Grammar, punctuation, fixes in Knowledge Base (#1473)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gray <dng@disroot.org>
This commit is contained in:
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Daniel Gray
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@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Once you have your boot media, enter your system's UEFI settings and boot from t
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### Flash Storage
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For [flash memory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flash_memory) (SSD, NVMe etc) devices we suggest the ATA Secure Erase command. Methods such as `nwipe` should not be used on flash storage devices as it may damage their performance. The "Secure Erase" feature is often accessible through the UEFI setup menu.
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For [flash memory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flash_memory) (SSD, NVMe, etc) devices we suggest the ATA Secure Erase command. Methods such as `nwipe` should not be used on flash storage devices as it may damage their performance. The "Secure Erase" feature is often accessible through the UEFI setup menu.
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It is also possible to complete a Secure Erase using the [`hdparm`](https://ata.wiki.kernel.org/index.php/ATA_Secure_Erase) command, or [Microsoft Secure Group Commands](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/storage/security-group-commands).
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@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ Shortcuts is quite intuitive to work with, so if you don't like the behavior dem
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!!! tip "Worth Mentioning"
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The open source [ImageOptim](https://imageoptim.com/mac) app integrates into Finder's *Services* context menu by default. While it is primarily an image optimization app, it also removes metadata.
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The open-source [ImageOptim](https://imageoptim.com/mac) app integrates into Finder's *Services* context menu by default. While it is primarily an image optimization app, it also removes metadata.
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### Enabling & using the Shortcut
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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: 'material/cellphone-cog'
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---
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## Profiles
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CalyxOS includes a device controller app so there is no need to install a third party app like Shelter.
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CalyxOS includes a device controller app so there is no need to install a third-party app like Shelter.
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GrapheneOS extends the user profile feature, allowing you to end a current session. To do this, select *End Session* which will clear the encryption key from memory. There are plans to add a [cross profile notifications system](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/88) in the future. GrapheneOS plans to introduce nested profile support with better isolation in the future.
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@ -30,13 +30,13 @@ In terms of application compatibility, Sandboxed Google Play on GrapheneOS outpe
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Currently, eSIM activation is tied to a privileged proprietary application by Google. The app has the `READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE` permission, giving Google access to your hardware identifiers such as the IMEI.
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On GrapheneOS, the app comes disabled, and can be *optionally* enabled by the user after they have installed Sandboxed Play Services.
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On GrapheneOS, the app comes disabled and can be *optionally* enabled by the user after they have installed Sandboxed Play Services.
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On CalyxOS, the app comes installed by default (regardless of whether you choose to have microG or not) and cannot be opted out. This is particularly problematic, as it means Google still has access to the user's hardware identifiers regardless of whether they even need the eSIM activation or not, and can access them persistently.
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## Privileged App Extensions
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Android 12 comes with special support for seamless app updates with [third party app stores](https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2020/09/listening-to-developer-feedback-to.html). The popular Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) repository [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org) doesn't implement this feature and requires a [privileged extension](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.fdroid.privileged) to be included with the Android distribution in order to have unattended app installation.
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Android 12 comes with special support for seamless app updates with [third-party app stores](https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2020/09/listening-to-developer-feedback-to.html). The popular Free and Open-Source Software (FOSS) repository [F-Droid](https://f-droid.org) doesn't implement this feature and requires a [privileged extension](https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.fdroid.fdroid.privileged) to be included with the Android distribution in order to have unattended app installation.
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GrapheneOS does not include F-Droid, because all updates have to be manually installed, which poses a security risk. However, you can use the [Neo Store](../android.md#neo-store) client for F-Droid which does support seamless (background) app updates in Android 12. GrapheneOS officially recommends [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play) instead. Many FOSS Android apps are also in Google Play but sometimes they are not (like [NewPipe](../video-streaming.md)).
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@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://so
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## Choosing an Android Distribution
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When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has irrevocable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android.
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When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has irrevocable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android.
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This problem could be solved by using a custom Android distribution that does not come with such invasive integration. Unfortunately, many custom Android distributions often violate the Android security model by not supporting critical security features such as AVB, rollback protection, firmware updates, and so on. Some distributions also ship [`userdebug`](https://source.android.com/setup/build/building#choose-a-target) builds which expose root via [ADB](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb) and require [more permissive](https://github.com/LineageOS/android_system_sepolicy/search?q=userdebug&type=code) SELinux policies to accommodate debugging features, resulting in a further increased attack surface and weakened security model.
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@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that
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[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
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Adblockers which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For Adblocking we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or [VPN](../vpn.md) server blocking solutions instead. RethinkDNS, TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN) preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as Orbot or a real VPN server.
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Adblockers, which modify the [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)) (AdAway) and firewalls (AFWall+) which require root access persistently are dangerous and should not be used. They are also not the correct way to solve their intended purposes. For Adblocking we suggest encrypted [DNS](../dns.md) or [VPN](../vpn.md) server blocking solutions instead. RethinkDNS, TrackerControl and AdAway in non-root mode will take up the VPN slot (by using a local loopback VPN) preventing you from using privacy enhancing services such as Orbot or a real VPN server.
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AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Packet_filter) approach and may be bypassable in some situations.
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@ -30,15 +30,15 @@ We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth
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Android 10 and above has moved away from full-disk encryption to more flexible [file-based encryption](https://source.android.com/security/encryption/file-based). Your data is encrypted using unique encryption keys, and the operating system files are left unencrypted.
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Verified Boot ensures the integrity of the operating system files, thereby preventing an adversary with physical access from tampering or installing malware on the device. In the unlikely case that malware is able to exploit other parts of the system and gain higher privileged access, Verified Boot will prevent and revert changes to the system partition upon rebooting device.
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Verified Boot ensures the integrity of the operating system files, thereby preventing an adversary with physical access from tampering or installing malware on the device. In the unlikely case that malware is able to exploit other parts of the system and gain higher privileged access, Verified Boot will prevent and revert changes to the system partition upon rebooting the device.
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Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock Android distribution. Only a few OEMs such as Google support custom AVB key enrollment on their devices. Additionally, some AOSP derivatives such as LineageOS or /e/ OS do not support Verified Boot even on hardware with Verified Boot support for third party operating systems. We recommend that you check for support **before** purchasing a new device. AOSP derivatives which do not support Verified Boot are **not** recommended.
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Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock Android distribution. Only a few OEMs such as Google support custom AVB key enrollment on their devices. Additionally, some AOSP derivatives such as LineageOS or /e/ OS do not support Verified Boot even on hardware with Verified Boot support for third-party operating systems. We recommend that you check for support **before** purchasing a new device. AOSP derivatives which do not support Verified Boot are **not** recommended.
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## Firmware Updates
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Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin).
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Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin).
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As the components of the phone such as the processor and radio technologies rely on closed source components, the updates must be provided by the respective manufacturers. Therefore it is important that you purchase a device within an active support cycle. [Qualcomm](https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2020/12/16/qualcomm-and-google-announce-collaboration-extend-android-os-support-and) and [Samsung](https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-security-extending-updates-knox/) support their devices for 4 years, while cheaper products often have shorter support cycles. With the introduction of the [Pixel 6](https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/4457705), Google now makes their own SoC and they will provide a minimum of 5 years of support.
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As the components of the phone, such as the processor and radio technologies rely on closed-source components, the updates must be provided by the respective manufacturers. Therefore, it is important that you purchase a device within an active support cycle. [Qualcomm](https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2020/12/16/qualcomm-and-google-announce-collaboration-extend-android-os-support-and) and [Samsung](https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-security-extending-updates-knox/) support their devices for 4 years, while cheaper products often have shorter support cycles. With the introduction of the [Pixel 6](https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/4457705), Google now makes their own SoC and they will provide a minimum of 5 years of support.
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EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive firmware updates from OEM vendors or after market Android distributors. This means that security issues with those devices will remain unfixed.
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@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) versi
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## Android Permissions
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[Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore there is no need to install any antivirus apps. The savings you make from not purchasing or subscribing to security apps is better spent on paying for a supported device in the future.
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[Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps. The savings you make from not purchasing or subscribing to security apps is better spent on paying for a supported device in the future.
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Should you want to run an app that you're unsure about, consider using a user or work profile.
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@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ Should you want to run an app that you're unsure about, consider using a user or
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Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android.
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With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles is a more secure method of isolation.
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With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation.
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## Work Profile
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## VPN Killswitch
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Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in (:gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**).
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Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in (:gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**).
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## Global Toggles
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@ -86,8 +86,8 @@ If you have a Google account we suggest enrolling in the [Advanced Protection Pr
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The Advanced Protection Program provides enhanced threat monitoring and enables:
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- Stricter two factor authentication; e.g. that [FIDO](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) **must** be used and disallows the use of [SMS OTPs](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#sms-or-email-mfa), [TOTP](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp), and [OAuth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth)
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- Only Google and verified third party apps can access account data
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- Stricter two factor authentication; e.g. that [FIDO](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#fido-fast-identity-online) **must** be used and disallows the use of [SMS OTPs](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#sms-or-email-mfa), [TOTP](../basics/multi-factor-authentication.md#time-based-one-time-password-totp) and [OAuth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth)
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- Only Google and verified third-party apps can access account data
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- Scanning of incoming emails on Gmail accounts for [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing#Email_phishing) attempts
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- Stricter [safe browser scanning](https://www.google.com/chrome/privacy/whitepaper.html#malware) with Google Chrome
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- Stricter recovery process for accounts with lost credentials
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- Windows [Credential Manager](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/accessing-credential-manager-1b5c916a-6a16-889f-8581-fc16e8165ac0)
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- macOS [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211145)
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- iOS [Passwords](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211146)
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- Linux, Gnome Keyring, which can be accessed through [Seahorse](https://help.gnome.org/users/seahorse/stable/passwords-view.html.en), or [KDE Wallet Manager](https://userbase.kde.org/KDE_Wallet_Manager)
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- Linux, Gnome Keyring, which can be accessed through [Seahorse](https://help.gnome.org/users/seahorse/stable/passwords-view.html.en) or [KDE Wallet Manager](https://userbase.kde.org/KDE_Wallet_Manager)
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### Email
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In order to delete your old accounts, you'll need to first make sure you can log in to them. Again, if the account was in your password manager, this step is easy. If not, you can try to guess your password. Failing that, there are typically options to regain access to your account, commonly available through a "forgot password" link on the login page. It may also be possible that accounts you've abandoned have already been deleted—sometimes services prune all old accounts.
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When attempting to regain access, if the site returns an error message saying that email is not associated with an account, or you never receive a reset link after multiple attempts, then you do not have an account under that email address and should try a different one. If you can't figure out which email address you used, or you no longer have access to that email, you can try contacting the service's customer support. Unfortunately there is no guarantee that you will be able to reclaim access your account.
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When attempting to regain access, if the site returns an error message saying that email is not associated with an account, or you never receive a reset link after multiple attempts, then you do not have an account under that email address and should try a different one. If you can't figure out which email address you used, or you no longer have access to that email, you can try contacting the service's customer support. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that you will be able to reclaim access your account.
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### GDPR (EEA residents only)
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Residents of the EEA have additional rights regarding data erasure specified in [Article 17](https://www.gdpr.org/regulation/article-17.html) of the GDPR. If it's applicable to you, read the privacy policy for any given service to find information on how to exercise your right to erasure. Reading the privacy policy can prove important, as some services have a "Delete Account" option that only disables your account and for real deletion you have to take additional action. Sometimes actual deletion may involve filling out surveys, emailing the data protection officer of the service, or even proving your residence in the EEA. If you plan to go this way, do **not** overwrite account information—your identity as an EEA resident may be required. Note that the location of the service does not matter; GDPR applies to anyone serving European users. If the service does not respect your right to erasure, you can contact your national [Data Protection Authority](https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/rights-citizens/redress/what-should-i-do-if-i-think-my-personal-data-protection-rights-havent-been-respected_en) and you may be entitled to monetary compensation.
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Residents of the EEA have additional rights regarding data erasure specified in [Article 17](https://www.gdpr.org/regulation/article-17.html) of the GDPR. If it's applicable to you, read the privacy policy for any given service to find information on how to exercise your right to erasure. Reading the privacy policy can prove important, as some services have a "Delete Account" option that only disables your account and for real deletion you have to take additional action. Sometimes actual deletion may involve filling out surveys, emailing the data protection officer of the service or even proving your residence in the EEA. If you plan to go this way, do **not** overwrite account information—your identity as an EEA resident may be required. Note that the location of the service does not matter; GDPR applies to anyone serving European users. If the service does not respect your right to erasure, you can contact your national [Data Protection Authority](https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/rights-citizens/redress/what-should-i-do-if-i-think-my-personal-data-protection-rights-havent-been-respected_en) and you may be entitled to monetary compensation.
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### Overwriting Account information
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## Avoid New Accounts
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As the old saying goes, "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." Whenever you feel tempted to sign up for a new account, ask yourself "Do I really need this? Can I accomplish what I need to without an account?" It can often be much harder to delete an account than to create one. And even after deleting or changing the info on your account, there might be a cached version from a third party—like the [Internet Archive](https://archive.org/). Avoid the temptation when you're able to—your future self will thank you!
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As the old saying goes, "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." Whenever you feel tempted to sign up for a new account, ask yourself, "Do I really need this? Can I accomplish what I need to without an account?" It can often be much harder to delete an account than to create one. And even after deleting or changing the info on your account, there might be a cached version from a third-party—like the [Internet Archive](https://archive.org/). Avoid the temptation when you're able to—your future self will thank you!
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--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.en.md"
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<span class="pg-orange">:material-bug-outline: Passive Attacks</span>
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Security and privacy are often conflated, because you need security to obtain any semblance of privacy: Using tools which appear private is futile if they could easily be exploited by attackers to release your data later. However, the inverse is not necessarily true; the most secure service in the world *isn't necessarily* private. The best example of this is trusting data to Google, who, given their scale, have had minimal security incidents by employing industry-leading security experts to secure their infrastructure. Even though Google provides a very secure service, very few would consider their data private in Google's free consumer products (Gmail, YouTube etc).
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Security and privacy are often conflated, because you need security to obtain any semblance of privacy: Using tools which appear private is futile if they could easily be exploited by attackers to release your data later. However, the inverse is not necessarily true; the most secure service in the world *isn't necessarily* private. The best example of this is trusting data to Google, who, given their scale, have had minimal security incidents by employing industry-leading security experts to secure their infrastructure. Even though Google provides a very secure service, very few would consider their data private in Google's free consumer products (Gmail, YouTube, etc).
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When it comes to application security, we generally do not (and sometimes cannot) know if the software that we use is malicious, or might one day become malicious. Even with the most trustworthy developers, there is generally no guarantee that their software does not have a serious vulnerability that could later be exploited.
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- Your browser or device fingerprint
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- Payment method correlation
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Therefore your goals could be to segregate your online identities from each other, to blend in with other users, and to simply avoid giving out identifying information to anyone as much as possible.
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Therefore, your goals could be to segregate your online identities from each other, to blend in with other users, and to simply avoid giving out identifying information to anyone as much as possible.
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<span class="pg-blue">:material-eye-outline: Mass Surveillance</span>
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Governments often cite mass surveillance programs as necessary to combat terrorism and prevent crime, however it is most often used to disproportionately target minorities, political dissidents, and many other groups to create a chilling effect on free speech.
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Governments often cite mass surveillance programs as necessary to combat terrorism and prevent crime, however it is most often used to disproportionately target minorities, political dissidents and many other groups to create a chilling effect on free speech.
