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i18n/zh-Hant/desktop.md
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@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Nix是一個基於源的套件管理器；如果二進位快取中沒有預先
![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right }
**Whonix** 來自 [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure)，為 Debian 安全分支。 它旨在提供網際網路的隱私、安全和匿名性。 Whonix 最好與 [Qubes OS](# qubes-os) 配合使用。
**Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. 它旨在提供網際網路的隱私、安全和匿名性。 Whonix 最好與 [Qubes OS](# qubes-os) 配合使用。
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ Whonix 運行兩個虛擬機器：一個“工作站”和一個 Tor “閘道
Whonix 未來版本可能包括 [完整系統 AppArmor](https://github.com/Whonix/apparmor-profile-everything) 和 [個沙盒應用程式啟動器](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Sandbox-app-launcher) ，以完全限制系統上的所有進程。
Whonix 最好與 Qubes</a>一起使用
，與其他 hypervisor相比， Qubes-Whonix 有不同 [缺點](https://forums.whonix.org/t/qubes-whonix-security-disadvantages-help-wanted/8581) 。</p>
@@ -160,10 +161,9 @@ Tails Tor 瀏覽器預設包含 [uBlock Origin](desktop-browsers.md#ublock-origi
![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right }
**Qubes OS** 是一個開源作業系統，旨在為桌機運算提供強大的安全性。 Qubes 基於 Xen、X Window System 和 Linux ，可以運行大多數 Linux 應用程式與使用大多數 Linux 驅動程式。
**Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes 基於 Xen、X Window System 和 Linux ，可以運行大多數 Linux 應用程式與使用大多數 Linux 驅動程式。
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation }
@@ -171,26 +171,44 @@ Tails Tor 瀏覽器預設包含 [uBlock Origin](desktop-browsers.md#ublock-origi
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
Qubes OS 是基於Xen 的作業系統，通過安全虛擬機器為桌機提供強大的安全性，（也稱為 *Qubes*）。
Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system.
Qubes OS 作業系統將子系統（例如網絡、USB等）和應用程式隔離在個別的虛擬機器中以保護電腦。 如果系統的一部分被破壞，那麼額外的隔離可以保護系統其餘部分。 詳情請參閱Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/)。
For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page.
### Kicksecure
While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install.
!!! recommendation
![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right }
**Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. 它預設覆蓋了大量的隱私和加固建議。 It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix).
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
## 標準
**請注意，我們所推薦專案沒有任何瓜葛。 ** 除了 [標準準則](about/criteria.md)外，我們還發展出一套明確要求以提出客觀建議。 我們建議您在選擇使用項目之前先熟悉此列表，並進行自己的研究，以確保它是您的正確選擇。
Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards:
!!! example "此部分是新的"
- Free and open-source.
- Receives regular software and kernel updates.
- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland).
- The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other.
- Supports full-disk encryption during installation.
- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year.
- We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage.
- Supports a wide variety of hardware.
- Preference towards larger projects.
- Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers.
我們正在努力為我們網站的每個部分建立定義的標準，這可能會有所變化。 如果您對我們的標準有任何疑問，請在 [論壇上提問](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) ，如果沒有列出，請不要認為我們在提出建議時沒有考慮到某些事情。 當我們推薦一個項目時，有許多因素被考慮和討論，記錄每一個項目都是正在進行式。
我們推薦的作業系統：
- 必須是開源的。
- 必須定期接收軟體和Linux內核更新。
- Linux 發行版本必須支援[Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland)。
- 安裝時必須支援全磁碟加密。
- 不可將定期更新發佈凍結超過1年。 我們 [不建議](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) 桌機使用“長期支援”或“穩定”發行版。
- 需要支持各種各樣的硬體。
In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.**

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@@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android
description: Android是一個開源作業系統，具有強大的安全保護，使其成為手機的首選。
---
Android是一個安全的操作系統，具有強大的 [應用程式沙盒](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox)， [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) （AVB）和強大的 [許可](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) 控制系統。
![Android 圖標](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right }
## 選擇Android 發佈版本
The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system.
