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New Crowdin translations by GitHub Action

This commit is contained in:
Crowdin Bot
2024-06-26 03:33:56 +00:00
parent 48a2042c5e
commit b674026f5e
87 changed files with 290 additions and 319 deletions

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@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and S
### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
- Source code must be publicly available.
- Must not require internet connectivity.
- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
- **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## Additional Resources

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and S
### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
- Source code must be publicly available.
- Must not require internet connectivity.
- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
- **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## Additional Resources

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and S
### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
- Source code must be publicly available.
- Must not require internet connectivity.
- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
- **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## Additional Resources

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and S
### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
- Source code must be publicly available.
- Must not require internet connectivity.
- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
- **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## Additional Resources

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and S
### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
- Source code must be publicly available.
- Must not require internet connectivity.
- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
- **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## Additional Resources

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and S
### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
- Source code must be publicly available.
- Must not require internet connectivity.
- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
- **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## Additional Resources

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and S
### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
- Source code must be publicly available.
- Must not require internet connectivity.
- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
- **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## Additional Resources

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Los proveedores de correo electrónico que permiten utilizar protocolos de acces
### ¿Cómo puedo proteger mis claves privadas?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. El mensaje es entonces descifrado por la tarjeta inteligente y el contenido descifrado es enviado de vuelta al dispositivo.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. El mensaje es entonces descifrado por la tarjeta inteligente y el contenido descifrado es enviado de vuelta al dispositivo.
Es ventajoso para el descifrado que suceda en la tarjeta inteligente para evitar la posible exposición de tu clave privada en un dispositivo comprometido.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ Recomendamos encarecidamente que utilice aplicaciones TOTP para móviles en luga
- El código fuente debe estar a disposición del público.
- No debe requerir conexión a Internet.
- No debe sincronizarse con un servicio de sincronización/copia de seguridad en la nube de terceros.
- Es aceptable el soporte de sincronización E2EE** Opcional** con herramientas nativas del sistema operativo, por ejemplo, sincronización cifrada a través de iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ El [framework qrexec](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) es una parte central de Q
Nosotros [recomendamos](../advanced/tor-overview.md) conectarse a la red Tor a través de un proveedor de [VPN](../vpn.md), y, por suerte, Qubes hace que esto sea fácil de hacer con una combinación de ProxyVMs y Whonix.
Después de [crear una nueva ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) que se conecte a la VPN de tu elección, puedes encadenar tus qubes Whonix a ese ProxyVM **antes de** que se conecten a la red Tor, configurando la NetVM de tu Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) a la ProxyVM recién creada.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Tus qubes deberían estar configurados de forma similar a esta:
| Nombre Qube | Descripción Qube | NetVM |
| --------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Tu qube de red por defecto (preinstalado)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Tu qube de red por defecto (preinstalado)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | La VPN ProxyVM que has [creado](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Tu MV Whonix Gateway | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Tu MV Whonix Workstation | sys-whonix |
| Nombre Qube | Descripción Qube | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Tu qube de red por defecto (preinstalado)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Tu qube de red por defecto (preinstalado)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Tu MV Whonix Gateway | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Tu MV Whonix Workstation | sys-whonix |
## Recursos Adicionales

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and S
### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
- Source code must be publicly available.
- Must not require internet connectivity.
- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
- **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## Additional Resources

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Les fournisseurs d'e-mail qui vous permettent d'utiliser les protocoles d'accès
### Comment puis-je protéger mes clés privées ?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. Le message est ensuite déchiffré par la carte à puce et le contenu déchiffré est renvoyé à l'appareil.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. Le message est ensuite déchiffré par la carte à puce et le contenu déchiffré est renvoyé à l'appareil.
Il est préférable que le déchiffrement ait lieu sur la carte à puce afin d'éviter d'exposer votre clé privée à un dispositif compromis.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ Nous vous recommandons vivement d'utiliser des applications TOTP mobiles plutôt
- Le code source doit être accessible au public.
- Ne doit pas nécessiter de connexion à internet.
- Ne doit pas se synchroniser avec un service tiers de synchronisation/sauvegarde cloud.
- La prise en charge **facultative** de la synchronisation E2EE avec des outils natifs du système d'exploitation est acceptable, par exemple la synchronisation chiffrée via iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ Le [framework qrexec](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) est une partie essentiell
Nous [recommandons](../advanced/tor-overview.md) de se connecter au réseau Tor via un fournisseur [VPN](../vpn.md), et heureusement Qubes rend cela très simple à faire avec une combinaison de ProxyVMs et Whonix.
Après [avoir créé un nouveau ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) qui se connecte au VPN de votre choix, vous pouvez enchaîner vos qubes Whonix à ce ProxyVM **avant** qu'ils se connectent au réseau Tor, en paramétrant le NetVM de votre **passerelle** Whonix (`sys-whonix`) au ProxyVM nouvellement créé.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Vos qubes devraient être configurés de la manière suivante :
| Nom du cube | Description du Qube | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Votre qube réseau par défaut (pré-installé)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Votre qube pare-feu par défaut (pré-installé)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | Le ProxyVM VPN que vous [avez créé](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Votre VM passerelle Whonix | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Votre VM station de travail Whonix | sys-whonix |
| Nom du cube | Description du Qube | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Votre qube réseau par défaut (pré-installé)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Votre qube pare-feu par défaut (pré-installé)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Votre VM passerelle Whonix | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Votre VM station de travail Whonix | sys-whonix |
## Ressources supplémentaires

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ If you use a shared domain from a provider which doesn't support WKD, like @gmai
### כיצד אוכל להגן על המפתחות הפרטיים שלי?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. לאחר מכן, ההודעה מפוענחת על ידי הכרטיס החכם והתוכן המפוענח נשלח חזרה למכשיר.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. לאחר מכן, ההודעה מפוענחת על ידי הכרטיס החכם והתוכן המפוענח נשלח חזרה למכשיר.
זה יתרון שהפענוח יתרחש בכרטיס החכם כדי למנוע חשיפת המפתח הפרטי שלך למכשיר שנפגע.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ cover: multi-factor-authentication.webp
- קוד המקור חייב להיות זמין לציבור.
- אסור לדרוש חיבור לאינטרנט.
- אסור לסנכרן לשירות סנכרון/גיבוי בענן של צד שלישי.
- **אופציונלי** תמיכה בסנכרון E2EE עם כלים מקוריים של מערכת ההפעלה מקובלת, למשל. סנכרון מוצפן באמצעות iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## מקורות נוספים

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and S
### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
- Source code must be publicly available.
- Must not require internet connectivity.
- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
- **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## Additional Resources

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and S
### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
- A forráskódnak nyilvánosan elérhetőnek kell lennie.
- Must not require internet connectivity.
- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
- **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## Android

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Penyedia email yang memungkinkan Anda menggunakan protokol akses standar seperti
### Bagaimana Cara Melindungi Kunci Pribadi Saya?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. Pesan tersebut kemudian didekripsi oleh smartcard dan konten yang telah didekripsi dikirim kembali ke perangkat.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. Pesan tersebut kemudian didekripsi oleh smartcard dan konten yang telah didekripsi dikirim kembali ke perangkat.
Terjadinya proses dekripsi di kartu pintar begitu menguntungkan karena hal tersebut berfungsi untuk menghindari kemungkinan mengekspos kunci pribadi Anda ke perangkat yang telah tersusupi.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
- Source code must be publicly available.
- Must not require internet connectivity.
- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
- **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## Sumber Daya Tambahan

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ I fornitori email che ti consentono di utilizzare i protocolli d'accesso standar
### Come proteggo le mie chiavi private?
Una smartcard (come una [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) o [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) funziona ricevendo un messaggio email crittografato da un dispositivo (telefono, tablet, computer, ecc.) con un client email/webmail. Il messaggio, quindi, viene decrittografato dalla smartcart e il contenuto decrittografato è reinviato al dispositivo.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. Il messaggio, quindi, viene decrittografato dalla smartcart e il contenuto decrittografato è reinviato al dispositivo.
È preferibile che la decodifica avvenga sulla smartcard per evitare di esporre la tua chiave privata a un dispositivo compromesso.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ Consigliamo vivamente l'utilizzo delle app TOTP mobili, invece delle alternative
- Il codice sorgente dev'essere disponibile pubblicamente.
- Non deve richiedere la connessione a Internet.
- Non deve sincronizzarsi a un servizio su cloud di sincronizzazione/backup di terze parti.
- **Facoltativo**: Il supporto alla sincronizzazione E2EE con strumenti nativi dell'OS è accettabile, es. sincronizzazione crittografata tramite iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
[Consigliamo](../advanced/tor-overview.md) di connettersi alla rete di Tor tramite un fornitore di [VPN](../vpn.md) e, fortunatamente, Qubes semplifica ciò combinando ProxyVM e Whonix.
Dopo [aver creato un nuovo ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) che si connetta alla VPN di tua scelta, puoi collegare i tuoi Qube di Whonix a tale ProxyVM **prima** che che si connettano alla rete di Tor, impostando la NetVM del tuo **Gateway** di Whonix (`sys-whonix`) al ProxyVM appena creato.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
I tuoi qube dovrebbero esser configurati similmente a come segue:
| Nome del Qube | Descrizione del Qube | NetVM |
| --------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Il tuo qube di rete predefinito (preinstallato)* | *n/d* |
| sys-firewall | *Il qube del tuo firewall predefinito (preinstallato)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | Il ProxyVM della VPN che hai [creato](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | La tua VM del Gateway di Whonix | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | La tua VM della Workstation di Whonix | sys-whonix |
| Nome del Qube | Descrizione del Qube | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Il tuo qube di rete predefinito (preinstallato)* | *n/d* |
| sys-firewall | *Il qube del tuo firewall predefinito (preinstallato)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | La tua VM del Gateway di Whonix | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | La tua VM della Workstation di Whonix | sys-whonix |
## Risorse aggiuntive

