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@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ Tails Tor 瀏覽器預設包含 [uBlock Origin](desktop-browsers.md#ublock-origi
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{ align=right }
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**Qubes OS** is an open-source operating system designed to provide strong security for desktop computing through secure virtual machines (or "qubes"). Qubes is based on Xen, the X Window System, and Linux. It can run most Linux applications and use most of the Linux drivers.
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**Qubes OS** 是開源作業系統，利用安全的虛擬器為桌面運算提供更強的安全性 (或稱"qubes"). Qubes 基於 Xen, X Window 系統與 Linux。 大多數 Linux 應用它都可以執行且適用 Linux 驅動。
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[:octicons-home-16: Homepage](https://www.qubes-os.org/){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
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[:simple-torbrowser:](http://qubesosfasa4zl44o4tws22di6kepyzfeqv3tg4e3ztknltfxqrymdad.onion){ .card-link title="Onion Service" }
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@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ Tails Tor 瀏覽器預設包含 [uBlock Origin](desktop-browsers.md#ublock-origi
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[:octicons-heart-16:](https://www.qubes-os.org/donate/){ .card-link title=Contribute }
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Qubes OS secures the computer by isolating subsystems (e.g., networking, USB, etc.) and applications in separate *qubes*. Should one part of the system be compromised, the extra isolation is likely to protect the rest of the *qubes* and the core system.
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Qubes OS 作業系統將子系統（例如網絡、USB等）和應用程式隔離在個別的 *qubes*以保護電腦。 如果系統的一部分被破壞，其餘的 *qubes*與核心系統仍受到保護。
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有關 Oubes 運作的進一步資訊，請參考我們完整的 [Qubes OS 介紹](os/qubes-overview.md) 頁面。
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@ -61,29 +61,29 @@ A paid **iCloud+** subscription (with any iCloud storage plan) comes with some p
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Your location data is not E2EE when your device is online and you use Find My iPhone remotely to locate your device. You will have to make the decision whether these trade-offs are worth the anti-theft benefits of Activation Lock.
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在「 **設定** 」應用程式的頂部，如果您已登入 Apple ID，便會看到您的姓名和個人資料相片。 Select that, then select **Find My**. Here you can choose whether to enable or disable Find My location features.
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在「 **設定** 」應用程式的頂部，如果您已登入 Apple ID，便會看到您的姓名和個人資料相片。 Select that, then select **Find My**. 此處您可以選擇是否啟用或禁用“查找設備”功能。
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### 設定
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Many other privacy-related settings can be found in the **Settings** app.
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許多其他與隱私相關的設置可以在**設置**應用中找到。
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#### 飛航模式
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Enabling **Airplane Mode** stops your phone from contacting cell towers. You will still be able to connect to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, so whenever you are connected to Wi-Fi you can turn this setting on.
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啟用 **飛航模式** 會阻止您的手機與手機基地塔連線。 您仍然可以連接到 Wi-Fi 和藍牙，因此每當您連接到 Wi-Fi 時，您都可以開啟此設置。
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#### Wi-Fi
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You can enable hardware address randomization to protect you from tracking across Wi-Fi networks. On the network you are currently connected to, press the :material-information: button:
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您可以啟用硬體位址隨機化功能，以保護您免受跨 Wi-Fi 網路的追蹤。 在您目前連線的網路上，按下 :material-information: 按鈕：
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- [x] Turn on **Private Wi-Fi Address**
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- [x] 打開 **私人 Wi-Fi 地址**
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You also have the option to **Limit IP Address Tracking**. This is similar to iCloud Private Relay but only affects connections to "known trackers." Because it only affects connections to potentially malicious servers, this setting is probably fine to leave enabled, but if you don't want *any* traffic to be routed through Apple's servers, you should turn it off.
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您也可以選擇 **限制 IP 位址追蹤**。 這與 iCloud Private Relay 類似，但僅影響與“已知跟踪器”的連接。 因為它只影響與潛在惡意伺服器的連接，所以啟用此設置應該沒問題，但如果不希望*任何*流量通過 Apple 的伺服器路由，則可把它關掉。
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#### 藍牙
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**Bluetooth** should be disabled when you aren't using it as it increases your attack surface. Disabling Bluetooth (or Wi-Fi) via the Control Center only disables it temporarily: you must switch it off in Settings for disabling it to remain effective.
