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Author SHA1 Message Date
Daniel Gray 0e861aaf79 Rebased on #2606, swapped legacy admonitions 2025-01-13 20:15:16 -08:00
Ikel Atomig e57874d3cc Changes as in Code suggestions
Co-authored-by: noClaps <github@zerolimits.dev>
Co-authored-by: Pa1NarK <69745008+pixincreate@users.noreply.github.com>
2025-01-13 20:15:16 -08:00
Ikel Atomig f8f1b327c0 Add remaining pages in Recommendations 2025-01-13 20:15:16 -08:00
Ikel Atomig 17c499945f Change Sidebar logo - Overview 2025-01-13 20:15:16 -08:00
Ikel Atomig dbbe200623 Grammar Fix
Co-authored-by: noClaps <github@zerolimits.dev>
2025-01-13 20:15:16 -08:00
Ikel Atomig eaf2ef194b Changes as per Forum discussion - 1
This is done with respect to comment by 128bitpotato - https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/windows-guide/250/81
2025-01-13 20:15:16 -08:00
Ikel Atomig 39f281f428 1st Draft of PR.
This is refresh commit made due to merge conflicts that came when trying to sync the fork
2025-01-13 20:15:16 -08:00
Daniel Gray 86655d7831 fix: Improvements on Windows overview (#2606) 2025-01-13 20:15:16 -08:00
allcontributors[bot] 56ec37aec1 Add bruch-alex as a contributor for translation (#2849)
Signed-off-by: Jonah Aragon <jonah@privacyguides.org>
Signed-off-by: Mare Polaris <15004290+ph00lt0@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: fria <138676274+friadev@users.noreply.github.com>
2025-01-13 13:56:58 -06:00
Alex Bruch 9261e78237 Capitalize Russian in the language selector (#2850)
Signed-off-by: Jonah Aragon <jonah@privacyguides.org>
Signed-off-by: Mare Polaris <15004290+ph00lt0@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: fria <138676274+friadev@users.noreply.github.com>
2025-01-13 13:53:49 -06:00
113 changed files with 683 additions and 3060 deletions
-9
View File
@@ -2965,15 +2965,6 @@
"contributions": [
"translation"
]
},
{
"login": "qiyongzheng",
"name": "qiyongzheng",
"avatar_url": "https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/153378707?v=4",
"profile": "https://github.com/qiyongzheng",
"contributions": [
"doc"
]
}
],
"contributorsPerLine": 5,
+3 -14
View File
@@ -99,24 +99,13 @@ jobs:
continue-on-error: true
privileged: ${{ fromJSON(needs.metadata.outputs.privileged) }}
build_videos:
if: ${{ contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'ci:build videos') }}
needs: [submodule, metadata]
uses: ./.github/workflows/build-videos.yml
with:
ref: ${{github.event.pull_request.head.ref}}
repo: ${{github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name}}
continue-on-error: true
privileged: ${{ fromJSON(needs.metadata.outputs.privileged) }}
combine_build:
needs: [build_english, build_i18n, build_blog, build_videos]
needs: [build_english, build_i18n, build_blog]
if: |
(always() && !cancelled() && !failure()) &&
needs.build_english.result == 'success' &&
(needs.build_i18n.result == 'success' || needs.build_i18n.result == 'skipped') &&
(needs.build_blog.result == 'success' || needs.build_blog.result == 'skipped') &&
(needs.build_videos.result == 'success' || needs.build_videos.result == 'skipped')
(needs.build_blog.result == 'success' || needs.build_blog.result == 'skipped')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
@@ -138,5 +127,5 @@ jobs:
cleanup:
if: ${{ always() }}
needs: [build_english, build_i18n, build_blog, build_videos]
needs: [build_english, build_i18n, build_blog]
uses: privacyguides/.github/.github/workflows/cleanup.yml@main
-104
View File
@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
name: 🛠️ Build Videos
on:
workflow_call:
inputs:
ref:
required: true
type: string
repo:
required: true
type: string
context:
type: string
default: deploy-preview
continue-on-error:
type: boolean
default: true
privileged:
type: boolean
default: true
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
continue-on-error: ${{ inputs.continue-on-error }}
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- name: Add GitHub Token to Environment
run: |
echo "GH_TOKEN=${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Download Repository
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
repository: ${{ inputs.repo }}
ref: ${{ inputs.ref }}
persist-credentials: "false"
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Download Submodules
uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
with:
pattern: repo-*
path: modules
- name: Move mkdocs-material-insiders to mkdocs-material
if: inputs.privileged
run: |
rmdir modules/mkdocs-material
mv modules/repo-mkdocs-material-insiders modules/mkdocs-material
- name: Move brand submodule to theme/assets/brand
run: |
rmdir theme/assets/brand
mv modules/repo-brand theme/assets/brand
- name: Install Python (pipenv)
if: inputs.privileged
uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
cache: "pipenv"
- name: Install Python (no pipenv)
if: ${{ !inputs.privileged }}
uses: actions/setup-python@v5
- name: Install Python Dependencies
if: inputs.privileged
run: |
pip install pipenv
pipenv install
sudo apt install pngquant
- name: Install Python Dependencies (Unprivileged)
if: ${{ !inputs.privileged }}
run: |
pip install mkdocs-material mkdocs-rss-plugin mkdocs-glightbox mkdocs-macros-plugin
sudo apt install pngquant
- name: Build Website (Privileged)
if: inputs.privileged
run: |
pipenv run mkdocs build --config-file mkdocs.videos.yml
- name: Build Website (Unprivileged)
if: ${{ !inputs.privileged }}
run: |
BUILD_INSIDERS=false mkdocs build --config-file mkdocs.videos.yml
- name: Package Website
run: |
tar -czf site-build-videos.tar.gz site
- name: Upload Site
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: site-build-videos.tar.gz
path: site-build-videos.tar.gz
retention-days: 1
-85
View File
@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2021-2025 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
# deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the
# rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or
# sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
# IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
# FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NON-INFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
# AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
# LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
# FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS
# IN THE SOFTWARE.
name: 📦 Immediate Releases
on:
workflow_dispatch:
push:
branches:
- "main"
paths:
- "blog/**"
- "videos/**"
concurrency:
group: release-deployment
cancel-in-progress: false
permissions:
contents: write
pages: write
id-token: write
deployments: write
jobs:
submodule:
strategy:
matrix:
repo: [mkdocs-material-insiders, brand]
uses: privacyguides/.github/.github/workflows/download-repo.yml@main
with:
repo: ${{ matrix.repo }}
secrets:
ACTIONS_SSH_KEY: ${{ secrets.ACTIONS_SSH_KEY }}
build_blog:
needs: submodule
permissions:
contents: read
uses: ./.github/workflows/build-blog.yml
with:
repo: ${{ github.repository }}
ref: ${{ github.ref }}
continue-on-error: false
build_videos:
needs: submodule
permissions:
contents: read
uses: ./.github/workflows/build-videos.yml
with:
repo: ${{ github.repository }}
ref: ${{ github.ref }}
continue-on-error: false
deploy:
needs: [build_blog, build_videos]
uses: privacyguides/webserver/.github/workflows/deploy-garage.yml@main
with:
environment: production
secrets:
PROD_GARAGE_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.PROD_GARAGE_KEY_ID }}
PROD_GARAGE_SECRET_KEY: ${{ secrets.PROD_GARAGE_SECRET_KEY }}
cleanup:
if: ${{ always() }}
needs: [build_blog, build_videos]
uses: privacyguides/.github/.github/workflows/cleanup.yml@main
+2 -12
View File
@@ -74,16 +74,6 @@ jobs:
ref: ${{ github.ref }}
continue-on-error: false
build_videos:
needs: submodule
permissions:
contents: read
uses: ./.github/workflows/build-videos.yml
with:
repo: ${{ github.repository }}
ref: ${{ github.ref }}
continue-on-error: false
release:
name: Create release notes
needs: build
@@ -105,7 +95,7 @@ jobs:
makeLatest: true
deploy:
needs: [build, build_blog, build_videos]
needs: [build, build_blog]
uses: privacyguides/webserver/.github/workflows/deploy-all.yml@main
secrets:
NETLIFY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.NETLIFY_TOKEN }}
@@ -122,5 +112,5 @@ jobs:
cleanup:
if: ${{ always() }}
needs: [build, build_blog, build_videos]
needs: [build, build_blog]
uses: privacyguides/.github/.github/workflows/cleanup.yml@main
-1
View File
@@ -28,4 +28,3 @@ no-hard-tabs: true
emphasis-style:
style: "asterisk"
no-duplicate-header: false
no-trailing-punctuation: false
-1
View File
@@ -611,7 +611,6 @@ Privacy Guides wouldn't be possible without these wonderful people ([emoji key](
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center" valign="top" width="20%"><a rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" href="https://github.com/bruch-alex"><img src="https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/173354246?v=4" width="100px;" loading=lazy /><br /><sub><b>Alex Bruch</b></sub></a><br /><a href="#translation-bruch-alex" title="Translation">🌍</a></td>
<td align="center" valign="top" width="20%"><a rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" href="https://github.com/qiyongzheng"><img src="https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/153378707?v=4" width="100px;" loading=lazy /><br /><sub><b>qiyongzheng</b></sub></a><br /><a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/commits?author=qiyongzheng" title="Documentation">📖</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
<tfoot>
+11 -18
View File
@@ -8,17 +8,17 @@ authors:
name: Dan Arel
description: Former Team Member
avatar: https://github.com/danarel.png
niek-de-wilde:
name: Niek de Wilde
description: Team Member
avatar: https://github.com/blacklight447.png
mastodon:
username: blacklight447
instance: mastodon.social
dngray:
name: Daniel Gray
description: Team Member
avatar: https://github.com/dngray.png
em:
name: Em
description: Staff Writer
avatar: https://github.com/EmAtPrivacyGuides.png
mastodon:
username: Em0nM4stodon
instance: infosec.exchange
freddy:
name: Freddy
description: Team Member
@@ -28,10 +28,6 @@ authors:
instance: social.lol
twitter: m00ws
bluesky: freddy.lol
fria:
name: fria
description: Team Member
avatar: https://github.com/friadev.png
jonah:
name: Jonah Aragon
description: Project Director
@@ -57,14 +53,11 @@ authors:
name: Nate Bartram
description: Guest Contributor
avatar: https://gitlab.com/uploads/-/system/user/avatar/8993331/avatar.png
niek-de-wilde:
name: Niek de Wilde
description: Team Member
avatar: https://github.com/blacklight447.png
mastodon:
username: blacklight447
instance: mastodon.social
sam-howell:
name: Sam Howell
description: Guest Contributor
avatar: https://gitlab.com/uploads/-/system/user/avatar/5349522/avatar.png
fria:
name: fria
description: Team Member
avatar: https://github.com/friadev.png
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---
description: Em is a full-time journalist at Privacy Guides.
schema:
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dateCreated: "2025-02-03T19:00:00Z"
dateModified: "2024-02-03T19:00:00Z"
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"@context": https://schema.org
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name: Em
jobTitle: Staff Writer
description: Em is a full-time journalist at Privacy Guides.
url: https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/author/em/
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---
# Em
![Profile picture](https://github.com/EmAtPrivacyGuides.png){ align=right }
[**Em**](https://emontheinternet.me/) is a full-time staff writer at *Privacy Guides*. She is a publicinterest technologist and researcher who has been working on various independent projects in data privacy, information security, and software engineering since 2018.
Em is passionate about digital rights, privacy advocacy, solid security, and code for the public good. In her free time, you can find Em on Mastodon giving privacy tips or boosting photos of cats and moss.
[:simple-mastodon: @Em0nM4stodon@infosec.exchange](https://infosec.exchange/@Em0nM4stodon "@Em0nM4stodon@infosec.exchange"){ .md-button rel=me }
@@ -1,317 +0,0 @@
---
date:
created: 2025-01-23T19:15:00
updated: 2025-01-27T20:00:00
categories:
- Tutorials
authors:
- jonah
description: Your phone is an essential tool, but it also represents a huge risk to your privacy and security. Understanding these best practices when it comes to securing your smartphone will help keep you and your data safe.
schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle
---
# The Protesters' Guide to Smartphone Security
![Article cover photo showing a phone icon over a protest](../assets/images/activists-guide-securing-your-smartphone/cover.webp)
<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Jonah Aragon / Privacy Guides | Photo: Koshu Kunii / Unsplash</small>
For most protesters, activists, and journalists, your smartphone is an essential tool you depend on for organizing with your peers, accessing and distributing information, and helping others. It also represents a great risk, as a tool that is easily appropriated by authorities for targeted and mass surveillance.<!-- more -->
The perennial question when it comes to protests is whether you should bring your phone at all. If you leave your phone at home, that is probably the safest your data will get, and you will be at very low risk of being tracked by mass surveillance tools. On the other hand, your phone is a critical resource when it comes to coordinating with others, getting updates on the protest from social media, or simply documenting what is going on with your phone's camera.
If possible, bringing a separate device like a "burner phone," an old phone you can reset, or even a regular old-fashioned camera is a much better option than bringing your primary phone. Any data you don't bring with you can't be taken from you at the scene.
However, getting access to or affording devices like these aren't a realistic option for many people. Whether you decide to take your smartphone or a secondary smartphone with you to the event, this guide will cover how to maximize that device's security and minimize risks to your privacy.
**Update (2025-01-27):** This article has been updated based on some community [feedback](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/24316), notably I added the [Burner Phones](#burner-phones), [Minimize Your Stored Data](#minimize-your-stored-data), [Use Public Wi-Fi](#use-public-wi-fi), and [Check Your Keyboard](#check-your-keyboard) sections.
## Your Risks at a Protest
There are plenty of risks you should consider if you use your smartphone at a protest. We are going to try and cover the following in this guide:
1. Losing your device.
2. Authorities confiscating your smartphone.
3. Service disruption, either due to intentional interference by authorities or caused by networks being overloaded by large groups of people.
4. Targeted surveillance:
- Disrupting your service.
- Blocking delivery of calls/SMS to your number.
- Monitoring your unencrypted traffic.
- Monitoring communications over local radios like walkie-talkies, etc.
5. Mass surveillance:
- Interference with web services. Popular communication platforms like Twitter or TikTok could be throttled or blocked.
- Interference with messengers and voice services like Signal or WhatsApp.
- Authorities could use public Wi-Fi networks in the area to monitor traffic and identify nearby devices.
- Cell phone companies could provide records to authorities of devices near cell towers in the area to track and identify protesters.
Like all of our guides, we are going to cover the general best practices and provide helpful tips, but your individual situation may be different. You should always research and plan according to what you specifically are doing, and if you need legal advice you should always consult a qualified and licensed attorney.
## "Burner Phones"
Cell phones are generally tracked by law enforcement using two identifiers:
1. Your **IMSI**, which uniquely identifies your SIM card
2. Your **IMEI**, which uniquely identifies your phone
Thus, simply using a prepaid SIM in your primary/personal device is not a foolproof method of avoiding tracking, because your IMEI is still correlatable between networks.
Buying a secondary, disposable device is an option that will provide you with much greater protection than bringing your personal device. However, if the threat you face is serious enough that you feel the need to do this, you should strongly consider not bringing a phone at all. Properly securing a disposable/burner phone is fairly challenging and may not be worth it.
If you *do* buy a secondary device for this purpose, you should buy it in-person, with **cash**.
**Do not activate or power it on at home**. The location of a phone is tracked by network carriers for at least a year at minimum, but you should assume that location history is just kept forever. Therefore, you should activate and set up the device in a very public place that is not significant to your daily life, then always keep it powered off at locations associated with you. You don't want the phone's location to ever be recorded at your home or workplace.
If possible, you should try to purchase and set up this phone well in advance. This certainly depends on your plans, but spreading out your purchase, activation, and use of the device makes it less easy to detect. It also makes it less likely that the store you bought the phone from still has security footage of your purchase.
You will also want to make sure you do not identify yourself when purchasing a cellular plan. This is highly dependent on your country, but many prepaid plans will not require any identification to activate. There are also some global eSIM providers which will accept payment without the need to identify yourself to them.
One last thing: Your secondary device should still be a reasonably modern smartphone. The security measures we cover below regarding [hardware and software security](#consider-your-phones-security-patches) still apply. Smartphones are more secure against the sort of threats that activists are likely to face—such as someone trying to crack into your device's data—than a simple/feature/"dumb" phone will be. They also have many more options for secure & encrypted communication methods that we'll cover below as well.
Using a secondary device only at the protest allows you to leave your primary device powered on and at home. This potentially provides some plausible deniability, if someone requests the location of your phone during the time of the event later.
## Secure Your Device
If your phone falls into the wrong hands, the information on it could be hugely damaging to yourself or others. Make sure you've taken the necessary steps to prevent it from being broken into.
### Use a Strong Screen Lock
At a bare minimum, you should use a 6-digit PIN, but ideally you should protect your phone with an alphanumeric passphrase. This prevents people from trivially accessing your data, and additionally protects your data with strong encryption.
Barring a massive security exploit (more on this [later](#consider-your-phones-security-patches)), most law enforcement tools work by essentially brute-forcing your PIN, running tons of guesses until it gets one right. This makes a long and unique passphrase your strongest protection against your data being stolen by people in possession of your device.
In the United States and many other countries it is legal to refuse to unlock your phone or provide your passcode to law enforcement. **Know your rights** wherever you're located before attending a protest, so you aren't blindly following orders later.
### Disable Biometic Authentication
We commonly recommend using biometric features like Face ID or Touch ID to prevent "shoulder surfing" attacks, where an attacker steals your PIN by discreetly watching you enter it, or where your PIN is recorded by surveillance cameras in the area.
**However**, in this situation it may make more sense to disable biometric authentication. Authorities are trained and known to use biometrics quickly to forcefully unlock your device, so you should be mindful of this fact when deciding what to do. If you disable biometrics, be wary of shoulder surfing attacks and prying eyes by obscuring or covering your phone whenever you unlock it.
Whatever you do, make sure you know how to quickly shut down your phone or disable biometrics at a moment's notice. Many phones have begun replacing the standard "hold down the power button" function with voice assistants or other features, so practice performing the actual shutdown method beforehand to familiarize yourself.
Modern iPhones require you to hold down the side button and either volume button before the power-off slider appears. Even if you don't get a chance to slide to power off, getting to this screen will at least disable biometric authentication, making your phone a bit more secure than it otherwise might be.
In the United States, it is still a legal gray area when it comes to whether law enforcement can force you to use biometrics, but many court decisions have leaned toward saying they **can** compel you to use your fingerprint. Using a passphrase and disabling biometrics gives you more robust 5th Amendment rights. In other countries you should again familiarize yourself with your rights in this scenario, so that you can make the most informed decision.
### Hide Your Notifications
Even with your device locked, law enforcement can see everything you're up to simply by scrolling through your notifications. Reducing the amount of information accessible on the lock screen improves your security and the security of those you're messaging, so make sure your notifications are only visible when your device is unlocked.
On an iPhone:
1. Open **Settings**
2. Navigate to **Notifications**
3. Navigate to **Show Previews**
4. Select **Never** (or, **When Unlocked**)
On Android:
1. Open **Settings**
2. Navigate to **Notifications**
3. Touch **Notifications on lock screen**
- Select **Don't show any notifications**
4. Switch **Sensitive notifications** to **off**
### Minimize Your Stored Data
The best way to protect your data is to not have it on your phone in the first place. If you're using a secondary device, simply don't install anything other than what will be absolutely necessary during the protest, like a secure messenger.
Otherwise, delete any cloud storage apps you don't need access to during the protest. If you're able to delete an app and then download it later and log in without experiencing any data loss, then that app probably doesn't *need* to be on your phone all the time.
Some [password managers](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/passwords/) have the option to temporarily remove certain vaults from your devices, 1Password calls this [Travel Mode](https://support.1password.com/travel-mode/) for example. You can do this manually as well, by having a separate password manager or vault with only the essentials you will need at the time, and removing your primary password manager from your device for the duration of the event.
### Disable Lock Screen Actions
In a similar vein, any functionality you have enabled while your device is unlocked can pose a security risk. It is always best practice to reduce your attack surface by disabling these options whenever possible. Even though these features are typically designed to not pose a security risk to your data, they have been known to be exploited in the past to bypass lock screens and other security features.
On an iPhone:
1. Open **Settings**
2. Navigate to **Face ID & Passcode**
3. Scroll to the **Allow Access When Locked** section
4. Switch all features you don't need **off**
On Android, disabling functionality while the phone is locked will vary widely by manufacturer. Some like Samsung provide more flexible options in their lock screen settings, but others like Google do not provide the option to disable the quick settings panel or other similar features.
### Avoid External Storage
Your Android phone might have the option to store files or photos on a microSD card, but these cards are not always subject to the same encryption standards as your phone's built-in storage. You should check whether your microSD card can be encrypted in your phone's settings, although this will prevent it from being read by other devices like your computer later.
Additionally, even *if* it's encrypted, it still won't benefit from the same security protections that your phone's built-in storage provides, such as advanced brute-force protections. Ideally you should remove all external storage devices from your phone during the event, and save photos, videos, and other files to your phone's encrypted internal storage.
### Consider Your Phone's Security Patches
Exploits against smartphones are discovered on a very regular basis, and spyware companies that work with law enforcement—like Cellebrite—abuse these exploits to crack into stolen devices. If your phone is no longer receiving regular updates from its manufacturer, you are in a very dangerous position as you may be vulnerable to the exploits used.
In general, we consider the latest iPhone and latest Google Pixel to be the most secured against this sort of threat. You can increase your security further by using a [hardened alternative operating system](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/android/distributions/) on your Google Pixel.
Robust security information about phones from other manufacturers is less common. If you use a different device you may still consider the risks to be worth it, but if confiscation is of *particular* concern to you, or especially if your phone no longer receives security patches, you may want to consider leaving the phone at home.
## Protect Against Surveillance
### Disable AirDrop
One of the most innocuous features enabled on millions of iPhones is also one of the most dangerous for those seeking to protect their privacy in public. Apple's AirDrop protocol [uses](https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec21-heinrich.pdf) trivially bypassed security measures that authorities like the Chinese government have openly [bragged](https://arstechnica.com/security/2024/01/hackers-can-id-unique-apple-airdrop-users-chinese-authorities-claim-to-do-just-that/) about cracking to identify users since at least 2022.
