New Crowdin translations by GitHub Action

i18n/ko/desktop.md

@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Nix is a source-based package manager; if there’s no pre-built available in th
 
     ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ align=right }
     
-    **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os).
+    **Whonix** is based on [Kicksecure](#kicksecure), a security-focused fork of Debian. It aims to provide privacy, security, and anonymity on the internet. Whonix is best used in conjunction with [Qubes OS](#qubes-os).
     
     [:octicons-home-16: 홈페이지](https://www.whonix.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
     [:simple-torbrowser:](http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion){ .card-link title="Onion 서비스" }
@@ -152,33 +152,48 @@ Tails는 재부팅 시마다 완전히 초기화되도록 설계되었습니다.
 
     ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ align=right }
     
-    **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers.
+    **Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (a.k.a. "Qubes"). Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux, and can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers.
     
-    [:octicons-home-16: 홈페이지](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
-    [:material-arrow-right-drop-circle: 개요](os/qubes-overview.md){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
     [:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
-    [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="프라이버시 정책" }
-    [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=문서 }
-    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="소스 코드" }
-    [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=기부 }
+    [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/privacy/){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/){ .card-link title=Documentation }
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/QubesOS/){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+    [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
 
-Qubes OS is a Xen-based operating system meant to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (VMs), also known as *Qubes*.
+Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system.
 
-The Qubes OS operating system secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate VMs. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the system. For further details see the Qubes [FAQ](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/).
+For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview](os/qubes-overview.md) page.
+
+### Kicksecure
+
+While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install.
+
+!!! recommendation
+
+    ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ align=right }
+    
+    **Kicksecure**—in oversimplified terms—is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default. It also serves as the base OS for [Whonix](#whonix).
+    
+    [:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.kicksecure.com/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
+    [:octicons-eye-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Privacy_Policy){ .card-link title="Privacy Policy" }
+    [:octicons-info-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Documentation){ .card-link title=Documentation }
+    [:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/Kicksecure){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
+    [:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Donate){ .card-link title=Contribute }
 
 ## 평가 기준
 
-**Privacy Guides는 권장 목록의 어떠한 프로젝트와도 제휴를 맺지 않았습니다.** 객관적인 권장 목록을 제공하기 위해, [일반적인 평가 기준](about/criteria.md)에 더해 명확한 요구 사항을 정립하였습니다. 어떠한 프로젝트를 선택해 사용하기 전에, 이러한 요구 사항들을 숙지하고 여러분 스스로 조사하는 과정을 거쳐 적절한 선택을 하시기 바랍니다.
+Choosing a Linux distro that is right for you will come down to a huge variety of personal preferences, and this page is **not** meant to be an exhaustive list of every viable distribution. Our Linux overview page has some advice on [choosing a distro](os/linux-overview.md#choosing-your-distribution) in more detail. The distros on *this* page do all generally follow the guidelines we covered there, and all meet these standards:
 
-!!! example "이 단락은 최근에 만들어졌습니다"
+- Free and open-source.
+- Receives regular software and kernel updates.
+- [Avoids X11](os/linux-overview.md#wayland).
+    - The notable exception here is Qubes, but the isolation issues which X11 typically has are avoided by virtualization. This isolation only applies to apps *running in different qubes* (virtual machines), apps running in the *same* qube are not protected from each other.
+- Supports full-disk encryption during installation.
+- Doesn't freeze regular releases for more than 1 year.
+    - We [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "Long Term Support" or "stable" distro releases for desktop usage.
+- Supports a wide variety of hardware.
+- Preference towards larger projects.
+    - Maintaining an operating system is a major challenge, and smaller projects have a tendency to make more avoidable mistakes, or delay critical updates (or worse, disappear entirely). We lean towards projects which will likely be around 10 years from now (whether that's due to corporate backing or very significant community support), and away from projects which are hand-built or have a small number of maintainers.
 
-    Privacy Guides 팀은 사이트의 모든 항목마다 명확한 평가 기준을 정립하는 중이며, 따라서 세부 내용은 변경될 수 있습니다. 평가 기준에 대해서 질문이 있다면 [포럼에서 문의](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest)하시기 바랍니다. (무언가가 목록에 존재하지 않다고 해서 권장 목록을 작성할 때 고려한 적이 없을 것으로 단정 짓지 마세요.) 권장 목록에 어떤 프로젝트를 추가할 때 고려하고 논의해야 할 요소는 매우 많으며, 모든 요소를 문서화하는 것은 현재 진행 중인 작업입니다.
-
-Privacy Guides 권장 운영 체제는 다음 조건을 만족해야 합니다:
-
-- 오픈 소스여야 합니다.
-- 소프트웨어 및 Linux 커널 업데이트를 정기적으로 받아야 합니다.
-- Linux distributions must support [Wayland](os/linux-overview.md#wayland).
-- 설치 과정에서 전체 디스크 암호화를 지원해야 합니다.
-- 정기 릴리스가 1년 이상 고정되어선 안됩니다. Privacy Guides 데스크톱 사용에 있어서 'LTS(Long Term Support, 장기 지원)'이나 'Stable(안정적인)' 릴리스 배포판을 [권장하지 않습니다](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle).
-- 다양한 하드웨어를 지원해야 합니다.
+In addition, [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md) for recommended projects still applies. **Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.**

i18n/ko/os/android-overview.md

@@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ icon: simple/android
 description: Android는 강력한 보안 및 보호 기능을 갖춘 오픈 소스 운영 체제로, 휴대폰에 있어서 최고의 선택입니다.
 ---
 
-Android는 강력한 [애플리케이션 샌드박스](https://source.android.com/docs/security/app-sandbox?hl=ko), [자체 검사 부팅](https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/verifiedboot?hl=ko)(AVB) 기능과 엄밀한 [권한](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview?hl=ko) 제어 시스템을 갖춘 안전한 운영 체제입니다.
+![Android 로고](../assets/img/android/android.svg){ align=right }
 
-## Android 배포판 선택
+The **Android Open Source Project** is a secure mobile operating system featuring strong [app sandboxing](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox), [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot) (AVB), and a robust [permission](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview) control system.
+
+## Our Advice
+
+### Android 배포판 선택
 
 여러분이 Android 휴대폰을 새로 구입하면, 기기의 기본 운영체제 내에 [Android 오픈 소스 프로젝트(AOSP)](https://source.android.com/)에 포함되지 않은 앱, 서비스가 강력히 통합되어 있는 경우가 많습니다. 대표적인 예시로는 Google Play 서비스가 있습니다. Google Play 서비스는 파일, 통화 기록, 연락처, 통화 기록, SMS 메시지, 위치, 카메라, 마이크, 하드웨어 식별자 등에 접근할 수 있으며, 이 권한을 빼앗을 수도 없습니다. 이러한 앱, 서비스는 기기의 공격 표면을 증가시키고 Android의 다양한 프라이버시 문제로 이어집니다.
 