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**當您不使用藍牙時，應停用藍牙** ，因為它會增加您被攻擊的機會。 透過控制中心停用藍牙（或 Wi-Fi ）只會暫時停用：您必須在「設定」中關閉藍牙才能保持有效。
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- [ ] Turn off **Bluetooth**
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- [] 關閉 **藍牙**
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#### 一般設定
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@ -1,53 +1,53 @@
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---
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title: "Qubes概述"
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icon: simple/qubesos
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description: Qubes is an operating system built around isolating apps within *qubes* (formerly "VMs") for heightened security.
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description: Qubes 作業系統利用*qubes* (過去稱"虛擬機器") 來隔離應用程式以提高安全性。
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---
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[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) is an open-source operating system which uses the [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) hypervisor to provide strong security for desktop computing through isolated *qubes*, (which are Virtual Machines). You can assign each *qube* a level of trust based on its purpose. Qubes OS provides security by using isolation. It only permits actions on a per-case basis and therefore is the opposite of [badness enumeration](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/).
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[**Qubes OS**](../desktop.md#qubes-os) 為開源作業系統，其使用 [Xen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen) 管理程序利用 隔離*qubes*(虛擬器)來為桌面運算提供強固的安全。 您可為每一個 *qube* 依其目的指定不同的信賴層級。 Qubes OS 利用隔離作法來提高安全性。 它只允許根據具體情況進行操作，因此與[不良枚舉](https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/)相反。
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## Qubes OS如何工作？
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Qubes 使用 [分區化](https://www.qubes-os.org/intro/) 來確保系統安全。 Qubes 從模板創建，預設為 Fedora、Debian 和 [Whonix](../desktop.md#whonix)。 Qubes OS also allows you to create once-use [disposable](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-use-disposables/) *qubes*.
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Qubes 使用 [分區化](https://www.qubes-os.org/intro/) 來確保系統安全。 Qubes 從模板創建，預設為 Fedora、Debian 和 [Whonix](../desktop.md#whonix)。 Qubes OS還允許您創建一次性 [一次性](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-use-disposables/) *qubes*。
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??? "The term *qubes* is gradually being updated to avoid referring to them as "virtual machines"."
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??? 更新改用“*qubes*一辭，避免將它們稱為“虛擬器”。
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Some of the information here and on the Qubes OS documentation may contain conflicting language as the "appVM" term is gradually being changed to "qube". Qubes are not entire virtual machines, but maintain similar functionalities to VMs.
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由於“appVM”一辭更改為“qube”，此處和 Qubes OS 文檔中的一些資訊可能在語言上產生衝突。 Qube 不是完整的虛擬器，但有與 VM 類似的功能。
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<figcaption>Qubes Architecture, Credit: What is Qubes OS Intro</figcaption>
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Each qube has a [colored border](https://www.qubes-os.org/screenshots/) that can help you keep track of the domain in which it runs. 例如，可以為銀行瀏覽器使用特定的顏色，而一般不信任的瀏覽器則使用不同顏色。
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每個 qubes 都有 [顏色邊框](https://www.qubes-os.org/screenshots/) ，幫助您追蹤它運行的地方。 例如，可以為銀行瀏覽器使用特定的顏色，而一般不信任的瀏覽器則使用不同顏色。
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<figcaption>Qubes 視窗邊框，圖片來源： Qubes Screenshots</figcaption>
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## 我爲什麼要使用Qubes ？
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Qubes OS is useful if your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md) requires strong security and isolation, such as if you think you'll be opening untrusted files from untrusted sources. A typical reason for using Qubes OS is to open documents from unknown sources, but the idea is that if a single qube is compromised it won't affect the rest of the system.
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如果您的 [威脅模型](../basics/threat-modeling.md) 需要強大的安全與隔離，例如認為需要從不信任的來源開啟可疑檔案， Qubes OS 非常有用。 使用 Qubes 作業系統的典型原因是打開不明來源的文檔，其考量是如果單個 qube 受到損害，也不會影響系統的其餘部分。
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Qubes OS utilizes [dom0](https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Dom0) Xen VM for controlling other *qubes* on the host OS, all of which display individual application windows within dom0's desktop environment. There are many uses for this type of architecture. Here are some tasks you can perform. You can see just how much more secure these processes are made by incorporating multiple steps.
