From c853747d8ae1b1106fb0a8a4bc12b889ca95639f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Crowdin Bot Date: Sat, 22 Jul 2023 04:04:23 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] New Crowdin translations by GitHub Action --- i18n/ar/desktop.md | 49 ++++-- i18n/ar/os/android-overview.md | 48 +++--- i18n/ar/os/ios-overview.md | 213 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ i18n/ar/os/linux-overview.md | 78 +++++---- i18n/ar/os/qubes-overview.md | 2 +- i18n/ar/tools.md | 1 + i18n/bn/desktop.md | 49 ++++-- i18n/bn/os/android-overview.md | 48 +++--- i18n/bn/os/ios-overview.md | 213 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ i18n/bn/os/linux-overview.md | 78 +++++---- i18n/bn/os/qubes-overview.md | 2 +- i18n/bn/tools.md | 1 + i18n/cs/desktop.md | 49 ++++-- i18n/cs/os/android-overview.md | 48 +++--- i18n/cs/os/ios-overview.md | 213 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ i18n/cs/os/linux-overview.md | 78 +++++---- i18n/cs/os/qubes-overview.md | 2 +- i18n/cs/tools.md | 1 + i18n/de/desktop.md | 49 ++++-- i18n/de/os/android-overview.md | 48 +++--- i18n/de/os/ios-overview.md | 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a/i18n/ar/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/ar/desktop.md @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } @@ -152,33 +152,48 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/). +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! recommendation + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## Criteria -**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! example "This section is new" +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress. - -Our recommended operating systems: - -- Must be open-source. -- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates. -- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- Must support full-disk encryption during installation. -- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. -- Must support a wide variety of hardware. +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/ar/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/ar/os/android-overview.md index d0c88ecb..bffa9e33 100644 --- a/i18n/ar/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/ar/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android description: Android is an open-source operating system with strong security protections, which makes it our top choice for phones. --- -Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. +![Android logo](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## Choosing an Android Distribution +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### Choosing an Android Distribution When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has irrevocable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android. @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that [Our Android System Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## Avoid Rooting +### Avoid Rooting [Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses. @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps. -## Verified Boot +### Install Updates + +It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Security Protections + +### Verified Boot [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection). @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock And Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be aware of beyond their marketing. For example, the Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage. -## Firmware Updates +### Firmware Updates Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin). @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive Fairphone, for example, markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates. -## Android Versions - -It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. - -## Android Permissions +### Android Permissions [Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps. @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ An app may request a permission for a specific feature it has. For example, any Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) may show some trackers such as [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). This library includes [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) which can provide [push notifications](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps. This [is the case](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) with Bitwarden. That doesn't mean that Bitwarden is using all of the analytics features that are provided by Google Firebase Analytics. -## Media Access +## Privacy Features -Quite a few applications allows you to "share" a file with them for media upload. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter. - -## User Profiles +### User Profiles Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android. With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation. -## Work Profile +### Work Profile [Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously. -## VPN Killswitch +### VPN Killswitch Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**. -## Global Toggles +### Global Toggles Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled. -## Google +## Google Services If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play. diff --git a/i18n/ar/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/ar/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4dee83e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/ar/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Privacy Notes + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Activation Lock + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## Recommended Configuration + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### Settings + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! warning + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### Privacy + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/ar/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/ar/os/linux-overview.md index e484c466..656f95a8 100644 --- a/i18n/ar/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/ar/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative, but not all distribitions are created equal. --- -It is often believed that [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigor applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years. +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.: - -- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack) -- A strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go -- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are great if you want to: - -- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems -- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- Have privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) - -Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed here. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Privacy Notes + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems +- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## Choosing your distribution -Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use. +Not all Linux distributions are created equal. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### Release cycle We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates. -For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. +For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this: @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tu ### “Security-focused” distributions -There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. +There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. ### Arch-based distributions -Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically: +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories. - **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks. -### Kicksecure - -While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. - ### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions -We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons. +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## General Recommendations @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS] ### Swap -Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do n ### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates) -Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. ### Updates Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found. -Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd). @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automaticall ### MAC Address Randomization -Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous. @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as sugges If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=). -There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. ### Other Identifiers diff --git a/i18n/ar/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/ar/os/qubes-overview.md index 17b286b9..3ed80dcd 100644 --- a/i18n/ar/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/ar/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within virtual machines for heightened security. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## How does Qubes OS work? diff --git a/i18n/ar/tools.md b/i18n/ar/tools.md index 3fac08af..7cb493af 100644 --- a/i18n/ar/tools.md +++ b/i18n/ar/tools.md @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b - ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) - ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) - ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure) diff --git a/i18n/bn/desktop.md b/i18n/bn/desktop.md index 94a6b93f..0120c600 100644 --- a/i18n/bn/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/bn/desktop.md @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } @@ -152,33 +152,48 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/). +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! recommendation + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## Criteria -**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! example "This section is new" +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress. - -Our recommended operating systems: - -- Must be open-source. -- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates. -- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- Must support full-disk encryption during installation. -- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. -- Must support a wide variety of hardware. +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/bn/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/bn/os/android-overview.md index e83a357a..84673306 100644 --- a/i18n/bn/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/bn/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: ফন্টঅ্যাওসাম/ ব্র্যান্ড / অ্ description: Android is an open-source operating system with strong security protections, which makes it our top choice for phones. --- -Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. +![Android logo](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## Choosing an Android Distribution +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### Choosing an Android Distribution When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has irrevocable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android. @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that [Our Android System Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## Avoid Rooting +### Avoid Rooting [Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses. @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps. -## Verified Boot +### Install Updates + +It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Security Protections + +### Verified Boot [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection). @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock And Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be aware of beyond their marketing. For example, the Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage. -## Firmware Updates +### Firmware Updates Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin). @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive Fairphone, for example, markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates. -## Android Versions - -It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. - -## Android Permissions +### Android Permissions [Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps. @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ An app may request a permission for a specific feature it has. For example, any Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) may show some trackers such as [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). This library includes [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) which can provide [push notifications](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps. This [is the case](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) with Bitwarden. That doesn't mean that Bitwarden is using all of the analytics features that are provided by Google Firebase Analytics. -## Media Access +## Privacy Features -Quite a few applications allows you to "share" a file with them for media upload. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter. - -## User Profiles +### User Profiles Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android. With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation. -## Work Profile +### Work Profile [Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously. -## VPN Killswitch +### VPN Killswitch Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**. -## Global Toggles +### Global Toggles Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled. -## Google +## Google Services If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play. diff --git a/i18n/bn/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/bn/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4dee83e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/bn/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Privacy Notes + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Activation Lock + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## Recommended Configuration + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### Settings + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! warning + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### Privacy + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/bn/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/bn/os/linux-overview.md index e484c466..656f95a8 100644 --- a/i18n/bn/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/bn/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative, but not all distribitions are created equal. --- -It is often believed that [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigor applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years. +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.: - -- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack) -- A strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go -- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are great if you want to: - -- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems -- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- Have privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) - -Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed here. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Privacy Notes + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems +- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## Choosing your distribution -Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use. +Not all Linux distributions are created equal. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### Release cycle We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates. -For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. +For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this: @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tu ### “Security-focused” distributions -There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. +There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. ### Arch-based distributions -Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically: +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories. - **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks. -### Kicksecure - -While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. - ### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions -We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons. +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## General Recommendations @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS] ### Swap -Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do n ### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates) -Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. ### Updates Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found. -Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd). @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automaticall ### MAC Address Randomization -Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous. @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as sugges If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=). -There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. ### Other Identifiers diff --git a/i18n/bn/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/bn/os/qubes-overview.md index 17b286b9..3ed80dcd 100644 --- a/i18n/bn/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/bn/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within virtual machines for heightened security. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## How does Qubes OS work? diff --git a/i18n/bn/tools.md b/i18n/bn/tools.md index 3fac08af..7cb493af 100644 --- a/i18n/bn/tools.md +++ b/i18n/bn/tools.md @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b - ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) - ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) - ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure) diff --git a/i18n/cs/desktop.md b/i18n/cs/desktop.md index 94a6b93f..0120c600 100644 --- a/i18n/cs/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/cs/desktop.md @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } @@ -152,33 +152,48 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/). +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! recommendation + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## Criteria -**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! example "This section is new" +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress. - -Our recommended operating systems: - -- Must be open-source. -- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates. -- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- Must support full-disk encryption during installation. -- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. -- Must support a wide variety of hardware. +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/cs/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/cs/os/android-overview.md index d0c88ecb..bffa9e33 100644 --- a/i18n/cs/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/cs/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android description: Android is an open-source operating system with strong security protections, which makes it our top choice for phones. --- -Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. +![Android logo](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## Choosing an Android Distribution +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### Choosing an Android Distribution When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has irrevocable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android. @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that [Our Android System Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## Avoid Rooting +### Avoid Rooting [Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses. @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps. -## Verified Boot +### Install Updates + +It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Security Protections + +### Verified Boot [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection). @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock And Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be aware of beyond their marketing. For example, the Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage. -## Firmware Updates +### Firmware Updates Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin). @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive Fairphone, for example, markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates. -## Android Versions - -It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. - -## Android Permissions +### Android Permissions [Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps. @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ An app may request a permission for a specific feature it has. For example, any Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) may show some trackers such as [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). This library includes [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) which can provide [push notifications](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps. This [is the case](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) with Bitwarden. That doesn't mean that Bitwarden is using all of the analytics features that are provided by Google Firebase Analytics. -## Media Access +## Privacy Features -Quite a few applications allows you to "share" a file with them for media upload. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter. - -## User Profiles +### User Profiles Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android. With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation. -## Work Profile +### Work Profile [Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously. -## VPN Killswitch +### VPN Killswitch Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**. -## Global Toggles +### Global Toggles Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled. -## Google +## Google Services If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play. diff --git a/i18n/cs/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/cs/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4dee83e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/cs/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Privacy Notes + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Activation Lock + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## Recommended Configuration + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### Settings + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! warning + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### Privacy + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/cs/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/cs/os/linux-overview.md index e484c466..656f95a8 100644 --- a/i18n/cs/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/cs/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative, but not all distribitions are created equal. --- -It is often believed that [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigor applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years. +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.: - -- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack) -- A strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go -- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are great if you want to: - -- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems -- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- Have privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) - -Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed here. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Privacy Notes + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems +- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## Choosing your distribution -Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use. +Not all Linux distributions are created equal. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### Release cycle We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates. -For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. +For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this: @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tu ### “Security-focused” distributions -There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. +There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. ### Arch-based distributions -Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically: +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories. - **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks. -### Kicksecure - -While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. - ### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions -We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons. +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## General Recommendations @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS] ### Swap -Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do n ### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates) -Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. ### Updates Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found. -Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd). @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automaticall ### MAC Address Randomization -Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous. @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as sugges If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=). -There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. ### Other Identifiers diff --git a/i18n/cs/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/cs/os/qubes-overview.md index 17b286b9..3ed80dcd 100644 --- a/i18n/cs/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/cs/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within virtual machines for heightened security. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## How does Qubes OS work? diff --git a/i18n/cs/tools.md b/i18n/cs/tools.md index 3fac08af..7cb493af 100644 --- a/i18n/cs/tools.md +++ b/i18n/cs/tools.md @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b - ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) - ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) - ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure) diff --git a/i18n/de/desktop.md b/i18n/de/desktop.md index 94a6b93f..0120c600 100644 --- a/i18n/de/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/de/desktop.md @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } @@ -152,33 +152,48 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/). +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! recommendation + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## Criteria -**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! example "This section is new" +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress. - -Our recommended operating systems: - -- Must be open-source. -- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates. -- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- Must support full-disk encryption during installation. -- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. -- Must support a wide variety of hardware. +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/de/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/de/os/android-overview.md index d0c88ecb..bffa9e33 100644 --- a/i18n/de/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/de/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android description: Android is an open-source operating system with strong security protections, which makes it our top choice for phones. --- -Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. +![Android logo](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## Choosing an Android Distribution +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### Choosing an Android Distribution When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has irrevocable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android. @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that [Our Android System Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## Avoid Rooting +### Avoid Rooting [Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses. @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps. -## Verified Boot +### Install Updates + +It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Security Protections + +### Verified Boot [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection). @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock And Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be aware of beyond their marketing. For example, the Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage. -## Firmware Updates +### Firmware Updates Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin). @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive Fairphone, for example, markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates. -## Android Versions - -It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. - -## Android Permissions +### Android Permissions [Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps. @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ An app may request a permission for a specific feature it has. For example, any Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) may show some trackers such as [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). This library includes [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) which can provide [push notifications](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps. This [is the case](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) with Bitwarden. That doesn't mean that Bitwarden is using all of the analytics features that are provided by Google Firebase Analytics. -## Media Access +## Privacy Features -Quite a few applications allows you to "share" a file with them for media upload. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter. - -## User Profiles +### User Profiles Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android. With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation. -## Work Profile +### Work Profile [Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously. -## VPN Killswitch +### VPN Killswitch Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**. -## Global Toggles +### Global Toggles Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled. -## Google +## Google Services If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play. diff --git a/i18n/de/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/de/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d4e9b739 --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/de/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Privacy Notes + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Activation Lock + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## Empfohlene Konfiguration + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### Einstellungen + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! warning + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### Datenschutz + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/de/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/de/os/linux-overview.md index 4cc2615f..33dfced0 100644 --- a/i18n/de/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/de/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative, but not all distribitions are created equal. --- -It is often believed that [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigor applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years. +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.: - -- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack) -- A strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go -- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are great if you want to: - -- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems -- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- Have privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) - -Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed here. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Privacy Notes + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems +- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## Choosing your distribution -Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use. +Not all Linux distributions are created equal. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### Release cycle We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates. -For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. +For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this: @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tu ### “Security-focused” distributions -There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. +There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. ### Arch-based distributions -Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically: +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories. - **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks. -### Kicksecure - -While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. - ### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions -Wir raten dringend **davon ab**, den Linux-Libre-Kernel zu verwenden, da er [Sicherheits-Mitigationen](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) entfernt und [Kernelwarnungen](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) über verwundbaren Mikrocode aus ideologischen Gründen unterdrückt. +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## General Recommendations @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS] ### Swap -Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Einige Distributionen wie Fedora und Tumbleweed verwenden es standardmäßig, und einige andere könnten dies in Zukunft tun, da sich X11 im ["hard maintenance mode"](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly) befindet. If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do n ### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates) -Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. ### Updates Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found. -Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd). @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automaticall ### MAC Address Randomization -Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous. @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as sugges If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=). -There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. ### Other Identifiers diff --git a/i18n/de/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/de/os/qubes-overview.md index 17b286b9..3ed80dcd 100644 --- a/i18n/de/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/de/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within virtual machines for heightened security. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## How does Qubes OS work? diff --git a/i18n/de/tools.md b/i18n/de/tools.md index 853a30ef..98447d0a 100644 --- a/i18n/de/tools.md +++ b/i18n/de/tools.md @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b - ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) - ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) - ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure) diff --git a/i18n/el/desktop.md b/i18n/el/desktop.md index 94a6b93f..0120c600 100644 --- a/i18n/el/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/el/desktop.md @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } @@ -152,33 +152,48 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/). +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! recommendation + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## Criteria -**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! example "This section is new" +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress. - -Our recommended operating systems: - -- Must be open-source. -- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates. -- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- Must support full-disk encryption during installation. -- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. -- Must support a wide variety of hardware. +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/el/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/el/os/android-overview.md index d0c88ecb..bffa9e33 100644 --- a/i18n/el/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/el/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android description: Android is an open-source operating system with strong security protections, which makes it our top choice for phones. --- -Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. +![Android logo](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## Choosing an Android Distribution +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### Choosing an Android Distribution When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has irrevocable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android. @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that [Our Android System Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## Avoid Rooting +### Avoid Rooting [Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses. @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps. -## Verified Boot +### Install Updates + +It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Security Protections + +### Verified Boot [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection). @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock And Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be aware of beyond their marketing. For example, the Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage. -## Firmware Updates +### Firmware Updates Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin). @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive Fairphone, for example, markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates. -## Android Versions - -It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. - -## Android Permissions +### Android Permissions [Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps. @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ An app may request a permission for a specific feature it has. For example, any Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) may show some trackers such as [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). This library includes [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) which can provide [push notifications](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps. This [is the case](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) with Bitwarden. That doesn't mean that Bitwarden is using all of the analytics features that are provided by Google Firebase Analytics. -## Media Access +## Privacy Features -Quite a few applications allows you to "share" a file with them for media upload. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter. - -## User Profiles +### User Profiles Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android. With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation. -## Work Profile +### Work Profile [Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously. -## VPN Killswitch +### VPN Killswitch Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**. -## Global Toggles +### Global Toggles Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled. -## Google +## Google Services If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play. diff --git a/i18n/el/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/el/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4dee83e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/el/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Privacy Notes + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Activation Lock + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## Recommended Configuration + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### Settings + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! warning + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### Privacy + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/el/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/el/os/linux-overview.md index e484c466..656f95a8 100644 --- a/i18n/el/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/el/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative, but not all distribitions are created equal. --- -It is often believed that [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigor applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years. +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.: - -- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack) -- A strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go -- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are great if you want to: - -- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems -- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- Have privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) - -Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed here. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Privacy Notes + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems +- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## Choosing your distribution -Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use. +Not all Linux distributions are created equal. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### Release cycle We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates. -For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. +For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this: @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tu ### “Security-focused” distributions -There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. +There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. ### Arch-based distributions -Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically: +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories. - **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks. -### Kicksecure - -While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. - ### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions -We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons. +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## General Recommendations @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS] ### Swap -Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do n ### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates) -Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. ### Updates Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found. -Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd). @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automaticall ### MAC Address Randomization -Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous. @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as sugges If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=). -There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. ### Other Identifiers diff --git a/i18n/el/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/el/os/qubes-overview.md index 17b286b9..3ed80dcd 100644 --- a/i18n/el/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/el/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within virtual machines for heightened security. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## How does Qubes OS work? diff --git a/i18n/el/tools.md b/i18n/el/tools.md index 7bba62e1..dc1da5d2 100644 --- a/i18n/el/tools.md +++ b/i18n/el/tools.md @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b - ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) - ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) - ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure) diff --git a/i18n/eo/desktop.md b/i18n/eo/desktop.md index 94a6b93f..0120c600 100644 --- a/i18n/eo/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/eo/desktop.md @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } @@ -152,33 +152,48 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/). +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! recommendation + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## Criteria -**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! example "This section is new" +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress. - -Our recommended operating systems: - -- Must be open-source. -- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates. -- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- Must support full-disk encryption during installation. -- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. -- Must support a wide variety of hardware. +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/eo/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/eo/os/android-overview.md index d0c88ecb..bffa9e33 100644 --- a/i18n/eo/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/eo/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android description: Android is an open-source operating system with strong security protections, which makes it our top choice for phones. --- -Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. +![Android logo](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## Choosing an Android Distribution +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### Choosing an Android Distribution When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has irrevocable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android. @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that [Our Android System Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## Avoid Rooting +### Avoid Rooting [Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses. @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps. -## Verified Boot +### Install Updates + +It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Security Protections + +### Verified Boot [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection). @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock And Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be aware of beyond their marketing. For example, the Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage. -## Firmware Updates +### Firmware Updates Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin). @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive Fairphone, for example, markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates. -## Android Versions - -It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. - -## Android Permissions +### Android Permissions [Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps. @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ An app may request a permission for a specific feature it has. For example, any Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) may show some trackers such as [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). This library includes [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) which can provide [push notifications](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps. This [is the case](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) with Bitwarden. That doesn't mean that Bitwarden is using all of the analytics features that are provided by Google Firebase Analytics. -## Media Access +## Privacy Features -Quite a few applications allows you to "share" a file with them for media upload. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter. - -## User Profiles +### User Profiles Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android. With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation. -## Work Profile +### Work Profile [Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously. -## VPN Killswitch +### VPN Killswitch Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**. -## Global Toggles +### Global Toggles Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled. -## Google +## Google Services If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play. diff --git a/i18n/eo/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/eo/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4dee83e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/eo/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Privacy Notes + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Activation Lock + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## Recommended Configuration + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### Settings + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! warning + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### Privacy + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/eo/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/eo/os/linux-overview.md index e484c466..656f95a8 100644 --- a/i18n/eo/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/eo/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative, but not all distribitions are created equal. --- -It is often believed that [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigor applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years. +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.: - -- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack) -- A strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go -- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are great if you want to: - -- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems -- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- Have privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) - -Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed here. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Privacy Notes + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems +- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## Choosing your distribution -Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use. +Not all Linux distributions are created equal. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### Release cycle We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates. -For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. +For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this: @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tu ### “Security-focused” distributions -There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. +There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. ### Arch-based distributions -Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically: +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories. - **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks. -### Kicksecure - -While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. - ### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions -We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons. +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## General Recommendations @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS] ### Swap -Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do n ### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates) -Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. ### Updates Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found. -Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd). @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automaticall ### MAC Address Randomization -Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous. @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as sugges If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=). -There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. ### Other Identifiers diff --git a/i18n/eo/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/eo/os/qubes-overview.md index 17b286b9..3ed80dcd 100644 --- a/i18n/eo/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/eo/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within virtual machines for heightened security. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## How does Qubes OS work? diff --git a/i18n/eo/tools.md b/i18n/eo/tools.md index 3fac08af..7cb493af 100644 --- a/i18n/eo/tools.md +++ b/i18n/eo/tools.md @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b - ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) - ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) - ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure) diff --git a/i18n/es/desktop.md b/i18n/es/desktop.md index 91096d54..baca38a1 100644 --- a/i18n/es/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/es/desktop.md @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Nix es un gestor de paquetes basado en el código fuente; si no hay ningún paqu ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** está basado en [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), una bifurcación de Debian centrada en la seguridad. Su objetivo es proporcionar privacidad, seguridad y anonimato en Internet. Whonix se utiliza mejor junto con [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. Su objetivo es proporcionar privacidad, seguridad y anonimato en Internet. Whonix se utiliza mejor junto con [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: Página principal](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Servicio Onion" } @@ -150,35 +150,50 @@ Tails está diseñado para formatearse por completo después de cada reinicio. [ !!! recommendation - ![Logotipo de Qubes OS](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } + ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes** es un sistema operativo de código abierto diseñado para proporcionar una fuerte seguridad para el uso de escritorio. Qubes se basa en Xen, el Sistema de Ventanas X y Linux, y puede ejecutar la mayoría de las aplicaciones Linux y utilizar la mayoría de los controladores de Linux. + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes se basa en Xen, el Sistema de Ventanas X y Linux, y puede ejecutar la mayoría de las aplicaciones Linux y utilizar la mayoría de los controladores de Linux. - [:octicons-home-16: Página Principal](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Vista General](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Servicio Onion" } - [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Politica de Privacidad" } - [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentación } - [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Código Fuente" } - [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribuir } + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS es un sistema operativo basado en Xen destinado a proporcionar una fuerte seguridad para la informática de escritorio a través de máquinas virtuales (MVs) seguras, también conocidas como *Qubes*. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -El sistema operativo Qubes OS asegura el ordenador aislando subsistemas (por ejemplo, redes, USB, etc.) y aplicaciones en máquinas virtuales separadas. Si una parte del sistema se ve comprometida, es probable que el aislamiento adicional proteja al resto del sistema. Para obtener más detalles, consulte las [Preguntas Frecuentes](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/) de Qubes. +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! recommendation + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. Cubre muchas recomendaciones de privacidad y seguridad por defecto. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## Criterios -**Por favor, tenga en cuenta que no estamos afiliados con ninguno de los proyectos que recomendamos.** Además de [nuestros criterios estándar](about/criteria.md), hemos desarrollado un conjunto claro de requisitos que nos permiten ofrecer recomendaciones objetivas. Sugerimos que usted se familiarice con esta lista, antes de decidir utilizar un proyecto y realizar su propia investigación para asegurarse de que es la elección ideal para usted. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! example "Esta sección es nueva" +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - Estamos trabajando en establecer criterios definidos para cada sección de nuestra página, y esto puede estar sujeto a cambios. Si tiene alguna duda sobre nuestros criterios, por favor [pregunte en nuestro foro](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) y no asuma que no hemos tenido en cuenta algo a la hora de hacer nuestras recomendaciones si no aparece aquí. Son muchos los factores que se tienen en cuenta y se debaten cuando recomendamos un proyecto, y documentar cada uno de ellos es un trabajo en curso. - -Nuestros sistemas operativos recomendados: - -- Deben ser de código abierto. -- Deben recibir actualizaciones periódicas de software y del núcleo de Linux. -- Las distribuciones Linux deben ser compatibles con [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- Debe soportar el cifrado de disco completo durante la instalación. -- No debe congelar las publicaciones periódicas durante más de 1 año. Nosotros [no recomendamos](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) versiones de distribución "Long Term Support (Soporte a Largo Plazo)" o "stable (estable)" para uso de escritorio. -- Debe ser compatible con una amplia variedad de hardware. +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/es/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/es/os/android-overview.md index a221761f..b14a1ac9 100644 --- a/i18n/es/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/es/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android description: Android es un sistema operativo de código abierto con fuertes medidas de seguridad, lo que lo convierte en nuestra primera opción para teléfonos. --- -Android es un sistema operativo seguro el cuál tiene [aislamiento de las aplicaciones](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [arranque verificado](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), y un robusto sistema de control de [permisos](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview). +![Logotipo de Android](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## Elegir una distribución de Android +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### Elegir una distribución de Android Cuando compras un celular Android, el sistema operativo por defecto suele venir con una integración invasiva con aplicaciones y servicios que no son parte del [Android Open Source Project](https://source.android.com/). Un ejemplo de ello son los servicios de Google Play, el cual tiene permisos irrevocables a tus archivos, almacenamiento de contactos, registros de llamadas, mensajes SMS, ubicación, cámara, micrófono, identificadores de hardware, etc. Estas aplicaciones y servicios aumentan la superficie de ataque de tu dispositivo y son la fuente de varios problemas de privacidad en Android. @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Idealmente, cuando escojas una distribución de Android, deberías asegurarte de [Nuestras recomendaciones del sistema Android :material-arrow-right:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## Evita el Rooting +### Evita el Rooting Hacer [Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) en celulares Android puede debilitar la seguridad significativamente debido que debilita el [modelo completo de seguridad de Android](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android#Seguridad,_privacidad_y_vigilancia). Esto puede debilitar la privacidad en caso de que haya un exploit que sea asistido por la seguridad debilitada. Los métodos de rooteo más comunes involucran la manipulación directa de la partición de arranque, haciendo que sea imposible realizar con éxito el arranque verificado. Las aplicaciones que requieren root también modificarán la partición del sistema, lo que significa que el arranque verificado tendría que permanecer deshabilitado. Tener el root expuesto directamente en la interfaz del usuario también incrementa la [superficie de ataque](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) de tu dispositivo y puede asistir en la [escalada de privilegios](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Escalada_de_privilegios) de vulnerabilidades y omisiones de la política de SELinux. @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ funciona basado en el enfoque del [filtrado de paquetes](https://es.wiki No creemos que los sacrificios de seguridad realizados al rootear un teléfono merezcan la pena por los cuestionables beneficios de privacidad de esas aplicaciones. -## Arranque verificado +### Install Updates + +Es importante no usar una versión de Android al [final de su vida útil](https://endoflife.date/android). Las versiones más recientes de Android no solo reciben actualizaciones de seguridad para el sistema operativo, sino también actualizaciones importantes para mejorar la privacidad. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. Las aplicaciones del sistema sólo las proporciona el OEM o la distribución de Android. + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Security Protections + +### Arranque verificado El [arranque verificado](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) es una parte importante del modelo de seguridad de Android. Proviene de protección contra ataques [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack), persistencia del malware, y se asegura que las actualizaciones de seguridad no puedan ser desactualizadas gracias a la [protección de reversión](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection). @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Desgraciadamente, los fabricantes de equipos originales (OEM) solo están obliga Muchos OEMs también han roto la implementación del Arranque Verificado que tienes que conocer más allá de su marketing. Por ejemplo, los Fairphone 3 y 4 no son seguros por defecto, ya que el [bootloader de serie confía en la clave de firma pública AVB](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). Esto rompe el arranque verificado en un dispositivo Fairphone de fábrica, ya que el sistema arrancará sistemas operativos Android alternativos como (como /e/) [sin ninguna advertencia](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) sobre el uso del sistema operativo personalizado. -## Actualizaciones de firmware +### Actualizaciones de firmware Las actualizaciones de firmware son fundamentales para mantener la seguridad y, sin ellas, tu dispositivo no puede ser seguro. Los fabricantes de equipos originales tienen acuerdos de asistencia con sus socios para proporcionar los componentes de código cerrado durante un periodo de asistencia limitado. Estos se detallan en los [boletines de seguridad mensuales de Android](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin). @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ Los dispositivos EOL que ya no son compatibles con el fabricante del SoC no pued Fairphone, por ejemplo, comercializa sus dispositivos con 6 años de soporte. Sin embargo, el SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G en el Fairphone 4) tiene una fecha de caducidad considerablemente más corta. Esto significa que las actualizaciones de seguridad de firmware de Qualcomm para el Fairphone 4 terminarán en septiembre de 2023, independientemente de que Fairphone siga publicando actualizaciones de seguridad de software. -## Versiones de Android - -Es importante no usar una versión de Android al [final de su vida útil](https://endoflife.date/android). Las versiones más recientes de Android no solo reciben actualizaciones de seguridad para el sistema operativo, sino también actualizaciones importantes para mejorar la privacidad. Por ejemplo, [antes de Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), cualquier aplicación con el permiso [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) podía acceder a números de serie únicos y sensibles como el [IMEI](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/IMEI), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), el [IMSI](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/IMSI) de tu tarjeta SIM, mientras que ahora deben ser aplicaciones del sistema para poder hacerlo. Las aplicaciones del sistema sólo las proporciona el OEM o la distribución de Android. - -## Permisos de Android +### Permisos de Android Los [permisos en Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) te dan control sobre que pueden acceder las aplicaciones. Google regularmente hace [mejoras](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) en el sistema de permisos en cada versión sucesiva. Todas las aplicaciones que instales están estrictamente [aisladas](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), por lo que no es necesario instalar ninguna aplicación de antivirus. @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ Una aplicación puede solicitar un permiso para una función específica que ten Las aplicaciones que respetan la privacidad, como [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/), pueden mostrar algunos rastreadores como [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). Esta biblioteca incluye [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) que puede proporcionar [notificaciones push](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tecnología_push) en las aplicaciones. Este [es el caso](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) con Bitwarden. Esto no significa que Bitwarden utilice todas las funciones analíticas que ofrece Google Firebase Analytics. -## Acceso a medios +## Privacy Features -Unas cuantas aplicaciones te permiten "compartir" un archivo con ellos para la carga de medios. Si quieres, por ejemplo, tuitear una foto a Twitter, no le des acceso a tus "medios y fotos", porque entonces tendrá acceso a todas tus fotos. En su lugar, ve a tu gestor de archivos (documentsUI), mantén la imagen y compártela en Twitter. - -## Perfiles de usuario +### Perfiles de usuario Los perfiles de usuario múltiples pueden ser encontrados en **Ajustes** → **Sistema** → **Usuarios múltiples** y son la manera más simple de aislar en Android. Con los perfiles de usuario, puedes imponer restricciones a un perfil específico, como: realizar llamadas, usar SMS o instalar aplicaciones en el dispositivo. Cada perfil se cifra con su propia clave de cifrado y no puede acceder a los datos de ningún otro perfil. Incluso el propietario del dispositivo no puede ver los datos de otros perfiles sin conocer su contraseña. Los perfiles de usuario múltiples son un método más seguro de aislamiento. -## Perfil de trabajo +### Perfil de trabajo Los [perfiles de trabajo](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) son otra manera de aislar aplicaciones individuales y pueden ser más convenientes que usar perfiles de usuario separados. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ El perfil de trabajo depende de un controlador de dispositivo para funcionar. Ca Este método es generalmente menos seguro que un perfil de usuario secundario; sin embargo, le permite la comodidad de ejecutar aplicaciones tanto en el trabajo y perfiles personales simultáneamente. -## "Killswitch" de un VPN +### "Killswitch" de un VPN Android 7 y superiores soportan un VPN killswitch y está disponible sin necesidad de instalar aplicaciones de terceros. Esta función puede evitar fugas si la VPN está desconectada. Se puede encontrar en :gear: **Ajustes** → **Red e internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Bloquear conexiones sin VPN**. -## Cambios globales +### Cambios globales Los dispositivos Android modernos tienen interruptores globales para desactivar los servicios de Bluetooth y de localización. Android 12 introdujo interruptores para la cámara y el micrófono. Cuando no estén en uso, recomendamos desactivar estas funciones. Las aplicaciones no pueden usar las funciones desactivadas (incluso si se les concede un permiso individual) hasta que se reactiven. -## Google +## Google Services Si está utilizando un dispositivo con servicios de Google, ya sea su sistema operativo de stock o un sistema operativo que utiliza Google Play Services de forma segura como GrapheneOS, hay una serie de cambios adicionales que puede realizar para mejorar su privacidad. Seguimos recomendando evitar los servicios de Google por completo, o limitar los servicios de Google Play a un perfil específico de usuario/trabajo combinando un controlador de dispositivo como *Shelter* con Google Play aislado de GrapheneOS. diff --git a/i18n/es/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/es/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f0e79962 --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/es/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Privacy Notes + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Activation Lock + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## Configuración Recomendada + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### Configuración + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! warning "Advertencia" + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### Privacidad + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/es/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/es/os/linux-overview.md index 2376b1d3..cfdfbaf7 100644 --- a/i18n/es/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/es/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux es una alternativa de sistema operativo de escritorio de código abierto y centrado en la privacidad, pero no todas las distribuciones son iguales. --- -Es una creencia popular que los programas de [código abierto](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) son seguros porque su código fuente está disponible. Siempre hay una expectativa de que la verificación comunitaria sucede regularmente; sin embargo, [este no siempre es el caso](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). Depende de varios factores, como la actividad del proyecto, la experiencia de los desarrolladores, el nivel de rigor aplicado a las [revisiones del código](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), y la frecuencia con la que se presta atención a partes específicas del [código](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) que pueden permanecer intactas durante años. +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -De momento, Linux de escritorio tiene algunas áreas que pueden ser mejoradas al ser comparadas con sus contrapartes propietarias, por ejemplo: - -- Una cadena verificada de inicio, como el [Inicio Seguro](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) de Apple (con el [enclave seguro](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), el [Arranque Verificado](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) de Android, el [Arranque Verificado](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot) de ChromeOS, o el [proceso de inicio](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) de Windows con [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). Estas características y tecnologías de hardware pueden ayudar a prevenir la manipulación persistente ocasionada por algún malware o [ataque de 'evil-maid'](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack). -- Una fuerte solución de aislamiento como la que se encuentra en [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md) y [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Las soluciones de aislamiento utilizadas comúnmente de Linux como [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) y [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/), aún tienen mucho por recorrer. -- Fuertes [mitigaciones de vulnerabilidades](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations). - -A pesar de estos inconvenientes, las distribuciones Linux de escritorio son geniales si quieres: - -- Evitar la telemetría que, regularmente, viene con los sistemas operativos propietarios. -- Mantener la ['libertad del software'](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms). -- Tener sistemas enfocados en la privacidad como [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) o [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/). - -Nuestra página generalmente utiliza el término "Linux" para describir las distribuciones Linux de escritorio. Otros sistemas operativos que también utilizan el kernel de Linux como ChromeOS, Android y Qubes OS no se discuten aquí. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [Nuestras recomendaciones de Linux: :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Privacy Notes + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- Evitar la telemetría que, regularmente, viene con los sistemas operativos propietarios. +- Mantener la ['libertad del software'](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms). +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## Elegir tu distribución -No todas las distribuciones Linux son iguales. Mientras nuestra página con recomendaciones de Linux no fue creada para ser una fuente autorizada para decidir cuál distribución debes utilizar, hay algunos aspectos que debes considerar al elegir cuál distribución usar. +No todas las distribuciones Linux son iguales. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### Ciclo de lanzamiento Recomendamos encarecidamente que elijas las distribuciones que permanecen cerca a los lanzamientos estables, comúnmente denominadas como distribuciones de lanzamiento continuo. Esto se debe a que las distribuciones de lanzamiento de ciclo congelado, normalmente no actualizan las versiones de sus paquetes y se encuentran detrás en actualizaciones de seguridad. -Para las distribuciones congeladas como [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), se espera que los encargados de mantener los paquetes adapten los parches para corregir vulnerabilidades, en lugar de actualizar el software a la "siguiente versión" lanzada por el desarrollador original. Algunos arreglos de seguridad [no](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) reciben un [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (programas de menor popularidad) del todo y no llegan a la distribución con este modelo de parches. Por ello, a veces las correcciones de seguridad son pospuestas hasta la siguiente versión importante. +Para las distribuciones congeladas como [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), se espera que los encargados de mantener los paquetes adapten los parches para corregir vulnerabilidades, en lugar de actualizar el software a la "siguiente versión" lanzada por el desarrollador original. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. Por ello, a veces las correcciones de seguridad son pospuestas hasta la siguiente versión importante. No creemos que retener paquetes y aplicar los parches provisionales sea una buena idea, porque se aleja de la forma en que el desarrollador se pudo asegurar que el software funcione. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) tiene una presentación sobre esto: @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ El método de actualizaciones Atómicas es utilizado para distribuciones inmutab ### Distribuciones "enfocadas en la seguridad" -A menudo existe cierta confusión entre las distribuciones "enfocadas en la privacidad" y las distribuciones "pentesting". Una búsqueda rápida para "la distribución más segura de Linux" suele arrojar resultados como Kali Linux, Black Arch y Parrot OS. Estas distribuciones son distribuciones de pruebas de penetración ofensivas que incluyen herramientas para probar otros sistemas. Estas no incluyen ninguna "seguridad adicional" o mitigaciones defensivas destinadas a un uso regular. +A menudo existe cierta confusión entre las distribuciones "enfocadas en la privacidad" y las distribuciones "pentesting". A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. Estas distribuciones son distribuciones de pruebas de penetración ofensivas que incluyen herramientas para probar otros sistemas. Estas no incluyen ninguna "seguridad adicional" o mitigaciones defensivas destinadas a un uso regular. ### Distribuciones basadas en Arch Linux -Las distribuciones basadas en Arch no son recomendables para los que se inician en Linux, (independientemente de la distribución) ya que requieren un [mantenimiento regular del sistema](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch no dispone de un mecanismo de actualización de la distribución para las opciones de software subyacentes. Por ello, hay que estar al tanto de las tendencias actuales y adoptar las tecnologías a medida que van sustituyendo a las prácticas más antiguas. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. Por ello, hay que estar al tanto de las tendencias actuales y adoptar las tecnologías a medida que van sustituyendo a las prácticas más antiguas. Para un sistema seguro, también se espera que tenga suficientes conocimientos de Linux para configurar correctamente la seguridad de su sistema, como la adopción de un sistema [de control de acceso obligatorio](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control), la configuración de listas negras de [módulos del kernel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security), el endurecimiento de los parámetros de arranque, la manipulación de parámetros[ sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl), y saber qué componentes necesitan como [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Cualquiera que utilice el repositorio de usuarios de Arch [(AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **debe** estar cómodo en auditar PKGBUILDs que instalan desde ese servicio. Los paquetes AUR son contenidos producidos por la comunidad y no se examinan de ninguna manera, por lo que son vulnerables a los ataques a la cadena de suministro de software, como de hecho ha sucedido en [en el pasado](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR debe utilizarse siempre con moderación y, a menudo, hay muchos malos consejos en diversas páginas que dirigen a la gente a utilizar ciegamente [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) sin suficiente advertencia. Se aplican advertencias similares al uso de Archivos de Paquetes Personales (PPA) de terceros en distribuciones basadas en Debian o Proyectos Comunitarios (COPR) en Fedora. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. Los paquetes AUR son contenidos producidos por la comunidad y no se examinan de ninguna manera, por lo que son vulnerables a los ataques a la cadena de suministro de software, como de hecho ha sucedido en [en el pasado](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -Si tienes experiencia con Linux y deseas utilizar una distribución basada en Arch, sólo recomendamos Arch Linux de línea principal, no cualquiera de sus derivados. Desaconsejamos específicamente estos dos derivados de Arch: +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Se aplican advertencias similares al uso de Archivos de Paquetes Personales (PPA) de terceros en distribuciones basadas en Debian o Proyectos Comunitarios (COPR) en Fedora. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: Esta distribución retiene los paquetes durante 2 semanas para asegurarse de que sus propios cambios no se rompan, no para asegurarse de que el flujo ascendente sea estable. Cuando se utilizan paquetes AUR, suelen compilarse con las últimas [bibliotecas](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) de los repositorios de Arch. - **Garuda**: Utilizan [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) que compila automáticamente y a ciegas paquetes del AUR. No existe ningún proceso de verificación que garantice que los paquetes AUR no sufran ataques en la cadena de suministro. -### Kicksecure - -Aunque recomendamos encarecidamente no utilizar distribuciones obsoletas como Debian, existe un sistema operativo basado en Debian que ha sido reforzado para ser mucho más seguro que las distribuciones típicas de Linux: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, en términos demasiado simplificados, es un conjunto de scripts, configuraciones y paquetes que reducen sustancialmente la superficie de ataque de Debian. Cubre muchas recomendaciones de privacidad y seguridad por defecto. - ### Kernel Linux-libre y distribuciones "Libre" -Recomendamos encarecidamente **no ** utilizar el kernel Linux-libre, ya que [elimina las mitigaciones de seguridad](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) y [suprime las advertencias del kernel](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) sobre microcódigo vulnerable por razones ideológicas. +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## Recomendaciones Generales @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ La mayoría de las distribuciones de Linux tienen una opción dentro de su insta ### Swap -Considera el uso de [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) o [swap cifrado](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) en lugar de swap sin cifrar para evitar posibles problemas de seguridad con los datos sensibles que se graben en el [espacio swap](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging)(espacio de intercambio). Las distribuciones basadas en Fedora [utilizan ZRAM por defecto](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -Recomendamos utilizar un entorno de escritorio compatible con el protocolo de visualización [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)), ya que se ha desarrollado [teniendo en cuenta](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/) la seguridad. Su predecesor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), no soporta el aislamiento GUI, permitiendo que todas las ventanas [graben pantalla, registren e inyecten entradas en otras ventanas](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), haciendo inútil cualquier intento de sandboxing. Aunque hay opciones para hacer X11 anidado como [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) o [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), a menudo vienen con consecuencias negativas en el rendimiento y no son convenientes de configurar y no son preferibles sobre Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. Afortunadamente, entornos comunes como [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), y el gestor de ventanas [Sway](https://swaywm.org) tienen soporte para Wayland. Algunas distribuciones como Fedora y Tumbleweed lo utilizan por defecto, y es posible que otras lo hagan en el futuro, ya que X11 está en [modo de mantenimiento duro](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). Si estás utilizando uno de esos entornos es tan fácil como seleccionar la sesión "Wayland" en el gestor de pantalla del escritorio ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ Estamos **en contra** de usar entornos de escritorio o gestores de ventanas que ### Firmware propietario (actualizaciones de microcódigo) -Las distribuciones de Linux como las que son [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) o DIY (Arch Linux) no vienen con las actualizaciones de [ microcódigo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) propietarias que a menudo parchean las vulnerabilidades. Algunos ejemplos notables de estas vulnerabilidades incluyen [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), y otras [vulnerabilidades de hardware](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Algunos ejemplos notables de estas vulnerabilidades incluyen [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), y otras [vulnerabilidades de hardware](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -Nosotros **recomendamos encarecidamente** que instale las actualizaciones del microcódigo, ya que su CPU ya está ejecutando el microcódigo propietario de fábrica. Tanto Fedora como openSUSE tienen las actualizaciones de microcódigo aplicadas por defecto. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Tanto Fedora como openSUSE tienen las actualizaciones de microcódigo aplicadas por defecto. ### Actualizaciones La mayoría de las distribuciones de Linux instalan automáticamente las actualizaciones o le recuerdan que debe hacerlo. Es importante mantener el sistema operativo actualizado para que el software esté parcheado cuando se detecte una vulnerabilidad. -Algunas distribuciones (especialmente las dirigidas a usuarios avanzados) son más básicas y esperan que hagas las cosas tú mismo (por ejemplo, Arch o Debian). Será necesario ejecutar manualmente el "gestor de paquetes" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) para recibir actualizaciones de seguridad importantes. +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). Será necesario ejecutar manualmente el "gestor de paquetes" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) para recibir actualizaciones de seguridad importantes. Además, algunas distribuciones no descargan automáticamente las actualizaciones de firmware. Para eso necesitarás instalar [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd). @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ Además, algunas distribuciones no descargan automáticamente las actualizacione ### Aleatorización de direcciones Mac -Muchas distribuciones Linux de escritorio (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) vienen con [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), para configurar los ajustes de Ethernet y Wi-Fi. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. Es posible [aleatorizar](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) la [dirección MAC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) cuando se utiliza NetworkManager. Esto proporciona un poco más de privacidad en las redes Wi-Fi, ya que hace más difícil rastrear dispositivos específicos en la red a la que estás conectado. [**No**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) te hace anónimo. @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ Recomendamos cambiar la configuración a **aleatoria** en lugar de **estable**, Si estás utilizando [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), necesitarás configurar [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) que habilitará [RFC 7844 (Perfiles de anonimato para clientes DHCP)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=). -No tiene mucho sentido aleatorizar la dirección MAC para las conexiones Ethernet, ya que un administrador del sistema puede encontrarte mirando el puerto que estás utilizando en el [conmutador de red](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). La aleatorización de las direcciones MAC Wi-Fi depende del soporte del firmware de la Wi-Fi. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). La aleatorización de las direcciones MAC Wi-Fi depende del soporte del firmware de la Wi-Fi. ### Otros identificadores diff --git a/i18n/es/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/es/os/qubes-overview.md index 5b476586..5b20a2f4 100644 --- a/i18n/es/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/es/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos description: Qubes es un sistema operativo basado en el aislamiento de aplicaciones dentro de máquinas virtuales para una mayor seguridad. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) es un sistema operativo que utiliza el hipervisor [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) para proporcionar una fuerte seguridad para la informática de escritorio a través de máquinas virtuales aisladas. Cada VM se denomina *Qube* y puedes asignar a cada Qube un nivel de confianza en función de su finalidad. Ya que Qubes OS proporciona seguridad mediante el uso de aislamiento, y sólo permite acciones por caso, es lo contrario de la [enumeración de maldad](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Cada VM se denomina *Qube* y puedes asignar a cada Qube un nivel de confianza en función de su finalidad. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## ¿Cómo funciona Qubes OS? diff --git a/i18n/es/tools.md b/i18n/es/tools.md index df225e6c..cd4d208b 100644 --- a/i18n/es/tools.md +++ b/i18n/es/tools.md @@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ Para obtener más información sobre cada proyecto, por qué han sido elegidos y
-- ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ .twemoji } [Qubes OS (Distribución de MV de Xen)](desktop.md#qubes-os) +- ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ .twemoji } [Qubes OS (Xen VM Distribution)](desktop.md#qubes-os) - ![Fedora logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-workstation.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Workstation](desktop.md#fedora-workstation) - ![openSUSE Tumbleweed logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/opensuse-tumbleweed.svg){ .twemoji } [OpenSUSE Tumbleweed](desktop.md#opensuse-tumbleweed) - ![Arch logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/archlinux.svg){ .twemoji } [Arch Linux](desktop.md#arch-linux) @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ Para obtener más información sobre cada proyecto, por qué han sido elegidos y - ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) - ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) - ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure)
diff --git a/i18n/fa/desktop.md b/i18n/fa/desktop.md index 94a6b93f..0120c600 100644 --- a/i18n/fa/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/fa/desktop.md @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } @@ -152,33 +152,48 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/). +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! recommendation + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## Criteria -**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! example "This section is new" +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress. - -Our recommended operating systems: - -- Must be open-source. -- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates. -- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- Must support full-disk encryption during installation. -- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. -- Must support a wide variety of hardware. +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/fa/email.md b/i18n/fa/email.md index 4fc44fbf..b9ab9691 100644 --- a/i18n/fa/email.md +++ b/i18n/fa/email.md @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ Proton Mail همچنین از کشف کلیدهای عمومی از طریق HTT Proton Mail یک حساب "نامحدود" یا Unlimited به مبلغ 9.99 یورو در ماه ارائه می‌دهد که علاوه بر ارائه چندین حساب، دامنه، نام مستعار و 500 گیگابایت فضای ذخیره سازی، دسترسی به Proton VPN را نیز امکان پذیر می‌کند. -Proton Mail doesn't offer a digital legacy feature. +Proton Mail امکان به ارث بردن اطلاعات برای وراث را ندارد. ### Mailbox.org @@ -137,31 +137,31 @@ Mailbox.org امکان رمزگذاری نامه های دریافتی را با #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } رمزگذاری ایمیل -Mailbox.org has [integrated encryption](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Send+encrypted+e-mails+with+Guard) in their webmail, which simplifies sending messages to people with public OpenPGP keys. They also allow [remote recipients to decrypt an email](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/My+recipient+does+not+use+PGP) on Mailbox.org's servers. This feature is useful when the remote recipient does not have OpenPGP and cannot decrypt a copy of the email in their own mailbox. +Mailbox.org دارای [رمزگذاری یکپارچه](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Send+encrypted+e-mails+with+Guard) در ایمیل وب خود است که ارسال پیام به افراد دارای کلیدهای عمومی OpenPGP را ساده می کند. آنها همچنین به [گیرندگان راه دور اجازه رمزگشایی ایمیل](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/My+recipient+does+not+use+PGP) در سرورهای Mailbox.org را می‌دهند. این ویژگی زمانی مفید است که گیرنده امکان استفاده از OpenPGP را ندارد و نمی تواند یک کپی از ایمیل را در صندوق پستی خود رمزگشایی کند. -Mailbox.org also supports the discovery of public keys via HTTP from their [Web Key Directory (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD). This allows people outside of Mailbox.org to find the OpenPGP keys of Mailbox.org accounts easily, for cross-provider E2EE. +Mailbox.org همچنین از کشف کلیدهای عمومی از طریق HTTP از [دایرکتوری کلیدهای وب (WKD)](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD) پشتیبانی می کند. این قابلیت به افرادی که از سرویس Mailbox.org استفاده نمی‌کنند اجازه می‌دهد تا کلیدهای OpenPGP حساب‌های Mailbox.org را برای رمزگذاری E2EE سرویس‌های دیگر به راحتی پیدا کنند. #### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } بستن حساب -Your account will be set to a restricted user account when your contract ends, after [30 days it will be irrevocably deleted](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/payment-article/what-happens-at-the-end-of-my-contract). +پس از پایان اشتراک، حساب شما محدود می شود. پس از [30 روز به صورت غیر قابل برگشت](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/payment-article/what-happens-at-the-end-of-my-contract) حذف می شود. -#### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } Additional Functionality +#### :material-information-outline:{ .pg-blue } عملکردهای دیگر -You can access your Mailbox.org account via IMAP/SMTP using their [.onion service](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/The+Tor+exit+node+of+mailbox.org). However, their webmail interface cannot be accessed via their .onion service and you may experience TLS certificate errors. +با استفاده از [سرویس onion](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/The+Tor+exit+node+of+mailbox.org) می‌توانید به حساب Mailbox.org خود از طریق IMAP/SMTP دسترسی پیدا کنید. با این حال، رابط وب ایمیل از طریق سرویس .onion آنها قابل دسترسی نیست و ممکن است با خطاهای گواهی TLS مواجه شوید. -All accounts come with limited cloud storage that [can be encrypted](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Encrypt+files+on+your+Drive). Mailbox.org also offers the alias [@secure.mailbox.org](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Ensuring+E-Mails+are+Sent+Securely), which enforces the TLS encryption on the connection between mail servers, otherwise the message will not be sent at all. Mailbox.org also supports [Exchange ActiveSync](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exchange_ActiveSync) in addition to standard access protocols like IMAP and POP3. +همه حساب‌ها دارای فضای ذخیره‌سازی ابری محدودی هستند که [قابل رمزگذاری](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Encrypt+files+on+your+Drive) است. Mailbox.org همچنین نام مستعار (Alias) [@secure.mailbox.org](https://kb.mailbox.org/display/MBOKBEN/Ensuring+E-Mails+are+Sent+Securely) را ارائه می دهد که رمزگذاری TLS را در اتصال بین سرورهای ایمیل اعمال می کند، در غیر این صورت پیام به هیچ وجه ارسال نخواهد شد. Mailbox.org همچنین از [Exchange ActiveSync](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exchange_ActiveSync) علاوه بر پروتکل‌های دسترسی استاندارد مانند IMAP و POP3 پشتیبانی می‌کند. -Mailbox.org has a digital legacy feature for all plans. You can choose whether you want any of your data to be passed to heirs providing that they apply and provide your testament. Alternatively, you can nominate a person by name and address. +Mailbox.org امکان به ارث بردن اطلاعات برای همه طرح‌هایش را دارد. می‌توانید انتخاب کنید که آیا می‌خواهید کدام یک از داده‌هایتان به وراث داده شود، مشروط بر اینکه آنها درخواست دهند و وصیت شما را ارائه دهند. همچنین می‌توانید فردی را با نام و آدرس معرفی کنید. -## More Providers +## سرویس دهندگان بیشتر -These providers store your emails with zero-knowledge encryption, making them great options for keeping your stored emails secure. However, they don't support interoperable encryption standards for E2EE communications between different providers. +این ارائه دهندگان ایمیل های شما را با رمزگذاری دانش صفر (zero-knowledge encryption) ذخیره می کنند که آنها را گزینه‌های خوبی برای ایمن نگه داشتن ایمیل های شما می‌کند. با این حال، آنها از استانداردهای رمزگذاری E2EE بین ارائه دهندگان مختلف ایمیل پشتیبانی نمی‌کنند.