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!!! quote "ACLU: [The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward](https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/the-privacy-lesson-of-9-11-mass-surveillance-is-not-the-way-forward)"
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@ -130,19 +130,19 @@ People concerned with the threat of censorship can use technologies like Tor to
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You should consider what aspects of the network your adversary can observe, and whether you have plausible deniability for your actions. For example, using encrypted DNS can help you bypass rudimentary censorship systems based solely on DNS, but it cannot truly hide what you are visiting from your ISP. A VPN or Tor can help hide what you are visiting from the network administrators, but cannot hide that you are using those networks. Pluggable transports like Obfs4proxy, Meek or Shadowsocks can help you evade firewalls that block common VPN protocols or Tor, but an adversary can still figure out that you are actively trying to bypass their censorship system as opposed to just protecting your privacy through probing or deep packet inspection.
|
||||
|
||||
You must always consider the risks involved with trying to bypass censorship, what the potential consequences are, and how sophisticated your adversary may be. Be extra cautious with your software selection, and have a backup plan in case you are caught.
|
||||
You must always consider the risks involved with trying to bypass censorship, what the potential consequences are, and how sophisticated your adversary may be. Be extra cautious with your software selection and have a backup plan in case you are caught.
|
||||
|
||||
## Common Misconceptions
|
||||
|
||||
:material-numeric-1-circle: **Open source software is always secure** or **Proprietary software is more secure**
|
||||
:material-numeric-1-circle: **Open-source software is always secure** or **Proprietary software is more secure**
|
||||
|
||||
These myths stem from a number of prejudices, but the source-availability and licensure of a software product does not inherently affect its security in any way. ==Open-source software has the *potential* to be more secure than proprietary software, but there is absolutely no guarantee this is the case.== When you evaluate software, you need to look at the reputation and security of each tool on an individual basis.
|
||||
|
||||
Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties, and is often more transparent regarding potential vulnerabilities than their proprietary counterparts. They can also be more flexible, allowing you to delve into the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, unless you review the code yourself there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects, and the open development process can sometimes be exploited by malicious parties to introduce new vulnerabilities into even large projects.[^4]
|
||||
Open-source software *can* be audited by third-parties and is often more transparent regarding potential vulnerabilities than their proprietary counterparts. They can also be more flexible, allowing you to delve into the code and disable any suspicious functionality you find yourself. However, unless you review the code yourself there is no guarantee that code has ever been evaluated, especially with smaller software projects, and the open development process can sometimes be exploited by malicious parties to introduce new vulnerabilities into even large projects.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
On the flip side, proprietary software is less transparent, but that does not imply it is not secure. Major proprietary software projects can be audited internally and by third-party agencies, and independent security researchers can still find vulnerabilities with techniques like reverse engineering.
|
||||
|
||||
At the end of the day, it is **vital** that you research and evaluate the privacy and security properties of each piece of software being used, and avoid making decisions based on biases.
|
||||
At the end of the day, it is **vital** that you research and evaluate the privacy and security properties of each piece of software being used and avoid making decisions based on biases.
|
||||
|
||||
:material-numeric-2-circle: **Shifting trust can increase privacy**
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ We talk about "shifting trust" a lot when discussing solutions like VPNs, which
|
|||
|
||||
:material-numeric-3-circle: **Privacy-focused solutions are inherently trustworthy**
|
||||
|
||||
Focusing solely on the privacy policies and marketing of a tool or provider can blind you to its weaknesses. When you're looking for a privacy solution you should determine what the underlying problem is and find technical solutions to that problem. For example, you may want to avoid Google Drive, which gives Google access to all of your data. The underlying problem in this case is a lack of end-to-end encryption, so you should make sure the provider you switch to actually implements end-to-end encryption, or use a tool like Cryptomator which provides end-to-end encryption on any cloud provider. Blindly switching to a "privacy-focused" provider which does not provide end-to-end encryption does not solve your problem, it merely shifts trust from Google to that provider.
|
||||
Focusing solely on the privacy policies and marketing of a tool or provider can blind you to its weaknesses. When you're looking for a privacy solution, you should determine what the underlying problem is and find technical solutions to that problem. For example, you may want to avoid Google Drive, which gives Google access to all of your data. The underlying problem, in this case, is a lack of end-to-end encryption, so you should make sure the provider you switch to actually implements end-to-end encryption or use a tool like Cryptomator which provides end-to-end encryption on any cloud provider. Blindly switching to a "privacy-focused" provider which does not provide end-to-end encryption does not solve your problem, it merely shifts trust from Google to that provider.
|
||||
|
||||
The privacy policies and business practices of a provider you choose are very important, but should be considered secondary to technical guarantees of your privacy: Don't elect to merely shift trust to another provider when trusting a provider isn't a requirement at all.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -179,13 +179,13 @@ One of the clearest threat models is one where people *know who you are* and one
|
|||
|
||||
When shopping online, the use of a [parcel locker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parcel_locker) can help keep your physical address private.
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Unknown identity** - An unknown identity could be a stable pseudonym that you regularly use. It is not anonymous because it doesn't change. If you're a part of an online community you may wish to retain persona that others know. The reason this is not anonymous is because if monitored over a period of time details about the owner may reveal further information, such as the way they write (linguistics), general knowledge about topics of interest etc.
|
||||
2. **Unknown identity** - An unknown identity could be a stable pseudonym that you regularly use. It is not anonymous because it doesn't change. If you're a part of an online community, you may wish to retain a persona that others know. The reason this is not anonymous is that if monitored over a period of time details about the owner may reveal further information, such as the way they write (linguistics), general knowledge about topics of interest, etc.
|
||||
|
||||
You may wish to use a VPN for this to mask your IP address. Financial transactions are more difficult and for this we'd suggest using anonymous cryptocurrencies such as Monero. Employing alt-coin shifting may also help disguise where your currency originated. Typically exchanges require KYC (know your customer) to be completed before they will allow you to exchange fiat currency into any kind of cryptocurrency. Local meet-up options may also be a solution, however those often are more expensive and sometimes also require KYC.
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Anonymous identity** - Anonymous identities are difficult to maintain over long periods of time for even the most experienced. They should be short-term and short lived identities which are rotated regularly.
|
||||
|
||||
Using Tor can help with this, it's also worth noting greater anonymity is possible through asynchronous (not real time communication). Real time communication is vulnerable to typing analysis patterns more than a slab of text distributed on a forum, email) etc that you've had time to think about, maybe even put through a translator and back again.
|
||||
Using Tor can help with this, it's also worth noting greater anonymity is possible through asynchronous (not real-time communication). Real-time communication is vulnerable to typing analysis patterns (more than a slab of text distributed on a forum, email, etc) that you've had time to think about, maybe even put through a translator and back again.
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: United States Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: [Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215](https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/ec542143-1079-424a-84b3-acc354698560/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf)
|
||||
[^2]: Wikipedia: [Surveillance capitalism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance_capitalism)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ Encrypted DNS can refer to one of a number of protocols, the most common ones be
|
|||
|
||||
[**DNS over HTTPS**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_HTTPS) as defined in [RFC 8484](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8484) packages queries in the [HTTP/2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/2) protocol and provides security with HTTPS. Support was first added in web browsers such as Firefox 60 and Chrome 83.
|
||||
|
||||
Native implementation of DoH showed up in iOS 14, macOS 11, Microsoft Windows, and Android 13 (however it won't be enabled [by default](https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/packages/modules/DnsResolver/+/1833144)). General Linux desktop support is waiting on the systemd [implementation](https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/8639) so [installing third party software is still required](../dns.md#linux).
|
||||
Native implementation of DoH showed up in iOS 14, macOS 11, Microsoft Windows, and Android 13 (however, it won't be enabled [by default](https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/packages/modules/DnsResolver/+/1833144)). General Linux desktop support is waiting on the systemd [implementation](https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/8639) so [installing third-party software is still required](../dns.md#linux).
|
||||
|
||||
## What can an outside party see?
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ When we do a DNS lookup, it's generally because we want to access a resource. Be
|
|||
|
||||
The simplest way to determine browsing activity might be to look at the IP addresses your devices are accessing. For example, if the observer knows that `privacyguides.org` is at `198.98.54.105`, and your device is requesting data from `198.98.54.105`, there is a good chance you're visiting Privacy Guides.
|
||||
|
||||
This method is only useful when the IP address belongs to a server that only hosts few websites. It's also not very useful if the site is hosted on a shared platform, (e.g. Github Pages, Cloudflare Pages, Netlify, WordPress, Blogger, etc). It also isn't very useful if the server is hosted behind a [reverse proxy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_proxy), which is very common on the modern Internet.
|
||||
This method is only useful when the IP address belongs to a server that only hosts few websites. It's also not very useful if the site is hosted on a shared platform (e.g. Github Pages, Cloudflare Pages, Netlify, WordPress, Blogger, etc). It also isn't very useful if the server is hosted behind a [reverse proxy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_proxy), which is very common on the modern Internet.
|
||||
|
||||
### Server Name Indication (SNI)
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ Governments, in particular [China](https://www.zdnet.com/article/china-is-now-bl
|
|||
|
||||
### Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
|
||||
|
||||
Another way your browser can disclose your browsing activities is with the [Online Certificate Status Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_Certificate_Status_Protocol). When visiting a HTTPS website, the browser might check to see if the website's [certificate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_certificate) has been revoked. This is generally done through the HTTP protocol, meaning it is **not** encrypted.
|
||||
Another way your browser can disclose your browsing activities is with the [Online Certificate Status Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_Certificate_Status_Protocol). When visiting an HTTPS website, the browser might check to see if the website's [certificate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_certificate) has been revoked. This is generally done through the HTTP protocol, meaning it is **not** encrypted.
|
||||
|
||||
The OCSP request contains the certificate "[serial number](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_certificate#Common_fields)", which is unique. It is sent to the "OCSP responder" in order to check its status.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ We can simulate what a browser would do using the [`openssl`](https://en.wikiped
|
|||
wireshark -r /tmp/pg_ocsp.pcap
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
There will be two packets with the "OCSP" protocol; a "Request" and a "Response". For the "Request" we can see the "serial number" by expanding the triangle ▸ next to each field:
|
||||
There will be two packets with the "OCSP" protocol: a "Request" and a "Response". For the "Request" we can see the "serial number" by expanding the triangle ▸ next to each field:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
▸ Online Certificate Status Protocol
|
||||
|
|
@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ graph TB
|
|||
ispDNS --> | No | nothing(Do nothing)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Encrypted DNS with a 3rd party should only be used to get around redirects and basic [DNS blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) when you can be sure there won't be any consequences or you're interested in a provider that does some rudimentary filtering.
|
||||
Encrypted DNS with a third-party should only be used to get around redirects and basic [DNS blocking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_blocking) when you can be sure there won't be any consequences or you're interested in a provider that does some rudimentary filtering.
|
||||
|
||||
[List of recommended DNS servers](../dns.md){ .md-button }
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -21,13 +21,13 @@ Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and S
|
|||
|
||||
### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
|
||||
|
||||
A smartcard (such as a [Yubikey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer etc) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
|
||||
A smartcard (such as a [Yubikey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
|
||||
|
||||
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard so as to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.
|
||||
|
||||
## Email Metadata Overview
|
||||
|
||||
Email metadata is stored in the [message header](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) of the email message, and includes some visible headers that you may have seen such as: `To`, `From`, `Cc`, `Date`, `Subject`. There are also a number of hidden headers included by many email clients and providers that can reveal information about your account.
|
||||
Email metadata is stored in the [message header](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) of the email message and includes some visible headers that you may have seen such as: `To`, `From`, `Cc`, `Date`, `Subject`. There are also a number of hidden headers included by many email clients and providers that can reveal information about your account.
|
||||
|
||||
Client software may use email metadata to show who a message is from and what time it was received. Servers may use it to determine where an email message must be sent, among [other purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email#Message_header) which are not always transparent.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
title: "Multi-factor Authentication"
|
||||
title: "Multifactor Authentication"
|
||||
icon: 'material/two-factor-authentication'
|
||||
---
|
||||
**Multi-factor authentication** is a security mechanism that requires additional steps beyond entering your username (or email) and password. The most common method is time limited codes you might receive from SMS or an app.
|
||||
**Multifactor authentication** is a security mechanism that requires additional steps beyond entering your username (or email) and password. The most common method is time limited codes you might receive from SMS or an app.
|
||||
|
||||
Normally, if a hacker (or adversary) is able to figure out your password then they’d gain access to the account that password belongs to. An account with MFA forces the hacker to have both the password (something you *know*) and a device that you own (something you *have*), like your phone.
|
||||
|
||||
MFA methods vary in security, but are based on the premise that the more difficult it is for an attacker to gain access to your MFA method, the better. Examples of MFA methods (from weakest to strongest) include SMS, Email codes, app push notifications, TOTP, Yubico OTP, and FIDO.
|
||||
MFA methods vary in security, but are based on the premise that the more difficult it is for an attacker to gain access to your MFA method, the better. Examples of MFA methods (from weakest to strongest) include SMS, Email codes, app push notifications, TOTP, Yubico OTP and FIDO.
|
||||
|
||||
## MFA Method Comparison
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -24,13 +24,13 @@ The security of push notification MFA is dependent on both the quality of the ap
|
|||
|
||||
### Time-based One-time Password (TOTP)
|
||||
|
||||
TOTP is one of the most common forms of MFA available. When you set up TOTP you are generally required to scan a [QR Code](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QR_code) which establishes a "[shared secret](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_secret)" with the service that you intend to use. The shared secret is secured inside of the authenticator app's data, and is sometimes protected by a password.
|
||||
TOTP is one of the most common forms of MFA available. When you set up TOTP, you are generally required to scan a [QR Code](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QR_code) which establishes a "[shared secret](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_secret)" with the service that you intend to use. The shared secret is secured inside of the authenticator app's data, and is sometimes protected by a password.
|
||||
|
||||
The time-limited code is then derived from the shared secret and the current time. As the code is only valid for a short time, without access to the shared secret an adversary cannot generate new codes.
|
||||
The time-limited code is then derived from the shared secret and the current time. As the code is only valid for a short time, without access to the shared secret, an adversary cannot generate new codes.
|
||||
|
||||
If you have a hardware security key with TOTP support (such as a YubiKey with [Yubico Authenticator](https://www.yubico.com/products/yubico-authenticator/)), we recommend that you store your "shared secrets" on the hardware. Hardware such as the YubiKey was developed with the intention of making the "shared secret" difficult to extract and copy. A YubiKey is also not connected to the Internet, unlike a phone with a TOTP app.
|
||||
|
||||
Unlike [WebAuthn](#fido-fast-identity-online), TOTP offers no protection against [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing) or reuse attacks. If an adversary obtains a valid code from you they may use it as many times as they like until it expires (generally 60 seconds).
|
||||
Unlike [WebAuthn](#fido-fast-identity-online), TOTP offers no protection against [phishing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing) or reuse attacks. If an adversary obtains a valid code from you, they may use it as many times as they like until it expires (generally 60 seconds).
|
||||
|
||||
An adversary could set up a website to imitate an official service in an attempt to trick you into giving out your username, password and current TOTP code. If the adversary then uses those recorded credentials they may be able to log into the real service and hijack the account.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -38,9 +38,9 @@ Although not perfect, TOTP is secure enough for most people, and when [hardware
|
|||
|
||||
### Hardware security keys
|
||||
|
||||
The YubiKey stores data on a tamper-resistant solid-state chip which is [impossible to access](https://security.stackexchange.com/a/245772) non-destructively without a expensive processes and a forensics laboratory.
|
||||
The YubiKey stores data on a tamper-resistant solid-state chip which is [impossible to access](https://security.stackexchange.com/a/245772) non-destructively without an expensive process and a forensics laboratory.
|
||||
|
||||
These keys are generally multi-function and provide a number of methods to authenticate. Below are the most common ones.
|
||||
These keys are generally multifunction and provide a number of methods to authenticate. Below are the most common ones.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Yubico OTP
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Yubico OTP is an authentication protocol typically implemented in hardware secur
|
|||
|
||||
When logging into a website, all you need to do is to physically touch the security key. The security key will emulate a keyboard and print out a one-time password into the password field.
|
||||
|
||||
The service will then forward the one-time password to the Yubico OTP server for validation. A counter is incremented both on the key and Yubico's validation server. The OTP can only only be used once, and when a successful authentication occurs the counter is increased which prevents reuse of the OTP. Yubico provides a [detailed document](https://developers.yubico.com/OTP/OTPs_Explained.html) about the process.
|
||||
The service will then forward the one-time password to the Yubico OTP server for validation. A counter is incremented both on the key and Yubico's validation server. The OTP can only be used once, and when a successful authentication occurs, the counter is increased which prevents reuse of the OTP. Yubico provides a [detailed document](https://developers.yubico.com/OTP/OTPs_Explained.html) about the process.
|
||||
|
||||
<figure markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ The service will then forward the one-time password to the Yubico OTP server for
|
|||
|
||||
There are some benefits and disadvantages to using Yubico OTP when compared to TOTP.
|
||||
|
||||
The Yubico validation server is a cloud based service, and you're placing trust in Yubico that they are storing data securely and not profiling you. The public ID associated with Yubico OTP is reused on every website and could be another avenue for third parties to profile you. Like TOTP, Yubico OTP does not provide phishing resistance.
|
||||
The Yubico validation server is a cloud based service, and you're placing trust in Yubico that they are storing data securely and not profiling you. The public ID associated with Yubico OTP is reused on every website and could be another avenue for third-parties to profile you. Like TOTP, Yubico OTP does not provide phishing resistance.
|
||||
|
||||
If your threat model requires you to have different identities on different websites, **do not** use Yubico OTP with the same hardware security key across those websites as public ID is unique to each security key.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -66,13 +66,13 @@ If your threat model requires you to have different identities on different webs
|
|||
|
||||
U2F and FIDO2 refer to the [Client to Authenticator Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Client_to_Authenticator_Protocol), which is the protocol between the security key and the computer, such as a laptop or phone. It complements WebAuthn which is the component used to authenticate with the website (the "Relying Party") you're trying to log in on.
|
||||
|
||||
WebAuthn is the most secure and private form of second factor authentication. While the authentication experience is similar to Yubico OTP, the key does not print out a one-time password and validate with a third party server. Instead it uses [public key cryptography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography) for authentication.
|
||||
WebAuthn is the most secure and private form of second factor authentication. While the authentication experience is similar to Yubico OTP, the key does not print out a one-time password and validate with a third-party server. Instead, it uses [public key cryptography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography) for authentication.
|
||||
|
||||
<figure markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
</figure>
|
||||
|
||||
When you create an account the public key is sent to the service, then when you log in, the service will require you to "sign" some data with your private key. The benefit of this is that no password data is ever stored by the service, so there is nothing for an adversary to steal.
|
||||
When you create an account, the public key is sent to the service, then when you log in, the service will require you to "sign" some data with your private key. The benefit of this is that no password data is ever stored by the service, so there is nothing for an adversary to steal.
|
||||
|
||||
This presentation discusses the history of password authentication, the pitfalls (such as password reuse), and discussion of FIDO2 and [WebAuthn](https://webauthn.guide) standards.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ FIDO2 and WebAuthn have superior security and privacy properties when compared t
|
|||
|
||||
Typically for web services it is used with WebAuthn which is a part of the [W3C recommendations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Wide_Web_Consortium#W3C_recommendation_(REC)). It uses public key authentication and is more secure than shared secrets used in Yubico OTP and TOTP methods, as it includes the origin name (usually, the domain name) during authentication. Attestation is provided to protect you from phishing attacks, as it helps you to determine that you are using the authentic service and not a fake copy.
|
||||
|
||||
Unlike Yubico OTP, WebAuthn does not use any public ID, so the key is **not** identifiable across different websites. It also does not use any third party cloud server for authentication. All communication is completed between the key and the website you are logging into. FIDO also uses a counter which is incremented upon use in order to prevent session reuse and cloned keys.
|
||||
Unlike Yubico OTP, WebAuthn does not use any public ID, so the key is **not** identifiable across different websites. It also does not use any third-party cloud server for authentication. All communication is completed between the key and the website you are logging into. FIDO also uses a counter which is incremented upon use in order to prevent session reuse and cloned keys.
|
||||
|
||||
If a website or service supports WebAuthn for the authentication, it is highly recommended that you use it over any other form of MFA.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -98,13 +98,13 @@ When configuring your MFA method, keep in mind that it is only as secure as your
|
|||
|
||||
### Backups
|
||||
|
||||
You should always have backups for your MFA method. Hardware security keys can get lost, stolen, or simply stop working over time. It is recommended that you have a pair of hardware security keys with the same access to your accounts instead of just one.
|
||||
You should always have backups for your MFA method. Hardware security keys can get lost, stolen or simply stop working over time. It is recommended that you have a pair of hardware security keys with the same access to your accounts instead of just one.
|
||||
|
||||
When using TOTP with an authenticator app, be sure to back up your recovery keys or the app itself, or copy the "shared secrets" to another instance of the app on a different phone or to an encrypted container (e.g [VeraCrypt](../encryption.md#veracrypt)).
|
||||
When using TOTP with an authenticator app, be sure to back up your recovery keys or the app itself, or copy the "shared secrets" to another instance of the app on a different phone or to an encrypted container (e.g. [VeraCrypt](../encryption.md#veracrypt)).
|
||||
|
||||
### Initial Set Up
|
||||
|
||||
When buying a security key, it is important that you change the default credentials, set up password protection for the key, and enable touch confirmation if your key supports it. Products such as the YubiKey) have multiple interfaces with separate credentials for each one of them, so you should go over each interface and set up protection as well.
|
||||
When buying a security key, it is important that you change the default credentials, set up password protection for the key, and enable touch confirmation if your key supports it. Products such as the YubiKey have multiple interfaces with separate credentials for each one of them, so you should go over each interface and set up protection as well.
|
||||
|
||||
### Email and SMS
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ If you use SMS MFA, use a carrier who will not switch your phone number to a new
|
|||
|
||||
## More Places to Set Up MFA
|
||||
|
||||
Beyond just securing your website logins, multi-factor authentication can be used to secure your local logins, SSH keys or even password databases as well.
|
||||
Beyond just securing your website logins, multifactor authentication can be used to secure your local logins, SSH keys or even password databases as well.
|
||||
|
||||
### Windows
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ The command will prevent an adversary from bypassing MFA when the computer boots
|
|||
|
||||
If the hostname of your system changes (such as due to DHCP), you would be unable to login. It is vital that you set up a proper hostname for your computer before following this guide.
|
||||
|
||||
The `pam_u2f` module on Linux can provide two factor authentication for logging in on most popular Linux distributions. If you have a hardware security key that supports U2F, you can set up MFA authentication for your login. Yubico has a guide [Ubuntu Linux Login Guide - U2F](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016649099-Ubuntu-Linux-Login-Guide-U2F) which should work on any distribution. The package manager commands—such as `apt-get`—and package names may however differ. This guide does **not** apply to Qubes OS.
|
||||
The `pam_u2f` module on Linux can provide two-factor authentication for logging in on most popular Linux distributions. If you have a hardware security key that supports U2F, you can set up MFA authentication for your login. Yubico has a guide [Ubuntu Linux Login Guide - U2F](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016649099-Ubuntu-Linux-Login-Guide-U2F) which should work on any distribution. The package manager commands—such as `apt-get`—and package names may however differ. This guide does **not** apply to Qubes OS.
|
||||
|
||||
### Qubes OS
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -156,10 +156,10 @@ SSH MFA could be set up using multiple different authentication methods that are
|
|||
|
||||
#### Time-based One-time Password (TOTP)
|
||||
|
||||
SSH MFA can also be set up using TOTP. DigitalOcean has provided a tutorial [How To Set Up Multi-Factor Authentication for SSH on Ubuntu 20.04](https://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/how-to-set-up-multi-factor-authentication-for-ssh-on-ubuntu-20-04). Most things should be the same regardless of distribution, however the package manager commands—such as `apt-get`—and package names may differ.
|
||||
SSH MFA can also be set up using TOTP. DigitalOcean has provided a tutorial [How To Set Up MultiFactor Authentication for SSH on Ubuntu 20.04](https://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/how-to-set-up-multi-factor-authentication-for-ssh-on-ubuntu-20-04). Most things should be the same regardless of distribution, however the package manager commands—such as `apt-get`—and package names may differ.
|
||||
|
||||
### KeePass (and KeePassXC)
|
||||
|
||||
KeePass and KeePassXC databases can be secured using Challenge-Response or HOTP as a second factor authentication. Yubico has provided a document for KeePass [Using Your YubiKey with KeePass](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013779759-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-KeePass) and there is also one on the [KeePassXC](https://keepassxc.org/docs/#faq-yubikey-2fa) website.
|
||||
KeePass and KeePassXC databases can be secured using Challenge-Response or HOTP as a second-factor authentication. Yubico has provided a document for KeePass [Using Your YubiKey with KeePass](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013779759-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-KeePass) and there is also one on the [KeePassXC](https://keepassxc.org/docs/#faq-yubikey-2fa) website.
|
||||
|
||||
--8<-- "includes/abbreviations.en.md"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ title: "Threat Modeling"
|
|||
icon: 'material/target-account'
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Balancing security, privacy, and usability is one of the first and most difficult tasks you'll face on your privacy journey. Everything is a trade-off: The more secure something is, the more restricting or inconvenient it generally is, et cetera. Often people find that the problem with the tools they see recommended is they're just too hard to start using!
|
||||
Balancing security, privacy and usability is one of the first and most difficult tasks you'll face on your privacy journey. Everything is a trade-off: The more secure something is, the more restricting or inconvenient it generally is, et cetera. Often people find that the problem with the tools they see recommended is they're just too hard to start using!
|
||||
|
||||
If you wanted to use the **most** secure tools available, you'd have to sacrifice *a lot* of usability. And even then, ==nothing is ever fully secure.== There's **high** security, but never **full** security. That's why threat models are important.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -31,11 +31,11 @@ An “asset” is something you value and want to protect. In the context of dig
|
|||
|
||||
### Who do I want to protect it from?
|
||||
|
||||
To answer this question, it's important to identify who might want to target you or your information. ==A person or entity that poses a threat to your assets is an “adversary.”== Examples of potential adversaries are your boss, your former partner, your business competition, your government, or a hacker on a public network.
|
||||
To answer this question, it's important to identify who might want to target you or your information. ==A person or entity that poses a threat to your assets is an “adversary”.== Examples of potential adversaries are your boss, your former partner, your business competition, your government, or a hacker on a public network.
|
||||
|
||||
*Make a list of your adversaries, or those who might want to get ahold of your assets. Your list may include individuals, a government agency, or corporations.*
|
||||
*Make a list of your adversaries or those who might want to get ahold of your assets. Your list may include individuals, a government agency, or corporations.*
|
||||
|
||||
Depending on who your adversaries are, under some circumstances this list might be something you want to destroy after you're done security planning.
|
||||
Depending on who your adversaries are, under some circumstances, this list might be something you want to destroy after you're done security planning.
|
||||
|
||||
### How likely is it that I will need to protect it?
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ Security planning involves understanding how bad the consequences could be if an
|
|||
|
||||
==There is no perfect option for security.== Not everyone has the same priorities, concerns, or access to resources. Your risk assessment will allow you to plan the right strategy for you, balancing convenience, cost, and privacy.
|
||||
|
||||
For example, an attorney representing a client in a national security case may be willing to go to greater lengths to protect communications about that case, such as using encrypted email, than a mother who regularly emails her daughter funny cat videos.
|
||||
For example, an attorney representing a client in a national security case may be willing to go to greater lengths to protect communications about that case, such as using encrypted email than a mother who regularly emails her daughter funny cat videos.
|
||||
|
||||
*Write down what options you have available to you to help mitigate your unique threats. Note if you have any financial constraints, technical constraints, or social constraints.*
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ For example, an attorney representing a client in a national security case may b
|
|||
|
||||
These questions can apply to a wide variety of situations, online and offline. As a generic demonstration of how these questions work, let's build a plan to keep your house and possessions safe.
|
||||
|
||||
**What do you want to protect? (Or, *what do you have that is worth protecting?*)**
|
||||
**What do you want to protect? (Or *what do you have that is worth protecting?*)**
|
||||
|
||||
: Your assets might include jewelry, electronics, important documents, or photos.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ These questions can apply to a wide variety of situations, online and offline. A
|
|||
|
||||
: Are you willing to buy a safe for sensitive documents? Can you afford to buy a high-quality lock? Do you have time to open a security box at your local bank and keep your valuables there?
|
||||
|
||||
Only once you have asked yourself these questions will you be in a position to assess what measures to take. If your possessions are valuable, but the probability of a break-in is low, then you may not want to invest too much money in a lock. But, if the probability of a break-in is high, you'll want to get the best lock on the market, and consider adding a security system.
|
||||
Only once you have asked yourself these questions will you be in a position to assess what measures to take. If your possessions are valuable, but the probability of a break-in is low, then you may not want to invest too much money in a lock. But, if the probability of a break-in is high, you'll want to get the best lock on the market and consider adding a security system.
|
||||
|
||||
Making a security plan will help you to understand the threats that are unique to you and to evaluate your assets, your adversaries, and your adversaries' capabilities, along with the likelihood of risks you face.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Every time you connect to Tor, it will choose three nodes to build a path to the
|
|||
|
||||
The entry node, often called the guard node, is the first node to which your Tor client connects. The entry node is able to see your IP address, however it is unable to see what you are connecting to.
|
||||
|
||||
Unlike the other nodes, the Tor client will randomly select an entry node, and stick with it for two to three months to protect you from certain attacks.[^1]
|
||||
Unlike the other nodes, the Tor client will randomly select an entry node and stick with it for two to three months to protect you from certain attacks.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: The first relay in your circuit is called an "entry guard" or "guard". It is a fast and stable relay that remains the first one in your circuit for 2-3 months in order to protect against a known anonymity-breaking attack. The rest of your circuit changes with every new website you visit, and all together these relays provide the full privacy protections of Tor. For more information on how guard relays work, see this [blog post](https://blog.torproject.org/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters) and [paper](https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/single_guard.pdf) on entry guards. ([https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2/](https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2/))
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ Once Tor has built a circuit, data transmission is done as follows:
|
|||
|
||||
1. Firstly: when the packet arrives at the entry node, the first layer of encryption is removed. In this encrypted packet, the entry node will find another encrypted packet with the middle node’s address. The entry node will then forward the packet to the middle node.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Secondly: when the middle node receives the packet from the entry node, it too will remove a layer of encryption with its key, and this time find an encrypted packet with the exit node's address. The middle node will then forward the packet to the exit node.
|
||||
2. Secondly: when the middle node receives the packet from the entry node, it too will remove a layer of encryption with its key, and this time finds an encrypted packet with the exit node's address. The middle node will then forward the packet to the exit node.
