New Crowdin translations by GitHub Action

2026-10-27 22:48:25 +00:00 · 2026-09-30 17:36:45 +00:00
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@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ description: Tor هي شبكة مجانية ولا مركزية، صُممت ل

 ### متصفح Tor ليس المتصفح الأكثر *أمانًا*

-قد تتعارض إخفاء الهوية أحيانا مع الأمان. يحقق Tor إخفاء الهوية بجعل جميع المستخدمين يبدون متشابهين، مما يخلق بيئة رقمية موحّدة تتشارك فيها جميع النسخ نفس نقاط الضعف. في الأمن السيبراني، تُعدّ البيئات الموحّدة عمومًا مصدرًا للمخاطر. الأمان من خلال التنوع يوفر عزلا طبيعيا، لأنه يحد من تأثير أي ثغرة بحيث يقتصر على شريحة أصغر من المستخدمين. ورغم أن هذا التنوع مفيد للأمان من ناحية البنية، فإنه يضعف إخفاء هوية المستخدمين بطبيعته، لأنه يجعل تتبّع كل مستخدم أسهل.
+قد تتعارض إخفاء الهوية أحيانا مع الأمان. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. في الأمن السيبراني، تُعدّ البيئات الموحّدة عمومًا مصدرًا للمخاطر. الأمان من خلال التنوع يوفر عزلا طبيعيا، لأنه يحد من تأثير أي ثغرة بحيث يقتصر على شريحة أصغر من المستخدمين. ورغم أن هذا التنوع مفيد للأمان من ناحية البنية، فإنه يضعف إخفاء هوية المستخدمين بطبيعته، لأنه يجعل تتبّع كل مستخدم أسهل.

 بالإضافة إلى ذلك، يعتمد متصفح Tor على إصدارات Firefox Extended Support Release، والتي لا تتلقى تحديثات أمنية إلا للثغرات المصنفة على أنها *Critical* و*High*، وليس *Medium* و*Low*. هذا يعني أن المهاجمين يمكنهم، على سبيل المثال:

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and eva

 ### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and eva

 ### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and eva

 ### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and eva

 ### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and eva

 ### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and eva

 ### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ Es fundamental comprender la diferencia entre eludir la censura y eludir la dete

 ### Tor Browser no es el navegador más *seguro*

-El anonimato puede entrar en conflicto con la seguridad. Tor logra el anonimato garantizando que todos los usuarios parezcan idénticos, creando un monocultivo digital donde las mismas vulnerabilidades existen en todas las instalaciones. En ciberseguridad, los monocultivos suelen ser considerados un riesgo. La seguridad mediante la diversidad proporciona una segmentación natural, ya que limita el impacto de un ataque a un segmento más reducido de usuarios. Si bien esa diversidad es estructuralmente deseable para la seguridad, compromete el anonimato de los usuarios al hacer a los individuos rastreables.
+El anonimato puede entrar en conflicto con la seguridad. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. En ciberseguridad, los monocultivos suelen ser considerados un riesgo. La seguridad mediante la diversidad proporciona una segmentación natural, ya que limita el impacto de un ataque a un segmento más reducido de usuarios. Si bien esa diversidad es estructuralmente deseable para la seguridad, compromete el anonimato de los usuarios al hacer a los individuos rastreables.

 Adicionalmente, Tor Browser está basado en la versión de Soporte Extendido de Firefox, que solo recibe parches para vulnerabilidades consideradas *Críticas* y *Altas* (no *Medias* y *Bajas*). Esto significa que los atacantes podrían (por ejemplo):

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and eva

 ### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and eva

 ### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ Il est essentiel de comprendre la différence entre contourner la censure et éc

 ### Le Navigateur Tor n'est pas le navigateur le plus *sûr*

-L'anonymat peut souvent aller à l'encontre de la sécurité. Tor garantit l'anonymat en veillant à ce que tous les utilisateurs se présentent de manière identique, créant ainsi une « monoculture numérique » où les mêmes vulnérabilités existent dans toutes les installations. En matière de cybersécurité, les monocultures sont généralement considérées comme un risque. La sécurité par la diversité assure une segmentation naturelle en limitant l'impact d'une faille à un groupe restreint d'utilisateurs. Si une telle diversité est souhaitable d'un point de vue structurel pour la sécurité, elle compromet toutefois intrinsèquement l'anonymat des utilisateurs en rendant ces derniers identifiables.
+L'anonymat peut souvent aller à l'encontre de la sécurité. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. En matière de cybersécurité, les monocultures sont généralement considérées comme un risque. La sécurité par la diversité assure une segmentation naturelle en limitant l'impact d'une faille à un groupe restreint d'utilisateurs. Si une telle diversité est souhaitable d'un point de vue structurel pour la sécurité, elle compromet toutefois intrinsèquement l'anonymat des utilisateurs en rendant ces derniers identifiables.

 En outre, le Navigateur Tor est basé sur les versions Extended Support Release de Firefox, qui ne reçoivent des correctifs que pour les vulnérabilités considérées comme *Critique* et *Élevée* (et non pour celles *Moyenne* et *Faible*). Cela signifie que les attaquants pourraient (par exemple) :

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and eva

 ### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and eva

 ### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and eva

 ### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and eva

 ### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ Esistono altri trasporti collegabili oltre questi tre, ma si affidano tipicament

 ### Il Browser Tor non è il browser più *sicuro*

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Inoltre, Tor Browser si basa sulle build delle Versioni di Supporto Esteso di Firefox, che ricevono correzioni soltanto per le vulnerabilità considerate *Critiche* ed *Elevate* (non *Medie* e *Basse*). Ciò significa che dei malintenzionati potrebbero, ad esempio:

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and eva

 ### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):

@@ -117,7 +120,7 @@ Those at risk of browser vulnerabilities should consider additional protections

 ### 入力ノード

-入力ノードはしばしばガードノードと呼ばれ、Torのクライアントが最初に接続するノードです。 入力ノードはあなたのIPアドレスを見ることができますが、あなたが何に接続しているかを見ることはできません。
+入力ノードはしばしばガードノードと呼ばれ、Torのクライアントが最初に接続するノードです。入力ノードはあなたのIPアドレスを見ることができますが、あなたが何に接続しているかを見ることはできません。

 他のノードとは異なり、Torクライアントはランダムに入力ノードを選択した後、特定の攻撃からあなたを守るため、2～3ヶ月間そのノードを使用します。[^1]

@@ -151,7 +154,7 @@ Tor encrypts each packet (a block of transmitted data) three times with the keys

 Torが回路を構築すると、データの伝送は以下のように行われます。

-1. Firstly: When the packet arrives at the entry node, the first layer of encryption is removed. この暗号化されたパケットの中から、入力ノードは中間ノードのアドレスを持つ、別の暗号化されたパケットを見つけます。 入力ノードはその後、パケットを中間ノードに転送します。
+1. Firstly: When the packet arrives at the entry node, the first layer of encryption is removed. この暗号化されたパケットの中から、入力ノードは中間ノードのアドレスを持つ、別の暗号化されたパケットを見つけます。入力ノードはその後、パケットを中間ノードに転送します。

 2. Secondly: When the middle node receives the packet from the entry node, it too will remove a layer of encryption with its key, and this time finds an encrypted packet with the exit node's address. 中間ノードはその後、パケットを出口ノードに転送します。

@@ -165,7 +168,7 @@ Torが回路を構築すると、データの伝送は以下のように行わ
  <figcaption>Sending and receiving data through the Tor Network</figcaption>
 </figure>

-Torを使えば、誰にも全経路を知られることなくサーバーに接続することができます。 入口ノードは、あなたが誰であるかは知っているが、どこへ行こうとしているかは知りません。中間ノードには、あなたが誰であるかも、どこへ行こうとしているかも知ることができません。出口ノードは、あなたがどこへ行こうとしているかは知っていますが、誰であるかは知りません。 最終的な接続を行うのは出口ノードであるため、接続先のサーバーが、あなたのIPアドレスを知ることは決してありません。
+Torを使えば、誰にも全経路を知られることなくサーバーに接続することができます。入口ノードは、あなたが誰であるかは知っているが、どこへ行こうとしているかは知りません。中間ノードには、あなたが誰であるかも、どこへ行こうとしているかも知ることができません。出口ノードは、あなたがどこへ行こうとしているかは知っていますが、誰であるかは知りません。最終的な接続を行うのは出口ノードであるため、接続先のサーバーが、あなたのIPアドレスを知ることは決してありません。

 ## 注意事項

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and eva

 ### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and eva

 ### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and eva

 ### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ Ważne jest rozróżnienie między omijaniem cenzury a unikaniem wykrycia. To pi

 ### Tor Browser nie jest naj*bezpieczniejszą* przeglądarką

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Ponadto przeglądarka Tor Browser bazuje na wydaniach Firefoksa o wydłużonym wsparciu (Extended Support Release – ESR), które otrzymują poprawki tylko dla podatności sklasyfikowanych jako *krytyczne* i *wysokie* (nie dla *średnich* i *niskich*). Oznacza to, że atakujący mogą (na przykład):

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and eva

 ### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and eva

 ### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and eva

 ### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and eva

 ### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and eva

 ### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and eva

 ### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):

@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and eva

 ### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: Tor 是一個免費使用的去中心化網路，其讓用戶在使

 ![Tor logo](../assets/img/self-contained-networks/tor.svg){ align=right }

-[Tor </strong>](../alternative-networks.md#tor)是一個免費使用的去中心化網路，其讓用戶在使用網際網路之際盡可能地保護自己的隱私。 如果使用得當，該網路可以實現私人和匿名瀏覽和通訊。 很難阻止和追蹤 Tor 流量，因此它是一種有效的審查規避工具。
+[Tor </strong>](../alternative-networks.md#tor)是一個免費使用的去中心化網路，其讓用戶在使用網際網路之際盡可能地保護自己的隱私。如果使用得當，該網路可以實現私人和匿名瀏覽和通訊。很難阻止和追蹤 Tor 流量，因此它是一種有效的審查規避工具。

 [:material-movie-open-play-outline: Video: Why You Need Tor](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/03/02/why-you-need-tor ""){.md-button}

@@ -31,29 +31,29 @@ If you live in a free country, are accessing mundane content via Tor, aren't wor
 - 您的威脅模型將 ISP 作為對手
 - 您的威脅模型包括區域網路管理員，再來是您的 ISP 成為敵對方

-由於各種原因，我們已[一般建議](../basics/vpn-overview.md)絕大多數人使用值得信賴的VPN 提供商，以下有關透過 VPN 連接到Tor的建議可能適用。 <mark>在連接到 Tor 之前無需停用 VPN</mark>，某些線上資源讓您相信這一點。
+由於各種原因，我們已[一般建議](../basics/vpn-overview.md)絕大多數人使用值得信賴的VPN 提供商，以下有關透過 VPN 連接到Tor的建議可能適用。<mark>在連接到 Tor 之前無需停用 VPN</mark>，某些線上資源讓您相信這一點。

-直接連接到 Tor 將使您的連接在任何區域網路管理員或 ISP 面前暴露。 網路管理員過去已[偵測並將此類流量作關聯性](https://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/17/justice/massachusetts-harvard-hoax)，以識別網路上的特定 Tor 使用者並對其進行去匿名化。 另一方面，連接 VPN 並不會太可疑，因為日常消費者使用商業 VPN 服務來執行各種日常任務例如繞過地理限制，即使在網路限制嚴格的國家也是如此。
+直接連接到 Tor 將使您的連接在任何區域網路管理員或 ISP 面前暴露。網路管理員過去已[偵測並將此類流量作關聯性](https://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/17/justice/massachusetts-harvard-hoax)，以識別網路上的特定 Tor 使用者並對其進行去匿名化。另一方面，連接 VPN 並不會太可疑，因為日常消費者使用商業 VPN 服務來執行各種日常任務例如繞過地理限制，即使在網路限制嚴格的國家也是如此。

 所以應在**在**連接到 Tor 網路之前盡力隱藏自己的 IP 位址。 You can do this by simply connecting to a VPN (through a client installed on your computer) and then accessing [Tor](../tor.md) as normal (e.g., through Tor Browser). This creates a connection chain like so:

 - [x] 你 → VPN → Tor → 網際網路

-從 ISP 的角度來看，用戶似乎正在存取 VPN（提供的相關保護）。 從 VPN 角度，他們可以看到您正在連接到 Tor 網路，但看不到您訪問哪些網站。 從Tor 角度，可以正常連接，但萬一發生某種 Tor 網路洩露的情況（不太可能發生），只有 VPN 的IP 會被暴露，且所用的VPN 也會*額外*妥協才能使您去匿名化。
+從 ISP 的角度來看，用戶似乎正在存取 VPN（提供的相關保護）。從 VPN 角度，他們可以看到您正在連接到 Tor 網路，但看不到您訪問哪些網站。從Tor 角度，可以正常連接，但萬一發生某種 Tor 網路洩露的情況（不太可能發生），只有 VPN 的IP 會被暴露，且所用的VPN 也會*額外*妥協才能使您去匿名化。

 This is **not** censorship circumvention advice because if Tor is blocked entirely by your ISP, your VPN likely is as well. 相反，此建議旨在使流量與常見 VPN 用戶流量更好地融合，透過掩蓋從 ISP 連接到 Tor 的事實來提供某種程度的合理推諉。

 ---

-我們**強烈反對**以任何其他方式將 Tor 與 VPN 結合。 不要以下任何相似方式配置連接：
+我們**強烈反對**以任何其他方式將 Tor 與 VPN 結合。不要以下任何相似方式配置連接：

 - 你 → Tor → VPN → 網際網路
 - 你 → VPN → Tor → VPN → 網際網路
 - 任何其它設定

-Some VPN providers and other publications will occasionally recommend these **bad** configurations to evade Tor bans (i.e., exit nodes being blocked by websites) in some places. [通常](https://support.torproject.org/#about_change-paths)，Tor 會經常更改通過網路的迴路路徑。 當選擇永久*目的地* VPN（在*Tor 之後*連接到VPN 伺服器）時，就消除了此番優勢且嚴重損害匿名性。
+Some VPN providers and other publications will occasionally recommend these **bad** configurations to evade Tor bans (i.e., exit nodes being blocked by websites) in some places. [通常](https://support.torproject.org/#about_change-paths)，Tor 會經常更改通過網路的迴路路徑。當選擇永久*目的地* VPN（在*Tor 之後*連接到VPN 伺服器）時，就消除了此番優勢且嚴重損害匿名性。

-此類不良配置很難無意中完成，因為它通常涉及在 Tor 瀏覽器內設定自訂代理設置，或在 VPN 用戶端內設定自訂代理設定（透過 Tor 瀏覽器路由 VPN 流量）。 只要避免這些非預設配置，可能就沒問題。
+此類不良配置很難無意中完成，因為它通常涉及在 Tor 瀏覽器內設定自訂代理設置，或在 VPN 用戶端內設定自訂代理設定（透過 Tor 瀏覽器路由 VPN 流量）。只要避免這些非預設配置，可能就沒問題。

 ---

@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ Some VPN providers and other publications will occasionally recommend these **ba

 Tor Project [指出](https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/wikis/doc/TorPlusVPN#vpnssh-fingerprinting) *理論上*使用 VPN 對 ISP 隱藏 Tor 活動可能並非萬無一失。 VPNs have been found to be vulnerable to website traffic fingerprinting, where an adversary can still guess what website is being visited because all websites have specific traffic patterns.

-因此，相信 VPN 隱藏的加密 Tor 流量也可以透過類似的方法被偵測，這並非沒道理。 沒有這個主題的研究論文，我們仍然認為使用 VPN 的好處遠遠超過這些風險，但需要記住這點。
+因此，相信 VPN 隱藏的加密 Tor 流量也可以透過類似的方法被偵測，這並非沒道理。沒有這個主題的研究論文，我們仍然認為使用 VPN 的好處遠遠超過這些風險，但需要記住這點。

 如果仍認為可插拔傳輸（橋接器）可以針對網站流量指紋識別提供 VPN 無法提供的額外保護，那麼可以選擇結合使用橋接器**和** VPN。

@@ -76,25 +76,28 @@ The Tor network is not the perfect privacy protection tool in all cases and has

 ### Tor 不是免費的 VPN

-*Orbot* 行動應用，讓許多人誤將 Tor 描述為適用所有裝置流量的「免費 VPN」。 然而，與典型的 VPN 相比，這樣使用 Tor 會有某些危險。
+*Orbot* 行動應用，讓許多人誤將 Tor 描述為適用所有裝置流量的「免費 VPN」。然而，與典型的 VPN 相比，這樣使用 Tor 會有某些危險。

-不同於 Tor 出口節點，VPN 服務商通常不會*主動*[惡意](#caveats)。 Tor 出口節點可由任何人創建，它們是網路日誌記錄和修改的熱點。 2020 年許多 Tor 出口節點被記錄將 HTTPS 流量降級為 HTTP，以便[「劫持」加密貨幣交易](https://therecord.media/thousands-of-tor-exit-nodes-attacked-cryptocurrency-users-over-the-past-year)。 其他出口節點攻擊，例如用惡意軟體替換通過未加密通道的下載。 HTTPS 確實某程度緩解了這些威脅。
+不同於 Tor 出口節點，VPN 服務商通常不會*主動*[惡意](#caveats)。 Tor 出口節點可由任何人創建，它們是網路日誌記錄和修改的熱點。 2020 年許多 Tor 出口節點被記錄將 HTTPS 流量降級為 HTTP，以便[「劫持」加密貨幣交易](https://therecord.media/thousands-of-tor-exit-nodes-attacked-cryptocurrency-users-over-the-past-year)。其他出口節點攻擊，例如用惡意軟體替換通過未加密通道的下載。 HTTPS 確實某程度緩解了這些威脅。

-正如我們已提過的，Tor 在網路上很容易識別。 與實際的 VPN 服務不同，使用 Tor 會讓您成為可能試圖逃避當局的人。 In a perfect world, Tor would be seen by network administrators and authorities as a tool with many uses (like how VPNs are viewed), but in reality the perception of Tor is still far less legitimate than the perception of commercial VPNs. As such, using a real VPN provides you with plausible deniability, e.g. "I was just using it to watch Netflix," etc.
+正如我們已提過的，Tor 在網路上很容易識別。與實際的 VPN 服務不同，使用 Tor 會讓您成為可能試圖逃避當局的人。 In a perfect world, Tor would be seen by network administrators and authorities as a tool with many uses (like how VPNs are viewed), but in reality the perception of Tor is still far less legitimate than the perception of commercial VPNs. As such, using a real VPN provides you with plausible deniability, e.g. "I was just using it to watch Netflix," etc.

 ### Tor 的使用並非無法偵測

-**Even if you use bridges and pluggable transports,** the Tor Project doesn't provide any tools to hide the fact that you are using Tor from your ISP. 即使使用模糊的「可插拔傳輸」或非公共橋接器也不能隱藏正在使用私人通訊通道的事實。 最受歡迎的可插拔傳輸，例如obfs4（將流量混淆為「看起來沒什麼」）和meek（使用網域前置來偽裝流量）可以是[使用相當標準的流量分析技術檢測](https://hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/889-Tor-0day-Burning-Bridges.html)。 Snowflake 也有類似的問題， *在 Tor 連線建立之前*[很容易被偵測到](https://hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/944-Tor-0day-Snowflake.html)。
+**Even if you use bridges and pluggable transports,** the Tor Project doesn't provide any tools to hide the fact that you are using Tor from your ISP. 即使使用模糊的「可插拔傳輸」或非公共橋接器也不能隱藏正在使用私人通訊通道的事實。最受歡迎的可插拔傳輸，例如obfs4（將流量混淆為「看起來沒什麼」）和meek（使用網域前置來偽裝流量）可以是[使用相當標準的流量分析技術檢測](https://hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/889-Tor-0day-Burning-Bridges.html)。 Snowflake 也有類似的問題， *在 Tor 連線建立之前*[很容易被偵測到](https://hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/944-Tor-0day-Snowflake.html)。

 還有這三種以外的可插拔傳輸，但通常依賴透過隱蔽性來逃避偵測的安全性。 They aren't impossible to detect—they are just used by so few people that it's not worth the effort building detectors for them. 如果特別遭受監控，則不應依賴它們。

-了解繞過審查和逃避檢測兩者的差異很重要。 要實現前者更容易，因為網路審查員實際上存在許多現實限制，但這些技術並沒有掩蓋這個事實：監視網路使用的相關單位知道您——*的確在* — —使用Tor 。
+了解繞過審查和逃避檢測兩者的差異很重要。要實現前者更容易，因為網路審查員實際上存在許多現實限制，但這些技術並沒有掩蓋這個事實：監視網路使用的相關單位知道您——*的確在* — —使用Tor 。

 ### Tor 瀏覽器不是最*安全*的瀏覽器

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.

-此外，Tor 瀏覽器是 Firefox 的擴展支援版本，僅接收被視為*嚴重*和*高*漏洞的補丁>（不是*中*和*低*）。 這意味著攻擊者可以（例如）：
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+
+此外，Tor 瀏覽器是 Firefox 的擴展支援版本，僅接收被視為*嚴重*和*高*漏洞的補丁>（不是*中*和*低*）。這意味著攻擊者可以（例如）：

 1. 在 Firefox nightly 或 beta 版本中尋找新的嚴重/高危險漏洞，然後檢查它們可否利用在 Tor 瀏覽器（此漏洞週期可能會持續數週）。
 2. 將*多個*中/低漏洞連結在一起，直到它們獲得所需的存取等級（此漏洞週期可能會持續數月或更長時間）。
@@ -117,32 +120,32 @@ Those at risk of browser vulnerabilities should consider additional protections

 ### 入口節點

-入口節點，通常稱為守護節點，是 Tor 客戶端連接的第一個節點。 入口節點能夠看到您的 IP 位址，但無法看到您正在連接的內容。
+入口節點，通常稱為守護節點，是 Tor 客戶端連接的第一個節點。入口節點能夠看到您的 IP 位址，但無法看到您正在連接的內容。

 不像其它節點 Tor 客戶端會隨機地選取入口節點後持續使用二~三個月以防護某些外部攻擊 [^1]

 ### 中間節點

-中間節點是 Tor 客戶端連接的第二個節點。 它可以看到流量來自哪個節點（入口節點）以及它下一步要去哪個節點。 中間節點無法看到您的 IP 位址或您連接的網域。
+中間節點是 Tor 客戶端連接的第二個節點。它可以看到流量來自哪個節點（入口節點）以及它下一步要去哪個節點。中間節點無法看到您的 IP 位址或您連接的網域。

 對於每個新迴路，中間節點是隨機從所有可用的 Tor 節點中選出。

 ### 出口節點

-出口節點是您的 Web 流量離開 Tor 網路並轉發到所需目的地的點。 出口節點無法看到您的 IP 位址，但它知道將連接到哪個網站。
+出口節點是您的 Web 流量離開 Tor 網路並轉發到所需目的地的點。出口節點無法看到您的 IP 位址，但它知道將連接到哪個網站。

 出口節點將從所有可用的 Tor 節點中隨機選擇，並使用退出中繼標記。[^ 2]

 ## Onion 服務的路徑建立

-“Onion 服務” （通常也被稱為“洋蔥服務” ）是只能由 Tor 瀏覽器訪問的網站。 這些網站有一個長串隨機生成的域名，結尾為 `.onion`。
+“Onion 服務” （通常也被稱為“洋蔥服務” ）是只能由 Tor 瀏覽器訪問的網站。這些網站有一個長串隨機生成的域名，結尾為 `.onion`。

 在Tor中連接到 Onion服務的工作原理與連接到明網服務非常相似，但您的流量在到達目的地伺服器之前會通過 **6 個** 節點。 Just like before, however, only three of these nodes are contributing to *your* anonymity, the other three nodes protect *the Onion Service's* anonymity, hiding the website's true IP and location in the same manner that Tor Browser is hiding yours.

 <figure style="width:100%" markdown>
  ![Tor路徑顯示您的流量通過您的三個Tor節點加上三個額外的Tor節點隱藏網站的身份](../assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-hidden-service.svg#only-light)
  ![Tor路徑顯示您的流量被路由通過您的三個Tor節點加上三個額外的Tor節點隱藏網站的身份](../assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-hidden-service-dark.svg#only-dark)
-  <figcaption>Tor電路路徑與洋蔥服務。 <span class="pg-blue">藍色</span> 圍欄中的節點屬於您的瀏覽器，而 <span class="pg-red">紅色</span> 圍欄中的節點屬於伺服器，因此它們的身份對您是隱藏的。</figcaption>
+  <figcaption>Tor電路路徑與洋蔥服務。<span class="pg-blue">藍色</span> 圍欄中的節點屬於您的瀏覽器，而 <span class="pg-red">紅色</span> 圍欄中的節點屬於伺服器，因此它們的身份對您是隱藏的。</figcaption>
 </figure>

 ## 加密
@@ -151,13 +154,13 @@ Tor encrypts each packet (a block of transmitted data) three times with the keys

 一旦 Tor 構建了電路，數據傳輸將按照以下方式進行：

-1. Firstly: When the packet arrives at the entry node, the first layer of encryption is removed. 在這個加密封包中，入口節點將找到另一個具有中間節點位址的加密封包。 然後，入口節點將將封包轉發到中間節點。
+1. Firstly: When the packet arrives at the entry node, the first layer of encryption is removed. 在這個加密封包中，入口節點將找到另一個具有中間節點位址的加密封包。然後，入口節點將將封包轉發到中間節點。

 2. Secondly: When the middle node receives the packet from the entry node, it too will remove a layer of encryption with its key, and this time finds an encrypted packet with the exit node's address. 然後中間節點將數據包轉發到出口節點。

 3. Lastly: When the exit node receives its packet, it will remove the last layer of encryption with its key. 出口節點將看到目的地位址，並將封包轉發到該位址。