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and S
### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
- Source code must be publicly available.
- Must not require internet connectivity.
- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
- **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| キューブ名 | キューブの説明 | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *デフォルトのネットワークキューブ(プリインストール済み)* | *なし* |
| sys-firewall | *デフォルトのファイアウォールキューブ(プリインストール済み)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | WhonixゲートウェイのVM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | WhonixワークステーションのVM | sys-whonix |
| キューブ名 | キューブの説明 | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *デフォルトのネットワークキューブ(プリインストール済み)* | *なし* |
| sys-firewall | *デフォルトのファイアウォールキューブ(プリインストール済み)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | WhonixゲートウェイのVM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | WhonixワークステーションのVM | sys-whonix |
## その他の資料

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ IMAP, SMTP 등 표준 접속 프로토콜을 사용할 수 있는 이메일 제
### 개인 키를 어떻게 보호해야 하나요?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. 암호화된 메일 내용은 스마트카드에서 복호화되며, 복호화된 내용이 스마트카드로부터 기기로 전달됩니다.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. 암호화된 메일 내용은 스마트카드에서 복호화되며, 복호화된 내용이 스마트카드로부터 기기로 전달됩니다.
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
- 소스 코드는 공개적으로 이용 가능해야 합니다.
- 인터넷 연결 없이도 작동해야 합니다.
- 제3자 클라우드 동기화/백업 서비스와 동기화하는 식으로 작동해서는 안 됩니다.
- **선택적인** (운영 체제 네이티브 툴을 이용한) E2EE 동기화 지원은 허용됩니다. 예시: 'iCloud를 통한 암호화 동기화'
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## Additional Resources

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and S
### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
- Source code must be publicly available.
- Must not require internet connectivity.
- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
- **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## Additional Resources

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ E-mailproviders die je in staat stellen standaard toegangsprotocollen zoals IMAP
### Hoe bescherm ik mijn private sleutels?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. Het bericht wordt vervolgens door de smartcard ontsleuteld en de ontsleutelde inhoud wordt teruggestuurd naar het apparaat.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. Het bericht wordt vervolgens door de smartcard ontsleuteld en de ontsleutelde inhoud wordt teruggestuurd naar het apparaat.
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ Wij raden je ten zeerste aan om mobiele TOTP apps te gebruiken in plaats van des
- Broncode moet openbaar beschikbaar zijn.
- Moet geen internetverbinding vereisen.
- Mag niet synchroniseren met een cloud sync/backup service van derden.
- **Optioneel is** E2EE sync-ondersteuning met OS-native tools aanvaardbaar, bv. versleutelde sync via iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## Extra bronnen

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and S
### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
- Source code must be publicly available.
- Must not require internet connectivity.
- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
- **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## Android

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and S
### Como Protejo Minhas Chaves Privadas?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
- O código-fonte deve estar publicamente disponível.
- Must not require internet connectivity.
- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
- **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ A [estrutura qrexec](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) é uma parte essencial do
Recomendamos [que](../advanced/tor-overview.md) você se conecte à rede Tor por meio de um provedor de [VPN](../vpn.md) e, felizmente, o Qubes facilita isso com uma combinação de ProxyVMs e Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## Recursos Adicionais

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and S
### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ Recomendamos vivamente que utilize aplicações TOTP para dispositivos móveis,
- O código-fonte deve estar disponível ao público.
- Não devem exigir ligação à Internet.
- Não podem utilizar um serviço de sincronização/backup numa nuvem de terceiros.
- O suporte de sincronização E2EE **opcional**, com ferramentas nativas do SO, é aceitável (por exemplo, sincronização encriptada via iCloud).
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## Recursos Adicionais

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ description: Электронная почта по своей природе н
### Как я могу защитить свои приватные ключи?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. Затем сообщение расшифровывается смарт-картой, и расшифрованное содержимое отправляется обратно на устройство.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. Затем сообщение расшифровывается смарт-картой, и расшифрованное содержимое отправляется обратно на устройство.
Расшифровку лучше производить на смарт-карте, чтобы избежать возможное раскрытие приватного ключа на скомпрометированном устройстве.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ cover: multi-factor-authentication.webp
- Исходный код должен быть общедоступным.
- Не должно требовать интернет соединения.
- Не должен синхронизировать данные со сторонним облачным сервисом синхронизации/резервного копирования.
- **Опционально** допустима поддержка E2EE синхронизации с помощью нативных служб ОС. Например, зашифрованная синхронизация через iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## Дополнительные советы

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ E-postleverantörer som tillåter dig att använda standardprotokoll som IMAP oc
### Hur skyddar jag mina privata nycklar?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. Meddelandet dekrypteras sedan av smartkortet och det dekrypterade innehållet skickas tillbaka till enheten.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. Meddelandet dekrypteras sedan av smartkortet och det dekrypterade innehållet skickas tillbaka till enheten.
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ Vi rekommenderar starkt att du använder mobila TOTP-appar i stället för alter
- Source code must be publicly available.
- Får inte kräva internetuppkoppling.
- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
- **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## Ytterligare resurser

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and S
### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
- Source code must be publicly available.
- Must not require internet connectivity.
- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
- **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## Additional Resources

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ description: Електронна пошта за своєю природою є
### Як захистити свої приватні ключі?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. Потім повідомлення розшифровується смарткартою, і розшифрований вміст надсилається назад на пристрій.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. Потім повідомлення розшифровується смарткартою, і розшифрований вміст надсилається назад на пристрій.
Для уникнення можливого потрапляння вашого приватного ключа на скомпрометований пристрій бажано, щоб розшифрування відбувалося на смарткарті.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
- Source code must be publicly available.
- Must not require internet connectivity.
- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
- **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## Additional Resources

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Email providers which allow you to use standard access protocols like IMAP and S
### How Do I Protect My Private Keys?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. The message is then decrypted by the smartcard and the decrypted content is sent back to the device.
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.

View File

@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
- Source code must be publicly available.
- Must not require internet connectivity.
- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
- **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

View File

@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## Additional Resources

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ description: 從許多方面來看電子郵件本質上是不安全的,這也
### 我要怎樣保護自己的私密鑰匙?
智慧鑰卡(例如 [Yubikey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey))的工作原理是從用戶端的設備(手機,平板電腦,電腦等)接收加密的電子郵件消息。 安全鑰卡會解密該訊息再把解開的內容傳到設備。
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. 安全鑰卡會解密該訊息再把解開的內容傳到設備。
在智慧卡上進行解密的優點是可避免將私鑰暴露在某個遭破壞的裝置。

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@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ cover: multi-factor-authentication.webp
- 源代碼必須公開。
- 無需網際網路連線。
- 不得同步至第三方雲端同步/備份服務。
- **可選** 支援與作業系統原生工具的 E2EE 同步是可以的,例如透過 iCloud 進行加密同步。
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

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@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ Qubes OS在主機作業系統上 利用 [dom0](https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/
[建議](../advanced/tor-overview.md) 使用 [VPN](../vpn.md) 來連接 Tor 網絡Qubes 可以很輕鬆地結合 ProxyVMs 與 Whonix 來操作。
[建立新的 ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) 後再連接到所選的 VPN可**先將** Whonix qubes 串接至 ProxyVM 再連上 Tor 網絡其用法是設置Whonix 所建立的 NetVM **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`)
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Qubes 設置大概像這樣:
| Qube 名稱 | Qube 簡述 | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *預設的網路 qube (已預先安裝)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *預設的防火牆 qube (已預先安裝)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | [建立的 VPN ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube 名稱 | Qube 簡述 | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *預設的網路 qube (已預先安裝)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *預設的防火牆 qube (已預先安裝)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## 其他資源

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@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ description: 电子邮件在许多方面本身就不安全,以下是它不是
### 我如何保护我的私钥?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. 然后,该信息被智能卡解密,解密后的内容被送回设备。
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. 然后,该信息被智能卡解密,解密后的内容被送回设备。
在智能卡上进行解密是很有利的,这样可以避免将你的私钥暴露给某个被攻破的设备。

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@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
- Source code must be publicly available.
- Must not require internet connectivity.
- Must not sync to a third-party cloud sync/backup service.
- **Optional** E2EE sync support with OS-native tools is acceptable, e.g. encrypted sync via iCloud.
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

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@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## 其它资源