privacyguides/i18n
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/privacyguides/i18n.git synced 2025-06-25 12:14:24 +00:00
Code Activity

New Crowdin translations by GitHub Action

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
Crowdin Bot
2023-07-22 04:04:23 +00:00
parent 6f3217b8b9
commit c853747d8a
185 changed files with 9416 additions and 2331 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

49
i18n/sv/desktop.md
View File

@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th
![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right }
**Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os).
**Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os).
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
@ -152,33 +152,48 @@ By design, Tails is meant to completely reset itself after each reboot. Encrypte
![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right }
**Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers.
**Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers.
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: Overview](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*.
Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system.
The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/).
For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page.
### Kicksecure
While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install.
!!! recommendation
![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right }
**Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. Den täcker många rekommendationer för sekretess och skydd av integritet som standard. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix).
[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
[:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
[:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation }
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
## Kriterier
**Observera att vi inte är knutna till något av de projekt som vi rekommenderar.** Förutom [våra standardkriterier](about/criteria.md)har vi utvecklat en tydlig uppsättning krav som gör det möjligt för oss att ge objektiva rekommendationer. Vi föreslår att du bekantar dig med den här listan innan du väljer att använda ett projekt, och att du gör din egen forskning för att se till att det är rätt val för dig.
Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards:
!!! exempel "Det här avsnittet är nytt"
- Free and open-source.
- Receives regular software and kernel updates.
- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland).
- The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other.
- Supports full-disk encryption during installation.
- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year.
- We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage.
- Supports a wide variety of hardware.
- Preference towards larger projects.
- Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers.
Vi arbetar med att fastställa kriterier för varje del av vår webbplats, och detta kan komma att ändras. Om du har några frågor om våra kriterier, vänligen [fråga på vårt forum] (https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) och tro inte att vi inte har beaktat något när vi gjorde våra rekommendationer om det inte finns med här. Det finns många faktorer som beaktas och diskuteras när vi rekommenderar ett projekt, och att dokumentera varje enskild faktor är ett pågående arbete.
Our recommended operating systems:
- Must be open-source.
- Must receive regular software and Linux kernel updates.
- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland).
- Must support full-disk encryption during installation.
- Must not freeze regular releases for more than 1 year. We [do not recommend](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage.
- Must support a wide variety of hardware.
In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.**

48
i18n/sv/os/android-overview.md
View File

@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android
description: Android is an open-source operating system with strong security protections, which makes it our top choice for phones.
---
Android is a secure operating system that has strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system.
![Android logo](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right }
## Choosing an Android Distribution
The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system.
## Our Advice
### Choosing an Android Distribution
When you buy an Android phone, the device's default operating system often comes with invasive integration with apps and services that are not part of the [Android Open-Source Project](https://source.android.com/). An example of such is Google Play Services, which has irrevocable privileges to access your files, contacts storage, call logs, SMS messages, location, camera, microphone, hardware identifiers, and so on. These apps and services increase the attack surface of your device and are the source of various privacy concerns with Android.
@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Ideally, when choosing a custom Android distribution, you should make sure that
[Our Android System Recommendations :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button}
## Avoid Rooting
### Avoid Rooting
[Rooting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)) Android phones can decrease security significantly as it weakens the complete [Android security model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy). This can decrease privacy should there be an exploit that is assisted by the decreased security. Common rooting methods involve directly tampering with the boot partition, making it impossible to perform successful Verified Boot. Apps that require root will also modify the system partition meaning that Verified Boot would have to remain disabled. Having root exposed directly in the user interface also increases the [attack surface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface) of your device and may assist in [privilege escalation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) vulnerabilities and SELinux policy bypasses.
@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire
We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps.
## Verified Boot
### Install Updates
It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too.
For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution.
### Sharing Media
You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload.
For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos.
## Security Protections
### Verified Boot
[Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) is an important part of the Android security model. It provides protection against [evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) attacks, malware persistence, and ensures security updates cannot be downgraded with [rollback protection](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection).
@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock And
Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be aware of beyond their marketing. For example, the Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage.
## Firmware Updates
### Firmware Updates
Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin).
@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ EOL devices which are no longer supported by the SoC manufacturer cannot receive
Fairphone, for example, markets their devices as receiving 6 years of support. However, the SoC (Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G on the Fairphone 4) has a considerably shorter EOL date. This means that firmware security updates from Qualcomm for the Fairphone 4 will end in September 2023, regardless of whether Fairphone continues to release software security updates.
## Android Versions
It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution.
## Android Permissions
### Android Permissions
[Permissions on Android](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) grant you control over what apps are allowed to access. Google regularly makes [improvements](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions) on the permission system in each successive version. All apps you install are strictly [sandboxed](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), therefore, there is no need to install any antivirus apps.
@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ An app may request a permission for a specific feature it has. For example, any
Privacy-friendly apps such as [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) may show some trackers such as [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/). This library includes [Firebase Cloud Messaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging) which can provide [push notifications](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Push_technology) in apps. This [is the case](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007) with Bitwarden. That doesn't mean that Bitwarden is using all of the analytics features that are provided by Google Firebase Analytics.
## Media Access
## Privacy Features
Quite a few applications allows you to "share" a file with them for media upload. If you want to, for example, tweet a picture to Twitter, do not grant Twitter access to your "media and photos", because it will have access to all of your pictures then. Instead, go to your file manager (documentsUI), hold onto the picture, then share it with Twitter.
## User Profiles
### User Profiles
Multiple user profiles can be found in **Settings** → **System** → **Multiple users** and are the simplest way to isolate in Android.
With user profiles, you can impose restrictions on a specific profile, such as: making calls, using SMS, or installing apps on the device. Each profile is encrypted using its own encryption key and cannot access the data of any other profiles. Even the device owner cannot view the data of other profiles without knowing their password. Multiple user profiles are a more secure method of isolation.
## Work Profile
### Work Profile
[Work Profiles](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949) are another way to isolate individual apps and may be more convenient than separate user profiles.
@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ The work profile is dependent on a device controller to function. Features such
This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it does allow you the convenience of running apps in both the work and personal profiles simultaneously.
## VPN Killswitch
### VPN Killswitch
Android 7 and above supports a VPN killswitch and it is available without the need to install third-party apps. This feature can prevent leaks if the VPN is disconnected. It can be found in :gear: **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **VPN** → :gear: → **Block connections without VPN**.
## Global Toggles
### Global Toggles
Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, we recommend disabling these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled.
## Google
## Google Services
If you are using a device with Google services, either your stock operating system or an operating system that safely sandboxes Google Play Services like GrapheneOS, there are a number of additional changes you can make to improve your privacy. We still recommend avoiding Google services entirely, or limiting Google Play services to a specific user/work profile by combining a device controller like *Shelter* with GrapheneOS's Sandboxed Google Play.

213
i18n/sv/os/ios-overview.md Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
---
title: iOS Overview
icon: simple/apple
description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone.
---
**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system.
## Privacy Notes
iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways.
We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services.
### Activation Lock
All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device.
### Mandatory App Store
The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method.
### Invasive Telemetry
Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance).
More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023.
## Rekommenderad konfiguration
### iCloud
The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company.
Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple.
The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks.
You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here.
#### iCloud+
A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone.
**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari.
**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support.
#### Media & Purchases
At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**.
- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations**
#### Find My
**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when:
- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater.
- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network.
Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock.
At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features.
### Settings
Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app.
#### Airplane Mode
Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on.
#### Wi-Fi
You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button:
- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address**
You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off.
#### Bluetooth
**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective.
- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth**
#### General
Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer.
It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**:
- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates**
- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates**
- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files**
**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want.
- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off**
**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**:
- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask**
**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps.
Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**.
#### Siri & Search
If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here.
- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked**
#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode
Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security.
Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/).
If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode.
If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts.
On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device.
**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone.
- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search**
- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center**
- [ ] Turn off **Control Center**
- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets**
- [ ] Turn off **Siri**
- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message**
- [ ] Turn off **Home Control**
- [ ] Turn off **Wallet**
- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls**
- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories**
iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts.
!!! varning
With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it.
- [x] Turn on **Erase Data**
#### Privacy
**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**:
- [ ] Turn off **Location Services**
You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**:
- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track**
You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**:
- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection**
**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources.
You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**:
- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics**
- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics**
- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+**
- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety**
- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation**
Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising**
- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads**
**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**:
- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report**
[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally.
- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode**
## Additional Advice
### E2EE Calls
Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal.
### Avoid Jailbreaking
Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware.
### Encrypted iMessage
The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices.
If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications.
### Blacking Out Faces/Information
If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%.
### iOS Betas
Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities.
## Security Highlights
### Before First Unlock
If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation.

78
i18n/sv/os/linux-overview.md
View File

@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux
description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative, but not all distribitions are created equal.
---
Man tror ofta att [programvara med öppen källkod](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software) är säker i sig eftersom källkoden är tillgänglig. Det finns en förväntan på att gemenskapens kontroll sker regelbundet, men detta är inte alltid fallet [](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). It does depend on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, level of rigor applied to [code reviews](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review), and how often attention is given to specific parts of the [codebase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase) that may go untouched for years.
**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up.
För närvarande har skrivbord Linux några områden som kan förbättras bättre jämfört med sina egenutvecklade motsvarigheter, t.ex.:
- En verifierad startkedja, som Apples [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (med [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Androids [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot)eller Microsoft Windows [bootprocess](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) med [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). Dessa funktioner och hårdvarutekniker kan alla bidra till att förhindra ihållande manipulering av skadlig kod eller [evil maid-attacker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack)
- En stark sandlådelösning som den som finns i [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md)och [Android](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox). Vanligt förekommande sandboxing-lösningar för Linux, t.ex. [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html) och [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/), har fortfarande en lång väg att gå
- Starka [åtgärder för att minska exploateringar](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations)
Trots dessa nackdelar är stationära Linux-distributioner bra om du vill:
- Undvik telemetri som ofta kommer med egna operativsystem
- Bevara [frihet för programvara](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms)
- Har system som är inriktade på integritet, t.ex. [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) eller [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/)
På vår webbplats används i allmänhet termen "Linux" för att beskriva Linuxdistributioner för skrivbordsmiljöer. Andra operativsystem som också använder Linux-kärnan som ChromeOS, Android och Qubes OS diskuteras inte här.
Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page.
[Våra Linux-rekommendationer :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button}
## Privacy Notes
There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to:
- Undvik telemetri som ofta kommer med egna operativsystem
- Bevara [frihet för programvara](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms)
- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/)
### Open Source Security
It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/).
In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years.
### Missing Security Features
At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future.
- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3).
- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox.
Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust.
## Välja din distribution
Inte alla Linux-distributioner är skapade lika. Medan vår Linux-rekommendationssida inte är avsedd att vara en auktoritativ källa på vilken distribution du ska använda, finns det några saker du bör tänka på när du väljer vilken distribution du ska använda.
Inte alla Linux-distributioner är skapade lika. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution:
### Utgivningscykel
Vi rekommenderar starkt att du väljer distributioner som ligger nära de stabila uppströmsutgåvorna, ofta kallade rullande utgåvor. Detta beror på att frysta utgåvor ofta inte uppdaterar paketversioner och hamnar bakom säkerhetsuppdateringar.
För frusna distributioner som [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling)förväntas paketansvariga backa patchar för att åtgärda sårbarheter snarare än att stöta programvaran till "nästa version" som släppts av uppströmsutvecklaren. Vissa säkerhetskorrigeringar [inte](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) får en [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (särskilt mindre populär programvara) alls och därför inte göra det i distributionen med denna patching modell. Som ett resultat hålls mindre säkerhetskorrigeringar ibland tillbaka till nästa stora utgåva.
För frusna distributioner som [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling)förväntas paketansvariga backa patchar för att åtgärda sårbarheter snarare än att stöta programvaran till "nästa version" som släppts av uppströmsutvecklaren. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. Som ett resultat hålls mindre säkerhetskorrigeringar ibland tillbaka till nästa stora utgåva.
Vi tror inte att hålla paket tillbaka och tillämpa tillfälliga patchar är en bra idé, eftersom det skiljer sig från hur utvecklaren kan ha avsett att programvaran ska fungera. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) har en presentation om detta:
@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ Atomic update-metoden används för oföränderliga distributioner som Silverblu