-下面是顯示此過程的圖表。 每個節點都會移除自己的加密層，當目的地伺服器傳回數據時，同樣過程會再反向發生。 例如，出口節點不知道你是誰，但它確實知道封包來自哪個節點，因此添加了自己的加密層並將其發送回來。
+下面是顯示此過程的圖表。每個節點都會移除自己的加密層，當目的地伺服器傳回數據時，同樣過程會再反向發生。例如，出口節點不知道你是誰，但它確實知道封包來自哪個節點，因此添加了自己的加密層並將其發送回來。

 <figure markdown>
  ![Tor 加密](../assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg#only-light)
@@ -165,15 +168,15 @@ Tor encrypts each packet (a block of transmitted data) three times with the keys
  <figcaption>通過 Tor 網路發送與接數資料</figcaption>
 </figure>

-Tor 允許我們連接到伺服器，而不讓任何一方知道完整路徑。 入口節點知道你是誰，但不知道你要去哪裡；中間節點不知道你是誰或你要去哪裡；出口節點知道你要去哪裡，但不知道你是誰。 由於出口節點負責了最終連線，目的地伺服器永遠不會知道您的 IP 位址。
+Tor 允許我們連接到伺服器，而不讓任何一方知道完整路徑。入口節點知道你是誰，但不知道你要去哪裡；中間節點不知道你是誰或你要去哪裡；出口節點知道你要去哪裡，但不知道你是誰。由於出口節點負責了最終連線，目的地伺服器永遠不會知道您的 IP 位址。

 ## 注意事項

 雖然 Tor 確實提供了強大的隱私保證，但必須意識到它並不完美：

 - Tor 不會保護您免於錯誤地暴露自己，例如分享了太多有關自身真實身份的資訊。
- Tor 出口節點可以**修改**通過的未加密流量。 這意味著未加密的流量（例如純 HTTP 流量）可能會被惡意出口節點變更。 **切勿**透過Tor 從未加密的`http://` 網站下載文件，確保瀏覽器設定為始終將HTTP 流量升級為HTTPS。
- Tor 出口節點還可以監控通過它們的流量。 包含個人識別資訊的未加密流量可能會讓您在該出口節點被消除匿名。 再次強調，建議僅透過 Tor 使用 HTTPS。
+- Tor 出口節點可以**修改**通過的未加密流量。這意味著未加密的流量（例如純 HTTP 流量）可能會被惡意出口節點變更。**切勿**透過Tor 從未加密的`http://` 網站下載文件，確保瀏覽器設定為始終將HTTP 流量升級為HTTPS。
+- Tor 出口節點還可以監控通過它們的流量。包含個人識別資訊的未加密流量可能會讓您在該出口節點被消除匿名。再次強調，建議僅透過 Tor 使用 HTTPS。
 - 能被動監視全球*所有*網路流量的強大對手（「全球被動對手」）**並不是** Tor 所能防禦的對手（即便將Tor [與VPN](#safely-connecting-to-tor) 也無法改變此一事實）。
 - 資金雄厚、能夠被動監視全球*大多數*網路流量的對手仍然有*機會*通過進階流量分析去匿名化Tor 用戶。

@@ -183,21 +186,21 @@ Tor 允許我們連接到伺服器，而不讓任何一方知道完整路徑。

 ### 橋接器提供的保護

-Tor 橋接器通常被認為是向 ISP 隱藏 Tor 使用情況的替代方法，而不是 VPN（我們建議盡可能使用後者 ）。 需要考慮的是，雖然橋接器可以提供足夠的審查規避，但這只是*暫時*的好處。 它們無法充分保護您，防止 ISP 透過歷史流量日誌分析發現您*過去*連接 Tor。
+Tor 橋接器通常被認為是向 ISP 隱藏 Tor 使用情況的替代方法，而不是 VPN（我們建議盡可能使用後者 ）。需要考慮的是，雖然橋接器可以提供足夠的審查規避，但這只是*暫時*的好處。它們無法充分保護您，防止 ISP 透過歷史流量日誌分析發現您*過去*連接 Tor。

-請考慮以下場景來理解：透過橋接器連接到 Tor，而 ISP 沒有偵測到它，因為他們沒有對流量進行複雜分析，因此一切都按預期進行。 現在，4個月過去，橋接器 IP 已經公開了。 This is a very common occurrence with bridges; they are discovered and blocked relatively frequently, just not immediately.
+請考慮以下場景來理解：透過橋接器連接到 Tor，而 ISP 沒有偵測到它，因為他們沒有對流量進行複雜分析，因此一切都按預期進行。現在，4個月過去，橋接器 IP 已經公開了。 This is a very common occurrence with bridges; they are discovered and blocked relatively frequently, just not immediately.

-您的 ISP 想要辨識出 4 個月前 Tor 用戶，透過其有限的元資料記錄，他們可以看到您連接到的 IP 位址其實是 Tor 橋接器。 您幾乎沒有其他藉口進行此類連接，因此 ISP 可以非常有信心地說您當時是 Tor 用戶。
+您的 ISP 想要辨識出 4 個月前 Tor 用戶，透過其有限的元資料記錄，他們可以看到您連接到的 IP 位址其實是 Tor 橋接器。您幾乎沒有其他藉口進行此類連接，因此 ISP 可以非常有信心地說您當時是 Tor 用戶。

-對比我們所推薦的場景，透過 VPN 連接到 Tor。 假設 4 個月後，您的 ISP 再次想要識別 4 個月前使用過 Tor 的任何人。 他們的日誌幾乎肯定可以識別 4 個月前的流量，他們可能僅能看到所連接的 VPN IP 位址。 大多數 ISP 僅長期保留元數據，而不是您要求的流量完整內容。 儲存全部流量資料需要大量空間，而幾乎所有威脅行為者都不具備這種能力。
+對比我們所推薦的場景，透過 VPN 連接到 Tor。假設 4 個月後，您的 ISP 再次想要識別 4 個月前使用過 Tor 的任何人。他們的日誌幾乎肯定可以識別 4 個月前的流量，他們可能僅能看到所連接的 VPN IP 位址。大多數 ISP 僅長期保留元數據，而不是您要求的流量完整內容。儲存全部流量資料需要大量空間，而幾乎所有威脅行為者都不具備這種能力。

 ISP 肯定不會截取所有資料包級資料與將其永久儲存，他們*無法利用深度資料包檢查等先進技術* 來確認通過VPN 連接的內容，因此你有合理的推諉能力。

 因此，橋接器在規避網路審查時提供了最大的好處，但*目前*它們還未能充分取代**所有</em >結合使用 VPN 和 Tor 的好處。 Again, this is not advice *against* using Tor bridges—you should just be aware of these limitations while making your decision. 在某些情況下，橋接器可能是*唯一*選項（例如，如果所有VPN 提供者都被封鎖），因此您仍然可以在這些情況下使用它們，但請記住此限制。</p>

-如果認為橋接器比 VPN 的加密隧道更能幫助防禦指紋識別或其他進階網路分析，那麼可以一直選擇將橋接器與 VPN 結合使用。 這樣，即使對手取得對 VPN 隧道某程度的可見性，您仍然受到可插拔傳輸混淆技術的保護。 如果決定走這條路，建議您連接到 VPN 後面的 obfs4 橋，以獲得最佳的指紋識別保護，而不是 meek 或 Snowflake。
+如果認為橋接器比 VPN 的加密隧道更能幫助防禦指紋識別或其他進階網路分析，那麼可以一直選擇將橋接器與 VPN 結合使用。這樣，即使對手取得對 VPN 隧道某程度的可見性，您仍然受到可插拔傳輸混淆技術的保護。如果決定走這條路，建議您連接到 VPN 後面的 obfs4 橋，以獲得最佳的指紋識別保護，而不是 meek 或 Snowflake。

-[可能](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/clarify-tors-weaknesses-with-respect-to-observability/3676/16)目前正在試驗中的 [WebTunnel](https://forum.torproject.org/t/tor-relays-announcement-webtunnel-a-new-pluggable-transport-for-bridges-now-available-for-deployment/8180) 可插拔傳輸可以減輕其中一些擔憂。 我們將繼續關注這項技術的發展。
+[可能](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/clarify-tors-weaknesses-with-respect-to-observability/3676/16)目前正在試驗中的 [WebTunnel](https://forum.torproject.org/t/tor-relays-announcement-webtunnel-a-new-pluggable-transport-for-bridges-now-available-for-deployment/8180) 可插拔傳輸可以減輕其中一些擔憂。我們將繼續關注這項技術的發展。

 ## 其他資源

@@ -205,6 +208,6 @@ ISP 肯定不會截取所有資料包級資料與將其永久儲存，他們*無
 - [How Tor Works - Computerphile](https://youtube.com/watch?v=QRYzre4bf7I) <small>(YouTube)</small>
 - [Tor Onion Services - Computerphile](https://youtube.com/watch?v=lVcbq_a5N9I) <small>(YouTube)</small>

-[^1]: 迴路中的第一個節點被稱為“入口守衛”或“守衛”。 它是一個快速和穩定的中繼站，作迴路中的第一個入口通常會維持 2~3個月，以防止已知的匿名破壞攻擊。 其餘的迴路則會依每次訪問網站而變化，這些中繼節點共同提供Tor  完整隱私保護。 了解更多關於守衛中繼的運作，請參考 [部落格文章](https://blog.torproject.org/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters) 和 [入口守衛論文paper](https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/single_guard.pdf)。 ([https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2](https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2))
+[^1]: 迴路中的第一個節點被稱為“入口守衛”或“守衛”。它是一個快速和穩定的中繼站，作迴路中的第一個入口通常會維持 2~3個月，以防止已知的匿名破壞攻擊。其餘的迴路則會依每次訪問網站而變化，這些中繼節點共同提供Tor  完整隱私保護。了解更多關於守衛中繼的運作，請參考 [部落格文章](https://blog.torproject.org/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters) 和 [入口守衛論文paper](https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/single_guard.pdf)。 ([https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2](https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2))

 [^2]: 中繼標記：迴路位置（例如， “Guard” ， “Exit” ， “BadExit” ） ，迴路屬性（例如， “Fast” ， “Stable” ）或角色（例如， “Authority” ， “HSDir” ）這些中繼節點的特殊（ dis- ）資格，是由目錄機構分配並在目錄協議規範中進一步定義。 ([https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html](https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html#relay-flag))
@@ -6,11 +6,11 @@ description: Tor 是一個免費使用的去中心化網路，其讓用戶在使

 ![Tor logo](../assets/img/self-contained-networks/tor.svg){ align=right }

-[Tor </strong>](../alternative-networks.md#tor)是一個免費使用的去中心化網路，其讓用戶在使用網際網路之際盡可能地保護自己的隱私。 如果使用得當，該網路可以實現私人和匿名瀏覽和通訊。 很難阻止和追蹤 Tor 流量，因此它是一種有效的審查規避工具。
+[Tor </strong>](../alternative-networks.md#tor)是一個免費使用的去中心化網路，其讓用戶在使用網際網路之際盡可能地保護自己的隱私。如果使用得當，該網路可以實現私人和匿名瀏覽和通訊。很難阻止和追蹤 Tor 流量，因此它是一種有效的審查規避工具。

 [:material-movie-open-play-outline:影片：Why You Need Tor](https://www.privacyguides.org/videos/2025/03/02/why-you-need-tor ""){.md-button}

-Tor 的工作原理是通過志工營運的伺服器來引導您的上網路由，而不是直接連線到想開啟的網站。 這樣可以混淆流量來源，所連接的伺服器都無法看到流量來去的完整路徑，也意味著即使您連接的伺服器無法破壞您的匿名性。
+Tor 的工作原理是通過志工營運的伺服器來引導您的上網路由，而不是直接連線到想開啟的網站。這樣可以混淆流量來源，所連接的伺服器都無法看到流量來去的完整路徑，也意味著即使您連接的伺服器無法破壞您的匿名性。

 [:octicons-home-16:](https://torproject.org){ .card-link title=首頁 }
 [:simple-torbrowser:](http://2gzyxa5ihm7nsggfxnu52rck2vv4rvmdlkiu3zzui5du4xyclen53wid.onion){ .card-link title="洋蔥服務" }
@@ -31,70 +31,73 @@ Tor 的工作原理是通過志工營運的伺服器來引導您的上網路由
 - 您的威脅模型將 ISP 作為對手
 - 您的威脅模型包括區域網路管理員，再來是您的 ISP 成為敵對方

-由於各種原因，我們已[一般建議](../basics/vpn-overview.md)絕大多數人使用值得信賴的VPN 提供商，以下有關透過 VPN 連接到Tor的建議可能適用。 <mark>在連接到 Tor 之前無需停用 VPN</mark>，某些線上資源讓您相信這一點。
+由於各種原因，我們已[一般建議](../basics/vpn-overview.md)絕大多數人使用值得信賴的VPN 提供商，以下有關透過 VPN 連接到Tor的建議可能適用。<mark>在連接到 Tor 之前無需停用 VPN</mark>，某些線上資源讓您相信這一點。

-直接連接到 Tor 將使您的連接在任何區域網路管理員或 ISP 面前暴露。 網路管理員過去已[偵測並將此類流量作關聯性](https://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/17/justice/massachusetts-harvard-hoax)，以識別網路上的特定 Tor 使用者並對其進行去匿名化。 另一方面，連接 VPN 並不會太可疑，因為日常消費者使用商業 VPN 服務來執行各種日常任務例如繞過地理限制，即使在網路限制嚴格的國家也是如此。
+直接連接到 Tor 將使您的連接在任何區域網路管理員或 ISP 面前暴露。網路管理員過去已[偵測並將此類流量作關聯性](https://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/17/justice/massachusetts-harvard-hoax)，以識別網路上的特定 Tor 使用者並對其進行去匿名化。另一方面，連接 VPN 並不會太可疑，因為日常消費者使用商業 VPN 服務來執行各種日常任務例如繞過地理限制，即使在網路限制嚴格的國家也是如此。

-所以應在**在**連接到 Tor 網路之前盡力隱藏自己的 IP 位址。 只需連線到 VPN（透過電腦上安裝的軟體），然後正常使用 [Tor](../tor.md)（例如透過 Tor 瀏覽器）即可做到這一點。 這將建立一個連線鏈，例如：
+所以應在**在**連接到 Tor 網路之前盡力隱藏自己的 IP 位址。只需連線到 VPN（透過電腦上安裝的軟體），然後正常使用 [Tor](../tor.md)（例如透過 Tor 瀏覽器）即可做到這一點。這將建立一個連線鏈，例如：

 - [x] 你 → VPN → Tor → 網際網路

-從 ISP 的角度來看，用戶似乎正在存取 VPN（提供的相關保護）。 從 VPN 角度，他們可以看到您正在連接到 Tor 網路，但看不到您訪問哪些網站。 從Tor 角度，可以正常連接，但萬一發生某種 Tor 網路洩露的情況（不太可能發生），只有 VPN 的IP 會被暴露，且所用的VPN 也會*額外*妥協才能使您去匿名化。
+從 ISP 的角度來看，用戶似乎正在存取 VPN（提供的相關保護）。從 VPN 角度，他們可以看到您正在連接到 Tor 網路，但看不到您訪問哪些網站。從Tor 角度，可以正常連接，但萬一發生某種 Tor 網路洩露的情況（不太可能發生），只有 VPN 的IP 會被暴露，且所用的VPN 也會*額外*妥協才能使您去匿名化。

-這**不是**規避審查的建議，如果 ISP 完全封鎖 Tor，VPN 可能也會遭到封鎖。 相反，此建議旨在使流量與常見 VPN 用戶流量更好地融合，透過掩蓋從 ISP 連接到 Tor 的事實來提供某種程度的合理推諉。
+這**不是**規避審查的建議，如果 ISP 完全封鎖 Tor，VPN 可能也會遭到封鎖。相反，此建議旨在使流量與常見 VPN 用戶流量更好地融合，透過掩蓋從 ISP 連接到 Tor 的事實來提供某種程度的合理推諉。

 ---

-我們**強烈反對**以任何其他方式將 Tor 與 VPN 結合。 不要以下任何相似方式配置連接：
+我們**強烈反對**以任何其他方式將 Tor 與 VPN 結合。不要以下任何相似方式配置連接：

 - 你 → Tor → VPN → 網際網路
 - 你 → VPN → Tor → VPN → 網際網路
 - 任何其它設定

-有些 VPN 業者和其他出版物會推薦這些**錯誤**設定方式，以逃避某些地區的 Tor 禁令（出口節點被網站阻止）。 [通常](https://support.torproject.org/#about_change-paths)，Tor 會經常更改通過網路的迴路路徑。 當選擇永久*目的地* VPN（在*Tor 之後*連接到VPN 伺服器）時，就消除了此番優勢且嚴重損害匿名性。
+有些 VPN 業者和其他出版物會推薦這些**錯誤**設定方式，以逃避某些地區的 Tor 禁令（出口節點被網站阻止）。[通常](https://support.torproject.org/#about_change-paths)，Tor 會經常更改通過網路的迴路路徑。當選擇永久*目的地* VPN（在*Tor 之後*連接到VPN 伺服器）時，就消除了此番優勢且嚴重損害匿名性。

-此類不良配置很難無意中完成，因為它通常涉及在 Tor 瀏覽器內設定自訂代理設置，或在 VPN 用戶端內設定自訂代理設定（透過 Tor 瀏覽器路由 VPN 流量）。 只要避免這些非預設配置，可能就沒問題。
+此類不良配置很難無意中完成，因為它通常涉及在 Tor 瀏覽器內設定自訂代理設置，或在 VPN 用戶端內設定自訂代理設定（透過 Tor 瀏覽器路由 VPN 流量）。只要避免這些非預設配置，可能就沒問題。

 ---

 <div class="admonition info" markdown>
 <p class="admonition-title">VPN/SSH 指紋</p>

-Tor Project [指出](https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/wikis/doc/TorPlusVPN#vpnssh-fingerprinting) *理論上*使用 VPN 對 ISP 隱藏 Tor 活動可能並非萬無一失。 人們發現 VPN 很容易受到網站流量指紋辨識的影響，攻擊者仍然可猜測正在造訪哪個網站，因為所有網站都有特定的流量模式。
+Tor Project [指出](https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/wikis/doc/TorPlusVPN#vpnssh-fingerprinting) *理論上*使用 VPN 對 ISP 隱藏 Tor 活動可能並非萬無一失。人們發現 VPN 很容易受到網站流量指紋辨識的影響，攻擊者仍然可猜測正在造訪哪個網站，因為所有網站都有特定的流量模式。

-因此，相信 VPN 隱藏的加密 Tor 流量也可以透過類似的方法被偵測，這並非沒道理。 沒有這個主題的研究論文，我們仍然認為使用 VPN 的好處遠遠超過這些風險，但需要記住這點。
+因此，相信 VPN 隱藏的加密 Tor 流量也可以透過類似的方法被偵測，這並非沒道理。沒有這個主題的研究論文，我們仍然認為使用 VPN 的好處遠遠超過這些風險，但需要記住這點。

 如果仍認為可插拔傳輸（橋接器）可以針對網站流量指紋識別提供 VPN 無法提供的額外保護，那麼可以選擇結合使用橋接器**和** VPN。

 </div>

-確定是否應該先使用 VPN 連接到 Tor 網路需要一些常識和了解當地政府和 ISP 與所連接內容的政策。 不過在大部分情況下，最好被視為連線到商業 VPN 網路，而不是直接連到 Tor 網路。 如果 VPN 業者在您的地區受到審查，那麼也可以考慮使用 Tor 可插拔傳輸（例如 Snowflake 或 meek 橋接）作為替代方案，但使用這些橋接器可能比標準 WireGuard/OpenVPN 隧道引起更多懷疑。
+確定是否應該先使用 VPN 連接到 Tor 網路需要一些常識和了解當地政府和 ISP 與所連接內容的政策。不過在大部分情況下，最好被視為連線到商業 VPN 網路，而不是直接連到 Tor 網路。如果 VPN 業者在您的地區受到審查，那麼也可以考慮使用 Tor 可插拔傳輸（例如 Snowflake 或 meek 橋接）作為替代方案，但使用這些橋接器可能比標準 WireGuard/OpenVPN 隧道引起更多懷疑。

 ## Tor 並非是

-Tor 網路並非在任何情況下都是完美的隱私保護工具，其存在一些應仔細考慮的缺點。 如果 Tor 適合您的需求，則這些缺點不應阻止 Tor 使用，但在決定哪種解決方案最適合時仍然需要考慮這些問題。
+Tor 網路並非在任何情況下都是完美的隱私保護工具，其存在一些應仔細考慮的缺點。如果 Tor 適合您的需求，則這些缺點不應阻止 Tor 使用，但在決定哪種解決方案最適合時仍然需要考慮這些問題。

 ### Tor 不是免費的 VPN

-*Orbot* 行動應用，讓許多人誤將 Tor 描述為適用所有裝置流量的「免費 VPN」。 然而，與典型的 VPN 相比，這樣使用 Tor 會有某些危險。
+*Orbot* 行動應用，讓許多人誤將 Tor 描述為適用所有裝置流量的「免費 VPN」。然而，與典型的 VPN 相比，這樣使用 Tor 會有某些危險。

-不同於 Tor 出口節點，VPN 服務商通常不會*主動*[惡意](#caveats)。 Tor 出口節點可由任何人創建，它們是網路日誌記錄和修改的熱點。 2020 年許多 Tor 出口節點被記錄將 HTTPS 流量降級為 HTTP，以便[「劫持」加密貨幣交易](https://therecord.media/thousands-of-tor-exit-nodes-attacked-cryptocurrency-users-over-the-past-year)。 其他出口節點攻擊，例如用惡意軟體替換通過未加密通道的下載。 HTTPS 確實某程度緩解了這些威脅。
+不同於 Tor 出口節點，VPN 服務商通常不會*主動*[惡意](#caveats)。 Tor 出口節點可由任何人創建，它們是網路日誌記錄和修改的熱點。 2020 年許多 Tor 出口節點被記錄將 HTTPS 流量降級為 HTTP，以便[「劫持」加密貨幣交易](https://therecord.media/thousands-of-tor-exit-nodes-attacked-cryptocurrency-users-over-the-past-year)。其他出口節點攻擊，例如用惡意軟體替換通過未加密通道的下載。 HTTPS 確實某程度緩解了這些威脅。

-正如我們已提過的，Tor 在網路上很容易識別。 與實際的 VPN 服務不同，使用 Tor 會讓您成為可能試圖逃避當局的人。 在完美世界裡，Tor 會被網路管理員和主管機關視為有許多用途的工具 (就像對 VPN 的看法一樣)，但在現實世界中，人們對 Tor 合法性的看法，仍遠不及對商業 VPN 的看法。 因此，使用真正的 VPN 可為您提供似是而非的免責聲明，例如：「我只是用來觀看 Netflix」等。
+正如我們已提過的，Tor 在網路上很容易識別。與實際的 VPN 服務不同，使用 Tor 會讓您成為可能試圖逃避當局的人。在完美世界裡，Tor 會被網路管理員和主管機關視為有許多用途的工具 (就像對 VPN 的看法一樣)，但在現實世界中，人們對 Tor 合法性的看法，仍遠不及對商業 VPN 的看法。因此，使用真正的 VPN 可為您提供似是而非的免責聲明，例如：「我只是用來觀看 Netflix」等。

 ### Tor 的使用並非無法偵測

-**即便使用橋接器和可插拔傳輸，**Tor 專案並未提供任何工具來對 ISP 隱藏正在使用 Tor 的事實。 即使使用模糊的「可插拔傳輸」或非公共橋接器也不能隱藏正在使用私人通訊通道的事實。 最受歡迎的可插拔傳輸，例如obfs4（將流量混淆為「看起來沒什麼」）和meek（使用網域前置來偽裝流量）可以是[使用相當標準的流量分析技術檢測](https://hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/889-Tor-0day-Burning-Bridges.html)。 Snowflake 也有類似的問題， *在 Tor 連線建立之前*[很容易被偵測到](https://hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/944-Tor-0day-Snowflake.html)。
+**即便使用橋接器和可插拔傳輸，**Tor 專案並未提供任何工具來對 ISP 隱藏正在使用 Tor 的事實。即使使用模糊的「可插拔傳輸」或非公共橋接器也不能隱藏正在使用私人通訊通道的事實。最受歡迎的可插拔傳輸，例如obfs4（將流量混淆為「看起來沒什麼」）和meek（使用網域前置來偽裝流量）可以是[使用相當標準的流量分析技術檢測](https://hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/889-Tor-0day-Burning-Bridges.html)。 Snowflake 也有類似的問題， *在 Tor 連線建立之前*[很容易被偵測到](https://hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/944-Tor-0day-Snowflake.html)。

-還有這三種以外的可插拔傳輸，但通常依賴透過隱蔽性來逃避偵測的安全性。 它們不是完全無法被偵測到，只是使用者太少，以至於不值得為它們建立偵測器。 如果特別遭受監控，則不應依賴它們。
+還有這三種以外的可插拔傳輸，但通常依賴透過隱蔽性來逃避偵測的安全性。它們不是完全無法被偵測到，只是使用者太少，以至於不值得為它們建立偵測器。如果特別遭受監控，則不應依賴它們。

-了解繞過審查和逃避檢測兩者的差異很重要。 要實現前者更容易，因為網路審查員實際上存在許多現實限制，但這些技術並沒有掩蓋這個事實：監視網路使用的相關單位知道您——*的確在* — —使用Tor 。
+了解繞過審查和逃避檢測兩者的差異很重要。要實現前者更容易，因為網路審查員實際上存在許多現實限制，但這些技術並沒有掩蓋這個事實：監視網路使用的相關單位知道您——*的確在* — —使用Tor 。

 ### Tor 瀏覽器不是最*安全*的瀏覽器

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.

-此外，Tor 瀏覽器是 Firefox 的擴展支援版本，僅接收被視為*嚴重*和*高*漏洞的補丁>（不是*中*和*低*）。 這意味著攻擊者可以（例如）：
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+
+此外，Tor 瀏覽器是 Firefox 的擴展支援版本，僅接收被視為*嚴重*和*高*漏洞的補丁>（不是*中*和*低*）。這意味著攻擊者可以（例如）：

 1. 在 Firefox nightly 或 beta 版本中尋找新的嚴重/高危險漏洞，然後檢查它們可否利用在 Tor 瀏覽器（此漏洞週期可能會持續數週）。
 2. 將*多個*中/低漏洞連結在一起，直到它們獲得所需的存取等級（此漏洞週期可能會持續數月或更長時間）。
@@ -117,32 +120,32 @@ Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring

 ### 入口節點

-入口節點，通常稱為守護節點，是 Tor 客戶端連接的第一個節點。 入口節點能夠看到您的 IP 位址，但無法看到您正在連接的內容。
+入口節點，通常稱為守護節點，是 Tor 客戶端連接的第一個節點。入口節點能夠看到您的 IP 位址，但無法看到您正在連接的內容。

 不像其它節點 Tor 客戶端會隨機地選取入口節點後持續使用二~三個月以防護某些外部攻擊 [^1]

 ### 中間節點

-中間節點是 Tor 客戶端連接的第二個節點。 它可以看到流量來自哪個節點（入口節點）以及它下一步要去哪個節點。 中間節點無法看到您的 IP 位址或您連接的網域。
+中間節點是 Tor 客戶端連接的第二個節點。它可以看到流量來自哪個節點（入口節點）以及它下一步要去哪個節點。中間節點無法看到您的 IP 位址或您連接的網域。

 對於每個新迴路，中間節點是隨機從所有可用的 Tor 節點中選出。

 ### 出口節點

-出口節點是您的 Web 流量離開 Tor 網路並轉發到所需目的地的點。 出口節點無法看到您的 IP 位址，但它知道將連接到哪個網站。
+出口節點是您的 Web 流量離開 Tor 網路並轉發到所需目的地的點。出口節點無法看到您的 IP 位址，但它知道將連接到哪個網站。

 出口節點將從所有可用的 Tor 節點中隨機選擇，並使用退出中繼標記。[^ 2]

 ## Onion 服務的路徑建立

-“Onion 服務” （通常也被稱為“洋蔥服務” ）是只能由 Tor 瀏覽器訪問的網站。 這些網站有一個長串隨機生成的域名，結尾為 `.onion`。
+“Onion 服務” （通常也被稱為“洋蔥服務” ）是只能由 Tor 瀏覽器訪問的網站。這些網站有一個長串隨機生成的域名，結尾為 `.onion`。

-在Tor中連接到 Onion服務的工作原理與連接到明網服務非常相似，但您的流量在到達目的地伺服器之前會通過 **6 個** 節點。 不過就如之前所言，其中只有三個節點會有助*您的*匿名性，而另外三個節點則是為了保護* Onion 服務*的匿名性，隱藏該網站的真正 IP 和位置，就如同 Tor 瀏覽器如何隱蔽您的 IP 一樣。
+在Tor中連接到 Onion服務的工作原理與連接到明網服務非常相似，但您的流量在到達目的地伺服器之前會通過 **6 個** 節點。不過就如之前所言，其中只有三個節點會有助*您的*匿名性，而另外三個節點則是為了保護* Onion 服務*的匿名性，隱藏該網站的真正 IP 和位置，就如同 Tor 瀏覽器如何隱蔽您的 IP 一樣。

 <figure style="width:100%" markdown>
  ![Tor路徑顯示您的流量通過您的三個Tor節點加上三個額外的Tor節點隱藏網站的身份](../assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-hidden-service.svg#only-light)
  ![Tor路徑顯示您的流量被路由通過您的三個Tor節點加上三個額外的Tor節點隱藏網站的身份](../assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-path-hidden-service-dark.svg#only-dark)
-  <figcaption>Tor電路路徑與洋蔥服務。 <span class="pg-blue">藍色</span> 圍欄中的節點屬於您的瀏覽器，而 <span class="pg-red">紅色</span> 圍欄中的節點屬於伺服器，因此它們的身份對您是隱藏的。</figcaption>
+  <figcaption>Tor電路路徑與洋蔥服務。<span class="pg-blue">藍色</span> 圍欄中的節點屬於您的瀏覽器，而 <span class="pg-red">紅色</span> 圍欄中的節點屬於伺服器，因此它們的身份對您是隱藏的。</figcaption>
 </figure>

 ## 加密
@@ -151,13 +154,13 @@ Tor 使用來自出口，中間和入口節點的金鑰對每個封包（傳輸

 一旦 Tor 構建了電路，數據傳輸將按照以下方式進行：

-1. 首先：當封包到達入口節點時，會移除第一層加密。 在這個加密封包中，入口節點將找到另一個具有中間節點位址的加密封包。 然後，入口節點將將封包轉發到中間節點。
+1. 首先：當封包到達入口節點時，會移除第一層加密。在這個加密封包中，入口節點將找到另一個具有中間節點位址的加密封包。然後，入口節點將將封包轉發到中間節點。

-2. 其次：當中間節點從入口節點收到封包時，也會利用其金鑰移除一層加密，找到具有出口節點位置的加密封包。 然後中間節點將數據包轉發到出口節點。
+2. 其次：當中間節點從入口節點收到封包時，也會利用其金鑰移除一層加密，找到具有出口節點位置的加密封包。然後中間節點將數據包轉發到出口節點。

-3. 最後：當初口節點收到封包時，將使用其金鑰移除最後一層加密。 出口節點將看到目的地位址，並將封包轉發到該位址。
+3. 最後：當初口節點收到封包時，將使用其金鑰移除最後一層加密。出口節點將看到目的地位址，並將封包轉發到該位址。

-下面是顯示此過程的圖表。 每個節點都會移除自己的加密層，當目的地伺服器傳回數據時，同樣過程會再反向發生。 例如，出口節點不知道你是誰，但它確實知道封包來自哪個節點，因此添加了自己的加密層並將其發送回來。
+下面是顯示此過程的圖表。每個節點都會移除自己的加密層，當目的地伺服器傳回數據時，同樣過程會再反向發生。例如，出口節點不知道你是誰，但它確實知道封包來自哪個節點，因此添加了自己的加密層並將其發送回來。

 <figure markdown>
  ![Tor 加密](../assets/img/how-tor-works/tor-encryption.svg#only-light)
@@ -165,15 +168,15 @@ Tor 使用來自出口，中間和入口節點的金鑰對每個封包（傳輸
  <figcaption>通過 Tor 網路發送與接數資料</figcaption>
 </figure>

-Tor 允許我們連接到伺服器，而不讓任何一方知道完整路徑。 入口節點知道你是誰，但不知道你要去哪裡；中間節點不知道你是誰或你要去哪裡；出口節點知道你要去哪裡，但不知道你是誰。 由於出口節點負責了最終連線，目的地伺服器永遠不會知道您的 IP 位址。
+Tor 允許我們連接到伺服器，而不讓任何一方知道完整路徑。入口節點知道你是誰，但不知道你要去哪裡；中間節點不知道你是誰或你要去哪裡；出口節點知道你要去哪裡，但不知道你是誰。由於出口節點負責了最終連線，目的地伺服器永遠不會知道您的 IP 位址。

 ## 注意事項

 雖然 Tor 確實提供了強大的隱私保證，但必須意識到它並不完美：

 - Tor 不會保護您免於錯誤地暴露自己，例如分享了太多有關自身真實身份的資訊。
- Tor 出口節點可以**修改**通過的未加密流量。 這意味著未加密的流量（例如純 HTTP 流量）可能會被惡意出口節點變更。 **切勿**透過Tor 從未加密的`http://` 網站下載文件，確保瀏覽器設定為始終將HTTP 流量升級為HTTPS。
- Tor 出口節點還可以監控通過它們的流量。 包含個人識別資訊的未加密流量可能會讓您在該出口節點被消除匿名。 再次強調，建議僅透過 Tor 使用 HTTPS。
+- Tor 出口節點可以**修改**通過的未加密流量。這意味著未加密的流量（例如純 HTTP 流量）可能會被惡意出口節點變更。**切勿**透過Tor 從未加密的`http://` 網站下載文件，確保瀏覽器設定為始終將HTTP 流量升級為HTTPS。
+- Tor 出口節點還可以監控通過它們的流量。包含個人識別資訊的未加密流量可能會讓您在該出口節點被消除匿名。再次強調，建議僅透過 Tor 使用 HTTPS。
 - 能被動監視全球*所有*網路流量的強大對手（「全球被動對手」）**並不是** Tor 所能防禦的對手（即便將Tor [與VPN](#safely-connecting-to-tor) 也無法改變此一事實）。
 - 資金雄厚、能夠被動監視全球*大多數*網路流量的對手仍然有*機會*通過進階流量分析去匿名化Tor 用戶。

@@ -183,21 +186,21 @@ Tor 允許我們連接到伺服器，而不讓任何一方知道完整路徑。

 ### 橋接器提供的保護

-Tor 橋接器通常被認為是向 ISP 隱藏 Tor 使用情況的替代方法，而不是 VPN（我們建議盡可能使用後者 ）。 需要考慮的是，雖然橋接器可以提供足夠的審查規避，但這只是*暫時*的好處。 它們無法充分保護您，防止 ISP 透過歷史流量日誌分析發現您*過去*連接 Tor。
+Tor 橋接器通常被認為是向 ISP 隱藏 Tor 使用情況的替代方法，而不是 VPN（我們建議盡可能使用後者 ）。需要考慮的是，雖然橋接器可以提供足夠的審查規避，但這只是*暫時*的好處。它們無法充分保護您，防止 ISP 透過歷史流量日誌分析發現您*過去*連接 Tor。

-請考慮以下場景來理解：透過橋接器連接到 Tor，而 ISP 沒有偵測到它，因為他們沒有對流量進行複雜分析，因此一切都按預期進行。 現在，4個月過去，橋接器 IP 已經公開了。 這種情況在橋接器中很常見，它們被發現並被封鎖的頻率相對較高，但不是立即發生。
+請考慮以下場景來理解：透過橋接器連接到 Tor，而 ISP 沒有偵測到它，因為他們沒有對流量進行複雜分析，因此一切都按預期進行。現在，4個月過去，橋接器 IP 已經公開了。這種情況在橋接器中很常見，它們被發現並被封鎖的頻率相對較高，但不是立即發生。

-您的 ISP 想要辨識出 4 個月前 Tor 用戶，透過其有限的元資料記錄，他們可以看到您連接到的 IP 位址其實是 Tor 橋接器。 您幾乎沒有其他藉口進行此類連接，因此 ISP 可以非常有信心地說您當時是 Tor 用戶。
+您的 ISP 想要辨識出 4 個月前 Tor 用戶，透過其有限的元資料記錄，他們可以看到您連接到的 IP 位址其實是 Tor 橋接器。您幾乎沒有其他藉口進行此類連接，因此 ISP 可以非常有信心地說您當時是 Tor 用戶。

-對比我們所推薦的場景，透過 VPN 連接到 Tor。 假設 4 個月後，您的 ISP 再次想要識別 4 個月前使用過 Tor 的任何人。 他們的日誌幾乎肯定可以識別 4 個月前的流量，他們可能僅能看到所連接的 VPN IP 位址。 大多數 ISP 僅長期保留元數據，而不是您要求的流量完整內容。 儲存全部流量資料需要大量空間，而幾乎所有威脅行為者都不具備這種能力。
+對比我們所推薦的場景，透過 VPN 連接到 Tor。假設 4 個月後，您的 ISP 再次想要識別 4 個月前使用過 Tor 的任何人。他們的日誌幾乎肯定可以識別 4 個月前的流量，他們可能僅能看到所連接的 VPN IP 位址。大多數 ISP 僅長期保留元數據，而不是您要求的流量完整內容。儲存全部流量資料需要大量空間，而幾乎所有威脅行為者都不具備這種能力。

 ISP 肯定不會截取所有資料包級資料與將其永久儲存，他們*無法利用深度資料包檢查等先進技術* 來確認通過VPN 連接的內容，因此你有合理的推諉能力。

-因此，橋接器在規避網路審查時提供了最大的好處，但*目前*它們還未能充分取代**所有</em >結合使用 VPN 和 Tor 的好處。 再次強調，這並不是*反對*使用 Tor 橋接器，但在做出決定前應先了解其限制。 在某些情況下，橋接器可能是*唯一*選項（例如，如果所有VPN 提供者都被封鎖），因此您仍然可以在這些情況下使用它們，但請記住此限制。</p>
+因此，橋接器在規避網路審查時提供了最大的好處，但*目前*它們還未能充分取代**所有</em >結合使用 VPN 和 Tor 的好處。再次強調，這並不是*反對*使用 Tor 橋接器，但在做出決定前應先了解其限制。在某些情況下，橋接器可能是*唯一*選項（例如，如果所有VPN 提供者都被封鎖），因此您仍然可以在這些情況下使用它們，但請記住此限制。</p>

-如果認為橋接器比 VPN 的加密隧道更能幫助防禦指紋識別或其他進階網路分析，那麼可以一直選擇將橋接器與 VPN 結合使用。 這樣，即使對手取得對 VPN 隧道某程度的可見性，您仍然受到可插拔傳輸混淆技術的保護。 如果決定走這條路，建議您連接到 VPN 後面的 obfs4 橋，以獲得最佳的指紋識別保護，而不是 meek 或 Snowflake。
+如果認為橋接器比 VPN 的加密隧道更能幫助防禦指紋識別或其他進階網路分析，那麼可以一直選擇將橋接器與 VPN 結合使用。這樣，即使對手取得對 VPN 隧道某程度的可見性，您仍然受到可插拔傳輸混淆技術的保護。如果決定走這條路，建議您連接到 VPN 後面的 obfs4 橋，以獲得最佳的指紋識別保護，而不是 meek 或 Snowflake。

-[可能](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/clarify-tors-weaknesses-with-respect-to-observability/3676/16)目前正在試驗中的 [WebTunnel](https://forum.torproject.org/t/tor-relays-announcement-webtunnel-a-new-pluggable-transport-for-bridges-now-available-for-deployment/8180) 可插拔傳輸可以減輕其中一些擔憂。 我們將繼續關注這項技術的發展。
+[可能](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/clarify-tors-weaknesses-with-respect-to-observability/3676/16)目前正在試驗中的 [WebTunnel](https://forum.torproject.org/t/tor-relays-announcement-webtunnel-a-new-pluggable-transport-for-bridges-now-available-for-deployment/8180) 可插拔傳輸可以減輕其中一些擔憂。我們將繼續關注這項技術的發展。

 ## 其他資源

@@ -205,6 +208,6 @@ ISP 肯定不會截取所有資料包級資料與將其永久儲存，他們*無
 - [How Tor Works - Computerphile](https://youtube.com/watch?v=QRYzre4bf7I) <small>(YouTube)</small>
 - [Tor Onion Services - Computerphile](https://youtube.com/watch?v=lVcbq_a5N9I) <small>(YouTube)</small>

-[^1]: 迴路中的第一個節點被稱為“入口守衛”或“守衛”。 它是一個快速和穩定的中繼站，作迴路中的第一個入口通常會維持 2~3個月，以防止已知的匿名破壞攻擊。 其餘的迴路則會依每次訪問網站而變化，這些中繼節點共同提供Tor  完整隱私保護。 了解更多關於守衛中繼的運作，請參考 [部落格文章](https://blog.torproject.org/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters) 和 [入口守衛論文paper](https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/single_guard.pdf)。 （[https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2](https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2)）
+[^1]: 迴路中的第一個節點被稱為“入口守衛”或“守衛”。它是一個快速和穩定的中繼站，作迴路中的第一個入口通常會維持 2~3個月，以防止已知的匿名破壞攻擊。其餘的迴路則會依每次訪問網站而變化，這些中繼節點共同提供Tor  完整隱私保護。了解更多關於守衛中繼的運作，請參考 [部落格文章](https://blog.torproject.org/improving-tors-anonymity-changing-guard-parameters) 和 [入口守衛論文paper](https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/single_guard.pdf)。 （[https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2](https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2)）

 [^2]: 中繼標記：迴路位置（例如， “Guard” ， “Exit” ， “BadExit” ） ，迴路屬性（例如， “Fast” ， “Stable” ）或角色（例如， “Authority” ， “HSDir” ）這些中繼節點的特殊（ dis- ）資格，是由目錄機構分配並在目錄協議規範中進一步定義。 （[https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html](https://metrics.torproject.org/glossary.html#relay-flag)）
@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ It is critical to understand the difference between bypassing censorship and eva

 ### Tor Browser is not the most *secure* browser

-Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring every user appears identical, creating a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across all installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.
+Anonymity can often be at odds with security. Tor achieves anonymity by ensuring more users appear [similar](https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/#:~:text=Tor%20Browser%20is,individual%20users%20effectively.):
+> Tor Browser is specifically engineered to minimize the uniqueness of each user's fingerprint across various metrics. While it is practically impossible to make all Tor Browser users identical, the goal is to reduce the number of distinguishable "buckets" for each metric. This approach makes it harder to track individual users effectively.
+
+ While this is effective at preserving anonymity, it also creates a digital monoculture where the same vulnerabilities exist across many installations. In cybersecurity, monocultures are generally considered a risk. Security through diversity provides natural segmentation by limiting the impact of an exploit to a smaller segment of users. While such diversity is structurally desirable for security, it inherently compromises user anonymity by making individuals trackable.

 Additionally, Tor Browser is based on Firefox's Extended Support Release builds, which only receives patches for vulnerabilities considered *Critical* and *High* (not *Medium* and *Low*). This means that attackers could (for example):