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New Crowdin translations by GitHub Action

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2
i18n/ko/basics/email-security.md
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@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ IMAP, SMTP 등 표준 접속 프로토콜을 사용할 수 있는 이메일 제
### 개인 키를 어떻게 보호해야 하나요?
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../multi-factor-authentication.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. 암호화된 메일 내용은 스마트카드에서 복호화되며, 복호화된 내용이 스마트카드로부터 기기로 전달됩니다.
A smartcard (such as a [YubiKey](https://support.yubico.com/hc/articles/360013790259-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-OpenPGP) or [Nitrokey](../security-keys.md#nitrokey)) works by receiving an encrypted email message from a device (phone, tablet, computer, etc.) running an email/webmail client. 암호화된 메일 내용은 스마트카드에서 복호화되며, 복호화된 내용이 스마트카드로부터 기기로 전달됩니다.
It is advantageous for the decryption to occur on the smartcard to avoid possibly exposing your private key to a compromised device.

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i18n/ko/multi-factor-authentication.md
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@@ -72,5 +72,4 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
- 소스 코드는 공개적으로 이용 가능해야 합니다.
- 인터넷 연결 없이도 작동해야 합니다.
- 제3자 클라우드 동기화/백업 서비스와 동기화하는 식으로 작동해서는 안 됩니다.
- **선택적인** (운영 체제 네이티브 툴을 이용한) E2EE 동기화 지원은 허용됩니다. 예시: 'iCloud를 통한 암호화 동기화'
- Cloud syncing must be optional, and (if available) sync functionality must be E2EE.

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i18n/ko/os/qubes-overview.md
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@@ -59,17 +59,17 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec) is a core part of Qubes
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
After [creating a new ProxyVM](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) which connects to the VPN of your choice, you can chain your Whonix qubes to that ProxyVM **before** they connect to the Tor network, by setting the NetVM of your Whonix **Gateway** (`sys-whonix`) to the newly-created ProxyVM.
Your qubes should be configured in a manner similar to this:
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/configuration/vpn.md) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
| Qube name | Qube description | NetVM |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- |
| sys-net | *Your default network qube (pre-installed)* | *n/a* |
| sys-firewall | *Your default firewall qube (pre-installed)* | sys-net |
| ==sys-proxyvm== | The VPN ProxyVM you [created](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) | sys-firewall |
| sys-whonix | Your Whonix Gateway VM | ==sys-proxyvm== |
| anon-whonix | Your Whonix Workstation VM | sys-whonix |
## Additional Resources