### "Säkerhetsfokuserad" distribution
Det råder ofta viss förvirring mellan "säkerhetsfokuserade" fördelningar och "pentesting"-fördelningar. En snabb sökning på "den säkraste Linuxdistributionen" ger ofta resultat som Kali Linux, Black Arch och Parrot OS. Dessa distributioner är offensiva distributioner för penetrationstestning som innehåller verktyg för att testa andra system. De innehåller ingen "extra säkerhet" eller defensiva åtgärder som är avsedda för vanlig användning.
Det råder ofta viss förvirring mellan "säkerhetsfokuserade" fördelningar och "pentesting"-fördelningar. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. Dessa distributioner är offensiva distributioner för penetrationstestning som innehåller verktyg för att testa andra system. De innehåller ingen "extra säkerhet" eller defensiva åtgärder som är avsedda för vanlig användning.
### Arch Linux baserade distributioner
Arch-baserade distributioner rekommenderas inte för dem som är nya i Linux (oavsett distribution) eftersom de kräver regelbundet underhåll av systemet [](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch har ingen distributionsuppdateringsmekanism för de underliggande programvaruvalen. Därför måste du hålla dig uppdaterad om aktuella trender och ta till dig teknik när den ersätter äldre metoder på egen hand.
Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. Därför måste du hålla dig uppdaterad om aktuella trender och ta till dig teknik när den ersätter äldre metoder på egen hand.
För ett säkert system förväntas du också ha tillräckliga Linuxkunskaper för att korrekt konfigurera säkerheten för deras system, t.ex. anta ett [obligatoriskt system för åtkomstkontroll](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control), konfigurera [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, skärpa uppstartsparametrar, manipulera [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) -parametrar och veta vilka komponenter de behöver, t.ex. [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit).
Alla som använder [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **måste** vara bekväma med att granska PKGBUILDs som de installerar från den tjänsten. AUR-paket är innehåll som produceras av gemenskapen och är inte granskade på något sätt, och är därför sårbara för attacker i programvarukedjan, vilket faktiskt har hänt [tidigare](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR bör alltid användas sparsamt och ofta finns det många dåliga råd på olika sidor som uppmanar folk att blint använda [AUR-hjälpmedel](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) utan tillräcklig varning. Liknande varningar gäller för användning av tredje parts Personal Package Archives (PPAs) på Debianbaserade distributioner eller Community Projects (COPR) på Fedora.
Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR-paket är innehåll som produceras av gemenskapen och är inte granskade på något sätt, och är därför sårbara för attacker i programvarukedjan, vilket faktiskt har hänt [tidigare](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/).
Om du har erfarenhet av Linux och vill använda en Arch-baserad distribution rekommenderar vi endast huvudversionen av Arch Linux, inte något av dess derivat. Vi rekommenderar särskilt dessa två Arch-derivat:
The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Liknande varningar gäller för användning av tredje parts Personal Package Archives (PPAs) på Debianbaserade distributioner eller Community Projects (COPR) på Fedora.
If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives.
Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically:
- **Manjaro**: Denna distribution håller tillbaka paket i två veckor för att se till att deras egna ändringar inte går sönder, inte för att se till att uppströmsversionen är stabil. När AUR-paket används byggs de ofta med de senaste [-biblioteken](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) från Arch:s arkiv.
- **Garuda**: De använder [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) som automatiskt och blint kompilerar paket från AUR. Det finns ingen verifieringsprocess för att se till att AUR-paketen inte drabbas av attacker i leveranskedjan.
### Kicksecure
Vi rekommenderar starkt att du inte använder föråldrade distributioner som Debian, men det finns ett Debianbaserat operativsystem som har hårdgjorts för att vara mycket säkrare än vanliga Linuxdistributioner: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure är, förenklat uttryckt, en uppsättning skript, konfigurationer och paket som avsevärt minskar angreppsytan för Debian. Den täcker många rekommendationer för sekretess och skydd av integritet som standard.
### Linux-libre-kärnan och "Libre"-distributioner
We strongly recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode for ideological reasons.
We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode.
## Allmänna rekommendationer
@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ De flesta Linux-distributioner har ett alternativ i installationsprogrammet för
### Växla
Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora-baserade distributioner [använder ZRAM som standard](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM).
Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM).
If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats.
### Wayland
Vi rekommenderar att du använder en skrivbordsmiljö som stöder visningsprotokollet [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) eftersom det har utvecklats med säkerheten [i åtanke](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Dess föregångare, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), har inte stöd för isolering av grafiska gränssnitt, vilket gör att alla fönster kan [spela in skärmen, logga och injicera inmatningar i andra fönster](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), vilket gör alla försök till sandboxing meningslösa. Även om det finns alternativ för att göra nested X11, t.ex. [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) eller [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), har de ofta negativa konsekvenser för prestandan och är inte bekväma att konfigurera och är inte att föredra framför Wayland.
We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland.
Lyckligtvis har vanliga miljöer som [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org)och fönsterhanteraren [Sway](https://swaywm.org) stöd för Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). Om du använder en av dessa miljöer är det lika enkelt som att välja "Wayland"-sessionen i skrivbordsdisplayhanteraren ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)).
@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ Vi rekommenderar **mot** om du använder skrivbordsmiljöer eller fönsterhanter
### Proprietär fast programvara (uppdateringar av mikrokod)
Linuxdistributioner som [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) eller DIY (Arch Linux) levereras inte med de proprietära [mikrokodsuppdateringarna](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) som ofta åtgärdar sårbarheter. Några anmärkningsvärda exempel på dessa sårbarheter är [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), och andra [maskinvarusårbarheter](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html).
Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Några anmärkningsvärda exempel på dessa sårbarheter är [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), och andra [maskinvarusårbarheter](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html).
Vi rekommenderar **starkt** att du installerar mikrokodsuppdateringar, eftersom din CPU redan kör den egenutvecklade mikrokoden från fabriken. Fedora och openSUSE har båda mikrokoduppdateringar som standard.
We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora och openSUSE har båda mikrokoduppdateringar som standard.
### Uppdateringar
De flesta Linuxdistributioner installerar automatiskt uppdateringar eller påminner dig om att göra det. Det är viktigt att hålla operativsystemet uppdaterat så att programvaran korrigeras när en sårbarhet hittas.
Vissa distributioner (särskilt de som riktar sig till avancerade användare) är mer avskalade och förväntar sig att du gör saker själv (t.ex. Arch eller Debian). Dessa kräver att du kör "pakethanteraren" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manuellt för att få viktiga säkerhetsuppdateringar.
Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). Dessa kräver att du kör "pakethanteraren" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manuellt för att få viktiga säkerhetsuppdateringar.
Dessutom hämtar vissa distributioner inte uppdateringar av den fasta programvaran automatiskt. För detta måste du installera [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd).
@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ Dessutom hämtar vissa distributioner inte uppdateringar av den fasta programvar
### Randomisering av MAC-adresser
Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings.
Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings.
Det är möjligt att [randomisera MAC-adressen](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) [MAC-adressen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) när du använder NetworkManager. Detta ger lite mer integritet i Wi-Fi-nätverk eftersom det är svårare att spåra specifika enheter i nätverket du är ansluten till. Den [**gör dig inte anonym**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf).
@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ Vi rekommenderar att du ändrar inställningen till **random** i stället för *
Om du använder [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components)måste du ställa in [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) vilket aktiverar [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=).
Det finns inte många punkter i slumpmässig MAC-adress för Ethernet-anslutningar som en systemadministratör kan hitta dig genom att titta på den port du använder på [-nätverksväxeln](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomisering av Wi-Fi- MAC-adresser beror på stöd från Wi-Fi-programmets fasta programvara.
MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Randomisering av Wi-Fi- MAC-adresser beror på stöd från Wi-Fi-programmets fasta programvara.
### Andra identifierare

2
i18n/sv/os/qubes-overview.md
View File

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos
description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within virtual machines for heightened security.
---
[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) är ett operativsystem som använder hypervisorn [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) för att ge stark säkerhet för skrivbordsdatorer genom isolerade virtuella maskiner. Varje virtuell dator kallas *Qube* och du kan tilldela varje Qube en förtroendenivå baserat på dess syfte. Eftersom Qubes OS ger säkerhet genom att använda isolering och endast tillåta åtgärder från fall till fall är det motsatsen till [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/).
[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Varje virtuell dator kallas *Qube* och du kan tilldela varje Qube en förtroendenivå baserat på dess syfte. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/).
## Hur fungerar Qubes OS?

1
i18n/sv/tools.md
View File

@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ Vi [rekommenderar](dns.md#recommended-providers) ett antal krypterade DNS-servra
- ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos)
- ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix)
- ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails)
- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure)
</div>