@@ -16,7 +20,7 @@ Android는 강력한 [애플리케이션 샌드박스](https://source.android.co
 
 [Android 시스템 권장 사항 :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../android.md ""){.md-button}
 
-## 루팅 방지
+### 루팅 방지
 
 Android 휴대폰을 [루팅](https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%EB%A3%A8%ED%8C%85_(%EC%95%88%EB%93%9C%EB%A1%9C%EC%9D%B4%EB%93%9C))할 경우, [전체 Android 보안 모델](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Security_and_privacy)이 약화되므로 보안 수준이 크게 저하됩니다. 보안 수준이 낮아져 취약점의 발생으로 이어질 경우 프라이버시 또한 저해됩니다. 루팅은 일반적으로 부팅 파티션을 직접 조작하는 방식으로 이루어지므로, 자체 검사 부팅을 제대로 수행할 수 없습니다. 루트 권한을 요구하는 앱 또한 시스템 파티션을 수정하므로 자체 검사 부팅을 활성화할 수 없습니다. 사용자 인터페이스에서 루트 권한이 직접 노출될 경우 기기의 [공격 표면](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_surface)이 증가하고 [권한 에스컬레이션](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation) 취약성과 SELinux 정책 우회 문제가 발생할 수 있습니다.
 
@@ -26,7 +30,21 @@ AFWall+는 [패킷 필터링](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_(computing)
 
 Privacy Guides는 이러한 앱들의 불확실한 프라이버시 보호 효과가 휴대폰을 루팅함으로써 발생하는 보안상의 희생을 감수할 만큼 중요하다고는 생각하지 않습니다.
 
-## 자체 검사 부팅
+### Install Updates
+
+[지원 기간이 종료된](https://endoflife.date/android) Android 버전은 사용하지 않아야 합니다. 최신 버전 Android에는 운영 체제 보안 업데이트뿐만 아니라, 중요한 프라이버시 강화 업데이트도 포함되어 있습니다.
+
+For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes) any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), or your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity); whereas now they must be system apps to do so. 시스템 앱은 OEM이나 Android 배포판에서만 제공됩니다.
+
+### Sharing Media
+
+You can avoid giving many apps permission to access your media with Android's built-in sharing features. Many applications allow you to "share" a file with them for media upload.
+
+For example, if you want to post a picture to Discord you can open your file manager or gallery and share that picture with the Discord app, instead of granting Discord full access to your media and photos.
+
+## Security Protections
+
+### 자체 검사 부팅
 
 [자체 검사 부팅(Verified Boot)](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot)은 Android 보안 모델에서 중요한 부분을 차지하고 있습니다. [Evil maid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack) 공격, 멀웨어 지속성으로부터 보호하고, [롤백 보호](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection)를 통해 보안 업데이트가 다운그레이드되는 일이 없도록 보장합니다.
 
@@ -38,7 +56,7 @@ Android 10 이상부터는 기존의 전체 디스크 암호화보다 유연한
 
 또한, OEM 중에는 마케팅과 달리 자체 검사 부팅을 제대로 구현하지 않는 경우도 많으므로 주의해야 합니다. 예시로 Fairphone 3, 4는 [기본 부트로더가 공개 AVB 서명 키를 신뢰하기 때문에](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11), 기본적으로는 안전하지 않습니다. 이 경우 시스템이 커스텀 운영 체제 사용에 대한 [경고 없이](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) 다른 Android 운영 체제(/e/ 등)를 부팅할 수 있으므로, Fairphone은 기본적으로 자체 검사 부팅이 활성화되지 않습니다.
 
-## 펌웨어 업데이트
+### 펌웨어 업데이트
 
 펌웨어 업데이트는 보안에 있어 매우 중요합니다. 펌웨어 업데이트가 없으면 기기 보안을 유지할 수 없습니다. OEM은 자신들의 협력체와 지원 계약을 맺고 제한된 기간 동안 비공개 소스로 된 구성 요소를 제공합니다. 관련 내용은 [Android 보안 게시판](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin)에 자세히 설명되어 있습니다.
 
@@ -48,11 +66,7 @@ SoC 제조업체에서 더 이상 지원하지 않는 EOL 기기는 OEM 업체
 
 예시로, Fairphone은 6년의 지원 기간을 제공하는 것으로 홍보합니다. 하지만 SoC(Fairphone 4의 Qualcomm Snapdragon 750G)는 훨씬 짧은 EOL 날짜를 가지고 있습니다. 즉, Fairphone이 계속 소프트웨어 보안 업데이트를 릴리스하더라도, Fairphone 4에 대한 Qualcomm의 펌웨어 보안 업데이트는 2023년 9월에 종료됩니다.
 
-## Android 버전
-
-[지원 기간이 종료된](https://endoflife.date/android) Android 버전은 사용하지 않아야 합니다. 최신 버전 Android에는 운영 체제 보안 업데이트뿐만 아니라, 중요한 프라이버시 강화 업데이트도 포함되어 있습니다. 예를 들어, [Android 10 이전](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes?hl=ko)에는 어떤 앱이든 [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) 권한을 가졌다면 [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), SIM 카드 [IMSI](https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%EA%B5%AD%EC%A0%9C_%EB%AA%A8%EB%B0%94%EC%9D%BC_%EA%B0%80%EC%9E%85%EC%9E%90_%EA%B5%AC%EB%B3%84%EC%9E%90) 등 여러분 휴대폰의 민감한 고유 일련 번호에 접근 가능했지만, 현재는 시스템 앱만 가능합니다. 시스템 앱은 OEM이나 Android 배포판에서만 제공됩니다.
-
-## Android 권한
+### Android 권한
 
 [Andoird에서의 권한](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview)은 앱이 접근 가능한 항목을 여러분이 제어할 수 있는 권한을 부여합니다. Google은 매 버전마다 권한 시스템을 [개선합니다](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/11/privacy/permissions?hl=ko). 여러분이 설치한 모든 앱은 엄격하게 [샌드박스로 격리](https://source.android.com/docs/security/app-sandbox?hl=ko)되어 있으므로, 바이러스 백신 앱은 설치하실 필요가 없습니다.
 
@@ -93,17 +107,15 @@ Android 13:
 
     [Bitwarden](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.x8bit.bitwarden/latest/) 처럼 프라이버시 친화적인 앱에서도 [Google Firebase Analytics](https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/trackers/49/) 등의 일부 추적기가 표시될 수 있습니다. 해당 라이브러리는 앱에서 [푸시 알림](https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%ED%91%B8%EC%8B%9C_%EA%B8%B0%EB%B2%95)을 제공할 수 있는 [Firebase 클라우드 메시징(FCM)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebase_Cloud_Messaging)이 포함되어 있습니다. Bitwarden이 바로 [이러한 경우](https://fosstodon.org/@bitwarden/109636825700482007)에 해당합니다. Bitwarden에서 Google Firebase Analytics 트래커가 발견됐다는 사실이 Bitwarden에서 Google Firebase Analytics의 모든 분석 기능을 사용한다는 것을 의미하지는 않습니다.
 
-## 미디어 액세스
+## Privacy Features
 
-많은 애플리케이션은 '공유' 기능을 이용해 미디어를 업로드하는 기능을 지원합니다. Twitter에 사진을 트윗하려는 경우로 예를 들면, Twitter가 여러분의 모든 사진에 접근할 수 있도록 하고 싶은 것이 아닌 이상 '미디어 및 사진' 접근 권한을 허용해선 안 됩니다. 대신 파일 관리자(documentsUI)로 이동해, 파일 관리자에서 사진을 길게 터치한 다음 Twitter에 공유하세요.
-
-## 사용자 프로필
+### 사용자 프로필
 
 여러 사용자 프로필은 Android에서 격리 환경을 가장 간단하게 구축할 수 있는 방법으로, **설정** → **시스템** → **여러 사용자**에서 확인할 수 있습니다.
 
 사용자 프로필 기능을 이용하면 전화 걸기, SMS 사용, 앱 설치 등의 행위를 특정 프로필에서만 제한적으로 수행할 수 있습니다. 각 프로필은 고유한 암호화 키를 사용하여 암호화되며 다른 프로필의 데이터에 접근할 수 없습니다. 기기 소유자라 할지라도 비밀번호를 모르면 다른 프로필의 데이터를 볼 수 없습니다. '여러 사용자 프로필'은 여타 방법보다 더 안전한 격리 방법입니다.
 
-## 직장 프로필
+### 직장 프로필
 
 [직장 프로필](https://support.google.com/work/android/answer/6191949)은 개별 앱을 격리하는 방식 중 하나로, 경우에 따라서 별도 사용자 프로필을 사용하는 것보다 편리합니다.
 
@@ -113,15 +125,15 @@ A **device controller** app such as [Shelter](../android.md#shelter) is required
 
 직장 프로필은 보조 사용자 프로필에 비해 보안성은 떨어집니다. 하지만 개인 프로필과 직장 프로필에서 동시에 앱을 실행할 수 있다는 편리함이 존재합니다.
 
-## VPN 킬 스위치
+### VPN 킬 스위치
 
 Android 7 이상은 외부 앱을 설치할 필요 없이 VPN 킬 스위치를 자체적으로 지원합니다. 해당 기능은 VPN 연결이 끊어졌을 때 유출이 발생하지 않도록 방지할 수 있습니다. :gear: **설정** → **네트워크 및 인터넷** → **VPN** → :gear: → **연결 차단(VPN 제외)**에서 확인할 수 있습니다.
 
-## 전역 제어
+### 전역 제어
 
 최신 Android 기기에는 Bluetooth 및 위치 서비스를 비활성화할 수 있는 전역 제어 기능이 존재합니다. Android 12에는 카메라, 마이크 접근 제어 기능이 도입되었습니다. 해당 기능들을 사용하지 않을 때에는 전역적으로 비활성화해 두는 것을 권장드립니다. 개별 권한이 허가된 앱일지라도 해당 기능 접근이 활성화되기 전까진 접근할 수 없습니다.
 
-## Google
+## Google Services
 
 기본 운영 체제를 사용하든 GrapheneOS에서 샌드박스 Google Play 서비스를 사용하든, 기기에서 Google 서비스를 사용하고 있다면 여러 추가 변경 사항을 적용해 프라이버시를 강화할 수 있습니다. 물론, Privacy Guides에서는 '가능하다면' Google 서비스를 아예 사용하지 않거나, Shelter 등의 기기 컨트롤러와 GrapheneOS의 Sandboxed Google Play 기능을 결합해 특정 사용자/업무 프로필로 Google Play 서비스를 제한해서 사용하실 것을 권장드립니다.
 

i18n/ko/os/ios-overview.md

@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+---
+title: iOS Overview
+icon: simple/apple
+description: iOS is a mobile operating system developed by Apple for the iPhone.
+---
+
+**iOS** and **iPadOS** are proprietary mobile operating systems developed by Apple for their iPhone and iPad products, respectively. If you have an Apple mobile device, you can increase your privacy by disabling some built-in telemetry features, and hardening some privacy and security settings which are built in to the system.
+
+## Privacy Notes
+
+iOS devices are frequently praised by security experts for their robust data protection and adherence to modern best-practices. However, the restrictiveness of Apple's ecosystem—particularly with their mobile devices—does still hamper privacy in a number of ways.
+
+We generally consider iOS to provide better than average privacy and security protections for most people, compared to stock Android devices from any manufacturer. However, you can achieve even higher standards of privacy with a [custom Android operating system](../android.md) like GrapheneOS, if you want or need to be completely independent of Apple or Google's cloud services.
+
+### Activation Lock
+
+All iOS devices must be checked against Apple's Activation Lock servers when they are initially set up or reset, meaning an internet connection is **required** to use an iOS device.
+
+### Mandatory App Store
+
+The only source for apps on iOS is Apple's App Store, which requires an Apple ID to access. This means that Apple has a record of every app you install on your device, and can likely tie that information to your actual identity if you provide the App Store with a payment method.
+
+### Invasive Telemetry
+
+Apple has historically had problems with properly anonymizing their telemetry on iOS. [In 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings), Apple was found to transmit Siri recordings—some containing highly confidential information—to their servers for manual review by third-party contractors. While they temporarily stopped that program after that practice was [widely reported on](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/23/20830120/apple-contractors-siri-recordings-listening-1000-a-day-globetech-microsoft-cortana), the problem wasn't completely resolved [until 2021](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/07/apple-overhauls-siri-to-address-privacy-concerns-and-improve-performance).
+
+More recently, Apple has been found to [transmit analytics even when analytics sharing is disabled](https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-analytics-tracking-even-when-off-app-store-1849757558) on iOS, and this data [appears](https://twitter.com/mysk_co/status/1594515229915979776) to be easily linked to unique iCloud account identifiers despite supposedly being anonymous. Apple has not fixed [these problems](https://gizmodo.com/clarence-thomas-aide-venmo-laywers-supreme-court-1850631585) as of July 2023.
+
+## 권장 설정
+
+### iCloud
+
+The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to their cloud services, not their hardware or software. When you use Apple services like iCloud, most of your information is stored on their servers and secured with keys which Apple has access to by default. You can check [Apple's documentation](https://support.apple.com/HT202303) for information on which services are end-to-end encrypted. Anything listed as "in transit" or "on server" means it's possible for Apple to access that data without your permission. This level of access has occasionally been abused by law enforcement to get around the fact that your data is otherwise securely encrypted on your device, and of course Apple is vulnerable to data breaches like any other company.
+
+Therefore, if you do use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple.
+
+The encryption used by Advanced Data Protection, while strong, [is not *quite* as robust](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/10778/4) as the encryption offered by other [cloud services](../cloud.md), particularly when it comes to iCloud Drive. While we strongly encourage using Advanced Data Protection if you use iCloud, we would also suggest considering finding an alternative to iCloud from a more [privacy-focused service provider](../tools.md), although it is unlikely most people would be impacted by these encryption quirks.
+
+You can also protect your data by limiting what you sync to iCloud in the first place. At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to iCloud. Select that, then **iCloud**, and turn off the switches for any services you don't want to sync to iCloud. You may see third-party apps listed under **Show All** if they sync to iCloud, which you can disable here.
+
+#### iCloud+
+
+A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some privacy-protecting functionality. While these may provide adequate service for current iCloud customers, we wouldn't recommend purchasing an iCloud+ plan over a [VPN](../vpn.md) and [standalone email aliasing service](../email.md#email-aliasing-services) just for these features alone.
+
+**Private Relay** is a proxy service which relays your Safari traffic through two servers: one owned by Apple and one owned by a third-party provider (including Akamai, Cloudflare, and Fastly). In theory this should prevent any single provider in the chain—including Apple—from having full visibility into which websites you visit while connected. Unlike a full VPN, Private Relay does not protect traffic from your apps outside of Safari.
+
+**Hide My Email** is Apple's email aliasing service. You can create an email aliases for free when you *Sign In With Apple* on a website or app, or generate unlimited aliases on demand with a paid iCloud+ plan. Hide My Email has the advantage of using the `@icloud.com` domain for its aliases, which may be less likely to be blocked compared to other email aliasing services, but does not offer functionality offered by standalone services such as automatic PGP encryption or multiple mailbox support.
+
+#### Media & Purchases
+
+At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Media & Purchases** > **View Account**.
+
+- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Recommendations**
+
+#### Find My
+
+**Find My** is a service that lets you track your Apple devices and share your location with your friends and family. It also allows you to wipe your device remotely in case it is stolen, preventing a thief from accessing your data. Your Find My [location data is E2EE](https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/find-my/) when:
+
+- Your location is shared with a family member or friend, and you both use iOS 15 or greater.
+- Your device is offline and is located by the Find My Network.
+
+Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock.
+
+At the top of the **Settings** app, you'll see your name and profile picture if you are signed in to an Apple ID. Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features.
+
+### 설정
+
+Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app.
+
+#### Airplane Mode
+
+Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on.
+
+#### Wi-Fi
+
+You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button:
+
+- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address**
+
+You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off.
+
+#### Bluetooth
+
+**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective.
+
+- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth**
+
+#### General
+
+Your iPhone's device name will by default contain your first name, and this will be visible to anyone on networks you connect to. You should change this to something more generic, like "iPhone." Select **About** > **Name** and enter the device name you prefer.
+
+It is important to install **Software Updates** frequently to get the latest security fixes. You can enable **Automatic Updates** to keep your phone up-to-date without needing to constantly check for updates. Select **Software Update** > **Automatic Updates**:
+
+- [x] Turn on **Download iOS Updates**
+- [x] Turn on **Install iOS Updates**
+- [x] Turn on **Security Responses & System Files**
+
+**AirDrop** allows you to easily transfer files, but it can allow strangers to send you files you do not want.
+
+- [x] Select **AirDrop** > **Receiving Off**
+
+**AirPlay** lets you seamlessly stream content from your iPhone to a TV; however, you might not always want this. Select **AirPlay & Handoff** > **Automatically AirPlay to TVs**:
+
+- [x] Select **Never** or **Ask**
+
+**Background App Refresh** allows your apps to refresh their content while you're not using them. This may cause them to make unwanted connections. Turning this off can also save battery life, but it may affect an app's ability to receive updated information, particularly weather and messaging apps.
+
+Select **Background App Refresh** and switch off any apps you don't want to continue refreshing in the background. If you don't want any apps to refresh in the background, you can select **Background App Refresh** again and turn it **Off**.
+
+#### Siri & Search
+
+If you don't want anyone to be able to control your phone with Siri when it is locked, you can turn that off here.
+
+- [ ] Turn off **Allow Siri When Locked**
+
+#### Face ID/Touch ID & Passcode
+
+Setting a strong password on your phone is the most important step you can take for physical device security. You'll have to make tradeoffs here between security and convenience: A longer password will be annoying to type in every time, but a shorter password or PIN will be easier to guess. Setting up Face ID or Touch ID along with a strong password can be a good compromise between usability and security.
+
+Select **Turn Passcode On** or **Change Passcode** > **Passcode Options** > **Custom Alphanumeric Code**. Make sure that you create a [secure password](https://www.privacyguides.org/basics/passwords-overview/).
+
+If you wish to use Face ID or Touch ID, you can go ahead and set it up now. Your phone will use the password you set up earlier as a fallback in case your biometric verification fails. Biometric unlock methods are primarily a convenience, although they do stop surveillance cameras or people over your shoulder from watching you input your passcode.
+
+If you use biometrics, you should know how to turn them off quickly in an emergency. Holding down the side or power button and *either* volume button until you see the Slide to Power Off slider will disable biometrics, requiring your passcode to unlock. Your passcode will also be required after device restarts.
+
+On some older devices, you may have to press the power button five times to disable biometrics instead, or for devices with Touch ID you may just have to hold down the power button and nothing else. Make sure you try this in advance so you know which method works for your device.
+
+**Allow Access When Locked** gives you options for what you can allow when your phone is locked. The more of these options you disable, the less someone without your password can do, but the less convenient it will be for you. Pick and choose which of these you don't want someone to have access to if they get their hands on your phone.
+
+- [ ] Turn off **Today View and Search**
+- [ ] Turn off **Notification Center**
+- [ ] Turn off **Control Center**
+- [ ] Turn off **Lock Screen Widgets**
+- [ ] Turn off **Siri**
+- [ ] Turn off **Reply with Message**
+- [ ] Turn off **Home Control**
+- [ ] Turn off **Wallet**
+- [ ] Turn off **Return Missed Calls**
+- [ ] Turn off **USB Accessories**
+
+iPhones are already resistant to brute-force attacks by making you wait long periods of time after multiple failed attempts; however, there have historically been exploits to get around this. To be extra safe, you can set your phone to wipe itself after 10 failed passcode attempts.
+
+!!! warning "경고"
+
+    With this setting enabled, someone could intentionally wipe your phone by entering the wrong password many times. Make sure you have proper backups and only enable this setting if you feel comfortable with it.
+
+- [x] Turn on **Erase Data**
+
+#### 프라이버시
+
+**Location Services** allows you to use features like Find My and Maps. If you don't need these features, you can disable Location Services. Alternatively, you can review and pick which apps can use your location here. Select **Location Services**:
+
+- [ ] Turn off **Location Services**
+
+You can decide to allow apps to request to **track** you here. Disabling this disallows all apps from tracking you with your phone's advertising ID. Select **Tracking**:
+
+- [ ] Turn off **Allow Apps to Request to Track**
+
+You should turn off **Research Sensor & Usage Data** if you don't wish to participate in studies. Select **Research Sensor & Usage Data**:
+
+- [ ] Turn off **Sensor & Usage Data Collection**
+
+**Safety Check** allows you to quickly view and revoke certain people and apps that might have permission to access your data. Here you can perform an **Emergency Reset**, immediately resetting permissions for all people and apps which might have access to device resources, and you can **Manage Sharing & Access** which allows you to go through and customize who and what has access to your device and account resources.
+
+You should disable analytics if you don't wish to send Apple usage data. Select **Analytics & Improvements**:
+
+- [ ] Turn off **Share iPhone Analytics** or **Share iPhone & Watch Analytics**
+- [ ] Turn off **Share iCloud Analytics**
+- [ ] Turn off **Improve Fitness+**
+- [ ] Turn off **Improve Safety**
+- [ ] Turn off **Improve Siri & Dictation**
+
+Disable **Personalized Ads** if you don't want targeted ads. Select **Apple Advertising**
+
+- [ ] Turn off **Personalized Ads**
+
+**App Privacy Report** is a built-in tool that allows you to see which permissions your apps are using. Select **App Privacy Report**:
+
+- [x] Select **Turn On App Privacy Report**
+
+[Lockdown Mode](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/27/macos-ventura-privacy-security-updates/#lockdown-mode) is a security setting you can enable to make your phone more resistant to attacks. Be aware that certain apps and features [won't work](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650) as they do normally.
+
+- [x] Select **Turn On Lockdown Mode**
+
+## Additional Advice
+
+### E2EE Calls
+
+Normal phone calls made with the Phone app through your carrier are not E2EE. Both FaceTime Video and FaceTime Audio calls are E2EE, or you can use [another app](../real-time-communication.md) like Signal.
+
+### Avoid Jailbreaking
+
+Jailbreaking an iPhone undermines its security and makes you vulnerable. Running untrusted, third-party software could cause your device to be infected with malware.
+
+### Encrypted iMessage
+
+The color of the message bubble in the Messages app indicates whether your messages are E2EE or not. A blue bubble indicates that you're using iMessage with E2EE, while a green bubble indicates they're using the outdated SMS and MMS protocols. Currently, the only way to get E2EE in Messages is for both parties to be using iMessage on Apple devices.
+
+If either you or your messaging partner have iCloud Backup enabled without Advanced Data Protection, the encryption key will be stored on Apple's servers, meaning they can access your messages. Additionally, iMessage's key exchange is not as secure as alternative implementations, like Signal (which allows you to view the recipients key and verify by QR code), so it shouldn't be relied on for particularly sensitive communications.
+
+### Blacking Out Faces/Information
+
+If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in tools to do so. Open the photo you want to edit, press edit in the top right corner of the screen, then press the markup symbol at the top right. Press the plus at the bottom right of the screen, then press the rectangle icon. Now, you can place a rectangle anywhere on the image. Make sure to press the shape icon at the bottom left and select the filled-in rectangle. **Don't** use the highlighter to obfuscate information, because its opacity is not quite 100%.
+
+### iOS Betas
+
+Apple always makes beta versions of iOS available early for those that wish to help find and report bugs. We don't recommend installing beta software on your phone. Beta releases are potentially unstable and could have undiscovered security vulnerabilities.
+
+## Security Highlights
+
+### Before First Unlock
+
+If your threat model includes forensic tools and you want to minimize the chance of exploits being used to access your phone, you should restart your device frequently. The state *after* a reboot but *before* unlocking your device is referred to as "Before First Unlock" (BFU), and when your device is in that state it makes it [significantly more difficult](https://belkasoft.com/checkm8_glossary) for forensic tools to exploit vulnerabilities to access your data. This BFU state allows you to receive notifications for calls, texts, and alarms, but most of the data on your device is still encrypted and inaccessible. This can be impractical, so consider whether these trade-offs make sense for your situation.

i18n/ko/os/linux-overview.md

@@ -4,33 +4,45 @@ icon: simple/linux
 description: Linux is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative, but not all distribitions are created equal.
 ---
 
-대부분의 사람들은 [오픈소스 소프트웨어](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_software)는 소스가 공개되어 있어 근본적으로 안전하다고 생각합니다. 커뮤니티가 코드를 주기적으로 검증할 것이라고 생각하지만, [꼭 그렇지 않습니다](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/). 실제 보안은 프로젝트 활동량, 개발자들의 경험, [코드 리뷰](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_review)를 얼마나 엄격하게 하는지, [코드베이스](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codebase)의 다양한 부분에 얼마나 주의를 기울이는지 등과 같은 다양한 요인에 따라 달라집니다.
+**Linux** is an open-source, privacy-focused desktop operating system alternative. In the face of pervasive telemetry and other privacy-encroaching technologies in mainstream operating systems, Linux desktop has remained the clear choice for people looking for total control over their computers from the ground up.
 
-At the moment, desktop Linux does have some areas that could be better improved when compared to their proprietary counterparts, e.g.:
-
-- A verified boot chain, like Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/startup-security-utility-secc7b34e5b5/web) (with [Secure Enclave](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/1/web/1)), Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), ChromeOS' [Verified boot](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/#verified-boot), or Microsoft Windows’s [boot process](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process) with [TPM](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/how-windows-uses-the-tpm). 이러한 기능과 기술들은 [evil maid 공격](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack)이나 멀웨어로 인한 변조를 막는데 도움을 줍니다.
-- [macOS](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/AppSandboxDesignGuide/AboutAppSandbox/AboutAppSandbox.html), [ChromeOS](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/docs/+/HEAD/sandboxing.md), [안드로이드](https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox)와 같은 운영체제에 탑재된 샌드박스 기술 Linux에서 자주 사용되는 [Flatpak](https://docs.flatpak.org/en/latest/sandbox-permissions.html)과 [Firejail](https://firejail.wordpress.com/) 샌드박스 기술은 아직 발전중입니다.
-- Strong [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations)
-
-이런 단점에도 불구하고 다음과 같은 경우에는 Linux를 사용하는 것을 권장합니다:
-
-- 독점 소프트웨어에 자주 따라오는 데이터 수집을 피하고 싶을 때
-- [자유 소프트웨어](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms)를 사용하고 싶은 경우
-- [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org)나 [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/)와 같은 프라이버시를 중요시하는 운영체제를 사용하고 싶은 경우
-
-이 웹사이트에서 사용하는 "Linux"는 주로 데스크탑 Linux 배포판을 가리킵니다. Linux 커널을 사용하지만 ChromeOS, Android, Qubes OS와 같은 타 운영체제는 해당 페이지에서 소개하지 않습니다.
+Our website generally uses the term “Linux” to describe **desktop** Linux distributions. Other operating systems which also use the Linux kernel such as ChromeOS, Android, and Qubes OS are not discussed on this page.
 
 [권장하는 Linux 배포판 :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](../desktop.md ""){.md-button}
 
+## Privacy Notes
+
+There are some notable privacy concerns with Linux which you should be aware of. Despite these drawbacks, desktop Linux distributions are still great for most people who want to:
+
+- 독점 소프트웨어에 자주 따라오는 데이터 수집을 피하고 싶을 때
+- [자유 소프트웨어](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html#four-freedoms)를 사용하고 싶은 경우
+- Use privacy focused systems such as [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) or [Tails](https://tails.boum.org/)
+
+### Open Source Security
+
+It is a [common misconception](../basics/common-misconceptions.md#open-source-software-is-always-secure-or-proprietary-software-is-more-secure) that Linux and other open-source software is inherently secure simply because the source code is available. There is an expectation that community verification occurs regularly, but this isn’t always [the case](https://seirdy.one/posts/2022/02/02/floss-security/).
+
+In reality, distro security depends on a number of factors, such as project activity, developer experience, the level of rigor applied to code reviews, and how often attention is given to specific parts of the codebase that may go untouched for years.
+
+### Missing Security Features
+
+At the moment, desktop Linux [falls behind alternatives](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/fedora-strategy-2028-proposal-fedora-linux-is-as-secure-as-macos/46899/9) like macOS or Android when it comes to certain security features. We hope to see improvements in these areas in the future.
+
+- **Verified boot** on Linux is not as robust as alternatives such as Apple’s [Secure Boot](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web) or Android’s [Verified Boot](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot). Verified boot prevents persistent tampering by malware and [evil maid attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_Maid_attack), but is still largely [unavailable on even the most advanced distributions](https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/has-silverblue-achieved-verified-boot/27251/3).
+
+- **Strong sandboxing** for apps on Linux is severely lacking, even with containerized apps like Flatpaks or sandboxing solutions like Firejail. Flatpak is the most promising sandboxing utility for Linux thus far, but is still deficient in many areas and allows for [unsafe defaults](https://flatkill.org/2020/) which allow most apps to trivially bypass their sandbox.
+
+Additionally, Linux falls behind in implementing [exploit mitigations](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html#exploit-mitigations) which are now standard on other operating systems, such as Arbitrary Code Guard on Windows or Hardened Runtime on macOS. Also, most Linux programs and Linux itself are coded in memory-unsafe languages. Memory corruption bugs are responsible for the [majority of vulnerabilities](https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2019/07/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/) fixed and assigned a CVE. While this is also true for Windows and macOS, they are quickly making progress on adopting memory-safe languages—such as Rust and Swift, respectively—while there is no similar effort to rewrite Linux in a memory-safe language like Rust.
+
 ## 배포판 선택하기
 
-Not all Linux distributions are created equal. While our Linux recommendation page is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, there are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing which distribution to use.
+Not all Linux distributions are created equal. Our [Linux recommendation page](../desktop.md) is not meant to be an authoritative source on which distribution you should use, but our recommendations *are* aligned with the following guidelines. These are a few things you should keep in mind when choosing a distribution:
 
 ### Release cycle
 
 We highly recommend that you choose distributions which stay close to the stable upstream software releases, often referred to as rolling release distributions. This is because frozen release cycle distributions often don’t update package versions and fall behind on security updates.
 
-For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release.
+For frozen distributions such as [Debian](https://www.debian.org/security/faq#handling), package maintainers are expected to backport patches to fix vulnerabilities rather than bump the software to the “next version” released by the upstream developer. Some security fixes [do not](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.14565) receive a [CVE ID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures) (particularly less popular software) at all and therefore do not make it into the distribution with this patching model. As a result minor security fixes are sometimes held back until the next major release.
 
 We don’t believe holding packages back and applying interim patches is a good idea, as it diverges from the way the developer might have intended the software to work. [Richard Brown](https://rootco.de/aboutme/) has a presentation about this:
 
@@ -54,28 +66,28 @@ The Atomic update method is used for immutable distributions like Silverblue, Tu
 
 ### “Security-focused” distributions
 
-There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch and Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use.
+There is often some confusion between “security-focused” distributions and “pentesting” distributions. A quick search for “the most secure Linux distribution” will often give results like Kali Linux, Black Arch, or Parrot OS. These distributions are offensive penetration testing distributions that bundle tools for testing other systems. They don’t include any “extra security” or defensive mitigations intended for regular use.
 
 ### Arch-based distributions
 
-Arch based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux, (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have an distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own.
+Arch and Arch-based distributions are not recommended for those new to Linux (regardless of distribution) as they require regular [system maintenance](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/System_maintenance). Arch does not have a distribution update mechanism for the underlying software choices. As a result you have to stay aware with current trends and adopt technologies as they supersede older practices on your own.
 
 For a secure system, you are also expected to have sufficient Linux knowledge to properly set up security for their system such as adopting a [mandatory access control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) system, setting up [kernel module](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Security) blacklists, hardening boot parameters, manipulating [sysctl](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sysctl) parameters, and knowing what components they need such as [Polkit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polkit).
 
-Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository), **must** be comfortable in auditing PKGBUILDs that they install from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/). AUR should always be used sparingly and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora.
+Anyone using the [Arch User Repository (AUR)](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Arch_User_Repository) **must** be comfortable auditing PKGBUILDs that they download from that service. AUR packages are community-produced content and are not vetted in any way, and therefore are vulnerable to software supply chain attacks, which has in fact happened [in the past](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/).
 
-If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we only recommend mainline Arch Linux, not any of its derivatives. We recommend against these two Arch derivatives specifically:
+The AUR should always be used sparingly, and often there is a lot of bad advice on various pages which direct people to blindly use [AUR helpers](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/AUR_helpers) without sufficient warning. Similar warnings apply to use third-party Personal Package Archives (PPAs) on Debian based distributions or Community Projects (COPR) on Fedora.
+
+If you are experienced with Linux and wish to use an Arch-based distribution, we generally recommend mainline Arch Linux over any of its derivatives.
+
+Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically:
 
 - **Manjaro**: This distribution holds packages back for 2 weeks to make sure that their own changes don’t break, not to make sure that upstream is stable. When AUR packages are used, they are often built against the latest [libraries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_(computing)) from Arch’s repositories.
 - **Garuda**: They use [Chaotic-AUR](https://aur.chaotic.cx/) which automatically and blindly compiles packages from the AUR. There is no verification process to make sure that the AUR packages don’t suffer from supply chain attacks.
 
-### Kicksecure
-
-While we strongly recommend against using outdated distributions like Debian, there is a Debian based operating system that has been hardened to be much more secure than typical Linux distributions: [Kicksecure](https://www.kicksecure.com/). Kicksecure, in oversimplified terms, is a set of scripts, configurations, and packages that substantially reduce the attack surface of Debian. It covers a lot of privacy and hardening recommendations by default.
-
 ### Linux-libre kernel and “Libre” distributions
 
-저희는 Linux-libre 커널을 사용하는 것을 **권장하지 않습니다**. 해당 커널은 이념과 관련된 이유로 [보안 패치를 제거](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released)하고 취약한 코드로 인한 [경고 메세지를 숨깁니다](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846).
+We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode.
 
 ## General Recommendations
 
@@ -87,11 +99,13 @@ Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS]
 
 ### Swap
 
-Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) or [encrypted swap](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) instead of unencrypted swap to avoid potential security issues with sensitive data being pushed to [swap space](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_paging). Fedora based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM).
+Consider using [ZRAM](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Zram#Using_zram-generator) instead of a traditional swap file or partition to avoid writing potentially sensitive memory data to persistent storage (and improve performance). Fedora-based distributions [use ZRAM by default](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SwapOnZRAM).
+
+If you require suspend-to-disk (hibernation) functionality, you will still need to use a traditional swap file or partition. Make sure that any swap space you do have on a persistent storage device is [encrypted](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Dm-crypt/Swap_encryption) at a minimum to mitigate some of these threats.
 
 ### Wayland
 
-We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor, [X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System), does not support GUI isolation, allowing all windows to [record screen, log and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences and are not convenient to set up and are not preferable over Wayland.
+We recommend using a desktop environment that supports the [Wayland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayland_(display_server_protocol)) display protocol, as it was developed with security [in mind](https://lwn.net/Articles/589147/). Its predecessor ([X11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Window_System)) does not support GUI isolation, which allows any window to [record, log, and inject inputs in other windows](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/04/23/linux-security-circus-on-gui-isolation.html), making any attempt at sandboxing futile. While there are options to do nested X11 such as [Xpra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xpra) or [Xephyr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xephyr), they often come with negative performance consequences, and are neither convenient to set up nor preferable over Wayland.
 
 Fortunately, common environments such as [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org), [KDE](https://kde.org), and the window manager [Sway](https://swaywm.org) have support for Wayland. Some distributions like Fedora and Tumbleweed use it by default, and some others may do so in the future as X11 is in [hard maintenance mode](https://www.phoronix.com/news/X.Org-Maintenance-Mode-Quickly). If you’re using one of those environments it is as easy as selecting the “Wayland” session at the desktop display manager ([GDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNOME_Display_Manager), [SDDM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Desktop_Display_Manager)).
 
@@ -99,15 +113,15 @@ We recommend **against** using desktop environments or window managers that do n
 
 ### Proprietary Firmware (Microcode Updates)
 
-Linux distributions such as those which are [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre) or DIY (Arch Linux) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates that often patch vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html).
+Some Linux distributions (such as [Linux-libre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux-libre)-based or DIY distros) don’t come with the proprietary [microcode](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcode) updates which patch critical security vulnerabilities. Some notable examples of these vulnerabilities include [Spectre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)), [Meltdown](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)), [SSB](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speculative_Store_Bypass), [Foreshadow](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreshadow), [MDS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microarchitectural_Data_Sampling), [SWAPGS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWAPGS_(security_vulnerability)), and other [hardware vulnerabilities](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.html).
 
-We **highly recommend** that you install the microcode updates, as your CPU is already running the proprietary microcode from the factory. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default.
+We **highly recommend** that you install microcode updates, as they contain important security patches for the CPU which can not be fully mitigated in software alone. Fedora and openSUSE both have the microcode updates applied by default.
 
 ### Updates
 
 Most Linux distributions will automatically install updates or remind you to do so. It is important to keep your OS up to date so that your software is patched when a vulnerability is found.
 
-Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more barebones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates.
+Some distributions (particularly those aimed at advanced users) are more bare bones and expect you to do things yourself (e.g. Arch or Debian). These will require running the "package manager" (`apt`, `pacman`, `dnf`, etc.) manually in order to receive important security updates.
 
 Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automatically. For that you will need to install [`fwupd`](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Fwupd).
 
@@ -115,7 +129,7 @@ Additionally, some distributions will not download firmware updates automaticall
 
 ### MAC Address Randomization
 
-Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) will come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager), to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings.
+Many desktop Linux distributions (Fedora, openSUSE, etc.) come with [NetworkManager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NetworkManager) to configure Ethernet and Wi-Fi settings.
 
 It is possible to [randomize](https://fedoramagazine.org/randomize-mac-address-nm/) the [MAC address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address) when using NetworkManager. This provides a bit more privacy on Wi-Fi networks as it makes it harder to track specific devices on the network you’re connected to. It does [**not**](https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2016.pdf) make you anonymous.
 
@@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ We recommend changing the setting to **random** instead of **stable**, as sugges
 
 If you are using [systemd-networkd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systemd#Ancillary_components), you will need to set [`MACAddressPolicy=random`](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.link.html#MACAddressPolicy=) which will enable [RFC 7844 (Anonymity Profiles for DHCP Clients)](https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.network.html#Anonymize=).
 
-There isn’t many points in randomizing the MAC address for Ethernet connections as a system administrator can find you by looking at the port you are using on the [network switch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware.
+MAC address randomization is primarily beneficial for Wi-Fi connections. For Ethernet connections, randomizing your MAC address provides little (if any) benefit, because a network administrator can trivially identify your device by other means (such as inspecting the port you are connected to on the network switch). Randomizing Wi-Fi MAC addresses depends on support from the Wi-Fi’s firmware.
 
 ### Other Identifiers
 

i18n/ko/os/qubes-overview.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: simple/qubesos
 description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within virtual machines for heightened security.
 ---
 
-[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/).
+[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated virtual machines. Each VM is called a *Qube* and you can assign each Qube a level of trust based on its purpose. As Qubes OS provides security by using isolation, and only permitting actions on a per-case basis, it is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/).
 
 ## How does Qubes OS work?
 

i18n/ko/tools.md

@@ -442,14 +442,15 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
 
 <div class="grid cards" markdown>
 
-- ![Qubes OS 로고](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ .twemoji } [Qubes OS (Xen VM 배포판)](desktop.md#qubes-os)
-- ![Fedora 로고](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-workstation.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Workstation](desktop.md#fedora-workstation)
-- ![openSUSE Tumbleweed 로고](assets/img/linux-desktop/opensuse-tumbleweed.svg){ .twemoji } [OpenSUSE Tumbleweed](desktop.md#opensuse-tumbleweed)
-- ![Arch 로고](assets/img/linux-desktop/archlinux.svg){ .twemoji } [Arch Linux](desktop.md#arch-linux)
-- ![Fedora Silverblue 로고](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-silverblue.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Silverblue & Kinoite](desktop.md#fedora-silverblue)
-- ![nixOS 로고](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos)
-- ![Whonix 로고](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix)
-- ![Tails 로고](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails)
+- ![Qubes OS logo](assets/img/qubes/qubes_os.svg){ .twemoji } [Qubes OS (Xen VM Distribution)](desktop.md#qubes-os)
+- ![Fedora logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-workstation.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Workstation](desktop.md#fedora-workstation)
+- ![openSUSE Tumbleweed logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/opensuse-tumbleweed.svg){ .twemoji } [OpenSUSE Tumbleweed](desktop.md#opensuse-tumbleweed)
+- ![Arch logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/archlinux.svg){ .twemoji } [Arch Linux](desktop.md#arch-linux)
+- ![Fedora Silverblue logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/fedora-silverblue.svg){ .twemoji } [Fedora Silverblue & Kinoite](desktop.md#fedora-silverblue)
+- ![nixOS logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/nixos.svg){ .twemoji } [NixOS](desktop.md#nixos)
+- ![Whonix logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/whonix.svg){ .twemoji } [Whonix (Tor)](desktop.md#whonix)
+- ![Tails logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/tails.svg){ .twemoji } [Tails (Live Boot)](desktop.md#tails)
+- ![Kicksecure logo](assets/img/linux-desktop/kicksecure.svg){ .twemoji } [Kicksecure](desktop.md#kicksecure)
 
 </div>