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@@ -251,11 +251,20 @@ In addition to locking apps behind biometrics, you can also hide apps so that th
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You can hide an app by long-pressing on it and selecting **Require Face ID/Touch ID** → **Hide and Require Face ID/Touch ID**. Note that pre-installed Apple apps, as well as the default web browser and email app, cannot be hidden. Hidden apps reside in a **Hidden** folder at the bottom of the App Library, which can be unlocked using biometrics. This folder appears in the App Library whether you hid any apps or not, which provides you a degree of plausible deniability.
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### 塗黑臉孔/資訊
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### Redacting Elements in Images
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If you need to hide information in a photo, you can use Apple's built-in editing tools to do so.
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If your device supports it, you can use the [Clean Up](https://support.apple.com/en-us/121429) feature to pixelate faces or remove objects from images.
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- Open the **Photos** app and tap the photo you have selected for redaction
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- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen)
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- Tap the button labeled **Clean Up**
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- Draw a circle around whatever you want to redact. Faces will be pixelated and it will attempt to delete anything else.
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Our warning [against blurring text](../data-redaction.md) also applies here, so we recommend to instead add a black shape with 100% opacity over it. In addition to redacting text, you can also black out any face or object using the **Photos** app.
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- Tap the image you have selected for redaction
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- Tap the :material-tune: (at the bottom of the screen) → markup symbol (top right) → plus icon at the bottom right
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- Select **Add Shape** and choose the square or circle
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- On the toolbar, tap the circle (left-most option) and choose black as the color for filling in the shape. You can also move the shape and increase its size as you see fit.
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@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ Signal 需要手機號碼才能註冊,但是您應該建立用戶名,以隱
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{ align=right }
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**Molly** 是 Android 的替代 Signal 用戶端,可讓您使用密碼加密本機資料庫、安全地刪除未使用的 RAM 資料、透過 Tor 路由連線;除此之外,還有 [許多](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features)。 它還改善了可用性,包括排程備份、自動鎖定,以及使用 Android 手機作為連結裝置,而非 Signal 帳戶的主要裝置。
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**Molly** 是 Android 的替代 Signal 用戶端,可讓您使用密碼加密本機資料庫、安全地刪除未使用的 RAM 資料、透過 Tor 路由連線;除此之外,還有 [許多](https://blog.privacyguides.org/2022/07/07/signal-configuration-and-hardening#privacy-and-security-features)。 It also has usability improvements including scheduled backups, automatic locking, [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org) support, and the ability to use your Android phone as a linked device instead of the primary device for a Signal account.
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[:octicons-home-16: 首頁](https://molly.im){ .md-button .md-button--primary }
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[:octicons-eye-16:](https://signal.org/legal/#privacy-policy){ .card-link title="隱私權政策" }
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@@ -100,13 +100,11 @@ Molly 每兩週更新一次,以包含 Signal 的最新功能和錯誤修正。
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請注意,您使用 Molly 是對多方的信任,因為您現在需要信任 Signal 團隊 *和* Molly 團隊 ,以提供安全且及時的更新。
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Molly 有一個稱為 **Molly-FOSS** 的版本,它移除了 Signal 和 Molly 所使用的 Google 服務等專有程式碼,但卻犧牲了一些功能,例如透過 Google Play 服務來推送通知(可節省電池用量)。
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There is a version of Molly called **Molly-FOSS** which removes proprietary code like the Google services used by both Signal and Molly, at the expense of some features like battery-saving push notifications via Google Play Services. You can regain push notifications without Google Play Services in either version of Molly with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) on another device to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)).
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There is also a version called [**Molly-UP**](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#unifiedpush) which is based on Molly-FOSS and adds support for push notifications with [UnifiedPush](https://unifiedpush.org), an open source alternative to the push notifications provided by Google Play Services, but it requires running a separate program called [Mollysocket](https://github.com/mollyim/mollysocket) to function. Mollysocket can either be self-hosted on a separate computer or server (VPS), or alternatively a public Mollysocket instance can be used ([step-by-step tutorial, in German](https://kuketz-blog.de/messenger-wechsel-von-signal-zu-molly-unifiedpush-mollysocket-ntfy)).
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All versions of Molly provide the same security improvements.
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三個版本的 Molly 都提供相同的安全性改進。
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Molly 和 Molly-FOSS 支援 [可重現構建](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds) ,這表示可以確認編譯後的 APK 與原始碼相符。
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Molly and Molly-FOSS support [reproducible builds](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/tree/main/reproducible-builds), meaning it's possible to confirm that the compiled APKs match the source code.
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### SimpleX Chat
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@@ -137,7 +135,7 @@ Molly 和 Molly-FOSS 支援 [可重現構建](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim
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SimpleX provides direct messaging, group chats, and E2EE calls secured with the [SimpleX Messaging Protocol](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md), which uses double ratchet encryption with quantum resistance. Additionally, SimpleX Chat provides metadata protection by using unidirectional ["simplex queues"](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/simplex-messaging.md#simplex-queue) to deliver messages.
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To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. 您的資料可以匯出或匯入另一部裝置,因為沒有中央伺服器備份這些資料。
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To participate in conversations on SimpleX Chat, you must scan a QR code or click an invite link. This allows you to verify a contact out-of-band, which protects against man-in-the-middle attacks by network providers. Your data can be exported and imported onto another device, as there are no central servers where this is backed up.
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You can find a full list of the privacy and security [features](https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplex-chat#privacy-and-security-technical-details-and-limitations) implemented in SimpleX Chat on the app's repository.
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@@ -169,13 +167,13 @@ SimpleX Chat was independently audited in [July 2024](https://simplex.chat/blog/
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</div>
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Briar 要新增聯絡人,必須先彼此互加。 您可以交換 `briar://` 鏈結或是掃瞄對方的QR碼。
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To add a contact on Briar, you must both add each other first. You can either exchange `briar://` links or scan a contact’s QR code if they are nearby.
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客戶端軟體被獨立 [稽核](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit),而匿名路由協議使用Tor 網路也接受了審計。
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The client software was independently [audited](https://briarproject.org/news/2017-beta-released-security-audit), and the anonymous routing protocol uses the Tor network which has also been audited.
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Briar有一個完整 [發布的規範](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec)。
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Briar has a fully [published specification](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec).
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Briar 利用[^1] Bramble[Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) 和[Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md)協定來支援前向保密。
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Briar supports forward secrecy[^1] by using the Bramble [Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BHP.md) and [Transport](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BTP.md) protocol.
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## 額外選項
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@@ -216,13 +214,13 @@ Briar 利用[^1] Bramble[Handshake](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-sp
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</div>
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個人資料圖片、反應和暱稱不會加密。
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Profile pictures, reactions, and nicknames are not encrypted.
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With the integration of [Element Call](https://element.io/blog/we-have-lift-off-element-x-call-and-server-suite-are-ready) into Element's web app, desktop apps, and its [rewritten mobile apps](https://element.io/blog/element-x-experience-the-future-of-element), group VoIP and video calls are E2EE by default.
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Matrix協議本身 [理論上支援前向保密](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1] ,但 [目前在 Element 中並不支援](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) ,因為這會破壞某些方面的使用者體驗,例如金鑰備份和共用訊息歷史記錄。
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The Matrix protocol itself [theoretically supports forward secrecy](https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md#partial-forward-secrecy)[^1], however this is [not currently supported in Element](https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/7101) due to it breaking some aspects of the user experience such as key backups and shared message history.
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其協議在 2016年獨立進行了 [審計](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) 。 Matrix 協議的規範可以在他們的 [文檔](https://spec.matrix.org/latest)中找到。 Matrix 使用的 [Olm 加密棘輪](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption) 是 Signal 的 [雙棘輪演算法](https 的實作: //signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet)。
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The protocol was independently [audited](https://matrix.org/blog/2016/11/21/matrixs-olm-end-to-end-encryption-security-assessment-released-and-implemented-cross-platform-on-riot-at-last) in 2016. The specification for the Matrix protocol can be found in their [documentation](https://spec.matrix.org/latest). The [Olm cryptographic ratchet](https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption) used by Matrix is an implementation of Signal’s [Double Ratchet algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet).
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### Session
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@@ -253,15 +251,15 @@ Session使用去中心化的 [Oxen Service Node Network](https://oxen.io/) 來
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</div>
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Session 允許E2EE在一對一聊天或封閉羣組中,最多可容納100名成員。 It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants.
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Session allows for E2EE in one-on-one chats or closed groups which allow for up to 100 members. It is also possible to [set up](https://docs.oxen.io/oxen-docs/products-built-on-oxen/session/guides/open-group-setup) or join open groups which can host thousands of members, but messages in these open groups are **not** end-to-end encrypted between participants.
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Session 先前基於 Signal 協議,並於 2020 年 12 月替換為自己的協議。 Session 協議[不](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information)支援前向保密。[^1]
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Session was previously based on Signal Protocol before replacing it with their own in December 2020. Session Protocol does [not](https://getsession.org/blog/session-protocol-technical-information) support forward secrecy.[^1]
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2020年3月Oxen 對 Session 進行獨立審計。 審計於 2021 年 4 月 [結束](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) :
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Oxen requested an independent audit for Session in March 2020. The audit [concluded](https://getsession.org/session-code-audit) in April 2021:
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> 此應用程式的整體安全層級良好,讓注重隱私的人也能使用。
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Session [白皮書](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) ,描述了應用程式和協議的技術。
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Session has a [whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf) describing the technical details of the app and protocol.
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## 標準
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