## Our Advice
### 選擇Android 發佈版本
當購買 Android 手機時，該設備的預設作業系統通常放入非 [Android 開源專案](https://source.android.com/)的應用程式與服務，成為侵入性整合。 例如， Google Play 服務擁有不可撤銷的權限，可存取您的檔案、聯絡人儲存空間、通話記錄、SMS訊息、位置、攝影機、麥克風、硬體識別碼等。 這些應用程式和服務增加了設備的攻擊面，成為 Android 各種隱私問題的來源。
@@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Android是一個安全的操作系統，具有強大的 [應用程式沙盒](htt
[Android 系統建議 :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button}
## 避免 Root
### 避免 Root
[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) 安卓手机会大大降低安全性，因为它削弱了完整的 [安卓安全模型](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy)。 這可能會降低隱私，如果有一個漏洞被降低的安全性所輔助。 常見的 root 方法涉及直接篡改開機分割區，以至於造成無法成功執行Verified Boot。 需要 root 的應用程式也會修改系統分割區，這意味著 Verified Boot 必須維持停用。 直接在使用者介面中暴露 root 也會增加裝置的 [攻擊面](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) ，助長 [特權升級](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) 漏洞和 SELinux 政策繞過。
@@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ 基於 [封包過濾](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)
我們認為，不值得這些應用程序的可疑隱私利益而犧牲手機 root 的安全。
## 已驗證的啟動
### Install Updates
重要的是不要使用 [結束生命周期](https://endoflife.date/android) 版本的Android。 較新版本的 Android 不僅會收到作業系統的安全性更新，而且還會收到重要的隱私增強更新。
For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. 系統應用程式僅由 OEM 或 Android 發行版提供。
### Sharing Media
You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload.
For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos.
## 安全保護
### 已驗證的啟動
[ Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) ，是 Android 安全模式的重要組成。 它可保護 [邪惡女僕](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) 、惡意軟件的持久性攻擊，確保安全性更新不會造成 [回滾保護降級](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection)。
@@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Verified Boot確保作業系統檔案的完整性，從而防止具有物理訪
許多 OEM 也破壞了 Verified Boot，您必須在廠商行銷之餘認知到這點。 例如， Fairphone 3和4在預設情況下並不安全，因為 [股票引導裝載程式信任公開的AVB簽名密鑰](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11)。 這會在庫存 Fairphone 設備中斷 verified boot，因為系統將啟動替代 Android 作業系統（如/e/） [，而不對自定作業系統發出警告](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) 。
## 韌體更新
### 韌體更新
韌體更新對於維護安全性至關重要，沒有它們，您的設備就無法安全。 OEM 與其合作夥伴簽訂了支援協議，在有限的支持期內提供封閉式元件。 詳情請參閱每月 [Android 安全公告](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin)。
@@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ Verified Boot確保作業系統檔案的完整性，從而防止具有物理訪
例如， Fairphone 推銷其設備有 6年的支持。 然而， SoC （ Fairphone 4上的Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G ）的EOL日期要短得多。 這意味著，無論 Fairphone 是否繼續發布軟體安全更新， Qualcomm Fairphone 4 固件安全更新將於 2023年9月結束。
## Android 版本
重要的是不要使用 [結束生命周期](https://endoflife.date/android) 版本的Android。 較新版本的 Android 不僅會收到作業系統的安全性更新，而且還會收到重要的隱私增強更新。 例如， [，Android 10 之前](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes)，任何具有 [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) 權限的應用程式都可存取手機敏感獨特的序列號，如 [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity)， [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier)，SIM卡的 [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity)，而現在則必須是系統應用程式才可以。 系統應用程式僅由 OEM 或 Android 發行版提供。
## Android權限
### Android權限
Android</a> 上的
@@ -100,13 +114,11 @@ Android 13:
## 媒體存取
相當多的應用程式讓您須以他們"“共享”"以便上傳媒體檔案。 例如，如果想在Twitter 發佈圖片，請不要授予Twitter 訪問您的“媒體和照片”的權限，因為它將可以訪問您所有圖片。 相反，請前往您的檔案管理器（ documentsUI ） ，按住圖片，然後與Twitter分享。
## Privacy Features
## 用戶設定檔
### 用戶設定檔
多重用戶設定可以在 **設置** → **系統** → **多個用戶** 中找到，是 Android 最簡單的隔離方式。
@@ -114,7 +126,7 @@ Android 13:
## 工作用設定檔
### 工作用設定檔
[工作用設定檔](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) 是另一個隔離個別應用的方法，也比單獨的用戶設定檔更為方便。
@@ -126,19 +138,19 @@ Android 13:
## VPN Killswitch
### VPN Killswitch
Android 7以上版本支援VPN killswitch ，無需安裝第三方應用程式即可使用。 此功能可以防止VPN中斷連線時的洩漏。 它可以在 :gear: **設置** → **網路 & 網際網路** → **VPN** → :gear: → **區塊連接沒有 VPN**中找到。
## 全局切換
### 全局切換
現代 Android 裝置具有全局切換功能，可停用藍牙和定位服務。 Android 12為相機和麥克風引入了切換功能。 不使用時，建議停用這些功能。 在重新啟用之前，應用程式無法使用已停用的功能（即使授予個別權限）。
## Google
## Google Services
如果您使用的裝置搭載Google服務，無論是您庫存作業系統，還是能夠安全地使用 Google Play服務（如GrapheneOS ）的作業系統，可進行許多其他變更以改善隱私。 我們仍然建議避免使用 Google 服務，或者將 *Shelter* 等設備控制器與 GrapheneOS 的Sandboxed Google Play相結合，將 Google Play 服務限制為特定用戶/工作檔案。

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@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
---
title: iOS Overview
icon: simple/apple
description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone.
---
**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system.
## 隱私筆記
iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways.
We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services.
### 激活鎖
All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device.
### Mandatory App Store
The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method.
### Invasive Telemetry
Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance).
More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023.
## 建議配置
### iCloud
The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. 這種訪問級別偶爾會被執法部門濫用，儘管您的資料在設備上還是安全加密的狀態。當然，Apple 與任何其他公司一樣容易遭受資料洩露。
Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple.
The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks.
You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here.
#### iCloud+
A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone.
**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari.
**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support.
#### Media & Purchases
At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**.
- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations**
#### Find My
**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when:
- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater.
- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network.
Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock.
At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features.
### 設定
Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app.
#### Airplane Mode
Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on.
#### Wi-Fi
You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button:
- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address**
You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off.
#### 藍牙
**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective.
- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth**
#### 一般設定
Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer.
It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**:
- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates**
- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates**
- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files**
**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want.
- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off**
**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**:
- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask**
**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps.
Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**.
#### Siri & Search
If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here.
- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked**
#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode
Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security.
Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/).
If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode.
If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts.
On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device.
**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone.
- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search**
- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center**
- [ ] Turn off **Control Center**
- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets**
- [ ] Turn off **Siri**
- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message**
- [ ] Turn off **Home Control**
- [ ] Turn off **Wallet**
- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls**
- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories**
iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts.
!!! warning "警告"
With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it.
- [x] Turn on **Erase Data**
#### 隱私
**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**:
- [ ] Turn off **Location Services**
You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**:
- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track**
You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**:
- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection**
**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources.
You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**:
- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics**
- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics**
- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+**
- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety**
- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation**
Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising**
- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads**
**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**:
- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report**
[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally.
- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode**
## Additional Advice
### E2EE Calls
Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal.
### Avoid Jailbreaking
Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware.
### Encrypted iMessage
The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices.
If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications.
### Blacking Out Faces/Information
If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%.
### iOS Betas
Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities.
## Security Highlights
### Before First Unlock
If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation.

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@@ -4,35 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux
description: Linux 為開源、以隱私為中心的桌面作業系統替代選項，但並非所有發行版都一模一樣。
---
人們通常認為 [開源](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) 軟體本質上是安全的，因為源代碼可以公開取得。 人們期望定期進行社群驗證；然而這種情況 [並不常見](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/)。 它確實取決於許多因素，例如專案活動、開發人員經驗、用於 [代碼審查的嚴格程度](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review)以及 [代碼庫](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) 特定部分的關注頻率，這些可能多年未被觸及。
**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up.
目前，桌面 Linux 確實有一些領域可以比商有作業系統更好地改進，例如：
- 驗證啟動鏈，例如 Apple 的 [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) （帶有 [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)） ， Android的 [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot)， ChromeOS [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot)或 Microsoft Windows [開機程序](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) 與 [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm)。 這些功能和硬體技術都有助於防止惡意軟體的持續篡改或 [邪惡女僕的攻擊](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack)
- 強大的沙箱解決方案，如在 [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html)， [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md)，和 [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox)。 常用的 Linux 沙盒解決方案，如 [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) 和 [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) ，仍然有很長的路要走。
- 強大的 [漏洞緩解措施](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations)
儘管有這些缺點，但如果可以稍加調整，桌面 Linux 發行版還是很不錯的。
- 避免商業作業系統經常出現的遙測現象
- 保持 [軟體自由](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms)
- 有專注隱私保護的作業系統，如 [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) 或 [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/)
我們網站通常使用術語 "Linux "來講述桌面Linux 發行版。 其它也使用Linux內核的作業系統，如 ChromeOS、Android 和Qubes OS，此處不作討論。
Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page.
[建議的 Linux 發行版 :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button}
## 隱私筆記
There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to:
- 避免商業作業系統經常出現的遙測現象
- 保持 [軟體自由](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms)
- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/)
### Open Source Security
It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/).
In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years.
### Missing Security Features
At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future.
- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3).
- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox.
Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust.
## 挑選發行版本
所有 Linux 發行版並非一模一樣。 我們的 Linux 建議頁面並不打算成為您應該使用哪個發行版的權威來源，但在選擇使用哪個發行版時，您應該記住一些事情。
所有 Linux 發行版並非一模一樣。 Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution:
### 發布週期
強烈建議您選擇與穩定的上遊軟體版本保持接近的發行版，通常稱為滾動發行版。 因為凍結發行週期旳發行版通常不會更新套件版本，並且在安全性更新方面落後。
像 [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling)這樣的凍結發行版，套件維護人員預計會回移補丁修復漏洞，而不是將軟體提昇到上遊開發人員發布的“下一個版本”。 某些安全修復
根本没收到 [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) （特别是不流行的軟體），在此種補丁模式不會放入發行版。 因此小型安全修復有時候要等到下次主要發佈時才一起進行。</p>
像 [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling)這樣的凍結發行版，套件維護人員預計會回移補丁修復漏洞，而不是將軟體提昇到上遊開發人員發布的“下一個版本”。 Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. 因此小型安全修復有時候要等到下次主要發佈時才一起進行。
我們不認為保留軟體套件和應用臨時補丁是好主意，因為它偏離了開發者計畫讓軟體工作的方式。 [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) 對此有一份簡報：
@@ -56,90 +66,70 @@ description: Linux 為開源、以隱私為中心的桌面作業系統替代選
### “以安全爲重點的發行版
人們常會混淆“以安全為中心”的發行版和“滲透測試”發行版。 快速搜索“最安全的 Linux發行版”，通常會得到像 Kali Linux, Black Arch 和 Parrot OS 這樣結果。 這些發行版是攻擊性的滲透測試發行版，捆綁了測試其他系統的工具。 它們不包括任何 "額外的安全 "或常規使用的防禦性緩解措施。
人們常會混淆“以安全為中心”的發行版和“滲透測試”發行版。 A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. 這些發行版是攻擊性的滲透測試發行版，捆綁了測試其他系統的工具。 它們不包括任何 "額外的安全 "或常規使用的防禦性緩解措施。
### 基於 Arch Linux 的發行版
不推薦 Arch發行版(無論哪個發行版)給剛接觸 Linux 的人，因為它們需要定期進行 [系統維護](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance)。 Arch沒有底層軟體選擇的發行版更新機制。 因此，必須了解當前趨勢，並在新技術取代舊有做法時予以採用。
Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. 因此，必須了解當前趨勢，並在新技術取代舊有做法時予以採用。
對於一個安全的系統，還應有足夠的 Linux 知識來作正確安全設置，如採用 [強制性訪問控制](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) 系統，設置 [內核模塊](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) 黑名單，硬化啟動參數，操作 [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) 參數，並知道需要哪些組件，如 [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit)。
使用 [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **者必須** 對該服務中安裝的 PKGBUILD進行審計。 AUR 軟體套件是社區製作的內容，未經任何審查，很容易受到軟體供應鏈的攻擊， [事實上已發生過這類事件](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/)。 應該少用 AUR，而往往各種網頁有很多不好的建議，指導人們盲目地使用 [AUR 幫助器](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) 卻沒有足夠警告。 類似的警告也適用基於Debian 發行版上使用第三方個人軟體套件檔案(PPAs)或 Fedora使用社區項目(COPR)。
Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR 軟體套件是社區製作的內容，未經任何審查，很容易受到軟體供應鏈的攻擊， [事實上已發生過這類事件](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/)。
如果是 Linux 老手，希望使用基於 Arch 發行版，我們只推薦主線 Arch Linux，而不是任何衍生品。 我們特別建議不要使用這兩種 Arch 衍生品。
The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. 類似的警告也適用基於Debian 發行版上使用第三方個人軟體套件檔案(PPAs)或 Fedora使用社區項目(COPR)。
If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives.
Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically:
- **Manjaro**: 此發行版將軟體套件保留 2週，以確保不會破壞他們自己的修改，而不是確保上游的穩定。 使用AUR軟體套件時，通常是根據 Arch 軟體庫中最新的 [存放庫構建](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing))。
- **Garuda**: 他們使用 [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) ，它自動地、盲目地從 AUR 編譯軟件套件。 沒有驗證程序去確保 AUR 套件不會受到供應鏈攻擊。
### Kicksecure
雖然我們強烈建議不要使用 Debian 這類過時的發行版，但有一種基於Debian 的加固作業系統，比傳統的 Linux 發行版更安全。 [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/)。 簡單地說，Kicksecure 是一組腳本、配置和軟體套件，可大大減少 Debian 的攻擊面。 它預設覆蓋了大量的隱私和加固建議。
### Linux-libre 內核與 “Libre” 發行版
我們非常 **不推薦**使用 Linux-libre 內核，因為它[移除了安全緩和](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) 以及由於意識型態而 [壓制有關微碼脆弱的內核警告](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846)。
We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode.
## 一般性建議
### 磁碟加密
大多數Linux 發行版安裝程序中都有啟用 [LUKS](../encryption.md#linux-unified-key-setup) FDE之選項。 如果在安裝時沒有設置這個選項，就只能重新安裝，因為在 [系統系統](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_system) 被格式化 [磁碟分區](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_partitioning)後進行加密。 我們還建議安全地刪除儲存設備。
- [安全資料清除 :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/05/25/secure-data-erasure/)
### Swap
考慮使用[ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) 或 [加密的d swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption)取代未加密的swap 以避免潛在地把敏感資料推送到 [swap 空間](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging)的安全問題。 基於 Fedora 的發行版 [預設使用 ZRAM](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM)。
Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM).
If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats.
### Wayland
建議使用支持 [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) 顯示協議的桌面環境，因為它的開發 [考慮到了安全](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/)。 其前身 [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)，不支持GUI 隔離，允許所有視窗[記錄畫面、日誌和注入其他視窗的輸入](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html)，使任何沙盒嘗試都是徒勞。 雖然有一些選項可以做嵌套 X11，比如 [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) 或 [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr)，但它們往往會帶來負面性能，設置也不方便，不如 Wayland 可取。
We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland.
幸好常見的桌面環境，如 [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org)， [KDE](https://kde.org)以及視窗管理器 [Sway](https://swaywm.org) 都支持 Wayland。 某些發佈版本如 Fedora 和 Tumbleweed 預設使用它，有些則可能在未來也會這樣作在 X11 成為 [硬性維護模式](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly)後。 如果使用以下的桌面環境，就像在桌面顯示管理器中選擇 "Wayland "一樣簡單([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)) 。
我們**反對**使用不支援 Wayland 的桌面環境或視窗管理器，如Cinnamon（Linux Mint）、Pantheon（Elementary OS）、MATE、Xfce 和 i3。
### 商用靭體(Microcode更新)
Linux 發行版，如 [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) 或 DIY(Arch Linux)，不附帶商業專用的 [微碼](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) 更新，這類更新通常會修補漏洞。 這些漏洞例子包括： [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), 以及其他 [硬體漏洞](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html)。
我們 **強烈建議** 安裝微碼更新，因為CPU 出廠時已經在運行專有的微碼。 Fedora 和 openSUSE 都預設採用微碼更新。
Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. 這些漏洞例子包括： [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), 以及其他 [硬體漏洞](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html)。
We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora 和 openSUSE 都預設採用微碼更新。
### 更新
大多數 Linux 發行版會自動安裝更新或發出提醒。 重要的是保持作業系統系統最新，當發現漏洞時，可修補軟體。
一些發行版（尤其是那些針對進階用戶）更加簡陋，指望使用者自己能做一些事情（例如 Arch 或 Debian）。 例如需要手動運行 "軟體套件管理器" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`等等)，以便接收重要的安全更新。
Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). 例如需要手動運行 "軟體套件管理器" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`等等)，以便接收重要的安全更新。
此外，一些發行版不會自動下載靭體更新。 为此，你将需要安装 [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd)。
## 隱私微調
### MAC 地址隨機化
許多桌面 Linux 發行版（Fedora、openSUSE等）自帶 [網路管理員](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager)，以配置以太網和 Wi-Fi設置。
Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings.
在使用NetworkManager時，可以隨機化 [](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) [MAC 地址](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address)。 這在Wi-Fi 上提供了更多隱私，因為這讓追踪所連網路的特定設備變得更困難。 但這 [**並不是**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) 讓您匿名。
@@ -147,9 +137,7 @@ Linux 發行版，如 [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)
如使用 [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components)，需要設置 [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) ，以啟用 [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=)。
對以太網上的 MAC 地址進行隨機化的意義不大，因為系統管理員可以通過查看 [網路交換機上使用的端口找到您](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch)。 隨機化 Wi-Fi MAC 地址必須有 Wi-Fi 靭體支持。
MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). 隨機化 Wi-Fi MAC 地址必須有 Wi-Fi 靭體支持。
### 其他標識符
@@ -159,8 +147,6 @@ Linux 發行版，如 [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)
- **用戶名稱 ** 。同樣地，用戶名稱會在系統中以各種方式使用。 考慮用 "用戶 "這樣一般常見字，而不是您的真實姓名。
- **機器 ID：**：在安裝過程中，會生成一個獨特的機器ID 並存儲在您的設備上。 考慮 [將它設置為一個通用 ID](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#machine-id)。
### 系統計數
Fedora 專案使用[`countme`](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting#Detailed_Description) 變量而非獨特 ID 來[計算多少](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting)系統訪問它的鏡像。 Fedora 這樣做是為了確定負載並在必要時為更新提供更好的伺服器。

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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos
description: Qubes 作業系統利用虛擬機器來隔離應用程式以提高安全性。
---
[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) 作業系統，利用 [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor 通過隔離虛擬機器為桌面計算提供強大的安全性。 每個虛擬機器被稱為 *Qube* ，可以根據其目的為各個Qube 分配信任等級。 由於 Qubes OS 通過使用隔離提供安全性，依每個案例情況作行為授權，因此與 [ badness 枚舉](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/)相反。
[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. 每個虛擬機器被稱為 *Qube* ，可以根據其目的為各個Qube 分配信任等級。 As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/).
## Qubes OS如何工作？

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@@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ description: Privacy Guides 是最透明和可靠的網站，用於尋找保護
- ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos)
- ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix)
- ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails)
- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure)
</div>