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Qubes OS在主機作業系統上 利用 [dom0](https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Dom0) Xen VM 來控制其他 *qubes* ，這些都在 dom0 的桌面環境中顯示個別的應用程式視窗。 這種類型的架構有很多用途。 以下是您可以執行的一些任務。 您可以看到通過合併多個步驟可以使過程更加安全。
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### 復制和黏貼文本
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可利用 `qvm-copy-to-vm` 或以下說明 [複製並貼上文本](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-and-paste-text/) ：
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1. Press **Ctrl+C** to tell the *qube* you're in that you want to copy something.
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2. Press **Ctrl+Shift+C** to tell the *qube* to make this buffer available to the global clipboard.
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3. Press **Ctrl+Shift+V** in the destination *qube* to make the global clipboard available.
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4. Press **Ctrl+V** in the destination *qube* to paste the contents in the buffer.
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1. 按 **Ctrl + C** 讓所在的 *qube* 複製某些內容。
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2. 按 **Ctrl + Shift + C** 讓 *qube* 將此緩衝區供全局剪貼板使用。
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3. 在指定*qube* 下按 **Ctrl + Shift + V** 以使全局剪貼簿可用。
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4. 在目標*qube* 中按 **Ctrl + V** 將內容粘貼到緩衝區中。
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### 檔案交換
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To copy and paste files and directories (folders) from one *qube* to another, you can use the option **Copy to Other AppVM...** or **Move to Other AppVM...**. 不同之處在於 **Move** 選項會刪除原始檔案。 Either option will protect your clipboard from being leaked to any other *qubes*. This is more secure than air-gapped file transfer. An air-gapped computer will still be forced to parse partitions or file systems. 這在inter-qube複製系統中是不需要的。
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若要將檔案和目錄(資料夾) 從一個*qube* 複製貼到另一個 ，您可以使用選項 **Copy to Other AppVM...** 或 **Move to Other AppVM...**。 不同之處在於 **Move** 選項會刪除原始檔案。 這兩個選項都可以保護您的剪貼簿不會洩漏到任何其他*qube* 。 這比氣隙檔案傳輸更安全。 氣隙電腦仍會被迫解析分區或檔案系統。 這在inter-qube複製系統中是不需要的。
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??? "Qubes do not have their own filesystems."
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??? *Qube* 沒有自己的檔案系統。
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You can [copy and move files](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-and-move-files/) between *qubes*. 當這樣做時，不會立即進行更改，並且在發生事故時可以輕鬆撤消。 When you run a *qube*, it does not have a persistent filesystem. You can create and delete files, but these changes are ephemeral.
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您可以在 qubes之間[複製和移動檔案](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-and-move-files/)。 當這樣做時，不會立即進行更改，並且在發生事故時可以輕鬆撤消。 當您運行 *qube* 時，它沒有持久檔案系統。 您可以創建和刪除檔案，但這些更改是暫時的。
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### 虛擬機之間交互
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The [qrexec framework](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec/) is a core part of Qubes which allows communication between domains. 它基於 Xen 庫 *vchan*之上，通過策略</a>促進
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[qrexec 框架](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec/) 是 Qubes 的核心構成，其可在域之間進行溝通。 它基於 Xen 庫 *vchan*之上，通過策略</a>促進
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隔離。</p>
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@ -59,4 +59,4 @@ The [qrexec framework](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec/) is a core part of Q
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- [Arguably the world's most secure operating system](https://www.opentech.fund/news/qubes-os-arguably-the-worlds-most-secure-operating-system-motherboard/) (Open Technology Fund)
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- [Software compartmentalization vs. physical separation](https://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/2014/Software_compartmentalization_vs_physical_separation.pdf) (J. Rutkowska)
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- [Partitioning my digital life into security domains](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/03/13/partitioning-my-digital-life-into.html) (J. Rutkowska)
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- [Related Articles](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/categories/#articles) (Qubes OS)
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- [相關文章](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/categories/#articles) (Qubes OS)
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