You should assume that any device with AirDrop enabled is constantly broadcasting your name, email address, and phone number to everyone around you, **even if** you have it set to "Contacts Only." Apple has known about this [flaw](https://www.macrumors.com/2021/04/23/airdrop-researchers-security-flaw/) since 2019 and has not issued any fix.
1. Open the **Settings** app
2. Navigate to **General**
3. Navigate to **AirDrop**
4. Select **Receiving Off**
### Lock Down Your Network
Your phone signals can be used to track you even if you don't make a call or send a text. Some law enforcement agencies use "stingrays," devices which can impersonate a cell tower to track visitors to an area. It is speculated that more advanced ones can intercept unencrypted text messages and phone calls as well, making the use of an [encrypted messenger](#use-signal) during the event even more critical.
While the capabilities of the most modern ones isn't fully known, you should definitely protect yourself from the subset of stingrays which abuse the lower security standards of older, 2G networks.
On Android:
1. Open **Settings**
2. Navigate to **Network & internet**
3. Navigate to **SIMs**
4. Select your carrier or SIM card
5. Switch **Allow 2G** to **off**
You might also consider installing Privacy Cell ([F-Droid](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/com.stoutner.privacycell/) / [Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.stoutner.privacycell)), an app that tells you whether you are connected to a cell network using the most modern security. Even the "5G" indicator on your phone alone doesn't guarantee you are using the latest-generation protocol.
On iPhone:
1. Open **Settings**
2. Navigate to **Privacy & Security**
3. Navigate to **Lockdown Mode**
4. Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode**
Note that enabling [Lockdown Mode](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) on an iPhone will change a variety of settings to harden its security. Many of them are smart improvements, but certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/HT212650) normally, so read the previous links here for more details.
### Use Airplane Mode Frequently
Even after mitigating the risks of 2G networks, your cellular activity can still be tracked. If not by law enforcement then by your carrier, who will likely be responsive to law enforcement's requests for data after the fact.
To prevent this, you should keep your phone turned off or use Airplane Mode to disable cellular connections whenever possible. Ideally you should only connect to networks in an emergency situation to communicate with others in your group, otherwise keeping messages and network transmissions to a minimum is key.
If you absolutely need internet connectivity and it's possible, you should keep Airplane Mode on and connect to a public Wi-Fi network instead, which brings me to:
### Use Public Wi-Fi
If you're able, scope out businesses in the area that provide public Wi-Fi in advance. This is better than using cellular service, because less information about your device is shared with Wi-Fi networks as opposed to cell towers. Most modern phones support MAC address randomization, which makes it even harder to correlate your cell phone's connections between different Wi-Fi access points.
There is a danger that public Wi-Fi services will be set up by authorities or others in the area to track protesters. You could consider using a [VPN service](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/) while connected to them to minimize the amount of metadata about your traffic that the Wi-Fi operator is able to collect.
### Disable Location Services
If you have to keep your device powered on and connected, you can at least minimize the number of parties who have access to your location data. Be mindful of apps that you choose to share your location with, and consider disabling location services entirely while you're at the event.
On an iPhone:
1. Open **Settings**
2. Navigate to **Privacy & Security**
3. Navigate to **Location Services**
4. Switch **Location Services** to **off**
On Android:
1. Open **Settings**
2. Navigate to **Location**
3. Switch **Use location** to **off**
If you use an Android phone, you should also check your Google account settings to [ensure location history is disabled](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/3118687). Google is frequently tapped by law enforcement to provide location data, because they don't protect your personal information with strong, zero-knowledge encryption.
### Check Your Keyboard
An often overlooked security risk is the software keyboard installed on your device. The best encrypted messenger in the world is no match for all of your inputs being read by third-parties as you type them.
If you are on [GrapheneOS](#consider-your-phones-security-patches), the default keyboard from AOSP that it comes with makes no internet connections, so if you don't install a third-party keyboard you should be fine. Most other Android users are using Google's *Gboard*, which does make internet connections you may decide you don't trust, so you could consider installing an offline alternative. iOS users are able to control whether their third-party keyboard has network access in their system settings, although it may be wiser to not install a third-party keyboard in the first place.
This is [particularly relevant](https://xcancel.com/RealSexyCyborg/status/1197695344575799296) to people typing in languages like Chinese or others where you use an Input Method Editor (IME) to convert Latin letters to characters in the target language. These IMEs are very often third-party apps that have full internet access.
## Other Tips
### Use Signal
[**Signal**](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/#signal) is the most secure app for sending text messages and making voice calls with others. It is also impossible to configure Signal to lower its encryption security or other security standards, so you know that everyone in your group is using settings that are safe by default.
You should turn on disappearing messages with a reasonably short interval for sensitive communications. You can do this by default in the Privacy section of Signal's app settings, and you can also do it on a per-conversation basis in each conversation's settings panel. This way there is a time limit for an attacker to crack your phone and extract your messages before they permanently disappear.
Signal is battle-tested for this situation. [Signal has responded to 6 government requests](https://signal.org/bigbrother/) since 2016, and in each case the only information they were able to provide was at most:
1. Whether the user was registered with Signal
2. When that user registered with Signal
3. When that user connected to Signal last
Keep in mind that using Signal could still expose your phone's location, simply due to making a network request as we covered above. You should still keep your phone in [Airplane Mode](#use-airplane-mode-frequently) and minimize the use of Signal or any other networked app during the event.
There *are* other [encrypted messengers](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/), some of them even making use of technologies developed by Signal. However, they all come with trade-offs that could easily compromise your security. WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger are end-to-end encrypted for example, but they collect copious amounts of *metadata* about your messages, such as who you're sending them to, when you're sending them, your location when you're sending them, etc. Apple's iMessage service in the Messages app has strong encryption but similar metadata concerns, and only works if everyone in your group has an iPhone.
### Protect Your Access to Information
Phones can be easily lost, taken, broken, or they can simply run out of juice. Bring a spare mobile battery or a charged power bank with you, and try to minimize your phone usage to preserve power. You should also make sure your mobile plan is topped up and you have enough mobile data prior to the event.
You should also write down the number of an emergency contact or a lawyer on a physical piece of paper, or [even](https://xcancel.com/madeleine_rae/status/1266528386878443522) in Sharpie on your arm. You'll want this information easily accessible if you're arrested regardless of your phone's state or location.
### Change Your Camera Settings
Check your camera settings for things which may draw unwanted attention, like the flash or a shutter sound. You should go through these settings in advance and configure it for the safest possible use.
### Back Up Your Data
You should be prepared to have your phone taken or lost during a protest. You can limit the potential costs and headache to you if this happens by making sure you have an updated, encrypted backup of your data.
If you have an iPhone, you can make a local backup to a macOS computer or a Windows computer with iTunes. You can also back up to iCloud, but these backups are only secure if you enable [Advanced Data Protection](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/os/ios-overview/#icloud) on your iCloud account. We strongly encourage [enabling Advanced Data Protection](https://support.apple.com/en-us/108756) for all iCloud users in any case, as it protects not only device backups but most iCloud account data as well.
The backup situation on Android is not nearly as robust unfortunately, but you can back up photos and files with a variety of services. If you use an online backup service we recommend choosing one with strong, zero-knowledge encryption so that the service provider is unable to access your data.
- [Recommended Photo Backup Services](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/photo-management/)
- [Recommended Cloud Drive Services](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/cloud/)
- [Recommended File Sync Services](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/file-sharing/)
## At The Protest
### Keep Your Device Locked
You should always use your camera to take pictures or videos while your phone is locked, in case your device is taken while filming. This is easier if you've [disabled biometrics](#disable-biometic-authentication), because Face ID or similar features might unlock your device automatically when you don't want that to happen.
On an iPhone you can hold down the camera icon on the lock screen to open the camera without unlocking your device. You could also configure the Action Button to open the camera, or use the dedicated camera button on the latest iPhone model.
On a Google Pixel and most other Android devices, double-tapping the power button will open the camera without needing to unlock your device.
You should learn and/or set up device shortcuts to do things quickly, ideally while the device remains locked whenever possible, and ensure you're familiar with the shortcuts before the event.
### Have a Backup Communications Network
In the event of an internet blackout, it might be a good idea to have a backup network prepared, organized with other attendees. Messaging apps like [Briar](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/real-time-communication/#briar) can operate in a local mesh mode, connecting to other devices in the area with Bluetooth or local Wi-Fi connections instead of relying on centralized internet services. Another newer option is [Meshtastic](https://meshtastic.org/), which uses peer-to-peer/mesh radio that is much more reliable than using either Wi-Fi or Bluetooth, but requires purchasing dedicated hardware that you connect to your phone.
You might also want to consider local radios like walkie-talkies, although keep in mind these devices are nearly always unencrypted and can be easily monitored by others, so you won't want to use them to transmit sensitive information.
## After The Event
### If Your Phone Was Taken
If you lose your phone, you may be able to locate or wipe your phone remotely depending on the model. Here are some instructions for common devices you can try:
- [Finding a lost Android device](https://support.google.com/android/answer/3265955?hl=en)
- [Finding a lost iPhone](https://support.apple.com/en-us/104978)
If you were logged in to any online services on your phone, you should try and get them signed out. On many social media websites for example, you can go to your account's settings to see what devices are signed in and revoke their access remotely.
Please be aware of the **legal consequences** of these actions. Wiping your device or revoking online account access could lead to obstruction of justice or destruction of evidence charges in some jurisdictions. You should always speak with your licensed attorney before deciding how to proceed. If your phone was taken by law enforcement you may have legal recourse to get it back.
### Be Mindful of Others
If you post your photos online, be mindful of identifiable faces or other characteristics of your fellow protesters or bystanders. Law enforcement or vigilantes use these photos to track down other attendees and arrest or harass them.
To prevent this, you can obscure the faces of anyone in the image. Most phones have [built-in photo editing tools](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/os/ios-overview/#redacting-elements-in-images) that allow you to draw on an image. Blurring can sometimes be reversed, so blocking it out entirely is generally preferable.
Be careful of the editing tools you use, and don't select highlighters or other semi-transparent editing tools. Even if you scribble over an area of a photo multiple times with a dark/black "highlighter" tool until it *appears* black, that can often be reversed with photo editing software by adjusting the contrast of the image. Using a shape/rectangle tool to draw a black box over areas you wish to redact is much better than trying to manually cross out image elements with drawing tools.
The Signal app also has built-in tools for photo editing and blurring. You can send a photo to yourself in the "Notes to Self" chat, then save the edited image from that chat for sharing. Signal also automatically removes photo metadata, so if you use it you're already covered with our next section:
### Scrub Photo Metadata
Photos have hidden information, or *metadata*, embedded in them which include the type of phone/camera you used, the photo's location, and other potentially sensitive data.
You should use a [metadata removal tool](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/data-redaction/) to remove this data from images before you share them with others. If you send a photo to someone using Signal, that app removes this metadata automatically.
@@ -18,8 +18,6 @@ schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle
!["Choosing The Right Messenger" cover image](../assets/images/choosing-the-right-messenger/cover.png)
<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Jonah Aragon / Privacy Guides | Photo: Unsplash</small>
One of the most common questions users have when it comes to privacy is about messaging services. It seems almost all of them mention some level of privacy or encryption to entice the user to sign up for their service, but how can you be sure youre using the most secure, privacy respecting platform?<!-- more -->
The answer actually lies in ones [threat model](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/threat-modeling/), which is often an ignored step in choosing all privacy related apps and services, meaning a lot of users limit their internet and communication experience because they believe they need Edward Snowden level privacy settings.
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@@ -17,8 +17,6 @@ schema_type: NewsArticle
!["Delisting Startpage" cover image](../assets/images/delisting-startpage/cover.png)
<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Privacy Guides | Photo: Unsplash</small>
Dear *Privacy Guides* Community,
On the 15th of October, it was [brought to our attention](https://web.archive.org/web/20201127034309/https://www.reddit.com/r/privacy/comments/di5rn3/startpage_is_now_owned_by_an_advertising_company/) that Startpage.com was reportedly (partially?) taken over by a company called the Privacy One Group, which is in turn owned by a company called System1. We found this quite remarkable as the two companies seem to have conflicting business models.<!-- more --> Startpage has been known for basing their advertisements on what their users enter in their search bar. System1 on the other hand, is a pay-per-click advertising company that "[has developed a pre-targeting platform that identifies and unlocks consumer intent across channels including social, native, email, search, market research and lead generation rather than relying solely on what consumers enter into search boxes.](https://web.archive.org/web/20201127034309/https://www.bizjournals.com/losangeles/news/2017/09/20/system1-raises-270-million-for-consumer-intent.html)"
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!["Delisting Wire" cover image](../assets/images/delisting-wire/cover.png)
<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Jonah Aragon / Privacy Guides | Photo: Unsplash</small>
It has recently come to the attention of the *Privacy Guides* team that **Wire**, the popular end-to-end encryption messaging platform [has been sold or moved to a US company](https://web.archive.org/web/20201128215737/https://forum.privacytools.io/t/wire-swiss-gmbh-is-now-owned-by-a-usa-holding-company/1932). After a week of questioning, Wire finally confirmed they had changed holding companies and would now be a US based company in a move they called “simple and pragmatic,” as they worked to expand their foothold in the enterprise market. This also came alongside the news that Wire had accepted more than $8 million in Venture Capital (VC) funding from Morpheus Ventures, as well as other investors.<!-- more -->
Morpheus Ventures holds a [portfolio](https://web.archive.org/web/20201128215737/https://morpheus.com/portfolio/) including companies in healthcare, voice AI, life insurance, and retail customer data analytics: All sectors that have historically used invasive data collection methods to survive. Why would a VC with a portfolio centered on consumer data want to invest in a company whose mission claims to protect that very same information?
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---
title: EasyOptOuts Review & Real-World Test
description: "People-search sites represent an immense privacy risk to the majority of Americans. EasyOptOuts is a low-cost online service which automates opt-out requests on your behalf."
date:
created: 2025-02-03T16:20:00
categories:
- Reviews
authors:
- jonah
links:
- Data Removal Services: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/data-broker-removals/
tags:
- People-Search Sites
license: BY-SA
template: review-article.html
schema_type: ReviewNewsArticle
review:
type: WebApplication
category: SecurityApplication
subcategory: People-Search Site Removal Tool
name: EasyOptOuts
alternateName: EasyOptOuts.com
price: 19.99
period: yr
website: https://easyoptouts.com/
rating: 4.5
pros:
- Saves enormous time compared to manual opt-outs.
- Exceptional value, priced an order of magnitude lower than much of its competition.
- Searches and opts-out of all supported sites extremely quickly.
cons:
- Fairly bare-boned interface.
- The 100+ supported websites is still not close to some of the more expensive alternatives.
- No manual/human interaction.
---
![EasyOptOuts logo](../assets/img/data-broker-removals/easyoptouts.svg){ align=right itemprop="image" }
**EasyOptOuts.com** is a $19.99/year [people-search site removal service](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/data-broker-removals/) which will search a number of different data broker sites and automatically submit opt-out requests on your behalf. They will perform the first search and removal process immediately, and then re-run the process every 4 months in case your data shows up on new sites over time.<!-- more -->
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://easyoptouts.com){ .md-button }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://easyoptouts.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
## Background
People-search sites represent an immense privacy risk to the majority of Americans. For many, sensitive personal information such as your address, phone number, email, and age is a simple internet search away. While there is unfortunately no federal regulation in place to protect your data, many of these companies will remove your information from their public databases upon request. EasyOptOuts is a low-cost online service which automates these opt-out requests, saving you time and removing the need to constantly monitor new sites/databases for your personal information on a regular basis.
*Privacy Guides* selected this service for review based on community reviews and various reporting from organizations including [Consumer Reports](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/consumer-reports-evaluating-people-search-site-removal-services/19948). In our best judgement, EasyOptOuts services consistently received the most positive feedback and results in terms of efficacy, so we prioritized its testing over other similar services due to our limited budget.
The EasyOptOuts subscription was paid for by Privacy Guides. *Privacy Guides* did not contact EasyOptOuts regarding this review, or request free/discounted services before conducting this review.
## Methodology
*Privacy Guides* conducted this review with 2 volunteer subjects who agreed to allow us to use EasyOptOuts to attempt to remove their personal information from public people-search sites, then evaluate those results. Our subjects:
- Are US citizens
- Have never used a people-search removal service
- Have never manually opted-out of people-search sites
- Are homeowners
- Do not live in a state with specific privacy regulations related to data brokers or people-search sites
The information we provided to EasyOptOuts:
- First and last name
- Maiden name (if applicable)
- Birth year
- Current street address
- Most recent previous address (if applicable)
- Current phone number(s)
- Current email address
We did not provide the names of relatives as requested by EasyOptOuts, as they were not volunteers for this review. This is one potential limitation with our evaluation to keep in mind.
!!! info "Disclaimer"
**Please note that this review is not intended to be a comprehensive evaluation of EasyOptOuts, as we are conducting this test with a very limited sample size.** We do not consider our results to be statistically significant. Rather, this review should be taken as an additional "real-world" data point for you to consider when evaluating this service. We encourage you to seek out other independent reporting to consider as well before making any purchase decision.
## Initial Search
*Privacy Guides* performed an initial search for personal information for each of our subjects on Google by searching for their first and last name in quotes, plus their current city and state (for example, `"Jane Doe" Chicago IL`). We then counted the number of unique results which contained their personal information in the title or description shown in Google.
Using standard engine search results is one of the most common methods of discovering personal information, and typically represents the greatest risk to most people, so measuring the number of search engine results that are removed as a result of the opt-out process is one of our highest priority measurements.
<div class="grid" markdown>
<div markdown>
**Person A (11 Google results):**
- 411.com
- thatsthem.com
- blockshopper.com*
- fastpeoplesearch.com
- usphonebook.com
- spokeo.com
- truepeoplesearch.com
- information.com
- peoplesearch.com*
- radaris.com
- peoplefinders.com
</div>
<div markdown>
**Person B (10 Google results):**
- whitepages.com
- truepeoplesearch.com
- usphonebook.com
- fastpeoplesearch.com
- spokeo.com
- radaris.com
- information.com
- thatsthem.com
- idcrawl.com*
- peekyou.com*
</div>
</div>
We also performed a manual search for their information on 15 different "high-priority" data brokers. These brokers represent either the most commonly used people-search sites, and/or cover a large number of people-search sites with their databases, so having your data removed from these companies can have an outsized positive effect on your overall privacy.
| Service | Person A | Person B |
| ----- | ----- | ----- |
| advancedbackgroundchecks.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found |
| beenverified.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found |
| checkpeople.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found |
| clustrmaps.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found |
| dataveria.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found |
| gladiknow.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found |
| infotracer.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found |
| intelius.com* | :warning: Found | :warning: Found |
| peekyou.com* | :warning: Found | :warning: Found |
| publicdatausa.com* | :warning: Found | :warning: Found |
| radaris.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found |
| spokeo.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found |
| thatsthem.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found |
| usphonebook.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found |
| spyfly.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found |
| **Remaining Results** | **100%** | **100%** |
It should be noted that EasyOptOuts does not claim or advertise that they have the ability to opt you out of some of the websites above, so we do not expect 100% coverage. However, the site compatibility of EasyOptOuts *is* a real-world limitation of the service we think you should consider before making a decision, so we intentionally did not limit our review to only the sites they advertise support for. The sites EasyOptOuts does *not* advertise support for are marked with an asterisk (*).
## User Experience
Registering a new account with EasyOptOuts was a very simple and easy-to-follow process. Their website does a great job explaining what is happening and why they need the data they're requesting at every step. Many of the fields are required, including your first and last name, year of birth, and precise street address. However, including your email addresses, phone numbers, and names of relatives in the search are optional. This is to be generally expected, as your precise data is needed to perform opt-out requests in the majority of cases. However, some competitors do allow you to provide a little less information, such as only your city/state instead of your exact current address, at the expense of potentially being less effective.
The only payment processor in use by EasyOptOuts is PayPal, but they've enabled the option to accept credit card payments without an actual PayPal account. PayPal does default to creating a new account for you with this information, so if you want to avoid that you should uncheck the "Save info & create your PayPal account" option at checkout.
We received a notification that the opt-out process had been completed approximately 1.5 hours after payment. This is much faster than many similar services will submit opt-out requests. However, as they note in the notification email: "Some sites remove data quickly, but some take weeks," so while the initial requests have been made, it will still take some time for them to actually go into effect.
EasyOptOuts is able to provide its service at a much lower price point than competitors like Optery or DeleteMe because they have no manual/human intervention at any point in the opt-out process. This limits the amount of websites they are able to support, however. In fact, their emailed report explicitly recommends manually opting-out of PeopleConnect (Intelius) sites at <https://suppression.peopleconnect.us/login> because they are not able to do so with their automated systems.
## 1 Week
| Service | Person A | Person B |
| ----- | ----- | ----- |
| advancedbackgroundchecks.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| beenverified.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :warning: Found |
| checkpeople.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| clustrmaps.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| dataveria.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| gladiknow.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| infotracer.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :warning: Found |
| intelius.com* | :warning: Found | :warning: Found |
| peekyou.com* | :warning: Found | :warning: Found |
| publicdatausa.com* | :warning: Found | :warning: Found |
| radaris.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found |
| spokeo.com | :warning: Found | :warning: Found |
| thatsthem.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| usphonebook.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| spyfly.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| **Remaining Results** | **33%** | **46%** |
It should be noted that some of these websites included "sponsored links" to *other* data-brokers in their search results. For example, while both people's data was removed from advancedbackgroundchecks.com's own internal database, the search results on advancedbackgroundchecks.com still included a sponsored link to their data on truthfinder.com, one of the websites operated separately by PeopleConnect which EasyOptOuts does not support. This means that manual intervention is still very important when using EasyOptOuts, to cover larger services like PeopleConnect which require more complex interaction.
On Google we saw some reduction, but many results with sensitive information remained. This is something we'll monitor for future updates, as these results drop from Google's caches. Once again, the sites EasyOptOuts does not advertise support for are marked with an asterisk (*) in all of these tables.
<div class="grid" markdown>
<div markdown>
**Person A (8 Google results):**
- thatsthem.com
- blockshopper.com*
- fastpeoplesearch.com
- usphonebook.com
- information.com
- peoplesearch.com*
- radaris.com
- fastpeoplesearch.com
</div>
<div markdown>
**Person B (6 Google results):**
- truepeoplesearch.com
- usphonebook.com
- information.com
- fastpeoplesearch.com
- thatsthem.com
- peekyou.com*
</div>
</div>
## 1 Month
| Service | Person A | Person B |
| ----- | ----- | ----- |
| advancedbackgroundchecks.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| beenverified.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :warning: Found |
| checkpeople.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| clustrmaps.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| dataveria.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| gladiknow.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| infotracer.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :warning: Found |
| intelius.com* | :warning: Found | :warning: Found |
| peekyou.com* | :warning: Found | :warning: Found |
| publicdatausa.com* | :warning: Found | :warning: Found |
| radaris.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| spokeo.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | ::white_check_mark: Removed |
| thatsthem.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| usphonebook.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| spyfly.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| **Remaining Results** | **20%** | **33%** |
Once again, we also searched for their information on Google, and we noticed a reduction in exposure to basic search engines as we expected:
<div class="grid" markdown>
<div markdown>
**Person A (4 Google results):**
- thatsthem.com
- blockshopper.com*
- fastpeoplesearch.com
- peoplesearch.com*
</div>
<div markdown>
**Person B (2 Google results):**
- thatsthem.com
- peekyou.com*
</div>
</div>
## 3 Months
| Service | Person A | Person B |
| ----- | ----- | ----- |
| advancedbackgroundchecks.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| beenverified.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :warning: Found |
| checkpeople.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| clustrmaps.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| dataveria.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| gladiknow.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| infotracer.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :warning: Found |
| intelius.com* | :warning: Found | :warning: Found |
| peekyou.com* | :warning: Found | :warning: Found |
| publicdatausa.com[^1] | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| radaris.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| spokeo.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | ::white_check_mark: Removed |
| thatsthem.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| usphonebook.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| spyfly.com | :white_check_mark: Removed | :white_check_mark: Removed |
| **Remaining Results** | **13%** | **23%** |
[^1]: While writing this article, EasyOptOuts added support for *publicdatausa.com*. This was first applicable during the "3 month" test, where we noticed the opt-out was successful.
Once again, the sites EasyOptOuts does not advertise support for are marked with an asterisk (*). Finally, we searched for their information on Google, and there were no results from websites supported by EasyOptOuts remaining:
<div class="grid" markdown>
<div markdown>
**Person A (1 Google result):**
- blockshopper.com*
</div>
<div markdown>
**Person B (2 Google results):**
- idcrawl.com*
- peekyou.com*
</div>
</div>
## Additional Sites
In addition to the websites we performed an [initial search](#initial-search) with, the EasyOptOuts report we received claimed to find and remove our participants' data from the following websites. While *Privacy Guides* did not search all of these sites in advance of the test to validate these results independently, searching tens or hundreds of smaller sites *is* one of the key advantages of using an automated service like EasyOptOuts.
<div class="grid" markdown>
<div markdown>
**Person A:**
??? warning "We found your information and performed opt outs for the following 112 sites"
- 411.com
- advancedbackgroundchecks.com
- arrestwarrant.org
- backgroundcheck.run
- backgroundcheckers.net
- beenverified.com
- bumper.com, covered by beenverified.com
- centeda.com
- checkpeople.com
- checksecrets.com
- clubset.com
- clustrmaps.com
- councilon.com
- courtcasefinder.com
- curadvisor.com
- cyberbackgroundchecks.com
- dataveria.com
- familytreenow.com
- fastbackgroundcheck.com
- fastpeoplesearch.com
- findpeoplesearch.com
- freepeoplesearch.com
- gladiknow.com
- golookup.com
- goreversephone.com
- govwarrantsearch.org
- hudwayglass.com
- information.com
- infotracer.com
- inmatessearcher.com
- kidslivesafe.com
- kwold.com
- mugshotlook.com
- mylife.com
- neighbor.report
- neighborwho.com
- newenglandfacts.com
- numberguru.com
- nuwber.com
- officialusa.com
- ownerly.com
- people-background-check.com
- people-wizard.com
- peoplebyname.com
- peoplechk.com
- peoplefinders.com
- peoplelooker.com
- peoplesearch123.com
- peoplesearcher.com
- peoplesearchnow.com
- peoplesearchusa.org
- peoplesmart.com
- peopleswhizr.com
- peopleswiz.com
- peopleswizard.com
- peoplewhiz.com
- peoplewhiz.net
- peoplewhized.com
- peoplewhized.net
- peoplewhizr.com
- peoplewhizr.net
- peoplewiz.com
- peoplewizard.net
- peoplewizr.com
- personsearchers.com
- persontrust.com
- privaterecords.net
- privatereports.com
- pub360.com
- publicdatacheck.com
- publicinfoservices.com
- publicrecordreports.com
- publicsearcher.com
- quickpeopletrace.com
- radaris.com
- recordsfinder.com
- rehold.com
- reunion.com
- reverselookupaphonenumber.com
- reversephonecheck.com
- sealedrecords.net
- searchpeoplefree.com
- searchpublicrecords.com
- searchquarry.com
- secretinfo.org
- smartbackgroundchecks.com
- spydialer.com
- spyfly.com
- staterecords.org
- telephonedirectories.us
- texasarrests.org
- texasarrestwarrants.org
- thatsthem.com
- truepeoplesearch.com
- truthrecord.org
- unmask.com
- usa-people-search.com
- usatrace.com
- usphonebook.com
- usrecords.net
- uswarrants.org
- vehiclerelatedrecords.com
- verecor.com
- vericora.com
- veriforia.com
- verifyrecords.com
- veripages.com
- virtory.com
- weinform.org
- wellnut.com
- whitepages.com
- yellowbook.com
??? info "We checked the following 10 sites, but didn't find any personal information, so we didn't perform opt outs"
- americaphonebook.com
- floridaresidentsdirectory.com
- freepeopledirectory.com
- northcarolinaresidentdatabase.com
- ohioresidentdatabase.com
- peoplewin.com
- selfie.network
- selfie.systems
- spokeo.com
- unitedstatesphonebook.com
</div>
<div markdown>
**Person B:**
??? warning "We found your information and performed opt outs for the following 107 sites"
- 411.com
- advancedbackgroundchecks.com
- arrestwarrant.org
- backgroundcheck.run
- backgroundcheckers.net
- beenverified.com
- bumper.com, covered by beenverified.com
- centeda.com
- checkpeople.com
- checksecrets.com
- clubset.com
- councilon.com
- courtcasefinder.com
- curadvisor.com
- cyberbackgroundchecks.com
- dataveria.com
- familytreenow.com
- fastbackgroundcheck.com
- fastpeoplesearch.com
- findpeoplesearch.com
- freepeoplesearch.com
- gladiknow.com
- golookup.com
- goreversephone.com
- govwarrantsearch.org
- hudwayglass.com
- information.com
- infotracer.com
- inmatessearcher.com
- kidslivesafe.com
- kwold.com
- mugshotlook.com
- neighborwho.com
- newenglandfacts.com
- numberguru.com
- nuwber.com
- ownerly.com
- people-background-check.com
- people-wizard.com
- peoplebyname.com
- peoplechk.com
- peoplefinders.com
- peoplelooker.com
- peoplesearch123.com
- peoplesearcher.com
- peoplesearchnow.com
- peoplesearchusa.org
- peoplesmart.com
- peopleswhizr.com
- peopleswiz.com
- peopleswizard.com
- peoplewhiz.com
- peoplewhiz.net
- peoplewhized.com
- peoplewhized.net
- peoplewhizr.com
- peoplewhizr.net
- peoplewiz.com
- peoplewizard.net
- peoplewizr.com
- personsearchers.com
- persontrust.com
- privaterecords.net
- privatereports.com
- pub360.com
- publicdatacheck.com
- publicinfoservices.com
- publicrecordreports.com
- publicsearcher.com
- quickpeopletrace.com
- radaris.com
- recordsfinder.com
- rehold.com
- reverselookupaphonenumber.com
- reversephonecheck.com
- sealedrecords.net
- searchpeoplefree.com
- searchpublicrecords.com
- searchquarry.com
- secretinfo.org
- smartbackgroundchecks.com
- spydialer.com
- spyfly.com
- staterecords.org
- telephonedirectories.us
- texasarrests.org
- texasarrestwarrants.org
- thatsthem.com
- truepeoplesearch.com
- truthrecord.org
- unmask.com
- usa-people-search.com
- usatrace.com
- usphonebook.com
- usrecords.net
- uswarrants.org
- vehiclerelatedrecords.com
- verecor.com
- vericora.com
- veriforia.com
- verifyrecords.com
- veripages.com
- virtory.com
- weinform.org
- wellnut.com
- whitepages.com
- yellowbook.com
??? info "We checked the following 15 sites, but didn't find any personal information, so we didn't perform opt outs"
- americaphonebook.com
- clustrmaps.com
- floridaresidentsdirectory.com
- freepeopledirectory.com
- mylife.com
- neighbor.report
- northcarolinaresidentdatabase.com
- officialusa.com
- ohioresidentdatabase.com
- peoplewin.com
- reunion.com
- selfie.network
- selfie.systems
- spokeo.com
- unitedstatesphonebook.com
</div>
</div>
In addition, for all subscriptions EasyOptOuts says that "the following 10 sites aren't freely searchable. We always perform opt outs for them:"
- acxiom.com
- adstradata.com
- archives.com
- backgroundalert.com (searchable, but covered by lexisnexis.com, which isn't searchable)
- idtrue.com (searchable, but covered by lexisnexis.com, which isn't searchable)
- lexisnexis.com
- oracle.com
- pipl.com
- thomsonreuters.com
- us.epsilon.com
What this means is that EasyOptOuts will send the personal information you provide to these websites *regardless* of whether they have your information in the first place. While this is an unfortunate necessity if you want to ensure your data is removed from as many databases as possible, we would like to see this provided as an *option* during EasyOptOuts' registration process for people who would like to avoid this behavior.
## Evaluation
For our final evaluation, we will look at how many of the initial Google search engine results are no longer listed after 3 months, how many results from the 15 data brokers we initially measured were removed, and how many results from the subset of the 15 data brokers that EasyOptOuts advertises support for (13 total) were removed.
The first two results are intended to benchmark the "real-world efficacy" of EasyOptOuts, i.e. how much of an impact you will immediately notice while using the service. The third result is intended to benchmark how well EasyOptOuts lives up to their own marketing claims.
| | Person A | Person B |
| ---- | ---- | ---- |
| Percentage of Google search results removed | 90% | 80% |
| Percentage of high-priority data brokers removed | 86% | 73% |
| Percentage of *compatible* high-priority data brokers removed | 100% | 84% |
Based on these results, I consider EasyOptOuts to be well worth the money. It made a substantial difference in the amount of real-world exposure for both subjects, with relatively little effort required. The amount of data remaining publicly accessible is a very manageable amount that can be manually dealt with afterward.
It isn't a perfect service, and even our limited testing shows that your mileage may vary depending on your individual circumstances, but any reduction in the amount of data publicly available about you is a good thing, and if you're in the United States this is certainly an option worth considering.
@@ -17,8 +17,6 @@ schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle
![Firefox Privacy cover](../assets/images/firefox-privacy/cover.png)
<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Jonah Aragon / Privacy Guides | Photo: Unsplash</small>
A lot changed between 2019 and now, not least in regards to Firefox. Since our last post, Mozilla has [improved](https://blog.mozilla.org/en/products/firefox/latest-firefox-rolls-out-enhanced-tracking-protection-2-0-blocking-redirect-trackers-by-default/) privacy with [Enhanced Tracking Protection (ETP)](https://blog.mozilla.org/en/products/firefox/firefox-now-available-with-enhanced-tracking-protection-by-default/). Earlier this year Mozilla introduced [Total Cookie Protection](https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2021/02/23/total-cookie-protection/) (Dynamic First Party Isolation dFPI). This was then further tightened with [Enhanced Cookie Clearing](https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2021/08/10/firefox-91-introduces-enhanced-cookie-clearing/). Were also looking very forward to [Site Isolation](https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2021/05/18/introducing-site-isolation-in-firefox/) (code named Fission) being enabled by default in the coming releases.<!-- more -->
Now that so many privacy features are built into the browser, there is little need for extensions made by third-party developers. Accordingly, we have updated our very outdated [browser](https://www.privacyguides.org/desktop-browsers/) section. If youve got an old browser profile we suggest **creating a new one**. Some of the old advice may make your browser *more* unique.
-2
View File
@@ -17,8 +17,6 @@ schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle
!["Firefox Privacy" cover image](../assets/images/firefox-privacy/cover.png)
<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Jonah Aragon / Privacy Guides | Photo: Unsplash</small>
Mozilla Firefox is one of the most popular web browsers around, and for good reason. It's fast, secure, open-source, and it's backed by an organization that actually respects your privacy. Unlike many other Chrome alternatives and forks, it has a massive development team behind it that publishes new updates on a constant, regular basis. Regular updates doesn't only mean shiny new features, it means you'll also receive security updates that will keep you protected as you browse the web.<!-- more -->
Because of all of this, [we recommend Firefox](https://www.privacyguides.org/desktop-browsers/#firefox) as our general-purpose browser for most users. It's the best alternative to Chrome and Edge for privacy conscious individuals.
-501
View File
@@ -1,501 +0,0 @@
---
date:
created: 2025-01-29T22:00:00
categories:
- Tutorials
authors:
- em
description: When browsing the web at home becomes dangerous to your safety, there are tools that can help minimizing your digital traces to stay safe. Tails is one of these tools. Here's why, when, and how you can install and use Tails.
schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle
---
# Using Tails When Your World Doesn't Feel Safe Anymore
![Photo of a hand plugging a USB stick into a laptop and the Tails logo under it.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/cover.webp)
<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Jonah Aragon / Privacy Guides | Photo: Aleksander Dumała / Pexels</small>
There is a growing number of people who no longer feel safe in their own home or country. Whatever the reason, many people might not feel safe to browse certain topics online. With all the information getting collected for each internet search, it is difficult to access sometime vital information without leaving a trace. These digital footprints might not threaten your personal safety if you are living with a supportive family, and in a democratic and free country. However, there are situations where someone might be put in great danger simply for looking at a website.<!-- more -->
While this guide will be applicable to many, I am writing this article with these groups in mind:
1. Victims of domestic violence,
2. Trans and queer individuals living in a hostile environment, and
3. Democracy and human rights activists located in regions adverse to their cause.
This article will help people in such situations learn how to browse the internet and use a computer in a more protected and anonymous way, in order to stay safe from harm.
<div class="admonition danger" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">A warning for those at very high risk</p>
If you feel at very high risk in your home or country, and the device you are currently using to read this article could be accessed by a person or group meaning you harm, I recommend you ask a *trusted ally* who does not experience the same level of threat to complete this tutorial for you on their device instead. This will help with minimizing any digital traces left on your device that could endanger you.
Then, I recommend that **you erase your browsing history (ideally, delete this and related websites only) and clear your browser's cache and cookies**. If you have a Google account and used Google to find this article, also make sure to [**delete your Google search history**](https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/6096136).
Once you have securely reached out to a trusted ally to request their help, and erased your browser's data for this site, do not consult this article again *if the digital traces of it might put you in danger*.
</div>
If you are completing this installation for someone else, or if the device your are currently using cannot put you at risk, here's why, when, and how you can install and use the portable system Tails:
## What is Tails?
![Illustration of the Tails logo.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-logo-flat-inverted.svg)
<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Tails / Tor Project</small>
Tails is a portable *operating system* (a type of software like Windows and macOS) that is especially designed to minimize your digital footprints while using it.
The name is an acronym for "The Amnesic Incognito Live System". It is kept on a USB stick and resets itself entirely after each use (except if you enable its encrypted password-protected [Persistent Storage](https://tails.net/doc/persistent_storage/index.en.html)). What is done on Tails does not leave any digital traces on the computer it is plugged into, hence "amnesic."
Additionally, Tails comes with pre-installed applications that will help increase your security and privacy online. When accessing the internet from Tails, your traffic will be automatically rerouted through the [Tor network](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/advanced/tor-overview/). This is a special network that makes it very difficult to identify your location or the websites you access, even from your Internet Service Provider (ISP).
However, unless you configure the [Tor bridge](https://tails.net/doc/anonymous_internet/tor/index.en.html#hiding) option to hide this, your ISP will know you have been using Tor, although they will not know which websites in particular you have visited through Tor. It could have been anything. I personally use Tor when I have to visit Google Maps, just to protect my data from Google's advertising.
## Why you might want to use Tails
There are many good and legitimate reasons for using Tails. Here are a few examples from the scenarios I am considering in this article:
1. A victim of domestic violence who needs a secure way to research and communicate with shelters or other supportive resources to plan a safe escape, without leaving traces of their activities on a device accessible to the perpetrator.
2. A trans or queer individual who lives with an unsupportive or hostile family and wishes to research trans or queer-related topics online, find communities, or access supportive resources without leaving any digital traces of their activities on a family device.
3. A democracy or human rights activist who organizes protests, communicate information online, or carry on any other activities that might have been declared unauthorized by an oppressive regime.
4. Any other situations where browsing the web or using a device anonymously might be necessary to protect someone's safety.
## When to use Tails, and when not to use Tails
Tails protects some data very well, but it will not magically protect everything. Before using it, read carefully what it can help you with and what it cannot do.
### When using Tails might help you
- Browsing the web without leaving traces on your main computer.
- Using a computer without leaving traces of your activities on your main computer.
- Storing information and processing files in an encrypted way, away from your main computer.
- Hiding which websites you visit from your ISP by using Tor, without leaving traces on your main computer.
### What you should be careful about
- Remember that unless you enable the Tor bridge, your ISP will know you have accessed the Tor network. Your government could request this information from your ISP. Be careful if this can put you in danger in your country. If you are not using Tails from a public Wi-Fi network, and if revealing to your ISP that you are using Tor could be dangerous to you, you should [enable the Tor bridge option](https://tails.net/doc/anonymous_internet/tor/index.en.html#hiding).
- Tails cannot protect your anonymity if while using Tails you log into an account that you have already been identified with, or have used outside of Tails. While using Tails, **do not log into anything that you have logged in outside of Tails**.
- If you communicate with others or create an account within Tails, be mindful not to share any personal details that could identify you while using Tails.
- If you share any files, be careful to **remove thoroughly any metadata** that could identify you from the file.
- If you share any pictures or videos, be extremely cautious with removing metadata and examining the picture or video to make sure no reflections or other details could inadvertently identify you.
- Do not to reuse any usernames, pseudonyms, email addresses, phone numbers, profile pictures, passwords, or any other information that you have used outside of Tails.
- Do not do anything that could identify you while using Tails. Assume that everything you do while using Tails could be linked together.
- Be careful with using any mobile data network to connect to the internet. Information related to [your mobile device could identify you](https://tails.net/doc/anonymous_internet/no-wifi/index.en.html).
- A very powerful adversary, such as a government, could potentially reidentify some information despite you using Tails. Read more about Tails' limitations here: [https://tails.net/doc/about/warnings/index.en.html](https://tails.net/doc/about/warnings/index.en.html)
### When you should **not** use Tails
- If someone finding your Tails USB stick could put you in worse danger than not using it at all.
- If you have not enabled the Tor bridge option, and your ISP or government finding out you have accessed Tor could put you in worse danger than not using it at all.
- When the computer you are using Tails with might be [compromised at the firmware or hardware level](https://tails.net/doc/about/warnings/computer/index.en.html).
- When there are cameras in your environment recording your activity on this computer.
- If your computer cannot securely boot from an external USB stick.
## Installing Tails
Before you start, make sure that:
1. The device you use for the installation is free from malware or spyware.
2. There is no recording software such as [Windows Recall](https://allthings.how/how-to-turn-off-windows-recall-ai-feature-in-windows-11-copilot-plus-pcs/) running. If there is, disable or pause it and delete your visit of this website from it.
3. You have a USB stick with a storage capacity of at least 8 GB. Ideally, I recommend using a fresh and new USB stick, but if this is not accessible to you, make sure you can erase this USB stick entirely and that the files on it were not sensitive or revealing information. Assume your USB stick could get seized later on and these deleted files could potentially get restored.
4. If you complete this installation for someone else, or if it is safe for you to do so (ordering online leaves a lot of digital footprints!), you may be interested in using a USB stick that looks more like a banal object. You can easily find cheap USB sticks on popular online stores that look like innocuous cartoon keychain charms, for example.
### What you'll need
- [x] USB stick with a storage capacity of at least 8 GB.
- [x] A computer with a port compatible with your USB stick (both for installation and usage).
- [x] A computer running one of these operating systems: Apple computer with *Intel* processor (not M1-M2-M3) running macOS version 10.10 or later, PC with at least 2 GB of RAM running Windows 7 or later, PC with at least 2 GB of RAM running Linux.
- [x] Capacity to install new software on the computer you are using for the installation.
- [x] At least 1-2 hours of free time when you are safe and free from threats.
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Hardware incompatibility</p>
You might experience some hardware incompatibilities while running Tails (this is common for Linux-based software on Mac devices). If this happens, you will need to use **a wired (or dongle) mouse, a wired (or dongle) keyboard, and a Wi-Fi adapter or an internet access you can plug in directly from an [Ethernet cable](https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethernet)**.
If you need a Wi-Fi adapter, you will find a list of adapters compatible with Tails at the bottom of this page: [https://tails.net/doc/anonymous_internet/no-wifi/index.en.html](https://tails.net/doc/anonymous_internet/no-wifi/index.en.html)
Be very careful if you decide to use mobile phone connectivity, however. The data linked to your mobile device could de-anonymize you, even while using Tails. More information on this here: [https://tails.net/doc/anonymous_internet/no-wifi/index.en.html](https://tails.net/doc/anonymous_internet/no-wifi/index.en.html)
</div>
<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Delete your traces afterward</p>
Depending on your situation, you might want to delete the traces of this installation after. See a To-Do list for this on [Step 9](#step-9-delete-the-installation-traces).
</div>
<div class="admonition info" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">About this tutorial</p>
I am going to walk you through a **step-by-step through the process for an installation from macOS**. If you are using a computer running Windows or Linux, the steps will be similar, but the windows appearances and warnings will vary. The steps to boot from an external USB stick will also vary.
You might decide to reference the [guides from the Tails website](https://tails.net/install/index.en.html) instead. Tails' installation guides are excellent.
</div>
If you encounter any issues during the installation or running processes, you can try to find support specific to your issue here: [https://tails.net/support/index.en.html](https://tails.net/support/index.en.html)
### Step 1: Download Tails
Visit this website and select your installation computer's operating system: [https://tails.net/install/](https://tails.net/install/)
![Screenshot of a browser window showing Tails' installation page.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-1.png)
Scroll down to the "**Download Tails**" section and click on the green download button. Make sure to save the installation file in a folder where you can find it back easily and not forget to **delete it afterwards**.
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
Do not save this file on your USB stick!
</div>
<div class="admonition info" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Always install the latest version of Tails</p>
The download link is not shared directly here because you should always make sure to download and install [the most recent version of Tails](https://tails.net/doc/upgrade/). If you read this article at a later date, the version number you will be installing will likely be higher than the number shown here.
</div>
![Screenshot of a browser window showing Tails' download step.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-2.png)
### Step 2: Verify the file you just downloaded
Scroll down to "**Verify your download**" and click on "**Select your download to verify...**"
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Do not skip this step!</p>
This step is important to ensure the file you just downloaded has not been tampered with or corrupted during the process.
</div>
![Screenshot of a browser window showing Tails' verification step.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-3.png)
Once the verification is completed (this might take a few minutes), you should see a green checkmark with "**Verification successful!**" followed by the file name. If you do not see this, delete the file and repeat [Step 1](#step-1-download-tails) and [Step 2](#step-2-verify-the-file-you-just-downloaded).
![Screenshot of a browser window showing Tails' successful verification with file name.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-4.png)
### Step 3: Download and install balenaEtcher
You will need this free software in order to install Tails on your USB stick.
<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Reminder</p>
Make sure the USB stick you have has a storage capacity of at least 8 GB, and does not store any files you wish to keep. Ideally, use a fresh never-used-before USB stick.
</div>
You can download *balenaEtcher* from this link: [https://tails.net/etcher/balenaEtcher.dmg](https://tails.net/etcher/balenaEtcher.dmg)
Open the folder where you downloaded the *balenaEtcher* installation file (keep it open to delete this file after the installation is completed), and double-click on the "**balenaEtcher.dmg**" file. Drag the "**balenaEtcher.app**" icon over the "**Applications**" folder icon when prompted from the window below:
![Screenshot of a macOS application installation window for balenaEtcher.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-5.png)
Once the file is copied to you "**Applications**" folder, go on your computer's desktop and right-click on the "**balenaEtcher**" icon. Select '**Eject "balenaEtcher"**'
![Screenshot of a desktop showing the balenaEtcher installation icon and a macOS menu with the option to Eject balenaEtcher.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-6.png)
### Step 4: Install Tails on your USB stick using balenaEtcher
4.1. Open your Mac's "**Applications**" folder and double-click on "**balenaEtcher.app**".
Depending on your macOS version, your Mac might open a popup window saying '**Verifying "balenaEtcher.app"...**'. This is normal, let it complete its verification. Next, you will likely see another popup window with '**"balenaEtcher.app” is an app downloaded from the Internet. Are you sure you want to open it?**'. Click "**Open**".
![Screenshot of a macOS popup with a verifying loading bar.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-7.png)
![Screenshot of a macOS popup with a warning message with the options to Cancel or Open.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-8.png)
4.2. Open *balenaEtcher* and click on the settings gear button on the upper-right. Disable the option "**Anonymously report errors and usage statistics to balena.io**", then click "**OK**".
![Screenshot of a balenaEtcher window showing a gear icon on the upper-right, and a disabled option to share anonymous error reports.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-9.png)
4.3. Eject and unplug any other external USB stick(s) or external USB drive(s) that might be plugged into your computer if possible, and plug in the USB stick you wish to erase and install Tails on.
4.4. Once it is plugged in, return to *balenaEtcher* and click on the "**Flash from file**" blue button on the left. You will be prompted to select a file. Select the Tails "**.img**" file you have downloaded and verified earlier.
![Screenshot of a balenaEtcher window showing 3 buttons. The button on the left is blue and labeled Flash from file.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-10.png)
4.5. Click on the "**Select target**" blue button in the middle, and select your USB stick.
![Screenshot of a balenaEtcher window showing 3 buttons. The button in the middle is blue and labeled "Select target".](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-11.png)
<div class="admonition danger" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Caution! Select the correct USB stick!</p>
Make sure you are not selecting a USB stick or drive different from the one you wish to erase for Tails. **All data on the USB stick or drive you select will be permanently lost. Be careful!**
</div>
![Screenshot of a balenaEtcher window inside a menu with one or more checkboxes. One checkbox is selected next to a USB stick name and description.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-12.png)
4.6. Once you have verified that all the information is correct, click on the "**Flash!**" blue button on the right.
![Screenshot of a balenaEtcher window showing 3 buttons. The button on the right is blue and labeled "Flash!".](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-13.png)
You will see a *balenaEtcher* popup window saying: "**balenaEtcher needs privileged access in order to flash disks. Type your password to allow this.**". Type your computer's password and click "**Ok**".
![Screenshot of a macOS popup warning with a password field.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-14.png)
Depending on the version of macOS you use, you might see another popup window saying '**"balenaEtcher.app" would like to access files on a removable volume.**'. Click "**OK**" and wait for the installation to start.
![Screenshot of a macOS popup warning with the options to "Don't Allow" or "OK".](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-15.png)
While Tails is getting installed, you should see a window that looks like this with "**Flashing...**". The operation might take a few minutes. Do not interrupt this process!
![Screenshot of a balenaEtcher window showing on the left a Flashing progression bar.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-16.png)
4.7. Once Flashing is completed, you will see *balenaEtcher* validating the installation with "**Validating...**". This process should be quick.
<div class="admonition failure" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Failed validation</p>
If the validation fails, close *balenaEtcher*, eject your USB stick, and try the installation process again from [Step 4](#step-4-install-tails-on-your-usb-stick-using-balenaetcher). You may also want to try with a different USB port or a different USB stick.
</div>
![Screenshot of a balenaEtcher window showing on the left a Validating progression bar.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-17.png)
Once the installation is completed successfully, you should see a window like this with "**Flash Completed!**" on the left. You can now close *balenaEtcher* and unplug your USB stick.
<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Unreadable USB</p>
If you see a notification about a USB stick that appears to be unreadable, click "**Eject**" and unplug your USB stick.
</div>
![Screenshot of a balenaEtcher window showing on the left a green checkmark with "Flash Completed!".](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-installation-mac-18.png)
### Step 5: Continue this tutorial from paper or from another device (if you can do so safely)
For the rest of this tutorial, you will have to shut down the computer you will be using or testing Tails with. If this is the same computer you are currently using, you will need an aternative way to keep following along with the instructions. Make sure you either:
- Note the rest of the instructions in advance on something that will be easy to delete/erase/destroy after.
- Open this article on a mobile device where it is not dangerous for you to visit this page.
### Step 6: Boot your computer from your Tails USB stick
<details class="warning" markdown>
<summary>Warning: If the computer running Tails is a Mac with a T2 Security Chip (2018-2020):</summary>
If the computer you will be using Tails with is a [Mac with a T2 Security Chip](https://support.apple.com/en-us/103265), and you receive the following message (or similar) when trying to boot your Mac from your Tails USB stick:
`Security settings do not allow this Mac to use an external startup disk.`
Here's how to modify options in your Mac's [Startup Security Utility](https://support.apple.com/en-us/102522) to make this works:
1. Turn off your Mac, then turn it on again and right away press and hold **Command(⌘)+R**, this will enter your Mac's recovery mode. The startup process will take longer than usual and you will see the screen flashing a few times, this is normal.
2. You will see a "**Language**" menu appear, select a language then click on the arrow at the bottom-right.
3. If your computer has multiple volumes (disks), you will be required to select one, then click "**Next**".
4. You will need to select a user you know the password for and enter it, then click "**Next**".
5. Once you see a window with 4 options, select none of these and instead go to the upper-left menu to select the "**Utilities**" drop-menu, then select "**Startup Security Utility**".
6. You will see an "**Authentication Needed**" window appear and you will need to enter your macOS user password again.
7. Once you see the "**Startup Security Utility**" window with 5 options, in the "**Secure Boot**" section select "**No Security**" and in the "**External Boot**" or "**Allowed Boot Media**" section select "**Allow booting from external or removable media**".
<div class="admonition danger" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Security warning!</p>
This reduces the security of your device because your computer could boot from anything else as well. You could "Turn On Firmware Password" at the top to mitigate this, however, if others use this device, I would recommend that you do not do this. Enabling a firmware password would require this new password to be entered [each time this device starts from a different disk](https://support.apple.com/en-us/102384). This could raise a lot of suspicions if there was no password before.
Moreover, if you ever lose this password, you would be entirely locked out of this device and require an in-person service at the Apple Store to be able to keep using it.
If you want to hide that you are using Tails from the people near you, I would recommend you do **not** turn on firmware password. However, do know this could increase some security risks for this device.
</div>
![Screenshot of a macOS "Startup Security Utility" window from the recovery mode. In the "Secure Boot" section the option "No Security" is selected. In the "External Boot" section the option "Allow booting from external media" is selected.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/mac-startup-security-utility.png)
<small aria-hidden="true">Screenshot: Tails / Tor Project</small>
<div class="admonition success" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Quit Recovery Mode</p>
Once you have modified your "**Startup Security Utility**" options, click on the drop-down Apple menu (apple icon) of the upper-left, then select "**Shut Down**".
</div>
</details>
To boot from your Tails USB stick:
**From macOS:**
1. Shut down your computer.
2. Plug in your Tails USB stick.
3. Turn on your Mac, then right away press and hold the "**Option**" key (⌥ or Alt key) until you see a loading bar or a disks menu.
4. When you see a disks menu, select the yellow disk called "**EFI Boot**" or "**Windows**".
<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">No disks menu?</p>
If you do not see this disks menu, wait 2-3 minutes, shut down your computer, unplug your USB stick, plug it in another port if you can, and start the boot process over.
</div>
**From Windows 8 or 10:**
1. From Windows or the sign-in screen, click on the "**Start**" button.
2. While you choose "**Power**" > "**Restart**", press and hold the "**Shift**" key.
3. Once you get to the "**Choose and option**" screen, select "**Use a device**"
4. In "**Use a device**", select "**Boot Menu**" and plug in your Tails USB stick while Windows is shutting down.
<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Boot Step 3: No device selection menu?</p>
If you do not see this, follow these instructions from Tails: [https://tails.net/doc/first_steps/start/pc/index.en.html#boot-menu-key](https://tails.net/doc/first_steps/start/pc/index.en.html#boot-menu-key)
</div>
<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Boot Step 4: No boot menu?</p>
If Windows does not display a "**Boot Menu**", plug in your Tails USB stick then select it directly from the list of devices. Press "**Enter**".
</div>
**From Linux:**
1. Shut down your computer.
2. Plug in your Tails USB stick.
3. Identify the Boot Menu key for your specific computer manufacturer. You can see a list of the most common ones here: [https://tails.net/doc/first_steps/start/pc/index.en.html#boot-menu-key](https://tails.net/doc/first_steps/start/pc/index.en.html#boot-menu-key)
4. Turn on your computer and immediately press and hold this identified Boot Menu key.
## Starting and using Tails
If the installation was successful and the process of booting from the USB stick went well, you will see Tails starting. You will see some grey screens, you will see some flashes, you will see some black screen with lots of white text rolling down very quickly!
Don't panic! This is normal :thumbsup:
Once Tails has started, you will see a top menu bar with a blue wallpaper. It might take a few minutes before you see a window popping up there, this is also normal. Be patient.
The first window you should see is a window saying "**Welcome to Tails!**"
There, you will see language options, the [Persistent Storage](https://tails.net/doc/persistent_storage/index.en.html) option, and Additional Settings options.
<div class="admonition bug" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">No keyboard! No mouse!</p>
At this point you might realize your mouse and/or keyboard are not working. If this happens, you can use a wired (or dongle) mouse and a wired (or dongle) keyboard to fix this problem quickly. If you plug a peripheral in and it is still not working, leave all peripherals plugged in and restart Tails (see [Step 6](#step-6-boot-your-computer-from-your-tails-usb-stick)).
</div>
### Using Persistent Storage
Make sure to test this feature works well multiple times before storing anything of value there. If you forget the Persistent Storage's password or if a bug occurs, you might no be able to access these files anymore. Know that you also have the option to plug in a separate (ideally encrypted) USB stick to store files on it, even while using Tails. If you encounter a problem when using Tails' Persistent Storage feature, you can troubleshoot it here: [https://tails.net/doc/persistent_storage/fsck/index.en.html](https://tails.net/doc/persistent_storage/fsck/index.en.html)
If you decide to setup Persistent Storage:
1. Choose a long passphrase that is **not** something known like music lyrics or movie quotes. Choose something you do not usually say/write and that you could not Google. Choose **something long and unique**, that nobody else has used before, and that you will be able to remember well. Practice this passphrase in your head regularly.
2. After setting up Persistent Storage, you will see a window like this with additional options:
![Screenshot of a window within Tails titled "Persistent Storage" and showing various options.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-usage-persistentstorage.png)
### Connecting to the internet
Make sure that your Wi-Fi card, Wi-Fi adapter, or Ethernet cable is plugged in and working. On the upper-right menu bar, click on the onion icon and select "**Open Tor Connection Assistant**". You will see a "**Tor Connection**" window appear with a few options. If it is not dangerous for you to have your ISP or government know you are using the Tor network, choose "**Connect to Tor automatically**" then click on "**Connect to Tor**".
<div class="admonition danger" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Danger!</p>
If using Tor is dangerous for you, read more about the other options before deciding anything.
</div>
![Screenshot of a window within Tails titled "Tor Connection" and showing various options.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-usage-torconnection.png)
If the connection is successful, you should see this window and you will be ready to browse the internet anonymously:
![Screenshot of a window within Tails titled "Tor Connection" indicating the connection to Tor was successful. There is a button at the bottom labeled "Start Tor Browser".](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-usage-torconnection-successful.png)
![Screenshot within Tails showing the Tor Browser application displaying the onion version of the Privacy Guides website.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-usage-privacyguides-onion.png)
### Sharing files with others
There is a lot of great applications already installed on Tails to help you! You will find them listed in the "**Applications**" drop-menu on the upper-left top bar. One of these applications is [OnionShare](https://onionshare.org/), which you can use to share files with others anonymously.
![Screenshot within Tails showing the application OnionShare open.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-usage-onionshare.png)
### Storing passwords
If you are using the Persistent Storage with Tails, and need to store passwords, you can use the pre-installed [KeePassXC](https://keepassxc.org/) application. This application will store your passwords encrypted, locally-only, and protected by a main password (ideally, a **passphrase**). Be careful however if you store important passwords in there. Remember that if a bug occurs or if you forget your Persistent Storage's password, you could lose access to all of it.
![Screenshot within Tails showing the application KeePassXC open.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-usage-keepassxc.png)
### Shutting down Tails
When you are done using Tails, you should always **shut it down and unplug the USB stick** after.
To shut Tails down, click on the upper-right menu on the top bar, the one with the battery icon. Then click on "**Power Off**" at the bottom-right of the drop-menu box. Wait for the screen to turn black, then unplug your Tails USB stick.
<div class="admonition danger" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">In Case of Emergency!</p>
In case of emergency, you can shut down Tails quickly by directly unplugging the USB stick while it is still running. This will effectively reset Tails like a normal shut down **IF** it was not in "Suspend" state. More on this here: [https://tails.net/contribute/design/memory_erasure/](https://tails.net/contribute/design/memory_erasure/)
</div>
Shutting down Tails by physically unplugging it while it is still running [could potentially damage your Persistent Storage](https://tails.net/doc/first_steps/shutdown/index.en.html). Only use this feature in case of emergency, and shut down Tails using the "**Power Off**" menu option whenever possible.
## Final notes
Remember to delete the traces of this installation from the computer you used, once you have verified that everything works properly.
**You should also remember to:**
- [x] Delete the browsing history for these websites (this article, the Tails web pages, and any other related pages you have visited).
- [x] Delete cookies for these websites (or all cookies).
- [x] Delete the site data and cache for these websites (or all sites data).
- [x] If logged into your Google account, [delete your Google search history](https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/6096136) for these websites.
- [x] Delete *balenaEtcher*, both the software and the installation files (after verifying your Tails is operational).
- [x] Delete *balenaEtcher* from the recently used applications list.
- [x] Empty your computer's trash bin.
- [x] Once you have completed this list and verified your installation, reboot your computer.
### Consider supporting Tails and the Tor Project
Finally, if you are not personally at risk of harm by reading this article or by getting associated with Tails, I strongly encourage you to support this incredible project by donating to Tails or to the Tor Project. Tools like Tails and Tor help a lot of people in very vulnerable situations. Your support means a lot to non-profit organizations like the Tor Project to improve and maintain these tools.
Thank you for helping yourself and others to stay safe :purple_heart:
Support Tails (if it is safe for you to do so): [https://tails.net/donate/](https://tails.net/donate/)
Support the Tor Project (if it is safe for you to do so): [https://donate.torproject.org/](https://donate.torproject.org/)
![Screenshot within Tails showing the Tor Browser application displaying the Tails website welcome page.](../assets/images/installing-and-using-tails/tails-usage-tailswebsite.png)
<small aria-hidden="true">Unless credited otherwise, all screenshots from: Privacy Guides</small>
@@ -16,8 +16,6 @@ schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle
![](../assets/images/mozilla-disappoints-us-yet-again-2/cover.jpeg)
<small aria-hidden="true">Image: Unsplash</small>
**"No shady privacy policies or back doors for advertisers" proclaims the Firefox homepage, but that's no longer true in Firefox 128.**
Less than a month after [acquiring the AdTech company Anonym](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/mozilla-acquires-anonym-raising-the-bar-for-privacy-preserving-digital-advertising/18936), Mozilla has added special software co-authored by Meta and built for the advertising industry directly to the latest release of Firefox, in an experimental trial you have to opt out of manually. This "Privacy-Preserving Attribution" (PPA) API adds another tool to the arsenal of tracking features that advertisers can use, which is thwarted by traditional content blocking extensions.<!-- more -->
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
---
date:
created: 2025-01-17
categories:
- Announcements
authors:
- niek-de-wilde
tags:
- Privacy Guides
description: Privacy Guides is welcoming three new additions to the team.
schema_type: NewsArticle
---
# Privacy Guides Hires Three Staff Members
At Privacy Guides, we are always looking for ways to be more effective at our mission of promoting privacy and security for everyone. To help us grow, reach a broader audience, and provide more high quality educational resources, we are thrilled to announce the hiring of three talented individuals to our team! Each of them brings a strong passion to their respective roles, and we are excited about working with them.<!-- more -->
## Em Journalist
![](https://forum-cdn.privacyguides.net/user_avatar/discuss.privacyguides.net/ematprivacyguides/288/8211_2.png){ align=right }
Were excited to welcome Em (she/her), our new journalist, who will play an important role in taking our [articles](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/) to the next level. She will be focusing on creating in-depth, interesting posts that explore the most important topics in the world of online privacy, security, and digital rights. Em will also conduct interviews with experts in the industry, analyze reports and studies, and produce investigative news stories to keep our readers informed.
*Em is a privacy advocate and publicinterest technologist who has been fervently defending privacy rights online (and offline) since 2018. Her work focuses on raising awareness and informing the public and organizations on data privacy tools, practices, and regulations. She is a passionate writer and thorough investigator, continuously working on ways to improve adoption of better privacy practices, and regularly creating educational material to make protective tools accessible to the groups who need them most.*
*Em is also a human rights activist who deeply values inclusivity, diversity, accessibility, and software for the public good. In her free time, you can find Em on Mastodon sharing privacy tips or boosting photos of cats and moss.*
[:material-mastodon: Follow Em at @Em0nM4stodon@infosec.exchange](https://infosec.exchange/@Em0nM4stodon)
## Jordan Content Producer
![](https://forum-cdn.privacyguides.net/user_avatar/discuss.privacyguides.net/jordan/288/7793_2.png){ align=right }
We also welcome Jordan Warne (they/them), our new content producer who will manage our channels on various video platforms! Jordan has a strong background in video production and content strategy, and were confident that they will help us expand our reach and connect with a broader audience. Through informative, easy-to-understand videos, Jordan will simplify complex privacy topics and keep our community engaged. Expect a significantly larger presence on our [PeerTube](https://neat.tube/c/privacyguides/videos) and [YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/@privacyguides) channels in the coming months!
*Jordan is a passionate creative with an education in both cybersecurity and photography. Having completed a Diploma of Digital Imaging at Billy Blue College of Design, Jordan is equipped with the skills and experience to take Privacy Guides' video content to the next level. Having recently completed a Diploma of Information Technology (Cybersecurity) Jordan has the unique skillset to simplify complex cybersecurity topics and turn them into engaging and approachable content.*
*Outside producing high-quality videos, Jordan enjoys exploring the Australian bush, capturing intricate details of its flora and fauna through photography.*
[:material-mastodon: Follow Jordan at @jw@social.lol](https://social.lol/@jw)
## Kevin Intern
![](https://forum-cdn.privacyguides.net/user_avatar/discuss.privacyguides.net/kevpham/288/8198_2.png){ align=right }
Last but not least, we are excited to start working with Kevin Pham (he/him), our new intern focused on community & news, who will support both Em and Jordan in their roles while also engaging with our community across all platforms. His enthusiasm for digital privacy and his commitment to helping others make him a perfect fit for our team. He will help with managing our community, and interact with our growing online community to ensure that everyone has a voice. Kevins passion and eagerness to learn will no doubt contribute greatly to our mission.
*Kevin is a senior at Tufts University studying Political Science and Science & Technology Studies. Originally from Florida, he is now freezing up in the greater Boston area. Kevin is passionate about usable security and privacy for vulnerable populations. He has previously worked with Freedom of the Press Foundation's Digital Security Team and Cornell Tech's Clinic to End Tech Abuse to help journalists and domestic violence survivors alike.*
*Besides doomscrolling on social media, he loves cooking new recipes, reading philosophy essays, and perpetuating his caffeine addiction with Vietnamese coffee. Please feel free to reach out to him to discuss anything regarding best operational security practices and threat modeling...or just say hi!*
[:material-mastodon: Follow Kevin at @kevpham@mastodon.social](https://mastodon.social/@kevpham)
## What This Means for Privacy Guides
The expansion of the Privacy Guides team continues our commitment to provide the best quality resources and information on privacy and security. With Ems investigative work, Jordans video content, and Kevins hands-on support, we look forward to communicating easy to understand and factual information with a broader audience.
Were excited to see how these talented people will help Privacy Guides continue to grow, and we look forward to the amazing work they will contribute in the coming months.
Thank you for being a part of our community, and stay tuned for the exciting new content and updates that will be coming your way soon!
Welcome aboard, Em, Jordan, and Kevin! Lets make privacy accessible for everyone. 🚀
[:material-mastodon: Follow Privacy Guides at @privacyguides@neat.computer](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides)
[:material-youtube: Subscribe to Privacy Guides on YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/@privacyguides)
@@ -12,8 +12,6 @@ schema_type: BackgroundNewsArticle
![](../assets/images/privacy-guides-partners-with-magic-grants-501-c-3/magicblog.webp)
<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Jonah Aragon / Privacy Guides</small>
In February, the OpenCollective Foundation (OCF)—[our fiscal host of 4 years](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2019/10/31/weve-joined-the-open-collective-foundation/)—sent us an email to [announce](https://docs.opencollective.foundation/) that they would be shutting down, and they would no longer be able to collect donations on our behalf (or for any of the hundreds of projects they provided fiscal hosting services to). We immediately began to consider multiple options for the future of this project, including forming our own non-profit or finding another [fiscal host](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiscal_sponsorship).<!-- more -->
We're excited to announce a [partnership](https://magicgrants.org/2024/07/22/Privacy-Guides-Fund) with MAGIC Grants, a Public 501(c)(3) charity with the mission of supporting privacy projects like ours and providing undergraduate scholarships for students interested in cryptocurrencies and privacy. They will immediately take over all of the operations previously provided by OCF, including accepting donations on our behalf, handling any of our accounting and taxes, reimbursing team members and volunteers, and taking legal ownership of assets like our domains and servers.
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!["Relisting Startpage" cover image](../assets/images/relisting-startpage/cover.png)
<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Privacy Guides</small>
Dear *Privacy Guides* Community,
In October 2019, we learned that System1 had become the majority shareholder in Startpage.com via a new System1 subsidiary, Privacy One Group. Due to the uncertainty surrounding the acquisition and the initial lack of clear communication from the Startpage team towards the privacy community, we were forced to delist Startpage from our [search engine recommendations](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/search-engines/).<!-- more --> In an [explanatory blog post](delisting-startpage.md), we asked for more clarity surrounding the situation, stating:
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![](../assets/images/security-privacy-anonymity/cover.jpeg)
<small aria-hidden="true">Image: Unsplash</small>
We may think that we know the differences between privacy, security and anonymity, however we often mix them up. People will often criticize a product or service as “not private” when they really mean “not anonymous.” Privacy, security, and anonymity often complement each other, but they are not always dependent on each other, and they are definitely not the same thing. A service can be private without being anonymous, or even secure without being private. Which one should you prioritize?<!-- more --> To some extent, there are no wrong answers. It really comes down to your threat model and what your desired goal is. It is perfectly fine to pick a product that provides privacy even though it doesn't provide anonymity. Furthermore, it's okay to pick a product that doesn't provide security if it does provide one of the other features. The important thing is that you need to be aware what these products and services are and arent offering you so that you can use them correctly.
Theres lots of ways to define privacy, security, and anonymity. Someone showed me [this](https://code.privacyguides.dev/privacyguides/privacytools.io/issues/1760#issuecomment-10452) definition and I really liked it. It seems to pretty much hit the nail on the head when applying these terms specifically to data privacy and cybersecurity:
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---
date:
created: 2025-02-03T19:00:00
categories:
- Opinion
authors:
- em
description: Privacy is intrinsically intertwined with politics. Each change in governance can have serious effects on privacy rights and privacy tools, for better or for worse. Let's examine with concrete examples how politics affect legislations that can have an immense impact on the privacy tools and features we use.
schema_type: OpinionNewsArticle
---
# The Future of Privacy: How Governments Shape Your Digital Life
![Black and white photo of a street post at night. The street post has some ripped stickers on it and a stencilled graffiti saying Big Data is Watching You.](../assets/images/the-future-of-privacy/cover.webp)
<small aria-hidden="true">Photo: ev / Unsplash</small>
Data privacy is a vast subject that encompasses so much. Some might think it is a niche focus interesting only a few. But in reality, it is a wide-ranging field influenced by intricate relationships between politics, law, technology, and much more. Further, it affects **everyone** in one way or another, whether they care about it or not.<!-- more -->
I routinely read articles discussing changes in politics on the advocacy side of data privacy. Then, I read articles talking about changes in regulations on the legal side of data privacy. And then, I see all the articles and guides presenting new tools and privacy features on the tech side of data privacy. Of course, all of this is linked together.
Let's talk about how politics, law, and technological features are intertwined, all at once.
## Privacy laws are always one election away from getting better, or worse
Each change in government can have a serious effect on data privacy legislation. Privacy is a politically charged field. For example, authoritarian regimes might want to remove or weaken privacy rights to exert strict control over their population. While democratic governments generally bring more freedom and protections to its citizens, including privacy rights. It's important to keep in mind who in the past has bettered citizen rights and protections, and who has actively worked to undermine civil rights.
Each time a new government takes power, its values will be put forward and influence legislation in place, or legislation not in place yet. While the Western world has benefited from some improvements in data privacy law for the past few years, we must consider these gains are fragile and protections could get removed or lessened at any time.
Unfortunately, it seems there is currently a political push towards deregulation, mass surveillance, and a focus on corporate gains. This is **extremely worrisome for the future of privacy rights**, human rights, and individual liberties.
Following politics and advocating for better privacy rights and legislation is essential in improving access to privacy tools and features around the world. Privacy is never politically neutral.
## The tools you use might depend on government funding
Many [privacy tools](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/tools/) we use depend at least partially on government funding or on other tools which depend on government funding. This is especially true for open-source nonprofit organizations needing some (usually) more stable income, in addition to donations.
### Which privacy and security tools could be impacted
One notable example of a privacy-related project receiving government funding is the [Tor Project](https://www.torproject.org/). If this source of funding [were cut off](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/01/executive-order-state-department-sideswipes-freedom-tools-threatens-censorship), the impact on Tor could be quite detrimental, not only to the Tor Project but to all projects relying on Tor as well. Many privacy-focus software are built around the [Tor network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tor_(network)). To name only a few, whistleblowing software such as [Hush Line](https://hushline.app/) and [SecureDrop](https://securedrop.org/) both utilize the Tor network to harden privacy. [Briar](https://briarproject.org/), [Cwtch](https://cwtch.im/), and [SimpleX](https://simplex.chat/), are examples of messaging applications also using Tor to add a layer of security and privacy to communications. **Tor is critical infrastructure** in the world of data privacy.
Another important project receiving government funding is [Let's Encrypt](https://letsencrypt.org/). Let's Encrypt is a nonprofit Certificate Authority providing [TLS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security) certificates to websites. It is run by the Internet Security Research Group (ISRG), which [receives funding](https://www.abetterinternet.org/sponsors/) from the Sovereign Tech Agency, [supported by](https://www.sovereign.tech/faq) the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action. The ISRG also receives funding from the [Open Technology Fund](https://www.opentech.fund/) (OTF), which receives the [majority](https://www.opentech.fund/about/about-our-funding/) of its funding from the United States government, through the U.S. Agency for Global Media.
In current events, last month an [executive order](https://web.archive.org/web/20250131165539/https://new.nsf.gov/executive-orders) in the United States from the Trump administration led the National Science Foundation (NSF) to [freeze grant reviews](https://www.npr.org/sections/shots-health-news/2025/01/27/nx-s1-5276342/nsf-freezes-grant-review-trump-executive-orders-dei-science). This is currently impacting many important projects in the tech world, [including](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/sethmlarson_national-science-foundation-freezes-grant-activity-7290072485423656960-n2eJ/) the Python Software Foundation (PSF). **The repercussions of this freeze could be devastating for many open-source projects, in privacy and beyond.**
### Government funding should support civil liberties and protections
Governments funding nonprofit projects and organizations working on improving human rights, civil liberties, and technological security and safety is a good thing. This can bring an important source of stable income to nonprofit projects that could not stay afloat solely from donations.
However, this dependency can become precarious when governments aren't working for the good of the people anymore, and when organizations rely too heavily on such support, making them vulnerable to change in power. Such a change of regime can have devastating repercussions on the privacy tools we use.
## The GDPR gave you deletion features in your apps
On the good side of regulatory influence, there are regulations like the [General Data Protection Regulation](https://gdpr-info.eu/) (GDPR). Saying the GDPR revolutionized the world of data privacy would not be an overstatement. While many privacy regulations pre-date the GDPR, in the Western world none had the scope nor the grit the GDPR has.
### What is the GDPR
The GDPR is a data privacy regulation that was adopted by the European Union (EU) in 2016 and became effective in May 2018. Its scope encompasses all of the EU member states as well as all the countries part of the European Economic Area (EEA), which together count 30 countries to this day. The United Kingdom also uses an [amended version](https://www.gdpreu.org/differences-between-the-uk-and-eu-gdpr-regulations/) of the GDPR post-Brexit.
However, the reach of the GDPR isn't limited to Europe. Every organization based *outside of the EU* that is offering goods or services to, or is monitoring the behavior of, individuals located in the EU [must comply](https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-topic/data-protection/rules-business-and-organisations/application-regulation/who-does-data-protection-law-apply_en) as well. This means that **most organizations operating worldwide, regardless of where they are located in the world, must comply** with the GDPR.
As is often the case with data privacy laws, it took a few years before [Data Subjects](https://www.gdprsummary.com/gdpr-definitions/data-subject/) (your legal designation under the GDPR) noticed any concrete changes. One change that has become prominent in the past few years, and is likely a direct product of the GDPR, is data deletion features within apps and accounts.
### What does the GDPR have to do with data deletion features
An important right granted by the GDPR to Data Subjects is the [Right to Erasure](https://gdpr-info.eu/art-17-gdpr/) (or the Right to be Forgotten). Other legislation such as the [California Consumer Privacy Act](https://www.oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa) (CCPA) calls for a similar right, the *Right to Delete*. This and similar rights have existed before, but through the GDPR and its enforcement it has affected technology in a much broader and impactful way.
Slowly since 2018, applications requiring accounts have started to implement data deletion and account deletion features within the account itself. A probable reason for this is that due to the GDPR, and a now [growing number](https://iapp.org/resources/article/us-state-privacy-legislation-tracker/) of privacy regulations from various states in the United States, organizations are obligated to respond to Data Subject [requests](https://www.gdprsummary.com/data-subject-rights/) to get their personal data deleted. Managing this can be quite cumbersome for organizations. The burden of answering and implementing each data deletion request manually is often not worth the value of the data itself. Organizations with enough resources have simply added it as an internal product feature. This makes data deletion requests manageable by each Data Subject themselves (at least partially), freeing the organization from legally having to answer each individual request. When implemented properly, this is what we can call a win-win situation.
<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Request to delete</p>
Unfortunately, not all applications have integrated automatic deletion features internally (yet). Additionally, some applications and accounts will allow you to delete information only partially this way.
If you wish to exercise or have questions related to your Right to Erasure or Right to Delete, first consult your local privacy regulation to check if you have this right as a *Data Subject*, *Individual,* or *Consumer*. Then, you can contact the organization's *Privacy Officer* with your request. You can usually find information about an organization's designated *Privacy Officer* by reading its privacy policy or privacy notice. In any case, it never hurts to ask.
</div>
## Chat Control wants to break end-to-end encryption
If you are not European, please bear with me. First of all, everyone outside of Europe should care about what is happening in Europe, regardless. But even if you don't care, you should know **this kind of mass surveillance proposition will inevitably leak west**, and if adopted will affect us all globally.
### What is Chat Control
In 2021, the EU [approved a derogation](https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/chatcontrol-european-parliament-approves-mass-surveillance-of-private-communications/) to the [ePrivacy Directive](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EPrivacy_Directive) to allow communication service providers to scan all exchanged messages to detect child sexual abuse material (CSAM). Although this first derogation was not mandatory, some policymakers kept pushing with new propositions.
A year later, a [new regulation](https://edri.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/EDRi-Position-Paper-CSAR-short.pdf) (CSAR) was proposed by the European Commissioner for Home Affairs to make scanning messages for CSAM *mandatory* for all EU countries, and also allow them to **break end-to-end encryption**. In 2023, the UK passed a similar legislation called the [Online Safety Act](https://hackaday.com/2023/10/29/the-uk-online-safety-bill-becomes-law-what-does-it-mean/). These types of messaging mass scanning regulations have been called by critics *Chat Control*.
### Why is Chat Control horrible for privacy, and for children
Such legislation might sound like a noble cause at first, but consider this: Scanning all messages exchanged for any reason treats everyone like a criminal, no matter what. **This is not hunting criminals, this is mass surveillance.** Not only is this horrifying for privacy rights, but it also endangers democracy. Once a system to mass monitor all written communications is implemented to (supposedly) stop CSAM, new topics to detect, block, and report could be added anytime, and by any future governments. There is nothing that would prevent much less reasonable topics from being added to the list to be filtered out at a later date.
Chat Control would hurt everyone, [including the children](https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol99/iss1/9/). Not only would mass scanning of all messages be [ineffective](https://volteuropa.org/news/chat-control-wont-protect-children) at reducing CSAM, but it would endanger the children even further by also scanning their communications. Because yes, children also communicate online. Parents also communicate sensitive information about their children online, with trusted family or doctors. All this data would get scanned and collected, only [one breach away](https://techcrunch.com/2025/01/28/powerschool-begins-notifying-students-and-teachers-after-massive-data-breach/) from being made public.
*Protecting the children* is a pretext regularly used to implement abusive regulations undermining individual liberties and protections. Do not get fooled by this demagogical stratagem. **Chat Control is the opposite of protecting the children.**
Chat Control would only lead to destroying the end-to-end encryption messaging features that are protecting us and the children so well already. Criminals exploiting children would simply move to underground channels, unbothered.
### Who opposes Chat Control
Thankfully, opposition from experts and advocates alike has been strong. To name only a few, Meredith Whittaker, president of the Signal Foundation which develops the messaging app [Signal](https://signal.org/), has taken [a clear stand](https://signal.org/blog/uk-online-safety-bill/) against Chat Control. The Electronic Frontier Foundation has also [firmly opposed](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/06/now-eu-council-should-finally-understand-no-one-wants-chat-control) Chat Control legislation. In the UK, the Open Rights Group has led [powerful campaigns](https://www.openrightsgroup.org/campaign/save-encryption/) to fight against the Online Safety Act. In Europe, privacy advocacy organization [noyb](https://noyb.eu/en/noyb-files-complaint-against-eu-commission-over-targeted-chat-control-ads) and former Member of the European Parliament Patrick Breyer have both been fervent defenders of privacy rights [raising relentless resistance](https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/posts/messaging-and-chat-control/) to Chat Control.
Harmful policies such as Chat Control are a direct example of how politics can affect laws that can cause **unimaginable damage** to the privacy-preserving technologies we use every day.
## Age Verification wants to collect your sensitive data
Another potent example of the *protecting-the-children stratagem* to undermine privacy rights is [Age Verification legislation](https://www.jonaharagon.com/posts/age-verification-is-incompatible-with-the-internet/). In the past few years, this idea of controlling which online content should be accessible to children has raised new proposals around the world.
Age Verification policies generally start with the premise that some content should not be accessible to children online. Again, this could seem like a reasonable idea at first. Nobody would debate that children should be shielded from some type of content. Sadly, we have all witnessed how horrifying the internet can be at times. However, both the premise and methodology to achieve this goal are wrong.
### Who will decide what content should be walled online?
First of all, even putting aside the fact that there is plenty of disturbing content accessible *outside* the internet (newspapers, television, movies, radio, advertising, etc), who would be [the deciders](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/01/impact-age-verification-measures-goes-beyond-porn-sites) of which specific content can be accessed by children or not? This can be extremely problematic, to say the least.
There is no objective measure to decide on this, and what might be deemed appropriate by one might not be by another. More importantly in the context of our discussion, what one government might judge appropriate might be very different from the next or previous administration.
This is again **a dangerous slippery slope opening the door wide to authoritarian policies**.
### Age Verification undermines privacy and security
Secondly, [how can age be verified online](https://www.woodhullfoundation.org/fact-checked/online-age-verification-is-not-the-same-as-flashing-your-id-at-a-liquor-store/)? Of course by collecting more data, on everyone. Age Verification policies don't affect only the children, they affect everyone who wants to access content online. If a website is deemed to display content that should not be accessed by children, the only way to enforce this rule would be to ask for some form of official identity verification from all adults who want to access it.
Proponents of these regulations often refer to "age assurance processes" and suppose these processes to be undoubtedly secure. Anyone familiar with data security will understand how naive this approach is. I will not go into the details here, but you probably can already see how having each private website (or third-party processor) collect such sensitive information from each visitor is horrendous for privacy rights, and data security as well. Of course, these websites or third-party "age assurance processors" will unavoidably become a large treasure trove for thieves, and their sensitive data will be [inevitably leaked or stolen](https://www.404media.co/id-verification-service-for-tiktok-uber-x-exposed-driver-licenses-au10tix/) sooner rather than later.
Age Verification is one of the biggest privacy threats online. Continuing in this direction could ultimately lead to the end of pseudonymous browsing. Additionally, this could also mean the end of your official ID having any value at all. After all, what unique identification value does a piece of ID keep after it has been leaked in a thousand different data breaches? Maybe even one day bought on a [darknet market](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darknet_market) by a curious teenager in need of accessing some website...
### Age Verification is already here, sadly
Regrettably, this is not a hypothetical scare. Age Verification legislation has already passed in [Australia](https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/what-is-australias-online-safety-amendment-about-explained/article69026251.ece), in the [UK](https://www.ofcom.org.uk/online-safety/protecting-children/age-checks-to-protect-children-online/), as well as in [many U.S. states](https://action.freespeechcoalition.com/age-verification-resources/state-avs-laws/). It is also on the table federally in the [United States](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/10/eff-new-york-age-verification-threatens-everyones-speech-and-privacy), [Canada](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/09/canadas-leaders-must-reject-overbroad-age-verification-bill), [France](https://www.politico.eu/article/france-doubles-down-on-social-media-age-limit-at-15/), [Norway](https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/norwegian-government-sets-15-year-age-limit-for-using-social-media/), and [Europe](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/funding/call-tenders-development-consultancy-and-support-age-verification-solution).
There is some [tenacious opposition](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/12/global-age-verification-measures-2024-year-review) to Age Verification policies from digital rights and free speech advocates. Unfortunately, there is also a strong push in support of Age Verification from the rapidly growing "age assurance" and identity verification [industry](https://avpassociation.com/thought-leadership/2025-the-year-of-implementation-for-age-assurance/), and from many governments worldwide **moving towards a surveillance state**.
Again, government values are deciding on digital features that impact our data privacy in disastrous ways. If you want to **take a stand against Age Verification**, you can join the [Stop Online ID Checks](https://www.stoponlineidchecks.org/) campaign from the nonprofit organization Fight for the Future.
## The future of privacy
There's a lot to be worrying about in today's privacy landscape. Unfortunately, recent political tendencies in the Western world make it difficult to stay optimistic. The trend toward authoritarian regimes and surveillance capitalism is bad news for the future of privacy around the globe.
There is no question that privacy is intrinsically intertwined with politics, and can therefore never be politically neutral. The latest decisions taken by the new U.S. administration running full speed into deregulation and defunding, growing pressure in Europe to break end-to-end encryption in favor of a surveillance state, and invasive age verification policies to censor the web and collect even more data on every netizen is admittedly frightening.
But one thing frightens me even more than all of this. One thing that could end privacy rights, forever. This threat to privacy is never far and always looming.
This threat is giving up.
Despite all the gloom menacing privacy rights, **privacy will never be dead as long as we stand up to defend it**. Governments might have the power to remove our privacy rights on paper and proclaim privacy features illegal. But the people have the power to keep pushing for better privacy rights and to keep developing even more robust and more accessible privacy tools.
We must continue to advocate loudly for privacy rights and *all* human rights every chance we have. The fight for better privacy rights is only over when we give up.
**Do not give up.**
@@ -19,8 +19,6 @@ schema_type: AnalysisNewsArticle
!["Unbiased Reviews" cover image](../assets/images/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-review-sites/cover.png)
<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Jonah Aragon / Privacy Guides | Photo: Unsplash</small>
Theres a massive problem in the privacy world. Websites, social media accounts, and other platforms are constantly popping up out of nowhere, telling you to buy *The Greatest Service Ever* in order to solve all your privacy woes, whatever that may be. These websites often employ marketing teams to make sure their “reviews” are what you see first when you begin your research. Some of them are even operated by VPN providers themselves, operating under anonymous business entities to hide their bias, or doing it right out in the open, hoping youll mistake their advertising-filled press releases and blogs as insider knowledge of the VPN space.<!-- more -->
When a seemingly “unbiased review” on a site is merely a paid advertisement in disguise, that website is breaking their readers trust. From a consumers point of view, affiliate marketing and other paid promotional techniques like this make it near impossible to know when a review is genuine or not.
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![Privacy Guides cover image](../assets/brand/images/png/cover.png)
<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Jonah Aragon / Privacy Guides</small>
We are excited to announce the launch of [Privacy Guides](https://www.privacyguides.org/) and [r/PrivacyGuides](https://www.reddit.com/r/PrivacyGuides/), and welcome the privacy community to participate in our crowdsourced software recommendations and share tips and tricks for keeping your data safe online. Our goal is to be a central resource for privacy and security-related tips that are usable by anybody, and to carry on the trusted legacy of PrivacyTools.<!-- more -->
As we [announced](https://web.archive.org/web/20210729184422/https://blog.privacytools.io/the-future-of-privacytools/) on the PrivacyTools blog in July, we made the decision to migrate off our former privacytools.io domain for various reasons, including an inability to contact the current domain holder for over a year and [growing](http://www.thedarksideof.io/) [issues](https://fortune.com/2020/08/31/crypto-fraud-io-domain-chagos-islands-uk-colonialism-cryptocurrency/) [with the .IO top-level domain](https://code.privacyguides.dev/privacyguides/privacytools.io/issues/1324). As attempts to regain ownership of the domain have proven fruitless, we found it necessary to make this switch sooner rather than later to ensure people would find out about this transition as soon as possible. This gives us adequate time to transition the domain name, which is currently redirecting to [www.privacyguides.org](https://www.privacyguides.org/), and it hopefully gives everyone enough time to notice the change, update bookmarks and websites, etc.
@@ -16,8 +16,6 @@ schema_type: NewsArticle
![Privacy Guides cover image](../assets/brand/images/png/cover.png)
<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Jonah Aragon / Privacy Guides</small>
[Privacy Guides](https://www.privacyguides.org) provides knowledge, recommendations, and services to protect you against global mass surveillance programs and encourage self-control of your data online. Our website is free of advertisements and is not affiliated with any listed providers, because we believe that our ability to recommend solutions without receiving financial kickbacks is incredibly important in remaining unbiased.<!-- more -->
However, we have always accepted and solicited financial contributions from our community. Running this network of websites and services for free to the public is a time-consuming and costly endeavor. We do it because we believe it is the right thing to do, not because we are looking to make a profit. Any contributions have been either used to pay our expenses or saved in a reserve for expansion or times of need.
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![Tor graphic](../assets/images/why-i-run-a-tor-relay/cover.png)
<small aria-hidden="true">Illustration: Tor Project</small>
It makes me smile when I come across someone struggling with the decision of whether to get a [VPN](https://www.privacyguides.org/vpn/). It makes me smile not because of the indecision and relative lack of knowledge, but because it wasn't so long ago I was in exactly the same position—perceiving VPNs to be some kind of extreme measure only the paranoid and the criminal resorted to. How wrong I was.<!-- more -->
In just a few months I've come to realize that something like a VPN is in fact a basic measure one might take in the effort to more freely roam the Internet—tainted as it is by censorship, surveillance and many other forms of state control. So where do you go from realizing these issues if you know them to be the threats that they are to democracy and freedom? You seek to *take control*.
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@@ -29,26 +29,6 @@ In addition to our core team, [many other people](about/contributors.md) have ma
[Job Openings :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](about/jobs.md)
## Contact Us
[:simple-discourse: Join the Privacy Guides forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
The best way to get individual help is from our community on Discourse. If you notice an issue with our website, please open a discussion in the [Site Development](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/site-development/7) category on our forum. If you have a question about anything we cover, please ask it in the [Questions](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/privacy/questions/8) category on our forum.
![Signal contact QR code](assets/img/layout/signal-contact-qr.png){ align=right }
Have a tip for us, or need to share some sensitive information? The best way to get in touch with us securely is via `@privacyguides.01` on Signal. This group account is monitored by [Jonah](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/jonah), [Niek](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/niek-de-wilde), [Em](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/ematprivacyguides), and [Jordan](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/jordan).
[:simple-signal: Chat on Signal](https://signal.me/#eu/zg9xcrIv5w-EtXt2FmTJgfWv01LmyTed8rpr7RDv35Mizq8ISZ9NJLmYtzsxI0Z4){ .md-button }
You may also email the entire team at <team@privacyguides.org>. This is a shared inbox that could be read by any [team member](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u?group=team&order=solutions&period=all), so please consider what sensitive information you share via email accordingly.
We will do our best to respond to all queries within 3 business days, but please understand we are unable to provide individualized advice to everyone who asks. If you have a question about privacy, you will receive a much more detailed and timely response from the Privacy Guides community by [asking on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/privacy/questions/8).
You can also use OpenPGP to contact us via email, if you feel comfortable with your client's security settings. You can discover the PGP keys of our team members using WKD if your client supports it. If it doesn't, or you don't know what that means, you can also find the public key for any Privacy Guides email account by searching on [keys.openpgp.org](https://keys.openpgp.org/). We do not have PGP for the shared team inbox, only individual mailboxes which can be found in our team directory below.
If you need an alternative secure channel, please request one via any contact method including social media, and we will work with you to establish one. Please do not share any sensitive information with us before we have established an appropriately secure discussion channel.
## Executive Committee
<!-- markdownlint-disable MD030 -->
@@ -118,50 +98,6 @@ The project executive committee consists of five volunteers charged with managem
</div>
## Staff
Our staff are paid to contribute to supplemental content at Privacy Guides, like [video production](https://www.youtube.com/@privacyguides), [news articles and tutorials](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/), and our discussion communities and social media. Most are available and paid on a full-time basis to assist the organization.
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
- :jack_o_lantern:{ .lg .middle } **Em**
---
:material-text-account: Journalist
[:material-account: Profile](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/ematprivacyguides)
[:material-github:](https://github.com/EmAtPrivacyGuides "GitHub")
[:material-mastodon:](https://infosec.exchange/@Em0nM4stodon "@Em0nM4stodon@infosec.exchange"){rel=me}
[:material-email:](mailto:em@privacyguides.org "Email")
- :full_moon_with_face:{ .lg .middle } **Jordan Warne**
---
:material-text-account: Content Producer
[:material-account: Profile](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/Jordan)
[:material-github:](https://github.com/jordan-warne "GitHub")
[:material-mastodon:](https://social.lol/@jw "@jw@social.lol"){rel=me}
[:material-email:](mailto:jordan@privacyguides.org "Email")
- :japanese_goblin:{ .lg .middle } **Kevin Pham**
---
:material-text-account: Community & News Intern
[:material-account: Profile](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/kevpham)
[:material-github:](https://github.com/kevpham123 "GitHub")
[:material-mastodon:](https://mastodon.social/@kevpham "@kevpham@mastodon.social"){rel=me}
[:material-email:](mailto:kevin@privacyguides.org "Email")
</div>
## In The Media
> To find [privacy-focused alternative] apps, check out sites like Good Reports and **Privacy Guides**, which list privacy-focused apps in a variety of categories, notably including email providers (usually on paid plans) that arent run by the big tech companies.
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---
meta_title: "The Best Android Operating Systems - Privacy Guides"
meta_title: "The Best Custom Android OSes (aka Custom ROMs) - Privacy Guides"
title: "Alternative Distributions"
description: You can replace the operating system on your Android phone with these secure and privacy-respecting alternatives.
schema:
@@ -26,15 +26,13 @@ robots: nofollow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large
- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
A **custom Android-based operating system** (sometimes referred to as a **custom ROM**) can be a way to achieve a higher level of privacy and security on your device. This is in contrast to the "stock" version of Android which comes with your phone from the factory, and is often deeply integrated with Google Play Services as well as other vendor software.
A **custom Android-based operating system** (often known as a **custom ROM**) is a popular way to achieve higher levels of privacy and security on your device. This is in contrast to the "stock" version of Android which comes with your phone from the factory, and is often deeply integrated with Google Play Services.
We recommend installing GrapheneOS if you have a Google Pixel as it provides improved security hardening and additional privacy features. The reasons we don't list other operating systems or devices are as follows:
We recommend installing one of these custom Android operating systems on your device, listed in order of preference, depending on your device's compatibility with these operating systems.
- They often have [weaker security](index.md#install-a-custom-distribution).
- Support is frequently dropped when the maintainer loses interest or upgrades their device, which is in contrast to the predictable [support cycle](https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-lifetime) that GrapheneOS follows.
- They generally have few or no notable privacy or security improvements that make installing them worthwhile.
## AOSP Derivatives
## GrapheneOS
### GrapheneOS
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@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ Peergos is primarily a web app, but you can self-host the server either as a loc
Running a local version of Peergos alongside a registered account on their paid, hosted service allows you to access your Peergos storage without any reliance on DNS or TLS certificate authorities, and keep a copy of your data backed up to their cloud. The user experience should be the same whether you run their desktop server or just use their hosted web interface.
Peergos was [audited](https://peergos.org/posts/security-audit-2024) in November 2024 by Radically Open Security and all issues were fixed. They were previously [audited](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_peergos.pdf) by Cure53 in June 2019, and all found issues were subsequently fixed.
Peergos was [audited](https://cure53.de/pentest-report_peergos.pdf) by Cure53 in June 2019, and all found issues were subsequently fixed.
An Android app is not available but it is [in the works](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/peergos-private-storage-sharing-social-media-and-application-platform/11825/25). The current workaround is to use the mobile [PWA](https://peergos.net) instead.
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@@ -63,18 +63,18 @@ For optimal privacy, make sure to use a self-custody wallet where the [view key]
### Monero nodes
For maximum privacy (even with a self-custody wallet), you should run your own Monero node called the [Monero daemon](https://docs.getmonero.org/interacting/monerod-reference), which is included in the [CLI wallet](https://getmonero.org/downloads/#cli). Using another persons node will expose some information to them, such as the IP address that you connect to it from, the timestamps that you sync your wallet, and the transactions that you send from your wallet (though no other details about those transactions). Alternatively, you can connect to someone elses Monero node over [Tor](alternative-networks.md#tor), [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project), or a [VPN](vpn.md).
For maximum privacy (even with a self-custody wallet), you should run your own Monero node called the [Monero daemon](https://getmonero.org/downloads/#cli). Using another persons node will expose some information to them, such as the IP address that you connect to it from, the timestamps that you sync your wallet, and the transactions that you send from your wallet (though no other details about those transactions). Alternatively, you can connect to someone elses Monero node over Tor, [I2P](alternative-networks.md#i2p-the-invisible-internet-project), or a VPN.
### Buying Monero
[General tips for acquiring Monero](advanced/payments.md#acquisition){ .md-button }
There are numerous centralized exchanges (CEX) as well as P2P marketplaces where you can buy and sell Monero. Some of them require identifying yourself (KYC) to comply with anti-money laundering regulations. However, due to Monero's privacy features, the only thing known to the seller is *that* you bought Monero, but not how much you own or where you spend it (after it leaves the exchange). Some reputable places to buy Monero include:
There are numerous centralized exchanges (CEX) as well as P2P marketplaces where you can buy and sell Monero. Some of them require identifying yourself (KYC) to comply with anti-money laundering regulations. However, due to Monero's privacy features, the only thing known to the seller is _that_ you bought Monero, but not how much you own or where you spend it (after it leaves the exchange). Some reputable places to buy Monero include:
- [Kraken](https://kraken.com): A well-known CEX. Registration and KYC are mandatory. Card payments and bank transfers accepted. Make sure not to leave your newly purchased Monero on Kraken's platform after the purchase; withdraw them to a self-custody wallet. Monero is not available in all jurisdictions that Kraken operates in.[^1]
- [Cake Wallet](https://cakewallet.com): A self-custody cross-platform wallet for Monero and other cryptocurrencies. You can buy Monero directly in the app using card payments or bank transfers (through third-party providers such as [Guardarian](https://guardarian.com) or [DFX](https://dfx.swiss)).[^2] KYC is usually not required, but it depends on your country and the amount you are purchasing. In countries where directly purchasing Monero is not possible, you can also use a provider within Cake Wallet to first buy another cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, or Litecoin and then exchange it to Monero in-app.
- [Monero.com](https://monero.com) is an associated website where you can buy Monero and other cryptocurrencies without having to download an app. The funds will simply be sent to the wallet address of your choice.
- [RetoSwap](https://retoswap.com) (formerly known as Haveno-Reto) is a self-custody, decentralized P2P exchange platform based on the [Haveno](https://haveno.exchange) project which is available for Linux, Windows, and macOS. Monero can be bought and sold with maximum privacy, since most trading counterparties do not require KYC, trades are made directly between users (P2P), and all connections run through the Tor network. It is possible to buy Monero via bank transfer, Paypal, or even by paying in cash (meeting in person or sending by mail). Arbitrators can step in to resolve disputes between buyer and seller, but be careful when sharing your bank account or other sensitive information with your trading counterparty. Trading with some accounts may be against those accounts' terms of service.
- [RetoSwap](https://retoswap.com) (formerly known as Haveno-Reto) is a self-custody, decentralized P2P exchange platform based on the [Haveno](https://haveno.exchange) project which is available for Linux, Windows, and macOS. Monero can be bought and sold with maximum privacy, since most trading counterparties do not require KYC, trades are made directly between users (P2P), and all connections run through the Tor network. It is possible to buy Monero via bank transfer, Paypal, or even by paying in cash (meeting in person or sending by mail). Arbitrators can step in to resolve disputes between buyer and seller, but be careful when sharing your bank account or other sensitive information with your trading counterparty. Trading with some accounts may be against those accounts' terms of service. Please note that you can only buy Monero on RetoSwap if you already own a small amount of Monero (currently a minimum of 0.11 XMR) in order to fund security deposits, although there are ongoing efforts to drop this requirement in the future.
## Criteria
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@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ If you don't use an automatic scanner to find results about you, consider settin
Some websites supported by EasyOptOuts are publicly searchable. In those cases EasyOptOuts will perform a search and only submit an opt-out request if your personal data is already found, to prevent sending your data in an opt-out request to sites that didn't have it already. However, they do support some sites which are not publicly searchable, and in those cases your data will be sent to them in an opt-out request regardless, in case you are in their private databases.
Our [testing](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/02/03/easyoptouts-review/) indicates that EasyOptOuts provides the best value out of any data removal service we've tested, with a very affordable price and high effectiveness. Independent [findings from Consumer Reports](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/consumer-reports-evaluating-people-search-site-removal-services/19948) also indicate that EasyOptOuts is one of the top performing data removal services.
Our testing indicates that EasyOptOuts provides the best value out of any data removal service we've tested, with a very affordable price and high effectiveness. We will publish a detailed review of EasyOptOuts on our blog in the near future and update this page when it is published. [Independent findings from Consumer Reports](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/consumer-reports-evaluating-people-search-site-removal-services/19948) also indicate that EasyOptOuts is one of the top performing data removal services.
<div class="admonition failure" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">High priority sites not supported by EasyOptOuts</p>
@@ -85,7 +85,6 @@ Our [testing](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/02/03/easyoptouts-revi
EasyOptOuts does not cover the following sites we consider to be "high priority," so you should still manually opt-out of:
- Intelius ([Search](https://intelius.com), [Opt-Out](https://suppression.peopleconnect.us/login))
- PeekYou ([Search](https://peekyou.com), [Opt-Out](https://peekyou.com/about/contact/optout))
</div>
@@ -129,4 +128,4 @@ Our picks for removal services are primarily based on independent professional t
- Must not be affiliated with the data broker industry or purchase advertising on people search sites.
- Must only use your personal data for the purposes of opting you out of data broker databases and people search sites.
[^1]: If you *are* immediately threatened by stalkers or other threats, you should strongly consider an automated tool like [EasyOptOuts](#easyoptouts-paid), at least for the initial "purge." When things are more manageable in the future you can come back to the manual process. Of course, in a dangerous situation your first priority should always be to seek professional help [from police](https://onlineharassmentfieldmanual.pen.org/involving-law-enforcement) or others before tackling it on your own.
[^1]: If you *are* immediately threatened by stalkers or other threats, you should strongly consider an automated tool like [EasyOptOuts](#easyoptouts-paid), at least for the initial "purge." When things are more manageable in the future you can come back to the manual process. Of course, in a dangerous situation your first priority should always be to seek professional help from police or others before tackling it on your own.
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@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ A large portion of [Arch Linuxs packages](https://reproducible.archlinux.org)
[Fedora Atomic Desktops](https://fedoramagazine.org/introducing-fedora-atomic-desktops) come in a variety of flavors depending on the desktop environment you prefer. As with the recommendation to avoid X11 in our [criteria](#criteria) for Linux distributions, we recommend avoiding flavors that support only the legacy X11 window system.
These operating systems differ from Fedora Workstation as they replace the [DNF](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/quick-docs/dnf) package manager with a much more advanced alternative called [`rpm-ostree`](https://coreos.github.io/rpm-ostree). The `rpm-ostree` package manager works by downloading a base image for the system, then overlaying packages over it in a [git](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Git)-like commit tree. When the system is updated, a new base image is downloaded and the overlays will be applied to that new image.
These operating systems differ from Fedora Workstation as they replace the [DNF](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/quick-docs/dnf) package manager with a much more advanced alternative called [`rpm-ostree`](https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/fedora/latest/system-administrators-guide/package-management/rpm-ostree). The `rpm-ostree` package manager works by downloading a base image for the system, then overlaying packages over it in a [git](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Git)-like commit tree. When the system is updated, a new base image is downloaded and the overlays will be applied to that new image.
After the update is complete, you will reboot the system into the new deployment. `rpm-ostree` keeps two deployments of the system so that you can easily roll back if something breaks in the new deployment. There is also the option to pin more deployments as needed.
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@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ If you cancel your subscription, you will still enjoy the features of your paid
SimpleLogin was [acquired by Proton AG](https://proton.me/news/proton-and-simplelogin-join-forces) as of April 8, 2022. If you use Proton Mail for your primary mailbox, SimpleLogin is a great choice. As both products are now owned by the same company you now only have to trust a single entity. We also expect that SimpleLogin will be more tightly integrated with Proton's offerings in the future. SimpleLogin continues to support forwarding to any email provider of your choosing. Securitum [audited](https://simplelogin.io/blog/security-audit) SimpleLogin in early 2022 and all issues [were addressed](https://simplelogin.io/audit2022/web.pdf).
You can link your SimpleLogin account in the settings with your Proton account. If you have Proton Pass Plus, Proton Unlimited, or any multi-user Proton plan, you will have SimpleLogin Premium for free.
You can link your SimpleLogin account in the settings with your Proton account. If you have the Proton Unlimited plan or any multi-user Proton plan, you will have SimpleLogin Premium for free.
Notable free features:
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@@ -46,8 +46,6 @@ The options listed here are available on multiple platforms and great for creati
Cryptomator uses AES-256 encryption to encrypt both files and filenames. Cryptomator cannot encrypt metadata such as access, modification, and creation timestamps, nor the number and size of files and folders.
Cryptomator is free to use on all desktop platforms, as well as on iOS in "read only" mode. Cryptomator offers [paid](https://cryptomator.org/pricing) apps with full functionality on iOS and Android. The Android version can be purchased anonymously via [ProxyStore](https://cryptomator.org/coop/proxystore).
Some Cryptomator cryptographic libraries have been [audited](https://community.cryptomator.org/t/has-there-been-a-security-review-audit-of-cryptomator/44) by Cure53. The scope of the audited libraries includes: [cryptolib](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptolib), [cryptofs](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptofs), [siv-mode](https://github.com/cryptomator/siv-mode) and [cryptomator-objc-cryptor](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptomator-objc-cryptor). The audit did not extend to [cryptolib-swift](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptolib-swift), which is a library used by Cryptomator for iOS.
Cryptomator's documentation details its intended [security target](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/security-target), [security architecture](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/architecture), and [best practices](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/best-practices) for use in further detail.
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@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Most **mobile phones** receive short or limited windows of security updates from
The mobile devices listed here provide a long lifespan of guaranteed security updates and allow you to install a custom operating system without violating the Android security model.
[Recommended Android Distributions :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](android/distributions.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Details about Android Security :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/android-overview.md#security-protections){ .md-button }
[Recommended Custom OSes :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](android/distributions.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Details about Android Security :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/android-overview.md#security-protections){ .md-button }
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
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@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ All devices with Google Play Services installed automatically generate an [adver
On Android distributions with [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), go to :gear: **Settings****Apps****Sandboxed Google Play****Google Settings****Ads**, and select *Delete advertising ID*.
On Android distributions with privileged Google Play Services (which includes the stock installation on most devices), the setting may be in one of several locations. Check
On Android distributions with privileged Google Play Services (such as stock OSes), the setting may be in one of several locations. Check
- :gear: **Settings****Google** → **Ads**
- :gear: **Settings****Privacy** → **Ads**
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@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest sec
- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates**
- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files**
**AirDrop** is commonly used to easily share files, but it represents a significant privacy risk. The AirDrop protocol constantly broadcasts your personal information to your surroundings, with [very weak](https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec21-heinrich.pdf) security protections. Your identity can easily be discovered by attackers even with limited resources, and the Chinese government has [openly acknowledged](https://arstechnica.com/security/2024/01/hackers-can-id-unique-apple-airdrop-users-chinese-authorities-claim-to-do-just-that/) using such techniques to identify AirDrop users in public since 2022.
**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want.
- [x] Select **AirDrop** → **Receiving Off**
@@ -250,20 +250,11 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th
You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID****Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability.
### Redacting Elements in Images
### Blacking Out Faces/Information
If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so.
If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images.
- Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction
- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen)
- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up**
- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else.
Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app.
- Tap the image you have selected for redaction
- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right
- Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle
- On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit.
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@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
---
title: System Hardening
icon: material/monitor-lock
---
## Setting up Windows after Installation
If you wish to limit the amount of data Microsoft obtains from your device, an [offline/local account](https://answers.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/forum/all/how-to-create-a-local-or-offline-account-in/95097c32-40c4-48c0-8f3b-3bcb67afaf7c) is **recommended**.
![user-account](/assets/img/windows/user-account.webp)
<div class="admonition note" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Note</p>
Microsoft is pushing users to use Microsoft accounts for other editions except Education and Enterprise after installation.
So, You could also follow the guide by [ghacks.net](https://www.ghacks.net/2022/05/13/how-to-bypass-the-microsoft-account-requirement-during-windows-setup/) to bypass the Microsoft account requirement during setup and use Local account.
</div>
While setting up, it is recommended to use a generic name such as `user` and `host` and avoid identifying terms such as your name or operating system. This can make it more difficult for privileged `Win32` apps or attackers to discern your identity.
For security, it's recommended to set up Windows Hello on all of your accounts because it uses the trusted platform module (TPM) if applicable, which protects against brute-force attacks; see the documentation: [How Windows Uses the TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm#windows-hello-for-business)
- [ ] Toggle off all privacy related settings as shown in the image:
![Privacy Settings](/assets/img/windows/privacy-settings.webp)
## Encrypting the Drive
After you have installed Windows, turn on full disk encryption (FDE) using BitLocker via the Control Panel.
<div class="admonition info" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Choosing the Way to Encrypt</p>
It is recommended to use only the Control Panel because if you go to encrypt via settings app, Microsoft named it as `Device Encryption` and designed it in a way that the encryption keys for BitLocker would be stored on Microsoft's server which is attached to your Microsoft account. This can be dangerous to your privacy and security as anyone who gains access to your account, as could an attacker if they were able to gain access to Microsoft's servers or any Law Enforcement could by a Gag order.
</div>
The best way is to go to the Control Panel by searching for it in the Start Menu or from the context menu (right-click) in File Explorer and set it up for all of the drives that you have.
![Bitlocker in Control Panel](/assets/img/windows/Bitlocker%20Group%20Policies/bitlocker-control%20panel.webp)
Bitlocker is suggested because of the native implementation by the OS and along with the usage of hardware to be resistant against encryption flaws.
### Security policies for Bitlocker
Enable the Following group policies before you start encrypting your drives.
<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Tip</p>
To go to it, search **Group Policy** in the **Windows Search Bar** and press **Enter** or type `gpedit.msc` in ++win+r++. Then, proceed as mentioned below.
</div>
General Policies :
Go to `Computer Configuration` > `Administrative Templates` > `Windows Components` > `Bitlocker Drive Encryption`
![Encryption & Cipher](/assets/img/windows/Bitlocker%20Group%20Policies/encryption-method-and-cipher.webp)
![Disable DMA](/assets/img/windows/Bitlocker%20Group%20Policies/Disable%20DMA.webp)
For OS drives :
Go to `Computer Configuration` > `Administrative Templates` > `Windows Components` > `Bitlocker Drive Encryption` > `Operating System Drives`
Enable Group policies as in the images below <!--(Check images side by side)--> :
![Enforcing full encryption](/assets/img/windows/Bitlocker%20Group%20Policies/enforce-full-encryption.webp)
![secure boot integrity validation](/assets/img/windows/Bitlocker%20Group%20Policies/Secure-boot-integrity-validation.webp)
![TPM & PIN](/assets/img/windows/Bitlocker%20Group%20Policies/TPM+PIN.webp)
![enhanced PINS](/assets/img/windows/Bitlocker%20Group%20Policies/enhanced-pins.webp)
![Disallow others changing PIN](/assets/img/windows/Bitlocker%20Group%20Policies/disallow-user-from-changing-PIN.webp)
For Fixed Drives :
Go to `Computer Configuration` > `Administrative Templates` > `Windows Components` > `Bitlocker Drive Encryption` > `Fixed Data Drives` > `Enforce drive encryption type on fixed data drives`
![Encryption Type](/assets/img/windows/Bitlocker%20Group%20Policies/fixed-drives.webp)
These policies ensure that your drives are encrypted with `XTS-AES-256` Bit encryption, **fully**.
### Setting up Pre-boot Authentication
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Update your TPM</p>
Before enabling Bitlocker in your device,It is strongly recommended to update your TPM chip by downloading package only from **OEM** Websites.
</div>
As you are using Windows 11, TPM is used to encrypt and decrypt the drive but it is susceptible to [cold boot attacks](https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2021/01/understanding-bitlocker-tpm-protection/). So, it is recommended to use TPM + PIN to protect the drives
After enabling all the group policies above, Go to Control panel and click on Add PIN. It can be alphanumeric if you had enabled the above policies.
You can check if it's enabled by typing `manage-bde -status`. It will normally show in **Key Protectors**: **Numerical Password** (it's the recovery key) and **TPM And PIN**.
<div class="admonition abstract" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Disabling pre-boot Authentication (Not Recommended)</p>
- open a **terminal** as an **administrator** and type this command `manage-bde -protectors -add c: -TPM`.
- You can again check if it worked by typing `manage-bde -status c:` and it will show you **Numerical Password** and **TPM**
</div>
<div class="admonition info" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Info</p>
The above Group Policy configuration tells the TPM to release the encryption keys after entering PIN instead of releasing it on boot automatically.
Doing this will set a double password. So, you enter the PIN to release the encryption keys from TPM & boot Windows and another credential to unlock your user account.
The pre-boot PIN not only protects the OS drive but also other fixed drives used just for storage if bitlocker is enabled for that drive also.
</div>
When you do this, the encryption keys of your drive are only unlocked once you enter the PIN, and the decryption happens after. If you forget or lose the PIN, you won't be able to access your drives and OS anymore, and the only way to recover is using the Recovery Key provided during the initial setup of BitLocker. **Make sure you store it in a safe place**, such as a password manager, and keep backups of your Recovery Key or even use an encrypted USB drive.
The preboot authentication is recommend to avoid data being accessed by removal of user Account passwords by methods like this - [How to Reset Windows 11 Password Without Any Software](https://youtu.be/0gOZoroPNuA) and access data even though Bitlocker is enabled and managed by TPM
But when you use TPM + Startup PIN, nobody can restart to load the shell and bypass password. Because you need to enter your PIN to go to the Advanced Startup settings as in the video.
Enabling or not-enabling is up to the user's threat model.
If it's a personal device, Startup PIN + TPM is recommended.
If a family computer, Normal Bitlocker (Managed by TPM) for OS drive is recommended.
It is recommended to encrypt the OS drive at the least. Encrypting secondary drives either via Bitlocker or other encryption tools such as Veracrypt is upto the user's threat model.
## Creation of User Account and usage
- By Default Windows gives `administrator` access to the user account. Create another `standard` user account to reduce the attack surface enormously as most vulnerabilities today come from the fact that the user is always in `administrator` mode. In addition, you shouldn't use the same password for standard and administrator account.
- Don't use admin account for any of your personal tasks!
- Just restrict it to the standard account created.
- Set [UAC](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-security-policy-settings) settings to the [Highest Privilege](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/about-user-account-control-settings-d5b2046b-dcb8-54eb-f732-059f321afe18).
- Only use your account for you, if someone needs to use your computer **ALWAYS** create another standard account, even if it's for a one-time use, even if it's your family or someone you trust. This person can plug a malicious USB, can connect to malicious Wi-Fi network, download infectious files, etc... without you knowing about it.
- You might be afraid that the user accessing your device via another User account can access your Internal drive and access critical files violating your privacy. Refer, [Privacy page](windows/privacy/#restrict-access-to-data-drives) on How to restrict access to certain drives only or use EFS on a per-file basis. You can read more about EFS on [Privacy page](privacy.md).
<div class="admonition tip" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Tip</p>
You should ALWAYS do the quick shortcut ++win+l++ to lock your device when you are away to prevent unauthorized access.
</div>
- If you don't like managing a standard account, then enforce authentication for Administrator accounts too like Standard ones by following the guide by [Wikihow](https://www.wikihow.tech/Require-UAC-Passwords-on-Administrator-Accounts)
- This way, Even administrators need to use Password to approve processes instead of just clicking `Yes` or `No`.
## Securing the Boot chain
- In your BIOS/UEFI settings, disable the booting of USB devices
- Add a password to your BIOS/UEFI settings which restricts anyone from changing them.
### Enabling Secure Boot
- Windows 11 secures its bootloader by default by using Secure boot with the usage of TPM.
- Windows 10, on the other hand, doesn't come with Secure boot enabled by default except for new devices.
To enable Secure Boot from the PC BIOS menu. Follow this Step-by-Step Instructions by visiting this [documentation](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/manufacture/desktop/disabling-secure-boot?view=windows-11#re-enable-secure-boot).
Visit: [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/user-help/you-need-to-enable-secure-boot-windows#check-secure-boot-status](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/user-help/you-need-to-enable-secure-boot-windows#check-secure-boot-status) on how to verify if enabled after enabling secure boot.
### Firmware Protection
As there are thousands of PC vendors that produce many models with different UEFI BIOS versions, there becomes an incredibly large number of SRTM measurements upon bootup. Two techniques exist to establish trust here—either maintain a list of known 'bad' SRTM measurements (also known as a blocklist), or a list of known 'good' SRTM measurements (also known as an allowlist).
**System Guard** lets the system freely boot into untrusted code initially, but shortly after launches the system into a trusted state by taking control of all CPUs and forcing them down a well-known and measured code path. This has the benefit of allowing untrusted early UEFI code to boot the system, but then being able to securely transition into a trusted and measured state.
- [x] Enable [System Guard](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/how-hardware-based-root-of-trust-helps-protect-windows) by following the instructions of [Microsoft Docs](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-system-guard/system-guard-secure-launch-and-smm-protection) to secure the boot chain.
You can also know how to check if it is enabled or not in the guide.
<div class="admonition note" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Note</p>
System Guard is mostly available on Windows Secured-Core PCs not on regular consumer devices. So, Before enabling it check the requirements of your Device.
</div>
## Protection against Malware and Viruses
- Just use the built-in Windows Defender Security to protect against threats and stick to it. Don't use any other Antivirus or Anti-Malware software [as it can weaken your security and your privacy](https://wonderfall.space/windows-hardening/#microsoft-defender-antivirus).
- [x] **Enable** [Windows Defender in a Sandbox](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/10/26/windows-defender-antivirus-can-now-run-in-a-sandbox/) by launching a **terminal** as an **administrator** and copy/paste this command ```setx /M MP_FORCE_USE_SANDBOX 1```. Restart your device and check if there's a process called **MsMpEngCP.exe** by typing `tasklist` in the terminal to verify.
- [ ] Disable Autoplay for devices so that malware hidden in USB don't execute on plugging in
![Disable autoplay](/assets/img/windows/autoplay.webp)
- [x] Enable [Controlled Folder Access](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/enable-controlled-folders) in Windows defender settings. So, The Important folders you listed for protection doesn't get attacked or held hostage in case of a ransomware attack and also stops apps from accessing your important folders. This could also be used as a firewall for the filesystem such as Choosing the drives in the protected ones. And allowing each app when it request access to your device.
- [x] Enable [Microsoft Defender Application Guard](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/md-app-guard-overview). After installing by going to "[Turn Windows Features on or off](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/install-md-app-guard)" you can enable it. This runs Microsoft Edge in an Isolated Hyper-V container preventing unknown Malware from damaging the system.
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
When you use Microsoft Defender Application Guard it bypasses the VPN you are using as when you use WDAG is launching the application in what is essentially a virtual machine, so it bypasses the host, where the VPN is connected.
</div>
- [x] Enable [Memory Integrity](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/core-isolation-e30ed737-17d8-42f3-a2a9-87521df09b78) (also called Hypervisor-Protected Code Integrity) in Windows Defender settings which will run important system process isolated in an environment that cannot be attacked by viruses & malware.
- [x] Enable `Display File Extensions` as most problems start here.
<div class="admonition example" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Enabling file extension</p>
On standard Windows settings, Malware can hide itself if the filename is like: `Secure-File.txt.exe`
What you see? A file named `Secure-File.txt`
Of course the attacker can add a different icon to the file, so it looks like you open the file type extension you think.
And if you open it, the Malware start's.
Just Open the File Explorer's settings and change it to show File Extensions by clicking on `View` > `Show` or by configuring via [Registry Editor](https://github.com/beerisgood/Windows11_Hardening/blob/master/always%20display%20file%20typ%20extension)
</div>
## Apps
- Avoid any types of Cleaning software at all cost. As Microsoft is working on its own implementation specfically designed for windows.
- To Install apps, using the `winget` (Windows Package manager). More details in [Sandboxing page](/windows/sandboxing/#using-winget-to-install-sofwaret)
## Security Improvements
- Use [PeaZip](https://peazip.github.io/) archiver instead of 7-zip as it disables [Mark of the Web(MoW)](https://nolongerset.com/mark-of-the-web-details/) [support by default](https://github.com/nmantani/archiver-MOTW-support-comparison#*2) leading to execution of malicious instantly after extracting.
- Using MS edge or brave over Firefox. Edge is recommended with MDAG mode for secure browsing if security is your priority. Brave is recommeded if content blocking is important for you (Brave shields)
- [Check](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/kernel-dma-protection-for-thunderbolt#how-to-check-if-kernel-dma-protection-is-enabled) if Kernel DMA protections is turned on.
- Use [Winget](/windows/sandboxing/#using-winget-to-install-sofware) tool to remove Bloatware instead of third party apps.
- [x] Block all incoming connections in Windows firewall.
- Go to `Firewall & Network Protection` in Windows defender security.
- Go to `Domain`, `Private` and `Public` network settings
- Scroll and check the box under **Incoming Connections**
<div class="admonition warning" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">A note regarding screen casting</p>
If you try to cast your screen to another device or cast another device screen to your device via Wireless display (Optional feature). You won't be able to connect the devices. As we have blocked Incoming connections. Miracast (Wireless casting) requires incoming connection to send data back and forth to show the screen on other or vice versa.
If you want to cast, then disable incoming connections in public network and cast your device and block connection again.
There is no problem if you use normal Projection via cable.
</div>
## Keeping your device up-to-date
You should keep your Windows Device up-to-date by enabling automatic updates. It is recommended to do so to keep your device with latest security fixes and new features.
To get information about the latest updates, you can look at the [Windows Release Information](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/release-health/windows11-release-information).
It is recommended to stick to driver updates provided via Optional Updates, as they are thoroughly vetted by Microsoft for the stability of your device, and **do not rely on third-party apps for driver updates**. This way, you get the latest updates and security patches for your drivers along with firmware updates as long as your device is supported by the OEM.
Some Hardware vendors like Nvidia, Intel has their own updater tool which will provide latest drivers.
It is recommended to rather rely on Windows updates or first-party apps.
**Credits** : The page is mostly made based on the recommendations of Windows Hardening Guide by [beerisgood](https://github.com/beerisgood/Windows11_Hardening)
*[TPM]: Trusted Platform Module
*[FDE]: Full Disk Encryption
*[UAC]: User Account Control
*[WDAG]: Windows Defender Application Guard
*[SRTM]: Static Root-of-Trust Measurement
+3 -3
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@@ -13,9 +13,9 @@ You can enhance your privacy and security on Windows without downloading any thi
- Initial Installation (coming soon)
- [Group Policy Settings](group-policies.md)
- Privacy Settings (coming soon)
- Application Sandboxing (coming soon)
- Security Hardening (coming soon)
- [Privacy Settings](privacy.md)
- [Application Sandboxing](sandboxing.md)
- [Security Hardening](hardening.md)
<div class="admonition example" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">This section is new</p>
+86
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---
title: Achieving Privacy
icon: material/incognito
---
## Using Microsoft account
You should avoid sign in to Windows with a Microsoft account. As signing in to applications like Microsoft Office (which some users are required to do for their school or company) will trigger a dark pattern offering you to sign in to Windows, which will connect your device to your Microsoft account, and compels sending data to Microsoft servers and it is critical to reject this offer.
Its worth noting that according to [this study](https://www.autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/sites/default/files/atoms/files/public_version_dutch_dpa_informal_translation_summary_of_investigation_report.pdf) it seems that Windows collects more telemetry when signed into a Microsoft Account.
![Using account for specific app](/docs/assets/img/windows/signin-one-app.webp)
You should log in to that specific app only if you need to.
or
Create another standard user account and connect it to Microsoft account if you are required for School or Work and keep the apps to that account alone. By restricting other data drive access, it is fully isolated from other profiles.
## Telemetry
To disable telemetry at full level, Open Group policy and navigate to `Computer Configuration` > `Administrative Templates` > `Windows Components` > `Data Collection and Preview builds` and choose as required
![Disable telemetry](/docs/assets/img/windows/disable-telemetry.webp)
The above works only if you use Enterprise or Education edition. If Professional, It will send required (Basic) data.
If you read this article - [https://www.softscheck.com/en/blog/windows-10-enterprise-telemetry-analysis/](https://www.softscheck.com/en/blog/windows-10-enterprise-telemetry-analysis/), Enterprise even sends data even though telemetry is disabled. But there is no updated info about this available.
Disabling full telemetry or sending basic data to Microsoft is totally upto the user's threat model.
- [ ] Disable `Automatic Sample Submission` in Windows Defender, as the feature will send your files as a sample for Signature Database and might leak your data. You can do it via the below Group Policy so to not prompt you again and again constantly.
```text
Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Microsoft Defender Antivirus > MAPS > Send file samples when further analysis is required to Never Send.
```
- [ ] Disable Windows spotlight by navigating to `User Configuration` > `Administrative Templates` > `Windows Components` > `Cloud Content` and setting **Turn off all Windows Spotlight features** policy to enabled.
<div class="admonition note" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Note</p>
This explicitly disables Windows spotlight features in Lockscreen and Desktop to sever unnecessary connections between Microsoft servers and the device.
</div>
- [ ] Disable Bing integration in Windows search, by navigating to `Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Search\Don't search the web or display web results`. This way your search queries for local indexed data is not sent to Microsoft.
- [ ] Disable notification in the Lock screen in Windows settings
![Lock screen notification](/docs/assets/img/windows/lock-screen-notifications.webp)
- [ ] Disable Online Speech recognition and Voice activation
![Alt text](/docs/docs/assets/img/windows/online-speech.webp)
![Alt text](/docs/assets/img/windows/voice-activation.webp)
- [ ] Disable delivery optimization in Windows Update settings.
- Check all the App permissions and allow only necessary ones.
## Hide MAC Address
Go to `Settings` > `Network & Internet` > `Wifi`
Enable **Random hardware addresses**
## Restrict access to data drives
To prevent other users from accessing your secondary data drives. Type `gpedit.msc` in Windows Run dialog box.
Go to `User Configuration` > `Administrative Templates` > `Windows Components` > `File Explorer` and set the Group Policy as below.
![Restrict-drive](/docs/assets/img/windows/drive-restriction.webp)
The above configuration will restrict other users to the OS drive where Windows is installed. Making total isolation between your Account and other user account.
If it's a shared drive with another person but you don't want the user to access sensitive data then use EFS. EFS encrypts the documents so that the user who encrypted it can only access it and not others.
![EFS](/docs/assets/img/windows/EFS.gif)
It is better to export the Private key certificate and store in a safe place so as to use the file later in other devices. To do so,
Press, ++win+r++, Then type `certmgr.msc`, Under `Personal` > `Certificates`. Click the certificate that contains your username. Right Click and choose export. If you find this too tricky, then after using EFS for first time. You will see an encrypted locker Icon in system tray which help you in exporting on clicking it.
To import in another device, simply open and install this certificate in that device and choose the above location. Then you can access EFS encrypted files in other system too.
*[EFS]: Encrypted File System
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---
title: Application Sandboxing
icon: octicons/apps-16
---
## Native Application Sandboxing
### Application Packaging by Windows
Windows has two types of application packaging such as `.exe`/`.msi` (Win32) and `.appx`/`.msix` (UWA).
#### Universal Windows Application (UWA)
UWAs are processes that operate within the `AppContainer` is an application sandbox environment, which implements mechanisms for the restriction of `AppContainer` processes in terms of what system resources they can access. Basically, Application that is fully isolated and only given access to certain resources.
#### Win32 Apps
Win32 is the application platform of choice for developing and running classic Windows applications, that
is, Win32 applications, that require direct access to Windows and hardware.
The core of Win32 is the Win32 API implemented in the Windows SubDLLs (DLLs) and the ntdll.dll library file. With the combination of `SubDLLs` and `ntdll.dll`, the Win32 application has direct access to full system resources.
#### A comparison between UWA and Win32
| UWAs | Windows |
| :--------- | :---------------------------------- |
|UWAs run as restricted, containerized `AppContainer` processes that run by accessing the WinRT API, a subset of COM functionalities and the Win32 API. They have specific properties that define process restrictions in terms of the system resources that processes can access.| Win32 applications run as Windows native, traditional processes that run by accessing the Win32 API and COM functionalities to their full extent and a subset of the WinRT API to directly access all system resources. They do not run as restricted processes, all system functionalities are by design directly available to them.|
|Only a single instance of a given UWA may run at a given time. | Any number of instances of a given Win32 application may run simultaneously. |
|UWAs are distributed as application packages, archive files with a pre-defined format and required content that is necessary for the deployment and operation of UWAs |The way in which Win32 applications are distributed is not restricted by the operating system. It is defined by the application vendors. |
The above comparison gives a clear cut that UWA/UWP apps are the best ones to use in terms of sandboxing the app.
### Choosing the way to install software
UWA apps are primarily distributed through Microsoft store and are counter-signed by Microsoft while as third party UWA's are signed by the vendor without Microsoft's signature.
It is recommended to use the UWA apps as they are sandboxed into their own containers.
And for Win32 apps. If you are required to use Win32 apps. Install the application in the host and run it using [Windows Sandbox](/windows/sandboxing/#run-programs-instantly-in-sandbox).
It is **recommended** to install in host and use in Sandbox to reduce your time installing the software again and again in Windows Sandbox.
### Finding Win32 and UWP apps in Windows Store
Generally, apps available in Microsoft store was UWP only before Windows 11 was launched but after the launch both Win32 and UWP apps co-exist in the store.
At this point, it is difficult to differentiate between Win32 and UWP apps. To find which is UWP or Win32. Read below:
When you see an app in store and scroll down to *Additional Information* section and see if it asks for certain permissions like in the image below:
![UWP in store](/assets/img/windows/UWP-in-MS-Store.webp)
If the Win32 App, Microsoft store will explicitly state that it is Provided and Updated by `****` and `Uses all System resources` as in the image below:
![Win32 in store](/assets/img/windows/Win32-in-MS-Store.webp)
<div class="admonition note" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Un-sandboxed UWP apps</p>
Some UWP apps in the store due to the lift of restrictions in Microsoft store developers can submit the app with a property named `runFullTrust` which disables sandboxing of that UWP application and shows that `Uses all System Resources` in *Additional Information* section such as Firefox. By this you can know if a UWP app is sandboxed or not.
If it is sandboxed, it will show only certain permissions in *Additional Information* section.
</div>
<div class="admonition abstract" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Note</p>
Most apps will ask that if the app needs to be used for all users or just for your user account. It is best you keep the app to your user Account. So, We achieve better sandboxing between different user accounts.
</div>
#### Another way to find
[rg-adguard.net](https://store.rg-adguard.net/) is a third party Microsoft store app which can be used to download `.appx` files (Installer for UWP) and install UWP apps. You can use this site to download Age Restricted apps in store and Install it. **Note** that paid apps don't work unless you connect a Microsoft Account.
## Using Winget to Install Sofware
Windows Package Manager winget command-line tool is bundled with Windows 11 and modern versions of Windows 10 by default as the App Installer.
The winget command line tool enables users to discover, install, upgrade, remove and configure applications on Windows 10 and Windows 11 computers. This tool is the client interface to the Windows Package Manager service.
More information here : [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/package-manager/winget/](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/package-manager/winget/)
The Winget tool is a powerful tool to install apps that are safe, trusted and official ones. This should be used to avoid sketchy installers.
Even you have apps installed via the traditional installer setup. You can continue using winget
A Quick demo by ThioJoe - [https://youtu.be/uxr7m8wDeGA](https://youtu.be/uxr7m8wDeGA)
Detailed info about the tool by Microsoft - [https://youtu.be/Lk1gbe_JTpY](https://youtu.be/Lk1gbe_JTpY)
If you understood about Winget, then this tool - [https://winstall.app/](https://winstall.app/) is suggested to bulk install apps.
Note : Be sure to install via Winget or using MSI installer to upgrade the app easily.
### Benefits of winget
There are general advantages in having a package manager regardless of the operating system.
- Security : The packages that the package manager includes are usually safe because theyre verified by maintainers.
- Automation : Its easier to install or uninstall N applications using a package manager. No need to do it manually.
- Maintenance : With a package manager usually you can update all your applications, including configurations.
Exploration. Instead of searching manually in a browser for an application you can use the package manager. Since its centralized it should be easier to find what you want.
## Windows Sandbox
Windows Sandbox provides a lightweight desktop environment to safely run applications in isolation. Software installed inside the Windows Sandbox environment remains "sandboxed" and runs separately from the host machine.
The sandbox is temporary like TailsOS running on a USB drive. When it's closed, all the software and files and the state are deleted. You get a brand-new instance of the sandbox every time you open it.
You can know more from the Official [Documentation](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-sandbox/windows-sandbox-overview).
**Use case of Sandbox:** The Windows Sandbox can be used to run unknown software or if you want to isolate your Workspace from the host with only Specific set of apps, etc.
### Using Sandbox
To use Sandbox, you can create a configuration file as per the official Microsoft [Documentation](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-sandbox/windows-sandbox-configure-using-wsb-file) for your needs.
So, when opening the file, sandbox opens with the Configurations you had set up in your file.
If you do not understand the documentation, you can use [Windows Sandbox Editor](https://github.com/damienvanrobaeys/Windows_Sandbox_Editor) instead. It is a GUI application that can be used to create configuration files easily.
<div class="admonition note" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Regarding Windows Sandbox Editor</p>
The repository doesn't provide a package. So, you need to download the whole codebase. After, extracting the zip Windows Defender or other Antivirus software may flag the [exe](https://github.com/damienvanrobaeys/Windows_Sandbox_Editor/tree/master/EXE) file as a malware. So, it is recommended to install it via the [Powershell Script](https://github.com/damienvanrobaeys/Windows_Sandbox_Editor/tree/master/Install%20on%20desktop%20(in%20case%20of%20issue%20with%20EXE)) they provide.
By default, You cannot execute Scripts in Powershell and it is restricted to commands only. It is recommend you allow the Terminal to `Unrestricted` mode and use it to install the editor via Script after that change it back to `Restricted` [execution policy](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_execution_policies?view=powershell-7.2) to prevent accidental execution of malicious scripts in the future.
</div>
### Run programs instantly in Sandbox
[Run in Sandbox](https://github.com/damienvanrobaeys/Run-in-Sandbox) is a tool to quickly run files in Windows Sandbox with a right click.
We recommend you to use this software as it is convenient and easy to use and even credited by Microsoft.
A full guide on How to use it can be found here: [https://www.systanddeploy.com/2021/11/run-in-sandbox-quick-way-to-runextract.html](https://www.systanddeploy.com/2021/11/run-in-sandbox-quick-way-to-runextract.html)
Note: The same note of installing sandbox editor via PowerShell also applies here except this doesn't provide an `exe` at all.
This page is based on the German BSI project - [SiSyPHuS Win10](https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN/Topics/Cyber-Security/Recommendations/SiSyPHuS_Win10/SiSyPHuS_node.html)'s Work Package 9 Dcoument.
**For Advanced Users :**
Sandboxie Plus, is a Sandboxing tool which uses File system and registry Virtualization techniques to sandbox every apps and at the same data not being lost like Windows Sandbox.
Use this at your own Risk !
*[UWA]:Universal Windows Applications
*[UWP]:Universal Windows Platform
*[SubDLLs]: Subsystem Dynamic link libraries
*[ntdll.dll]: A core Windows library file that implements functions for interaction with the kernel.
*[WinRT]: Windows Runtime
*[COM]: Component Object Model
+105
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
---
title: Windows Overview
icon: fontawesome/brands/microsoft
---
## Windows
Windows is a proprietary operating system created by Microsoft Inc. in 1985. It is primarily focused on personal computing and is now the most popular desktop OS, used by about [75%](https://gs.statcounter.com/os-market-share/desktop/worldwide) of all desktop users. However, it has its own privacy and security issues.
## Issues present in Windows
Over the years, Microsoft has demonstrated a lot of privacy-invasive behaviour with their software and services. They have continually taken advantage of the fact that Windows is the most wide-used desktop OS, and that most people don't change the default settings, in order to collect users' personal information.
Windows 10 was [criticized](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/31/windows-10-microsoft-faces-criticism-over-privacy-default-settings) for having default settings that sent a lot of data and telemetry back to Microsoft, including:
<div class="admonition quote" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">[Criticism of Microsoft - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_Microsoft#Telemetry_and_data_collection)</p>
User's contacts and calendar events, location data and history, "telemetry" (diagnostics data) ... and "advertising ID", as well as further data when the Cortana assistant is enabled.
</div>
At launch, telemetry could not be disabled in non-enterprise editions of Windows 10. Only after [criticism](https://www.theverge.com/2016/7/21/12246266/france-microsoft-privacy-windows-10-cnil) from the France data protection commission, the [Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/08/windows-10-microsoft-blatantly-disregards-user-choice-and-privacy-deep-dive) and the [European Union](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-microsoft-dataprotection-eu-idUSKBN15Z1UI), Microsoft changed the way they collect telemetry, allowing users to choose between "Basic" (now renamed as `Required`) and "Full", with "Basic" mode collecting [much less telemetry](https://www.extremetech.com/computing/243079-upcoming-windows-update-reduces-spying-microsoft-still-mum-data-collects). Along with that, Microsoft collects a [lot more data from Windows 10](https://web.archive.org/web/20210711143017/https://privacytools.io/operating-systems/#win10).
With the launch of Windows 11, a lot of [other](https://www.windowscentral.com/one-thing-microsoft-didnt-discuss-windows-11-privacy) [concerns](https://www.pcworld.com/article/539183/windows-11-review-an-unnecessary-replacement-for-windows-10.html) were raised, such as:
- Integration of Microsoft Teams into the OS, which would encourage users to switch to the service, allowing Microsoft to collect even more data.
- Removing the ability to have local accounts in Windows 11 Home, therefore forcing you to log into a Microsoft account so as to collect more data.
- Having all data collection options on by default
- Working with Amazon to bring Android apps to Windows through the Windows Subsystem for Android, likely allowing both Microsoft and Amazon to collect data about Android app usage on Windows.
- Using users in a P2P way to distribute Windows updates to reduce load in Microsoft's servers without users' consent.
## Choosing your Windows edition
While using Windows, it is better to select either Windows **Enterprise** Edition or **Education** Edition because it gives more control over the system for hardening it for privacy and security by giving access to stops the OS from sending any Telemetry data using GP Editor.
If you cannot get the above editions, you should opt for **Professional** Edition.
### Editions to avoid
- It is not recommended to use forks or modified versions of Windows such as Windows AME. It should be avoided at all cost. Since modified versions of Windows, such as AME, don't get updates, antivirus programs like Defender can fall out of date or be disabled entirely, opening you up to attacks.
- Windows **Home** edition is **not** recommended as it does not have many advantages that Professional edition provides such as BitLocker Drive Encryption, Hyper-V, Windows Sandbox, etc. It also uploads Bitlocker Encryption keys to Microsoft servers which actually defies the aspect of the encryption implemented as the key was supposed to be hold by the user.
#### Recommendations
We recommend you choose Windows 11 over Windows 10 as it is the latest version and brings many security-related improvements with it by default such as [Secure Boot](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-secure-boot), [VBS](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-vbs), [HVCI](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/bringup/device-guard-and-credential-guard), etc. Windows 10 will stop getting updates after [October 14, 2025](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/lifecycle/products/windows-10-home-and-pro).
### Installing Windows
We recommend that you use the official [Media Creation tool](https://www.microsoft.com/software-download/windows11) to flash the ISO to the USB, over third-party options such as Rufus, Balena Etcher, etc., so that you don't tamper the ISO.
#### Downloading ISO
To download the ISO. Follow these steps :
- Download Media Creation tool under `Windows 11 Installation Media`
- Open a Command prompt terminal in the directory where `mediacreationtool.exe` is downloaded.
- And Input the following Command :
```text
mediacreationtool.exe /Eula Accept /Retail /MediaArch x64 /MediaLangCode en-US /MediaEdition Enterprise
```
- If it asks for Activation key, Use this Generic Key `XGVPP-NMH47-7TTHJ-W3FW7-8HV2C`. This will just allow you to download the ISO but activation is totally upon the user.
- Accept the UAC prompt
- Download the ISO file or flash to a USB as you wish
<div class="admonition note" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Note</p>
- The ISO will consists **only** of Professional, Education & Enterprise editions with a size of ~4.2 GB (Instead of >5.5GB when you download the Multi-Edition ISO). When you download using the above way, no other editions such as Home are included in it.
- If you want to change the language of the ISO file, Just change the `en-US` part with the appropriate language and country code as per your needs.
</div>
### Activating Windows
Activating Education/Enterprise edition is different because for Enterprise Edition it needs to be a part of an enterprise network or buying an enterprise License for several devices and use it for your one device & for Education Edition it needs to be a part of school network or managed by a school administrator.
For activating Professional edition, you can buy the license key from resellers (not recommended) or the [Microsoft Store](https://www.microsoft.com/d/windows-11-pro/dg7gmgf0d8h4?rtc=1).
If you are currently using Pro and want to upgrade to Enterprise. Then, Follow the guide [here](https://www.kapilarya.com/how-to-upgrade-windows-11-pro-to-enterprise-edition)
<div class="admonition abstract" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Note</p>
This guide will be mostly on Windows 11 but some of the recommendations can be applied to Windows 10 too.
</div>
<div class="admonition danger" markdown>
<p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>
If you are going to install Windows 11, then install it only on supported devices. It is not recommended to use tools/scripts that are available online to bypass the requirements which would break the security of Windows 11 which it is aimed for.
**Never** download *Pirated* ISO Files
</div>
*[GP]: Group Policy
*[VBS]: Virtualization-Based Security
*[HVCI]: Hypervisor-Protected Code Integrity
*[AME]: Ameliorated
*[P2P]: Peer-to-Peer
+5 -3
View File
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material-
![Molly logo](assets/img/messengers/molly.svg){ align=right }
**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account.
**Molly** is an alternative Signal client for Android which allows you to encrypt the local database with a passphrase at rest, to have unused RAM data securely shredded, to route your connection via Tor, and [more](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features). It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@@ -99,9 +99,11 @@ Molly is updated every two weeks to include the latest features and bug fixes fr
Note that you are trusting multiple parties by using Molly, as you now need to trust the Signal team *and* the Molly team to deliver safe and timely updates.
There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)).
There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services.
All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements.
There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)).
All three versions of Molly provide the same security improvements.
Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code.
-1
View File
@@ -448,7 +448,6 @@
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center" valign="top" width="20%"><a rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" href="https://github.com/bruch-alex"><img src="https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/173354246?v=4" width="100px;" loading=lazy /><br /><sub><b>Alex Bruch</b></sub></a><br /><a href="#translation-bruch-alex" title="Translation">🌍</a></td>
<td align="center" valign="top" width="20%"><a rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" href="https://github.com/qiyongzheng"><img src="https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/153378707?v=4" width="100px;" loading=lazy /><br /><sub><b>qiyongzheng</b></sub></a><br /><a href="https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/commits?author=qiyongzheng" title="Documentation">📖</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
<tfoot>
+1 -1
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ NAV_ABOUT_TEAM_MEMBERS="Team Members"
NAV_ADVANCED="Advanced"
NAV_ADVANCED_TOPICS="Advanced Topics"
NAV_BLOG="Articles"
NAV_CHANGELOG="Changelog"
NAV_CODE_OF_CONDUCT="Code of Conduct"
NAV_COMMUNITY="Community"
NAV_CONTRIBUTING="Contributing"
@@ -41,7 +42,6 @@ NAV_SOFTWARE="Software"
NAV_HARDWARE="Hardware"
NAV_TECHNICAL_GUIDES="Technical Guides"
NAV_TECHNOLOGY_ESSENTIALS="Technology Essentials"
NAV_VIDEOS="Videos"
NAV_WRITING_GUIDE="Writing Guide"
SITE_DESCRIPTION="Privacy Guides is your central privacy and security resource to protect yourself online."
SITE_LANGUAGE="English"
+2 -4
View File
@@ -59,9 +59,6 @@ extra:
- icon: simple/bluesky
link: https://bsky.app/profile/privacyguides.org
name: !ENV [SOCIAL_BLUESKY, "Bluesky"]
- icon: simple/peertube
link: https://neat.tube/c/privacyguides
name: !ENV [SOCIAL_PEERTUBE, "PeerTube"]
- icon: simple/matrix
link: https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org
name: !ENV [SOCIAL_MATRIX, "Matrix"]
@@ -215,9 +212,10 @@ nav:
- index.md
- editorial.md
- tags.md
- !ENV [NAV_VIDEOS, "Videos"]: /videos/
- !ENV [NAV_ABOUT, "About"]: /en/about/
- "Donate": /en/about/donate/
- !ENV [NAV_CHANGELOG, "Changelog"]:
"https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/releases"
- !ENV [NAV_FORUM, "Forum"]: "https://discuss.privacyguides.net/"
validation:
-216
View File
@@ -1,216 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2022-2024 Jonah Aragon <jonah@triplebit.net>
# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
# deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the
# rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or
# sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
# IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
# FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NON-INFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
# AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
# LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
# FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS
# IN THE SOFTWARE.
docs_dir: "videos"
site_url: "https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/"
site_dir: "site/videos"
site_name: Privacy Guides
site_description: "Privacy Guides is the most popular & trustworthy non-profit privacy resource to find privacy tools and learn about protecting your digital life."
edit_uri_template: blob/main/videos/{path}?plain=1
extra:
privacy_guides:
footer:
intro:
!ENV [
FOOTER_INTRO,
"Privacy Guides is a non-profit, socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy.",
]
note:
!ENV [
FOOTER_NOTE,
"We do not make money from recommending certain products, and we do not use affiliate links.",
]
copyright:
author:
!ENV [FOOTER_COPYRIGHT_AUTHOR, "Privacy Guides and contributors."]
date: !ENV [FOOTER_COPYRIGHT_DATE, "2019-2024"]
license:
- fontawesome/brands/creative-commons
- fontawesome/brands/creative-commons-by
- fontawesome/brands/creative-commons-sa
homepage: https://www.privacyguides.org/en/
generator: false
context: !ENV [BUILD_CONTEXT, "production"]
offline: !ENV [BUILD_OFFLINE, false]
deploy: !ENV DEPLOY_ID
social:
- icon: simple/mastodon
link: https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides
name: !ENV [SOCIAL_MASTODON, "Mastodon"]
- icon: simple/bluesky
link: https://bsky.app/profile/privacyguides.org
name: !ENV [SOCIAL_BLUESKY, "Bluesky"]
- icon: simple/peertube
link: https://neat.tube/c/privacyguides
name: !ENV [SOCIAL_PEERTUBE, "PeerTube"]
- icon: simple/matrix
link: https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org
name: !ENV [SOCIAL_MATRIX, "Matrix"]
- icon: simple/discourse
link: https://discuss.privacyguides.net/
name: !ENV [SOCIAL_FORUM, "Forum"]
- icon: simple/github
link: https://github.com/privacyguides
name: !ENV [SOCIAL_GITHUB, "GitHub"]
- icon: simple/torbrowser
link: http://www.xoe4vn5uwdztif6goazfbmogh6wh5jc4up35bqdflu6bkdc5cas5vjqd.onion/posts/
name: !ENV [SOCIAL_TOR_SITE, "Hidden service"]
repo_url:
!ENV [BUILD_REPO_URL, "https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org"]
repo_name: ""
theme:
name: material
language: en
custom_dir: theme
font:
text: Public Sans
code: DM Mono
palette:
- media: "(prefers-color-scheme)"
scheme: default
accent: deep purple
toggle:
icon: material/brightness-auto
name: !ENV [THEME_DARK, "Switch to dark mode"]
- media: "(prefers-color-scheme: dark)"
scheme: slate
accent: amber
toggle:
icon: material/brightness-2
name: !ENV [THEME_LIGHT, "Switch to light mode"]
- media: "(prefers-color-scheme: light)"
scheme: default
accent: deep purple
toggle:
icon: material/brightness-5
name: !ENV [THEME_AUTO, "Switch to system theme"]
favicon: assets/brand/logos/png/favicon-32x32.png
icon:
repo: simple/github
features:
- announce.dismiss
- navigation.tracking
- navigation.tabs
- navigation.path
- navigation.indexes
- navigation.footer
- content.action.edit
- content.tabs.link
- content.tooltips
- search.highlight
extra_css:
- assets/stylesheets/extra.css?v=20240829
watch:
- theme
- includes
plugins:
blog:
blog_dir: .
blog_toc: true
post_url_format: "{date}/{file}"
post_excerpt_max_authors: 0
authors_profiles: false
categories: false
rss:
match_path: posts/.*
abstract_chars_count: -1
date_from_meta:
as_creation: date.created
as_update: date.updated
categories:
- categories
- tags
glightbox: {}
tags: {}
search: {}
privacy:
enabled: !ENV [BUILD_PRIVACY, true]
offline:
enabled: !ENV [BUILD_OFFLINE, false]
group:
enabled: !ENV [BUILD_INSIDERS, true]
plugins:
macros: {}
meta: {}
optimize:
enabled: !ENV [OPTIMIZE, PRODUCTION, NETLIFY, false]
typeset: {}
social:
cards: !ENV [CARDS, true]
cards_dir: assets/img/social
cards_layout_dir: theme/layouts
cards_layout: page
markdown_extensions:
admonition: {}
pymdownx.details: {}
pymdownx.superfences:
custom_fences:
- name: mermaid
class: mermaid
format: !!python/name:pymdownx.superfences.fence_code_format
pymdownx.tabbed:
alternate_style: true
pymdownx.arithmatex:
generic: true
pymdownx.critic: {}
pymdownx.caret: {}
pymdownx.keys: {}
pymdownx.mark: {}
pymdownx.tilde: {}
pymdownx.snippets:
auto_append:
- !ENV [BUILD_ABBREVIATIONS, "includes/abbreviations.en.txt"]
pymdownx.tasklist:
custom_checkbox: true
attr_list: {}
def_list: {}
md_in_html: {}
meta: {}
abbr: {}
pymdownx.emoji:
emoji_index: !!python/name:material.extensions.emoji.twemoji
emoji_generator: !!python/name:material.extensions.emoji.to_svg
tables: {}
footnotes: {}
toc:
toc_depth: 4
nav:
- !ENV [NAV_HOME, "Home"]: /en/
- !ENV [NAV_KNOWLEDGE_BASE, "Knowledge Base"]: /en/basics/why-privacy-matters/
- !ENV [NAV_RECOMMENDATIONS, "Recommendations"]: /en/tools/
- !ENV [NAV_BLOG, "Articles"]: /articles/
- !ENV [NAV_VIDEOS, "Videos"]:
- index.md
- !ENV [NAV_ABOUT, "About"]: /en/about/
- "Donate": /en/about/donate/
- !ENV [NAV_FORUM, "Forum"]: "https://discuss.privacyguides.net/"
validation:
nav:
not_found: info
+15 -14
View File
@@ -132,6 +132,16 @@ extra:
"If you spot an error, think a provider should not be listed, notice a qualified provider is missing, believe a browser plugin is no longer the best choice, or uncover any other issue, please let us know.",
]
rss:
- title:
!ENV [
HOMEPAGE_RSS_CHANGELOG_TITLE,
"Privacy Guides release changelog",
]
link:
!ENV [
HOMEPAGE_RSS_CHANGELOG_LINK,
"https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/site-development/changelog/9.rss",
]
- title: !ENV [HOMEPAGE_RSS_BLOG_TITLE, "Privacy Guides blog feed"]
link:
!ENV [
@@ -148,16 +158,6 @@ extra:
HOMEPAGE_RSS_FORUM_LINK,
"https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest.rss",
]
- title:
!ENV [
HOMEPAGE_RSS_CHANGELOG_TITLE,
"Privacy Guides release changelog",
]
link:
!ENV [
HOMEPAGE_RSS_CHANGELOG_LINK,
"https://discuss.privacyguides.net/c/site-development/changelog/9.rss",
]
translation_notice:
notice: !ENV TRANSLATION_NOTICE
cta: !ENV [TRANSLATION_NOTICE_CTA, "Visit Crowdin"]
@@ -170,9 +170,6 @@ extra:
- icon: simple/bluesky
link: https://bsky.app/profile/privacyguides.org
name: !ENV [SOCIAL_BLUESKY, "Bluesky"]
- icon: simple/peertube
link: https://neat.tube/c/privacyguides
name: !ENV [SOCIAL_PEERTUBE, "PeerTube"]
- icon: simple/matrix
link: https://matrix.to/#/#privacyguides:matrix.org
name: !ENV [SOCIAL_MATRIX, "Matrix"]
@@ -394,6 +391,9 @@ nav:
- !ENV [NAV_OPERATING_SYSTEMS_WINDOWS, "Windows"]:
- "os/windows/index.md"
- "os/windows/group-policies.md"
- "os/windows/privacy.md"
- "os/windows/hardening.md"
- "os/windows/sandboxing.md"
- !ENV [NAV_RECOMMENDATIONS, "Recommendations"]:
- "tools.md"
- !ENV [NAV_INTERNET_BROWSING, "Internet Browsing"]:
@@ -444,7 +444,6 @@ nav:
- "alternative-networks.md"
- "device-integrity.md"
- !ENV [NAV_BLOG, "Articles"]: "/articles/"
- !ENV [NAV_VIDEOS, "Videos"]: /videos/
- !ENV [NAV_ABOUT, "About"]:
- "about.md"
- "about/donate.md"
@@ -471,6 +470,8 @@ nav:
- "meta/git-recommendations.md"
- "meta/commit-messages.md"
- !ENV [NAV_DONATE, "Donate"]: https://donate.magicgrants.org/privacyguides
- !ENV [NAV_CHANGELOG, "Changelog"]:
"https://github.com/privacyguides/privacyguides.org/releases"
- !ENV [NAV_FORUM, "Forum"]: "https://discuss.privacyguides.net/"
validation:

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