New Crowdin translations by GitHub Action

i18n/de/basics/common-threats.md

@@ -135,15 +135,15 @@ Glücklicherweise kann E2EE dieses Problem lindern, indem es die Kommunikation z
 <div class="admonition note" markdown>
 <p class="admonition-title">Hinweis zur webbasierten Verschlüsselung</p>
 
-In der Praxis ist die Effektivität der verschiedenen E2EE-Implementierungen unterschiedlich. Anwendungen wie [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal) werden nativ auf deinem Gerät ausgeführt, und jede Kopie der Anwendung ist bei verschiedenen Installationen identisch. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering).
+In der Praxis ist die Effektivität der verschiedenen E2EE-Implementierungen unterschiedlich. Anwendungen wie [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal) werden nativ auf deinem Gerät ausgeführt, und jede Kopie der Anwendung ist bei verschiedenen Installationen identisch. Wenn ein solcher Dienstanbieter eine [Hintertür](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor) in seine Anwendung einbauen würde, um deine privaten Schlüssel zu stehlen, könnte dies später mit [Reverse Engineering](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering) entdeckt werden.
 
-On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt.
+Auf der anderen Seite, bei webbasierten E2EE-Implementierungen, wie der Webanwendung von Proton Mail oder dem *Web Vault* von Bitwarden muss der Server dem Browser dynamisch JavaScript-Code zur Verfügung stellen, um die Kryptografie zu handhaben. Ein bösartiger Server kann dich ins Visier nehmen und dir bösartigen JavaScript-Code senden, um deine Verschlüsselungscode zu stehlen (und das wäre extrem schwer zu bemerken). Da der Server verschiedene Web-Clients für verschiedene Personen bereitstellen kann, wäre es - selbst wenn du den Angriff bemerkst -, unglaublich schwierig, die Schuld des Anbieters zu beweisen.
 
-Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible.
+Daher solltest du, wann immer möglich, native Anwendungen anstelle von Webclients verwenden.
 
 </div>
 
-Even with E2EE, service providers can still profile you based on **metadata**, which typically isn't protected. While the service provider can't read your messages, they can still observe important things, such as who you're talking to, how often you message them, and when you're typically active. Protection of metadata is fairly uncommon, and—if it's within your [threat model](threat-modeling.md)—you should pay close attention to the technical documentation of the software you're using to see if there's any metadata minimization or protection at all.
+Selbst mit E2EE können Dienstanbieter immer noch Profile von dir auf der Grundlage von **Metadaten** erstellen, die normalerweise nicht geschützt sind. Der Dienstanbieter kann deine Nachrichten zwar nicht lesen, aber er kann dennoch wichtige Dinge beobachten, z. B. mit wem du sprichst, wie oft du einer Person Nachrichten schickst und wann du normalerweise aktiv bist. Der Schutz von Metadaten ist eher unüblich, und wenn es in deinem [Bedrohungsmodell](threat-modeling.md) vorkommt, solltest du die technische Dokumentation der Software, die du verwendest, genau prüfen, um zu sehen, ob es eine Minimierung oder einen Schutz von Metadaten gibt.
 
 ## Massenüberwachungsprogramme
 
@@ -160,10 +160,10 @@ In France you can take a look at the [Technopolice website](https://technopolice
 
 </div>
 
-Governments often justify mass surveillance programs as necessary means to combat terrorism and prevent crime. However, as breaches of human rights, they're most often used to disproportionately target minority groups and political dissidents, among others.
+Regierungen rechtfertigen Massenüberwachungsprogramme oft als notwendige Mittel zur Terrorismus- und Verbrechensbekämpfung. Als Menschenrechtsverletzungen werden sie jedoch am häufigsten eingesetzt, um Minderheiten und politische Dissidenten unverhältnismäßig hart zu treffen.
 
 <div class="admonition quote" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">ACLU: <em><a href="https://aclu.org/news/national-security/the-privacy-lesson-of-9-11-mass-surveillance-is-not-the-way-forward">The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward</a></em></p>
+<p class="admonition-title">ACLU: <em><a href="https://aclu.org/news/national-security/the-privacy-lesson-of-9-11-mass-surveillance-is-not-the-way-forward">Die Datenschutz-Lektion von 9/11: Massenüberwachung ist nicht der richtige Weg (englisch)</a></em></p>
 
 In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRISM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM) and [Upstream](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upstream_collection), intelligence officials also admitted that the NSA had for years been secretly collecting records about virtually every American’s phone calls — who’s calling whom, when those calls are made, and how long they last. This kind of information, when amassed by the NSA day after day, can reveal incredibly sensitive details about people’s lives and associations, such as whether they have called a pastor, an abortion provider, an addiction counselor, or a suicide hotline.
 

i18n/de/basics/hardware.md

@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
 ---
-title: Choosing Your Hardware
+title: Hardware auswählen
 icon: material/chip
-description: Software isn't all that matters; learn about the hardware tools you use every day to protect your privacy.
+description: Software ist nicht alles, was zählt. Informiere dich über die Hardware-Tools, die du täglich zum Schutz deiner Daten verwendest.
 ---
 
-When it comes to discussions about privacy, hardware is often not thought about as much as what software we use. Your hardware should be considered the foundation on which you build the rest of your privacy setup.
+Wenn es um Diskussionen über die Privatsphäre geht, wird oft nicht so viel über Hardware nachgedacht wie über die Software, die wir verwenden. Deine Hardware sollte als Fundament betrachtet werden, auf dem du den Rest deiner Datenschutzeinrichtung aufbaust.
 
-## Picking a Computer
+## Auswahl eines Computers
 
 The internals of your devices process and store all of your digital data. It is important that all devices are supported by the manufacturer and developers by continuing to receive security updates.
 
-### Hardware Security Programs
+### Hardware-Sicherheitsprogramme
 
 Some devices will have a "hardware security program", which is a collaboration between vendors on best practices and recommendations when designing hardware, for example:
 
@@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ Some devices will have a "hardware security program", which is a collaboration b
 
 Even if you don't use these operating systems, participation in these programs may indicate that the manufacturer is following best practices when it comes to hardware security and updates.
 
-### Preinstalled OS
+### Vorinstallierte Betriebssysteme
 
 New computers nearly always come with Windows preinstalled, unless you buy a Mac or a specialty Linux machine. It's usually a good idea to wipe the drive and install a fresh copy of your operating system of choice, even if that means just reinstalling Windows from scratch. Due to agreements between hardware vendors and shady software vendors, the default Windows install often comes preloaded with bloatware, [adware](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/technology/lenovo-gets-a-slap-on-the-wrist-for-superfish-adware-scandal), or even [malware](https://zdnet.com/article/dell-poweredge-motherboards-ship-with-malware).
 
-### Firmware Updates
+### Firmware-Updates
 
 Hardware often has security issues that are discovered and patched through firmware updates for your hardware.
 
@@ -38,13 +38,13 @@ If you build your own PC, you may need to manually update your motherboard's fir
 Most computers and phones come equipped with a TPM (or a similar secure cryptoprocessor) which safely stores your encryption keys and handles other security-related functions. If you're currently using a machine that doesn't have one of these, you might benefit from purchasing a newer computer that has this feature. Some desktop and server motherboards have a "TPM header" which can accept a small accessory board containing the TPM.
 
 <div class="admonition Note" markdown>
-<p class="admonition-title">Note</p>
+<p class="admonition-title">Anmerkung</p>
 
 Virtual TPMs are susceptible to side-channel attacks and external TPMs, as a result of being separate from the CPU on the motherboard, are vulnerable to [sniffing](https://pulsesecurity.co.nz/articles/TPM-sniffing) when an attacker has access to the hardware. The solution to this problem is to include the secure processor inside the CPU itself, which is the case for Apple's chips and Microsoft's [Pluton](https://microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2020/11/17/meet-the-microsoft-pluton-processor-the-security-chip-designed-for-the-future-of-windows-pcs).
 
 </div>
 
-### Biometrics
+### Biometrie
 
 Many devices come equipped with a fingerprint reader or face recognition capabilities. These can be very convenient, but they aren't perfect and sometimes fail. Most devices will fall back to a PIN or password when this happens, meaning that the security of your devices is still only as good as your password.
 
@@ -61,13 +61,13 @@ Some devices do not have the proper hardware for secure face authentication. The
 
 Android defines three [security classes](https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/biometric/measure#biometric-classes) for biometrics; you should check that your device is Class 3 before enabling biometrics.
 
-### Device Encryption
+### Geräteverschlüsselung
 
 If your device is [encrypted](../encryption.md), your data is most secure when your device is completely powered off (as opposed to merely asleep), i.e. before you've entered your encryption key or lock screen password for the first time. On phones, this state of higher security is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and "After First Unlock" (AFU) once you enter the correct password after a reboot/power-on. AFU is considerably less secure against digital forensics toolkits and other exploits, compared to BFU. Therefore, if you are concerned about an attacker with physical access to your device, you should turn it off fully whenever you aren't using it.
 
 This may be impractical, so consider whether it's worth it, but in either case even AFU mode is effective against most threats, given you are using a strong encryption key.
 
-## External Hardware
+## Externe Geräte
 
 Some threats can't be protected against by your internal components alone. Many of these options are highly situational; please evaluate if they are really necessary for your threat model.
 
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ Hardware keys are devices that use strong cryptography to authenticate you to a
 
 [Recommended Hardware Keys :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../security-keys.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [Learn More about Hardware Keys :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](multi-factor-authentication.md#hardware-security-keys){ .md-button }
 
-### Camera/Microphone
+### Kamera/Mikrofon
 
 If you don't want to trust your OS's permission controls to prevent the camera from activating in the first place, you can buy camera blockers that physically prevent light from reaching the camera. You could also buy a device that doesn't have a built-in camera and use an external camera that you can unplug whenever you're done using it. Some devices come with built-in camera blockers or hardware switches that physically disconnect the camera from power.
 

i18n/de/os/qubes-overview.md

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 ---
-title: "Qubes Overview"
+title: "Qubes Übersicht"
 icon: simple/qubesos
 description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within *qubes* (formerly "VMs") for heightened security.
 ---
@@ -25,13 +25,13 @@ Each qube has a [colored border](https://qubes-os.org/screenshots) that can help
 ![Colored border](../assets/img/qubes/r4.0-xfce-three-domains-at-work.png)
 <figcaption>Qubes window borders, Credit: Qubes Screenshots</figcaption>
 
-## Why Should I use Qubes?
+## Warum sollte ich Qubes verwenden?
 
 Qubes OS is useful if your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md) requires strong security and isolation, such as if you think you'll be opening untrusted files from untrusted sources. A typical reason for using Qubes OS is to open documents from unknown sources, but the idea is that if a single qube is compromised it won't affect the rest of the system.
 
 Qubes OS utilizes [dom0](https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Dom0) Xen VM for controlling other *qubes* on the host OS, all of which display individual application windows within dom0's desktop environment. There are many uses for this type of architecture. Here are some tasks you can perform. You can see just how much more secure these processes are made by incorporating multiple steps.
 
-### Copying and Pasting Text
+### Kopieren und Einfügen von Text
 
 You can [copy and paste text](https://qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-and-paste-text) using `qvm-copy-to-vm` or the below instructions: