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i18n/zh/desktop.md
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@@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ Nix是一个基于源代码的软件包管理器；如果在二进制缓存中
!!! recommendation
![Whonix标志](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right }
![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right }
**Whonix**是基于 [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure)，一个注重安全的Debian分叉。 它的目的是在互联网上提供隐私、安全和匿名性。 Whonix最好与[Qubes OS]（#qubes-os）一起使用。
**Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. 它的目的是在互联网上提供隐私、安全和匿名性。 Whonix最好与[Qubes OS]（#qubes-os）一起使用。
[:octicons-home-16: 主页](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="洋葱服务" }
@@ -150,35 +150,50 @@ Tails默认在Tor浏览器中包括 [uBlock Origin](desktop-browsers.md#ublock-o
!!! recommendation
![Qubes OS标志](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right }
![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right }
**Qubes OS**是一个开源的操作系统，旨在为桌面计算提供强大的安全性。 Qubes基于Xen、X窗口系统和Linux，可以运行大多数Linux应用程序并使用大多数Linux驱动程序。
**Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes基于Xen、X窗口系统和Linux，可以运行大多数Linux应用程序并使用大多数Linux驱动程序。
[:octicons-home-16: 主页](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: 概述](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="洋葱头服务" }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="隐私政策" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title="文档" }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="源代码" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=贡献 }
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
Qubes OS是一个基于Xen的操作系统，旨在通过安全的虚拟机（VM）为桌面计算提供强大的安全性，也被称为 *Qubes*。
Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system.
Qubes OS操作系统通过将子系统（如网络、USB等）和应用程序隔离在独立的虚拟机中来保证计算机的安全。 如果系统的一个部分被破坏，额外的隔离可能会保护系统的其他部分。 更多详情请见Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/)。
For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page.
### Kicksecure
While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install.
!!! recommendation
![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right }
**Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. 它默认涵盖了大量的隐私和加固建议。 It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix).
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
## Criteria
**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. We suggest you familiarize yourself with this list before choosing to use a project, and conduct your own research to ensure it's the right choice for you.
Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards:
!!! example "This section is new"
- Free and open-source.
- Receives regular software and kernel updates.
- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland).
- The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other.
- Supports full-disk encryption during installation.
- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year.
- We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage.
- Supports a wide variety of hardware.
- Preference towards larger projects.
- Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers.
We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
我们推荐的操作系统。
- 必须是开源的。
- 必须定期接受软件和Linux内核的更新。
- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland).
- 在安装过程中必须支持全盘加密。
- 不得将定期发布的信息冻结1年以上。 我们 [，不建议将](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "长期支持 "或 "稳定 "的发行版用于桌面使用。
- 必须支持各种各样的硬件。
In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.**

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@@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android
description: Android is an open-source operating system with strong security protections, which makes it our top choice for phones.
---
安卓是一个安全的操作系统，它有强大的[应用程序沙箱](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox)，[启动时验证](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot)（AVB），以及一个强大的[权限](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview)控制系统。
![安卓徽标](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right }
## 挑选安卓 ROM
The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system.
## Our Advice
### 挑选安卓 ROM
你买到的安卓手机多半已经预装了能侵犯隐私的应用与服务，而这些服务并不属于 [AOSP](https://source.android.com/)。 例如 Google Play 服务：它有权访问你的文件、联系人、通话记录、短信、定位、相机、麦克风、硬件身份码等。且这些权限无法收回。 这类应用与服务扩大了你的设备的攻击面，也是安卓系统的各种隐私问题的源头。
@@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ description: Android is an open-source operating system with strong security pro
[我们推荐的安卓 ROM :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button}
## 避免 Root
### 避免 Root
[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) 安卓手机会大大降低安全性，因为它削弱了完整的 [安卓安全模型](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy)。 如果有一个被降低的安全性所帮助的漏洞，这可能会减少隐私。 常见的root方法涉及直接篡改启动分区，使得它不可能成功地进行验证性启动。 需要root的应用程序也会修改系统分区，这意味着验证启动将不得不保持禁用。 在用户界面上直接暴露root也增加了你的设备的 [攻击面](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) ，并可能有助于 [特权升级](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) 漏洞和SELinux政策的绕过。
@@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+基于 [包过滤](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Pac
我们认为，通过root手机所做的安全牺牲不值得那些应用程序的可疑隐私利益。
## 已验证的启动
### Install Updates
重要的是，不要使用 [报废的](https://endoflife.date/android) 版本的Android。 较新版本的安卓系统不仅会收到操作系统的安全更新，也会收到重要的隐私增强更新。
For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. 系统应用只由OEM或安卓发行提供。
### Sharing Media
You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload.
For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos.
## Security Protections
### 已验证的启动
[经过验证的启动](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) ，是安卓安全模式的一个重要组成部分。 它能够保护您免受 [罪恶的](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) 攻击、恶意软件的持久性，并确保安全更新不能用 [回滚保护降级](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection)
@@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ AFWall+基于 [包过滤](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Pac
许多原始设备制造商也有破碎的实施验证启动，你必须注意他们的营销之外。 例如，Fairphone 3和4在默认情况下是不安全的，因为 [股票引导程序信任公共AVB签名密钥](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11)。 这破坏了Fairphone设备上的验证引导，因为系统将引导替代Android操作系统（如/e/） [，而没有任何关于自定义操作系统使用的警告](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) 。
## 固件更新
### 固件更新
固件更新是维护安全的关键，没有它们，你的设备就不可能是安全的。 原始设备制造商与他们的合作伙伴有支持协议，在有限的支持期内提供闭源组件。 这些内容详见每月的 [Android安全公告](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin)。
@@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ AFWall+基于 [包过滤](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)#Pac
例如，Fairphone在市场上宣传他们的设备可以获得6年的支持。 然而，SoC（Fairphone 4上的高通骁龙750G）的EOL日期要短得多。 这意味着高通公司为Fairphone 4提供的固件安全更新将在2023年9月结束，无论Fairphone是否继续发布软件安全更新。
## Android 版本
重要的是，不要使用 [报废的](https://endoflife.date/android) 版本的Android。 较新版本的安卓系统不仅会收到操作系统的安全更新，也会收到重要的隐私增强更新。 例如， [，在Android 10之前](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes)，任何具有 [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) 权限的应用程序都可以访问你的手机的敏感和独特的序列号，如 [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity)， [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier)，你的SIM卡的 [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity)，而现在他们必须是系统应用程序才能这样做。 系统应用只由OEM或安卓发行提供。
## Android 权限
### Android 权限
[Android上的权限](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) ，让你控制哪些应用程序被允许访问。 谷歌定期在每个连续的版本中对权限系统进行 [改善](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions)。 你安装的所有应用程序都是严格的 [沙箱](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox)，因此，没有必要安装任何杀毒软件。
@@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ An app may request a permission for a specific feature it has. For example, any
Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) may show some trackers such as [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). This library includes [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) which can provide [push notifications](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps. This [is the case](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) with Bitwarden. That doesn't mean that Bitwarden is using all of the analytics features that are provided by Google Firebase Analytics.
## 媒体访问
## Privacy Features
相当多的应用程序允许你与他们 "共享 "一个文件进行媒体上传。 例如，如果你想在推特上发布一张图片，不要授予推特对你的 "媒体和照片 "的访问权，因为那时它就可以访问你所有的图片。 相反，去你的文件管理器（documentsUI），按住图片，然后与Twitter分享。
## 用户资料
### 用户资料
多个用户配置文件可以在 **设置** → **系统** → **多个用户** ，是Android中最简单的隔离方式。
通过用户个人资料，你可以对一个特定的个人资料施加限制，如：打电话、使用短信或在设备上安装应用程序。 每个用户资料使用自己的加密密钥进行加密，不能访问任何其他人的个人资料。 即使是设备所有者，如果不知道他们的密码，也不能查看其他人的个人资料。 多个个人资料是一种更安全的隔离方法。
## 工作身份
### 工作身份
[工作配置文件](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) 是隔离单个应用程序的另一种方式，可能比单独的用户配置文件更方便。
@@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ A **device controller** app such as [Shelter](../android.md#shelter) is required
这种方法通常不如二级用户配置文件安全；但是，它确实允许你在工作和个人配置文件中同时运行应用程序的便利。
## VPN Killswitch
### VPN Killswitch
Android 7及更高版本支持VPN killswitch ，无需安装第三方应用程序即可使用。 如果VPN断开连接，此功能可以防止泄漏。 可以在 :gear: **设置** → **网络 & 互联网** → **VPN** → :gear: → **阻止没有VPN的连接**。
## 全局切换
### 全局切换
现代安卓设备有全局切换键，用于禁用蓝牙和定位服务。 安卓12引入了相机和麦克风的切换功能。 在不使用时，我们建议禁用这些功能。 在重新启用之前，应用程序不能使用被禁用的功能（即使被授予个别许可）。
## 谷歌
## Google Services
如果你使用的是带有谷歌服务的设备，无论是你的原生操作系统还是像GrapheneOS这样的安全沙盒式的操作系统，你可以做一些额外的改变来改善你的隐私。 我们仍然建议完全避免使用谷歌服务，或者通过将 *Shelter* 等设备控制器与GrapheneOS的沙盒化谷歌游戏结合起来，将谷歌游戏服务限制在特定的用户/工作档案中。

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@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
---
title: iOS Overview
icon: simple/apple
description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone.
---
**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system.
## Privacy Notes
iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways.
We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services.
### Activation Lock
All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device.
### Mandatory App Store
The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method.
### Invasive Telemetry
Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance).
More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023.
## 推荐配置
### iCloud
The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company.
Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple.
The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks.
You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here.
#### iCloud+
A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone.
**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari.
**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support.
#### Media & Purchases
At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**.
- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations**
#### Find My
**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when:
- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater.
- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network.
Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock.
At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features.
### Settings
Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app.
#### Airplane Mode
Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on.
#### Wi-Fi
You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button:
- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address**
You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off.
#### Bluetooth
**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective.
- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth**
#### General
Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer.
It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**:
- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates**
- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates**
- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files**
**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want.
- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off**
**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**:
- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask**
**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps.
Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**.
#### Siri & Search
If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here.
- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked**
#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode
Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security.
Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/).
If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode.
If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts.
On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device.
**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone.
- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search**
- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center**
- [ ] Turn off **Control Center**
- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets**
- [ ] Turn off **Siri**
- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message**
- [ ] Turn off **Home Control**
- [ ] Turn off **Wallet**
- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls**
- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories**
iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts.
!!! 推荐
With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it.
- [x] Turn on **Erase Data**
#### 隐私
**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**:
- [ ] Turn off **Location Services**
You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**:
- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track**
You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**:
- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection**
**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources.
You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**:
- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics**
- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics**
- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+**
- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety**
- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation**
Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising**
- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads**
**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**:
- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report**
[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally.
- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode**
## Additional Advice
### E2EE Calls
Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal.
### Avoid Jailbreaking
Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware.
### Encrypted iMessage
The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices.
If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications.
### Blacking Out Faces/Information
If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%.
### iOS Betas
Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities.
## Security Highlights
### Before First Unlock
If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation.

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@@ -4,35 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux
description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative, but not all distribitions are created equal.
---
人们通常认为， [开源](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) 软件本身是安全的，因为源代码是可用的。 预期社区验证会定期进行；但这并不总是 [案例](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/)。 It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigor applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years.
**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up.
目前，桌面Linux与它们的专利同行相比，确实有一些可以更好地改进的地方，例如：。
- 一个经过验证的启动链，如苹果的 [安全启动](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) （有 [安全飞地](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)），安卓的 [验证启动](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot)，ChromeOS的 [验证启动](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot)，或微软Windows的 [启动过程](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) ，有 [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm)。 这些功能和硬件技术都可以帮助防止恶意软件的持续篡改或 [邪恶女仆的攻击](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack)
- 一个强大的沙箱解决方案，如在 [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html)， [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md)，和 [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox)。 常用的Linux沙箱解决方案，如 [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) 和 [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) ，仍然有很长的路要走。
- 强大的 [漏洞缓解措施](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations)
尽管有这些缺点，但如果你想，桌面Linux发行版还是很不错的。
- 避免专有操作系统中经常出现的遥测现象
- 保持 [软件自由](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms)
- 有关注隐私的系统，如 [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) 或 [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/)
我们的网站通常使用术语 "Linux "来描述桌面Linux发行版。 其他也使用Linux内核的操作系统，如ChromeOS、Android和Qubes OS，这里不作讨论。
Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page.
[我们的Linux推荐 :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button}
## Privacy Notes
There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to:
- 避免专有操作系统中经常出现的遥测现象
- 保持 [软件自由](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms)
- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/)
### Open Source Security
It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/).
In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years.
### Missing Security Features
At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future.
- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3).
- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox.
Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust.
## 选择您的发行版
并非所有的 Linux 发行版都是相同的。 虽然我们的Linux推荐页面并不是要成为你应该使用哪个发行版的权威来源，但在选择使用哪个发行版时，有几件事你应该记住。
并非所有的 Linux 发行版都是相同的。 Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution:
### 发布周期
我们强烈建议你选择与稳定的上游软件版本接近的发行版，通常被称为滚动发行版。 这是因为冻结发布周期的发行版往往不更新软件包版本，并且在安全更新方面落后。
对于冻结的发行版，如 [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling)，软件包维护者被要求回传补丁来修复漏洞，而不是将软件提升到上游开发者发布的 "下一个版本"。 </a> 有些安全补丁
，根本没有收到 [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) （特别是不太流行的软件），因此在这种补丁模式下，不能进入发行版。 因此，小的安全修复有时会被推迟到下一个主要版本。</p>
对于冻结的发行版，如 [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling)，软件包维护者被要求回传补丁来修复漏洞，而不是将软件提升到上游开发者发布的 "下一个版本"。 Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. 因此，小的安全修复有时会被推迟到下一个主要版本。
我们不认为保留软件包和应用临时补丁是一个好主意，因为它偏离了开发者可能打算让软件工作的方式。 [理查德-布朗](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) ，有一个关于这个问题的介绍。
@@ -56,90 +66,70 @@ description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system a
### “以安全为重点”的分发
通常在“以安全为中心”的发行版和“渗透测试”发行版之间存在一些混淆。 快速搜索“最安全的Linux发行版”通常会得到像Kali Linux ， Black Arch和Parrot OS这样的结果。 这些发行版是攻击性的渗透测试发行版，捆绑了测试其他系统的工具。 它们不包括任何 "额外的安全 "或用于常规使用的防御性缓解措施。
通常在“以安全为中心”的发行版和“渗透测试”发行版之间存在一些混淆。 A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. 这些发行版是攻击性的渗透测试发行版，捆绑了测试其他系统的工具。 它们不包括任何 "额外的安全 "或用于常规使用的防御性缓解措施。
### 基于Arch的发行版
基于Arch的发行版不推荐给那些刚接触Linux的人，（无论哪个发行版），因为它们需要定期进行 [系统维护](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance)。 Arch没有底层软件选择的分发更新机制。 因此，你必须保持对当前趋势的了解，并在技术取代旧有做法时自行采用。
Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. 因此，你必须保持对当前趋势的了解，并在技术取代旧有做法时自行采用。
对于一个安全的系统，你还应该有足够的Linux知识来为他们的系统正确设置安全，如采用 [强制性访问控制](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) 系统，设置 [内核模块](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) 黑名单，硬化启动参数，操作 [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) 参数，并知道他们需要哪些组件，如 [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit)。
任何使用 [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **的人必须** ，对他们从该服务中安装的PKGBUILD进行审计。 AUR软件包是社区制作的内容，没有经过任何审查，因此很容易受到软件供应链的攻击，事实上在过去已经发生了 [](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/)。 AUR总是应该少用，而且往往在各种网页上有很多不好的建议，指导人们盲目地使用 [AUR帮助器](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) ，而没有足够的警告。 类似的警告也适用于在基于Debian的发行版上使用第三方个人软件包档案（PPAs）或在Fedora上使用社区项目（COPR）。
Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR软件包是社区制作的内容，没有经过任何审查，因此很容易受到软件供应链的攻击，事实上在过去已经发生了 [](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/)。
如果你对Linux有经验，并希望使用基于Arch的发行版，我们只推荐主线Arch Linux，而不是它的任何衍生品。 我们特别建议不要使用这两种Arch衍生品。
The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. 类似的警告也适用于在基于Debian的发行版上使用第三方个人软件包档案（PPAs）或在Fedora上使用社区项目（COPR）。
If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives.
Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically:
- **Manjaro**: 这个发行版将软件包保留2周，以确保他们自己的修改不会破坏，而不是确保上游的稳定。 当使用AUR软件包时，它们通常是根据Arch的软件库中最新的 [库构建的](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing))。
- **Garuda**: 他们使用 [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) ，它自动地、盲目地从AUR编译软件包。 没有验证过程来确保AUR包不会受到供应链的攻击。
### Kicksecure
虽然我们强烈建议不要使用像Debian这样的过时的发行版，但有一种基于Debian的操作系统已经被加固，比典型的Linux发行版要安全得多。 [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/)。 Kicksecure，简单地说，是一组脚本、配置和软件包，可以大大减少 Debian 的攻击面。 它默认涵盖了大量的隐私和加固建议。
### Linux-libre内核和“Libre”发行版
We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons.
We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode.
## 一般建议
### 驱动器加密
大多数Linux发行版在其安装程序中都有一个选项用于启用 [LUKS](../encryption.md#linux-unified-key-setup) FDE。 如果在安装时没有设置这个选项，你将不得不备份你的数据并重新安装，因为加密是在 [磁盘分区](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_partitioning)，但在 [文件系统](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_system) 被格式化之前应用。 我们还建议安全地删除你的存储设备。
- [安全数据清除 :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/05/25/secure-data-erasure/)
### Swap
Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). 基于Fedora的发行版 [，默认使用ZRAM](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM)。
Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM).
If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats.
### Wayland
我们建议使用支持 [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) 显示协议的桌面环境，因为它的开发考虑到了安全 [](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/)。 其前身 [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)，不支持GUI隔离，允许所有窗口 [，记录屏幕、日志和注入其他窗口的输入](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html)，使任何沙箱的尝试都是徒劳的。 虽然有一些选项可以做嵌套的X11，比如 [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) 或 [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr)，但它们往往会带来负面的性能后果，而且设置起来也不方便，比起Wayland来并不可取。
We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland.
幸运的是，常见的环境，如 [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org)， [KDE](https://kde.org)，以及窗口管理器 [Sway](https://swaywm.org) 都支持 Wayland。 Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). 如果你使用的是这些环境之一，就像在桌面显示管理器中选择 "Wayland "会话一样简单([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)) 。
</strong> 我们建议 **，反对使用没有Wayland支持的桌面环境或窗口管理器，如Cinnamon（Linux Mint的默认）、Pantheon（Elementary OS的默认）、MATE、Xfce和i3。</p>
</strong> 我们建议 **，反对使用没有Wayland支持的桌面环境或窗口管理器，如Cinnamon（Linux Mint的默认）、Pantheon（Elementary OS的默认）、MATE、Xfce和i3。</p>
### 专有固件(Microcode更新)
Linux发行版，如那些 [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) 或DIY（Arch Linux），不附带专有的 [微码](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) 更新，而这些更新通常会修补漏洞。 这些漏洞的一些明显例子包括： [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), 以及其他 [硬件漏洞](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html)。
我们 **，强烈建议** ，安装微码更新，因为你的CPU在出厂时已经在运行专有的微码。 Fedora和openSUSE都有默认应用的微码更新。
Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. 这些漏洞的一些明显例子包括： [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), 以及其他 [硬件漏洞](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html)。
We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora和openSUSE都有默认应用的微码更新。
### 更新
大多数Linux发行版会自动安装更新或提醒你这样做。 重要的是保持你的操作系统是最新的，这样当发现漏洞时，你的软件就会打上补丁。
一些发行版（尤其是那些针对高级用户的发行版）更加简陋，希望你能自己做一些事情（例如Arch或Debian）。 这些将需要手动运行 "软件包管理器" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, 等等)，以便接收重要的安全更新。
Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). 这些将需要手动运行 "软件包管理器" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, 等等)，以便接收重要的安全更新。
此外，一些发行版将不会自动下载固件更新。 为此，你将需要安装 [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd)。
## 隐私调整
### MAC地址随机化
Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings.
Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings.
在使用NetworkManager时，可以随机化 [](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) [MAC地址](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address)。 这在Wi-Fi网络上提供了更多的隐私，因为它使你更难追踪你所连接的网络上的特定设备。 它并不是 [****](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) 让你匿名。
@@ -147,9 +137,7 @@ Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [Networ
如果你使用 [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components)，你需要设置 [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) ，这将启用 [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=)。
对以太网连接的MAC地址进行随机化的意义不大，因为系统管理员可以通过查看你在 [网络交换机上使用的端口找到你](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch)。 随机化Wi-Fi MAC地址取决于Wi-Fi固件的支持。
MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). 随机化Wi-Fi MAC地址取决于Wi-Fi固件的支持。
### 其他标识符
@@ -159,8 +147,6 @@ Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [Networ
- **用户名。** 同样地，你的用户名在你的系统中以各种方式使用。 考虑使用 "用户 "这样的通用术语，而不是你的真实姓名。
- **机器ID：**：在安装过程中，会生成一个独特的机器ID并存储在你的设备上。 考虑 [，将其设置为一个通用的ID](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#machine-id)。
### 系统计数
Fedora 项目 [通过使用一个 [`countme`](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting#Detailed_Description) 变量而不是唯一的 ID 来计算](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/DNF_Better_Counting) 有多少独特的系统访问它的镜像。 Fedora这样做是为了确定负载并在必要时为更新提供更好的服务器。

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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos
description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within virtual machines for heightened security.
---
[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) 是一个操作系统，它使用 [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) 管理程序，通过隔离的虚拟机为桌面计算提供强大的安全性。 每个虚拟机被称为 *Qube* ，你可以根据它的目的给每个Qube分配一个信任等级。 由于Qubes操作系统通过使用隔离来提供安全，并且只允许在每个案例的基础上进行操作，它与 [坏性枚举](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/)。
[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. 每个虚拟机被称为 *Qube* ，你可以根据它的目的给每个Qube分配一个信任等级。 As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/).
## Qubes操作系统是如何工作的？

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@@ -451,8 +451,15 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
- ![OpenWrt logo](assets/img/router/openwrt.svg#only-light){ .twemoji }![OpenWrt logo](assets/img/router/openwrt-dark.svg#only-dark){ .twemoji } [OpenWrt](router.md#openwrt)
- ![OPNsense logo](assets/img/router/opnsense.svg){ .twemoji } [OPNsense](router.md#opnsense)
- ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ .twemoji } [Qubes OS (Xen VM Distribution)](desktop.md#qubes-os)
- ![Fedora logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-workstation.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Workstation](desktop.md#fedora-workstation)
- ![openSUSE Tumbleweed logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/opensuse-tumbleweed.svg){ .twemoji } [OpenSUSE Tumbleweed](desktop.md#opensuse-tumbleweed)
- ![Arch logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/archlinux.svg){ .twemoji } [Arch Linux](desktop.md#arch-linux)
- ![Fedora Silverblue logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-silverblue.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Silverblue & Kinoite](desktop.md#fedora-silverblue)
- ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos)
- ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix)
- ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails)
- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure)
</div>