@@ -176,33 +176,31 @@ These providers store your emails with zero-knowledge encryption, making them gr ![Skiff Mail logo](assets/img/email/skiff-mail.svg){ align=right } - **Skiff Mail** is a web based email service with E2EE that began in 2020 that is based in San Francisco with developers worldwide. Accounts start with 10GB of free storage. + **Skiff Mail** یک سرویس ایمیل مبتنی بر وب با E2EE است که در سال 2020 آغاز شد و در سانفرانسیسکو مستقر است و توسعه دهندگان آن در سرتاسر جهان هستند. حساب‌ها با 10 گیگابایت فضای ذخیره‌سازی رایگان شروع می‌شوند. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://skiff.com/mail){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://app.skiff.com/docs/db93c237-84c2-4b2b-9588-19a7cd2cd45a#tyGksN9rkqbo2uGYASxsA6HVLjUoly/wTYK8tncTto8=){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://skiff.com/help){ .card-link title=Documentation} [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/skiff-org/skiff-apps){ .card-link title="Source Code" } - ??? downloads - - - [:simple-android: Android](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.skemailmobileapp&pli=1) + ??? - [:simple-android: Android](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.skemailmobileapp&pli=1) - [:simple-appstore: iOS](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/skiff-mail/id1619168801) - [:octicons-browser-16: Web](https://app.skiff.com/mail) -Skiff has undergone a few [audits](https://skiff.com/transparency) during its development. +Skiff در طول توسعه خود تحت چند [ممیزی (Audit)](https://skiff.com/transparency) قرار گرفته است. -#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Custom Domains and Aliases +#### :material-check:{ .pg-green } دامنه ها و نام های مستعار (Aliases) سفارشی -You can create up to 3 additional @skiff.com email aliases in addition to your primary account address on their free plan. Free accounts can add 1 [custom domain](https://skiff.com/blog/custom-domain-setup), and up to 15 custom domains on a paid plan. You can create unlimited aliases or a [catch-all](https://skiff.com/blog/catch-all-email-alias) alias on your custom domain. +در طرح رایگان، می توانید تا 3 نام مستعار ایمیل @skiff.com علاوه بر آدرس حساب اصلی خود ایجاد کنید. حساب‌های رایگان می‌توانند 1 [دامنه سفارشی (custom domain)](https://skiff.com/blog/custom-domain-setup) و حساب‌های پولی می‌توانند حداکثر 15 دامنه سفارشی را اضافه کنند. می توانید نام های مستعار (Alias) نامحدود یا قابلیت [catch-all](https://skiff.com/blog/catch-all-email-alias) را در دامنه سفارشی خود ایجاد کنید. -#### :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } Private Payment Methods +#### :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } روش های پرداخت خصوصی -Skiff Mail accepts cryptocurrency payments via Coinbase Commerce, including Bitcoin and Ethereum, but they do not accept our recommended [cryptocurrency](cryptocurrency.md), Monero. They also accept credit card payments via Stripe. +Skiff Mail پرداخت‌های رمزارز از جمله بیت‌کوین و اتریوم را از طریق Coinbase Commerce می‌پذیرد، اما آنها [رمزارز](cryptocurrency.md) پیشنهادی ما، Monero را نمی‌پذیرند. They also accept credit card payments via Stripe. diff --git a/i18n/fa/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/fa/os/android-overview.md index d0c88ecb..bffa9e33 100644 --- a/i18n/fa/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/fa/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android description: Android is an open-source operating system with strong security protections, which makes it our top choice for phones. --- -Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. +![Android logo](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## Choosing an Android Distribution +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### Choosing an Android Distribution When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has irrevocable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android. @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that [Our Android System Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## Avoid Rooting +### Avoid Rooting [Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses. @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps. -## Verified Boot +### Install Updates + +It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Security Protections + +### Verified Boot [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection). @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock And Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be aware of beyond their marketing. For example, the Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage. -## Firmware Updates +### Firmware Updates Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin). @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive Fairphone, for example, markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates. -## Android Versions - -It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. - -## Android Permissions +### Android Permissions [Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps. @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ An app may request a permission for a specific feature it has. For example, any Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) may show some trackers such as [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). This library includes [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) which can provide [push notifications](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps. This [is the case](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) with Bitwarden. That doesn't mean that Bitwarden is using all of the analytics features that are provided by Google Firebase Analytics. -## Media Access +## Privacy Features -Quite a few applications allows you to "share" a file with them for media upload. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter. - -## User Profiles +### User Profiles Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android. With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation. -## Work Profile +### Work Profile [Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously. -## VPN Killswitch +### VPN Killswitch Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**. -## Global Toggles +### Global Toggles Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled. -## Google +## Google Services If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play. diff --git a/i18n/fa/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/fa/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5c76159b --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/fa/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Privacy Notes + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Activation Lock + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## فایرفاکس Firefox + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### Settings + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! warning + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### Privacy + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/fa/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/fa/os/linux-overview.md index 1a9432bb..861e5bcd 100644 --- a/i18n/fa/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/fa/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative, but not all distribitions are created equal. --- -It is often believed that [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigor applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years. +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.: - -- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack) -- A strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go -- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are great if you want to: - -- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems -- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- Have privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) - -Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed here. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Privacy Notes + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems +- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## Choosing your distribution -Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use. +Not all Linux distributions are created equal. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### Release cycle We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates. -For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. +For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this: @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tu ### “Security-focused” distributions -There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. +There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. ### Arch-based distributions -Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically: +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories. - **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks. -### Kicksecure - -While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. - ### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions -We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons. +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## توصیه‌های عمومی @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS] ### Swap -Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do n ### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates) -Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. ### Updates Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found. -Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd). @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automaticall ### MAC Address Randomization -Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous. @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as sugges If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=). -There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. ### Other Identifiers diff --git a/i18n/fa/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/fa/os/qubes-overview.md index 17b286b9..3ed80dcd 100644 --- a/i18n/fa/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/fa/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within virtual machines for heightened security. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## How does Qubes OS work? diff --git a/i18n/fa/tools.md b/i18n/fa/tools.md index 3fac08af..7cb493af 100644 --- a/i18n/fa/tools.md +++ b/i18n/fa/tools.md @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b - ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) - ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) - ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure)
diff --git a/i18n/fr/desktop.md b/i18n/fr/desktop.md index 2cfbf1cf..d21515e4 100644 --- a/i18n/fr/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/fr/desktop.md @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Les distributions Linux sont généralement recommandées pour la protection de - [Vue d'ensemble de Linux :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](os/linux-overview.md) -## Distributions Traditionnelles +## Distributions traditionnelles ### Station de Travail Fedora @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ S'agissant d'une distribution DIY, vous êtes [censé mettre en place et mainten Une grande partie des [paquets d'Arch Linux](https://reproducible.archlinux.org) sont [reproductibles](https://reproducible-builds.org). -## Distributions Immuables +## Distributions immuables ### Fedora Silverblue @@ -103,15 +103,15 @@ Nix, le gestionnaire de paquets, utilise un langage purement fonctionnel - qui s Nix est un gestionnaire de paquets basé sur les sources ; s'il n'y a pas de paquet pré-construit disponible dans le cache binaire, Nix construira simplement le paquet à partir des sources en utilisant sa définition. Il construit chaque paquet dans un environnement *pur* en bac à sable, qui est aussi indépendant que possible du système hôte, ce qui rend les binaires reproductibles. -## Distributions Axées sur l'Anonymat +## Distributions axées sur l'anonymat ### Whonix !!! recommendation - ![Logo Whonix](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } + ![logo Whonix](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** est basé sur [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), un fork de Debian axé sur la sécurité. Il vise à assurer la vie privée, la sécurité et l'anonymat sur Internet. Whonix est utilisé de préférence en conjonction avec [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). + **Whonix** est basée sur [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), une version de Debian axée sur la sécurité. Il vise à assurer la vie privée, la sécurité et l'anonymat sur Internet. Whonix est utilisé de préférence en conjonction avec [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation} @@ -149,35 +149,50 @@ Par conception, Tails est censé se réinitialiser complètement après chaque r !!! recommendation - ![Logo Qubes OS](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } + ![logo Qubes OS](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes** est un système d'exploitation open-source conçu pour fournir une sécurité forte pour l'informatique de bureau. Qubes est basé sur Xen, le système X Window et Linux, et peut exécuter la plupart des applications Linux et utiliser la plupart des pilotes Linux. + **Qubes OS** est un système d'exploitation open-source conçu pour fournir une sécurité forte pour l'informatique de bureau à travers des machines virtuelles sécurisées (aussi connus sous le nom de "Qubes"). Qubes est basé sur Xen, le système X Window et Linux, et peut exécuter la plupart des applications Linux et utiliser la plupart des pilotes Linux. [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Aperçu](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Service onion" } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Code source" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribuer } -Qubes OS est un système d'exploitation basé sur Xen destiné à fournir une sécurité forte pour l'informatique de bureau par le biais de machines virtuelles (VMs) sécurisées, également connues sous le nom de *Qubes*. +Qubes OS sécurise l'ordinateur en isolant les sous-systèmes (par exemple, réseau, USB, etc.) et les applications dans des VMs distinctes. Si une partie du système est compromise, l'isolation supplémentaire est susceptible de protéger le reste du système. -Le système d'exploitation Qubes OS sécurise l'ordinateur en isolant les sous-systèmes (par exemple, réseau, USB, etc.) et les applications dans des VMs distinctes. Si une partie du système est compromise, l'isolation supplémentaire est susceptible de protéger le reste du système. Pour plus de détails, voir la FAQ de Qubes [](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/). +Pour plus d'informations sur le fonctionnement de Qubes, lisez notre page [Introduction à Qubes](os/qubes-overview.md) . + +### Kicksecure + +Bien que nous [déconseillions](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) d'utiliser des distributions "perpétuellement dépassées" comme Debian pour un usage bureautique dans la plupart des cas, Kicksecure est un système d'exploitation basé sur Debian qui a été renforcé pour être bien plus qu'une installation Linux classique. + +!!! recommendation + + ![Logo Kicksecure](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure** - en termes simplifiés à l'extrême - est un ensemble de scripts, de configurations et de paquets qui réduisent considérablement la surface d'attaque de Debian. Il couvre par défaut un grand nombre de recommandations en matière de confidentialité et de durcissement. Il sert également de système d'exploitation de base pour [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Page d'accueil](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Politique de confidentialité" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Code source" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribuer } ## Critères -**Veuillez noter que nous ne sommes affiliés à aucun des projets que nous recommandons.** En plus de [nos critères de base](about/criteria.md), nous avons développé un ensemble d'exigences claires pour nous permettre de fournir des recommandations objectives. Nous vous suggérons de vous familiariser avec cette liste avant de choisir d'utiliser un projet, et de mener vos propres recherches pour vous assurer que c'est le bon choix pour vous. +Le choix d'une distribution Linux qui vous convient dépend d'une grande variété de préférences personnelles, et cette page n'est **pas** une liste exhaustive de toutes les distributions viables. Notre page de présentation de Linux contient des conseils sur [le choix d'une distribution](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution). Les distros sur *cette page* suivent généralement les lignes directrices que nous avons abordées dans cette page, et respectent toutes ces normes : -!!! example "Cette section est récente" +- Gratuit et open source. +- Reçoivent régulièrement des mises à jour des logiciels et du noyau. +- [Évitent X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - L'exception notable est Qubes, mais la virtualisation permet d'éviter les problèmes d'isolation que rencontre généralement X11. Cette isolation ne s'applique qu'aux applications *fonctionnant dans différents qubes* (machines virtuelles), les applications fonctionnant dans le *même* qube ne sont pas protégées les unes des autres. +- Prennent en charge le chiffrement complet du disque pendant l'installation. +- Ne gêlent pas les mises à jour régulières pendant plus d'un an. + - Nous [ne recommandons pas](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" ou les versions "stables" de distro pour une utilisation de bureau. +- Prennent en charge une grande variété de matériel. +- Préférence pour les projets de plus grande envergure. + - La maintenance d'un système d'exploitation est un défi majeur, et les petits projets ont tendance à faire plus d'erreurs évitables ou à retarder les mises à jour critiques (ou pire, à disparaître complètement). Nous privilégions les projets qui seront probablement toujours présents dans 10 ans (que ce soit grâce au soutien d'une entreprise ou à un soutien communautaire très important), et nous évitons les projets qui sont construits de zéro ou qui ont un petit nombre de mainteneurs. - Nous travaillons à l'établissement de critères définis pour chaque section de notre site, et celles-ci peuvent être sujet à changement. Si vous avez des questions sur nos critères, veuillez [poser la question sur notre forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) et ne supposez pas que nous n'avons pas pris en compte un élément dans nos recommandations s'il ne figure pas dans la liste. De nombreux facteurs sont pris en compte et discutés lorsque nous recommandons un projet, et la documentation de chacun d'entre eux est en cours. - -Nos systèmes d'exploitation recommandés : - -- Doivent être open-source. -- Doivent recevoir régulièrement des mises à jour des logiciels et du noyau Linux. -- Les distributions Linux doivent prendre en charge [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- Doitvent prendre en charge le chiffrement complet du disque pendant l'installation. -- Ne doivent pas geler les mises à jour régulières pendant plus d'un an. Nous [ne recommandons pas](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" ou les versions "stables" de distro pour une utilisation domestique. -- Doivent prendre en charge une grande variété de matériel. +En outre, [nos critères standards](about/criteria.md) pour les projets recommandés s'appliquent toujours. **Veuillez noter que nous ne sommes affiliés à aucun des projets que nous recommandons.** diff --git a/i18n/fr/email.md b/i18n/fr/email.md index 3606dd1e..d6af1883 100644 --- a/i18n/fr/email.md +++ b/i18n/fr/email.md @@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ Skiff a fait l'objet de quelques [audits](https://skiff.com/transparency) au cou #### :material-check:{ .pg-green } Domaines personnalisés et alias -Vous pouvez créer jusqu'à 3 alias d'email @skiff.com en plus de l'adresse principale de votre compte sur leur plan gratuit. Free accounts can add 1 [custom domain](https://skiff.com/blog/custom-domain-setup), and up to 15 custom domains on a paid plan. You can create unlimited aliases or a [catch-all](https://skiff.com/blog/catch-all-email-alias) alias on your custom domain. +Vous pouvez créer jusqu'à 3 alias d'email @skiff.com en plus de l'adresse principale de votre compte sur leur plan gratuit. Les comptes gratuits peuvent ajouter 1 [domaine personnalisé](https://skiff.com/blog/custom-domain-setup) et jusqu'à 15 domaines personnalisés avec une offre payante. Vous pouvez créer un nombre illimité d'alias ou un [alias fourre-tout](https://skiff.com/blog/catch-all-email-alias) sur votre domaine personnalisé. #### :material-alert-outline:{ .pg-orange } Modes de paiement privés diff --git a/i18n/fr/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/fr/os/android-overview.md index aa9b21a1..c3be5c04 100644 --- a/i18n/fr/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/fr/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android description: Android est un système d'exploitation open source doté de solides protections de sécurité, ce qui en fait notre premier choix pour les téléphones. --- -Android est un système d'exploitation sécurisé qui dispose d'un [sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox) solide, du [Démarrage Vérifié](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), et d'un système de contrôle des [autorisations](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) robuste. +![Logo d'Android](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## Choisir une distribution Android +**Android Open Source Project** est un système d'exploitation mobile sécurisé doté d'un solide [sandboxing d'application](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), d'un [démarrage vérifié](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), et d'un solide système de contrôle des [autorisations](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview). + +## Nos conseils + +### Choisir une distribution Android Lorsque vous achetez un téléphone Android, le système d'exploitation par défaut de l'appareil s'accompagne souvent d'une intégration envahissante des applications et des services qui ne font pas partie de l'[Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). C'est le cas par exemple de l'application Services Google Play, qui dispose de privilèges irrévocables pour accéder à vos fichiers, au stockage de vos contacts, aux journaux d'appels, aux SMS, à votre localisation, à votre appareil photo, à votre microphone, aux identifiants matériels, etc. Ces applications et ces services augmentent la surface d'attaque de votre appareil et sont à l'origine de divers problèmes d'invasion de la vie privée sur Android. @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Idéalement, lorsque vous choisissez une distribution Android, vous devez vous a [Nos recommandations de distributions Android :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## Éviter le rootage +### Éviter le rootage [Le rootage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) des téléphones Android peut diminuer la sécurité de manière significative car il affaiblit complétement le modèle de sécurité d'[Android](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). Cela peut nuire à la protection de la vie privée en cas d'exploitation facilitée par la diminution de la sécurité. Les méthodes courantes de rootage impliquent une modification directe de la partition de démarrage, ce qui rend impossible l'exécution du Démarrage Vérifié. Les applications qui requièrent un Android rooté modifieront également la partition du système, ce qui signifie que le Démarrage Vérifié devra rester désactivé. Le fait que le root soit exposé directement dans l'interface utilisateur augmente également la [surface d'attaque](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) de votre appareil et peut contribuer aux vulnérabilités [d'élévation de privilèges](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) et aux contournements de la politique SELinux. @@ -26,9 +30,23 @@ AFWall+ fonctionne sur le [filtrage des paquets](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F Nous ne pensons pas que les sacrifices de sécurité en rootant un smartphone valent les avantages discutables de ces applications en matière de vie privée. -## Démarrage Vérifié +### Installer les mises à jour -Le [Démarrage Vérifié](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) est un élément important du modèle de sécurité d'Android. Il fournit une protection contre les attaques de type [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack), la persistance de logiciels malveillants et garantit que les mises à jour de sécurité ne peuvent pas être rétrogradées grâce au [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection). +Il est important de ne pas utiliser une version d'Android [en fin de vie](https://endoflife.date/android). Les nouvelles versions d'Android reçoivent non seulement des mises à jour de sécurité pour le système d'exploitation, mais aussi d'importantes mises à jour destinées à améliorer votre vie privée. + +Par exemple, [avant Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) toute application disposant de l'autorisation [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) pouvait accéder aux numéros de série sensibles et uniques de votre téléphone, tels que l'[IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), le [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), ou l'[IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity) de votre carte SIM ; alors qu'aujourd'hui, il doit s'agir d'applications système pour le faire. Les applications système sont uniquement fournies par le fabricant ou la distribution Android. + +### Partager des médias + +Vous pouvez éviter de donner à de nombreuses applications l'autorisation d'accéder à vos médias grâce aux fonctions de partage intégrées d'Android. De nombreuses applications vous permettent de "partager" un fichier avec elles pour l'envoi de médias. + +Par exemple, si vous souhaitez publier une photo sur Discord, vous pouvez ouvrir votre gestionnaire de fichiers ou votre galerie et partager cette photo avec l'application Discord, au lieu d'accorder à Discord un accès complet à vos médias et photos. + +## Protections de sécurité + +### Démarrage vérifié + +Le [Démarrage vérifié](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) est un élément important du modèle de sécurité d'Android. Il fournit une protection contre les attaques de type [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack), la persistance de logiciels malveillants et garantit que les mises à jour de sécurité ne peuvent pas être rétrogradées grâce au [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection). Les versions supérieures à Android 10 ont abandonné le chiffrement complet du disque au profit d'un chiffrement plus souple [basé sur les fichiers](https://source.android.com/security/encryption/file-based). Vos données sont chiffrées à l'aide de clés de chiffrement propres à chaque utilisateur, tandis que les fichiers du système d'exploitation ne sont pas chiffrés. @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Malheureusement, les fabricants sont tenus de prendre uniquement en charge le D De nombreux contructeurs ont également une implémentation défectueuse du Démarrage Vérifié dont vous devez être conscient au-delà de leur marketing. Par exemple, les Fairphone 3 et 4 ne sont pas sécurisés par défaut, car le [chargeur d'amorçage de base fait confiance à la clé de signature AVB publique](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). Cela contourne le Démarrage Vérifié sur un appareil Fairphone d'origine, car le système démarrera des systèmes d'exploitation Android alternatifs tels que (comme /e/) [sans aucun avertissement](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) sur l'utilisation d'un système d'exploitation personnalisé. -## Mises à jour du micrologiciel +### Mises à jour du micrologiciel Les mises à jour du micrologiciel sont essentielles au maintien de la sécurité. Sans elles, votre appareil ne peut être sécurisé. Les fabriquants ont conclu des accords de prise de en charge avec leurs partenaires pour fournir les mises à jour des composants closed-source pendant une période limitée. Celles-ci sont détaillées dans les [Bulletins de Sécurité Android](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin) mensuels. @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ Les appareils qui ne sont plus pris en charge par le fabricant du SoC ne peuvent Fairphone, par exemple, commercialise ses appareils comme bénéficiant de 6 ans de mises à jour. Cependant, le SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G sur le Fairphone 4) a une date de fin de vie (EOL) beaucoup plus courte. Cela signifie que les mises à jour de sécurité du micrologiciel de Qualcomm pour le Fairphone 4 prendront fin en septembre 2023, que Fairphone continue ou non à publier des mises à jour de sécurité logicielle. -## Versions d'Android - -Il est important de ne pas utiliser une version d'Android [en fin de vie](https://endoflife.date/android). Les nouvelles versions d'Android reçoivent non seulement des mises à jour de sécurité pour le système d'exploitation, mais aussi d'importantes mises à jour destinées à améliorer votre vie privée. Par exemple, [avant Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), toute application disposant de l'autorisation [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) pouvait accéder aux numéros de série uniques et sensibles de votre téléphone, tels que l'[IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), le [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), et l'[IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity) de votre carte SIM, alors qu'aujourd'hui les applications soivent désormais être des des applications système pour lire ces données sensibles. Les applications système sont uniquement fournies par le fabricant ou la distribution Android. - -## Autorisations d'Android +### Autorisations d'Android Les [autorisations sur Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) vous permettent de contrôler ce que les applications ont le droit d'accéder. Google apporte régulièrement des [améliorations](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) sur le système d'autorisations à chaque nouvelle version d'Android. Toutes les applications que vous installez sont strictement [isolées](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), il n'est donc pas nécessaire d'installer des applications antivirus. @@ -60,50 +74,48 @@ Un smartphone équipé de la dernière version d'Android sera toujours plus sûr Android 10 : -- [Scoped Storage](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes#scoped-storage) vous donne plus de contrôle sur vos fichiers et peut limiter ce qui peut [accéder au stockage externe](https://developer.android.com/training/data-storage?hl=fr#permissions). Les applications peuvent avoir un répertoire spécifique dans le stockage externe ainsi que la possibilité d'y stocker des types de médias spécifiques. -- Un acès plus strict à l'emplacement du dispositif [](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes#app-access-device-location) en introduisant la permission `ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION` . Cela empêche les applications d'accéder à l'emplacement lorsqu'elles fonctionnent en arrière-plan sans l'autorisation expresse de l'utilisateur. +- [Scoped Storage](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes#scoped-storage) vous donne plus de contrôle sur vos fichiers et peut limiter les applications qui peuvent [accéder au stockage externe](https://developer.android.com/training/data-storage#permissions). Les applications peuvent avoir un répertoire spécifique dans le stockage externe ainsi que la possibilité d'y stocker des types de médias spécifiques. +- Un acès plus strict à la [localisation de l'appareil](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes#app-access-device-location) en introduisant l'autorisation `ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION` . Cela empêche les applications d'accéder à la localisation lorsqu'elles fonctionnent en arrière-plan sans l'autorisation expresse de l'utilisateur. Android 11 : -- [Permissions uniques](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions#one-time) qui vous permet d'accorder une permission à une application une seule fois. +- [Autorisations uniques](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions#one-time) qui vous permettent d'accorder une autorisation à une application une seule fois. - [Réinitialisation automatique des autorisations](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions#auto-reset), qui réinitialise [les autorisations d'exécution](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview#runtime) accordées lors de l'ouverture de l'application. -- Autorisations granulaires pour accéder aux fonctions liées au numéro de téléphone [](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions#phone-numbers). +- Autorisations granulaires pour accéder aux fonctions liées au [numéro de téléphone](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions#phone-numbers). Android 12 : -- Une permission d'accorder uniquement l'emplacement approximatif [](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/12/behavior-changes-12#approximate-location). +- Une autorisation pour accorder uniquement la [localisation approximative](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/12/behavior-changes-12#approximate-location). - Réinitialisation automatique des [applications en hibernation](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/12/behavior-changes-12#app-hibernation). - [Audit de l'accès aux données](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/12/behavior-changes-12#data-access-auditing) qui permet de déterminer plus facilement quelle partie d'une application effectue un type spécifique d'accès aux données. Android 13 : -- Une autorisation pour [un accès wifi à proximité](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/13/behavior-changes-13#nearby-wifi-devices-permission). Les adresses MAC des points d'accès WiFi à proximité étaient un moyen populaire pour les applications de suivre la localisation d'un utilisateur. -- Plus d'[autorisations granulaires pour les médias](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/13/behavior-changes-13#granular-media-permissions), ce qui signifie que vous pouvez accorder l'accès uniquement aux images, aux vidéos ou aux fichiers audio. -- L'utilisation de capteurs en arrière-plan nécessite désormais l'autorisation [`BODY_SENSORS`](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/13/behavior-changes-13#body-sensors-background-permission) . +- Une autorisation pour [un accès aux wifi à proximité](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/13/behavior-changes-13#nearby-wifi-devices-permission). Utiliser les adresses MAC des points d'accès WiFi à proximité était une technique populaire des applications pour suivre la position d'un utilisateur. +- Des [autorisations plus granulaires pour les médias](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/13/behavior-changes-13#granular-media-permissions), ce qui signifie que vous pouvez accorder l'accès uniquement aux images, aux vidéos ou aux fichiers audio. +- L'utilisation de capteurs en arrière-plan nécessite désormais l'autorisation [`BODY_SENSORS`](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/13/behavior-changes-13#body-sensors-background-permission). -Une application peut demander une autorisation pour une fonction spécifique qu'elle possède. Par exemple, toute application permettant de scanner des codes QR nécessitera l'autorisation de l'appareil photo. Certaines applications peuvent demander plus de permissions qu'elles n'en ont besoin. +Une application peut demander une autorisation pour une fonction spécifique qu'elle possède. Par exemple, toute application permettant de scanner des codes QR nécessitera l'autorisation de l'appareil photo. Certaines applications peuvent demander plus d'autorisations qu'elles n'en ont besoin. -[Exodus](https://exodus-privacy.eu.org/fr//) peut être utile pour comparer des applications ayant des objectifs similaires. Si une application nécessite de nombreuses autorisations et comporte beaucoup de publicité et d'analyses, c'est probablement un mauvais signe. **Nous vous recommandons de regarder les trackers individuels et de lire leurs descriptions plutôt que de vous contenter de compter le total** et de supposer que tous les éléments énumérés sont égaux. +[Exodus](https://exodus-privacy.eu.org/fr/) peut être utile pour comparer des applications ayant des objectifs similaires. Si une application nécessite de nombreuses autorisations et comporte beaucoup de traqueurs publicitaires et d'analytiques, c'est probablement un mauvais signe. Nous vous recommandons d'examiner les différents traqueurs et de lire leur description plutôt que de vous contenter de **compter leur nombre** et de supposer que tous les éléments énumérés sont égaux. !!! warning "Avertissement" - Si une application est principalement un service web, le suivi peut se faire du côté du serveur. [Facebook](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/fr/reports/com.facebook.katana/latest/) n'affiche "aucun traceur" mais suit certainement les intérêts et le comportement des utilisateurs sur le site. Les applications peuvent échapper à la détection en n'utilisant pas les bibliothèques de code standard produites par le secteur de la publicité, bien que cela soit peu probable. + Si une application est principalement un service web, le suivi peut se faire du côté du serveur. [Facebook](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/fr/reports/com.facebook.katana/latest/) n'affiche "aucun traqueur" mais suit certainement les intérêts et le comportement des utilisateurs sur le site. Les applications peuvent échapper à la détection en n'utilisant pas les bibliothèques de code standard produites par l'industrie de la publicité, bien que cela soit peu probable. !!! note "À noter" - Les applications respectueuses de la vie privée telles que [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/fr/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) peuvent afficher certains traceurs tels que [Google Firebase Analytics] (https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/fr/trackers/49/). Cette bibliothèque comprend [Firebase Cloud Messaging] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) qui peut fournir des [notifications push] (https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_push) dans les applications. C'est le cas (https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) avec Bitwarden. Cela ne signifie pas que Bitwarden utilise toutes les fonctionnalités d'analyse fournies par Google Firebase Analytics. + Les applications respectueuses de la vie privée telles que [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/fr/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) peuvent afficher certains traqueurs tels que [Google Firebase Analytics] (https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/fr/trackers/49/). Cette bibliothèque comprend [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) qui peut fournir des [notifications push](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_push) dans les applications. C'est [le cas](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) avec Bitwarden. Cela ne signifie pas que Bitwarden utilise toutes les fonctionnalités d'analyse fournies par Google Firebase Analytics. -## Accès aux médias +## Fonctionnalités de protection de la vie privée -De nombreuses applications vous permettent de "partager" un fichier avec elles pour le téléchargement de médias. Si vous voulez, par exemple, envoyer une photo sur Twitter, n'accordez pas à Twitter l'accès à vos "médias et photos", car il aura alors accès à toutes vos photos. Au lieu de cela, allez dans votre gestionnaire de fichiers (documentsUI), appuyez longuement sur l'image, puis partagez-la avec Twitter. - -## Profils Utilisateurs +### Profils utilisateurs Les profils d'utilisateurs multiples se trouvent dans **Paramètres** → **Système** → **Utilisateurs multiples** et constituent le moyen le plus simple d'isoler dans Android. Avec les profils d'utilisateur, vous pouvez imposer des restrictions à un profil spécifique, par exemple : passer des appels, utiliser des SMS ou installer des applications sur l'appareil. Chaque profil est chiffré à l'aide de sa propre clé de chiffrement et ne peut accéder aux données d'aucun autre profil. Même le propriétaire de l'appareil ne peut pas voir les données des autres profils sans connaître leur mot de passe. Les profils d'utilisateurs multiples est une méthode d'isolement plus sécurisée. -## Profil Professionnel +### Profil professionnel Les [Profils Professionnels](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949?hl=fr) sont une autre façon d'isoler des applications de manière individuelles et peuvent s'avérer plus pratiques que des profils d'utilisateur séparés. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ Le profil professionnel dépend d'un gestionnaire d'appareil pour fonctionner. L Cette méthode est généralement moins sûre qu'un profil utilisateur secondaire, mais elle vous permet d'exécuter simultanément des applications dans les profils professionnel et personnel. -## Arrêt d'Urgence VPN +### Arrêt d'urgence VPN Android 7 et plus prennent en charge un arrêt d'urgence de VPN et il est disponible sans qu'il soit nécessaire d'installer des applications tierces. Cette fonction permet d'éviter les fuites si le VPN est déconnecté. Il se trouve dans :gear: **Paramètres** → **Réseau & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Bloquer les connexions sans VPN**. -## Boutons à Bascule Globaux +### Boutons à bascule globaux Les appareils Android modernes disposent de boutons à bascule permettant de désactiver les services Bluetooth et de localisation. Android 12 a introduit des boutons à bascule pour l'appareil photo et le microphone. Lorsque vous n'utilisez pas ces fonctions, nous vous recommandons de les désactiver. Les applications ne peuvent pas utiliser les fonctions désactivées (même si elles ont reçu une autorisation individuelle) jusqu'à ce qu'elles soient réactivées. -## Google +## Services Google Si vous utilisez un appareil doté des services Google, qu'il s'agisse de votre système d'exploitation d'origine ou d'un système d'exploitation qui intègre les services Google Play sandboxed en toute sécurité, comme GrapheneOS, vous pouvez apporter un certain nombre de modifications supplémentaires pour améliorer votre confidentialité. Nous recommandons toujours d'éviter complètement les services Google ou de limiter les services Google Play à un profil utilisateur/professionnel spécifique en combinant un contrôleur d'appareil comme *Shelter* avec le Sandboxed Google Play de GrapheneOS. diff --git a/i18n/fr/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/fr/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5873f55e --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/fr/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Remarques concernant la vie privée + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Verrouillage d'activation + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## Configuration recommandée + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. Ce niveau d'accès a parfois été utilisé de manière abusive par les forces de l'ordre pour contourner le fait que vos données sont par ailleurs chiffrées de manière sécurisée sur votre appareil, et bien sûr Apple est vulnérable aux fuites de données comme toute autre entreprise. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). Cela permet de chiffrer la quasi-totalité de vos données iCloud à l'aide de clés stockées sur vos appareils (chiffrement de bout en bout), plutôt que sur les serveurs d'Apple, de sorte que vos données iCloud sont sécurisées en cas de fuite de données, et qu'elles sont par ailleurs cachées à Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### Paramètres + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### Général + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! warning "Avertissement" + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### Confidentialité + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/fr/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/fr/os/linux-overview.md index 27c99924..a8c48007 100644 --- a/i18n/fr/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/fr/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux est un système d'exploitation de bureau alternatif open source, axé sur la protection de la vie privée, mais toutes les distributions ne sont pas créées égales. --- -On croit souvent que les logiciels [open source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) sont intrinsèquement sûrs parce que le code source est disponible. On s'attend à ce que la vérification de la communauté ait lieu régulièrement ; cependant, ce n'est pas toujours [le cas](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). Cela dépend d'un certain nombre de facteurs, tels que l'activité du projet, l'expérience du développeur, le niveau de rigueur appliqué aux [revues de code](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), et la fréquence de l'attention accordée à certaines parties spécifiques du [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) qui peuvent rester à l'abandon pendant des années. +**Linux** est un système d'exploitation de bureau alternatif, open-source et axé sur la protection de la vie privée. Face à l'omniprésence de la télémétrie et d'autres technologies portant atteinte à la vie privée dans les systèmes d'exploitation courants, Linux est resté le choix le plus évident pour les personnes désireuses de contrôler totalement leur ordinateur de zéro. -À l'heure actuelle, les systèmes GNU/Linux de bureau ont certains domaines qui pourraient être améliorés par rapport à leurs homologues propriétaires, par exemple : - -- Une chaîne de démarrage vérifiée, telle que le [Démarage Sécurisé d'Apple](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (avec l'[Enclave Sécurisée](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), le [Démarrage Vérifié d'Android](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), le [Démarrage vérifié de ChromeOS](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), ou le processus de démarrage de [Microsoft Windows](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) avec le [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). Ces fonctionnalités et technologies matérielles peuvent toutes contribuer à empêcher une altération persistante par des logiciels malveillants ou des [attaques de personnel de ménage malfaisant](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack) -- Une solution de sandboxing forte, comme celle que l'on trouve dans [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), et [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Les solutions de sandboxing Linux couramment utilisées, telles que [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) et [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) , ont encore beaucoup de chemin à parcourir -- Forte [atténuation des exploits](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -Malgré ces inconvénients, les distributions GNU/Linux de bureau sont excellentes si vous souhaitez : - -- Évitez la télémétrie qui accompagne souvent les systèmes d'exploitation propriétaires -- Maintenir [la liberté des logiciels](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- Disposer de systèmes axés sur la protection de la vie privée tels que [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) ou [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) - -Notre site web utilise généralement le terme "Linux" pour décrire les distributions GNU/Linux de bureau. Les autres systèmes d'exploitation qui utilisent également le noyau Linux, tels que ChromeOS, Android et Qubes OS, ne sont pas abordés ici. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [Nos recommandations Linux :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Remarques concernant la vie privée + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- Évitez la télémétrie qui accompagne souvent les systèmes d'exploitation propriétaires +- Maintenir [la liberté des logiciels](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## Choisir sa distribution -Toutes les distributions Linux ne sont pas créées égales. Bien que notre page de recommandations Linux ne soit pas censée être une source faisant autorité sur la distribution que vous devriez utiliser, il y a quelques éléments que vous devriez garder à l'esprit lors du choix de la distribution à utiliser. +Toutes les distributions Linux ne sont pas créées égales. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### Cycle de mises à jour Nous vous recommandons vivement de choisir des distributions qui restent proches des versions stables des logiciels en amont, souvent appelées distributions à publications continues. En effet, les distributions à cycle de publication gelé ne mettent souvent pas à jour les versions des paquets et prennent du retard sur les mises à jour de sécurité. -Pour les distributions gelées telles que [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), les responsables de paquets sont censés rapporter les correctifs pour corriger les vulnérabilités plutôt que de faire passer le logiciel à la "prochaine version" publiée par le développeur en amont. Certains correctifs de sécurité ne reçoivent [pas du tout](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) de [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (en particulier les logiciels moins populaires) et ne sont donc pas intégrés à la distribution avec ce modèle de correctifs. Par conséquent, les corrections de sécurité mineures sont parfois reportées à la prochaine version majeure. +Pour les distributions gelées telles que [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), les responsables de paquets sont censés rapporter les correctifs pour corriger les vulnérabilités plutôt que de faire passer le logiciel à la "prochaine version" publiée par le développeur en amont. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. Par conséquent, les corrections de sécurité mineures sont parfois reportées à la prochaine version majeure. Nous ne pensons pas que retenir les paquets et appliquer des correctifs provisoires soit une bonne idée, car cela s'écarte de la manière dont le développeur aurait pu vouloir que le logiciel fonctionne. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) propose une présentation à ce sujet : @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ La méthode de mise à jour atomique est utilisée pour les distributions immuab ### "Distributions "axées sur la sécurité -Il y a souvent une certaine confusion entre les distributions "axées sur la sécurité" et les distributions pour les "tests de pénétration". Une recherche rapide de "la distribution Linux la plus sûre" donne souvent des résultats comme Kali Linux, Black Arch et Parrot OS. Ces distributions sont des distributions de tests de pénétration offensifs qui regroupent des outils pour tester d'autres systèmes. Elles n'incluent pas de "sécurité supplémentaire" ni de mesures d'atténuation défensives destinées à une utilisation régulière. +Il y a souvent une certaine confusion entre les distributions "axées sur la sécurité" et les distributions pour les "tests de pénétration". A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. Ces distributions sont des distributions de tests de pénétration offensifs qui regroupent des outils pour tester d'autres systèmes. Elles n'incluent pas de "sécurité supplémentaire" ni de mesures d'atténuation défensives destinées à une utilisation régulière. ### Distributions basées sur Arch Linux -Les distributions basées sur Arch ne sont pas recommandées pour les débutants en Linux (quelle que soit la distribution) car elles nécessitent une [maintenance régulière du système](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch ne dispose pas d'un mécanisme de mise à jour de la distribution pour les choix logiciels sous-jacents. Par conséquent, vous devez rester au courant des tendances actuelles et adopter les technologies au fur et à mesure qu'elles remplacent les anciennes pratiques. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. Par conséquent, vous devez rester au courant des tendances actuelles et adopter les technologies au fur et à mesure qu'elles remplacent les anciennes pratiques. Pour un système sécurisé, vous êtes également censé avoir une connaissance suffisante de Linux pour configurer correctement la sécurité de votre système, par exemple en adoptant un système de [contrôle d'accès obligatoire](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control), en configurant des listes noires de [modules du noyau](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security), en renforçant les paramètres de démarrage, en manipulant les paramètres [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl), et en sachant de quels composants ils ont besoin, comme [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Toute personne utilisant l'[Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **doit** être à l'aise pour auditer les PKGBUILDs qu'elle installe à partir de ce service. Les paquets AUR sont des contenus produits par la communauté et ne font l'objet d'aucune vérification. Ils sont donc vulnérables aux attaques de la chaîne d'approvisionnement des logiciels, ce qui s'est d'ailleurs produit [dans le passé](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR doit toujours être utilisé avec parcimonie et il existe souvent de nombreux mauvais conseils sur diverses pages qui incitent les gens à utiliser aveuglément [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) sans avertissement suffisant. Des avertissements similaires s'appliquent à l'utilisation d'Archives de Paquets Personnels (PPA) de tiers sur les distributions basées sur Debian ou de Projets Communautaires (COPR) sur Fedora. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. Les paquets AUR sont des contenus produits par la communauté et ne font l'objet d'aucune vérification. Ils sont donc vulnérables aux attaques de la chaîne d'approvisionnement des logiciels, ce qui s'est d'ailleurs produit [dans le passé](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -Si vous avez de l'expérience avec Linux et souhaitez utiliser une distribution basée sur Arch, nous recommandons uniquement Arch Linux, et non ses dérivés. Nous déconseillons spécifiquement ces deux dérivés de Arch : +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Des avertissements similaires s'appliquent à l'utilisation d'Archives de Paquets Personnels (PPA) de tiers sur les distributions basées sur Debian ou de Projets Communautaires (COPR) sur Fedora. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: Cette distribution bloque les mises à jour des paquets pendant 2 semaines pour s'assurer que leurs propres changements ne cassent pas, et non pas pour s'assurer que l'amont est stable. Lorsque des paquets AUR sont utilisés, ils sont souvent construits avec les dernières [bibliothèques](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) des dépôts d'Arch. - **Garuda**: Ils utilisent [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) qui compile automatiquement et aveuglément les paquets de l'AUR. Il n'existe aucun processus de vérification pour s'assurer que les paquets AUR ne souffrent pas d'attaques de la chaîne d'approvisionnement. -### Kicksecure - -Bien que nous déconseillions fortement l'utilisation de distributions obsolètes comme Debian, il existe un système d'exploitation basé sur Debian qui a été renforcé pour être beaucoup plus sûr que les distributions Linux habituelles : [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, en termes très simplifiés, est un ensemble de scripts, de configurations et de paquets qui réduisent considérablement la surface d'attaque de Debian. Il couvre par défaut un grand nombre de recommandations en matière de confidentialité et de durcissement. - ### Le noyau Linux-libre et les distributions "libres" -Nous recommandons fortement **de ne pas** utiliser le noyau Linux-libre, car il [supprime des mesures de sécurité et d'atténuation](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) et [supprime des avertissements de noyau](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) concernant les microcodes vulnérables pour des raisons idéologiques. +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## Recommandations générales @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ La plupart des distributions Linux ont une option dans leur installateur pour ac ### Swap -Envisagez l'utilisation de [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) ou du [swap chiffré](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) au lieu du swap non chiffré pour éviter les problèmes de sécurité potentiels avec des données sensibles poussées vers [l'espace swap](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Les distributions basées sur Fedora [utilisent ZRAM par défaut](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -Nous recommandons l'utilisation d'un environnement de bureau prenant en charge le protocole d'affichage [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) car il a été développé dans [un souci](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/) de sécurité. Son prédécesseur, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), ne prend pas en charge l'isolation de l'interface graphique, ce qui permet à toutes les fenêtres [d'enregistrer l'écran, d'enregistrer et d'injecter des entrées dans d'autres fenêtres](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), rendant toute tentative de sandboxing futile. Bien qu'il existe des options pour faire du X11 imbriqué telles que [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) ou [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), elles ont souvent des conséquences négatives sur les performances, ne sont pas pratiques à mettre en place et ne sont pas préférables à Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. Heureusement, des environnements courants tels que [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), et le gestionnaire de fenêtres [Sway](https://swaywm.org) prennent en charge Wayland. Certaines distributions comme Fedora et Tumbleweed l'utilisent par défaut, et d'autres pourraient le faire à l'avenir car X11 est en [mode maintenance limitée](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). Si vous utilisez l'un de ces environnements, il vous suffit de sélectionner la session "Wayland" dans le gestionnaire d'affichage du bureau ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ Nous recommandons **de ne pas** utiliser des environnements de bureau ou des ges ### Micrologiciel propriétaire (mises à jour du microcode) -Les distributions Linux telles que celles qui sont [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) ou DIY (Arch Linux) ne sont pas fournies avec les mises à jour propriétaires [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) qui corrigent souvent des vulnérabilités. Voici quelques exemples notables de ces vulnérabilités : [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), et d'autres [vulnérabilités matérielles](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Voici quelques exemples notables de ces vulnérabilités : [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), et d'autres [vulnérabilités matérielles](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -Nous **recommandons vivement** d'installer les mises à jour du microcode, car votre CPU exécute déjà le microcode propriétaire depuis l'usine. Fedora et openSUSE ont tous deux les mises à jour du microcode appliquées par défaut. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora et openSUSE ont tous deux les mises à jour du microcode appliquées par défaut. ### Mises à jour La plupart des distributions Linux installent automatiquement les mises à jour ou vous rappellent de le faire. Il est important de maintenir votre système d'exploitation à jour afin que votre logiciel soit corrigé lorsqu'une vulnérabilité est découverte. -Certaines distributions (notamment celles destinées aux utilisateurs avancés) sont plus bruts et vous demandent de faire les choses vous-même (par exemple Arch ou Debian). Il faudra manuellement exécuter le "gestionnaire de paquets" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) afin de recevoir les mises à jour de sécurité importantes. +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). Il faudra manuellement exécuter le "gestionnaire de paquets" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) afin de recevoir les mises à jour de sécurité importantes. En outre, certaines distributions ne téléchargent pas automatiquement les mises à jour du micrologiciel. Pour cela, vous devrez installer [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd). @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ En outre, certaines distributions ne téléchargent pas automatiquement les mise ### Adresse MAC aléatoire -De nombreuses distributions Linux de bureau (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) sont fournies avec [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), pour configurer les paramètres Ethernet et Wi-Fi. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. Il est possible de [changer aléatoirement](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) l'[adresse MAC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) en utilisant NetworkManager. Cela permet de protéger un peu plus la vie privée sur les réseaux Wi-Fi, car il est plus difficile de suivre des appareils spécifiques sur le réseau auquel vous êtes connecté. Cela ne vous rend [**pas**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) anonyme. @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ Nous recommandons de changer le paramètre et mettre **aléatoire** plutôt que Si vous utilisez [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), vous devrez définir [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) qui activera [RFC 7844 (Profils d'anonymat pour les clients DHCP)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=). -Il n'y a pas beaucoup d'intérêt à rendre aléatoire l'adresse MAC pour les connexions Ethernet car un administrateur système peut vous trouver en regardant le port que vous utilisez sur le [commutateur réseau](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Rendre aléatoire les adresses MAC Wi-Fi dépend de la prise en charge par le micrologiciel du Wi-Fi. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Rendre aléatoire les adresses MAC Wi-Fi dépend de la prise en charge par le micrologiciel du Wi-Fi. ### Autres identifiants diff --git a/i18n/fr/os/macos-overview.md b/i18n/fr/os/macos-overview.md index 6d8d8d11..052d92e5 100644 --- a/i18n/fr/os/macos-overview.md +++ b/i18n/fr/os/macos-overview.md @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ macOS est livré avec un logiciel de sauvegarde automatique appelé [Time Machin De nombreuses fonctions de sécurité modernes de macOS - telles que le démarrage sécurisé moderne, l'atténuation des exploits au niveau matériel, les vérifications de l'intégrité du système d'exploitation et le chiffrement des fichiers - reposent sur le silicium d'Apple, et le matériel le plus récent d'Apple est toujours doté de la [meilleure sécurité](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/apple-soc-security-sec87716a080/1/web/1). Nous n'encourageons que l'utilisation du silicium d'Apple, et non des anciens ordinateurs Mac à base d'Intel ou des Hackintosh. -Some of these modern security features are available on older Intel-based Mac computers with the Apple T2 Security Chip, but that chip is susceptible to the *checkm8* exploit which could compromise its security. +Certaines de ces fonctions de sécurité modernes sont disponibles sur les anciens ordinateurs Mac à base d'Intel équipés de la puce de sécurité T2 d'Apple, mais cette puce est susceptible d'être exploitée par *checkm8*, ce qui pourrait compromettre sa sécurité. Si vous utilisez des accessoires Bluetooth tels qu'un clavier, nous vous recommandons d'utiliser les accessoires officiels d'Apple car leur micrologiciel sera automatiquement mis à jour pour vous par macOS. L'utilisation d'accessoires tiers est possible, mais il faut penser à installer régulièrement les mises à jour du micrologiciel de ces accessoires. diff --git a/i18n/fr/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/fr/os/qubes-overview.md index e9a26073..b584cbdc 100644 --- a/i18n/fr/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/fr/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos description: Qubes est un système d'exploitation conçu pour isoler les applications au sein de machines virtuelles afin de renforcer la sécurité. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) est un système d'exploitation qui utilise l'hyperviseur [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) pour fournir une sécurité forte pour l'informatique de bureau par le biais de machines virtuelles isolées. Chaque VM est appelée un *Qube* et vous pouvez attribuer à chaque Qube un niveau de confiance en fonction de son objectif. Étant donné que le système d'exploitation Qubes assure la sécurité en utilisant l'isolation et en n'autorisant des actions qu'au cas par cas, il est à l'opposé de [l'énumération de méchanceté](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) est un système d'exploitation open-source qui utilise l'hyperviseur [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) pour fournir une sécurité forte pour l'informatique de bureau par le biais de machines virtuelles isolées. Chaque VM est appelée un *Qube* et vous pouvez attribuer à chaque Qube un niveau de confiance en fonction de son objectif. Étant donné que Qubes OS assure la sécurité en utilisant l'isolation et en n'autorisant des actions qu'au cas par cas, il est à l'opposé de [l'énumération de méchanceté](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## Comment fonctionne Qubes OS ? diff --git a/i18n/fr/tools.md b/i18n/fr/tools.md index b575696c..31aec7e3 100644 --- a/i18n/fr/tools.md +++ b/i18n/fr/tools.md @@ -154,8 +154,8 @@ Nous [recommandons](dns.md#recommended-providers) un certain nombre de serveurs
-- ![Privacy.com logo](assets/img/financial-services/privacy_com.svg#only-light){ .twemoji }![Privacy.com logo](assets/img/financial-services/privacy_com-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji } [Privacy.com](financial-services.md#privacycom-us) -- ![MySudo logo](assets/img/financial-services/mysudo.svg#only-light){ .twemoji }![MySudo logo](assets/img/financial-services/mysudo-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji } [MySudo](financial-services.md#mysudo-us-paid) +- ![logo Privacy.com](assets/img/financial-services/privacy_com.svg#only-light){ .twemoji }![logo Privacy.com](assets/img/financial-services/privacy_com-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji } [Privacy.com](financial-services.md#privacycom-us) +- ![logo MySudo](assets/img/financial-services/mysudo.svg#only-light){ .twemoji }![logo MySudo](assets/img/financial-services/mysudo-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji } [MySudo](financial-services.md#mysudo-us-paid)
[En savoir plus :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](financial-services.md#payment-masking-services) @@ -330,8 +330,8 @@ Nous [recommandons](dns.md#recommended-providers) un certain nombre de serveurs - ![YubiKeys](assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/mini/yubico.svg){ .twemoji } [YubiKey](multi-factor-authentication.md#yubikey) - ![Nitrokey](assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/mini/nitrokey.svg){ .twemoji } [Nitrokey](multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey) -- ![Aegis logo](assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/aegis.png){ .twemoji } [Aegis Authenticator (Android)](multi-factor-authentication.md#aegis-authenticator-android) -- ![Raivo OTP logo](assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/raivo-otp.png){ .twemoji } [Raivo OTP (iOS)](multi-factor-authentication.md#raivo-otp-ios) +- ![logo Aegis](assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/aegis.png){ .twemoji } [Aegis Authenticator (Android)](multi-factor-authentication.md#aegis-authenticator-android) +- ![logo Raivo OTP](assets/img/multi-factor-authentication/raivo-otp.png){ .twemoji } [Raivo OTP (iOS)](multi-factor-authentication.md#raivo-otp-ios) @@ -341,13 +341,13 @@ Nous [recommandons](dns.md#recommended-providers) un certain nombre de serveurs
-- ![Akregator logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/akregator.svg){ .twemoji } [Akregator](news-aggregators.md#akregator) -- ![Feeder logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/feeder.png){ .twemoji} [Feeder (Android)](news-aggregators.md#feeder) -- ![Fluent Reader logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/fluent-reader.svg){ .twemoji } [Fluent Reader](news-aggregators.md#fluent-reader) -- ![GNOME Feeds logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/gfeeds.svg){ .twemoji } [GNOME Feeds](news-aggregators.md#gnome-feeds) -- ![Miniflux logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/miniflux.svg#only-light){ .twemoji }![Miniflux logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/miniflux-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji } [Miniflux](news-aggregators.md#miniflux) -- ![NetNewsWire logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/netnewswire.png){ .twemoji } [NetNewsWire](news-aggregators.md#netnewswire) -- ![Newsboat logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/newsboat.svg){ .twemoji } [Newsboat](news-aggregators.md#newsboat) +- ![logo Akregator](assets/img/news-aggregators/akregator.svg){ .twemoji } [Akregator](news-aggregators.md#akregator) +- ![logo Feeder](assets/img/news-aggregators/feeder.png){ .twemoji} [Feeder (Android)](news-aggregators.md#feeder) +- ![logo Fluent Reader](assets/img/news-aggregators/fluent-reader.svg){ .twemoji } [Fluent Reader](news-aggregators.md#fluent-reader) +- ![logo GNOME Feeds](assets/img/news-aggregators/gfeeds.svg){ .twemoji } [GNOME Feeds](news-aggregators.md#gnome-feeds) +- ![logo Miniflux](assets/img/news-aggregators/miniflux.svg#only-light){ .twemoji }![Miniflux logo](assets/img/news-aggregators/miniflux-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji } [Miniflux](news-aggregators.md#miniflux) +- ![logo NetNewsWire](assets/img/news-aggregators/netnewswire.png){ .twemoji } [NetNewsWire](news-aggregators.md#netnewswire) +- ![logo Newsboat](assets/img/news-aggregators/newsboat.svg){ .twemoji } [Newsboat](news-aggregators.md#newsboat)
@@ -442,14 +442,15 @@ Nous [recommandons](dns.md#recommended-providers) un certain nombre de serveurs
