style: Update frontmatter/intros to tool pages

2026-05-14 15:41:17 +00:00 · 2026-05-12 13:09:57 -05:00
parent 2e0ad0fc9d
commit caed4eb4b6
48 changed files with 162 additions and 583 deletions
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ cascade:
  type: docs
  contextMenu: true
 ---
-
 If you're looking for a specific solution to something, these are the hardware and software tools we recommend in a variety of categories. Our recommended privacy tools are primarily chosen based on security features, with additional emphasis on decentralized and open-source tools. They are applicable to a variety of threat models ranging from protection against global mass surveillance programs and avoiding big tech companies to mitigating attacks, but only you can determine what will work best for your needs.

 {{< cards >}}
@@ -1,18 +1,16 @@
 ---
 title: "Alternative Networks"
-icon: material/vector-polygon
 description: These tools allow you to access networks other than the World Wide Web.
-cover: alternative-networks.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
- [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs){ .pg-blue }
- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
+[{{< badge content="Service Providers" color="indigo" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers)
+[{{< badge content="Mass Surveillance" color="blue" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs)
+[{{< badge content="Surveillance Capitalism" color="purple" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model)

 ## Anonymizing Networks

-When it comes to anonymizing networks, we want to specially note that [Tor](advanced/tor-overview.md) is our top choice. It is by far the most utilized, robustly studied, and actively developed anonymous network. Using other networks could be more likely to endanger your [:material-incognito: Anonymity](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple }, unless you know what you're doing.
+When it comes to anonymizing networks, we want to specially note that [Tor](../../../wiki/advanced/tor-overview.md) is our top choice. It is by far the most utilized, robustly studied, and actively developed anonymous network. Using other networks could be more likely to endanger your [:material-incognito: Anonymity](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple }, unless you know what you're doing.

 ### Tor

@@ -20,7 +18,7 @@ When it comes to anonymizing networks, we want to specially note that [Tor](adva

 ![Tor logo](tor.svg){ align=right }

-The **Tor** network is a group of volunteer-operated servers that allows you to connect for free and improve your privacy and security on the Internet. Individuals and organizations can also share information over the Tor network with ".onion hidden services" without compromising their privacy. Because Tor traffic is difficult to block and trace, Tor is an effective [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray } circumvention tool.
+The **Tor** network is a group of volunteer-operated servers that allows you to connect for free and improve your privacy and security on the Internet. Individuals and organizations can also share information over the Tor network with ".onion hidden services" without compromising their privacy. Because Tor traffic is difficult to block and trace, Tor is an effective [:material-close-outline: Censorship](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray } circumvention tool.

 [:octicons-home-16:](https://torproject.org){ .card-link title=Homepage }
 [:simple-torbrowser:](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
@@ -32,7 +30,7 @@ The **Tor** network is a group of volunteer-operated servers that allows you to

 The recommended way to access the Tor network is via the official Tor Browser, which we have covered in more detail on a dedicated page:

-[Tor Browser Info :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
+[Tor Browser Info :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](tor.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../../../wiki/advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }

 You can access the Tor network using other tools; making this determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using apps like [Orbot](#orbot) or mobile browser apps to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.

@@ -1,11 +1,8 @@
 ---
 title: "Device Integrity"
-icon: material/security
 description: These tools can be used to check your devices for compromise.
-cover: device-integrity.webp
 robots: nofollow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large
 ---
-
 These tools can be used to validate the integrity of your mobile devices and check them for indicators of compromise by spyware and malware such as Pegasus, Predator, or KingsPawn. This page focuses on **mobile security**, because mobile devices typically have read-only systems with well-known configurations, so detecting malicious modifications is easier than on traditional desktop systems. We may expand the focus of this page in the future.

 <div class="admonition note" markdown>
@@ -48,7 +45,7 @@ These tools provide analysis based on the information they have the ability to a

 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
+[{{< badge content="Targeted Attacks" color="red" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals)

 External verification tools run on your computer and scan your mobile device for forensic traces, which are helpful to identify potential compromise.

@@ -135,8 +132,8 @@ iMazing automates and interactively guides you through the process of using [MVT

 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
+[{{< badge content="Targeted Attacks" color="red" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals)
+[{{< badge content="Passive Attacks" color="amber" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy)

 These are apps you can install which check your device and operating system for signs of tampering, and validate the identity of your device.

@@ -187,4 +184,4 @@ It is important to note that Auditor can only effectively detect changes **after

 No personally identifiable information is submitted to the attestation service. We recommend that you sign up with an anonymous account and enable remote attestation for continuous monitoring.

-If your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address from the attestation service, you could consider using [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [VPN](vpn.md).
+If your [threat model](../../../wiki/basics/threat-modeling.md requires hiding your IP address from the attestation service, you could consider using [Orbot](alternative-networks.md#orbot) or a [VPN](vpn.md).
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
 title: All Privacy Tools
 weight: 10
 ---
-
 <style>
 .hextra-card-image {
  width: 100px;
@@ -1,34 +1,11 @@
 ---
 title: Mobile Phones
-icon: material/cellphone-check
 description: These mobile devices provide the best hardware security support for custom Android operating systems.
-cover: android.webp
-schema:
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": WebPage
-    name: Mobile Phone Recommendations
-    url: "./"
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": Product
-    name: Pixel
-    brand:
-      "@type": Brand
-      name: Google
-    image: /assets/img/android/google-pixel.png
-    sameAs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Pixel
-    review:
-      "@type": Review
-      author:
-        "@type": Organization
-        name: Privacy Guides
-robots: nofollow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
+[{{< badge content="Targeted Attacks" color="red" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals)
+[{{< badge content="Passive Attacks" color="amber" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy)

 Most **mobile phones** receive short or limited windows of security updates from OEMs; after these devices reach the end of their support period, they **cannot** be considered secure as they no longer receive firmware or driver security updates.

@@ -1,15 +1,13 @@
 ---
 title: Security Keys
-icon: material/key-chain
 description: These security keys provide a form of phishing-immune authentication for accounts that support it.
-cover: multi-factor-authentication.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
+[{{< badge content="Targeted Attacks" color="red" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals)
+[{{< badge content="Passive Attacks" color="amber" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy)

-A physical **security key** adds a very strong layer of protection to your online accounts. Compared to [authenticator apps](multi-factor-authentication.md), the [FIDO2](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) security key protocol is immune to phishing, and cannot be compromised without physical possession of the key itself. Many services support FIDO2/WebAuthn as a multifactor authentication option for securing your account, and some services allow you to use a security key as a strong single-factor authenticator with passwordless authentication.
+A physical **security key** adds a very strong layer of protection to your online accounts. Compared to [authenticator apps](multi-factor-authentication.md), the [FIDO2](../../../wiki/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) security key protocol is immune to phishing, and cannot be compromised without physical possession of the key itself. Many services support FIDO2/WebAuthn as a multifactor authentication option for securing your account, and some services allow you to use a security key as a strong single-factor authenticator with passwordless authentication.

 ## Yubico Security Key

@@ -1,23 +1,7 @@
 ---
 title: "Android"
 description: Our advice for replacing privacy-invasive default Android features with private and secure alternatives.
-icon: 'simple/android'
-cover: android.webp
-schema:
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": WebPage
-    name: Android Recommendations
-    url: "./"
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": CreativeWork
-    name: Android
-    image: /assets/img/android/android.svg
-    url: https://source.android.com/
-    sameAs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)
 ---
-
 ![Android logo](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right }

 The **Android Open Source Project** (AOSP) is an open-source mobile operating system led by Google which powers the majority of the world's mobile devices. Most phones sold with Android are modified to include invasive integrations and apps such as Google Play Services, so you can significantly improve your privacy on your mobile device by replacing your phone's default installation with a version of Android without these invasive features.
@@ -1,30 +1,11 @@
 ---
-meta_title: "The Best Android Operating Systems - Privacy Guides"
 title: Alternative Distributions
 description: You can replace the operating system on your Android phone with these secure and privacy-respecting alternatives.
-schema:
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": WebPage
-    name: Private Android Operating Systems
-    url: "./"
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": CreativeWork
-    name: GrapheneOS
-    image: /assets/img/android/grapheneos.svg
-    url: https://grapheneos.org/
-    sameAs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GrapheneOS
-    subjectOf:
-      "@context": http://schema.org
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
-robots: nofollow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
+[{{< badge content="Targeted Attacks" color="red" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals)
+[{{< badge content="Passive Attacks" color="amber" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy)

 A **custom Android-based operating system** (sometimes referred to as a **custom ROM**) can be a way to achieve a higher level of privacy and security on your device. This is in contrast to the "stock" version of Android which comes with your phone from the factory, and is often deeply integrated with Google Play Services as well as other vendor software.

@@ -61,7 +42,7 @@ GrapheneOS also provides a global toggle for enabling MTE on all user-installed

 ### Connectivity Checks

-By default, Android makes many network connections to Google to perform DNS connectivity checks, to sync with current network time, to check your network connectivity, and for many other background tasks. GrapheneOS replaces these with connections to servers operated by GrapheneOS and subject to their privacy policy. This hides information like your IP address [from Google](../basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers), but means it is trivial for an admin on your network or ISP to see you are making connections to `grapheneos.network`, `grapheneos.org`, etc. and deduce what operating system you are using.
+By default, Android makes many network connections to Google to perform DNS connectivity checks, to sync with current network time, to check your network connectivity, and for many other background tasks. GrapheneOS replaces these with connections to servers operated by GrapheneOS and subject to their privacy policy. This hides information like your IP address [from Google](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers), but means it is trivial for an admin on your network or ISP to see you are making connections to `grapheneos.network`, `grapheneos.org`, etc. and deduce what operating system you are using.

 If you want to hide information like this from an adversary on your network or ISP, you **must** use a [trusted VPN](../vpn.md) in addition to changing the connectivity check setting to **Standard (Google)**. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **Internet connectivity checks**. This option allows you to connect to Google's servers for connectivity checks, which, alongside the usage of a VPN, helps you blend in with a larger pool of Android devices.