|
||||
|
||||
3. Lastly: when the exit node receives its packet, it will remove the last layer of encryption with its key. The exit node will see the destination address and forward the packet to that address.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ Tor allows us to connect to a server without any single party knowing the entire
|
|||
|
||||
Though Tor does provide strong privacy guarantees, one must be aware that Tor is not perfect:
|
||||
|
||||
- Well-funded adversaries with the capability to passively watch most network traffic over the globe have a chance of deanonymizing Tor users by means of advanced traffic analysis. Nor does Tor does not protect you from exposing yourself by mistake, such as if you share to much information about your real identity.
|
||||
- Well-funded adversaries with the capability to passively watch most network traffic over the globe have a chance of deanonymizing Tor users by means of advanced traffic analysis. Nor Tor does not protect you from exposing yourself by mistake, such as if you share to much information about your real identity.
|
||||
- Tor exit nodes can also monitor traffic that passes through them. This means traffic which is not encrypted, such as plain HTTP traffic, can be recorded and monitored. If such traffic contains personally identifiable information, then it can deanonymize you to that exit node. Thus, we recommend using HTTPS over Tor where possible.
|
||||
|
||||
If you wish to use Tor for browsing the web, we only recommend the **official** Tor Browser—it is designed to prevent fingerprinting.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ title: VPN Overview
|
|||
icon: material/vpn
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit somewhere else in the world. An ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (ie. modem).
|
||||
Virtual Private Networks are a way of extending the end of your network to exit somewhere else in the world. An ISP can see the flow of internet traffic entering and exiting your network termination device (i.e. modem).
|
||||
|
||||
Encryption protocols such as HTTPS are commonly used on the internet, so they may not be able to see exactly what you're posting or reading but they can get an idea of the [domains you request](dns-overview.md#why-shouldnt-i-use-encrypted-dns).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ A VPN can help as it can shift trust to a server somewhere else in the world. As
|
|||
|
||||
## Should I use a VPN?
|
||||
|
||||
**Yes**, unless you are already using Tor. A VPN does 2 things: shifting the risks from your Internet Service Provider to itself and hiding your IP from a third party service.
|
||||
**Yes**, unless you are already using Tor. A VPN does two things: shifting the risks from your Internet Service Provider to itself and hiding your IP from a third-party service.
|
||||
|
||||
VPNs cannot encrypt data outside of the connection between your device and the VPN server. VPN providers can see and modify your traffic the same way your ISP could. And there is no way to verify a VPN provider's "no logging" policies in any way.
|
||||
|
||||
However, they do hide your actual IP from a third party service, provided that there are no IP leaks. They help you blend in with others and mitigate IP based tracking.
|
||||
However, they do hide your actual IP from a third-party service, provided that there are no IP leaks. They help you blend in with others and mitigate IP based tracking.
|
||||
|
||||
## What about encryption?
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -25,15 +25,15 @@ In order to keep what you actually do on the websites you visit private and secu
|
|||
|
||||
## Should I use encrypted DNS with a VPN?
|
||||
|
||||
Unless your VPN provider hosts the encrypted DNS servers, **no**. Using DOH/DOT (or any other form of encrypted DNS) with third party servers will simply add more entities to trust, and does **absolutely nothing** to improve your privacy/security. Your VPN provider can still see which websites you visit based on the IP addresses and other methods. Instead of just trusting your VPN provider, you are now trusting both the VPN provider and the DNS provider.
|
||||
Unless your VPN provider hosts the encrypted DNS servers, **no**. Using DOH/DOT (or any other form of encrypted DNS) with third-party servers will simply add more entities to trust and does **absolutely nothing** to improve your privacy/security. Your VPN provider can still see which websites you visit based on the IP addresses and other methods. Instead of just trusting your VPN provider, you are now trusting both the VPN provider and the DNS provider.
|
||||
|
||||
A common reason to recommend encrypted DNS is that it helps against DNS spoofing. However, your browser should already be checking for [TLS certificates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Digital_certificates) with **HTTPS** and warn you about it. If you are not using **HTTPS**, then an adversary can still just modify anything other than your DNS queries and the end result will be little different.
|
||||
|
||||
Needless to say, **you shouldn't use encrypted DNS with Tor**. This would direct all of your DNS requests through a single circuit, and would allow the encrypted DNS provider to deanonymize you.
|
||||
Needless to say, **you shouldn't use encrypted DNS with Tor**. This would direct all of your DNS requests through a single circuit and would allow the encrypted DNS provider to deanonymize you.
|
||||
|
||||
## Should I use Tor *and* a VPN?
|
||||
|
||||
By using a VPN with Tor, you're creating essentially a permanent entry node, often with a money trail attached. This provides zero additional benefit to you, while increasing the attack surface of your connection dramatically. If you wish to hide your Tor usage from your ISP or your government, Tor has a built-in solution for that: Tor bridges. [Read more about Tor bridges and why using a VPN is not necessary](tor-overview.md).
|
||||
By using a VPN with Tor, you're creating essentially a permanent entry node, often with a money trail attached. This provides zero additional benefits to you, while increasing the attack surface of your connection dramatically. If you wish to hide your Tor usage from your ISP or your government, Tor has a built-in solution for that: Tor bridges. [Read more about Tor bridges and why using a VPN is not necessary](tor-overview.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## What if I need anonymity?
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ VPNs cannot provide anonymity. Your VPN provider will still see your real IP add
|
|||
|
||||
## What about VPN providers that provides Tor nodes?
|
||||
|
||||
Do not use that feature. The point of using Tor is that you do not trust your VPN provider. Currently Tor only supports the [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol) protocol. [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol) (used in [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC) for voice and video sharing, the new [http3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) protocol, etc), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol) and other packets will be dropped. To compensate for this, VPN providers typically will route all non TCP packets through their VPN server (your first hop). This is the case with [ProtonVPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn/). Additionally, when using this Tor over VPN setup, you do not have control over other important Tor features such as [Isolated Destination Address](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (using a different Tor circuit for every domain you visit).
|
||||
Do not use that feature. The point of using Tor is that you do not trust your VPN provider. Currently Tor only supports the [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol) protocol. [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol) (used in [WebRTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebRTC) for voice and video sharing, the new [HTTP3/QUIC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/3) protocol, etc), [ICMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Control_Message_Protocol) and other packets will be dropped. To compensate for this, VPN providers typically will route all non-TCP packets through their VPN server (your first hop). This is the case with [ProtonVPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/tor-vpn/). Additionally, when using this Tor over VPN setup, you do not have control over other important Tor features such as [Isolated Destination Address](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Stream_Isolation) (using a different Tor circuit for every domain you visit).
|
||||
|
||||
Thus, this feature should be viewed as a convenient way to access the Tor Network, not to stay anonymous. For true anonymity, use the Tor Browser Bundle, TorSocks, or a Tor gateway.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ A VPN may still be useful to you in a variety of scenarios, such as:
|
|||
|
||||
1. Hiding your traffic from **only** your Internet Service Provider.
|
||||
2. Hiding your downloads (such as torrents) from your ISP and anti-piracy organizations.
|
||||
3. Hiding your IP from third party websites and services, preventing IP based tracking.
|
||||
3. Hiding your IP from third-party websites and services, preventing IP based tracking.
|
||||
|
||||
For use cases like these, or if you have another compelling reason, the VPN providers we listed above are who we think are the most trustworthy. However, using a VPN provider still means you're *trusting* the provider. In pretty much any other scenario you should be using a secure**-by-design** tool such as Tor.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ A [firewall](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)) may be used to
|
|||
|
||||
Red Hat distributions (such as Fedora) are typically configured through [firewalld](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewalld). Red Hat has plenty of [documentation](https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/8/html/configuring_and_managing_networking/using-and-configuring-firewalld_configuring-and-managing-networking) regarding this topic. There is also the [Uncomplicated Firewall](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncomplicated_Firewall) which can be used as an alternative.
|
||||
|
||||
Consider blocking all ports which are **not** [well known](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Well-known_port#Well-known_ports) or “privileged ports”. That is, ports from 1025 up to 65535. Block both [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol) and [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol) after the operating system is installed.
|
||||
Consider blocking all ports which are **not** [well-known](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Well-known_port#Well-known_ports) or “privileged ports.” That is, ports from 1025 up to 65535. Block both [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol) and [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol) after the operating system is installed.
|
||||
|
||||
If you use Fedora, consider removing the whitelist for [smb](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block)-client and [mdns](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multicast_DNS) services if you do not use them.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Some distributions like Arch Linux have the [linux-hardened](https://github.com/
|
|||
|
||||
## Linux Kernel Runtime Guard (LKRG)
|
||||
|
||||
LKRG is a kernel module that performs runtime integrity check on the kernel to help detect detect exploits against the kernel. LKRG works in a *post*-detect fashion, attempting to respond to unauthorized modifications to the running Linux kernel. While it is [bypassable by design](https://lkrg.org/), it does stop off-the-shelf malware that does not specifically target LKRG itself. This may make exploits harder to develop and execute on vulnerable systems.
|
||||
LKRG is a kernel module that performs runtime integrity check on the kernel to help detect exploits against the kernel. LKRG works in a *post*-detect fashion, attempting to respond to unauthorized modifications to the running Linux kernel. While it is [bypassable by design](https://lkrg.org/), it does stop off-the-shelf malware that does not specifically target LKRG itself. This may make exploits harder to develop and execute on vulnerable systems.
|
||||
|
||||
If you can get LKRG and maintain module updates it provides a worthwhile improvement to security. Debian based distributions can get the LKRG DKMS from KickSecure's secure repository and the [KickSecure documentation](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Linux_Kernel_Runtime_Guard_LKRG) has instructions on how this can be achieved. There is no LKRG package for Fedora yet, however the Qubes OS project has a COPR repository which [may become](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/5461) part of the main distribution in the future. Archlinux based systems provide LKRG DKMS modules via an [AUR package](https://aur.archlinux.org/packages/lkrg-dkms).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ On systems where [`pam_faillock`](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/pam_tall
|
|||
|
||||
## USB port protection
|
||||
|
||||
To better protect your [USB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USB) ports from attacks such as [BadUSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BadUSB) we recommend [USBGuard](https://github.com/USBGuard/usbguard). USBGuard has [documentation](https://github.com/USBGuard/usbguard#documentation) as does the [Arch Wiki](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/USBGuard).
|
||||
To better protect your [USB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USB) ports from attacks such as [BadUSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BadUSB), we recommend [USBGuard](https://github.com/USBGuard/usbguard). USBGuard has [documentation](https://github.com/USBGuard/usbguard#documentation) as does the [Arch Wiki](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/USBGuard).
|
||||
|
||||
Another alternative option if you’re using the [linux-hardened](#linux-hardened) is the [`deny_new_usb`](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/linux-hardened/commit/96dc427ab60d28129b36362e1577b6673b0ba5c4) sysctl. See [Preventing USB Attacks with `linux-hardened`](https://blog.lizzie.io/preventing-usb-attacks-with-linux-hardened.html).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -88,11 +88,11 @@ Another alternative option if you’re using the [linux-hardened](#linux-hardene
|
|||
|
||||
[Secure Boot](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface#Secure_Boot) can be used to secure the boot process by preventing the loading of [unsigned](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography) [UEFI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface) drivers or [boot loaders](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bootloader). Some guidance for this is provided in [this physical security guide](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#physical-security) and [this verified boot guide](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#verified-boot).
|
||||
|
||||
For further resources on Secure Boot we suggest taking a look at the following for instructional advice:
|
||||
For further resources on Secure Boot, we suggest taking a look at the following for instructional advice:
|
||||
|
||||
- The Archwiki’s [Secure Boot](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface/Secure_Boot) article. There are two main methods, the first is to use a [shim](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface/Secure_Boot#shim), the second more complete way is to [use your own keys](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface/Secure_Boot#Using_your_own_keys).
|
||||
|
||||
For background of how Secure Boot works on Linux:
|
||||
For the background of how Secure Boot works on Linux:
|
||||
|
||||
- [The Strange State of Authenticated Boot and Disk Encryption on Generic Linux Distributions](https://0pointer.net/blog/authenticated-boot-and-disk-encryption-on-linux.html)
|
||||
- [Rod Smith’s Managing EFI Boot Loaders for Linux](https://www.rodsbooks.com/efi-bootloaders/)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
|
|||
title: Linux Overview
|
||||
icon: fontawesome/brands/linux
|
||||
---
|
||||
It is often believed that [open source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/2022/02/02/floss-security.html). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigour applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years.
|
||||
It is often believed that [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/2022/02/02/floss-security.html). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigour applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years.
|
||||
|
||||
At the moment, desktop GNU/Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g:
|
||||
At the moment, desktop GNU/Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.:
|
||||
|
||||
- A verified boot chain, unlike Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack)
|
||||
- Strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go
|
||||
|
|
@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Traditionally, Linux distributions update by sequentially updating the desired p
|
|||
|
||||
Atomic updating distributions apply updates in full or not at all. Typically, transactional update systems are also atomic.
|
||||
|
||||
A transactional update system creates a snapshot that is made before and after an update is applied. If an update fails at any time (perhaps due to a power failure), the update can be easily rolled back to a “last known good state”.
|
||||
A transactional update system creates a snapshot that is made before and after an update is applied. If an update fails at any time (perhaps due to a power failure), the update can be easily rolled back to a “last known good state."
|
||||
|
||||
The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tumbleweed, and NixOS and can achieve reliability with this model. [Adam Šamalík](https://twitter.com/adsamalik) provided a presentation on how `rpm-ostree` works with Silverblue:
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tu
|
|||
|
||||
### “Security-focused” distributions
|
||||
|
||||
There is often some confusion about “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use.
|
||||
There is often some confusion about “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use.
|
||||
|
||||
### Arch-based distributions
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, regardless
|
|||
|
||||
For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit).
|
||||
|
||||
Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to using third party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora.
|
||||
Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora.
|
||||
|
||||
If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend Arch Linux proper, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically:
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Swap#zram-generator) or [
|
|||
|
||||
We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland.
|
||||
|
||||
Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)).
|
||||
Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)).
|
||||
|
||||
We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do not have Wayland support such as Cinnamon (default on Linux Mint), Pantheon (default on Elementary OS), MATE, Xfce, and i3.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is a
|
|||
|
||||
### MAC Address Randomization
|
||||
|
||||
Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE etc) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings.
|
||||
Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings.
|
||||
|
||||
It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as sugges
|
|||
|
||||
If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=).
|
||||
|
||||
There isn’t much point in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware.
|
||||
There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware.
|
||||
|
||||
### Other Identifiers
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ You can make your own AppArmor profiles, SELinux policies, Bubblewrap profiles,
|
|||
|
||||
### Securing Linux containers
|
||||
|
||||
If you’re running a server you may have heard of Linux Containers, Docker, or Podman which refer to a kind of [OS-level virtualization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OS-level_virtualization). Containers are more common in server and development environments where individual apps are built to operate independently.
|
||||
If you’re running a server, you may have heard of Linux Containers, Docker, or Podman which refer to a kind of [OS-level virtualization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OS-level_virtualization). Containers are more common in server and development environments where individual apps are built to operate independently.
|
||||
|
||||
[Docker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Docker_(software)) is one of the most common container solutions. It does not run a proper sandbox, and this means that there is a large kernel attack surface. The [daemon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daemon_(computing)) controls everything and [typically](https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/rootless/#known-limitations) runs as root. If it crashes for some reason, all the containers will crash too. The [gVisor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GVisor) runtime which implements an application level kernel can help limit the number of [syscalls](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/System_call) an application can make and can help isolate it from the host’s [kernel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kernel_(operating_system)).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue