citys-privacy-watchdog) six Worldcoin offices citing personal information privacy and security concerns.
-
-There is no doubt more countries and regions will follow with similar investigations and bans as the World project expands to its ambition.
-
-### In the United States, the app is restricted in some states
-
-Even in the US where the company is headquartered, the app is [restricted](https://www.wired.com/story/sam-altman-orb-eyeball-scan-launch-us/) in some states. The announcement for its event this month carried a warning the World is “not available for distribution via World App to people, companies or organizations who are residents of, or are located or incorporated in the State of New York or other restricted territories.”
-
-We can also expect the project will encounter roadblocks in states that have passed [regulations specific to the collection of biometric data](https://www.huschblackwell.com/2024-state-biometric-privacy-law-tracker). This includes states like Illinois, Texas, Washington, and Colorado.
-
-### Some regions have special regulations for biometric data
-
-Around the world the number of biometric-specific regulations is growing. Even without a regulation specific to this type of data, many privacy laws have started to include special categories and requirements to govern the collection and processing of sensitive biometric data. As companies are increasingly requesting such collection, legislations to protect users are essential.
-
-For example, the province of Quebec in Canada has recently implemented [strong protections for biometric data](https://www.cai.gouv.qc.ca/protection-renseignements-personnels/sujets-et-domaines-dinteret/biometrie?%2F) with its new privacy law, the Law 25. Consent isn't sufficient to collect biometric data, as the law requires organizations to explicitly justify the necessity for such collection in the first place. Importantly, any violation of Law 25 comes with fines as hefty as the GDPR's.
-
-More privacy laws should implement such protections quickly, as corporations collecting biometric information carelessly are multiplying fast.
-
-## Welcome to full dystopia
-
-The most concerning part of the World project's recent expansion isn't its cryptocurrency grift as much as stepping out of it.
-
-If cryptocurrency enthusiasts wish to share their personal data to get into a special cryptocurrency club, they might (although privacy regulations should still protect them). But using financial coercion to get new users by exploiting vulnerable communities living in poverty is **absolutely despicable**.
-
-Further, the fact that the World project has partnered with powerful players in the financial, gaming, and even dating sectors *should terrify everyone*.
-
-Beyond cryptocurrency, if platforms start to demand users everywhere to verify they are a human and verify they are an adult through the World ID system, then **everyone will soon be subjected to this**.
-
-The amount of money invested in the project means there will be an incredible pressure to spread it everywhere soon, and *monetize* it. There will be a *strong* incentive to monetize our data and to monetize our proof of humanity. This isn't trivial.
-
-The well-known dating app Tinder has already partnered with World ID to verify the age of users in Japan. If this experiment works well, and if users comply without objection, this could be soon mandatory for *all* dating apps.
-
-Let's not stop at dating apps, the World project has already announced last week they will also be working with Razer to verify humanity of online gamers. How far can this go in the age of age verification? Will every online games with mature content soon require a World ID to play?
-
-What about social media? Tools for Humanity's team have insisted the age of AI made us incapable of detecting if we are interacting with bots online. Therefore, they must valiantly come to our rescue to verify our humanity scanning our eyeballs (which bots tragically lack). What if this human verification is expanded to all our social media accounts? Certainly, regulators pushing for authoritarian age verification online would be delighted by such a product.
-
-Then, it comes for our money. The everything app of course offers payment and money management features. This is the app where you can keep your whole wallet, containing all your official IDs, your cryptocurrencies of all kind, and even connect with your less hyped regular bank accounts.
-
-Imagine a single app, owned by a single for-profit corporation, that collects and processes all the data from all your transactions online, all your communications online, that you absolutely have to continue using for your other social media accounts, your gaming life, and your dating life.
-
-There could soon be no way to escape the grasp of World's everything app. Actually, [some governments](https://www.theregister.com/2025/05/04/sam_altman_startup_world/) (Taiwan and Malesia) have already started using it for official services, because why not.
-
-**The ways this could degenerate fast into full dystopia are infinite**, and very real.
-
-The company even plans to ship next year the Orb Mini, a pocket-size personal spy-device with which users will be able to scan their own eyeballs on the go!
-
-But why stop there? Why not scan other people's eyeballs as well? Maybe all government officials could carry one? Maybe every payment terminal could have one too?
-
-We will find out soon, in one or two years.
-
-Tools for Humanity also bragged about the numerous utilities its new technology could make possible. For example, for event tickets! Order a concert ticket with your "proof of personhood" then maybe confirm you are the owner by having your eyeballs scanned to assist to a Rage Against the Machine concert?
-
-The only fun part in this is the irony.
-
-Tools for Humanity with its expansionist dream is without a doubt hungry enough to eat the whole World™️.
-
-### A new world of wealth inequalities
-
-The company brings up a few times the mention of Universal Basic Income (UBI) in its documentation, it even mentions it briefly in its [white paper](https://whitepaper.world.org/#ubi).
-
-While puzzling, it appears Tools for Humanity might consider its cryptocurrency bribe to sign up and subsequent token giveaways as some form of UBI? Or perhaps this is only one of its other ambition to control all the financial systems in the entire world. Why UBI is even mentioned at all in this context is unclear.
-
-Regardless, it's worth mentioning a for-profit company giving cash back in exchange for biometric data isn't UBI at all, it's just a **creepy membership card points**, at best.
-
-While the World project works hard to present the idea this is a tool for the people, where everyone is equal, wealth will definitely [not be distributed evenly](https://whitepaper.world.org/#wld-token-allocation) in this new World order.
-
-Already, 11.1% of World's cryptocurrency tokens (WLD) have been distributed to the World's team, 13.6% to investors, and 0.3% are reserved for Tools for Humanity. This means these entities would share together 25% of the wealth, while 75% of the world's population (according the Tools for Humanity's ambition) would have to share 75% of what's left.
-
-In the new "human" world this corporation envisions, Tools for Humanity and its investors would own 1 quarter of the entire world's wealth. There is nothing equitable or communal in a system like this.
-
-It's important not to forget this everything app will do everything to pressure its users in eventually using Worldcoins, its ultimate goal.
-
-From Tinder's mandatory age verification to cryptocurrency financial ruin in one single move.
-
-## The normalization of surveillance
-
-Even if this process was perfectly secure and perfectly private (which it is definitely not), the problem remains the normalization of surveillance.
-
-This isn't limited to Tools for Humanity, although the way the company tries to advertise itself as a privacy-first organization makes it even more important to scrutinize.
-
-But anyone else with a similar approach to biometric data collection for verifying humanity or age or legal names should be on our radar. Moreover, if it's a for-profit corporation with the power to impose this technology on us everywhere in the world.
-
-One company should never have such power.
-
-Further, biometric data should never be used for trivial purposes like "proof of personhood" or age verification. No amount of supposedly "privacy-preserving" features can change this.
-
-The premise itself is flawed from the start to respect privacy rights.
-
-While the problem of proving identify can still be an important one to solve in *some* context, the solution to this can never be monopolized by for-profit corporations.
-
-Regardless of Tools for Humanity's intentions and efforts to convince us to trust them, any similar technology is just another step towards a global system of mass surveillance, where ultimately privacy rights and human rights are lost.
-
-So, should you scan your eyeball to get a verified World ID?
-
-**No.**
-
-**No, you really shouldn't.**

blog/posts/taking-advantage-of-android-user-profiles.md

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+---
+date:
+    created: 2025-04-23T19:00:00Z
+categories:
+    - Tutorials
+authors:
+    - jonah
+description: Android's ability to support multiple user profiles is one of the simplest ways to isolate applications and data on Android, which can provide you with huge privacy and security advantages.
+schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle
+---
+# How to Take Advantage of Multiple Users on Android
+
+![Article cover photo showing a tablet with 3 user profile icons](../assets/images/taking-advantage-of-android-user-profiles/multiple-users-tablet-cover.webp)
+
+<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Jonah Aragon / Privacy Guides</small>
+
+One of the simplest ways to isolate different applications and personal data on an Android device is to use **multiple users**. This is a feature which has been widely available on Android phones since 2014, but goes fairly underutilized by most people.<!-- more -->
+
+Originally, this feature was intended to support multiple physical people sharing the same device, with the AOSP team envisioning a second user being added to a tablet for children to use, or critical response teams sharing a phone for on-call duty.
+
+There are two main types of users on Android:
+
+- The **system user**, which is the first user on the device. This user has special privileges and settings that only it can set. The name of this user defaults to "Owner" on English language devices.
+- **Secondary users**, which are any users added to the device other than the system user. These users can be removed (either by the system user or by themselves) and cannot impact other users set up on the device.
+
+## Advantages
+
+While originally intended for multiple people, there are a number of advantages to setting up secondary users on your phone that will benefit even a single person!
+
+### Isolating Apps
+
+Apps installed in one user profile cannot communicate with apps installed in a different user profile. It is not possible to access the app data or storage of one user from a different user at all. The workspaces are completely isolated.
+
+If you have multiple accounts with any apps that don't support multiple logins, this feature can really come in handy. Using multiple users allows you to have multiple, independent copies of an app installed on your device, one per user. Each app install can be logged in with different credentials and have access to different data.
+
+### Isolating Data
+
+Each user has its own set of files, contacts, and media. Apps installed by that user can only access data owned by that user.
+
+This could come in handy if you have two different sets of contacts, say, a work address book and a personal address book, and you want to sync each one to a different user. It also allows you to have a profile for highly sensitive data that only needs to be accessed by a minimal number of apps.
+
+### Resource Management
+
+It is also possible to end the sessions of secondary users, which puts its data at rest (a more secure state) and stops its apps from running in the background.
+
+This is particularly relevant when using a [custom ROM](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/android/distributions) with non-system Google Play Services, such as sandboxed Google Play on GrapheneOS. For example, you could have a secondary user with Google Play Services, and a primary user without, letting you choose when exactly you are making connections to Google. We'll delve deeper into this example later on.
+
+Additionally, each user makes its own independent [VPN](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn) connections. If you have two user sessions running, they could be connected to different VPN providers or different countries. You could even have one user connected to a VPN and one that doesn't use a VPN at all.
+
+### GrapheneOS Specific
+
+If you use [**GrapheneOS**](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/android/distributions/#grapheneos), you can take advantage of additional [features](https://grapheneos.org/features#improved-user-profiles){rel=nofollow} not available with a standard Android phone:
+
+- **Notification forwarding**: Normally, only the notifications of the currently active user on Android are shown. On GrapheneOS, you can optionally configure secondary users to forward their notifications to the currently active profile, so you can make sure you don't miss anything important occurring in a background user session. Remember that you must unlock secondary user profiles before you can receive notifications from them. Otherwise, you will miss important notifications after your phone reboots.
+
+- **Additional user profiles:** GrapheneOS raises the maximum number of secondary users to 31, which means you have the option to be much more granular with how you isolate apps and data than you normally would (the maximum number is configurable by OEMs, but a stock Google Pixel only supports 3).
+
+## Common Setups
+
+When it comes to juggling multiple users, the best approach will always be highly dependent on your data, the apps you use, and your typical workflows.
+
+It's important to think about how **you** use your device because you might use apps in conjunction with one another in ways that someone else might not. Similarly to [Qubes](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/os/qubes-overview), the correct number of isolated users and the apps you install within them is basically subjective. There's no "best" approach.
+
+This being said, there are a few common or popular setups we see within the *Privacy Guides* [community](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/) which might make sense for you, or at least could help you start thinking about the best ways to isolate your apps and data from each other. You could also certainly use any combination of these approaches. At least within the confines of the maximum number of users available on your device, the sky's the limit!
+
+### Isolating Google Dependencies
+
+To preserve your privacy, the most commonly recommended "minimum" setup for multiple users on Android *with GrapheneOS* is a two-user setup, where only one secondary user has Google Play Services installed.
+
+In this setup, the system user only contains apps that don't require Google Play Services, like open source apps installed with [Obtainium](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/android/obtaining-apps/#obtainium) or [F-Droid](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/android/obtaining-apps/#f-droid). The secondary user would contain apps from [Aurora Store](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/android/obtaining-apps/#aurora-store) or the Google Play Store that rely on Google Play Services, such as some banking apps, social media apps, etc.
+
+This configuration is really only viable with GrapheneOS and sandboxed Google Play (or [another](grapheneos-or-calyxos.md) custom ROM with non-system microG) because that setup doesn't require Google Play Services be integrated with the system. On your typical stock Android device, Google Play Services will be installed with system-level permissions, meaning that it will be present in all user profiles on your phone.
+
+### Minimal Owner Profile
+
+Another frequently utilized configuration is keeping the system user as bare-bones as possible and *only* using (a) secondary user(s) to increase the security of your device.
+
+This is because the system user has a number of special privileges that other users do not, such as the ability to enable ADB or other developer tools, for example. By avoiding regular usage of the system user, these settings become harder to unintentionally access.
+
+An additional advantage of this approach is that it makes cleaning up and erasing portions of your device easier. Secondary users can be erased very easily if the need to do so for any reason arises. Doing so won't affect other users on the device. On the other hand, the system user can only really be erased with a full factory reset, which would also wipe out all users on the device at once.
+
+### Per-Persona
+
+Some people choose to group their apps on a "per-persona" basis, for example, having a user for school, one for work, one for games, one for social media, etc. If you find your time spent on your phone can be easily categorized into different groups of apps, this approach might make the most sense to you.
+
+Not only does this limit the data that each group of apps can access (you can completely avoid accidentally sharing *personal* photos in your work chat, for example), but this approach can be also a huge boon to focus and productivity. Switching users on Android *does* add some friction, so keeping distractions in a separate user that can be disabled when you're not intentionally using them is an approach some find very helpful.
+
+## Alternatives
+
+### No Secondary Users At All
+
+While secondary users can offer substantial privacy and security benefits, they are not necessary for everyone.
+
+From a security perspective, all apps on Android are strongly sandboxed from each other. While this sandbox does not provide the complete isolation of data and interactions between apps, it does prevent apps from exploiting your device or other apps, and interactions that *do* occur between apps are typically gated behind permission prompts and other access controls. This means that for many [threat models](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/basics/threat-modeling/), enhancing app isolation beyond the default may be a bit overkill!
+
+It's perfectly reasonable to decide that the standard sandboxing is all you require, *especially* if you have minimal apps installed in the first place, if you're only using [trustworthy](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tools/) and open-source apps, or if you simply find managing multiple users too cumbersome for everyday use.
+
+### Users vs. Profiles
+
+Another alternative to multiple users on Android are **profiles**, which are separate workspaces contained within a single user.
+
+The most well known implementation of profiles on Android is the **Work Profile** functionality. In normal usage, a Work Profile might be set up on your phone by your employer in order for them to install work-related apps without giving them full access to your device and personal apps. However, if you don't already have a work profile installed, you can also create a personally-managed one yourself by using an app like [Shelter](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/android/general-apps/#shelter) or Insular.
+
+A big advantage of Work Profiles is that apps installed in the profile are accessible from your regular launcher without having to log out and switch user sessions. It is also very easy to multitask between apps installed in a work profile and personal apps.
+
+Work profiles are much more isolated from your personal apps compared to the typical app sandbox, but they *do* share some underlying resources with the rest of your user profile, making them a bit of a middle-ground between standard app sandboxing and full multi-user isolation.
+
+#### Private Space
+
+In Android 15, a new feature called **Private Space** was introduced, which is very similar to work profiles in function, but does not require a separate management app like Shelter to use. Because this is a built-in feature, we always recommend using private profiles before or instead of using Work Profile functionality whenever possible.
+
+Again, Private Space is a middle-ground between the standard sandboxing and multiple users. One example of a shared resource between the system user and the private profile within is the clipboard. This is a very significant vector to leak information between your standard apps and apps installed in the private space if you do not manage it properly.
+
+Private Space is currently only available for the system user, not by secondary users. You also have the option to enable both a private space *and* a work profile, meaning you could have up to three semi-isolated workspaces contained within a single user.
+
+## Sources
+
+- <https://source.android.com/docs/devices/admin/multi-user>{rel=nofollow}
+- <https://seprand.github.io/articles/best-user-profile-setup>{rel=nofollow}
+- <https://arxiv.org/html/1904.05572v3/#S4.SS3>{rel=nofollow}

blog/posts/tor-security-slider-flaw.md

@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
----
-date:
-    created: 2025-05-02T11:20:00Z
-    updated: 2025-05-03T15:00:00Z
-categories:
-    - News
-authors:
-    - jonah
-tags:
-    - PSA
-    - Tor
-description: |
-  PSA: The security level slider in Tor Browser (and Mullvad Browser) does not fully apply until restarting the browser. This presents a high risk to people who switch from Standard to Safer security during a browsing session in order to protect themselves from browser exploits.
-schema_type: ReportageNewsArticle
-preview:
-  cover: blog/assets/images/tor-security-slider-flaw/cover.png
----
-# A Flaw With the Security Level Slider in Tor Browser
-
-![Illustration showing Tor's security level options with question marks next to the selected Safer level](../assets/images/tor-security-slider-flaw/cover.png)
-
-<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Jonah Aragon / Privacy Guides</small>
-
-[Tor Browser](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tor/#tor-browser) and [Mullvad Browser](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/desktop-browsers/#mullvad-browser) users should be aware of a flaw with the Security Level slider: Not all protections advertised by the browser are properly engaged until the browser is fully restarted.<!-- more -->
-
-This flaw was anonymously reported to *Privacy Guides* by a member of our [community](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/), and I confirmed it via the latest Tor Browser 14.5.1 on macOS. Additionally, I confirmed this behavior in Mullvad Browser 14.5.1 on macOS.
-
-~~I was unable to find any documentation or open GitLab issues with Tor regarding the need to take additional steps before security settings are fully applied, and~~ Tor Browser documentation does not note that a restart is required, nor does it prompt users to restart the browser after security changes are made. (update: see below)
-
-This presents a high risk to people who switch from Standard to Safer security during a browsing session with the goal to protect themselves from browser exploits.
-
-## Demonstration
-
-The effect can be easily demonstrated in your own Tor Browser install by running a JavaScript benchmark such as [JetStream 2.2](https://browserbench.org/JetStream/). These benchmarks rely on a technology called Just-in-Time (JIT) compilation to improve performance, but JIT is linked to numerous security vulnerabilities in modern web browsers. The "Safer" security level normally disables JIT entirely to prevent these issues, however, you can see virtually no performance impact when switching to the Safer security level in Tor Browser and running the benchmark again:
-
-<figure markdown="span">
-  ![JetStream2 benchmark results with a score of 196 and the shield indicator in the browser's toolbar indicating that Standard security level is set](../assets/images/tor-security-slider-flaw/standard-level-jetstream2.png)
-  <figcaption>JetStream 2.2 benchmark results in <strong>Standard</strong> mode</figcaption>
-</figure>
-
-<figure markdown="span">
-  ![JetStream2 benchmark results with a score of 191 and the shield indicator in the browser's toolbar indicating that Safer security level is set](../assets/images/tor-security-slider-flaw/safer-level-before-restart-jetstream2.png)
-  <figcaption>JetStream 2.2 benchmark results in <strong>Safer</strong> mode, <em>without</em> restarting Tor Browser</figcaption>
-</figure>
-
-While the performance is virtually identical between these two runs, *after* restarting Tor Browser and re-running the test, we see drastically lower performance results, in line with what we would expect with JIT properly disabled:
-
-<figure markdown="span">
-  ![JetStream2 benchmark results with a score of 33 and the shield indicator in the browser's toolbar indicating that Safer security level is set](../assets/images/tor-security-slider-flaw/safer-level-after-restart-jetstream2.png)
-  <figcaption>JetStream 2.2 benchmark results in <strong>Safer</strong> mode, <em>after</em> restarting Tor Browser</figcaption>
-</figure>
-
-As you can see, there is no visible indicator that anything is different between the last two runs, and there was no prompt to restart the browser after changing these settings. However, this clearly indicates that JavaScript technologies that are meant to be disabled in Safer mode can still be accessed by websites until the browser is restarted, potentially opening you up to browser exploits if you are unaware of the additional steps required to secure yourself.
-
-## Safest Mode
-
-We have not tested or verified the full extent of security features which require a browser restart. We tested whether JIT remained enabled after switching to Safer mode because it was the easiest feature to test. Safest mode disables JavaScript entirely, so the demonstration above will not demonstrate this problem exists when switching to Safest mode.
-
-However, it is possible that there are *other* features normally disabled by Safest mode which remain enabled until you restart your browser. Out of an abundance of caution, we recommend always restarting your browser after changing this setting, regardless of whether you are switching to Safer or Safest mode.
-
-## Conclusion
-
-The Tor Project advertises the security slider as a way to conveniently adjust the protections that the Tor Browser provides, but does not note additional steps necessary to ensure those settings actually go into effect.
-
-This is our public service announcement to make sure you **always completely restart Tor Browser after adjusting your security settings.** Relying on these indicators can create a false sense of security and potentially expose users relying on this security level slider to greater risk than they expect based on Tor Browser's UI and documentation.
-
-Hopefully, Tor Browser will prompt or force their users to restart the browser after adjusting these settings in a future update.
-
----
-
-**Update (5/3):** A few hours following the publication of this article, the Tor Project emailed us the following statement:
-
-> The Tor Project is aware of this issue, and it is being tracked and actively
-> addressed. Those interested can follow the discussion and progress here:
-> <https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/42572>. In
-> addition to a restart prompt, we’re also exploring broader improvements to the
-> security level system, including aligning it more closely with Tor Browser's
-> updated threat model\[1] and possibly delegating even more of its back-end
-> to NoScript for additional flexibility. These improvements may be part of the
-> upcoming 15.0 release cycle.
->
-> \[1]: <https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/wiki/-/wikis/>

docs/basics/common-threats.md

@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ Censorship online can be carried out (to varying degrees) by actors including to
 
 Censorship on corporate platforms is increasingly common, as platforms like Twitter and Facebook give in to public demand, market pressures, and pressures from government agencies. Government pressures can be covert requests to businesses, such as the White House [requesting the takedown](https://nytimes.com/2012/09/17/technology/on-the-web-a-fine-line-on-free-speech-across-globe.html) of a provocative YouTube video, or overt, such as the Chinese government requiring companies to adhere to a strict regime of censorship.
 
-People concerned with the threat of censorship can use technologies like [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) to circumvent it, and support censorship-resistant communication platforms like [Matrix](../social-networks.md#element), which doesn't have a centralized account authority that can close accounts arbitrarily.
+People concerned with the threat of censorship can use technologies like [Tor](../advanced/tor-overview.md) to circumvent it, and support censorship-resistant communication platforms like [Matrix](../real-time-communication.md#element), which doesn't have a centralized account authority that can close accounts arbitrarily.
 
 <div class="admonition tip" markdown>
 <p class="admonition-title">Tip</p>

docs/desktop-browsers.md

@@ -88,11 +88,7 @@ If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) ins
 
 </div>
 
-Like [Tor Browser](tor.md), Mullvad Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting by making your browser fingerprint identical to all other Mullvad Browser users, and it includes default settings and extensions that are automatically configured by the default security levels: *Standard*, *Safer* and *Safest*.
-
-Therefore, it is imperative that you do not modify the browser at all outside adjusting the default [security levels](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings). When adjusting the security level, you **must** always restart the browser before continuing to use it. Otherwise, [the security settings may not be fully applied](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/05/02/tor-security-slider-flaw/), putting you at a higher risk of fingerprinting and exploits than you may expect based on the setting chosen.
-
-Modifications other than adjusting this setting would make your fingerprint unique, defeating the purpose of using this browser. If you want to configure your browser more heavily and fingerprinting is not a concern for you, we recommend [Firefox](#firefox) instead.
+Like [Tor Browser](tor.md), Mullvad Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting by making your browser fingerprint identical to all other Mullvad Browser users, and it includes default settings and extensions that are automatically configured by the default security levels: *Standard*, *Safer* and *Safest*. Therefore, it is imperative that you do not modify the browser at all outside adjusting the default [security levels](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings). Other modifications would make your fingerprint unique, defeating the purpose of using this browser. If you want to configure your browser more heavily and fingerprinting is not a concern for you, we recommend [Firefox](#firefox) instead.
 
 ### Anti-Fingerprinting
 

docs/frontends.md

@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ ProxiTok is useful if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, such as [T
 There are a number of public instances, with some that offer a [Tor](tor.md) onion service or an [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project) eepsite.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://invidious.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-server-16:](https://docs.invidious.io/instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances" }
+[:octicons-server-16:](https://instances.invidious.io){ .card-link title="Public Instances" }
 [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.invidious.io){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
 [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/iv-org/invidious){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
 [:octicons-heart-16:](https://invidious.io/donate){ .card-link title="Contribute" }
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ Invidious is useful if you want to disable JavaScript in your browser, such as [
 Piped requires JavaScript in order to function and there are a number of public instances.
 
 [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/documentation/blob/main/content/docs/public-instances/index.md){ .card-link title="Public Instances" }
+[:octicons-server-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances){ .card-link title="Public Instances" }
 [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.piped.video/docs){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
 [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
 [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped#donations){ .card-link title="Contribute" }

docs/os/android-overview.md

@@ -89,11 +89,13 @@ Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/
 
 ## Privacy Features
 
-### User Profiles
+### Multiple Users
 
-Multiple **user profiles** can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **System** → **Users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android.
+The option to enable **multiple users** can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **System** → **Users**, and are the simplest way to isolate in Android.
 
-With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation.
+Even a single person can take advantage of using multiple user accounts. To limit the applications you run on your phone, you can impose restrictions on a specific account, such as making calls, using SMS, or installing apps. Each account is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other users. Even the device owner cannot view the data of secondary users without knowing their password. Multiple users are a more secure method of isolation than work profiles or a private space.
+
+[:material-star-box: How to Take Advantage of Multiple Users](/articles/2025/04/23/taking-advantage-of-android-user-profiles/){ .md-button }
 
 ### Work Profile
 

docs/real-time-communication.md

@@ -183,6 +183,44 @@ These messengers do not have forward secrecy[^1], and while they fulfill certain
 
 </div>
 
+### Element
+
+<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
+
+![Element logo](assets/img/messengers/element.svg){ align=right }
+
+**Element** is the flagship client for the [Matrix](https://matrix.org/docs/chat_basics/matrix-for-im) protocol, an [open standard](https://spec.matrix.org/latest) for secure decentralized real-time communication.
+
+Messages and files shared in private rooms (those which require an invite) are by default E2EE, as are one-to-one voice and video calls.
+
+[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://element.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[:octicons-eye-16:](https://element.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://element.io/help){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/element-hq){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+
+<details class="downloads" markdown>
+<summary>Downloads</summary>
+
+- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=im.vector.app)
+- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1083446067)
+- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/element-hq/element-android/releases)
+- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://element.io/download)
+- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://element.io/download)
+- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://element.io/download)
+- [:octicons-globe-16: Web](https://app.element.io)
+
+</details>
+
+</div>
+
+Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
+
+With the integration of [Element Call](https://element.io/blog/we-have-lift-off-element-x-call-and-server-suite-are-ready) into Element's web app, desktop apps, and its [rewritten mobile apps](https://element.io/blog/element-x-experience-the-future-of-element), group VoIP and video calls are E2EE by default.
+
+The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
+
+The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet).
+
 ### Session
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>

docs/security-keys.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 title: "Security Keys"
-icon: material/key-chain
-description: These security keys provide a form of phishing-immune authentication for accounts that support it.
+icon: 'material/key-chain'
+description: Secure your internet accounts with Multi-Factor Authentication without sending your secrets to a third-party.
 cover: multi-factor-authentication.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>
@@ -19,11 +19,11 @@ A physical **security key** adds a very strong layer of protection to your onlin
   ![Security Key Series by Yubico](assets/img/security-keys/yubico-security-key.webp){ width="315" }
 </figure>
 
-The **Yubico Security Key** series is the most cost-effective hardware security key with FIDO Level 2 certification[^1]. It supports FIDO2/WebAuthn and FIDO U2F, and works out of the box with most services that support a security key as a second factor, as well as many password managers.
+The **Yubico Security Key** series is the most cost-effective hardware security key with FIDO Level 2 certification. It supports FIDO2/WebAuthn and FIDO U2F, and works out of the box with most services that support a security key as a second factor, as well as many password managers.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://yubico.com/products/security-key){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://yubico.com/support/terms-conditions/privacy-notice){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.yubico.com){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.yubico.com){ .card-link title=Documentation}
 
 </details>
 
@@ -54,21 +54,23 @@ The firmware of Yubico's Security Keys is not updatable. If you want features in
   ![YubiKeys](assets/img/security-keys/yubikey.png){ width="400" }
 </figure>
 
-The **YubiKey** series from Yubico are among the most popular security keys with FIDO Level 2 Certification[^1]. The YubiKey 5 Series has a wide range of features such as [Universal 2nd Factor (U2F)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_2nd_Factor), [FIDO2 and WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online), [Yubico OTP](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#yubico-otp), [Personal Identity Verification (PIV)](https://developers.yubico.com/PIV), [OpenPGP](https://developers.yubico.com/PGP), and [TOTP and HOTP](https://developers.yubico.com/OATH) authentication.
+The **YubiKey** series from Yubico are among the most popular security keys. The YubiKey 5 Series has a wide range of features such as: [Universal 2nd Factor (U2F)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_2nd_Factor), [FIDO2 and WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online), [Yubico OTP](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#yubico-otp), [Personal Identity Verification (PIV)](https://developers.yubico.com/PIV), [OpenPGP](https://developers.yubico.com/PGP), [TOTP and HOTP](https://developers.yubico.com/OATH) authentication.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://yubico.com/products/yubikey-5-overview){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://yubico.com/support/terms-conditions/privacy-notice){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.yubico.com){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.yubico.com){ .card-link title=Documentation}
 
 </details>
 
 </div>
 
-The [comparison table](https://yubico.com/store/compare) shows how the YubiKeys compare to each other and to Yubico's [Security Key](#yubico-security-key) series in terms of features and other specifications. One of the benefits of the YubiKey series is that one key can do almost everything you could expect from a hardware security key. We encourage you to take their [quiz](https://yubico.com/quiz) before purchasing in order to make sure you choose the right security key.
+The [comparison table](https://yubico.com/store/compare) shows the features and how the YubiKeys compare to each other and to Yubico's [Security Key](#yubico-security-key) series. One of the benefits of the YubiKey series is that one key can do almost everything you could expect from a hardware security key. We encourage you to take their [quiz](https://yubico.com/quiz) before purchasing in order to make sure you make the right choice.
+
+The YubiKey 5 series has FIDO Level 1 certification, which is the most common. However, some governments or other organizations may require a key with Level 2 certification, in which case you'll have to purchase a [YubiKey 5 **FIPS** series](https://yubico.com/products/yubikey-fips) key, or a [Yubico Security Key](#yubico-security-key). Most people do not have to worry about this distinction.
 
 YubiKeys can be programmed using the [YubiKey Manager](https://yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-manager) or [YubiKey Personalization Tools](https://yubico.com/support/download/yubikey-personalization-tools). For managing TOTP codes, you can use the [Yubico Authenticator](https://yubico.com/products/yubico-authenticator). All of Yubico's clients are open source.
 
-For models which support HOTP and TOTP, there are 2 slots in the OTP interface which could be used for HOTP and 32 slots to store TOTP secrets. These secrets are stored encrypted on the key and never exposed to the devices they are plugged into. Once a seed (shared secret) is given to the Yubico Authenticator, it will only give out the six-digit codes, but never the seed. This security model helps limit what an attacker can do if they compromise one of the devices running the Yubico Authenticator and make the YubiKey resistant to a physical attacker.
+For models which support HOTP and TOTP, there are 2 slots in the OTP interface which could be used for HOTP and 32 slots to store TOTP secrets. These secrets are stored encrypted on the key and never expose them to the devices they are plugged into. Once a seed (shared secret) is given to the Yubico Authenticator, it will only give out the six-digit codes, but never the seed. This security model helps limit what an attacker can do if they compromise one of the devices running the Yubico Authenticator and make the YubiKey resistant to a physical attacker.
 
 <div class="admonition warning" markdown>
 <p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
@@ -85,17 +87,17 @@ The firmware of YubiKey is not updatable. If you want features in newer firmware
   ![Nitrokey](assets/img/security-keys/nitrokey.jpg){ width="300" }
 </figure>
 
-**Nitrokey** has a security key capable of [FIDO2 and WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) called the **Nitrokey FIDO2**. For PGP support, you need to purchase one of their other keys such as the **Nitrokey Start**, **Nitrokey Pro 2**, or the **Nitrokey Storage 2**.
+**Nitrokey** has a security key capable of [FIDO2 and WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) called the **Nitrokey FIDO2**. For PGP support, you need to purchase one of their other keys such as the **Nitrokey Start**, **Nitrokey Pro 2** or the **Nitrokey Storage 2**.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://nitrokey.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://nitrokey.com/data-privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.nitrokey.com){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
+[:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.nitrokey.com){ .card-link title=Documentation}
 
 </details>
 
 </div>
 
-The [comparison table](https://nitrokey.com/products/nitrokeys) shows how the different Nitrokey models compare to each other in terms of features and other specifications. The **Nitrokey 3** listed will have a combined feature set.
+The [comparison table](https://nitrokey.com/#comparison) shows the features and how the Nitrokey models compare. The **Nitrokey 3** listed will have a combined feature set.
 
 Nitrokey models can be configured using the [Nitrokey app](https://nitrokey.com/download).
 
@@ -111,7 +113,7 @@ While Nitrokeys do not release the HOTP/TOTP secrets to the device they are plug
 <div class="admonition warning" markdown>
 <p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
 
-Resetting the OpenPGP interface on a Nitrokey [Pro 2](https://docs.nitrokey.com/nitrokeys/pro/factory-reset) or Nitrokey [Start 2](https://docs.nitrokey.com/nitrokeys/storage/factory-reset) will also make the password database inaccessible.
+Resetting the OpenPGP interface on a Nitrokey will also make the password database [inaccessible](https://docs.nitrokey.com/pro/linux/factory-reset).
 
 </div>
 
@@ -121,7 +123,7 @@ Resetting the OpenPGP interface on a Nitrokey [Pro 2](https://docs.nitrokey.com/
 
 ### Minimum Requirements
 
-- Must use high-quality, tamper-resistant hardware security modules.
+- Must use high quality, tamper resistant hardware security modules.
 - Must support the latest FIDO2 specification.
 - Must not allow private key extraction.
 - Devices which cost over $35 must support handling OpenPGP and S/MIME.
@@ -130,9 +132,7 @@ Resetting the OpenPGP interface on a Nitrokey [Pro 2](https://docs.nitrokey.com/
 
 Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect project in this category. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page.
 
-- Should be available in USB-C form factor.
+- Should be available in USB-C form-factor.
 - Should be available with NFC.
 - Should support TOTP secret storage.
 - Should support secure firmware updates.
-
-[^1]: Some governments or other organizations may require a key with Level 2 certification, but most people do not have to worry about this distinction.

docs/social-networks.md

@@ -9,43 +9,23 @@ cover: social-networks.webp
 - [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }
 - [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
 
-These privacy-respecting **social networks** allow you to participate in online communities without giving up your personal information like your full name, phone number, and other data commonly requested by tech companies.
+These privacy-respecting **social networks** allow you to participate in online communities without giving up your personal information, like your full name, phone number, and other data commonly requested by tech companies.
 
-A growing problem among social media platforms is censorship in two different forms. First, they often acquiesce to illegitimate censorship requests, either from malicious governments or their own internal policies. Second, they often require accounts to access walled-off content that would otherwise be published freely on the open internet; this effectively censors the browsing activities of privacy-conscious users who are unable to pay the privacy cost of opening an account on these networks.
+A growing problem among social media platforms is censorship in two different forms. First, they often acquiesce to illegitimate censorship requests, either from malicious governments or their own internal policies.
 
-The social networks we recommend solve the issue of censorship by operating atop an open and decentralized social networking protocol. They also don't require an account merely to view publicly available content.
+Second, they often require accounts to access walled-off content that would otherwise be published freely on the open internet. This effectively censors the browsing activities of privacy-conscious users who are unable to pay the privacy cost of opening an account on these networks.
+
+The social networks we recommend solve the issue of censorship by operating atop an open and decentralized social networking protocol. While it is possible for your account to be banned or silenced by an individual server, there is no central authority which can censor your account across the entire network. They also don't require an account merely to view publicly available content.
 
 You should note that **no** social networks are appropriate for private or sensitive communications. For chatting directly with others, you should use a recommended [instant messenger](real-time-communication.md) with strong end-to-end encryption, and only use direct messages on social media in order to establish a more private and secure chat platform with your contacts.
 
-## Decentralization
-
-Decentralized social networks are built on an architecture that is fundamentally different than mainstream social media platforms, yet quite similar to the underlying structure of email. Instead of opening an account under a single, unified service like you would for Facebook or Discord, you instead choose an independent, public server to join. The server you join can communicate with and discover other servers; this aspect of decentralization is also known as *federation*.
-
-A significant benefit of this decentralized model is that there is no central authority which can censor your account across the entire network, though it is possible for your account to be banned or silenced by an individual server.
-
-A caveat of this decentralized model is that each server is its own legal entity, with its own privacy policy, terms of use, administration team, and moderators. While many of these servers are far *less* restrictive and more privacy-respecting than traditional social media platforms, some can be far *more* restrictive or potentially *worse* for your privacy. Typically, the software on which the social network runs does not discriminate between these administrators or place any limitations on their powers.
-
-## Censorship Resistance
-
-While censorship in decentralized social networks does not exist on a network level, it is very possible to experience censorship on a server level depending on a server's administrator. Administrators have the power to *defederate* from other servers, which leads to limiting the content you can view and the people you can interact with.
-
-If you are greatly concerned about an existing server censoring your content, the content available to you, or other servers, you generally have two options:
-
-1. **Host the social network software yourself.** This approach gives you the exact same censorship resistance as any other website you can host yourself, which is fairly high.
-
-2. **Use a managed hosting service.** We don't have any specific recommendations, but there are a variety of hosting services which will create a brand-new server on your own domain (or occasionally a subdomain of their domain, but we recommend against this unless registering your own domain presents too much of a burden to your privacy).
-
-    Typically, hosting providers will handle the *technical* side of your server, but completely leave the *moderation* side up to you. This often represents a better approach than self-hosting for most people because you can benefit from greater control over your own server without worrying about technical problems or unpatched security vulnerabilities.
-
-    You should look closely at your hosting provider's terms of service and acceptable use policies before registering. These are often far more broad than typical hosted server rules, and they are far less likely to be enforced without recourse, but they can still be restrictive in undesirable ways.
-
 ## Mastodon
 
 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
 
 ![Mastodon logo](assets/img/social-networks/mastodon.svg){ align=right }
 
-**Mastodon** is a social network based on open web protocols and free, open-source software. It uses the **:simple-activitypub: ActivityPub** protocol, which is decentralized like email: Users can exist on different servers or even different platforms but still communicate with each other.
+**Mastodon** is a social network based on open web protocols and free, open-source software. It uses the **:simple-activitypub: ActivityPub** protocol, which is decentralized like email: users can exist on different servers or even different platforms but still communicate with each other.
 
 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://joinmastodon.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.joinmastodon.org){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
@@ -60,11 +40,29 @@ We chose to recommend Mastodon over other ActivityPub software as your primary s
 
 2. Mastodon is largely usable with most content types. While it is primarily a microblogging platform, Mastodon easily handles longer posts, image posts, video posts, and most other posts you might encounter when following ActivityPub users who aren't on Mastodon. This makes your Mastodon account an ideal "central hub" for following anyone regardless of the platform they chose to use. In contrast, if you were only using a PeerTube account, you would *only* be able to follow other video channels, for example.
 
-3. Mastodon has fairly comprehensive privacy controls. It has many built-in features which allow you to limit how and when your data is shared, some of which we'll cover below. They also develop new features with privacy in mind. For example, while other ActivityPub software quickly implemented "quote posts" by merely handling links to other posts with a slightly different embed modal, Mastodon is [developing](https://blog.joinmastodon.org/2025/02/bringing-quote-posts-to-mastodon) a quote post feature which will give you more fine-grained control when your post is quoted.
+3. Mastodon has fairly comprehensive privacy controls. It has many built-in features which allow you to limit how and when your data is shared, some of which we'll cover below. They also develop new features with privacy in mind. For example, while other ActivityPub software quickly implemented "quote posts" by merely handling links to other posts with a slightly different embed modal, Mastodon is [developing](https://blog.joinmastodon.org/2025/02/bringing-quote-posts-to-mastodon/) a quote post feature which will give you more fine-grained control when your post is quoted.
 
 ### Choosing an Instance
 
-To benefit the most from Mastodon, it is critical to choose a server, or "instance," which is well aligned with the type of content you want to post or read about. We do not currently recommend any specific instances, but you may find advice within our communities. We recommend avoiding *mastodon.social* and *mastodon.online* because they are operated by the same company which develops Mastodon itself. From the perspective of decentralization, it is better in the long term to separate software developers and server hosts so that no one party can exert too much control over the network as a whole.
+To benefit the most from Mastodon, it is critical to choose a server, or "instance," which is well aligned with the type of content you want to post or read about. While censorship in Mastodon does not exist on a network level, it is very possible to experience censorship on a server level depending on your server's administrator.
+
+It is critical to understand that Mastodon is not a single, unified service in the way that X (Twitter) or Facebook are. Each server is its own legal entity, with its own privacy policy, terms of use, administration team, and moderators. While many of these servers are far *less* restrictive and more privacy-respecting than traditional social media platforms, some can be far *more* restrictive or potentially *worse* for your privacy. The Mastodon software does not discriminate between these administrators or place any limitations on their powers.
+
+We do not currently recommend any specific instances, but you may find advice within our communities. We recommend avoiding *mastodon.social* and *mastodon.online* because they are operated by the same company which develops Mastodon itself. From the perspective of decentralization, it is better in the long term to separate software developers and server hosts so that no one party can exert too much control over the network as a whole.
+
+If you are greatly concerned about an existing server censoring your content or the content you can view, you generally have two options:
+
+1. **Host Mastodon yourself.** This approach gives you the exact same censorship resistance as any other website you can host yourself, which is fairly high. Mastodon even [integrates with the Tor network](https://docs.joinmastodon.org/admin/optional/tor) for more extreme scenarios where even your underlying hosting provider is subject to censorship, but this may limit who can access your content to only other servers which integrate with Tor, like most other hidden services.
+
+    Mastodon benefits greatly from a large and active self-hosting community, and its administration is comprehensively documented. While many other ActivityPub platforms can require extensive technical knowledge to run and troubleshoot, Mastodon has very stable and tested releases, and it can generally be run securely without issue by anyone who can use the Linux command line and follow [step-by-step instructions](https://docs.joinmastodon.org/admin/prerequisites).
+
+2. **Use a managed hosting service.** We don't have any specific recommendations, but there are a variety of Mastodon hosting services which will create a brand-new Mastodon server on your own domain (or occasionally a subdomain of their domain, but we recommend against this unless registering your own domain presents too much of a burden to your privacy).
+
+    Typically, Mastodon hosting providers will handle the *technical* side of your instance, but they completely leave the *moderation* side up to you. This means that you will be able to follow any content you like, although it may expose you to more spam or unwanted content because you will not have the dedicated moderation team many larger instances will have.
+
+    This often represents a better approach than self-hosting for most people, because you can benefit from greater control over your own instance without worrying about technical problems or unpatched security vulnerabilities.
+
+    You should look closely at your hosting provider's terms of service and acceptable use policies before registering. These are often far more broad than typical hosted instance rules, and they are far less likely to be enforced without recourse, but they can still be restrictive in undesirable ways.
 
 ### Recommended Privacy Settings
 
@@ -76,7 +74,7 @@ There are a number of privacy controls under the **privacy and reach** tab here.
 
 - [ ] **Automatically accept new followers**: You should consider unchecking this box to have a private profile. This will allow you to review who can follow your account before accepting them.
 
-    In contrast to most social media platforms, if you have a private profile you still have the *option* to publish posts which are publicly visible to non-followers and can still be boosted by non-followers. Therefore, unchecking this box is the only way to have the *choice* to publish to either the entire world or a select group of people.
+    In contrast to most social media platforms, if you have a private profile you still have the *option* to publish posts which are publicly visible to non-followers, and which can still be boosted and seen by non-followers. Therefore, unchecking this box is the only way to have the *choice* to publish to either the entire world or a select group of people.
 
 - [ ] **Show follows and followers on profile**: You should uncheck this box to hide your social graph from the public. It is fairly uncommon for the list of people you follow to have some genuine benefit to others, but that information can present a risk to you.
 
@@ -105,93 +103,17 @@ It is very rare for social media posts older than a few weeks to be read or rele
 When publishing a new post, you will have the option to choose from one of these visibility settings:
 
 - **Public**, which publishes your content to anyone on the internet.
-- **Quiet public**, which you should consider equivalent to publicly posting! This is not a technical guarantee, but merely a request you are making to other servers to hide your post from some feeds.
+- **Quiet public**, which you should consider equivalent to publicly posting! This is not a technical guarantee, merely a request you are making to other servers to hide your post from some feeds.
 - **Followers**, which publishes your content only to your followers. If you did not follow our recommendation of restricting your followers, you should consider this equivalent to publicly posting!
-- **Specific people**, which only shares the post with people who are specifically mentioned within the post. This is Mastodon's version of direct messages, but should never be relied on for private communications as we covered earlier since Mastodon has no E2EE.
+- **Specific people**, which only shares the post with people who are specifically mentioned within the post. This is Mastodon's version of direct messages, but should never be relied on for private communications as we covered earlier, since Mastodon has no E2EE.
 
 If you used our recommended configuration settings above, you should be posting to **Followers** by default, and only posting to **Public** on an intentional and case-by-case basis.
 
-## Element
-
-<div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>
-
-![Element logo](assets/img/social-networks/element.svg){ align=right }
-
-**Element** is the flagship client for the **:simple-matrix: [Matrix](https://matrix.org/docs/chat_basics/matrix-for-im)** protocol, an [open standard](https://spec.matrix.org/latest) that enables decentralized communication by way of federated chat rooms. Users can exist on different homeservers but still communicate with each other.
-
-[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://element.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-[:octicons-eye-16:](https://element.io/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
-[:octicons-info-16:](https://element.io/help){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
-[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/element-hq){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
-
-<details class="downloads" markdown>
-<summary>Downloads</summary>
-
-- [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=im.vector.app)
-- [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1083446067)
-- [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/element-hq/element-android/releases)
-- [:fontawesome-brands-windows: Windows](https://element.io/download)
-- [:simple-apple: macOS](https://element.io/download)
-- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://element.io/download)
-- [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://app.element.io)
-
-</details>
-
-</div>
-
-### Choosing a Homeserver
-
-To benefit the most from Matrix, it is critical to choose a homeserver which is well aligned with the subject(s) you want to chat about. We do not currently recommend any specific homeservers, but you may find advice within our communities or third-party resources like [*joinmatrix.org*](https://servers.joinmatrix.org). We recommend avoiding *matrix.org* because they are operated by the same company which develops Matrix itself. From the perspective of decentralization, it is better in the long term to separate software developers and server hosts so that no one party can exert too much control over the network as a whole.
-
-### Recommended Privacy Settings
-
-From Element's web or desktop app, go to :gear: → **All settings** to find these sections:
-
-#### Sessions
-
-By default, when you log in to Element on a new device, the session name will be automatically populated with the Matrix client and platform you used for login. This information may be visible to other users depending on the Matrix client they use.
-
-To prevent revealing information about your personal device to others unnecessarily, consider emptying the session name; this will change the session name to the randomly generated alphanumeric Session ID instead.
-
-#### Preferences
-
-- [ ] Uncheck **Send read receipts**
-- [ ] Uncheck **Send typing notifications**
-
-You should uncheck these options to reduce the exposure of metadata to other users when chatting in a public room.
-
-#### Voice & Video
-
-- [ ] Uncheck **Allow Peer-to-Peer for 1:1 calls**
-- [ ] Uncheck **Allow fallback call assist server (turn.matrix.org)**
-
-If you do decide to use Element for one-to-one communication, we recommend unchecking these settings to prevent the exposure of your IP address to the other party.
-
-#### Security & Privacy
-
-##### Manage integrations (scalar.vector.im)
-
-A Matrix integration manager connects Matrix to third-party services such as bots, bridges, and other enhancements. Element collects information to provide these services to those using an integration manager; you can review its detailed [Privacy Notice](https://element.io/integration-manager-privacy-notice) for the exact information Element collects and the ways it uses such information.
-
-As an end user on a public homeserver, you can consider unchecking the **Enable the integration manager** option, which does not affect the visibility of bots or other third-party services. As a homeserver administrator, consider whether the additional parties with which you share your data are worth the extra functionality.
-
-##### Sessions
-
-- [ ] (Optional) Uncheck **Record the client name, version, and url to recognize sessions for easily in session manager**
-
-Unchecking this option may make it more diffcult to discern your active sessions if you logged in to your Matrix account on multiple devices.
-
-#### Encryption
-
-- [x] (Optional) Check **In encrypted rooms, only send messages to verified users**
-
-With this setting enabled, unverified users (i.e., those who have not used the **Verify User** function) and unverified devices of verified users will not receive your messages in a room with encryption enabled. This may limit the messages you can view and the people you can interact with.
-
 ## Criteria
 
 **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
 
-- Must be free and open-source software.
+- Must be free and open source software.
 - Must use a federated protocol to communicate with other instances of the social networking software.
 - Must not have non-technical restrictions on who can be federated with.
 - Must be usable within a standard [web browser](desktop-browsers.md).

docs/tools.md

@@ -603,6 +603,7 @@ For encrypting your OS drive, we typically recommend using the encryption tool y
 - ![Signal logo](assets/img/messengers/signal.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Signal](real-time-communication.md#signal)
 - ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Briar](real-time-communication.md#briar)
 - ![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [SimpleX Chat](real-time-communication.md#simplex-chat)
+- ![Element logo](assets/img/messengers/element.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Element](real-time-communication.md#element)
 - ![Session logo](assets/img/messengers/session.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Session](real-time-communication.md#session)
 
 </div>
@@ -614,7 +615,6 @@ For encrypting your OS drive, we typically recommend using the encryption tool y
 <div class="grid cards" markdown>
 
 - ![Mastodon logo](assets/img/social-networks/mastodon.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Mastodon](social-networks.md#mastodon)
-- ![Element logo](assets/img/social-networks/element.svg){ .twemoji loading=lazy } [Element](social-networks.md#element)
 
 </div>
 

docs/tor.md

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ You should **never** install any additional extensions on Tor Browser or edit `a
 
 </div>
 
-The Tor Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting, or identifying you based on your browser configuration. Therefore, it is imperative that you do **not** modify the browser beyond the default [security levels](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings). When modifying the security level setting, you **must** always restart the browser before continuing to use it. Otherwise, [the security settings may not be fully applied](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/05/02/tor-security-slider-flaw/), putting you at a higher risk of fingerprinting and exploits than you may expect based on the setting chosen.
+The Tor Browser is designed to prevent fingerprinting, or identifying you based on your browser configuration. Therefore, it is imperative that you do **not** modify the browser beyond the default [security levels](https://tb-manual.torproject.org/security-settings).
 
 In addition to installing Tor Browser on your computer directly, there are also operating systems designed specifically to connect to the Tor network such as [Whonix](desktop.md#whonix) on [Qubes OS](desktop.md#qubes-os), which provide even greater security and protections than the standard Tor Browser alone.
 
@@ -110,3 +110,5 @@ In addition to installing Tor Browser on your computer directly, there are also
 Onion Browser does not provide the same levels of privacy protections as Tor Browser does on desktop platforms. For casual use it is a perfectly fine way to access hidden services, but if you're concerned about being traced or monitored by advanced adversaries you should not rely on this as an anonymity tool.
 
 [Notably](https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/issues/2929), Onion Browser does not *guarantee* all requests go through Tor. When using the built-in version of Tor, [your real IP **will** be leaked via WebRTC and audio/video streams](https://onionbrowser.com/faqs) due to limitations of WebKit. It is *safer* to use Onion Browser alongside [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot), but this still comes with some limitations on iOS.
+
+[^1]: The `IsolateDestAddr` setting is discussed on the [Tor mailing list](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html) and [Whonix's Stream Isolation documentation](https://whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation), where both projects suggest that it is usually not a good approach for most people.

mkdocs.blog.yml

@@ -128,10 +128,10 @@ plugins:
   blog:
     blog_dir: .
     blog_toc: true
+    pagination_per_page: 16
     post_url_format: "{date}/{file}"
     post_excerpt: required
     post_excerpt_max_authors: 0
-    post_readtime: false
     authors_profiles: true
     authors_profiles_toc: true
     categories_allowed:

mkdocs.videos.yml

@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ plugins:
   blog:
     blog_dir: .
     blog_toc: true
+    pagination_per_page: 16
     post_url_format: "{date}/{file}"
     post_excerpt_max_authors: 0
     authors_profiles: false
@@ -204,7 +205,6 @@ nav:
   - !ENV [NAV_BLOG, "Articles"]: /articles/
   - !ENV [NAV_VIDEOS, "Videos"]:
       - index.md
-      - playlists.md
   - !ENV [NAV_ABOUT, "About"]: /en/about/
   - "Donate": /en/about/donate/
   - !ENV [NAV_FORUM, "Forum"]: "https://discuss.privacyguides.net/"

theme/video-post.html

@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@
 
         <div>
           <div style="position: relative; padding-top: 56.25%;">
-            <iframe width="100%" height="100%" src="{{ page.meta.embed }}?autoplay=1&title=0&p2p=0" allow="autoplay" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" sandbox="allow-same-origin allow-scripts allow-popups allow-forms" style="position: absolute; inset: 0px;"></iframe>
+            <iframe width="100%" height="100%" src="{{ page.meta.embed }}?autoplay=1&title=0" allow="autoplay" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" sandbox="allow-same-origin allow-scripts allow-popups allow-forms" style="position: absolute; inset: 0px;"></iframe>
           </div>
         </div>
 

videos/playlists.md

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-# Playlists
-
-<!-- material/tags -->

videos/posts/when-code-became-a-weapon.md

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
----
-title: |
-  When Code Became a Weapon
-date:
-  created: 2025-05-08T20:00:00Z
-authors:
-  - jordan
-description: |
-  During the Cold War, the US government tried to stop the export of strong cryptography. In this video we'll dive into the history and explain what happened to cause this and why it was eventually overturned.
-tags:
-  - The History and Future of the Encryption Wars
-readtime: 10
-thumbnail: https://neat.tube/lazy-static/previews/64ffa267-44f4-4780-b283-a620bf856934.jpg
-embed: https://neat.tube/videos/embed/8Yrh3JVFbS3ekG8i2JGzjN
-peertube: https://neat.tube/w/8Yrh3JVFbS3ekG8i2JGzjN
-youtube: https://youtu.be/DtPKBngQcEQ
-links:
-  - Encryption Software: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/encryption/#openpgp
----
-During the Cold War, the US government tried to stop the export of strong cryptography. In this video we'll dive into the history and explain what happened to cause this and why it was eventually overturned. The ability to use strong encryption wasn’t a given; it has been continually fought for throughout history.
-
-## Sources
-
-- <https://hiddenheroes.netguru.com/philip-zimmermann>
-- <https://dubois.com/pgp-case/>
-- <https://www.philzimmermann.com/EN/background/index.html>
-- <https://www.philzimmermann.com/EN/bibliography/index.html>
-- <https://www.philzimmermann.com/multimedia/NPR%20Morning%20Edition%2012%20Jan%201996%20-%20Justice%20Dept%20drops%20Zimmermann%20case.m4a>
-- [158,962,555,217,826,360,000 (Enigma Machine) - Numberphile](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2_Q9FoD-oQ&pp=ygUSbnVtYmVycGhpbGUgZW5pZ21h)
-- [Enigma Code](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LU2s28-tN08&pp=ygUbZW5pZ21hIG1hY2hpbmUgZGlzY292ZXJ5IHVr)
-- [Our History](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tIDb-rVvHgQ&pp=ygUSb3VyIGhpc3RvcnkgbnNhIHl0)
-- [The cold war, Checkpoint Charlie](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-pUmfKX3C04&pp=ygUSY2hlY2twb2ludCBjaGFybGll)
-- [Ordinary Life in the USSR 1961](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ExHCAjRsZhA&pp=ygUYbGlmZSBpbiB0aGUgdXNzciBmb290YWdl)
-- [USA: WASHINGTON: ANTI-NUCLEAR PROTESTS](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3SbC3EHS04I&pp=ygUZYW50aSBudWtlIHByb3Rlc3QgMTk5MCBhcNIHCQmGCQGHKiGM7w%3D%3D)
-- [DEF CON 11 - Phil Zimmerman - A Conversation with Phil Zimmermann](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ww8AAkWFhM&pp=ygUTcGhpbCB6aW1tZXJtYW5uIHBncA%3D%3D)
-- [The Screen Savers - Phil Zimmerman, creator of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) Interview](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cZD36L3BXXs&pp=ygUdcGhpbCB6aW1tZXJtYW5uIHNjcmVlbiBzYXZlcnM%3D)
-- [Creator of PGP, Phil Zimmermann Talks At Bitcoin Wednesday](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M8z0Nx8svC4&pp=ygUXcGhpbCB6aW1tZXJtYW5uIGJpdGNvaW4%3D)
-- [Life On The Internet: Networking (1996 Usenet Documentary)](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jNme5DlNaZY&pp=ygUbbGlmZSBvbiB0aGUgaW50ZXJuZXIgdXNlbmV0)
-- [Snooping is in the nature of govts – king of encryption Phil Zimmermann](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1eYZ8v_R9jI&pp=ygUdcGhpbCB6aW1tZXJtYW5uIHNjcmVlbiBzYXZlcnM%3D)
-- <https://www.eff.org/cases/bernstein-v-us-dept-justice>