@@ -1,35 +1,10 @@
 ---
 title: "General Apps"
 description: The apps listed here are Android-exclusive and specifically enhance or replace key system functionality.
-schema:
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": WebPage
-    name: General Android Apps
-    url: "./"
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": MobileApplication
-    name: Shelter
-    applicationCategory: Utilities
-    operatingSystem: Android
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": MobileApplication
-    name: Secure Camera
-    applicationCategory: Utilities
-    operatingSystem: Android
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": MobileApplication
-    name: Secure PDF Viewer
-    applicationCategory: Utilities
-    operatingSystem: Android
-robots: nofollow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
+[{{< badge content="Passive Attacks" color="amber" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy)

 We recommend a wide variety of Android apps throughout this site. The apps listed here are Android-exclusive and specifically enhance or replace key system functionality.

@@ -64,7 +39,7 @@ Shelter is recommended over [Insular](https://secure-system.gitlab.io/Insular) a

 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-account-search: Public Exposure](../basics/common-threats.md#limiting-public-information){ .pg-green }
+[{{< badge content="Public Exposure" color="green" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#limiting-public-information)

 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>

@@ -108,7 +83,7 @@ The image orientation metadata is not deleted. If you enable location (in Secure

 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](../basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
+[{{< badge content="Targeted Attacks" color="red" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals)

 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>

@@ -1,12 +1,10 @@
 ---
 title: "Desktop/PC"
-icon: simple/linux
 description: Linux distributions are commonly recommended for privacy protection and software freedom.
-cover: desktop.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
+[{{< badge content="Surveillance Capitalism" color="purple" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model)

 Linux distributions are commonly recommended for privacy protection and software freedom. If you don't already use Linux, below are some distributions we suggest trying out, as well as some general privacy and security improvement tips that are applicable to many Linux distributions.

@@ -140,7 +138,7 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th

 ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right }

-**Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and [:material-incognito: Anonymity](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple } on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os).
+**Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and [:material-incognito: Anonymity](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple } on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os).

 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://whonix.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:simple-torbrowser:](http://dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
@@ -163,7 +161,7 @@ Whonix is best used [in conjunction with Qubes](https://whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Wh

 ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ align=right }

-**Tails** is a live operating system based on Debian that routes all communications through Tor, which can boot on on almost any computer from a DVD, USB stick, or SD card installation. It uses [Tor](tor.md) to preserve privacy and [:material-incognito: Anonymity](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple } while circumventing censorship, and it leaves no trace of itself on the computer it is used on after it is powered off.
+**Tails** is a live operating system based on Debian that routes all communications through Tor, which can boot on on almost any computer from a DVD, USB stick, or SD card installation. It uses [Tor](tor.md) to preserve privacy and [:material-incognito: Anonymity](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple } while circumventing censorship, and it leaves no trace of itself on the computer it is used on after it is powered off.

 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://tails.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-info-16:](https://tails.net/doc/index.en.html){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
@@ -190,7 +188,7 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte

 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
+[{{< badge content="Passive Attacks" color="amber" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy)

 ### Qubes OS

@@ -211,7 +209,7 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte

 </div>

-Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate *qubes*. Should one part of the system be compromised via an exploit in a [:material-target-account: Targeted Attack](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the *qubes* and the core system.
+Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate *qubes*. Should one part of the system be compromised via an exploit in a [:material-target-account: Targeted Attack](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the *qubes* and the core system.

 For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page.

@@ -271,4 +269,4 @@ Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety o

 In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.**

-[^1]: Reproducibility entails the ability to verify that packages and binaries made available to the end user match the source code, which can be useful against potential [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations){ .pg-viridian }.
+[^1]: Reproducibility entails the ability to verify that packages and binaries made available to the end user match the source code, which can be useful against potential [:material-package-variant-closed-remove: Supply Chain Attacks](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-certain-organizations){ .pg-viridian }.
@@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
 ---
 title: "Router Firmware"
-icon: material/router-wireless
 description: Alternative operating systems for securing your router or Wi-Fi access point.
-cover: router.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
+[{{< badge content="Surveillance Capitalism" color="purple" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model)
+[{{< badge content="Passive Attacks" color="amber" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy)

 Below are a few alternative operating systems that can be used on routers, Wi-Fi access points, etc.

@@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
 ---
 title: Self-Hosting
-meta_title: "Self-Hosting Software and Services - Privacy Guides"
 description: For our more technical readers, self-hosting software and services can provide additional privacy assurances since you have maximum control over your data.
-cover: router.webp
 weight: 40
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](../basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
+[{{< badge content="Service Providers" color="indigo" >}}](../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers)

 **Self-hosting** software and services can be a way to achieve a higher level of privacy through digital sovereignty, particularly independence from cloud servers controlled by product developers or vendors. By self-hosting, we mean hosting applications and data on your own hardware.

@@ -1,14 +1,11 @@
 ---
 title: DNS Filtering
-meta_title: "Self-Hosting DNS Solutions - Privacy Guides"
-icon: material/dns
 description: For our more technical readers, self-hosting a DNS solution can provide filtering for devices not covered by cloud-based DNS solutions.
-cover: dns.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](../basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](../basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
+[{{< badge content="Service Providers" color="indigo" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers)
+[{{< badge content="Surveillance Capitalism" color="purple" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model)

 **Self-hosting DNS** is useful for providing [DNS filtering](https://cloudflare.com/learning/access-management/what-is-dns-filtering) on controlled platforms, such as smart TVs and other IoT devices, as no client-side software is needed. Keep in mind that the DNS solutions below are typically restricted to your home or local network unless you set up a more advanced configuration.

@@ -1,13 +1,10 @@
 ---
 title: Email Servers
-meta_title: "Self-Hosting Email - Privacy Guides"
-icon: material/email
 description: For our more technical readers, self-hosting your own email can provide additional privacy assurances by having maximum control over your data.
-cover: email.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](../basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
+[{{< badge content="Service Providers" color="indigo" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers)

 Advanced system administrators may consider setting up their own **email server**. Mail servers require attention and continuous maintenance in order to keep things secure and mail delivery reliable. In addition to the "all-in-one" solutions below, we've picked out a few articles that cover a more manual approach:

@@ -1,13 +1,10 @@
 ---
 title: File Management
-meta_title: "Self-Hosting File Management Tools - Privacy Guides"
-icon: material/file-multiple-outline
 description: For our more technical readers, self-hosting file management tools can provide additional privacy assurances by having maximum control over your data.
-cover: cloud.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](../basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
+[{{< badge content="Service Providers" color="indigo" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers)

 Self-hosting your own **file management** tools may be a good idea to reduce the risk of encryption flaws in a cloud provider's native clients.

@@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
 ---
 title: Calendar Sync
-icon: material/calendar
 description: Calendars contain some of your most sensitive data; use products that implement encryption at rest.
-cover: calendar.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
+[{{< badge content="Passive Attacks" color="amber" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy)
+[{{< badge content="Service Providers" color="indigo" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers)

 **Calendars** contain some of your most sensitive data; use products that implement end-to-end encryption at rest to prevent a provider from reading them.

@@ -2,29 +2,29 @@
 title: Cloud Storage
 description: Many cloud storage providers require your trust that they will not look at your files. These are private alternatives!
 ---
+<small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

-<small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small> 
-[{{< badge content="Passive Attacks" color="orange" >}}]((basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy))
-[{{< badge content="Service Providers" color="teal" >}}]((basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers))
+[{{< badge content="Passive Attacks" color="amber" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy)
+[{{< badge content="Service Providers" color="indigo" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers)

 <div class="pg-card-logos">
 {{< cards >}}
-  {{< card link="#proton-drive" title="Proton Drive" image="https://www.privacyguides.org/en/assets/img/cloud/protondrive.svg" subtitle="Proton Drive is an encrypted cloud storage provider from the popular encrypted email provider Proton Mail." >}}
-  {{< card link="#tresorit" title="Tresorit" image="https://www.privacyguides.org/en/assets/img/cloud/tresorit.svg" subtitle="Tresorit is a Swiss-Hungarian encrypted cloud storage provider founded in 2011. Tresorit is owned by the Swiss Post, the national postal service of Switzerland." >}}
-  {{< card link="#peergos" title="Peergos" image="https://www.privacyguides.org/en/assets/img/cloud/peergos.svg" subtitle="Peergos is a decentralized protocol and open-source platform for storage, social media, and applications. It provides a secure and private space where users can store, share, view, and edit their photos, videos, documents, etc." >}}
+  {{< card link="#proton-drive" title="Proton Drive" image="./protondrive.svg" subtitle="Proton Drive is an encrypted cloud storage provider from the popular encrypted email provider Proton Mail." >}}
+  {{< card link="#tresorit" title="Tresorit" image="./tresorit.svg" subtitle="Tresorit is a Swiss-Hungarian encrypted cloud storage provider founded in 2011. Tresorit is owned by the Swiss Post, the national postal service of Switzerland." >}}
+  {{< card link="#peergos" title="Peergos" image="./peergos.svg" subtitle="Peergos is a decentralized protocol and open-source platform for storage, social media, and applications. It provides a secure and private space where users can store, share, view, and edit their photos, videos, documents, etc." >}}
 {{< /cards >}}
 </div>

 Many **cloud storage providers** require your full trust that they will not look at your files. The alternatives listed below eliminate the need for trust by implementing secure end-to-end encryption.

-If these alternatives do not fit your needs, we suggest you look into using encryption software like [Cryptomator](encryption.md#cryptomator-cloud) with another cloud provider. Using Cryptomator in conjunction with **any** cloud provider (including these) may be a good idea to reduce the risk of encryption flaws in a provider's native clients.
+If these alternatives do not fit your needs, we suggest you look into using encryption software like [Cryptomator](../../software/encryption/_index.md#cryptomator-cloud) with another cloud provider. Using Cryptomator in conjunction with **any** cloud provider (including these) may be a good idea to reduce the risk of encryption flaws in a provider's native clients.

 > [!NOTE]
-> For more technical readers, Nextcloud is [still a recommended tool](self-hosting/file-management.md#nextcloud) for self-hosting a file management suite, however we do not recommend third-party Nextcloud storage providers at the moment, because we do [not recommend](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/dont-recommend-nextcloud-e2ee/10352/29) Nextcloud's built-in E2EE functionality for home users.
+> For more technical readers, Nextcloud is [still a recommended tool](../../self-hosting/file-management/_index.md#nextcloud) for self-hosting a file management suite, however we do not recommend third-party Nextcloud storage providers at the moment, because we do [not recommend](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/dont-recommend-nextcloud-e2ee/10352/29) Nextcloud's built-in E2EE functionality for home users.

 ## Proton Drive

-**Proton Drive** is an encrypted cloud storage provider from the popular encrypted email provider [Proton Mail](email.md#proton-mail).
+**Proton Drive** is an encrypted cloud storage provider from the popular encrypted email provider [Proton Mail](../email/_index.md#proton-mail).

 The initial free storage is limited to 2 GB, but with the completion of [certain steps](https://proton.me/support/more-free-storage-existing-users), additional storage can be obtained up to 5 GB.

@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ Peergos secures your files with quantum-resistant E2EE and ensures all data abou
 [{{< badge content="Web" color="gray" >}}](https://peergos.net)
 [{{< badge content="GitHub" color="gray" >}}](https://github.com/Peergos/web-ui/releases)

-Peergos is built on top of the [InterPlanetary File System (IPFS)](https://ipfs.tech), a peer-to-peer architecture that protects against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }.
+Peergos is built on top of the [InterPlanetary File System (IPFS)](https://ipfs.tech), a peer-to-peer architecture that protects against [Censorship](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship).

 The client, server, and command line interface for Peergos all run from the same binary. Additionally, Peergos includes a [sync engine](https://book.peergos.org/features/sync) (accessible via the native apps) for bi-directionally synchronizing a local folder with a Peergos folder, and a [webdav bridge](https://book.peergos.org/features/webdav) to allow other applications to access your Peergos storage. You can refer to Peergos's documentation for a full overview of their numerous features.

@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ Peergos was [audited](https://peergos.org/posts/security-audit-2024) in November

 ## Criteria

-**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](../../../about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.

 ### Minimum Requirements

@@ -1,12 +1,10 @@
 ---
 title: Data Removal Services
-icon: material/database-off
 description: Our recommended methods for removing your personal information from data brokers and people search sites.
-cover: data-broker-removals.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-account-search: Public Exposure](../../kb/basics/common-misconceptions.md){ .pg-green }
+[{{< badge content="Public Exposure" color="green" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-misconceptions.md)

 "People search sites" operated by data brokers represent an immense privacy risk to the majority of Americans. For many, sensitive personal information such as your address, phone number, email, and age is a simple internet search away. While there is unfortunately no federal regulation in place to protect your data, many of these companies will remove your information from their *public* databases upon request.

@@ -1,24 +1,20 @@
 ---
 title: DNS Resolvers
-icon: material/dns
 description: We recommend choosing these encrypted DNS providers to replace your ISP's default configuration.
-cover: dns.webp
-global:
- - [randomize-element, "table tbody"]
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
+[{{< badge content="Surveillance Capitalism" color="purple" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model)

 Encrypted **DNS** with third-party servers should only be used to get around basic [DNS blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) when you can be sure there won't be any consequences. Encrypted DNS will not help you hide any of your browsing activity.

-[Learn more about DNS :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/dns-overview.md){ .md-button }
+[Learn more about DNS :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../../../wiki/advanced/dns-overview.md){ .md-button }

 ## Recommended Providers

 These are our favorite public DNS resolvers based on their privacy and security characteristics, and their worldwide performance. Some of these services offer basic DNS-level blocking of malware or trackers depending on the server you choose, but if you want to be able to see and customize what is blocked, you should use a dedicated DNS filtering product instead.

-| DNS Provider | Protocols | Logging / Privacy Policy | [ECS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-edns-client-subnet-ecs) | Filtering | Signed Apple Profile |
+| DNS Provider | Protocols | Logging / Privacy Policy | [ECS](../../../wiki/advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-edns-client-subnet-ecs) | Filtering | Signed Apple Profile |
 |---|---|---|---|---|---|
 | [**AdGuard Public DNS**](https://adguard-dns.io/en/public-dns.html) | Cleartext <br>DoH/3 <br>DoT <br>DoQ <br>DNSCrypt | Anonymized[^1] | Anonymized | Based on server choice. Filter list being used can be found here. [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardSDNSFilter) | Yes [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://adguard-dns.io/en/blog/encrypted-dns-ios-14.html) |
 | [**Cloudflare**](https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/setup) | Cleartext <br>DoH/3 <br>DoT | Anonymized[^2] | No | Based on server choice. | No [:octicons-link-external-24:](https://community.cloudflare.com/t/requesting-1-1-1-1-signed-profiles-for-apple/571846) |
@@ -118,7 +114,7 @@ NextDNS also offers a public DoH service at `https://dns.nextdns.io` and DNS-ove

 ## Encrypted DNS Proxies

-Encrypted DNS proxy software provides a local proxy for the [unencrypted DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md#unencrypted-dns) resolver to forward to. Typically, it is used on platforms that don't natively support [encrypted DNS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns).
+Encrypted DNS proxy software provides a local proxy for the [unencrypted DNS](../../../wiki/advanced/dns-overview.md#unencrypted-dns) resolver to forward to. Typically, it is used on platforms that don't natively support [encrypted DNS](../../../wiki/advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-encrypted-dns).

 ### RethinkDNS

@@ -127,7 +123,7 @@ Encrypted DNS proxy software provides a local proxy for the [unencrypted DNS](ad
 ![RethinkDNS logo](assets/img/android/rethinkdns.svg#only-light){ align=right }
 ![RethinkDNS logo](assets/img/android/rethinkdns-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right }

-**RethinkDNS** is an open-source Android client that supports [DoH](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), [DoT](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-tls-dot), [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt) and DNS Proxy. It also provides additional functionality such as caching DNS responses, locally logging DNS queries, and using the app as a firewall.
+**RethinkDNS** is an open-source Android client that supports [DoH](../../../wiki/advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), [DoT](../../../wiki/advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-tls-dot), [DNSCrypt](../../../wiki/advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt) and DNS Proxy. It also provides additional functionality such as caching DNS responses, locally logging DNS queries, and using the app as a firewall.

 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://rethinkdns.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://rethinkdns.com/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@@ -152,7 +148,7 @@ While RethinkDNS takes up the Android VPN slot, you can still use a VPN or Orbot

 ![DNSCrypt-Proxy logo](assets/img/dns/dnscrypt-proxy.svg){ align=right }

-**DNSCrypt-Proxy** is a DNS proxy with support for [DNSCrypt](advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt), [DoH](advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), and [Anonymized DNS](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Anonymized-DNS).
+**DNSCrypt-Proxy** is a DNS proxy with support for [DNSCrypt](../../../wiki/advanced/dns-overview.md#dnscrypt), [DoH](../../../wiki/advanced/dns-overview.md#dns-over-https-doh), and [Anonymized DNS](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki/Anonymized-DNS).

 [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/DNSCrypt/dnscrypt-proxy/wiki){ .card-link title="Documentation" }
@@ -173,19 +169,19 @@ While RethinkDNS takes up the Android VPN slot, you can still use a VPN or Orbot
 <div class="admonition warning" markdown>
 <p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>

-The anonymized DNS feature does [not](advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns) anonymize other network traffic.
+The anonymized DNS feature does [not](../../../wiki/advanced/dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns) anonymize other network traffic.

 </div>

 ## Criteria

-**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
+**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](../../../about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.

 All DNS products...

- Must support [DNSSEC](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-dnssec).
- Must support [QNAME Minimization](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-qname-minimization).
- Must anonymize [ECS](advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-edns-client-subnet-ecs) or disable it by default.
+- Must support [DNSSEC](../../../wiki/advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-dnssec).
+- Must support [QNAME Minimization](../../../wiki/advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-qname-minimization).
+- Must anonymize [ECS](../../../wiki/advanced/dns-overview.md#what-is-edns-client-subnet-ecs) or disable it by default.

 Additionally, all public providers...

@@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
 ---
 title: "Email Aliasing"
-icon: material/email-lock
 description: An email aliasing service allows you to easily generate a new email address for every website you register for.
-cover: email-aliasing.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
- [:material-account-search: Public Exposure](basics/common-threats.md#limiting-public-information){ .pg-green }
+[{{< badge content="Surveillance Capitalism" color="purple" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model)
+[{{< badge content="Public Exposure" color="green" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#limiting-public-information)

 An **email aliasing service** allows you to easily generate a new email address for every website you register for. The email aliases you generate are then forwarded to an email address of your choosing, hiding both your "main" email address and the identity of your [email provider](email.md).

@@ -1,19 +1,14 @@
 ---
-meta_title: "Encrypted Private Email Recommendations - Privacy Guides"
 title: Email Services
-icon: material/email
 description: These email providers offer a great place to store your emails securely, and many offer interoperable OpenPGP encryption with other providers.
-cover: email.webp
-global:
- - [randomize-element, "table tbody"]
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
+[{{< badge content="Service Providers" color="indigo" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers)

 Email is practically a necessity for using any online service, however we do not recommend it for person-to-person conversations. Rather than using email to contact other people, consider using an instant messaging medium that supports forward secrecy.

-[Recommended Instant Messengers](real-time-communication.md){ .md-button }
+[Recommended Instant Messengers](../messengers/_index.md){ .md-button }

 ## Recommended Providers

@@ -25,13 +20,13 @@ For everything else, we recommend a variety of email providers based on sustaina
 | [Mailbox Mail](#mailbox-mail) | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Mail only | Cash |
 | [Tuta](#tuta) | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } | :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } | :material-check:{ .pg-green } | Monero via third party <br>Cash via third party |

-In addition to (or instead of) an email provider recommended here, you may wish to consider a dedicated [email aliasing service](email-aliasing.md#recommended-providers) to protect your privacy. Among other things, these services can help protect your real inbox from spam, prevent marketers from correlating your accounts, and encrypt all incoming messages with PGP.
+In addition to (or instead of) an email provider recommended here, you may wish to consider a dedicated [email aliasing service](../email-aliasing/_index.md#recommended-providers) to protect your privacy. Among other things, these services can help protect your real inbox from spam, prevent marketers from correlating your accounts, and encrypt all incoming messages with PGP.

- [More Information :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](email-aliasing.md)
+- [More Information :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../email-aliasing/_index.md)

 ## OpenPGP Compatible Services

-These providers natively support OpenPGP encryption/decryption and the [Web Key Directory (WKD) standard](basics/email-security.md#what-is-the-web-key-directory-standard), allowing for provider-agnostic end-to-end encrypted emails. For example, a Proton Mail user could send an E2EE message to a Mailbox Mail user, or you could receive OpenPGP-encrypted notifications from internet services which support it.
+These providers natively support OpenPGP encryption/decryption and the [Web Key Directory (WKD) standard](../../../wiki/basics/email-security.md#what-is-the-web-key-directory-standard), allowing for provider-agnostic end-to-end encrypted emails. For example, a Proton Mail user could send an E2EE message to a Mailbox Mail user, or you could receive OpenPGP-encrypted notifications from internet services which support it.

 <div class="grid cards" markdown>

@@ -43,11 +38,11 @@ These providers natively support OpenPGP encryption/decryption and the [Web Key
 <div class="admonition warning" markdown>
 <p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>

-When using E2EE technology like OpenPGP your email will still have some metadata that is not encrypted in the header of the email, generally including the subject line! Read more about [email metadata](basics/email-security.md#email-metadata-overview).
+When using E2EE technology like OpenPGP your email will still have some metadata that is not encrypted in the header of the email, generally including the subject line! Read more about [email metadata](../../../wiki/basics/email-security.md#email-metadata-overview).

 OpenPGP also does not support forward secrecy, which means if the private key of either you or the message recipient is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed.

- [How do I protect my private keys?](basics/email-security.md#how-do-i-protect-my-private-keys)
+- [How do I protect my private keys?](../../../wiki/basics/email-security.md#how-do-i-protect-my-private-keys)

 </div>

@@ -82,7 +77,7 @@ The Proton Free plan comes with 500 MB of Mail storage, which you can increase u

 </div>

-Free accounts have some limitations, such as not being able to search body text and not having access to [Proton Mail Bridge](https://proton.me/mail/bridge), which is required to use a [recommended desktop email client](email-clients.md) such as Thunderbird. Paid accounts include features like Proton Mail Bridge, additional storage, and custom domain support. The Proton Unlimited plan or any multi-user Proton plan includes access to [SimpleLogin](email-aliasing.md#simplelogin) Premium.
+Free accounts have some limitations, such as not being able to search body text and not having access to [Proton Mail Bridge](https://proton.me/mail/bridge), which is required to use a [recommended desktop email client](../../software/email-clients/_index.md) such as Thunderbird. Paid accounts include features like Proton Mail Bridge, additional storage, and custom domain support. The Proton Unlimited plan or any multi-user Proton plan includes access to [SimpleLogin](../email-aliasing/_index.md#simplelogin) Premium.

 A [letter of attestation](https://res.cloudinary.com/dbulfrlrz/images/v1714639878/wp-pme/letter-of-attestation-proton-mail-20211109_3138714c61/letter-of-attestation-proton-mail-20211109_3138714c61.pdf) was provided for Proton Mail's apps in November 2021 by [Securitum](https://research.securitum.com).

@@ -108,7 +103,7 @@ Paid Proton Mail subscribers can use their own domain with the service or a [cat

 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Private Payment Methods

-Proton Mail [accepts](https://proton.me/support/payment-options) **cash** by mail in addition to standard credit/debit card, [Bitcoin](advanced/payments.md#other-coins-bitcoin-ethereum-etc), and PayPal payments. Additionally, you can use [**Monero**](cryptocurrency.md#monero) to purchase vouchers for Proton Mail Plus or Proton Unlimited via their [official](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/add-monero-as-an-anonymous-payment-method-for-proton-services/31058/15) reseller [ProxyStore](https://dys2p.com/en/2025-09-09-proton.html).
+Proton Mail [accepts](https://proton.me/support/payment-options) **cash** by mail in addition to standard credit/debit card, [Bitcoin](../../../wiki/advanced/payments.md#other-coins-bitcoin-ethereum-etc), and PayPal payments. Additionally, you can use [**Monero**](../cryptocurrency/_index.md#monero) to purchase vouchers for Proton Mail Plus or Proton Unlimited via their [official](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/add-monero-as-an-anonymous-payment-method-for-proton-services/31058/15) reseller [ProxyStore](https://dys2p.com/en/2025-09-09-proton.html).

 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Account Security

@@ -124,7 +119,7 @@ Certain information stored in [Proton Contacts](https://proton.me/support/proton

 Proton Mail has [integrated OpenPGP encryption](https://proton.me/support/how-to-use-pgp) in their webmail. Emails to other Proton Mail accounts are encrypted automatically, and encryption to non-Proton Mail addresses with an OpenPGP key can be enabled easily in your account settings. Proton also supports automatic external key discovery with WKD. This means that emails sent to other providers which use WKD will be automatically encrypted with OpenPGP as well, without the need to manually exchange public PGP keys with your contacts. They also allow you to [encrypt messages to non-Proton Mail addresses without OpenPGP](https://proton.me/support/password-protected-emails), without the need for them to sign up for a Proton Mail account.

-Proton Mail also publishes the public keys of Proton accounts via HTTP from their WKD. This allows people who don't use Proton Mail to find the OpenPGP keys of Proton Mail accounts easily for cross-provider E2EE. This only applies to email addresses ending in one of Proton's own domains, like `@proton.me`. If you use a custom domain, you must [configure WKD](basics/email-security.md#what-is-the-web-key-directory-standard) separately.
+Proton Mail also publishes the public keys of Proton accounts via HTTP from their WKD. This allows people who don't use Proton Mail to find the OpenPGP keys of Proton Mail accounts easily for cross-provider E2EE. This only applies to email addresses ending in one of Proton's own domains, like `@proton.me`. If you use a custom domain, you must [configure WKD](../../../wiki/basics/email-security.md#what-is-the-web-key-directory-standard) separately.

 #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Account Termination

@@ -158,7 +153,7 @@ Accounts start with up to 2 GB storage, which can be upgraded as needed.
 </div>

 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Custom Domains and Aliases
-z
+
 Mailbox Mail lets you use your own domain, and they support [catch-all](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/custom-domains/use-your-own-domain-with-catch-all/) addresses. Mailbox Mail also supports [sub-addressing](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/e-mail/what-is-an-alias-and-how-do-i-use-it/), which is useful if you don't want to purchase a domain.

 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Private Payment Methods
@@ -167,19 +162,19 @@ Mailbox Mail doesn't accept any cryptocurrencies as a result of their payment pr

 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Account Security

-Mailbox Mail supports [two-factor authentication](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/security-and-privacy/how-to-use-two-factor-authentication-2fa/) for their webmail only. You can use either TOTP or a [YubiKey](security-keys.md#yubikey) via the [YubiCloud](https://yubico.com/products/services-software/yubicloud). Web standards such as [WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) are not yet supported.
+Mailbox Mail supports [two-factor authentication](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/security-and-privacy/how-to-use-two-factor-authentication-2fa/) for their webmail only. You can use either TOTP or a [YubiKey](../../hardware/security-keys/_index.md#yubikey) via the [YubiCloud](https://yubico.com/products/services-software/yubicloud). Web standards such as [WebAuthn](../../../wiki/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) are not yet supported.

 #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Data Security

 Mailbox Mail allows for encryption of incoming mail using their [encrypted mailbox](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/encryption/your-encrypted-mailbox/). New messages that you receive will then be immediately encrypted with your public key.

-However, [Open-Xchange](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-Xchange), the software platform used by Mailbox Mail, [does not support](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/business/security-privacy-article/encryption-of-calendar-and-address-book/) the encryption of your address book and calendar. A [standalone option](calendar.md) may be more appropriate for that data.
+However, [Open-Xchange](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-Xchange), the software platform used by Mailbox Mail, [does not support](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/business/security-privacy-article/encryption-of-calendar-and-address-book/) the encryption of your address book and calendar. A [standalone option](../../software/calendar/_index.md) may be more appropriate for that data.

 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Email Encryption

 Mailbox Mail has [integrated encryption](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/encryption/how-can-e-mails-be-encrypted-with-pgp/) in their webmail, which simplifies sending messages to people with public OpenPGP keys. They also allow [remote recipients to decrypt an email](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/encryption/my-recipient-does-not-use-pgp/) on Mailbox Mail's servers. This feature is useful when the remote recipient does not have OpenPGP and cannot decrypt a copy of the email in their own mailbox.

-Mailbox Mail also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their WKD. This allows people outside of Mailbox Mail to find the OpenPGP keys of Mailbox Mail accounts easily for cross-provider E2EE. This only applies to email addresses ending in one of Mailbox Mail's own domains, like `@mailbox.org`. If you use a custom domain, you must [configure WKD](basics/email-security.md#what-is-the-web-key-directory-standard) separately.
+Mailbox Mail also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their WKD. This allows people outside of Mailbox Mail to find the OpenPGP keys of Mailbox Mail accounts easily for cross-provider E2EE. This only applies to email addresses ending in one of Mailbox Mail's own domains, like `@mailbox.org`. If you use a custom domain, you must [configure WKD](../../../wiki/basics/email-security.md#what-is-the-web-key-directory-standard) separately.

 #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Account Termination

@@ -235,7 +230,7 @@ Free accounts start with 1 GB of storage.

 </div>

-Tuta doesn't support the [IMAP protocol](https://tuta.com/support#imap) or the use of third-party [email clients](email-clients.md), and you also won't be able to add [external email accounts](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/544#issuecomment-670473647) to the Tuta app. [Email import](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/630) is not currently supported either, though this is [due to be changed](https://tuta.com/blog/kickoff-import). Emails can be exported [individually or by bulk selection](https://tuta.com/support#generalMail) per folder, which may be inconvenient if you have many folders.
+Tuta doesn't support the [IMAP protocol](https://tuta.com/support#imap) or the use of third-party [email clients](../../software/email-clients/_index.md), and you also won't be able to add [external email accounts](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/544#issuecomment-670473647) to the Tuta app. [Email import](https://github.com/tutao/tutanota/issues/630) is not currently supported either, though this is [due to be changed](https://tuta.com/blog/kickoff-import). Emails can be exported [individually or by bulk selection](https://tuta.com/support#generalMail) per folder, which may be inconvenient if you have many folders.

 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Custom Domains and Aliases

@@ -243,7 +238,7 @@ Paid Tuta accounts can use either 15 or 30 aliases depending on their plan and u

 #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Private Payment Methods

-Tuta only directly accepts credit cards and PayPal, however you can use [**cryptocurrency**](cryptocurrency.md) to purchase gift cards via their [partnership](https://tuta.com/support/#cryptocurrency) with ProxyStore.
+Tuta only directly accepts credit cards and PayPal, however you can use [**cryptocurrency**](../cryptocurrency/_index.md) to purchase gift cards via their [partnership](https://tuta.com/support/#cryptocurrency) with ProxyStore.

 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Account Security

@@ -304,7 +299,7 @@ We prefer our recommended providers to collect as little data as possible.

 **Best Case:**

- Should accept [anonymous payment options](advanced/payments.md) ([cryptocurrency](cryptocurrency.md), cash, gift cards, etc.)
+- Should accept [anonymous payment options](../../../wiki/advanced/payments.md) ([cryptocurrency](../cryptocurrency/_index.md), cash, gift cards, etc.)
 - Should be hosted in a jurisdiction with strong email privacy protection laws.

 ### Security
@@ -313,7 +308,7 @@ Email servers deal with a lot of very sensitive data. We expect that providers w

 **Minimum to Qualify:**

- Protection of webmail with 2FA, such as [TOTP](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp).
+- Protection of webmail with 2FA, such as [TOTP](../../../wiki/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp).
 - Encryption at rest, using asymmetric encryption where the service provider does not have the decryption keys to the data they hold. This prevents a rogue employee leaking data they have access to, or a remote adversary from releasing data they have stolen by gaining unauthorized access to the server.
 - [DNSSEC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Extensions) support.
 - No TLS errors or vulnerabilities when being profiled by tools such as [Hardenize](https://hardenize.com), [testssl.sh](https://testssl.sh), or [Qualys SSL Labs](https://ssllabs.com/ssltest); this includes certificate related errors and weak DH parameters, such as those that led to [Logjam](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logjam_(computer_security)).
@@ -331,7 +326,7 @@ Email servers deal with a lot of very sensitive data. We expect that providers w

 **Best Case:**

- Should support hardware authentication, i.e. U2F and [WebAuthn](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online).
+- Should support hardware authentication, i.e. U2F and [WebAuthn](../../../wiki/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online).
 - [DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844) in addition to DANE support.
 - Should implement [Authenticated Received Chain (ARC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_Received_Chain), which is useful for people who post to mailing lists [RFC8617](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8617).
 - Published security audits from a reputable, third-party firm.
@@ -1,22 +1,20 @@
 ---
 title: Financial Services
-icon: material/bank
-cover: financial-services.webp
 description: These services can assist you in protecting your privacy from merchants and other trackers, which is one of the biggest challenges to privacy today.
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
+[{{< badge content="Surveillance Capitalism" color="purple" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model)

 Making payments online is one of the biggest challenges to privacy. These services can assist you in protecting your privacy from merchants and other trackers, provided you have a strong understanding of how to make private payments effectively. We strongly encourage you first read our payments overview article before making any purchases:

-[Making Private Payments :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/payments.md){ .md-button }
+[Making Private Payments :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../../../wiki/advanced/payments.md){ .md-button }

 ## Payment Masking Services

 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-account-search: Public Exposure](basics/common-threats.md#limiting-public-information){ .pg-green }
+[{{< badge content="Public Exposure" color="green" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#limiting-public-information)

 There are a number of services which provide "virtual debit cards" which you can use with online merchants without revealing your actual banking or billing information in most cases. It's important to note that these financial services are **not** anonymous and are subject to "Know Your Customer" (KYC) laws and may require your ID or other identifying information. These services are primarily useful for protecting you from merchant data breaches, less sophisticated tracking or purchase correlation by marketing agencies, and online data theft; and **not** for making a purchase completely anonymously.

@@ -76,7 +74,7 @@ MySudo's virtual cards are currently only available via their iOS app.

 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs){ .pg-blue }
+[{{< badge content="Mass Surveillance" color="blue" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs)

 These services allow you to purchase gift cards for a variety of merchants online with [cryptocurrency](cryptocurrency.md). Some of these services offer ID verification options for higher limits, but they also allow accounts with just an email address. Basic limits typically start at $5,000-10,000 a day for basic accounts, with significantly higher limits for ID verified accounts (if offered).

@@ -1,17 +1,15 @@
 ---
 title: Instant Messengers
-icon: material/chat-processing
 description: Encrypted messengers like Signal and SimpleX keep your sensitive communications secure from prying eyes.
-cover: real-time-communication.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
- [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs){ .pg-blue }
- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
+[{{< badge content="Passive Attacks" color="amber" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy)
+[{{< badge content="Service Providers" color="indigo" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers)
+[{{< badge content="Mass Surveillance" color="blue" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs)
+[{{< badge content="Surveillance Capitalism" color="purple" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model)

-These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
+These recommendations for encrypted **real-time communication** are great for securing your sensitive communications. These instant messengers come in the form of many [types of communication networks](../../../wiki/advanced/communication-network-types.md).

 [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: It's time to stop using SMS](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/01/24/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-heres-why){ .md-button }

@@ -66,7 +64,7 @@ The protocol was independently [audited](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf)

 ### Molly (Android)

-If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red  } you may consider using this alternative app, which features a number of security and usability improvements, to access the Signal network.
+If you use Android and your threat model requires protecting against [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red  } you may consider using this alternative app, which features a number of security and usability improvements, to access the Signal network.

 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>

@@ -105,7 +103,7 @@ Both versions of Molly provide the same security improvements and support [repro

 ![SimpleX Chat logo](assets/img/messengers/simplex.svg){ align=right }

-**SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }.
+**SimpleX Chat** is an instant messenger that doesn't depend on any unique identifiers such as phone numbers or usernames. Its decentralized network makes SimpleX Chat an effective tool against [:material-close-outline: Censorship](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }.

 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://simplex.chat){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://simplex.chat/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@@ -141,7 +139,7 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/

 ![Briar logo](assets/img/messengers/briar.svg){ align=right }

-**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem.
+**Briar** is an encrypted instant messenger that [connects](https://briarproject.org/how-it-works) to other clients using the [Tor network](alternative-networks.md#tor), making it an effective tool at circumventing [:material-close-outline: Censorship](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }. Briar can also connect via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth when in local proximity. Briar’s local mesh mode can be useful when internet availability is a problem.

 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://briarproject.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://briarproject.org/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@@ -186,7 +184,7 @@ Our best-case criteria represents what we would like to see from the perfect pro

 - Should support future secrecy (post-compromise security)[^2]
 - Should have open-source servers.
- Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](advanced/communication-network-types.md).
+- Should use a decentralized network, i.e. [federated or P2P](../../../wiki/advanced/communication-network-types.md).
 - Should use E2EE for all messages by default.
 - Should support Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, and iOS.

@@ -1,133 +1,16 @@
 ---
-meta_title: "The Best Password Managers to Protect Your Privacy and Security - Privacy Guides"
 title: Password Managers
-icon: material/form-textbox-password
 description: Password managers allow you to securely store and manage passwords and other credentials.
-cover: passwords.webp
-schema:
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": WebPage
-    name: Password Manager Recommendations
-    url: "./"
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": SoftwareApplication
-    name: Bitwarden
-    image: /assets/img/password-management/bitwarden.svg
-    url: https://bitwarden.com
-    sameAs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitwarden
-    applicationCategory: Password Manager
-    operatingSystem:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-      - Android
-      - iOS
-    subjectOf:
-      "@context": http://schema.org
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": SoftwareApplication
-    name: 1Password
-    image: /assets/img/password-management/1password.svg
-    url: https://1password.com
-    sameAs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1Password
-    applicationCategory: Password Manager
-    operatingSystem:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-      - Android
-      - iOS
-    subjectOf:
-      "@context": http://schema.org
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": SoftwareApplication
-    name: Proton Pass
-    image: /assets/img/password-management/protonpass.svg
-    url: https://proton.me/pass
-    applicationCategory: Password Manager
-    operatingSystem:
-      - Android
-      - iOS
-    subjectOf:
-      "@context": http://schema.org
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": SoftwareApplication
-    name: Psono
-    image: /assets/img/password-management/psono.svg
-    url: https://psono.com
-    applicationCategory: Password Manager
-    operatingSystem:
-      - Android
-      - iOS
-    subjectOf:
-      "@context": http://schema.org
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": SoftwareApplication
-    name: KeePassXC
-    image: /assets/img/password-management/keepassxc.svg
-    url: https://keepassxc.org
-    sameAs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KeePassXC
-    applicationCategory: Password Manager
-    operatingSystem:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-    subjectOf:
-      "@context": http://schema.org
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": SoftwareApplication
-    name: KeePassDX
-    image: /assets/img/password-management/keepassdx.svg
-    url: https://keepassdx.com
-    applicationCategory: Password Manager
-    operatingSystem: Android
-    subjectOf:
-      "@context": http://schema.org
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": SoftwareApplication
-    name: Gopass
-    image: /assets/img/password-management/gopass.svg
-    url: https://gopass.pw
-    applicationCategory: Password Manager
-    operatingSystem:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-      - FreeBSD
-    subjectOf:
-      "@context": http://schema.org
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
+[{{< badge content="Targeted Attacks" color="red" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals)
+[{{< badge content="Passive Attacks" color="amber" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy)
+[{{< badge content="Service Providers" color="indigo" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers)

 **Password managers** allow you to securely store and manage passwords and other credentials with the use of a master password.

-[Introduction to Passwords :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](basics/passwords-overview.md)
+[Introduction to Passwords :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../../../wiki/basics/passwords-overview.md)

 <div class="admonition info" markdown>
 <p class="admonition-title">Info</p>
@@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
 ---
 title: Photo Management
-icon: material/image
 description: These photo management tools keep your personal photos safe from the prying eyes of cloud storage providers and other unauthorized parties.
-cover: photo-management.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
+[{{< badge content="Passive Attacks" color="amber" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy)
+[{{< badge content="Service Providers" color="indigo" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers)

 Most cloud **photo management solutions** like Google Photos, Flickr, and Amazon Photos don't secure your photos against being accessed by the cloud storage provider themselves. These options keep your personal photos private, while allowing you to share them only with family and trusted people.

@@ -1,15 +1,10 @@
 ---
-meta_title: "Recommended Search Engines: Anonymous Alternatives to Google - Privacy Guides"
 title: Search Engines
-icon: material/search-web
 description: Use privacy-respecting search engines which don't build an advertising profile based on your searches.
-cover: search-engines.webp
-global:
- - [randomize-element, "table tbody"]
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
+[{{< badge content="Surveillance Capitalism" color="purple" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model)

 Use a **search engine** that doesn't build an advertising profile based on your searches.

@@ -1,16 +1,10 @@
 ---
-meta_title: "Private VPN Service Recommendations and Comparison, No Sponsors or Ads - Privacy Guides"
 title: VPN Services
-icon: material/vpn
 description: The best VPN services for protecting your privacy and security online. Find a provider here that isn't out to spy on you.
-cover: vpn.webp
-global:
-  - [randomize-element, "table tbody"]
 ---
-
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
+[{{< badge content="Surveillance Capitalism" color="purple" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model)

 If you're looking for additional *privacy* from your ISP, on a public Wi-Fi network, or while torrenting files, a **VPN** may be the solution for you.

@@ -21,11 +15,11 @@ Using a VPN will **not** keep your browsing habits anonymous, nor will it add ad

 If you are looking for **anonymity**, you should use the Tor Browser. If you're looking for added **security**, you should always ensure you're connecting to websites using HTTPS. A VPN is not a replacement for good security practices.

-[Introduction to the Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Tor Myths & FAQ](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }
+[Introduction to the Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Tor Myths & FAQ](../../../wiki/advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button }

 </div>

-[Detailed VPN Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](basics/vpn-overview.md){ .md-button }
+[Detailed VPN Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../../../wiki/basics/vpn-overview.md){ .md-button }

 ## Recommended Providers

@@ -86,7 +80,7 @@ Proton VPN provides the source code for their desktop and mobile clients in thei

 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Accepts Cash

-Proton VPN, in addition to accepting credit/debit cards, PayPal, and [Bitcoin](advanced/payments.md#other-coins-bitcoin-ethereum-etc), also accepts **cash/local currency** as an anonymous form of payment.
+Proton VPN, in addition to accepting credit/debit cards, PayPal, and [Bitcoin](../../../wiki/advanced/payments.md#other-coins-bitcoin-ethereum-etc), also accepts **cash/local currency** as an anonymous form of payment.

 #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } WireGuard Support

@@ -330,7 +324,7 @@ We prefer our recommended providers to collect as little data as possible. Not c

 **Best Case:**

- Accepts multiple [anonymous payment options](advanced/payments.md).
+- Accepts multiple [anonymous payment options](../../../wiki/advanced/payments.md).
 - No personal information accepted (auto-generated username, no email required, etc.).

 ### Security
@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
 ---
-meta_title: "Recommended AI Chat: Private ChatGPT Alternatives - Privacy Guides"
 title: "AI Chat"
-icon: material/assistant
 description: Unlike OpenAI's ChatGPT and its Big Tech competitors, these AI tools run locally so your data never leaves your desktop device.
-cover: ai-chatbots.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
- [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }
+[{{< badge content="Service Providers" color="indigo" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers)
+[{{< badge content="Surveillance Capitalism" color="purple" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model)
+[{{< badge content="Censorship" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship)

 The use of **AI chat**, also known as Large Language Models (LLMs), has become increasingly common since the release of ChatGPT in 2022. LLMs can help us write better, understand unfamiliar subjects, or answer a wide range of questions. They work by statistically predicting the next word in their responses based on a vast amount of data scraped from the web.

@@ -1,17 +1,14 @@
 ---
 title: Browser Extensions
-icon: material/puzzle-outline
 description: These browser extensions can enhance your browsing experience and protect your privacy.
-cover: browser-extensions.webp
 ---
-
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
+[{{< badge content="Surveillance Capitalism" color="purple" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model)

 In general, we recommend keeping your browser extensions to a minimum to decrease your attack surface. They have privileged access within your browser, require you to trust the developer, can make you [stand out](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint#Browser_fingerprint), and [weaken](https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/chromium-extensions/c/0ei-UCHNm34/m/lDaXwQhzBAAJ) site isolation.

-However, some provide functionality which can outweigh these downsides in certain situations, particularly when it comes to [content blocking](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs).
+However, some provide functionality which can outweigh these downsides in certain situations, particularly when it comes to [content blocking](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs).

 Don't install extensions which you don't immediately have a need for, or ones that duplicate the functionality of your browser. For example, [Brave](desktop-browsers.md#brave) users don't need to install uBlock Origin, because Brave Shields already provides the same functionality.

@@ -60,7 +57,7 @@ uBlock Origin also has a "Lite" version of their extension, which offers a limit

 ![uBlock Origin Lite logo](assets/img/browsers/ublock_origin_lite.svg){ align=right }

-**uBlock Origin Lite** is a Manifest V3 compatible content blocker. Compared to the original *uBlock Origin*, this extension does not require broad "read/modify data" permissions to function, which lowers the risk of [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange } on your browser if a malicious rule is added to a filter list.
+**uBlock Origin Lite** is a Manifest V3 compatible content blocker. Compared to the original *uBlock Origin*, this extension does not require broad "read/modify data" permissions to function, which lowers the risk of [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange } on your browser if a malicious rule is added to a filter list.

 [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/uBlockOrigin/uBOL-home#readme){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/uBlockOrigin/uBOL-home/wiki/Privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@@ -1,18 +1,15 @@
 ---
-meta_title: "Private Cryptocurrency Blockchains - Privacy Guides"
 description: Unlike most cryptocurrencies, these ones provide transaction privacy by default. Monero is our top choice for obfuscating transaction information.
 title: Cryptocurrency
-icon: material/bank-circle
-cover: cryptocurrency.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs){ .pg-blue }
- [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }
+[{{< badge content="Mass Surveillance" color="blue" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs)
+[{{< badge content="Censorship" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship)

 Making payments online is one of the biggest challenges to privacy. These cryptocurrencies provide transaction privacy by default (something which is **not** guaranteed by the majority of cryptocurrencies), provided you have a strong understanding of how to make private payments effectively. We strongly encourage you first read our payments overview article before making any purchases:

-[Making Private Payments :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/payments.md){ .md-button }
+[Making Private Payments :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../../../wiki/advanced/payments.md){ .md-button }

 <div class="admonition danger" markdown>
 <p class="admonition-title">Danger</p>
@@ -27,7 +24,7 @@ Many if not most cryptocurrency projects are scams. Make transactions carefully

 ![Monero logo](assets/img/cryptocurrency/monero.svg){ align=right }

-**Monero** uses a blockchain with privacy-enhancing technologies that obfuscate transactions to achieve [:material-incognito: Anonymity](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple }. Every Monero transaction hides the transaction amount, sending and receiving addresses, and source of funds without any hoops to jump through, making it an ideal choice for cryptocurrency novices.
+**Monero** uses a blockchain with privacy-enhancing technologies that obfuscate transactions to achieve [:material-incognito: Anonymity](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple }. Every Monero transaction hides the transaction amount, sending and receiving addresses, and source of funds without any hoops to jump through, making it an ideal choice for cryptocurrency novices.

 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://getmonero.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-info-16:](https://getmonero.org/resources/user-guides){ .card-link title=Documentation}
@@ -67,7 +64,7 @@ For maximum privacy (even with a self-custody wallet), you should run your own M

 ### Buying Monero

-[General tips for acquiring Monero](advanced/payments.md#acquisition){ .md-button }
+[General tips for acquiring Monero](../../../wiki/advanced/payments.md#acquisition){ .md-button }

 There are numerous centralized exchanges (CEX) as well as P2P marketplaces where you can buy and sell Monero. Some of them require identifying yourself (KYC) to comply with anti-money laundering regulations. However, due to Monero's privacy features, the only thing known to the seller is *that* you bought Monero, but not how much you own or where you spend it (after it leaves the exchange). Some reputable places to buy Monero include:

@@ -1,13 +1,10 @@
 ---
-meta_title: "Remove PII with Metadata Scrubbers and Data Redaction Tools - Privacy Guides"
 title: "Data and Metadata Redaction"
-icon: material/tag-remove
 description: Use these tools to remove metadata like GPS location and other identifying information from photos and files you share.
-cover: data-redaction.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-account-search: Public Exposure](basics/common-threats.md#limiting-public-information){ .pg-green }
+[{{< badge content="Public Exposure" color="green" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#limiting-public-information)

 When sharing files, be sure to remove associated metadata. Image files commonly include [Exif](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exif) data. Photos sometimes even include GPS coordinates in the file metadata.

@@ -1,64 +1,10 @@
 ---
-meta_title: "Privacy Respecting Web Browsers for PC and Mac - Privacy Guides"
 title: Desktop Browsers
-icon: material/laptop
 description: These privacy-protecting browsers are what we currently recommend for standard/non-anonymous internet browsing on desktop systems.
-cover: desktop-browsers.webp
-schema:
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": WebPage
-    name: Private Desktop Browser Recommendations
-    url: "./"
-    relatedLink: "../mobile-browsers/"
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": SoftwareApplication
-    name: Mullvad Browser
-    image: /assets/img/browsers/mullvad_browser.svg
-    url: https://mullvad.net/en/browser
-    applicationCategory: Web Browser
-    operatingSystem:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-    subjectOf:
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": SoftwareApplication
-    name: Firefox
-    image: /assets/img/browsers/firefox.svg
-    url: https://firefox.com
-    sameAs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firefox
-    applicationCategory: Web Browser
-    operatingSystem:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-    subjectOf:
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": SoftwareApplication
-    name: Brave
-    image: /assets/img/browsers/brave.svg
-    url: https://brave.com
-    sameAs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brave_(web_browser)
-    applicationCategory: Web Browser
-    operatingSystem:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-    subjectOf:
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
+[{{< badge content="Surveillance Capitalism" color="purple" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model)

 These are our currently recommended **desktop web browsers** and configurations for standard/non-anonymous browsing. We recommend [Mullvad Browser](#mullvad-browser) if you are focused on strong privacy protections and anti-fingerprinting out of the box, [Firefox](#firefox) for casual internet browsers looking for a good alternative to Google Chrome, and [Brave](#brave) if you need Chromium browser compatibility.

@@ -70,7 +16,7 @@ If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) ins

 ![Mullvad Browser logo](assets/img/browsers/mullvad_browser.svg){ align=right }

-**Mullvad Browser** is a version of [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) with Tor network integrations removed. It aims to provide to VPN users Tor Browser's anti-fingerprinting browser technologies, which are key protections against [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs){ .pg-blue }. It is developed by the Tor Project and distributed by [Mullvad](vpn.md#mullvad), and does **not** require the use of Mullvad's VPN.
+**Mullvad Browser** is a version of [Tor Browser](tor.md#tor-browser) with Tor network integrations removed. It aims to provide to VPN users Tor Browser's anti-fingerprinting browser technologies, which are key protections against [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs){ .pg-blue }. It is developed by the Tor Project and distributed by [Mullvad](vpn.md#mullvad), and does **not** require the use of Mullvad's VPN.

 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://mullvad.net/en/browser){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://mullvad.net/en/help/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@@ -360,7 +306,7 @@ We recommend disabling search suggestions in Brave for the same reason we recomm

 #### Brave Rewards and Wallet

-**Brave Rewards** lets you receive Basic Attention Token (BAT) cryptocurrency for performing certain actions within Brave. It relies on a custodial account and KYC from a select number of providers. We do not recommend BAT as a [private cryptocurrency](cryptocurrency.md), nor do we recommend using a [custodial wallet](advanced/payments.md#wallet-custody), so we would discourage using this feature.
+**Brave Rewards** lets you receive Basic Attention Token (BAT) cryptocurrency for performing certain actions within Brave. It relies on a custodial account and KYC from a select number of providers. We do not recommend BAT as a [private cryptocurrency](cryptocurrency.md), nor do we recommend using a [custodial wallet](../../../wiki/advanced/payments.md#wallet-custody), so we would discourage using this feature.

 **Brave Wallet** operates locally on your computer, but does not support any private cryptocurrencies, so we would discourage using this feature as well.

@@ -1,12 +1,10 @@
 ---
 title: Document Collaboration
-icon: material/account-group
 description: Most online office suites do not support end-to-end encryption, meaning the cloud provider has access to everything you do.
-cover: document-collaboration.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
+[{{< badge content="Service Providers" color="indigo" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers)

 Most online **document collaboration** platforms like Google Drive do not support end-to-end encryption, meaning the cloud provider has access to everything you do. The provider's privacy policy may legally protect your rights, but it does not provide technical access constraints.

@@ -1,24 +1,22 @@
 ---
 title: "Email Clients"
-icon: material/email-open
 description: These email clients are privacy-respecting and support OpenPGP email encryption.
-cover: email-clients.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
+[{{< badge content="Service Providers" color="indigo" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers)
+[{{< badge content="Targeted Attacks" color="red" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals)

-The **email clients** we recommend support both [OpenPGP](encryption.md#openpgp) and strong authentication such as [Open Authorization (OAuth)](basics/account-creation.md#sign-in-with-oauth). OAuth allows you to use [Multi-Factor Authentication](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md) to prevent account theft.
+The **email clients** we recommend support both [OpenPGP](../encryption/_index.md#openpgp) and strong authentication such as [Open Authorization (OAuth)](../../../wiki/basics/account-creation.md#sign-in-with-oauth). OAuth allows you to use [Multi-Factor Authentication](../../../wiki/basics/multi-factor-authentication.md) to prevent account theft.

 <details class="warning" markdown>
 <summary>Email does not provide forward secrecy</summary>

-When using end-to-end encryption (E2EE) technology like OpenPGP, email will still have [some metadata](basics/email-security.md#email-metadata-overview) that is not encrypted in the header of the email.
+When using end-to-end encryption (E2EE) technology like OpenPGP, email will still have [some metadata](../../../wiki/basics/email-security.md#email-metadata-overview) that is not encrypted in the header of the email.

-OpenPGP also does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed: [How do I protect my private keys?](basics/email-security.md) Consider using a medium that provides forward secrecy:
+OpenPGP also does not support [forward secrecy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), which means if either your or the recipient's private key is ever stolen, all previous messages encrypted with it will be exposed: [How do I protect my private keys?](../../../wiki/basics/email-security.md#how-do-i-protect-my-private-keys) Consider using a medium that provides forward secrecy:

-[Real-time Communication](real-time-communication.md){ .md-button }
+[Real-time Communication](../../services/messengers/_index.md){ .md-button }

 </details>

@@ -91,7 +89,7 @@ These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Privacy & S

 ![Apple Mail logo](assets/img/email-clients/applemail.png){ align=right }

-**Apple Mail** is included in macOS and can be extended to have OpenPGP support with [GPG Suite](encryption.md#gpg-suite), which adds the ability to send PGP-encrypted email.
+**Apple Mail** is included in macOS and can be extended to have OpenPGP support with [GPG Suite](../encryption/_index.md#gpg-suite), which adds the ability to send PGP-encrypted email.

 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/welcome/mac){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@@ -1,11 +1,7 @@
 ---
-meta_title: "Recommended Encryption Software: VeraCrypt, Cryptomator, and OpenPGP - Privacy Guides"
 title: "Encryption Software"
-icon: material/file-lock
 description: Encryption of data is the only way to control who can access it. These tools allow you to encrypt your emails and any other files.
-cover: encryption.webp
 ---
-
 **Encryption** is the only secure way to control who can access your data. If you are currently not using encryption software for your hard disk, emails, or files, you should pick an option here.

 ## Multi-platform
@@ -16,13 +12,13 @@ The options listed here are available on multiple platforms and great for creati

 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
+[{{< badge content="Passive Attacks" color="amber" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy)

 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>

 ![Cryptomator logo](assets/img/encryption-software/cryptomator.svg){ align=right }

-**Cryptomator** is an encryption solution designed for privately saving files to any cloud [:material-server-network: Service Provider](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }, eliminating the need to trust that they won't access your files. It allows you to create vaults that are stored on a virtual drive, the contents of which are encrypted and synced with your cloud storage provider.
+**Cryptomator** is an encryption solution designed for privately saving files to any cloud [:material-server-network: Service Provider](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }, eliminating the need to trust that they won't access your files. It allows you to create vaults that are stored on a virtual drive, the contents of which are encrypted and synced with your cloud storage provider.

 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://cryptomator.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:octicons-eye-16:](https://cryptomator.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
@@ -57,7 +53,7 @@ Cryptomator's documentation details its intended [security target](https://docs.

 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
+[{{< badge content="Targeted Attacks" color="red" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals)

 <div class="admonition recommendation" markdown>

@@ -92,9 +88,9 @@ TrueCrypt has been [audited a number of times](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tru

 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
+[{{< badge content="Targeted Attacks" color="red" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals)

-Built-in OS encryption solutions generally leverage hardware security features such as a [secure cryptoprocessor](basics/hardware.md#tpmsecure-cryptoprocessor). Therefore, we recommend using the built-in encryption solutions for your operating system. For cross-platform encryption, we still recommend [cross-platform tools](#multi-platform) for additional flexibility and to avoid vendor lock-in.
+Built-in OS encryption solutions generally leverage hardware security features such as a [secure cryptoprocessor](../../../wiki/basics/hardware.md#tpmsecure-cryptoprocessor). Therefore, we recommend using the built-in encryption solutions for your operating system. For cross-platform encryption, we still recommend [cross-platform tools](#multi-platform) for additional flexibility and to avoid vendor lock-in.

 <details class="warning" markdown>

@@ -190,7 +186,7 @@ cryptsetup luksHeaderBackup /dev/device --header-backup-file /mnt/backup/file.im

 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
+[{{< badge content="Targeted Attacks" color="red" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals)

 Tools with command-line interfaces are useful for integrating [shell scripts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shell_script).

@@ -240,9 +236,9 @@ Tools with command-line interfaces are useful for integrating [shell scripts](ht

 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
- [:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy){ .pg-orange }
- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
+[{{< badge content="Targeted Attacks" color="red" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals)
+[{{< badge content="Passive Attacks" color="amber" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#security-and-privacy)
+[{{< badge content="Service Providers" color="indigo" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers)

 OpenPGP is sometimes needed for specific tasks such as digitally signing and encrypting email. PGP has many features and is [complex](https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html) as it has been around a long time. For tasks such as signing or encrypting files, we suggest the above options.

@@ -1,12 +1,10 @@
 ---
 title: File Sharing and Sync
-icon: material/share-variant
 description: Discover how to privately share your files between your devices, with your friends and family, or anonymously online.
-cover: file-sharing.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
+[{{< badge content="Service Providers" color="indigo" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers)

 Discover how to privately share your files between your devices, with your friends and family, or anonymously online.

@@ -44,7 +42,7 @@ ffsend upload --host https://send.vis.ee/ FILE

 ![OnionShare logo](assets/img/file-sharing-sync/onionshare.svg){ align=right }

-**OnionShare** is an open-source tool that lets you securely and [:material-incognito: anonymously](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple } share a file of any size. It works by starting a web server accessible as a Tor onion service, with an unguessable URL that you can share with the recipients to download or send files.
+**OnionShare** is an open-source tool that lets you securely and [:material-incognito: anonymously](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple } share a file of any size. It works by starting a web server accessible as a Tor onion service, with an unguessable URL that you can share with the recipients to download or send files.

 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://onionshare.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:simple-torbrowser:](http://lldan5gahapx5k7iafb3s4ikijc4ni7gx5iywdflkba5y2ezyg6sjgyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
@@ -63,7 +61,7 @@ ffsend upload --host https://send.vis.ee/ FILE

 </div>

-OnionShare provides the option to connect via [Tor bridges](https://docs.onionshare.org/2.6.2/en/tor.html#automatic-censorship-circumvention) to circumvent [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }.
+OnionShare provides the option to connect via [Tor bridges](https://docs.onionshare.org/2.6.2/en/tor.html#automatic-censorship-circumvention) to circumvent [:material-close-outline: Censorship](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }.

 ### Criteria

@@ -1,12 +1,10 @@
 ---
 title: "Frontends"
-icon: material/flip-to-front
 description: These open-source frontends for various internet services allow you to access content without JavaScript or other annoyances.
-cover: frontends.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
+[{{< badge content="Surveillance Capitalism" color="purple" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model)

 Sometimes services will try to force you to sign up for an account by blocking access to content with annoying popups. They might also break without JavaScript enabled. These frontends can allow you to circumvent these restrictions.

@@ -170,7 +168,7 @@ When using FreeTube, your subscription list, playlists, watch history and search
 <div class="admonition warning" markdown>
 <p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>

-When using FreeTube, your IP address may still be known to YouTube, [Invidious](https://instances.invidious.io), or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](tor.md) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+When using FreeTube, your IP address may still be known to YouTube, [Invidious](https://instances.invidious.io), or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](tor.md) if your [threat model](../../../wiki/basics/threat-modeling.md requires hiding your IP address.

 </div>

@@ -205,7 +203,7 @@ Your subscription list and playlists are saved locally on your Android device.
 <div class="admonition warning" markdown>
 <p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>

-When using LibreTube, your IP address will be visible to YouTube, [Piped](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances), or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](tor.md) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+When using LibreTube, your IP address will be visible to YouTube, [Piped](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped/wiki/Instances), or [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) depending on your configuration. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](tor.md) if your [threat model](../../../wiki/basics/threat-modeling.md requires hiding your IP address.

 </div>

@@ -241,7 +239,7 @@ Your subscription list and playlists are saved locally on your Android device.
 <div class="admonition warning" markdown>
 <p class="admonition-title">Warning</p>

-When using NewPipe, your IP address will be visible to the video providers used. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](tor.md) if your [threat model](basics/threat-modeling.md) requires hiding your IP address.
+When using NewPipe, your IP address will be visible to the video providers used. Consider using a [VPN](vpn.md) or [Tor](tor.md) if your [threat model](../../../wiki/basics/threat-modeling.md requires hiding your IP address.

 </div>

@@ -1,13 +1,10 @@
 ---
-meta_title: "Privacy-Respecting Health and Wellness apps for Android and iOS - Privacy Guides"
 title: "Health and Wellness"
-icon: material/heart-pulse
 description: These applications are what we currently recommend for all health- and fitness-related activites on your phone.
-cover: health.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
+[{{< badge content="Service Providers" color="indigo" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers)

 Keep track of your health and fitness-related goals with these apps. Unlike their mainstream alternatives, your personal health information will be kept private.

@@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
 ---
 title: "Language Tools"
-icon: material/alphabetical-variant
 description: These language tools do not send your input text to a server and can be used offline and self-hosted.
-cover: language-tools.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
+[{{< badge content="Service Providers" color="indigo" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers)
+[{{< badge content="Surveillance Capitalism" color="purple" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model)

 Text inputted to grammar, spelling, and style checkers, as well as translation services, can contain sensitive information which may be stored on their servers for an indefinite amount of time and sold to third parties. The language tools listed on this page do not store your submitted text on a server and can be self-hosted and used offline for maximum control of your data.

@@ -1,13 +1,10 @@
 ---
-meta_title: "Recommended Maps and Navigation Apps - Privacy Guides"
 title: Maps and Navigation
-icon: material/map
 description: Privacy-respecting map providers and navigation apps which don't build an advertising profile based on your searches and locations.
-cover: maps.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
+[{{< badge content="Surveillance Capitalism" color="purple" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model)

 Use a **map and navigation app** that doesn't build an advertising profile based on your searches and location history. Instead of using Google Maps, Apple Maps, or Waze, we recommend these privacy-respecting alternatives.

@@ -1,57 +1,10 @@
 ---
-meta_title: "Privacy Respecting Web Browsers for Android and iOS - Privacy Guides"
 title: Mobile Browsers
-icon: material/cellphone-information
 description: These browsers are what we currently recommend for standard/non-anonymous internet browsing on your phone.
-cover: mobile-browsers.webp
-schema:
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": WebPage
-    name: Private Mobile Browser Recommendations
-    url: "./"
-    relatedLink: "../desktop-browsers/"
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": MobileApplication
-    name: Brave
-    image: /assets/img/browsers/brave.svg
-    url: https://brave.com
-    applicationCategory: Web Browser
-    operatingSystem:
-      - Android
-      - iOS
-    subjectOf:
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": MobileApplication
-    name: Cromite
-    image: /assets/img/browsers/cromite.svg
-    url: https://cromite.org
-    applicationCategory: Web Browser
-    operatingSystem:
-      - Android
-    subjectOf:
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": MobileApplication
-    name: Safari
-    image: /assets/img/browsers/safari.svg
-    url: https://apple.com/safari
-    applicationCategory: Web Browser
-    operatingSystem:
-      - iOS
-    subjectOf:
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
+[{{< badge content="Surveillance Capitalism" color="purple" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model)

 These are our currently recommended **mobile web browsers** and configurations for standard/non-anonymous internet browsing. If you need to browse the internet anonymously, you should use [Tor](tor.md) instead.

@@ -1,12 +1,10 @@
 ---
 title: Multifactor Authentication
-icon: material/two-factor-authentication
 description: These tools assist you with securing your internet accounts with multifactor authentication without sending your secrets to a third party.
-cover: multi-factor-authentication.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-target-account: Targeted Attacks](basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals){ .pg-red }
+[{{< badge content="Targeted Attacks" color="red" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#attacks-against-specific-individuals)

 <div class="admonition note" markdown>
 <p class="admonition-title">Hardware Keys</p>
@@ -1,12 +1,10 @@
 ---
 title: "News Aggregators"
-icon: material/rss
 description: These news aggregator clients let you keep up with your favorite blogs and news sites using internet standards like RSS.
-cover: news-aggregators.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
+[{{< badge content="Service Providers" color="indigo" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers)

 A **news aggregator** is software which aggregates digital content from online newspapers, blogs, podcasts, and other resources to one location for easy viewing. Using one can be a great way to keep up with your favorite content.

@@ -1,12 +1,10 @@
 ---
 title: "Notebooks"
-icon: material/notebook-edit-outline
 description: These encrypted note-taking apps let you keep track of your notes without giving them to a third party.
-cover: notebooks.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
+[{{< badge content="Service Providers" color="indigo" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers)

 Keep track of your notes and journals without giving them to a third party.

@@ -1,12 +1,10 @@
 ---
 title: "Office Suites"
-icon: material/file-edit-outline
 description: These office suites offer their full functionality without an account and can be used offline.
-cover: office-suites.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
+[{{< badge content="Service Providers" color="indigo" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers)

 Choose an **office suite** that does not require logging in to an account to access its full functionality. The tools listed here can be used offline and could reasonably act as a replacement for Microsoft Office for most needs.

@@ -1,12 +1,10 @@
 ---
 title: "Pastebins"
-icon: material/content-paste
 description: These tools allow you to have full control of any pasted data you share to other parties.
-cover: pastebins.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-server-network: Service Providers](basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers){ .pg-teal }
+[{{< badge content="Service Providers" color="indigo" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#privacy-from-service-providers)

 [**Pastebins**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pastebin) are online services most commonly used to share large blocks of code in a convenient and efficient manner. The pastebins listed here employ client-side encryption and password protection for pasted content; both of these features prevent the website or server operator from reading or accessing the contents of any paste.

@@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
 ---
 title: Social Networks
-icon: material/account-supervisor-circle-outline
 description: Find a new social network that doesn’t pry into your data or monetize your profile.
-cover: social-networks.webp
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }
- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
+[{{< badge content="Censorship" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship)
+[{{< badge content="Surveillance Capitalism" color="purple" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model)

 These privacy-respecting **social networks** allow you to participate in online communities without giving up your personal information like your full name, phone number, and other data commonly requested by tech companies.

@@ -1,46 +1,26 @@
 ---
-meta_title: "Tor Browser and Network: Anonymous Web Browsing - Privacy Guides"
 title: "Tor Browser"
-icon: simple/torbrowser
 description: Protect your internet browsing from prying eyes by using the Tor network, a secure network which circumvents censorship.
-cover: tor.webp
-schema:
-  -
-    "@context": http://schema.org
-    "@type": SoftwareApplication
-    name: Tor Browser
-    image: /assets/img/browsers/tor.svg
-    url: https://torproject.org
-    sameAs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tor_(network)
-    applicationCategory: Web Browser
-    operatingSystem:
-      - Windows
-      - macOS
-      - Linux
-      - Android
-    subjectOf:
-      "@type": WebPage
-      url: "./"
 ---
 <small>Protects against the following threat(s):</small>

- [:material-account-cash: Surveillance Capitalism](basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model){ .pg-brown }
- [:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance](basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs){ .pg-blue }
- [:material-close-outline: Censorship](basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship){ .pg-blue-gray }
+[{{< badge content="Surveillance Capitalism" color="purple" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#surveillance-as-a-business-model)
+[{{< badge content="Mass Surveillance" color="blue" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#mass-surveillance-programs)
+[{{< badge content="Censorship" >}}](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#avoiding-censorship)

 **Tor** is a group of volunteer-operated servers that allows you to connect for free and improve your privacy and security on the Internet. Individuals and organizations can also share information over the Tor network with ".onion hidden services" without compromising their privacy. Because Tor traffic is difficult to block and trace, Tor is an effective censorship circumvention tool.

-[Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+[Detailed Tor Overview :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../../../wiki/advanced/tor-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
 [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: Why You Need Tor](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/03/02/why-you-need-tor){ .md-button }

 <div class="admonition tip" markdown>
 <p class="admonition-title">Tip</p>

-Before connecting to Tor, please ensure you've read our [overview](advanced/tor-overview.md) on what Tor is and how to connect to it safely. We often recommend connecting to Tor through a trusted [VPN provider](vpn.md), but you have to do so **properly** to avoid decreasing your anonymity.
+Before connecting to Tor, please ensure you've read our [overview](../../../wiki/advanced/tor-overview.md on what Tor is and how to connect to it safely. We often recommend connecting to Tor through a trusted [VPN provider](vpn.md), but you have to do so **properly** to avoid decreasing your anonymity.

 </div>

-There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for [:material-incognito: anonymous](basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple } browsing for desktop computers and Android.
+There are a variety of ways to connect to the Tor network from your device, the most commonly used being the **Tor Browser**, a fork of Firefox designed for [:material-incognito: anonymous](../../../wiki/basics/common-threats.md#anonymity-vs-privacy){ .pg-purple } browsing for desktop computers and Android.

 Some of these apps are better than others; making a determination comes down to your threat model. If you are a casual Tor user who is not worried about your ISP collecting evidence against you, using mobile browser apps like [Onion Browser](#onion-browser-ios) to access the Tor network is probably fine. Increasing the number of people who use Tor on an everyday basis helps reduce the bad stigma of Tor, and lowers the quality of "lists of Tor users" that ISPs and governments may compile.