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@ -8,40 +8,40 @@ Tor è una rete decentralizzata e libera, progettata per utilizzare Internet con
|
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|
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## Connettersi in sicurezza a Tor
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|
||||
Before connecting to [Tor](../tor.md), you should carefully consider what you're looking to accomplish by using Tor in the first place, and who you're trying to hide your network activity from.
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Prima di connettersi a [Tor](../tor.md), è necessario considerare attentamente cosa si vuole ottenere utilizzando Tor e a chi si vuole nascondere la propria attività in rete.
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If you live in a free country, are accessing mundane content via Tor, aren't worried about your ISP or local network administrators having the knowledge that you're using Tor, and want to help [de-stigmatize](https://2019.www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en) Tor usage, you can likely connect to Tor directly via standard means like [Tor Browser](../tor.md) without worry.
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If you have the ability to access a trusted VPN provider and **any** of the following are true, you almost certainly should connect to Tor through a VPN:
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Se hai la possibilità di accedere a un provider VPN affidabile e **qualsiasi** dei seguenti punti è vero, quasi certamente dovresti connetterti a Tor attraverso una VPN:
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- You already use a [trusted VPN provider](../vpn.md)
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- Your threat model includes an adversary which is capable of extracting information from your ISP
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- Your threat model includes your ISP itself as an adversary
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- Your threat model includes local network administrators before your ISP as an adversary
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- Utilizzi già un [provider VPN affidabile](../vpn.md)
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- Il tuo modello di minaccia prevede un avversario in grado di estrarre informazioni dal tuo ISP
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- Il tuo modello di minaccia include il tuo stesso ISP come avversario
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- Il tuo modello di minaccia include gli amministratori della rete locale prima del tuo ISP come avversario
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Because we already [generally recommend](../basics/vpn-overview.md) that the vast majority of people use a trusted VPN provider for a variety of reasons, the following recommendation about connecting to Tor via a VPN likely applies to you. <mark>There is no need to disable your VPN before connecting to Tor</mark>, as some online resources would lead you to believe.
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Poiché abbiamo già [raccomandato in generale](../basics/vpn-overview.md) che la stragrande maggioranza delle persone utilizzi un provider VPN affidabile per una serie di motivi, la seguente raccomandazione sulla connessione a Tor tramite una VPN probabilmente si applica anche a te. <mark>Non è necessario disattivare la VPN prima di connettersi a Tor</mark>, come alcune risorse online potrebbero far credere.
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Connecting directly to Tor will make your connection stand out to any local network administrators or your ISP. Detecting and correlating this traffic [has been done](https://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/17/justice/massachusetts-harvard-hoax/) in the past by network administrators to identify and deanonymize specific Tor users on their network. On the other hand, connecting to a VPN is almost always less suspicious, because commercial VPN providers are used by everyday consumers for a variety of mundane tasks like bypassing geo-restrictions, even in countries with heavy internet restrictions.
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Collegandosi direttamente a Tor, la connessione si farà notare dagli amministratori della rete locale o dal tuo ISP. Il rilevamento e la correlazione di questo traffico [è stato fatto](https://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/17/justice/massachusetts-harvard-hoax/) in passato dagli amministratori di rete per identificare e deanonimizzare specifici utenti Tor sulla loro rete. D'altra parte, la connessione a una VPN è quasi sempre meno sospetta, perché i provider VPN commerciali sono utilizzati dai consumatori di tutti i giorni per una serie di attività banali come l'aggiramento delle geo-restrizioni, anche in Paesi con forti restrizioni su Internet.
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Therefore, you should make an effort to hide your IP address **before** connecting to the Tor network. You can do this by simply connecting to a VPN (through a client installed on your computer) and then accessing [Tor](../tor.md) as normal, through Tor Browser for example. This creates a connection chain like:
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Pertanto, si dovrebbe fare uno sforzo per nascondere il proprio indirizzo IP **prima di** connettersi alla rete Tor. È possibile farlo semplicemente collegandosi a una VPN (tramite un client installato sul computer) e poi accedere a [Tor](../tor.md) come di consueto, ad esempio tramite Tor Browser. In questo modo si crea una catena di connessioni del tipo:
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- [x] Tu → VPN → Tor → Internet
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From your ISP's perspective, it looks like you're accessing a VPN normally (with the associated cover that provides you). From your VPN's perspective, they can see that you are connecting to the Tor network, but nothing about what websites you're accessing. From Tor's perspective, you're connecting normally, but in the unlikely event of some sort of Tor network compromise, only your VPN's IP would be exposed, and your VPN would *additionally* have to be compromised to deanonymize you.
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Dal punto di vista del tuo ISP, sembra che stai accedendo normalmente a una VPN (con la relativa copertura che ti fornisce). Dal punto di vista della VPN, possono vedere che ti stai connettendo alla rete Tor, ma non possono sapere a quali siti web stai accedendo. Dal punto di vista di Tor, ti stai connettendo normalmente, ma nell'improbabile caso di una qualche compromissione della rete Tor, solo l'IP della tua VPN sarebbe esposto, e la tua VPN dovrebbe *inoltre* essere compromessa per deanonimizzarvi.
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This is **not** censorship circumvention advice, because if Tor is blocked entirely by your ISP, your VPN likely is as well. Rather, this recommendation aims to make your traffic blend in better with commonplace VPN user traffic, and provide you with some level of plausible deniability by obscuring the fact that you're connecting to Tor from your ISP.
