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i18n/i18n/sv/os/qubes-overview.md
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Översikt över Qubes simple/qubesos Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within *qubes* (formerly "VMs") for heightened security.

Qubes OS is an open-source operating system which uses the Xen hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated qubes, (which are Virtual Machines). You can assign each qube a level of trust based on its purpose. Qubes OS provides security by using isolation. It only permits actions on a per-case basis and therefore is the opposite of badness enumeration.

Hur fungerar Qubes OS?

Qubes använder compartmentalization för att hålla systemet säkert. Qubes skapas från mallar, med Fedora, Debian och Whonixsom standard. Qubes OS also allows you to create once-use disposable qubes.

The term qubes is gradually being updated to avoid referring to them as "virtual machines".

Some of the information here and on the Qubes OS documentation may contain conflicting language as the "appVM" term is gradually being changed to "qube". Qubes are not entire virtual machines, but maintain similar functionalities to VMs.

Qubes arkitektur

Qubes arkitektur, kredit: Vad är Qubes OS Intro

Each qube has a colored border that can help you keep track of the domain in which it runs. Du kan till exempel använda en särskild färg för din bankwebbläsare och en annan färg för en allmänt opålitlig webbläsare.

Färgad kant

Qubes fönstergränser, kredit: Qubes Screenshots

Varför ska jag använda Qubes?

Qubes OS is useful if your threat model requires strong security and isolation, such as if you think you'll be opening untrusted files from untrusted sources. A typical reason for using Qubes OS is to open documents from unknown sources, but the idea is that if a single qube is compromised it won't affect the rest of the system.

Qubes OS utilizes dom0 Xen VM for controlling other qubes on the host OS, all of which display individual application windows within dom0's desktop environment. There are many uses for this type of architecture. Here are some tasks you can perform. You can see just how much more secure these processes are made by incorporating multiple steps.

Kopiera och klistra in text

Du kan kopiera och klistra in text med hjälp av qvm-copy-to-vm eller nedanstående instruktioner:

  1. Press Ctrl+C to tell the qube you're in that you want to copy something.
  2. Press Ctrl+Shift+C to tell the qube to make this buffer available to the global clipboard.
  3. Press Ctrl+Shift+V in the destination qube to make the global clipboard available.
  4. Press Ctrl+V in the destination qube to paste the contents in the buffer.

Filutbyte

To copy and paste files and directories (folders) from one qube to another, you can use the option Copy to Other AppVM... or Move to Other AppVM.... Skillnaden är att alternativet Move raderar den ursprungliga filen. Either option will protect your clipboard from being leaked to any other qubes. This is more secure than air-gapped file transfer. An air-gapped computer will still be forced to parse partitions or file systems. Detta är inte nödvändigt med inter-qube-kopieringssystemet.

Qubes do not have their own filesystems.

You can copy and move files between qubes. När du gör det görs inte ändringarna omedelbart och kan lätt ångras i händelse av en olycka. When you run a qube, it does not have a persistent filesystem. You can create and delete files, but these changes are ephemeral.

Inter-VM-interaktioner

The qrexec framework is a core part of Qubes which allows communication between domains. Det bygger på Xen-biblioteket vchan, som underlättar isolering genom policyer.

Connecting to Tor via a VPN

We recommend connecting to the Tor network via a VPN provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.

After creating a new ProxyVM which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM before they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix Gateway (sys-whonix) to the newly-created ProxyVM.

Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:

Qube name Qube description NetVM
sys-net Your default network qube (pre-installed) n/a
sys-firewall Your default firewall qube (pre-installed) sys-net
==sys-proxyvm== The VPN ProxyVM you created sys-firewall
sys-whonix Your Whonix Gateway VM ==sys-proxyvm==
anon-whonix Your Whonix Workstation VM sys-whonix

Ytterligare resurser

För ytterligare information rekommenderar vi att du konsulterar de omfattande Qubes OS-dokumentationssidorna som finns på webbplatsen Qubes OS. Offlinekopior kan laddas ner från dokumentationsarkivet för Qubes OS .