-- ![Logo Qubes OS](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ .twemoji } [Qubes OS (Xen VM Distribution)](desktop.md#qubes-os) -- ![Logo Fedora](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-workstation.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Workstation](desktop.md#fedora-workstation) +- ![logo Qubes OS](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ .twemoji } [Qubes OS (Xen VM Distribution)](desktop.md#qubes-os) +- ![logo Fedora](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-workstation.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Workstation](desktop.md#fedora-workstation) - ![logo openSUSE Tumbleweed](assets/img/linux-desktop/opensuse-tumbleweed.svg){ .twemoji } [OpenSUSE Tumbleweed](desktop.md#opensuse-tumbleweed) - ![logo Arch](assets/img/linux-desktop/archlinux.svg){ .twemoji } [Arch Linux](desktop.md#arch-linux) -- ![Logo Fedora Silverblue](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-silverblue.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Silverblue & Kinoite](desktop.md#fedora-silverblue) -- ![Logo nixOS](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) -- ![Logo Whonix](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) -- ![Logo Tails](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![logo Fedora Silverblue](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-silverblue.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Silverblue & Kinoite](desktop.md#fedora-silverblue) +- ![logo nixOS](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) +- ![logo Whonix](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) +- ![logo Tails](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![logo Kicksecure](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure)
diff --git a/i18n/he/desktop.md b/i18n/he/desktop.md index 5cbb4f19..a3d5a7cb 100644 --- a/i18n/he/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/he/desktop.md @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Nix הוא מנהל חבילות מבוסס מקור; אם אין מוכן מר ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** מבוסס על [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), מזלג ממוקד אבטחה של דביאן. מטרתו לספק פרטיות, אבטחה ואנונימיות באינטרנט. כדאי להשתמש ב - Whonix בשילוב עם [Qubes OS](# qubes- os). + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. מטרתו לספק פרטיות, אבטחה ואנונימיות באינטרנט. כדאי להשתמש ב - Whonix בשילוב עם [Qubes OS](# qubes- os). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } @@ -150,35 +150,50 @@ Tailsכולל[uBlock Origin](desktop-browsers.md#ublock-origin) בדפדפן Tor !!! recommendation - ![לוגו של מערכת ההפעלה Qubes ]( assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } + ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **מערכת ההפעלה Qubes** היא מערכת הפעלה בקוד פתוח שנועדה לספק אבטחה חזקה למחשוב שולחני. Qubes מבוססת על Xen, מערכת החלונות X ולינוקס, ויכולה להריץ את רוב יישומי לינוקס ולהשתמש ברוב מנהלי ההתקן של לינוקס. + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes מבוססת על Xen, מערכת החלונות X ולינוקס, ויכולה להריץ את רוב יישומי לינוקס ולהשתמש ברוב מנהלי ההתקן של לינוקס. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } - [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="מדיניות פרטיות" } - [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=תיעוד } - [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="קוד מקור" } - [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=לתרומה } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS היא מערכת הפעלה מבוססת Xen שנועדה לספק אבטחה חזקה למחשוב שולחני באמצעות מכונות וירטואליות מאובטחות (VMs), הידוע גם בשם *Qubes*. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -מערכת ההפעלה Qubes מאבטחת את המחשב על ידי בידוד תת - מערכות (למשל, רשת, USB וכו ') ויישומים ב - VMs נפרדים. אם חלק אחד של המערכת נפגע, הבידוד הנוסף עשוי להגן על שאר המערכת. לפרטים נוספים ראו Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/). +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! recommendation + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. זה מכסה הרבה המלצות לפרטיות והקשחה כברירת מחדל. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## קריטריונים -**שים לב שאיננו קשורים לאף אחד מהפרויקטים שאנו ממליצים עליהם.** בנוסף ל [הקריטריונים הסטנדרטיים שלנו](about/criteria.md), פיתחנו סט ברור של דרישות כדי לאפשר לנו לספק המלצות אובייקטיביות. אנו מציעים לך להכיר את הרשימה הזו לפני שתבחר להשתמש בפרויקט, ולערוך מחקר משלך כדי להבטיח שזו הבחירה הנכונה עבורך. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! example "חלק זה הוא חדש" +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - אנו עובדים על קביעת קריטריונים מוגדרים לכל קטע באתר שלנו, והדבר עשוי להשתנות. אם יש לך שאלות כלשהן לגבי הקריטריונים שלנו, אנא [שאל בפורום שלנו](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) ואל תניח שלא שקלנו משהו כשהצענו את ההמלצות שלנו אם הוא לא רשום כאן. ישנם גורמים רבים שנחשבים ונדונים כאשר אנו ממליצים על פרויקט, ותיעוד כל אחד מהם הוא עבודה בתהליך. - -מערכות ההפעלה המומלצות שלנו: - -- זה חייב להיות קוד פתוח. -- חייבים לקבל עדכוני תוכנה וליבת לינוקס באופן קבוע. -- הפצות לינוקס חייבות לתמוך ב[Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- חייב לתמוך בהצפנה בדיסק מלא במהלך ההתקנה. -- אין להקפיא מהדורות רגילות במשך יותר משנה. [איננו ממליצים](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) על מהדורות distro "תמיכה לטווח ארוך" או "יציבה" לשימוש בשולחן העבודה. -- חייב לתמוך במגוון רחב של חומרה. +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/he/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/he/os/android-overview.md index af516e5e..93564dee 100644 --- a/i18n/he/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/he/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android description: אנדרואיד היא מערכת הפעלה בקוד פתוח עם הגנות אבטחה חזקות, מה שהופך אותה לבחירה המובילה שלנו עבור טלפונים. --- -אנדרואיד היא מערכת הפעלה מאובטחת הכוללת [ארגז חול חזק של אפליקציות](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [אתחול מאומת](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB) ומערכת בקרת [הרשאות](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) חזקה. +![לוגו אנדרואיד](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## בחירת הפצת אנדרואיד +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### בחירת הפצת אנדרואיד כאשר אתה קונה טלפון אנדרואיד, מערכת ההפעלה המוגדרת כברירת מחדל של המכשיר מגיעה לרוב עם אינטגרציה פולשנית עם אפליקציות ושירותים שאינם חלק מ[פרויקט הקוד הפתוח של אנדרואיד](https://source.android.com/). דוגמה כזו היא שירותי Google Play, שיש לו הרשאות בלתי חוזרות לגשת לקבצים שלך, אחסון אנשי הקשר, יומני שיחות, הודעות SMS, מיקום, מצלמה, מיקרופון, מזהי חומרה וכו'. אפליקציות ושירותים אלו מגדילים את משטח ההתקפה של המכשיר שלך ומהווים מקור לחששות פרטיות שונים עם אנדרואיד. @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ description: אנדרואיד היא מערכת הפעלה בקוד פתוח ע [המלצות מערכת אנדרואיד שלנו :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## הימנע מהשתרשות +### הימנע מהשתרשות [השרשת](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) טלפונים אנדרואיד יכולים להפחית את האבטחה באופן משמעותי מכיוון שהוא מחליש את [מודל האבטחה של אנדרואיד](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). זה יכול להפחית את הפרטיות אם יש ניצול הנעזר בירידה באבטחה. שיטות השתרשות נפוצות כוללות התעסקות ישירה במחיצת האתחול, מה שהופך את זה לבלתי אפשרי לבצע אתחול מאומת בהצלחה. אפליקציות הדורשות שורש ישנו גם את מחיצת המערכת, כלומר אתחול מאומת יצטרך להישאר מושבת. חשיפת השורש ישירות בממשק המשתמש גם מגדילה את [משטח ההתקפה](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) של המכשיר שלך ועשויה לסייע ב[הסלמה של הרשאות](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) פגיעויות ועקיפות מדיניות SELinux. @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ פועל על בסיס גישת [סינון חבילות](https://en.wik אנחנו לא מאמינים שקורבנות האבטחה שנעשו על ידי השתרשות טלפון שווים את יתרונות הפרטיות המפוקפקים של אפליקציות אלה. -## אתחול מאומת +### Install Updates + +חשוב לא להשתמש בגרסת [סוף החיים](https://endoflife.date/android) של אנדרואיד. גרסאות חדשות יותר של אנדרואיד לא רק מקבלות עדכוני אבטחה עבור מערכת ההפעלה אלא גם עדכונים חשובים לשיפור הפרטיות. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. אפליקציות מערכת מסופקות רק על ידי הפצת OEM או אנדרואיד. + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Security Protections + +### אתחול מאומת [אתחול מאומת](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) הוא חלק חשוב ממודל האבטחה של אנדרואיד. הוא מספק הגנה מפני התקפות [משרתת רעה](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack), התמדה של תוכנות זדוניות, ומבטיח שלא ניתן לשדרג לאחור עדכוני אבטחה עם [הגנה לאחור](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection). @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ AFWall+ פועל על בסיס גישת [סינון חבילות](https://en.wik יצרני OEM רבים גם עשו יישום שבור של אתחול מאומת שעליך להיות מודע אליו מעבר לשיווק שלהם. לדוגמה, ה-Fairphone 3 ו-4 אינם מאובטחים כברירת מחדל, מכיוון ש[מטען האתחול של הברירת מחדל סומך על מפתח החתימה הציבורי של ](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11)AVB. זה שובר אתחול מאומת במכשיר Fairphone ברירת מחדל, מכיוון שהמערכת תאתחל מערכות הפעלה חלופיות של אנדרואיד כגון (כגון /e/) [ללא כל אזהרה](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) לגבי שימוש מותאם אישית במערכת ההפעלה. -## עדכוני קושחה +### עדכוני קושחה עדכוני קושחה הם קריטיים לשמירה על האבטחה ובלעדיהם המכשיר שלך לא יכול להיות מאובטח. ליצרני ציוד מקורי יש הסכמי תמיכה עם השותפים שלהם כדי לספק את רכיבי הקוד הסגור לתקופת תמיכה מוגבלת. אלה מפורטים ב[עלוני האבטחה של אנדרואיד](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin) החודשיים. @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ AFWall+ פועל על בסיס גישת [סינון חבילות](https://en.wik Fairphone, למשל, משווקת את המכשירים שלהם כמקבלים 6 שנות תמיכה. עם זאת, ל-SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G ב-Fairphone 4) יש תאריך EOL קצר בהרבה. המשמעות היא שעדכוני אבטחת קושחה מ-Qualcomm עבור Fairphone 4 יסתיימו בספטמבר 2023, ללא קשר לשאלה אם Fairphone תמשיך לשחרר עדכוני אבטחה תוכנה. -## גרסאות אנדרואיד - -חשוב לא להשתמש בגרסת [סוף החיים](https://endoflife.date/android) של אנדרואיד. גרסאות חדשות יותר של אנדרואיד לא רק מקבלות עדכוני אבטחה עבור מערכת ההפעלה אלא גם עדכונים חשובים לשיפור הפרטיות. לדוגמה, [לפני אנדרואיד 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), כל אפליקציה עם הרשאת [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) יכלו לגשת למספרים סידוריים רגישים וייחודיים של הטלפון שלך כגון [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), כרטיס ה-SIM שלך [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), בעוד שכעת הם חייבים להיות אפליקציות מערכת כדי לעשות זאת. אפליקציות מערכת מסופקות רק על ידי הפצת OEM או אנדרואיד. - -## הרשאות אנדרואיד +### הרשאות אנדרואיד [הרשאות ב-אנדרואיד](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) מעניקות לך שליטה על האפליקציות המורשות לגשת. גוגל מבצעת בקביעות [שיפורים](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) במערכת ההרשאות בכל גרסה עוקבת. כל האפליקציות שאתה מתקין הן אך ורק [ארגז חול](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), לכן, אין צורך להתקין אפליקציות אנטי וירוס. @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ Fairphone, למשל, משווקת את המכשירים שלהם כמקבלים אפליקציות ידידותיות לפרטיות כגון [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) עשויות להציג עוקבים מסוימים כגון [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). ספרייה זו כוללת את [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) שיכולה לספק [הודעות דחיפה](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) באפליקציות. זה [המקרה](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) עם Bitwarden. זה לא אומר ש-Bitwarden משתמש בכל תכונות הניתוח שמסופקות על ידי Google Firebase Analytics. -## גישה למדיה +## Privacy Features -לא מעט אפליקציות מאפשרות "לחלוק" איתם קובץ להעלאת מדיה. אם אתה רוצה, למשל, לצייץ תמונה לטוויטר, אל תעניק לטוויטר גישה ל"מדיה ותמונות" שלך, כי אז תהיה לה גישה לכל התמונות שלך. במקום זאת, עבור אל מנהל הקבצים שלך (documentsUI), שמור את התמונה ולאחר מכן שתף אותה עם טוויטר. - -## פרופילי משתמשים +### פרופילי משתמשים ניתן למצוא פרופילי משתמש מרובים ב**הגדרות** ← **מערכת** ← **משתמש מרובים** והם הדרך הפשוטה ביותר לבודד באנדרואיד. עם פרופילי משתמש, אתה יכול להטיל הגבלות על פרופיל ספציפי, כגון: ביצוע שיחות, שימוש ב-SMS או התקנת אפליקציות במכשיר. כל פרופיל מוצפן באמצעות מפתח הצפנה משלו ואינו יכול לגשת לנתונים של אף פרופיל אחר. אפילו בעל המכשיר לא יכול לראות את הנתונים של פרופילים אחרים מבלי לדעת את הסיסמה שלהם. פרופילי משתמשים מרובים הם שיטה בטוחה יותר לבידוד. -## פרופיל עבודה +### פרופיל עבודה [פרופילי עבודה](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) הם דרך נוספת לבודד אפליקציות בודדות ועשויה להיות נוחה יותר מפרופילי משתמשים נפרדים. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ Fairphone, למשל, משווקת את המכשירים שלהם כמקבלים שיטה זו בדרך כלל פחות מאובטחת מפרופיל משתמש משני; עם זאת, זה כן מאפשר לך את הנוחות של הפעלת אפליקציות בפרופיל העבודה וגם בפרופיל האישי בו-זמנית. -## מתג הרג VPN +### מתג הרג VPN אנדרואיד 7 ומעלה תומך ב-VPN Killswitch והוא זמין ללא צורך בהתקנת אפליקציות של צד שלישי. תכונה זו יכולה למנוע דליפות אם ה-VPN מנותק. ניתן למצוא אותו ב:gear: **הגדרות** ← **רשת & אינטרנט** ← **VPN** ← :gear: ← **חסום חיבורים ללא VPN**. -## בוררים גלובליים +### בוררים גלובליים למכשירי אנדרואיד מודרניים יש בוררים גלובליים לביטול Bluetooth ושירותי מיקום. אנדרואיד 12 הציגה מתגים למצלמה ולמיקרופון. כאשר אינו בשימוש, אנו ממליצים להשבית את התכונות הללו. אפליקציות לא יכולות להשתמש בתכונות מושבתות (גם אם ניתנה הרשאה אישית) עד להפעלה מחדש. -## גוגל +## Google Services אם אתה משתמש במכשיר עם שירותי Google, בין אם מערכת ההפעלה ברירת מחדל שלך או מערכת הפעלה המארחת בבטחה את שירותי Google Play כמו GrapheneOS, ישנם מספר שינויים נוספים שתוכל לבצע כדי לשפר את הפרטיות שלך. אנו עדיין ממליצים להימנע לחלוטין משירותי Google, או להגביל את שירותי Google Play לפרופיל משתמש/עבודה ספציפי על ידי שילוב של בקר מכשיר כמו *Shelter* עם Google Play Sandboxed של GrapheneOS. diff --git a/i18n/he/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/he/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5578e995 --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/he/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Privacy Notes + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Activation Lock + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## תצורה מומלצת + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### הגדרות + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! warning "אזהרה" + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### פרטיות + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/he/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/he/os/linux-overview.md index f6172ebf..9e2825f2 100644 --- a/i18n/he/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/he/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: לינוקס היא חלופה למערכת הפעלה שולחנית ממוקדת פרטיות בקוד פתוח, אך לא כל ההפצות נוצרות שווה. --- -לעתים קרובות מאמינים שתוכנת [קוד פתוח](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) מאובטחת מטבעה מכיוון שקוד המקור זמין. קיימת ציפייה שאימות קהילה מתרחש באופן קבוע; עם זאת, זה לא תמיד [המקרה](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). זה אכן תלוי במספר גורמים, כגון פעילות הפרויקט, חוויית מפתח, רמת הקפדה על [ביקורות קוד](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), וכן באיזו תדירות ניתנת תשומת לב לחלקים ספציפיים של [בסיס הקוד](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) שעלולים להישאר ללא נגיעה במשך שנים. +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -נכון לעכשיו, ללינוקס שולחני יש כמה תחומים שניתן לשפר טוב יותר בהשוואה לעמיתיהם הקנייניים, למשל.: - -- שרשרת אתחול מאומתת, כמו [אתחול מאובטח](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) של אפל (עם [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)),של אנדרואיד [אתחול מאומת](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [אתחול מאומת](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), או Microsoft Windows’s [תהליך האתחול](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) עם [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). תכונות וטכנולוגיות חומרה אלו יכולות לעזור למנוע התעסקות מתמשכת על ידי תוכנות זדוניות או [התקפות עוזרות מרושעות](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack) -- פתרון ארגזי חול חזק כמו זה שנמצא ב- [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), ו- [אנדרואיד](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). פתרונות ארגז חול נפוצים של לינוקס כגון [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) ו- [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) עדיין יש דרך ארוכה לפניו -- חזק [ניצול ההקלות](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -למרות החסרונות הללו, הפצות לינוקס לשולחן העבודה הן נהדרות אם אתה רוצה: - -- הימנע מטלמטריה שמגיעה לרוב עם מערכות הפעלה קנייניות -- לשמור על [חופש תוכנה](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- יש מערכות ממוקדות פרטיות כגון [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) או [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) - -האתר שלנו משתמש בדרך כלל במונח "לינוקס" כדי לתאר הפצות לינוקס לשולחן העבודה. מערכות הפעלה אחרות המשתמשות גם בליבת לינוקס כמו ChromeOS, אנדרואיד ו-Qubes OS אינן נדונות כאן. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [המלצות לינוקס שלנו :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Privacy Notes + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- הימנע מטלמטריה שמגיעה לרוב עם מערכות הפעלה קנייניות +- לשמור על [חופש תוכנה](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## בחירת ההפצה שלך -לא כל ההפצות של לינוקס נוצרו שוות. בעוד שדף ההמלצות שלנו ללינוקס לא נועד להיות מקור סמכותי לגבי ההפצה שבה אתה צריך להשתמש, יש כמה דברים שאתה צריך לזכור כאשר אתה בוחר באיזו הפצה להשתמש. +לא כל ההפצות של לינוקס נוצרו שוות. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### מחזור שחרור אנו ממליצים בחום לבחור בהפצות שנשארות קרובות למהדורות התוכנה היציבות במעלה הזרם, המכונה לעתים קרובות הפצות מהדורות מתגלגלות. הסיבה לכך היא שהפצות מחזור שחרור קפוא לרוב אינן מעדכנות גרסאות חבילה ונגררות לפי עדכוני אבטחה. -עבור הפצות קפואות כגון [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), מתחזקים חבילות צפויים לבצע אחורה תיקונים כדי לתקן נקודות תורפה במקום להקפיץ את התוכנה ל- "הגרסה הבאה" שפורסמה על ידי המפתח במעלה הזרם. חלק מתיקוני האבטחה [אינם](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) מקבלים [CVE ](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (במיוחד תוכנה פחות פופולרית) בכלל ולכן אל תכנסו להפצה עם מודל התיקון הזה. כתוצאה מכך תיקוני אבטחה קלים מתעכבים לפעמים עד לגרסה הגדולה הבאה. +עבור הפצות קפואות כגון [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), מתחזקים חבילות צפויים לבצע אחורה תיקונים כדי לתקן נקודות תורפה במקום להקפיץ את התוכנה ל- "הגרסה הבאה" שפורסמה על ידי המפתח במעלה הזרם. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. כתוצאה מכך תיקוני אבטחה קלים מתעכבים לפעמים עד לגרסה הגדולה הבאה. אנחנו לא מאמינים שהחזקת חבילות והחלת תיקוני ביניים הם רעיון טוב, מכיוון שהוא שונה מהדרך שבה המפתח התכוון שהתוכנה תעבוד. ל [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) יש מצגת על נושא זה: @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ description: לינוקס היא חלופה למערכת הפעלה שולחני ### הפצות "ממוקדות אבטחה" -לעתים קרובות קיים בלבול מסוים בין הפצות "ממוקדות אבטחה" והפצות "לבדיקת חדירות". חיפוש מהיר של "הפצת לינוקס המאובטחת ביותר" יביא לרוב תוצאות כמו Kali Linux, Black Arch ו- Parrot OS. הפצות אלו הן הפצות בדיקות חדירה פוגעניות המאגדות כלים לבדיקת מערכות אחרות. הם אינם כוללים "אבטחה נוספת" או הקלות הגנתיות המיועדות לשימוש קבוע. +לעתים קרובות קיים בלבול מסוים בין הפצות "ממוקדות אבטחה" והפצות "לבדיקת חדירות". A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. הפצות אלו הן הפצות בדיקות חדירה פוגעניות המאגדות כלים לבדיקת מערכות אחרות. הם אינם כוללים "אבטחה נוספת" או הקלות הגנתיות המיועדות לשימוש קבוע. ### הפצות מבוססות Arch -הפצות מבוססות Arch אינן מומלצות לחדשים ב-Linux, (ללא קשר להפצה) מכיוון שהן דורשות [תחזוקת מערכת](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance) רגילה. ל- Arch אין מנגנון עדכון הפצה עבור אפשרויות התוכנה הבסיסיות. כתוצאה מכך, עליך להישאר מודע למגמות הנוכחיות ולאמץ טכנולוגיות מכיוון שהן מחליפות שיטות ישנות בעצמך. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. כתוצאה מכך, עליך להישאר מודע למגמות הנוכחיות ולאמץ טכנולוגיות מכיוון שהן מחליפות שיטות ישנות בעצמך. עבור מערכת מאובטחת, מצפים ממך גם שיהיה לך מספיק ידע בלינוקס כדי להגדיר כראוי אבטחה עבור המערכת שלהם, כגון אימוץ מערכת [בקרת כניסה חובה](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control), הגדרת רשימות שחורות של [מודול ליבה](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) רשימות שחורות, הקשחת פרמטרי אתחול, מניפולציה של [סיסקטל](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) פרמטרים, ולדעת אילו רכיבים הם צריכים כמו [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -כל מי שמשתמש ב[Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **חייב** להיות נוח בביקורת PKGBUILDs שהם מתקינים משירות זה. חבילות AUR הן תוכן המיוצר בקהילה ואינן נבדקות בשום צורה, ולכן הן פגיעות להתקפות שרשרת אספקת תוכנה, [מה שקרה למעשה](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). יש להשתמש תמיד במשורה ב-AUR ולעיתים קרובות יש הרבה עצות רעות בדפים שונים שמפנים אנשים להשתמש באופן עיוור ב [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) ללא אזהרה מספקת. אזהרות דומות חלות על שימוש בארכיון חבילות אישיות של צד שלישי (PPA) בהפצות מבוססות דביאן או בפרויקטים קהילתיים (COPR) בפדורה. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. חבילות AUR הן תוכן המיוצר בקהילה ואינן נבדקות בשום צורה, ולכן הן פגיעות להתקפות שרשרת אספקת תוכנה, [מה שקרה למעשה](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -אם אתה מנוסה עם לינוקס וברצונך להשתמש בהפצה מבוססת Arch, אנו ממליצים רק על Arch Linux הראשי, לא על אף אחת מהנגזרות שלו. אנו ממליצים נגד שתי נגזרות Arch אלה באופן ספציפי: +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. אזהרות דומות חלות על שימוש בארכיון חבילות אישיות של צד שלישי (PPA) בהפצות מבוססות דביאן או בפרויקטים קהילתיים (COPR) בפדורה. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: הפצה זו מעכבת חבילות למשך שבועיים כדי לוודא שהשינויים שלהן לא יישברו, לא כדי לוודא שהמעלה הזרם יציב. כאשר נעשה שימוש בחבילות AUR, הן בנויות לרוב על פי [ספריות](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) העדכניות ביותר מהמאגרים של Arch. - **Garuda**: הם משתמשים ב[Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) אשר מרכיב באופן אוטומטי ועיוור חבילות מה- AUR. אין תהליך אימות כדי לוודא שחבילות AUR אינן סובלות מהתקפות שרשרת האספקה. -### Kicksecure - -למרות שאנו ממליצים בחום לא להשתמש בהפצות מיושנות כמו דביאן, יש מערכת הפעלה מבוססת דביאן שהוקשה להיות בטוחה הרבה יותר מהפצות לינוקס טיפוסיות: [Kicksecure ](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, במונחים פשוטים מדי, היא קבוצה של סקריפטים, תצורות וחבילות שמצמצמות באופן משמעותי את משטח ההתקפה של דביאן. זה מכסה הרבה המלצות לפרטיות והקשחה כברירת מחדל. - ### הפצות ליבה של לינוקס ו-"Libre" -אנו ממליצים בחום **נגד** שימוש בליבת Linux-libre, שכן היא [מסירה הגבלות אבטחה](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) ו[מדכאת אזהרות ליבה](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) על מיקרוקוד פגיע מסיבות אידיאולוגיות. +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## המלצות כלליות @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ description: לינוקס היא חלופה למערכת הפעלה שולחני ### החלף -שקול להשתמש ב-[ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) או [החלפה מוצפנת](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) במקום החלפה לא מוצפנת כדי למנוע בעיות אבטחה פוטנציאליות עם דחיפה של נתונים רגישים ל[מרחב החלפה](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). הפצות מבוססות פדורה [משתמשות ב-ZRAM כברירת מחדל](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -אנו ממליצים להשתמש בסביבת שולחן עבודה התומכת בפרוטוקול התצוגה [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) כפי שפותח [תוך מחשבה](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/) על אבטחה. קודמו, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), אינו תומך בבידוד GUI, מה שמאפשר לכל החלונות [רשום מסך, רישום והכנס קלט בחלונות אחרים](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), מה שהופך כל ניסיון לארגז חול לחסר תועלת. אמנם יש אפשרויות לעשות X11 מקונן כגון [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) או [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), לעתים קרובות הם מגיעים עם השלכות ביצועים שליליות ואינם נוחים להגדרה ואינם עדיפים על פני Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. למרבה המזל, סביבות נפוצות כגון [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org) וה- למנהל החלונות [Sway](https://swaywm.org) יש תמיכה ב-Wayland. חלק מההפצות כמו Fedora ו- Tumbleweed משתמשות בו כברירת מחדל, וחלק אחרות עשויות לעשות זאת בעתיד מכיוון ש-X11 נמצא ב[מצב תחזוקה קשה](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). אם אתה משתמש באחת מהסביבות האלה זה קל כמו לבחור את הפגישה "Wayland" במנהל התצוגה של שולחן העבודה ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ description: לינוקס היא חלופה למערכת הפעלה שולחני ### קושחה קניינית (עדכוני מיקרוקוד) -הפצות לינוקס כגון אלו שהן [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) או DIY (Arch Linux) אינן מגיעות עם עדכוני [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) שלעתים קרובות מתקנים נקודות תורפה. כמה דוגמאות בולטות לפגיעויות אלה כוללות [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), ועוד [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. כמה דוגמאות בולטות לפגיעויות אלה כוללות [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), ועוד [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -אנו **ממליצים בחום** להתקין את עדכוני המיקרוקוד, מכיוון שהמעבד שלך כבר מריץ את המיקרוקוד הקנייני מהמפעל. לפדורה ול-openSUSE יש את עדכוני המיקרוקוד כברירת מחדל. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. לפדורה ול-openSUSE יש את עדכוני המיקרוקוד כברירת מחדל. ### עדכונים רוב ההפצות של לינוקס יתקינו עדכונים אוטומטית או יזכירו לך לעשות זאת. חשוב לשמור על מערכת ההפעלה שלך מעודכנת כדי שהתוכנה שלך תתוקן כאשר מתגלה פגיעות. -חלק מההפצות (במיוחד אלו המיועדות למשתמשים מתקדמים) הן יותר חשופות ומצפות ממך לעשות דברים בעצמך (למשל Arch או Debian). אלה ידרשו להפעיל את "מנהל החבילות" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf` וכו') באופן ידני על מנת לקבל עדכוני אבטחה חשובים. +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). אלה ידרשו להפעיל את "מנהל החבילות" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf` וכו') באופן ידני על מנת לקבל עדכוני אבטחה חשובים. בנוסף, הפצות מסוימות לא יוריד עדכוני קושחה באופן אוטומטי. לשם כך תצטרך להתקין את [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd). @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ description: לינוקס היא חלופה למערכת הפעלה שולחני ### כתובת MAC אקראית -הפצות רבות של לינוקס לשולחן העבודה (Fedora, openSUSE וכו') יגיעו עם [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), כדי להגדיר הגדרות Ethernet ו-Wi-Fi. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. אפשר [לבצע באקראי](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) את [כתובת MAC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) בעת שימוש ב-NetworkManager. זה מספק קצת יותר פרטיות ברשתות Wi-Fi מכיוון שהוא מקשה על מעקב אחר מכשירים ספציפיים ברשת שאליה אתה מחובר. זה [**לא**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) הופך אותך לאנונימי. @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ description: לינוקס היא חלופה למערכת הפעלה שולחני אם אתה משתמש ב [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), יהיה עליך להגדיר [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) אשר יאפשר [RFC 7844 (פרופילי אנונימיות עבור לקוחות DHCP)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=). -אין הרבה נקודות בביצוע אקראי של כתובת ה-MAC עבור חיבורי Ethernet, שכן מנהל מערכת יכול למצוא אותך על ידי התבוננות ביציאה שבה אתה משתמש ב-[מתג רשת](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). הקצאה אקראית של כתובות Wi-Fi MAC תלויה בתמיכה מהקושחה של ה-Wi-Fi. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). הקצאה אקראית של כתובות Wi-Fi MAC תלויה בתמיכה מהקושחה של ה-Wi-Fi. ### מזהים אחרים diff --git a/i18n/he/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/he/os/qubes-overview.md index 9b681a6f..275311a4 100644 --- a/i18n/he/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/he/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos description: Qubes היא מערכת הפעלה הבנויה סביב בידוד אפליקציות בתוך מכונות וירטואליות לאבטחה מוגברת. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) היא מערכת הפעלה המשתמשת ב [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) היפרוויזר לספק אבטחה חזקה עבור מחשוב שולחני באמצעות מכונות וירטואליות מבודדות. כל VM נקרא *Qube* ואתה יכול להקצות לכל Qube רמת אמון על סמך מטרתו. מכיוון שמערכת ההפעלה Qubes מספקת אבטחה על ידי שימוש בבידוד, ומתירה רק פעולות על בסיס כל מקרה, זה ההפך מ[ספירת רעות](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. כל VM נקרא *Qube* ואתה יכול להקצות לכל Qube רמת אמון על סמך מטרתו. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## איך עובדת מערכת ההפעלה של Qubes? diff --git a/i18n/he/tools.md b/i18n/he/tools.md index a79fbfa7..250fc8a1 100644 --- a/i18n/he/tools.md +++ b/i18n/he/tools.md @@ -442,14 +442,15 @@ description: Privacy Guides הוא האתר השקוף והאמין ביותר
-- ![Qubes OS לוגו](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ .twemoji } [Qubes OS (Xen VM Distribution)](desktop.md#qubes-os) -- ![Fedora לוגו](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-workstation.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Workstation](desktop.md#fedora-workstation) -- ![openSUSE Tumbleweed לוגו](assets/img/linux-desktop/opensuse-tumbleweed.svg){ .twemoji } [OpenSUSE Tumbleweed](desktop.md#opensuse-tumbleweed) -- ![Arch לוגו](assets/img/linux-desktop/archlinux.svg){ .twemoji } [Arch Linux](desktop.md#arch-linux) -- ![Fedora Silverblue לוגו](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-silverblue.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Silverblue & Kinoite](desktop.md#fedora-silverblue) -- ![nixOS לוגו](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) -- ![Whonix לוגו](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) -- ![Tails לוגו](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ .twemoji } [Qubes OS (Xen VM Distribution)](desktop.md#qubes-os) +- ![Fedora logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-workstation.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Workstation](desktop.md#fedora-workstation) +- ![openSUSE Tumbleweed logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/opensuse-tumbleweed.svg){ .twemoji } [OpenSUSE Tumbleweed](desktop.md#opensuse-tumbleweed) +- ![Arch logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/archlinux.svg){ .twemoji } [Arch Linux](desktop.md#arch-linux) +- ![Fedora Silverblue logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-silverblue.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Silverblue & Kinoite](desktop.md#fedora-silverblue) +- ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) +- ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) +- ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure)
diff --git a/i18n/hi/desktop.md b/i18n/hi/desktop.md index 94a6b93f..0120c600 100644 --- a/i18n/hi/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/hi/desktop.md @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } @@ -152,33 +152,48 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/). +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! recommendation + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## Criteria -**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! example "This section is new" +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress. - -Our recommended operating systems: - -- Must be open-source. -- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates. -- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- Must support full-disk encryption during installation. -- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. -- Must support a wide variety of hardware. +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/hi/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/hi/os/android-overview.md index d0c88ecb..bffa9e33 100644 --- a/i18n/hi/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/hi/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android description: Android is an open-source operating system with strong security protections, which makes it our top choice for phones. --- -Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. +![Android logo](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## Choosing an Android Distribution +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### Choosing an Android Distribution When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has irrevocable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android. @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that [Our Android System Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## Avoid Rooting +### Avoid Rooting [Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses. @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps. -## Verified Boot +### Install Updates + +It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Security Protections + +### Verified Boot [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection). @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock And Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be aware of beyond their marketing. For example, the Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage. -## Firmware Updates +### Firmware Updates Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin). @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive Fairphone, for example, markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates. -## Android Versions - -It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. - -## Android Permissions +### Android Permissions [Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps. @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ An app may request a permission for a specific feature it has. For example, any Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) may show some trackers such as [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). This library includes [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) which can provide [push notifications](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps. This [is the case](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) with Bitwarden. That doesn't mean that Bitwarden is using all of the analytics features that are provided by Google Firebase Analytics. -## Media Access +## Privacy Features -Quite a few applications allows you to "share" a file with them for media upload. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter. - -## User Profiles +### User Profiles Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android. With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation. -## Work Profile +### Work Profile [Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously. -## VPN Killswitch +### VPN Killswitch Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**. -## Global Toggles +### Global Toggles Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled. -## Google +## Google Services If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play. diff --git a/i18n/hi/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/hi/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4dee83e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/hi/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Privacy Notes + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Activation Lock + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## Recommended Configuration + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### Settings + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! warning + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### Privacy + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/hi/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/hi/os/linux-overview.md index e484c466..656f95a8 100644 --- a/i18n/hi/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/hi/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative, but not all distribitions are created equal. --- -It is often believed that [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigor applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years. +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.: - -- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack) -- A strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go -- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are great if you want to: - -- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems -- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- Have privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) - -Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed here. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Privacy Notes + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems +- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## Choosing your distribution -Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use. +Not all Linux distributions are created equal. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### Release cycle We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates. -For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. +For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this: @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tu ### “Security-focused” distributions -There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. +There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. ### Arch-based distributions -Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically: +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories. - **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks. -### Kicksecure - -While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. - ### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions -We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons. +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## General Recommendations @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS] ### Swap -Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do n ### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates) -Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. ### Updates Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found. -Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd). @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automaticall ### MAC Address Randomization -Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous. @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as sugges If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=). -There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. ### Other Identifiers diff --git a/i18n/hi/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/hi/os/qubes-overview.md index 17b286b9..3ed80dcd 100644 --- a/i18n/hi/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/hi/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within virtual machines for heightened security. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## How does Qubes OS work? diff --git a/i18n/hi/tools.md b/i18n/hi/tools.md index 3fac08af..7cb493af 100644 --- a/i18n/hi/tools.md +++ b/i18n/hi/tools.md @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b - ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) - ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) - ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure) diff --git a/i18n/hu/desktop.md b/i18n/hu/desktop.md index 9faeef75..320b40c1 100644 --- a/i18n/hu/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/hu/desktop.md @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } @@ -152,33 +152,48 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - A **Qubes OS** egy nyílt forráskódú operációs rendszer, amelyet úgy terveztek, hogy erős biztonságot nyújtson asztali számítógépek számára. Qubes a Xen-en, az X Window System-en és a Linuxon alapul, képes a legtöbb Linux alkalmazás futtatására és a legtöbb Linux illesztőprogram használatára. + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes a Xen-en, az X Window System-en és a Linuxon alapul, képes a legtöbb Linux alkalmazás futtatására és a legtöbb Linux illesztőprogram használatára. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/). +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! recommendation + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## Követelmények -**Tartsd figyelemben, hogy nem állunk kapcsolatban az általunk ajánlott projektek egyikével sem.** Az [alap kritériumaink mellett](about/criteria.md), egyértelmű követelményrendszert dolgoztunk ki, hogy objektív ajánlásokat tudjunk tenni. Javasoljuk, hogy ismerkedj meg ezzel a listával, mielőtt kiválasztanál egy projektet, és végezz saját kutatásokat, hogy megbizonyosodj arról, hogy ez a megfelelő választás számodra. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! example "Ez a szakasz új" +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - Azon dolgozunk, hogy meghatározott követelményeket állapítsunk meg az oldalunk minden egyes szakaszára vonatkozóan, és ez még változhat. Ha bármilyen kérdésed van a követelményinkkel kapcsolatban, kérjük, [kérdezz a fórumon](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest), és ne feltételezd, hogy valamit nem vettünk figyelembe az ajánlásaink elkészítésekor, ha az nem szerepel itt. Számos tényezőt veszünk figyelembe és vitatunk meg, amikor egy projektet ajánlunk, és minden egyes tényező dokumentálása folyamatban lévő munka. - -Our recommended operating systems: - -- Must be open-source. -- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates. -- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- Must support full-disk encryption during installation. -- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. -- Must support a wide variety of hardware. +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/hu/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/hu/os/android-overview.md index bf371f8d..e3dd8dcf 100644 --- a/i18n/hu/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/hu/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android description: Az Android egy nyílt forráskódú operációs rendszer, amely erős biztonsági védelemmel rendelkezik, ezért ez az elsődleges választásunk telefonok esetében. --- -Az Android egy biztonságos operációs rendszer, amely erős [app sandboxoló](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB) és egy robusztus [engedély](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) ellenőrző rendszerrel rendelkezik. +![Android logo](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## Egy Android Disztribúció Kiválasztása +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### Egy Android Disztribúció Kiválasztása Egy Android telefon vásárlásakor a készülék alapértelmezett operációs rendszere gyakran olyan alkalmazások és szolgáltatások invazív integrációját tartalmazza, amelyek nem részei az [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/)-nek. Ilyen például a Google Play Szolgáltatások, amely visszavonhatatlan jogosultságokkal rendelkezik a fájljaidhoz, névjegy tárolódhoz, hívásnaplóidhoz, SMS-üzeneteidhez, tartózkodási helyedhez, kamerádhoz, mikrofonodhoz, hardverazonosítóidhoz, stb. való hozzáférésre. Ezek az alkalmazások és szolgáltatások növelik a készüléked támadási felületét, és számos adatvédelmi aggály forrását jelentik az Androiddal kapcsolatban. @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Ideális esetben, amikor egyedi Android disztribúciót választasz, győződj m [Android Rendszer Ajánlásaink :hero-arrow-circle-right-fill:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## Kerüld a Rootolást +### Kerüld a Rootolást [Az](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android telefonok rootolása jelentősen csökkentheti a biztonságot, mivel gyengíti a teljes [Android biztonsági modellt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). Ez csökkentheti az adatvédelmet, ha van olyan biztonsági rés, amelynek kihasználását a csökkent biztonság elősegíti. A gyakori rootolási módszerek a boot partíció közvetlen megváltoztatásával járnak, ami lehetetlenné teszi egy sikeres Verified Boot elvégzését. A root-ot igénylő alkalmazások szintén módosítják a rendszerpartíciót, ami azt jelenti, hogy a Verified Boot-nak kikapcsolva kell maradnia. A root közvetlen kitétele a felhasználói felületnek szintén növeli az eszközöd [támadási felületetét](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) és elősegítheti [ jogosultságnöveléses](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) sebezhetőségek véghezvitelét és az SELinux házirendek megkerülését. @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ Az AFWall+ a [csomagszűrő](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)# Nem hisszük, hogy egy telefon rootolásával járó biztonsági áldozatok megérik az alkalmazások megkérdőjelezhető adatvédelmi előnyeit. -## Verified Boot +### Install Updates + +Fontos, hogy ne használj egy [lejárt élettartamú](https://endoflife.date/android) Android verziót. Az Android újabb verziói nemcsak biztonsági frissítéseket kapnak az operációs rendszerhez, hanem fontos adatvédelmi fejlesztéseket is. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. A rendszeralkalmazásokat csak az OEM vagy az Android disztribúció biztosítja. + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Security Protections + +### Verified Boot A [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) az Android biztonsági modelljének egy fontos része. Védelmet nyújt az [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) támadások, valamint rosszindulatú programok állandósulása ellen, és biztosítja a [rollback védelem](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection) segítségével, hogy a biztonsági frissítéseket ne lehessen downgradelni. @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Sajnos OEM-gyártók csak az Android alapkiadásánál kötelesek támogatni a V Több OEM-gyártó is elrontotta a Verified Boot megvalósítását, amivel a marketingjükön túlmenően is tisztában kell lenned. A Fairphone 3 és 4 például alapértelmezetten nem biztonságosak, mivel az [alap bootloader a nyilvános AVB aláíró kulcsban bízik](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage. -## Firmware-frissítések +### Firmware-frissítések A firmware-frissítések kritikus fontosságúak a biztonság fenntartása szempontjából, és nélkülük az eszközöd nem lehet biztonságos. Az OEM-gyártók támogatási megállapodásokat kötnek partnereikkel a zárt forráskódú komponensek korlátozott ideig történő biztosítására. Ezek a havonta megjelenő [Android Security Bulletin](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin)-ben vannak részletezve. @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ Az SoC gyártó által már nem támogatott, lejárt élettartalmú eszközök n A Fairphone például úgy forgalmazza készülékeit, hogy azok 6 évig kapnak támogatást. Az SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G a Fairphone 4-ben) azonban jóval rövidebb lejárati dátummal rendelkezik. Ez azt jelenti, hogy a Qualcomm által a Fairphone 4 számára biztosított firmware biztonsági frissítések 2023 szeptemberében véget érnek, függetlenül attól, hogy a Fairphone továbbra is kiad-e szoftveres biztonsági frissítéseket. -## Android Verziók - -Fontos, hogy ne használj egy [lejárt élettartamú](https://endoflife.date/android) Android verziót. Az Android újabb verziói nemcsak biztonsági frissítéseket kapnak az operációs rendszerhez, hanem fontos adatvédelmi fejlesztéseket is. Például az Android 10 előtt[](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), a [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) engedéllyel rendelkező alkalmazások hozzáférhettek a telefon érzékeny és egyedi sorozatszámaihoz, mint például az [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), a SIM-kártyád [IMSI-je](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), míg most már csak rendszer alkalmazások tehetik ezt meg. A rendszeralkalmazásokat csak az OEM vagy az Android disztribúció biztosítja. - -## Android Engedélyek +### Android Engedélyek [Engedélyek az Androidon](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) lehetővé teszik, hogy te szabályozd, az alkalmazások mihez férhetnek hozzá. A Google minden egyes verzióban rendszeresen ad ki javít [javításokat](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) az engedély rendszerhez. Minden telepített alkalmazás szigorúan [sandboxolva](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox) van, ezért nincs szükség vírusirtó alkalmazások telepítésére. @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ Az [Exodus](https://exodus-privacy.eu.org/) hasznos lehet hasonló célú alkalm Az olyan magánélet-barát alkalmazások, mint a [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/), megjeleníthetnek néhány nyomkövetőt, mint például a [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). Ez a könyvtár tartalmazza a [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging)-et, amely [push értesítéseket](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) tud nyújtani az alkalmazásoknak. Ez [a helyzet](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) a Bitwardennel is. Ez nem jelenti azt, hogy a Bitwarden a Google Firebase Analytics által biztosított összes elemzési funkciót használja. -## Média Hozzáférés +## Privacy Features -Elég sok alkalmazás lehetővé teszi, hogy "megossz" egy fájlt velük média feltöltéshez. Ha például egy képet szeretnél tweetelni a Twitterre, akkor ne adj hozzáférést a Twitternek a "média és fotók"-hoz, mert akkor az összes képedhez hozzáférhet. Ehelyett menjen a fájlkezelőbe (documentsUI), tartsd nyomva képet, majd osszd meg a Twitterrel. - -## Felhasználói Profilok +### Felhasználói Profilok Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android. A felhasználói profilok segítségével korlátozásokat szabhatsz meg egy adott profilra vonatkozóan, például: hívások kezdeményezése, SMS használata vagy alkalmazások telepítése a készülékre. Minden profil a saját titkosítási kulcsával van titkosítva, és nem tud hozzáférni más profilok adataihoz. Még a készülék tulajdonosa sem tekintheti meg más profilok adatait a jelszó ismerete nélkül. A több felhasználói profil az izoláció biztonságosabb módja. -## Munkaprofil +### Munkaprofil [Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously. -## VPN Killswitch +### VPN Killswitch Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**. -## Global Toggles +### Global Toggles Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled. -## Google +## Google Services If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play. diff --git a/i18n/hu/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/hu/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fd009859 --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/hu/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Privacy Notes + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Activation Lock + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## Recommended Configuration + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### Settings + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! warning + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### Adatvédelem + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/hu/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/hu/os/linux-overview.md index e484c466..656f95a8 100644 --- a/i18n/hu/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/hu/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative, but not all distribitions are created equal. --- -It is often believed that [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigor applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years. +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.: - -- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack) -- A strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go -- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are great if you want to: - -- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems -- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- Have privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) - -Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed here. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Privacy Notes + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems +- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## Choosing your distribution -Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use. +Not all Linux distributions are created equal. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### Release cycle We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates. -For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. +For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this: @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tu ### “Security-focused” distributions -There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. +There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. ### Arch-based distributions -Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically: +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories. - **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks. -### Kicksecure - -While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. - ### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions -We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons. +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## General Recommendations @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS] ### Swap -Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do n ### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates) -Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. ### Updates Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found. -Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd). @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automaticall ### MAC Address Randomization -Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous. @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as sugges If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=). -There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. ### Other Identifiers diff --git a/i18n/hu/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/hu/os/qubes-overview.md index 2b667a1f..5de8874e 100644 --- a/i18n/hu/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/hu/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: pg/qubes-os description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within virtual machines for heightened security. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## How does Qubes OS work? diff --git a/i18n/hu/tools.md b/i18n/hu/tools.md index 43f087fa..38552806 100644 --- a/i18n/hu/tools.md +++ b/i18n/hu/tools.md @@ -442,14 +442,15 @@ Számos követelmény alapján [ajánlunk](dns.md#recommended-providers) több t
-- ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ .twemoji } [Qubes OS (Xen VM Disztribúció)](desktop.md#qubes-os) +- ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ .twemoji } [Qubes OS (Xen VM Distribution)](desktop.md#qubes-os) - ![Fedora logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-workstation.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Workstation](desktop.md#fedora-workstation) - ![openSUSE Tumbleweed logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/opensuse-tumbleweed.svg){ .twemoji } [OpenSUSE Tumbleweed](desktop.md#opensuse-tumbleweed) - ![Arch logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/archlinux.svg){ .twemoji } [Arch Linux](desktop.md#arch-linux) - ![Fedora Silverblue logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-silverblue.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Silverblue & Kinoite](desktop.md#fedora-silverblue) - ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) - ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) -- ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Élő Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure)
diff --git a/i18n/id/calendar.md b/i18n/id/calendar.md index be358c5b..e6fef68e 100644 --- a/i18n/id/calendar.md +++ b/i18n/id/calendar.md @@ -66,6 +66,6 @@ Calendars contain some of your most sensitive data; use products that implement ### Kasus Terbaik -Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang sempurna dalam kategori ini. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page. +Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang sempurna dalam kategori ini. Rekomendasi kami mungkin tidak menyertakan salah satu atau semua fungsi ini, tetapi rekomendasi yang menyertakan fungsi ini mungkin memiliki peringkat yang lebih tinggi daripada yang lain di halaman ini. - Should integrate with native OS calendar and contact management apps if applicable. diff --git a/i18n/id/cloud.md b/i18n/id/cloud.md index f732d9cc..57e4d042 100644 --- a/i18n/id/cloud.md +++ b/i18n/id/cloud.md @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ They have also received the Digital Trust Label, a certification from the [Swiss ### Kasus Terbaik -Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang sempurna dalam kategori ini. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page. +Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang sempurna dalam kategori ini. Rekomendasi kami mungkin tidak menyertakan salah satu atau semua fungsi ini, tetapi rekomendasi yang menyertakan fungsi ini mungkin memiliki peringkat yang lebih tinggi daripada yang lain di halaman ini. - Clients should be open-source. - Clients should be audited in their entirety by an independent third-party. diff --git a/i18n/id/desktop-browsers.md b/i18n/id/desktop-browsers.md index a19714f2..f7a06edc 100644 --- a/i18n/id/desktop-browsers.md +++ b/i18n/id/desktop-browsers.md @@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ These are some other [filter lists](https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Dashb ### Kasus Terbaik -Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang sempurna dalam kategori ini. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page. +Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang sempurna dalam kategori ini. Rekomendasi kami mungkin tidak menyertakan salah satu atau semua fungsi ini, tetapi rekomendasi yang menyertakan fungsi ini mungkin memiliki peringkat yang lebih tinggi daripada yang lain di halaman ini. - Includes built-in content blocking functionality. - Supports cookie compartmentalization (à la [Multi-Account Containers](https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/containers)). diff --git a/i18n/id/desktop.md b/i18n/id/desktop.md index aa25afc6..ad877371 100644 --- a/i18n/id/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/id/desktop.md @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } @@ -152,33 +152,48 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/). +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! recommendation + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## Kriteria -**Harap diperhatikan bahwa kami tidak berafiliasi dengan proyek-proyek yang kami rekomendasikan.** Selain [kriteria standar kami](about/criteria.md), kami telah mengembangkan serangkaian persyaratan yang jelas untuk memungkinkan kami memberikan rekomendasi yang objektif. Kami sarankan Anda membiasakan diri dengan daftar ini sebelum memilih untuk menggunakan sebuah proyek, dan melakukan penelitian sendiri untuk memastikan bahwa itu adalah pilihan yang tepat untuk Anda. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! contoh "Bagian ini baru" +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - Kami sedang berupaya menetapkan kriteria yang jelas untuk setiap bagian dari situs kami, dan hal ini dapat berubah sewaktu-waktu. Jika Anda memiliki pertanyaan mengenai kriteria kami, silakan [tanyakan di forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) dan jangan berasumsi bahwa kami tidak mempertimbangkan sesuatu saat membuat rekomendasi jika tidak tercantum di sini. Ada banyak faktor yang dipertimbangkan dan didiskusikan saat kami merekomendasikan sebuah proyek, dan mendokumentasikan setiap faktor tersebut merupakan sebuah pekerjaan yang sedang berjalan. - -Our recommended operating systems: - -- Must be open-source. -- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates. -- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- Must support full-disk encryption during installation. -- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. -- Must support a wide variety of hardware. +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/id/email-clients.md b/i18n/id/email-clients.md index 2c92f711..3a7f68d0 100644 --- a/i18n/id/email-clients.md +++ b/i18n/id/email-clients.md @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ Canary Mail is closed-source. We recommend it due to the few choices there are f ### Kasus Terbaik -Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang sempurna dalam kategori ini. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page. +Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang sempurna dalam kategori ini. Rekomendasi kami mungkin tidak menyertakan salah satu atau semua fungsi ini, tetapi rekomendasi yang menyertakan fungsi ini mungkin memiliki peringkat yang lebih tinggi daripada yang lain di halaman ini. - Should be open-source. - Should be cross-platform. diff --git a/i18n/id/encryption.md b/i18n/id/encryption.md index 470318e5..20f42398 100644 --- a/i18n/id/encryption.md +++ b/i18n/id/encryption.md @@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ When encrypting with PGP, you have the option to configure different options in ### Kasus Terbaik -Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang sempurna dalam kategori ini. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page. +Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang sempurna dalam kategori ini. Rekomendasi kami mungkin tidak menyertakan salah satu atau semua fungsi ini, tetapi rekomendasi yang menyertakan fungsi ini mungkin memiliki peringkat yang lebih tinggi daripada yang lain di halaman ini. - Operating System (FDE) encryption apps should utilize hardware security such as a TPM or Secure Enclave. - File encryption apps should have first- or third-party support for mobile platforms. diff --git a/i18n/id/file-sharing.md b/i18n/id/file-sharing.md index 95c69093..53b12a8e 100644 --- a/i18n/id/file-sharing.md +++ b/i18n/id/file-sharing.md @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ ffsend upload --host https://send.vis.ee/ FILE #### Kasus Terbaik -Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang sempurna dalam kategori ini. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page. +Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang sempurna dalam kategori ini. Rekomendasi kami mungkin tidak menyertakan salah satu atau semua fungsi ini, tetapi rekomendasi yang menyertakan fungsi ini mungkin memiliki peringkat yang lebih tinggi daripada yang lain di halaman ini. - Has mobile clients for iOS and Android, which at least support document previews. - Supports photo backup from iOS and Android, and optionally supports file/folder sync on Android. diff --git a/i18n/id/multi-factor-authentication.md b/i18n/id/multi-factor-authentication.md index ac7c9f3b..aa2bd9d6 100644 --- a/i18n/id/multi-factor-authentication.md +++ b/i18n/id/multi-factor-authentication.md @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ Nitrokey's firmware is open-source, unlike the YubiKey. The firmware on modern N #### Kasus Terbaik -Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang sempurna dalam kategori ini. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page. +Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang sempurna dalam kategori ini. Rekomendasi kami mungkin tidak menyertakan salah satu atau semua fungsi ini, tetapi rekomendasi yang menyertakan fungsi ini mungkin memiliki peringkat yang lebih tinggi daripada yang lain di halaman ini. - Should be available in USB-C form-factor. - Should be available with NFC. diff --git a/i18n/id/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/id/os/android-overview.md index d6dd7386..4efb8901 100644 --- a/i18n/id/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/id/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android description: Android adalah sistem operasi sumber terbuka dengan perlindungan keamanan yang kuat, yang menjadikannya pilihan utama kami untuk ponsel. --- -Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. +![Android logo](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## Memilih Distribusi Android +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### Memilih Distribusi Android Ketika Anda membeli ponsel Android, sistem operasi bawaan perangkat sering kali dilengkapi dengan integrasi invasif dengan aplikasi dan layanan yang bukan merupakan bagian dari [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). Contohnya adalah Layanan Google Play, yang memiliki hak istimewa yang tidak dapat dibatalkan untuk mengakses file, penyimpanan kontak, log panggilan, pesan SMS, lokasi, kamera, mikrofon, pengidentifikasi perangkat keras, dan sebagainya. Aplikasi dan layanan ini meningkatkan permukaan serangan pada perangkat Anda dan merupakan sumber dari berbagai masalah privasi pada Android. @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Idealnya, ketika memilih distribusi Android kustom, Anda harus memastikan bahwa [Rekomendasi Sistem Android kami :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## Avoid Rooting +### Avoid Rooting [Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). Hal ini dapat mengurangi privasi jika ada eksploitasi yang dibantu oleh penurunan keamanan. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses. @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps. -## Verified Boot +### Install Updates + +It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Versi Android yang lebih baru tidak hanya menerima pembaruan keamanan untuk sistem operasi, tetapi juga pembaruan penting untuk meningkatkan privasi. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Security Protections + +### Verified Boot [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection). @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock And Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be aware of beyond their marketing. For example, the Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage. -## Pembaruan Firmware +### Pembaruan Firmware Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEM memiliki perjanjian dukungan dengan mitra mereka untuk menyediakan komponen sumber tertutup untuk periode dukungan terbatas. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin). @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive Fairphone, misalnya, memasarkan perangkat mereka dengan dukungan selama 6 tahun. Namun, SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G pada Fairphone 4) memiliki tanggal EOL yang jauh lebih pendek. Ini berarti bahwa pembaruan keamanan firmware dari Qualcomm untuk Fairphone 4 akan berakhir pada bulan September 2023, terlepas dari apakah Fairphone terus merilis pembaruan keamanan perangkat lunak. -## Versi Android - -It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Versi Android yang lebih baru tidak hanya menerima pembaruan keamanan untuk sistem operasi, tetapi juga pembaruan penting untuk meningkatkan privasi. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. - -## Izin Android +### Izin Android [Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps. @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ An app may request a permission for a specific feature it has. For example, any Aplikasi ramah privasi seperti [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) dapat menampilkan beberapa pelacak seperti [Google Firebase Analytics] (https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). This library includes [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) which can provide [push notifications](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps. Ini [adalah kasus] (https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) dengan Bitwarden. Itu tidak berarti bahwa Bitwarden menggunakan semua fitur analisis yang disediakan oleh Google Firebase Analytics. -## Akses Media +## Privacy Features -Cukup banyak aplikasi yang memungkinkan Anda untuk "berbagi" file dengan mereka untuk mengunggah media. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter. - -## Profil Pengguna +### Profil Pengguna Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android. With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation. -## Work Profile +### Work Profile [Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously. -## VPN Killswitch +### VPN Killswitch Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**. -## Global Toggles +### Global Toggles Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled. -## Google +## Google Services If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play. diff --git a/i18n/id/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/id/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d8f31376 --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/id/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Privacy Notes + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Activation Lock + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## Recommended Configuration + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### Settings + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! peringatan + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### Privasi + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/id/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/id/os/linux-overview.md index e484c466..656f95a8 100644 --- a/i18n/id/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/id/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative, but not all distribitions are created equal. --- -It is often believed that [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigor applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years. +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.: - -- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack) -- A strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go -- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are great if you want to: - -- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems -- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- Have privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) - -Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed here. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Privacy Notes + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems +- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## Choosing your distribution -Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use. +Not all Linux distributions are created equal. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### Release cycle We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates. -For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. +For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this: @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tu ### “Security-focused” distributions -There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. +There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. ### Arch-based distributions -Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically: +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories. - **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks. -### Kicksecure - -While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. - ### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions -We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons. +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## General Recommendations @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS] ### Swap -Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do n ### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates) -Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. ### Updates Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found. -Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd). @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automaticall ### MAC Address Randomization -Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous. @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as sugges If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=). -There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. ### Other Identifiers diff --git a/i18n/id/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/id/os/qubes-overview.md index 583c716a..e86af4c0 100644 --- a/i18n/id/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/id/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos description: Qubes adalah sistem operasi yang dibangun dengan mengisolasi aplikasi di dalam mesin virtual untuk meningkatkan keamanan. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) adalah sistem operasi yang menggunakan hypervisor [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) untuk memberikan keamanan yang kuat untuk komputasi desktop melalui mesin virtual yang terisolasi. Setiap VM disebut *Qube* dan Anda dapat menetapkan tingkat kepercayaan untuk setiap Qube berdasarkan tujuannya. Karena Qubes OS menyediakan keamanan dengan menggunakan isolasi, dan hanya mengizinkan tindakan berdasarkan kasus per kasus, ini merupakan kebalikan dari [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) adalah sistem operasi sumber terbuka yang menggunakan hypervisor [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) untuk memberikan keamanan yang kuat untuk komputasi desktop melalui mesin virtual yang terisolasi. Setiap VM disebut *Qube* dan Anda dapat menetapkan tingkat kepercayaan untuk setiap Qube berdasarkan tujuannya. Karena Qubes OS menyediakan keamanan dengan menggunakan isolasi, dan hanya mengizinkan tindakan berdasarkan basis per kasus, ini merupakan kebalikan dari [enumerasi kejahatan](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## Bagaimana cara kerja Qubes OS? diff --git a/i18n/id/passwords.md b/i18n/id/passwords.md index 20b322c0..40a55daf 100644 --- a/i18n/id/passwords.md +++ b/i18n/id/passwords.md @@ -175,13 +175,13 @@ Kode sisi server Bitwarden adalah [open-source](https://github.com/bitwarden/ser ![Logo 1Password](assets/img/password-management/1password.svg){ align=right } - **1Password** adalah pengelola kata sandi dengan fokus yang kuat pada keamanan dan kemudahan penggunaan, yang memungkinkan Anda menyimpan kata sandi, kartu kredit, lisensi perangkat lunak, dan informasi sensitif lainnya dalam brankas digital yang aman. Brankas Anda di-host di server 1Password dengan biaya [biaya bulanan] (https://1password.com/sign-up/). 1Password sudah [teraudit](https://support.1password.com/security-assessments/) secara teratur dan menyediakan dukungan pelanggan yang bagus. 1Password is closed source; however, the security of the product is thoroughly documented in their [security white paper](https://1passwordstatic.com/files/security/1password-white-paper.pdf). + **1Password** adalah pengelola kata sandi dengan fokus yang kuat pada keamanan dan kemudahan penggunaan, yang memungkinkan Anda menyimpan kata sandi, kartu kredit, lisensi perangkat lunak, dan informasi sensitif lainnya dalam brankas digital yang aman. Brankas Anda di-host di server 1Password dengan biaya [biaya bulanan] (https://1password.com/sign-up/). 1Password sudah [teraudit](https://support.1password.com/security-assessments/) secara teratur dan menyediakan dukungan pelanggan yang bagus. 1Password memiliki sumber yang tertutup; namun, keamanan produk didokumentasikan secara menyeluruh dalam [laporan resmi keamanan] (https://1passwordstatic.com/files/security/1password-white-paper.pdf) mereka. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://1password.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:octicons-eye-16:](https://1password.com/legal/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } - [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.1password.com/){ .card-link title=Documentation} + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://1password.com/legal/privacy/){ .card-link title="Kebijakan Privasi" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.1password.com/){ .card-link title=Dokumentasi} - ??? downloads + ??? unduhan - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.onepassword.android) - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1511601750?mt=8) @@ -189,24 +189,24 @@ Kode sisi server Bitwarden adalah [open-source](https://github.com/bitwarden/ser - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://1password.com/downloads/mac/) - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://1password.com/downloads/linux/) -Traditionally, **1Password** has offered the best password manager user experience for people using macOS and iOS; however, it has now achieved feature-parity across all platforms. It boasts many features geared towards families and less technical people, as well as advanced functionality. +Secara tradisional, **1Password** telah menawarkan pengalaman pengguna pengelola kata sandi terbaik untuk orang-orang yang menggunakan macOS dan iOS; namun, kini telah mencapai kesamaan fitur di semua platform. Aplikasi ini memiliki banyak fitur yang ditujukan untuk keluarga dan orang yang kurang teknis, serta fungsionalitas yang canggih. -Your 1Password vault is secured with both your master password and a randomized 34-character security key to encrypt your data on their servers. This security key adds a layer of protection to your data because your data is secured with high entropy regardless of your master password. Many other password manager solutions are entirely reliant on the strength of your master password to secure your data. +Brankas 1Password Anda diamankan dengan kata sandi utama dan kunci keamanan 34 karakter yang diacak untuk mengenkripsi data Anda di server mereka. Kunci keamanan ini menambahkan lapisan perlindungan pada data Anda karena data Anda diamankan dengan entropi yang tinggi terlepas dari kata sandi utama Anda. Banyak solusi pengelola kata sandi lainnya yang sepenuhnya bergantung pada kekuatan kata sandi utama Anda untuk mengamankan data Anda. -One advantage 1Password has over Bitwarden is its first-class support for native clients. While Bitwarden relegates many duties, especially account management features, to their web vault interface, 1Password makes nearly every feature available within its native mobile or desktop clients. 1Password's clients also have a more intuitive UI, which makes them easier to use and navigate. +Satu keunggulan yang dimiliki 1Password dibandingkan Bitwarden adalah dukungan kelas satu untuk klien asli. Sementara Bitwarden mendelegasikan banyak tugas, terutama fitur manajemen akun, pada antarmuka brankas web mereka, 1Password membuat hampir semua fitur tersedia dalam klien seluler atau desktop aslinya. Klien-klien 1Password juga memiliki UI yang lebih intuitif, yang membuatnya lebih mudah digunakan dan dinavigasi. ### Psono !!! recommendation - ![Psono logo](assets/img/password-management/psono.svg){ align=right } + ![Logo Psono](assets/img/password-management/psono.svg){ align=right } - **Psono** is a free and open-source password manager from Germany, with a focus on password management for teams. Psono supports secure sharing of passwords, files, bookmarks, and emails. All secrets are protected by a master password. + **Psono** adalah pengelola kata sandi gratis dan bersumber terbuka dari Jerman, dengan fokus pada pengelolaan kata sandi untuk tim. Psono mendukung berbagi kata sandi, file, penanda, dan email dengan aman. Semua rahasia dilindungi oleh kata sandi utama. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://psono.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:octicons-eye-16:](https://psono.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } - [:octicons-info-16:](https://doc.psono.com){ .card-link title=Documentation} - [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/psono){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://psono.com/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Kebijakan Privasi" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://doc.psono.com){ .card-link title=Dokumentasi} + [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/psono){ .card-link title="Kode Sumber" } ??? unduhan @@ -236,30 +236,30 @@ Psono menyediakan dokumentasi ekstensif untuk produk mereka. Klien web untuk Pso #### Kasus Terbaik -Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang sempurna dalam kategori ini. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page. +Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang sempurna dalam kategori ini. Rekomendasi kami mungkin tidak menyertakan salah satu atau semua fungsi ini, tetapi rekomendasi yang menyertakan fungsi ini mungkin memiliki peringkat yang lebih tinggi daripada yang lain di halaman ini. -- Telemetry should be opt-in (disabled by default) or not collected at all. -- Should be open-source and reasonably self-hostable. +- Telemetri harus bersifat opsional (dinonaktifkan secara default) atau tidak dikumpulkan sama sekali. +- Harus bersumber terbuka dan dapat dihosting sendiri. -## Local Storage +## Penyimpanan Lokal -These options allow you to manage an encrypted password database locally. +Opsi ini memungkinkan Anda untuk mengelola basis data kata sandi terenkripsi secara lokal. ### KeePassXC !!! recommendation - ![KeePassXC logo](assets/img/password-management/keepassxc.svg){ align=right } + ![Logo KeePassXC](assets/img/pengelolaan kata sandi/keepassxc.svg){ align=right } - **KeePassXC** is a community fork of KeePassX, a native cross-platform port of KeePass Password Safe, with the goal to extend and improve it with new features and bugfixes to provide a feature-rich, cross-platform and modern open-source password manager. + **KeePassXC** adalah sebuah fork komunitas dari KeePassX, sebuah port lintas platform asli dari KeePass Password Safe, dengan tujuan untuk memperluas dan memperbaikinya dengan fitur-fitur baru dan perbaikan bug untuk menyediakan sebuah pengelola kata sandi yang kaya akan fitur, lintas platform, dan modern bersumber terbuka. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://keepassxc.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:octicons-eye-16:](https://keepassxc.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } - [:octicons-info-16:](https://keepassxc.org/docs/){ .card-link title=Documentation} - [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc){ .card-link title="Source Code" } - [:octicons-heart-16:](https://keepassxc.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://keepassxc.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Kebijakan Privasi" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://keepassxc.org/docs/){ .card-link title=Dokumentasi} + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc){ .card-link title="Kode Sumber" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://keepassxc.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Kontribusi } - ??? downloads + ??? unduhan - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://keepassxc.org/download/#windows) - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://keepassxc.org/download/#mac) @@ -268,22 +268,22 @@ These options allow you to manage an encrypted password database locally. - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/keepassxc-browser) - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/keepassxc-browser/oboonakemofpalcgghocfoadofidjkkk) -KeePassXC stores its export data as [CSV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comma-separated_values) files. This may mean data loss if you import this file into another password manager. We advise you check each record manually. +KeePassXC menyimpan data ekspornya sebagai file [CSV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comma-separated_values). Hal ini dapat menyebabkan hilangnya data jika Anda mengimpor file ini ke pengelola kata sandi lain. Kami menyarankan Anda memeriksa setiap catatan secara manual. ### KeePassDX (Android) !!! recommendation - ![KeePassDX logo](assets/img/password-management/keepassdx.svg){ align=right } + ![Logo KeePassDX](assets/img/pengelolaan kata sandi/keepassdx.svg){ align=right } - **KeePassDX** is a lightweight password manager for Android, allows editing encrypted data in a single file in KeePass format and can fill in the forms in a secure way. [Contributor Pro](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kunzisoft.keepass.pro) allows unlocking cosmetic content and non-standard protocol features, but more importantly, it helps and encourages development. + **KeePassDX** adalah pengelola kata sandi yang ringan untuk Android, memungkinkan pengeditan data terenkripsi dalam satu file dalam format KeePass dan dapat mengisi formulir dengan cara yang aman. [Contributor Pro] (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kunzisoft.keepass.pro) memungkinkan untuk membuka konten kosmetik dan fitur protokol non-standar, tetapi yang lebih penting lagi, ini membantu dan mendorong pengembangan. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.keepassdx.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentation} - [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX){ .card-link title="Source Code" } - [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.keepassdx.com/#donation){ .card-link title=Contribute } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX/wiki){ .card-link title=Dokumentasi} + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX){ .card-link title="Kode Sumber" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.keepassdx.com/#donation){ .card-link title=Kontribusi } - ??? downloads + ??? unduhan - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.kunzisoft.keepass.free) - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/Kunzisoft/KeePassDX/releases) @@ -292,17 +292,17 @@ KeePassXC stores its export data as [CSV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comma-se !!! recommendation - ![Strongbox logo](assets/img/password-management/strongbox.svg){ align=right } + ![Logo Strongbox](assets/img/password-management/strongbox.svg){ align=right } - **Strongbox** is a native, open-source password manager for iOS and macOS. Supporting both KeePass and Password Safe formats, Strongbox can be used in tandem with other password managers, like KeePassXC, on non-Apple platforms. By employing a [freemium model](https://strongboxsafe.com/pricing/), Strongbox offers most features under its free tier with more convenience-oriented [features](https://strongboxsafe.com/comparison/)—such as biometric authentication—locked behind a subscription or perpetual license. + **Strongbox** adalah pengelola kata sandi sumber terbuka untuk iOS dan macOS. Mendukung format KeePass dan Password Safe, Strongbox bisa digunakan bersamaan dengan pengelola kata sandi lainnya, seperti KeePassXC, pada platform non-Apple. Dengan menggunakan [model freemium] (https://strongboxsafe.com/pricing/), Strongbox menawarkan sebagian besar fitur di bawah tingkat gratisnya dengan lebih berorientasi pada kenyamanan [features](https://strongboxsafe.com/comparison/) - seperti otentikasi biometrik - yang terkunci di balik langganan atau lisensi abadi. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://strongboxsafe.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:octicons-eye-16:](https://strongboxsafe.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } - [:octicons-info-16:](https://strongboxsafe.com/getting-started/){ .card-link title=Documentation} - [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/strongbox-password-safe/Strongbox){ .card-link title="Source Code" } - [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/strongbox-password-safe/Strongbox#supporting-development){ .card-link title=Contribute } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://strongboxsafe.com/privacy/){ .card-link title="Kebijakan Privasi" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://strongboxsafe.com/getting-started/){ .card-link title=Dokumentasi} + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/strongbox-password-safe/Strongbox){ .card-link title="Kode Sumber" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/strongbox-password-safe/Strongbox#supporting-development){ .card-link title=Kontribusi } - ??? downloads + ??? unduhan - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/strongbox-keepass-pwsafe/id897283731) diff --git a/i18n/id/productivity.md b/i18n/id/productivity.md index f5bdb08d..2a1a561f 100644 --- a/i18n/id/productivity.md +++ b/i18n/id/productivity.md @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ In general, we define collaboration platforms as full-fledged suites which could #### Kasus Terbaik -Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang sempurna dalam kategori ini. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page. +Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang sempurna dalam kategori ini. Rekomendasi kami mungkin tidak menyertakan salah satu atau semua fungsi ini, tetapi rekomendasi yang menyertakan fungsi ini mungkin memiliki peringkat yang lebih tinggi daripada yang lain di halaman ini. - Should store files in a conventional filesystem. - Should support TOTP or FIDO2 multi-factor authentication support, or Passkey logins. @@ -169,6 +169,6 @@ In general, we define office suites as applications which could reasonably act a #### Kasus Terbaik -Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang sempurna dalam kategori ini. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page. +Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang sempurna dalam kategori ini. Rekomendasi kami mungkin tidak menyertakan salah satu atau semua fungsi ini, tetapi rekomendasi yang menyertakan fungsi ini mungkin memiliki peringkat yang lebih tinggi daripada yang lain di halaman ini. - Should have a published audit from a reputable, independent third-party. diff --git a/i18n/id/real-time-communication.md b/i18n/id/real-time-communication.md index 780c573e..5fcb6477 100644 --- a/i18n/id/real-time-communication.md +++ b/i18n/id/real-time-communication.md @@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the ### Kasus Terbaik -Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang sempurna dalam kategori ini. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page. +Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang sempurna dalam kategori ini. Rekomendasi kami mungkin tidak menyertakan salah satu atau semua fungsi ini, tetapi rekomendasi yang menyertakan fungsi ini mungkin memiliki peringkat yang lebih tinggi daripada yang lain di halaman ini. - Should have Forward Secrecy. - Should have open-source servers. diff --git a/i18n/id/search-engines.md b/i18n/id/search-engines.md index 4f4f59f0..7bc2d410 100644 --- a/i18n/id/search-engines.md +++ b/i18n/id/search-engines.md @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ Startpage's majority shareholder is System1 who is an adtech company. We don't b ### Kasus Terbaik -Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang sempurna dalam kategori ini. Our recommendations may not include any or all of this functionality, but those which do may rank higher than others on this page. +Kriteria kasus terbaik kami mewakili apa yang ingin kami lihat dari proyek yang sempurna dalam kategori ini. Rekomendasi kami mungkin tidak menyertakan salah satu atau semua fungsi ini, tetapi rekomendasi yang menyertakan fungsi ini mungkin memiliki peringkat yang lebih tinggi daripada yang lain di halaman ini. - Should be based on open-source software. - Should not block Tor exit node IP addresses. diff --git a/i18n/id/tools.md b/i18n/id/tools.md index 0a63834d..f0d0fbc8 100644 --- a/i18n/id/tools.md +++ b/i18n/id/tools.md @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ Kami [merekomendasikan](dns.md#recommended-providers) sejumlah server DNS terenk - ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) - ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) - ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure) diff --git a/i18n/it/desktop.md b/i18n/it/desktop.md index e8950793..0f9260e5 100644 --- a/i18n/it/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/it/desktop.md @@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ Nix è un gestore di pacchetti basato sul codice sorgente; se non ne esiste alcu !!! recommendation - ![Logo di Whonix](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } + ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** è basato su [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), una biforcazione di Debian, focalizzata sulla sicurezza. Mira a fornire privacy, sicurezza e anonimato su Internet. Whonix è meglio utilizzato insieme a [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. Mira a fornire privacy, sicurezza e anonimato su Internet. Whonix è meglio utilizzato insieme a [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: Home](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Servizio Onion" } @@ -150,35 +150,50 @@ Di design, Tails dovrebbe ripristinarsi completamente dopo ogni riavvio. L'[arch !!! recommendation - ![Logo di Qubes OS](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } + ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes OS** è un sistema operativo open source progettato per fornire una forte sicurezza per l'informatica desktop. Si basa su Xen, il Sistema X Window, e su Linux, e può eseguire gran parte delle applicazioni di Linux, e utilizzare molti dei suoi driver. + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Si basa su Xen, il Sistema X Window, e su Linux, e può eseguire gran parte delle applicazioni di Linux, e utilizzare molti dei suoi driver. - [:octicons-home-16: Home](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Panoramica](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Servizio Onion" } - [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Politica sulla Privacy" } - [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentazione } - [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Codice Sorgente" } - [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribuisci } + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS è un sistema operativo basato su Xen, pensato per fornire una forte sicurezza per l'informatica desktop, tramite le macchine virtuali sicure (VM), anche note come *Qubes*. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -Il sistema operativo Qubes OS protegge il computer isolando i sottosistemi (ad esempio, rete, USB, ecc.) e le applicazioni, in VM separate. Se una parte del sistema dovesse essere compromessa, l'isolamento aggiuntivo potrebbe proteggere il resto del sistema. Per ulteriori dettagli, consulta le [Domande Frequenti](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/) di Qubes. +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! recommendation + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. Copre di default molti dei consigli sulla privacy e la sicurezza. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## Criteri -**Ti preghiamo di notare che non siamo affiliati con alcun progetto consigliato.** Oltre ai [nostri criteri standard](about/criteria.md), abbiamo sviluppato una serie chiara di requisiti per consentirci di fornire consigli oggettivi. Ti suggeriamo di familiarizzare con questo elenco prima di scegliere di utilizzare un progetto e di condurre le tue ricerche per assicurarti che si tratti della scelta adatta a te. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! esempio "Questa sezione è nuova" +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - Stiamo lavorando per stabilire i criteri definiti per ogni sezione del nostro sito e, questa, potrebbe essere soggetta a modifiche. Se hai qualsiasi domanda sui nostri criteri, ti preghiamo di [chiedere sul nostro forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) e di non supporre che non abbiamo considerato qualcosa, formulando i nostri consigli, se non elencato qui. Molti fattori sono presi in considerazione e discussi quando consigliamo un progetto e la documentazione di ognuno è in lavorazione. - -I nostri sistemi operativi consigliati: - -- Devono essere open source. -- Devono ricevere regolarmente aggiornamenti del software e del kernel di Linux. -- Le distribuzioni Linux devono supportare [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- Devono supportare la crittografia dell'intero disco durante l'installazione. -- Non devono interrompere i rilasci regolari per più di 1 anno. [Sconsigliamo](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) le versioni di distribuzioni con "Supporto a Lungo Termine" o "stabili", per l'utilizzo da desktop. -- Devono supportare un'ampia varietà di hardware. +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/it/email-clients.md b/i18n/it/email-clients.md index 7bc0a734..9fa3cbac 100644 --- a/i18n/it/email-clients.md +++ b/i18n/it/email-clients.md @@ -5,15 +5,16 @@ description: Questi client email rispettano la privacy e supportano la crittogra cover: email-clients.png --- -Il nostro elenco di raccomandazioni contiene client di posta elettronica che supportano sia [OpenPGP](encryption.md#openpgp) che l'autenticazione forte come [Open Authorization (OAuth)](https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth). OAuth consente di utilizzare l'[autenticazione a più fattori](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md) e di prevenire il furto di account. +Il nostro elenco di consigli contiene i client email che supportano sia [OpenPGP](encryption.md#openpgp) che l'autenticazione forte, come [Open Authorization (OAuth)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OAuth). OAuth consente di utilizzare l'[autenticazione a più fattori](basics/multi-factor-authentication.md) e di prevenire il furto del profilo. -??? warning "L'email non fornisce la segretezza dell'inoltro" +??? warning "L'email non fornisce la segretezza in avanti" - Quando si utilizza una tecnologia di crittografia end-to-end (E2EE) come OpenPGP, le e-mail avranno ancora [alcuni metadati](email.md#email-metadata-overview) non crittografati nell'intestazione dell'e-mail. + Utilzzando la tecnologia di crittografia end-to-end (E2EE), come OpenPGP, l'email conterrà comunque [dei metadati](email.md#email-metadata-overview) non crittografati nell'intestazione dell'email. - OpenPGP non supporta inoltre la [forward secrecy](https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), il che significa che se la chiave privata del destinatario o dell'utente viene rubata, tutti i messaggi precedenti crittografati con essa saranno esposti: [come proteggo le mie chiavi private?](basics/email-security.md) Considera l'utilizzo di un mezzo che garantisca la segretezza in avanti (forward secrecy): + Inoltre, OpenPGP non supporta la [segretezza in avanti](https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy), il che significa che se la chiave privata tua o del destinatario dovesse mai essere perduta, tutti i messaggi precedenti crittografati con essa saranno esposti: [Come proteggo le mie chiavi private?](basics/email-security.md) + Considera di utilizzare un mezzo che fornisca la segretezza in avanti: - [Comunicazione in tempo reale](real-time-communication.md){ .md-button } + [Comunicazione in tempo reaale](real-time-communication.md){ .md-button } ## Multipiattaforma @@ -21,16 +22,16 @@ Il nostro elenco di raccomandazioni contiene client di posta elettronica che sup !!! recommendation - ![Thunderbird logo](assets/img/email-clients/thunderbird.svg){ align=right } + ![Logo di Thunderbird](assets/img/email-clients/thunderbird.svg){ align=right } - **Thunderbird** è un client di posta elettronica, newsgroup, news feed e chat (XMPP, IRC, Twitter) gratuito, open-source e multipiattaforma, sviluppato dalla comunità Thunderbird e precedentemente dalla Mozilla Foundation. + **Thunderbird** è un client email, newsgroup, feed di notizie e chat (XMPP, IRC, Twitter) gratuito, open source e multipiattaforma, sviluppato dalla community di Thunderbird e precedentemente dalla Mozilla Foundation. - [:octicons-home-16: Pagina principale](https://www.thunderbird.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mozilla.org/privacy/thunderbird){ .card-link title="Politica sulla privacy" } + [:octicons-home-16: Home](https://www.thunderbird.net){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mozilla.org/privacy/thunderbird){ .card-link title="Politica sulla Privacy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.mozilla.org/products/thunderbird){ .card-link title=Documentazione} - [:octicons-code-16:](https://hg.mozilla.org/comm-central){ .card-link title="Codice sorgente" } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://hg.mozilla.org/comm-central){ .card-link title="Codice Sorgente" } - ??? downloads "Scarica" + ??? downloads - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.thunderbird.net) - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.thunderbird.net) @@ -39,52 +40,52 @@ Il nostro elenco di raccomandazioni contiene client di posta elettronica che sup #### Configurazione consigliata -Si consiglia di modificare alcune di queste impostazioni per rendere Thunderbird un po' più privato. +Consigliamo di modificare alcune di queste impostazioni per rendere Thunderbird un po' più privato. -Queste opzioni si trovano in :material-menu: → **Impostazioni** → **Privacy e sicurezza**. +Queste opzioni si trovano in :material-menu: → **Impostazioni** → **Privacy e Sicurezza**. -##### Contenuto Web +##### Contenuti Web -- [ ] Deseleziona **Ricorda siti web e link visitati** -- [ ] Deseleziona **Accetta i cookie dai siti** +- [ ] Rimuovi la spunta da **Ricorda siti web e link visitati** +- [ ] Rimuovi la spunta da **Accetta i cookie dai siti** ##### Telemetria -- [ ] Deseleziona **Consenti a Thunderbird di inviare a Mozilla dati tecnici e di interazione** +- [ ] Rimuovi la spunta da **Consenti a Thunderbird di inviare a Mozilla dati tecnici e d'interazione** #### Thunderbird-user.js (avanzato) -[`thunderbird-user.js`](https://github.com/HorlogeSkynet/thunderbird-user.js), è un insieme di opzioni di configurazione che mira a disabilitare il maggior numero possibile di funzioni di navigazione web all'interno di Thunderbird, al fine di ridurre la superficie e mantenere la privacy. Alcune modifiche sono state prese dal [progetto Arkenfox](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js). +[`thunderbird-user.js`](https://github.com/HorlogeSkynet/thunderbird-user.js), è una serie di opzioni di configurazione che mira a disabilitare quante più funzionalità di navigazione web possibili su Thunderbird, per poter ridurre la superficie e mantenere la privacy. Alcune delle modifiche provengono dal [progetto Arkenfox](https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js). -## Specifiche alla piattaforma +## Specifiche della Piattaforma ### Apple Mail (macOS) !!! recommendation - ![Apple Mail logo](assets/img/email-clients/applemail.png){ align=right } + ![Logo di Apple Mail](assets/img/email-clients/applemail.png){ align=right } - **Apple Mail** è incluso in macOS e può essere esteso per avere il supporto OpenPGP con [GPG Suite](encryption.md#gpg-suite), che aggiunge la possibilità di inviare e-mail crittografate. + **Apple Mail** è incluso in macOS ed è estendibile per supportare OpenPGP con [GPG Suite](encryption.md#gpg-suite), che aggiunge la possibilità di inviare email crittografate in PGP. - [:octicons-home-16: Pagina Principale](https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/welcome/mac){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-home-16: Home](https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/welcome/mac){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/){ .card-link title="Politica sulla Privacy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/mail){ .card-link title=Documentazione} -Apple Mail ha la possibilità di caricare contenuti in remoto in background o di bloccarli completamente nascondendo il tuo indirizzo IP dai mittenti su [macOS](https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/mlhl03be2866/mac) e [iOS](https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/iphf084865c7/ios). +Apple Mail può caricare i contenuti da remoto in background o bloccarli interamente e nascondere l'indirizzo IP di mittenti su [macOS](https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/mlhl03be2866/mac) e [iOS](https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/iphf084865c7/ios). ### Canary Mail (iOS) !!! recommendation - ![Canary Mail logo](assets/img/email-clients/canarymail.svg){ align=right } + ![Logo di Canary Mail](assets/img/email-clients/canarymail.svg){ align=right } - **Canary Mail** è un client di posta elettronica a pagamento progettato per rendere perfetta la crittografia end-to-end con funzioni di sicurezza come il blocco biometrico dell'app. + **Canary Mail** è un client email a pagamento progettato per semplificare la crittografia end-to-end con funzionaalità di sicurezza come il blocco biometrico dell'app. - [:octicons-home-16: Pagina principale](https://canarymail.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:octicons-eye-16:](https://canarymail.io/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Politica sulla privacy" } + [:octicons-home-16: Home](https://canarymail.io){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://canarymail.io/privacy.html){ .card-link title="Politica sulla Privacy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://canarymail.zendesk.com/){ .card-link title=Documentazione} - ??? downloads "Scarica" + ??? downloads - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.canarymail.android) - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/app/id1236045954) @@ -92,25 +93,25 @@ Apple Mail ha la possibilità di caricare contenuti in remoto in background o di !!! warning - Canary Mail ha rilasciato solo di recente un client per Windows e Android, anche se non crediamo che siano stabili come le loro controparti per iOS e Mac. + Canary Mail ha rilasciato soltanto di recente un client per Windows e Android, sebbene non crediamo sia altrettanto stabile, quanto le controparti per iOS e Mac. -Canary Mail è closed-source. Lo consigliamo a causa della scarsa scelta di client email su iOS che supportano la E2EE PGP. +Canary Mail è closed-source. Lo consigliamo a causa di alcune scelte per i client email su iOS, che supportano l'E2EE PGP. ### FairEmail (Android) !!! recommendation - ![logo FairEmail ](assets/img/email-clients/fairemail.svg){ align=right } + ![Logo di FairEmail ](assets/img/email-clients/fairemail.svg){ align=right } - **FairEmail** è un'applicazione di posta elettronica minimale e open-source, che utilizza standard aperti (IMAP, SMTP, OpenPGP) con un basso consumo di dati e batteria. + **FairEmail** è un'app di email minimale e open source che utilizza gli standard apeerti (IMAP, SMTP, OpenPGP), con un basso consumo di dati e batteria. - [:octicons-home-16: Pagina principale](https://email.faircode.eu){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/blob/master/PRIVACY.md){ .card-link title="Politica sulla privacy" } + [:octicons-home-16: Home](https://email.faircode.eu){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/blob/master/PRIVACY.md){ .card-link title="Politica sulla Privacy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/blob/master/FAQ.md){ .card-link title=Documentazione} - [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail){ .card-link title="Codice sorgente" } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail){ .card-link title="Codice Sorgente" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://email.faircode.eu/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribuisci } - ??? downloads "Scarica" + ??? downloads - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=eu.faircode.email) - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/M66B/FairEmail/releases) @@ -119,17 +120,17 @@ Canary Mail è closed-source. Lo consigliamo a causa della scarsa scelta di clie !!! recommendation - ![Evolution logo](assets/img/email-clients/evolution.svg){ align=right } + ![Logo di Evolution](assets/img/email-clients/evolution.svg){ align=right } - **Evolution** è un'applicazione per la gestione delle informazioni personali che fornisce funzionalità integrate di posta, calendario e rubrica. Evolution dispone di un'ampia [documentazione](https://help.gnome.org/users/evolution/stable/) per aiutarti a iniziare. + **Evolution** è un'applicazione per la gestione delle informazioni personali che fornisce funzionalità integrate di email, calendario e rubrica. Evolution dispone di un'ampia [documentazione](https://help.gnome.org/users/evolution/stable/) per aiutarti a iniziare. - [:octicons-home-16: Pagina principale](https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Evolution){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:octicons-eye-16:](https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Evolution/PrivacyPolicy){ .card-link title="Politica sulla privacy" } + [:octicons-home-16: Home](https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Evolution){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Evolution/PrivacyPolicy){ .card-link title="Politica sulla Privacy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://help.gnome.org/users/evolution/stable/){ .card-link title=Documentazione} - [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution/){ .card-link title="Codice sorgente" } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution/){ .card-link title="Codice Sorgente" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.gnome.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribuisci } - ??? downloads "Scarica" + ??? downloads - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.gnome.Evolution) @@ -137,42 +138,42 @@ Canary Mail è closed-source. Lo consigliamo a causa della scarsa scelta di clie !!! recommendation - ![K-9 Mail logo](assets/img/email-clients/k9mail.svg){ align=right } + ![Logo di K-9 Mail](assets/img/email-clients/k9mail.svg){ align=right } - **K-9 Mail** è un'applicazione di posta elettronica indipendente che supporta sia le caselle POP3 che IMAP, ma supporta solo la posta push per IMAP. + **K-9 Mail** è un'applicazione indipendente di email che supporta le caselle POP3 e IMAP, ma supporta soltanto le email push per IMAP. In futuro, K-9 Mail sarà il client [ufficiale](https://k9mail.app/2022/06/13/K-9-Mail-and-Thunderbird.html) di Thunderbird per Android. - [:octicons-home-16: Pagina principale](https://k9mail.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:octicons-eye-16:](https://k9mail.app/privacy){ .card-link title="Politica sulla privacy" } + [:octicons-home-16: Home](https://k9mail.app){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://k9mail.app/privacy){ .card-link title="Politica sulla Privacy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.k9mail.app/){ .card-link title=Documentazione} - [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/k9mail/k-9){ .card-link title="Codice sorgente" } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/k9mail/k-9){ .card-link title="Codice Sorgente" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://k9mail.app/contribute){ .card-link title=Contribuisci } - ??? downloads "Scarica" + ??? downloads - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.fsck.k9) - [:simple-github: GitHub](https://github.com/k9mail/k-9/releases) !!! warning - Quando si risponde a qualcuno di una mailing list, l'opzione "rispondi" può includere anche la mailing list. Per maggiori informazioni visita le loro (https://github.com/thundernest/k-9/issues/3738). + Rispondendo a qualcuno in una mailing list, l'opzione "rispondi" potrebbe includere anche la mailing list stessa. Per maggiori informazioni visita il ticket [#3738 di thundernest/k-9](https://github.com/thundernest/k-9/issues/3738). ### Kontact (KDE) !!! recommendation - ![Logo Kontact](assets/img/email-clients/kontact.svg){ align=right } + ![Logo di Kontact](assets/img/email-clients/kontact.svg){ align=right } - **Kontact** è un'applicazione di gestione delle informazioni personali (PIM) del progetto [KDE](https://kde.org). Offre un client email, una rubrica, un'agenda e un client RSS. + **Kontact** è un'applicazione di gestione delle informazioni personali (PIM), dal progetto [KDE](https://dke.org). Fornisce un client email, rubrica, un'agenda e un client RSS. - [:octicons-home-16: Pagina Principale](https://kontact.kde.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-home-16: Home](https://kontact.kde.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://kde.org/privacypolicy-apps){ .card-link title="Politica sulla Privacy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://kontact.kde.org/users/){ .card-link title=Documentazione} [:octicons-code-16:](https://invent.kde.org/pim/kmail){ .card-link title="Codice Sorgente" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://kde.org/community/donations/){ .card-link title=Contribuisci } - ??? downloads "Scarica" + ??? downloads - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://kontact.kde.org/download) - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.kde.kontact) @@ -181,16 +182,16 @@ Canary Mail è closed-source. Lo consigliamo a causa della scarsa scelta di clie !!! recommendation - ![Logo Mailvelope](assets/img/email-clients/mailvelope.svg){ align=right } + ![Logo di Mailvelope](assets/img/email-clients/mailvelope.svg){ align=right } - **Mailvelope** è un'estensione del browser che consente lo scambio di e-mail crittografate secondo lo standard di crittografia OpenPGP. + **Mailvelope** è un'estensione del browser che consente lo scambio di email crittografate secondo lo standard di crittografia OpenPGP. - [:octicons-home-16: Pagina Principale](https://www.mailvelope.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-home-16: Home](https://www.mailvelope.com){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.mailvelope.com/en/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Politica sulla Privacy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://mailvelope.com/faq){ .card-link title=Documentazione} [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/mailvelope/mailvelope){ .card-link title="Codice Sorgente" } - ??? downloads "Scarica" + ??? downloads - [:simple-firefoxbrowser: Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/mailvelope) - [:simple-googlechrome: Chrome](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/mailvelope/kajibbejlbohfaggdiogboambcijhkke) @@ -200,42 +201,42 @@ Canary Mail è closed-source. Lo consigliamo a causa della scarsa scelta di clie !!! recommendation - ![NeoMutt logo](assets/img/email-clients/mutt.svg){ align=right } + ![Logo di NeoMutt](assets/img/email-clients/mutt.svg){ align=right } - **NeoMutt** è un lettore di posta elettronica a riga di comando open-source (or MUA) per Linux e BSD. È un fork di [Mutt](https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutt) con funzionalità aggiuntive. + **NeoMutt** è un lettore di email a riga di comando (MUA) open source per Linux e BSD. È una biforcazione di [Mutt](https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutt) con funzionalità aggiuntive. - NeoMutt è un client basato sul testo che ha una curva di apprendimento molto ripida. Tuttavia, è molto personalizzabile. + NeoMutt è un client basato su testo con una curva d'apprendimento molto rapida. Tuttavia, è molto personalizzabile. - [:octicons-home-16: Pagina Principale](https://neomutt.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-home-16: Home](https://neomutt.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-info-16:](https://neomutt.org/guide/){ .card-link title=Documentazione} [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt){ .card-link title="Codice Sorgente" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/russon/){ .card-link title=Contribuisci } - ??? downloads "Scarica" + ??? downloads - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://neomutt.org/distro) - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://neomutt.org/distro) ## Criteri -**Si noti che non siamo affiliati a nessuno dei progetti che raccomandiamo.** Oltre ai [ nostri criteri standard ](about/criteria.md), abbiamo sviluppato una serie di requisiti chiari che ci consentono di fornire raccomandazioni oggettive. Ti consigliamo di familiarizzare con questo elenco prima di scegliere di utilizzare un progetto e di condurre le tue ricerche per assicurarti che sia la scelta giusta per te. +**Ti preghiamo di notare che non siamo affiliati con alcun progetto consigliato.** Oltre ai [nostri criteri standard](about/criteria.md), abbiamo sviluppato una serie chiara di requisiti per consentirci di fornire consigli oggettivi. Ti suggeriamo di familiarizzare con questo elenco prima di scegliere di utilizzare un progetto e di condurre le tue ricerche per assicurarti che si tratti della scelta adatta a te. -!!! example "Questa sezione è nuova" +!!! esempio "Questa sezione è nuova" - Stiamo lavorando per stabilire criteri definiti per ogni sezione del nostro sito, e questo potrebbe essere soggetto a modifiche. Se hai qualsiasi domanda sui nostri criteri, ti preghiamo di [chiedere sul nostro forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) e di non supporre che non abbiamo considerato qualcosa, formulando i nostri consigli, se non elencato qui. Molti fattori sono presi in considerazione e discussi quando consigliamo un progetto e la documentazione di ognuno è in lavorazione. + Stiamo lavorando per stabilire i criteri definiti per ogni sezione del nostro sito e, questa, potrebbe essere soggetta a modifiche. Se hai qualsiasi domanda sui nostri criteri, ti preghiamo di [chiedere sul nostro forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) e di non supporre che non abbiamo considerato qualcosa, formulando i nostri consigli, se non elencato qui. Molti fattori sono presi in considerazione e discussi quando consigliamo un progetto e la documentazione di ognuno è in lavorazione. ### Requisiti minimi -- Le applicazioni sviluppate per sistemi operativi open-source devono essere open-source. -- Non deve raccogliere la telemetria o deve avere un modo semplice per disabilitare tutta la telemetria. +- Le app sviluppate per i sistemi operativi open source, devono essere open source. +- Non devono raccogliere telemetria, o deve disporre di un metodo facile per disabilitare tutta la telemetria. - Deve supportare la crittografia dei messaggi OpenPGP. -### Criteri ottimali +### Miglior Caso -I nostri criteri ottimali rappresentano ciò che vorremmo vedere dal progetto perfetto in questa categoria. Le nostre raccomandazioni potrebbero non includere tutte o alcune di queste funzionalità, ma quelle che le includono potrebbero avere una posizione più alta rispetto ad altre in questa pagina. +I nostri criteri del caso migliore rappresentano cosa vorremmo vedere dal progetto perfetto in questa categoria. I nostri consigli potrebbero non includere tutte o alcune di queste funzionalità, ma quelli che le includono potrebbero essere preferiti ad altri su questa pagina. -- Dovrebbe essere open-source. +- Dovrebbe essere open source. - Dovrebbe essere multipiattaforma. -- Non dovrebbe raccogliere alcuna telemetria per impostazione predefinita. -- Deve supportare OpenPGP in modo nativo, cioè senza estensioni. -- Dovrebbe supportare l'archiviazione locale delle e-mail crittografate OpenPGP. +- Non dovrebbe raccogliere alcuna telemetria di default. +- Deve supportare OpenPGP nativamente, cioè senza estensioni. +- Dovrebbe supportare l'archiviazione locale delle email crittografate, OpenPGP. diff --git a/i18n/it/encryption.md b/i18n/it/encryption.md index 0797b475..97c9acc0 100644 --- a/i18n/it/encryption.md +++ b/i18n/it/encryption.md @@ -2,15 +2,15 @@ meta_title: "Software di crittografia consigliati: VeraCrypt, Cryptomator, PicoCrypt e OpenPGP - Privacy Guides" title: "Software di crittografia" icon: material/file-lock -description: La crittografia dei dati è l'unico modo per controllare chi può accedervi. Questi strumenti ti consentono di crittografare le tue email e qualsiasi altro file. +description: La crittografia dei dati è il solo modo per controllare chi possa accedervi. Questi strumenti ti consentono di crittografare le tue email e qualsiasi altro file. cover: encryption.png --- -La crittografia dei dati è l'unico modo per controllare chi può accedervi. Se al momento non stai utilizzando software per la crittografia del tuo hard disk, delle email, o dei file, dovresti scegliere una delle seguenti opzioni. +La crittografia dei dati è l'unico modo per controllare chi può accedervi. Se, al momento, non stai utilizzando del software crittografico per il tuo disco rigido, le tue email o file, dovresti selezionare un'opzione qui. ## Multipiattaforma -Le opzioni qui elencate sono multipiattaforma e ottime per la creazione di backup crittografati dei tuoi dati. +Le opzioni qui elencate sono multipiattaforma e ottime per creare backup crittografati dei tuoi dati. ### Cryptomator (Cloud) @@ -18,29 +18,29 @@ Le opzioni qui elencate sono multipiattaforma e ottime per la creazione di backu ![Cryptomator logo](assets/img/encryption-software/cryptomator.svg){ align=right } - **Cryptomator** è una soluzione per la crittografia progettata per salvare privatamente i file di qualsiasi provider cloud. Ti permette di creare cassaforti che sono memorizzate su un'unità di archiviazione virtuale, il cui contenuto è crittografato e sincronizzato con i tuoi provider di cloud storage. + **Cryptomator** è una soluzione per la crittografia progettata per salvare privatamente i file di qualsiasi provider cloud. Ti consente di creare cassaforti memorizzate su un'unità virtuale, i cui contenuti sono crittografati e sincronizzati con il tuo fornitore d'archiviazione su cloud. - [:octicons-home-16: Pagina principale](https://cryptomator.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:octicons-eye-16:](https://cryptomator.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Politica sulla privacy" } + [:octicons-home-16: Home](https://cryptomator.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://cryptomator.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Politica sulla Privacy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.cryptomator.org/){ .card-link title=Documentazione} - [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/cryptomator){ .card-link title="Codice sorgente" } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/cryptomator){ .card-link title="Codice Sorgente" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://cryptomator.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribuisci } - ??? downloads "Scarica" + ??? downloads - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.cryptomator) - - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/it/app/cryptomator-2/id1560822163) + - [:simple-appstore: App Store](https://apps.apple.com/us/app/cryptomator-2/id1560822163) - [:simple-android: Android](https://cryptomator.org/android) - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://cryptomator.org/downloads) - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://cryptomator.org/downloads) - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://cryptomator.org/downloads) - [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.cryptomator.Cryptomator) -Cryptomator utilizza la crittografia AES-256 per criptare sia i file che i nomi dei file. Cryptomator non è in grado di criptare metadati come i timestamp di accesso, modifica e creazione, né il numero e la dimensione di file e cartelle. +Cryptomator utilizza la crittografiaa AES-256 per crittografare i file e i loro nomi. Cryptomator non può crittografare i metadati come marche orarie d'accesso, modifica e creazione, né il numero e le dimensioni dei file e delle cartelle. Alcune librerie crittografiche di Cryptomator sono state [revisionate](https://community.cryptomator.org/t/has-there-been-a-security-review-audit-of-cryptomator/44) da Cure53. Alcune delle librerie sottoposte a verifica sono: [cryptolib](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptolib), [cryptofs](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptofs), [siv-mode](https://github.com/cryptomator/siv-mode) e [cryptomator-objc-cryptor](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptomator-objc-cryptor). Non è stata controllata [cryptolib-swift](https://github.com/cryptomator/cryptolib-swift), che è una libreria usata da Cryptomator per iOS. -La documentazione di Cryptomator descrive più nel dettaglio [i suoi obiettivi di sicurezza](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/security-target/), [l'architettura di sicurezza](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/architecture/), e [le migliori pratiche](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/best-practices/) per l'utilizzo. +La documentazione di Cryptomator ne descrive l'[obiettivo di sicurezza](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/security-target/), [architettura di sicurezza](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/architecture/) e le [migliori pratiche](https://docs.cryptomator.org/en/latest/security/best-practices/) previsti, per l'utilizzo. ### Picocrypt (File) @@ -48,13 +48,13 @@ La documentazione di Cryptomator descrive più nel dettaglio [i suoi obiettivi d ![Picocrypt logo](assets/img/encryption-software/picocrypt.svg){ align=right } - **Picocrypt** è un strumento semplice e di piccole dimensioni che fornisce tecniche di crittografia moderna. Utilizza il cifrario sicuro XChaCha20 e la funzione di derivazione delle chiavi Argon2id per garantire un alto livello di sicurezza. Utilizza inoltre i moduli standard x/crypto di Go per le sue funzionalità di crittografia. + **Picocrypt** è un strumento semplice e di piccole dimensioni che fornisce tecniche di crittografia moderna. Picocrypt utilizza il cifrario sicuro XChaCha20 e la funzione di derivazione della chiave Argon2id per fornire un alto livello di sicurezza. Utilizza i moduli standard x/crypto di Go per le sue funzionalità di sicurezza. [:octicons-repo-16: Repository](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt){ .card-link title="Codice sorgente" } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt){ .card-link title="Codice Sorgente" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://opencollective.com/picocrypt){ .card-link title=Contribuisci } - ??? downloads "Scarica" + ??? downloads - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases) - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://github.com/HACKERALERT/Picocrypt/releases) @@ -64,71 +64,71 @@ La documentazione di Cryptomator descrive più nel dettaglio [i suoi obiettivi d !!! recommendation - ![VeraCrypt logo](assets/img/encryption-software/veracrypt.svg#only-light){ align=right } - ![VeraCrypt logo](assets/img/encryption-software/veracrypt-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right } + ![Logo di VeraCrypt](assets/img/encryption-software/veracrypt.svg#only-light){ align=right } + ![Logo di VeraCrypt](assets/img/encryption-software/veracrypt-dark.svg#only-dark){ align=right } - **VeraCrypt** è un software di utilità gratuito, disponibile in formato sorgente, utilizzato per crittografare al volo. Permette di creare un disco virtuale crittografato all'interno di un file, crittografare una partizione o interi dispositivi di archiviazione con autenticazione pre-avvio. + **VeraCrypt** è un'utility libera con sorgente disponibile, utilizzata per la crittografia al volo. Può creare un disco virtuale crittografato in un file, crittografare una partizione o crittografare l'intero dispositivo di archiviazione con l'autenticazione antecedente l'avvio. - [:octicons-home-16: Pagina principale](https://veracrypt.fr){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-home-16: Home](https://veracrypt.fr){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-info-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/en/Documentation.html){ .card-link title=Documentazione} - [:octicons-code-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/code/){ .card-link title="Codice sorgente" } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/code/){ .card-link title="Codice Sorgente" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://veracrypt.fr/en/Donation.html){ .card-link title=Contribuisci } - ??? downloads "Scarica" + ??? downloads - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html) - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html) - [:simple-linux: Linux](https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Downloads.html) -VeraCrypt è un fork del progetto abbandonato TrueCrypt. A detta degli sviluppatori, sono stati implementati miglioramenti sulla sicurezza e i problemi sollevati dalla inziale verifica di TrueCrypt sono stati affrontati. +VeraCrypt è una biforcazione del progetto abbandonato TrueCrypt. Secondo i suoi sviluppatori, sono stati implementati dei miglioramenti alla sicurezza e, i problemi sollevati dall'iniziale controllo del codice di TrueCrypt sono stati risolti. -Quando utilizzi la crittografia di VeraCrypt, hai la possibilità di scegliere tra diverse [funzioni di hash](https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Funzione_di_hash). Suggeriamo di selezionare **unicamente** [SHA-512](https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Hash_Algorithm) e il cifrario a blocchi [AES](https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard). +Crittografando con VeraCrypt, puoi selezionare [funzioni di hash](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt#Encryption_scheme) differenti. Ti suggeriamo di selezionare **soltanto** [SHA-512](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-512), e il cifrario a blocchi [AES](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard). -TrueCrypt è stato [sottoposto ad audit un certo numero di volte](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TrueCrypt#Security_audits); anche VeraCrypt è stato [verificato separatamente](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt#VeraCrypt_audit). +Truecrypt è stato [controllato numerose volte](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TrueCrypt#Security_audits), così come VeraCrypt, [controllato separatamente](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt#VeraCrypt_audit). ## Crittografia dell'intero disco del sistema operativo -I sistemi operativi moderni includono la [FDE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_encryption) e utilizzeranno un [cryptoprocessor sicuro](https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptoprocessor). +I sistemi operativi moderni includono la [FDE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_encryption) e utilizzeranno un [cripto-processore sicuro](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_cryptoprocessor). ### BitLocker !!! recommendation - ![BitLocker logo](assets/img/encryption-software/bitlocker.png){ align=right } + ![Logo di BitLocker](assets/img/encryption-software/bitlocker.png){ align=right } - **BitLocker** è il programma di crittografia completa del volume integrato a Microsoft Windows. Il principale motivo per cui lo consigliamo è il suo [uso del TPM Trusted Platform Module)](https://docs.microsoft.com/it-it/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). La società di analisi forense [ElcomSoft](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ElcomSoft) ne ha scritto al riguardo in [Understanding BitLocker TPM Protection](https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2021/01/understanding-BitLocker-tpm-protection/). + **BitLocker** è il programma di crittografia completa del volume, integrato con Microsoft Windows. Il motivo principale per cui lo consigliamo è il suo [utilizzo di TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). [ElcomSoft](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ElcomSoft), una società forense, ha scritto a riguardo in [Comprendere la Protezione TPM di BitLocker](https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2021/01/understanding-BitLocker-tpm-protection/). [:octicons-info-16:](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/BitLocker/BitLocker-overview){ .card-link title=Documentazione} -BitLocker è [supportato solo](https://support.microsoft.com/it-it/windows/abilitare-la-crittografia-dei-dispositivi-0c453637-bc88-5f74-5105-741561aae838) sulle edizioni Pro, Enterprise ed Education di Windows. Può essere attivato sulle edizioni Home, a condizione che soddisfino i prerequisiti. +BitLocker è [supportato soltanto](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/turn-on-device-encryption-0c453637-bc88-5f74-5105-741561aae838) dalle edizioni Pro, Enterprise ed Education di Windows. Può essere abilitato sulle edizioni Home, ammesso che soddisfino i prerequisiti. ??? example "Attivare BitLocker su Windows Home" - Per abilitare BitLocker sull'edizione "Home" di Windows è necessario che le partizioni siano formattate con una [Tabella di Partizione GUID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GUID_Partition_Table) e che abbiano un modulo TPM (v1.2, 2.0+) dedicato. + Per abilitare BitLocker sulle edizioni "Home" di Windows, devi avere le partizioni formattate con una [Tabella di Partizione GUID](https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/GUID_Partition_Table) e disporre di un modulo TPM (v1.2, 2.0+) dedicato. - 1. Aprire un prompt dei comandi e verificare il formato della tabella delle partizioni dell'unità con il seguente comando. Dovreste vedere "**GPT**" elencato sotto "Stile partizione": + 1. Apri il prompt dei comandi e verifica il formato della tabella di partizione dell'unità, con il seguente comando. Dovresti vedere "**GPT**" elencato sotto "Stile di Partizione": ``` powershell Get-Disk ``` - 2. Esegui questo comando (in un prompt dei comandi di amministrazione) per verificare la versione del TPM. Dovresti vedere `2.0` o `1.2` elencati accanto a `SpecVersion`: + 2. Esegui questo comando (nel prompt dei comandi da admin), per verificare la tua versione di TPM. Dovresti vedere `2.0` o `1.2`, elencato affianco a `SpecVersion`: ``` powershell Get-WmiObject -Namespace "root/cimv2/security/microsofttpm" -Class WIN32_tpm ``` - 3. Accedi alle [Opzioni di Avvio Avanzate](https://support.microsoft.com/it-it/windows/opzioni-di-avvio-avanzate-inclusa-la-modalit%C3%A0-provvisoria-b90e7808-80b5-a291-d4b8-1a1af602b617). È necessario riavviare il sistema premendo il tasto F8 prima dell'avvio di Windows ed entrare nel *prompt dei comandi* in **Risoluzione dei problemi** → **Opzioni avanzate** → **Prompt dei comandi**. + 3. Accedi alle [Opzioni d'Avvio Avanzato](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/advanced-startup-options-including-safe-mode-b90e7808-80b5-a291-d4b8-1a1af602b617). Devi riavviare premendo il tasto F8, prima dell'avvio di Windows e andare nel *prompt dei comandi* in **Risoluzione dei Problemi** → **Opzioni Avanzate** → **Prompt dei Comandi**. - 4. Accedi con il tuo account admin e digita questo nel prompt dei comandi per avviare la cifratura: + 4. Accedi con il tuo profilo da amministratore e digita nel prompt dei comandi questo comando, per avviare la crittografia: ``` manage-bde -on c: -used ``` - 5. Chiudi il prompt dei comandi e continua l'avvio di Windows normalmente. + 5. Chiudi il prompt dei comandi e procedi con l'avvio regolare di Windows. - 6. Apri il prompt dei comandi con privilegio di amministratore ed esegui i seguenti comandi: + 6. Apri il prompt dei comandi con privilegi da amministratore ed esegui i seguenti comandi: ``` manage-bde c: -protectors -add -rp -tpm @@ -136,35 +136,35 @@ BitLocker è [supportato solo](https://support.microsoft.com/it-it/windows/abili manage-bde -protectors -get c: > %UserProfile%\Desktop\BitLocker-Recovery-Key.txt ``` - !!! tip "Suggerimento" + !!! tip - Esegui il backup di `BitLocker-Recovery-Key.txt` sul desktop in un dispositivo di archiviazione separato. La perdita di questo codice di recupero può comportare la perdita dei dati. + Esegui il backup di 'BitLocker-Recovery-Key.txt' sul tuo desktop, in un dispositivo d'archiviazione separato. La perdita del codice di recupero potrebbe risultare nella perdita dei dati. ### FileVault !!! recommendation - ![FileVault logo](assets/img/encryption-software/filevault.png){ align=right } + ![Logo di FileVault](assets/img/encryption-software/filevault.png){ align=right } - **FileVault** è la soluzione per la crittografia di volumi on-the-fly integrata in macOS. FileVault è consigliata perché [leverages](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/volume-encryption-with-filevault-sec4c6dc1b6e/web) le funzionalità di sicurezza hardware presenti su un SoC in silicio o un T2 Security Chip di Apple. + **FileVault** è la soluzione per la crittografia rapida dei volumi, integrata su macOS. FileVault è consigliata perché [sfrutta](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/volume-encryption-with-filevault-sec4c6dc1b6e/web) le funzionalità di sicurezza hardware presenti su un SoC in silicio o un Chip di Sicurezza T2 di Apple. [:octicons-info-16:](https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/encrypt-mac-data-with-filevault-mh11785/mac){ .card-link title=Documentazione} -Consigliamo di memorizzare una chiave di ripristino locale in un luogo sicuro, anziché utilizzare l'account iCloud per il ripristino. +Consigliamo di memorizzare una chiave di recupero locale in un luogo sicuro, invece di utilizzare il tuo profilo di iCloud per il recupero. ### Linux Unified Key Setup !!! recommendation - ![LUKS logo](assets/img/encryption-software/luks.png){ align=right } + ![Logo di LUKS](assets/img/encryption-software/luks.png){ align=right } - **LUKS** è il metodo di FDE (full-disk encryption) predefinito per Linux. Può essere usato per cifrare volumi completi, partizioni o creare container crittografati. + **LUKS** è il metodo di FDE predefinito per Linux. È utilizzabile per crittografare interi volumi, partizioni, o creare contenitori crittografati. - [:octicons-home-16: Pagina Principale](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/blob/main/README.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-home-16: Home](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/blob/main/README.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-info-16:](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/wikis/home){ .card-link title=Documentazione} [:octicons-code-16:](https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/){ .card-link title="Codice Sorgente" } -??? example "Creazione e apertura di container criptati" +??? example "Creazione e apertura di contenitori crittografati" ``` dd if=/dev/urandom of=/path-to-file bs=1M count=1024 status=progress @@ -172,8 +172,8 @@ Consigliamo di memorizzare una chiave di ripristino locale in un luogo sicuro, a ``` - #### Apertura di contenitori criptati - Consigliamo di aprire container e volumi con `udisksctl` poiché utilizza [Polkit](https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/PolicyKit). La maggior parte dei file manager, tra cui quelli inclusi negli ambienti desktop maggiormente diffusi, posso sbloccare file crittografati. Strumenti come [udiskie](https://github.com/coldfix/udiskie) possono essere eseguiti nella barra delle applicazioni e forniscono un'utile interfaccia utente. + #### Apertura di contenitori crittografati + Consigliamo di aprire contenitori e volumi con `udisksctl`, poiché utilizza [Polkit](https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/PolicyKit). Gran parte dei gestori di file, come quelli inclusi con i popolari ambienti desktop, possono sbloccare i file crittografati. Strumenti come [udiskie](https://github.com/coldfix/udiskie) possono essere eseguiti nella barra delle applicazioni e forniscono un'utile interfaccia utente. ``` udisksctl loop-setup -f /path-to-file udisksctl unlock -b /dev/loop0 @@ -189,42 +189,42 @@ Consigliamo di memorizzare una chiave di ripristino locale in un luogo sicuro, a ## Basati sul browser -La crittografia browser-based può essere utile quando è necessario cifrare un file ma non è possibile installare un software o delle applicazioni sul dispositivo. +La crittografia basata sul browser può essere utile quando devi crittografare un file, ma non puoi installare software o app sul tuo dispositivo. ### hat.sh !!! recommendation - ![hat.sh logo](assets/img/encryption-software/hat-sh.png#only-light){ align=right } - ![hat.sh logo](assets/img/encryption-software/hat-sh-dark.png#only-dark){ align=right } + ![Logo di hat.sh](assets/img/encryption-software/hat-sh.png#only-light){ align=right } + ![Logo di hat.sh](assets/img/encryption-software/hat-sh-dark.png#only-dark){ align=right } - **Hat.sh** è una web application che fornisce una crittografia dei file lato client nel browser. Può anche essere self-hosted ed è utile se è necessario crittografare un file ma non è possibile installare un software sul dispositivo a causa delle politiche organizzative. + **Hat.sh** è un'applicazione web che fornisce una crittografia dei file dal lato del client nel browser. Può anche essere ospitata autonomamente ed è utile se devi crittografare un file ma non puoi installare alcun software sul tuo dispositivo, a causa di politiche organizzative. [:octicons-globe-16: Sito web](https://hat.sh){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:octicons-eye-16:](https://hat.sh/about/){ .card-link title="Informativa sulla privacy" } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://hat.sh/about/){ .card-link title="Politica sulla Privacy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://hat.sh/about/){ .card-link title=Documentazione} [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/sh-dv/hat.sh){ .card-link title="Codice Sorgente" } - :octicons-heart-16:{ .card-link title="Le modalità per le donazioni possono essere trovate al fondo del sito" } + :octicons-heart-16:{ .card-link title="I metodi di donazione si possono trovare in fondo al sito web" } -## Linea di comando +## Riga di comando -Gli strumenti con interfacce a riga di comando sono utili per integrare [script di shells](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shell_script). +Gli strumenti con interfacce di riga di comando sono utili per integrare gli [script della shell](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shell_script). ### Kryptor !!! recommendation - ![Kryptor logo](assets/img/encryption-software/kryptor.png){ align=right } + ![Logo di Kryptor](assets/img/encryption-software/kryptor.png){ align=right } - **Kryptor** è uno strumenti gratuito e open-source per la crittografia e la firma dei file che utilizza algoritmi di cifratura moderni e sicuri. Punta a essere una versione migliorata di[age](https://github.com/FiloSottile/age) e [Minisign](https://jedisct1.github.io/minisign/) per fornire un'alternativa semplice a GPG. + **Kryptor** è uno strumento gratuito e open source di crittografia e firma dei file, che utilizza algoritmi crittografici moderni e sicuri. Punta a essere una versione migliorata di[age](https://github.com/FiloSottile/age) e [Minisign](https://jedisct1.github.io/minisign/) per fornire un'alternativa semplice a GPG. - [:octicons-home-16: Pagina Principale](https://www.kryptor.co.uk){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-home-16: Home](https://www.kryptor.co.uk){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/features#privacy){ .card-link title="Politica sulla Privacy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/tutorial){ .card-link title=Documentazione} - [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/samuel-lucas6/Kryptor){ .card-link title="Codice sorgente" } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/samuel-lucas6/Kryptor){ .card-link title="Codice Sorgente" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kryptor.co.uk/#donate){ .card-link title=Contribuisci } - ??? downloads "Scarica" + ??? downloads - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://www.kryptor.co.uk) - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://www.kryptor.co.uk) @@ -234,9 +234,9 @@ Gli strumenti con interfacce a riga di comando sono utili per integrare [script !!! recommendation - ![Tomb logo](assets/img/encryption-software/tomb.png){ align=right } + ![Logo di Tomb](assets/img/encryption-software/tomb.png){ align=right } - **Tomb** è un wrapper di shell a riga di comando per LUKS. Supporta la steganografia tramite [strumenti di terze parti](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb#how-does-it-work). + **Tomb** è un wrapper della shell a riga di comando, per LUKS. Supporta la steganografia tramite [strumenti di terze parti](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb#how-does-it-work). [:octicons-home-16: Pagina principale](https://www.dyne.org/software/tomb){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/dyne/Tomb/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentazione} @@ -245,13 +245,13 @@ Gli strumenti con interfacce a riga di comando sono utili per integrare [script ## OpenPGP -OpenPGP è talvolta necessario per compiti specifici, come la firma digitale e la crittografia delle e-mail. PGP ha molte funzionalità ed è [complesso](https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html)visto che è in circolazione da molto tempo. Per task come firmare o criptare i file, suggeriamo le opzioni di cui sopra. +OpenPGP è talvolta necessario per incarichi specifici, come firmare digitalmente e crittografare un'email. PGP include molte funzionalità ed è [complesso](https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html), dato che è in circolazione da molto tempo. Per gli incarichi come firmare o crittografare i file, suggeriamo le opzioni precedenti. -Quando cripti con PGP, puoi configurare diverse opzioni nel file `gpg.conf`. Raccomandiamo di attenersi alle opzioni standard specificate nella [FAQ per utenti di GnuPG](https://www.gnupg.org/faq/gnupg-faq.html#new_user_gpg_conf). +Crittografando con PGP, puoi configurare diverse opzioni nel tuo file `gpg.config`. Ti consigliamo di attenerti con le opzioni standard specificate nelle [Domande Frequenti degli utenti di GnuPG](https://www.gnupg.org/faq/gnupg-faq.html#new_user_gpg_conf). -!!! tip "Utilizzare future-default quando si genera una chiave" +!!! tip "Utilizzare 'future-default' generando una chiave" - Quando si [generano le chiavi](https://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual/c14.html) suggeriamo di usare il comando 'future-default', che indica a GnuPG di usare metodi di crittografia moderna come [Curve25519](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curve25519#History) e [Ed25519](https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/): + [Generando le chiavi]https://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual/c14.html), consigliamo di utilizzare il comando 'future-default', istruendo GnuPG a utilizzare la crittografia moderna come [Curve25519](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curve25519#History) ed [Ed25519](https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/): ```bash gpg --quick-gen-key alice@example.com future-default @@ -261,16 +261,16 @@ Quando cripti con PGP, puoi configurare diverse opzioni nel file `gpg.conf`. Rac !!! recommendation - ![GNU Privacy Guard logo](assets/img/encryption-software/gnupg.svg){ align=right } + ![Logo di GNU Privacy Guard](assets/img/encryption-software/gnupg.svg){ align=right } - **GnuPG** è un'alternativa con licenza GPL alla suite PGP per software crittografici. GnuPG è compliant a [RFC 4880](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880), che è l'attuale specifica IETF di OpenPGP. Il progetto GnuPG ha lavorato a una [bozza aggiornata](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh/) nel tentativo di modernizzare OpenPGP. GnuPG fa parte del progetto software Free Software Foundation di GNU ed ha ricevuto un'importante [finanziamento](https://gnupg.org/blog/20220102-a-new-future-for-gnupg.html) dal governo tedesco. + **GnuPG** è un'alternativa con licenza GPL alla suite PGP per software crittografici. GnuPG è conforme con [RFC 4880](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880), la specifica IETF corrente di OpenPGP. Il progetto GnuPG ha lavorato a una [bozza aggiornata](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh/) nel tentativo di modernizzare OpenPGP. GnuPG fa parte del progetto Free Software Foundation di GNU ed ha ricevuto un'importante [finanziamento](https://gnupg.org/blog/20220102-a-new-future-for-gnupg.html) dal governo tedesco. - [:octicons-home-16: Pagina principale](https://gnupg.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gnupg.org/privacy-policy.html){ .card-link title="Politica sulla privacy" } + [:octicons-home-16: Home](https://gnupg.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gnupg.org/privacy-policy.html){ .card-link title="Politica sulla Privacy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://gnupg.org/documentation/index.html){ .card-link title=Documentazione} - [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git){ .card-link title="Codice sorgente" } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git){ .card-link title="Codice Sorgente" } - ??? downloads "Scarica" + ??? downloads - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.sufficientlysecure.keychain) - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://gpg4win.org/download.html) @@ -281,40 +281,40 @@ Quando cripti con PGP, puoi configurare diverse opzioni nel file `gpg.conf`. Rac !!! recommendation - ![GPG4win logo](assets/img/encryption-software/gpg4win.svg){ align=right } + ![Logo di GPG4win](assets/img/encryption-software/gpg4win.svg){ align=right } - **GPG4win** è un pacchetto per Windows di [Intevation e g10 Code](https://gpg4win.org/impressum.html). Comprende [diversi strumenti](https://gpg4win.org/about.html) che possono aiutare nell'utilizzo di GPG su Microsoft Windows. Il progetto è stato avviato e in origine [finanziato dal](https://web.archive.org/web/20190425125223/https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/news/government-used-cryptography) Federal Office per l'Information Security (BSI) tedesco nel 2005. + **GPG4win** è un pacchetto per Windows di [Intevation e g10 Code](https://gpg4win.org/impressum.html). Include [vari strumenti](https://gpg4win.org/about.html), che possono assisterti nell'utilizzo di GPG su Microsoft Windows. Il progetto è stato avviato e originariamente [finanziato dall'](https://web.archive.org/web/20190425125223/https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/news/government-used-cryptography)Ufficio Federale Tedesco per la Sicurezza delle Informazioni (BSI) nel 2005. - [:octicons-home-16: Pagina principale](https://gpg4win.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gpg4win.org/privacy-policy.html){ .card-link title="Politica sulla privacy" } + [:octicons-home-16: Home](https://gpg4win.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gpg4win.org/privacy-policy.html){ .card-link title="Politica sulla Privacy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://gpg4win.org/documentation.html){ .card-link title=Documentazione} - [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gpg4win.git;a=summary){ .card-link title="Codice sorgente" } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gpg4win.git;a=summary){ .card-link title="Codice Sorgente" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://gpg4win.org/donate.html){ .card-link title=Contribuisci } - ??? downloads "Scarica" + ??? downloads - [:simple-windows11: Windows](https://gpg4win.org/download.html) ### GPG Suite -!!! note "Nota" +!!! note - Suggeriamo [Canary Mail](email-clients.md#canary-mail) per utilizzare PGP con le email su dispositivi iOS. + Suggeriamo [Canary Mail](email-clients.md#canary-mail) per utilizzare PGP con le email sui dispositivi iOS. !!! recommendation - ![GPG Suite logo](assets/img/encryption-software/gpgsuite.png){ align=right } + ![Logo di GPG Suite](assets/img/encryption-software/gpgsuite.png){ align=right } **GPG Suite** fornisce il supporto OpenPGP per [Apple Mail](email-clients.md#apple-mail) e macOS. - Si consiglia di dare un'occhiata ai [primi passi](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb/how-to/first-steps-where-do-i-start-where-do-i-begin-setup-gpgtools-create-a-new-key-your-first-encrypted-email) e alle [conoscenze di base](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb) come supporto. + Consigliamo di dare un'occhiata ai loro [Primi passi](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb/how-to/first-steps-where-do-i-start-where-do-i-begin-setup-gpgtools-create-a-new-key-your-first-encrypted-email) e alla loro [Base di Conoscenza](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb) per supporto. - [:octicons-home-16: Pagina Principale](https://gpgtools.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-home-16: Home](https://gpgtools.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://gpgtools.org/privacy){ .card-link title="Politica sulla Privacy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb){ .card-link title=Documentazione} - [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GPGTools){ .card-link title="Codice sorgente" } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/GPGTools){ .card-link title="Codice Sorgente" } - ??? downloads "Scarica" + ??? downloads - [:simple-apple: macOS](https://gpgtools.org) @@ -322,16 +322,16 @@ Quando cripti con PGP, puoi configurare diverse opzioni nel file `gpg.conf`. Rac !!! recommendation - ![OpenKeychain logo](assets/img/encryption-software/openkeychain.svg){ align=right } + ![Logo di OpenKeychain](assets/img/encryption-software/openkeychain.svg){ align=right } - **OpenKeychain** è un'implementazione Android di GnuPG. È comunementa richiesta da client mail come [K-9 Mail](email-clients.md#k-9-mail) e [FairEmail](email-clients.md#fairemail) e da alltre applicazioni Android per fornire supporto alla crittografia. Cure53 ha completato un'[ispezione di sicurezza](https://www.openkeychain.org/openkeychain-3-6) di OpenKeychain 3.6 nell'ottobre 2015. Dettagli tecnici riguardo all'audit e alle soluzioni di OpenKeychain possono essere trovate [qui](https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain/wiki/cure53-Security-Audit-2015). + **OpenKeychain** è un'implementazione Android di GnuPG. È comunementa richiesta da client mail come [K-9 Mail](email-clients.md#k-9-mail) e [FairEmail](email-clients.md#fairemail) e da altre app Android per fornire supporto alla crittografia. Cure53 ha completato un [controllo di sicurezza](https://www.openkeychain.org/openkeychain-3-6) di OpenKeychain 3.6 a ottobre 2015. I dettagli tecnici sul controllo e le soluzioni di OpenKeychain possono essere trovate [qui](https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain/wiki/cure53-Security-Audit-2015). - [:octicons-home-16: Pagina principale](https://www.openkeychain.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.openkeychain.org/help/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Politica sulla privacy" } + [:octicons-home-16: Home](https://www.openkeychain.org){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.openkeychain.org/help/privacy-policy){ .card-link title="Politica sulla Privacy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.openkeychain.org/faq/){ .card-link title=Documentazione} [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/open-keychain/open-keychain){ .card-link title="Codice Sorgente" } - ??? downloads "Scarica" + ??? downloads - [:simple-googleplay: Google Play](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.sufficientlysecure.keychain) @@ -345,14 +345,14 @@ Quando cripti con PGP, puoi configurare diverse opzioni nel file `gpg.conf`. Rac ### Requisiti minimi -- Le applicazioni di crittografia multipiattaforma devono essere open-source. -- Le app di crittografia dei file devono supportare la decodifica su Linux, macOS e Windows. -- Le applicazioni per la crittografia dei dischi esterni devono supportare la decodifica su Linux, macOS e Windows. -- Le applicazioni di crittografia del disco interno (OS) devono essere multipiattaforma o integrate nel sistema operativo in modo nativo. +- Le app di crittografia multipiattaforma devono essere open source. +- Le app di crittografia dei file devono supportare la decrittografia su Linux, macOS e Windows. +- Le app per la crittografia del disco esterno devono supportare la decrittografia su Linux, macOS e Windows. +- Le app di crittografia del disco interno (OS) devono essere multipiattaforma o integrate nativamente al sistema operativo. -### Caso migliore +### Miglior Caso -KeePassXC memorizza i suoi dati di esportazione come file [CSV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comma-separated_values). Ciò può comportare la perdita di dati se si importa questo file in un altro gestore di password. +I nostri criteri ottimali rappresentano ciò che vorremmo vedere dal progetto perfetto in questa categoria. I nostri consigli potrebbero non includere tutte o alcune di queste funzionalità, ma quelli che le includono potrebbero essere preferiti ad altri su questa pagina. -- Le applicazioni di crittografia del sistema operativo (FDE) dovrebbero utilizzare una protezione hardware come TPM o Secure Enclave. -- Le applicazioni per la crittografia dei file devono avere un supporto di primo o terzo livello per le piattaforme mobili. +- Le app di crittografia del Sistema Operativo (FDE) dovrebbero utilizzare la sicurezza hardware, come TPM o Secure Enclave. +- Le app per la crittografia dei file dovrebbero avere supporto da prime o terze parti, per le piattaforme mobili. diff --git a/i18n/it/frontends.md b/i18n/it/frontends.md index dafe43ed..8634fdc3 100644 --- a/i18n/it/frontends.md +++ b/i18n/it/frontends.md @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Quando utilizzi un'istanza gestita da altri, assicurati di leggere la politica s [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter){ .card-link title="Codice sorgente" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/zedeus/nitter#nitter){ .card-link title=Contribuisci} -!!! tip "Suggerimento" +!!! tip Nitter è utile se si desidera navigare tra i contenuti di Twitter senza dover effettuare il login e se si desidera disabilitare JavaScript nel browser, come nel caso di [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) al livello di sicurezza Molto Sicuro. Permette anche di [creare feed RSS per Twitter] (news-aggregators.md#twitter). @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ Quando utilizzi un'istanza gestita da altri, assicurati di leggere la politica s [:octicons-info-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok/wiki){ .card-link title=Documentazione} [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/pablouser1/ProxiTok){ .card-link title="Codice sorgente" } -!!! tip "Suggerimento" +!!! tip ProxiTok è utile se desideri disabilitare JavaScript nel browser, come ad esempio con [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) sul livello di sicurezza Molto Sicuro. @@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ Per impostazione predefinita, LibreTube blocca tutti gli annunci pubblicitari di Invidious non esegue il proxy dei video in modo predefinito. I video guardati attraverso Invidious continueranno a collegarsi direttamente ai server di Google (ad esempio, `googlevideo.com`); tuttavia, alcune istanze supportano il proxy video: è sufficiente attivare *Proxy video* nelle impostazioni dell'istanza o aggiungere `&local=true` all'URL. -!!! tip "Suggerimento" +!!! tip Invidious è utile se si desidera disabilitare JavaScript nel browser, ad esempio [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/) al livello di sicurezza Molto Sicuro. Non garantisce di per sé la privacy e non consigliamo di accedere ad alcun account. @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ Per impostazione predefinita, LibreTube blocca tutti gli annunci pubblicitari di [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped){ .card-link title="Codice sorgente" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/TeamPiped/Piped#donations){ .card-link title=Contribuisci } -!!! tip "Suggerimento" +!!! tip Piped è utile se si vuole utilizzare [SponsorBlock](https://sponsor.ajay.app) senza installare un'estensione o se si vuole accedere a contenuti con limiti d'età senza un account. Non garantisce di per sé la privacy e non consigliamo di accedere ad alcun account. diff --git a/i18n/it/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/it/os/android-overview.md index aaf3dbca..42354995 100644 --- a/i18n/it/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/it/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android description: Android è un sistema operativo open source con forti protezioni per la sicurezza, il che lo rende la nostra scelta migliore, per la telefonia. --- -Android è un sistema operativo sicuro, dotato di [sandboxing delle app](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB) e di un robusto sistema di controllo delle [autorizzazioni](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview). +![Logo di Android](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## Scegliere una distribuzione di Android +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### Scegliere una distribuzione di Android Quando acquisti un telefono Android, il sistema operativo predefinito del dispositivo è spesso dotato di un'integrazione invasiva con applicazioni e servizi che non fanno parte di [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). Un esempio è Google Play Services, che ha privilegi irrevocabili di accesso ai file, all'archiviazione dei contatti, ai registri delle chiamate, ai messaggi SMS, alla posizione, alla fotocamera, al microfono, agli identificativi hardware e così via. Queste applicazioni e servizi aumentano la superficie di attacco del dispositivo e sono all'origine di vari problemi di privacy con Android. @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Idealmente, quando si sceglie una distribuzione modificata di Android, bisogna a [Le nostre raccomandazioni per il sistema Android :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## Evitare il rooting +### Evitare il rooting Il [rooting](https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting) dei telefoni Android può diminuire notevolmente la sicurezza in quanto indebolisce nel complesso il [modello di sicurezza di Android](https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android#Privacy_e_sicurezza). Ciò può ridurre la privacy in caso di exploit assistito dalla sicurezza ridotta. I metodi di rooting comuni richiedono la manomissione diretta della partizione d'avvio, rendendo impossibile l'esecuzione corretta dell'Avvio Verificato. Le app che richiedono root, inoltre, modificheranno la partizione di sistema, a significare che l'Avvio Verificato dovrebbe rimanere disabilitato. Esporre il root direttamente nell'interfaccia utente, inoltre, incrementa la [superficie d'attacco](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) del tuo dispositivo e potrebbe favorire le vulnerabilità d'[intensificazione del privilegio](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) e aggiramenti della politica di SELinux. @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ opera secondo l'approccio di [filtraggio dei pacchetti](https://en.wikip Non crediamo che i sacrifici di sicurezza effettuati dal rooting di un telefono, valgano i discutibili benefici della privacy di tali app. -## Avvio Verificato +### Install Updates + +È importante non utilizzare una versione di Android arrivata al [termine della sua vita](https://endoflife.date/android). Le più recenti versioni di Android non soltanto ricevono gli aggiornamenti di sicurezza per il sistema operativo, ma anche importanti aggiornamenti di miglioramento della privacy. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. Le app di sistema sono fornite soltanto dall'OEM o dalla distribuzione di Android. + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Protezioni di Sicurezza + +### Avvio Verificato L'[Avvio Verificato](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) è una parte importante del modello di sicurezza di Android. Fornisce protezione dagli attacchi di [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack), la persistenza del malware e assicura che gli aggiornamenti di sicurezza non siano rimuovibili con la [protezione da rollback](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection). @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Sfortunatamente, gli OEM devono supportare l'Avvio Verificato sulla propria dist Inoltre, molti OEM dispongono di un'implementazione corrotta dell'Avvio Verificato, di cui devi essere consapevole, al di là del loro marketing. Ad esempio, i Fairphone 3 e 4 non sono sicuri di default, poiché il [bootloader di fabbrica si fida della chiave di firma AVB pubblica](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). Ciò invalida l'avvio verificato su un dispositivo di fabbrica Fairphone, poiché il sistema avvierà i sistempi operativi Android alternativi (come /e/) [senza alcun avviso](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) sull'utilizzo del sistema operativo personalizzato. -## Aggiornamenti del firmware +### Aggiornamenti del firmware Gli aggiornamenti del firmware sono fondamentali per mantenere la sicurezza e, senza di essi, il tuo dispositivo non può essere sicuro. Gli OEM stipulano accordi di supporto coi propri partner per fornire i componenti closed-source per un periodo di supporto limitato. Questi sono mensilmente riportati nei [Bollettini di Sicurezza di Android](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin). @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ I dispositivi EOL, non più supportati dal produttore del SoC, non possono ricev Fairphone, ad esempio, commercializza i propri prodotti come se ricevessero 6 anni di supporto. Tuttavia, il SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G sul Fairphone 4), ha una data di scadenza considerevolmente più breve. Ciò significa che gli aggiornamenti di sicurezza di quel firmware da Qualcomm per il Fairphone 4 termineranno a settembre 2023, indipendentemente dal fatto che Fairphone continui a rilasciare aggiornamenti di sicurezza del software. -## Versioni di Android - -È importante non utilizzare una versione di Android arrivata al [termine della sua vita](https://endoflife.date/android). Le più recenti versioni di Android non soltanto ricevono gli aggiornamenti di sicurezza per il sistema operativo, ma anche importanti aggiornamenti di miglioramento della privacy. Ad esempio, [prima di Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), qualsiasi app avente l'autorizzazione [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE), poteva accedere ai numeri seriali sensibili e univoci del tuo telefono, quali l'[IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity). il [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), l'[IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity) della tua scheda SIM, mentre ora devono essere le app di sistema a farlo. Le app di sistema sono fornite soltanto dall'OEM o dalla distribuzione di Android. - -## Autorizzazioni di Android +### Autorizzazioni di Android [Le autorizzazioni su Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) ti garantiscono il controllo su quali app hanno accesso. Google apporta [miglioramenti](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) regolari al sistema di autorizzazioni, in ogni nuova versione. Tutte le app che installi sono rigorosamente [testate](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), dunque, non è necessario installare alcuna app di antivirus. @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ Un'app potrebbe richiedere un'autorizzazione per una sua funzionalità specifica Le app che rispettano la privacy come [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) potrebbero mostrare dei tracciatori come [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus.privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). Questa libreria include [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) che può fornire [notifiche push](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) nelle app. Questo [è il caso] (https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) di Bitwarden. Ciò non significa che Bitwarden sta utilizzando tutte le funzionalità analitiche fornite da Google Firebase Analytics. -## Accesso ai media +## Privacy Features -Molte app ti consentono di "condividere" un file con loro, per il caricamento dei media. Se, ad esempio, desideri caricare un'immagine su Twitter, non concedergli l'accesso ai tuoi "media e foto", poiché così avrà accesso a tutte le tue immagini. Piuttosto, apri il tuo gestore dei file (documentsUI), tieni premuta l'immagine, quindi condividila con Twitter. - -## Profili Utente +### Profili Utente I profili utente multipli si trovano in **Impostazioni** → **Sistema** → **Utenti multipli** e sono il metodo più semplice per isolare in Android. Con i profili utente, puoi imporre limitazioni a un profilo specifico, come: effettuare chiamate, utilizzare gli SMS o installare app sul dispositivo. Ogni profilo è crittografato con la sua chiave crittografica e non può accedere ai dati di qualsiasi altro profilo. Anche il proprietario del dispositivo non può visualizzare i dati di altri profili, senza conoscerne la password. I profili utente multipli sono un metodo di isolamento più sicuro. -## Profilo di lavoro +### Profilo di lavoro I [Profili di Lavoro](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) sono un altro metodo per isolare le singole app e potrebbe essere più comodo dei profili utente separati. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ Il profilo di lavoro dipende da un controllore del dispositivo per funzionare. L Questo metodo, generalmente, è meno sicuro di un profilo utente secondario; tuttavia, ti consente la comodità di eseguire le app nei profili lavorativi e personali, simultaneamente. -## Interruttore d'Emergenza per VPN +### Interruttore d'Emergenza per VPN Android 7 e successive supportano un'interruttore d'emergenza per VPN ed è disponibile senza dover installare alcuna app di terze parti. Questa funzionalità può prevenire fughe, se la VPN è disconnessa. Si trova in :gear: **Impostazioni** → **Rete e Internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Blocca connessioni senza VPN**. -## Interruttori globali +### Interruttori globali I dispositivi Androiid moderni dispongono di interruttori globali per disabilitare i servizi Bluetooth e della posizione. Android 12 ha introdotto gli interruttori per la fotocamera e il microfono. Quando non sono iin uso, consigliamo di disabilitare queste funzionalità. Le app non possono utilizzare le funzionalità disabilitate (anche se la singola autorizzazione è concessa), finché non sono riabilitate. -## Google +## Google Services Se utilizzi un dispositivo provvisto dei servizi di Google, il tuo sistema operativo di fabbrica o un sistema operativo che mette in sicurezza Google Play Services, come GrapheneOS, esistono numerose modifiche aggiuntive che puoi effettuare per migliorare la tua privacy. Comunque, consigliamo di evitare interamente i servizi di Google, o di limitare Google Play Services a un profilo dell'utente/di lavoro specifico, combinando un controllore del dispositivo come *Shelter*, con il Google Play di GrapheneOS. diff --git a/i18n/it/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/it/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c2d528d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/it/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Note sulla Privacy + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Blocco di Attivazione + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## Configurazione consigliata + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. Questo livello d'accesso è stato occasionalmente abusato dalle autorità per aggirare il fatto che i tuoi dati sono altrimenti crittografati in sicurezza sul tuo dispositivo e, ovviamente, Apple è vulnerabile alle violazioni di dati, come ogni altra azienda. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). Questa, crittografa praticamente tutti i tuoi dati di iCloud con chiavi memorizzate sui tuoi dispositivi (crittografia end-to-end), piuttosto che sui server di Apple, così che i tuoi dati di iCloud siano protetti nel caso di una violazione di dati, e altrimenti nascosti da Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### Impostazioni + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### Generali + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! warning + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### Privacy + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/it/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/it/os/linux-overview.md index 3f4f5424..d24dec49 100644 --- a/i18n/it/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/it/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux è un sistema operativo desktop, open source, incentrato sulla privacy e alternativo, ma non tutte le distribuzioni sono uguali. --- -Spesso si ritiene che un software [open source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) sia intrinsecamente sicuro, poiché il codice sorgente è disponibile. Ci si aspeetta che la verifica dalla community si verifichi regolarmente; tuttavia, questo non è sempre [il caso](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). Dipende da numerosi fattori, come l'attività del progetto, l'esperienza degli sviluppatori, il livello di rigore applicato alle [revisioni del codice](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review) e a quanto spesso l'attenzione è prestata a parti specifiche della [base di codice](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase), che potrebbe rimanere inalterata per anni. +**Linux** è un sistema operativo per desktop open-source, alternativo e incentrato sulla privacy. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -Al momento, Linux presenta delle aree che potrebbero essere migliorate, rispetto aalle sue controparti proprietarie, es.: - -- Una catena d'avvio verificata, come l'[Avvio Sicuro](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) di Apple (con [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), l'[Avvio Verificato](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) di Android, l'[Avvio verificato](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot) di ChromeOS, o il [processo d'avvio](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) di Microsoft Windows, con [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). Queste funzionalità e tecnologie hardware possono aiutare a prevenire la manomissione persistente da parte di malware o [attacchi di evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack) -- Una forte soluzione di sandboxing, come quella di [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md) e [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Le soluzioni di sandboxing di Linux utilizzate comunemente, come [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) e [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/), hanno ancora molta strada da fare -- Forte [mitigazione degli exploit](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -Nonostante questi svantaggi, le distribuzioni di Linux per desktop sono ottime se desideri: - -- Evitare la telemetria fornita dai sistemi operativi proprietari -- Mantenere la [libertà del software](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- Avere sistemi orientati alla password, come [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) o [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) - -Questa pagina utilizza il termine "Linux" per descrivere le distribuzioni di Linux per desktop. Altri sistemi operativi che utilizzano anch'essi il kernel di Linux, come ChromeOS, Android e Qubes OS non sono discussi qui. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [Consigli su Linux :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Note sulla Privacy + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- Evitare la telemetria fornita dai sistemi operativi proprietari +- Mantenere la [libertà del software](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## Scegliere la tua distribuzione -Non tutte le distribuzioni Linux sono uguali. Sebbene la nostra pagina di consigli su Linux non sia intesa come una fonte autorevole sulla distribuzione che dovresti utilizzare, esistono delle cose che dovresti tenere a mente scegliendo quale distribuzione utilizzare. +Non tutte le distribuzioni Linux sono uguali. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### Ciclo di rilascio Ti consigliamo vivamente di scegliere le distribuzioni che restano vicine alle release stabili a monte del software, spesso note come distribuzioni a rilascio continuo. Questo perché le distribuzioni a rilascio congelato, spesso, non aggiornano le versioni dei pacchetti e restano indietro con gli aggiornamenti di sicurezza. -Per le distribuzioni congelate come [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), i manutentori dei pacchetti dovrebbero effettuare il backport delle patch per correggere le vulnerabilità, piuttosto che portare il software alla "versione successiva", rilasciata dallo sviluppatore a monte. Alcune correzioni di sicurezza [non](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) ricevono affatto un [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (software particolarmente meno diffuso) e, dunque, non arrivano alla distribuzione con questo modello di patch. Di conseguenza, talvolta, le correzioni di sicurezza minori sono rimandate alla versione principale successiva. +Per le distribuzioni congelate come [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), i manutentori dei pacchetti dovrebbero effettuare il backport delle patch per correggere le vulnerabilità, piuttosto che portare il software alla "versione successiva", rilasciata dallo sviluppatore a monte. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. Di conseguenza, talvolta, le correzioni di sicurezza minori sono rimandate alla versione principale successiva. Non crediamo che trattenere i pacchetti e applicare patch provvisorie sia una buona idea, poiché si discosta dal modo in cui lo sviluppatore avrebbe voluto che il software funzionasse. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) ha una presentazione a riguardo: @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ Il modello d'aggiornamento Atomico è utilizzato per le distribuzioni immutabili ### Distribuzioni "Incentrate sulla sicurezza" -Spesso si fa confusione tra distribuzioni "incentrate sulla sicurezza" e distribuzioni di "pentesting". Una rapida ricerca per la "distribuzione Linux più sicura", restituirà spesso risultati come Kali Linux, Black Arch e Parrot OS. Queste distribuzioni sono distribuzioni testate contro la penetrazione offensiva che impacchettano strumenti per testare altri sistemi. Non includono nessuna "ulteriore sicurezza" o mitigazione difensiva intesa per l'utilizzo regolare. +Spesso si fa confusione tra distribuzioni "incentrate sulla sicurezza" e distribuzioni di "pentesting". A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. Queste distribuzioni sono distribuzioni testate contro la penetrazione offensiva che impacchettano strumenti per testare altri sistemi. Non includono nessuna "ulteriore sicurezza" o mitigazione difensiva intesa per l'utilizzo regolare. ### Distribuzioni basate su Arch -Le distribuzioni basate su Arch sono sconsigliate per coloro che sono alle prime armi con Linux, (indipendentemente dalla distribuzione), poiché richiedono una regolare [manuntenzione del sistema](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch non dispone di un meccanismo d'aggiornamento della distribuzione per le scelte software sottostanti. Di conseguenza, devi tenerti aggiornato con le tendenze attuali e adottare tecnologie, a mano a mano che sostituiscono le vecchie pratiche. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. Di conseguenza, devi tenerti aggiornato con le tendenze attuali e adottare tecnologie, a mano a mano che sostituiscono le vecchie pratiche. Per avere un sistema sicuro, si suppone che tu abbia una conoscenza sufficiente di Linux per configurarne adeguatamente la sicurezza, come adottando un sistema di [controllo obbligatorio dell'accesso](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control), configurando liste nere del [modulo del kernel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security), rafforzando la sicurezza dei parametri d'avvio, manipolando i parametri [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) e conoscendo quali componenti necessitano, come [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Chiunque utilizzi la [Repository di Arch User (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **deve** essere a proprio agio nel controllare i PKGBUILD che installano da tale servizio. I pacchetti AUR sono contenuti prodotti dalla community e non sono controllati in alcun modo e, dunque, sono vulnerabili agli attacchi alla catena di distribuzione dei softwre, che, difatti, si sono verificati [in passato](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR dovrebbe sempre essere utilizzato con parsimonia e, spesso, ci sono molti cattivi consigli su varie pagine, che indirizzano le persone a utilizzare ciecamente gli [aiutanti AUR](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers), senza avvertimenti sufficienti. Simili avvertenze si applicano all'utilizzo di Archivi di Pacchetti Personali (PPA) di terze parti sulle distribuzioni basate su Debian, o dei Progetti della Community (COPR) su Fedora. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. I pacchetti AUR sono contenuti prodotti dalla community e non sono controllati in alcun modo e, dunque, sono vulnerabili agli attacchi alla catena di distribuzione dei softwre, che, difatti, si sono verificati [in passato](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -Se hai esperienza con Linux e desideri utilizzare una distribuzione basata su Arch, consigliaamo esclusivamente la linea principale di Arch Linux, non alcuno dei suoi derivati. Sconsigliamo in particolare questi due derivati di Arch: +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Simili avvertenze si applicano all'utilizzo di Archivi di Pacchetti Personali (PPA) di terze parti sulle distribuzioni basate su Debian, o dei Progetti della Community (COPR) su Fedora. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: Questa distribuzione trattiene i pacchetti per 2 settimane per assicurarsi che le proprie modifiche non si corrrompano, non per assicurarsi che, tutto sia stabile a monte. Utilizzando i pacchetti AUR, sono spesso compilati con le [librerie](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) più recenti dalle repository di Arch. - **Garuda**: Utilizza [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) che compila automaticamente e alla cieca i pacchetti da AUR. Non esiste alcun processo di verifica per assicurarsi che i pacchetti di AUR non subiscano attacchi alla catena di distribuzione del software. -### Kicksecure - -Sebbene sconsigliamo vivamente di utilizzare distribuzioni obsolete come Debian, esiste un sistema operativo basato su Debian che è stato reso molto più sicuro delle tipiche distribuzioni Linux: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in breve, è una serie di script, configurazioni e pacchetti che riducono sostanzialmente la superficie di attacco di Debian. Copre di default molti dei consigli sulla privacy e la sicurezza. - ### Distribuzioni del kernel libero di Linux e "Libre" -**Sconsigliamo** vivamente di utilizzare il kernel libero di Linux, poiché [rimuove le mitigazioni di sicurezza](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) e [sopprime gli avvisi del kernel](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846), sul microcodice vulnerabile, per motivi ideologici. +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## Consigli generali @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ Molte delle distribuzioni Linux offrono un opzione nel proprio programma d'insta ### Swap -Considera l'utilizzo della [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) o della [swap crittografata](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption), invece della swap non crittografata, per evitare potenziali problemi di sicurezza dovuti al trasferimento di dati sensibili, allo [spazio di swap](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Le distribuzioni basate su Fedora [utilizzano la ZRAM di default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -Consigliamo l'utilizzo di un ambiente desktop che supporti il protocollo grafico [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)), essendo sviluppato [tenendo a mente](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/) la sicurezza. Il suo predecessore, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), non supporta l'isolamento della GUI, consentendo a tutte le finestre di [registrare lo schermo, registrare e iniettare input in altre finestre](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), rendendo futile ogni tentativo di sandboxing. Sebbene esistano altre opzioni per eseguire X11 nidifcato, quali [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) o [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), queste, spesso presentano delle conseguenze negative sulle prestazioni e non sono facili da configurare e non sono preferibili a Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. Fortunatamente, ambienti comuni come [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), e il gestore di finestre [Sway](https://swaywm.org), supportano Wayland. Alcune distribuzioni come Fedora e Tumbleweed lo utilizzano di default, mentre altre potrebbero farlo in futuro, dato che X11 è in [modalità di manutenzione](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). Se stai utilizzando uno di questi ambienti è molto facile, basta selezionare la sessione “Wayland” nel gestore dello schermo del desktop([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ Fortunatamente, ambienti comuni come [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https ### Firmware Proprietario (Aggiornamenti al Microcodice) -Le distribuzioni di Linux come queste, ovvero [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) o DIY (Arch Linux) non sono fornite con gli aggiornamenti proprietari al [microcodice](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) che, spesso, correggono le vulnerabilità. Alcuni esempi significativi di queste vulnerabilità includono [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), e altre [vulnerabilità hardware](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Alcuni esempi significativi di queste vulnerabilità includono [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), e altre [vulnerabilità hardware](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -Ti **consigliamo vivamente** di installare gli aggiornamenti al microcodice, poiché la tua CPU sta già eseguendo il microcodice proprietario dalla fabbrica. Sia Fedora che openSUSE hanno gli aggiornamenti del microcodice applicati di default. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Sia Fedora che openSUSE hanno gli aggiornamenti del microcodice applicati di default. ### Aggiornamenti Molte distribuzioni di Linux installano automaticamente gli aggiornamenti o ti ricordano di farlo. È importante mantenere aggiornato il sistema operativo, così che il tuo software sia subito corretto, all'individuazione di una vulnerabilità. -Alcune distribuzioni (in particolare quelle mirate agli utenti avanzati) sono più scarne e si aspettano che tu faccia le cose da solo (es., Arch o Debian). Per ricevere gli aggiornamenti di sicurezza importanti, queste richiederanno l'esecuzione del "gestore di pacchetti" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.). +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). Per ricevere gli aggiornamenti di sicurezza importanti, queste richiederanno l'esecuzione del "gestore di pacchetti" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.). Inoltre, alcune distribuzioni non scaricano in automatico gli aggiornamenti del firmware. Per questo, dovrai installare [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd). @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ Inoltre, alcune distribuzioni non scaricano in automatico gli aggiornamenti del ### Casualizzazione dell'Indirizzo MAC -Molte distribuzioni di Linux per desktop (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.), sono dotate di [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), per configurare le impostazioni Ethernet e Wi-Fi. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. È possibile [casualizzre](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) l'[indirizzo MAC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address), utilizzando NetworkManager. Ciò fornisce una privacy lievemente migliore sulle reti Wi-Fi, complicando il tracciamento di dispositivi specifici sulla rete cui sei connesso. [**Non**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) ti rende anonimo. @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ Consigliamo di modificare l'impostazione a **casuale**, invece che a **stabile** Se stai utilizzando [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), dovrai impostare [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=), che abiliterà [RFC 7844 (Profili Anonimi per i Client DHCP)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=). -Non ha molto senso casualizzre l'indirizzo MAC per le connessioni Ethernet, poiché un amministratore di sistema può trovarti osservando la porta che stai utilizzando sul [commutatore di rete](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). La casualizzazione degli indirizzi MAC della Wi-Fi, dipende dal supporto dal firmware della Wi-Fi. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). La casualizzazione degli indirizzi MAC della Wi-Fi, dipende dal supporto dal firmware della Wi-Fi. ### Altri identificatori diff --git a/i18n/it/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/it/os/qubes-overview.md index 4ffe72e6..e0fbd2a3 100644 --- a/i18n/it/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/it/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos description: Qubes è un sistema operativo basato sull'isolamento delle app su macchine virtuali, per una maggiore sicurezza. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) è un sistema operativo che utilizza l'ipervisore [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) per fornire una forte sicurezza per l'informatica desktop, tramite macchine virtuali isolate. Ogni macchina virtuale è chiamata *Qube* e, a ognuna di esse, puoi assegnare un livello di fiducia, basato sul suo scopo. Poiché Qubes OS fornisce la sicurezza tramite l'isolamento e permette le azioni soltanto a seconda del caso, è l'opposto dell'[enumerazione delle minacce](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Ogni macchina virtuale è chiamata *Qube* e, a ognuna di esse, puoi assegnare un livello di fiducia, basato sul suo scopo. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## Come funziona Qubes OS? diff --git a/i18n/it/tools.md b/i18n/it/tools.md index 6fae5b9c..1bbdb0a5 100644 --- a/i18n/it/tools.md +++ b/i18n/it/tools.md @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ Per maggiori dettagli su ogni progetto, sul motivo per cui è stato scelto e su - ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) - ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) - ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure) diff --git a/i18n/ja/desktop.md b/i18n/ja/desktop.md index fc858d0b..a80996e1 100644 --- a/i18n/ja/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/ja/desktop.md @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } @@ -152,33 +152,48 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/). +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! recommendation + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## Criteria -**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! example "This section is new" +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress. - -Our recommended operating systems: - -- Must be open-source. -- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates. -- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- Must support full-disk encryption during installation. -- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. -- Must support a wide variety of hardware. +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/ja/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/ja/os/android-overview.md index 5658949b..11706a12 100644 --- a/i18n/ja/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/ja/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android description: アンドロイドはオープンソースのオペレーティングシステムで、強力なセキュリティ保護が施されている。 --- -Androidは強力な[アプリのサンドボックス](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox)、[確認付きブート](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB)、および堅牢な[パーミッション](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview)制御システムを備えた安全なオペレーティングシステムです。 +![Android logo](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## Androidディストリビューションの選択 +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### Androidディストリビューションの選択 Androidの携帯を購入すると、その端末に標準で搭載されているOSには、 [アンドロイド・オープンソース・プロジェクト](https://source.android.com/)に含まれていないアプリやサービスが侵襲的に統合されていることが多いです。 例えば、Google Playサービスは、あなたのファイル、連絡先ストレージ、通話ログ、SMSメッセージ、位置情報、カメラ、マイク、ハードウェア識別子などにアクセスする取り消し不能な権限を持っています。 これらのアプリやサービスは、あなたのデバイスの攻撃対象を増やし、Androidのプライバシーに関する様々な懸念の原因となっています。 @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Android のカスタムされたディストリビューションを選択する [私たちがお勧めしているAndroidシステム :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## Avoid Rooting +### Avoid Rooting [](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android携帯のルート化は、完全な[Androidセキュリティモデル](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy)を弱めるため、セキュリティを著しく低下させる可能性があります。 これにより、セキュリティが低下し悪用された場合、プライバシーを低下させる可能性があります。 一般的なルーティング方法では、ブートパーティションを直接変更してしまうため、Verified Bootを成功させることは不可能になります。 ルートを必要とするアプリはシステムパーティションを変更するため、確認付きブートは無効のままでなければなりません。 また、ユーザーインターフェースで直接ルートを露出させると、[デバイスの攻撃面](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface)が増加し 、 [権限昇格](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation)の脆弱性やSELinuxポリシーのバイパス を助長する可能性があります。 @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps. -## 確認付きブート +### Install Updates + +It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Security Protections + +### 確認付きブート [確認付きブート](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) は、アンドロイドのセキュリティ・モデルの重要な部分である。 It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection). @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock And Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be aware of beyond their marketing. For example, the Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage. -## Firmware Updates +### Firmware Updates Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin). @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive Fairphone, for example, markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates. -## Android Versions - -It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. - -## Android Permissions +### Android Permissions [Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps. @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ An app may request a permission for a specific feature it has. For example, any Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) may show some trackers such as [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). This library includes [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) which can provide [push notifications](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps. This [is the case](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) with Bitwarden. That doesn't mean that Bitwarden is using all of the analytics features that are provided by Google Firebase Analytics. -## Media Access +## Privacy Features -Quite a few applications allows you to "share" a file with them for media upload. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter. - -## User Profiles +### User Profiles Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android. With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation. -## Work Profile +### Work Profile [Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously. -## VPN Killswitch +### VPN Killswitch Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**. -## Global Toggles +### Global Toggles Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled. -## Google +## Google Services If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play. diff --git a/i18n/ja/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/ja/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0c1876d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/ja/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## プライバシーに関する注意事項 + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### アクティベーションロック + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## Recommended Configuration + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### Settings + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! warning + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### プライバシー + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/ja/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/ja/os/linux-overview.md index e484c466..87e05e77 100644 --- a/i18n/ja/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/ja/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative, but not all distribitions are created equal. --- -It is often believed that [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigor applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years. +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.: - -- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack) -- A strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go -- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are great if you want to: - -- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems -- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- Have privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) - -Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed here. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## プライバシーに関する注意事項 + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems +- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## Choosing your distribution -Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use. +Not all Linux distributions are created equal. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### Release cycle We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates. -For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. +For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this: @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tu ### “Security-focused” distributions -There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. +There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. ### Arch-based distributions -Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically: +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories. - **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks. -### Kicksecure - -While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. - ### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions -We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons. +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## General Recommendations @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS] ### Swap -Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do n ### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates) -Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. ### Updates Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found. -Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd). @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automaticall ### MAC Address Randomization -Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous. @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as sugges If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=). -There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. ### Other Identifiers diff --git a/i18n/ja/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/ja/os/qubes-overview.md index 17b286b9..3ed80dcd 100644 --- a/i18n/ja/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/ja/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within virtual machines for heightened security. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## How does Qubes OS work? diff --git a/i18n/ja/tools.md b/i18n/ja/tools.md index 0ba21091..32a4fe22 100644 --- a/i18n/ja/tools.md +++ b/i18n/ja/tools.md @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b - ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) - ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) - ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure) diff --git a/i18n/ko/desktop.md b/i18n/ko/desktop.md index 98a9ebb2..de40dcf0 100644 --- a/i18n/ko/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/ko/desktop.md @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: 홈페이지](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion 서비스" } @@ -152,33 +152,48 @@ Tails는 재부팅 시마다 완전히 초기화되도록 설계되었습니다. ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. - [:octicons-home-16: 홈페이지](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: 개요](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } - [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="프라이버시 정책" } - [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=문서 } - [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="소스 코드" } - [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=기부 } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/). +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! recommendation + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## 평가 기준 -**Privacy Guides는 권장 목록의 어떠한 프로젝트와도 제휴를 맺지 않았습니다.** 객관적인 권장 목록을 제공하기 위해, [일반적인 평가 기준](about/criteria.md)에 더해 명확한 요구 사항을 정립하였습니다. 어떠한 프로젝트를 선택해 사용하기 전에, 이러한 요구 사항들을 숙지하고 여러분 스스로 조사하는 과정을 거쳐 적절한 선택을 하시기 바랍니다. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! example "이 단락은 최근에 만들어졌습니다" +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - Privacy Guides 팀은 사이트의 모든 항목마다 명확한 평가 기준을 정립하는 중이며, 따라서 세부 내용은 변경될 수 있습니다. 평가 기준에 대해서 질문이 있다면 [포럼에서 문의](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest)하시기 바랍니다. (무언가가 목록에 존재하지 않다고 해서 권장 목록을 작성할 때 고려한 적이 없을 것으로 단정 짓지 마세요.) 권장 목록에 어떤 프로젝트를 추가할 때 고려하고 논의해야 할 요소는 매우 많으며, 모든 요소를 문서화하는 것은 현재 진행 중인 작업입니다. - -Privacy Guides 권장 운영 체제는 다음 조건을 만족해야 합니다: - -- 오픈 소스여야 합니다. -- 소프트웨어 및 Linux 커널 업데이트를 정기적으로 받아야 합니다. -- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- 설치 과정에서 전체 디스크 암호화를 지원해야 합니다. -- 정기 릴리스가 1년 이상 고정되어선 안됩니다. Privacy Guides 데스크톱 사용에 있어서 'LTS(Long Term Support, 장기 지원)'이나 'Stable(안정적인)' 릴리스 배포판을 [권장하지 않습니다](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle). -- 다양한 하드웨어를 지원해야 합니다. +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/ko/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/ko/os/android-overview.md index 29c6aec4..c0b8b4c8 100644 --- a/i18n/ko/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/ko/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android description: Android는 강력한 보안 및 보호 기능을 갖춘 오픈 소스 운영 체제로, 휴대폰에 있어서 최고의 선택입니다. --- -Android는 강력한 [애플리케이션 샌드박스](https://source.android.com/docs/security/app-sandbox?hl=ko), [자체 검사 부팅](https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/verifiedboot?hl=ko)(AVB) 기능과 엄밀한 [권한](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview?hl=ko) 제어 시스템을 갖춘 안전한 운영 체제입니다. +![Android 로고](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## Android 배포판 선택 +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### Android 배포판 선택 여러분이 Android 휴대폰을 새로 구입하면, 기기의 기본 운영체제 내에 [Android 오픈 소스 프로젝트(AOSP)](https://source.android.com/)에 포함되지 않은 앱, 서비스가 강력히 통합되어 있는 경우가 많습니다. 대표적인 예시로는 Google Play 서비스가 있습니다. Google Play 서비스는 파일, 통화 기록, 연락처, 통화 기록, SMS 메시지, 위치, 카메라, 마이크, 하드웨어 식별자 등에 접근할 수 있으며, 이 권한을 빼앗을 수도 없습니다. 이러한 앱, 서비스는 기기의 공격 표면을 증가시키고 Android의 다양한 프라이버시 문제로 이어집니다. @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Android는 강력한 [애플리케이션 샌드박스](https://source.android.co [Android 시스템 권장 사항 :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## 루팅 방지 +### 루팅 방지 Android 휴대폰을 [루팅](https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%EB%A3%A8%ED%8C%85_(%EC%95%88%EB%93%9C%EB%A1%9C%EC%9D%B4%EB%93%9C))할 경우, [전체 Android 보안 모델](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy)이 약화되므로 보안 수준이 크게 저하됩니다. 보안 수준이 낮아져 취약점의 발생으로 이어질 경우 프라이버시 또한 저해됩니다. 루팅은 일반적으로 부팅 파티션을 직접 조작하는 방식으로 이루어지므로, 자체 검사 부팅을 제대로 수행할 수 없습니다. 루트 권한을 요구하는 앱 또한 시스템 파티션을 수정하므로 자체 검사 부팅을 활성화할 수 없습니다. 사용자 인터페이스에서 루트 권한이 직접 노출될 경우 기기의 [공격 표면](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface)이 증가하고 [권한 에스컬레이션](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) 취약성과 SELinux 정책 우회 문제가 발생할 수 있습니다. @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+는 [패킷 필터링](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing) Privacy Guides는 이러한 앱들의 불확실한 프라이버시 보호 효과가 휴대폰을 루팅함으로써 발생하는 보안상의 희생을 감수할 만큼 중요하다고는 생각하지 않습니다. -## 자체 검사 부팅 +### Install Updates + +[지원 기간이 종료된](https://endoflife.date/android) Android 버전은 사용하지 않아야 합니다. 최신 버전 Android에는 운영 체제 보안 업데이트뿐만 아니라, 중요한 프라이버시 강화 업데이트도 포함되어 있습니다. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. 시스템 앱은 OEM이나 Android 배포판에서만 제공됩니다. + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Security Protections + +### 자체 검사 부팅 [자체 검사 부팅(Verified Boot)](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot)은 Android 보안 모델에서 중요한 부분을 차지하고 있습니다. [Evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) 공격, 멀웨어 지속성으로부터 보호하고, [롤백 보호](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection)를 통해 보안 업데이트가 다운그레이드되는 일이 없도록 보장합니다. @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Android 10 이상부터는 기존의 전체 디스크 암호화보다 유연한 또한, OEM 중에는 마케팅과 달리 자체 검사 부팅을 제대로 구현하지 않는 경우도 많으므로 주의해야 합니다. 예시로 Fairphone 3, 4는 [기본 부트로더가 공개 AVB 서명 키를 신뢰하기 때문에](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11), 기본적으로는 안전하지 않습니다. 이 경우 시스템이 커스텀 운영 체제 사용에 대한 [경고 없이](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) 다른 Android 운영 체제(/e/ 등)를 부팅할 수 있으므로, Fairphone은 기본적으로 자체 검사 부팅이 활성화되지 않습니다. -## 펌웨어 업데이트 +### 펌웨어 업데이트 펌웨어 업데이트는 보안에 있어 매우 중요합니다. 펌웨어 업데이트가 없으면 기기 보안을 유지할 수 없습니다. OEM은 자신들의 협력체와 지원 계약을 맺고 제한된 기간 동안 비공개 소스로 된 구성 요소를 제공합니다. 관련 내용은 [Android 보안 게시판](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin)에 자세히 설명되어 있습니다. @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ SoC 제조업체에서 더 이상 지원하지 않는 EOL 기기는 OEM 업체 예시로, Fairphone은 6년의 지원 기간을 제공하는 것으로 홍보합니다. 하지만 SoC(Fairphone 4의 Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G)는 훨씬 짧은 EOL 날짜를 가지고 있습니다. 즉, Fairphone이 계속 소프트웨어 보안 업데이트를 릴리스하더라도, Fairphone 4에 대한 Qualcomm의 펌웨어 보안 업데이트는 2023년 9월에 종료됩니다. -## Android 버전 - -[지원 기간이 종료된](https://endoflife.date/android) Android 버전은 사용하지 않아야 합니다. 최신 버전 Android에는 운영 체제 보안 업데이트뿐만 아니라, 중요한 프라이버시 강화 업데이트도 포함되어 있습니다. 예를 들어, [Android 10 이전](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes?hl=ko)에는 어떤 앱이든 [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) 권한을 가졌다면 [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), SIM 카드 [IMSI](https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%EA%B5%AD%EC%A0%9C_%EB%AA%A8%EB%B0%94%EC%9D%BC_%EA%B0%80%EC%9E%85%EC%9E%90_%EA%B5%AC%EB%B3%84%EC%9E%90) 등 여러분 휴대폰의 민감한 고유 일련 번호에 접근 가능했지만, 현재는 시스템 앱만 가능합니다. 시스템 앱은 OEM이나 Android 배포판에서만 제공됩니다. - -## Android 권한 +### Android 권한 [Andoird에서의 권한](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview)은 앱이 접근 가능한 항목을 여러분이 제어할 수 있는 권한을 부여합니다. Google은 매 버전마다 권한 시스템을 [개선합니다](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions?hl=ko). 여러분이 설치한 모든 앱은 엄격하게 [샌드박스로 격리](https://source.android.com/docs/security/app-sandbox?hl=ko)되어 있으므로, 바이러스 백신 앱은 설치하실 필요가 없습니다. @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ Android 13: [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) 처럼 프라이버시 친화적인 앱에서도 [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/) 등의 일부 추적기가 표시될 수 있습니다. 해당 라이브러리는 앱에서 [푸시 알림](https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%ED%91%B8%EC%8B%9C_%EA%B8%B0%EB%B2%95)을 제공할 수 있는 [Firebase 클라우드 메시징(FCM)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging)이 포함되어 있습니다. Bitwarden이 바로 [이러한 경우](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007)에 해당합니다. Bitwarden에서 Google Firebase Analytics 트래커가 발견됐다는 사실이 Bitwarden에서 Google Firebase Analytics의 모든 분석 기능을 사용한다는 것을 의미하지는 않습니다. -## 미디어 액세스 +## Privacy Features -많은 애플리케이션은 '공유' 기능을 이용해 미디어를 업로드하는 기능을 지원합니다. Twitter에 사진을 트윗하려는 경우로 예를 들면, Twitter가 여러분의 모든 사진에 접근할 수 있도록 하고 싶은 것이 아닌 이상 '미디어 및 사진' 접근 권한을 허용해선 안 됩니다. 대신 파일 관리자(documentsUI)로 이동해, 파일 관리자에서 사진을 길게 터치한 다음 Twitter에 공유하세요. - -## 사용자 프로필 +### 사용자 프로필 여러 사용자 프로필은 Android에서 격리 환경을 가장 간단하게 구축할 수 있는 방법으로, **설정** → **시스템** → **여러 사용자**에서 확인할 수 있습니다. 사용자 프로필 기능을 이용하면 전화 걸기, SMS 사용, 앱 설치 등의 행위를 특정 프로필에서만 제한적으로 수행할 수 있습니다. 각 프로필은 고유한 암호화 키를 사용하여 암호화되며 다른 프로필의 데이터에 접근할 수 없습니다. 기기 소유자라 할지라도 비밀번호를 모르면 다른 프로필의 데이터를 볼 수 없습니다. '여러 사용자 프로필'은 여타 방법보다 더 안전한 격리 방법입니다. -## 직장 프로필 +### 직장 프로필 [직장 프로필](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949)은 개별 앱을 격리하는 방식 중 하나로, 경우에 따라서 별도 사용자 프로필을 사용하는 것보다 편리합니다. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ A **device controller** app such as [Shelter](../android.md#shelter) is required 직장 프로필은 보조 사용자 프로필에 비해 보안성은 떨어집니다. 하지만 개인 프로필과 직장 프로필에서 동시에 앱을 실행할 수 있다는 편리함이 존재합니다. -## VPN 킬 스위치 +### VPN 킬 스위치 Android 7 이상은 외부 앱을 설치할 필요 없이 VPN 킬 스위치를 자체적으로 지원합니다. 해당 기능은 VPN 연결이 끊어졌을 때 유출이 발생하지 않도록 방지할 수 있습니다. :gear: **설정** → **네트워크 및 인터넷** → **VPN** → :gear: → **연결 차단(VPN 제외)**에서 확인할 수 있습니다. -## 전역 제어 +### 전역 제어 최신 Android 기기에는 Bluetooth 및 위치 서비스를 비활성화할 수 있는 전역 제어 기능이 존재합니다. Android 12에는 카메라, 마이크 접근 제어 기능이 도입되었습니다. 해당 기능들을 사용하지 않을 때에는 전역적으로 비활성화해 두는 것을 권장드립니다. 개별 권한이 허가된 앱일지라도 해당 기능 접근이 활성화되기 전까진 접근할 수 없습니다. -## Google +## Google Services 기본 운영 체제를 사용하든 GrapheneOS에서 샌드박스 Google Play 서비스를 사용하든, 기기에서 Google 서비스를 사용하고 있다면 여러 추가 변경 사항을 적용해 프라이버시를 강화할 수 있습니다. 물론, Privacy Guides에서는 '가능하다면' Google 서비스를 아예 사용하지 않거나, Shelter 등의 기기 컨트롤러와 GrapheneOS의 Sandboxed Google Play 기능을 결합해 특정 사용자/업무 프로필로 Google Play 서비스를 제한해서 사용하실 것을 권장드립니다. diff --git a/i18n/ko/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/ko/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0c5b6a1f --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/ko/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Privacy Notes + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Activation Lock + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## 권장 설정 + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### 설정 + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! warning "경고" + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### 프라이버시 + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/ko/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/ko/os/linux-overview.md index 883bce5c..75497a4d 100644 --- a/i18n/ko/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/ko/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative, but not all distribitions are created equal. --- -대부분의 사람들은 [오픈소스 소프트웨어](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software)는 소스가 공개되어 있어 근본적으로 안전하다고 생각합니다. 커뮤니티가 코드를 주기적으로 검증할 것이라고 생각하지만, [꼭 그렇지 않습니다](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). 실제 보안은 프로젝트 활동량, 개발자들의 경험, [코드 리뷰](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review)를 얼마나 엄격하게 하는지, [코드베이스](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase)의 다양한 부분에 얼마나 주의를 기울이는지 등과 같은 다양한 요인에 따라 달라집니다. +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.: - -- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). 이러한 기능과 기술들은 [evil maid 공격](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack)이나 멀웨어로 인한 변조를 막는데 도움을 줍니다. -- [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), [안드로이드](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox)와 같은 운영체제에 탑재된 샌드박스 기술 Linux에서 자주 사용되는 [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html)과 [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) 샌드박스 기술은 아직 발전중입니다. -- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -이런 단점에도 불구하고 다음과 같은 경우에는 Linux를 사용하는 것을 권장합니다: - -- 독점 소프트웨어에 자주 따라오는 데이터 수집을 피하고 싶을 때 -- [자유 소프트웨어](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms)를 사용하고 싶은 경우 -- [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org)나 [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/)와 같은 프라이버시를 중요시하는 운영체제를 사용하고 싶은 경우 - -이 웹사이트에서 사용하는 "Linux"는 주로 데스크탑 Linux 배포판을 가리킵니다. Linux 커널을 사용하지만 ChromeOS, Android, Qubes OS와 같은 타 운영체제는 해당 페이지에서 소개하지 않습니다. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [권장하는 Linux 배포판 :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Privacy Notes + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- 독점 소프트웨어에 자주 따라오는 데이터 수집을 피하고 싶을 때 +- [자유 소프트웨어](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms)를 사용하고 싶은 경우 +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## 배포판 선택하기 -Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use. +Not all Linux distributions are created equal. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### Release cycle We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates. -For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. +For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this: @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tu ### “Security-focused” distributions -There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. +There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. ### Arch-based distributions -Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically: +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories. - **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks. -### Kicksecure - -While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. - ### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions -저희는 Linux-libre 커널을 사용하는 것을 **권장하지 않습니다**. 해당 커널은 이념과 관련된 이유로 [보안 패치를 제거](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released)하고 취약한 코드로 인한 [경고 메세지를 숨깁니다](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846). +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## General Recommendations @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS] ### Swap -Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do n ### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates) -Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. ### Updates Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found. -Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd). @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automaticall ### MAC Address Randomization -Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous. @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as sugges If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=). -There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. ### Other Identifiers diff --git a/i18n/ko/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/ko/os/qubes-overview.md index 17b286b9..3ed80dcd 100644 --- a/i18n/ko/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/ko/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within virtual machines for heightened security. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## How does Qubes OS work? diff --git a/i18n/ko/tools.md b/i18n/ko/tools.md index 000cfffa..ac928f64 100644 --- a/i18n/ko/tools.md +++ b/i18n/ko/tools.md @@ -442,14 +442,15 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
-- ![Qubes OS 로고](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ .twemoji } [Qubes OS (Xen VM 배포판)](desktop.md#qubes-os) -- ![Fedora 로고](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-workstation.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Workstation](desktop.md#fedora-workstation) -- ![openSUSE Tumbleweed 로고](assets/img/linux-desktop/opensuse-tumbleweed.svg){ .twemoji } [OpenSUSE Tumbleweed](desktop.md#opensuse-tumbleweed) -- ![Arch 로고](assets/img/linux-desktop/archlinux.svg){ .twemoji } [Arch Linux](desktop.md#arch-linux) -- ![Fedora Silverblue 로고](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-silverblue.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Silverblue & Kinoite](desktop.md#fedora-silverblue) -- ![nixOS 로고](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) -- ![Whonix 로고](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) -- ![Tails 로고](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ .twemoji } [Qubes OS (Xen VM Distribution)](desktop.md#qubes-os) +- ![Fedora logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-workstation.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Workstation](desktop.md#fedora-workstation) +- ![openSUSE Tumbleweed logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/opensuse-tumbleweed.svg){ .twemoji } [OpenSUSE Tumbleweed](desktop.md#opensuse-tumbleweed) +- ![Arch logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/archlinux.svg){ .twemoji } [Arch Linux](desktop.md#arch-linux) +- ![Fedora Silverblue logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-silverblue.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Silverblue & Kinoite](desktop.md#fedora-silverblue) +- ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) +- ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) +- ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure)
diff --git a/i18n/ku-IQ/desktop.md b/i18n/ku-IQ/desktop.md index 94a6b93f..0120c600 100644 --- a/i18n/ku-IQ/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/ku-IQ/desktop.md @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } @@ -152,33 +152,48 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/). +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! recommendation + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## Criteria -**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! example "This section is new" +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress. - -Our recommended operating systems: - -- Must be open-source. -- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates. -- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- Must support full-disk encryption during installation. -- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. -- Must support a wide variety of hardware. +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/ku-IQ/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/ku-IQ/os/android-overview.md index d0c88ecb..bffa9e33 100644 --- a/i18n/ku-IQ/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/ku-IQ/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android description: Android is an open-source operating system with strong security protections, which makes it our top choice for phones. --- -Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. +![Android logo](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## Choosing an Android Distribution +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### Choosing an Android Distribution When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has irrevocable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android. @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that [Our Android System Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## Avoid Rooting +### Avoid Rooting [Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses. @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps. -## Verified Boot +### Install Updates + +It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Security Protections + +### Verified Boot [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection). @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock And Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be aware of beyond their marketing. For example, the Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage. -## Firmware Updates +### Firmware Updates Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin). @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive Fairphone, for example, markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates. -## Android Versions - -It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. - -## Android Permissions +### Android Permissions [Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps. @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ An app may request a permission for a specific feature it has. For example, any Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) may show some trackers such as [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). This library includes [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) which can provide [push notifications](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps. This [is the case](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) with Bitwarden. That doesn't mean that Bitwarden is using all of the analytics features that are provided by Google Firebase Analytics. -## Media Access +## Privacy Features -Quite a few applications allows you to "share" a file with them for media upload. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter. - -## User Profiles +### User Profiles Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android. With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation. -## Work Profile +### Work Profile [Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously. -## VPN Killswitch +### VPN Killswitch Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**. -## Global Toggles +### Global Toggles Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled. -## Google +## Google Services If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play. diff --git a/i18n/ku-IQ/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/ku-IQ/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4dee83e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/ku-IQ/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Privacy Notes + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Activation Lock + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## Recommended Configuration + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### Settings + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! warning + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### Privacy + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/ku-IQ/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/ku-IQ/os/linux-overview.md index e484c466..656f95a8 100644 --- a/i18n/ku-IQ/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/ku-IQ/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative, but not all distribitions are created equal. --- -It is often believed that [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigor applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years. +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.: - -- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack) -- A strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go -- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are great if you want to: - -- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems -- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- Have privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) - -Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed here. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Privacy Notes + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems +- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## Choosing your distribution -Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use. +Not all Linux distributions are created equal. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### Release cycle We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates. -For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. +For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this: @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tu ### “Security-focused” distributions -There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. +There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. ### Arch-based distributions -Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically: +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories. - **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks. -### Kicksecure - -While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. - ### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions -We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons. +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## General Recommendations @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS] ### Swap -Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do n ### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates) -Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. ### Updates Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found. -Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd). @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automaticall ### MAC Address Randomization -Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous. @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as sugges If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=). -There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. ### Other Identifiers diff --git a/i18n/ku-IQ/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/ku-IQ/os/qubes-overview.md index 17b286b9..3ed80dcd 100644 --- a/i18n/ku-IQ/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/ku-IQ/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within virtual machines for heightened security. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## How does Qubes OS work? diff --git a/i18n/ku-IQ/tools.md b/i18n/ku-IQ/tools.md index 3fac08af..7cb493af 100644 --- a/i18n/ku-IQ/tools.md +++ b/i18n/ku-IQ/tools.md @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b - ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) - ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) - ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure) diff --git a/i18n/nl/desktop.md b/i18n/nl/desktop.md index ef5a73cd..8aa760b3 100644 --- a/i18n/nl/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/nl/desktop.md @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Nix is een source-based package manager; als er geen pre-built beschikbaar is in ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** is gebaseerd op [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), een op beveiliging gerichte vork van Debian. Het is gefocust op privacy, veiligheid en anonimiteit op het internet te bieden. Whonix wordt het best gebruikt in combinatie met [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. Het is gefocust op privacy, veiligheid en anonimiteit op het internet te bieden. Whonix wordt het best gebruikt in combinatie met [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } @@ -150,33 +150,48 @@ Het is de bedoeling dat Tails zichzelf volledig reset na elke herstart. Een vers ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes OS** is een open-source besturingssysteem ontworpen om sterke beveiliging te bieden voor desktop computergebruik. Qubes is gebaseerd op Xen, het X Window System, en Linux, en kan de meeste Linux-toepassingen draaien en de meeste Linux-stuurprogramma's gebruiken. + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes is gebaseerd op Xen, het X Window System, en Linux, en kan de meeste Linux-toepassingen draaien en de meeste Linux-stuurprogramma's gebruiken. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } } - [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }. - [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentatie }. - [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Broncode" }. - [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Bijdragen } + [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS is een op Xen gebaseerd besturingssysteem dat bedoeld is om sterke beveiliging te bieden voor desktopcomputers via beveiligde virtuele machines (VM's), ook bekend als *Qubes*. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -Het besturingssysteem Qubes beveiligt de computer door subsystemen (bijv. netwerken, USB, enz.) en applicaties in afzonderlijke VM 's te isoleren. Als een deel van het systeem wordt gecompromitteerd, zal de extra isolatie waarschijnlijk de rest van het systeem beschermen. Zie voor meer details de Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/). +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! recommendation + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. Het dekt standaard een heleboel aanbevelingen voor privacy en hardening. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## Criteria -**Wij zijn niet verbonden aan de projecten die wij aanbevelen.** Naast [onze standaardcriteria](about/criteria.md)hebben wij een duidelijke reeks eisen ontwikkeld om objectieve aanbevelingen te kunnen doen. Wij stellen voor dat je jezelf vertrouwd maakt met deze lijst voordat je een project kiest, en jouw eigen onderzoek uitvoert om er zeker van te zijn dat je de juiste keuze maakt. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! example "Deze sectie is nieuw" +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - We werken aan het vaststellen van gedefinieerde criteria voor elk deel van onze site, en dit kan onderhevig zijn aan verandering. Als je vragen hebt over onze criteria, stel ze dan [op ons forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) en neem niet aan dat we iets niet in overweging hebben genomen bij het opstellen van onze aanbevelingen als het hier niet vermeld staat. Er zijn veel factoren die worden overwogen en besproken wanneer wij een project aanbevelen, en het documenteren van elke factor is een werk in uitvoering. - -Onze aanbevolen besturingssystemen: - -- Moet open-source zijn. -- Moet regelmatig software en Linux kernel updates ontvangen. -- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- Moet tijdens de installatie volledige schijfversleuteling ondersteunen. -- Mag regelmatige releases niet langer dan 1 jaar bevriezen. Wij [raden](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" of "stabiele" distro-uitgaven niet aan voor desktopgebruik. -- Moet een grote verscheidenheid aan hardware ondersteunen. +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/nl/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/nl/os/android-overview.md index 365b722d..06ab1d15 100644 --- a/i18n/nl/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/nl/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android description: Android is een open-source besturingssysteem met sterke beveiliging, waardoor het onze topkeuze is voor telefoons. --- -Android is een veilig besturingssysteem met sterke [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), en een robuust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. +![Android logo](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## Het kiezen van een Android distributie +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### Het kiezen van een Android distributie Wanneer je een Androidtelefoon koopt, wordt het standaardbesturingssysteem van het toestel vaak geleverd met een indringende integratie met apps en diensten die geen deel uitmaken van het [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). Een voorbeeld hiervan zijn Google Play Services, die onherroepelijke rechten heeft om toegang te krijgen tot jouw bestanden, contactenopslag, oproeplogs, sms-berichten, locatie, camera, microfoon, hardware-identificaties, enzovoort. Deze apps en diensten vergroten het aanvalsoppervlak van jouw toestel en zijn de bron van diverse privacyproblemen met Android. @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Idealiter, wanneer je een aangepaste Android distributie kiest, moet je ervoor z [Onze Android Systeemaanbevelingen :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## Rooting vermijden +### Rooting vermijden [Rooten van](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android-telefoons kan de veiligheid aanzienlijk verminderen omdat het het volledige [Android beveiligingsmodel verzwakt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). Dit kan de privacy verminderen mocht er een exploit zijn die door de verminderde beveiliging wordt geholpen. Bij veelgebruikte rootingmethoden wordt rechtstreeks met de opstartpartitie geknoeid, waardoor het onmogelijk is om een succesvolle Verified Boot uit te voeren. Apps die root vereisen zullen ook de systeempartitie wijzigen, wat betekent dat Verified Boot uitgeschakeld zou moeten blijven. Als root direct in de gebruikersinterface wordt blootgesteld, wordt ook het [aanvalsoppervlak](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) van jouw apparaat vergroot en kan het helpen bij [privilege-escalatie](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) kwetsbaarheden en omzeilen van SELinux-beleidslijnen. @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ werkt op basis van de [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F Wij geloven niet dat de veiligheidsoffers die gemaakt worden door het rooten van een telefoon, de twijfelachtige privacyvoordelen van die apps waard zijn. -## Geverifieerde boot +### Install Updates + +Het is belangrijk om geen [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) versie van Android te gebruiken. Nieuwere versies van Android krijgen niet alleen beveiligingsupdates voor het besturingssysteem, maar ook belangrijke updates die privacy verbeteren. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. Systeem-apps worden alleen geleverd door de OEM of de Android-distributie. + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Security Protections + +### Geverifieerde boot [Geverifieerde Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is een belangrijk onderdeel van het Android-beveiligingsmodel. Het biedt bescherming tegen [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) aanvallen, malware persistentie, en zorgt ervoor dat beveiligingsupdates niet kunnen worden gedowngraded met [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection). @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ OEM's zijn helaas alleen verplicht om de verspreiding van geverifieerde Boot op Veel OEM's hebben ook een gebroken uitvoering van Verified Boot waar je je bewust van moet zijn buiten hun marketing. De Fairphone 3 en 4 zijn bijvoorbeeld standaard niet veilig, aangezien de [standaard bootloader vertrouwt op de publieke AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). Dit breekt geverifieerd opstarten op een standaard Fairphone toestel, omdat het systeem alternatieve Android besturingssystemen zoals (zoals /e/) [zal opstarten zonder enige waarschuwing](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) over aangepast besturingssysteem gebruik. -## Firmware-updates +### Firmware-updates Firmware-updates zijn van cruciaal belang voor het behoud van de veiligheid en zonder deze updates kan uw toestel niet veilig zijn. OEM's hebben ondersteuningsovereenkomsten met hun partners om de closed-source componenten voor een beperkte ondersteuningsperiode te leveren. Deze worden gedetailleerd beschreven in de maandelijkse [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin). @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ EOL-apparaten die niet langer door de SoC-fabrikant worden ondersteund, kunnen g Fairphone, bijvoorbeeld, brengt hun toestellen op de markt met een ondersteuning van 6 jaar. De SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G op de Fairphone 4) heeft echter een aanzienlijk kortere EOL-datum. Dit betekent dat de firmware-beveiligingsupdates van Qualcomm voor de Fairphone 4 in september 2023 aflopen, ongeacht of Fairphone doorgaat met het uitbrengen van software-beveiligingsupdates. -## Android-versies - -Het is belangrijk om geen [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) versie van Android te gebruiken. Nieuwere versies van Android krijgen niet alleen beveiligingsupdates voor het besturingssysteem, maar ook belangrijke updates die privacy verbeteren. Bijvoorbeeld, [vóór Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) konden alle apps met de toestemming [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) toegang krijgen tot gevoelige en unieke serienummers van uw telefoon, zoals [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), en uw SIM-kaart [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity). Nu moeten dat systeem-apps zijn om dit te kunnen doen. Systeem-apps worden alleen geleverd door de OEM of de Android-distributie. - -## Android-machtigingen +### Android-machtigingen [Machtigingen op Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) geven je controle over waar apps toegang tot toe krijgen. Google brengt regelmatig [verbeteringen aan](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) in het machtigingssysteem in elke opeenvolgende versie. Alle apps die je installeert zijn strikt [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), daarom is het niet nodig om antivirus apps te installeren. @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ Een app kan een toestemming vragen voor een specifieke functie die hij heeft. Bi Privacy-vriendelijke apps zoals [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) kunnen sommige trackers tonen zoals [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). Deze bibliotheek bevat [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) die [pushmeldingen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps kan bieden. Dit [is het geval](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) met Bitwarden. Dat betekent niet dat Bitwarden alle analysefuncties gebruikt die Google Firebase Analytics biedt. -## Mediatoegang +## Privacy Features -Heel wat toepassingen laten je toe een bestand te "delen" met hen voor het uploaden van media. Als je bijvoorbeeld een foto naar Twitter wilt tweeten, geef Twitter dan geen toegang tot jouw "media en foto's", want dan heeft het toegang tot al jouw foto's. Ga in plaats daarvan naar je bestandsbeheerder (documentsUI), houd de foto vast en deel hem dan met Twitter. - -## Gebruikers Profielen +### Gebruikers Profielen Meervoudige gebruikersprofielen zijn te vinden in **Instellingen** → **Systeem** → **Meervoudige gebruikers** en zijn de eenvoudigste manier om te isoleren in Android. Met gebruikersprofielen kun je beperkingen opleggen aan een specifiek profiel, zoals: bellen, sms'en of apps installeren op het toestel. Elk profiel wordt versleuteld met zijn eigen versleutelingscode en heeft geen toegang tot de gegevens van andere profielen. Zelfs de eigenaar van het apparaat kan de gegevens van andere profielen niet bekijken zonder hun wachtwoord te kennen. Meervoudige gebruikersprofielen zijn een veiligere methode van isolatie. -## Werkprofiel +### Werkprofiel [Werkprofielen](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) zijn een andere manier om afzonderlijke apps te isoleren en kunnen handiger zijn dan afzonderlijke gebruikersprofielen. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ Het werkprofiel is afhankelijk van een apparaatcontroller om te kunnen functione Deze methode is over het algemeen minder veilig dan een secundair gebruikersprofiel; het biedt je echter wel het gemak dat je tegelijkertijd apps kunt uitvoeren in zowel het werk- als het persoonlijke profiel. -## VPN Killswitch +### VPN Killswitch Android 7 en hoger ondersteunt een VPN killswitch en het is beschikbaar zonder de noodzaak om apps van derden te installeren. Deze functie kan lekken voorkomen als de VPN wordt verbroken. Het kan gevonden worden in :gear: **Instellingen** → **Netwerk & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Blokkeer verbindingen zonder VPN**. -## Globale schakelaars +### Globale schakelaars Moderne Android-toestellen hebben globale toggles voor het uitschakelen van Bluetooth en locatiediensten. Android 12 introduceerde toggles voor de camera en microfoon. Wanneer u deze functies niet gebruikt, raden wij je aan ze uit te schakelen. Apps kunnen geen gebruik maken van uitgeschakelde functies (zelfs niet als daarvoor individuele toestemming is verleend) totdat ze weer zijn ingeschakeld. -## Google +## Google Services Als je een apparaat gebruikt met Google-diensten, hetzij ujouw standaard besturingssysteem of een besturingssysteem dat Google Play Services veilig sandboxed zoals GrapheneOS, zijn er een aantal extra wijzigingen die je kunt aanbrengen om jouw privacy te verbeteren. We raden nog steeds aan om Google diensten volledig te vermijden, of om Google Play diensten te beperken tot een specifiek gebruiker/werkprofiel door een apparaatcontroller zoals *Shelter* te combineren met GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play. diff --git a/i18n/nl/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/nl/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2a1fd730 --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/nl/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Privacy Notes + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Activation Lock + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## Aanbevolen configuratie + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### Instellingen + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! warning + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### Privacy + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/nl/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/nl/os/linux-overview.md index 81f2a60e..99a89d75 100644 --- a/i18n/nl/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/nl/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux is een open-source, privacy-gericht desktop besturingssysteem alternatief, maar niet alle distributies zijn gelijk. --- -Vaak wordt aangenomen dat [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software inherent veilig is omdat de broncode beschikbaar is. Er wordt verwacht dat er regelmatig communautaire verificatie plaatsvindt; dit is echter niet altijd [het geval](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). Het hangt af van een aantal factoren, zoals de activiteit van het project, de ervaring van de ontwikkelaar, de striktheid waarmee [code wordt gereviewd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), en hoe vaak aandacht wordt besteed aan specifieke delen van de [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) die misschien jarenlang onaangeroerd zijn gebleven. +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -Op dit moment heeft desktop GNU/Linux enkele gebieden die beter zouden kunnen dan hun propriëtaire tegenhangers, bijv.: - -- Een geverifieerde opstartketen, in tegenstelling tot Apple's [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (met [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android's [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) of Microsoft Windows's [opstartproces](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) met [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). Deze voorzieningen en hardwaretechnologieën kunnen allemaal helpen om aanhoudende sabotage door malware of [evil maid attacks te voorkomen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack) -- Sterke sandboxing-oplossing zoals die welke te vinden is in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), en [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Veelgebruikte Linux sandboxing oplossingen zoals [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) en [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) hebben nog een lange weg te gaan -- Sterke [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -Ondanks deze nadelen zijn desktop GNU/Linux distributies geweldig als je dat wilt: - -- Vermijd telemetrie die vaak gepaard gaat met propriëtaire besturingssystemen -- Handhaving van [softwarevrijheid](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- Hebben speciaal gebouwde systemen zoals [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) of [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) - -Op onze website wordt de term "Linux" doorgaans gebruikt om desktop GNU/Linux-distributies te beschrijven. Andere besturingssystemen die ook de Linux-kernel gebruiken, zoals ChromeOS, Android en Qubes OS, worden hier niet besproken. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [Onze Linux-aanbevelingen :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Privacy Notes + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- Vermijd telemetrie die vaak gepaard gaat met propriëtaire besturingssystemen +- Handhaving van [softwarevrijheid](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## Uw distributie kiezen -Niet alle Linux-distributies zijn gelijk geschapen. Hoewel onze Linux-aanbevelingspagina niet bedoeld is als een gezaghebbende bron over welke distributie je zou moeten gebruiken, zijn er een paar dingen die je in gedachten moet houden bij het kiezen van de distributie die je wilt gebruiken. +Niet alle Linux-distributies zijn gelijk geschapen. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### Vrijgave cyclus Wij raden je ten zeerste aan distributies te kiezen die dicht bij de stabiele upstream software releases blijven, vaak aangeduid als rolling release distributies. Dit komt omdat distributies met een bevroren releasecyclus vaak de pakketversies niet bijwerken en achterlopen op beveiligingsupdates. -Voor bevroren distributies wordt van pakketbeheerders verwacht dat ze patches backporteren om kwetsbaarheden te verhelpen (Debian is zo'n [voorbeeld](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling)) in plaats van de software aan te passen aan de "volgende versie" die door de upstream-ontwikkelaar wordt uitgebracht. Sommige beveiligingsfixes [krijgen](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) helemaal geen [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (vooral minder populaire software) en komen daarom niet in de distributie met dit patchingmodel. Als gevolg daarvan worden kleine beveiligingsupdates soms uitgesteld tot de volgende grote release. +Voor bevroren distributies wordt van pakketbeheerders verwacht dat ze patches backporteren om kwetsbaarheden te verhelpen (Debian is zo'n [voorbeeld](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling)) in plaats van de software aan te passen aan de "volgende versie" die door de upstream-ontwikkelaar wordt uitgebracht. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. Als gevolg daarvan worden kleine beveiligingsupdates soms uitgesteld tot de volgende grote release. Wij geloven niet dat het een goed idee is om pakketten tegen te houden en tussentijdse patches toe te passen, aangezien dit afwijkt van de manier waarop de ontwikkelaar de software bedoeld zou kunnen hebben. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) heeft hier een presentatie over: @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ De Atomic update methode wordt gebruikt voor immutable distributies zoals Silver ### "Beveiligingsgerichte" distributies -Er bestaat vaak enige verwarring over "op veiligheid gerichte" distributies en "pentesting"-distributies. Een snelle zoekactie naar "de veiligste Linux-distributie" levert vaak resultaten op als Kali Linux, Black Arch en Parrot OS. Deze distributies zijn offensieve penetratietestdistributies die hulpmiddelen bundelen voor het testen van andere systemen. Ze bevatten geen "extra beveiliging" of defensieve maatregelen voor normaal gebruik. +Er bestaat vaak enige verwarring over "op veiligheid gerichte" distributies en "pentesting"-distributies. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. Deze distributies zijn offensieve penetratietestdistributies die hulpmiddelen bundelen voor het testen van andere systemen. Ze bevatten geen "extra beveiliging" of defensieve maatregelen voor normaal gebruik. ### Arch-gebaseerde distributies -Arch-gebaseerde distributies worden niet aanbevolen voor mensen die nieuw zijn met Linux, ongeacht de distributie. Arch heeft geen distributie update mechanisme voor de onderliggende software keuzes. Als gevolg daarvan moet je op de hoogte blijven van de huidige trends en technologieën overnemen naarmate deze oudere praktijken verdringen. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. Als gevolg daarvan moet je op de hoogte blijven van de huidige trends en technologieën overnemen naarmate deze oudere praktijken verdringen. Voor een veilig systeem wordt ook verwacht dat je voldoende Linux kennis hebt om de beveiliging van hun systeem goed in te stellen, zoals het aannemen van een [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) systeem, het opzetten van [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, het harden van boot parameters, het manipuleren van [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, en weten welke componenten ze nodig hebben zoals [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Iedereen die gebruik maakt van de [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **moet zich** comfortabel voelen bij het auditen van PKGBUILDs die ze vanuit die service installeren. AUR-pakketten zijn door de gemeenschap geproduceerde inhoud en worden op geen enkele manier doorgelicht, en zijn daarom kwetsbaar voor aanvallen op de softwareketen, wat in het verleden inderdaad is gebeurd [](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR moet altijd met mate worden gebruikt en vaak is er veel slecht advies op verschillende pagina's die mensen zonder voldoende waarschuwing opdragen om blindelings [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) te gebruiken. Vergelijkbare waarschuwingen gelden voor het gebruik van Personal Package Archives (PPA's) van derden op Debian gebaseerde distributies of Community Projects (COPR) op Fedora. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR-pakketten zijn door de gemeenschap geproduceerde inhoud en worden op geen enkele manier doorgelicht, en zijn daarom kwetsbaar voor aanvallen op de softwareketen, wat in het verleden inderdaad is gebeurd [](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -Als je ervaring hebt met Linux en een Arch-gebaseerde distributie wilt gebruiken, raden wij alleen Arch Linux zelf aan, niet een van zijn afgeleiden. Wij raden deze twee Arch-derivaten specifiek af: +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Vergelijkbare waarschuwingen gelden voor het gebruik van Personal Package Archives (PPA's) van derden op Debian gebaseerde distributies of Community Projects (COPR) op Fedora. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: Deze distributie houdt pakketten 2 weken achter om er zeker van te zijn dat hun eigen veranderingen niet kapot gaan, niet om er zeker van te zijn dat upstream stabiel is. Wanneer AUR pakketten worden gebruikt, worden ze vaak gebouwd tegen de laatste [bibliotheken](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) uit Arch's repositories. - **Garuda**: Zij gebruiken [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) die automatisch en blindelings pakketten compileert uit de AUR. Er is geen verificatieproces om ervoor te zorgen dat de AUR-pakketten niet te lijden hebben van aanvallen op de toeleveringsketen. -### Kicksecure - -Hoewel we sterk afraden om verouderde distributies zoals Debian te gebruiken, als je besluit om het te gebruiken, stellen we voor dat je [](https://www. kicksecure. com/wiki/Debian) omzet in [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure is, in oversimplistische termen, een verzameling scripts, configuraties en pakketten die het aanvalsoppervlak van Debian aanzienlijk verkleinen. Het dekt standaard een heleboel aanbevelingen voor privacy en hardening. - ### Linux-libre kernel en "Libre" distributies -We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons. +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## Algemene aanbevelingen @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ De meeste Linux-distributies hebben een optie in het installatieprogramma om [LU ### Wissel -Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Op Fedora gebaseerde distributies [gebruiken standaard ZRAM](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -We raden aan een desktopomgeving te gebruiken die het [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) weergaveprotocol ondersteunt, aangezien het ontwikkeld is met beveiliging [in gedachten](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Zijn voorganger, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), ondersteunt geen GUI isolatie, waardoor alle vensters [scherm kunnen opnemen, loggen en invoer injecteren in andere vensters](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), waardoor elke poging tot sandboxing zinloos wordt. Hoewel er opties zijn om geneste X11 te doen, zoals [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) of [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), komen ze vaak met negatieve prestatiegevolgen en zijn ze niet handig op te zetten en hebben ze geen voorkeur boven Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. Gelukkig hebben veelgebruikte omgevingen zoals [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), en de window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) ondersteuning voor Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). Als je een van deze omgevingen gebruikt is het zo eenvoudig als het selecteren van de "Wayland" sessie bij de desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ Wij raden **aan tegen** door desktop omgevingen of window managers te gebruiken ### Eigen firmware (Microcode Updates) -Linux-distributies zoals die van [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) of DIY (Arch Linux) worden niet geleverd met de propriëtaire [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates die vaak kwetsbaarheden patchen. Enkele opmerkelijke voorbeelden van deze kwetsbaarheden zijn [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), en andere [hardwarekwetsbaarheden](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Enkele opmerkelijke voorbeelden van deze kwetsbaarheden zijn [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), en andere [hardwarekwetsbaarheden](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -Wij **bevelen** ten zeerste aan dat je de microcode-updates installeert, aangezien jouw CPU al vanaf de fabriek op de eigen microcode draait. Fedora en openSUSE hebben beide standaard de microcode updates toegepast. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora en openSUSE hebben beide standaard de microcode updates toegepast. ### Updates De meeste Linux-distributies zullen automatisch updates installeren of u eraan herinneren om dat te doen. Het is belangrijk om jouw besturingssysteem up-to-date te houden, zodat jouw software wordt gepatcht wanneer een kwetsbaarheid wordt gevonden. -Sommige distributies (vooral die gericht zijn op gevorderde gebruikers) zijn aan de kale kant en verwachten dat je dingen zelf doet (bijvoorbeeld Arch of Debian). Hiervoor moet de "pakketbeheerder" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, enz.) handmatig worden uitgevoerd om belangrijke beveiligingsupdates te ontvangen. +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). Hiervoor moet de "pakketbeheerder" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, enz.) handmatig worden uitgevoerd om belangrijke beveiligingsupdates te ontvangen. Bovendien downloaden sommige distributies firmware-updates niet automatisch. Daarvoor moet je [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd)installeren. @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ Bovendien downloaden sommige distributies firmware-updates niet automatisch. Daa ### MAC-adres randomisatie -Veel desktop Linux distributies (Fedora, openSUSE, enz.) worden geleverd met [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), om Ethernet en Wi-Fi instellingen te configureren. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. Het is mogelijk om [te randomiseren](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) het [MAC adres](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) bij gebruik van NetworkManager. Dit zorgt voor wat meer privacy op Wi-Fi-netwerken, omdat het moeilijker wordt specifieke apparaten op het netwerk waarmee u verbonden bent, te traceren. Het doet [**niet**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) maakt je anoniem. @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ Wij raden aan de instelling te wijzigen in **random** in plaats van **stable**, Als je [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components)gebruikt, moet je [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) instellen, waardoor [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=)wordt ingeschakeld. -Het heeft niet veel zin om het MAC-adres voor Ethernetverbindingen te randomiseren, aangezien een systeembeheerder je kan vinden door te kijken naar de poort die je gebruikt op de [netwerkswitch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Het willekeurig maken van Wi-Fi MAC-adressen hangt af van de ondersteuning door de firmware van de Wi-Fi. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Het willekeurig maken van Wi-Fi MAC-adressen hangt af van de ondersteuning door de firmware van de Wi-Fi. ### Andere identificatiemiddelen diff --git a/i18n/nl/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/nl/os/qubes-overview.md index 8e51575c..2ada7407 100644 --- a/i18n/nl/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/nl/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos description: Qubes is een besturingssysteem dat apps isoleert binnen virtuele machines voor een betere beveiliging. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is een besturingssysteem dat gebruik maakt van de [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor om sterke beveiliging te bieden voor desktop computing via geïsoleerde virtuele machines. Elke VM wordt een *Qube* genoemd en je kunt elke Qube een vertrouwensniveau toewijzen op basis van het doel ervan. Omdat Qubes OS beveiliging biedt door isolatie te gebruiken en alleen acties per geval toe te staan, is dit het tegenovergestelde van [slechtheids opsomming](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Elke VM wordt een *Qube* genoemd en je kunt elke Qube een vertrouwensniveau toewijzen op basis van het doel ervan. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## Hoe werkt Qubes OS? diff --git a/i18n/nl/tools.md b/i18n/nl/tools.md index d7f0f68a..06d90791 100644 --- a/i18n/nl/tools.md +++ b/i18n/nl/tools.md @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ Wij [bevelen](dns.md#recommended-providers) een aantal versleutelde DNS servers - ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) - ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) - ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure) diff --git a/i18n/pl/desktop.md b/i18n/pl/desktop.md index 7dba911b..25a947f8 100644 --- a/i18n/pl/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/pl/desktop.md @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } @@ -152,33 +152,48 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/). +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! rekomendacja + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## Criteria -**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! example "This section is new" +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress. - -Our recommended operating systems: - -- Must be open-source. -- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates. -- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- Must support full-disk encryption during installation. -- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. -- Must support a wide variety of hardware. +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/pl/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/pl/os/android-overview.md index dc944c7c..54d0f010 100644 --- a/i18n/pl/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/pl/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: fontawesome/brands/android description: Android is an open-source operating system with strong security protections, which makes it our top choice for phones. --- -Android to bezpieczny system operacyjny, który posiada silną [izolację aplikacji](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Weryfikację rozruchu](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), oraz solidny system kontroli [uprawnień](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview). +![Android logo](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## Wybór dystrybucji Androida +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### Wybór dystrybucji Androida System Android na zakupionym telefonie często zawiera zintegrowane inwazyjne aplikacje oraz usługi, które nie są częścią [Android Open Source Project](https://source.android.com/). Jedną z nich są Usługi Google Play, która ma niezbywalne uprawnienia dostępu do Twoich plików, magazynu kontaktów, rejestru połączeń, wiadomości SMS, lokalizacji, aparatu, mikrofonu, identyfikatorów sprzętowych oraz wiele więcej. Te aplikacje i usługi zwiększają możliwości ataku na Twoje urządzenie oraz są źródłem wielu obaw związanych z prywatnością systemu Android. @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Wybierając niestandardową dystrybucję Androida, należy upewnić się, że je [Polecane przez nas dystrybucje Androida :hero-arrow-circle-right-fill:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## Unikaj rootowania +### Unikaj rootowania [Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses. @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ działa w oparciu o [filtrowanie pakietów](https://en.wikipedia.org/wik Naszym zdaniem, wady zdecydowanie przewyższają zalety rootowania telefonu w celu korzystania z tych aplikacji. -## Verified Boot +### Install Updates + +It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Security Protections + +### Verified Boot [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection). @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock And Aktualizacje oprogramowania mają kluczowe znaczenie dla zachowania bezpieczeństwa. Producenci urządzeń zawierają umowy ze swoimi partnerami na dostarczanie komponentów o zamkniętym kodzie źródłowym przez ograniczony czas. This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage. -## Aktualizacje oprogramowania +### Aktualizacje oprogramowania Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. Dlatego ważne jest, aby zakupić urządzenie, które jest nadal wspierane. [Qualcomm](https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2020/12/16/qualcomm-and-google-announce-collaboration-extend-android-os-support-and) oraz [Samsung](https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-security-extending-updates-knox/) oferując wsparcie dla swoich urządzeń przez 4 lata, podczas gdy tańsze produkty często mają krótszy okres wsparcia. @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ Ważne jest, aby nie korzystać z [niewspieranej](https://endoflife.date/android [Uprawnienia systemu Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) umożliwiają Ci kontrolę nad tym, do czego mają dostęp Twoje aplikacje. Firma Google regularnie wprowadza [poprawki](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) do systemu zabezpieczeń z każdą kolejną wersją. Wszystkie instalowane przez Ciebie aplikacje są ściśle [izolowane](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), więc nie ma potrzeby instalowania żadnych aplikacji antywirusowych. -## Wersje Androida - -It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. - -## Uprawnienia systemu Android +### Uprawnienia systemu Android [Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps. @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ An app may request a permission for a specific feature it has. For example, any Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) may show some trackers such as [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). This library includes [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) which can provide [push notifications](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps. This [is the case](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) with Bitwarden. That doesn't mean that Bitwarden is using all of the analytics features that are provided by Google Firebase Analytics. -## Profile użytkowników +## Privacy Features -Quite a few applications allows you to "share" a file with them for media upload. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter. - -## User Profiles +### User Profiles Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android. With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation. -## Work Profile +### Work Profile [Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously. -## VPN Killswitch +### VPN Killswitch Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**. -## Global Toggles +### Global Toggles Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled. -## Google +## Google Services If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play. diff --git a/i18n/pl/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/pl/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4dee83e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/pl/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Privacy Notes + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Activation Lock + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## Recommended Configuration + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### Settings + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! warning + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### Privacy + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/pl/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/pl/os/linux-overview.md index e6f3d288..420e36d5 100644 --- a/i18n/pl/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/pl/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: fontawesome/brands/linux description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative, but not all distribitions are created equal. --- -It is often believed that [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigor applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years. +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.: - -- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack) -- A strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go -- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are great if you want to: - -- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems -- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- Have privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) - -Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed here. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Privacy Notes + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems +- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## Choosing your distribution -Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use. +Not all Linux distributions are created equal. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### Release cycle We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates. -For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. +For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this: @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tu ### “Security-focused” distributions -There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. +There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. ### Arch-based distributions -Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically: +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories. - **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks. -### Kicksecure - -While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. - ### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions -We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons. +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## Ogólne zalecenia @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS] ### Swap -Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do n ### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates) -Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. ### Updates Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found. -Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd). @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automaticall ### MAC Address Randomization -Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous. @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as sugges If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=). -There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. ### Other Identifiers diff --git a/i18n/pl/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/pl/os/qubes-overview.md index 1325d97c..c6daf390 100644 --- a/i18n/pl/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/pl/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within virtual machines for heightened security. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## How does Qubes OS work? diff --git a/i18n/pl/tools.md b/i18n/pl/tools.md index bdd72bbd..4b2b74f1 100644 --- a/i18n/pl/tools.md +++ b/i18n/pl/tools.md @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b - ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) - ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) - ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure) diff --git a/i18n/pt-BR/desktop.md b/i18n/pt-BR/desktop.md index 0a6d409f..8e1cb842 100644 --- a/i18n/pt-BR/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/pt-BR/desktop.md @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } @@ -152,33 +152,48 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/). +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! recommendation + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## Criteria -**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! example "This section is new" +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress. - -Our recommended operating systems: - -- Must be open-source. -- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates. -- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- Must support full-disk encryption during installation. -- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. -- Must support a wide variety of hardware. +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/pt-BR/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/pt-BR/os/android-overview.md index b4661d45..bbe75118 100644 --- a/i18n/pt-BR/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/pt-BR/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android description: Android is an open-source operating system with strong security protections, which makes it our top choice for phones. --- -Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. +![Android logo](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## Escolhendo uma Distribuição Android +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### Escolhendo uma Distribuição Android When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has irrevocable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android. @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that [Our Android System Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## Evite Roteamento +### Evite Roteamento [Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses. @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps. -## Verified Boot +### Install Updates + +It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Security Protections + +### Verified Boot [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection). @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock And Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be aware of beyond their marketing. For example, the Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage. -## Atualizações de Firmware +### Atualizações de Firmware Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin). @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive Fairphone, for example, markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates. -## Android Versions - -It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. - -## Android Permissions +### Android Permissions [Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps. @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ An app may request a permission for a specific feature it has. For example, any Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) may show some trackers such as [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). This library includes [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) which can provide [push notifications](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps. This [is the case](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) with Bitwarden. That doesn't mean that Bitwarden is using all of the analytics features that are provided by Google Firebase Analytics. -## Media Access +## Privacy Features -Quite a few applications allows you to "share" a file with them for media upload. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter. - -## Perfis de Usuário +### Perfis de Usuário Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android. With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation. -## Perfil de Trabalho +### Perfil de Trabalho Os [Perfis de Trabalho](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) são outra forma de isolar aplicações individuais e podem ser mais convenientes do que perfis de usuário separados. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously. -## VPN Killswitch +### VPN Killswitch Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**. -## Global Toggles +### Global Toggles Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled. -## Google +## Google Services If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play. diff --git a/i18n/pt-BR/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/pt-BR/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6f26be01 --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/pt-BR/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Privacy Notes + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Activation Lock + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## Firefox + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### Configurações + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! warning + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### Privacidade + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/pt-BR/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/pt-BR/os/linux-overview.md index f05fdda6..389d377c 100644 --- a/i18n/pt-BR/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/pt-BR/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative, but not all distribitions are created equal. --- -It is often believed that [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigor applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years. +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.: - -- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack) -- A strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go -- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are great if you want to: - -- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems -- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- Have privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) - -Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed here. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Privacy Notes + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems +- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## Choosing your distribution -Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use. +Not all Linux distributions are created equal. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### Release cycle We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates. -For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. +For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this: @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tu ### “Security-focused” distributions -There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. +There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. ### Arch-based distributions -Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically: +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories. - **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks. -### Kicksecure - -While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. - ### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions -We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons. +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## Recomendações gerais @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS] ### Swap -Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do n ### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates) -Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. ### Updates Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found. -Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd). @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automaticall ### MAC Address Randomization -Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous. @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as sugges If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=). -There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. ### Other Identifiers diff --git a/i18n/pt-BR/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/pt-BR/os/qubes-overview.md index ae4916df..5eaa56ec 100644 --- a/i18n/pt-BR/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/pt-BR/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within virtual machines for heightened security. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## Como funciona o Qubes OS? diff --git a/i18n/pt-BR/tools.md b/i18n/pt-BR/tools.md index 2dc21162..67b230c5 100644 --- a/i18n/pt-BR/tools.md +++ b/i18n/pt-BR/tools.md @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b - ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) - ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) - ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure) diff --git a/i18n/pt/desktop.md b/i18n/pt/desktop.md index 185b817a..b2267cb7 100644 --- a/i18n/pt/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/pt/desktop.md @@ -105,9 +105,9 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th !!! nota Consulte o [Tabela de Hardware](https://openwrt.org/toh/start) para verificar se o seu dispositivo é suportado. - ![Whonix logo](/assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } + ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** é baseado em [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), um garfo focado na segurança do Debian. O seu objectivo é proporcionar privacidade, segurança e anonimato na Internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. O seu objectivo é proporcionar privacidade, segurança e anonimato na Internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } @@ -146,37 +146,51 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte !!! nota Consulte o [Tabela de Hardware](https://openwrt.org/toh/start) para verificar se o seu dispositivo é suportado. - ![logótipo do SO Qubes](/assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } + ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes*** é um sistema operacional open-source projetado para fornecer uma forte segurança para a computação desktop. Qubes é baseado no Xen, o Sistema X Window e Linux, e pode executar a maioria das aplicações Linux e utilizar a maioria dos drivers Linux. + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes é baseado no Xen, o Sistema X Window e Linux, e pode executar a maioria das aplicações Linux e utilizar a maioria dos drivers Linux. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/). +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! nota + Consulte o [Tabela de Hardware](https://openwrt.org/toh/start) para verificar se o seu dispositivo é suportado. + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## Framadate -**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! Considere o auto-hospedagem para mitigar esta ameaça. +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - ![logo PrivateBin](/assets/img/productivity/privatebin.svg){ align=right } - - **PrivateBin** é um pastebin online minimalista e de código aberto onde o servidor tem zero conhecimento de dados colados. Os dados são criptografados/descriptografados no navegador usando AES de 256 bits. Psono suporta compartilhamento seguro de senhas, arquivos, marcadores e e-mails. - -Our recommended operating systems: - -- Must be open-source. -- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates. -- As distribuições Linux devem suportar [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- Must support full-disk encryption during installation. -- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. -- Must support a wide variety of hardware. +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/pt/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/pt/os/android-overview.md index 89a7f9bd..52f83e16 100644 --- a/i18n/pt/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/pt/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android description: Android is an open-source operating system with strong security protections, which makes it our top choice for phones. --- -Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. +![Logótipo do Android](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## Choosing an Android Distribution +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### Choosing an Android Distribution When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has irrevocable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android. @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that [Our Android System Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## Avoid Rooting +### Avoid Rooting [Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses. @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps. -## Verified Boot +### Install Updates + +It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Security Protections + +### Verified Boot [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection). @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock And Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be aware of beyond their marketing. For example, the Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage. -## Firmware Updates +### Firmware Updates Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin). @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive Fairphone, for example, markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. atenção This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates. -## Android Versions - -It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. - -## Android Permissions +### Android Permissions [Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps. @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ An app may request a permission for a specific feature it has. For example, any Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) may show some trackers such as [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). This library includes [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) which can provide [push notifications](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps. This [is the case](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) with Bitwarden. That doesn't mean that Bitwarden is using all of the analytics features that are provided by Google Firebase Analytics. -## Media Access +## Privacy Features -Quite a few applications allows you to "share" a file with them for media upload. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter. - -## User Profiles +### User Profiles Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android. With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation. -## Work Profile +### Work Profile [Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously. -## VPN Killswitch +### VPN Killswitch Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**. -## Global Toggles +### Global Toggles Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled. -## Google +## Google Services If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play. diff --git a/i18n/pt/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/pt/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..09c113cc --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/pt/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Privacy Notes + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Activation Lock + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## Configuração recomendada + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### Definições + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! Recomendamos que você verifique o [documentação](https://developers.yubico.com/SSH/) de Yubico sobre como configurar isso. + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### Privacidade + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/pt/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/pt/os/linux-overview.md index 3eb0b77c..233ad564 100644 --- a/i18n/pt/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/pt/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: fontawesome/brands/linux description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative, but not all distribitions are created equal. --- -Existe uma crença comum que o *software* de [código aberto](https://pt. wikipedia. org/wiki/Software_de_c%C3%B3digo_aberto) é intrinsecamente seguro porque o código-fonte está disponível. Existe uma expectativa de que a verificação por parte da comunidade ocorre regularmente; contudo, esse nem sempre é [o caso](https://seirdy. one/2022/02/02/floss-security. html). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigor applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years. +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -Neste momento, a utilização de GNU/Linux em computadores pessoais tem algumas áreas que poderiam ser melhoradas quando comparadas com os seus equivalentes proprietários, por exemplo: - -- Uma cadeia de inicialização verificada, ao contrário do [Secure Boot](https://support. apple. com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (com o [Secure Enclave](https://support. apple. com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), o [Verified Boot](https://source. android. com/security/verifiedboot) do Android ou [processo de boot](https://docs. microsoft. com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) com [TPM](https://docs. microsoft. com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm) do Microsoft Windows. Estas funcionalidades e tecnologias de hardware podem ajudar a prevenir manipulações persistentes por malware ou a "[evil maid attacks](https://en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack)" -- Solução de sandboxing forte como a encontrada no [macOS](https://developer. apple. com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox. html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium. googlesource. com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing. md) e [Android](https://source. android. com/security/app-sandbox). As soluções de sandboxing mais comuns em Linux, tais como [Flatpak](https://docs. flatpak. org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions. html) e [Firejail](https://firejail. wordpress. com/) ainda têm um longo caminho a percorrer -- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are great if you want to: - -- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems -- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- Have privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) - -Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed here. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Privacy Notes + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems +- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## Choosing your distribution -Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use. +Not all Linux distributions are created equal. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### Release cycle We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates. -For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. +For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this: @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tu ### “Security-focused” distributions -There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. +There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. ### Arch-based distributions -Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically: +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories. - **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks. -### Kicksecure - -While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. - ### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions -We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons. +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## Recomendações Gerais @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS] ### Swap -Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do n ### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates) -Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. ### Updates Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found. -Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd). @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automaticall ### MAC Address Randomization -Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous. @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as sugges If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=). -There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. ### Other Identifiers diff --git a/i18n/pt/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/pt/os/qubes-overview.md index 06847aba..0f9b0728 100644 --- a/i18n/pt/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/pt/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within virtual machines for heightened security. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## How does Qubes OS work? diff --git a/i18n/pt/tools.md b/i18n/pt/tools.md index 37dbf9bb..b87d9f21 100644 --- a/i18n/pt/tools.md +++ b/i18n/pt/tools.md @@ -442,14 +442,15 @@ Recomendamos armazenar uma chave de recuperação local em um local seguro, em v
-- ![Logótipo Qubes OS](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ .twemoji } [Qubes OS (Xen VM Distribution)](desktop.md#qubes-os) -- ![Logótipo Fedora](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-workstation.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Workstation](desktop.md#fedora-workstation) -- ![Logótipo openSUSE Tumbleweed](assets/img/linux-desktop/opensuse-tumbleweed.svg){ .twemoji } [OpenSUSE Tumbleweed](desktop.md#opensuse-tumbleweed) -- ![Logótipo Arch](assets/img/linux-desktop/archlinux.svg){ .twemoji } [Arch Linux](desktop.md#arch-linux) -- ![Logótipo Fedora Silverblue](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-silverblue.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Silverblue & Kinoite](desktop.md#fedora-silverblue) -- ![Logótipo nixOS](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) -- ![Logótipo Whonix](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) -- ![Logótipo Tails](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ .twemoji } [Qubes OS (Xen VM Distribution)](desktop.md#qubes-os) +- ![Fedora logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-workstation.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Workstation](desktop.md#fedora-workstation) +- ![openSUSE Tumbleweed logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/opensuse-tumbleweed.svg){ .twemoji } [OpenSUSE Tumbleweed](desktop.md#opensuse-tumbleweed) +- ![Arch logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/archlinux.svg){ .twemoji } [Arch Linux](desktop.md#arch-linux) +- ![Fedora Silverblue logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-silverblue.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Silverblue & Kinoite](desktop.md#fedora-silverblue) +- ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) +- ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) +- ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure)
diff --git a/i18n/ru/desktop.md b/i18n/ru/desktop.md index d0133cf8..0662ff1c 100644 --- a/i18n/ru/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/ru/desktop.md @@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ Nix - это менеджер пакетов на основе исходных !!! recommendation - ![Логотип Whonix](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } + ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** основан на [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), форке Debian, ориентированном на безопасность. Его цель - обеспечить конфиденциальность, безопасность и анонимность в интернете. Whonix лучше всего использовать в сочетании с [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. Его цель - обеспечить конфиденциальность, безопасность и анонимность в интернете. Whonix лучше всего использовать в сочетании с [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: Домашняя страница](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Сервис Onion" } @@ -150,35 +150,50 @@ Tails содержит [uBlock Origin](desktop-browsers.md#ublock-origin) в Tor !!! recommendation - ![Логотип Qubes OS](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } + ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes OS** - это операционная система с открытым исходным кодом, разработанная для обеспечения сильной безопасности персональных компьютеров. Qubes основан на Xen, X Window System и Linux, и может запускать большинство Linux-приложений и использовать большинство драйверов для Linux. + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes основан на Xen, X Window System и Linux, и может запускать большинство Linux-приложений и использовать большинство драйверов для Linux. - [:octicons-home-16: Домашняя страница](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Обзор](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Сервис Onion" } - [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Политика конфиденциальности" } - [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Документация } - [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Исходный код" } - [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Поддержать } + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS - это операционная система на базе Xen, предназначенная для обеспечения надежной защиты настольных компьютеров с помощью защищенных виртуальных машин (ВМ), также известных как *Qubes*. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -Операционная система Qubes OS обеспечивает безопасность компьютера путем изоляции подсистем (например, сетевых, USB и т.д.) и приложений в отдельных виртуальных машинах. Если одна часть системы будет скомпрометирована, дополнительная изоляция, скорее всего, защитит остальную часть системы. Более подробную информацию можно найти на сайте [Qubes](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/). +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! recommendation + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. Он охватывает множество рекомендаций по обеспечению конфиденциальности и усилению защиты, без необходимости дополнительной настройки. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## Критерии -**Обрати внимание, что у нас нет связей ни с одним проектом, который мы рекомендуем.** В дополнение к [нашим стандартным критериям](about/criteria.md) мы разработали четкий набор требований, позволяющий давать объективные рекомендации. Перед тем, как вы решите выбрать какой-либо проект, мы рекомендуем вам ознакомиться со списком критериев и провести собственное исследование, чтобы убедиться в правильности своего выбора. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! example "Это новый раздел" +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - Мы всё еще работаем над установлением критериев для каждого раздела нашего сайта, поэтому они могут поменяться в будущем. Если у вас есть вопросы по поводу наших критериев, пожалуйста, [задавайте их на нашем форуме](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest). Если какой-то критерий здесь не указан, это не значит, что мы его не учли. Перед тем, как рекомендовать какой-либо проект мы учитываем и обсуждаем множество факторов. Документирование этих факторов ещё не завершено. - -Наши рекомендованные операционные системы: - -- Должны иметь открытый исходный код. -- Должны получать регулярные обновления программного обеспечения и ядра Linux. -- Дистрибутивы Linux должны поддерживать [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- Должны предлагать шифрование всего диска во время установки. -- Не должны замораживать релизы более чем на 1 год. Мы [не рекомендуем](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) дистрибутивы с "Long Term Support" или "stable" релизами для персональных компьютеров. -- Должны поддерживать широкий спектр устройств. +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/ru/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/ru/os/android-overview.md index 8ff6f72f..29598c55 100644 --- a/i18n/ru/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/ru/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android description: Android - это операционная система с открытым исходным кодом, которая предоставляет надежную защиту, что делает ее нашим главным выбором для телефонов. --- -Android является безопасной операционной системой, имеющей мощную [изоляцию приложений](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [проверенную загрузка](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB) и надежную систему управления [разрешениями](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview). +![Логотип Android](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## Выбор Android дистрибутива +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### Выбор Android дистрибутива При покупке Android телефона, стандартная операционная система часто содержит приложения и интеграции с сервисами, которые не являются частью [проекта с открытым исходным кодом Android](https://source.android.com/). Примером могут служить Google Play Services, которые имеют неотменяемые привилегии на доступ к вашим файлам, хранилищу контактов, журналам вызовов, SMS-сообщениям, местоположению, камере, микрофону, аппаратным идентификаторам и так далее. Эти приложения и службы увеличивают поверхность атаки вашего устройства и являются источником различных проблем с конфиденциальностью в Android. @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Android является безопасной операционной сист [Наши рекомендации Android :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## Избегайте рутинга +### Избегайте рутинга [Рутинг](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) телефонов Android может значительно снизить безопасность, так как ослабляет всю [модель безопасности Android](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). Это может снизить конфиденциальность, если произойдет эксплойт, вызванный снижением безопасности. Обычные методы рутинга предполагают прямое вмешательство в загрузочный раздел, что делает невозможным успешное выполнение проверенной загрузки. Приложения, требующие root, также будут изменять системный раздел, это означает, что проверенную загрузку придется отключить. Наличие root непосредственно в пользовательском интерфейсе также увеличивает [поверхность атаки](https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9F%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%85%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D1%8C_%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%B8) вашего устройства и может помочь в [повышении привилегий](https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9F%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%8B%D1%88%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5_%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%B3%D0%B8%D0%B9) уязвимостей и обходе политики SELinux. @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ работает на основе подхода [пакетной фи Мы не считаем, что стоит жертвовать безопасностью (получение root-доступа), чтобы получить сомнительные преимущества конфиденциальности. -## Проверенная загрузка +### Install Updates + +Важно не использовать [устаревшую](https://endoflife.date/android) версию Android. Новые версии Android получают не только обновления безопасности операционной системы, но и важные обновления, улучшающие конфиденциальность. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. Системные приложения предоставляются только OEM-производителем или дистрибутивом Android. + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Security Protections + +### Проверенная загрузка [Проверенная загрузка](https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/verifiedboot?hl=ru) является важной частью модели безопасности Android. Она обеспечивает защиту от [атак злой горничной](https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.ru/glossary/evil-maid/), сохранения вредоносных программ и гарантирует, что обновления безопасности не могут быть понижены с помощью [защиты от отката](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot?hl=ru#rollback-protection). @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Android 10 и выше перешел от шифрования всего ди Многие OEM-производители также встраивают сломанную реализацию проверенной загрузки. Вы должны помнить об этом и не обращать внимание на их маркетинг. Например, телефоны Fairphone 3 и 4 не защищены по умолчанию, поскольку [стоковый загрузчик доверяет публичному ключу подписи AVB](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). Это нарушает проверенную загрузку на стоковом устройстве Fairphone, поскольку система будет загружать альтернативные операционные системы Android, такие как (например, /e/) [без какого-либо предупреждения](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) об использовании кастомной операционной системы. -## Обновления прошивки +### Обновления прошивки Обновления прошивки имеют критическое значение для поддержания безопасности. Без них ваше устройство не может быть безопасным. OEM-производители имеют соглашения о поддержке со своими партнерами для предоставления компонентов с закрытым исходным кодом на ограниченный период поддержки. Они подробно описаны в ежемесячных [бюллетенях по безопасности Android](https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin?hl=ru). @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ Android 10 и выше перешел от шифрования всего ди Fairphone, например, рекламирует свои устройства как имеющие 6 лет поддержки. Однако SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G в Fairphone 4) имеет значительно более короткую дату выхода из эксплуатации. Это означает, что обновления безопасности прошивки от Qualcomm для Fairphone 4 закончатся в сентябре 2023 года, независимо от того, будет ли Fairphone продолжать выпускать обновления безопасности программного обеспечения. -## Версии Android - -Важно не использовать [устаревшую](https://endoflife.date/android) версию Android. Новые версии Android получают не только обновления безопасности операционной системы, но и важные обновления, улучшающие конфиденциальность. Например, [до Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes)любые приложения с разрешением [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) могли получить доступ к конфиденциальным и уникальным серийным номерам вашего телефона, таким как [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), SIM-карта [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), тогда как теперь для этого они должны быть системными приложениями. Системные приложения предоставляются только OEM-производителем или дистрибутивом Android. - -## Разрешения в Android +### Разрешения в Android [Разрешения в Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) дают вам контроль над тем, к чему у приложений будет доступ. Google регулярно вносит [исправления](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) в систему разрешений в каждой следующей версии Android. Все установленные приложения строго [изолированы](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), поэтому нет необходимости устанавливать антивирусные программы. @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ Android 13: Приложения, уважающие вашу конфиденциальность, например [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/), могут показывать некоторые трекеры, например [Google Firebase Analytics] (https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). Эта библиотека включает [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging), которая нужна для поддержки [push-уведомлений](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) в приложениях. Именно [это относится](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) к Bitwarden. Это не означает, что Bitwarden использует все возможности аналитики, которые предоставляет Google Firebase Analytics. -## Доступ к файлам +## Privacy Features -Довольно многие приложения позволяют "поделиться" файлом для загрузки медиафайла. Если вы хотите, например, отправить фотографию в Twitter, не предоставляйте Twitter доступ к вашим "медиа и фотографиям", потому что тогда у него будет доступ ко всем вашим фотографиям. Вместо этого зайдите в файловый менеджер (или галерею), долго нажмите на фотографию, а затем поделитесь ею в Twitter. - -## Профили пользователей +### Профили пользователей Профили нескольких пользователей находятся в разделе **Настройки** → **Система** → **Пользователи** и являются самым простым способом изоляции в Android. С помощью профилей пользователей можно наложить ограничения на определенный профиль, например: совершение звонков, использование SMS или установка приложений на устройство. Каждый профиль шифруется с помощью собственного ключа шифрования и не может получить доступ к данным других профилей. Даже владелец устройства не может просматривать данные других профилей, не зная их пароля. Профили пользователей - это более безопасный метод изоляции. -## Рабочий профиль +### Рабочий профиль [Рабочие профили](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949?hl=ru&sjid=10752136651864735274-EU) - это еще один способ изолировать отдельные приложения, который может быть более удобным, чем отдельные профили пользователей. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ Android 13: Этот метод обычно менее безопасен, чем второй профиль пользователя; однако он позволяет запускать приложения одновременно в рабочем и личном профилях. -## VPN Killswitch +### VPN Killswitch Android 7 и выше поддерживает VPN killswitch, и он доступен без необходимости установки сторонних приложений. Эта функция может предотвратить утечку данных в случае отключения VPN. Его можно найти в :gear: **Настройки** → **Сеть и интернет** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Блокировать соединения без VPN**. -## Глобальные переключатели +### Глобальные переключатели В современных устройствах Android есть глобальные переключатели для отключения Bluetooth и служб определения местоположения. В Android 12 появились переключатели для камеры и микрофона. Когда эти функции не используются, мы рекомендуем отключать их. Приложения не могут использовать отключенные функции (даже при наличии индивидуального разрешения) до тех пор, пока они не будут снова включены. -## Google +## Google Services Если вы используете устройство с Google сервисами, либо стоковой операционной системой, либо операционной системой, которая безопасно изолирует службы Google Play, например GrapheneOS, вы можете внести ряд дополнительных изменений для повышения конфиденциальности. Мы по-прежнему рекомендуем полностью отказаться от сервисов Google или ограничить сервисы Google Play определенным профилем пользователя/рабочим профилем, объединив контроллер устройства, такой как *Shelter*, с GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play. diff --git a/i18n/ru/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/ru/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0fe81a7b --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/ru/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Privacy Notes + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Activation Lock + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## Рекомендованные настройки + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### Настройки + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! warning "Осторожно" + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### Конфиденциальность + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/ru/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/ru/os/linux-overview.md index d09e931a..86afc603 100644 --- a/i18n/ru/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/ru/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux - это альтернативная настольная операционная система с открытым исходным кодом, ориентированная на конфиденциальность, но не все дистрибутивы созданы одинаково. --- -Часто считается, что программное обеспечение с [открытым исходным кодом](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) по своей сути безопасно, поскольку исходный код доступен. Существует ожидание, что проверка сообщества происходит регулярно; однако это [не всегда так](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). Это зависит от ряда факторов, таких как активность проекта, опыт разработчиков, уровень строгости, применяемый в [обзорах кода](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), и как часто уделяется внимание определенным частям [кодовой базы](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase), которые могут оставаться нетронутыми годами. +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -На данный момент в настольном Linux есть некоторые области, которые можно улучшить при сравнении с проприетарными аналогами, например: - -- Проверенная загрузка, например, [безопасная загрузка](https://support.apple.com/ru-ru/guide/security/secc7b34e5b5/web) от Apple (с [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/ru-ru/guide/security/sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), [проверенная загрузка](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) в Android, [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot) в ChromeOS или [защита процесса загрузки](https://learn.microsoft.com/ru-ru/windows/security/operating-system-security/system-security/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) с [TPM](https://learn.microsoft.com/ru-ru/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm) в Microsoft Windows. Все эти функции и аппаратные технологии могут помочь предотвратить постоянное вмешательство вредоносных программ или предотвратить [атаки злой горничной](https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.ru/glossary/evil-maid/) -- Сильная "песочница", такая как в [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), и [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Широко используемые решения для создания песочниц в Linux, например [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) и [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/), все еще требуют много улучшений -- Сильные [средства защиты от эксплойтов](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -Несмотря на эти недостатки, настольные дистрибутивы Linux отлично вам подойдут, если вы хотите: - -- Избежать телеметрии, которая часто поставляется с проприетарными операционными системами -- Поддержать [свободу программного обеспечения](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- Использовать системы, ориентированные на конфиденциальность, такие как [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) или [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/index.ru.html) - -На нашем сайте термин "Linux" обычно используется для описания дистрибутивов Linux для настольных компьютеров. Другие операционные системы, которые также используют ядро Linux (ChromeOS, Android и Qubes OS) здесь не рассматриваются. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [Наши рекомендации Linux :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Privacy Notes + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- Избежать телеметрии, которая часто поставляется с проприетарными операционными системами +- Поддержать [свободу программного обеспечения](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## Выбор дистрибутива -Не все дистрибутивы Linux созданы одинаковыми. Хотя наша страница рекомендаций по Linux не является авторитетным источником информации о том, какой дистрибутив вам следует использовать, есть несколько моментов, на которые следует обращать внимание при выборе дистрибутива. +Не все дистрибутивы Linux созданы одинаковыми. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### Цикл релиза Мы настоятельно рекомендуем вам выбирать дистрибутивы, которые близки к стабильным релизам программного обеспечения, часто называемые дистрибутивами с плавающим релизом. Это связано с тем, что дистрибутивы с замороженным циклом выпуска часто не обновляют версии пакетов и не получают обновлений безопасности. -В замороженных дистрибутивах, таких как [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), ожидается, что сопровождающие пакетов будут вносить исправления из новых релизов для устранения уязвимостей, а не переводить программное обеспечение на новый релиз, выпущенный вышестоящим разработчиком. Некоторые исправления безопасности [вообще не](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) получают [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (особенно менее популярные программы) и поэтому не попадают в дистрибутив при такой модели исправлений. В результате незначительные исправления безопасности иногда задерживаются до следующего крупного релиза. +В замороженных дистрибутивах, таких как [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), ожидается, что сопровождающие пакетов будут вносить исправления из новых релизов для устранения уязвимостей, а не переводить программное обеспечение на новый релиз, выпущенный вышестоящим разработчиком. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. В результате незначительные исправления безопасности иногда задерживаются до следующего крупного релиза. Мы не считаем, что задержка пакетов и применение промежуточных исправлений является хорошей идеей, так как это расходится с тем, как разработчик мог задумать работу программного обеспечения. [Ричард Браун](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) подготовил презентацию об этом: @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ description: Linux - это альтернативная настольная о ### Дистрибутивы "ориентированные на безопасность" -Часто возникает путаница между дистрибутивами "ориентированными на безопасность" и дистрибутивами для "тестов на проникновение". Быстрый поиск "самый безопасный дистрибутив Linux" часто дает такие результаты, как Kali Linux, Black Arch и Parrot OS. Эти дистрибутивы представляют собой дистрибутивы для тестирования на проникновение, в которых собраны инструменты для тестирования других систем. Они не включают никаких "дополнительных мер безопасности" или защитных механизмов, предназначенных для регулярного использования. +Часто возникает путаница между дистрибутивами "ориентированными на безопасность" и дистрибутивами для "тестов на проникновение". A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. Эти дистрибутивы представляют собой дистрибутивы для тестирования на проникновение, в которых собраны инструменты для тестирования других систем. Они не включают никаких "дополнительных мер безопасности" или защитных механизмов, предназначенных для регулярного использования. ### Дистрибутивы на базе Arch -Дистрибутивы на базе Arch не рекомендуется использовать новичкам в Linux (независимо от дистрибутива), так как они требуют регулярного [обслуживания системы](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch не имеет механизма обновления дистрибутива для выбора основного программного обеспечения. В результате вы должны быть в курсе современных тенденций и самостоятельно внедрять технологии по мере того, как они вытесняют старые методы. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. В результате вы должны быть в курсе современных тенденций и самостоятельно внедрять технологии по мере того, как они вытесняют старые методы. Для поддержания безопасности системы от вас ожидается, что вы обладаете достаточными знаниями Linux, чтобы правильно настроить безопасность своей системы, например, принять систему [обязательного контроля доступа](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control), настроить черные списки [модулей ядра](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security), усилить параметры загрузки, манипулировать параметрами [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) и знать, какие компоненты им необходимы, например, [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Тот, кто использует [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **, должен** быть уверен в том, что он сможет провести аудит PKGBUILD, которые он устанавливает из этой службы. Пакеты AUR - это контент, созданный сообществом, он никак не проверяется и поэтому уязвим для атак на цепочки поставок программного обеспечения, что, собственно, и произошло [в прошлом](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR всегда следует использовать осторожно, и часто на различных страницах можно встретить множество плохих советов, которые направляют людей на слепое использование [помощников AUR](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) без достаточного предупреждения. Аналогичные предупреждения относятся к использованию сторонних персональных архивов пакетов (PPA) в дистрибутивах на базе Debian или проектов сообщества (COPR) в Fedora. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. Пакеты AUR - это контент, созданный сообществом, он никак не проверяется и поэтому уязвим для атак на цепочки поставок программного обеспечения, что, собственно, и произошло [в прошлом](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -Если у вас есть опыт работы с Linux и вы хотите использовать дистрибутив на базе Arch, мы рекомендуем только основной Arch Linux, а не его варианты. Мы особенно не рекомендуем использовать эти два варианта Arch: +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Аналогичные предупреждения относятся к использованию сторонних персональных архивов пакетов (PPA) в дистрибутивах на базе Debian или проектов сообщества (COPR) в Fedora. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: Этот дистрибутив задерживает пакеты на 2 недели, чтобы убедиться, что их собственные изменения не сломаются, а не для того, чтобы убедиться в стабильности upstream. Когда используются пакеты AUR, они часто собираются на основе последних [библиотек](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) из репозиториев Arch. - **Garuda**: Они используют [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/), который автоматически и вслепую компилирует пакеты из AUR. Не существует процесса проверки, чтобы убедиться, что пакеты AUR не страдают от атак в цепи поставок. -### Kicksecure - -Хотя мы настоятельно рекомендуем не использовать устаревшие дистрибутивы, такие как Debian, существует операционная система на базе Debian, которая была усилена, чтобы быть намного более безопасной, чем обычные дистрибутивы Linux: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, если говорить упрощенно, это набор скриптов, конфигураций и пакетов, которые значительно уменьшают поверхность атаки Debian. Он охватывает множество рекомендаций по обеспечению конфиденциальности и усилению защиты, без необходимости дополнительной настройки. - ### Ядро Linux-libre и дистрибутивы "Libre" -Мы настоятельно рекомендуем **не** использовать ядро Linux-libre, поскольку оно, по идеологическим причинам, [удаляет улучшения безопасности](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) и [подавляет предупреждения ядра](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) об уязвимом микрокоде. +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## Общие рекомендации @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ description: Linux - это альтернативная настольная о ### Swap -Рассмотрите возможность использования [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) или [зашифрованного свопа](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) вместо незашифрованного свопа, чтобы избежать потенциальных проблем безопасности, связанных с перемещением конфиденциальных данных в [пространство подкачки](https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9F%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%87%D0%BA%D0%B0_%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%86). Дистрибутивы на базе Fedora [по умолчанию используют ZRAM](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -Мы рекомендуем использовать среду рабочего стола, которая поддерживает графический протокол [Wayland](https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland), поскольку он был разработан [с учетом](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/) требований безопасности. Его предшественник, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), не поддерживает изоляцию графического интерфейса, позволяя всем окнам [записывать экран, логи и вводить данные в другие окна](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), что делает любые попытки создания "песочницы" бесполезными. Хотя существуют варианты вложенных X11, например [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) или [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), они часто имеют негативные последствия для производительности, не удобны в настройке и всё равно хуже Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. К счастью, такие распространенные среды, как [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org) и оконный менеджер [Sway](https://swaywm.org) имеют поддержку Wayland. Некоторые дистрибутивы, такие как Fedora и Tumbleweed, по умолчанию его используют, а некоторые другие могут начать использовать его в будущем, поскольку X11 находится в [режиме сложного обслуживания](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). Если вы используете одну из этих сред, можно просто выбрать сессию "Wayland" в менеджере отображения рабочего стола ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ description: Linux - это альтернативная настольная о ### Проприетарная прошивка (обновления микрокода) -Такие дистрибутивы Linux, как [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) или DIY (Arch Linux), не поставляются с собственными обновлениями [микрокода](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode), которые часто исправляют уязвимости. Некоторыми яркими примерами таких уязвимостей являются [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), и других [аппаратные уязвимости](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Некоторыми яркими примерами таких уязвимостей являются [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), и других [аппаратные уязвимости](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -Мы **настоятельно рекомендуем** устанавливать обновления микрокода, поскольку ваш процессор уже работает под управлением фирменного микрокода с завода. В Fedora и openSUSE обновления микрокода применяются по умолчанию. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. В Fedora и openSUSE обновления микрокода применяются по умолчанию. ### Обновления Большинство дистрибутивов Linux автоматически устанавливают обновления или напоминают вам сделать это. Важно поддерживать ОС в актуальном состоянии, чтобы при обнаружении уязвимости программное обеспечение было исправлено. -Некоторые дистрибутивы (особенно предназначенные для опытных пользователей) более "голые" и предполагают, что вы все сделаете сами (например, Arch или Debian). Для получения важных обновлений безопасности потребуется вручную запустить "менеджер пакетов" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf` и т.д.). +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). Для получения важных обновлений безопасности потребуется вручную запустить "менеджер пакетов" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf` и т.д.). Кроме того, некоторые дистрибутивы не будут автоматически загружать обновления прошивки. Для этого вам нужно установить [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd). @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ description: Linux - это альтернативная настольная о ### Рандомизация MAC-адресов -Многие настольные дистрибутивы Linux (Fedora, openSUSE и т.д.) поставляются с [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), для настройки параметров Ethernet и Wi-Fi. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. Можно [рандомизировать](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) [MAC-адрес](https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC-%D0%B0%D0%B4%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%81) при использовании NetworkManager. Это обеспечивает большую конфиденциальность в сетях Wi-Fi, так как затрудняет отслеживание конкретных устройств в сети, к которой вы подключены. Это [**не**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) делает вас анонимным. @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ description: Linux - это альтернативная настольная о Если вы используете [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), вам необходимо установить [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=), что позволит включить [RFC 7844 (профили анонимности для клиентов DHCP)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=). -Нет особого смысла в рандомизации MAC-адресов для Ethernet-подключений, поскольку системный администратор может найти вас, посмотрев на порт, который вы используете на [сетевом коммутаторе](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Рандомизация MAC-адресов Wi-Fi зависит от поддержки встроенного программного обеспечения Wi-Fi. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Рандомизация MAC-адресов Wi-Fi зависит от поддержки встроенного программного обеспечения Wi-Fi. ### Другие идентификаторы diff --git a/i18n/ru/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/ru/os/qubes-overview.md index c33232b4..672dfcd7 100644 --- a/i18n/ru/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/ru/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos description: Qubes - это операционная система, построенная на изоляции приложений в виртуальных машинах для обеспечения повышенной безопасности. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) - операционная система, использующая гипервизор [Xen](https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) для обеспечения надёжной защиты компьютера с помощью изолированных виртуальных машин (далее - ВМ). Каждая ВМ называется *Qube*, и вы можете назначить каждому Qube уровень доверия в зависимости от его назначения. Поскольку Qubes OS обеспечивает безопасность, используя изоляцию и разрешая действия только в каждом конкретном случае, она противоположна [перечислению плохого](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Каждая ВМ называется *Qube*, и вы можете назначить каждому Qube уровень доверия в зависимости от его назначения. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## Как работает Qubes OS? diff --git a/i18n/ru/tools.md b/i18n/ru/tools.md index 3a02ebd2..df21b22e 100644 --- a/i18n/ru/tools.md +++ b/i18n/ru/tools.md @@ -442,14 +442,15 @@ description: Privacy Guides - это самый прозрачный и наде
-- ![Логотип Qubes OS](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ .twemoji } [Qubes OS (Xen VM Distribution)](desktop.md#qubes-os) -- ![Логотип Fedora](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-workstation.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Workstation](desktop.md#fedora-workstation) -- ![Логотип openSUSE Tumbleweed](assets/img/linux-desktop/opensuse-tumbleweed.svg){ .twemoji } [OpenSUSE Tumbleweed](desktop.md#opensuse-tumbleweed) -- ![Логотип Arch](assets/img/linux-desktop/archlinux.svg){ .twemoji } [Arch Linux](desktop.md#arch-linux) -- ![Логотип Fedora Silverblue](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-silverblue.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Silverblue & Kinoite](desktop.md#fedora-silverblue) -- ![Логотип nixOS](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) -- ![Логотип Whonix](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) -- ![Логотип Tails](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ .twemoji } [Qubes OS (Xen VM Distribution)](desktop.md#qubes-os) +- ![Fedora logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-workstation.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Workstation](desktop.md#fedora-workstation) +- ![openSUSE Tumbleweed logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/opensuse-tumbleweed.svg){ .twemoji } [OpenSUSE Tumbleweed](desktop.md#opensuse-tumbleweed) +- ![Arch logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/archlinux.svg){ .twemoji } [Arch Linux](desktop.md#arch-linux) +- ![Fedora Silverblue logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-silverblue.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Silverblue & Kinoite](desktop.md#fedora-silverblue) +- ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) +- ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) +- ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure)
diff --git a/i18n/sv/desktop.md b/i18n/sv/desktop.md index d9126a5a..fe1183aa 100644 --- a/i18n/sv/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/sv/desktop.md @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } @@ -152,33 +152,48 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/). +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! recommendation + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. Den täcker många rekommendationer för sekretess och skydd av integritet som standard. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## Kriterier -**Observera att vi inte är knutna till något av de projekt som vi rekommenderar.** Förutom [våra standardkriterier](about/criteria.md)har vi utvecklat en tydlig uppsättning krav som gör det möjligt för oss att ge objektiva rekommendationer. Vi föreslår att du bekantar dig med den här listan innan du väljer att använda ett projekt, och att du gör din egen forskning för att se till att det är rätt val för dig. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! exempel "Det här avsnittet är nytt" +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - Vi arbetar med att fastställa kriterier för varje del av vår webbplats, och detta kan komma att ändras. Om du har några frågor om våra kriterier, vänligen [fråga på vårt forum] (https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) och tro inte att vi inte har beaktat något när vi gjorde våra rekommendationer om det inte finns med här. Det finns många faktorer som beaktas och diskuteras när vi rekommenderar ett projekt, och att dokumentera varje enskild faktor är ett pågående arbete. - -Our recommended operating systems: - -- Must be open-source. -- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates. -- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- Must support full-disk encryption during installation. -- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. -- Must support a wide variety of hardware. +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/sv/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/sv/os/android-overview.md index 06c28fcb..5323792a 100644 --- a/i18n/sv/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/sv/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android description: Android is an open-source operating system with strong security protections, which makes it our top choice for phones. --- -Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. +![Android logo](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## Choosing an Android Distribution +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### Choosing an Android Distribution When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has irrevocable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android. @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that [Our Android System Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## Avoid Rooting +### Avoid Rooting [Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses. @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps. -## Verified Boot +### Install Updates + +It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Security Protections + +### Verified Boot [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection). @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock And Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be aware of beyond their marketing. For example, the Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage. -## Firmware Updates +### Firmware Updates Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin). @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive Fairphone, for example, markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates. -## Android Versions - -It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. - -## Android Permissions +### Android Permissions [Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps. @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ An app may request a permission for a specific feature it has. For example, any Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) may show some trackers such as [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). This library includes [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) which can provide [push notifications](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps. This [is the case](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) with Bitwarden. That doesn't mean that Bitwarden is using all of the analytics features that are provided by Google Firebase Analytics. -## Media Access +## Privacy Features -Quite a few applications allows you to "share" a file with them for media upload. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter. - -## User Profiles +### User Profiles Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android. With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation. -## Work Profile +### Work Profile [Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously. -## VPN Killswitch +### VPN Killswitch Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**. -## Global Toggles +### Global Toggles Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled. -## Google +## Google Services If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play. diff --git a/i18n/sv/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/sv/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4f2940c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/sv/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Privacy Notes + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Activation Lock + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## Rekommenderad konfiguration + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### Settings + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! varning + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### Privacy + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/sv/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/sv/os/linux-overview.md index 9ad5dcc0..fbd4abb2 100644 --- a/i18n/sv/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/sv/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative, but not all distribitions are created equal. --- -Man tror ofta att [programvara med öppen källkod](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) är säker i sig eftersom källkoden är tillgänglig. Det finns en förväntan på att gemenskapens kontroll sker regelbundet, men detta är inte alltid fallet [](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigor applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years. +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -För närvarande har skrivbord Linux några områden som kan förbättras bättre jämfört med sina egenutvecklade motsvarigheter, t.ex.: - -- En verifierad startkedja, som Apples [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (med [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Androids [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot)eller Microsoft Windows [bootprocess](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) med [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). Dessa funktioner och hårdvarutekniker kan alla bidra till att förhindra ihållande manipulering av skadlig kod eller [evil maid-attacker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack) -- En stark sandlådelösning som den som finns i [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md)och [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Vanligt förekommande sandboxing-lösningar för Linux, t.ex. [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) och [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/), har fortfarande en lång väg att gå -- Starka [åtgärder för att minska exploateringar](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -Trots dessa nackdelar är stationära Linux-distributioner bra om du vill: - -- Undvik telemetri som ofta kommer med egna operativsystem -- Bevara [frihet för programvara](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- Har system som är inriktade på integritet, t.ex. [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) eller [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) - -På vår webbplats används i allmänhet termen "Linux" för att beskriva Linuxdistributioner för skrivbordsmiljöer. Andra operativsystem som också använder Linux-kärnan som ChromeOS, Android och Qubes OS diskuteras inte här. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [Våra Linux-rekommendationer :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Privacy Notes + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- Undvik telemetri som ofta kommer med egna operativsystem +- Bevara [frihet för programvara](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## Välja din distribution -Inte alla Linux-distributioner är skapade lika. Medan vår Linux-rekommendationssida inte är avsedd att vara en auktoritativ källa på vilken distribution du ska använda, finns det några saker du bör tänka på när du väljer vilken distribution du ska använda. +Inte alla Linux-distributioner är skapade lika. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### Utgivningscykel Vi rekommenderar starkt att du väljer distributioner som ligger nära de stabila uppströmsutgåvorna, ofta kallade rullande utgåvor. Detta beror på att frysta utgåvor ofta inte uppdaterar paketversioner och hamnar bakom säkerhetsuppdateringar. -För frusna distributioner som [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling)förväntas paketansvariga backa patchar för att åtgärda sårbarheter snarare än att stöta programvaran till "nästa version" som släppts av uppströmsutvecklaren. Vissa säkerhetskorrigeringar [inte](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) får en [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (särskilt mindre populär programvara) alls och därför inte göra det i distributionen med denna patching modell. Som ett resultat hålls mindre säkerhetskorrigeringar ibland tillbaka till nästa stora utgåva. +För frusna distributioner som [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling)förväntas paketansvariga backa patchar för att åtgärda sårbarheter snarare än att stöta programvaran till "nästa version" som släppts av uppströmsutvecklaren. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. Som ett resultat hålls mindre säkerhetskorrigeringar ibland tillbaka till nästa stora utgåva. Vi tror inte att hålla paket tillbaka och tillämpa tillfälliga patchar är en bra idé, eftersom det skiljer sig från hur utvecklaren kan ha avsett att programvaran ska fungera. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) har en presentation om detta: @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ Atomic update-metoden används för oföränderliga distributioner som Silverblu ### "Säkerhetsfokuserad" distribution -Det råder ofta viss förvirring mellan "säkerhetsfokuserade" fördelningar och "pentesting"-fördelningar. En snabb sökning på "den säkraste Linuxdistributionen" ger ofta resultat som Kali Linux, Black Arch och Parrot OS. Dessa distributioner är offensiva distributioner för penetrationstestning som innehåller verktyg för att testa andra system. De innehåller ingen "extra säkerhet" eller defensiva åtgärder som är avsedda för vanlig användning. +Det råder ofta viss förvirring mellan "säkerhetsfokuserade" fördelningar och "pentesting"-fördelningar. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. Dessa distributioner är offensiva distributioner för penetrationstestning som innehåller verktyg för att testa andra system. De innehåller ingen "extra säkerhet" eller defensiva åtgärder som är avsedda för vanlig användning. ### Arch Linux baserade distributioner -Arch-baserade distributioner rekommenderas inte för dem som är nya i Linux (oavsett distribution) eftersom de kräver regelbundet underhåll av systemet [](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch har ingen distributionsuppdateringsmekanism för de underliggande programvaruvalen. Därför måste du hålla dig uppdaterad om aktuella trender och ta till dig teknik när den ersätter äldre metoder på egen hand. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. Därför måste du hålla dig uppdaterad om aktuella trender och ta till dig teknik när den ersätter äldre metoder på egen hand. För ett säkert system förväntas du också ha tillräckliga Linuxkunskaper för att korrekt konfigurera säkerheten för deras system, t.ex. anta ett [obligatoriskt system för åtkomstkontroll](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control), konfigurera [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, skärpa uppstartsparametrar, manipulera [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) -parametrar och veta vilka komponenter de behöver, t.ex. [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Alla som använder [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **måste** vara bekväma med att granska PKGBUILDs som de installerar från den tjänsten. AUR-paket är innehåll som produceras av gemenskapen och är inte granskade på något sätt, och är därför sårbara för attacker i programvarukedjan, vilket faktiskt har hänt [tidigare](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR bör alltid användas sparsamt och ofta finns det många dåliga råd på olika sidor som uppmanar folk att blint använda [AUR-hjälpmedel](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) utan tillräcklig varning. Liknande varningar gäller för användning av tredje parts Personal Package Archives (PPAs) på Debianbaserade distributioner eller Community Projects (COPR) på Fedora. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR-paket är innehåll som produceras av gemenskapen och är inte granskade på något sätt, och är därför sårbara för attacker i programvarukedjan, vilket faktiskt har hänt [tidigare](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -Om du har erfarenhet av Linux och vill använda en Arch-baserad distribution rekommenderar vi endast huvudversionen av Arch Linux, inte något av dess derivat. Vi rekommenderar särskilt dessa två Arch-derivat: +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Liknande varningar gäller för användning av tredje parts Personal Package Archives (PPAs) på Debianbaserade distributioner eller Community Projects (COPR) på Fedora. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: Denna distribution håller tillbaka paket i två veckor för att se till att deras egna ändringar inte går sönder, inte för att se till att uppströmsversionen är stabil. När AUR-paket används byggs de ofta med de senaste [-biblioteken](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) från Arch:s arkiv. - **Garuda**: De använder [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) som automatiskt och blint kompilerar paket från AUR. Det finns ingen verifieringsprocess för att se till att AUR-paketen inte drabbas av attacker i leveranskedjan. -### Kicksecure - -Vi rekommenderar starkt att du inte använder föråldrade distributioner som Debian, men det finns ett Debianbaserat operativsystem som har hårdgjorts för att vara mycket säkrare än vanliga Linuxdistributioner: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure är, förenklat uttryckt, en uppsättning skript, konfigurationer och paket som avsevärt minskar angreppsytan för Debian. Den täcker många rekommendationer för sekretess och skydd av integritet som standard. - ### Linux-libre-kärnan och "Libre"-distributioner -We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons. +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## Allmänna rekommendationer @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ De flesta Linux-distributioner har ett alternativ i installationsprogrammet för ### Växla -Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora-baserade distributioner [använder ZRAM som standard](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -Vi rekommenderar att du använder en skrivbordsmiljö som stöder visningsprotokollet [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) eftersom det har utvecklats med säkerheten [i åtanke](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Dess föregångare, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), har inte stöd för isolering av grafiska gränssnitt, vilket gör att alla fönster kan [spela in skärmen, logga och injicera inmatningar i andra fönster](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), vilket gör alla försök till sandboxing meningslösa. Även om det finns alternativ för att göra nested X11, t.ex. [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) eller [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), har de ofta negativa konsekvenser för prestandan och är inte bekväma att konfigurera och är inte att föredra framför Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. Lyckligtvis har vanliga miljöer som [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org)och fönsterhanteraren [Sway](https://swaywm.org) stöd för Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). Om du använder en av dessa miljöer är det lika enkelt som att välja "Wayland"-sessionen i skrivbordsdisplayhanteraren ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ Vi rekommenderar **mot** om du använder skrivbordsmiljöer eller fönsterhanter ### Proprietär fast programvara (uppdateringar av mikrokod) -Linuxdistributioner som [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) eller DIY (Arch Linux) levereras inte med de proprietära [mikrokodsuppdateringarna](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) som ofta åtgärdar sårbarheter. Några anmärkningsvärda exempel på dessa sårbarheter är [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), och andra [maskinvarusårbarheter](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Några anmärkningsvärda exempel på dessa sårbarheter är [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), och andra [maskinvarusårbarheter](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -Vi rekommenderar **starkt** att du installerar mikrokodsuppdateringar, eftersom din CPU redan kör den egenutvecklade mikrokoden från fabriken. Fedora och openSUSE har båda mikrokoduppdateringar som standard. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora och openSUSE har båda mikrokoduppdateringar som standard. ### Uppdateringar De flesta Linuxdistributioner installerar automatiskt uppdateringar eller påminner dig om att göra det. Det är viktigt att hålla operativsystemet uppdaterat så att programvaran korrigeras när en sårbarhet hittas. -Vissa distributioner (särskilt de som riktar sig till avancerade användare) är mer avskalade och förväntar sig att du gör saker själv (t.ex. Arch eller Debian). Dessa kräver att du kör "pakethanteraren" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manuellt för att få viktiga säkerhetsuppdateringar. +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). Dessa kräver att du kör "pakethanteraren" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manuellt för att få viktiga säkerhetsuppdateringar. Dessutom hämtar vissa distributioner inte uppdateringar av den fasta programvaran automatiskt. För detta måste du installera [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd). @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ Dessutom hämtar vissa distributioner inte uppdateringar av den fasta programvar ### Randomisering av MAC-adresser -Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. Det är möjligt att [randomisera MAC-adressen](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) [MAC-adressen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) när du använder NetworkManager. Detta ger lite mer integritet i Wi-Fi-nätverk eftersom det är svårare att spåra specifika enheter i nätverket du är ansluten till. Den [**gör dig inte anonym**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf). @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ Vi rekommenderar att du ändrar inställningen till **random** i stället för * Om du använder [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components)måste du ställa in [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) vilket aktiverar [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=). -Det finns inte många punkter i slumpmässig MAC-adress för Ethernet-anslutningar som en systemadministratör kan hitta dig genom att titta på den port du använder på [-nätverksväxeln](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomisering av Wi-Fi- MAC-adresser beror på stöd från Wi-Fi-programmets fasta programvara. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Randomisering av Wi-Fi- MAC-adresser beror på stöd från Wi-Fi-programmets fasta programvara. ### Andra identifierare diff --git a/i18n/sv/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/sv/os/qubes-overview.md index 7bbe9cb6..a949768c 100644 --- a/i18n/sv/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/sv/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within virtual machines for heightened security. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) är ett operativsystem som använder hypervisorn [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) för att ge stark säkerhet för skrivbordsdatorer genom isolerade virtuella maskiner. Varje virtuell dator kallas *Qube* och du kan tilldela varje Qube en förtroendenivå baserat på dess syfte. Eftersom Qubes OS ger säkerhet genom att använda isolering och endast tillåta åtgärder från fall till fall är det motsatsen till [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Varje virtuell dator kallas *Qube* och du kan tilldela varje Qube en förtroendenivå baserat på dess syfte. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## Hur fungerar Qubes OS? diff --git a/i18n/sv/tools.md b/i18n/sv/tools.md index d4e03f66..c882d09a 100644 --- a/i18n/sv/tools.md +++ b/i18n/sv/tools.md @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ Vi [rekommenderar](dns.md#recommended-providers) ett antal krypterade DNS-servra - ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) - ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) - ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure) diff --git a/i18n/tr/desktop.md b/i18n/tr/desktop.md index 0f4e55da..fe683f97 100644 --- a/i18n/tr/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/tr/desktop.md @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } @@ -152,33 +152,48 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/). +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! öneri + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## Criteria -**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! example "This section is new" +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress. - -Our recommended operating systems: - -- Must be open-source. -- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates. -- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- Must support full-disk encryption during installation. -- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. -- Must support a wide variety of hardware. +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/tr/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/tr/os/android-overview.md index d0c88ecb..bffa9e33 100644 --- a/i18n/tr/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/tr/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android description: Android is an open-source operating system with strong security protections, which makes it our top choice for phones. --- -Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. +![Android logo](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## Choosing an Android Distribution +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### Choosing an Android Distribution When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has irrevocable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android. @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that [Our Android System Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## Avoid Rooting +### Avoid Rooting [Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses. @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps. -## Verified Boot +### Install Updates + +It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Security Protections + +### Verified Boot [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection). @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock And Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be aware of beyond their marketing. For example, the Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage. -## Firmware Updates +### Firmware Updates Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin). @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive Fairphone, for example, markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates. -## Android Versions - -It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. - -## Android Permissions +### Android Permissions [Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps. @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ An app may request a permission for a specific feature it has. For example, any Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) may show some trackers such as [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). This library includes [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) which can provide [push notifications](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps. This [is the case](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) with Bitwarden. That doesn't mean that Bitwarden is using all of the analytics features that are provided by Google Firebase Analytics. -## Media Access +## Privacy Features -Quite a few applications allows you to "share" a file with them for media upload. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter. - -## User Profiles +### User Profiles Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android. With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation. -## Work Profile +### Work Profile [Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously. -## VPN Killswitch +### VPN Killswitch Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**. -## Global Toggles +### Global Toggles Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled. -## Google +## Google Services If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play. diff --git a/i18n/tr/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/tr/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4dee83e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/tr/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Privacy Notes + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Activation Lock + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## Recommended Configuration + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### Settings + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! warning + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### Privacy + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/tr/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/tr/os/linux-overview.md index 9440ee7a..095c9bfe 100644 --- a/i18n/tr/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/tr/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative, but not all distribitions are created equal. --- -It is often believed that [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigor applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years. +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.: - -- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack) -- A strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go -- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are great if you want to: - -- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems -- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- Have privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) - -Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed here. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Privacy Notes + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems +- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## Choosing your distribution -Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use. +Not all Linux distributions are created equal. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### Release cycle We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates. -For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. +For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this: @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tu ### “Security-focused” distributions -There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. +There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. ### Arch-based distributions -Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically: +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories. - **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks. -### Kicksecure - -While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. - ### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions -We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons. +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## Genel Öneriler @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS] ### Swap -Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do n ### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates) -Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. ### Updates Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found. -Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd). @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automaticall ### MAC Address Randomization -Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous. @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as sugges If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=). -There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. ### Other Identifiers diff --git a/i18n/tr/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/tr/os/qubes-overview.md index 17b286b9..3ed80dcd 100644 --- a/i18n/tr/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/tr/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within virtual machines for heightened security. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## How does Qubes OS work? diff --git a/i18n/tr/tools.md b/i18n/tr/tools.md index 9ab71b2f..fb22627e 100644 --- a/i18n/tr/tools.md +++ b/i18n/tr/tools.md @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b - ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) - ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) - ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure) diff --git a/i18n/uk/desktop.md b/i18n/uk/desktop.md index 2d4a264e..24adecdd 100644 --- a/i18n/uk/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/uk/desktop.md @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } @@ -152,33 +152,48 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes** це операційна система з відкритим кодом, розроблена для забезпечення надійної безпеки настільних комп'ютерів. Qubes базується на Xen, X Window System та Linux і може запускати більшість програм Linux та використовувати більшість драйверів Linux. + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes базується на Xen, X Window System та Linux і може запускати більшість програм Linux та використовувати більшість драйверів Linux. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/). +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! рекомендації + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## Criteria -**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! example "This section is new" +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress. - -Our recommended operating systems: - -- Must be open-source. -- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates. -- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- Must support full-disk encryption during installation. -- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. -- Must support a wide variety of hardware. +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/uk/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/uk/os/android-overview.md index 8115242f..5f764757 100644 --- a/i18n/uk/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/uk/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android description: Android is an open-source operating system with strong security protections, which makes it our top choice for phones. --- -Android - це безпечна операційна система, яка має надійну [пісочницю для додатків](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), та систему управління [дозволами](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview). +![Android logo](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## Вибір прошивки Android +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### Вибір прошивки Android Коли ви купуєте телефон Android, операційна система пристрою за замовчуванням часто постачається з інвазивною інтеграцією з додатками та службами, які не є частиною [Android Open Source Project](https://source.android.com/). Прикладом цього є служби Google Play, які мають безповоротні привілеї для доступу до ваших файлів, зберігання контактів, журналів дзвінків, SMS-повідомлень, місцезнаходження, камери, мікрофона, ідентифікаторів обладнання тощо. Ці програми та сервіси збільшують вразливість вашого пристрою до атак і є джерелом різних проблем з конфіденційністю в Android. @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Android - це безпечна операційна система, яка ма [Наші рекомендації для системи Android :material-arrow-right:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## Уникайте рутування +### Уникайте рутування [Рутування](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android пристроїв може значно знизити безпеку, оскільки це послаблює повну [модель безпеки Android](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). Це може знизити конфіденційність у разі використання експлойта, якому сприяє зниження безпеки. Поширені методи отримання root-прав передбачають втручання в розділ boot, що унеможливлює успішне виконання Verified Boot. Додатки, які потребують root-права, також змінюють системний розділ, що означає, що Verified Boot повинен залишатись вимкненим. Наявність root-доступу безпосередньо в інтерфейсі користувача також збільшує [поверхню атаки](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) вашого пристрою і може сприяти [підвищенню привілеїв](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation), вразливостей та обходу політики SELinux. @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ використовує підхід на основі [пакетно Ми не вважаємо, що жертви безпеки, які приносить рутування телефону, варті сумнівних переваг конфіденційності цих програм. -## Verified Boot +### Install Updates + +It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Security Protections + +### Verified Boot [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot)> є важливою частиною моделі безпеки Android. Він забезпечує захист від атак [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack), стійкість до шкідливого програмного забезпечення, та гарантує що оновлення безпеки не можуть бути знижені за допомогою [захисту від відкату](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection). @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Verified Boot забезпечує цілісність файлів опера Оновлення мікропрограми є критично важливими для підтримки безпеки, і без них ваш пристрій не може бути захищеним. OEM-виробники мають угоди про підтримку зі своїми партнерами щодо надання компонентів із закритим вихідним кодом протягом обмеженого періоду. Вони детально описані в щомісячному [бюлетені безпеки Android](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin). -## Оновлення мікропрограми +### Оновлення мікропрограми Оскільки такі компоненти телефону, як процесор та радіотехнології, покладаються на компоненти із закритим вихідним кодом, оновлення повинні надаватися відповідними виробниками. Тому важливо, щоб ви придбали пристрій в рамках активного циклу підтримки. [Qualcomm](https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2020/12/16/qualcomm-and-google-announce-collaboration-extend-android-os-support-and) та [Samsung](https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-galaxy-security-extending-updates-knox/) підтримують свої пристрої протягом 4 років, тоді як дешевші продукти часто мають коротші цикли підтримки. @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ Verified Boot забезпечує цілісність файлів опера [Дозволи на Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) надають вам контроль над доступом програм. Google регулярно вносить [покращення](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) у систему дозволів в кожній наступній версії. Всі встановлені вами програми суворо [ізольовані](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), тому немає потреби встановлювати будь-які антивірусні додатки. -## Версії Android - -It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. - -## Дозволи Android +### Дозволи Android [Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps. @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ An app may request a permission for a specific feature it has. For example, any Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) may show some trackers such as [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). This library includes [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) which can provide [push notifications](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps. This [is the case](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) with Bitwarden. That doesn't mean that Bitwarden is using all of the analytics features that are provided by Google Firebase Analytics. -## Профілі користувачів +## Privacy Features -Quite a few applications allows you to "share" a file with them for media upload. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter. - -## Профілі користувачів +### Профілі користувачів Для цього потрібен **контролер пристрою** такий як [Shelter](#recommended-apps), якщо ви не використовуєте CalyxOS, яка вже містить в собі контролер. Робочий профіль залежить від функціонування контролера пристрою. Кожен профіль зашифрований за допомогою власного ключа шифрування і не може отримати доступ до даних будь-яких інших профілів. Навіть власник пристрою не може переглядати дані профілів, не знаючи їхніх паролів. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation. -## Робочий профіль +### Робочий профіль [Робочі профілі](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) - це ще один спосіб ізоляції програм, який може бути зручнішим, ніж окремі профілі користувачів. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ A **device controller** app such as [Shelter](../android.md#shelter) is required Цей метод, як правило, є менш безпечним, ніж додатковий профіль користувача; однак, він дозволяє вам зручно запускати додатки як в робочому, так і в особистому профілях одночасно. -## VPN Killswitch +### VPN Killswitch Якщо у вас є обліковий запис Google, радимо зареєструватися в [Програмі Додаткового Захисту](https://landing.google.com/advancedprotection/). Ця функція може запобігти витоку, якщо VPN відключений. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**. -## Глобальні перемикачі +### Глобальні перемикачі Сучасні пристрої Android мають глобальні перемикачі для вимкнення служб Bluetooth і визначення місцезнаходження. В Android 12 з'явилися перемикачі для камери та мікрофона. Коли вони не використовуються, ми рекомендуємо вимкнути їх. Програми не можуть використовувати вимкнені функції (навіть якщо їм надано індивідуальний дозвіл), поки їх не буде ввімкнено знову. -## Google +## Google Services Якщо ви користуєтесь пристроєм зі службами Google, заводською операційною системою або операційною системою, яка безпечно використовує служби Google Play, такі як GrapheneOS, ви можете внести ряд додаткових змін, щоб покращити конфіденційність. Ми як і раніше рекомендуємо повністю уникати сервісів Google або обмежити сервіси Google Play профілем користувача/робочим профілем, об'єднавши контролер пристрою, такий як *Shelter* з ізольованим Google Play від GrapheneOS. diff --git a/i18n/uk/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/uk/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4dee83e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/uk/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Privacy Notes + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Activation Lock + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## Recommended Configuration + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### Settings + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! warning + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### Privacy + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/uk/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/uk/os/linux-overview.md index e484c466..656f95a8 100644 --- a/i18n/uk/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/uk/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative, but not all distribitions are created equal. --- -It is often believed that [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigor applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years. +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.: - -- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack) -- A strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go -- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are great if you want to: - -- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems -- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- Have privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) - -Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed here. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Privacy Notes + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems +- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## Choosing your distribution -Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use. +Not all Linux distributions are created equal. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### Release cycle We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates. -For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. +For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this: @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tu ### “Security-focused” distributions -There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. +There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. ### Arch-based distributions -Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically: +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories. - **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks. -### Kicksecure - -While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. - ### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions -We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons. +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## General Recommendations @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS] ### Swap -Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do n ### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates) -Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. ### Updates Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found. -Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd). @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automaticall ### MAC Address Randomization -Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous. @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as sugges If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=). -There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. ### Other Identifiers diff --git a/i18n/uk/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/uk/os/qubes-overview.md index 5bba1170..f6c35f04 100644 --- a/i18n/uk/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/uk/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: pg/qubes-os description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within virtual machines for heightened security. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## How does Qubes OS work? diff --git a/i18n/uk/tools.md b/i18n/uk/tools.md index 277676c9..c829c1e9 100644 --- a/i18n/uk/tools.md +++ b/i18n/uk/tools.md @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b - ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) - ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) - ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure) diff --git a/i18n/vi/desktop.md b/i18n/vi/desktop.md index 87b74b81..5ac38170 100644 --- a/i18n/vi/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/vi/desktop.md @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os). [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } @@ -142,39 +142,48 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes** là một hệ điều hành mã nguồn mở được thiết kế để cung cấp bảo mật mạnh mẽ cho máy tính để bàn. Qubes dựa trên Xen, X Window System, và Linux, và có thể chạy hầu hết các ứng dụng Linux và sử dụng hầu hết các trình điều khiển Linux. + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes dựa trên Xen, X Window System, và Linux, và có thể chạy hầu hết các ứng dụng Linux và sử dụng hầu hết các trình điều khiển Linux. [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*. +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/). +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! khuyến nghị + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## Framadate -**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! cảnh báo - PrivateBin sử dụng JavaScript để xử lý mã hóa, vì vậy bạn phải tin tưởng nhà cung cấp ở mức độ họ không đưa bất kỳ JavaScript độc hại nào vào để lấy khóa cá nhân của bạn. +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - ![PrivateBin logo](assets/img/productivity/privatebin.svg){ align=right } - - **PrivateBin** là một pastebin trực tuyến mã nguồn mở, tối giản, nơi máy chủ không có kiến ​​thức về dữ liệu đã dán. Dữ liệu được mã hóa/giải mã trong trình duyệt bằng 256-bit AES. tải xuống - - - [:fontawesome-brands-docker: Dockerhub](https://hub.docker.com/r/vaultwarden/server) - - [:fontawesome-brands-github: Mã nguồn](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden) - -Our recommended operating systems: - -- Must be open-source. -- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates. -- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- Must support full-disk encryption during installation. -- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. -- Must support a wide variety of hardware. +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/vi/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/vi/os/android-overview.md index b33dea6d..40419033 100644 --- a/i18n/vi/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/vi/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: fontawesome/brands/android description: Android is an open-source operating system with strong security protections, which makes it our top choice for phones. --- -Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. +![Android logo](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## Choosing an Android Distribution +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### Choosing an Android Distribution When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has irrevocable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android. @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that [Our Android System Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## Avoid Rooting +### Avoid Rooting [Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses. @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps. -## Verified Boot +### Install Updates + +It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Security Protections + +### Verified Boot [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection). @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock And Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be aware of beyond their marketing. For example, the Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage. -## Firmware Updates +### Firmware Updates Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin). @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive Fairphone, for example, markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates. -## Android Versions - -It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution. - -## Android Permissions +### Android Permissions [Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps. @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ An app may request a permission for a specific feature it has. For example, any Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) may show some trackers such as [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). This library includes [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) which can provide [push notifications](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps. This [is the case](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) with Bitwarden. That doesn't mean that Bitwarden is using all of the analytics features that are provided by Google Firebase Analytics. -## Media Access +## Privacy Features -Quite a few applications allows you to "share" a file with them for media upload. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter. - -## User Profiles +### User Profiles Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android. With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation. -## Work Profile +### Work Profile [Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles. @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously. -## VPN Killswitch +### VPN Killswitch Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**. -## Global Toggles +### Global Toggles Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled. -## Google +## Google Services If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play. diff --git a/i18n/vi/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/vi/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4dee83e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/vi/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Privacy Notes + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Activation Lock + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## Recommended Configuration + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### Settings + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! warning + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### Privacy + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/vi/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/vi/os/linux-overview.md index e484c466..656f95a8 100644 --- a/i18n/vi/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/vi/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative, but not all distribitions are created equal. --- -It is often believed that [open-source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) software is inherently secure because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly; however, this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigor applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years. +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.: - -- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). These features and hardware technologies can all help prevent persistent tampering by malware or [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack) -- A strong sandboxing solution such as that found in [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), and [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Commonly used Linux sandboxing solutions such as [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) and [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) still have a long way to go -- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are great if you want to: - -- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems -- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- Have privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) - -Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe desktop Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed here. +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [Our Linux Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Privacy Notes + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- Avoid telemetry that often comes with proprietary operating systems +- Maintain [software freedom](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## Choosing your distribution -Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use. +Not all Linux distributions are created equal. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### Release cycle We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates. -For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. +For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release. We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this: @@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tu ### “Security-focused” distributions -There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. +There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use. ### Arch-based distributions -Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own. For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit). -Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). -If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically: +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora. + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories. - **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks. -### Kicksecure - -While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. - ### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions -We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons. +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## General Recommendations @@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS] ### Swap -Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). + +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland. +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)). @@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do n ### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates) -Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html). -We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default. ### Updates Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found. -Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates. Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd). @@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automaticall ### MAC Address Randomization -Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous. @@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as sugges If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=). -There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware. ### Other Identifiers diff --git a/i18n/vi/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/vi/os/qubes-overview.md index 5bba1170..f6c35f04 100644 --- a/i18n/vi/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/vi/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: pg/qubes-os description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within virtual machines for heightened security. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## How does Qubes OS work? diff --git a/i18n/vi/tools.md b/i18n/vi/tools.md index b58626cf..2f2ed086 100644 --- a/i18n/vi/tools.md +++ b/i18n/vi/tools.md @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b - ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) - ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) - ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure) diff --git a/i18n/zh-Hant/desktop.md b/i18n/zh-Hant/desktop.md index a4b4617d..30d8aada 100644 --- a/i18n/zh-Hant/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/zh-Hant/desktop.md @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Nix是一個基於源的套件管理器；如果二進位快取中沒有預先 ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix** 來自 [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure)，為 Debian 安全分支。 它旨在提供網際網路的隱私、安全和匿名性。 Whonix 最好與 [Qubes OS](# qubes-os) 配合使用。 + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. 它旨在提供網際網路的隱私、安全和匿名性。 Whonix 最好與 [Qubes OS](# qubes-os) 配合使用。 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } @@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ Whonix 運行兩個虛擬機器：一個“工作站”和一個 Tor “閘道 Whonix 未來版本可能包括 [完整系統 AppArmor](https://github.com/Whonix/apparmor-profile-everything) 和 [個沙盒應用程式啟動器](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Sandbox-app-launcher) ，以完全限制系統上的所有進程。 Whonix 最好與 Qubes一起使用 + ，與其他 hypervisor相比， Qubes-Whonix 有不同 [缺點](https://forums.whonix.org/t/qubes-whonix-security-disadvantages-help-wanted/8581) 。

@@ -160,10 +161,9 @@ Tails Tor 瀏覽器預設包含 [uBlock Origin](desktop-browsers.md#ublock-origi ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes OS** 是一個開源作業系統，旨在為桌機運算提供強大的安全性。 Qubes 基於 Xen、X Window System 和 Linux ，可以運行大多數 Linux 應用程式與使用大多數 Linux 驅動程式。 + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes 基於 Xen、X Window System 和 Linux ，可以運行大多數 Linux 應用程式與使用大多數 Linux 驅動程式。 [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } @@ -171,26 +171,44 @@ Tails Tor 瀏覽器預設包含 [uBlock Origin](desktop-browsers.md#ublock-origi [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS 是基於Xen 的作業系統，通過安全虛擬機器為桌機提供強大的安全性，（也稱為 *Qubes*）。 +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -Qubes OS 作業系統將子系統（例如網絡、USB等）和應用程式隔離在個別的虛擬機器中以保護電腦。 如果系統的一部分被破壞，那麼額外的隔離可以保護系統其餘部分。 詳情請參閱Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/)。 +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + + + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! recommendation + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. 它預設覆蓋了大量的隱私和加固建議。 It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } + ## 標準 -**請注意，我們所推薦專案沒有任何瓜葛。 ** 除了 [標準準則](about/criteria.md)外，我們還發展出一套明確要求以提出客觀建議。 我們建議您在選擇使用項目之前先熟悉此列表，並進行自己的研究，以確保它是您的正確選擇。 +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! example "此部分是新的" +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - 我們正在努力為我們網站的每個部分建立定義的標準，這可能會有所變化。 如果您對我們的標準有任何疑問，請在 [論壇上提問](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) ，如果沒有列出，請不要認為我們在提出建議時沒有考慮到某些事情。 當我們推薦一個項目時，有許多因素被考慮和討論，記錄每一個項目都是正在進行式。 - - -我們推薦的作業系統： - -- 必須是開源的。 -- 必須定期接收軟體和Linux內核更新。 -- Linux 發行版本必須支援[Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland)。 -- 安裝時必須支援全磁碟加密。 -- 不可將定期更新發佈凍結超過1年。 我們 [不建議](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) 桌機使用“長期支援”或“穩定”發行版。 -- 需要支持各種各樣的硬體。 +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/zh-Hant/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/zh-Hant/os/android-overview.md index c7f61ff0..6fe7e761 100644 --- a/i18n/zh-Hant/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/zh-Hant/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android description: Android是一個開源作業系統，具有強大的安全保護，使其成為手機的首選。 --- -Android是一個安全的操作系統，具有強大的 [應用程式沙盒](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox)， [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) （AVB）和強大的 [許可](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) 控制系統。 +![Android 圖標](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## 選擇Android 發佈版本 +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### 選擇Android 發佈版本 當購買 Android 手機時，該設備的預設作業系統通常放入非 [Android 開源專案](https://source.android.com/)的應用程式與服務，成為侵入性整合。 例如， Google Play 服務擁有不可撤銷的權限，可存取您的檔案、聯絡人儲存空間、通話記錄、SMS訊息、位置、攝影機、麥克風、硬體識別碼等。 這些應用程式和服務增加了設備的攻擊面，成為 Android 各種隱私問題的來源。 @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Android是一個安全的操作系統，具有強大的 [應用程式沙盒](htt [Android 系統建議 :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## 避免 Root +### 避免 Root [Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) 安卓手机会大大降低安全性，因为它削弱了完整的 [安卓安全模型](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy)。 這可能會降低隱私，如果有一個漏洞被降低的安全性所輔助。 常見的 root 方法涉及直接篡改開機分割區，以至於造成無法成功執行Verified Boot。 需要 root 的應用程式也會修改系統分割區，這意味著 Verified Boot 必須維持停用。 直接在使用者介面中暴露 root 也會增加裝置的 [攻擊面](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) ，助長 [特權升級](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) 漏洞和 SELinux 政策繞過。 @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ 基於 [封包過濾](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing) 我們認為，不值得這些應用程序的可疑隱私利益而犧牲手機 root 的安全。 -## 已驗證的啟動 +### Install Updates + +重要的是不要使用 [結束生命周期](https://endoflife.date/android) 版本的Android。 較新版本的 Android 不僅會收到作業系統的安全性更新，而且還會收到重要的隱私增強更新。 + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. 系統應用程式僅由 OEM 或 Android 發行版提供。 + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## 安全保護 + +### 已驗證的啟動 [ Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) ，是 Android 安全模式的重要組成。 它可保護 [邪惡女僕](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) 、惡意軟件的持久性攻擊，確保安全性更新不會造成 [回滾保護降級](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection)。 @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Verified Boot確保作業系統檔案的完整性，從而防止具有物理訪 許多 OEM 也破壞了 Verified Boot，您必須在廠商行銷之餘認知到這點。 例如， Fairphone 3和4在預設情況下並不安全，因為 [股票引導裝載程式信任公開的AVB簽名密鑰](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11)。 這會在庫存 Fairphone 設備中斷 verified boot，因為系統將啟動替代 Android 作業系統（如/e/） [，而不對自定作業系統發出警告](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) 。 -## 韌體更新 +### 韌體更新 韌體更新對於維護安全性至關重要，沒有它們，您的設備就無法安全。 OEM 與其合作夥伴簽訂了支援協議，在有限的支持期內提供封閉式元件。 詳情請參閱每月 [Android 安全公告](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin)。 @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ Verified Boot確保作業系統檔案的完整性，從而防止具有物理訪 例如， Fairphone 推銷其設備有 6年的支持。 然而， SoC （ Fairphone 4上的Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G ）的EOL日期要短得多。 這意味著，無論 Fairphone 是否繼續發布軟體安全更新， Qualcomm Fairphone 4 固件安全更新將於 2023年9月結束。 -## Android 版本 - -重要的是不要使用 [結束生命周期](https://endoflife.date/android) 版本的Android。 較新版本的 Android 不僅會收到作業系統的安全性更新，而且還會收到重要的隱私增強更新。 例如， [，Android 10 之前](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes)，任何具有 [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) 權限的應用程式都可存取手機敏感獨特的序列號，如 [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity)， [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier)，SIM卡的 [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity)，而現在則必須是系統應用程式才可以。 系統應用程式僅由 OEM 或 Android 發行版提供。 - -## Android權限 +### Android權限 Android 上的 @@ -100,13 +114,11 @@ Android 13: -## 媒體存取 - -相當多的應用程式讓您須以他們"“共享”"以便上傳媒體檔案。 例如，如果想在Twitter 發佈圖片，請不要授予Twitter 訪問您的“媒體和照片”的權限，因為它將可以訪問您所有圖片。 相反，請前往您的檔案管理器（ documentsUI ） ，按住圖片，然後與Twitter分享。 +## Privacy Features -## 用戶設定檔 +### 用戶設定檔 多重用戶設定可以在 **設置** → **系統** → **多個用戶** 中找到，是 Android 最簡單的隔離方式。 @@ -114,7 +126,7 @@ Android 13: -## 工作用設定檔 +### 工作用設定檔 [工作用設定檔](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) 是另一個隔離個別應用的方法，也比單獨的用戶設定檔更為方便。 @@ -126,19 +138,19 @@ Android 13: -## VPN Killswitch +### VPN Killswitch Android 7以上版本支援VPN killswitch ，無需安裝第三方應用程式即可使用。 此功能可以防止VPN中斷連線時的洩漏。 它可以在 :gear: **設置** → **網路 & 網際網路** → **VPN** → :gear: → **區塊連接沒有 VPN**中找到。 -## 全局切換 +### 全局切換 現代 Android 裝置具有全局切換功能，可停用藍牙和定位服務。 Android 12為相機和麥克風引入了切換功能。 不使用時，建議停用這些功能。 在重新啟用之前，應用程式無法使用已停用的功能（即使授予個別權限）。 -## Google +## Google Services 如果您使用的裝置搭載Google服務，無論是您庫存作業系統，還是能夠安全地使用 Google Play服務（如GrapheneOS ）的作業系統，可進行許多其他變更以改善隱私。 我們仍然建議避免使用 Google 服務，或者將 *Shelter* 等設備控制器與 GrapheneOS 的Sandboxed Google Play相結合，將 Google Play 服務限制為特定用戶/工作檔案。 diff --git a/i18n/zh-Hant/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/zh-Hant/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0104c963 --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/zh-Hant/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## 隱私筆記 + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### 激活鎖 + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## 建議配置 + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. 這種訪問級別偶爾會被執法部門濫用，儘管您的資料在設備上還是安全加密的狀態。當然，Apple 與任何其他公司一樣容易遭受資料洩露。 + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### 設定 + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### 藍牙 + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### 一般設定 + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! warning "警告" + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### 隱私 + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/zh-Hant/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/zh-Hant/os/linux-overview.md index f71e3d54..c7b39250 100644 --- a/i18n/zh-Hant/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/zh-Hant/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,35 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux 為開源、以隱私為中心的桌面作業系統替代選項，但並非所有發行版都一模一樣。 --- -人們通常認為 [開源](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) 軟體本質上是安全的，因為源代碼可以公開取得。 人們期望定期進行社群驗證；然而這種情況 [並不常見](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/)。 它確實取決於許多因素，例如專案活動、開發人員經驗、用於 [代碼審查的嚴格程度](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review)以及 [代碼庫](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) 特定部分的關注頻率，這些可能多年未被觸及。 +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -目前，桌面 Linux 確實有一些領域可以比商有作業系統更好地改進，例如： - -- 驗證啟動鏈，例如 Apple 的 [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) （帶有 [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)） ， Android的 [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot)， ChromeOS [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot)或 Microsoft Windows [開機程序](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) 與 [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm)。 這些功能和硬體技術都有助於防止惡意軟體的持續篡改或 [邪惡女僕的攻擊](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack) -- 強大的沙箱解決方案，如在 [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html)， [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md)，和 [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox)。 常用的 Linux 沙盒解決方案，如 [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) 和 [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) ，仍然有很長的路要走。 -- 強大的 [漏洞緩解措施](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -儘管有這些缺點，但如果可以稍加調整，桌面 Linux 發行版還是很不錯的。 - -- 避免商業作業系統經常出現的遙測現象 -- 保持 [軟體自由](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- 有專注隱私保護的作業系統，如 [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) 或 [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) - -我們網站通常使用術語 "Linux "來講述桌面Linux 發行版。 其它也使用Linux內核的作業系統，如 ChromeOS、Android 和Qubes OS，此處不作討論。 +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [建議的 Linux 發行版 :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## 隱私筆記 + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- 避免商業作業系統經常出現的遙測現象 +- 保持 [軟體自由](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## 挑選發行版本 -所有 Linux 發行版並非一模一樣。 我們的 Linux 建議頁面並不打算成為您應該使用哪個發行版的權威來源，但在選擇使用哪個發行版時，您應該記住一些事情。 +所有 Linux 發行版並非一模一樣。 Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### 發布週期 強烈建議您選擇與穩定的上遊軟體版本保持接近的發行版，通常稱為滾動發行版。 因為凍結發行週期旳發行版通常不會更新套件版本，並且在安全性更新方面落後。 -像 [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling)這樣的凍結發行版，套件維護人員預計會回移補丁修復漏洞，而不是將軟體提昇到上遊開發人員發布的“下一個版本”。 某些安全修復 - -根本没收到 [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) （特别是不流行的軟體），在此種補丁模式不會放入發行版。 因此小型安全修復有時候要等到下次主要發佈時才一起進行。

+像 [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling)這樣的凍結發行版，套件維護人員預計會回移補丁修復漏洞，而不是將軟體提昇到上遊開發人員發布的“下一個版本”。 Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. 因此小型安全修復有時候要等到下次主要發佈時才一起進行。 我們不認為保留軟體套件和應用臨時補丁是好主意，因為它偏離了開發者計畫讓軟體工作的方式。 [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) 對此有一份簡報： @@ -56,90 +66,70 @@ description: Linux 為開源、以隱私為中心的桌面作業系統替代選 ### “以安全爲重點的發行版 -人們常會混淆“以安全為中心”的發行版和“滲透測試”發行版。 快速搜索“最安全的 Linux發行版”，通常會得到像 Kali Linux, Black Arch 和 Parrot OS 這樣結果。 這些發行版是攻擊性的滲透測試發行版，捆綁了測試其他系統的工具。 它們不包括任何 "額外的安全 "或常規使用的防禦性緩解措施。 - - +人們常會混淆“以安全為中心”的發行版和“滲透測試”發行版。 A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. 這些發行版是攻擊性的滲透測試發行版，捆綁了測試其他系統的工具。 它們不包括任何 "額外的安全 "或常規使用的防禦性緩解措施。 ### 基於 Arch Linux 的發行版 -不推薦 Arch發行版(無論哪個發行版)給剛接觸 Linux 的人，因為它們需要定期進行 [系統維護](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance)。 Arch沒有底層軟體選擇的發行版更新機制。 因此，必須了解當前趨勢，並在新技術取代舊有做法時予以採用。 +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. 因此，必須了解當前趨勢，並在新技術取代舊有做法時予以採用。 對於一個安全的系統，還應有足夠的 Linux 知識來作正確安全設置，如採用 [強制性訪問控制](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) 系統，設置 [內核模塊](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) 黑名單，硬化啟動參數，操作 [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) 參數，並知道需要哪些組件，如 [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit)。 -使用 [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **者必須** 對該服務中安裝的 PKGBUILD進行審計。 AUR 軟體套件是社區製作的內容，未經任何審查，很容易受到軟體供應鏈的攻擊， [事實上已發生過這類事件](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/)。 應該少用 AUR，而往往各種網頁有很多不好的建議，指導人們盲目地使用 [AUR 幫助器](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) 卻沒有足夠警告。 類似的警告也適用基於Debian 發行版上使用第三方個人軟體套件檔案(PPAs)或 Fedora使用社區項目(COPR)。 +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR 軟體套件是社區製作的內容，未經任何審查，很容易受到軟體供應鏈的攻擊， [事實上已發生過這類事件](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/)。 -如果是 Linux 老手，希望使用基於 Arch 發行版，我們只推薦主線 Arch Linux，而不是任何衍生品。 我們特別建議不要使用這兩種 Arch 衍生品。 +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. 類似的警告也適用基於Debian 發行版上使用第三方個人軟體套件檔案(PPAs)或 Fedora使用社區項目(COPR)。 + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: 此發行版將軟體套件保留 2週，以確保不會破壞他們自己的修改，而不是確保上游的穩定。 使用AUR軟體套件時，通常是根據 Arch 軟體庫中最新的 [存放庫構建](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing))。 - **Garuda**: 他們使用 [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) ，它自動地、盲目地從 AUR 編譯軟件套件。 沒有驗證程序去確保 AUR 套件不會受到供應鏈攻擊。 - - -### Kicksecure - -雖然我們強烈建議不要使用 Debian 這類過時的發行版，但有一種基於Debian 的加固作業系統，比傳統的 Linux 發行版更安全。 [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/)。 簡單地說，Kicksecure 是一組腳本、配置和軟體套件，可大大減少 Debian 的攻擊面。 它預設覆蓋了大量的隱私和加固建議。 - - - ### Linux-libre 內核與 “Libre” 發行版 -我們非常 **不推薦**使用 Linux-libre 內核，因為它[移除了安全緩和](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) 以及由於意識型態而 [壓制有關微碼脆弱的內核警告](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846)。 - - +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## 一般性建議 - - ### 磁碟加密 大多數Linux 發行版安裝程序中都有啟用 [LUKS](../encryption.md#linux-unified-key-setup) FDE之選項。 如果在安裝時沒有設置這個選項，就只能重新安裝，因為在 [系統系統](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_system) 被格式化 [磁碟分區](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_partitioning)後進行加密。 我們還建議安全地刪除儲存設備。 - [安全資料清除 :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/05/25/secure-data-erasure/) - - ### Swap -考慮使用[ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) 或 [加密的d swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption)取代未加密的swap 以避免潛在地把敏感資料推送到 [swap 空間](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging)的安全問題。 基於 Fedora 的發行版 [預設使用 ZRAM](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM)。 - +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -建議使用支持 [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) 顯示協議的桌面環境，因為它的開發 [考慮到了安全](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/)。 其前身 [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)，不支持GUI 隔離，允許所有視窗[記錄畫面、日誌和注入其他視窗的輸入](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html)，使任何沙盒嘗試都是徒勞。 雖然有一些選項可以做嵌套 X11，比如 [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) 或 [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr)，但它們往往會帶來負面性能，設置也不方便，不如 Wayland 可取。 +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. 幸好常見的桌面環境，如 [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org)， [KDE](https://kde.org)以及視窗管理器 [Sway](https://swaywm.org) 都支持 Wayland。 某些發佈版本如 Fedora 和 Tumbleweed 預設使用它，有些則可能在未來也會這樣作在 X11 成為 [硬性維護模式](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly)後。 如果使用以下的桌面環境，就像在桌面顯示管理器中選擇 "Wayland "一樣簡單([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)) 。 我們**反對**使用不支援 Wayland 的桌面環境或視窗管理器，如Cinnamon（Linux Mint）、Pantheon（Elementary OS）、MATE、Xfce 和 i3。 - - ### 商用靭體(Microcode更新) -Linux 發行版，如 [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) 或 DIY(Arch Linux)，不附帶商業專用的 [微碼](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) 更新，這類更新通常會修補漏洞。 這些漏洞例子包括： [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), 以及其他 [硬體漏洞](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html)。 - -我們 **強烈建議** 安裝微碼更新，因為CPU 出廠時已經在運行專有的微碼。 Fedora 和 openSUSE 都預設採用微碼更新。 - +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. 這些漏洞例子包括： [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), 以及其他 [硬體漏洞](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html)。 +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora 和 openSUSE 都預設採用微碼更新。 ### 更新 大多數 Linux 發行版會自動安裝更新或發出提醒。 重要的是保持作業系統系統最新，當發現漏洞時，可修補軟體。 -一些發行版（尤其是那些針對進階用戶）更加簡陋，指望使用者自己能做一些事情（例如 Arch 或 Debian）。 例如需要手動運行 "軟體套件管理器" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`等等)，以便接收重要的安全更新。 +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). 例如需要手動運行 "軟體套件管理器" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`等等)，以便接收重要的安全更新。 此外，一些發行版不會自動下載靭體更新。 为此，你将需要安装 [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd)。 - - ## 隱私微調 - - ### MAC 地址隨機化 -許多桌面 Linux 發行版（Fedora、openSUSE等）自帶 [網路管理員](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager)，以配置以太網和 Wi-Fi設置。 +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. 在使用NetworkManager時，可以隨機化 [](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) [MAC 地址](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address)。 這在Wi-Fi 上提供了更多隱私，因為這讓追踪所連網路的特定設備變得更困難。 但這 [**並不是**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) 讓您匿名。 @@ -147,9 +137,7 @@ Linux 發行版，如 [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) 如使用 [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components)，需要設置 [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) ，以啟用 [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=)。 -對以太網上的 MAC 地址進行隨機化的意義不大，因為系統管理員可以通過查看 [網路交換機上使用的端口找到您](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch)。 隨機化 Wi-Fi MAC 地址必須有 Wi-Fi 靭體支持。 - - +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). 隨機化 Wi-Fi MAC 地址必須有 Wi-Fi 靭體支持。 ### 其他標識符 @@ -159,8 +147,6 @@ Linux 發行版，如 [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) - **用戶名稱 ** 。同樣地，用戶名稱會在系統中以各種方式使用。 考慮用 "用戶 "這樣一般常見字，而不是您的真實姓名。 - **機器 ID：**：在安裝過程中，會生成一個獨特的機器ID 並存儲在您的設備上。 考慮 [將它設置為一個通用 ID](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#machine-id)。 - - ### 系統計數 Fedora 專案使用[`countme`](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting#Detailed_Description) 變量而非獨特 ID 來[計算多少](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting)系統訪問它的鏡像。 Fedora 這樣做是為了確定負載並在必要時為更新提供更好的伺服器。 diff --git a/i18n/zh-Hant/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/zh-Hant/os/qubes-overview.md index 8a07c96e..5b6a4c73 100644 --- a/i18n/zh-Hant/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/zh-Hant/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos description: Qubes 作業系統利用虛擬機器來隔離應用程式以提高安全性。 --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) 作業系統，利用 [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor 通過隔離虛擬機器為桌面計算提供強大的安全性。 每個虛擬機器被稱為 *Qube* ，可以根據其目的為各個Qube 分配信任等級。 由於 Qubes OS 通過使用隔離提供安全性，依每個案例情況作行為授權，因此與 [ badness 枚舉](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/)相反。 +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. 每個虛擬機器被稱為 *Qube* ，可以根據其目的為各個Qube 分配信任等級。 As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## Qubes OS如何工作？ diff --git a/i18n/zh-Hant/tools.md b/i18n/zh-Hant/tools.md index b09ce472..2b411e22 100644 --- a/i18n/zh-Hant/tools.md +++ b/i18n/zh-Hant/tools.md @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ description: Privacy Guides 是最透明和可靠的網站，用於尋找保護 - ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) - ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) - ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure) diff --git a/i18n/zh/desktop.md b/i18n/zh/desktop.md index e83a24a1..041ee7da 100644 --- a/i18n/zh/desktop.md +++ b/i18n/zh/desktop.md @@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ Nix是一个基于源代码的软件包管理器；如果在二进制缓存中 !!! recommendation - ![Whonix标志](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } + ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right } - **Whonix**是基于 [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure)，一个注重安全的Debian分叉。 它的目的是在互联网上提供隐私、安全和匿名性。 Whonix最好与[Qubes OS]（#qubes-os）一起使用。 + **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. 它的目的是在互联网上提供隐私、安全和匿名性。 Whonix最好与[Qubes OS]（#qubes-os）一起使用。 [:octicons-home-16: 主页](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="洋葱服务" } @@ -150,35 +150,50 @@ Tails默认在Tor浏览器中包括 [uBlock Origin](desktop-browsers.md#ublock-o !!! recommendation - ![Qubes OS标志](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } + ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right } - **Qubes OS**是一个开源的操作系统，旨在为桌面计算提供强大的安全性。 Qubes基于Xen、X窗口系统和Linux，可以运行大多数Linux应用程序并使用大多数Linux驱动程序。 + **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes基于Xen、X窗口系统和Linux，可以运行大多数Linux应用程序并使用大多数Linux驱动程序。 - [:octicons-home-16: 主页](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: 概述](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary } - [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="洋葱头服务" } - [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="隐私政策" } - [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title="文档" } - [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="源代码" } - [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=贡献 } + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute } -Qubes OS是一个基于Xen的操作系统，旨在通过安全的虚拟机（VM）为桌面计算提供强大的安全性，也被称为 *Qubes*。 +Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. -Qubes OS操作系统通过将子系统（如网络、USB等）和应用程序隔离在独立的虚拟机中来保证计算机的安全。 如果系统的一个部分被破坏，额外的隔离可能会保护系统的其他部分。 更多详情请见Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/)。 +For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page. + +### Kicksecure + +While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install. + +!!! recommendation + + ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right } + + **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. 它默认涵盖了大量的隐私和加固建议。 It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix). + + [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary } + [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" } + [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation } + [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" } + [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute } ## Criteria -**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you. +Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards: -!!! example "This section is new" +- Free and open-source. +- Receives regular software and kernel updates. +- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). + - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other. +- Supports full-disk encryption during installation. +- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. + - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage. +- Supports a wide variety of hardware. +- Preference towards larger projects. + - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers. - We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress. - -我们推荐的操作系统。 - -- 必须是开源的。 -- 必须定期接受软件和Linux内核的更新。 -- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland). -- 在安装过程中必须支持全盘加密。 -- 不得将定期发布的信息冻结1年以上。 我们 [，不建议将](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "长期支持 "或 "稳定 "的发行版用于桌面使用。 -- 必须支持各种各样的硬件。 +In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** diff --git a/i18n/zh/os/android-overview.md b/i18n/zh/os/android-overview.md index bd389353..c86490b2 100644 --- a/i18n/zh/os/android-overview.md +++ b/i18n/zh/os/android-overview.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android description: Android is an open-source operating system with strong security protections, which makes it our top choice for phones. --- -安卓是一个安全的操作系统，它有强大的[应用程序沙箱](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox)，[启动时验证](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot)（AVB），以及一个强大的[权限](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview)控制系统。 +![安卓徽标](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right } -## 挑选安卓 ROM +The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system. + +## Our Advice + +### 挑选安卓 ROM 你买到的安卓手机多半已经预装了能侵犯隐私的应用与服务，而这些服务并不属于 [AOSP](https://source.android.com/)。 例如 Google Play 服务：它有权访问你的文件、联系人、通话记录、短信、定位、相机、麦克风、硬件身份码等。且这些权限无法收回。 这类应用与服务扩大了你的设备的攻击面，也是安卓系统的各种隐私问题的源头。 @@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ description: Android is an open-source operating system with strong security pro [我们推荐的安卓 ROM :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button} -## 避免 Root +### 避免 Root [Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) 安卓手机会大大降低安全性，因为它削弱了完整的 [安卓安全模型](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy)。 如果有一个被降低的安全性所帮助的漏洞，这可能会减少隐私。 常见的root方法涉及直接篡改启动分区，使得它不可能成功地进行验证性启动。 需要root的应用程序也会修改系统分区，这意味着验证启动将不得不保持禁用。 在用户界面上直接暴露root也增加了你的设备的 [攻击面](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) ，并可能有助于 [特权升级](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) 漏洞和SELinux政策的绕过。 @@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+基于 [包过滤](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Pac 我们认为，通过root手机所做的安全牺牲不值得那些应用程序的可疑隐私利益。 -## 已验证的启动 +### Install Updates + +重要的是，不要使用 [报废的](https://endoflife.date/android) 版本的Android。 较新版本的安卓系统不仅会收到操作系统的安全更新，也会收到重要的隐私增强更新。 + +For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. 系统应用只由OEM或安卓发行提供。 + +### Sharing Media + +You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload. + +For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos. + +## Security Protections + +### 已验证的启动 [经过验证的启动](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) ，是安卓安全模式的一个重要组成部分。 它能够保护您免受 [罪恶的](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) 攻击、恶意软件的持久性，并确保安全更新不能用 [回滚保护降级](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection) @@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ AFWall+基于 [包过滤](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Pac 许多原始设备制造商也有破碎的实施验证启动，你必须注意他们的营销之外。 例如，Fairphone 3和4在默认情况下是不安全的，因为 [股票引导程序信任公共AVB签名密钥](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11)。 这破坏了Fairphone设备上的验证引导，因为系统将引导替代Android操作系统（如/e/） [，而没有任何关于自定义操作系统使用的警告](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) 。 -## 固件更新 +### 固件更新 固件更新是维护安全的关键，没有它们，你的设备就不可能是安全的。 原始设备制造商与他们的合作伙伴有支持协议，在有限的支持期内提供闭源组件。 这些内容详见每月的 [Android安全公告](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin)。 @@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ AFWall+基于 [包过滤](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Pac 例如，Fairphone在市场上宣传他们的设备可以获得6年的支持。 然而，SoC（Fairphone 4上的高通骁龙750G）的EOL日期要短得多。 这意味着高通公司为Fairphone 4提供的固件安全更新将在2023年9月结束，无论Fairphone是否继续发布软件安全更新。 -## Android 版本 - -重要的是，不要使用 [报废的](https://endoflife.date/android) 版本的Android。 较新版本的安卓系统不仅会收到操作系统的安全更新，也会收到重要的隐私增强更新。 例如， [，在Android 10之前](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes)，任何具有 [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) 权限的应用程序都可以访问你的手机的敏感和独特的序列号，如 [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity)， [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier)，你的SIM卡的 [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity)，而现在他们必须是系统应用程序才能这样做。 系统应用只由OEM或安卓发行提供。 - -## Android 权限 +### Android 权限 [Android上的权限](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) ，让你控制哪些应用程序被允许访问。 谷歌定期在每个连续的版本中对权限系统进行 [改善](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions)。 你安装的所有应用程序都是严格的 [沙箱](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox)，因此，没有必要安装任何杀毒软件。 @@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ An app may request a permission for a specific feature it has. For example, any Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) may show some trackers such as [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). This library includes [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) which can provide [push notifications](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps. This [is the case](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) with Bitwarden. That doesn't mean that Bitwarden is using all of the analytics features that are provided by Google Firebase Analytics. -## 媒体访问 +## Privacy Features -相当多的应用程序允许你与他们 "共享 "一个文件进行媒体上传。 例如，如果你想在推特上发布一张图片，不要授予推特对你的 "媒体和照片 "的访问权，因为那时它就可以访问你所有的图片。 相反，去你的文件管理器（documentsUI），按住图片，然后与Twitter分享。 - -## 用户资料 +### 用户资料 多个用户配置文件可以在 **设置** → **系统** → **多个用户** ，是Android中最简单的隔离方式。 通过用户个人资料，你可以对一个特定的个人资料施加限制，如：打电话、使用短信或在设备上安装应用程序。 每个用户资料使用自己的加密密钥进行加密，不能访问任何其他人的个人资料。 即使是设备所有者，如果不知道他们的密码，也不能查看其他人的个人资料。 多个个人资料是一种更安全的隔离方法。 -## 工作身份 +### 工作身份 [工作配置文件](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) 是隔离单个应用程序的另一种方式，可能比单独的用户配置文件更方便。 @@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ A **device controller** app such as [Shelter](../android.md#shelter) is required 这种方法通常不如二级用户配置文件安全；但是，它确实允许你在工作和个人配置文件中同时运行应用程序的便利。 -## VPN Killswitch +### VPN Killswitch Android 7及更高版本支持VPN killswitch ，无需安装第三方应用程序即可使用。 如果VPN断开连接，此功能可以防止泄漏。 可以在 :gear: **设置** → **网络 & 互联网** → **VPN** → :gear: → **阻止没有VPN的连接**。 -## 全局切换 +### 全局切换 现代安卓设备有全局切换键，用于禁用蓝牙和定位服务。 安卓12引入了相机和麦克风的切换功能。 在不使用时，我们建议禁用这些功能。 在重新启用之前，应用程序不能使用被禁用的功能（即使被授予个别许可）。 -## 谷歌 +## Google Services 如果你使用的是带有谷歌服务的设备，无论是你的原生操作系统还是像GrapheneOS这样的安全沙盒式的操作系统，你可以做一些额外的改变来改善你的隐私。 我们仍然建议完全避免使用谷歌服务，或者通过将 *Shelter* 等设备控制器与GrapheneOS的沙盒化谷歌游戏结合起来，将谷歌游戏服务限制在特定的用户/工作档案中。 diff --git a/i18n/zh/os/ios-overview.md b/i18n/zh/os/ios-overview.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..099ecdaa --- /dev/null +++ b/i18n/zh/os/ios-overview.md @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +--- +title: iOS Overview +icon: simple/apple +description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone. +--- + +**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system. + +## Privacy Notes + +iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways. + +We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services. + +### Activation Lock + +All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device. + +### Mandatory App Store + +The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method. + +### Invasive Telemetry + +Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance). + +More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023. + +## 推荐配置 + +### iCloud + +The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company. + +Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple. + +The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks. + +You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here. + +#### iCloud+ + +A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone. + +**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari. + +**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support. + +#### Media & Purchases + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**. + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations** + +#### Find My + +**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when: + +- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater. +- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network. + +Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock. + +At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features. + +### Settings + +Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app. + +#### Airplane Mode + +Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on. + +#### Wi-Fi + +You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button: + +- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address** + +You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off. + +#### Bluetooth + +**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective. + +- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth** + +#### General + +Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer. + +It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**: + +- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates** +- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files** + +**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want. + +- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off** + +**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**: + +- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask** + +**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps. + +Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**. + +#### Siri & Search + +If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here. + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked** + +#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode + +Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security. + +Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/). + +If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode. + +If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts. + +On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device. + +**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone. + +- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search** +- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Control Center** +- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets** +- [ ] Turn off **Siri** +- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message** +- [ ] Turn off **Home Control** +- [ ] Turn off **Wallet** +- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls** +- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories** + +iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts. + +!!! 推荐 + + With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it. + +- [x] Turn on **Erase Data** + +#### 隐私 + +**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Location Services** + +You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track** + +You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection** + +**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources. + +You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**: + +- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety** +- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation** + +Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising** + +- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads** + +**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**: + +- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report** + +[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally. + +- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode** + +## Additional Advice + +### E2EE Calls + +Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal. + +### Avoid Jailbreaking + +Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware. + +### Encrypted iMessage + +The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices. + +If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications. + +### Blacking Out Faces/Information + +If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%. + +### iOS Betas + +Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities. + +## Security Highlights + +### Before First Unlock + +If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation. diff --git a/i18n/zh/os/linux-overview.md b/i18n/zh/os/linux-overview.md index 707e6618..e10f34a5 100644 --- a/i18n/zh/os/linux-overview.md +++ b/i18n/zh/os/linux-overview.md @@ -4,35 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative, but not all distribitions are created equal. --- -人们通常认为， [开源](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) 软件本身是安全的，因为源代码是可用的。 预期社区验证会定期进行；但这并不总是 [案例](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/)。 It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigor applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years. +**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up. -目前，桌面Linux与它们的专利同行相比，确实有一些可以更好地改进的地方，例如：。 - -- 一个经过验证的启动链，如苹果的 [安全启动](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) （有 [安全飞地](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)），安卓的 [验证启动](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot)，ChromeOS的 [验证启动](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot)，或微软Windows的 [启动过程](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) ，有 [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm)。 这些功能和硬件技术都可以帮助防止恶意软件的持续篡改或 [邪恶女仆的攻击](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack) -- 一个强大的沙箱解决方案，如在 [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html)， [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md)，和 [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox)。 常用的Linux沙箱解决方案，如 [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) 和 [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) ，仍然有很长的路要走。 -- 强大的 [漏洞缓解措施](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) - -尽管有这些缺点，但如果你想，桌面Linux发行版还是很不错的。 - -- 避免专有操作系统中经常出现的遥测现象 -- 保持 [软件自由](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) -- 有关注隐私的系统，如 [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) 或 [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) - -我们的网站通常使用术语 "Linux "来描述桌面Linux发行版。 其他也使用Linux内核的操作系统，如ChromeOS、Android和Qubes OS，这里不作讨论。 +Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page. [我们的Linux推荐 :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button} +## Privacy Notes + +There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to: + +- 避免专有操作系统中经常出现的遥测现象 +- 保持 [软件自由](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms) +- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) + +### Open Source Security + +It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). + +In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years. + +### Missing Security Features + +At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future. + +- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3). + +- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox. + +Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust. + ## 选择您的发行版 -并非所有的 Linux 发行版都是相同的。 虽然我们的Linux推荐页面并不是要成为你应该使用哪个发行版的权威来源，但在选择使用哪个发行版时，有几件事你应该记住。 +并非所有的 Linux 发行版都是相同的。 Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution: ### 发布周期 我们强烈建议你选择与稳定的上游软件版本接近的发行版，通常被称为滚动发行版。 这是因为冻结发布周期的发行版往往不更新软件包版本，并且在安全更新方面落后。 -对于冻结的发行版，如 [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling)，软件包维护者被要求回传补丁来修复漏洞，而不是将软件提升到上游开发者发布的 "下一个版本"。 有些安全补丁 - -，根本没有收到 [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) （特别是不太流行的软件），因此在这种补丁模式下，不能进入发行版。 因此，小的安全修复有时会被推迟到下一个主要版本。

+对于冻结的发行版，如 [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling)，软件包维护者被要求回传补丁来修复漏洞，而不是将软件提升到上游开发者发布的 "下一个版本"。 Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. 因此，小的安全修复有时会被推迟到下一个主要版本。 我们不认为保留软件包和应用临时补丁是一个好主意，因为它偏离了开发者可能打算让软件工作的方式。 [理查德-布朗](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) ，有一个关于这个问题的介绍。 @@ -56,90 +66,70 @@ description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system a ### “以安全为重点”的分发 -通常在“以安全为中心”的发行版和“渗透测试”发行版之间存在一些混淆。 快速搜索“最安全的Linux发行版”通常会得到像Kali Linux ， Black Arch和Parrot OS这样的结果。 这些发行版是攻击性的渗透测试发行版，捆绑了测试其他系统的工具。 它们不包括任何 "额外的安全 "或用于常规使用的防御性缓解措施。 - - +通常在“以安全为中心”的发行版和“渗透测试”发行版之间存在一些混淆。 A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. 这些发行版是攻击性的渗透测试发行版，捆绑了测试其他系统的工具。 它们不包括任何 "额外的安全 "或用于常规使用的防御性缓解措施。 ### 基于Arch的发行版 -基于Arch的发行版不推荐给那些刚接触Linux的人，（无论哪个发行版），因为它们需要定期进行 [系统维护](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance)。 Arch没有底层软件选择的分发更新机制。 因此，你必须保持对当前趋势的了解，并在技术取代旧有做法时自行采用。 +Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. 因此，你必须保持对当前趋势的了解，并在技术取代旧有做法时自行采用。 对于一个安全的系统，你还应该有足够的Linux知识来为他们的系统正确设置安全，如采用 [强制性访问控制](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) 系统，设置 [内核模块](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) 黑名单，硬化启动参数，操作 [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) 参数，并知道他们需要哪些组件，如 [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit)。 -任何使用 [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **的人必须** ，对他们从该服务中安装的PKGBUILD进行审计。 AUR软件包是社区制作的内容，没有经过任何审查，因此很容易受到软件供应链的攻击，事实上在过去已经发生了 [](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/)。 AUR总是应该少用，而且往往在各种网页上有很多不好的建议，指导人们盲目地使用 [AUR帮助器](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) ，而没有足够的警告。 类似的警告也适用于在基于Debian的发行版上使用第三方个人软件包档案（PPAs）或在Fedora上使用社区项目（COPR）。 +Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR软件包是社区制作的内容，没有经过任何审查，因此很容易受到软件供应链的攻击，事实上在过去已经发生了 [](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/)。 -如果你对Linux有经验，并希望使用基于Arch的发行版，我们只推荐主线Arch Linux，而不是它的任何衍生品。 我们特别建议不要使用这两种Arch衍生品。 +The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. 类似的警告也适用于在基于Debian的发行版上使用第三方个人软件包档案（PPAs）或在Fedora上使用社区项目（COPR）。 + +If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives. + +Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically: - **Manjaro**: 这个发行版将软件包保留2周，以确保他们自己的修改不会破坏，而不是确保上游的稳定。 当使用AUR软件包时，它们通常是根据Arch的软件库中最新的 [库构建的](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing))。 - **Garuda**: 他们使用 [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) ，它自动地、盲目地从AUR编译软件包。 没有验证过程来确保AUR包不会受到供应链的攻击。 - - -### Kicksecure - -虽然我们强烈建议不要使用像Debian这样的过时的发行版，但有一种基于Debian的操作系统已经被加固，比典型的Linux发行版要安全得多。 [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/)。 Kicksecure，简单地说，是一组脚本、配置和软件包，可以大大减少 Debian 的攻击面。 它默认涵盖了大量的隐私和加固建议。 - - - ### Linux-libre内核和“Libre”发行版 -We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons. - - +We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode. ## 一般建议 - - ### 驱动器加密 大多数Linux发行版在其安装程序中都有一个选项用于启用 [LUKS](../encryption.md#linux-unified-key-setup) FDE。 如果在安装时没有设置这个选项，你将不得不备份你的数据并重新安装，因为加密是在 [磁盘分区](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_partitioning)，但在 [文件系统](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_system) 被格式化之前应用。 我们还建议安全地删除你的存储设备。 - [安全数据清除 :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/05/25/secure-data-erasure/) - - ### Swap -Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). 基于Fedora的发行版 [，默认使用ZRAM](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM)。 - +Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM). +If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats. ### Wayland -我们建议使用支持 [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) 显示协议的桌面环境，因为它的开发考虑到了安全 [](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/)。 其前身 [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)，不支持GUI隔离，允许所有窗口 [，记录屏幕、日志和注入其他窗口的输入](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html)，使任何沙箱的尝试都是徒劳的。 虽然有一些选项可以做嵌套的X11，比如 [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) 或 [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr)，但它们往往会带来负面的性能后果，而且设置起来也不方便，比起Wayland来并不可取。 +We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland. 幸运的是，常见的环境，如 [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org)， [KDE](https://kde.org)，以及窗口管理器 [Sway](https://swaywm.org) 都支持 Wayland。 Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). 如果你使用的是这些环境之一，就像在桌面显示管理器中选择 "Wayland "会话一样简单([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)) 。 - 我们建议 **，反对使用没有Wayland支持的桌面环境或窗口管理器，如Cinnamon（Linux Mint的默认）、Pantheon（Elementary OS的默认）、MATE、Xfce和i3。

- - + 我们建议 **，反对使用没有Wayland支持的桌面环境或窗口管理器，如Cinnamon（Linux Mint的默认）、Pantheon（Elementary OS的默认）、MATE、Xfce和i3。

### 专有固件(Microcode更新) -Linux发行版，如那些 [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) 或DIY（Arch Linux），不附带专有的 [微码](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) 更新，而这些更新通常会修补漏洞。 这些漏洞的一些明显例子包括： [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), 以及其他 [硬件漏洞](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html)。 - -我们 **，强烈建议** ，安装微码更新，因为你的CPU在出厂时已经在运行专有的微码。 Fedora和openSUSE都有默认应用的微码更新。 - +Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. 这些漏洞的一些明显例子包括： [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), 以及其他 [硬件漏洞](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html)。 +We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora和openSUSE都有默认应用的微码更新。 ### 更新 大多数Linux发行版会自动安装更新或提醒你这样做。 重要的是保持你的操作系统是最新的，这样当发现漏洞时，你的软件就会打上补丁。 -一些发行版（尤其是那些针对高级用户的发行版）更加简陋，希望你能自己做一些事情（例如Arch或Debian）。 这些将需要手动运行 "软件包管理器" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, 等等)，以便接收重要的安全更新。 +Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). 这些将需要手动运行 "软件包管理器" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, 等等)，以便接收重要的安全更新。 此外，一些发行版将不会自动下载固件更新。 为此，你将需要安装 [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd)。 - - ## 隐私调整 - - ### MAC地址随机化 -Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. +Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings. 在使用NetworkManager时，可以随机化 [](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) [MAC地址](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address)。 这在Wi-Fi网络上提供了更多的隐私，因为它使你更难追踪你所连接的网络上的特定设备。 它并不是 [****](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) 让你匿名。 @@ -147,9 +137,7 @@ Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [Networ 如果你使用 [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components)，你需要设置 [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) ，这将启用 [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=)。 -对以太网连接的MAC地址进行随机化的意义不大，因为系统管理员可以通过查看你在 [网络交换机上使用的端口找到你](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch)。 随机化Wi-Fi MAC地址取决于Wi-Fi固件的支持。 - - +MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). 随机化Wi-Fi MAC地址取决于Wi-Fi固件的支持。 ### 其他标识符 @@ -159,8 +147,6 @@ Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [Networ - **用户名。** 同样地，你的用户名在你的系统中以各种方式使用。 考虑使用 "用户 "这样的通用术语，而不是你的真实姓名。 - **机器ID：**：在安装过程中，会生成一个独特的机器ID并存储在你的设备上。 考虑 [，将其设置为一个通用的ID](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#machine-id)。 - - ### 系统计数 Fedora 项目 [通过使用一个 [`countme`](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting#Detailed_Description) 变量而不是唯一的 ID 来计算](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting) 有多少独特的系统访问它的镜像。 Fedora这样做是为了确定负载并在必要时为更新提供更好的服务器。 diff --git a/i18n/zh/os/qubes-overview.md b/i18n/zh/os/qubes-overview.md index d16528b3..c72571fe 100644 --- a/i18n/zh/os/qubes-overview.md +++ b/i18n/zh/os/qubes-overview.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within virtual machines for heightened security. --- -[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) 是一个操作系统，它使用 [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) 管理程序，通过隔离的虚拟机为桌面计算提供强大的安全性。 每个虚拟机被称为 *Qube* ，你可以根据它的目的给每个Qube分配一个信任等级。 由于Qubes操作系统通过使用隔离来提供安全，并且只允许在每个案例的基础上进行操作，它与 [坏性枚举](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/)。 +[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. 每个虚拟机被称为 *Qube* ，你可以根据它的目的给每个Qube分配一个信任等级。 As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/). ## Qubes操作系统是如何工作的？ diff --git a/i18n/zh/tools.md b/i18n/zh/tools.md index fb29e2d7..ebbc1eb0 100644 --- a/i18n/zh/tools.md +++ b/i18n/zh/tools.md @@ -451,8 +451,15 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
-- ![OpenWrt logo](assets/img/router/openwrt.svg#only-light){ .twemoji }![OpenWrt logo](assets/img/router/openwrt-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji } [OpenWrt](router.md#openwrt) -- ![OPNsense logo](assets/img/router/opnsense.svg){ .twemoji } [OPNsense](router.md#opnsense) +- ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ .twemoji } [Qubes OS (Xen VM Distribution)](desktop.md#qubes-os) +- ![Fedora logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-workstation.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Workstation](desktop.md#fedora-workstation) +- ![openSUSE Tumbleweed logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/opensuse-tumbleweed.svg){ .twemoji } [OpenSUSE Tumbleweed](desktop.md#opensuse-tumbleweed) +- ![Arch logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/archlinux.svg){ .twemoji } [Arch Linux](desktop.md#arch-linux) +- ![Fedora Silverblue logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-silverblue.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Silverblue & Kinoite](desktop.md#fedora-silverblue) +- ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos) +- ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix) +- ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails) +- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure)