Hinweis zur webbasierten Verschlüsselung
-In der Praxis ist die Effektivität der verschiedenen E2EE-Implementierungen unterschiedlich. Anwendungen wie [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal) werden nativ auf deinem Gerät ausgeführt, und jede Kopie der Anwendung ist bei verschiedenen Installationen identisch. If the service provider were to introduce a [backdoor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)) in their application—in an attempt to steal your private keys—it could later be detected with [reverse engineering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering). +In der Praxis ist die Effektivität der verschiedenen E2EE-Implementierungen unterschiedlich. Anwendungen wie [Signal](../real-time-communication.md#signal) werden nativ auf deinem Gerät ausgeführt, und jede Kopie der Anwendung ist bei verschiedenen Installationen identisch. Wenn ein solcher Dienstanbieter eine [Hintertür](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor) in seine Anwendung einbauen würde, um deine privaten Schlüssel zu stehlen, könnte dies später mit [Reverse Engineering](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_engineering) entdeckt werden. -On the other hand, web-based E2EE implementations, such as Proton Mail's web app or Bitwarden's *Web Vault*, rely on the server dynamically serving JavaScript code to the browser to handle cryptography. A malicious server can target you and send you malicious JavaScript code to steal your encryption key (and it would be extremely hard to notice). Because the server can choose to serve different web clients to different people—even if you noticed the attack—it would be incredibly hard to prove the provider's guilt. +Auf der anderen Seite, bei webbasierten E2EE-Implementierungen, wie der Webanwendung von Proton Mail oder dem *Web Vault* von Bitwarden muss der Server dem Browser dynamisch JavaScript-Code zur Verfügung stellen, um die Kryptografie zu handhaben. Ein bösartiger Server kann dich ins Visier nehmen und dir bösartigen JavaScript-Code senden, um deine Verschlüsselungscode zu stehlen (und das wäre extrem schwer zu bemerken). Da der Server verschiedene Web-Clients für verschiedene Personen bereitstellen kann, wäre es - selbst wenn du den Angriff bemerkst -, unglaublich schwierig, die Schuld des Anbieters zu beweisen. -Therefore, you should use native applications over web clients whenever possible. +Daher solltest du, wann immer möglich, native Anwendungen anstelle von Webclients verwenden.ACLU: The Privacy Lesson of 9/11: Mass Surveillance is Not the Way Forward
+ACLU: Die Datenschutz-Lektion von 9/11: Massenüberwachung ist nicht der richtige Weg (englisch)
In the face of Edward Snowden's disclosures of government programs such as [PRISM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM) and [Upstream](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upstream_collection), intelligence officials also admitted that the NSA had for years been secretly collecting records about virtually every American’s phone calls — who’s calling whom, when those calls are made, and how long they last. This kind of information, when amassed by the NSA day after day, can reveal incredibly sensitive details about people’s lives and associations, such as whether they have called a pastor, an abortion provider, an addiction counselor, or a suicide hotline. diff --git a/i18n/de/basics/hardware.md b/i18n/de/basics/hardware.md index aedfd0cb..a4443364 100644 --- a/i18n/de/basics/hardware.md +++ b/i18n/de/basics/hardware.md @@ -1,16 +1,16 @@ --- -title: Choosing Your Hardware +title: Hardware auswählen icon: material/chip -description: Software isn't all that matters; learn about the hardware tools you use every day to protect your privacy. +description: Software ist nicht alles, was zählt. Informiere dich über die Hardware-Tools, die du täglich zum Schutz deiner Daten verwendest. --- -When it comes to discussions about privacy, hardware is often not thought about as much as what software we use. Your hardware should be considered the foundation on which you build the rest of your privacy setup. +Wenn es um Diskussionen über die Privatsphäre geht, wird oft nicht so viel über Hardware nachgedacht wie über die Software, die wir verwenden. Deine Hardware sollte als Fundament betrachtet werden, auf dem du den Rest deiner Datenschutzeinrichtung aufbaust. -## Picking a Computer +## Auswahl eines Computers The internals of your devices process and store all of your digital data. It is important that all devices are supported by the manufacturer and developers by continuing to receive security updates. -### Hardware Security Programs +### Hardware-Sicherheitsprogramme Some devices will have a "hardware security program", which is a collaboration between vendors on best practices and recommendations when designing hardware, for example: @@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ Some devices will have a "hardware security program", which is a collaboration b Even if you don't use these operating systems, participation in these programs may indicate that the manufacturer is following best practices when it comes to hardware security and updates. -### Preinstalled OS +### Vorinstallierte Betriebssysteme New computers nearly always come with Windows preinstalled, unless you buy a Mac or a specialty Linux machine. It's usually a good idea to wipe the drive and install a fresh copy of your operating system of choice, even if that means just reinstalling Windows from scratch. Due to agreements between hardware vendors and shady software vendors, the default Windows install often comes preloaded with bloatware, [adware](https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/technology/lenovo-gets-a-slap-on-the-wrist-for-superfish-adware-scandal), or even [malware](https://zdnet.com/article/dell-poweredge-motherboards-ship-with-malware). -### Firmware Updates +### Firmware-Updates Hardware often has security issues that are discovered and patched through firmware updates for your hardware. @@ -38,13 +38,13 @@ If you build your own PC, you may need to manually update your motherboard's fir Most computers and phones come equipped with a TPM (or a similar secure cryptoprocessor) which safely stores your encryption keys and handles other security-related functions. If you're currently using a machine that doesn't have one of these, you might benefit from purchasing a newer computer that has this feature. Some desktop and server motherboards have a "TPM header" which can accept a small accessory board containing the TPM.Note
+Anmerkung
Virtual TPMs are susceptible to side-channel attacks and external TPMs, as a result of being separate from the CPU on the motherboard, are vulnerable to [sniffing](https://pulsesecurity.co.nz/articles/TPM-sniffing) when an attacker has access to the hardware. The solution to this problem is to include the secure processor inside the CPU itself, which is the case for Apple's chips and Microsoft's [Pluton](https://microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2020/11/17/meet-the-microsoft-pluton-processor-the-security-chip-designed-for-the-future-of-windows-pcs).