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Questo **non è** un consiglio per aggirare la censura, perché se Tor è bloccato completamente dal tuo ISP, probabilmente lo sarà anche la tua VPN. Piuttosto, questa raccomandazione mira a far sì che il tuo traffico si confonda meglio con il traffico comune degli utenti della VPN e ti fornisca un certo livello di plausibile negabilità nascondendo il fatto che ti stai connettendo a Tor dal tuo ISP.
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|
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---
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|
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We **very strongly discourage** combining Tor with a VPN in any other manner. Do not configure your connection in a way which resembles any of the following:
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Noi **sconsigliamo vivamente** di combinare Tor con una VPN in qualsiasi altro modo. Non configurare la connessione in un modo che assomigli a uno dei seguenti:
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- Tu → Tor → VPN → Internet
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- Tu → VPN → Tor → VPN → Internet
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- Qualsiasi altra configurazione
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|
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Some VPN providers and other publications will occasionally recommend these **bad** configurations to evade Tor bans (exit nodes being blocked by websites) in some places. [Normally](https://support.torproject.org/#about_change-paths), Tor frequently changes your circuit path through the network. When you choose a permanent *destination* VPN (connecting to a VPN server *after* Tor), you're eliminating this advantage and drastically harming your anonymity.
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Alcuni provider di VPN e altre pubblicazioni raccomandano occasionalmente queste **errate** configurazioni per eludere i ban di Tor (i nodi di uscita sono bloccati dai siti web) in alcuni luoghi. [Normalmente](https://support.torproject.org/#about_change-paths), Tor cambia frequentemente il percorso del circuito attraverso la rete. Quando si sceglie una *destinazione permanente* VPN (collegandosi a un server VPN *dopo* Tor), si elimina questo vantaggio e si danneggia drasticamente l'anonimato.
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Setting up bad configurations like these is difficult to do accidentally, because it usually involves either setting up custom proxy settings inside Tor Browser, or setting up custom proxy settings inside your VPN client which routes your VPN traffic through the Tor Browser. As long as you avoid these non-default configurations, you're probably fine.
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È difficile impostare accidentalmente configurazioni errate come queste, perché di solito si tratta di configurare impostazioni proxy personalizzate all'interno di Tor Browser o di configurare impostazioni proxy personalizzate all'interno del client VPN che instrada il traffico VPN attraverso Tor Browser. Se si evitano queste configurazioni non predefinite, probabilmente dovresti essere a posto.
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|
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---
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@ -78,17 +78,17 @@ Download
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|
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## Criteri
|
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|
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**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. Ti suggeriamo di familiarizzare con questo elenco prima di scegliere di utilizzare un progetto e di condurre le tue ricerche per assicurarti che si tratti della scelta adatta a te.
|
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**Ti preghiamo di notare che non siamo affiliati con alcun progetto consigliato.** Oltre ai [nostri criteri standard](about/criteria.md), abbiamo sviluppato una serie chiara di requisiti per consentirci di fornire consigli oggettivi. Ti suggeriamo di familiarizzare con questo elenco prima di scegliere di utilizzare un progetto e di condurre le tue ricerche per assicurarti che si tratti della scelta adatta a te.
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|
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!!! example "Questa sezione è nuova"
|
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|
||||
```
|
||||
We are working on establishing defined criteria for every section of our site, and this may be subject to change. If you have any questions about our criteria, please [ask on our forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) and don't assume we didn't consider something when making our recommendations if it is not listed here. There are many factors considered and discussed when we recommend a project, and documenting every single one is a work-in-progress.
|
||||
Stiamo lavorando per stabilire dei criteri definiti per ogni sezione del nostro sito e ciò potrebbe essere soggetto a modifiche. Se hai domande sui nostri criteri, per favore [chiedi sul nostro forum](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest) e non dare per scontato che non abbiamo preso in considerazione qualcosa quando abbiamo fatto le nostre raccomandazioni se non è elencato qui. Sono molti i fattori presi in considerazione e discussi quando raccomandiamo un progetto, e documentare ogni singolo fattore è un lavoro in corso.
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Requisiti minimi
|
||||
|
||||
- Cloud-hosted providers must enforce end-to-end encryption.
|
||||
- I provider ospitati in cloud devono applicare la crittografia end-to-end.
|
||||
- Deve offrire un piano gratuito o un periodo di prova per testarlo.
|
||||
- Deve supportare l'autenticazione a più fattori TOTP o FIDO2, o gli accessi tramite Passkey.
|
||||
- Deve offrire un'interfaccia web che supporti le funzionalità di base per la gestione dei file.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "About Privacy Guides"
|
||||
title: "Privacy Guidesについて"
|
||||
description: Privacy Guides is a socially motivated website that provides information for protecting your data security and privacy.
|
||||
schema:
|
||||
"@context": https://schema.org
|
||||
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ schema:
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||||
- https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
**Privacy Guides** is a socially motivated website that provides [information](/kb) for protecting your data security and privacy. Our mission is to inform the public about the value of digital privacy, and global government initiatives which aim to monitor your online activity. We are a non-profit collective operated entirely by volunteer [team members](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/g/team) and contributors. Our website is free of advertisements and not affiliated with any of the listed providers.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
title: "Notices and Disclaimers"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Legal Disclaimer
|
||||
## 法的免責事項
|
||||
|
||||
Privacy Guides is not a law firm. As such, the Privacy Guides website and contributors are not providing legal advice. The material and recommendations in our website and guides do not constitute legal advice nor does contributing to the website or communicating with Privacy Guides or other contributors about our website create an attorney-client relationship.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ We believe that the logos and other images in `assets` obtained from third-party
|
||||
|
||||
When you contribute to our website you are doing so under the above licenses, and you are granting Privacy Guides a perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive, transferable, royalty-free, irrevocable license with the right to sublicense such rights through multiple tiers of sublicensees, to reproduce, modify, display, perform and distribute your contribution as part of our project.
|
||||
|
||||
## Acceptable Use
|
||||
## 許容される使用
|
||||
|
||||
You may not use this website in any way that causes or may cause damage to the website or impairment of the availability or accessibility of Privacy Guides, or in any way which is unlawful, illegal, fraudulent, harmful, or in connection with any unlawful, illegal, fraudulent, or harmful purpose or activity.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ You must not conduct any systematic or automated data collection activities on o
|
||||
* Excessive Automated Scans
|
||||
* Denial of Service Attacks
|
||||
* Scraping
|
||||
* Data Mining
|
||||
* データマイニング
|
||||
* 'Framing' (IFrames)
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Centralized messengers are those where all participants are on the same server o
|
||||
|
||||
Some self-hosted messengers allow you to set up your own server. Self-hosting can provide additional privacy guarantees, such as no usage logs or limited access to metadata (data about who is talking to whom). Self-hosted centralized messengers are isolated and everyone must be on the same server to communicate.
|
||||
|
||||
**Advantages:**
|
||||
**メリット：**
|
||||
|
||||
- New features and changes can be implemented more quickly.
|
||||
- Easier to get started with and to find contacts.
|
||||
@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Federated messengers use multiple, independent, decentralized servers that are a
|
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|
||||
When self-hosted, members of a federated server can discover and communicate with members of other servers, although some servers may choose to remain private by being non-federated (e.g., work team server).
|
||||
|
||||
**Advantages:**
|
||||
**メリット：**
|
||||
|
||||
- Allows for greater control over your own data when running your own server.
|
||||
- Allows you to choose whom to trust your data with by choosing between multiple "public" servers.
|
||||
@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ When self-hosted, members of a federated server can discover and communicate wit
|
||||
|
||||
## ピアツーピアネットワーク
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=left }
|
||||
{ align=left }
|
||||
|
||||
P2P messengers connect to a [distributed network](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_networking) of nodes to relay a message to the recipient without a third-party server.
|
||||
|
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@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ Once a peer has found a route to its contact via any of these methods, a direct
|
||||
|
||||
P2P networks do not use servers, as peers communicate directly between each other and hence cannot be self-hosted. However, some additional services may rely on centralized servers, such as user discovery or relaying offline messages, which can benefit from self-hosting.
|
||||
|
||||
**Advantages:**
|
||||
**メリット：**
|
||||
|
||||
- Minimal information is exposed to third-parties.
|
||||
- Modern P2P platforms implement E2EE by default. There are no servers that could potentially intercept and decrypt your transmissions, unlike centralized and federated models.
|
||||
@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ There are [many](https://doi.org/10.1145/3182658) different ways to implement an
|
||||
|
||||
Self-hosting a node in an anonymous routing network does not provide the hoster with additional privacy benefits, but rather contributes to the whole network's resilience against identification attacks for everyone's benefit.
|
||||
|
||||
**Advantages:**
|
||||
**メリット：**
|
||||
|
||||
- Minimal to no information is exposed to other parties.
|
||||
- Messages can be relayed in a decentralized manner even if one of the parties is offline.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -295,20 +295,20 @@ DNSSEC implements a hierarchical digital signing policy across all layers of DNS
|
||||
|
||||
A QNAME is a "qualified name", for example `discuss.privacyguides.net`. In the past, when resolving a domain name your DNS resolver would ask every server in the chain to provide any information it has about your full query. In this example below, your request to find the IP address for `discuss.privacyguides.net` gets asked of every DNS server provider:
|
||||
|
||||
| サーバー | Question Asked | 回答 |
|
||||
| ---------------------- | ------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| Root server | What's the IP of discuss.privacyguides.net? | I don't know, ask .net's server... |
|
||||
| .netのサーバー | What's the IP of discuss.privacyguides.net? | I don't know, ask Privacy Guides' server... |
|
||||
| Privacy Guides' server | What's the IP of discuss.privacyguides.net? | 5.161.195.190! |
|
||||
| サーバー | 質問 | 回答 |
|
||||
| ------------------- | ------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| Root server | What's the IP of discuss.privacyguides.net? | I don't know, ask .net's server... |
|
||||
| .netのサーバー | What's the IP of discuss.privacyguides.net? | I don't know, ask Privacy Guides' server... |
|
||||
| Privacy Guidesのサーバー | What's the IP of discuss.privacyguides.net? | 5.161.195.190! |
|
||||
|
||||
With "QNAME minimization," your DNS resolver now only asks for just enough information to find the next server in the chain. In this example, the root server is only asked for enough information to find the appropriate nameserver for the .net TLD, and so on, without ever knowing the full domain you're trying to visit:
|
||||
|
||||
| サーバー | Question Asked | 回答 |
|
||||
| ---------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------- |
|
||||
| Root server | What's the nameserver for .net? | *Provides .net's server* |
|
||||
| .netのサーバー | What's the nameserver for privacyguides.net? | *Provides Privacy Guides' server* |
|
||||
| Privacy Guides' server | What's the nameserver for discuss.privacyguides.net? | This server! |
|
||||
| Privacy Guides' server | What's the IP of discuss.privacyguides.net? | 5.161.195.190 |
|
||||
| サーバー | 質問 | 回答 |
|
||||
| ------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------- |
|
||||
| Root server | What's the nameserver for .net? | *Provides .net's server* |
|
||||
| .netのサーバー | What's the nameserver for privacyguides.net? | *Provides Privacy Guides' server* |
|
||||
| Privacy Guidesのサーバー | What's the nameserver for discuss.privacyguides.net? | This server! |
|
||||
| Privacy Guidesのサーバー | What's the IP of discuss.privacyguides.net? | 5.161.195.190 |
|
||||
|
||||
While this process can be slightly more inefficient, in this example neither the central root nameservers nor the TLD's nameservers ever receive information about your *full* query, thus reducing the amount of information being transmitted about your browsing habits. Further technical description is defined in [RFC 7816](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7816).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Connecting directly to Tor will make your connection stand out to any local netw
|
||||
|
||||
Therefore, you should make an effort to hide your IP address **before** connecting to the Tor network. You can do this by simply connecting to a VPN (through a client installed on your computer) and then accessing [Tor](../tor.md) as normal, through Tor Browser for example. This creates a connection chain like:
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] You → VPN → Tor → Internet
|
||||
- [x] あなた → VPN → Tor → インターネット
|
||||
|
||||
From your ISP's perspective, it looks like you're accessing a VPN normally (with the associated cover that provides you). From your VPN's perspective, they can see that you are connecting to the Tor network, but nothing about what websites you're accessing. From Tor's perspective, you're connecting normally, but in the unlikely event of some sort of Tor network compromise, only your VPN's IP would be exposed, and your VPN would *additionally* have to be compromised to deanonymize you.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ This is **not** censorship circumvention advice, because if Tor is blocked entir
|
||||
|
||||
We **very strongly discourage** combining Tor with a VPN in any other manner. Do not configure your connection in a way which resembles any of the following:
|
||||
|
||||
- You → Tor → VPN → Internet
|
||||
- You → VPN → Tor → VPN → Internet
|
||||
- あなた → Tor → VPN → インターネット
|
||||
- あなた → VPN → Tor → VPN → インターネット
|
||||
- Any other configuration
|
||||
|
||||
Some VPN providers and other publications will occasionally recommend these **bad** configurations to evade Tor bans (exit nodes being blocked by websites) in some places. [Normally](https://support.torproject.org/#about_change-paths), Tor frequently changes your circuit path through the network. When you choose a permanent *destination* VPN (connecting to a VPN server *after* Tor), you're eliminating this advantage and drastically harming your anonymity.
|
||||
@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ Setting up bad configurations like these is difficult to do accidentally, becaus
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
!!! info "VPN/SSH Fingerprinting"
|
||||
!!! info "VPN/SSHフィンガープリンティング"
|
||||
|
||||
The Tor Project [notes](https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/wikis/doc/TorPlusVPN#vpnssh-fingerprinting) that *theoretically* using a VPN to hide Tor activities from your ISP may not be foolproof. VPNs have been found to be vulnerable to website traffic fingerprinting, where an adversary can still guess what website is being visited, because all websites have specific traffic patterns.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ Main privacy features include:
|
||||
|
||||
### Secure PDF Viewer
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
!!! 推奨事項
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
@ -71,7 +71,7 @@
|
||||
<text x="0px" y="0px" style="font-family:'Helvetica';font-size:53.309px;fill:white;">Your</text>
|
||||
</g>
|
||||
<g transform="matrix(1,0,0,1,88.7196,616.708)">
|
||||
<text x="0px" y="0px" style="font-family:'Helvetica';font-size:53.309px;fill:white;">Device</text>
|
||||
<text x="0px" y="0px" style="font-family:'Helvetica';font-size:53.309px;fill:white;">端末</text>
|
||||
</g>
|
||||
</g>
|
||||
<g transform="matrix(0.423185,0,0,0.423185,215.188,217.539)">
|
||||
|
||||
|
Before Width: | Height: | Size: 35 KiB After Width: | Height: | Size: 35 KiB |
@ -71,7 +71,7 @@
|
||||
<text x="0px" y="0px" style="font-family:'Helvetica';font-size:53.309px;">Your</text>
|
||||
</g>
|
||||
<g transform="matrix(1,0,0,1,88.7196,616.708)">
|
||||
<text x="0px" y="0px" style="font-family:'Helvetica';font-size:53.309px;">Device</text>
|
||||
<text x="0px" y="0px" style="font-family:'Helvetica';font-size:53.309px;">端末</text>
|
||||
</g>
|
||||
</g>
|
||||
<g transform="matrix(0.423185,0,0,0.423185,215.188,217.539)">
|
||||
|
||||
|
Before Width: | Height: | Size: 34 KiB After Width: | Height: | Size: 34 KiB |
@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ The most common way to create a new account is by an email address and password.
|
||||
|
||||
You will be responsible for managing your login credentials. For added security, you can set up [MFA](multi-factor-authentication.md) on your accounts.
|
||||
|
||||
[Recommended password managers](../passwords.md ""){.md-button}
|
||||
[推奨のパスワードマネージャー](../passwords.md ""){.md-button}
|
||||
|
||||
#### 電子メールのエイリアス
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ On sites where you do share information, checking the privacy settings of your a
|
||||
|
||||
If you've already submitted your real information to sites which shouldn't have it, consider using disinformation tactics, like submitting fictitious information related to that online identity. This makes your real information indistinguishable from the false information.
|
||||
|
||||
## Avoiding Censorship
|
||||
## 検閲の回避
|
||||
|
||||
<span class="pg-blue-gray">:material-close-outline: Censorship</span>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -47,6 +47,6 @@ Client software may use email metadata to show who a message is from and what ti
|
||||
|
||||
Email metadata is protected from outside observers with [Opportunistic TLS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunistic_TLS) protecting it from outside observers, but it is still able to be seen by your email client software (or webmail) and any servers relaying the message from you to any recipients including your email provider. Sometimes email servers will also use third-party services to protect against spam, which generally also have access to your messages.
|
||||
|
||||
### Why Can't Metadata be E2EE?
|
||||
### メタデータをE2EEにできない理由
|
||||
|
||||
Email metadata is crucial to the most basic functionality of email (where it came from, and where it has to go). E2EE was not built into the email protocols originally, instead requiring add-on software like OpenPGP. Because OpenPGP messages still have to work with traditional email providers, it cannot encrypt email metadata, only the message body itself. That means that even when using OpenPGP, outside observers can see lots of information about your messages, such as who you're emailing, the subject lines, when you're emailing, etc.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ MFA methods vary in security, but are based on the premise that the more difficu
|
||||
|
||||
Receiving OTP codes via SMS or email are one of the weaker ways to secure your accounts with MFA. Obtaining a code by email or SMS takes away from the "something you *have*" idea, because there are a variety of ways a hacker could [take over your phone number](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam) or gain access to your email without having physical access to any of your devices at all. If an unauthorized person gained access to your email, they would be able to use that access to both reset your password and receive the authentication code, giving them full access to your account.
|
||||
|
||||
### Push Notifications
|
||||
### プッシュ通知
|
||||
|
||||
Push notification MFA takes the form of a message being sent to an app on your phone asking you to confirm new account logins. This method is a lot better than SMS or email, since an attacker typically wouldn't be able to get these push notifications without having an already logged-in device, which means they would need to compromise one of your other devices first.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ Unlike Yubico OTP, WebAuthn does not use any public ID, so the key is **not** id
|
||||
|
||||
If a website or service supports WebAuthn for the authentication, it is highly recommended that you use it over any other form of MFA.
|
||||
|
||||
## General Recommendations
|
||||
## 一般的な推奨事項
|
||||
|
||||
We have these general recommendations:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ You should always have backups for your MFA method. Hardware security keys can g
|
||||
|
||||
When using TOTP with an authenticator app, be sure to back up your recovery keys or the app itself, or copy the "shared secrets" to another instance of the app on a different phone or to an encrypted container (e.g. [VeraCrypt](../encryption.md#veracrypt)).
|
||||
|
||||
### Initial Set Up
|
||||
### 初期設定
|
||||
|
||||
When buying a security key, it is important that you change the default credentials, set up password protection for the key, and enable touch confirmation if your key supports it. Products such as the YubiKey have multiple interfaces with separate credentials for each one of them, so you should go over each interface and set up protection as well.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ If you have to use email for MFA, make sure that the email account itself is sec
|
||||
|
||||
If you use SMS MFA, use a carrier who will not switch your phone number to a new SIM card without account access, or use a dedicated VoIP number from a provider with similar security to avoid a [SIM swap attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIM_swap_scam).
|
||||
|
||||
[MFA tools we recommend](../multi-factor-authentication.md ""){.md-button}
|
||||
[推奨するMFAツール](../multi-factor-authentication.md ""){.md-button}
|
||||
|
||||
## More Places to Set Up MFA
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,6 +160,6 @@ SSH MFA could be set up using multiple different authentication methods that are
|
||||
|
||||
SSH MFA can also be set up using TOTP. DigitalOcean has provided a tutorial [How To Set Up Multi-Factor Authentication for SSH on Ubuntu 20.04](https://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/how-to-set-up-multi-factor-authentication-for-ssh-on-ubuntu-20-04). Most things should be the same regardless of distribution, however the package manager commands—such as `apt-get`—and package names may differ.
|
||||
|
||||
### KeePass (and KeePassXC)
|
||||
### KeePass（およびKeePassXC）
|
||||
|
||||
KeePass and KeePassXC databases can be secured using Challenge-Response or HOTP as a second-factor authentication. Yubico has provided a document for KeePass [Using Your YubiKey with KeePass](https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360013779759-Using-Your-YubiKey-with-KeePass) and there is also one on the [KeePassXC](https://keepassxc.org/docs/#faq-yubikey-2fa) website.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ MPRs seek to solve a problem inherent to VPNs: the fact that you must trust them
|
||||
|
||||
Other MPRs run by different companies like Google or INVISV operate in a very similar manner. This protection by segmentation only exists if you trust the two companies to not collude with each other to deanonymize you.
|
||||
|
||||
### Decentralized VPNs
|
||||
### 分散型VPN
|
||||
|
||||
Another attempt at solving the issues with centralized VPN services are dVPNs. These are based on blockchain technology and claim to eliminate trust in a single party by distributing the nodes across lots of different people. However, many times a dVPN will default to a single node, meaning you need to trust that node completely, just like a traditional VPN. Unlike a traditional VPN, this one node that can see all your traffic is a random person instead of your VPN provider that can be audited and has legal responsibilities to uphold their privacy policy. Multi-hop is needed to solve this, but that comes with a stability and performance cost.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ Many dVPNs are used to push a cryptocurrency rather than to make the best servic
|
||||
## Related VPN Information
|
||||
|
||||
- [The Trouble with VPN and Privacy Review Sites](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2019/11/20/the-trouble-with-vpn-and-privacy-review-sites/)
|
||||
- [Free VPN App Investigation](https://www.top10vpn.com/free-vpn-app-investigation/)
|
||||
- [無料VPNアプリの調査](https://www.top10vpn.com/free-vpn-app-investigation/)
|
||||
- [Hidden VPN owners unveiled: 101 VPN products run by just 23 companies](https://vpnpro.com/blog/hidden-vpn-owners-unveiled-97-vpns-23-companies/)
|
||||
- [This Chinese company is secretly behind 24 popular apps seeking dangerous permissions](https://vpnpro.com/blog/chinese-company-secretly-behind-popular-apps-seeking-dangerous-permissions/)
|
||||
- [VPN - a Very Precarious Narrative](https://schub.io/blog/2019/04/08/very-precarious-narrative.html) by Dennis Schubert
|
||||
|
||||
@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ The app offers multiple ways to erase metadata from images. Namely:
|
||||
|
||||
You should **never** use blur to redact [text in images](https://bishopfox.com/blog/unredacter-tool-never-pixelation). If you want to redact text in an image, draw a box over the text. For this, we suggest apps like [Pocket Paint](https://github.com/Catrobat/Paintroid).
|
||||
|
||||
## Command-line
|
||||
## コマンドライン
|
||||
|
||||
### ExifTool
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ For further information about how Qubes works, read our full [Qubes OS overview]
|
||||
|
||||
While we [recommend against](os/linux-overview.md#release-cycle) "perpetually outdated" distributions like Debian for Desktop use in most cases, Kicksecure is a Debian-based operating system which has been hardened to be much more than a typical Linux install.
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
!!! 推奨事項
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ These tools may provide utility for certain individuals. They provide functional
|
||||
|
||||
It is **critical** to understand that scanning your device for public indicators of compromise is **not sufficient** to determine that a device is "clean", and not targeted with a particular spyware tool. Reliance on these publicly-available scanning tools can miss recent security developments and give you a false sense of security.
|
||||
|
||||
## General Advice
|
||||
## 一般的なアドバイス
|
||||
|
||||
The majority of system-level exploits on modern mobile devices—especially zero-click compromises—are non-persistent, meaning they will not remain or run automatically after a reboot. For this reason, we highly recommend rebooting your device regularly. We recommend everybody reboot their devices once a week at minimum, but if non-persistent malware is of particular concern for you, we and many security experts recommend a daily reboot schedule.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ These tools provide analysis based on the information they have the ability to a
|
||||
1. Indicators of compromise are just that: _indicators_. They are not a definitive finding, and may occasionally be **false positives**. If an indicator of compromise is detected, it means you should do additional research into the _potential_ threat.
|
||||
2. The indicators of compromise these tools look for are published by threat research organizations, but not all indicators are made available to the public! This means that these tools can present a **false negative**, if your device is infected with spyware which is not detected by any of the public indicators. Reliable and comprehensive digital forensic support and triage requires access to non-public indicators, research and threat intelligence.
|
||||
|
||||
## External Verification Tools
|
||||
## 外部検証ツール
|
||||
|
||||
External verification tools run on your computer and scan your mobile device for forensic traces which are helpful to identify potential compromise.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -58,9 +58,9 @@ Such support is available to civil society through [Amnesty International's Secu
|
||||
|
||||
These tools can trigger false-positives. If any of these tools finds indicators of compromise, you need to dig deeper to determine your actual risk. Some reports may be false positives based on websites you've visited in the past, and findings which are many years old are likely either false-positives or indicate previous (and no longer active) compromise.
|
||||
|
||||
### Mobile Verification Toolkit
|
||||
### モバイル検証ツールキット
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
!!! 推奨事項
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ MVT allows you to perform deeper scans/analysis if your device is jailbroken. Un
|
||||
|
||||
### iMazing (iOS)
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
!!! 推奨事項
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ Using these apps is insufficient to determine that a device is "clean", and not
|
||||
|
||||
### Auditor (Android)
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
!!! 推奨事項
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ Using these apps is insufficient to determine that a device is "clean", and not
|
||||
|
||||
### Hypatia (Android)
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
!!! 推奨事項
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ Hypatia is particularly good at detecting common stalkerware: If you suspect you
|
||||
|
||||
### iVerify (iOS)
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
!!! 推奨事項
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ We recommend changing some of these settings to make Thunderbird a little more p
|
||||
|
||||
These options can be found in :material-menu: → **Settings** → **Privacy & Security**.
|
||||
|
||||
##### Web Content
|
||||
##### ウェブコンテンツ
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Uncheck **Remember websites and links I've visited**
|
||||
- [ ] Uncheck **Accept cookies from sites**
|
||||
@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ Canary Mailのソースコードは公開されていません。 We recommend i
|
||||
- [:simple-linux: Linux](https://kontact.kde.org/download)
|
||||
- [:simple-flathub: Flathub](https://flathub.org/apps/details/org.kde.kontact)
|
||||
|
||||
### Mailvelope (Browser)
|
||||
### Mailvlope（ブラウザー）
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ Browser-based encryption can be useful when you need to encrypt a file but canno
|
||||
[:octicons-code-16:](https://github.com/sh-dv/hat.sh){ .card-link title="Source Code" }
|
||||
[:octicons-heart-16:](https://github.com/sh-dv/hat.sh#donations){ .card-link title="Donations methods can be found at the bottom of the website" }
|
||||
|
||||
## Command-line
|
||||
## コマンドライン
|
||||
|
||||
Tools with command-line interfaces are useful for integrating [shell scripts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shell_script).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -82,4 +82,4 @@ These services allow you to purchase gift cards for a variety of merchants onlin
|
||||
私たちは、サイトの各項目に関して、定義された規準の確立に取り組んでいます。この規準は変更される可能性があります。 規準について疑問がある場合は、[フォーラムで質問](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/latest)してください。また、ここに記載されていない場合でも、私たちがプロジェクトを推奨する際に、そうした事柄を考慮しなかったと仮定するのはお止めください。 プロジェクトを推奨する際に考慮され、議論される要素は多くあり、そのすべてを文書化する作業は現在進行中です。
|
||||
|
||||
- Accepts payment in [a recommended cryptocurrency](cryptocurrency.md).
|
||||
- No ID requirement.
|
||||
- IDは不要。
|
||||
|
||||
@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ icon: material/archive
|
||||
description: Some pages that used to be in our knowledge base can now be found on our blog.
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Pages Moved to Blog
|
||||
# ブログに移動したページ
|
||||
|
||||
Some pages that used to be in our knowledge base can now be found on our blog:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -12,6 +12,6 @@ Some pages that used to be in our knowledge base can now be found on our blog:
|
||||
- [Signal Configuration Hardening](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening/)
|
||||
- [Linux - System Hardening](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/22/linux-system-hardening/)
|
||||
- [Linux - Application Sandboxing](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/22/linux-application-sandboxing/)
|
||||
- [Secure Data Erasure](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/05/25/secure-data-erasure/)
|
||||
- [安全なデータ消去](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/05/25/secure-data-erasure/)
|
||||
- [Integrating Metadata Removal](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/04/09/integrating-metadata-removal/)
|
||||
- [iOS Configuration Guide](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/10/22/ios-configuration-guide/)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ We're writing *for* a wide variety of people, but we are writing *to* the person
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/audience/address-the-user/)
|
||||
|
||||
### Avoid "users"
|
||||
### 「ユーザー」を避けること
|
||||
|
||||
Avoid calling people "users", in favor of "people", or a more specific description of the group of people you are writing for.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ Source: [plainlanguage.gov](https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines/concise/)
|
||||
>
|
||||
> Verbs tell your audience what to do. Make sure it’s clear who does what.
|
||||
|
||||
### Use active voice
|
||||
### 能動態を使うこと
|
||||
|
||||
> Active voice makes it clear who is supposed to do what. It eliminates ambiguity about responsibilities. Not “It must be done,” but “You must do it.”
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ We highly recommend that you use mobile TOTP apps instead of desktop alternative
|
||||
|
||||
### Aegis Authenticator (Android)
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
!!! 推奨事項
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ AFWall+ works based on the [packet filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire
|
||||
|
||||
We do not believe that the security sacrifices made by rooting a phone are worth the questionable privacy benefits of those apps.
|
||||
|
||||
### Install Updates
|
||||
### アップデートをインストールすること
|
||||
|
||||
It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ Unfortunately, OEMs are only obliged to support Verified Boot on their stock And
|
||||
|
||||
Many OEMs also have broken implementation of Verified Boot that you have to be aware of beyond their marketing. For example, the Fairphone 3 and 4 are not secure by default, as the [stock bootloader trusts the public AVB signing key](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11). This breaks verified boot on a stock Fairphone device, as the system will boot alternative Android operating systems such (such as /e/) [without any warning](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/boot-flow#locked-devices-with-custom-root-of-trust) about custom operating system usage.
|
||||
|
||||
### Firmware Updates
|
||||
### ファームウェアの更新
|
||||
|
||||
Firmware updates are critical for maintaining security and without them your device cannot be secure. OEMs have support agreements with their partners to provide the closed-source components for a limited support period. These are detailed in the monthly [Android Security Bulletins](https://source.android.com/security/bulletin).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -89,9 +89,9 @@ Additionally, we recommend **against** these two Arch derivatives specifically:
|
||||
|
||||
We recommend **against** using the Linux-libre kernel, since it [removes security mitigations](https://www.phoronix.com/news/GNU-Linux-Libre-5.7-Released) and [suppresses kernel warnings](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29674846) about vulnerable microcode.
|
||||
|
||||
## General Recommendations
|
||||
## 一般的な推奨事項
|
||||
|
||||
### Drive Encryption
|
||||
### ドライブの暗号化
|
||||
|
||||
Most Linux distributions have an option within its installer for enabling [LUKS](../encryption.md#linux-unified-key-setup) FDE. If this option isn’t set at installation time, you will have to backup your data and re-install, as encryption is applied after [disk partitioning](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disk_partitioning), but before [file systems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_system) are formatted. We also suggest securely erasing your storage device:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ The majority of privacy and security concerns with Apple products are related to
|
||||
|
||||
Therefore, if you use iCloud you should [enable **Advanced Data Protection**](https://support.apple.com/HT212520). This encrypts nearly all of your iCloud data with keys stored on your devices (end-to-end encryption), rather than Apple's servers, so that your iCloud data is secured in the event of a data breach, and otherwise hidden from Apple.
|
||||
|
||||
### System Settings
|
||||
### システムの設定
|
||||
|
||||
There are a number of built-in settings you should confirm or change to harden your system. Open the **Settings** app:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ By default, your device name will be something like "[your name]'s iMac". Becaus
|
||||
|
||||
Click on **About** and type your desired device name into the **Name** field.
|
||||
|
||||
##### Software Updates
|
||||
##### ソフトウェアの更新
|
||||
|
||||
You should automatically install all available updates to make sure your Mac has the latest security fixes.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ System Integrity Protection makes critical file locations read-only to protect a
|
||||
|
||||
#### Application Security
|
||||
|
||||
##### App Sandbox
|
||||
##### アプリのサンドボックス
|
||||
|
||||
macOS apps downloaded from the App Store are required to be sandboxed usng the [App Sandbox](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/app_sandbox).
|
||||
|
||||
@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ macOS apps downloaded from the App Store are required to be sandboxed usng the [
|
||||
|
||||
Software downloaded from outside the official App Store is not required to be sandboxed. You should avoid non-App Store software as much as possible.
|
||||
|
||||
##### Antivirus
|
||||
##### アンチウィルス
|
||||
|
||||
macOS comes with two forms of malware defense:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ If you use Bluetooth accessories such as a keyboard, we recommend that you use o
|
||||
|
||||
Apple's SoCs focus on minimizing attack surface by relegating security functions to dedicated hardware with limited functionality.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Boot ROM
|
||||
#### ブートROM
|
||||
|
||||
macOS prevents malware persistence by only allowing official Apple software to run at boot time; this is known as secure boot. Mac computers verify this with a bit of read-only memory on the SoC called the boot ROM, which is laid down during the manufacturing of the chip.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Qubesは、 [区画化（コンパートメンタリゼーション）](https://
|
||||
|
||||
Some of the information here and on the Qubes OS documentation may contain conflicting language as the "appVM" term is gradually being changed to "qube". Qubes are not entire virtual machines, but maintain similar functionalities to VMs.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
<figcaption>Qubes Architecture, Credit: What is Qubes OS Intro</figcaption>
|
||||
|
||||
Each qube has a [colored border](https://www.qubes-os.org/screenshots/) that can help you keep track of the domain in which it runs. You could, for example, use a specific color for your banking browser, while using a different color for a general untrusted browser.
|
||||
@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Each qube has a [colored border](https://www.qubes-os.org/screenshots/) that can
|
||||
|
||||
<figcaption>Qubes window borders, Credit: Qubes Screenshots</figcaption>
|
||||
|
||||
## Why Should I use Qubes?
|
||||
## Qubesを使うべき理由
|
||||
|
||||
Qubes OS is useful if your [threat model](../basics/threat-modeling.md) requires strong security and isolation, such as if you think you'll be opening untrusted files from untrusted sources. A typical reason for using Qubes OS is to open documents from unknown sources, but the idea is that if a single qube is compromised it won't affect the rest of the system.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ To copy and paste files and directories (folders) from one *qube* to another, yo
|
||||
|
||||
The [qrexec framework](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec/) is a core part of Qubes which allows communication between domains. It is built on top of the Xen library *vchan*, which facilitates [isolation through policies](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2020/06/22/new-qrexec-policy-system/).
|
||||
|
||||
## Connecting to Tor via a VPN
|
||||
## VPN経由でTorに接続
|
||||
|
||||
We [recommend](../advanced/tor-overview.md) connecting to the Tor network via a [VPN](../vpn.md) provider, and luckily Qubes makes this easy to do with a combination of ProxyVMs and Whonix.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: Photo Management
|
||||
title: 写真管理
|
||||
icon: material/image
|
||||
description: Photo management tools to keep your personal photos safe from the prying eyes of cloud storage providers and other unauthorized access.
|
||||
cover: photo-management.webp
|
||||
@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Most cloud photo management solutions like Google Photos, Flickr, and Amazon Pho
|
||||
|
||||
## ente
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
!!! 推奨事項
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Most cloud photo management solutions like Google Photos, Flickr, and Amazon Pho
|
||||
|
||||
## Stingle
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
!!! 推奨事項
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ Most cloud photo management solutions like Google Photos, Flickr, and Amazon Pho
|
||||
|
||||
## PhotoPrism
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
!!! 推奨事項
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ Most cloud photo management solutions like Google Photos, Flickr, and Amazon Pho
|
||||
|
||||
## 規準
|
||||
|
||||
**Please note we are not affiliated with any of the projects we recommend.** In addition to [our standard criteria](about/criteria.md), we have developed a clear set of requirements to allow us to provide objective recommendations. プロジェクトを利用する前に、このリストをよく理解し、ご自身で調査を行って、そのプロジェクトがあなたにとって適切な選択かどうかをご確認ください。
|
||||
\*\*私たちは、推薦するどのプロジェクトとも提携していません。\*\*客観的に推薦できるよう、[標準となる規準](about/criteria.md)に加えて、一連の明確な要件を定めています。 プロジェクトを利用する前に、このリストをよく理解し、ご自身で調査を行って、そのプロジェクトがあなたにとって適切な選択かどうかをご確認ください。
|
||||
|
||||
!!! example "この項目は最近作成されました"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ We [recommend](dns.md#recommended-providers) a number of encrypted DNS servers b
|
||||
|
||||
[詳細 :material-arrow-right-drop-circle:](financial-services.md#gift-card-marketplaces)
|
||||
|
||||
### Photo Management
|
||||
### 写真管理
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="grid cards" markdown>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ We previously recommended enabling the *Isolate Destination Address* preference
|
||||
|
||||
### Snowflake
|
||||
|
||||
!!! recommendation
|
||||
!!! 推奨事項
|
||||
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
{ align=right }
|
||||
|
||||
@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ nav:
|
||||
Internet Browsing: インターネットブラウジング
|
||||
Providers: プロバイダ
|
||||
Software: ソフトウェア
|
||||
Advanced: Advanced
|
||||
Advanced: 詳細
|
||||
About: 概要
|
||||
Community: コミュニティ
|
||||
Online Services: オンラインサービス
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user